JRPA

Aguirre v. Pheng
18 SCRA 18

DOCTRINE: Although ordinarily, the owner would be entitled to any

accession thereto, the rule is different where the works or improvements or
the accession was made on the property by one who acted in good faith.

FACTS:
On June 28, 1954, Vicente Aldaba and Teresa V. Aldaba sold to Jesus
Aguirre a circular bolted steel tank with a capacity of 5,000 gallons, for the
sum of P900.00, for which the latter delivered to the sellers duly endorsed,
Security Bank & Trust Company check No. 281912, in the amount of
P900.00. Aguirre, however, failed to, take physical possession of the tank,
having been prevented from doing so by the municipal authorities of Los
Baños, Laguna (where the tank was located), in view of the claim of
ownership being made by the Bureau of Public Highways. It appears,
however, that Vicente and Teresa Aldaba again sold the same tank on
December 2, 1954 to Zosimo Gabriel, for P900.000. Gabriel, in turn, sold it
to the Leonora & Company on December 5, 1954, for P2,500.00. After
some alterations and improvements made on the tank, Leonora &
Company was able to sell the tank to National Shipyards & Steel
Corporation (Nassco), for P14,500.00.

ISSUE:
1. WON Aguirre can take ownership of the property -- YES
2. WON Aguirre should reimburse Leonora for the improvements -- YES

HELD:

It is clear that we have here a case of accession by specification: Leonora

and Company, as purchaser acting in good faith, spending P11,299.00 for
the reconditioning of the tank which is later adjudged to belong to petitioner
Aguirre. There is no showing that without the works made by Leonora &
Company, the tank in its original condition when Aguirre paid P900.00
therefor, would command the price of P14,500 which Nassco was willing to
pay. Although ordinarily, therefore, Aguirre, as owner of the tank, would be
entitled to any accession thereto, the rule is different where the works or
improvements or the accession was made on the property by one who
acted in good faith.2 And, it is not contended that the making of the
improvements and incurring of expenses amounting to P11,299.00 by
Leonora & Company was done in bad faith. Furthermore, to uphold
petitioner's contention that he is entitled to the sum of P14,500.00 the price
of the tank in its present condition, would be to allow him to enrich himself
at the expense of another. The lower courts, therefore, acted correctly in
ordering the reimbursement to Leonora & Company of the expenses it
made on the tank.

JPOT
Jagualing v. CA
194 SCRA 607

DOCTRINE: Article 465 of the Civil Code -an island belongs to the owner
of the land along the nearer margin as sole owner thereof; or more
accurately, because the island is longer than the property of private
respondents, they are deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that portion
which corresponds to the length of their property along the margin of the
river.

FACTS:
Janita Eduave inherited a parcel of land in Mindoro which was eroded and
became surmountably underwater because of typhoon Ineng. She has
actual possesion of land and tends to its needs. She pays taxes, even
though, declared land fails in comparison to its present size. Eduave also
made a loan with Luzon Surety in consideration of said land for P6000.
Eventually, because of the sudden increase in size of said lot from 4,937
sq.m. to16,452 sq.m. and the formation of an island, Janita permitted
petitioners to occupy land in support of her endeavors warding away
informal settlers as well as planting corn and bananas in duration of their
stay.

Afterwhich, petitioners assail that they would be the rightful owners of the
said land by admission stating that they acquired it through prescription.
ISSUE:
Between the one who has actual possession of an island that forms in a
non-navigable and non-floatable river and the owner of the land along the
margin nearest the island, who has the better right thereto?

HELD:
Although there is much controversy regarding the matter, the meat of it is
stated on the issue aforementioned. In this regard the Court of Appeals did
not err in applying Article 465 of the Civil Code. 12 Under this provision, the
island belongs to the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole
owner thereof; or more accurately, because the island is longer than the
property of private respondents, they are deemed ipso jure to be the
owners of that portion which corresponds to the length of their property
along the margin of the river.

What then, about the adverse possession established by petitioners? Are

their rights as such not going to be recognized? It is well-settled that lands
formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner. 13This preferential right is,
under Article 465, also granted the owners of the land located in the margin
nearest the formed island for the reason that they are in the best position to
cultivate and attend to the exploitation of the same. 14 In fact, no specific act
of possession over the accretion is required. 15 If, however, the riparian
owner fails to assert his claim thereof, the same may yield to the adverse
possession of third parties, as indeed even accretion to land titled under
the torrens system must itself still be registered.

WHEREFORE, We find no error committed by respondent court and DENY

the petition for lack of sufficient merit. The decision of respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED.
FZC
Rosales, et al. v. Castellfort, et al.
G.R. No. 157044

DOCTRINE: Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a
conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to
protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the
owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced
co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of
the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the
proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and
the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is
the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his
right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to
the ownership of the accessory thing.

FACTS:
Spouses-petitioners Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily Rosqueta-Rosales
(petitioners) are the registered owners of a parcel of land designated as Lot
17, Block 1 of Subdivision Plan situated in Los Baños, Laguna.

Petitioners discovered that a house was being constructed on their lot,

without their knowledge and consent, by respondent Miguel Castelltort
(Castelltort). It turned out that respondents Castelltort and his wife Judith
had purchased a lot, Lot 16 of the same Subdivision Plan, from respondent
Lina Lopez-Villegas (Lina) through her son-attorney-in-fact Rene Villegas
(Villegas) but that after a survey thereof by geodetic engineer Augusto
Rivera, he pointed to Lot 17 as the Lot 16 the Castelltorts purchased.
Negotiations for the settlement of the case thus began, with Villegas
offering a larger lot near petitioners’ lot in the same subdivision as a
replacement thereof. In the alternative, Villegas proposed to pay the
purchase price of petitioners’ lot with legal interest. Both proposals were,
however, rejected by petitioners whose counsel directed Castelltort to stop
the construction of and demolish his house and any other structure he may
have built thereon, and desist from entering the lot. Petitioners
subsequently filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages
with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and preliminary injunction
against spouses-respondents Miguel and Judith Castelltort before the RTC
of Calamba, Laguna

ISSUE:
Under Art 448, who has the right of option?

HELD:
Under Article 448, the landowner can choose between appropriating the
building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the
price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than that of the
structures, in which case the builder in good faith shall pay reasonable rent.
If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease, the
court must fix the terms thereof.The choice belongs to the owner of the
land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e.,that the
accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the
option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive.
The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead
the owner of the building to remove it from the land.The raison d’etre for
this provision has been enunciated thus: Where the builder, planter or
sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the
owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the
improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of
the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has
provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire
the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the
builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He
cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who is
authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because,
by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the
accessory thing.

G.R. No. 165907               July 27, 2009

SPS. DOMINADOR R. NARVAEZ and LILIA W. NARVAEZ, Petitioners, 
vs.
SPS. ROSE OGAS ALCISO and ANTONIO ALCISO, Respondents.

Larry A. Ogas (Ogas) owned a 1,329-square meter parcel of land situated

in Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet. The property was covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1068, and a portion was subject to a 30-
year lease agreement4 with Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. Ogas sold the
property to his daughter Rose O. Alciso (Alciso). TCT No. T-1068 was
cancelled and TCT No. T-124225 was issued in the name of Alciso.
On 25 August 1979, Alciso entered into a Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase,6 selling the property to Jaime Sansano (Sansano) for
₱10,000. Alciso later repurchased the property from Sansano and, on 28
March 1980, she entered into another Deed of Absolute Sale, 7 this time
selling the property to Celso S. Bate (Bate) for ₱50,000. The Deed stated
that:
The SELLER warrants that her title to and ownership of the property herein
conveyed are free from all liens and encumbrances except those as appear
on the face of the title, specifically, that lease over the said property in favor
of ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC., the rights over which as a lessor
the SELLER likewise hereby transfers in full to the buyer. 8
TCT No. T-12422 was cancelled and TCT No. T-16066 9 was issued in the
name of Bate. On 14 August 1981, Bate entered into a Deed of Sale of
Realty,10 selling the property to the spouses Dominador R. Narvaez and
Lilia W. Narvaez (Spouses Narvaez) for ₱80,000. TCT No. T-16066 was
cancelled and TCT No. T-16528 11 was issued in the name of the Spouses
Narvaez. In 1982, the Spouses Narvaez built a commercial building on the
property amounting to ₱300,000.
Alciso demanded that a stipulation be included in the 14 August 1981 Deed
of Sale of Realty allowing her to repurchase the property from the Spouses
Narvaez. In compliance with Alciso’s demand, the Deed stated that, "The
SELLER (Bate) carries over the manifested intent of the original SELLER of
the property (Alciso) to buy back the same at a price under such conditions
as the present BUYERS (Spouses Narvaez) may impose." The Spouses
Narvaez furnished Alciso with a copy of the Deed.
Alciso alleged that she informed the Spouses Narvaez that she wanted to
repurchase the property. The Spouses Narvaez demanded ₱300,000, but
Alciso was willing to pay only ₱150,000. Alciso and the Spouses Narvaez
failed to reach an agreement on the repurchase price.
In a Complaint12 dated 15 June 1984 and filed with the RTC, Alciso prayed
that (1) the 25 August 1979 Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase, the 28
March 1980 Deed of Absolute Sale, and the 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale
of Realty be annulled; (2) the Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel TCT
Nos. T-16066 and T-16528; (3) the Spouses Narvaez be ordered to
reconvey the property; and (4) Sansano, Bate, and the Spouses Narvaez
be ordered to pay damages, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.
Alciso claimed that the intention of the parties was to enter into a contract
of real estate mortgage and not a contract of sale with right of repurchase.
She stated that:
[C]ontrary to the clear intention and agreement of the parties, particularly
the plaintiffs herein, defendant JAIME SANSANO, taking advantage of the
good faith and financial predicament and difficulties of plaintiffs at the time,
caused to be prepared and induced with insidous [sic] words and
machinations, prevailed upon plaintiff to sign a contract denominated as
"Sale With Right to Repurchase", instead of Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
as was the clear intention and agreement of the parties.
xxxx
Defendant JAIME SANSANO caused to be prepared a contract
denominated as DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE, covering the lot in question,
contrary to the clear intention and understanding of plaintiff who was
inveigled into signing said contract under the impression that what she was
executing was a real estate mortgage.

The Issue
The Spouses Narvaez elevated the case to the Court. In their Petition
dated 15 December 2004, the Spouses Narvaez claimed that Alciso did not
communicate her acceptance of the favor contained in the stipulation pour
autrui; thus, she could not repurchase the property.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.
Article 1311, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code states the rule on
stipulations pour autrui:
If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he
may demand its fulfillment provided he communicated his acceptance to
the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit or interest of a
person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and
deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person.
In Limitless Potentials, Inc. v. Quilala,15 the Court laid down the requisites
of a stipulation pour autrui: (1) there is a stipulation in favor of a third
person; (2) the stipulation is a part, not the whole, of the contract; (3) the
contracting parties clearly and deliberately conferred a favor to the third
person — the favor is not an incidental benefit; (4) the favor is
unconditional and uncompensated; (5) the third person communicated his
or her acceptance of the favor before its revocation; and (6) the contracting
parties do not represent, or are not authorized by, the third party.
All the requisites are present in the instant case: (1) there is a stipulation in
favor of Alciso; (2) the stipulation is a part, not the whole, of the contract;
(3) Bate and the Spouses Narvaez clearly and deliberately conferred a
favor to Alciso; (4) the favor is unconditional and uncompensated; (5)
Alciso communicated her acceptance of the favor before its revocation —
she demanded that a stipulation be included in the 14 August 1981 Deed of
Sale of Realty allowing her to repurchase the property from the Spouses
Narvaez, and she informed the Spouses Narvaez that she wanted to
repurchase the property; and (6) Bate and the Spouses Narvaez did not
represent, and were not authorized by, Alciso.
The Spouses Narvaez claim that Alciso did not communicate her
acceptance of the favor. They state that:
A perusal of the provision of the Deed of Sale of Realty between Celso
Bate and the spouses Dominador R. Narvaez and Lilia W. Narvaez (Annex
"B") which clearly provides that "the third person" (Rose O. Alciso) must
have communicated her acceptance to the obligors (spouses Dominador R.
Narvaez and Lilia W. Narvaez) before its revocation was not complied with.
The acceptance is at best by mere inference.
xxxx
Petitioner Narvaez clearly stated that while the contract (Deed of Sale of
Realty, Annex "D") contained an [sic] stipulation in favor of a third person
(Rose O. Alciso), she did not demand its fulfillment and communicate her
acceptance to the obligors before its revocation.
xxxx
We maintain that the stipulation aforequoted is not a stipulation pour autrui.
Let the following be emphasized:
1.While the contract contained a stipulation in favor of a third person (Rose
Alciso) she did not demand its fulfillment and she never communicated her
acceptance to the obligors (Spouses Narvaez) before its revocation (Uy
Tam vs. Leonard, 30 Phil. 471; Coquia vs. Fieldmen’s Insurance Co., Inc.,
26 SCRA 178)
2.Granting arguendo that the stipulation is a pour autrui yet in the three
meetings Rose Alciso had with Mrs. Narvaez she never demanded
fulfillment of the alleged stipulation pour autrui and, what is worse, she did
not communicate her acceptance to the obligors before it is revoked. 16
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
should include only questions of law — questions of fact are not
reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the
law is on a certain set of facts, while a question of fact exists when the
doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. There is a question
of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of
reviewing the probative value of the evidence. Once the issue invites a
review of the evidence, the question is one of fact. 17
Whether Alciso communicated to the Spouses Narvaez her acceptance of
the favor contained in the stipulation pour autrui is a question of fact. It is
not reviewable.
The factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, are binding on the Court. 18In its 6 April 1998 Decision, the RTC
found that Alciso communicated to the Spouses Narvaez her acceptance of
the favor contained in the stipulation pour autrui. The RTC stated that:
Rose Alciso communicated her acceptance of such favorable
stipulation when she went to see defendant Lillia [sic] Narvaez in their
house. Under the foregoing circumstances, there is no question that
plaintiff Rose Alciso can maintain her instant action for the enforcement
and/or fulfillment of the aforestated stipulation in her favor to by [sic] back
the property in question.19 (Emphasis supplied)
The exceptions to the rule that the factual findings of the trial court are
binding on the Court are (1) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (2)
when the findings are grounded on speculations; (3) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual
findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went beyond the
issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the
parties; (7) when the Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9)
when the facts set forth by the petitioners are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence
on record.22 The Spouses Narvaez did not show that the instant case falls
under any of the exceptions.
In its 29 October 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals held that Bate and
the Spouses Narvaez entered into a sale with right of repurchase and that,
applying Article 448 of the Civil Code, Alciso could either appropriate the
commercial building after payment of the indemnity or oblige the Spouses
Narvaez to pay the price of the land, unless the price was considerably
more than that of the building. Article 448 states:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the
works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or the trees. In such case, he
shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall
agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court
shall fix the terms thereof.
The Court of Appeals stated that:
[T]he contract between defendants-appellants Bate and Narvaez spouses
is a contract of sale with a stipulation granting plaintiffs-appellees the right
to repurchase the property at a reasonable price. Being the absolute
owners of the property in question, defendants-appellants Narvaez
spouses have the undisputed right to use, enjoy and build thereon.
Having built the improvement on the land they own and registered in their
names, they are likened to builders in good faith and their rights over the
improvement shall be governed by Article 448 of the Civil Code which
provides:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the
works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or tress. In such case, he shall
pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall
agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court
shall fix the terms thereof.
Applying said Article, plaintiffs-appellees, after repurchasing the land, will
have the following options:
(1) to appropriate for themselves the building upon payment of its value to
defendants-appellants Narvaez spouses; OR
(2) to compel the defendants-appellants Narvaez spouses to buy the land,
unless the value of thereof [sic] be considerably more than that of the
building, in which case, said spouses may lease the land instead. The
parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the courts shall fix the terms thereof. 23
The Court disagrees.
The rule is that only errors specifically assigned and properly argued in the
appellant’s brief will be considered, except jurisdictional and clerical
errors.24 However, the Court is clothed with ample authority to review
matters not assigned as errors if their consideration is necessary in arriving
at a just decision.25
Article 448 is inapplicable in cases involving contracts of sale with right of
repurchase — it is inapplicable when the owner of the land is the builder,
sower, or planter. In Pecson v. Court of Appeals,26 the Court held that:
Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the
builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by
sale or donation. This Court said so in Coleongco v. Regalado:
Article 361 of the old Civil Code is not applicable in this case, for
Regalado constructed the house on his own land before he sold said
land to Coleongco. Article 361 applies only in cases where a person
constructs a building on the land of another in good or in bad faith, as
the case may be. It does not apply to a case where a person
constructs a building on his own land, for then there can be no
question as to good or bad faith on the part of the builder.
Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of the
works on his own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely
irrelevant. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 448 is inapplicable in the present case because the Spouses
Narvaez built the commercial building on the land that they own. Besides,
to compel them to buy the land, which they own, would be absurd.
As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, the terms of the 14 August
1981 Deed of Sale of Realty show that Bate and the Spouses Narvaez
entered into a sale with right of repurchase, where Bate transferred his right
of repurchase to Alciso. The Deed states that, "The SELLER (Bate) carries
over the manifested intent of the original SELLER of the property (Alciso) to
buy back the same at a price under such conditions as the present
BUYERS (Spouses Narvaez) may impose." Article 1601 of the Civil Code
states that, "Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor
reserves the right to repurchase the thing sold, with the obligation to
comply with the provisions of Article 1616 and other stipulations which may
have been agreed upon." In Gallar v. Husain,27 the Court held that "the right
of repurchase may be exercised only by the vendor in whom the right is
recognized by contract or by any person to whom the right may have been
transferred."
In a sale with right of repurchase, the applicable provisions are Articles
1606 and 1616 of the Civil Code, not Article 448. Articles 1606 and 1616
state:
Art. 1606. The right referred to in Article 1601, in the absence of an express
agreement, shall last four years from the date of the contract.lawph!l
Should there be an agreement, the period cannot exceed ten years.
However, the vendor may still exercise the right to repurchase within thirty
days from the time final judgment was rendered in a civil action on the
basis that the contract was a true sale with right to repurchase.
Art. 1616. The vendor cannot avail himself of the right of repurchase
without returning to the vendee the price of the sale, and in addition:
(1) The expenses of the contract, and any other legitimate payments made
by reason of the sale;
(2) The necessary and useful expenses made on the thing sold.
Under Article 1616, Alciso may exercise her right of redemption by paying
the Spouses Narvaez (1) the price of the sale, (2) the expenses of the
contract, (3) legitimate payments made by reason of the sale, and (4) the
necessary and useful expenses made on the thing sold. In the present
case, the cost of the building constitutes a useful expense. Useful
expenses include improvements which augment the value of the land. 28
Under the first paragraph of Article 1606, Alciso had four years from 14
August 1981 to repurchase the property since there was no express
agreement as to the period when the right can be exercised. Tender of
payment of the repurchase price is necessary in the exercise of the right of
redemption. Tender of payment is the seller’s manifestation of his or her
desire to repurchase the property with the offer of immediate
performance.29
Alciso’s intimation to the Spouses Narvaez that she wanted to repurchase
the property was insufficient. To have effectively exercised her right of
repurchase, Alciso should have tendered payment. In Lee v. Court of
Appeals,30the Court held that:
The rule that tender of payment of the repurchase price is necessary to
exercise the right of redemption finds support in civil law. Article 1616 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines x x x furnishes the guide, to wit: "The vendor
cannot avail himself of the right of repurchase without returning to the
vendee the price of the sale..."1avvphi1
Thus, in the case of Angao vs. Clavano, 17 Phil. 152, it was held that "it is
not sufficient for the vendor to intimate or to state to the vendee that the
former desires to redeem the thing sold, but he must immediately
thereupon offer to repay the price..." Likewise, in several other cases
decided by the Supreme Court (Fructo vs. Fuentes, 15 Phil. 362; Retes vs.
Suelto, 20 Phil. 394; Rosales vs. Reyes, et al., 25 Phil. 495; Canuto vs.
Mariano, 37 Phil. 840; De la Cruz, et al. vs. Resurreccion, et al., 98 Phil.
975; and other cases) where the right to repurchase was held to have been
properly exercised, there was a definite finding of tender of payment having
been made by the vendor. (Emphasis supplied)
Nevertheless, under the third paragraph of Article 1606, Alciso has 30 days
from the finality of this Decision to exercise her right of repurchase.
In Laserna v. Javier,31 the Court held that:
The new Civil Code in Article 1606, thereof gives the vendors a retro "the
right to repurchase within thirty days from the time final judgment was
rendered in a civil action, on the basis that the contract was a true sale with
the right to repurchase." This provision has been construed to mean that
"after the courts have decided by a final or executory judgment that the
contract was a pacto de retro and not a mortgage, the vendor (whose claim
as mortgagor had definitely been rejected) may still have the privilege of
repurchasing within 30 days." (Perez, et al. vs. Zulueta, 106 Phil., 264.)
The third paragraph of Article 1606 allows sellers, who considered the
transaction they entered into as mortgage, to repurchase the property
within 30 days from the time they are bound by the judgment finding the
transaction to be one of sale with right of repurchase.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the 29
October 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63757
with MODIFICATION. Respondent Rose O. Alciso may exercise her right
of redemption by paying the petitioners Spouses Dominador R. Narvaez
and Lilia W. Narvaez (1) the price of the sale, (2) the expenses of the
contract, (3) legitimate payments made by reason of the sale, and (4) the
necessary and useful expenses made on the subject property. The
Court DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court, Judicial Region 1, Branch 8, La
Trinidad, Benguet, to determine the amounts of the expenses of the
contract, the legitimate expenses made by reason of the sale, and the
necessary and useful expenses made on the subject property.
After such determination, respondent Rose O. Alciso shall have 30 days to
pay the amounts to petitioners Spouses Dominador R. Narvaez and Lilia
W. Narvaez.

LEONEN, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed by Spouses Pablo
M. Padilla, Jr. and Maria Luisa P. Padilla (Spouses Padilla) assailing the
Decision[2] dated March 19, 2012 of the Court of Appeals, which reversed
and set aside the Decision[3] dated July 15, 2009 of Branch 30 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City.

Spouses Padilla bought a parcel of land in Magsaysay Norte, Cabanatuan

City in 1984.[4] The lot was covered by Transfer Certificate Title No. T-45565
and had an area of 150 square meters.[5] It had an assessed value of more
than P20,000.00.[6]

Sometime in 1998, Spouses Padilla discovered that Leopoldo Malicsi, Lito

Casino, and Agrifino Guanes (Malicsi, et al.) constructed houses on their
lot.[7]

Spouses Padilla made repeated verbal and written demands for Malicsi, et
al. to vacate the premises and pay a monthly rental of P2,000.00, but
Malicsi, et al. refused to heed Spouses Padilla's demands.[8]

The matter was referred to the Katarungang Pambarangay for conciliation

proceedings and amicable settlement, but all efforts at conciliation failed. [9]

On August 6, 2007, Spouses Padilla filed a complaint for recovery of

possession against Malicsi, et al., along with three (3) others: Larry
Marcelo, Diosdado dela Cruz, and Rolando Pascua.[10]

In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, Malicsi, et al. alleged that

they believed in all honesty and good faith that the lot belonged to Toribia
Vda. De Mossessgeld (De Mossessgeld).[11] They claimed that they possessed
the land and built their houses on the lot only after receiving De
Mossessgeld's permission.[12]

Malicsi, et al. also claimed that they and De Mossessgeld agreed that she
would sell them the areas occupied by their houses, provided that pending
full payment, they would pay her P40.00 per month as rent.[13]

Between 1980 and 1983, Malicsi, et al. constructed their respective houses
on the lot in the belief that they would eventually own the areas they were
occupying. Malicsi and Casino even introduced improvements to the houses
they had built.[14]

Malicsi, et al. stated that they first found out about Spouses Padilla's claim
of ownership sometime in 2002.[15] They admitted receiving the demand
letters to vacate and pay rentals, but they refused to leave the premises.
[16]
 They denied that conciliation and mediation proceedings for amicable
settlement were ever conducted before the Katarungang Pambarangay.[17]

On September 3, 2008, a commission was created to determine the actual

valuation of the lot, including the improvements erected on it.[18] In its
Report, the Commission found that "the prevailing valuation of similar lots
in the vicinity ranges from P4,000 to P6,000 per [square] [meter] or an
average valuation of P5000.00/[square] [meter] as per information
gathered from several bank appraisers in the locality."[19]

The Commissioner's Report likewise quoted the appraised value of the

improvements on the lot, thus:

The Computation of the value of the property

The appraised value of the property subject of this case were [sic] computed
using the straightline method of depreciation with the formula:

Appraised Value = Market value x Remaining Life (building)/Life of the

building

A. The 2-level residential house occupied by Sps. Angelito & Carmelita

Casino:

    Appraised Value = P183,040 x 22/25 = P161,075.20

B. The 2-level residential building house occupied by Sps. Larry &

Candida Marcelo:

    Appraised Value = P199,280 x 22/25 = P175,366.40

C. The bungalow type residential building occupied by Mr. Diosdado

dela Cruz:

    Appraised Value = P68,000 x 22/25 = P59,840

D. The 2-level residential house occupied by Sps. Leopoldo Malicsi

     Appraised Value = P183,040 x 22/25 = P161,075.20

E. [T]he 2-level residential house occupied by Sps. Agri[f]ino & Aida

Guane[s]:

    Appraised Value = P208,000 x 22/25 = 183,040[20] (Emphasis in

the original)

On January 30, 2009, Spouses Padilla, exercising their option to sell the
land to Malicsi, et al. under Article 448 of the Civil Code in the amount of
P5,000.00 per square meter, filed a Motion and Manifestation with Offer to
Sell. In their Comment, Malicsi, et al. stated that by filing the Motion and
Manifestation, Spouses Padilla had, in effect, recognized Malicsi, et al.'s
standing as builders in good faith. They did not accept the offer to sell. [21]

In the Decision[22] dated July 15, 2009, the Regional Trial Court ruled that
Malicsi, et al. cannot be considered as builders in good faith.[23] The
dispositive of the Regional Trial Court Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of the [Spouses Padilla] and against [Malicsi, et al.] ordering the
latter:

1. To vacate the property covered by TCT-T-45565 of the Registry of

Deeds of Cabanatuan City and surrender possession of the same to
[Spouses Padilla];

2. To pay [Spouses Padilla] jointly and severally attorney's fees in the

amount of P20,000.00 and litigation expenses in the amount of
P10,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[24] (Emphasis in the original)

Malicsi, et al. appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 19, 2012, the
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court Decision.
[25]

The Court of Appeals gave credence to Malicsi, et al.'s allegation that they
relied on De Mossessgeld's representation that she owned the lot and gave
them permission to build their houses on it.[26] The dispositive of the Court
of Appeals Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered
as follows:

1. Declaring [respondents] as builders in good faith.

2. Ordering [respondents] to purchase the subject land unless the fair

market value of the land is considerably more than the fair market
value of the improvements thereon, in which case, a forced lease shall
be created between the parties on terms to be mutually agreed upon
by them or, in case of disagreement, to be fixed by the court.

3. Deleting the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses for lack
of basis.

SO ORDERED.[27] (Emphasis in the original)

Petitioners Spouses Pablo M. Padilla, Jr. and Maria Luisa P. Padilla
elevated the case to this Court. In their Petition for Review on Certiorari,
[28]
 they point out that respondents Leopoldo Malicsi, Lito Casino, and
Agrifino Guanes failed to substantiate their claim of being builders in good
faith:

While the law says, that presumption of good faith leans in favor of the
respondents and the burden rests upon the petitioners, yet from the
surroundings [sic] circumstances and the evidenced [sic] adduced before
the Regional Trial Court, it appears that respondents' declaration that
Toribia Vda. De Mossessgeld permitted them to stay in the premises in
question is not an evidence at all to prove them to be builders in good faith.
Mossessgeld was never presented as a witness nor there was an evidence
[sic], that Mossessgeld is the owner thereof. Is that sufficient evidence to
support the claim of the respondents that they are builders in good faith? [29]
In their Comment,[30] respondents maintain that the question of whether
they were builders in good faith has already been settled by the Court of
Appeals, and that there is no reason to deviate from its findings. [31]

The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether respondents are
builders in good faith.
 I

The Rules of Court categorically states that a review of appeals filed before
this Court is "not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion." [32]

The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law should be
raised in petitions filed under Rule 45[33] since factual questions are not the
proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court's function to
analyze or weigh all over again evidence that has already been considered in
the lower courts.[34]

However, these rules admit exceptions. Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.[35] lists

down 10 recognized exceptions:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,

surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) When: the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the
evidence on record.[36]
Pascual v. Burgos[37] instructs that parties must demonstrate by convincing
evidence that the case clearly falls under the exceptions to the rule:

Parties praying that this court review the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals must demonstrate and prove that the case clearly falls under the
exceptions to the rule. They have the burden of proving to this court that a
review of the factual findings is necessary. Mere assertion and claim that
the case falls under the exceptions do not suffice.[38] (Citation omitted)
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial
court's finding that respondents were not builders in good faith. However,
that the findings of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court are opposite
does not warrant this Court's automatic review of factual findings. [39] This
only presents a prima facie basis for recourse to this Court. Fernan v.
Court of Appeals[40] cautions that this Court's review of the factual findings
of the lower courts "must be invoked and applied only with great
circumspection and upon a clear showing that manifestly correct findings
have been unwarrantedly rejected or reversed."[41]

A careful study of the records leads this Court to conclude that this case
falls under the exceptions cited in Medina, particularly in that "the
inference made is manifestly mistaken";[42] and that "[t]he findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, necessitating a
review of the question of fact raised before this Court."[43]

II

A builder in good faith is a builder who was not aware of a defect or flaw in
his or her title when he or she introduced improvements on a lot that turns
out to be owned by another.[44]

Philippine National Bank v. De Jesus[45] explains that the essence of good

faith is an honest belief of the strength and validity of one's right while
being ignorant of another's superior claim at the same time:

Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and abstract quality with no

technical meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other
things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to
defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individual's personal
good faith is a concept of his own mind and, therefore, may not conclusively
be determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention,
and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the
holder upon inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the
validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of
intention to overreach another[.][46] (Citations omitted)
The following provisions of the Civil Code are relevant as regards the
remedies available to a landowner and builder in good faith:

Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown
or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the
works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall
pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate
the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon
the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the
terms thereof.

....

Article 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but

only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been
reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with
the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the
possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of
paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason
thereof.

....

Article 548. Expense for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded
to the possessor in good faith; but he may remove the ornaments with
which he has embellished the principal thing if it suffers no injury thereby,
and if his successors in the possession do not prefer to refund the amount
expended.
Article 448 of the1 Civil Code gives a builder in good faith the right to
compel the landowner to choose between two (2) options: (1) to appropriate
the building by paying the indemnity required by law; or (2) to sell the land
to the builder. Ignacio v. Hilario[47] summarized the respective rights of the
landowner and builder in good faith as follows:

The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another,
is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of
his building, under article [546]. The owner of the land, upon the other
hand, has the option, under article [448], either to pay for the building or to
sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as respondents
here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel
the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He
is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land,
the other party fails to pay for the same.[48]
Rosales v. Castelltort[49] has emphasized that the choice belongs to the
landowner, but the landowner must choose from the two (2) available
options:

The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the
principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not
the other way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant
to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise
either option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it
from the land.[50](Citations omitted)
Even before the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision, petitioners had
already intimated their willingness to sell the property to respondents at
P5,000.00 per square meter, which was the valuation recommended in the
Commissioner's Report. However, respondents refused to accept the offer
to sell.[51]

Respondents claim to be builders in good faith because they believed that

the lot was owned by De Mossessgeld.[52] Operating under this belief, they
entered into an agreement with her where she would sell them the areas
occupied by their respective houses, and pending full payment, they would
each pay her P40.00 monthly as rent.[53]

However, the Regional Trial Court was not swayed by respondents'

assertion of being builders in good faith since it found that the property was
titled, as early as 1963, to petitioner Pablo M. Padilla, Jr.'s mother, while
respondents only entered the lot sometime between 1980 and 1983, thus:

Undoubtedly, [Malicsi, et al.] can not claim that they were builders in good
faith because they relied on the promise of one Mrs. Toribia Vda. De
Mossessgeld who will sell the same to them but such allegations are
contrary to the actual circumstances obtaining in this case.

A check with the Office of the Register of Deeds will show that the property
in question had already been registered in the name of the mother of [Pablo
M. Padilla, Jr.] way back in 1963 under TCT-T-8303 such that [Malicsi, et
al.] "can not claim good faith when they constructed their residential
houses thereon in 1980 and 1983. Said Mrs. Mossessgeld had never been an
owner thereof to sell the same to them.

[Pablo M. Padilla, Jr.] is merely giving [Malicsi, et al.] some liberalities by

allowing them to buy the lots they occupy but the latter adamantly refused
as can be gleaned from their written Comment dated March 27, 2009. [54]
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the findings of the Regional
Trial Court and found respondents to be builders in good faith:

Here, [Malicsi, et al] constructed their houses on the subject parcel of land
on their mistaken belief that it was owned by Toribia vda de Mossessgeld. It
was the latter who gave them permission to build their houses thereat. This
situation is no different from that in Sarmiento vs. Agana where the
private respondents who constructed their residential house on a property
they had mistakenly believed to be owned by their mother but later turned
out to belong to another, were considered as builders in good faith.

This ruling was reiterated in the case of Spouses Ismael and Teresita
Macasaet vs. Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet[.]
[55]
 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals relied heavily on Sarmiento v. Agana[56] and Spouses

Macasaet v. Spouses Macasaet[57] to support its reversal of the Regional
Trial Court Decision. A judicious reading of the cited jurisprudence,
however, shows that the facts in this case greatly differ from those
in Sarmiento and Spouses Macasaet.

In Sarmiento, Spouses Ernesto and Rebecca Valentino were allowed by

Ernesto's mother to build a house on what she claimed was her lot. The
couple then built their house on the lot, but later found out that the lot was
titled to Mr. and Mrs. Jose C. Santos, who had sold the lot to Leonila
Sarmiento.[58] This Court ruled that Spouses Ernesto and Rebecca Valentino
were builders in good faith "in view of the peculiar circumstances under
which they had constructed the residential house."[59]

In Spouses Macasaet, a mother and father owned a parcel of land. They

told their son and daughter-in-law to build a house on a part of the lot so
that the family could live near each other and they could help out in the
family business. After some time, relations became strained between the
family members.[60] The parents filed an ejectment suit against their son
and daughter-in-law, saying that their stay was only based on tolerance.
[61]
 This Court deemed the son and daughter-in-law to be builders in good
faith as they introduced improvements on the lot with the knowledge and
consent of their parents, the registered lot owners.[62]

No such peculiar circumstance of close family relations can be found here.

Respondents say that they believed De Mossessgeld when she told them
that the lot belonged to her. Yet, the records show that De Mossessgeld was
a complete stranger to them. The lack of blood relation should have been
enough to put respondents on guard and convince them not to rely on her
claim of ownership. If respondents had looked into the ownership of the lot,
they would have easily discovered that it was titled to petitioner Pablo M.
Padilla, Jr.'s mother as early as 1963 under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-8303.

In Baltazar v. Court of Appeals,[63] the burden of proving the status of a

purchaser in good faith lies on the person asserting that status.[64] It is not
enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith; that is, that
everyone is presumed to act in good faith.[65]Respondents, as the party
asserting the status of builder in good faith, must substantiate their claim
through preponderance of evidence.[66]

To support their assertion, respondents claim that they were made to

believe by De Mossessgeld that she owned the lot. Respondents also claim
that they received permission from De Mossessgeld to build their houses on
the land, subject to their eventual purchase of the portions where their
houses stood. However, aside from this naked and self-serving testimony,
respondents failed to present any evidence to bolster their claim.

Respondents likewise failed to adduce evidence that they entered into an

agreement to sell with De Mossessgeld, or that they paid her P40.00 per
month as rent, pending full payment of the areas they were occupying.

Furthermore, respondents neither presented De Mossessgeld herself nor

submitted proof on which she might have based her purported ownership
of the lot. If De Mossessgeld proved elusive, respondents could then have
presented statements from disinterested third parties who could testify that
it was so well-known in the community that De Mossessgeld owned the lot
that they had to believe her claim of ownership. Respondents likewise failed
to prove that they exercised the necessary diligence required by their
situation. They did not examine the tax declarations or the title to the
property before they built on it.

Failing to substantiate their claim, respondents cannot be considered as

builders in good faith. Therefore, the benefits and rights provided under
Article 448 of the Civil Code do not apply.

As builders in bad faith, respondents have no right to recover their

expenses over the improvements they have introduced to petitioners' lot
under Article 449 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Article 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of
another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.
Under Article 452[67] of the Civil Code, a builder in bad faith is entitled to
recoup the necessary expenses incurred for the preservation of the land.
However, respondents neither alleged nor presented evidence to show that
they introduced improvements for the preservation of the land.

Therefore, petitioners as landowners became the owners[68] of the

improvements on the lot, including the residential buildings constructed by
respondents, if they chose to appropriate the accessions. However, they
could instead choose the demolition of the improvements at respondents'
expense or compel respondents to pay the price of the land under Article
450 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or
that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their
former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed;
or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the
sower the proper rent.
Whether petitioners choose to appropriate the improvements, compel their
demolition, or compel respondents to pay the price of the land, they are
entitled to damages under Article 451[69] of the Civil Code.

Heirs of Durano v. Spouses Uy[70] has summarized the remedies available

to the landowner:

The Civil Code provides:

Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another,
loses what is built, planted or sown without right of indemnity.

Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted
or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the
planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former
condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he
may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the
sower the proper rent.

Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled
to damages from the builder, planter or sower.
Based on, these provisions, the owner of the land has three alternative
rights: (1) to appropriate what has been built without any obligation to pay
indemnity therefor, or (2) to demand that the builder remove what he had
built, or (3) to compel the-builder to pay the value of the land. In any case,
the landowner is entitled to damages under Article 451, abovecited.
[71]
 (Citations omitted)
Considering that petitioners pray for the reinstatement of the Regional
Trial Court Decision ordering respondents to vacate the lot and surrender
its possession to them, petitioners are deemed to have chosen to
appropriate the improvements built on their lot without any obligation to
pay indemnity to respondents.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 19, 2012

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96141 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated July 15, 2009 of Branch 30 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City in Civil Case No. 5469 is REINSTATED IN
TOTO.

SO ORDERED.
Spouses Caezo v. Spouses Bautista (2010)
GR No. 170189

FACTS:
The lot of the Spouses Caezo and the lot of the Spouses Bautista are
adjacent and are covered by their respective TCTs. The Spouses Caezo
started the construction of a building on their lot, and then they discovered
that their lot was encroached upon by the structures built by the Spouses
Bautista without their knowledge and consent. 3 surveys confirmed the fact
of encroachment. Despite oral and written demands, the Spouses Bautista
failed and refused to remove the structures encroaching on the Spouses
Caezo’s lot. Attempts were made to settle their dispute with the barangay
lupon, but to no avail. The Spouses Caezo filed with the RTC a complaint
for the issuance of a writ of demolition.

The RTC declared the Spouses Bautista in default for failure to file an
Answer within the extended period granted by the court. The Spouses
Caezo were allowed to present their evidence ex parte before an appointed
commissioner. Thereafter, RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the
Spouses Caezo. It ruled that the Spouses Bautista are builders in bad
faith because they refused to remove the structures and respect the
boundaries as established by the various surveyors and there was no
settlement reached in the Barangay Lupon. Thus, the Spouses Caezo are
entitled to an issuance of a writ of demolition with damages.

The CA reversed the RTC’s decision and ruled that 1) the Spouses Caezo
should have filed a suit for recovery of possession and not for the
issuance of a writ of demolition because the last demand was made
more than one year before the filing of the complaint; 2) the Spouses
Caezo’s complaint should be dismissed because a writ of demolition
can only be granted as an effect of a final judgment or order; 3) The
complaint lacked sufficient basis to constitute a cause of action
because the Spouses Caezo failed to specify the assessed value of the
encroached portion of their property; 4) There should be a finding of
encroachment in the action for recovery of possession; and 5)
Encroachment was built in good faith.

ISSUE:
Whether the Spouses Caezo should have filed recovery of possession and
not writ of demolition

RULING:
NO. The present case is inaccurately captioned as an action for a Writ of
Demolition with Damages. It is actually an action to recover a parcel of land
or an accion reivindicatoria under Article 434 of the Civil Code, which
reads: In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant’s claim.

Accion reivindicatoria seeks the recovery of the ownership and

includes the jus utendi (right to use and enjoy) and the jus fruendi
(right to the fruits) brought in the proper regional trial court. Accion
reivindicatoria is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a
parcel of land and seeks the recover of its full possession.

In order that an action for recovery of title may prosper, it is indispensable

that the party who prosecutes it must fully prove, not only his ownership of
the thing claimed but also the identity of the property. However, if the
plaintiff has already proved his right of ownership over a tract of land, and
the defendant is occupying without right of any part of such tract, it is not
necessary for plaintiff to establish the precise location and extent of the
portions occupied by the defendant within the plaintiff’s property.

The Spouses Caezo were able to establish their ownership of the

encroached property. Aside from testimonial evidence, they were also able
to present documentary and object evidence, which consisted of
photographs, TCT, and a relocation survey plan.

The relocation survey plan showed that the Spouses Bautista’s property
encroached upon that of the Spouses Caezo and that the Spouses
Bautista’s property was encroached upon by another landowner. Elegio
Caezo testified that the defendants wanted him to get the portion Spouses
Bautista had encroached on from Lot 15 beause Lot 15 also encroached on
their lot.

The testimony and the relocation survey plan both show that the Spouses
Bautista were aware of the encroachment upon their lot by the owner of Lot
15 and thus they made a corresponding encroachment upon the lot of the
Spouses Caezo. This awareness of the two encroachments made the
spouses Bautista builders in bad faith. The Spouses Caezo are entitled to
the issuance of a writ of demolition in their favor and against the Spouses
Bautista, in accordance with Article 450 of the Civil Code, which reads: The
owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad
faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing
be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the
expense of the person who built, planted, or sowed; or he may compel the
builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper
rent.

Wherefore, petition is GRANTED. A writ of demolition of the encroaching

structures should be issued against and at the expense of the Spouses
Bautista upon the finality of this judgment.