Crimes Mala In Se and Mala Prohibita
@: pernicious effect  display = tend incite resistance to governmental functions
Intent to perpetrate the act, not intent to commit the crime (Mala Prohibita)
1. US v. Go Chico
Ponente: Moreland, J.
DOC: That a specific criminal intent, apart from the act of displaying, is not necessary to a
violation of said statute
Facts:
CFI adjudged the defendant guilty of the crime charged. He now moves to acquisit himself.
On or about August 4, 1908, appellant Go Chico displayed on the window of his store, No 89
Calle Rosario, medallions in form of small buttons, upon which were faces of Emilio
Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the late insurrection of the Philippine
Islands to designate the identify those in armed insurrection against the United States. Prior to
the day aforementioned, appellant had purchased the stock of goods in said store, of which the
medallions formed part, at a public sale made under authority of the sheriff of the city of
Manila. On August 4, appellant was arranging his stocks for the purpose of displaying them to
the public, placing them in his showcase and in one of the windows of his store.
The appellant  states “he was ignorant of the law” against the display of the medallions
and adds that “he had no corrupt intention”. He was charged in violation of Sec. 1 of Art.
1696 of the Philippine Commission.
Appellant moved to acquit himself on the grounds that:
(1) criminal intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt upon the part of the accused
before being convicted and;
(2) the prohibition of the law is directed against the use of the identical banners, devices, or
emblems actually used during the Philippine insurrection by those in armed rebellion against
the United States.
Issue:
WON intent must be an element of an act to be constituted as a crime punishable by special
laws. NO.
Held:
1. it is not necessary that intent be present for an act to be punishable by law.
2. The intention of the person who commits a crime is entirely immaterial
a. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would be substantially
worthless. It would be impossible of execution.
b. In many cases the act complained of is itself that which produces the
pernicious effect which the statute seeks to avoid.
c. In those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same
fore and result whether the intention of the person performing the act is
good or bad.
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3.
and insurrection against governmental authority just as effectively if made in the
best of good faith as if made with the most corrupt intent.
a. The display itself, without the intervention of any other factor, is the evil.
4. The accused did not consciously intend to commit a crime; but he did intend to
commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself-
intent and all.
5. The wording of the law is such that the intent and the act are inseparable. The act is
the crime. The accused intended to put the device in his window. Nothing more is
required to commit the crime.
As to 2nd contention  It is impossible that the Commission would prohibit the display of the
flags actually used in the insurrection and at the same time, permit exact duplicates thereof. In
totality, the description of the Commission refers not to a particular flag, but to any type of
flag. In construing a statute at question, there is no necessity required that clauses should be
taken from the position given them and placed in a different context to give the whole Act a
reasonable meaning.
NOTES:
Any person who shall expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view on his own
premises, or who shall expose, or cause to be exposed, to public view, either on his own
premises or elsewhere, any flag, banner, emblem, or device used during the late insurrection in
the Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the United
States, or any flag, banner, emblem, or device used or adopted at any time by the public
enemies of the United States in the Philippine Islands for the purposes of public disorder or of
rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands, or
any flag, banner, emblem, or device of the Katipunan Society, or which is commonly known
as such, shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred pesos nor more than five
thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not less 'than three months nor more than five years,
or by both , such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court:"
2. PPL V LACERNA
Facts:
Noriel and Marlon Lacerna were inside a taxi when the group of Police Officer
Carlito Valenzuela of the Western Police District signaled the taxi driver to park by the side of
the road in lieu of a police checkpoint. P03 Valenzuela asked permission to search the
vehicle. The officers went about searching the luggages in the vehicle. They found 18 blocks
wrapped in newspaper with a distinct smell of marijuana emanating from it. When the
package was opened, P03 Valenzuela saw dried marijuana leaves.
Noriel and Marlon  the bag was a “padala” of their uncle.
- Marlon = admitted that he was the one who gave the 18 bundle blocks of marijuana
to his cousin as the latter seated at rear of the taxi with it.
- Noriel = DENIED knowledge of the contents of the package.
Marlon was charged before the RTC for “giving away” marijuana to another. CONVICTED.
Noriel on the other hand was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The court noticed that
Noriel manifested “probinsyano” traits and was, thus, unlikely to have dealt in prohibited
drugs.
TC ruled  “giving away to another” (charged in the INGORMATION) is akin to
transporting prohibited drugs, a malum prohibitum established by the mere commission of said
act.
Marlon = APPEAL SC. objected on the RTC’s decision, also said that he was not
aware of the contents of the plastic bag given to him by his uncle. Lower court erred in not
giving credence to the assertion of accused-appellant that he had no knowledge that what were
inside the plastic bag given to him by his uncle were marijuana leaves.  since he literally
“Gave away” the bag to his co accused!!!
ISSUE: WON the acts of accused constitutes the “giving away” prohibited drugs penalized by
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended (The Dangerous Drugs Act).
HELD: NO, but nonetheless, he cannot escape the law because the very same deeds, which
appellant admits to have performed, show his culpability for “illegal possession of prohibited
drugs” penalized in Section 8 which is necessarily included in the crime charged in the
Information.
Criminal intent need not be proved in prosecution of acts mala prohibita
12. Criminal intent need not be proved in the prosecution of acts mala prohibita. The
prohibited act is so injurious to the public welfare that, regardless of the person's intent, it is
the crime itself.
enactments are based on the experience that repressive measures which depend for their
efficiency upon proof of the dealerÊs knowledge or of his intent are of little use and rarely
accomplish their purposes.
The evidence on record established beyond any doubt that appellant was in possession of the
plastic bag containing prohibited drugs without the requisite authority. The NBI forensic
chemist’s identification of the marijuana or Indian hemp was conclusive.
Intent to perpetrate the act, not intent to commit the crime necessary in prosecution of
acts prohibited by special laws
13. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person
may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but if he did intend to commit an act,
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and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself, then he can be held liable for the
malum prohibitum.
14. The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala
prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done. Thus in illegal possession
of prohibited drugs, the prosecution is thus not excused from proving that the act was done
“freely and consciously”, which is an essential element of the crime.
15. In this case, Marlon failed to overcome the presumption of his knowledge of the contents
of the package. He was thus held liable for illegal possession of prohibited drugs.
His bare, unpersuasive, feeble and uncorroborated disavowal·that the plastic bag was allegedly
given to him by his uncle without his knowing the contents·amounts to a denial which by itself
is insufficient to overcome this presumption.
NOTES:
o 2 versions:
o Prosec: police asked what contents of blue plastic bag, Noriel answered:
“vomit”.
 Skeptical re answer, police made a hole and smell of marijuana
emanated. Opened, saw dried marijuana leaves.
o Defense:
 Mobile search + taxi stopped + police asked if they can search
baggae, they agreed + econd bag was taken out from the taxi and
was checked at the back of the taxicab. The accused were not
able to see the checking when the policemen brought the plastic
bag at the back of the taxi.
 After checking, the policemen told them its Âpositive.
 The accused were (asked) to alight and go to the patrol car.
WPD HQ  police made them hold marijuana; took pics of
them; maltreated them to admit ownership
o
- Case at hand, probable cause is not evident –In the case at hand, however, probable
cause is not evident.
o First, the radio communication from General Nazareno, which the
arresting officers received and which they were implementing at that time,
concerned possible cases of robbery and holdups in their area.
o Second, Noriel’s suspicious reactions of hiding his face and slouching in
his seat when PO3 Valenzuela’s car passed alongside the taxicab might
have annoyed the latter, or any other law enforcer, and might have caused
him to suspect that something was miss.
 o These bare acts do not constitute probable cause to justify the search and
seizure of appellantÊs person and baggage.
o Furthermore, the marijuana was securely packed inside an airtight plastic
bag and no evidence, e.g., a distinctive marijuana odor, was offered by the
prosecution.
- Elements of Illegal Possession of Prohibited Drugs.·From the penal provision under
consideration and from the cases adjudicated, the elements of illegal possession of
prohibited drugs are as follows: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug.
3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. AUGUSTO MANZANO Y REYES,
respondent.
Information charging — ". . . AUGUSTO MANZANO Y REYES (with) Violation of Section
4, Article II in relation to Section 2 (i) Article I of Republic Act No. 6425 (DANGEROUS
DRUGS ACT) // SALE AND DELIVERY
The trial court, in convicting the accused-appellant, relied, in main, on the evidence for the
prosecution, thus —
The Drug Enforcement Section of the Western Police District received information that the
accused was engaged in the sale of marijuana. On 02 September 1983, a "trial-buy" operation
was conducted by the law enforcement operatives. At five o'clock that afternoon, a civilian
poseur-buyer was able to purchase from the accused dried flowering tops of suspected
marijuana with cigarette rolling papers contained in three (3) tea-bag sized plastic bags. Each
bag sold for P5.00. No arrest was made. At seven o'clock in the evening of the same day,
however, a "buy-bust" operation, this time conducted by police officers Sgt. Gaudencio
Quebuyen, Pat. Rolando Anza, Pat. Paterno Banawel, Pat. Bernabe Yokingco and Pat. Eriberto
Alameda, with Rebecca Avila Reyes, a civilian informer, as poseur buyer, was set into motion.
The team was so positioned as to have a clear view of the transaction that was to take place
near an electric post. Not long after, the poseur-buyer gave the accused four (4) P5.00 marked
bills. The accused left; moments later, he returned and handed over to the poseur-buyer four
(4) plastic bags, tea-bag size, containing marijuana flowering tops and pieces of white rolling
paper. Forthwith, the informer gave the pre-arranged signal (by scratching her head). The team
promptly moved in and arrested the accused.
Defense: ple of innocence; reasonable doubt
ISSUE: WON the prosecution has been able to prove the fact of sale and delivery of the
prohibited drug by the accused, a matter that must likewise be established beyond reasonable
doubt.
NO
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In any criminal prosecution, it would be imperative to establish the elements of the offense;
viz:
(1) That the accused had sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another; and
(2) That he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a dangerous drug.
@: PROSEC has missed putting on record any evidence to indicate that the tea bags,
supposedly delivered to the poseur-buyer, had been known by the accused to contain
dangerous drugs. Even the information itself has failed to allege this fact.
“deliver," the offense that is charged in the information, as ". . . a person's act of knowingly
passing a dangerous drug to another personally or otherwise, and by any means, with or
without consideration."
Given all the above, it is readily discernible that the testimony of the poseur-buyer would have
been most vital to the prosecution's case. Yet, the prosecution did not even bother to have her
take the witness stand.
NOTE:
o Discprencies during trial by prosec witnesses:
o As to number of tea bags = 3 v. 4
o As to number of people during buybust
o WON the companion of accused was present or not
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SY BING YOK a.k.a.
ARTURO MARCELO SY, accused-appellant. (Drugs; box; unlawfully
selling/delivering/transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu)
FACTS:
Springed from a buy bust against Puongbarit who agreed to assist the police in the entrapment
of his supplier/co-ccused, Willie.
Entrapment operation; Acting upon an information given by a certain Armando Pulongbarit,
NARCOM Agents waited for the arrival of accused-appellant inside the house of said
informant. Accused-appellant came at around 5:30 P.M. carrying a carton. As he entered the
house, accused-appellant was accosted and the carton he was carrying, seized.
The box yielded what turned out to be methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). Accused was
subsequently charged for violation of Sec. 15, Art. III of R.A. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1992, as amended). TCguilty. His motion for New Trial having been denied, accused-
appellant filed an appeal.
DEFENSE  NOT KNOW BOX CONTAINTED SHABU! He was only asked to deliver the
box to Pulongbarit.
HELD:
a. Appellant's bare denials cannot prevail over the positive identi cation by the
prosecution witnesses of appellant as the person who was in possession of and who
delivered, methamphetamine hydrochloride.
b. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the
crime charged is malum prohibitum—
c. The accused’s contention that he did not know that the box he was carrying
contained shabu cannot constitute a valid defense.·
a. The crime under consideration is mala prohibita. It is settled that lack of
criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the
crime charged is malum prohibitum.
b. Hence, appellant’s contention that he did not know that the box he was
carrying contained “shabu” cannot constitute a valid defense. Mere
possession and/or delivery of a regulated drug, without legal authority, is
punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.
d. Presumption of Regularity; The Supreme Court has consistently held that in the
absence of proof to the contrary, law enforcers are presumed to have regularly
performed their duty.·
a. Chief Inspector, team leader of the NARCOM team, fully corroborated
SPO3 Timbol’s testimony.
b. It may be noted that there is nothing on record to indicate that the above-
named witnesses harbored ill motives against appellant.
c. In several drug cases, this Court has consistently held that in the absence
of proof to the contrary, law enforcers are presumed to have regularly
performed their duty.
NOTEs:
o The defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the
courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and
standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
o Appellant would have this Court believe that he was merely asked to
deliver the box to Pulongbarit and that he was not aware of the contents
thereof.
o It is to be expected that the testimony of witnesses regarding the same incident may
be inconsistent (what appellant wore) in some aspects because different persons
may have different impressions or recollection of the same incident
o Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and
relevant details concerning the principal occurrence.
Adm Case No. 308 [ADMIN CASE; rooted from acquitting accused for smuggling
foreign currency)
Padilla (Comm of Customs) v. Dizon (RTC Judge)
Facts:
The case is an administrative complaint filed by the Commission of CustomsPadilla, against
respondent Judge Dizon, RTC Judge for rendering a manifestly erroneous decision due to
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gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law in “People of the Philippines v. Lo Chi
Fai” for acquitting said accused for the offense charged which was smuggling foreign
currency out of the country and releasing the amount of $3,000.00 to the accused under
Central Bank Circular No. 960 (CBCN 960).
The facts of the case are as follows:
o Lo Chi Fai, a Hongkong businessman, was apprehended by the Customs guard at
MIA for attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange out of the
country.
o He had with him 380 pieces of foreign exchange instruments, of 12 currencies all in
all, amounting to $355,347,54, all of which without any authority as provided by
law.
o An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai in violation of Sec. 6 of CBCN 960 of
the Central Bank which should subsequently be penalized by Sec. 1 of PD. 1883.
o Lo Chi Fai defends that he has been in the Philippines 9-10 times and had invested
4-5 million Hongkong dollars in the garment industry and came to the Philippines
to likewise invest and play casino.
o He had a group of business associates, 5 of them, who decided to invest in the
business with him and it is these associates that prompted him to fly to the
Philippines to bring out all the money they invested out the Philippines in fear of the
“revolution” rising in Manila.
Judge  ACQUITTED Lo Chi Fai. stating that he had no criminal intention to break the law,
specifically CBCN 960. Padilla then filed a complaint against Baltazar for rendering such
erroneous decision.
JUDGE; DEFENSE  if there are mistakes or errors in the questioned decision, they are
committed in good faith.
Issue:
WON the respondent judge has shown gross incompetence and gross negligence of the law in
holding that to convict the accused for violation of CBCN 960, the accused should have
criminal intent to violate the law.
Held:
YES. The court finds the respondent guilty of gross incompetence and gross negligence of the
law in holding that to convict the accused for violation of CBCN 960, the prosecution must
establish that the accused had criminal intent to violate the law.
o The respondent ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens
rea) is NOT essential in offenses punished by special laws, which are mala
prohibita.
 o The accused at the time of his apprehension at the Manila International Airport had
in his possession the amount of US$355,349.57 in assorted foreign currencies and
foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces), without any specific authority from the
Central Bank as required by law.
o At the time of his apprehension, he was able to exhibit only two foreign currency
declarations in his possession. These were old declarations made by him on the
occasion of his previous trips to the Philippines.
o The judge did NOT take into consideration the admission of the accused
that he was a “carrier” of foreign currency for other people but chose to
give credence to the fantastic tale of the accused that he and his alleged
business associate were using the money for a particular investment.
o It did not matter to the respondent that the foreign currency and foreign currency
instruments found in the possession of the accused when he was apprehended at the
airport·380 pieces in all·and the amounts of such foreign exchange did not
correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by the accused at the trial.
o It did not matter to the respondent that the accused by his own story admitted, in
effect, that he was a "carrier" of foreign currency for other people.
o The respondent closed his eyes to the fact that the very substantial amounts of
foreign exchange found in the possession of the accused at the time of his
apprehension consisted of personal checks of other people, as well as cash in
various currency denominations (12 kinds of currency in all), which clearly belied
the claim of the accused that they were part of the funds which he and his supposed
associates had brought to and kept in the Philippines for the purpose of investing in
some business ventures.
o ignored the fact that most of the CB Currency declarations presented by the defense
at the trial were declarations belonging to other peeple which could not be utilized
by the accused to justify his having the foreign exchange in his possession.
o Similarly, the respondent not only allow the accused to go scot free but he also
directed the release of at least the amount of $3,000.00, allowed, according to him
under CBCN 960, although no provision in the said statute provides for such.
JUDGE = DISMISSED FROM SERVICE!!
MATALAM V PEOPLE
Matalam, petitioner vs. People, respondent
G.R. No. 221849-50, April 5, 2016
Facts:
 The Sandiganbayan found petitioner Datu Guimid P. Matalam (Matalam) guilty of
non-remittance of the employer's share in Government Insurance System and Home
Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG Fund) premiums.
 Accused: (1) Datu Guimid Matallam – High ranking public officer; Regional
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform-Autnomous Region for Muslim
Mindanao (DAR-ARMM) (2) Ansarry Lawi; and (3) Naimah B. Unte – Both low-
ranking officials cashier and accountant.
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 Governmental Roles of the accused/appellants: Collection and remittance of
accounts to GSIS and PAG-IBIG fund.
 Appellants were subjected to (2) two criminal cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 26707
(Violation of Sec. 52 (g), Republic Act No. 8291); and (2) Criminal Case No. 26708
(Violation of Sec. 1, Rule XIII of the Implementing Rules & Regulations of
Republic Act No. 7742)
 The Prosecution presented both documentary and testimonial evidence for both
criminal cases. The Prosecution presented 5 witnesses:
o accused were the officers involved in the collection and remittance of
accounts to the GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund and, thus, were accountable for
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the non-remittance. Matalam and his co-accused failed and/or refused to
remit the
required contributions without justifiable cause despite repeated demands
 He claimed that his co-accused Lawi and Unte were responsible for remitting the
GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund government contributions.
SB:  found that with the Notice of Underpayment were six (6) Statements of Account of
Compulsory Contributions Due and Payable all addressed to Matalam.  that the Department
of Budget and Management (DBM) released the funds to the DAR- ARMM through the
corresponding Advice of Notice of Cash Allocation issued
SB held: The act constituting the offense is the failure, refusal or delay in the payment,
turnover, remittance or delivery of such accounts to the GSIS within thirty (30) days from the
time that the same shall have been due and demandable. (cashier and accountants fell on the
second category)
And in another case, under the pertinent rules and law, it is the employer who is penalized for
the non-remittance to Pag-IBIG Fund
Hence, this case.
Matalam argues that even if the offenses he allegedly committed are mala prohibita, his guilt
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must still be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The pieces of evidence presented in this case
40
create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Thus, a reevaluation of the evidence is required.
ISSUE: WON petitioner Matalam is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of non-remittance
of the employer's share of the GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund premiums.
We deny the Petition.
Republic Act (RA) No. 8291, Section 52(g) clearly provides that heads of agencies or
branches of government shall be criminally liable for the failure, refusal, or delay in the
payment, turnover, and remittance or delivery of such accounts to the GSIS.
 Similarly, the refusal or failure without lawful cause or with fraudulent intent to comply with
the provisions of RA No. 7742, with respect to the collection and remittance of employee
savings as well as the required employer contributions to the Pag-IBIG Fund, subjects the
employer to criminal liabilities -- Indeed, non-remittance of GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund
premiums is criminally punishable.
o When an act is malum prohibitum, "[i]t is the commission of that act as defined
by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or
not the provision has been violated."
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o In ABS-CBN Corp. v. Gozon, we discussed the difference between acts mala
prohibita and mala in se:
The general rule is that acts punished under a special law are malum prohibitum.
“An act which is declared malum prohibitum, malice or criminal intent is completely
immaterial. “
In contrast, crimes mala in se concern inherently immoral acts:
Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that
as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine.
In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the
violation of the statue
Implicit in the concept of mala in se is that of mens rea.
Mens rea is defined as the nonphysical element which, combined with the act of the accused,
makes up the crime charged. Most frequently it is the criminal intent, or the guilty mind.
Crimes mala in se presuppose that the person who did the felonious act had criminal
intent to do so, while crimes mala prohibita do not require knowledge or criminal intent:
In the case of mala in se it is necessary, to constitute a punishable offense, for the person
doing the act to have knowledge of the nature of his act and to have a criminal intent; in the
case of mala prohibita, unless such words as “knowingly” and “willfully” are contained in
the statute, neither knowledge nor criminal intent is necessary.
In other words, a person morally quite innocent and with every intention of being a law-
abiding citizen becomes a criminal, and liable to criminal penalties, if he does an act
prohibited by these statutes.
Hence, [i]ntent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A
person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an
act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself[.]
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When an act is prohibited by a special law, it is considered injurious to public welfare, and the
performance of the prohibited act is the crime itself.
Volition, or intent to commit the act, is different from criminal intent. Volition or
voluntariness refers to knowledge of the act being done. On the other hand, criminal intent ·
refers to the state of mind beyond voluntariness. It is this intent that is being punished by
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crimes mala in se.
o @: The non-remittance of GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund premiums is malum
prohibitum. What the relevant laws punish is the failure, refusal, or delay
without lawful or justifiable cause in remitting or paying the required
contributions or accounts.
o @: Petitioner failed to prove a justifiable cause for his failure to remit the premiums.
We cannot subscribe to petitioner's defense that the funds for the remittances were
not directly credited to DAR-ARMM but to the account of the Office of the
Regional Governor of the ARMM, which had the obligation to remit to the various
line agencies of the ARMM the specific amounts provided to them.
NOTES:
o The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) was created for the purpose of
providing social security and insurance benefits as well as promoting efficiency and
the welfare of government employees
o The Pag-IBIG Fund was established pursuant to „constitutional mandates on the
promotion of public welfare through ample social services, as well as its humanist
commitment to the interest of the working groups, in relation particularly to their
need for decent shelter
o Penalties shall not be standardized but fitted as far as is possible to the individual,
with due regard to the imperative necessity of protecting the social order
People v. Quijada y Circulado (en banc)
Facts:
a benefit dance was held at the Basketball Court of Barangay Tinago, Dauis, Bohol. On this
occasion, a fist fight occurred between Diosdado Iroy and appellant Daniel Quijada as the
latter was constantly annoying and pestering the former’s sister
Another benefit dance/-disco was held in the same place. After dancing, Rosita Iroy decided to
leave and went outside the gate of the dance area.
While facing the direction of Diosdado Iroy, Rosita Iroy saw appellant surreptitiously
approach her brother Diosdado Iroy from behind. Suddenly, appellant fired his revolver at
Diosdado Iroy, hitting the latter at the back portion of the head. This caused Rosita Iroy to
spontaneously shout that appellant shot her brother; while appellant, after shooting Diosdado
Iroy, ran towards the cornfield. Later, Victim died in the hospital.
Arrested. Charge. Defense of alibi. RTC convicted 2 crimes.
Accused-appellant Daniel Quijada appeals from the RTC decision convicting him of the two
offenses separately charged in two informations, viz.,
a. murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
b. illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated from under P.D. No. 1866, and
imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the first crime and an
indeterminate penalty ranging from seventeen years, four months, and one day, as
minimum, to twenty years and one day, as maximum, for the second crime.
Issue: WON mala in se offense refer only to offenses in the RPC. - NO.
Held: Appeal Dismissed. RTC affirmed.
1. Murder and homicide are defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code as
crimes against persons.
They are mala in se because malice or dolo is a necessary ingredient therefor.
On the other hand, the offense of illegal possession of firearm is defined and
punished by a special penal law, 48 P.D. No. 1866.  It is a malum prohibitum
where all that is needed is intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by law, coupled, of
course, by animus possidendi.
However, it must be clearly understood that this animus possidendi is without regard
to any other criminal or felonious intent which an accused may have harbored in
possessing the firearm.
2. The unequivocal intent of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 is to
respect and preserve homicide or murder as a distinct offense penalized under
the Revised Penal Code and to increase the penalty for illegal possession of firearm
where such a firearm is used in killing a person.
3. Its clear language yields no intention of the lawmaker to repeal or modify, pro tanto,
Articles 248 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code, in such a way that if an unlicensed
firearm is used in the commission of homicide or murder, either of these crimes, as
the case may be, would only serve to aggravate the offense of illegal possession of
firearm and would not anymore be separately punished.
7
4. Indeed, the words of the subject provision are palpably clear to exclude any
suggestion that either of the crimes of homicide and murder, as crimes mala in se
under the Revised Penal Code, is obliterated as such and reduced as a mere
aggravating circumstance in illegal possession of firearm whenever the unlicensed
firearm is used in killing a person.
5. The only purpose of the provision is to increase the penalty prescribed in the first
paragraph of Section 1 — reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua — to death, seemingly because of the accused's manifest arrogant defiance
and contempt of the law in using an unlicensed weapon to kill another, but never, at
the same time, to absolve the accused from any criminal liability for the death of the
victim.
Regalado, J., concurring and dissenting (in the syllabus)
1. I concur in the majority opinion only insofar as it holds accused-appellant Daniel Quijada y
Circulado guilty of the crime of murder with the use of an illegally possessed firearm and
punishes him therefor.
2. I confess, however, that I cannot in conscience reconcile myself with the unfortunate
doctrine first announced in People vs. Tac-an, and now reiterated by the majority,
that said appellant should be twice penalized for two supposedly distinct offenses
involving (1) the murder of the victim with an illegally possessed firearm, under
Presidential Decree No. 1866 and (2) the same murder of that same victim,
this time under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
3. Nor should we hold a "judicial prejudice" from the fact that the two forms of illegal
possession of firearms
in Presidential Decree No. 1866 are mala prohibita. On this score, I believe it is time
to disabuse our minds of some superannuated concepts of the difference between
mala in se and mala prohibita. I find in these cases a felicitous occasion to point out
this misperception thereon since even now there are instances of incorrect
assumptions creeping into some of our decisions that if the crime is punished by the
Revised Penal Code, it is necessarily a malum in se and, if provided for by a special
law, it is a malum prohibitum.
4. It was from hornbook lore that we absorbed the distinctions given by text writers,
claiming that: (1) mala in se require criminal intent on the part of the offender; in
mala prohibita, the mere commission of the prohibited act, regardless of intent, is
sufficient; and (2) mala in se refer to felonies in the Revised Penal Code, while mala
prohibita are offenses punished under special laws.
5. The first distinction is still substantially correct, but the second is not accurate. In
fact, even in the Revised Penal Code there are felonies which are actually and
essentially mala prohibita. To illustrate, in time of war, and regardless of his intent, a
 person who shall have correspondence with a hostile country or territory occupied
by enemy troops shall be punished therefor. An accountable public officer who
voluntarily fails to issue the required receipt for any sum of money officially
collected by him, regardless of his intent, is liable for illegal exaction. Unauthorized
possession of picklocks or similar tools, regardless of the possessor's intent, is
punishable as such illegal possession. These are felonies under the Revised Penal
Code but criminal intent is not required therein.
6. On the other hand, I need not mention anymore that there are now in our statutes so
many offense punished under special laws but wherein criminal intent is required as
an element, and which offenses are accordingly mala in se although they are not
felonies provided for in the Code.
NOTES:
It is a malum prohibitum which the lawmaker, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, in the
exercise of his martial law powers, so condemned not only because of its nature but also
because of the larger policy consideration of containing or reducing, if not eliminating, the
upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally
possessed and manufactured firearms, ammunition, and explosives. If intent to commit the
crime were required, enforcement of the decree and its policy or purpose would be difficult to
achieve.
Purpose; There is a world of difference, which is too obvious, between (a) the commission of
homicide or murder as a result or on the occasion of the violation of Section 1, and (b) the
commission of homicide or murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
Tac-an, reiterated in Tiozon, Caling, Jumamoy, Deunida, Tiongco, Fernandez, and Somooc is
the better rule, for it applies the laws concerned according to their letter and spirit.  that one
who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm commits two separate offenses
Estrada vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official is to be prosecuted under RA
7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, (for
acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the amount of P4,097,804,173.17) and wishes to impress upon
the court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct
line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm.
He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of
constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness;
(b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
8
Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to
due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Petitioner also maintains that the Plunder Law violates the due process clause and the
constitutional presumption of innocence by lowering the quantum of evidence necessary for
proving the component elements of plunder because Section 4 does not require that each and
every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy be proved,
„it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
Finally, petitioner alleges that it is beyond the power of Congress to delimit the reasonable
doubt standard and to abolish the element of mens rea in mala in se crimes by converting these
to mala prohibita, thereby making it easier for the prosecution to prove malversation, bribery,
estafa and other crimes committed by public officers since criminal intent need not be
established.
ISSUE
WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the
power of the Congress to so classify it.
HELD
NO. The Supreme Court held that plunder is malum in se, which requires proof of criminal
intent. And while citing Justice Mendoza in his concurring opinion “xxx Precisely because the
constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for
plunder. Is it noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was
committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally”. It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part
of the petitioner.”
Furthermore, the application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the RPC to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea (deliberate
intent) is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined
by his criminal intent.
Finally, the crime of plunder is a malum in se as corroborated in the decision of Congress in
1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been
resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, the legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659
that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se.—
For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala
in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since
in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be
absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for
violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against
jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
The court dismisses the petition, holds plunder as crime mala in se and renders RA 7080
constitutional.
CONCURRING:
Same; Criminal Law; Crimes Mala In Se and Mala Prohibita; Plunder is a malum in se,
requiring proof of mens rea.·Plunder is a malum in se, requiring proof of criminal intent.
Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se, the element of mens rea must be
proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that
the crime of plunder was committed „willfully, unlawfully and criminally.‰ It thus alleges
guilty knowledge on the part of petitionner.
The fact that the acts enumerated in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 were made criminal by
special law does not necessarily make the same mala prohibita where criminal intent is
not essential, although the term refers generally to acts made criminal by special laws.
For there is a marked difference between the two. According to a well- known author on
criminal law:
There is a distinction between crimes which are mala in se, or wrongful from their nature,
such as theft, rape, homicide, etc., and those that are mala prohibita, or wrong merely because
prohibited by statute, such as illegal possession of firearms.
DISSENTING
Regardless of whether plunder is classified as mala prohibita or in se, it is the prerogative of
the legislature ·which is undeniably vested with the authority·to determine whether certain
acts are criminal irrespective of the actual intent of the perpetrator.·While I simply cannot
agree that the Anti-Plunder Law eliminated mens rea from the component crimes of plunder,
my bottom-line position still is: regardless of whether plunder is classified as mala prohibita
9
or in se, it is the prerogative of the legislature·which is undeniably vested with the authority·to
determine whether certain acts are criminal irrespective of the actual intent of the perpetrator.
join the view that when we speak of plunder, we are referring essentially to two or more
instances of mala in se constituting one malum prohibitum.·Without being facetious, may I say
that, unlike the act of discharging a gun, the acts mentioned in Section 1(d)·bribery,
conversion, fraudulent conveyance, unjust enrichment and the like·cannot be committed sans
criminal intent. And thus, I finally arrive at a point of agreement with petitioner: that the acts
enumerated in Section l(d) are by their nature mala in se, and most of them are in fact defined
and penalized as such by the Revised Penal Code. Having said that, I join the view that when
we speak of plunder, we are referring essentially to two or more instances of mala in se
constituting one malum prohibitum. Thus, there should be no difficulty if each of the predicate
acts be proven beyond reasonable doubt as mala in se, evenifthedefenseoflackofintentbe taken
away as the solicitor general has suggested. In brief, the matter of classification is not really
significant, contrary to what petitioner would have us believe. The key, obviously, is whether
the same burden of proof·proof beyond reasonable doubt·would apply.
NOTES:
The acts enumerated in Section 1(d) of the Plunder Law are mostly defined and penalized by
the Revised Penal Code, e.g. Malversation, Estafa, bribery and other crimes committed by
public officers. As such, they are by nature mala in se crimes. Since intent is an essential
element of these crimes, then with more reason that criminal intent be established in plunder
which, under R.A. No. 7659, is one of the heinous crimes as pronounced in one of its whereas
clauses. Mala in Se requires proof of criminal intent.
Mens rea is a substantive due process requirement under the Constitution, and this is a
limitation on police power.
Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law, what the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is
only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a
pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00.  PROSEC needs to prove
beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series
which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is
no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed
by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
On the other hand, Respondents argue that the „particular elements constituting the crime of
plunder‰ are stated with „definiteness and certainty,‰ as follows:
1. (1)  There is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates
or other persons;
2. (2)  There is an amassing, accumulating or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth;
 3. (3)  The total amount of ill-gotten wealth so amassed, accumulated or acquired is at
least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00); and
4. (4)  The ill-gotten wealth, which is defined as any asset, property, business
enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two
(2) of R.A. No. 7080, was acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates, and/or business associates by any combination or
series of the means or similar schemes enumerated in Section 1(d).
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties - Any public officer who, by
himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates
or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as
described in Section 1(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least
Seventy-five million pesos (P75,000,000.00), shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and
shall be punished by life imprisonment with perpetual absolute disqualification from
holding any public office. Any person who participated with said public officer in the
commission of plunder shall likewise be punished. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances
shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and
their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stock
derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.
Sec. 1 (d):
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of
any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or
raids on the public treasury;
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,
kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer concerned;
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the
National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or
government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock,
equity or any other form of interest or participation including promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
10
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection
or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. JEFFREY MACARANAS y
FERNANDEZ, Accused-Appellant G.R. No. 226846
Facts:
• Frank Karim Langaman and his girlfriend Kathlyn Irish Mae Cervantes were at Meyland
Village, Meycauayan, Bulacan, aboard Frank's motorcycle.
• When they were about to leave the place, 2 men suddenly approached them, followed by a
third man who was earlier standing at a post.
• One of the three men held Frank by the neck and shot Frank causing the latter to fall down.
The same man pointed his gun at Kathlyn and demanded that she give him her cellphone.
After Kathlyn gave her cellphone, the same man hit her on the back.
• Thereafter, Kathlyn pretended to be unconscious and saw that the men searched the body of
Frank for any valuables.
While the incident was taking place, the second man took Frank's motorcycle, while the third
man, herein appellant, just stood to guard them and acted as the look-out.
• Afterwards, the three men left together riding Frank's motorcycle. It was then that Kathlyn
was able to seek help and.Frank was taken to the hospital.
• Eventually, Frank died
• Information was then filed against appellant, Richard Lalata and a certain John Doe charging
them of violation of R.A. No.6539,
• Appellant pleaded "not guilty" during his arraignment and after the pre-trial ended, the trial
ensued.
Defense  alibi. Was Sleeping the whole day.
• The RTC, in its decision, found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged and disposed the case
• On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification – increased the
indemnity for the death of Frank,increased the damages and indicated that the damages shall
earn 6% interest per annum
• Hence, the present appeal.
Issue: WON Macaranas is guilty of the crime of Carnapping? YES
Held:
R.A. No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, defines carnapping as the
taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation against persons, or by using force
upon things
Three amendments have been made to the original Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act: (1)
the penalty of life imprisonment was changed to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape,
and (3) the change of the phrase "in the commission of the carnapping" to "in the course of th
ecommission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof"
This third amendment clarifies the law's intent to make the offense a special complex crime,
by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with
violence against or intimidation of persons.
Thus, under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the prosecution has to
prove the = essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim +
more importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping
and that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on
the occasion thereof"
Consequently, where the elements of carnapping are not proved, the provisions of the Anti-
Carnapping Act would cease to be applicable and the homicide or murder (if proven) would be
punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, the elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under R.A. No. 6539, as amended
are the following:
1) That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2) That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
3) That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things; and
11
4) That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle
@: In this particular case, all the elements are present as the pieces of evidence presented by
the prosecution show that there were two (2) men both wearing jackets and bonnets, together
with the appellant who approached the victim and the witness Kathlyn and employed force
and intimidation upon them and thereafter forcibly took the victim's motorcycle and then shot
the victim on the neck causing his death.
From the acts of accused Jeffrey Macaranas, there was unity in his action with his co-accused
and a concerted effort to commit the crime charged. The simultaneous acts of Macaranas and
his two (2) companions indicate a joint purpose and concurrence of intentions on their part. x x
x
NOTES:
PENALTY:
and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of
the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
G.R. No. 172602 April 13, 2007
HENRY T. GO vs.THE FIFTH DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN and THE OFFICE OF
THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Vicente C. Rivera, then DOTC Secretary, and petitioner Henry Go, Chairman and President of
PIATCO, were charged (INFORMATION) with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, also
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Go, in relation to the voided 1997
Concession Agreement and the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA)
entered into by the government with Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc
(PIATCO).
In this MR, Go  contended that it was error to charge him with the violation given that he
was not a public officer, a necessary element of the offense under Sec 3(g) of RA 3019. He
further assert that conspiracy by a private party with a public officer is chargeable only with
the offense under Sec3(e).
Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Go, a private person, may be charged with violation of Sec
3(g) of RA 3019.
Ruling:
e first element of the crime punished by Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 is that the accused must
be a public officer who enters into a contract on behalf of the government.· Petitioner, a
private individual, stands charged with violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, the
clear terms of which punishes:
“ public officers who, on behalf of the government, enter into contracts or transactions
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, whether or not the public officer
profited or will profit thereby. – The first element of the crime is that the accused must be a
public officer who enters into a contract on behalf of the government. “
The philosophy behind this is that the public officer is duty bound to see to it that the interest
of the government is duly protected. Thus, should the contract or transaction entered into by
such public officer is manifestly or grossly disadvantageous to the governmentÊs interests, the
public officer is held liable for violation of Section 3(g), whether or not this public officer
profited or will profit thereby.
1. An act which is declared malum prohibitum, malice or criminal intent is completely
immaterial; Section 3(g), R.A. No. 3019, applies restrictively only to public officers
entering into a contract on behalf of the government manifestly or grossly
disadvantageous to the government.·
a. In Luciano v. Estrella  the act treated in Section 3(g) partakes of the
nature of malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as defined by
the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or
not the provision has been violated.
b. An act which is declared malum prohibitum, malice or criminal intent is
completely immaterial. Section 3(g), however, applies restrictively only
to public officers entering into a contract on behalf of the government
manifestly or grossly disadvantageous to the government.
2. Notwithstanding the allegation of conspiracy to violate Section 3(g), the liability of
private individuals who participated in the transaction must be established under
the appropriate provision which is Section 4(b), for knowingly inducing or causing
the public officers to commit Section 3(g) where criminal intent must necessarily be
proved.·
a. the criminal liability of the public officers for violation of Section 3(g) is
separate and distinct from the liability of private persons under Section
4(b) of Republic Act No. 3019.
b. In other words, notwithstanding the allegation of conspiracy to violate
Section 3(g), the liability of private individuals who participated in the
transaction must be established under the appropriate provision which is
Section 4(b), for knowingly inducing or causing the public officers to
commit Section 3(g) where criminal intent must necessarily be proved.
This is in clear recognition that Section 3(g), a malum prohibitum,
specifically applies to public officers only.
3. It is well-settled that penal statutes are strictly construed against the State and
liberally for the accused, so much so that the scope of a penal statute cannot be
extended by good intention or by implication; Section 3(g), R.A. No. 3019, can only
be violated by a public officer.
12
a. The Information lumping petitioner with a public official for conspiracy to
violate Section 3(g), is totally infirm. Section 3(g) can only be violated by
a public officer. The acts for which private persons can be charged
together with the public officials are enumerated in the last paragraph of
Section 3 and Section 4, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Republic Act No. 3019.
b. If warranted, petitioner Go should be charged for violation of Section
4(b) in relation to Section 3(g).
ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016
P4Certiorari on CA Decision finding him guilty of possessing unlicensed firearms under
7 8
Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764 in relation to Section 261 of Batas
9
Pambansa Blg. 881 during the 2007 election period.
Dela Cruz, an OJT of an interim-vessel, was at a pier of the Cebu Domestic Port to go home to
Iloilo. While buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter. When his bag
was placed in the x-ray machine, the operator saw firearms inside his bag.
Upon seeing the suspected firearms, the operator called the attention of port personnel Archie
Igot (Igot) who was the baggage inspector then.
Dela Cruz claimed ownership for the bag and consented to manual inspection. Dela Cruz was
charged with violation of RA. 8294 AND violation of Comelec. The trial court held that the
search conducted by the port authorities was reasonable and, thus, valid. The Court finds the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 7764 in
relation to Section 261 of BP Blg. 881.
At first, appellant denied any knowledge about the explosives. Then, he alternatively
contended that his act of guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano does not
constitute illegal possession thereof because there was no intent on his part to possess the
same, since he was merely employed as an errand boy of Col. Matillano. His pretension of
impersonal or indifferent material possession does not and cannot inspire credence.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and whether the
search was valid
HELD:
1. Petitioner failed to negate the prosecution’s evidence that he had animus possidendi or the
intent to possess the illegal firearms.
In
People v. De Gracia  this court elucidated on the concept of animus possidendi and the
importance of the intent to commit an act prohibited by law as differentiated from criminal
intent.
The accused was charged with the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms in
furtherance of rebellion under Presidential Decree No. 1866 resulting from the coup dÊétat
167
staged in 1989 by the Reform Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People.
This court held that the actions of the accused established his intent to possess the illegal
firearms:
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not
necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the
special law.
Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person
may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and
that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself.
In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent;
in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done
freely and consciously.
@: a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere
possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a
firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on
the part of the accused. Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other
criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm.
Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of
an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree
No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is
sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he
intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without
criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a
firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of
weapon, such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or
constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense
committed.
o @: De Gracia is indeed guilty of having intentionally possessed several firearms,
explosives and ammunition without the requisite license or authority therefor.
13
o Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia categorically testified that he was the first
one to enter the Eurocar Sales Office when tHE military operatives raided the same,
and he saw De Gracia standing in the room and holding the several explosives
o In this case, petitioner failed to prove that his possession of the illegal firearms
seized from his bag was „temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession[.]
171
‰ As put by the tria
o petitionerÊs claim that anyone could have planted the firearms in his bag while it
was unattended is flimsy.
ARNULFO a.k.a. ARNOLD JACABAN, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 184355
Facts:
 Police Senior Inspector Dueñas of the now defunct Presidential Anti-Organized
Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) filed an Application for Search Warrant to search
the premises of Jacaban’s residence
 A Search Warrant was then immediately issued to the applicant.
 The search warrant = implemented by P/S Insp. Dueñas as the team leader, SPO2
Eric Mendoza, SPO2 Eric Abellana. PO1 Allan Jalagpas, PO3 Epifania Manila Sarte
and other members of the PAOCTF.
 Before reaching appellant's house, the policemen invited three (3) barangay tanods
from Guadalupe's Barangay outpost to accompany them to the house of the
appellant.
 Upon arrival to appellant's house, SPO2 Abellana served the search warrant to
appellant who was just inside the house together with his wife and other ladies.
 Upon informing appellant of the search warrant, he became angry and denied having
committed any illegal activity. P/SInsp. Dueñas assured appellant that he had
nothing to worry about if the PAOCTF would not find anything.
 The team proceeded to search the living room in the presence of three tanods and the
appellant himself.
 The team continued to search the room where SPO2 Abellana found a calibre .
45 placed in the ceiling.
 Appellant, who was at the living room that time, rushed to the room and grappled
with SPO2 Abellana but failed to get hold of the gun.
  After an exhaustive search was done, other firearms and ammunitions were
recovered from the searched premises.
 An inventory was made at the living room of appellant in the presence of appellant
himself, the barangay tanods and other persons present during the search. After
appellant and the witnesses signed the inventory receipt, the team proceeded back to
their office with appellant and the confiscated items.
 RTC = convicting petitioner of the crime charged,
 the prosecution had established all the elements of the crime charged.
 Petitioner was in possession of the firearm, ammunitions and other
items with intent to possess the same as they were found inside his
house; and he had no license or permit to possess the same from any
competent authority.
 Petitioner appealed his conviction to the CA.
 The CA issued its assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
 Hence, this petition for review filed by petitioner.
Issue: WON Jacaban is guilty of the crime? YES
Held:
The essential elements in the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions are: (1) the existence of subject firearm; and, (2) the fact that the accused who
possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it. The unvarying
rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession, which includes not only actual
physical possession, but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one’s
control and management
Once the prosecution evidence indubitably points to possession without the requisite
authority or license, coupled with animus possidendi or intent to possess on the part of
the accused, conviction for violation of the said law must follow.
Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or determination of which is largely
dependent on attendant events in each case. It may be inferred from the prior or
contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances
o @: the prosecution had proved the essential elements of the crime charged under
PD 1866 as amended by RA 8294.
14
o The existence of the seized firearm and the ammunitions was established
through the testimony of PO3 Sarte.
o There was an inventory of the items seized which was made in the
presence of the petitioner and the three barangay tanods who all
voluntarily signed the inventory receipt.
o PO3 Sarte identified all the seized items in open court.
It was convincingly proved that petitioner had constructive possession of the gun and the
ammunitions, coupled with the intent to possess the same. Petitioner's act of immediately
rushing from the living room to the room where SPO2 Abellana found a calibre .45 and
grappled with the latter for the possession of the gun proved that the gun was under his control
and management. He also had the animus possidendi or intent to possess the gun when he tried
to wrest it from SPO2 Abellana.
Teves vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 180363. April 28, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of
Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections.
On March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify petitioner
on the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, he was convicted of violating Section 3(h),
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing
pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the
Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00.
Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office because
he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.
COMELEC First Division  disqualified petitioner// from running for the position of member
of House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy.
COMELEC EN BANC  It appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14 May 2007
congressional elections for the position of member of the House of Representatives of the
Third district of Negros Oriental thereby rendering the instant Motion for Reconsideration
moot and academic.
The petitioner FOR CERTIORARI filed a petition which the court found to have merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner’s conviction for violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019
involves moral turpitude.

Held: NO
Moral turpitude has been defined  as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty,
or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which
a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.
The essential elements of the violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 are as follows:
1) The accused is a public officer;
2) He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction;
3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest,
or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.
The petitioner was convicted under the 2 nd for having pecuniary or financial interest in a
cockpit which is prohibited under Section 89.
However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same
involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the
violation of the statute must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such
acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively
prohibited, as in the instant case.
The Court clarified that not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is
for this reason that "as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court
to determine." Consequently, considering all circumstances, the Court held that
petitioner’s conviction does not involve moral turpitude.
The crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not involve
moral turpitude.
Sanchez vs. People
G.R. No. 179090, June 5, 2009
FACTS:
Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse in an Information[6]
dated August 29, 2001 which reads:
The undersigned, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, hereby accuses Leonilo Sanchez
alias Nilo of Lajog, Clarin, Bohol of the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of September, 2000 in the municipality of Clarin, province of
Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, acting as a Family
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to abuse, exploit and/or to inflict other conditions
prejudicial to the child's development, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
abuse physically one [VVV],[7] a sixteen (16) year old minor, by hitting her thrice in the
upper part of her legs, and which acts are prejudicial to the child-victim's development which
15
acts are not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, but the same are covered by Art.
59, par. 8 of P.D. No. 603 as amended; to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in
the amount to be proved during the trial.
The appellant argues that the injuries inflicted by him were minor in nature that it is not
prejudicial to the child-victim’s development and therefore P.D. No. 603 is not applicable and
he should be charged under the Revised Penal Code for slight physical injuries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. 603 as amended is applicable to the case at hand.
HELD:
In this case, the applicable laws are Article 59 of P.D. No. 603 and Section 10(a) of R.A. No.
7610. Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 provides:
SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development. —
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered
by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b)
child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the
child’s development. The Rules and Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and
separately
defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three acts are different
from one another and from the act prejudicial to the child’s development. Contrary to
petitioner’s assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a),
Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The
prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation
have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the
child is different from the former acts.
Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word “or” is a disjunctive term
signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It should,
as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of “or” in
Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase “be responsible for other conditions
prejudicial to the child’s development” supposes that there are four punishable acts therein.
First, the act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being
responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The fourth penalized act
cannot be interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three other acts,
because an analysis of the entire context of the questioned provision does not warrant such
construal.
Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be considered as child abuse but merely
as slight physical injuries defined and punishable under Article 266 of the Revised Penal
Code. Appellant conveniently forgets that when the incident happened, VVV was a child
entitled to the protection extended by R.A. No. 7610, as mandated by the Constitution. As
defined in the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether the same is
habitual or not. The act of appellant falls squarely within this definition. We, therefore, cannot
accept appellant's contention.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 10(a) in relation to Sections 3(a) and 3(b)
No. 1 of Rep. Act No. 7610 and Sec. 59(8) of PD 603, amended.
People v. Saley – 291 SCRA 715 [1995]
FACTS: Antonine B. Saley, a.k.a. Annie B. Saley, seeks a reversal of the verdict finding her
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of eleven counts of estafa punishable under the Revised Penal
Code and six counts of illegal recruitment, one committed in large scale, proscribed by the
Labor Code.
The consolidated petitions provide that appellant promised the complainants job opportunities
in Korea. Appellant received acceptance fees and other fees from complainants and when the
job promises did not materialize, appellant was not able to refund these to complainants.
The defense posited the theory that appellant merely assisted the complainants in applying for
overseas employment with duly accredited travel agencies for and from which she derived a
commission.
The trial court found her guilty and posited as follows:
“In fine, accused gave the distinct assurance, albeit false, that she had the ability to send the
complainants abroad for work deployment, thereby employing false pretenses to defraud
them. This was despite her knowing very well that she was not legally authorized. The
complainants willingly parted with their money in the hope of overseas employment deceitfully
promised them by the accused. What makes matters worse is that these amounts given to the
accused come from hard-earned money, or worse, could have been borrowed from money
lenders who have no qualms about collecting usurious interest rates. Complainants who
faithfully relied on the accused did not hesitate to painstakingly raise or even beg or borrow
money just so they could give a decent future to their families even to the extent of leaving
them for far-off lands. But now, all their dreams are gone, their hopes shattered. Some may
not have even been able to pay back what they borrowed nor recoup their losses. Now, more
than ever, their future appears bleaker. But this time, a glimmering light appears at the end of
the tunnel as the Court steps in to lay down the iron fist of the law so as to serve the accused a
lesson, a bitter one, with the hope that those who are trekking or those who are about to trek
the same pilfered path that the accused took will reconsider their pursuits before it would be
16
too late, and in the end, this form of fraud which invariably victimizes the poor will forever be
stopped.”
ISSUE: W/N conviction under the Labor Code bar punishment for the offender for estafa. NO.
HELD: Conviction for these various offenses under the Labor Code does not bar the
punishment of the offender for estafa. Illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum offense where
criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction while estafa is malum in se
which requires criminal intent to warrant conviction. Under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the
Revised Penal Code, the elements of the offense (estafa) are that (1) the accused has defrauded
another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit and (2) damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Clearly, these elements
have sufficiently been shown in the cases under review.
People vs. Martin Simon G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994 Sale of Prohibited Drugs
NOVEMBER 28, 2017
FACTS:
Accused Martin Simon was charged with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He sold tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer. The confiscated 4 tea bags, weighing a total of 3.8
grams, when subjected to laboratory examination, were found positive for marijuana.
Simon denied the accusation against him, claiming that on the day of question, he was picked
up by the police at their house while watching TV. He was told that he was a pusher so he
attempted to alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the
camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the stomach
eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his signature and
fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied knowledge of the marked money or
the 4 teabags of dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the marked money came from the
pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was because of the blows he
suffered at the hands of Pejoro.
Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared
that she treated appellant for three days due to abdominal pain, but her examination revealed
that the cause for this ailment was appellant’s peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or
serious external injury, abrasion or contusion on his body.
Simon was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty
thousand pesos and to pay the costs.
Simon then seek the reversal of the judgement ISSUE:
Was the conviction of Simon correct?
RULING:
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably
established. To sell means to give, whether for money or any other material consideration. It
must, therefore, be established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea
bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for
two twenty-peso bills.
After careful review, the Court held that there were 2 tea bags of marijuana that was sold and
there were 2 other tea bags of marijuana confiscated. Thus, Simon should be charged of selling
for the 2 tea bags of marijuana only.
However, there is an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua
by reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is
less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved is
750 grams or more. The same error has been committed with respect to the other prohibited
and regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions in
order to give effect to the whole law, the court hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed
where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph
shall range from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is
also concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should be construed
in a manner favorable to the accused.
The court held that Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has
unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms,
hence with their technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining the
maximum of said sentence, the court have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of
said law to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the
medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in effect punished
by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, the court
applied first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that “in imposing a prison sentence
for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of
said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense.”
Thus, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence
within the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the
maximum range have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal
Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum sentence at 6 months of
arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional.
Evangeline Ladonga vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005
Facts:
17
In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became his regular customers in his
pawnshop business in Tagbilaran City, Bohol; sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses
obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)
Check No. 284743, post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; sometime in the last
week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an
additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated
July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained
a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated
to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; the three checks bounced upon presentment for the
reason CLOSED ACCOUNT; when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite
repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them.
While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient
deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued
only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks
when they mature; and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation
in the issuance thereof.
On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Adronico applied for probation which was
granted. On the other hand, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that
the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the priciple
of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law; moreover, she is not a
signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.
On May 17, 1999, the court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer of the three checks that
bounced but her co-accused husband under the latters account could be held liable for
violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 as conspirator.
Held:
The conviction must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC provides that “a conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it.” To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. The overt
act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the
crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to
execute or implement the criminal plan. In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove
that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Apparently,
the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present
when the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean
concurrence with the criminal design. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but
by positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere
presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge,
acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a
conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose.
People vs Allen Mantalaba (topic: application of RA 9344)
Facts:
In accordance with the report sent to the Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency
Response (RACER) that a certain Allen Mantalaba (then 17y.o.) was selling “Shabu” at Porok
4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City; a buy-bust team was organized. This was
composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers who were provided
with two (2) pieces of P100 marked bills to be used in the purchase.
The concurrence of the presence of the elements of Illegal possession of Dangerous Drugs and
sale of Dangerous Drugs was later established by the prosecutor’s evidences and witnesses.
Thus, the appellant was charge with the violation of RA 9165 Art.II sec. 5 and sec.11 thereof.
RTC and CA found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charge.
Nevertheless, the court found it necessary to consider the minority of the appellant in this case.
Issue:
WON appellant could avail of the benefits of RA 9344 when he committed the offense during
her minority
Ruling:
Applying sec. 68 of RA 9344 to wit:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons who have
been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were
below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which
they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive
application of this Act. x x x
Following the above provision, applying sec.38 of RA 9344 regarding Suspension of Sentence
must apply. However, citing People vs Sarcia, Sec.40 of the same law limits the said
suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. From this, the appellant
who is now beyond the age of 21 years can no longer avail of the provisions of sec.38 and
se.40 of RA 9344 as to the suspension of his sentence because such is already moot and
academic.
Nonetheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under section 51 of RA
9344 which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other Training
Facilities. - A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court,
be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
18
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised
and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
SC: Therefore, the decision of the lower courts were affirmed with modifications.
Dimacuta v. People
Effects of Probation Law
 ISSUE: WON petitioner should have been granted the benefit of PROBATION
LAW
 [NOTE that in this case, the petitioner was granted such benefit BUT since neither
the accused nor the OSG questioned the CA Decision, it has attained finality and to
correct the error at this stage is already barred by the right of the accused against
double jeopardy.]
 FACTS:
 Dimakuta was indicted for violation of Sec. 5 Par (b), Article III of RA No. 7610 or
the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discriminatory
Act.
 Petitioner elevated the case to the CA, in which it affirmed the recommendation of
the OSG to convict the petitioner due only to Acts of Lasciviousness under Article
336 of RPC in view of the prosecution's failure to establish that the lascivious acts
were attended by force or coercion because the victim was asleep at the time the
alleged acts were committed.
 Instead of filing fo an appeal, petitioner filed for a motion to allow him to apply
for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
 Benefit of Probation Law was granted to him.
 HELD: NO
 The decision of the trial court finding the petitioner guilty of Violation of Section 5
(b), Article III R.A. No. 7610 should have been upheld by the CA instead of
erroneously adopting the recommendation of the OSG, which inaccurately relied on
People v. Abello1.
1
In said case, the decisive factor for the acquittal of the accused was
not the absence of coercion or intimidation on the offended party, who
was then sleeping at the time the lascivious act was committed, but the
fact that the victim could not be considered as a "child" under R.A.
No. 7610. This Court held that while the twenty-one year old woman
has polio as a physical disability that rendered her incapable of normal
function, the prosecution did not present any testimonial or
documentary evidence that the victim.
  The Probation Law was construed as follows:
o During the martial law period, then President Marcos issued PD No. 968 2
in 1976. Originally, in which allowed the filing of an application for
probation at any time after the defendant had been convicted and
sentenced.
o Later, the filing of an application for probation pending appeal was
amended by P.D. No. 1257 on in 1977 by providing that such application
may be made after the defendant had been convicted and sentenced but
before he begins to serve his sentence.
o In 1985, Section 4 was subsequently amended by P.D. No. 1990. In
which, the policy has been to allow convicted and sentenced defendant to
apply for probation within the 15-day period for perfecting an appeal. As
modified, Section 4 of the Probation Law now reads:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the
provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and
upon application by said defendant within the period
for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the
sentence and place the defendant on probation for such
period and upon such terms and conditions as it may
deem best; Provided, that no application for probation
shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
 Section 4 of the Probation Law provides that the application for
probation must be filed with the trial court within the 15-day period
for perfecting an appeal. The need to file it within such period is
intended to encourage offenders, who are willing to be reformed and
rehabilitated, to avail themselves of probation at the first opportunity.
If the application for probation is filed beyond the 15-day period, then
the judgment becomes final and executory and the lower court can no
longer act on the application for probation. On the other hand, if a
notice of appeal is perfected, the trial court that rendered the
judgment of conviction is divested of any jurisdiction to act on the
case, except the execution of the judgment when it has become final
and executory.
 In view of the latest amendment to Section 4 of the Probation Law that
"no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction,"
prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive
remedies because the law is unmistakable about it.
 If this Court will adopt as jurisprudential doctrine the opinion (in Colinares case)
that an accused may still be allowed to apply for probation even if he has filed a
notice of appeal, it must be categorically stated that such appeal must be limited
to the following grounds:
2
Sec. 4: Probation = allowed ANY TIME after conviction.
19
1. When the appeal is merely intended for the
correction of the penalty imposed by the lower court, which
when corrected would entitle the accused to apply for
probation; and 2. When the appeal is merely intended to
review the crime for which the accused was convicted and
that the accused should only be liable to the lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the crime for which he was
originally convicted and the proper penalty imposable is
within the probationable period
 In both instances, the penalty imposed by the trial court for the
crime committed by the accused is more than six years; hence, the
sentence disqualifies the accused from applying for probation. The
accused should then be allowed to file an appeal under the afore-
stated grounds to seek a review of the crime and/or penalty imposed
by the trial court. If, on appeal, the appellate court finds it proper to
modify the crime and/or the penalty imposed, and the penalty
finally imposed is within the probationable period, the accused
should still be allowed to apply for probation.
 In addition, before an appeal is filed based on the grounds
enumerated above, the accused should first file a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the trial court anchored on the
above-stated grounds and manifest his intent to apply for probation
if the motion is granted. The motion for reconsideration will give
the trial court an opportunity to review and rectify any errors in its
judgment, while the manifestation of the accused will immediately
show that he is agreeable to the judgment of conviction and does
not intend to appeal from it, but he only seeks a review of the crime
and/or penalty imposed, so that in the event that the penalty will be
modified within the probationable limit, he will immediately apply
for probation. Without such motion for reconsideration, the notice
of appeal should be denied outright.
 The notice of appeal should contain the following averments:
(1) that an earlier motion for reconsideration was filed but was
denied by the trial court; (2) that the appeal is only for reviewing
the penalty imposed by the lower court or the conviction should
only be for a lesser crime necessarily included in the crime charged
in the information; and (3) that the accused-appellant is not seeking
acquittal of the conviction.
 To note, what Section 4 of the Probation Law prohibits is an appeal
from the judgment of conviction, which involves a review of the
merits of the case and the determination of whether the accused is
entitled to acquittal.
 On the other hand, probation should not be granted to the accused in
 the following instances: 1. When the accused is convicted by the
trial court of a crime where the penalty imposed is within the
probationable period or a fine, and the accused files a notice of
appeal; and 2. When the accused files a notice of appeal which puts
the merits of his conviction in issue, even if there is an alternative
prayer for the correction of the penalty imposed by the trial court or
for a conviction to a lesser crime, which is necessarily included in
the crime in which he was convicted where the penalty is within the
probationable period.
o Both instances violate the spirit and letter of the law, as
Section 4 of the Probation Law prohibits granting an
application for probation if an appeal from the sentence of
conviction has been perfected by the accused.
 In this case, petitioner appealed the trial court's judgment of
conviction before the CA alleging that it was error on the part of the
RTC to have found him guilty of violating Section 5 (b), Article III
of R.A. No. 7610. He argued that the RTC should not have given
much faith and credence to the testimony of the victim because it
was tainted with inconsistencies. Moreover, he went on to assert
that even assuming he committed the acts imputed on him, still
there was no evidence showing that the lascivious acts were
committed without consent or through force, duress, intimidation or
violence because the victim at that time was in deep slumber. It is
apparent that petitioner anchored his appeal on a claim of innocence
and/or lack of sufficient evidence to support his conviction of the
offense charged, which is clearly inconsistent with the tenor of the
Probation Law that only qualified penitent offender are allowed to
apply for probation. The CA, therefore, did not err in applying the
similar case of Lagrosa v. People wherein the protestations of
petitioners therein did not simply assail the propriety of the
penalties imposed but meant a profession of guiltlessness, if not
complete innocence.|||
 To be sure, if petitioner intended in the first instance to be entitled
to apply for probation he should have admitted his guilt and
buttressed his appeal on a claim that the penalty imposed by the
RTC was erroneous or that he is only guilty of a lesser offense
necessarily included in the crime for which he was originally
convicted. Unfortunately for him, he already perfected his appeal
and it is late in the day to avail the benefits of probation despite the
imposition of the CA of a probationable penalty.|||
20
People v. Bon
G.R. No. 166401
October 30, 2006
Capital Punishment: R.A.9346 and Art. 71 (RPC) harmonized
FACTS:
AAA was only 6 years old when she was first molested in 1994 in the house Bon had shared
with her grandmother. He threatened that she and her parents would be killed should she
disclose the incident to anyone. She thereafter stopped sleeping in the house of her
grandmother. It was only 3 years after, in 1997, that she slept in the said house, yet again she
was sexually abused by appellant.
At age 11, she was raped by Bon for the 3 rd time, again at the house of her grandmother. The
following year, when she was 12, she was abused for the 4 th time by Bon. She was raped in an
outdoor clearing after having been invited there by Bon to get some vegetables. It was only on
12 June 2000 that she decided to reveal to her mother, CCC, the brutish acts Bon had done to
her and thus filed a complaint against him.
BBB, on the other hand, was 1 st raped by Bon in 1997 when she was 10 years old, also at the
same house. She did not report the rape to her parents out of fear of appellant's threat that he
would kill her.
In 1998 and 1999, she was raped again by appellant on several occasions, the rapes occurring
under threat of a bladed weapon, and regardless of the time of day.
BBB stated that she was last raped by appellant on 15 January 2000. Since then, she never
slept in her grandmother's house again.
It was on 14 June 2000 that BBB disclosed her harrowing experience to her mother.
The Court of Appeals established that Bon is guilty of 6 counts of rape and 2 counts of
attempted rape. It further considered the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims
and the relationship of the victims and Bon, the latter being the former's relative by
consanguinity within the third degree. The penalty imposed consisted of 8 death sentences.
ISSUE:
WON Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to delete the word "death" as expressly provided for in the
graduated scale of penalties under Article 71
HELD:
The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals can no
longer be affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, titled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the Philippines." Section 2 of the law mandates that in lieu of the death
penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.
Republic Act No. 9346
Sec. 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly,
Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177),
otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby
repealed, Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No.
 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive
orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or
amended accordingly.
Sec. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
At bare minimum, no provision in R.A. No. 9346 provides a context within which the concept
of "death penalty" bears retentive legal effect, especially in relation to Art. 71. R.A. No. 9346
expressly stipulate the amendment of all extant laws insofar as they called for the imposition
of the penalty of death.
The scale prescribed in Art. 71, the penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion
temporal, which was the maximum penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on Bon for
attempted rape. Reclusion temporal is a penalty comprised of three divisible periods, a
minimum, a medium and a maximum.
Art. 71. Graduated scales — In the case in which the law prescribes a penalty
lower or higher by one or more degrees than another given penalty, the rules
prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in graduating such penalty.
The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in which is
comprised the given penalty:
The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the following
graduated scales:
SCALE NO. 1
1. Death
2. Reclusion perpetua
3. Reclusion temporal
4. Prision mayor
5. Prision correctional
6. Arresto mayor
7. Destierro
8. Arresto menor
9. Public censure
10. Fine
There are principles in statutory construction that will sanction, even mandate, this
"expansive" interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346. The maxim interpretare et concordare
legibus est optimus interpretandi embodies the principle that a statute should be so construed
not only to be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject
matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system — a uniform system of
jurisprudence. "Interpreting and harmonizing laws with laws is the best method of
interpretation. . . . This manner of construction would provide a complete, consistent and
21
intelligible system to secure the rights of all persons affected by different legislative and quasi-
legislative acts."
In truth, there is no material difference between "imposition" and "application," for
both terms embody the operation in law of the death penalty. Since Art. 71 denominates
"death" as an element in the graduated scale of penalties, there is no question that the
operation of Art. 71 involves the actual application of the death penalty as a means of
determining the extent which a person's liberty is to be deprived. Since R.A. No. 9346
unequivocally bars the application of the death penalty, as well as expressly repeals all
such statutory provisions requiring the application of the death penalty, such effect
necessarily extends to its relevance to the graduated scale of penalties under Art. 71.
We cannot find basis to conclude that Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to retain the operative
effects of the death penalty in the graduation of the other penalties in our penal laws.
Muñoz cannot enjoin us to adopt such conclusion. Rep. Act No. 9346 is not swaddled in
the same restraints appreciated by Muñoz on Section 19(1), Article III. The very
Congress empowered by the Constitution to reinstate the imposition of the death penalty
once thought it best to do so, through Rep. Act No. 7650. Within the same realm of
constitutional discretion, Congress has reversed itself. It must be asserted that today, the
legal status of the suppression of the death penalty in the Philippines has never been
more secure than at any time in our political history as a nation.
Henceforth, "death," as utilized in Art. 71 of the RPC, shall no longer form part of the
equation in the graduation of penalties. For example, in the case of appellant, the
determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees
lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum
term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of
Appeals, but instead, prision mayor.
By reason of R.A. No. 9346, he is spared the death sentence, and entitled to the corresponding
reduction of his penalty as a consequence of the downgrading of his offense from 2 counts
consummated rape to 2 counts of attempted rape. For the 6 counts of rape, we downgrade the
penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole, pursuant to R.A. No. 9346.
For each of the 2 counts of attempted rape, we downgrade by one degree lower the penalty
imposed by the Court of Appeals. We hold that there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in it medium period.
Consequently, we impose the new penalty of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision
correccional as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum.
Lastly, as to damages, the Court awards AAA P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as
moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of attempted rape
Separately, the Court applies prevailing jurisprudence in awarding to BBB and AAA
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages, for each count of consummated rape.
NOTES:
Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law)
- prescribes that "the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence,
the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the
minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense."
- Under this law, the purpose of the prescription of minimum and maximum periods
under is to effect the privilege granted under the same law, for prisoners who have
served the minimum penalty to be eligible for parole per the discretion of the Board
of Indiscriminate Sentence.
- Convicts sentenced to suffer death penalty or life-imprisonment are ineligible under
this law, as are persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua, an indivisible penalty
without minimum or maximum periods.
Jurisprudence:
People v. Tolentino:
We ruled that the accused, who had been sentenced to die for the rape of his nine (9)-year old
stepdaughter, was guilty only of attempted rape. In explaining that "reclusion temporal" was
the proper penalty, the Court, through then Chief Justice Davide, explained:
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted felony is the
"penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony." In
this case, the penalty for the rape if it had been consummated would have been death, pursuant
to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, since [RT] was eight
years old and TOLENTINO was the common-law spouse of [RT's] mother. The last paragraph
thereof provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
The penalty in this case should have been reclusion temporal, which is the penalty lower by
two degrees than death. However, with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
TOLENTINO may be sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment penalty whose minimum
shall be within the range of prision mayor and whose maximum shall be within the range of
reclusion temporal in its medium period pursuant to Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
People v. Muñoz:
A divided Court ruled in that the constitutional bar on the imposition of the death penalty did
not enact "a corresponding modification in the other periods [in penalties]", there being no
expression of "such a requirement . . . in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution or
indicat[ion] therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication." In so concluding, the
Court made the oft-cited pronouncement that there was nothing in the 1987 Constitution
"which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty."
22
The accused in Muñoz were found guilty of murder, which under the RPC, carried the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The subject murders therein were not
attended by any modifying circumstance, and thus penalized in the penalty's medium term.
Jurisprudence previous to Muñoz held that the proper penalty in such instances should be "the
higher half of reclusion temporal maximum," with reclusion temporal maximum, divided into
two halves for that purpose.
Muñoz rejected this formulation, holding instead that the penalty should be reclusion perpetua.
Towards this conclusion, the Court made the above-cited conclusions relating to the
constitutional abolition of the death penalty, and the charter's effects on the other periods. Six
justices dissented from that ruling, and as recently as 1997, a member of the Court felt
strongly enough to publish a view urging the reexamination of Muñoz.
Muñoz made hay over the peculiar formulation of Sec. 19(1), Article III, which provided that
"[n]either shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it." Muñoz and its progenies, have interpreted that
provision as prohibiting the actual imposition of the death penalty, as opposed to enacting an
amendatory law that eliminates all references and applications of the death penalty in our
statutes. It can also be understood and appreciated that at the time Muñoz was decided, it
would have been polemical to foster an unequivocal pronouncement that Sec. 19(1), Article III
abolished the death penalty, since the very provision itself acknowledged that Congress may
nonetheless subsequently provide for the penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes," as Congress very well did just four (4) years after Muñoz. No such language exists in
R.A. No. 9346. Of course, the legislature has the inherent and
People v. Sarcia
G.R. No. 169641
September 10, 2009
Minority
FACTS:
On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her [cousin and two other
playmates], was playing in the yard of Saling Crisologo near a mango tree.
Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go with him to the backyard of Saling
Crisologo's house. She agreed. Unknown to appellant, [AAA's cousin] followed them.
Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAA's] shorts and underwear. He also removed
his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he ordered [AAA] to lie down on her back. Then, he lay on
top of her and inserted his penis into [AAA's] private organ. Appellant made an up-and-down
movement. [AAA] felt severe pain inside her private part and said "aray". She also felt an
intense pain inside her stomach.
[AAA's cousin], around five (5) meters away from them, witnessed appellant's dastardly act.
[AAA's cousin] instinctively rushed to the house of [AAA's] mother, Emily, and told the latter
what she had seen.
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and ordered [AAA] to put on her
clothes. Appellant then left.
Perplexed, [AAA's cousin] immediately returned to the backyard of Saling Crisologo where
she found [AAA] crying. [AAA's cousin] approached [AAA] and asked her what appellant
had done to her. When [AAA] did not answer, [her cousin] did not ask her any further
question and just accompanied her home.
At home, [AAA] did not tell Emily what appellant had done to her because she feared that her
mother might slap her. [AAA's cousin] came to their house and told Emily again that
appellant had earlier made an up-and-down movement on top of [AAA]. Emily, however did
not say anything.
After almost four (4) years, AAA's father filed a complaint for acts of lasciviousness against
herein accused-appellant on July 7, 2000.
Dr. Joana Manatloa testified that: [AAA]'s medical findings are negative for introital vulvar
laceration nor scars; means, in layman's language, that there was no showing of any scar or
wound, and there is a complete perforation of the hymen which means that it could have been
subjected to a certain trauma or pressure such as strenuous exercise or the entry of an object
like a medical instrument or penis.
Upon review of the evidence, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor upgraded the charge to
rape.  of his/her guilt.
ISSUE:
WON the accused-appellant can avail of the retroactive effect of R.A. 9344 with regard to
automatic suspension of sentence
HELD:
For purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant
is reclusion perpetua.
The CA also awarded P75,000.00 as civil indemnity. The award of moral damages is
P75,000.00 and exemplary damages is P30,000.00.
Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the New Bilibid Prison pending the
outcome of his appeal before this Court, Republic Act No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006 took effect on May 20, 2006.
The RTC decision and CA decision were promulgated on January 17, 2003 and July 14,
2005, respectively. The promulgation of the sentence of conviction of accused-appellant
handed down by the RTC was not suspended as he was about 25 years of age at that time, in
accordance with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth
Welfare Code and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict
with the Law. Accused-appellant is now approximately 31 years of age.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as follows:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentence. — Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence
23
at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for
which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise
benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. . . .
The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have
been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and
who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child
in conflict with the law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time
he/she is found guilty of the offense charged. It reads:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. — Once the child who is
under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine
and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the
offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of
conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however,
That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juvenile in
Conflict with the Law.
Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the said child
reaches the maximum age of 21, thus:
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. — If the
court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon
the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child
in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition
of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict
with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of
judgment. SHaIDE
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of
age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether
to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified
period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years. (emphasis ours)
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC
had been promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the
application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and
academic. However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under
 Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children
as follows:
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and
Other Training Facilities. — A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination
with the DSWD.
Llamado v CA
G.R. No. 84850. June 29, 1989
Facts:
Ricardo Llamado was a treasurer of Pan Asia Finance Corporation and was prosecuted for
violation of Batas Pambansa 22, along with Jacinto Pascual Sr. who is the President of the
same corporation. The two had co-signed a postdated check payable to the respondent Leon
Gaw which was dishonored for lack of funds.
In a decision dated March 10, 1987, the trial court convicted Llamado alone since the
jurisdiction over the person of Pascual, who had fled the country, had not been obtained.
Llamado orally manifested that he was taking an appeal and received a notice to file his
Apellant’s Brief within 30 days.
Llamado, with assistance from his new counsel, filed in the RTC a Petition for Probation
invoking PD 968, as amended. However, the petition was not accepted by the lower court
since the records of the case had already been forwarded to the CA.
Llamado filed with the CA a Manifestation and Petition for Probation, enclosing a copy of the
Petition for Probation that he had submitted to the trial court. He asked the CA to grant his
petition or, as an alternative, remand the petition back to the trial court for consideration and
approval under PD 968.
In a Resolution on June 17, 1988, the CA denied the Petition for Probation.
Issue:
Whether or not the application for probation (which was filed after a notice of appeal had been
filed with the trial court, after the records of the case had been forwarded to the Court of
Appeals and the Court of Appeals had issued the notice to file Appellant's Brief, after several
extensions of time to file Appellant's Brief had been sought from and granted by the Court of
Appeals but before actual filing of such brief) is barred under PD 968, as amended.
24
Held:
PD 968 is known as the Probation Law of 1976. Its section 4 was amended twice and reads as
follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within
the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem
best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only
An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application
shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
In applying Section 4, it must be asked whether by the time Llamado’s application was filed,
he had already perfected an appeal from the judgement of conviction of the RTC.
The period for perfecting an appeal is 15 days from the promulgation or notice of the
judgement appealed from. It is also stated in Rule 122, Section 3(a) of the Revised Rules of
Court that such appeal is taken to be perfected by simply filing a notice if appeal with the RTC
which rendered the judgement appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the People of
the Philippines.
Llamado had manifested orally and in open court his intention to appeal at the time of
promulgation of the judgement of conviction, a manifestation at least equivalent to a written
notice of appeal and treated as such by the RTC.
Although the Court understands Llamado’s argument of the cardinal rule in statutory
construction that “penal laws should be liberally construed in favor of the accused”, The
Probation Law is not a penal statute. Moreover, the Courts have no authority to invoke liberal
interpretation of the spirit of the law when the words of the statute themselves leave no room
for doubt or interpretation.
 the malum prohibitum.45 Intent to commit the crime is not necessary, but
intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law must be shown.
In Bayona, the Court declared: xxx The law which the defendant violated
is a statutory provision, and the intent with which he violated it is
immaterial. x x x x The act prohibited by the Election Law was complete.
The intention to intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise with the
election is not made an essential element of the offense. Unless such an
offender actually makes use of his revolver, it would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to prove that he intended to intimidate the
voters.

The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in
those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally
done. Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the
intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. * * * (U.S.
vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128).

3. PADILLA V DIZON proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea)

is not essential in offenses punished by special laws, which are mala
prohibita.

4. NO. QUIJADA: JUSTICE REGALADO: NOT ALL OFFENSES

PUNISHED UNDER SPL ARE MALA PROHIBITA.

1. mala in se require criminal intent on the part of the offender; in mala
prohibita, the mere commission of the prohibited act, regardless of intent,
is sufficient; and (2) mala in se refer to felonies in the Revised Penal
Code, while mala prohibita are offenses punished under special laws.
(QUIJANO)
In fact, even in the Revised Penal Code there are felonies which are
actually and essentially mala prohibita. To illustrate, in time of war,
and regardless of his intent, a person who shall have correspondence
with a hostile country or territory occupied by enemy troops shall be
punished therefor. An accountable public officer who voluntarily
fails to issue the required receipt for any sum of money officially
collected by him, regardless of his intent, is liable for illegal
exaction. Unauthorized possession of picklocks or similar tools,
regardless of the possessor's intent, is punishable as such illegal
possession. These are felonies under the Revised Penal Code but
criminal intent is not required therein. On the other hand, I need not
mention anymore that there are now in our statutes so many offenses
punished under special laws but wherein criminal intent is required
as an element, and which offenses are accordingly mala in se
although they are not felonies provided for in the Code.

5. In specific intent felonies, the prosecution must prove beyond

2. (LACERNA) Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act reasonable doubt the specific intent because it is an integral element
must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to of the crime. But sometimes, specific intent may be presumed.
commit a crime; but if he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by
the very nature of things, the crime itself, then he can be held liable for
25
  Ex. intent to kill must be proved. Onecan presume this, for
instance, from the mere fact that the victim died from a deliberate
act. But for attempted or frustrated homicide, intent to kill is not 8. RA 3019 Section 11. Prescription of offenses. All offenses
presumed and must be proved. punishable under this Act shall prescribe in ten years.

 Ex. intent to gain in theft. One is found in possession of recently 20 years (Sec. 11, RA 3019 as amended by RA 10910).
stolen property – there is a presumption.
10. “BLAMELESS IGNORANCE” DOCTRINE
o Criminal intent can be presumed from the commission of a
delictual act
Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the
invasion of a right which will support a cause of action. In other words, the courts would
decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no
reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action."
6. Teves: Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done
contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness,
vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man
owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.
The question as to whether an offense involves moral turpitude is for 11. Under RA No. 3326, which governs the prescription of offences punished by special laws,
the Supreme Court to decide. such as RA No. 10175 (Cybercrime), the prescriptive period of the offense is charged 12 years

1. Conviction of Estafa and/or BP 22. DISBARRED. isini said no. According to him, cyber libel’s prescriptive period should still be based on the
2. Conviction of bribery/ attempted bribery. DISBARRED. RPC, which is one year.
3. Conviction of murder. DISBARRED.
4. Conviction of illegal marriage before admission to the

bar. DISQUALIFIED FROM BEING ADMITTED TO THE BAR. 5. Conviction of In the 2014 decision of the Supreme Court, the en banc said that cyber libel is “not a new
falsification of public document. REMOVED FROM HIS OFFICE/NAME ERASED FROM crime but is one already punished under Article 353 (of the RPC).”
ROLL

OF ATTORNEYS.
6. Conviction of Estafa through falsification of public

document. DISBARRED.
7. Conviction of Abduction. SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE FOR

1 YEAR.
8. Conviction of Concubinage. SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE

FOR 1 YEAR.
9. Conviction of Smuggling. DISBARRED.

7. DIFFERENCE (CHECK JM REV)

26