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Statutory Interpretation - Wikipedia PDF
Statutory Interpretation - Wikipedia PDF
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Statutory
interpretation
History
Statutory interpretation first became
significant in common law systems, of
which England is the exemplar. In Roman
and Civil law, a statute (or code) guides
the magistrate, but there is no judicial
precedent. In England, Parliament
historically failed to enact a
comprehensive code of legislation, which
is why it was left to the courts to develop
the common law; and having decided a
case and given reasons for the decision,
the decision would become binding on
later courts.
General principles
The age old process of application of the
enacted law has led to formulation of
certain rules of interpretation. According
to CROSS, "Interpretation is the process by
which the courts determine the meaning
of a statutory provision for the purpose of
applying it to the situation before them."[6]
While SALMOND says that, "the process by
which the courts seek to ascertain the
meaning of the legislature through the
medium of authoritative forms in which it
is expressed".[7] Interpretation of a
particular statute depends upon the
degree of creativity applied by the judges
or the court in the reading of it, employed
to achieve some stated end. A statute can
be interpreted by using the Golden Rule,
the Mischief Rule or the Literal Rule.
United States …
Meaning …
Findings;
Declarations, sometimes suffixed with of
Policy or of Intent; or
Sense of Congress, or of either house in
multi-chamber bodies.
These provisions of the bill simply give the
legislature's goals and desired effects of
the law, and are considered non
substantive and non-enforceable in and of
themselves.[16][17]
Canons
Also known as canons of construction,
canons give common sense guidance to
courts in interpreting the meaning of
statutes. Most canons emerge from the
common law process through the choices
of judges. Proponents of the use of
canons argue that the canons constrain
judges and limit the ability of the courts to
legislate from the bench. Critics argue that
a judge always has a choice between
competing canons that lead to different
results, so judicial discretion is only hidden
through the use of canons, not reduced.
Textual …
Plain meaning
When writing statutes, the legislature
intends to use ordinary English words in
their ordinary senses. The United States
Supreme Court discussed the plain
meaning rule in Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917), reasoning "
[i]t is elementary that the meaning of a
statute must, in the first instance, be
sought in the language in which the act
is framed, and if that is plain... the sole
function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms." And if a statute's
language is plain and clear, the Court
further warned that "the duty of
interpretation does not arise, and the
rules which are to aid doubtful
meanings need no discussion."
Rule against surplusage
Where one reading of a statute would
make one or more parts of the statute
redundant and another reading would
avoid the redundancy, the other reading
is preferred.[18]
Eiusdem generis ("of the same kinds,
class, or nature")
When a list of two or more specific
descriptors is followed by more general
descriptors, the otherwise wide meaning
of the general descriptors must be
restricted to the same class, if any, of
the specific words that precede them.
For example, where "cars, motor bikes,
motor powered vehicles" are mentioned,
the word "vehicles" would be interpreted
in a limited sense (therefore vehicles
cannot be interpreted as including
airplanes).
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
("the express mention of one thing
excludes all others"), or "Expression of
one"
Items not on the list are impliedly
assumed not to be covered by the
statute or a contract term.[19] However,
sometimes a list in a statute is
illustrative, not exclusionary. This is
usually indicated by a word such as
"includes" or "such as."
In pari materia ("upon the same matter
or subject")
When a statute is ambiguous, its
meaning may be determined in light of
other statutes on the same subject
matter.
Noscitur a sociis ("a word is known by
the company it keeps")
When a word is ambiguous, its meaning
may be determined by reference to the
rest of the statute.
Reddendo singula singulis or "referring
each to each"
"When a will says "I devise and bequeath
all my real and personal property to A",
the principle of reddendo singula
singulis would apply as if it read "I
devise all my real property, and
bequeath all my personal property, to A",
since the word devise is appropriate
only to real property and the term
bequeath is appropriate only to personal
property."[20]
Generalia specialibus non derogant ("the
general does not detract from the
specific")
Described in The Vera Cruz[21] as: "Now
if anything be certain it is this, that
where there are general words in a later
Act capable of reasonable and sensible
application without extending them to
subjects specially dealt with by earlier
legislation, you are not to hold that
earlier legislation indirectly repealed,
altered, or derogated from merely by
force of such general words, without any
evidence of a particular intention to do
so." This means that if a later law and an
earlier law are potentially—but not
necessarily—in conflict, courts will adopt
the reading that does not result in an
implied repeal of the earlier statute.
Lawmaking bodies usually need to be
explicit if they intend to repeal an earlier
law.
Substantive …
Substantive canons instruct the court to
favor interpretations that promote certain
values or policy results.
Deference …
Deference to Administrative
Interpretations (US Chevron deference)
If a statute administered by an agency is
ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the courts will defer to the
agency's reasonable interpretation of
the statute. This rule of deference was
formulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
Avoidance Canon (Canon of
Constitutional Avoidance)
If a statute is susceptible to more than
one reasonable construction, courts
should choose an interpretation that
avoids raising constitutional problems.
In the US, this canon has grown stronger
in recent history. The traditional
avoidance canon required the court to
choose a different interpretation only
when one interpretation was actually
unconstitutional. The modern avoidance
canon tells the court to choose a
different interpretation when another
interpretation merely raises
constitutional doubts.[31][32]
Avoiding Absurdity
The legislature did not intend an absurd
or manifestly unjust result.[33][34]
Clear statement rule
When a statute may be interpreted to
abridge long-held rights of individuals or
states, or make a large policy change,
courts will not interpret the statute to
make the change unless the legislature
clearly stated it. This rule is based on
the assumption that the legislature
would not make major changes in a
vague or unclear way, and to ensure that
voters are able to hold the appropriate
legislators responsible for the
modification.
Leges posteriores priores contrarias
abrogant (Subsequent laws repeal those
before enacted to the contrary, aka
"Last in Time")
When two statutes conflict, the one
enacted last prevails.
See implied repeal and derogation.
Criticism …
U.S. Courts
The common textual canons of statutory
construction employed in American
jurisprudence are: (1) Ejusdem generis - "of
the same kinds, class, or nature," [36] (2)
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius - "the
express mention of one thing excludes all
others," [37] (3) Noscitur a sociis - "a word is
known by the company it keeps,"[38](4) In
pari materia - "upon the same matter or
subject," and (5) Common, technical, legal,
or trade definition.[39]
European perception
The French philosopher Montesquieu
(1689-1755) believed that courts should
act as "the mouth of the law", but soon it
was found that some interpretation is
inevitable. Following the German scholar
Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861) the
four main interpretation methods are:
International treaties
The interpretation of international treaties
is governed by another treaty, the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, notably
Articles 31-33. Some states (such as the
United States) are not a parties to the
treaty, but recognize that the Convention
is, at least in part, merely a codification of
customary international law.
Philosophies
Over time, various methods of statutory
construction have fallen in and out of
favor. Some of the better-known rules of
construction methods are:
References
1. Notes on the English Legal System -
2016 - Trevor Lyons - LJMU
2. Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132, [1969]
2 WLR 470, 53 Cr App R 221, [1969] 1
All ER 347, HL, reversing [1968] 2 QB
418
3. As with EU Law, so in the UK an
individual who is specifically targeted
by a statute will normally have locus
standi to bring a challenge by way of
Judicial Review
4. Shaw v DPP [1962] AC 220
5. R (Factortame Ltd) v Secretary of
State for Transport (No 2) [1991] 1 AC
603
. Rupert Cross, Statutory interpretation,
3rd Edition, p.34 ISBN 978-
0406049711
7. SALMOND: "Jurisprudence"11th
Edition, p.152
. Vishnu Pratap Sugar works (private)
ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Stamp, U.P.,
AIR 1968 SC 102, p. 104
9. R v. Secretary of State for the
Environment expert Spath Holme,
(2001) 1 All ER 195, p. 216(HL)
10. Venkataswami Naidu v. Narasram
Naraindas, AIR 1966 SC 361, p.363
11. GP Singh, Principles of Statutory
Interpretation, 13th Edition, p.4
12. "let" . Oxford English Dictionary (3rd
ed.). Oxford University Press.
September 2005. (Subscription or UK
public library membership required.)
13. "peculiar" . Oxford English Dictionary
(3rd ed.). Oxford University Press.
September 2005. (Subscription or UK
public library membership required.)
Further reading
CRS Report for Congress: "Statutory
interpretation: General Principles and
Recent Trends" (public domain - can be
copied into article with citations)
The multi-volume Sutherland Statutory
Construction is the authoritative text on
the rules of statutory construction.
Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of
Appellate Decisions and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be
Construed 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950).
United States of America v. William C.
Scrimgeour 636 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir.
1981) discusses most aspects of
statutory construction.
Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of
Construction and the Elusive Quest for
Neutral Reasoning
Sinclair, Michael, "Llewellyn's Dueling
Canons, One to Seven: A Critique" . New
York Law School Law Review, Vol. 51,
Fall 2006.
Jon May, "Statutory Construction: Not
For The Timid" , The Champion
Magazine (NACDL), January/February
2006.
Corrigan & Thomas, "Dice Loading"
Rules Of Statutory Interpretation , 59
NYU Annual Survey Of American Law
231, 238 (2003).
The Rules of Statutory Construction
(Virginia)
Statutory Interpretation, by Ruth Sullivan,
1997. Canadian examples and
explanations.
Menahem Pasternak, Christophe Rico,
Tax Interpretation, Planning, and
Avoidance: Some Linguistic Analysis, 23
Akron Tax Journal, 33 (2008)
(http://www.uakron.edu/law/lawreview/t
axjournal/atj23/docs/Pasternak08.pdf )
.
External links
Statutory Construction Blog
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