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Statutory
interpretation

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Statutory interpretation is the process by

which courts interpret and apply
legislation. Some amount of interpretation
is often necessary when a case involves a
statute. Sometimes the words of a statute
have a plain and a straightforward
meaning. But in many cases, there is some
ambiguity or vagueness in the words of
the statute that must be resolved by the
judge. To find the meanings of statutes,
judges use various tools and methods of
statutory interpretation, including
traditional canons of statutory
interpretation, legislative history, and
purpose. In common law jurisdictions, the
judiciary may apply rules of statutory
interpretation both to legislation enacted
by the legislature and to delegated
legislation such as administrative agency
regulations.

History
Statutory interpretation first became
significant in common law systems, of
which England is the exemplar. In Roman
and Civil law, a statute (or code) guides
the magistrate, but there is no judicial
precedent. In England, Parliament
historically failed to enact a
comprehensive code of legislation, which
is why it was left to the courts to develop
the common law; and having decided a
case and given reasons for the decision,
the decision would become binding on
later courts.

Accordingly, a particular interpretation of a

statute would also become binding, and it
became necessary to introduce a
consistent framework for statutory
interpretation. In the construction
(interpretation) of statutes, the principle
aim of the court must be to carry out the
"Intention of Parliament", and the English
courts developed three main rules (plus
some minor ones) to assist them in the
task. These were: the mischief rule, the
literal rule, and the golden rule.

Statutes may be presumed to incorporate

certain components, as Parliament is
"presumed" to have intended their
inclusion.[1] For example:

Offences defined in criminal statutes are

presumed to require mens rea (a guilty
intention by the accused), Sweet v
Parsley.[2]
A statute is presumed to make no
changes in the common law.
A statute is presumed not to remove an
individual's liberty, vested rights, or
property.[3]
A statute is presumed not to apply to the
Crown.
A statute is presumed not to apply
retrospectively (whereas the common
law is "declaratory", Shaw v DPP).[4]
A statute is to be interpreted so as to
uphold international treaties; and any
statutory provision which contravene EC
treaties are effectively void,
Factortame.[5]
 It is presumed that a statute will be
interpreted eiusdem generis, so that
words are to be construed in sympathy
with their immediate context.

Where legislation and case law are in

conflict, there is a presumption that
legislation takes precedence insofar as
there is any inconsistency. In the United
Kingdom this principle is known as
parliamentary sovereignty; but while
Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction to
legislate, the courts (mindful of their
historic role of having developed the entire
system of common law) retain sole
jurisdiction to interpret statutes.

General principles
The age old process of application of the
enacted law has led to formulation of
certain rules of interpretation. According
to CROSS, "Interpretation is the process by
which the courts determine the meaning
of a statutory provision for the purpose of
applying it to the situation before them."[6]
While SALMOND says that, "the process by
which the courts seek to ascertain the
meaning of the legislature through the
medium of authoritative forms in which it
is expressed".[7] Interpretation of a
particular statute depends upon the
degree of creativity applied by the judges
or the court in the reading of it, employed
to achieve some stated end. A statute can
be interpreted by using the Golden Rule,
the Mischief Rule or the Literal Rule.

Intention of the Legislature …

A statute is an edict of the legislature[8]

and the conventional way of interpreting a
statute is to seek the 'intention' of its
maker. It is the judicature's duty to act
upon the true intention of the legislature or
the mens or sentential legis. The courts
have to objectively determine the
interpretation with guidance furnished by
the accepted principles.[9] If a statutory
provision is open to more than one
interpretation the court has to choose that
interpretation which represents the true
intention of the legislature.[10] The function
of the courts is only to expound and not to
legislate.[11]

United States …
Meaning …

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The judiciary interprets how legislation

should apply in a particular case as no
legislation unambiguously and specifically
addresses all matters. Legislation may
contain uncertainties for a variety of
reasons:

Words are imperfect symbols to

communicate intent. They are
ambiguous and change in meaning over
time. The word 'let' used to mean
'prevent' or 'hinder'[12] and now means
'allow'. The word 'peculiar' is used to
mean both specific and unusual, e.g.
"kangaroos are peculiar to Australia,"
and "it's very peculiar to see a kangaroo
outside Australia." [13]
Unforeseen situations are inevitable,
and new technologies and cultures
make application of existing laws
difficult. (e.g. does the use of a new
cloning technique create an embryo
within the meaning of statute enacted
when embryos could only be created by
fertilisation?)[14]
 Uncertainties may be added to the
statute in the course of enactment, such
as the need for compromise or catering
to special interest groups.

Therefore, the court must try to determine

how a statute should be enforced. This
requires statutory construction. It is a
tenet of statutory construction that the
legislature is supreme (assuming
constitutionality) when creating law and
that the court is merely an interpreter of
the law. Nevertheless, in practice, by
performing the construction the court can
make sweeping changes in the operation
of the law.

Statutory interpretation refers to the

process by which a court looks at a
statute and determines what it means. A
statute, which is a bill or law passed by the
legislature, imposes obligations and rules
on the people. Although legislature makes
the Statute, it may be open to
interpretation and have ambiguities.
Statutory interpretation is the process of
resolving those ambiguities and deciding
how a particular bill or law will apply in a
particular case.

Assume, for example, that a statute

mandates that all motor vehicles travelling
on a public roadway must be registered
with the Department of Motor Vehicles
(DMV). If the statute does not define the
term "motor vehicles", then that term will
have to be interpreted if questions arise in
a court of law. A person driving a
motorcycle might be pulled over and the
police may try to fine him if his motorcycle
is not registered with the DMV. If that
individual argued to the court that a
motorcycle is not a "motor vehicle," then
the court would have to interpret the
statute to determine what the legislature
meant by "motor vehicle" and whether or
not the motorcycle fell within that
definition and was covered by the statute.

There are numerous rules of statutory

interpretation. The first and most
important rule is the rule dealing with the
statute's plain language. This rule
essentially states that the statute means
what it says. If, for example, the statute
says "motor vehicles", then the court is
most likely to construe that the legislation
is referring to the broad range of
motorised vehicles normally required to
travel along roadways and not
"aeroplanes" or "bicycles" even though
aeroplanes are vehicles propelled by a
motor and bicycles may be used on a
roadway.

In Australia and in the United States, the

courts have consistently stated that the
text of the statute is used first, and it is
read as it is written, using the ordinary
meaning of the words of the statute.

Below are various quotes on this topic

from US courts:

U.S. Supreme Court: "We begin with the

familiar canon of statutory construction
that the starting point for interpreting a
statute is the language of the statute
itself. Absent a clearly expressed
legislative intention to the contrary, that
language must ordinarily be regarded as
conclusive.:" Consumer Product Safety
Commission et al. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. et
al.,447 U.S. 102 (1980). "[I]n interpreting
a statute a court should always turn to
one cardinal canon before all others. . . .
[C]ourts must presume that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there."
Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S.
Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992). Indeed, "when the
words of a statute are unambiguous,
then, this first canon is also the last:
'judicial inquiry is complete.'" 503 U.S.
249, 254.
9th Circuit Court of Appeals: In the
dissent from en banc rehearing of
Silveira v. Lockyer 312 F.3rd 1052 (2002),
dissent at 328 F.3d 567 (2003) at 575,
Judge Kleinfeld stated "it is 'a cardinal
principle of statutory construction that
we must give effect, if possible, to every
clause and word of a statute.' Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404, 120 S.Ct.
1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)."
Supreme Court of Virginia: "Every part of
an act is presumed to be of some effect
and is not to be treated as meaningless
unless absolutely necessary." Red Ash
Coal Corp. v. Absher, 153 Va. 332, 335,
149 S.E. 541, 542 (1929).
Supreme Court of Alaska: "In assessing
statutory language, unless words have
acquired a peculiar meaning, by virtue of
statutory definition or judicial
construction, they are to be construed in
accordance with their common usage."
Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923
P.2d 783, 787-88 (Alaska 1996);
Arkansas Supreme Court: "When
reviewing issues of statutory
interpretation, we keep in mind that the
first rule in considering the meaning and
effect of a statute is to construe it just
as it reads, giving the words their
ordinary and usually accepted meaning
in common language. When the
language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort
to rules of statutory construction. A
statute is ambiguous only where it is
open to two or more constructions, or
where it is of such obscure or doubtful
meaning that reasonable minds might
disagree or be uncertain as to its
meaning. When a statute is clear,
however, it is given its plain meaning,
and this court will not search for
legislative intent; rather, that intent must
be gathered from the plain meaning of
the language used. This court is very
hesitant to interpret a legislative act in a
manner contrary to its express
language, unless it is clear that a
drafting error or omission has
circumvented legislative intent." Farrell v.
Farrell, 365 Ark. 465, 231 S.W.3d 619.
(2006)
New Mexico Supreme Court: "The
principal command of statutory
construction is that the court should
determine and effectuate the intent of
the legislature using the plain language
of the statute as the primary indicator of
legislative intent." State v. Ogden, 118
N.M. 234, 242, 880 P.2d 845, 853 (1994)
"The words of a statute . . . should be
given their ordinary meaning, absent
clear and express legislative intention to
the contrary," as long as the ordinary
meaning does "not render the statute's
application absurd, unreasonable, or
unjust." State v. Rowell, 121 N.M. 111,
114, 908 P.2d 1379, 1382 (1995) When
the meaning of a statute is unclear or
ambiguous, we have recognized that it
is "the high duty and responsibility of the
judicial branch of government to
facilitate and promote the legislature's
accomplishment of its purpose." State
ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346,
353, 871 P.2d 1352, 1359 (1994). - New
Mexico v. Juan, 2010-NMSC-041, August
9, 2010
California Court of Appeals, 4th District:
"Our role in construing a statute is to
ascertain the intent of the Legislature so
as to effectuate the purpose of the law.
(People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th
86, 94 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d
441].) Because the statutory language is
generally the most reliable indicator of
that intent, we look first at the words
themselves, giving them their usual and
ordinary meaning. (People v. Lawrence
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 219, 230 [99
Cal.Rptr.2d 570, 6 P.3d 228].) We do not,
however, consider the statutory
language in isolation, but rather examine
the entire substance of the statute in
order to determine the scope and
purpose of the provision, construing its
words in context and harmonizing its
various parts. (People v. Acosta (2002)
29 Cal.4th 105, 112 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d
435, 52 P.3d 624].)" Alford v. Superior
Court (People) (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033,
1040
United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit: "As in all statutory
construction cases, we begin with the
language of the statute. The first step is
to determine whether the language at
issue has a plain and unambiguous
meaning with regard to the particular
dispute in the case." Barnhart v. Sigmon
Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) "
[U]nless otherwise defined, statutory
words will be interpreted as taking their
ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning." United States v. Piervinanzi, 23
F.3d 670, 677 (2d Cir. 1994).
Maryland Court of Appeals: "[W]e begin
our analysis by reviewing the pertinent
rules of [statutory construction]. Of
course, the cardinal rule is to ascertain
and effectuate legislative intent. To this
end, we begin our inquiry with the words
of the statute and, ordinarily, when the
words of the statute are clear and
unambiguous, according to their
commonly understood meaning, we end
our inquiry there also." Chesapeake and
 Potomac Telephone Co. of Maryland v.
Director of Finance for Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, 343 Md. 567, 683
A.2d 512 (1996)
Indiana Court of Appeals: "The first and
often last step in interpreting a statute is
to examine the language of the statute.
We will not, however, interpret a statute
that is clear and unambiguous on its
face." Ashley v. State, 757 N.E.2d 1037,
1039 , 1040 (2001).
Conflict of laws within a federation …
 This section needs additional citations for
verification. Learn more

Federal jurisdictions may presume that

either federal or local government
authority prevails in the absence of a
defined rule. In Canada, there are areas of
law where provincial governments and the
federal government have concurrent
jurisdiction. In these cases the federal law
is held to be paramount. However, in areas
where the Canadian constitution is silent,
the federal government does not
necessarily have superior jurisdiction.
Rather, an area of law that is not expressly
mentioned in Canada's Constitution will
have to be interpreted to fall under either
the federal residual jurisdiction found in
the preamble of s. 91—known as the
Peace, Order and Good Government
clause—or the provinces residual
jurisdiction of "Property and Civil Rights"
under s. 92(13) of the 1867 Constitution
Act. This contrasts with other federal
jurisdictions, notably the United States and
Australia, where it is presumed that if
legislation is not enacted pursuant to a
specific provision of the federal
Constitution, the states will have authority
over the relevant matter in their respective
jurisdictions, unless the state's definitions
of their statutes conflicts with federally
established or recognized rights.

Internal and external consistency …

It is presumed that a statute will be

interpreted so as to be internally
consistent. A particular section of the
statute shall not be divorced from the rest
of the act. The ejusdem generis (or
eiusdem generis, Latin for "of the same
kind") rule applies to resolve the problem
of giving meaning to groups of words
where one of the words is ambiguous or
inherently unclear. The rule results that
where "general words follow enumerations
of particular classes or persons or things,
the general words shall be construed as
applicable only to persons or things of the
same general nature or kind as those
enumerated."[15]

A statute shall not be interpreted so as to

be inconsistent with other statutes. Where
there is an inconsistency, the judiciary will
attempt to provide a harmonious
interpretation.
Statements of the legislature …

Legislative bodies themselves may try to

influence or assist the courts in
interpreting their laws by placing into the
legislation itself statements to that effect.
These provisions have many different
names, but are typically noted as:

Findings;
Declarations, sometimes suffixed with of
Policy or of Intent; or
Sense of Congress, or of either house in
multi-chamber bodies.
These provisions of the bill simply give the
legislature's goals and desired effects of
the law, and are considered non
substantive and non-enforceable in and of
themselves.[16][17]

Canons
Also known as canons of construction,
canons give common sense guidance to
courts in interpreting the meaning of
statutes. Most canons emerge from the
common law process through the choices
of judges. Proponents of the use of
canons argue that the canons constrain
judges and limit the ability of the courts to
legislate from the bench. Critics argue that
a judge always has a choice between
competing canons that lead to different
results, so judicial discretion is only hidden
through the use of canons, not reduced.

Textual …

Textual canons are rules of thumb for

understanding the words of the text. Some
of the canons are still known by their
traditional Latin names.

Plain meaning
When writing statutes, the legislature
intends to use ordinary English words in
their ordinary senses. The United States
Supreme Court discussed the plain
meaning rule in Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917), reasoning "
[i]t is elementary that the meaning of a
statute must, in the first instance, be
sought in the language in which the act
is framed, and if that is plain... the sole
function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms." And if a statute's
language is plain and clear, the Court
further warned that "the duty of
interpretation does not arise, and the
rules which are to aid doubtful
meanings need no discussion."
Rule against surplusage
Where one reading of a statute would
make one or more parts of the statute
redundant and another reading would
avoid the redundancy, the other reading
is preferred.[18]
Eiusdem generis ("of the same kinds,
class, or nature")
When a list of two or more specific
descriptors is followed by more general
descriptors, the otherwise wide meaning
of the general descriptors must be
restricted to the same class, if any, of
the specific words that precede them.
For example, where "cars, motor bikes,
motor powered vehicles" are mentioned,
the word "vehicles" would be interpreted
in a limited sense (therefore vehicles
cannot be interpreted as including
airplanes).
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
("the express mention of one thing
excludes all others"), or "Expression of
one"
Items not on the list are impliedly
assumed not to be covered by the
statute or a contract term.[19] However,
sometimes a list in a statute is
illustrative, not exclusionary. This is
usually indicated by a word such as
"includes" or "such as."
In pari materia ("upon the same matter
or subject")
When a statute is ambiguous, its
meaning may be determined in light of
other statutes on the same subject
matter.
Noscitur a sociis ("a word is known by
the company it keeps")
When a word is ambiguous, its meaning
may be determined by reference to the
rest of the statute.
Reddendo singula singulis or "referring
each to each"
"When a will says "I devise and bequeath
all my real and personal property to A",
the principle of reddendo singula
singulis would apply as if it read "I
devise all my real property, and
bequeath all my personal property, to A",
since the word devise is appropriate
only to real property and the term
bequeath is appropriate only to personal
property."[20]
Generalia specialibus non derogant ("the
general does not detract from the
specific")
Described in The Vera Cruz[21] as: "Now
if anything be certain it is this, that
where there are general words in a later
Act capable of reasonable and sensible
application without extending them to
subjects specially dealt with by earlier
legislation, you are not to hold that
earlier legislation indirectly repealed,
 altered, or derogated from merely by
force of such general words, without any
evidence of a particular intention to do
so." This means that if a later law and an
earlier law are potentially—but not
necessarily—in conflict, courts will adopt
the reading that does not result in an
implied repeal of the earlier statute.
Lawmaking bodies usually need to be
explicit if they intend to repeal an earlier
law.

Substantive …
Substantive canons instruct the court to
favor interpretations that promote certain
values or policy results.

Charming Betsy canon 

National statute must be construed so
as not to conflict with international law.
See Murray v. The Charming Betsy , 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804): "It has also
been observed that an act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate
the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains..."
Interpretation in light of fundamental
values 
Statute does not violate fundamental
societal values. See, for example, Holy
Trinity Church v. United States,[22] or Coco
v The Queen.[23] However, legislation that
is intended to be consistent with
fundamental rights can be overridden by
clear and unambiguous language.[24]
Rule of lenity 
In construing an ambiguous criminal
statute, the court should resolve the
ambiguity in favor of the
defendant.[25][26]:296–302 See McNally v.
United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987); See,
e.g., Muscarello v. U.S., 524 U.S. 125
(1998) (declining to apply the rule of
lenity); Evans v. U.S., 504 U.S. 255
(1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Scarborough v. U.S., 431 U.S. 563 (1977)
(Stewart, J., dissenting); See United
States v. Santos (2008).
Avoidance of abrogation of state
sovereignty 
See Gregory v. Ashcroft;[27] see also
Gonzales v. Oregon;[28] see also Nevada
Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs,[29]
except where such would deprive the
defendant of bedrock, foundational
rights that the Federal Government
intended to be the minimum floor that
the states were not allowed to fall
beneath; Dombrowski v Pfister.[30]
'Indian' canon 
National statute must be construed in
favor of Native Americans. See
Chickasaw Nation v. United States , 534
U.S. 84 (2001): "statutes are to be
construed liberally in favor of Indians
with ambiguous provisions interpreted
to their benefit." This canon can be
 likened to the doctrine of contra
proferentem in contract law.

Deference …

Deference canons instruct the court to

defer to the interpretation of another
institution, such as an administrative
agency or Congress. These canons reflect
an understanding that the judiciary is not
the only branch of government entrusted
with constitutional responsibility.

Deference to Administrative
Interpretations (US Chevron deference) 
If a statute administered by an agency is
ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the courts will defer to the
agency's reasonable interpretation of
the statute. This rule of deference was
formulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
Avoidance Canon (Canon of
Constitutional Avoidance) 
If a statute is susceptible to more than
one reasonable construction, courts
should choose an interpretation that
avoids raising constitutional problems.
In the US, this canon has grown stronger
in recent history. The traditional
avoidance canon required the court to
choose a different interpretation only
when one interpretation was actually
unconstitutional. The modern avoidance
canon tells the court to choose a
different interpretation when another
interpretation merely raises
constitutional doubts.[31][32]
Avoiding Absurdity 
The legislature did not intend an absurd
or manifestly unjust result.[33][34]
Clear statement rule 
When a statute may be interpreted to
abridge long-held rights of individuals or
states, or make a large policy change,
courts will not interpret the statute to
make the change unless the legislature
clearly stated it. This rule is based on
the assumption that the legislature
would not make major changes in a
vague or unclear way, and to ensure that
voters are able to hold the appropriate
legislators responsible for the
modification.
 Leges posteriores priores contrarias
abrogant (Subsequent laws repeal those
before enacted to the contrary, aka
"Last in Time") 
When two statutes conflict, the one
enacted last prevails.
See implied repeal and derogation.

Criticism …

Critics of the use of canons argue that

canons impute some sort of
"omniscience" to the legislature,
suggesting that it is aware of the canons
when constructing the laws. In addition, it
is argued that the canons give a credence
to judges who want to construct the law a
certain way, imparting a false sense of
justification to their otherwise arbitrary
process. In a classic article, Karl Llewellyn
argued that every canon had a "counter-
canon" that would lead to the opposite
interpretation of the statute.[35]

U.S. Courts
The common textual canons of statutory
construction employed in American
jurisprudence are: (1) Ejusdem generis - "of
the same kinds, class, or nature," [36] (2)
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius - "the
express mention of one thing excludes all
others," [37] (3) Noscitur a sociis - "a word is
known by the company it keeps,"[38](4) In
pari materia - "upon the same matter or
subject," and (5) Common, technical, legal,
or trade definition.[39]

European perception
The French philosopher Montesquieu
(1689-1755) believed that courts should
act as "the mouth of the law", but soon it
was found that some interpretation is
inevitable. Following the German scholar
Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861) the
four main interpretation methods are:

Grammatical interpretation: using the

literal meaning of the statutory text.
Historical interpretation: using the
legislative history, to reveal the intent of
the legislator.
Systematic interpretation: considering
the context of provisions, if only by
acknowledging in which chapter a
provision is listed.
Teleological interpretation: considering
the purpose of the statute is considered,
 as it appears from legislative history, or
other observations.

It is controversial whether there is a

hierarchy between interpretation methods.
Germans prefer a "grammatical" (literal)
interpretation, because the statutory text
has a democratic legitimation, and
"sensible" interpretations are risky, in
particular in view of German history.
"Sensible" means different things to
different people. The modern common law
perception that courts actually make law is
very different. In a German perception,
courts can only further develop law
("Rechtsfortbildung"). All of the above
methods may seem reasonable:

It may be considered undemocratic to

ignore the literal text, because only that
text was passed through democratic
processes. Indeed, there may be no
single legislative "intent" other than the
literal text that was enacted by the
legislature, because different legislators
may have different views about the
meaning of an enacted statute. It may
also be considered unfair to depart from
the literal text because a citizen reading
 the literal text may not have fair notice
that a court would depart from its literal
meaning, nor fair notice as to what
meaning the court would adopt. It may
also be unwise to depart from the literal
text if judges are generally less likely
than legislatures to enact wise policies.
But it may also seem unfair to ignore the
intent of the legislators, or the system of
the statutes. So for instance in Dutch
law, no general priority sequence for the
above methods is recognized.

The freedom of interpretation varies by

area of law. Criminal law and tax law must
be interpreted very strictly, and never to
the disadvantage of citizens, but liability
law requires more elaborate interpretation,
because here (usually) both parties are
citizens. Here the statute may even be
interpreted contra legem in exceptional
cases, if otherwise a patently
unreasonable result would follow.

International treaties
The interpretation of international treaties
is governed by another treaty, the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, notably
Articles 31-33. Some states (such as the
United States) are not a parties to the
treaty, but recognize that the Convention
is, at least in part, merely a codification of
customary international law.

The rule set out in the Convention is

essentially that the text of a treaty is
decisive unless it either leaves the
meaning ambiguous, or obscure, or leads
to a result that is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable. Recourse to "supplementary
means of interpretation" is allowed only in
that case, like the preparatory works, also
known by the French designation of
travaux préparatoires.

Philosophies
Over time, various methods of statutory
construction have fallen in and out of
favor. Some of the better-known rules of
construction methods are:

The Golden rule

The Literal rule
The Mischief rule
The Purposive approach
See also
Sui generis § Statutory
Original intent — Original meaning —
Textualism
Interpretation Act
Judicial activism
Judicial interpretation
Legal interpretation in South Africa
Statutory term analysis
Rule of law
Pepper v. Hart [1993] AC 573

References
1. Notes on the English Legal System -
2016 - Trevor Lyons - LJMU
2. Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132, [1969]
2 WLR 470, 53 Cr App R 221, [1969] 1
All ER 347, HL, reversing [1968] 2 QB
418
3. As with EU Law, so in the UK an
individual who is specifically targeted
by a statute will normally have locus
standi to bring a challenge by way of
Judicial Review
4. Shaw v DPP [1962] AC 220
5. R (Factortame Ltd) v Secretary of
State for Transport (No 2) [1991] 1 AC
603
. Rupert Cross, Statutory interpretation,
3rd Edition, p.34 ISBN 978-
0406049711
7. SALMOND: "Jurisprudence"11th
Edition, p.152
. Vishnu Pratap Sugar works (private)
ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Stamp, U.P.,
AIR 1968 SC 102, p. 104
 9. R v. Secretary of State for the
Environment expert Spath Holme,
(2001) 1 All ER 195, p. 216(HL)
10. Venkataswami Naidu v. Narasram
Naraindas, AIR 1966 SC 361, p.363
11. GP Singh, Principles of Statutory
Interpretation, 13th Edition, p.4
12. "let" . Oxford English Dictionary (3rd
ed.). Oxford University Press.
September 2005. (Subscription or UK
public library membership required.)
13. "peculiar" . Oxford English Dictionary
(3rd ed.). Oxford University Press.
September 2005. (Subscription or UK
public library membership required.)

14. Pattinson, Shaun D.; Kind, Vanessa

(2017). "Using a moot to develop
students' understanding of human
cloning and statutory interpretation" .
Medical Law International. 17 (3):
111–133.
doi:10.1177/0968533217726350 .
PMC 5598875 . PMID 28943724 .
15. Walling v. Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co.,
49 F. Supp. 846, 859 (W.D. La. 1943).
1 . Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory
Construction, 6th Edition, Vol. 1A,
§20.12 (West Group 2000)
17. American Jurisprudence 2d, Vol. 73,
"Statutes" (West Group 2001)
1 . "Page Not Found — Georgetown Law"
(PDF). www.law.georgetown.edu.
Retrieved March 23, 2018.
19. Garner, Bryan A.. Ed. In Chief. (1999).
Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed.). St.
Paul, MN: West Publishing. p. 602.
20. "US Legal definitions" .
21. (1884) 10 App Cas 59
22. Holy Trinity Church v. United States
143 U.S. 457 (1892)
23. Coco v The Queen [1994] HCA 15 ,
(1994) 179 CLR 427, High Court
(Australia).
24. Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v
Australian Workers' Union [2004] HCA
40 , (2004) 221 CLR 309 (2 September
2004), High Court (Australia).
25. "A man's jail term turns on a comma" .
The Economist. November 4, 2015.
Retrieved November 9, 2015.
2 . Scalia, Antonin; Garne, Bryan A.
(2012). Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts.
ISBN 9780314275554. "Blurred
signposts to criminality will not suffice
to create it."
27. Gregory v. Ashcroft 501 U.S. 452
(1991)
2 . Gonzales v. Oregon 546 U.S. 243
(2006)
29. Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v.
Hibbs 538 U.S. 721 (2003)
30. Dombrowski v Pfister, 380 U.S. 479
(1965).
31. Einer Elhauge. Statutory Default Rules:
How to Interpret Unclear Legislation.
Harvard University Press (2008), p.
237–39 . ISBN 978-0-674-02460-1.
32. "United States v. Jin Fuey Moy", 241
U.S. 394, 401 (1916).
33. Einer Elhauge. Statutory Default Rules:
How to Interpret Unclear Legislation.
Harvard University Press (2008), p.
148 . ISBN 978-0-674-02460-1.
34. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,
490 U.S. 504 (1989).
35. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the
Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules of Canons About How Statutes
are to be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev.
395 (1950) republished with
permission in 5 Green Bag 297 (2002).
3 . Singer, Norman J. 2A Sutherland
Statutory Construction (7th ed.).
Thomas Reuters. p. § 47:17.
37. 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction
§ 47:23
3 . 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction
§ 47:16
39. 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction
§ 47:27

Further reading
CRS Report for Congress: "Statutory
interpretation: General Principles and
Recent Trends" (public domain - can be
copied into article with citations)
The multi-volume Sutherland Statutory
Construction is the authoritative text on
the rules of statutory construction.
Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of
Appellate Decisions and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be
Construed 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950).
United States of America v. William C.
Scrimgeour 636 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir.
1981) discusses most aspects of
statutory construction.
Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of
Construction and the Elusive Quest for
Neutral Reasoning
Sinclair, Michael, "Llewellyn's Dueling
Canons, One to Seven: A Critique" . New
York Law School Law Review, Vol. 51,
Fall 2006.
Jon May, "Statutory Construction: Not
For The Timid" , The Champion
Magazine (NACDL), January/February
2006.
Corrigan & Thomas, "Dice Loading"
Rules Of Statutory Interpretation , 59
NYU Annual Survey Of American Law
231, 238 (2003).
The Rules of Statutory Construction
(Virginia)
 Statutory Interpretation, by Ruth Sullivan,
1997. Canadian examples and
explanations.
Menahem Pasternak, Christophe Rico,
Tax Interpretation, Planning, and
Avoidance: Some Linguistic Analysis, 23
Akron Tax Journal, 33 (2008)
(http://www.uakron.edu/law/lawreview/t
axjournal/atj23/docs/Pasternak08.pdf )
.

External links
Statutory Construction Blog
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