Teachers Harassed Cases

G.R. No.
177580 October 17, 2008
OMB, vs. MEDRANO,
CHARGE: (1) violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of

1995), docketed as OMB-L-C-03-0613-E (criminal case), and (2) grave misconduct,
docketed as OMB-L-A-03-0488-E (administrative case).
The administrative complaint, in essence, alleged that in the afternoon of March 28,
2003, respondent made sexual advances on Ma. Ruby and abused her sexually.
In his Counter-Affidavit,4 respondent denied the charge, claiming that it was "maliciously

designed to harass and threaten him to succumb to Ma. Ruby’s demand that she be
given a regular teaching post." He thus prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
While the administrative case was pending investigation, Ma. Ruby filed an URGENT
EX-PARTE MOTION FOR PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION,5 alleging that respondent was
"using the powers of his office by utilizing his subordinates in harassing her." By
Order6 of July 29, 2003, petitioner granted the motion and ordered the preventive
suspension of respondent for six (6) months without pay.
Respondent, this time assisted by counsel, Atty. Alan P. Cabaero, moved for the lifting
of the preventive suspension Order on the ground that the evidence of his guilt is not
strong.7 It was denied.
Undaunted, respondent filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration8 alleging that

the Schools Division Superintendent Lilia T. Reyes had already designated Hereberto
Jose D. Miranda as the new OIC of the school in his stead, effective September 1,
2003. By Order9 of October 16, 2003, petitioner lifted the preventive suspension
Order.
By Decision10 of July 19, 2004 rendered in the administrative case, petitioner adjudged

respondent guilty of grave misconduct and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal
from the service.
With respect to the criminal case, petitioner, by Resolution11 of July 19, 2004, found
probable cause to indict respondent for violation of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of
1995. An information for violation of said Act, docketed as Criminal Case No. 29190
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Biñan, Laguna, was in fact filed.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of petitioner’s issuances in both cases.

Respecting the administrative case,12 he assailed not only the factual findings and
conclusions of petitioner, but, for the first time, he challenged its jurisdiction over the
case. He argued that under Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 (the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers), an administrative complaint against a public school teacher should
be heard by an investigating committee of the Department of Education Culture &
Sports, now Department of Education (DepEd), composed of the school superintendent
of the division where the teacher belongs, a representative from a teachers’
organization, and a supervisor of the division. He thus prayed for the dismissal of the
administrative case as petitioner has no jurisdiction over it.
By Joint Order13 of April 8, 2005, petitioner affirmed its Resolution in the criminal case
but modified its Decision in the administrative case by finding respondent guilty of
sexual harassment, instead of grave misconduct, and meted on him the penalty
of suspension from the service for one (1) year, without pay.
The issues for resolution are:

1. Whether the petition has become moot and academic, Ma. Ruby having executed an
affidavit of desistance and the criminal case having been dismissed due to her lack of
interest to prosecute the same;
NO.
In Gerardo R. Villaseñor and Rodel A. Mesa v. Sandiganbayan and Louella Mae Oco-
Pesquerra (Office of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman), 24 the Court stressed
the distinct and independent character of the remedies available to an offended party
against any impropriety or wrongdoing committed by a public officer, thus:
Significantly, there are three kinds of remedies available against a public officer for
impropriety in the performance of his powers and the discharge of his duties: (1) civil,
(2) criminal, and
(3) administrative. These remedies may be invoked separately, alternately, simultaneou
sly or successively. Sometimes, the same offense may be the subject of all three kinds
of remedies.
Defeat of any of the three remedies will not necessarily preclude resort to other remedie
s or affectdecisions reached thereat, as different degrees of evidence are required in th
ese several actions. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed,
whereas a mere preponderance of evidence will suffice in civil cases. In administrative
cases, only substantial evidence is required.
It is clear, then, that criminal and administrative cases are distinct from each
other. The settled rule isthat criminal and civil cases are altogether different from
administrative matters, such that thefirst two will not inevitably govern or affect t
he third and vice versa. Verily, administrative casesmay proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings. (Underscoring supplied)
At any rate, an affidavit of desistance (or recantation) is, AS A RULE, viewed with
suspicion and reservation because it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant
witness, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration.25 And there is
always the probability that it would later be repudiated, and criminal prosecution would
thus be interminable.26 Hence, such desistance, by itself, is not usually a ground for the
dismissal of an action once it has been instituted in court.27
The suspicious and unreliable nature of Ma. Ruby’s Affidavit of Desistance is

evident. Firstly, her affidavit was executed only on September 17, 2007 or more than
three (3) years after petitioner had rendered its July 19, 2004Decision, as modified by
its Joint Order of April 8, 2005 finding respondent guilty of sexual
harassment. Secondly, unlike her six-page sworn letter-complaint of May 13, 2003
wherein she narrated in her own Pilipino dialect the factual details of respondent’s acts
complained of, Ma. Ruby’s one-page Affidavit of Desistance is couched in English with
legal terms and conclusions only one with a trained legal mind can formulate, e.g., "I am
now fully enlightened that said incident was just a product of mistake of fact and clear
misunderstanding between me and the accused/respondent, who after all,
was not actually criminally nor immorally motivated to do any form ofoffense/harm to my
person." Thirdly, Ma. Ruby’s Affidavit is bereft of any factual particulars, engendering
more questions that bolster its unreliability, e.g.: What was the "misunderstanding"
between her and respondent? How was she "fully enlightened" about the whole
incident? How did she arrive at her conclusion that he "was not actually criminally nor
immorally motivated to do any form of offense/harm" against her person?
In fine, the bases of respondent’s plea to have the present petition dismissed do not
obliterate his liability in the administrative case subject of the present petition.
In resolving the SECOND ISSUE – whether petitioner has jurisdiction over the
administrative complaint against respondent – it is necessary to examine the source,
nature and extent of the power and authority of the Ombudsman vis-à-vis the provisions
of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.
Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution "created the independent Office of the

Ombudsman." Hailed as the "protectors of the people," the Ombudsman and his
Deputies are bestowed with overreaching authority, powers, functions, and duties to act
on complaints against public officials and employees, as provided in Sections 12 and 13
thereof, thus:
Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people,

shall act promptly oncomplaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or em
ployees of the Government, or anysubdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, includi
ng government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify
the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions,
and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any pu
blic official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, orinefficient;
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and
expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or
impropriety in the performance of duties;
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith;
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or
transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds
or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate
action;
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the
discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and
documents;
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and
with due prudence;
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and
corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the
observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency; and
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure

and exercise such other powers or perform such functions orduties as may be provided
by law. (Underscoring supplied)
The above enumeration of the Ombudsman’s far-reaching powers is not exclusive as

the framers of the Constitution gave Congress the leeway to prescribe, by subsequent
legislation, additional powers, functions or duties to the Ombudsman, as mandated in
Section 13(8), quoted above.
Pursuant to the constitutional command, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6770 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989) providing for the functional, structural organization, and the
extent of the administrative disciplinary authority of the petitioner.28 The provisions of
this law "apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance" committed
by any officer or employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, "during
his tenure in office."29 The acts or omissions which the petitioner may investigate are
quite extensive:
SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints.– The Ombudsman shall act

on all complaints relating, but notlimited, to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency’s functions, though in
accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
Its mandate is not only to "act promptly on complaints" against such public officers or
employees, but also to "enforce their administrative, civil and
criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order topromote efficient s
ervice by the Government to the people."30
R.A. No. 6770, however, restrains the petitioner from exercising its disciplinary authority
"over
officials who may beremoved only by impeachment or over Members of Congress and t
he Judiciary," thus:
SEC. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions.– The Office of the

Ombudsman shall
have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government a
nd its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet,
local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who maybe removed only by impeachment or ov
er Members of Congress and the Judiciary.
SEC. 22. Investigatory Power.– The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to
investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable
by
impeachment, for thepurpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted
.
In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of the government and a

private person, the Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include such
private person in the investigation and proceed against such private person as the
evidence may warrant. The officer or employee and the private person shall be tried
jointly and shall be subject to the same penalties and liabilities. (Underscoring supplied)
The above constitutional and statutory provisions taken together reveal the manifest
intent of the lawmakers to bestow upon the
petitioner full administrative disciplinary power over public officials and
employees except those impeachable officials, Members of Congress and of the
Judiciary.
When an administrative charge is initiated against a public school teacher, however,

Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers specifically provides that the
same shall be heard initially by an investigating committeecomposed of the school
superintendent of the division, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national teachers’ organization, and a supervisor of
the division, as members, thus:
SEC. 9. Administrative Charges. – Administrative charges against a teacher shall

be heard initially by a committee composed of the
corresponding Schools Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized
representative who should at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the
teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any
existing provincial or national teachers’ organization and a supervisor of the Division,
the last two to be designated by the Director of Public
Schools. The committee shall submit its findings and
recommendations to the Director of PublicSchools within thirty days from
termination of the hearings; Provided, however, That where the school superintendent is
the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Education. (Underscoring supplied)
In Fabella v. Court of Appeals,31 the Court held:
The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers,
which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers.
Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public
schoolteachers’ administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent
of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or
national teachers’ organization, and a supervisor of the division. x x x.
xxxx
The
aforementioned Section 9 of RA 4670, therefore, reflects the legislative intent to impose
astandard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with admi
nistrativeproceedings involving public schoolteachers. x x x. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Significantly, The Ombudsman Act of 1989 recognizes the existence of some "proper

disciplinary authorit[ies]," such as the investigating committee of the DepEd mentioned
in Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Thus, Section 23 of The
Ombudsman Act of 1989 directs that the petitioner "may refer certain complaints to
the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedi
ngs against erring public officers or employees."32
In light of this, the Court holds that the administrative disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an exclusive power but
is concurrent with the proper committee of the DepEd.
In the instant case, respondent, although designated as then OIC of a public school and
concurrently the school principal of another public school, is undoubtedly covered by the
definition of the term "teacher" under the second paragraph of Section 2 of the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers which provides:
SEC 2. Title – Definition.– This Act shall x x x apply to all public school teachers
except those in the professorial staff of state colleges and universities.
As used in this Act, the term ‘teacher’ shall mean all persons engaged in the classroom,
in any level of instruction; on full time basis, including guidance counselors, school
librarians, industrial arts or vocational
instructors, and all other persons performing supervisory and/or administrative functions
inall schools, colleges and
universities operated by the Government or its political subdivisions; but shall not
include school nurses, school physicians, school dentists, and other school employees.
(Underscoring supplied)
Thus, the administrative complaint against respondent should have been referred by
petitioner to the proper committee of the DepEd for the institution of appropriate
administrative proceedings, in light of Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989.
This brings the Court to the third issue. 3. Whether respondent is estopped to question

petitioner’s assumption of jurisdiction over the administrative complaint.
While petitioner should have desisted from hearing the administrative complaint against
respondent and referred it to the proper DepEd committee, given that it had already
concluded the proceedings and had rendered a decision thereon, respondent is
now barred from assailing petitioner’s acts under the PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL. He
had actively participated in the administrative proceedings before petitioner. In his
Counter-Affidavit, he asked petitioner for affirmative relief by seeking the dismissal of
the administrative complaint allegedly for being baseless.33 From then on, he was
assisted by counsel in filing several motions. When he was preventively suspended for
six months without pay, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that "a new Order
be issued reversing or setting aside the preventive suspension Order."34 When this was
denied, he again filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration35 for the lifting of his
suspension since he was already replaced as OIC, which motion was granted. It was
only after petitioner had rendered an adverse Decision that he, in a Motion for
Reconsideration, impugned petitioner’s assumption of jurisdiction over his case. Verily,
respondent cannot be permitted to challenge petitioner’s acts belatedly.
In applying the principle of estoppel in Alcala v. Villar,36 the Court held:
Respondent Jovencio D. Villar is the School Principal of Lanao National High School,
Pilar, Cebu City. In February 1998, x x x, teachers of Lanao National High School, x x x,
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative complaint against respondent
for dishonesty.
xxxx
On June 22, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding respondent
guilty of dishonesty and dismissing him from the service. x x x.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals nullified and set aside the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman on the ground that the latter was without jurisdiction over the
administrative complaints against public school teachers. It ruled that the governing law
is Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, and not Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989. x x x.
xxxx
x x x, in Fabella v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that R.A. No. 4670, the Magna Carta
for Public School Teachers, specifically covers and governs administrative proceedings
involving public school teachers. x x x.
xxxx
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals erred when it
nullified the proceedings before theOffice of the Ombudsman. x x x. In Emin v. De Leon,
a public school teacher was administratively charged with and found guilty of dishonesty
under P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Law). The Supreme Court ruled that R.A. No. 4670,
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, is the applicable law and that the Civil
Service Commission does not have jurisdiction over the administrative case.
Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the dismissal from the service of the public school
teacher as the latter was found to have been sufficiently afforded due process. x x x.
Thus –
However, at this late hour, the proceedings
conducted by the public respondent CSC canno longer be
nullified on procedural grounds. Under the principle of estoppel by laches, petitioner is
now barred from impugning the CSC’s jurisdiction over his case.
xxxx
As held previously, participation by parties in the administrative proceedings withoutraisi
ng any objection thereto bars them from raising any jurisdictional
infirmity afteran adverse decision is rendered against them. x x x. Notably, in his
Counter-Affidavit, petitioner himself invoked the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission by x x x further praying for ‘any remedy or judgment which under the
premises are just and equitable.’ It isan undesirable practice of a party
participating in the proceedings, submitting his case for
decision and accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack ofjurisdicti
on when adverse.
xxxx
In the same vein, respondent in the case should be barred under the principle of esto
ppel bylaches from assailing the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Therefore, the
Court of Appeals should have resolved the appeal on its merits, x x x. (Emphasis and
The ruling by the Court of Appeals that estoppel will not apply against respondent
because he raised the issue of jurisdiction "when the case
was still before the Ombudsman"37 is thus bereft of merit.
The appellate court’s citation of Duero v. Court of Appeals38 in which this Court held that
the therein private respondent Duero was not estopped from questioning the RTC
jurisdiction, despite his active participation in the proceedings before it, is misplaced.
For Duero involved lack of jurisdiction. The present case
involves CONCURRENTJURISDICTION. Vis-avis LACK OF JURISDICTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision of

June 29, 2006 and Resolution of April 2, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 93165
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals
which is directed to decide the case on the merits.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 132164 October 19, 2004
CSC vs. BELAGAN
When the CREDIBILITY OF A WITNESS IS SOUGHT TO

BE IMPEACHED BY PROOF OF HIS REPUTATION, it is
necessary that the reputation shown should be that which
existed before the occurrence of the circumstances out of
which the litigation arose,1 or at the time of the trial and
prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the
commencement of the suit.2This is because a person of
derogatory character or reputation can still change or
reform himself.
For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals’
Decision3 dated January 8, 1998, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 44180, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, Resolution No. 966213 dated September 23, 1996 and

Resolution No. 972423 dated April 11, 1997 of the respondent Civil Service
Commission are hereby set aside. The complaint against petitioner Allyson
Belagan filed by Magdalena Gapuz is hereby DISMISSED.
The dismissal of petitioner Belagan is lifted and he is hereby ordered to be

immediately reinstated to his position without loss of seniority, retirement,
backwages and other rights and benefits.
SO ORDERED."
The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate complaints filed respectively by
Magdalena Gapuz, founder/directress of the "Mother and Child Learning Center," and
Ligaya Annawi, a public school teacher at Fort Del Pilar Elementary School, against
respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS), all from Baguio City. Magdalena charged respondent with
sexual indignities and harassment, while Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment and
various malfeasances.
Magdalena’s sworn complaint alleges that sometime in March 1994, she filed an
application with the DECS Office in Baguio City for a permit to operate a pre-school.
One of the requisites for the issuance of the permit was the inspection of the school
premises by the DECS Division Office. Since the officer assigned to conduct the
inspection was not present, respondent volunteered his services. Sometime in June
1994, respondent and complainant visited the school. In the course of the inspection,
while both were descending the stairs of the second floor, respondent suddenly placed
his arms around her shoulders and kissed her cheek. Dumbfounded, she muttered, "Sir,
is this part of the inspection? Pati ba naman kayo sa DECS wala ng values?"
Respondent merely sheepishly smiled. At that time, there were no other people in the
area.
Fearful that her application might be jeopardized and that her husband might harm
respondent, Magdalena just kept quiet.
Several days later, Magdalena went to the DECS Division Office and asked respondent,
"Sir, kumusta yung application ko?" His reply was "Mag-date muna tayo." She declined,
explaining that she is married. She then left and reported the matter to DECS Assistant
Superintendent Peter Ngabit.
Magdalena never returned to the DECS Division Office to follow up her application.
However, she was forced to reveal the incidents to her husband when he asked why the
permit has not yet been released. Thereupon, they went to the office of the respondent.
He merely denied having a personal relationship with Magdalena.
Thereafter, respondent forwarded to the DECS Regional Director his recommendation

to approve Magdalena’s application for a permit to operate a pre-school.
Sometime in September 1994, Magdalena read from a local newspaper that certain
female employees of the DECS in Baguio City were charging a high-ranking DECS
official with sexual harassment. Upon inquiry, she learned that the official being
complained of was respondent. She then wrote a letter-complaint for sexual indignities
and harassment to former DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria.
On October 4, 1994, respondent was placed under suspension.
On the part of Ligaya Annawi, she alleged in her complaint that on four separate
occasions, respondent touched her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins,
embraced her from behind and pulled her close to him, his organ pressing the lower
part of her back.
Ligaya also charged respondent with: (1) delaying the payment of the teachers’

salaries; (2) failing to release the pay differentials of substitute teachers; (3) willfully
refusing to release the teachers’ uniforms, proportionate allowances and productivity
pay; and (4) failing to constitute the Selection and Promotion Board, as required by the
DECS rules and regulations.
The DECS conducted a joint investigation of the complaints of Magdalena and Ligaya.
In his defense, respondent denied their charge of sexual harassment. However, he
presented evidence to disprove Ligaya’s imputation of dereliction of duty.
On January 9, 1995, the DECS Secretary rendered a Joint Decision4 finding respondent

guilty of four (4) counts of sexual "indignities or harassments" committed against Ligaya;
and two (2) counts of "sexual advances or indignities" against Magdalena. He was
ordered dismissed from the service. The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing disquisitions duly considered, decision is hereby

rendered in the two above-entitled cases, finding:
a) Respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the DECS Baguio

City Schools Division GUILTY of the four counts of sexual indignities or
harassments committed against the person and honor of complainant
Miss Ligaya Annawi, a Baguio City public school teacher, while in the
performance of his official duties and taking advantage of his office. He is,
however, ABSOLVED of all the other charges of administrative
malfeasance or dereliction of duty.
b) Respondent Baguio City Superintendent Allyson Belagan likewise

GUILTY of the two counts of sexual advances or indignities committed
against the person and honor of complainant Mrs. Magdalena Gapuz, a
private school teacher of Baguio City, while in the performance of his
official duties and taking advantage of his office.
Consequently, respondent Allyson Belagan is HEREBY ORDERED DISMISSED
from the government service, with prejudice to reinstatement and all his
retirement benefits and other remunerations due him are HEREBY DECLARED
FORFEITED in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED."5
Upon appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), on September 23, 1996,
promulgated Resolution No. 9662136affirming the Decision of the DECS Secretary in
the case filed by Magdalena but dismissing the complaint of Ligaya. The CSC ruled that
respondent’s transgression against Magdalena constitutes grave misconduct. Thus:
"The acts of Belagan are serious breach of good conduct since he was holding a
position which requires the incumbent thereof to maintain a high degree of moral
uprightness. As Division Superintendent, Belagan represents an institution
tasked to mold the character of children. Furthermore, one of his duties is to
ensure that teachers in his division conduct themselves properly and observe the
proper discipline. Any improper behavior on his part will seriously impair his
moral ascendancy over the teachers and students which can not be
tolerated. Therefore, his misconduct towards an applicant for a permit to
operate a private pre-school cannot be treated lightly and constitutes the
offense of grave misconduct.
WHEREFORE, respondent Allyson Belagan is hereby found guilty of grave

misconduct and imposed the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service with all
the accessory penalties. The decision of the DECS Secretary is modified
accordingly."7
On October 29, 1996, respondent seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration,

contending that he has never been charged of any offense in his thirty-seven (37) years
of service. By contrast, Magdalena was charged with several offenses before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City, thus:
"1. Criminal Case No. 43416 for LIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION (December 3,
1980)
2. Criminal Case No. 45629 for SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES (May 13, 1982)
3. Criminal Case No. 45630 for GRAVE THREATS (May 13, 1982)
4. Criminal Case No. 45914 for GRAVE THREATS (June 24, 1982)
5. Criminal Case No. 51532 for MALICIOUS MISCHIEF (January 25, 1985)
6. Criminal Case No. 51533 for LIGHT THREATS (January 25, 1985)
7. Criminal Case No. 51556 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (January 30,
1985)
8. Criminal Case No. 51818 for LIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION (March 18, 1985)
9. Criminal Case No. 51819 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (March 18, 1985)
10. Criminal Case No. 51820 for MALICIOUS MISCHIEF (March 18, 1985)
11. Criminal Case No. 51821 for UNJUST VEXATION (March 18, 1985)
12. Criminal Case No. 62173 for UNJUST VEXATION (May 29, 1991)
13. Criminal Case No. 62172 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (May 29, 1991)
14. Criminal Case No. 62754 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (December 2,
1986)
15. Criminal Case No. 55642 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (December 2,
1986)
16. Criminal Case No. 55423 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (October 24,
1986)
17. Criminal Case No. 55846 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (November 4,
1986)
18. Criminal Case No. 55800 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (January 7,
1987)
19. Criminal Case No. 57312 for UNJUST VEXATION (November 29, 1987)
20. Criminal Case No. 55643 for SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES (December 13,
1985)
21. Criminal Case No. 53404 for UNJUST VEXATION (December 13, 1985)
22. Criminal Case No. 55422 for UNJUST VEXATION (October 24, 1986)"8
In addition, the following complaints against Magdalena were filed with the Barangay
Chairmen of Barangay Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, both in Baguio City:
"1. Ordana vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 11-19-02-A) for GRAVE THREATS,
UNJUST VEXATION, RUMOR MONGERING
2. Teresita De Los Santos vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 86-8-26-8) for GRAVE
THREATS & ORAL DEFAMATION
3. Mrs. Conchita Ballesteros vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 029) for ORAL
DEFAMATION and FALSE ACCUSATION
4. Mrs. Clara Baoas vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 030) for HARASSMENT and
THREATS
5. GABRIELA SILANG TANOD FORCES vs. Gapuz (Case No. 031) for
HABITUAL TROUBLE MAKER
6. Pablo Ortiz vs. Gapuz (November 1, 1979) for ORAL DEFAMATION
7. C. Ballesteros vs. Gapuz (September 11, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION
8. Mrs. Liza Ancheta vs. Gapuz (September 27, 1978) for RUMOR MONGERING
9. Mr. Pananin (Beneco Personnel) (October 8, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION
10. Mrs. Minda Valdez vs. Gapuz (November 6, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION
11. WOMEN’S CLUB vs. GAPUZ (February 9, 1979) for ORAL DEFAMATION
12. Vistro Salcedo case (May 8, 1979)
Where Mrs. Gapuz was spreading rumors against Barangay Captain and
Police Chief
13. Demolition Scandal (May 10, 1979)

Where she called all the residents of their Barangay for an emergency
meeting and where she shouted invectives against the residents
14. Incident of June 13, 1979

Mrs. Gapuz shouted invectives against the Barangay Sanitary Inspector
15. Incident of August 25, 1979

Mrs. Gapuz shouted invectives against the servants of Mr. De Leon
16. Incident of August 26, 1979

Mrs. Gapuz terrorized the council meeting
17. Incident of September 2, 1978

Mrs. Clara Baoas was harassed by Mrs. Gapuz

Mrs. Gapuz quarreled with Mrs. C. Ballesteros during the council meeting

Mrs. Gapuz was hurling invectives along her alley in the early morning

Mrs. Gapuz tapped electric wire from Mrs. Tessie de los Santos with the
latter’s consent

Mrs. Gapuz was shouting and hurling invectives scandalously around her
residence

Mrs. Gapuz was shouting, complaining about alleged poisoned sardines near
the premises of her residence which killed her hen.

Mrs. Gapuz was shouting unpleasant words around the neighborhood. She
did not like the actuations of a bayanihan group near the waiting shed."9
Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed against Magdalena cast doubt on
her character, integrity, and credibility.
In its Resolution No. 97242310 dated April 11, 1997, the CSC denied respondent’s
motion for reconsideration, holding that:
"The character of a woman who was the subject of a sexual assault is of minor
significance in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the person accused
of having committed the offense. This is so because even a prostitute or a
woman of ill repute may become a victim of said offense.
As such, the fact that complainant Magdalena Gapuz is shown to have had
cases before the regular courts for various offenses and was condemned by her
community for wrongful behavior does not discount the possibility that she was in
fact telling the truth when she cried about the lecherous advances made to her
by the respondent. x x x"
Respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. As stated earlier, it
reversed the CSC Resolutions and dismissed Magdalena’s complaint.
The Appellate Court held that Magdalena is an unreliable witness, her character being
questionable. Given her aggressiveness and propensity for trouble, "she is not one
whom any male would attempt to steal a kiss." In fact, her "record immediately raises an
alarm in any one who may cross her path."11 In absolving respondent from the charges,
the Appellate Court considered his "unblemished" service record for 37 years.
Unsatisfied, the CSC, through the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition raising the
following assignments of error:
"I. The Supreme Court may rule on factual issues raised on appeal where the
Court of Appeals misappreciated the facts. Furthermore, where the findings of
the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contrary to each other, the Supreme
Court may review the record and evidence. The Court of Appeals erred in not
giving credence to the testimony of complainant Magdalena Gapuz despite
convincing and overwhelming signs of its truthfulness.
II. The Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it failed to give due
weight to the findings of the DECS, which conducted the administrative
investigation, specifically with respect to the credibility of the witnesses
presented.
III. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondent should be penalized
under Sec. 22 (o) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V and not Sec. 22
(e) of said rules."12
In his comment, respondent maintains that Magdalena’s derogatory record undermines

the verity of her charge and that the Court of Appeals is correct in dismissing it.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The PIVOTAL ISSUE before us is whether complaining witness, Magdalena Gapuz, is

credible. This is a question of fact which, as a general rule, is not subject to this Court’s
review.
It is a rule of long standing that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, if supported by
substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable
by this Court.13 This Court is, after all, not a trier of facts. One of the exceptions,
however, is when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court or a quasi-judicial body, like petitioner herein.14
Here, the Court of Appeals and the CSC are poles apart in their appreciation of
Magdalena’s derogatory record. While the former considered it of "vital and paramount
importance" in determining the truth of her charge, the latter dismissed it as of "minor
significance." This contrariety propels us to the elusive area of character and reputation
evidence.
Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a

controversy.15 One statutory exception is that relied upon by respondent, i.e., Section 51
(a) 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which we quote here:
"SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions. –

(a) In Criminal Cases:
xxx xxx
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be
proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the
probability or improbability of the offense charged."
It will be readily observed that the above provision pertains only to criminal cases, not to
administrative offenses. And even assuming that this technical rule of evidence can be
applied here, still, we cannot sustain respondent’s posture.
Not every good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved under this
provision. Only those which would establish the probability or improbability of the
offense charged. This means that the character evidence must be limited to the traits
and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged.16 Thus, on a charge of rape
- character for chastity, on a charge of assault - character for peaceableness or
violence, and on a charge of embezzlement - character for honesty.17 In one rape case,
where it was established that the alleged victim was morally loose and apparently
uncaring about her chastity, we found the conviction of the accused doubtful.18
In the present administrative case for sexual harassment, respondent did not offer
evidence that has a bearing on Magdalena’s chastity. What he presented are charges
for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries, malicious
mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly, these pieces of evidence are inadmissible
under the above provision because they do not establish the probability or improbability
of the offense charged.
Obviously, in invoking the above provision, what respondent was trying to establish
is Magdalena’s lack of credibility AND NOT the probability or the improbability of the
charge. In this regard, a different provision applies.
Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony given. It
refers to a person’s integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief.19 A witness may
be discredited by evidence attacking his general reputation for truth,20 honesty21 or
integrity.22 Section 11, Rule 132 of the same Revised Rules on Evidence reads:
"SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party’s witness. –A witness may be

impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory
evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or
integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular
wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness,
or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense."
Although she is the offended party, Magdalena, by testifying in her own behalf, opened
herself to character or reputation attack pursuant to the principle that a party who
becomes a witness in his own behalf places himself in the same position as any other
witness, and may be impeached by an attack on his character or reputation.23
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the
character or reputation of a complaining witness in a sexual charge is a proper subject
of inquiry. This leads us to the ultimate question – is Magdalena’s derogatory record
sufficient to discredit her credibility?
A careful review of the record yields a NEGATIVE answer.

First, most of the twenty-two (22) cases filed with the MTC of Baguio City relate to acts
committed in the 80’s, particularly, 1985 and 1986. With respect to the complaints filed
with the Chairmen of Barangay Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, the acts
complained of took place in 1978 to 1979. In the instant administrative case, the offense
was committed in 1994. Surely, those cases and complaints are no longer reliable
proofs of Magdalena’s character or reputation. The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in
according much weight to such evidence. Settled is the principle that evidence of one’s
character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the time in
question.24 In other words, what is to be determined is the character or reputation of the
person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the
commencement of the suit.25 Hence, to say that Magdalena’s credibility is diminished by
proofs of tarnished reputation existing almost a decade ago is unreasonable. It is unfair
to presume that a person who has wandered from the path of moral righteousness can
never retrace his steps again. Certainly, every person is capable to change or reform.
Second, respondent failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted in any of the criminal
cases specified by respondent. The general rule prevailing in a great majority of
jurisdictions is that it is not permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or that
he has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in jail for the
purpose of impairing his credibility.26 This view has usually been based upon one or
more of the following grounds or theories: (a) that a mere unproven charge against the
witness does not logically tend to affect his credibility, (b) that innocent persons are
often arrested or accused of a crime, (c) that one accused of a crime is presumed to be
innocent until his guilt is legally established, and (d) that a witness may not be
impeached or discredited by evidence of particular acts of misconduct.27 Significantly,
the same Section 11, Rule 132 of our Revised Rules on Evidence provides that a
witness may not be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts. Such evidence
is rejected because of the confusion of issues and the waste of time that would be
involved, and because the witness may not be prepared to expose the falsity of such
wrongful acts.28 As it happened in this case, Magdalena was not able to explain or
rebut each of the charges against her listed by respondent.
But more than anything else, what convinces us to sustain the Resolution of the CSC is
the fact that it is supported by substantial evidence. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, Magdalena testified in a straightforward, candid and spontaneous manner. Her
testimony is replete with details, such as the number of times she and respondent
inspected the pre-school, the specific part of the stairs where respondent kissed her,
and the matter about her transient boarders during summer. Magdalena would not have
normally thought about these details if she were not telling the truth. We quote her
testimony during the cross-examination conducted by DECS Assistant Secretary
Romeo Capinpin and Undersecretary Antonio Nachura, thus:
"Q Was there any conversation between you and Dr. Belagan during the
inspection on the first floor and the second floor?
A There was, sir. It was a casual conversation that we had with regard to my
family, background, how the school came about, how I started with the project.
That was all, sir.
Q Nothing about any form of sexual harassment, in words or in deeds?
A Sir, because he inspected the second floor twice, sir. We went up to the stairs
twice, sir.
Q Why?
A I really don’t know what was the reason behind, sir. But on the second
inspection, sir, I told him that as of that time I had some transients with me. I was
making use of the premises for transients because that was summer then, sir.
And I already started paying the place so I said, ‘Sir, I have some transients with
me in the evening’ and he said, You know Mrs. Gapuz, I am interested to stay in
one of the rooms as one your boarders. But I respectfully declined saying, ‘Sir, I
think for delicadeza I cannot accept you. Not that I don’t want you to be here but
people might think that I am keeping you here and that would prejudice my
permit, sir.’
ASEC R. CAPINPIN:
Q When did the alleged kissing occur? Was it during the first time that you went
up with him or the second time?
A No, sir, on the second time, sir.
Q Second time?
A Yes, sir. We were going down, sir.
Q And you were going down?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you recall what portion of the stairs where you were during the alleged
kissing?
A Sir, on the topmost of the stairs.
Q Before you went down?
A Yes, sir. At the topmost because there is a base floor going up to the stairs and
it has 16 steps.
Q So, it was not on the 16th step but still on the topmost?
A Yes sir.
Q Part of the floor of the building?
A Yes, sir. Topmost, sir?
ASEC R. CAPINPIN:
Q Will you kindly tell us your relative position at that time?
A Sir, on the second time that we went up and I mentioned about these
transients that I had then and he wanted to stay in the place in one of the rooms
and then I declined and I was still showing the rooms simultaneously. On the last,
the biggest room that I had, he said, ‘No. Never mind, I am not going to see that
anymore.’ So he waited for me there and upon reaching the place, as I was to
step down on the first step going down, he placed his arm and held me tightly
and planted the kiss on my cheek, sir.
Q You said that he wanted to stay in one of the rooms?

A Yes, sir, as a boarder.
Q Is that room used for transients?
A During that time, sir, during the summertime, I made use of the time to get
some transients.
Q And he was telling you that he wanted to occupy one of the rooms?
A Yes, but I declined, sir for delicadeza.
Q At that time, there were no transients yet.
A When he came over for the inspection sir, nobody was there."29
The above testimony does not stand in isolation. It is corroborated by Peter Ngabit,
DECS Assistant Division Superintendent. Ngabit testified that Magdalena reported to
him that respondent kissed her and asked her for a "date."
"Q I would like to call your attention to Exhibit ‘A’ which is the affidavit of Mrs.
Magdalena B. Gapuz, particularly item no. 8, and may I read for your information
– ‘That the Monday after the incident, I went to the DECS Division Office
expecting to get favorable recommendation from the DECS Regional Office for
the issuance of my permit. That I proceeded to the Superintendent and asked
him, ‘Sir, kumusta ‘yung application ko’ and he said, ‘mag date muna tayo’ but I
refused and explained that I am married, after which I proceeded to the Office of
Asst. Superintendent Peter Ngabit to relate the incident and then left the Division
Office.’ Do you remember if Mrs. Gapuz went to your Office on the particular
day?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time was that?
A I cannot remember, sir.
Q Was it morning, afternoon?
A I think it was in the morning, sir.
Q Morning.
A Yes, sir.
Q Early morning?
A About noon, sir.
Q What transpired between you and Mrs. Gapuz in your office?
A When she came to my Office, she was relating about that and she was even
insulting me saying among others that I was a useless fixture in that Office
because I cannot do anything with the processing of her paper or application.
Q It says here that she would relate the incident to you. Did she relate any
incident?
A Yes, she did sir.
Q What was that incident all about?
A She was saying that when Mr. Belagan went to visit her school, he stole a
kiss from her and that she was saying that when she asked Supt. Belagan
for her papers, she was asked for a date before the Indorsement. After that,
she left."30
With Magdalena’s positive testimony and that of Ngabit, how can we disregard the
findings of the DECS and the CSC? Surely, we cannot debunk it simply because of the
Court of Appeals’ outdated characterization of Magdalena as a woman of bad
reputation. There are a number of cases where the triers of fact believe the testimony of
a witness of bad character31 and refuse to believe one of good character.32 As a matter
of fact, even a witness who has been convicted a number of times is worthy of belief,
when he testified in a straightforward and convincing manner.33
At this juncture, it bears stressing that more than anybody else, it is the DECS
investigating officials who are in a better position to determine whether Magdalena is
telling the truth considering that they were able to hear and observe her deportment and
manner of testifying.34
In reversing the CSC’s Resolutions, the Court of Appeals ruled that "there is ample
evidence to show that Magdalena had a motive" in accusing respondent, i.e., to
pressure him to issue a permit. This is unconvincing. The record shows that respondent
had already issued the permit when Magdalena filed her letter-complaint. Indeed, she
had no more reason to charge respondent administratively, except of course to
vindicate her honor.
Petitioner prays that we sustain its ruling penalizing respondent for grave misconduct
and not merely for disgraceful or immoral conduct which is punishable by suspension
for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense.35 Misconduct
means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior, especially by a government official.36 To constitute an administrative offense,
misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official
functions and duties of a public officer.37 In grave misconduct as distinguished from
simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must be manifest.38 Corruption as an element of grave
misconduct consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for
another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.39 This is apparently present in
respondent’s case as it concerns not only a stolen kiss but also a demand for a "date,"
an unlawful consideration for the issuance of a permit to operate a pre-school.
Respondent’s act clearly constitutes grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal.40
We are, however, not inclined to impose the penalty of dismissal from the service.
Respondent has served the government for a period of 37 years, during which, he made
a steady ascent from an Elementary Grade School Teacher to Schools Division
Superintendent. In devoting the best years of his life to the education department, he
received numerous awards.41 This is the first time he is being administratively charged.
He is in the edge of retirement. In fact, he had filed his application for retirement when
Magdalena filed her complaint. Section 16, Rule XIV, of the Rules Implementing Book V
of Executive Order No. 292 provides:
"SEC. 16. In the determination of penalties to be imposed, mitigating and

aggravating circumstances may be considered. x x x."
The mitigating circumstances are enumerated in Section 53, Rule IV, of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,42 which reads in part:
"SEC. 53. Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating, or Alternative Circumstances. –

In the determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and
alternative circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be
considered.
The following circumstances shall be appreciated:
xxx xxx
j. length of service
xxx xxx
l. and other analogous cases."
Conformably with our ruling in a similar case of sexual harassment,43 and respondent’s

length of service, unblemished record in the past and numerous awards,44 the penalty of
suspension from office without pay for one (1) year is in order.
While we will not condone the wrongdoing of public officers and employees, however,
neither will we negate any move to recognize and remunerate their lengthy service in
the government.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated

January 8, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44180 is REVERSED. The CSC Resolution Nos.
966213 and 972423 are AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that
respondent ALLYSON BELAGAN is SUSPENDED from office without pay for ONE (1)
YEAR, with full credit of his preventive suspension.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-

Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna*, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* On leave.
1
32 C.J.S. §434, citing In re Darrow, 92 N.E. 369, 175 Ind. 44.
2
81 Am Jur §897, citing Carter vs. State, 226 Ala 96, 145 So. 814; State vs.
Potts, 78 Iowa 656, 43 NW 534; State vs. Crockett, 161 Wash 262, 296 P 1041.
3
Rollo, pp. 42-56. Penned by former Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria
and concurred in by Justices Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes (retired Justice of this
Court), and Ramon A. Barcelona, retired.
4
Rollo at 52-59.
5
CA Rollo at 39.
6
Id. at 61-71.
7
Id. at 71.
8
Id. at 79-80.
9
Id. at 80-81.
10
Id. at 73-75.
11
Rollo at 53.
12
Id. at 24.
13
Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Leobrera, G.R. No. 137147, January 29,
2002, 375 SCRA 81 and cases cited therein.
14
Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 355 Phil. 520 (1998); Reyes vs. Court of
Appeals, 328 Phil. 171 (1996).
15
29 Am Jur 2d § 363.
16
Francisco, Basic Evidence, Second Edition, 1999 at 168, citing 22A C.J.S.,
Criminal Law, Sec. 667(5).
17
Id. at 168, citing Wigmore on Evidence (Student Text), 62.
18
People vs. Tempongko, Jr., G.R. No. 69668, October 2, 1986, 144 SCRA 583.
19
Francisco, Basic Evidence, Second Edition, 1999 at 502.
20
Truth means conformity to fact or reality, exact accordance with that which is,
or has been or shall be.
21
Honesty signifies the quality or state of being straight, forwardness of conduct,
thought, speech etc.
22
Integrity has been defined as moral soundness; honesty; freedom from
corrupting influence or practice, especially strictness in the fulfillment of
contracts, the discharge of agencies, trusts, and the like; uprightness, rectitude.
(Francisco, Basic Evidence, Second Edition, 1999 at 471, citing Section 11, Rule
132, Rules of Court, as amended).
There is a distinction between evidence as to the character of a party to a

litigation and evidence as to the character of a witness; in the former case
character is a fact in issue or an evidentiary fact affecting a fact in issue,
while the character of the witness is collateral matter which does not
pertain to the fact in issue but merely to the weight of the evidence of such
witness. (Francisco, Basic Evidence, Second Edition, 1999 at 474, citing
70 C.J.S. 821).
23
98 C.J.S. § 494.
24
Francisco, Basic Evidence, Second Edition, 1999 at 170, citing 29 Am Jur 2d,
Evidence, § 341; 22A C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 677 (2); 32 C.J.S., Evidence, § 434
(b).
25
81 Am Jur 2d § 897, supra FN 2.
Evidence of the reputation of a witness for truth and veracity twelve years
prior to the trial will be excluded as too remote. (Hapton vs. State, 78 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 639, 183 S.W. 887).
Section 41, Rule 130 reads:
"SEC. 41. Common reputation. – Common reputation existing previous to

the controversy, respecting facts of public or general interest more than
thirty years old, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be given
in evidence. x x x."
26
81 Am Jur 2d § 905, citing United States vs. Dilts, (CA7 Ill) 501 F2d
531; Stephens vs. State, 252 Ala 183, 40 So 2d 90; Woodard vs. State, (Ala
App) 489 So 2d 1; State vs. Johnson, 106 Ariz 539, 479 P2d 424; Judy vs.
Mcdaniel, 247 Ark 409, 445 SW2d 722.
27
81 Am Jur 2d § 905.
28
81 Am Jur 2d, § 901, citing Miller vs. Journal Co., 246 Mo 722, 152 SW
40; People vs. Brown, 72 NY 571.
29
Rollo at 154-156.
30
Id. at 161-162.
31
98 C.J.S. § 496, citing People vs. Matson, 158 P 335, 30 C.A. 288; People vs.
Strope, 272 N.Y. S. 268, 151 Misc. 580.
32
Id., citing State vs. Little, 94 S.E. 1, 174 N.C. 800.
33
People vs. Strope, supra.
34
Chase vs. Buencamino, Sr., L-20395, May 13, 1985, 136 SCRA 365.
35
Section 22 (o), Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order
No. 292.
36
Maguad vs. De Guzman, A.M. No. P-94-1015, March 29, 1999, 305 SCRA
469.
37
Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil. 456 (1953).
38
Civil Service Commission vs. Lucas, 361 Phil. 486 (1999).
39
Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 345.
40
Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive
Order No. 292 provides:
"SEC. 22. Administrative offenses with its corresponding penalties are

classified into grave, less grave, and light, depending on the gravity of its
nature and effects of said acts on the government service.
The following are grave offenses with its corresponding penalties.
(c) Grave misconduct: 1st Offense – Dismissal."

41
CA Rollo at 78.
42
Resolution No. 99-1936. This Resolution was published in the September 11,
1999 issue of the Manila Standard.
43
Vedaña vs. Judge Valencia, 356 Phil. 317 (1998).
44
Judge Agcaoili vs. Judge Ramos, 311 Phil. 238 (1995).
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175433, March 11, 2015
ATTY. JACINTO C. GONZALES, Petitioner, v. MAILA CLEMEN F.

SERRANO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court filed by Atty. Jacinto C. Gonzales,2 assailing the Decision3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 16, 2006, and its Resolution4 dated
October 4, 2006, in CA G.R. SP No. 76959. The CA reversed and set aside
the Memorandum-Order dated January 3, 2003 and the Order dated
February 11, 2003 approved by then Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito
P. Gervacio Jr. in OMB-ADM-0-01-0162, and reinstated the Decision dated
March 19, 2002 of the Ombudsman Administrative Adjudication Bureau
approved by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto in OMB-ADM-01-0162
(RAS-2001-0156).
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
This case arose from an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Maila Clemen
F. Serrano (respondent) against her direct superior, Atty. Jacinto C.
Gonzales (petitioner), Chief, Legal Division of the Philippine Racing
Commission (PHILRACOM), for grave misconduct, sexual harassment and
acts of lasciviousness.
In her Complaint-Affidavit5 dated January 12, 2001, respondent alleged that

on November 23, 2000, petitioner invited her, along with her officemates,
Administrative Officer V Eva Bataller, Atty. III Eugene Juanson, and
Stenographer II Roman Vidal, to eat lunch at Buddy's Restaurant, at J.P.
Rizal St., Makati City. While seated at the table waiting for their food to be
served, petitioner suddenly took hold of respondent's face and forcefully
kissed her lips in the presence of Eva, Eugene, Roman and other customers.
Respondent tried to ward off petitioner by pulling her head away from him,
but he persisted on kissing her against her will. She was so shocked,
terrified, and humiliated that she could hardly talk and move. She wanted to
cry, but held her tears for fear of further embarrassment. After releasing
her, petitioner said: “Ang sarap pala ng labi ni Maila...” Then, he held her
hand and said “Maila sige na...” But, she took away her hand from him.
Thereafter, she immediately reported the incident to PHILRACOM Executive
Director Juan Lozano.
Respondent also alleged that prior to that “kissing” incident, petitioner had
already degraded her person on four (4) separate occasions, namely: (1) on
the very first day she met him in the office, he offered to purchase her a cell
phone so that he can text her, which offer she straightforwardly refused; (2)
on that same day, he wanted her to join him in his car in going home, which
she likewise refused; (3) a week later, he asked her to eat out for lunch;
again, she refused; and (4) on August 23, 2000, after her sick leave from
office, petitioner called her in his office and scolded her and uttered the
following unsavory remarks:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Eh ayoko na sa iyo. Hindi mo sinabi sa akin na may anak ka! Nasaan na ang
tatay ng anak mo? Wala na? Ano pang hindi mo sinasabi sa akin, may
boyfriend ka? Akala ko pa naman ok ka, kaya nga sinabihan kita dati na
sumabay ka sa akin! Ang daming nagrereklamo sa iyo dito. Hindi ka
marunong makisama. Makisama ka naman! Paano na kung alisin ka dito,
makakabalik ka pa ba sa dati mong opisina? Eh ayoko talaga sa iyo dito.
Ano? Do you have a choice? Alam mo ba na ako ang nagrekomenda kay Eva
diyan sa Admin. kay Chairman. Kaya ka nakapasok dito dahil pakiusap ka
lang [ni] Eva sa akin. Alam mo bang nakasalalay dito and posisyon mo dito?
Alam mo bang kung ano mo ako dito? Ha? Ano mo ako dito? xxx Ano
ngayon ang gagawin natin eh ayoko nga sa iyo? Anong gagawin natin
ngayon?cralawlawlibrary
Respondent further alleged that she was constrained to elevate her

complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman because the PHILRACOM
Grievance Committee had not taken any concrete action on her
administrative case which had been pending for over a month, and also
because of petitioner's relatively high position in the office.
To support her complaint-affidavit and to corroborate her account,

respondent submitted the Joint Affidavit6 of her officemates Eva, Eugene and
Roman, who witnessed the entire “kissing” incident on November 23, 2000.
In his Counter-Affidavit/Answer dated March 22, 2001, petitioner alleged

that at the prodding of his staff, he agreed to treat them for lunch, as it was
respondent's birthday, and she had no money for a “blowout”.7 While their
group were talking in the restaurant, he greeted respondent and planted an
innocent birthday greeting kiss on her left cheek, near her lips. He also
alleged that he first met respondent when she applied for Attorney III; that
on July 1, 2000, he summoned her to explain the complaints forwarded by
the Personnel and Administrative Division as to her frequent absence and
tardiness; and that his act of reviewing her official functions was in
accordance with his duties and responsibilities as a legal counsel of
PHILRACOM.
In her Reply-Affidavit,8 respondent stated that she never solicited any favor

from petitioner, let alone obliged him to spend money for her birthday
“blowout”; that his birthday lunch treat was part of a premeditated evil plan
to have her submit to his sexual desire; that she never allowed him to kiss
her on the cheek, much less on the lips; that in the course of her
employment with petitioner as her supervisor, he had often made sexual
advances and gestures towards her, but she still tried to keep their
relationship on a strictly professional level; that the alleged work-related
incidents of tardiness, inefficiency and laziness were all intended to harass
her; and that because of the administrative case she filed against him, she
lost her job.
Meanwhile, records show that in an Order of Termination dated January 18,

2001, Executive Director Lozano ordered the termination of respondent at
the close of business hours of January 19, 2001.9Records also show that the
Commission on Human Rights issued a Resolution dated May 8, 2001 in CHR
Case No. 2001-037 which found petitioner to have committed acts of sexual
harassment, abuse of authority, and illegal dismissal against
respondent.10cralawred
In an Order dated June 27, 2001, the parties were directed to appear for the
preliminary conference of the administrative case. Both parties appeared as
directed and agreed to submit the case for decision based on the evidence
on record and pleadings filed.
A Resolution dated July 17, 2001 was approved by then Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. (Overall Deputy Ombudsman) in
OMB-0-01-0039, the dispositive portion of which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds sufficient evidence that

supports the conclusion that the crime of violation of Section 3(a), Republic
Act No. 7877, otherwise known as “An Act Declaring Sexual Harassment
Unlawful in the Employment, Education, or Training Environment, and for
other purposes,” was committed probably by the herein respondent. Let
therefore, the appropriate information be filed against Jacinto C. Gonzales
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City.
SO RESOLVED.11cralawred
cralawlawlibrary
On March 19, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman Administrative

Adjudication Bureau, through Graft Investigation Officer Marlon T. Molina,
issued a Decision finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct. Approved by
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, among other officers, the Decision has the
following dispositive portion:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds substantial evidence

that respondent JACINTO G. GONZALES is guilty of Grave Misconduct.
Accordingly, the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service is hereby imposed

upon him pursuant to Section 52 (A), par. 3, Rule IV of Resolution No.
991936 otherwise known as the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service.
The Honorable Chairman of the Philippine Racing Commission, Electra House

Building, Esteban Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City is hereby directed to
implement this Decision in accordance with law and promptly report to this
Office compliance thereof.
SO ORDERED.12cralawlawlibrary
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Ombudsman Administrative
Adjudication Bureau denied in the Order dated September 9,
2002.13cralawred
However, on January 3, 2003, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman approved the

Memorandum issued by Graft Investigation Officer II Julita M. Calderon, with
a decretal portion that states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, we most respectfully

recommend that the herein ORDER dated September 9, 2002 prepared by
GIO Molina be MODIFIED insofar as the infraction and the penalty to be
imposed upon the herein respondent is concerned, i.e., from GRAVE
MISCONDUCT to SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and from DISMISSAL from the
Service to a mere ONE (1) MONTH SUSPENSION, without pay, pursuant
to Section 52B (2) of Rule IV of the “Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service.14cralawlawlibrary
Aggrieved, respondent brought the case to the CA via a Petition

for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, attributing grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
Overall Deputy Ombudsman. On August 16, 2006, the CA sustained
respondent and rendered the herein assailed decision.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The

memorandum-order dated 03 January 2003 and the Order dated 11
February 2003 approved by then Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P.
Gervacio, Jr. in OMB-ADM-0-01-0162 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated 19 March 2002 approved by then Ombudsman Aniano A.
Desierto in OMB-ADM-0-01-0162 (RAS-2001-0156) is hereby REINSTATED.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.15cralawlawlibrary
Thereafter, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File

Motion for Reconsideration,16but the CA denied it in a Resolution17 dated
October 4, 2006 for being a prohibited motion.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review.
Petitioner raises the following issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN

SETTING ASIDE THE MEMORANDUM-ORDER DATED 03 JANUARY 2003 AND
THE ORDER DATED 11 FEBRUARY 2003 APPROVED BY THE THEN OVERALL
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR. IN OMB-ADM-0-01-
0162, IT APPEARING THAT THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, IN FINDING THAT
THERE WAS ONLY SIMPLE MISCONDUCT, HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO HAVE
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK, OR IN
EXCESS OF DISCRETION [sic], UPON WHICH THE INSTANT PETITION IS
BASED, IN GROSS CONTRAVENTION OF THE RULES AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE GROSSLY ERRED IN
DENYING PETITIONER'S URGENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, THE
GROUNDS INVOKED THEREIN NOT BEING APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR
AND MOREOVER, THE DENIAL THEREOF HAS SACRIF[I]CED THE BASIC
PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY TO TECHNICALITIES OF
PROCEDURE.18cralawlawlibrary
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that it is only in an appealed case, not in
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, that the CA has authority to substitute
its own findings and conclusions with that of the disciplining authority. He
points out that what is claimed as “grave abuse of discretion” on the part of
the Overall Deputy Ombudsman was his alleged erroneous approval of the
Memorandum-Order dated January 3, 2003 which modified the infraction
and the penalty from grave misconduct to simple misconduct, and from
dismissal to a mere one (1) month suspension without pay. But, he argues
that such was merely an error in the exercise of judgment or discretion
which is not correctible by a writ of certiorari. He also argues that the mere
fact that the Overall Deputy Ombudsman made findings and conclusions
contrary to or inconsistent with those of the Ombudsman Administrative
Adjudication Bureau cannot, by itself, be considered grave abuse of
discretion, as the findings of the disciplining authority is always subject to
amendment, corrections or reconsideration. He concedes that the Overall
Deputy Ombudsman found him to have committed misconduct amounting to
sexual harassment. However, he points out that such finding of simple
misconduct, instead of grave misconduct, is supported by facts and
circumstances, and such finding is within sole discretion of the Overall
Deputy Ombudsman over which the courts have no authority to interfere. At
any rate, he submits that his misconduct was not motivated by a
premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose; hence, the extreme penalty
of dismissal is not warranted. Finally, he maintains that the issue of sexual
harassment is better addressed and resolved in the criminal case for
violation of Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 787719 (docketed as Crim. Case No.
311165) pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Branch 64,
for to do so in an administrative proceedings would be unfair, unjust and
extremely unreasonable.
On the second issue, petitioner contends that the CA grossly erred in

applying the two prohibitions laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. et al.
v. Court of Appeals,20 which was reiterated in Ma. Imelda Argel, et al. v.
Court of Appeals, et al.,21i.e., the doctrine that the 15-day period for filing an
appeal is non-extendible, and the prohibition against the filing of a motion
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration in all courts, except
the Supreme Court. He insists that the denial of such motion for extension
should be based on the court's assessment of the grounds relied upon and
not on purely procedural technicality. He seeks to justify his urgent motion
for extension on the fact that, as Presiding Judge and Pairing Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Olongapo City, he was beset with pressures of
work attending to numerous court trials, preparation of court orders and
decisions, and large volume of case load. He prays for a liberal construction
of procedural rules in order to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding.
There is no merit in the petition

The Court shall first delve on the procedural issue of the case. In Imperial v.
Court of Appeals,22 the Court ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In a long line of cases starting with Habaluyas Enterprises v. Japzon, we

have laid down the following guideline:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall
be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for
new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal
Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as
the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or
deny the extension requested.
Thus, the general rule is that no motion for extension of time to file a motion
for reconsideration is allowed. This rule is consistent with the rule in the
2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals that unless an appeal or a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed within the 15-day
reglementary period, the CA’s decision becomes final. Thus, a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration does not stop the
running of the 15-day period for the computation of a decision’s finality. At
the end of the period, a CA judgment becomes final, immutable and beyond
our power to review.23cralawlawlibrary
This rule, however, admits of exceptions based on a liberal reading of the

rule,24 so long as the petitioner is able to prove the existence of cogent
reasons to excuse its non-observance.25 No such reasons were shown to
obtain in this case. Petitioner's reasons of pressures of work attending to
numerous court trials, preparation of court orders and decisions, and large
volume of case load, are foreseeable and perennial problems of most trial
court judges. Such reasons are inexcusable, as ordinary prudence should
have prompted him to secure the services of an independent counsel to
defend his administrative case.
While the CA was correct in denying his Urgent Motion for Extension to File
Motion for Reconsideration for being a prohibited motion, the Court, in the
interest of justice, looked into the merits of the case, and opted to suspend
the prohibition against such motion for extension after it found that a
modification of the CA Decision is warranted by the law and the
jurisprudence on administrative cases involving sexual harassment. The
emerging trend of jurisprudence, after all, is more inclined to the liberal and
flexible application of procedural rules.26 Rules of procedure exist to ensure
the orderly, just and speedy dispensation of cases; to this end, inflexibility
or liberality must be weighed. Thus, the relaxation or suspension of
procedural rules, or exemption of a case from their operation is warranted
only by compelling reasons or when the purpose of justice requires
it.27cralawred
The Court shall now delve on the substantive issue of whether the CA
gravely erred in reversing the Memorandum-Order of the Overall Deputy
Ombudsman which downgraded petitioner's infraction from grave
misconduct to simple misconduct, and the penalty imposed on him from
dismissal to a mere one (1) month suspension without pay.
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Amalio A. Mallari,28 the Court explained the

difference between simple and grave misconduct, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,

more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.
The misconduct is considered as grave if it involves additional elements such
as corruption or willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established
rules, which must be proven by substantial evidence; otherwise, the
misconduct is only simple. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct,
consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself
or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. In other
words, in grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be
evident.cralawlawlibrary
In this case, the Court finds the element of corruption present. As correctly
pointed out by the CA, petitioner used his position and authority as Head of
the Legal Division of PHILRACOM, as well as his moral ascendancy, to elicit
sexual favors and to indulge in sexually malicious acts from his respondent,
his female subordinate.29 As to petitioner's sole defense that he merely gave
respondent an innocent birthday greeting kiss, the Court is unconvinced in
view of the Joint Affidavit of their officemates attesting that he forcibly
kissed her on the lips and said: “Ang sarap pala ng labi ni Maila. x x x”
In Narvasa v. Sanchez, Jr.,30 the Court found the respondent public officer,

who merely attempted to forcibly kiss the complainant, guilty of grave
misconduct through sexual harassment, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Respondent’s acts of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss her were, no

doubt, intentional. Worse, the incident occurred months after he had made
similar but subtler overtures to [complainant] De la Cruz, who made it clear
that his sexual advances were not welcome. Considering that the acts
respondent committed against petitioner were much more aggressive, it was
impossible that the offensive nature of his actions could have escaped him.
It does not appear that petitioner and respondent were carrying on an
amorous relationship that might have justified his attempt to kiss petitioner
while they were separated from their companions. Worse, as petitioner and
respondent were both married (to other persons), respondent not only took
his marital status lightly, he also ignored petitioner’s married state, and
good character and reputation.
We disagree with the CA that neither corruption, clear intent to

violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule attended
the incident in question. RA 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of
1995, took effect on March 5, 1995. Respondent was charged with
knowledge of the existence of this law and its contents, more so because he
was a public servant. His act of grabbing petitioner and attempting to
kiss her without her consent was an unmistakable manifestation of
his intention to violate laws that specifically prohibited sexual
harassment in the work environment. Assuming arguendo that
respondent never intended to violate RA 7877, his attempt to kiss
petitioner was a flagrant disregard of a customary rule that had
existed since time immemorial – that intimate physical contact
between individuals must be consensual. Respondent’s defiance of
custom and lack of respect for the opposite sex were more appalling because
he was a married man. Respondent’s act showed a low regard for women
and disrespect for petitioner’s honor and dignity.31(Emphasis added)
cralawlawlibrary
However, it bears emphasis that in Narvasa v. Sanchez, Jr.,32 the Court

ordered the respondent public officer's dismissal from service with forfeiture
of retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations, because it was the third time that he was penalized
for acts of sexual harassment. In determining such penalty, moreover, the
Court considered the length of his service as an aggravating circumstance.
Apropos to this case is Civil Service Commission v. Nierras33 where the Court

upheld the CA's decision finding the respondent public officer guilty of grave
misconduct through sexual harassment with a reduced sentence of six (6)
months suspension without pay, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Petitioner alleged that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the case
of Veloso v. Caminade in imposing the proper penalty on Nierras since the
facts of the case are different. Indeed, it should be noted that in the instant
case, Oña and Nierras are not co-employees while in the Caminade case, the
complainants were the subordinates of the offender. Also, in the Caminade
case, there were several incidents of sexual harassment by a judge from
whom the expected standard of morality was more exacting. But here, there
was only one incident of sexual harassment. If a six-month suspension can
be meted to a judge from whom the expected standard of morality is more
exacting, a fortiori, the same or lesser penalty should be meted to Nierras.
Moreover, in the Caminade case, the offender actually forcefully kissed and
grabbed the complainants. However, in this case, Oña was able to flee from
the arms of Nierras even before he could cause more harm to her. Under the
circumstances of the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that
suspension of the offender for a period of six (6) months without pay is
sufficient penalty.34cralawred
cralawlawlibrary
Guided by the foregoing jurisprudence, the Court agrees with the CA that
petitioner should be held liable for grave misconduct, but holds that a
reduction of the penalty from dismissal from service to a mere suspension of
six (6) months without pay, is in order. Like in Veloso v. Caminade,35 there is
only one incident of sexual harassment in this case where petitioner forcibly
kissed respondent who was his subordinate. If a six (6)-month suspension
can be meted to a judge from whom the expected standard of morality is
more exacting, it is logical that a similar penalty should be meted to
petitioner.
Moreover, the Court's reduced penalty of six (6)-months suspension without

pay is in conformity with Civil Service Commission Resolution (CSC) No. 01-
0940 entitled the Administrative Disciplinary Rules on Sexual Harassment
Cases. Section 53, Rule X thereof classifies acts of sexual harassment as
grave, less grave and light offenses, while Sections 55 and 56, Rule XI
provides the corresponding penalties therefor, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
“RULE X
CLASSIFICATION OF ACTS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Section 53. Sexual harassment is classified as grave, less grave and light

offenses.
A. Grave Offenses shall include, but are not limited to:

1. unwanted touching of private parts of the body (genitalia, buttocks and
breast);
2. sexual assault;
3. malicious touching;
4. requesting for sexual favor in exchange for employment, promotion, local
or foreign travels, favorable working conditions or assignments, a passing
grade, the granting of honors or scholarship, or the grant of benefits or
payment of a stipend or allowance, and
5. other analogous cases.
B. Less Grave Offenses shall include, but are not limited to:
1. unwanted touching or brushing against a victim’s body;
2. pinching not falling under grave offenses;
3. derogatory or degrading remarks or innuendoes directed toward
the members of one sex, or one’s sexual orientation or used to describe a
person;
4. verbal abuse with sexual overtones; and
5. other analogous cases.
C. The following shall be considered Light Offenses;

1. surreptitiously looking or staring a look of a person’s private part or worn
undergarments;
2. telling sexist/smutty jokes or sending these through text, electronic mail
or other similar means, causing embarrassment or offense and carried out
after the offender has been advised that they are offensive or embarrassing
or, even without such advise, when they are by their nature clearly
embarrassing, offensive or vulgar;
3. malicious leering or ogling;
4. the display of sexually offensive pictures, materials or graffiti;
5. unwelcome inquiries or comments about a person’s sex life;
6. unwelcome sexual flirtation, advances, propositions;
7. making offensive hand or body gestures at an employee;
8. persistent unwanted attention with sexual overtones;
9. unwelcome phone calls with sexual overtones causing discomfort,
embarrassment, offense or insult to the receiver; and
10. other analogous cases.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
RULE XI
ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITIES
xxx xxx xxx
Section 55. Any person who is found guilty of sexual harassment shall, after
the investigation, be meted the penalty corresponding to the gravity and
seriousness of the offense.
Section 56. The penalties for light, less grave, and grave offenses are as
follows:
A. For light offenses:
1st offense – Reprimand 2nd offense – Fine or suspension not exceeding
thirty (30) days 3rd offense – Dismissal
B. For less grave offenses:
1st offense – Fine or suspension of not less than thirty (30) days and
not exceeding six (6) months 2nd offense – Dismissal
C. For grave offenses: Dismissal” (Emphasis added)cralawlawlibrary
Applying the foregoing provisions, the Court finds that the sexual
harassment offense petitioner committed falls under less grave
offenses which is analogous to “unwanted touching or brushing against a
victim’s body”, and to “derogatory or degrading remarks or innuendoes
directed toward the members of one sex”, with the corresponding maximum
penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay.36cralawred
Section 53 of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936, or the Uniform Rules on

Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS),37 states that in the
determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and
alternative circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall
be considered. The following circumstances shall be
appreciated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. Physical Illness
b. Good faith
c. Taking undue advantage of official position
d. Taking undue advantage of subordinate
e. Undue disclosure of confidential information
f. Use of government property in the commission of the offense
g. Habituality
h. Offense is committed during office hours and within the premises of the
office or building;
i. Employment of fraudulent means to commit or conceal the offense
j. Length of service in the government
k. Education
l. Other analogous circumstances.
Nevertheless, in the appreciation thereof, the same must be invoked or

pleaded by the proper party, otherwise, said circumstances shall not be
considered in the imposition of proper penalty. The Commission, however, in
the interest of substantial justice may take and consider these
circumstances.cralawlawlibrary
The Court notes that the Deputy Overall Ombudsman was correct in
appreciating the following mitigating circumstances in determining the
imposable penalty, to wit: (1) petitioner's weak physical condition and (2)
commission of the offense in a public place and in the presence of their
office mates. However, the said Ombudsman gravely erred in failing to
consider the following aggravating circumstances: (1) taking undue
advantage of official position; (2) taking undue advantage of subordinate;
and (3) education. As the Head of the Legal Department of PHILRACOM and
the direct superior of respondent, petitioner's act of forcibly kissing her lips
and saying “Ang sarap pala ng labi ni Maila x x x” in front of their office
mates, smacks of bad faith, abuse of official position, flagrant disregard of
the anti-sexual harassment law,38and willful violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.39 Under Section 54 (d) of the URACCS,40where
more aggravating circumstances are present than mitigating ones, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed. Hence, the Court imposes the penalty of
suspension of six (6) months without pay.
Given that the Ombudsman is vested with plenary and unqualified power41 to
investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance by a public
officer or employee of the government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof,42 the settled rule is that courts will not ordinarily
interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory
powers without good and compelling reason to indicate otherwise.43 As
discussed above, the Court finds such good and compelling reasons based on
law and jurisprudence as would warrant the modification of the CA decision,
as well as the Memorandum-Order of Overall Deputy Office of the
Ombudsman.
Meanwhile, the Court disagrees on petitioner's contention that the issue of

sexual harassment is better addressed in the pending criminal case for
sexual harassment before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, for to do so
in an administrative proceedings would be unfair, unjust and extremely
unreasonable. It bears to stress that administrative and criminal charges
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman and the trial court, respectively,
are separate and distinct from each other even if they arise from the same
act or omission. This is because the quantum of proof required in criminal
cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt, while in administrative cases, only
substantial evidence is required. Moreover, the purpose of the administrative
proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-
honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the
purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime.44 Thus, even
the dismissal of a criminal case does not necessarily foreclose the
administrative action against the respondent.45cralawred
Finally, considering that the Court is reducing the penalty imposed on him
from dismissal from service to a mere 6-month suspension without pay, and
that he is no longer connected with PHILRACOM, petitioner should refund the
salaries and all other monetary benefits he had received equivalent to six (6)
months with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum (p.a.) from finality
of this Decision until fully paid.46His earned leave credits for the duration of
such suspension are likewise deemed forfeited.47 The Court stresses that his
appointment48 as a trial court judge should not be viewed as a sort of
exoneration from such suspension that he should have served while he was
then PHILRACOM's Legal Department Head. Thus, in addition to the refund
of salaries and benefits, and forfeiture of earned leave credits during such
suspension, the Court sternly warns petitioner not to commit similar acts,
otherwise, his conduct may be construed as tainted with impropriety which
shall merit the penalty of dismissal from the service.
Moreover, in view of Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar
Council which disqualifies from being nominated for appointment to any
judicial post those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases, the
Court finds it necessary to investigate whether petitioner declared in his
application for appointment his pending administrative case for grave
misconduct and criminal cases for sexual harassment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,

dated August 16, 2006, and its Resolution dated October 4, 2006, in CA G.R.
SP No. 76959, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, reducing the penalty
for grave misconduct through sexual harassment from dismissal from service
to suspension of six (6) months without pay, and with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same offense shall be punished with dismissal from the
service. Considering, however, that petitioner Atty. Jacinto C. Gonzales is no
longer connected with Philippine Racing Commission, he
is ORDERED to REFUND the salaries and other monetary benefits he could
have received during the period of such suspension with legal interest of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
Further, his earned leave credits during such period of suspension are also
deemed FORFEITED.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) to form part of petitioner’s service record. The OCA is
hereby DIRECTED to investigate, report and recommend the necessary
action on whether petitioner declared in his application for appointment his
pending administrative and criminal cases.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Brion,* Peralta, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ.,

concur.
Endnotes:
*
Designated Acting Member, in lieu of Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama,
Jr., per Raffle dated March 5, 2015.
1
Rollo, pp. 10-31.
2
Appointed on August 23, 2005 as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Olongapo City, Branch 2, per Master List of Incumbent
Judges as of January 20, 2015; http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/index/judiciary-
book/lower court/municipal-trial-courts-in-cities; accessed on February 26,
2015 at 9:20 a.m.
3
Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, with Associate
Justices, now Supreme Court Associate Justices, Lucas P. Bersamin and
Martin S. Villarama Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 33-59.
4
Rollo, pp. 62-63.
5
CA rollo, pp. 41-45.
6
Id. at 46-47.
7
Rollo, pp. 41-42.
8
9
Id. at 53.
10
Id. at 54-58.
11
Id. at 81.
12
Rollo, pp. 83-84.
13
Id. at 46.
14
Id. at 87-88.
15
Id. at 58.
16
Id. at 110-111.
17
Id. at 62-63.
18
Rollo, p. 18. (Citation omitted)
19
An Act Declaring Sexual Harassment Unlawful in the Employment,
Education or Training Environment, and for other purposes.
20
226 Phil. 144 ( 1986).
21
374 Phil. 867 (1999).
22
Alberto Imperial v. Hon. Court of Appeals and the Republic of the
Philippines, 606 Phil. 391 (2009). (Citations omitted)
23
Id. at 396-397.
24
Id. at 397.
25
V.C. Ponce, Company, Inc. v. Municipality of Parañaque and Sampaguita
Hills Homeowner's Association, Inc., G.R. No. 178431, November 12, 2012,
685 SCRA 117, 130.
26
Hon. Orlando C. Casimiro, in his capacity as Acting Ombudsman; Hon.
Rogelio L. Singson, in his capacity as Department of Public Works and
Highways Secretary v. Josefino N. Rigor, G.R. No. 206661, December 10,
2014.
27
Id.
28
G.R. No. 183161, December 3, 2014.
29
Rollo, pp. 53-54.
30
630 Phil. 577 (2010).
31
Narvasa v. Sanchez, Jr., supra, at 582.
32
Supra note 30.
33
569 Phil. 37 (2008).
34
Civil Service Commission v. Nierras, supra, at 43.
35
478 Phil. 1 (2004).
36
Section 56 of the URACCS states that during the period of suspension,
respondent shall not be entitled to all money benefits including leave credits.
Now Section 51 (c) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (RRACCS).
37
Now Section 48 of the RRACCS.
38
R.A. No. 7877.
39
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
40
Now Section 49 (d) of the RRACCS.
41
Bureau of Internal Revenue v. Office of the Ombudsman, 430 Phil. 223,
232 (2002).
42
Laurel v. Desierto, 430 Phil. 658, 671 (2002).
43
Esquivel v. Ombudsman, 437 Phil. 702, 711 (2002).
44
Caña v. Gebusion, 385 Phil. 773 (2000).
45
Barillo v. Gervacio, 532 Phil. 267, 279 (2006).
46
Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA
439, 459.
47
Section 56 (d) of the URACCS; Now Section 51 (c) of the RRACCS.
48
See note 2; Appointed August 23, 2005.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 196342, August 08, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. NOEL GO CAOILI ALIAS

"BOY TAGALOG", Respondent.
G.R. No. 196848, August 8, 2017

NOEL GO CAOILI, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated petitions for review1 under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court are the July 22, 2010 Decision2 and March 29, 2011
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00576- MIN,
which set aside the June 17, 2008 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Surigao City, Branch 30, in Criminal Case No. 7363, finding Noel Go Caoili
(Caoili) alias "Boy Tagalog" guilty of the crime of Rape by Sexual Assault
under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353,5 and remanded the case to the
RTC for further proceedings consistent with the CA's opinion.
The Facts
On June 22, 2006, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Raul O. Nasayao filed
an Information against Caoili, charging him with the crime of rape through
sexual intercourse in violation of Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B,
of the RPC as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and R.A. No. 7610.6 The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 23rd day of October 2005, at 7:00 o'clock in the

evening, more or less, in Purok [III], Barangay [JJJ], [KKK], [LLL],
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with full freedom and intelligence, with lewd design, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had sexual intercourse
with one [AAA],7 a minor, fifteen (15) years of age and the daughter of the
herein accused, through force, threat and intimidation and against her will,
to her damage and prejudice in the amount as may be allowed by law.
CONTRARY TO Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B of R.A. 8353, with

the aggravating circumstance that the accused is the father of the victim and
R.A. 7610[.]8
On July 31, 2006, the RTC issued an Order9 confirming Caoili 's detention at
the Municipal Station of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology after
his arrest10 on October 25, 2005.
Upon arraignment on September 15, 2006,11 Caoili pleaded not guilty to the

crime charged. After the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
The victim, AAA, testified that on October 23, 2005, at 7:00p.m., her father,
Caoili, sexually molested her at their house located in Barangay JJJ,
Municipality of KKK, in the Province of LLL. Caoili kissed her lips, touched
and mashed her breast, inserted the fourth finger of his left hand into her
vagina, and made a push and pull movement into her vagina with such
finger for 30 minutes. AAA felt excruciating pain during and after the ordeal.
Against her father's harsh warning not to go out of the house, AAA
proceeded to the house of her uncle, BBB, located 20 meters away from
their house. When he learned of this, Caoili fetched AAA and dragged her
home. He beat and hit her with a piece of wood, and boxed her on the
stomach.12
On October 26, 2005, AAA disclosed to Emelia Loayon (Loayon), the

guidance counselor at AAA's school, the sexual molestation and physical
violence committed against her by her own father. Loayon accompanied AAA
to the police station to report the sexual and physical abuse. AAA also
executed a sworn statement13 regarding the incident before the Municipal
Mayor.14
AAA underwent a medical examination conducted by Dr. Ramie Hipe (Dr.

Hipe) at the [KKK] Medicare Community Hospital. Dr. Hipe issued a medical
certificate dated October 26, 2005 showing that AAA had suffered:15
xxxx
1. Contusion, 5 inches in width, distal 3rd, lateral aspect, left Thigh.

2. Contusion, 2 cms in width, distal 3rd, lateral aspect, left Forearm
3. (+) tenderness, left parietal area, head
4. (+)tenderness, over the upper periumbilical area of abdomen
5. tenderness, over the hypogastric area
xxxx
Genital Examination
xxxx
Hymen
- fimbriated in shape
- with laceration on the following:
-complete laceration - 12 o'clock position
- partial laceration - 3 o'clock position
-partial laceration - 8 o'clock position
-partial laceration - 11 o'clock position16
Dr. Hipe referred AAA to a Medical Specialist, Dr. Lucila Clerino (Dr. Clerino),
for further Medico-Legal examination and vaginal smear. Dr. Clerino issued a
Supplementary Medical Certificate dated October 28, 2005, indicating that
AAA's hymenal area had lacerations complete at 6 o'clock and 9 o'clock
superficial laceration at 12 o'clock.17
AAA sought the assistance of the Department of Social Welfare and

Development which facilitated her admission to a rehabilitation center run by
the Missionary Sisters of Mary.18
For his defense, Caoili denied molesting AAA. He alleged that on October 23,
2005, at about 7:00p.m., he saw AAA with her boyfriend at the cassava
plantation. He recognized AAA by the fragrance of her perfume and by the
outline of her ponytail. He even greeted them "good evening" but they did
not respond. He then went home. When AAA arrived at their house, he
confronted her and the latter admitted that she was with her boyfriend
"Dodong" earlier that evening. He was so angry so he struck AAA's right
thigh with a piece of wood and pushed the same piece of wood on her
forehead. When AAA cried out in pain, he became remorseful and asked for
forgiveness, but AAA kept mum. After they had supper, Caoili and his son
slept in one room; while AAA and her siblings slept in another room.19
The RTC's Ruling
On June 17, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision20 declaring Caoili guilty of
rape by sexual assault. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused NOEL GO CAOILI alias "Boy Tagalog" guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of rape, defined and
penalized in paragraph 2 of Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and after considering the
aggravating circumstance of being the parent of the complainant, who was
fourteen (14) years, one (1) month and ten (10) days old at the time of the
incident in question, there being no mitigating circumstance to off-set the
same, this Court hereby sentences the said accused to suffer imprisonment
for an indefinite period of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision
Mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum
period, as maximum, and to pay the costs. Four-fifths (4/5) of the
preventive detention of said accused shall be credited to his favor.
The same accused is hereby ordered to pay complainant [AAA] an

indemnity ex delicto of P50,000.00; moral damages of P50,000.00; and
exemplary damages of another P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.21
On September 29, 2008, pursuant to a Commitment Order22 issued by the

RTC on August 27, 2008, provincial jail guards escorted Caoili for his
confinement at the Davao Prisons and Penal Farm, Panabo, Davao del Norte
(Davao Penal Colony).23
Thereafter, Caoili filed his appeal before the CA.
The CA's Ruling
On July 22, 2010, the CA rendered the assailed Decision,24 the dispositive

portion of which reads, thus:
FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed Decision of Branch 30 of the Regional

Trial Court of Surigao City, in Criminal Case Nos. 7363, is SET ASIDE. Let
this case be as it is IMMEDIATELY REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.25
The CA held that although Caoili is clearly guilty of rape by sexual assault,
what the trial court should have done was to direct the State Prosecutor to
file a new Information charging the proper offense, and after compliance
therewith, to dismiss the original Information. The appellate court found it
"imperative and morally upright" to set the judgment aside and to remand
the case for further proceedings pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110,26 in
relation to Section 19, Rule 11927 of the Rules of Court.
Thereafter, Caoili and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed their
respective petitions for review before this Court: G.R. No. 196342 was
instituted by the OSG and G.R. No. 196848 was filed by Caoili. These
petitions were ordered consolidated by the Court in its Resolution28 dated on
August 1, 2011.
In G.R. No. 196342, the OSG assails the CA's Decision for not being in
accord with the law and established jurisprudence. Their petition was
anchored on the following grounds:29
I.
[CAOILI] WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN THE

OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION AND EMBRACED WITHIN THE
SAME ARTICLE OF [R.A. NO.] 8353.
II.
[CAOILI'S] CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE CHARGE

AGAINST HIM WAS NOT VIOLATED SINCE HE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED
DURING THE TRIAL PROCEEDINGS AND NEVER QUESTIONED THE
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS
SEXUAL ASSAULT AND NOT SIMPLE RAPE.
III.
THE HONORABLE [CA] HAS ALREADY AFFIRMED THE CONVICTION OF

[CAOILI] FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE BY SEXUAL ASSAULT.
IV.
THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 14, RULE 110 OF THE RULES OF COURT,
IN RELATION TO SECTION 19, RULE 119, OF THE SAME RULES, IS NOT
APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
In G.R. No. 196848, Caoili raises the following issues30 for our consideration:
I.
WHETHER RAPE BY SEXUAL ASSAULT IS NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN RAPE

BY SEXUAL INTERCOURSE;
II.
WHETHER THE CASE MAY BE REMANDED TO THE COURT A QUO FOR

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO SECTION 14, RULE 110 AND SEC.
19, RULE 119 OF THE RULES OF COURT;
III.
WHETHER THE PROSECUTION HAS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF [CAOILI] ON [sic] THE CRIME CHARGED
IN THE INFORMATION;
IV.
WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE [CA] ACQUITTED [CAOILI.]
The Court's Ruling
The petitions lack merit.
The prosecution has established rape by sexual assault.
R.A. No. 8353 or the "Anti-Rape Law of 1997" amended Article 335, the
provision on rape in the RPC, reclassifying rape as a crime against persons
and introducing rape by "sexual assault," as differentiated from rape through
"carnal knowledge" or rape through "sexual intercourse."31 Incorporated into
the RPC by R.A. No. 8353, Article 266-A reads:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed -
1) By a man who shall havecarnal knowledge of a woman under any of the

following circumstances:
(a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise

unconscious;
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; [and]
(d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present[.]
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in

paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act ofsexual assault by inserting his
penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.32 (Emphasis ours)
Thus, rape under the RPC, as amended, can be committed in two ways:
(1) Article 266-A paragraph 1 refers to rape through sexual intercourse,

also known as "organ rape" or "penile rape." The central element in rape
through sexual intercourse is carnal knowledge, which must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
(2) Article 266-A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called
"instrument or object rape," or "gender-free rape." It must be attended by
any of the circumstances enumerated in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of
paragraph 1.33 (Emphasis ours)
Through AAA's testimony, the prosecution was able to prove that Caoili
molested his own daughter when he inserted his finger into her vagina and
thereafter made a push and pull movement with such finger for 30
minutes,34 thus, clearly establishing rape by sexual assault35 under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC.
Caoili, however, questions AAA's credibility, arguing that her testimony

lacked veracity since she harbored hatred towards him due to the latter's
strict upbringing.36
The Court however, oppugns the veracity of Caoili's claim.
It is settled that ill motives become inconsequential if there is an affirmative

and credible declaration from the rape victim, which clearly establishes the
liability of the accused.37
AAA was a little over 15 years old when she testified,38 and she categorically
identified Caoili as the one who defiled her. She positively and consistently
declared that Caoili inserted his finger into her vagina and that she suffered
tremendous pain during the insertion. Her account of the incident, as found
by the RTC39 and the CA,40 was clear, convincing and straightforward, devoid
of any material or significant inconsistencies.
In People v. Pareja,41 the Court held that:
[T]he "assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the

trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their
deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied the
appellate courts, and when his findings have been affirmed by the CA, these
are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court."42
While there are recognized exceptions to the rule, this Court has found no
substantial reason to overturn the identical conclusions of the trial and
appellate courts on the matter of AAA's credibility.43
When a rape victim's testimony on the manner she was molested is

straightforward and candid, and is corroborated by the medical findings of
the examining physician, as in this case, the same is sufficient to support a
conviction for rape.44 In a long line of cases,45 this Court has given full
weight and credit to the testimonies of child victims, considering that their
youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Indeed,
leeway should be given to witnesses who are minors, especially when they
are relating past incidents of abuse.46
It is likewise settled that in cases where the rape is committed by a close

kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law
spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be
employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or
intimidation.47
Verily, the prosecution has sufficiently proved the crime of rape by sexual
assault as defined in paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC. Caoili,
however, cannot be convicted of said crime.
Rape by sexual assault is not subsumed in rape through sexual
intercourse.
We cannot accept the OSG's argument that based on the variance

doctrine,48 Caoili can be convicted of rape by sexual assault because this
offense is necessarily included in the crime of rape through sexual
intercourse.
The variance doctrine, which allows the conviction of an accused for a crime
proved which is different from but necessarily included in the crime charged,
is embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When

there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted
of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of
the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. (Emphasis ours)
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. - An offense

charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
By jurisprudence,49 however, an accused charged in the Information with

rape by sexual intercourse cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault,
even though the latter crime was proven during trial. This is due to the
substantial distinctions between these two modes of rape.50
The elements of rape through sexual intercourse are: (1) that the offender is
a man; (2) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) that
such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation.51 Rape by sexual
intercourse is a crime committed by a man against a woman, and the central
element is carnal knowledge.52
On the other hand, the elements of rape by sexual assault are: (1) that the
offender commits an act of sexual assault; (2) that the act of sexual assault
is committed by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal
orifice or by inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice
of another person; and that the act of sexual assault is accomplished by
using force or intimidation, among others.53
In the first mode (rape by sexual intercourse): (1) the offender is always a
man; (2) the offended party is always a woman; (3) rape is committed
through penile penetration of the vagina; and (4) the penalty is reclusion
perpertua.54
In the second mode (rape by sexual assault): (1) the offender may be a
man or a woman; (2) the offended party may be a man or a woman; (3)
rape is committed by inserting the penis into another person's mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another
person; and (4) the penalty is prision mayor.55
The Court en banc's categorical pronouncement in People v. Abulon,56 thus,

finds application:
In view of the material differences between the two modes of rape, the first
mode is not necessarily included in the second, and vice-versa. Thus, since
the charge in the Information in Criminal Case No. SC-7424 is rape through
carnal knowledge, appellant cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault
although it was proven, without violating his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.57
Our esteemed colleague, Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Justice Leonen), is of

the view that Caoili should be convicted of rape by sexual
intercourse.58 According to him, sexual intercourse encompasses a wide
range of sexual activities, and is not limited to those involving penetration,
genitals, and opposite sexes;59 it may be penetrative or simply
stimulative.60 Thus, he maintains that Caoili's act of inserting his finger into
his daughter's genitalia qualifies as carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse.61
The Court, however, cannot adopt Justice Leonen's theory.
The language of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended

by R.A. No. 8353, provides the elements that substantially differentiate the
two forms of rape, i.e., rape by sexual intercourse and rape by sexual
assault. It is through legislative process that the dichotomy between these
two modes of rape was created. To broaden the scope of rape by sexual
assault, by eliminating its legal distinction from rape through sexual
intercourse, calls for judicial legislation which We cannot traverse without
violating the principle of separation of powers. The Court remains steadfast
in confining its powers within the constitutional sphere of applying the law as
enacted by the Legislature.
In fine, given the material distinctions between the two modes of rape
introduced in R.A. No. 8353, the variance doctrine cannot be applied to
convict an accused of rape by sexual assault if the crime charged is rape
through sexual intercourse, since the former offense cannot be considered
subsumed in the latter.
The Court, thus, takes this occasion to once again remind public prosecutors
of their crucial role in drafting criminal complaints or Information. They have
to be more judicious and circumspect in preparing the Information since a
mistake or defect therein may not render full justice to the State, the
offended party and even the offender.
Thus, in Pareja,62 the Court held that:
The primary duty of a lawyer in public prosecution is to see that justice is

done - to the State, that its penal laws are not broken and order maintained;
to the victim, that his or her rights are vindicated; and to the offender, that
he is justly punished for his crime.63
Caoili can be convicted of the crime of lascivious conduct under

Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
R.A. No. 761064 finds application when the victims of abuse, exploitation or

discrimination are children or those "persons below 18 years of age or those
over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves
from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition."65
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the lascivious act, AAA
was fourteen (14) years, one (1) month and ten (10) days old. This calls for
the application of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 761066which provides:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male
or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion

perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse:
Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape
and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for
rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty
for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age
shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period. (Emphasis ours.)
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 are as
follows:
(1) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or

subjected to other sexual abuse; and
(3) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.67 (Emphasis

ours)
The prosecution's evidence has sufficiently established the elements of

lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
Caoili's lascivious conduct
The evidence confirms that Caoili committed lascivious acts against AAA
when he kissed her lips, touched and mashed her breast, and inserted his
finger into her vagina and made a push and pull movement with such finger
for 30 minutes.
AAA's testimony during direct examination showed how her father, Caoili,
committed lascivious acts against her:
(On Direct Examination)
Pros. Silvosa
Q Now, was there any unusual incident that happened at around 7:00
o'clock in the evening of October 23, 2005?
A Yes, sir.

Q What happened on October 23, 2005 at around 7:00 o'clock in the
evening?
A First, he kissed my lips, 2nd, he touched and mashed my breast and
his 4thfinger touched my private part.

Court

Q 4th finger of what hand?
A Left, your Honor.

xxxx

Q Who has done this to you?
A Noel Go Caoili.

Pros. Silvosa

Q If that Noel Go Caoili is present in the courtroom, can you identify him?
A Yes, sir.

Court

Q What is your relationship with Noel Caoili?
A My father.

xxxx

Pros. Silvosa

Q [AAA], you said that your father touched your vagina and inserted his, the
4thfinger of his left hand, for how many minutes, if you could still recall,
when he inserted... I withdraw the question, your Honor... What
specifically did he do with his 4th finger in your vagina?
A He inserted it in my vagina, sir.

Q While the finger was already inside your vagina, what did he do with his
finger?
A He inserted it and pulled it, he inserted and pulled it inside my vagina.

Q Can you still recall or how many or for how long did he made [sic] the
push and pull movement of his fingers inside you vagina?
A Thirty 30 minutes, sir.

Q Now, what did you feel while the finger of your father was inserted in your
vagina?
A Pain, sir.68 (Emphasis ours)
AAA likewise confirmed on cross examination69 that Caoili molested her. She

even recounted that her father threatened her not to tell anybody about the
incident.
Caoili's acts are clearly covered by the definitions of "sexual abuse" and
"lascivious conduct" under Section 2 of the rules and regulations70 of R.A.
No. 7610:
(g) "Sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement,

enticement orcoercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to
engage in, sexual intercourse orlascivious conduct or the molestation,
prostitution, or incest with children;
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or

through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,breast, inner thigh, or
buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth,
of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent toabuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area of a person. (Emphasis ours)
It has been settled that Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 does not require a
prior or contemporaneous abuse that is different from what is complained of,
or that a third person should act in concert with the accused.71
The victim's minority

AAA was a child below 18 years old at the time the lascivious conduct was
committed against her. Her minority was both sufficiently alleged in the
Information and proved.
Influence and coercion
"Influence" is the improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives a
person of free will and substitutes another's objective. On the other hand,
"coercion" is the improper use of power to compel another to submit to the
wishes of one who wields it.72
In People v. Leonardo,73 the Court ruled that:
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being
abused for profit, but also one in which a child is coerced to engage in
lascivious conduct. To repeat, intimidation need not necessarily be
irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation
annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. This is
especially true in the case of young, innocent and immature girls who could
not be expected to act with equanimity of disposition and with nerves of
steel. Young girls cannot be expected to act like adults under the same
circumstances or to have the courage and intelligence to disregard the
threat.74
It cannot be denied that AAA, who is only a little over 14 years old at the
time the offense was committed, was vulnerable and would have been easily
intimidated by an attacker who is not only a grown man but is also someone
exercising parental authority over her. Even absent such coercion or
intimidation, Caoili can still be convicted of lascivious conduct under Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 as he evidently used his moral influence and
ascendancy as a father in perpetrating his lascivious acts against AAA. It is
doctrinal that moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and
intimidation.75
It bears emphasis, too, that consent is immaterial in cases involving

violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610.76 The mere act of having sexual
intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in
prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense because it
is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.77
Clearly, therefore, all the essential elements of lascivious conduct under

Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 have been proved, making Caoili liable for said
offense.
Variance doctrine applied
Caoili had been charged with rape through sexual intercourse in violation of
Article 266-A of the RPC and R.A. No. 7610. Applying the variance doctrine
under Section 4, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Caoili can be held guilty of the lesser crime of acts of
lasciviousness performed on a child, i.e., lascivious conduct under Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, which was the offense proved, because it is included
in rape, the offense charged.78 This echoes the Court's pronouncement
in Leonardo, viz.:
This Court holds that the lower courts properly convicted the appellant in
Criminal Case Nos. 546-V-02, 547-V-02, 548-V-02, 554-V- 02 and 555-V-02
for five counts of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act
No. 7610 even though the charges against him in the aforesaid criminal
cases were for rape in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. The lower court['s]
ruling is in conformity with the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in
relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, x
x x:
xxxx
With the aforesaid provisions, the appellant can be held guilty of a

lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness performed on a child, i.e.,
sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No.
7610, which was the offense proved because it is included in rape,
the offense charged.79 (Emphasis ours)
The due recognition of the constitutional right of an accused to be informed

of the nature and cause of the accusation through the criminal complaint or
information is decisive of whether his prosecution for a crime stands or
not.80 Nonetheless, the right is not transgressed if the information
sufficiently alleges facts and omissions constituting an offense that includes
the offense established to have been committed by the accused,81 which, in
this case, is lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
Guidelines: Nomenclature of crime and penalties for lascivious

conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610
The Court is aware of its previous pronouncements where, applying the

variance doctrine, it convicted the accused, charged with the rape of a
minor, for the offense designated not as "Lascivious Conduct under Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610" but as "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610."
Thus, in People v. Bon,82 the accused was charged with having carnal

knowledge of a six-year-old child against her will and with the use of force
and intimidation. The trial court convicted the accused of rape. The
evidence, however, merely showed that accused inserted his finger into the
victim's vaginal orifice. Applying the variance doctrine, the Court en
banc held that the accused could still be made liable for acts of
lasciviousness under the RPC because said crime is included in rape. The
accused was convicted of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC
in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, since all the elements of the
said offense were established.
Likewise, in Navarrete v. People,83 the accused was charged with statutory

rape for having sexual intercourse with a five-year-old girl. Absent clear and
positive proof of the entry of accused's penis into the labia of the victim's
vagina, the trial court convicted the accused of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610. The CA and this Court affirmed the conviction. In the case
of Bon,84 the Court held that the crime of acts of lasciviousness is included in
rape. The Court likewise found that the victim's testimony established that
accused committed acts of lewdness which amounted to lascivious conduct
under R.A. No. 7610.
So also, in People v. Rellota,85 the Court modified the accused's conviction

for attempted rape86 of a 12-year-old minor to a conviction for Acts of
Lasciviousness as defined in the RPC in relation to Section 5 of R.A. No.
7610, holding that the accused's acts, while lascivious, did not exactly
demonstrate an intent to have carnal knowledge with the victim. The Court
applied the variance doctrine and reiterated that the crime of acts of
lasciviousness is included in rape. The conviction was based on the Court's
finding that the elements of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
RPC and of lascivious conduct as defined in the rules and regulations of R.A.
No. 7610 have been established.
Based on the language of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, however, the
offense designated as Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in
relation to Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 should be used when the victim is
under 12 years of age at the time the offense was committed. This finds
support in the first proviso in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 which requires
that "when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336
of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be." Thus, pursuant to this proviso, it has been
held that before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through
lascivious conduct on a minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for act of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the
requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610.87
Conversely, when the victim, at the time the offense was committed, is aged
twelve (12) years or over but under eighteen (18), or is eighteen (18) or
older but unable to fully take care of herself/himself or protect
himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition,88 the nomenclature of
the offense should be Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610, since the law no longer refers to Article 336 of the RPC, and the
perpetrator is prosecuted solely under R.A. No. 7610.
In the case at bar, AAA was a little over 14 years old when the lascivious
conduct was committed against her. Thus, We used the nomenclature
"Lascivious Conduct" under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
Accordingly, for the guidance of public prosecutors and the courts, the Court
takes this opportunity to prescribe the following guidelines in designating or
charging the proper offense in case lascivious conduct is committed under
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and in determining the imposable penalty:
1. The age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating or

charging the offense, and in determining the imposable penalty.
2. If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the
crime should be "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610." Pursuant to the
second proviso in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the imposable penalty
is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than twelve (12)
but below eighteen (18) years of age, or is eighteen (18) years old or older
but is unable to fully take care of herself/himself or protect herself/himself
physical or mental disability or condition, the crime should be designated as
"Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," and the
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua.89
The CA's order to remand the case to the trial court is procedurally
infirm.
The CA erred in remanding the case to the trial court for the purpose of filing
the proper Information on the basis of the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule
110 and Section 19, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which read:
Sec. 14. Amendment or substitution. — x x x
xxxx
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in

charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be
placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail
for their appearance at the trial.
Sec. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. —
When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be
convicted of the offense charged or any other offense necessarily included
therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to
detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for
the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper
information. (Emphasis ours)
It is clear that the rules are applicable only before judgment has been
rendered. In this case, the trial has been concluded. The RTC already
returned a guilty verdict, which has been reviewed by the CA whose
decision, in turn, has been elevated to this Court.
The CA's judgment did not amount to an acquittal.
Contrary to Caoili's stance, the CA's decision did not amount to a judgment
of acquittal. It is true the CA declared that given the substantial distinctions
between rape through sexual intercourse, as charged, and rape by sexual
assault, which was proved, "no valid conviction can be had without running
afoul of the accused's Constitutional right to be informed of the charge." This
statement, however, must be read alongside the immediately succeeding
directive of the appellate court, remanding the case to the RTC for further
proceedings pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 and Section 19, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court. Said directive clearly shows that the CA still had cause to
detain Caoili and did not discharge him; in fact, the CA would have Caoili
answer for the proper Information which it directed the prosecution to file.
These are not consistent with the concept of acquittal which denotes a
discharge, a formal certification of innocence, a release or an
absolution.90 While the procedure adopted by the CA is certainly incorrect, its
decision cannot be deemed to have the effect of an acquittal.
Penalty and Damages
Considering that AAA was over 12 but under 18 years of age at the time of
the commission of the lascivious act, the imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
Since the crime was committed by the father of the offended party, the
alternative circumstance of relationship should be appreciated.91 In crimes
against chastity, such as acts of lasciviousness, relationship is always
aggravating.92 With the presence of this aggravating circumstance and no
mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in its maximum
period, i.e., reclusion perpetua,93without eligibility of parole.94 This is in
consonance with Section 31(c)95 of R.A. No. 7610 which expressly provides
that the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period when the
perpetrator is, inter alia, the parent of the victim.
Likewise, Section 31(f)96 of R.A. No. 7610 imposes a fine upon the
perpetrator, which jurisprudence pegs in the amount of Php 15,000.97
Parenthetically, considering the gravity and seriousness of the offense, taken

together with the evidence presented against Caoili, this Court finds it
proper to award damages.
In light of recent jurisprudential rules, when the circumstances surrounding

the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua, the victim is entitled
to civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages each in the
amount of Php 75,000.00, regardless of the number of qualifying
aggravating circumstances present.98
The fine, civil indemnity and all damages thus imposed shall be subject to
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality
of this judgment until fully paid.99
WHEREFORE, both petitions are DENIED. The Court of Appeals' July 22,

2010 Decision and March 29, 2011 Resolution are SET ASIDE. Accused Noel
Go Caoili alias Boy Tagalog is guilty of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b)
of Republic Act No. 7610. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility of parole, and to pay a fine of Php 15,000.00. He
is further ordered to pay the victim, AAA, civil indemnity, moral damages
and exemplary damages each in the amount of Php 75,000.00. The fine, civil
indemnity and damages so imposed are subject to interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Del

Castillo, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Peralta, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Leonen and Martires, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Caguioa, J., see separate opinion.
Endnotes:
1
Rollo (G.R. No. 196342), pp. 11-48; rollo (G.R. No. 196848), pp. 11-35.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, concurred in by Associate
Justices Leoncia R. Dimagiba and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela; CA rollo, pp.
109-119.
3
Rollo (G.R. No. 196342), pp. 62-67.
4
Penned by Presiding Judge Floripinas C. Buyser: records, pp. 87-97.
5
The Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
6
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL
PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND
DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Approved on June 17, 1992.
7
The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or
compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or
household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610,
An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination. and for Other Purposes;
Republic Act No. 9262, An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
Therefrom; and for Other Purposes; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-
SC, known as the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children,
effective November 5, 2004. (People v. Dumadag, 667 Phil. 664 [2011])
8
Records, p. 1.
9
Id. at 17.
10
Apprehension Report, id. at 8.
11
Certificate of Arraignment, id. at 22.
12
Rollo (G.R. No. 196342), pp. 15-16.
13
Pangutana Ug Tubag, records, p. 5.
14
Rollo (G.R. No. 196342), p. 17.
15
Id.
16
Exhibits, pp. 10-11.
17
Rollo (G.R. No: 196342), p. 18.
18
CA rollo, p. 44.
19
Id. at 47-48.
20
Records, pp. 87-97.
21
Records, p. 97.
22
CA rollo, p. 7.
23
Id. at 8.
24
Id. at 109-119.
25
Id. at 119.
26
Sec. 14. Amendment or substitution.—x x x
xxxx
27
Sec. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. —
information.
28
Rollo (G.R. No. 196848), p. 160.
29
Rollo (G.R. No. 196342), pp. 27-28.
30
Rollo (G.R. No. 196848), pp. 21-22.
31
People v. Pareja, 724 Phil. 759 (2014).
32
Id. at 781.
33
Id. at 782.
34
Records, p. 88.
35
Rape by sexual assault has the following elements: (1) That the offender
commits an act of sexual assault; (2) That the act of sexual assault is
committed by any of the following means: (a) By inserting his penis into
another person's mouth or anal orifice; or (b) By inserting any
instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another
person; (3) That the act of sexual assault is accomplished under any of the
following circumstances: (a) By using force and intimidation; (b) When the
woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) By means of
fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or (d) When the woman
is under 12 years of age or demented. (People v. Soria, 698 Phil. 676
[2012])
36
Rollo (G.R. No. 196848), p. 28.
37]
Rondina v. People, 687 Phil. 274 (2012).
38
Records, p. 96.
39
The RTC's Decision states: "x x x this Court finds the testimony of AAA,
who was little over fifteen years old at the time she testified, to be clear,
convincing and straightforward, devoid of any material or significant
inconsistencies. x x x." Id.
40
The CA held: "We also find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the
trial court upholding [AAA]'s credibility. x x x." Rollo (G.R. No. 196342), p.
58.
41
Supra note 31.
42
Id. at 773.
43
Id.
44
People v. Soria, supra note 35.
45
Ricalde v. People, 751 Phil. 793, 805 (2015), citing Pielago v. People, 706
Phil. 460 (2013); Campos v. People, 569 Phil. 658, 671 (2008),
quoting People v. Capareda, 473 Phil. 301, 330 (2004); People v. Galigao,
443 Phil. 246, 260 (2003).
46
Ricalde v. People, supra note 45.
47
People v. Padua, 661 Phil. 366 (2011 ); People v. Corpuz, 597 Phil. 459
(2009).
48
Embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court.
49
People v. Abulon, 557 Phil. 428 (2007); People v. Pareja, supra note
31; People v. Cuaycong, 718 Phil. 633 (2013).
50
People v. Pareja, supra note 31.
51
People v. Alfredo, 653 Phil. 435 (2010).
52
People v. Espera, 718 Phil. 680 (2013).
53
People v. Alfredo, supra note 51.
54
People v. Espera, supra note 52, citing People v. Abulon, supra note 49.
55
Id.
56
Supra note 49.
57
Id. at 455.
58
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen; p. 6.
59
Id. at 12.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 7.
62
Supra note 31.
63
Id. at 785.
64
Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act.
65
People v. Chingh, 661 Phil. 208, 223 (2011).
66
Id.
67
Roallos v. People, 723 Phil. 655 (2013); Caballo v. People, 710 Phil. 792
(2013); People v. Rayon, Sr., 702 Phil. 672 (2013); Garingarao v. People,
669 Phil. 672 (2011); andOlivarez v. CA and People, 503 Phil. 421 (2005).
68
TSN, January 10,2007, pp. 7-8, 12.
69
Id. at 30-31.
70
Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse
Cases (Done in the City of Manila: October 1993).
71
Quimvel v. People, G.R. No. 214497, April 18, 2017.
72
Caballo v. People, supra note 67.
73
638 Phil. 161 (2010).
74
Id. at 188.
75
People v. Deligero, 709 Phil. 783 (2013).
76
Caballo v. People, supra note 67.
77
Id.
78
See People v. Leonardo, supra note 73.
79
Id. at 197-198.
80
People v. Manansala, 708 Phil. 66 (2013).
81
Id.
82
444 Phil. 571 (2003).
83
542 Phil. 496 (2007).
84
People v. Bon, supra note 82.
85
640 Phil. 471 (2010).
86
Accused in this case was also convicted of two (2) counts of consummated
rape.
87
People v. Bonaagua, 665 Phil. 750 (2011); Navarrete v. People, supra note
83, citing Amployo v. People, 496 Phil. 747 (2005).
88
See Section 3(a), R.A. No. 7610.
89
People v. Bacus, G.R. No. 208354, August 26, 2015, 768 SCRA
318; People v. Baraga, 735 Phil. 466 (2014); and People v. Rayon, 702 Phil.
672 (2013).
90
See definitions of "Acquittal" and "Acquitted" in Black's Law Dictionary,
Fifth Edition.
91
People v. Sumingwa, 618 Phil. 650 (2009).
92
Id.
93
People v. Gaduyon, 720 Phil. 750 (2013); People v. Sumingwa, supra note
91.
94
People v. Bacus, supra note 89.
95
Article XII, Section 31. Common Penal Provisions. -
xxxx
(c) The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period
when the perpetrator is an ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or
collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity, or a
manager or owner of an establishment which has no license to operate or its
license has expired or has been revoked.
xxxx
96
Article XII, Section 31. Common Penal Provisions.-
xxxx
(f) A fine to be determined by the court shall be imposed and administered
as a cash fund by the Department of Social Welfare and Development and
disbursed for the rehabilitation of each child victim, or any immediate
member of his family if the latter is the perpetrator of the offense.
xxxx
97
People v. Bacus, supra note 89.
98
People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, 788 SCRA 331.
99
Id.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PERALTA, J.:
I concur with the ponencia in finding accused Noel Go Caoili alias "Boy

Tagalog" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of sexual abuse under Section
5(b),1 Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, or the "Special Protection
of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," and not the
crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 3362 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
First. While there is a variance between the offense charged [rape by sexual

intercourse] and those offenses proved [sexual abuse under Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610 and rape by sexual assault], Caoili can be
convicted of sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 because it was the offense
proved during trial, and it is necessarily included in the crime of acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC which, under settled
jurisprudence, is necessarily included in rape. However, due to the material
differences between the two modes of committing rape, settled
jurisprudence holds that rape by sexual intercourse is not necessarily
included in rape by sexual assault, vice-versa, and that an accused cannot
be found guilty of rape by sexual assault even though it was proved, if the
charge is rape by sexual intercourse.
Second. Exception must be taken as to the applicability to this case

of People v. Nazareno3 where it was held that rape by sexual assault
committed at the time when the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (R.A. No. 8353) was
already in effect, although proven, should not have been considered by the
trial and appellate courts for lack of a proper allegation in the information,
which only charged the accused with rape by sexual intercourse.
Third. Sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 and
acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC are separate and distinct
from each other, despite the fact that the essential elements or ingredients
of both crimes barely have material or substantial differences.
Fourth. The penalty for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A.
No. 7610 varies if the age of the child victim is either below 12 years of age
or between Twelve (12) to Seventeen (17) years of age, as well as Eighteen
(18) and above but under special circumstances.4 Also, the crime of acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610, can only be committed against a victim who is less than 12
years old or one who cannot give intelligent consent.
Fifth. In view of possible different opinions between and among the crimes
of rape through carnal knowledge under Article 266, paragraph 1 of the RPC,
rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2, acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, and sexual abuse under Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, a copy of this Decision, including the
Separate Opinions, should be furnished the President of the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Department of Justice, as well as the President of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to enable them
to review the said laws for possible amendments.
The antecedents are as follows:
On July 7, 2006, Caoili was indicted for rape by sexual intercourse

committed against his fifteen (15)-year-old daughter, AAA. During trial, AAA
testified that Caoili kissed her lips, touched and mashed her breasts,
inserted the forefinger of his left hand into her vagina, then made a push-
and-pull movement inside her for about thirty (30) minutes. The accusatory
portion of the Information reads:
That, on or about the 23rd day of October 2005, at 7:00 o'clock in the

named accused, with full freedom and intelligence, with lewd design, did
with one [AAA], a minor, fifteen (15) years of age and the daughter of

R.A. 7610.5
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 30,6 found Caoili
guilty of rape by sexual assault. On appeal, the Court of Appeals7 set aside
the decision, and ordered the immediate remand of the case for further
proceedings, pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110, in relation to Section 19,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
Before us, the ponencia opined that even if the elements of rape by sexual

assault have been proven by the prosecution, Caoili could not be held guilty
of the crime proved during trial. Citing People v. Pareja8and People v.
Abulon,9 the ponencia held that due to the material differences and
substantial distinctions between the two modes of committing rape, rape by
sexual intercourse is not necessarily included in rape by sexual assault, and
vice-versa. Nonetheless, under the variance doctrine embodied under
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, sufficient evidence exists to
convict Caoili of the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
RPC, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
Theponencia sentenced Caoili to suffer reclusion perpetua, and to pay the
victim a fine of P15,000.00, as well as civil indemnity, moral damages, and
exemplary damages, in the amount of P75,000.00 each, plus interest rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from finality of the judgment until fully paid.
I explain my concurrence with the ponencia.

To be sure, Caoili cannot be merely convicted of the lesser crime of acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in an information charging rape
by sexual intercourse, because what were proved during trial are sexual
abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610and rape by sexual
assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC. Conviction for such
lesser crime is not only unfair to the victim who is no less than his minor
daughter, but also violates the declaration of state policy and principles
under Section 2 of R.A. No. 7610 and Section 3(2), Article XV of the 1987
Constitution, which provide for special protection to children from all forms
of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to
their development.
I fully agree with the doctrine in Abulon10 and Pareja11 to the effect that an

accused cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault although it was
proven, if the charge in the information is rape by carnal knowledge in view
of the material differences12 between rape by sexual intercourse and rape by
sexual assault, as well as the constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. I also do not dispute the
well-settled principles in the cases13 cited by the ponencia that a charge of
acts of lasciviousness is necessarily included in a complaint for rape, and
that an accused charged with rape by carnal knowledge or sexual
intercourse, can still be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of
lasciviousness, pursuant to the variance doctrine under Section 4, in relation
to Section 5, Rule 12014 of the Rules of Court.
After a careful review of the relevant laws and jurisprudence, however, I find
that Caoili should be convicted instead of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of
Article III of R.A. No. 7610, pursuant to the variance doctrine because it was
the crime proved during trial, and it is necessarily included in acts of
jurisprudence, is necessarily included in the crime of rape.
The 1987 Constitution mandates that in all criminal prosecutions, the

accused shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.15 From this fundamental law stems the rule that an
accused can only be convicted of a crime charged in the information, and
proved beyond reasonable doubt during trial.16 To convict the accused of an
offense other than that charged in the information would violate the
Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, unless the crime is alleged or necessarily included in the
information filed against him.17
For the variance doctrine to apply, it is required that (1) there is a variance
between an offense charged and that proved, and (2) the offense as charged
is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved. Under the variance
doctrine, the accused shall either be convicted (1) of the offense proved
which is included in the offense charged, or (2) of the offense charged which
is included in the offense proved.
While there is a variance between the offense charged [rape by sexual

intercourse] and that proved [sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 and rape by
sexual assault], Caoili should be convicted of sexual abuse under Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 because it was the offense proved during
trial, and it is necessarily included in the crime of acts of lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the RPC which, under settled jurisprudence, is
necessarily included in rape.
An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of

the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter, whereas an offense charged
is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.18
The elements of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, on the
one hand, are:
1. The offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;

2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
3. That the offended party is another person of either sex.
As correctly noted by the ponencia, lewdness is defined as an obscene,

lustful, indecent, and lecherous act which signifies that form of immorality
which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried in a wanton
manner. Moreover, the presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from
the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances.
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610, on the other hand, are:
1. The accused commits a sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;

2. The said act was performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to sexual abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Promulgated in relation to Section 32 of R.A. No. 7610 are the Rules and
Regulations (IRR) on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases
which define the terms "sexual abuse" and "lascivious conduct":
Section 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in these Rules, unless the context

requires otherwise -
xxxx
g) "Sexual Abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement,

enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to
engage in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation,
h) "Lascivious conduct'' means the intentional touching, either directly or

through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth,
of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic
area of a person; x x x19
A comparison of the essential elements or ingredients of sexual abuse under

Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 and acts lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC barely reveals any material or substantial difference
between them. The first element of sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610, which
includes lascivious conduct, lists the particular acts subsumed under the
broad term "act of lasciviousness or lewdness" under Article 336. The second
element of "coercion and influence" as appearing under R.A. No 7610 is
likewise broad enough to cover ''force and intimidation'' as one of the
circumstances under Article 336.20 Anent the third element, the offended
party under R.A. No. 7610 and Article 336 may be of either sex, save for the
fact that the victim in the former must be a child. I, therefore, posit that the
sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 is necessarily
included in the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC.
Applying the variance doctrine in this case where the crime charged is rape
by sexual intercourse, Caoili can still be convicted of sexual abuse under
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A No. 7610. This is because the same crime was
proved during trial and is necessarily included in the crime of acts of
jurisprudence, is necessarily included in a complaint for rape. For the same
reason, the CA erred in applying Section 14,21 Rule 110, in relation to
Section 19,22Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, and ordering the remand of the
case for further proceedings. Suffice it to stress that the provisions on
substitution of information applies only when (1) there is a mistake in
charging the proper offense, and (2) the accused cannot be convicted of the
offense charged or any other offense necessarily included in the offense
charged. The second requisite is absent in this case.
As held in Dimakuta v. People,23 if the victim of lascivious acts or conduct is

over 12 years of age and under eighteen (18) years of age, the accused may
be held liable for:
xxxx
2. Acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 if the act of lasciviousness is not

covered by lascivious conduct as defined in R.A. No. 7610. In case the acts
of lasciviousness is covered by lascivious conduct under R.A. No.
7610 and it is done through coercion or influence, which establishes
absence or lack of consent, then Art. 336 of the RPC is no longer
applicable. x x x24
Before an accused can be held criminally liable of lascivious conduct, which

is included in sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
the requisites of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be
met in addition to the requisites of sexual abuse under the said Section 5(b),
namely: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct; (2) the said act was performed with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female, is
below 18 years of age.25 All these requisites are present in this case.
First. Caoili's lewd acts of kissing the victim's lips, mashing her breasts,
inserting his finger into her vagina and making a push-and-pull movement
inside her for thirty (30) minutes, constitute lascivious conduct as defined in
the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse
Cases:
Section 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in these Rules. unless the context

requires otherwise—
xxxx
h) "Lascivious conduct" means theintentional touching, either directly or

through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
buttocks, or theintroduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent
to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire
of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals
or pubic area of a person; x x x26
Second. Caoili clearly has moral ascendancy over the victim who is his
minor daughter. It is settled that in cases where rape is committed by a
relative, such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or common law spouse, moral
influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence. It bears emphasis that a
child is considered as sexually abused under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A.
No. 7610 when he or she is subjected to lascivious conduct under the
coercion or influence of any adult, and that moral ascendancy is equivalent
to intimidation, which annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will by the
offended party. Apropos is Caballo v. People:27
As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides that

when a child indulges in sexual intercourse or any lascivious conduct due to
the coercion or influence of any adult, the child is deemed to be a "child
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." In this manner, the law is
able to act as an effective deterrent to quell all forms of abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation and discrimination against children, prejudicial as they
are to their development.
In this relation, case law further clarifies that sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists when there is
some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free
exercise of the offended party’s free will. Corollary thereto, Section 2(g) of
the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the
element of influence which manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined as:
The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a

child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in
any way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another's
objective." Meanwhile, "coercion" is the "improper use of ... power to compel
another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it."
Third. The victim was admitted and proved to be 14 years old at the time of
the commission of the offense. Under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610,
"children" refers to persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over
but unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical
or mental disability or condition."
Accordingly, Caoili should be convicted of sexual abuse under Section 5(b),

Article III of R.A. No. 7610, and not just acts of lasciviousness under Article
336 of the RPC, in relation to the same provision of R.A. No. 7610.
In Quimvel v. People,28 (Quimvel) the Court held that Section 5(b), Article III
of R.A. No. 7610 punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
committed on a child subjected to other sexual abuse, and covers not only a
situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child,
through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct. The Court noted that the very definition of "child abuse"
under Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610 does not require that the victim suffer a
separate and distinct act of sexual abuse aside from the act complained of,
for it refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child. Thus,
a violation of Section 5(b) occurs even though the accused committed sexual
abuse against the child victim only once, even without a prior sexual affront.
Moreover, the Court pointed out that it is immaterial whether or not the
accused himself employed the coercion or influence to subdue the will of the
child for the latter to submit to his sexual advances for him to be convicted
under paragraph (b). As can be gleaned from Section 5, Article III of R.A.
No. 7610, the offense can be committed against "any adult, syndicate or
group," without qualification. The clear language of the special law,
therefore, does not preclude the prosecution of lascivious conduct performed
by the same person who subdued the child through coercion or influence.
It may not be amiss to state that the absence of the phrase "exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse" or even the specific mention of
"coercion" or "influence" in the Information filed against Caoili, is not a bar
to uphold the finding of guilt against an accused for violation of Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610. As held in Quimvel:
x x x Just as the Court held that it was enough for the Information in
Olivarez to have alleged that the offense was committed by means of "force
and intimidation," the Court must also rule that the information in the case
at bench does not suffer from the alleged infirmity.
So too did the Court find no impediment in People v. Abadies, Malto v.

People, People v. Ching, People v. Bonaagua, and Caballo v. People to
convict the accused therein for violation of Sec. 5, RA 7610 notwithstanding
the non-mention in the information of "coercion", influence", or "exploited in
prostitution or subject to other abuse."29
In seeking his acquittal, Caoili cites People v. Nazareno30 and argues that he

cannot be convicted of rape by sexual assault because even if it was proved
during trial, the crime specifically alleged in the information is sexual
intercourse, which is a separate and distinct crime. The accusatory portion of
the said Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 2638 for violation of
Article 266-A of the RPC, reads:
That from sometime in January 1990 up to December 1998 in Barangay
Codon, Municipality of San Andres, Catanduanes, and within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, the said accused, being the father of the
complainant, did then and there willfully, feloniously and criminally
repeatedly had sexual intercourse with her daughter AAA, then five years old
up to the time when she was 15 years old against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Court ruled in Nazareno that considering that the Anti-Rape Law of 1997
(R.A. No. 8353) was already in force at the time of the insertion of
appellant's finger in BBB's vagina on December 6, 1998, he should have
been prosecuted and tried for rape by sexual assault and not under the
traditional definition of rape. This is because under the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the information must state the designation of the
offense given by the statute and specify its qualifying and generic
aggravating circumstances.31 Stated otherwise, the accused cannot be
convicted for the offense proved during trial if it was not properly alleged in
the information. The Court, thus, held that in Criminal Case No. 2638,
appellant should have been convicted only of qualified rape of BBB in
January 1992, while the rape by sexual assault committed on December 6,
1998, although proven, should not have been considered by the trial and
appellate courts for lack of a proper allegation in the information.
Contrary to Caoili's argument, Nazareno is inapplicable to this case for the

simple reason that there is no allegation in the afore-quoted information
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2638, which even remotely refers to acts
constituting a violation of R.A. No. 7610. Caoili was sufficiently apprised of
the offense being charged against him, and afforded opportunity to prepare
his defense, because the designation of the offense appears in the
Information filed against him, to wit:
That, on or about the 23rd day of October 2005m at 7:00 o'clock in the

then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had sexual
intercourse with one [AAA], a minor, fifteen (15) years of age and the
daughter of herein accused, through force, threat and intimidation and
against her will, to her damage and prejudice in the amount as may be
allowed by law.
CONTRARY TO Article 266-A, in relation to Art. 266-B of R.A. 8353, with

aggravating circumstance that the accused is the father of the victim
and R.A. 7610.32
In particular, Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 deals with sexual
intercourse committed against a child exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse:
ARTICLE III
Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse
SECTION 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether
male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to
the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual

with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age,
the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape
for Lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age
shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period;33
Significantly, while Nazareno is silent on the application of the variance

doctrine, I have discussed that applying the same doctrine in this case
where the crime charged is rape by sexual intercourse, Caoili can still be
convicted of sexual abuse committed against a child under Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A No. 7610. This is because the latter crime was proved
during trial and is necessarily included in the crime of acts of lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the RPC which, under settled jurisprudence, is
necessarily included in a complaint for rape.
Since Caoili should be convicted of sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610, the
proper imposable penalty should be taken from reclusion temporal in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua under Section 5(b), Article III thereof,
and not prision correccional under Article 336 of the RPC, because the victim
was alleged [15 years old] and proved [14 years old] to be a child.
It bears stressing that sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A.
No. 7610 and acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC are
separate and distinct from each other. With due indulgence, may I refer to
my Separate Concurring Opinion in Quimvel where I discussed the difference
between the two crimes:
Violation of the first clause of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 is
separate and distinct from acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the RPC. Aside from being dissimilar in the sense that the former is
an offense under special law, while the latter is a felony under the
RPC, they also have different elements. On the one hand, the elements
of violation of the first clause of Section 5(b) are: (1) accused commits the
act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with
a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3)
the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. On the other
hand, the elements of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 are: (1) that
the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is
done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or
intimidation; or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or (c) When the offended party is under 12 years of
age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex. x x x
I likewise opined that the penalty for sexual abuse under Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610 varies if the age of the child victim is either
below 12 years of age or between 12 to 17 years of age, as well as 18 and
above but under special circumstances:
Moreover, while the first clause of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 is
silent with respect to the age of the victim, Section 3, Article I thereof
defines "children" as those below eighteen (18) years of age or those over
but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical
or mental disability. Notably, two provisos succeeding the first clause of
Section 5(b) explicitly state a qualification that when the victims of lascivious
conduct is under 12 years of age, the perpetrator shall be (1) prosecuted
under Article 336 of the RPC, and (2) the penalty shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period. It is a basic rule in statutory construction
that the office of the proviso qualifies or modifies only the phrase
immediately preceding it or restrains of limits the generality of the clause
that it immediately follows. A proviso is to be construed with reference to
the immediately preceding part of the provisions, to which it is attached, and
not to the statute itself or the other sections thereof.34
In light of my foregoing, I found it necessary to restate in my Separate

Concurring Opinion in Quimvel the applicable laws and imposable penalties
for acts of lasciviousness committed against a child under Article 336 of the
RPC, in relation to R.A. No. 7610:
1. Under 12 years old - Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610, in relation to
Article 336 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353, applies and the imposable
penalty isreclusion temporal in its medium period, instead of prision
correccional. x x x
2. 12 years old and below 18, or 18 or older under special

circumstances under Section 3(a) of R.A. 7610 35 - Section 5(b), Article
III of R.A. 7610 in relation to Article 336 of the RPC, as amended, applies
and the penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua. This is because the proviso under Section 5(b) apply only if the
victim is under 12 years old, but silent as to those 12 years old and below
18; hence, the main clause thereof still applies in the absence of showing
that the legislature intended a wider scope to include those belonging to the
latter age bracket. xxx36
I further submit that the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 can only be
committed against a victim who is less than 12 years old or one who cannot
give intelligent consent. This theory is supported by the provisions of Section
5(b), in relation to Article 335(3), on rape and Article 336 on acts of
lasciviousness of the RPC, which deal with statutory rape and statutory acts
of lasciviousness, thus:
Art. 336, RPC, Act No. 3815

R.A. 7610 (June 17, 1992)
(December 8, 1930)
Chapter Two ARTICLE III
RAPE AND ACTS OF Child Prostitution and Other Sexual
Abuse
LASCIVIOUSNESS Section 5. Child Prostitution and
Other Sexual Abuse. - Children,
Art. 335. When and how rape is whether male or female, who for
committed. — Rape is committed money, profit, or any other
by having carnal knowledge of a consideration or due to the coercion or
woman under any of the influence of any adult, syndicate or
following circumstances: group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
1. By using force or intimidation: children exploited in prostitution and
2. When the woman is deprived of other sexual abuse.
reason or otherwise unconscious:
and The penalty of reclusion temporal in
3. When the woman is under its medium period to reclusion
twelve years of age, even though perpetua shall be imposed upon the
neither of the circumstances following: xxx
mentioned in the two next
preceding paragraphs shall be (b) Those who commit the act of
present. sexual intercourse of lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in
The crime of rape shall be punished prostitution or subject to other sexual
by reclusion perpetua. xxx abuse; Provided, That when the
victims is under twelve (12) years
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. — of age, the perpetrators shall be
Any person who shall commit any act prosecuted under Article 335,
of lasciviousness upon other persons paragraph 3, for rape and Article
of either sex, under any of the 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended,
circumstances mentioned in the the Revised Penal Code, for rape
preceding article, shall be punished or lascivious conduct, as the case
by prision correccional. may be: Provided, That the penalty
for lascivious conduct when the victim
is under twelve (12) years of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium
period; xxx
As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, if the victim of a lascivious

conduct is from 12 to 17 years old, like in the case at bar, the crime should
not be considered as "in relation to Article 336 of the RPC" because the
circumstances of absence of consent of the victim, her being deprived of
reason or consciousness, and the use of force or intimidation, should already
be established in order to hold the accused liable. Thus, if the victim is from
12 years old to 17, or 18 years old, or over but under special
circumstances,37 the crime is sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610, which carries the penalty of reclusion temporal medium
to reclusion perpetua. Note that it is only when the victim is under 12 years
old that the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3,
for rape, and Article 336 of the RPC, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the
case may be. Equally noteworthy is the fact that Article 335, paragraph 3
and Article 336 have been amended by R.A. No. 8353, thus:
Chapter Three
Rape
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
present.
xxx
Section 4. Repealing Clause. - Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, and
all laws, acts, presidential decrees, executive orders, administrative orders,
rules and regulations inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this
Act are deemed amended, modifiedor repealed accordingly.38
There being no mitigating circumstance to offset the alternative aggravating

circumstance of (paternal) relationship39 as alleged in the Information and
proved during trial, I therefore concur that Caoili should be sentenced to
suffer the maximum period of the penalty, i.e., reclusion perpetua.40 I also
agree with the ponencia that Caoili should also be ordered to pay the victim
civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages in the amount of
P75,000.00 each, pursuant to People v. Jugueta,41 and a fine in the amount
of P15,000.00, pursuant to Section 31(f),42 Article XII of R.A. No. 7610, with
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality
of judgment until fully paid.
Needless to state, Caoili cannot be meted indeterminate sentence computed

from the penalty of prision correccional under Article 336 of the RPC, as it
would defeat the purpose of R.A. No. 7610 to provide for stronger
deterrence and special protection against child abuse, exploitation and
discrimination. First, the imposition of such penalty would erase the
substantial distinction between acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 and
acts of lasciviousness with consent of the offended party under Article
339,43 which used to be punishable by arresto mayor, and now by prision
correccional pursuant to Section 10, Article VI of R.A. 7610. Second, it
would inordinately put on equal footing the acts of lasciviousness committed
against a child and the same crime committed against an adult, because the
imposable penalty for both would still be prision correccional, save for the
aggravating circumstance of minority that may be considered against the
perpetrator. Third, it would make acts of lasciviousness against a child an a
probationable offense, pursuant to the Probation Law of 1976,44 as amended
by R.A. No. 10707.45Indeed, while the foregoing implications are favorable to
the accused, they are contrary to the State policy and principles under R.A.
No. 7610 and the Constitution on the special protection to children.
As reference for future corrective legislation and for guidance and

information purposes, I find it necessary to reiterate the applicable laws and
imposable penalties for acts of lasciviousness committed against a child
under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to R.A. No. 7610, as stated in my
Separate Concurring Opinion in Quimvel:
1. Under 12 years old - Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610, in relation to
Article 336 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353, applies and the imposable
penalty isreclusion temporal in its medium period, instead of prision
correccional. In People v. Fragante,46Nonito Imbo y Gamores v. People of
the Philippines,47 and People of the Philippines v. Oscar Santos y
Encinas,48 the accused were convicted of acts of lasciviousness committed
against victims under 12 years old, and were penalized under Section 5(b),
Artcile III of R.A. 7610, and not under Article 336 of the RPC, as amended.
2. 12 years old and below 18, or 18 or older under special

circumstances under Section 3(a) of R.A. 761049 - Section 5(b), Article
III of R.A. 7610 in relation to Article 336 of the RPC, as amended, applies
and the penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua. This is because the proviso under Section 5(b) apply only if the
victim is under 12 years old, but silent as to those 12 years old and below
18; hence, the main clause thereof still applies in the absence of showing
that the legislature intended a wider scope to include those belonging to the
latter age bracket. The said penalty was applied in People of the Philippines
v. Ricardo Bacus50 and People of the Philippines v. Rolando Baraga y
Arcilla51 where the accused were convicted of acts of lasciviousness
committed against victims 12 years old and below 18, and were penalized
under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610. But, if the acts of lasciviousness
is not covered by lascivious conduct as defined in R.A. 7610, such as when
the victim is 18 years old and above, acts of lasciviousness under Article 336
of the RPC applies and the penalty is prision correccional.
Curiously, despite the clear intent of R.A. 7610 to provide for stronger
deterrence and special protection against child abuse, the penalty
[reclusion temporal medium] when the victim is under 12 years old is
lower compared to the penalty [reclusion temporalmedium to reclusion
perpetua] when the victim is 12 years old and below 18. The same holds
true if the crime of acts of lasciviousness is attended by an aggravating
circumstance or committed by persons under Section 31,52 Article XII of R.A.
7610, in which case, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. In
contrast, when no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attended the
crime of acts of lasciviousness, the penalty therefor when committed against
a child under 12 years old is aptly higher than the penalty when the child is
12 years old and below 18. This is because, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum term in the case of the younger victims shall be
taken from reclusion temporal minimum,53 whereas as the minimum term in
the case of the older victims shall be taken from prision mayor
medium to reclusion temporal minimum.54 It is a basic rule in statutory
construction that what courts may correct to reflect the real and apparent
intention of the legislature are only those which are clearly clerical errors or
obvious mistakes, omissions, and misprints,55 but not those due to
oversight, as shown by a review of extraneous circumstances, where the law
is clear, and to correct it would be to change the meaning of the law.56 To
my mind, a corrective legislation is the proper remedy to address the noted
incongruent penalties for acts of lasciviousness committed against a child.
Too, it bears emphasis that R.A. 8353 did not expressly repeal Article 336 of
the RPC, as amended. Section 4 of R.A. 8353 only states that Article 336 of
the RPC, as amended, and all laws, rules and regulations inconsistent with or
contrary to the provisions thereof are deemed amended, modified or
repealed, accordingly. There is nothing inconsistent between the provisions
of Article 336 of the RPC, as amended, and R.A. 8353, except in sexual
assault as a form of rape. Hence, when the lascivious act is not covered by
R.A. 8353, then Article 336 of the RPC is applicable, except when the
lascivious conduct is covered by R.A. 7610.
In fact, R.A. 8353 only modified Article. 336 of the RPC, as follows: (1) by
carrying over to acts of lasciviousness the additional
circumstances57 applicable to rape, viz.: threat and fraudulent machinations
or grave abuse of authority; (2) by retaining the circumstance that the
offended party is under 12 years old, and including dementia as another
one, in order for acts of lasciviousness to be considered as statutory,
wherein evidence of force or intimidation is immaterial because the offended
party who is under 12 years old or demented, is presumed incapable of
giving rational consent; and (3) by removing from the scope of acts of
lasciviousness and placing under the crime of rape by sexual assault the
specific lewd act of inserting the offender's penis into another person's
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal
orifice of another person. In fine, Article 336 of the RPC, as amended, is still
a good law despite the enactment of R.A. 8353 for there is no irreconcilable
inconsistency between their provisions.
Meanwhile, the Court is also not unmindful of the fact that the accused who
commits acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. 7610, suffers the more severe penalty
of reclusion temporal in its medium period, than the one who commits Rape
Through Sexual Assault, which is merely punishable byprision mayor.
In People v. Chingh y Parcia,58 the Court noted that the said fact is
undeniably unfair to the child victim, and it was not the intention of the
framers of R.A. 8353 to have disallowed the applicability of R.A. 7610 to
sexual abuses committed to children. The Court held that despite the
passage of R.A. 8353, R.A. 7610 is still good law, which must be
applied when the victims are children or those "persons below eighteen (18)
years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or
protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition."59
Finally, as the Court stressed in Mustapha Dimakuta Maruhom v.

People,60 where the lascivious conduct is covered by the definition under
R.A. 7610 where the penalty isreclusion temporal medium and the said act is
likewise covered by sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the
RPC, which is punishable by prision mayor, the offender should be liable for
violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610, where the law provides the
higher penalty of reclusion temporal medium, if the offended party is a child.
But if the victim is at least eighteen (18) years of age, the offender should
be liable under Article 266-A, par. 2 of the RPC and not R.A. 7610, unless
the victim is at least 18 years old and she is unable to fully take care of
herself or protect from herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition, in
which case, the offender may still be held liable of sexual abuse under R.A.
7610. The reason for the foregoing is that, aside from the affording special
protection and stronger deterrence against child abuse, R.A. 7610 is a
special law which should clearly prevail over R.A. 8353, which is a mere
general law amending the RPC.
Let a copy of this Decision and the Separate Opinions be furnished the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of
Justice, pursuant to Article 561 of the RPC, the President of the Senate of the
Philippines and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as reference
for possible amendments in light of the foregoing observations.
Endnotes:
1
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon the following: xxx
with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual
abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years of age,
the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape
shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; xxx
2
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. - Any person who shall commit any act of
lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished
by prision correccional.
3
574 Phil. 175, 206 (2008).
4
R.A. No. 7610, Section. 3. Definition of Terms. -
(a) "Children" refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or those
over but are unable to themselves or protect from themselves from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination beccause of a physical or
mental disability or condition.
5
Records, p. 1.
6
Penned by Presiding Judge Floripinas C. Buyser.
7
Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, with Associate Justices
Leoncia R. Dimagiba and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela, concurring.
8
724 Phil. 759 (2014).
9
557 Phil. 428 (2007).
10
Supra note 9.
11
Supra note 8.
12
The differences between the two modes of committing rape are the
following:
(1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the
second, the offended may be a man or a woman;
(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman,
while in the second, the offended party may be a man or a
woman;
(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile
penetration of the vagina, while the second is committed by
inserting the penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another
person; and
(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that
under the second.
13
People v. Poras, 626 Phil. 526 (2010); People v. Rellota, 640 Phil. 471
(2010); and People v. Garcia, 695 Phil. 576 (2012).
14
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.—
When there is variance between the offense charge in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted ofthe
offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.—An offense

charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
15
Article III, Section 14 (2).
16
Parungao v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 274 Phil. 451, 459 (1991).
17
Patula v. People of the Philippines, 685 Phil. 376, 388 (2012).
18
Sec. 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court.
19
Emphasis added.
20
Quimvel v. People, G.R. No. 214497, April 18, 2017.
21
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may
be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a
formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be
done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
xxxx
22
SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. -
information.
23
G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015, 773 SCRA 228.
24
Dimakuta v. People, supra, at 264. (Emphasis added).
25
Quimvel v. People, supra note 20.
26
Emphasis added.
27
710 Phil. 792, 805-806 (2013).
28
Supra note 20.
29
Citations omitted.
30
Supra note 3.
31
Rule 110, SEC. 8. Designation of the offense.—The complaint or
information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute,
aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense,
reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing
it.
SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation.—The acts or omissions complained of as

constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute, but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.
32
Emphasis added.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Section. 3. Definition of Terms.-
(a) "Children" refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or those
over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect from
themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition.
36
Quimvel v. People, supra note 20. (Emphasis added.)
37
R.A. No. 7610, Section. 3. Definition of Terms.- (a) "Children" refers to a
person below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to
fully take care of themselves or protect from themselves from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition.
38
Emphasis added on amended parts and underscoring added.
39
Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 15. Their concept. — Alternative circumstances are those which must be

taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature
and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission.
They are the relationship, intoxication and the degree of instruction and
education of the offender.
The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration
when the offended party in the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate,
natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same
degrees of the offender.
xxx
40
See People v. Sumingwa, 618 Phil. 650 (2009).
41
G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016.
42
Section. 31. Common Penal Provisions. -
xxxx
(f) A fine to be imposed by the court shall be imposed and administered as a
cash fund by the Department of Social Welfare and Development and
disbursed for the rehabilitation of each child victim, or any Immediate
member of his family if the latter Is the perpetrator of the offense.
43
ARTICLE 339. Acts of Lasciviousness with the Consent of the Offended
Party.- The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed to punish any other
acts of lasciviousness committed by the same persons and the same
circumstances as those provided in Articles 337 and 338.
ARTICLE 337. Qualified Seduction. - The seduction of a virgin over twelve
years and under eighteen years of age, committed by any person in public
authority, priest, house-servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person
who, in any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the
woman seduced, shall be punished by prision correccionalin its minimum and
medium periods.
The penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon any person who
shall seduce his sister or descendant, whether or not she be a virgin or over
eighteen years of age.
Under the provisions of this Chapter, seduction is committed when the
offender has carnal knowledge of any of the persons and under the
circumstances described herein.
ARTICLE 338. Simple Seduction. - The seduction of a woman who is single or
a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age,
committed by means of deceit, shall be punished by arresto mayor.
44
Presidential Decree No. 968.
45
An Act Amending Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the
"Probation Law of 1976", as amended. Approved on November 26, 2015.
Section 9 of the Decree, as amended, provides that the benefits thereof shall
not be extended to those "(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six (6) years." Note: The duration of the penalty
of prision correccional is 6 months and 1 day to 6 years.
46
657 Phil. 577, 601 (2011).
47
G.R. No. 197712, April 20, 2015, 756 SCRA 196.
48
753 Phil. 637 (2015).
49
Section. 3. Definition of Terms.-
(b) "Children" refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or those
over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect from
themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition.
50
G.R. No. 208354, August 26, 2015, 768 SCRA 318.
51
735 Phil. 466 (2014).
52
Section 31. Common Penal Provisions. -
xxxx
(c) The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period
when the perpetrator is an ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or
collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity, or a
manager or owner of an establishment which has no license to operate or its
license has expired or has been revoked. (Emphasis added)
53
Ranging from 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months.
54
Ranging from 8 years 1 day to 14 years and 8 months.
55
Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456 (1912).
56
People v. De Guzman, 90 Phil. 132 (1951).
57
Aside from use force or intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious.
58
661 Phil. 208, 224 (2011).
59
Section 3 (a), Article 1 of R.A. 7610
60
Supra note 23.
61
ARTICLE 5. Duty of the Court in Connection with Acts Which Should Be
Repressed but Which are Not Covered by the Law, and in Cases of Excessive
Penalties. — Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem
proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the
proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that
said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without
suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the
provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive
penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused
by the offense.
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
Rape is no longer a crime simply against the chastity of a woman. It is a

crime against her person. It is not simply a violation of a woman's moral
preferences. It is a violation of her human dignity. Rape labels the violence
done to her by another who inhumanely reduces her into an object of lust.
For his daughter, a father who kisses her, mashes her breasts, and then
inserts his finger into her vagina not only betrays a sacred trust but burdens
her life with coerced illicit sexual intercourse. For her, and our legal order as
well, it will not make sense to narrowly define sexual intercourse without
conceding the impotence of our law to understand what happened to her.
The depravity is the same, whether it was her father's penis or her father's
finger that was forced upon her vagina.
When his daughter sought succor from a relative, Noel Go Caoili (Caoili)
dragged her home. In an act of rage and cowardice, as a way to hide his
dastardly act, as a continuation of the violation of his own daughter, he
punched and beat his daughter.
Caoili raped his own daughter.
I do not see any procedural misstep that should take precedence over the
proper label for this criminal act. The evidence shows that Caoili raped his
own daughter by sexual intercourse, as charged.
I dissent.
On July 7, 2006, an Information was filed charging accused Caoili, alias "Boy
Tagalog," of forcefully having sexual intercourse with his 15-year-old
daughter.1 The Information read:
That, on or about the 23rd day of October 2005, at 7:00 o'clock in the
evening, more or less, in Purok Masipag, Barangay Matin-ao, Mainit, Surigao
del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with full freedom and intelligence, with lewd design,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had sexual
intercourse with one AAA, a minor, fifteen (15) years of age and the
daughter of the herein accused, through force, threat and intimidation and
against her will, to her damage and prejudice in the amount as may be
allowed by law.

R.A. 7610.2
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty.3
The accused's daughter testified that on October 23, 2005, at 7:00 p.m., the
accused kissed her lips, touched and mashed her breast, and inserted his
left forefinger into her vagina, making a push and pull movement for 30
minutes.4 She went to her uncle's house located 20 meters away from their
house.5The accused dragged his daughter home to be beaten and punched.6
The daughter reported the incident to her high school guidance counselor
and to the police.7 Later, she underwent a medical examination administered
by Dr. Ramie Hipe, who issued a medical certificate on October 26, 2005
stating:
Pertinent Physical Findings/Physical Injuries:
....
1. Contusion, 5 inches in width, distal 3rd, lateral aspect, left thigh.

2. Contusion, 2 cms in width, distal 3rd, lateral aspect, left forearm
3. (+) tenderness, left parietal area, head
4. (+) tenderness, over the upper periumbilical area of abdomen
5. tenderness, over the hypogastric area
....
Genital Examination
....
Hymen
- fimbriated in shape
- with laceration on the following:
- complete laceration - 12 o'clock position
- partial laceration - 11 o'clock position8
The daughter of the accused was also examined by Dr. Lucila Clerino, who
issued a supplementary medical certificate on October 28, 2005, stating:
Lacerations complete at 6 o'clock and 9 o'clock superficial laceration at 12

o'clock.9
The accused denied the charges against him. As a father, he was a

disciplinarian. He claimed that his daughter resented his methods and
became rebellious. His daughter talked back to him, lied, and exhibited bad
temper when he forbade her from having a boyfriend.10 The day he allegedly
raped his daughter was the day he beat her with a piece of wood on her
thigh because she lied to him about her whereabouts. She told him that she
was at the house of her aunt, but he saw her in the dark under the cassava
plants with a man.11 Accused stopped beating his daughter when she cried.
He asked her for forgiveness but she did not respond. Later, he went to
sleep in a room with his son. His daughter slept in another room with her
other siblings.12
The daughter's sister—accused's other daughter—testified that she was with

her sister immediately before the time that the accused allegedly raped her
sister. She manifested that she was there when accused beat her sister with
a piece of wood. She later slept with her sister and her other siblings in a
room. Her sister never told her that she was raped by their father.13
On June 17, 2008, the trial court found accused guilty of sexual assault
under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused NOEL GO CAOILI alias "Boy Tagalog" guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of rape, defined and
penalized in paragraph 2 of Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and after considering the
aggravating circumstance of being the parent of the complainant, who was
fourteen (14) years, one (1) month and ten (10) days old at the time of the
incident in question, there being no mitigating circumstance to off-set the
same, this Court hereby sentences the said accused to suffer imprisonment
for an indefinite period of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision
Mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum
period, as maximum, and to pay the costs. Four-fifths (4/5) of the
preventive detention of said accused shall be credited to his favor.
The same accused is hereby ordered to pay complainant ABC an

indemnity ex delictu of P50,000.00; moral damages of P50,000.00; and
exemplary damages of another P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.14
The accused appealed the trial court's June 17, 2008 Decision finding him
guilty of sexual assault. He argued that since the information charged him of
rape by sexual intercourse, he could not be convicted of sexual assault.15
The Court of Appeals found that the accused was guilty of sexual assault.
However, sexual assault was not charged in the Information. Thus, the case
was remanded to the trial court in accordance with Rule 110, Section
1416 and Rule 119, Section 1917 of the Rules of Court, thus:
FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed Decision of Branch 30 of the Regional

Trial Court of Surigao City, in Criminal Case Nos. 7363, is SET ASIDE. Let
this case be as it is IMMEDIATELY REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.18 (Emphasis in the original)
Both parties filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Court of

Appeals' July 22, 2010 Decision. Both motions were denied in the Court of
Appeals Resolution dated March 29, 2011.19
The accused and People of the Philippines filed their separate Petitions for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Accused
argued that he was unjustly convicted of a crime that was not charged in the
Information. This was a violation of his constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusations against him.20 In any case, the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
allegations against him.21
The People of the Philippines argued that the accused was rightfully
convicted of sexual assault, which was necessarily included in the offense
charged in the information. The Court of Appeals may no longer remand the
case to the trial court in accordance with Rule 110 and Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court because a judgment had already been rendered in the case.22
The ponencia proposes that Caoili be convicted of the lesser crime of

lascivious conduct under Article III, Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610.
Although the Information accuses him of rape by sexual intercourse, the
prosecution was able to prove rape by sexual assault, which, according to
the ponencia, is materially different and substantially distinct from rape by
sexual intercourse.23
I disagree.
The accused may be convicted of rape by sexual intercourse without

violating his due process rights and his right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusations against him as provided in Article III, Section
14 of the 1987 Constitution24 and reproduced in Rule 115, Section 1(b) of
our Rules of Procedure.25 The importance and purpose of this rule has been
explained by this Court in People v. Quitlong:26
First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against
him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of
his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the
same cause, and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it
may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one
should be had.27
The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against
a person need not be alleged with the highest degree of particularity. It is
satisfied as long as facts are alleged with sufficient clarity28that allows the
accused to understand what acts he is being made liable for in order to
enable him to make a defense.29
The ponencia insists that rape by sexual intercourse and sexual assault are
so materially different and substantially distinct that an accused charged
with one (1) mode cannot be convicted of the other mode without violating
the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusations against a person.30 Since the accused cannot be convicted of
sexual assault, the ponencia proposes that he instead be convicted of the
lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness under lascivious conduct under Article
III, Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610,31 which provide:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. -Children, whether

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua

shall be imposed upon the following:
....
with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse;
Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the
shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period[.]
The information substantially charged the accused with forced carnal

knowledge or sexual intercourse. It is sufficiently clear to inform the accused
what acts he is being made liable for. It is sufficient to enable him to form a
defense.
Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that carnal knowledge
without valid consent constitutes rape:
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed- Rape is committed -
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any

of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
present. (Emphasis supplied)
Evidence of lack of valid consent and carnal knowledge is, therefore, already
sufficient to convict an accused of rape by sexual intercourse under Article
266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution already established
that the accused inserted his finger in his daughter's vagina. This already
qualifies as carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse.
This Court's refusal to convict the accused of rape by sexual intercourse

despite the proper allegation in the information and the sufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence is based on this Court's restrictive definition of sexual
intercourse.
Carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse has been inaccurately and

restrictively used to denote an activity that must necessarily involve
penetration, genitals, and opposite sexes. Carnal knowledge or sexual
intercourse is currently understood as involving penile penetration of the
vaginal orifice. In People v. Opong:32
Carnal knowledge is synonymous with sexual intercourse. There is carnal

knowledge if there is the slightest penetration of the sexual organ of the
female by the sexual organ of the male.33
Earlier, in People v. Alib:34
Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual bodily

connections with a woman; sexual intercourse. Ordinarily, this would
connote the complete penetration of the female sexual organ by the male
sexual organ. In cases of rape, however, proof of the entrance of the male
sexual organ into the labia of the pudendum, or lips of the female organ, is
sufficient for conviction. Elsewise stated, the slightest penetration of the
female's private organ is sufficient to consummate the crime of rape.35
In People v. Almaden:36
Carnal knowledge is, simply put, sexual intercourse between a man and a
woman. With the slightest penetration, sexual intercourse is achieved, and
the crime of rape is consummated.37
In People v. Miclat:38
Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual intercourse or

sexual bodily connection with a woman.39
These interpretations, however, are residues of the archaic concept of rape

as a crime against chastity.
Chastity is a virtue. It denotes abstinence from sexual activity before

marriage or the limitation of one's sexual contact to his or her spouse after
marriage.
Crimes against chastity under our current law include, among others,
adultery, concubinage, seduction, corruption of minors, and abduction.40 The
criminalization of acts constituting these crimes is not only a declaration that
chastity is something that must be protected by the State, but is also a
revelation of the premium we put on abstinence before or outside marriage
and our fixation on puritanical ideals.
The brunt of the effects of this fixation is suffered to a significantly greater

degree by women more than men. Between the two (2) sexes, women are
expected to live out this ideal. Their adherence to this virtue is taken as a
given.
What acts constitute the crimes against chastity and how they are crafted in
our law reflect these unequal expectations.
Under Title Eleven or Crimes Against Chastity of the Revised Penal Code,
punishment is generally directed at acts that contradict this expectation of
virtue or acts that tend to give an appearance of diminished virtue. Married
women may be convicted of adultery for having sexual intercourse with any
man not her husband, regardless of the validity of her marriage.41 On the
other hand, sexual relations of a married man with a woman who is not his
wife is not always a crime. It only becomes a crime if there is cohabitation, if
it is committed under scandalous circumstances,42 or if the sexual relations
were committed with a married woman, and he had knowledge of that fact.43
Moreover, Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code suggests that only females
may be criminally seduced and abducted for lewd designs. Articles 337 and
343 emphasize virginity among their elements. Thus:
Article 337. Qualified seduction. - The seduction of a virgin over twelve years

and under eighteen years of age, committed by any person in public
authority, priest, home-servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person
who, in any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the
woman seduced, shall be punished by prision correccionalin its minimum and
medium periods.
....
Article 343. Consented abduction. - The abduction of a virgin over twelve

years and under eighteen years of age, carried out with her consent and
with lewd designs, shall be punished by the penalty of prision correccional in
its minimum and medium periods.
Meanwhile, the crime of simple seduction emphasizes good reputation

among females of 12 to 18 years, thus:
Article 338. Simple seduction. - The seduction of a woman who is single or a

widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age,
committed by means of deceit, shall be punished by Arresto mayor.
These further highlight that the expectation to remain pure is real and that
this expectation is not equal between sexes. It implies that while women
necessarily adhere and must necessarily adhere to chastity as a virtue, men
do not and have no need to. Hence, the State provides a means to protect
that virtue presumably and expectedly held by all its women.
This underlying assumption exposes the real focal point of crimes against
chastity. Unlike crimes against persons wherein acts are punished for the
harm done to an individual person's being regardless of sex, crimes against
chastity punishes persons for acts done against a virtue. Crimes against
persons recognize that individuals are conscious beings who are sovereigns
in their own right of their own bodies, thoughts, and lives.44 Crimes against
chastity emphasize the virtue more than the person. The person is nothing
more than a vessel of an independent abstract concept that must be
protected.
Republic Act No. 8353 has already reconceptualized rape as a crime against
persons. However, until present, virginity of a woman—as opposed to men's
virginity—is important to men. This is one (1) of the manifestations of
gender imbalance that is apparent in the current wordings of our crimes
against chastity. Women are seen as objects. A woman's value depends on
whether the man she will marry will be the person who will first conquer her
—the man to whom she will yield and for whom she will be owned.
Thus, under the old concept, what matters was what men wanted: the
woman is reduced into a vagina and it must be intact for him. He owns her
when he is first to violate her. She is not as worthy otherwise. She is
unchaste.
Carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse is a broad term that can be subject

to several interpretations. Understandably, albeit without sensitivity to
gendered meanings, past decisions even of this Court reduced this broad
term to penile penetration. A more enlightened gender and culturally
sensitive meaning expands this concept especially since rape is now no
longer a crime against chastity but a crime against persons.
Having carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse is a powerful expression of

intimacy. It is an act which requires the shedding of all inhibitions and
defenses to allow humans to explore each other in their most basic
nakedness. It is an act that brings out the best in humanity when it is
neither required nor coerced but chosen by the partners. This autonomy that
begets choice is what is protected by law. It is that choice that can complete
expression and can define him or her who makes that choice. After all, as
social beings, humans are defined by how they choose to be intimate, with
whom, and how deeply.
It is the violation of this choice—this autonomy—that inspires the

punishment for rape. Penile penetration was the traditional way to determine
whether sexual intercourse has happened. But it should no longer be
exclusively so. We should increasingly take the point of view of the victim.
For her most fundamental autonomy to choose her intimate partner was
violated when her father kissed her, mashed her breasts, inserted her finger
into her vagina, and satisfied his lust for her for 30 minutes. She is as much
a victim of coerced sexual intercourse as any other woman would be if it was
the penis that was inserted. Except that in this case, she is not simply a
woman: she is the daughter of the accused.
The determination of whether chastity was violated, in past cases, may have
required a clinical passing of the entire sexual act to privilege the penis and
its entry into the vagina. Regardless of its doctrinal presentation in the past,
our present, more gender sensitive law and legal lenses now require that we
see the acts in sexual intercourse as a whole. To reduce them to their
component parts would be to say that the violation of the human dignity of a
person insofar as her sexuality is concerned can be understood as a matter
of degree.
By maintaining fatuous classifications, this Court fails to recognize that we

create, through our interpretation, a dissonance between the law and the
actual scenarios to which they apply. In this case, we would be saying that
this father did not rape his daughter as much as he would have raped
another woman by forcing his penis in her vagina. We would then go back to
the feudal concept of protecting the powerful and graduating his liabilities by
traditional but irrational categories. Instead, we should look at the victim
and read the law from her perspective as a human being.
Doing so means that we pronounce that the entirety of what this father did
to his daughter was "sexual intercourse" as charged in the information
equivalent to "carnal knowledge" in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code
as amended.
In other words, we square the interpretation of the law with the victim's
reality. She was raped by sexual intercourse.
The persistence of an archaic understanding of rape relates to our failure to

disabuse ourselves of the notion that carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse
is merely a reproductive activity. It is not. Sexual intercourse may be done
for pleasure. It may be done for religious purposes. It may be a means to an
end.
Hence, sexual intercourse encompasses a wide range of sexual activities not

limited to those involving penetration, genitals, and opposite sexes. Sexual
intercourse is a sexual activity that is participated in by at least two (2)
individuals of the same or opposite sex for purposes of attaining erotic
pleasure.45 It may be penetrative or simply stimulative.46 It may or may not
involve persons of opposite sexes. When forced, sexual intercourse
constitutes rape.
This understanding of sexual intercourse would prevent courts from

unnecessarily and unjustly convicting persons of lesser crimes when they are
undoubtedly guilty of rape.
II
Republic Act No. 8353's reconceptualization of rape as a crime against

persons and the broadening of its definition to include its other forms point
towards this understanding.
The reconceptualization of rape as a crime against persons is a recognition

that rape may be committed to any person regardless of sex and gender. It
is also a recognition that rape may be committed through various means.
The diversity of means by which rape can be committed allowed our
lawmakers to create gradations for purposes of determining the appropriate
punishment.
However, the imposition of different punishments for different manners of

committing rape or sexual assault should not be read as a reflection of the
actual heinousness of the corresponding acts for the victim. In People v.
Quintos y Badilla,47 this Court said:
The classifications of rape in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code are
relevant only insofar as these define the manners of commission of rape.
However, it does not mean that one manner is less heinous or wrong than
the other. Whether rape is committed by nonconsensual carnal knowledge of
a woman or by insertion of the penis into the mouth of another person, the
damage to the victim's dignity is incalculable ... [O]ne experience of sexual
abuse should not be trivialized just because it was committed in a relatively
unusual manner.
"The prime purpose of [a] criminal action is to punish the offender in order
to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to
isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to
maintain social order." Crimes are punished as retribution so that society
would understand that the act punished was wrong.
Imposing different penalties for different manners of committing rape

creates a message that one experience of rape is relatively trivial or less
serious than another. It attaches different levels of wrongfulness to equally
degrading acts. Rape, in whatever manner, is a desecration of a person's will
and body. In terms of penalties, treating one manner of committing rape as
greater or less in heinousness than another may be of doubtful
constitutionality.48 (Citations omitted)
By involving the finger only as a means to violate Article 266-A, paragraph

2,49 thereby equating it to an "instrument or object," this Court
misunderstands the gravity and the power used by those who want to defile
the person of another through rape. It misunderstands the crime.
Rape is not an act of pleasure. It is an illicit expression of power. It is not an

act that simply addresses the uncontrolled instincts of the perpetrator. It is
an act which fulfills a depraved desire to impose one's will on another,
reducing the other to the status of a subordinate.
The finger is as much part of the human body as the penis. It is not a
separate instrument or object. It is an organ that can act as a conduit to
give both pleasure as well as raw control upon the body of another. At a
certain age, when men have difficulty with erections, his finger or any other
similar organ becomes a handy tool of oppression. This Court cannot
maintain an artificially prudish construction of sexual intercourse. When it
does, it becomes blind to the many ways that women's bodies are defiled by
the patriarchy. To legally constitute the finger as a separate object not used
in "sexual intercourse" or "carnal knowledge" not only defies reality, it
undermines the purpose of the punishment under Article 266-A, paragraph
2.
III
Even if there is any deficiency in the form of the information, the remedy is
not to prejudice the punishment for the wrong done to the victim. Rather it
is to call the attention of the prosecutor who drafted the charge. Too often,
the mistake of the same leads to acquittal or downgrading of the appropriate
punishment. Whether this is due to lack of competence, supervision, design
or consideration, the effect is the same. The consequent inability of our
institutions to do what is right and just due to trivial technicalities erodes the
public's confidence in what we are supposed to do: courageously do what is
right and just. When we allow our system to be eroded in this way, rapists
would be able to rely on the illicit graciousness of misguided prosecutors.
After all, using "sexual intercourse" in lieu of "carnal knowledge" or "sexual
assault" is so obviously simple but fraught with a lot of opportunities for the
accused.
Laws should not be read so as to obfuscate reality. Its words should be able
to reflect the ability of the state to correctly categorize the evil that men do.
Clearly, in this case, the offense committed was rape by sexual intercourse.
It was not rape by sexual assault or a mere lascivious conduct.
Accordingly, the accused should be convicted of rape under Article 266-A(1)

of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Endnotes:
1
Rollo (G.R. No. 196342), pp. 52 and 68.
2
Id.
3
Id. at 68.
4
Id. at 52 and 69.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 52-53 and 69.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 53.
9
Id. at 53-54.
10
Id. at 72.
11
Id. at 73.
12
Id. at 73-74.
13
Id. at 75-76.
14
Id. at 54 and 79.
15
Id. at 55.
16
RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, sec. 14 provides:
Section 14. Amendment or Substitution. - A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before
the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal
amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
....
accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be
17
RULES OF COURT, Rule 119, sec. 19 provides:
Section 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. -
information.
18
Rollo (G.R. No. 196342), p. 61.
19
Id. at 62-67.
20
Rollo (G.R. No. 196848), p. 26.
21
Rollo (G.R. No. 196342), p. 28.
22
Id. at 40.
23
Ponencia, pp. 11-15.
24
CONST., art. III, sec. 14 provides:
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel,to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence
of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable. (Emphasis supplied).
25
RULES OF COURT, Rule 115, sec. 1(b) provides:
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. - In all criminal prosecutions, the

accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
. . . .
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
26
354 Phil. 372 (1998) [Per J. Vitug, First Division].
27
Id. at 387 citing US v. Karelsen, 3 Phil. 223, 226 (1904) [Per J. Johnson,
En Banc], cited in Pecho vs. People, 331 Phil. 1 (1996) [Per J. Davide, Jr.,
En Banc].
28
See Jurado v. Suy Yan, 148 Phil. 677 (1971) [Per J. Makasiar, En Banc].
29
Id. at 689.
30
Ponencia, p. 11.
31
Id.
32
577 Phil. 571 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
33
Id. at 594 citing People v. Almendral, 477 Phil. 521 (2004) [Per J. Tinga,
Second Division].
34
294 Phil. 509 (1993) [Per J. Davide, Jr., Third Division].
35
Id. at 518.
36
364 Phil. 634 (1999) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].
37
Id. at 634-644.
38
435 Phil. 561 (2002) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
39
Id. at 575-576 citing People v. Domantay, 366 Phil. 459 (1999) [Per J.
Mendoza, En Banc].
40
REV. PEN. CODE, Title Eleven.
41
REV. PEN.CODE , art. 333 provides:
Article 333. Who are guilty of adultery. - Adultery is committed by any

married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her
husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to
be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void.
Adultery shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.
If the person guilty of adultery committed this offense while being
abandoned without justification by the offended spouse, the penalty next
lower in degree than that provided in the next preceding paragraph shall be
imposed.
42
REV.PEN. CODE, art. 334 provides:
Article 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the

conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous
circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in
any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods.
The concubine shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
43
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 333 provides:
Article 333. Who are guilty of adultery. - Adultery is committed by any

married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her
husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to
be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void.
Adultery shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.
If the person guilty of adultery committed this offense while being
abandoned without justification by the offended spouse, the penalty next
lower in degree than that provided in the next preceding paragraph shall be
imposed.
44
See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
45
See also NIALL RICHARDSON, CLARISSA SMITH, AND ANGELA VERNDLY,
STUDYING SEXUALITIES: THEORIES, REPRESENTATIONS, CULTURES 5
(2013).
46
Id.
47
746 Phil. 809 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
48
Id. at 832-833.
49
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 266-A provides:
Article 266--A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -

. . . .
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
SEPARATE OPINION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Having found all the essential elements obtaining in this case, I concur in the
result that the accused be convicted of Lascivious Conduct under Section
5(b) of RA 7610.
I differ from the ponencia only in the application of Section 5(b) to the facts

of the case, specifically, in the requirement of the second element for a
conviction under Section 5(b) (i.e., that the lascivious conduct is performed
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse).
Section 5(b) reads:

SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether

xxxx
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period x x x.1
The essential elements of a violation of Section 5(b) are: (1) The accused
commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) The said act
is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; and (3) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years
of age.2
The phrase "a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual

abuse" in the second element is defined by Section 5 of RA 7610 as "[a
child], who (a) for money, profit or other consideration, or (b) due to
coercion or influence by an adult, group, or syndicate, indulges in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct.3
This is what distinguishes the "common" or "ordinary" acts of lasciviousness

under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) from a violation of
Section 5(b). In other words, it must be alleged and proved that:
a) the child is exploited in prostitution; OR

b) the child is subjected to other sexual abuse.
These should already be existing at the time of sexual intercourse or

lascivious conduct complained of.
I have earlier stated in my dissent in Quimvel v. People4 that a person can

only be convicted of violation of Section 5(b), upon allegation and proof of
the unique circumstances of the child — that he or she is exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse, drawing from Justice Carpio's
dissenting opinion in Olivarez v. Court of Appeals5 :
Section 5 of RA 7610 deals with a situation where the acts of lasciviousness

are committed on a child already either exploited in prostitution or subjected
to "other sexual abuse." Clearly, the acts of lasciviousness committed on
the child are separate and distinct from the other circumstance — that the
child is either exploited in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual
abuse."
xxxx
Section 5 of RA 7610 penalizes those "who commit the act of sexual

intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse." The act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct may be committed on a child already exploited in prostitution,
whether the child engages in prostitution for profit or someone coerces her
into prostitution against her will. The element of profit or coercion refers to
the practice of prostitution, not to the sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct committed by the accused. A person may commit acts of
lasciviousness even on a prostitute, as when a person mashes the private
parts of a prostitute against her will.
The sexual intercourse or act of lasciviousness may be committed on a

child already subjected to other sexual abuse. The child may be
subjected to suchother sexual abuse for profit or through coercion, as when
the child is employed or coerced into pornography. A complete stranger,
through force or intimidation, may commit acts of lasciviousness on such
child in violation of Section 5 of RA 7610.
The phrase "other sexual abuse" plainly means that the child is already
subjected to sexual abuseother than the crime for which the accused is
charged under Section 5 of RA 7610. The "other sexual abuse" is an
element separate and distinct from the acts of lasciviousness that the
accused performs on the child. The majority opinion admits this when it
enumerates the second element of the crime under Section 5 of RA 7610 —
that the lascivious "act is performed with a child x x x subjected to other
sexual abuse."6
The allegation of relationship and

minority in the Information meets
the element of coercion or
influence under Section 5(b).
As I stated in Quimvel, the element of coercion or influence required by

Section 5(b) is not met by the allegation in the Information of force and
intimidation. I maintain this position. Several features distinguish this case
from Quimvel, as the age of the child victim, the relationship of the offender
and the child victim, and the manner of the commission of the lascivious
conduct as supported by evidence on record.
The child victim in Quimvel is under twelve (12) years of age, falling within
the first proviso of Section 5(b) — that the prosecution shall be under Article
336 of the Revised Penal Code. The child victim in this case was fifteen (15)
years of age at the time complained of, such that the case falls within the
general provision of Section 5(b). In this regard, I concur with Justice
Peralta that the designation would properly be a violation of Section 5(b).
Here, the Information alleged the use of force, threat, or intimidation, along
with the relationship and minority. The Information reads:
That on or about the 23rd day of October 2005, at 7:00 o'clock in the

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
with one [AAA], a minor, fifteen (15) years of age and the daughter of the
CONTRARY to Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B of R.A. 8353, with

R.A. 7610.7
In People v. Bayya,8 the Court explained the purpose of the right of the

accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him:
Elaborating on the defendant's right to be informed, the Court held in Pecho

vs. Peoplethat the objectives of this right are:
1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him
as will enable him to make the defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a

further prosecution for the same cause; and
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether
they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.
It is thus imperative that the Information filed with the trial court be
complete — to the end that the accused may suitably prepare his defense.
Corollary to this, an indictment must fully state the elements of the specific
offense alleged to have been committed as it is the recital of the essentials
of a crime which delineates the nature and cause of accusation against the
accused.9
More concretely, the Court explained what the accused must be informed of
in United States v. Lim San:10
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the
accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged.
It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. x x x. That to which his
attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should
be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he
commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did
he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner
therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter
of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime
which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the
caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading
is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the
accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and
complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no
consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights. The real
and important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts alleged in the
manner alleged?" not "Did you commit a crime named murder?" If he
performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law
determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty
therefor. It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime
is or what it is named. x x x11
The allegation of relationship and minority in the Information suffices to

inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
and supports a conviction for Section 5(b) under the same Information
because it meets the requirement of coercion and influence required to
convert a child into one subjected to other sexual abuse as defined by
Section 5. This, to me, forecloses any argument that the accused was not
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Neither does it offend against the variance doctrine to determine the

existence of the elements of Section 5(b) in a charge of Article 336 or one
wherein Article 336 is necessarily included, Section 5(b) being a subset of
the universe of lascivious conduct covered by Article 336 of the RPC, is
necessarily included in a charge of rape under Section 266-A(2) of the RPC if
the specific circumstances required for Section 5(b) to operate can be fairly
read into the allegations in the Information and thereafter proved.
There is sufficient showing that

coercion or influence attended
AAA's sexual abuse; otherwise,
that AAA was a child subjected to
other sexual abuse at the time of
the lascivious conduct complained
of.
The factual pattern of this case is analogous to that of Larin v.

People12 where the Court found the elements of Section 5(b) to be present.
Larin, being an adult and the swimming trainor of his 14-year-old victim,
had the influence and ascendancy to cow her into submission. Evidence was
introduced to show that Larin employed psychological coercion upon his child
victim by attacking her self-esteem and then pretending to be attentive to
her needs and making himself out to be the only one who could accept her
inadequacies.
To my mind, what was determinative of the existence of the second element

of Section 5(b) in Larin was:
The independent proof given of psychological coercion, prior to the first

lascivious conduct against the child victim, coupled with the fact that the
lascivious conduct happened on two separate occasions indubitably proved
the second element — that the child victim was coerced or influenced by
Larin to engage in lascivious conduct at the first instance of lascivious
conduct, or, to be sure, on the second instance of lascivious conduct (as the
first was already sufficient to convert the child victim into a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse).13
Verily, this factual milieu of Larin that places it within the ambit of Section
5(b) involving coercion and influence is shared by this case. From the initial
Sworn Statement filed by AAA, she already claimed that the abuse had
begun as early as February 2003.14 In fact, during AAA's direct testimony,
she testified that she had told her mother about the sexual abuse as early as
June 2005 but that her mother did not believe her.15 Therefore, at the time
the lascivious conduct was committed upon AAA on October 23, 2005, she
was already a child subjected to other sexual abuse — meeting the second
essential element.
Again, as I have said in Quimvel, this is not to say that in every instance,
prior sexual affront upon the child must be shown to characterize the child
as one "subjected to other sexual abuse". What is only necessary is to show
that the child is already a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse at the time the sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
complained of was committed or that circumstances obtained prior or during
the first instance of abuse that constitutes such first instance of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct as having converted the child into a child
"exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse."16 Otherwise, it
appears that without the circumstances of Section 5(a) or independent
evidence of coercion or influence, a single instance of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct may not be sufficient to meet the second element of
Section 5(b).
Similarly, in People v. Fragante,17 where the Court found the elements of

Section 5(b) present in the several instances of sexual intercourse and
lascivious conducted committed by the accused against his minor daughter,
it was held that actual force or intimidation need not be employed in
incestuous rape of a minor because the moral and physical dominion of the
father is sufficient to cow the victim into submission.18 The appreciation of
how the sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in this case fell within the
ambit of Section 5(b) is cogently explained thus: appellant, as a father
having moral ascendancy over his daughter, coerced AAA to engage in
lascivious conduct, which is within the purview of sexual abuse.19
This is the same situation obtaining in this case, with evidence extant in the
records that the child had already been subjected to sexual abuse under
circumstances showing coercion and influence (otherwise termed "[a
father's] moral and physical dominion" in Fragante) even prior to the act
complained of.
As well, in Malto v. People,20 the Court took pains to determine the existence

of the second element, thus:
The second element was likewise present here. The following

pronouncement in People v. Larin is significant:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual

abuse, when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under
thecoercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. (emphasis
supplied)
On November 19, 1997, due to the influence of petitioner, AAA indulged in

lascivious acts with or allowed him to commit lascivious acts on her. This
was repeated on November 26, 1997 on which date AAA also indulged in
sexual intercourse with petitioner as a result of the latter's influence and
moral ascendancy. Thus, she was deemed to be a "child subjected to other
sexual abuse" as the concept is defined in the opening paragraph of Section
5, Article III of RA 7610 and in Larin.21
This is consistent with my position that to secure a conviction for violation of

Section 5(b), coercion or influence (or otherwise, that the child indulged in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct for money, profit or other
consideration) is a textually-provided circumstance that must be shown. I
find that this element of coercion or influence was shown in this case.
Still, RA 7610 was not intended to

cover all sexual abuses against
children.
This case does not detract from my position that RA 7610 does not cover all
sexual abuses against children under its provisions to the exclusion of the
RPC. RA 7610 affords protection to a special class of children without
subsuming any and all offenses against children that are already covered by
other penal laws such as the RPC and the Child and Youth Welfare Code.
To reiterate, by both literal and purposive tests, I find nothing in the

language of the law or in the Senate deliberations that necessarily leads to
the conclusion that RA 7610 subsumes all instances of sexual abuse against
children.22
Given the foregoing, I concur in the result. The accused is, as he should be,
convicted of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of RA 7610.
Endnotes:
1
Underscoring supplied.
2
People v. Abello, 601 Phil. 373, 392 (2009), as cited in J. Caguioa, Diss.
Op. in Quimvel v. People, G.R. No. 214497, April 18, 2017, p. 6.
3
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether
4
G.R. No. 214497, April 18, 2017.
5
503 Phil. 421 (2005).
6
Id. at 445-447; italics omitted, emphasis supplied.
7
Records, p. 1, as cited in the Decision, p. 2.
8
384 Phil, 519 (2000).
9
Id. at 525-526; citations omitted.
10
17 Phil. 273 (1910).
11
Id. at 278-279; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
12
357 Phil. 987 (1998).
13
J. Caguioa, Diss. Op. in Quimvel v. People, supra note 2, at 14.
14
Sworn Statement, Annex "A," records (not paginated).
15
TSN, January 10, 2007 pp. 30, 35.
16
A more extensive discussion on this point is in my dissenting opinion in
Quimvel v. People, supra note 2, at 10.
17
657 Phil. 577 (2011 ).
18
Id. at 592.
19
Id. at 597.
20
560 Phil. 119 (2007).
21
Id. at 137.
22
My dissenting opinion in Quimvel extensively discusses this point.
DISSENTING OPINION
MARTIRES, J.:
Respectfully, I dissent from the majority opinion.
I am unable to accept that the act of "fingering," or the digital penetration of

the vagina, should be appreciated as a mere act of lasciviousness. My refusal
to accept this conclusion is grounded on the definition of carnal knowledge
that this Court set forth in the 2011 case of People vs. Butiong [G.R. No.
168932, 19 October 2011]:
Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual bodily

connections with a woman. This explains why the slightest penetration of
the female genitalia consummates the rape. [emphasis supplied]
The crux of carnal knowledge, then, is sexual bodily connection.
The finger is a part of the body by which a sexual bodily connection may be
attained. It is an organ that evokes sensations of pleasure, particularly in
sexual situations; thus, it should not be deemed as an "object" within the
contemplation of the second paragraph of Article 266-A. A man's use of his
penis, the tongue, or his finger to penetrate a vagina for the purpose of
sexual stimulation or sensation undeniably creates a sexual bodily
connection with a woman; thus, carnal knowledge of the woman is achieved.
I submit that the concept of carnal knowledge should not be limited

exclusively to the contact between the penis and the vagina. The
word carnal, as defined, describes "in or of the flesh" or "having to do with
or preoccupied with bodily or sexual pleasure, sensual or sexual."1 A
perpetrator's use of any of his or her organs, such as the tongue or the
finger, in order to create bodily pleasure or to penetrate a vagina constitutes
carnal knowledge. Consequently, when such carnal knowledge is attained
under any of the circumstances in the first paragraph of Article 266-A, the
perpetrator should be convicted of Rape under such, to wit:
Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
present.
The use of a body organ in order to penetrate a vagina should be

distinguished from the sexual insertionof an instrument or object into the
genital or anal orifice of another. This latter act is defined and punished
under the second paragraph of Article 266-A, viz:
Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. - Rape is committed:
xxxx

paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Thus, under the two categories of rape created by the twin paragraphs
under Article 266-A, when a perpetrator inserts into the genital or anal
orifice of another an instrument or object that does not form part of the
perpetrator's body, the offense committed is punishable under the second
paragraph of Article 266-A; when a perpetrator penetrates a vagina with the
use of any of his or her own body parts, the offense committed is punishable
under the first paragraph.
With this disquisition, I respectfully submit that the majority unduly confines
the concept of carnal knowledge under the first paragraph of Article 266-A to
penile penetration and, correspondingly, unduly restricts the law's coverage.
Such limitation disregards a vital premise in our rape jurisprudence, namely,
that carnal knowledge is achieved when a person has sexual bodily
connection with a woman. To reiterate: the penetration of a vagina by
means of any bodily part such as the finger or tongue is a sexual bodily
connection.
To limit the concept of carnal knowledge solely to penile penetration is

contrary to human experience. Carnal knowledge occurs on a wanton field,
and is achieved in sundry ways: vaginal, oral, anal, and fingering. Which
brings us back to the case at hand. The majority may take notice that the
act of "fingering" a woman, as it has been said time and again, is an act
from which women may, unwittingly or not, derive pleasure in varied
degrees. Rapists exploit this biological imperative. Our rape jurisprudence is
replete with grievous narratives where the perpetrators, before attaining
carnal knowledge of their victims through penile means, had already
attained carnal knowledge of their victims through the use of their finger on
their victim's vagina in a bid to arouse and confuse her, and in the belief
that this would facilitate the penile intercourse to follow. The fingering
committed, in itself, is already carnal knowledge. In cases of rape, the
forced penetration or entry into a woman's most private part by or with
whatever means with the use of a bodily organ is carnal knowledge, and an
outrage to the dignity of the victim. Fingering is no mere act of
lasciviousness.
I humbly beg that the majority see and punish the crime committed in this
case for what it is: Rape. The accused, having been found to have fingered
his own daughter, should be convicted of Rape under the first paragraph of
Article 266-A.
Endnotes:
1
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged), p. 340; New
World Dictiona
Q & A: Sexual Harassment Cases
Release Date:
Monday, March 3, 2008

WHAT IS SEXUAL HARASSMENT?
It is an act or a series of acts involving any unwelcome sexual advance, request or

demand for a sexual favor, or other verbal or physical behavior of a sexual nature,
committed by a government employee or official in a work-related, training- or
education- related environment.
WHAT IS THE POLICY OF THE STATE ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT?
Sexual harassment, which has been declared unlawful in the workplace, training and
education environments, will not be tolerated as it violates the dignity and human
rights of a person.
WHAT IS THE PRESENT LAW ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT?

R.A. 7877, an “Act Declaring Sexual Harassment Unlawful in the Employment,
Education or Training Environment, and for other purposes” was approved on
February 14, 1995 and became effective on March 5, 1995, fifteen (15) days after its
publication in the Malaya and Times Journal on February 18, 1995. It is known as “The
Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.”
WHAT IS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC) RESOLUTION NO. 01-0940?
It is known as the Administrative Disciplinary Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases.
WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF CSC RESOLUTION NO. 01-0940 TO PRIOR ISSUANCES OF

THE CSC AND THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT?
It supersedes or repeals prior CSC issuances such as MC No. 19, s. 1994 and CSC Res.
95-6161. DOLE Administrative Order No. 250, s. 1995 has to be amended accordingly
or replaced altogether, in consonance with the changes made in the new CSC Rules on
Sexual Harassment.
WHERE CAN SEXUAL HARASSMENT BE COMMITTED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CSC

RESOLUTION NO. 01-0940?
Sexual harassment may take place:
1. in the premises of the workplace or office or of the school or training institution;
2. in any place where the parties were found, as a result of work or education or
training responsibilities or relations;
3. at work or education- or training-related social functions;
4. while on official business outside the office or school or training institution or

during work or school or training-related travel;
5. at official conferences, fora, symposia or training sessions; or
6. by telephone, cellular phone, fax machine or electronic mail.
WHEN IS SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMMITTED IN THE EMPLOYMENT OR WORK-

RELATED ENVIRONMENT?
Work-related sexual harassment is committed when:
1. the submission to or rejection of the act or series of acts is used as basis for any
employment decision (including but not limited to, matters related to hiring,
promotion, raises in salary, job security, benefits and any other personnel action)
affecting the applicant/employee; or
2. the act or series of acts have the purpose or effect of interfering with the
complainant’s work performance, or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive
work environment; or
3. the act or series of acts might reasonably be expected to cause discrimination,
insecurity, discomfort, offense or humiliation to a complainant who may be a co-
employee, applicant, customer, or ward of the person complained of.
WHEN IS SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMMITTED IN AN EDUCATION OR TRAINING

ENVIRONMENT?
Education or training related sexual harassment is committed when:
1. the submission to or rejection of the act or series of acts is used as a basis for any
decision affecting the complainant, including, but not limited to, the giving of a
grade, the granting of honors or a scholarship, the payment of a stipend or allowance,
or the giving of any benefit, privilege or consideration; or
2. the act or series of acts have the purpose or effect of interfering with the
performance, or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive academic environment
of the complainant; or
3. the act or series of acts might reasonably be expected to cause discrimination,

insecurity, discomfort, offense or humiliation to a complainant who may be a trainee,
apprentice, intern, tutee or ward of the person complained of.
WHEN IS A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL/EMPLOYEE LIABLE FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT?
A government official or employee, regardless of sex, is liable for sexual harassment

when he/she:
1. directly participates in the execution of any act of sexual harassment as defined by

the Administrative Disciplinary Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases;
2. induces or directs another or others to commit sexual harassment as defined by

these Rules;
3. cooperates in the commission of sexual harassment by another through an act

without which the sexual harassment would not have been accomplished; or
4. cooperates in the commission of sexual harassment by another through previous or

simultaneous acts.
WHAT ARE THE FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT?
1. Physical
a. Malicious touching
b. Overt sexual advances
c. Gestures with lewd insinuation
2. Verbal, such as but not limited to, requests or demands for sexual favors, and lurid
remarks
3. Use of objects, pictures or graphics, letters or written notes with sexual
underpinnings
4. Other forms analogous to the foregoing.
WHAT ARE THE FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON DECORUM AND INVESTIGATION

(CODI) IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES?
The CODI shall:
1. Receive complaints of sexual harassment;
2. Investigate sexual harassment complaints in accordance with the prescribed

procedure;
3. Submit a report of its findings with the corresponding recommendation to the

disciplining authority for decision; and
4. Lead in the conduct of discussions about sexual harassment within the agency or
institution to increase understanding and prevent incidents of sexual harassment.
WHAT IS THE COMPOSITION OF THE CODI?
At least one (1) representative each from:
1. In a work-related environment:
i. the management
ii. the accredited union (if any)
iii. the first level employees iv. the second level employees
2. In an educational/training institution:
i. the administrator
ii. the trainers, teachers, instructors, professors or coaches
iii. the students or trainees
The term of office of the members of the CODI shall not be more than two (2) years.
AT THE PRE-FILING STAGE, WHAT ASSISTANCE CAN THE AGENCY PROVIDE TO AN

ALLEGED VICTIM OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT?
The agency may adopt mechanism to provide assistance to an alleged victim of sexual
harassment which may include:
1. counseling;
2. referral to an agency offering professional help; and
3. advice or options available before the filing of the complaint.

WHAT ARE THE STANDARD PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS IN HANDLING A SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CASE?
1. When can a complaint for sexual harassment be filed?
Anytime
2. With whom can a complaint file a complaint for sexual harassment be filed?
With the disciplining authority of the office/ agency; or with the Committee on
Decorum and Investigation. Upon receipt of the complaint, the disciplining authority
of the office/agency shall transmit the same to the CODI, if there is any.
In the absence of a CODI, the head of office/agency shall cause the creation of a CODI
in accordance with the law and rules and transmit the complaint to said Committee.
3. What are the requirements for a complaint?
It must be in writing, signed and sworn to by the complainant, and contains the
following:
Full name and address of the complainant;
Full name, address, and position of the respondent;
A brief statement of the relevant facts;
Residence, in support of the complaint, if any; and
A certification of non-forum shopping.
In the absence of any one of the aforementioned requirements, the complaint shall be
dismissed without prejudice to its refilling.
4. Are complaints sent thru telegram, radiogram, electronic mail or similar means
considered as filed?
Yes, if the requirements provided in Section 12 (b) of Resolution No. 01-0940 are
complied with. In the absence of the said requirements, the complaint is considered
non-filed. Complainant has to be notified to comply within ten (10) days from receipt
of the notice for compliance.
5. Shall the withdrawal of the complaint at any stage of the proceedings preclude the
CODI from proceeding with the investigation?
When there is obvious truth or merit to the allegations in the complaint or where
there is documentary or direct evidence that can prove the guilt of the person
complained of, the CODI can proceed with the investigation.
WHAT WILL BE THE ACTION OF THE CODI ON THE COMPLAINT?
1. Counter-Affidavit/Comment of Person Complained of

Upon receipt of a complaint that is sufficient in form and substance, the CODI shall
require the person complained of to submit a Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath
within three (3) days from receipt of the notice, furnishing a copy to the complainant;
otherwise, the Counter-Affidavit/ Comment shall be considered as not filed.
2. Preliminary Investigation
The CODI shall conduct a preliminary investigation which shall involve the ex parte
examination of documents submitted by the complainant and the person complained
of, as well as documents readily available from other government offices.
During the preliminary investigation, the parties may submit affidavits and counter-
affidavits.
3. Formal Charge
Upon receipt of the counter-affidavit/comment under oath, the Committee on

Decorum and Investigation may now recommend whether a prima facie case exists to
warrant the issuance of a formal charge.
Strict confidentiality of the proceedings during preliminary investigation by the CODI

shall be exercised.
WHAT SHALL BE THE DURATION OF THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?
The preliminary investigation shall commence not later than five (5) days from receipt
of the complaint by the CODI. It shall be terminated within fifteen (15) working days
thereafter.
WHEN WILL THE CODI SUBMIT ITS INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION?
The CODI shall submit the Investigation Report and the complete records of the case
to the disciplining authority within five (5) working days from the termination of the
preliminary investigation.
WHAT WILL BE THE ACTION OF THE DISCIPLINING AUTHORITY AFTER PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATION?
Within three (3) working days from receipt of the investigation report, the disciplining
authority shall issue a formal charge if a prima facie case is established during the
investigation. If a prima facie case is not established during the investigation, the
complaint shall be dismissed within three (3) working days from receipt of the
investigation report.
WHAT ARE THE CONTENTS OF THE FORMAL CHARGE?
1. A specification of the charge/s;
2. A brief statement of material or relevant facts;

3. Certified true copies of the documentary evidence, if any;
4. Sworn statement covering the testimony of witness/es;
5. A directive to answer the charge/s in writing under oath in not less than seventy-
two (72) hours from receipt thereof;
6. An advice for the respondent to indicate in his/her answer whether or not he/she
elects a formal investigation of the charges; and
7. A notice that he/she is entitled to be assisted by a counsel of his/her choice.
CAN THE RESPONDENT SUBMIT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE/S AFTER THE PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATION?
Yes, even if he has already submitted his/her comment/s and counter affidavits
during the preliminary investigation.
WHAT WILL BE THE CONTENT OF THE ANSWER OF THE RESPONDENT?
The answer, which must be in writing and under oath, shall be specific and shall
contain material facts and applicable laws, if any, including documentary evidence/s,
sworn statements covering testimonies of witnesses, if any, in support of respondent's
case. It shall also include a statement indicating whether he/she elects a formal
investigation. The answer must be filed within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt
thereof.
WHAT WILL BE THE EFFECT IF RESPONDENT FAILS OR REFUSES TO ANSWER WITHIN

THE 72 HOURS REQUIREMENT?
It shall be considered a waiver of respondent’s right to answer and a formal

investigation may commence.
WHEN CAN PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION BE APPLIED?
Preventive suspension can be applied upon petition of the complainant or motu propio
upon the recommendation of the CODI after the service of the Formal Charge to the
respondent.
The proper disciplining authority may order the preventive suspension during the
formal investigation, if there are reasons to believe that the person complained of is
probably guilty of the charges which would warrant his/her removal from the service.
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION?
An order of preventive suspension may be issued to temporarily remove the

respondent from the scene of his/her malfeasance or misfeasance and to preclude the
possibility of his/her exerting undue influence or pressure on the witnesses against
his/her tampering of documentary evidence on file with this Office.
HOW LONG IS THE PERIOD OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION?

Preventive suspension for an administrative case shall not be more than ninety (90)
days unless otherwise provided by a special law.
WHAT REMEDIES FROM THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION CAN BE AVAILED OF BY THE

RESPONDENT?
Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of order, respondent may:
1. file a motion for reconsideration with the disciplining authority; or
2. elevate the same to the Civil Service Commission by way of an appeal.
WHEN CAN A FORMAL INVESTIGATION BE CONDUCTED? BY WHOM?
If the CODI deems that a formal investigation is necessary to decide the case
judiciously, it shall conduct an investigation not earlier than five (5) days nor later
than ten (10) days from receipt of the respondent’s answer. It shall be finished within
thirty (30) days from the issuance of the formal charge or the receipt of the answer
unless the disciplining authority extends the period.
WHAT IS THE PRE-HEARING CONFERENCE?
The pre-hearing conference may be conducted by the CODI at the commencement of

the formal investigation to agree on matter/s that would expedite the hearing.
The hearing proper and the order of presentation of evidence/s is governed by

Sections 26 to 35 of the Administrative Disciplinary Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases
of the CSC.
WHEN IS THE FORMAL INVESTIGATION REPORT SUBMITTED? TO WHOM?
Within fifteen (15) days after the conclusion of the formal investigation, a report
containing a narration of the material facts established during the investigation, the
findings and the evidence supporting said findings, as well as the recommendations,
shall be submitted by the CODI to the disciplining authority together with the
complete records of the case.
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the investigation report, the disciplining
authority shall render his/her decision on the case.
WHEN IS A DECISION ON A SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE BY THE DISCIPLINING

AUTHORITY FINAL AND EXECUTORY?
The decision of the disciplining authority is final and executory when the penalty of
suspension is not more than thirty (30) days or a fine of not more than the equivalent
of thirty (30) days salary is imposed.
WHEN IS A PENALTY OF SUSPENSION APPEALABLE TO THE CIVIL SERVICE

COMMISSION?
A penalty of suspension exceeding thirty (30) days or a fine exceeding the equivalent
of thirty (30) days salary of the respondent shall be appealable to the ommission after
the lapse of the reglamentary period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal and no such pleading has been filed.
WHAT ARE THE REMEDIES AFTER A DECISION?
1. Motion for reconsideration by the adversed party
2. Appeal to the Civil Service Commission if penalty imposed exceeds thirty (30) days
suspension or fine exceeding the equivalent of thirty (30) days salary. The appeal may
be initially appealed to the department head (for decisions rendered by the bureau or
office head that are appealable to the CSC)
3. Petition for review with the CSC by a complainant for a decision of a disciplining
authority dismissing a complaint for lack of prima facie case
4. Petition for review with the Court of Appeals on a decision made by the CSC
5. Petition for certiorari in the proper court by the aggrieved party
WHEN CAN A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BE FILED BY THE ADVERSED PARTY?
The party adversely affected by the decision may file a motion for reconsideration
with the disciplining authority who rendered the decision within fifteen (15) days
from receipt thereof.
Such is deemed filed on the date stamped on the official copy by the proper receiving
authority, and if sent by mail, on the date shown by the postmark on the envelope,
which shall be attached to the records of the case.
The filing of the motion for reconsideration within the reglamentary period shall stay
the execution of the decision sought to be reconsidered.
WHAT CAN BE THE BASIS FOR A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION?
1. New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the decision rendered;
or
2. The decision is not supported by the evidence on record; or
3. Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of

the movant.
CAN THERE BE MORE THAN ONE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION?
No, only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
WHEN CAN AN APPEAL FOR DECISIONS OF HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, PROVINCES,

CITIES, MUNICIPALITIES AND OTHER INSTRUMENTALITIES BE APPEALED TO THE
CSC?
For a decision where the penalty imposed is more than thirty (30) days suspension or a
fine exceeding the equivalent of thirty (30) days salary, it may be appealed to the
CSC within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
A notice of appeal, including the appeal memorandum, shall be filed with the
appellate authority with a copy furnished to the disciplining office. The latter shall
submit the records of the case, which shall be automatically and chronologically
arranged, paged and securely bound to prevent loss with its comment within fifteen
(15) days, to the appellate authority.
WHEN IS THE APPEAL DEEMED FILED? HOW MUCH IS THE APPEAL FEE?
An appeal sent by mail shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the postmark on
the envelope, which shall be attached to the records of the case and in case of
personal delivery, the date stamped thereon by the proper office.
The appellant shall pay an appeal fee of three hundred pesos (P300.00) and a copy of
the receipt shall be attached to the appeal.
WHEN IS AN APPEAL PERFECTED?
The appeal is perfected when the appellant shall have submitted within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the decision the following:
1. Notice of appeal which shall specifically state the date of the decision appealed
from and the date of receipt thereof;
2. Three copies of appeal memorandum containing the grounds relied upon for the
appeal, together with the certified true copy of the decision, resolution or order
appealed from, and certified copies of the document or evidence;
3. Proof of service of a copy of the appeal memorandum to the disciplining office;
4. Proof of payment of the appeal fee; and
5. A statement or certification of non-forum shopping
WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE ABOVE REQUIREMENTS

WITHIN THE REGLAMENTARY PERIOD?
It shall be construed as failure to perfect an appeal and shall cause its dismissal.
WILL AN APPEAL FILED STOP THE DECISION FROM BEING EXECUTORY?
The appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.
In case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as

having been under preventive suspension during the period of the appeal, in the event
he wins the appeal.
WHAT IS THE CLASSIFICATION OF ACTS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT?

Sexual Harassment is classified as:
1. Grave Offenses
a. unwanted touching of private parts of the body (genitalia, buttocks, and breast);
b. sexual assault;
c. malicious touching;
d. requesting for sexual favor in exchange for employment, promotion, local or

foreign travels, favorable working conditions or assignments, a passing grade, the
granting of honors or scholarship, or the grant of benefits or payment of a stipend or
allowance; and
e. other analogous cases.
2. Less Grave Offenses
a. unwanted touching or brushing against a victim’s body;
b. pinching not falling under grave offenses;
c. derogatory or degrading remarks or innuendoes directed toward the members of

one sex or one’s sexual orientation or used to describe a person;
d. verbal abuse or threats with sexual overtones; and
e. other analogous cases.
3. Light Offenses
a. surreptitiously looking or stealing a look at a person’s private part or worn

undergarments;
b. telling sexist/smutty jokes or sending these through text, electronic mail or other
similar means, causing embarrassment or offense and carried out after the offender
has been advised that they are offensive or embarrassing or, even without such
advise, when they are by their nature clearly embarrassing, offensive or vulgar;
c. malicious leering or ogling;
d. the display of sexually offensive pictures, materials or graffiti;
e. unwelcome inquiries or comments about a person’s sex life;
f. unwelcome sexual flirtation, advances, propositions;
g. making offensive hand or body gestures at an employee;
h. persistent unwanted attention with sexual overtones;
i. unwelcome phone calls with sexual overtones causing discomfort, embarrassment,

offense or insult to the receiver; and
j. other analogous cases.
The head of the agency who fails to act on the complaint within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of any complaint for sexual harassment properly filed against any
employee in that office shall be charged with neglect of duty.
Any person found guilty of sexual harassment shall, after the investigation, be meted
the penalty corresponding to the gravity of the offense.
WHAT ARE THE PENALTIES FOR OFFENSES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT?
1. Grave offenses - Dismissal
2. Less grave offenses
1 st offense - Fine or suspension for thirty (30) days but not exceeding six (6)
months
2 nd offense - Dismissal
3. Light offenses
1 st offense - Reprimand
2 nd offense - Fine or suspension not exceeding thirty (30) days
3 rd offense - Dismissal
WHAT PENALTY SHALL BE APPLIED IF THE RESPONDENT IS FOUND GUILTY OF TWO

(2) OR MORE CHARGES OR COUNTS?
The penalty to be imposed shall be that corresponding to the most serious charges or
count and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances.
WHAT ARE THE DUTIES OF THE AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT ACCORDING TO

THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC) ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY RULES ON
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES?
All national and local government agencies, state colleges and universities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter, shall promulgate
or modify their own rules and regulations in conformity with these Rules, in
consultation with their employees, within six (6) months from the effectivity of this
Resolution.
All agencies of the government shall submit an authenticated copy of their rules and
regulations on sexual harassment to the Commission for approval within one (1)
month from the date of their promulgation. It shall likewise submit to the Commission
a list of the members of their Committee on Decorum and Investigation immediately
after its composition.
All agencies of the government shall develop an education and training program for
their officials and employees and the members of their Committee on Decorum and
Investigation to increase understanding about sexual harassment, prevent its
occurrence, and ensure proper investigation, prosecution and resolution of sexual
harassment cases.
The head of office who, after six (6) months from the affectivity of this resolution,
fails to cause the promulgation or modification of the agency’s rules and regulations
on sexual harassment in conformity with these rules, shall be charged with neglect of
duty.
WHAT SHALL APPLY TO A CASE OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT WHEN THE AGENCY IS

STILL IN THE PROCESS OF PROMULGATING OR MODIFYING ITS OWN RULES AND
REGULATIONS?
During the period when the agency is still in the process of promulgating or modifying
its own rules and regulations on sexual harassment, a complaint alleging acts
constituting sexual harassment shall be administratively prosecuted, resolved and
adjudicated based on these Rules.
Source: Civil Service Commission (CSC), Administrative Disciplinary Rules on

Sexual Harassment Cases.
Resolution No. 01-0940, May 21, 2001
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164733 September 21, 2007
MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Whereas, mankind owes to the child the best it has to give. (Final preambular clause of
the Declaration of the Rights of the Child)
This is a petition for review1 of the decision2 dated July 30, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25925 affirming with modification the decision3 of Branch 109
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 00-0691 which found
petitioner Michael John Z. Malto guilty for violation of paragraph 3, Section 5(a), Article
III of RA 7610,4 as amended.
Petitioner was originally charged in an information which read:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO of

VIOLATION OF SECTION 5(b), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610, AS AMENDED,
committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime during the month of November 1997 up to 1998, in
Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously induce and/or seduce his student at Assumption
College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse for
several times with him as in fact said accused had carnal knowledge.
Contrary to law.5
This was subsequently amended as follows:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO of

VIOLATION OF SECTION 5(a), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610, AS AMENDED,
committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime during the month of November 1997 up to 1998, in
Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage and exert influence, relationship and
moral ascendancy and induce and/or seduce his student at Assumption College,
complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse and
lascivious conduct for several times with him as in fact said accused has carnal
knowledge.
Contrary to law.6
Petitioner did not make a plea when arraigned; hence, the trial court entered for him a
plea of "not guilty." After the mandatory pre-trial, trial on the merits proceeded.
The prosecution established the following:
At the time of the incident, private complainant AAA was 17 years old.7 She was a
college student at the Assumption College in San Lorenzo Village, Makati City.
Petitioner, then 28, was her professor in her Philosophy II class in the first semester of
the school year 1997 to 1998.
On July 18, 1997, AAA was having lunch with her friends when petitioner joined their
group. He told them to address him simply as "Mike." He handed them his organizer
and asked them to list down their names and contact numbers.
On October 3, 1997, while AAA and her friends were discussing the movie Kama Sutra,
petitioner butted in and bragged that it was nothing compared to his collection of xxx-
rated films. To the shock of AAA’s group, he lectured on and demonstrated sexual acts
he had already experienced. He then invited the group to view his collection.
On October 10, 1997, petitioner reiterated his invitation to AAA and her friends to watch
his collection of pornographic films. Afraid of offending petitioner, AAA and two of her
friends went with him. They rode in his car and he brought them to the Anito Lodge on
Harrison St. in Pasay City. They checked in at a "calesa room." Petitioner was
disappointed when he found out there was neither a video cassette player (on which he
could play his video tapes) nor an x-rated show on the closed-circuit television. He
suggested that they just cuddle up together. AAA and her friends ignored him but he
pulled each of them towards him to lie with him in bed. They resisted until he relented.
AAA and her friends regretted having accepted petitioner’s invitation. For fear of
embarrassment in case their classmates got wind of what happened, they agreed to
keep things a secret. Meanwhile, petitioner apologized for his actuations.
Thereafter, petitioner started to show AAA amorous attention. He called her on the
phone and paged8 her romantic messages at least thrice a day. When semestral break
came, his calls and messages became more frequent. Their conversation always
started innocently but he had a way of veering the subject to sex. Young, naive and
coming from a broken family, AAA was soon overwhelmed by petitioner’s persistence
and slowly got attracted to him. He was the first person to court her. Soon, they had a
"mutual understanding" and became sweethearts.
When AAA secured her class card in Philosophy II at the start of the second semester,
petitioner told her that he gave her a final grade of "3." She protested, stating that her
mid-term grade was "1.2." He gave her a grade of "1.5" when she promised not to
disclose his intimate messages to her to anyone. He also cautioned her not to tell
anyone about their affair as it could jeopardize his job.
On November 19, 1997, at around 11:00 a.m., AAA agreed to have lunch with petitioner
outside the premises of the college. Since she was not feeling well at that time, he
asked her to lie down in the backseat of his car. She was surprised when he brought
her to Queensland Lodge9 on Harrison St. in Pasay City. Once inside the motel room,
he kissed her at the back and neck, touched her breasts and placed his hand inside her
blouse. She resisted his advances but he was too strong for her. He stopped only when
she got angry at him.
On November 26, 1997, petitioner asked AAA to come with him so that they could talk
in private. He again brought her to Queensland Lodge. As soon as they were inside the
room, he took off his shirt, lay down in bed and told her, "halika na, dito na tayo mag-
usap." She refused but he dragged her towards the bed, kissed her lips, neck and
breasts and unsnapped her brassiere. She struggled to stop him but he overpowered
her. He went on top of her, lowered her pants and touched her private part. He tried to
penetrate her but she pushed him away forcefully and she sat up in bed. He hugged her
tightly saying, "Sige na, AAA, pumayag ka na, I won’t hurt you." She refused and said,
"Mike, ayoko." He angrily stood up saying, "Fine, hindi na tayo mag-uusap. Don’t come
to the faculty room anymore. You know I need this and if you will not give in or give it to
me, let us end this." She replied, "Mike, hindi pa ako ready and it was you who said it
will be after my debut" on December 3, 1997. He insisted that there was no difference
between having sex then and after her debut. He told her, "kung hindi ko makukuha
ngayon, tapusin na natin ngayon." Pressured and afraid of his threat to end their
relationship, she hesitantly replied "Fine." On hearing this, he quickly undressed while
commenting "ibibigay mo rin pala, pinahirapan mo pa ako" and laughed. They had
sexual intercourse.
In July 1999, AAA ended her relationship with petitioner. She learned that he was either
intimately involved with or was sexually harassing his students in Assumption College
and in other colleges where he taught. In particular, he was dismissed from the De La
Salle University-Aguinaldo for having sexual relations with a student and sexually
harassing three other students. His employment was also terminated by Assumption
College for sexually harassing two of his students. It was then that AAA realized that
she was actually abused by petitioner. Depressed and distressed, she confided all that
happened between her and petitioner to her mother, BBB.
On learning what her daughter underwent in the hands of petitioner, BBB filed an
administrative complaint in Assumption College against him. She also lodged a
complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City which led to the filing of
Criminal Case No. 00-0691.
In his defense, petitioner proffered denial and alibi. He claimed that the alleged
incidents on October 3, 1997 and October 10, 1997 did not happen. He spent October
3, 1997 with his colleagues Joseph Hipolito and AJ Lagaso while he was busy checking
papers and computing grades on October 10, 1997. The last time he saw AAA during
the first semester was when she submitted her final paper on October 18, 1997.
On November 19, 1997, between 10:30 a.m. and 1:00 p.m., he sorted out conflicts of
class schedules for the second semester at the Assumption College. On November 26,
1997, he was at St. Scholastica’s College (where he was also teaching) preparing a
faculty concert slated on December 12, 1997. At lunch time, he attended the birthday
treat of a colleague, Evelyn Bancoro.
On November 29, 1997, he attended AAA’s 18th birthday party. That was the last time
he saw her.
According to petitioner, AAA became his sweetheart when she was already 19 years old
and after he was dismissed from Assumption College. On December 27 and 28, 1998,
they spent time together, shared their worries, problems and dreams and kissed each
other. On January 3, 1999, he brought her to Queensland Lodge where they had sexual
intercourse for the first time. It was repeated for at least 20 times from January 1999
until they broke up in July 1999, some of which were done at either his or her house
when no one was around.
The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to sustain petitioner’s
conviction. On March 7, 2001, it rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty.10 The
dispositive portion read:
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Michael John Malto y Zarsadias
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Article III, Section 5(a)[,] paragraph 3 of
RA 7610[,] as amended and hereby sentences him to reclusion temporal in its medium
period or an imprisonment of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and to pay civil indemnity in the amount of Php 75,000.00 and moral
and exemplary damages of Php 50,000.00 to minor complainant with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.11
Petitioner questioned the trial court’s decision in the CA. In a decision dated July 30,
2004,12 the appellate court affirmed his conviction even if it found that his acts were not
covered by paragraph (a) but by paragraph (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. It
further observed that the trial court failed to fix the minimum term of indeterminate
sentence imposed on him. It also ruled that the trial court erred in awarding ₱75,000
civil indemnity in favor of AAA as it was proper only in a conviction for rape committed
under the circumstances under which the death penalty was authorized by
law.13 Hence, the CA modified the decision of the trial court as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of conviction is AFFIRMED, with

the MODIFICATION that (1) appellant MICHAEL JOHN MALTO y ZARSADIAS is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day
of prision mayor as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1)
Day of reclusion temporal as maximum; and (2) the sum of ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity is DELETED.14
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in sustaining his conviction although it found that
he did not rape AAA. For him, he should have been acquitted since there was no rape.
He also claims that he and AAA were sweethearts and their sexual intercourse was
consensual.
Petitioner is wrong.
The Offense Stated in the Information Was Wrongly Designated
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.15 Pursuant thereto, the complaint or information
against him should be sufficient in form and substance. A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place
where the offense was committed.16
The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the
statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances.17 If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.18 The acts or omissions
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the
statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances
and for the court to pronounce judgment.19
The designation of the offense in the information against petitioner was changed from
"violation of Section 5(b), Article III" of RA 7610 to "violation of Section 5(a), Article III"
thereof. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provide:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or
female, who, for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be

imposed upon the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which
include, but are not limited to, the following:
1. Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
2. Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written

or oral advertisements or other similar means;
3. Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a

prostitute;
4. Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a

prostitute; or
5. Giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a

child with intent to engage such child in prostitution.

with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse:
Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and
Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, that the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period; and
x x x x x x x x x(emphasis supplied)
The elements of paragraph (a) are:
1. the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution;
2. the act is done through, but not limited to, the following means:
a. acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
b. inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written

or oral advertisements or other similar means;
c. taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a

prostitute;
d. threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a

prostitute or
e. giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a

child with intent to engage such child in prostitution;
3. the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and
4. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
On the other hand, the elements of paragraph (b) are:
1. the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other

sexual abuse and
3. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child

prostitution. It contemplates sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In other
words, under paragraph (a), the child is abused primarily for profit.
On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not
only with a child exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual
abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in
which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct.20
The information against petitioner did not allege anything pertaining to or connected
with child prostitution. It did not aver that AAA was abused for profit. What it charged
was that petitioner had carnal knowledge or committed sexual intercourse and
lascivious conduct with AAA; AAA was induced and/or seduced by petitioner who was
her professor to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct and AAA was a
17-year old minor. These allegations support a charge for violation of paragraph (b), not
paragraph (a), of Section 5, Article III, RA 7610.
The Real Nature of the Offense is Determined by Facts Alleged in the Information,
Not By the Designation
The designation in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid
surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense
accordingly. However, the failure to designate the offense by statute,21 or to mention the
specific provision penalizing the act,22 or an erroneous specification of the law
violated23 does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts
constituting the crime charged.24 What controls is not the title of the information or the
designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the information.25 In other
words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of
the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the information.26
The facts stated in the amended information against petitioner correctly made out a
charge for violation of Section 5(b), Article III, RA 7610. Thus, even if the trial and
appellate courts followed the wrong designation of the offense, petitioner could be
convicted of the offense on the basis of the facts recited in the information and duly
proven during trial.
Petitioner violated Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as amended
The first element of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertains to the act or acts
committed by the accused. The second element refers to the state or condition of the
offended party. The third element corresponds to the minority or age of the offended
party.
The first element was present in this case. Petitioner committed lascivious conduct
against and had sexual intercourse with AAA in the following instances: (1) on
November 19, 1997, when he kissed her at the back and neck, touched her breasts and
placed his hand inside her blouse to gratify his lust; (2) on November 26, 1997, when,
with lewd designs, he dragged her towards the bed of the motel room and forcibly
kissed her on the lips, neck and breasts and (3) when he exerted moral influence on her
and pressured her until she surrendered herself to him on November 26, 1997. His acts
were covered by the definitions of sexual abuse and lascivious conduct under Section
2(g) and (h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child
Abuse Cases promulgated to implement the provisions of RA 7610, particularly on child
abuse:
(g) "Sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement,

enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to
engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation,
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or

through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks,
or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person,
whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or public
area of a person. (emphasis supplied)
The second element was likewise present here. The following pronouncement
in People v. Larin27 is significant:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when

the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit,
or any other consideration; or (b) under thecoercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group. (emphasis supplied)
On November 19, 1997, due to the influence of petitioner, AAA indulged in lascivious
acts with or allowed him to commit lascivious acts on her. This was repeated on
November 26, 1997 on which date AAA also indulged in sexual intercourse with
petitioner as a result of the latter’s influence and moral ascendancy. Thus, she was
deemed to be a "child subjected to other sexual abuse" as the concept is defined in the
opening paragraph of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 and in Larin.
The third element of the offense was also satisfied. Section 3 (a), Article I of RA 7610
provides:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. –
(a) "Children" refers [to] persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over
but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability
or condition; (emphasis supplied)
On November 19, 2007 and November 26, 2007, AAA was a child as she was below 18
years of age. She was therefore within the protective mantle of the law.
Since all three elements of the crime were present, the conviction of petitioner was
proper.
Violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 and Rape are Separate and Distinct
Crimes
Petitioner was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610,
not rape. The offense for which he was convicted is punished by a special law while
rape is a felony under the Revised Penal Code.28 They have different elements.29 The
two are separate and distinct crimes. Thus, petitioner can be held liable for violation of
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 despite a finding that he did not commit rape.
Consent of the Child is Immaterial in Criminal Cases Involving Violation of

Section 5, Article III of RA 7610
Petitioner claims that AAA welcomed his kisses and touches and consented to have
sexual intercourse with him. They engaged in these acts out of mutual love and
affection. But may the "sweetheart theory" be invoked in cases of child prostitution and
other sexual abuse prosecuted under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610? No.
The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and rape, felonies committed
against or without the consent of the victim. It operates on the theory that the sexual act
was consensual. It requires proof that the accused and the victim were lovers and that
she consented to the sexual relations.30
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under
RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with
another person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish
[t]hose who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing
lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual
abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws.31 This is on the rationale
that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or
knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the
obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as
yet unable to take care of themselves fully.32 Those of tender years deserve its
protection.33
The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a sexual encounter may be
infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect
her from the harmful consequences34 of her attempts at adult sexual behavior.35 For this
reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity
and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks
to afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination.
(Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly tempted
by the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is
presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or
sexual intercourse.361âwphi1
This must be so if we are to be true to the constitutionally enshrined State policy to

promote the physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being of the
youth.37 This is consistent with the declared policy of the State
[T]o provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect,

cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development; provide sanctions for their commissionand carry out a program for
prevention and deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse,
exploitation, and discrimination.38 (emphasis supplied)
as well as to
intervene on behalf of the child when the parents, guardian, teacher or person having
care or custody of the child fails or is unable to protect the child against abuse,
exploitation, and discrimination or when such acts against the child are committed
by the said parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and custody of the
same.39(emphasis supplied)
This is also in harmony with the foremost consideration of the child’s best interests in all
actions concerning him or her.
The best interest of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions
concerning them, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with the
principles of First Call for Children as enunciated in the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child. Every effort shall be exerted to promote the welfare of
children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy life. 40 (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner May Enjoy the Benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
The penalty prescribed for violation of the provisions of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610
is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. In the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period, the medium of the penalty prescribed by the
law.41Notwithstanding that RA 7610 is a special law, petitioner may enjoy the benefits of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law.42 Since the penalty provided in RA 7610 is taken from
the range of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, it is covered by the first clause of
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.43 Thus, he is entitled to a maximum term
which should be within the range of the proper imposable penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period (ranging from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20
years) and a minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the law: prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period (ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months).
The Award of Damages Should Be Modified
The trial court awarded AAA ₱75,000 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000 as moral and
exemplary damages. The CA deleted the award for civil indemnity. It correctly reasoned
that the award was proper only in a conviction for rape committed under the
circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by law. Consistent, however,
with the objective of RA 7610 to afford children special protection against abuse,
exploitation and discrimination and with the principle that every person who contrary to
law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the
same,44 civil indemnity to the child is proper in a case involving violation of Section 5(b),
Article III of RA 7610. Every person criminally liable is civilly liable.45 The rule is that, in
crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.46Thus,
₱50,000 civil indemnity ex delicto shall be awarded in cases of violation of Section 5(b),
Article III of RA 7610.47
Moreover, the CA erred in affirming the grant of ₱50,000 as "moral and exemplary
damages." The rule is that, in every case, trial courts must specify the award of each
item of damages and make a finding thereon in the body of the decision.48 Thus, moral
damages and exemplary damages should be separate items of award.
AAA testified that she was "emotionally devastated" and "lost touch of her inner self" as
a result of what petitioner did to her. Because of the mental anxiety and wounded
feelings caused by petitioner to her, she had several sessions with the dean for student
affairs49 and the guidance counselor of Assumption College as well as with a
psychiatrist. This was corroborated by her mother and the dean of student affairs of
Assumption College. Thus, she is entitled to moral damages of ₱50,000. However, in
the absence of an aggravating circumstance, the grant of exemplary damages is
unwarranted.50
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. Petitioner Michael John Z. Malto is hereby

found guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as amended, for which he is
sentenced to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is further ordered to pay AAA ₱50,000 as civil
indemnity and ₱50,000 for moral damages.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. de Leon and concurred in by
Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Mariano C. del Castillo of the Special
Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 33-45.
3
Dated March 7, 2001. Penned by Judge Lilia C. Lopez. Id., pp. 57-89.
4
Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act. It is also known as the "Anti-Child Abuse Law."
5
Trial court records, vol. I, p. 2.
6
Id., p. 96.
7
Her birth certificate (Exhibit "H") showed that she was born on December 3,
1979. Id., p. 229.
8
Before cellular phones and text messaging came in vogue, the status symbol
were pagers/beepers used for paging/beeping messages.
9
Queensland Motel in some parts of the records.
10
Supra note 3.
11
Id.
12
Supra note 2.
13
RA 9346 ("An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty" enacted on June
24, 2006) subsequently repealed the death penalty.
14
Supra note 2.
15
Section 1(b), Rule 115, Rules of Court.
16
Section 6, Rule 110, id.
17
Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163866, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 465.
18
Section 8, Rule 110, Rules of Court.
19
Section 9, id.
20
People v. Larin, 357 Phil. 987 (1998).
21
U.S. v. de Dao, 2 Phil. 458 (1903).
22
People v. Gatchalian, 104 Phil. 664 (1958).
23
People v. Arnault, 92 Phil. 252 (1952).
24
Herrera, Oscar M., Remedial Law, volume IV: Criminal Procedure, Rex
Bookstore, 1992 edition, p. 59.
25
People v. Resayaga, G.R. No. L-49536, 30 March 1988, 159 SCRA
426; Santos v. People, G.R. No. 77429, 29 January 1990, 181 SCRA 487.
26
People v. Elesterio, G.R. No. 63971, 9 May 1989, 173 SCRA 243.
27
Supra note 20.
28
At the time of the commission of the offense, rape was still classified as a crime
against chastity punished under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. It is now
a crime against persons defined and penalized under Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code.
29
In contrast to the offense punished under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610,
the crime of rape has the following elements: (1) the offender is a man who had
carnal knowledge of a woman and (2) such act was accomplished through force
or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
or when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented. (People v. Padilla,
G.R. No. 142899, 31 March 2004, 426 SCRA 648)
30
People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 140278, 03 June 2004, 430 SCRA 469.
31
Article 1327, Civil Code. A contract between a child and another person who is
of legal age is voidable at the instance of the child. The rule is, however, subject
to the following exceptions: (a) upon reaching the age of majority, the contract is
ratified by the party who was a child when he entered into it, (b) the contract was
entered into thru a guardian and approved by a CA competent jurisdiction, (c) it is
a contract for necessities, such as food, but the person legally bound to give
them support should pay therefor and (e) the child misrepresented his age and
pretended to be of majority age and is thus in estoppel.
It should also be noted that under our present criminal laws, the age of
exemption from criminal liability was raised from 9 years old to 15 years
old. (RA 9344) Thus, a child 15 years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense is exempt from criminal liability. A child above
15 but below 18 years of age is presumed not to have acted with
discernment and will be criminally liable only upon rebuttal of that
presumption by proof that he acted with discernment. Thus, there is a
presumption of lack of discernment on the part of a child (which
presumption is conclusive if she is 15 years of age and below and
disputable if she is over 15 but below 18 years of age).
32
People v. Baylon, G.R. No. L-35785, 29 May 1974, 57 SCRA 114.
33
Id.
34
These harmful consequences include teenage pregnancy, mothering or
fathering an illegitimate child and contracting sexually transmitted disease(s).
35
The recognition that copulation is an adult activity is reflected in the way films
or shows are classified as rated "R" or "R-18." Under the Guidelines of the Movie
and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), a movie or show
classified as "Restricted–18" ("R-18") may be viewed only by those who are 18
years old and above. As to its sexual content, the movie may portray sexual
activity. (Section 1(D), Chapter IV, 2004 Guidelines of the MTRCB) Moreover,
Section 9 of PD 1986 (Creating the MTRCB) makes it unlawful for (a) any person
below 18 years of age to enter, to misrepresent or make use of any false
evidence about his or her age in order to gain admission into a movie house or
theater showing a motion picture classified as "Restricted" or "For Adults Only"
by the MTRCB and (b) for any employee of a movie house or theater to sell to, or
receive from, another person known to the former to be below 18 years of age
any admission ticket to the exhibition of motion pictures classified as "Restricted"
or "For Adults Only."
36
People v. Delantar, G.R. No. 169143, 02 February 2007.
37
Section 13, Article II, Constitution. The Constitution also provides that the State
shall defend "the right of children to assistance, including proper care and
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development."(Section 3,
Article XV)
38
Section 2, Article I, RA 7610.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
People v. Delantar, supra note 36.
42
People v. Bon, G.R. No. 149199, 28 January 2003, 396 SCRA 506.
43
Cadua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123123, 19 August 1999, 312 SCRA 703
citing People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 (1994). Section 1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law provides:
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense

punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the
said Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and
if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall
not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be
less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (emphasis supplied)
Simon ruled:
It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate

sentence for an offense under the Revised Penal Code, states that ‘if the
offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused
to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less
than the minimum term prescribed by the same.’ We hold that this quoted
portion of the section indubitably refers to an offense under a special
law wherein the penalty imposed was not taken from and is without
reference to the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding
illustrations, such that it may be said that the ‘offense is punished’
under that law. (emphasis supplied)
Cadua applied this rule by analogy and extension.

44
Article 20, Civil Code.
45
Article 100, Revised Penal Code. It provides:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. – Every person

criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
It may be applied in this case pursuant to Article 10 of the Revised Penal

Code which states that the Code shall be supplementary to special laws
unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. [See People v.
Moreno, 60 Phil. 712 (1934).]
46
Article 2202, Civil Code.
47
This rule does not apply where, pursuant to the proviso of Section 5(b), Article
III of RA 7610, the accused is prosecuted under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code and a higher civil indemnity is warranted under the circumstances.
48
People v. Masagnay, G.R. No. 137364, 10 June 2004, 431 SCRA 572.
49
Mrs. Ma. Socorro Villafania.
50
Article 2230, Civil Code. It provides:
ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil

liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from
fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 208760 April 23, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
FLORO BUBAN BARCELA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the March 19, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04961, which affirmed with modifications the January 6, 2011
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, San Pedro, Laguna (RTC), in Criminal
Case Nos. 5517-SPL, 5526-SPL and 5527-SPL, finding accused-appellant Floro B.
Barcela (Barcela) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Rape committed against
AAA,3 and of Qualified Rape by Sexual Assault and Violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7610 and Acts of Lasciviousness, committed against BBB.4
The Facts
Barcela was charged with the following crimes: 1] Qualified Rape, docketed as Crim.
Case No. 5517-SPL; 2] Violation of Article 266-A(2) in relation to R.A. No. 7610,
docketed as Crim. Case No. 5526-SPL; and 3] Violation of R.A. No. 7610 (Acts of
Lasciviousness), docketed as Crim.
Case No. 5527-SPL, in three (3) separate Informations which read:
Crim. Case No. 5517-SPL
That sometime in the year 2002, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused being the
stepfather of AAA by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with AAA, a minor, nine (9) years of
age, against her will and to her damage and prejudice.
The crime is qualified by minority and relationship between the offender and offended
party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
That on or about November 12, 2004, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of
Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused being
then the stepfather of BBB, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit sexual assault and/or subject to sexual abuse the latter by inserting his finger
into the genital or private part of the said BBB, a minor, fourteen (14) years of age,
against her will and consent, which act being detrimental to her normal growth and
development.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
That sometime on 2003 and subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of San Pedro,
Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of
lasciviousness upon his stepdaughter BBB, a minor, fourteen (14) years of age, by
touching the private part of the said minor, against the latter’s will and consent, which
act is detrimental to the normal growth and development of the said minor child.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution’s version of the events was succinctly summarized by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) in its Brief5 as follows:
Private complainants BBB and AAA were living, along with the appellant, their mother,
grandmother and sister in a two-storey house where all of the family members sleep
together in one room in San Pedro, Laguna, because the other rooms [were] being
rented to other people. AAA was seven (7) years old when her stepfather, appellant
Barcela, committed the despicable by sexually abusing her. She was lying on the floor
sleeping one early morning in 2002, when she was awakened and noticed that her
stepfather lifted her clothes and removed her shorts. Appellant then placed his hand on
his organ as AAA lay still with her hands on the floor shocked by what was happening.
Appellant successfully inserted his penis inside complainant AAA’s vagina. While
committing the bestial act, appellant threatened her not to tell anyone what he was
doing to her, otherwise he would kill her.
Her elder sister BBB also suffered the same horrible fate. On 12 November 2004 at
around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, appellant Barcela made a similar sexual assault
upon BBB who was only fourteen (14) years at that time. It happened while BBB was
sleeping in one room with her stepfather, mother and other sister. Appellant was lying at
her right side. Suddenly, appellant lifted her skirt, removed her underwear and inserted
his finger inside her vagina. After accomplishing the atrocious act, appellant threatened
to kill her if she [would] disclose to anyone what happened to her. BBB was very afraid
because of the threat that she pretended to be asleep after being raped. On that same
night, BBB also saw her stepfather molesting her sister AAA. BBB also testified that
prior to being raped in 2004, appellant had been regularly touching her private organ.
AAA informed her mother, grandmother and her sister BBB of what happened to her.
Sadly, her mother did not believe her but her grandmother and sister BBB (who also
suffered the same fate) believed her. BBB then informed her classmate, teacher and
school principal of the grim experience she and her sister underwent in the hands of her
stepfather. Her grandmother was summoned by the principal and, together, they
reported to the police the rape incidents. In order to protect herself, AAA stayed at the
"Kanlungan" shelter. As a result of the loathsome episode in their lives, AAA and BBB
both felt afraid, ashamed and aggrieved.
Private complainants were eventually examined by Dr. Roy Camarillo, a medico-legal

officer of the Philippine National Police. In his medico-legal report, he concluded that
BBB sustained a shallow healing laceration in her hymen caused by the insertion of a
hard object which may be a penis, finger or a flat hard object. As regards the
examination conducted on AAA, he concluded that there was no evident injury at the
time of the examination but testified that the injury that AAA incurred may have totally
healed as the rape occurred two (2) years from the time of the examination.6
Version of the Defense
Barcela denied the accusations and alleged the following in his Brief7 to substantiate his
claim of innocence:
Accused Floro B. Barcela is the common law husband of the private complainants’
mother, CCC. They all resided at the two-storey house of CCC’s mother in San Vicente,
San Pedro, Laguna.
On November 12, 2004, the private complainants were sleeping beside their mother
CCC and their half-sister DDD, herein accused-appellant’s daughter with CCC. He did
not rape AAA. Neither did he insert his finger inside BBB’s vagina, nor threatened either
of the two (2) private complainants. He knew of no reason why the private complainants
would accuse him of such crimes charged against him.8
Ruling of the RTC
In its January 6, 2011 Decision, the RTC found Barcela guilty as charged. In its
assessment, the testimonies of AAA and BBB have successfully met the test of
credibility and were found to have been solely motivated by the desire to obtain justice
for the wrong done against them.
The denial proffered by Barcela must then yield to the positive testimonies of the
offended parties. The RTC explained:
The culpability of accused FLORO BUBAN BARCELA was clearly established by

private complainants AAA and BBB. In this regard, there is nothing in the records to
show that their testimony was motivated by any other reason other than to bring to
justice the perpetrator of the crimes against them. Indeed, the Court finds that there is
no evidence to show that AAA and BBB were prejudiced against accused FLORO
BUBAN BARCELA that they would impute to him the commission of the crimes charged
if he was not guilty thereof. It must be noted that not only were the testimony of AAA
and BBB convincing and unequivocal, the same were also backedup by the physical
evidence, which is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth.9
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment:
1) Finding accused FLORO BUBAN BARCELA GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt of Rape in Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL and hereby sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. In addition, accused FLORO BUBAN
BARCELA is ORDERED to pay the victim the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
2) Finding accused FLORO BUBAN BARCELA guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of the crime of Violation of Article 266-A (2) in relation to R.A. 7610 in Criminal
Case No. 5526-SPL and hereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) Months and One (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor as maximum and to pay the victim the amounts of ₱30,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages
3) Finding accused FLORO BUBAN BARCELA guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of the crime of Violation of R.A. No. 7610 (Acts of Lasciviousness) in Criminal
Case No. 5527-SPL and hereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as
minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum
and to pay the victim the amounts of ₱30,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱30,000.00
as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.10
Feeling aggrieved, Barcela appealed the RTC judgments of conviction before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s finding of Barcela’s guilt of the crimes
charged. The appellate court lent credence to the testimonies of AAA and BBB,
declaring the same to be credible and sufficient to sustain the conviction. It ruled that
the crime of penile rape committed against AAA and that of rape by sexual assault
committed against BBB were qualified by the special qualifying circumstances of
minority and the relationship between the offender and the offended party because
Barcela was the common-law husband of the victims’ mother. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed RTC
Decision dated January 06, 2011 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL (Qualified Rape), Floro Barcela y Buban is

hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility of
parole. Accused-appellant is ordered to pay AAA ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
2. In Criminal Case No. 5526-SPL (Qualified Sexual Assault in relation to RA

7610), accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is ordered to pay BBB
₱30,000 as civil indemnity, ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
3. In Criminal Case No. 5527-SPL (Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to RA

7610), accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Consistent with the prevailing jurisprudence, he is ordered to pay a fine of
₱15,000.00 and to pay BBB of the amounts of ₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱15,000.00 as moral damages and ₱15,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.11
The Issue
Insisting on his innocence, Barcela filed the present appeal and raised this lone
assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED ALTHOUGH HIS GUILT WAS NOT
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.

Barcela faults the courts a quo for giving undue faith and credence to the testimonies of
AAA and BBB, contending that the same were laced with inconsistencies and
improbabilities that tainted the veracity of their charges. He avers that the lack of
concrete prosecution evidence showing any unusual behavior exhibited by AAA and
BBB after the alleged commission of the crimes, rendered said victims’ complaints
dubious. Barcela points out that it is incredible that AAA and BBB would still sleep with
him in the same room despite the fact that they had been previously sexually assaulted
by him. He argues that the absence of hymenal lacerations, healed or otherwise, in the
vagina of AAA and the presence of a mere shallow laceration in the vagina of BBB,
together with the inconsistencies in their testimonies, effectively belied their charges
against him.
The Court, however, is not at all swayed by the contentions of Barcela. His arguments
boil down to the credibility of the victims’ testimonies and the weight and sufficiency of
the prosecution evidence.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Court ruled that questions on the
credibility of witnesses should best be addressed to the trial court because of its unique
position to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’
deportment on the stand while testifying which is denied to the appellate courts.12 The
trial judge has the advantage of actually examining both real and testimonial evidence
including the demeanor of the witnesses. Hence, the judge’s assessment of the
witnesses’ testimonies and findings of fact are accorded great respect on appeal. In the
absence of any substantial reason to justify the reversal of the trial court’s assessment
and conclusion, as when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have
been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former’s
findings.13 The rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court has concurred
with the trial court.
After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court finds no cogent reason to
depart from the findings of the RTC and the CA, together with their respective
calibration of the credibility of the private complainants. AAA and BBB, guileless and
innocent in the ways of the flesh, categorically narrated in detail their ghastly ordeal in
the hands of Barcela. Their respective stories bear the stamp of truth and candor. There
is neither cause nor reason to withhold credence from their testimonies.
Moreover, Barcela did not establish any ill motive that could have compelled the private
complainants to falsely accuse him of committing the crimes charged. The failure of
Barcela to effectively cite any plausible reason for the private complainants’
accusations, all the more strengthens the latter’s credibility and the validity of their
charges. Besides, no sane woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or
ridicule if she was not, in truth, a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the
wrong done to her.14 The Court finds it hard to believe that AAA and BBB would
fabricate a tale of defilement and make public knowledge that Barcela robbed them of
their virtue and chastity, dragging themselves and their family to a lifetime of agony and
shame, unless motivated by a genuine desire to obtain redress for the foul deed forced
upon them.
Barcela claims that it is incredible that: 1] AAA did not cry out loud when he allegedly
inserted his penis into her tight vagina; 2] BBB just went back to sleep after he allegedly
inserted his finger into her vagina; and 3] private complainants still opted to sleep next
to him despite the incidents. To him, these are contrary to human nature and could not
be the actuations of abused young girls.
The Court is not convinced. Behavioral psychology teaches us that, even among adults,
people react to similar situations differently, and there is no standard form of human
behavioral response when one is confronted with a startling or frightful experience.15 Let
it be underscored that these cases involve victims of tender years, and with their simple,
unsophisticated minds, they must not have fully understood and realized at first the
repercussions of the contemptible nature of the acts committed against them. This
Court has repeatedly stated that no standard form of behavior could be anticipated of a
rape victim following her defilement, particularly a child who could not be expected to
fully comprehend the ways of an adult.16 At any rate, it is not inconceivable that the
victims continuously slept with Barcela despite the sexual molestations as it was
undisputed that everybody in the victims’ family slept in one room.
The absence of hymenal laceration on AAA and the finding of a shallow vaginal
laceration on BBB are not fatal to the cause of the prosecution. The Court has
repeatedly held that the presence of hymenal rapture, vaginal laceration or any genital
injury is not indispensable because the same is not an element of the crime of rape.17 In
the same breath, an intact hymen does not negate the finding that the victim was
raped.18 The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and BBB cannot
exculpate him either. Obviously, the inconsistencies referred to are trivial and only
pertained to inconsequential matters that do not alter the essential fact of the
commission of rape. What is decisive in a rape charge is that the commission of rape
has been sufficiently proven. Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters
which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be considered grounds for
acquittal.19
In stark contrast to the convincing narration of facts by AAA and BBB are the bare-faced
and shaky defenses of denial and alibi proffered by Barcela. Jurisprudence has decreed
that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of the
complainant and her identification of the accused.20 Alibi is an inherently weak defense,
which is viewed with suspicion because it can easily be fabricated.21 Denial is an
intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-
culpability to merit credibility.22 Here, not a shred of competent proof was adduced by
Barcela to corroborate his denial and alibi as they are only supported by his self-serving
testimony. Hence, they do not merit any evidentiary value.
The Court will now determine the specific crimes committed by Barcela with the
corresponding penalties to be imposed and the appropriate damages to be awarded.
Criminal Case Nos. 5517-SPL and 5526-SPL
The statutory provisions relevant to the present review are Article 266-A and Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), which state:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation; xxx
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is

present.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1

hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
xxxx
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim.
xxxx
Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by prision
mayor.
xxxx
Reclusion temporal shall also be imposed if the rape is committed with any of the ten
aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article. (Emphases supplied)
To sustain a conviction for qualified rape, the following elements must concur: a) the
victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age; b) the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and c) the offender
has carnal knowledge of the victim either through force, threat or intimidation; or when
she was deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent
machinations or grave abuse of authority.23
In Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL, the prosecution proved that AAA was only 7 years old
when the penile rape was committed in 2002. Her birth certificate showed that she was
born on September 24, 1994. The prosecution was also able to establish the fact of
sexual intercourse between Barcela and AAA. The Court notes that AAA told her story
by words and demonstrations using male and female dolls. AAA recounted that while
she was lying on the floor of their house, Barcela lifted her clothes and removed her
shorts; that he inserted his penis into her vagina; that she felt pain; and that he warned
her not to tell the incident to anyone, otherwise, he would kill her. The straightforward
narration of AAA of what transpired, and her categorical identification of Barcela as the
malefactor, sealed the case for the prosecution.
In the crime of rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship
with the offender is a special qualifying circumstance and raises the penalty to the
supreme penalty of death. It is essential that this circumstance must be alleged in the
criminal complaint or information and must be proved conclusively and indubitably as
the crime itself; otherwise, the crime shall be considered simple rape warranting the
imposition of the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua.24
The aforesaid qualifying circumstance, however, could not be appreciated in Criminal

Case No. 5517-SPL. To begin with, AAA was under 12 years old (only 7 years old)
when she was raped in 2002. More importantly, the prosecution failed to prove the
allegation in the information that Barcela was the step-father of AAA at the time of the
commission of the crime. It bears stressing that a stepfather-stepdaughter relationship
presupposes a legitimate relationship, which in this case is the valid marriage between
Barcela and the natural mother of AAA (also of BBB), and the best evidence to prove
the same is the marriage contract.25 Nowhere in the record, though, does it show that
such certificate of marriage was submitted in evidence by the prosecution. In People v.
Manggasin,26 the Court held that the qualifying circumstance was not proved because
there was no proof of the allegation that the accused-appellant was the stepfather of the
complainant as the evidence showed that he was not married to the complainant’s
mother.
Being regarded as the "tatay," Barcela had gained such moral ascendancy over AAA
and BBB that any resistance normally expected from girls their age could not have been
put up by them. His moral ascendancy and influence over them substituted for actual
physical violence and intimidation as an element of rape. This made them easy prey for
his sexual advances. Barcela’s moral and physical dominion of AAA and BBB are
sufficient to cow them into submission to his beastly desires. No further proof is needed
to show lack of consent of the victims to their own defilement. Further, record shows
that threat and intimidation were indeed employed by Barcela to consummate the
purpose which he had in mind. The threat of death he communicated to AAA and BBB
produced fear in their minds which made them yield to his bestial demands. In any
event, the prosecution need not prove that Barcela employed force, threat or
intimidation against AAA because rape is committed when the offender had carnal
knowledge of the offended party who is under 12 years of age.
The Court likewise finds convincing the testimony of BBB, which clearly established that
at around 3:00 A.M. of November 12, 2004, she was awakened when Barcela, who was
then sleeping next to her, lifted her skirt, removed her panty and, thereafter, inserted his
finger into her vagina; and that she suffered pain during the insertion but could not shout
for fear that Barcela would kill her. The Court notes that she consistently and without
hesitation pointed to Barcela as the person who sexually molested her. The prosecution
also established that she was only 14 years old when she was sexually molested as
evidenced by her birth certificate.
Taken in this light, the Court affirms Barcela’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 5526-
SPL of rape by sexual assault under Art. 266- A, par. 2 of the RPC, but not in its
qualified form. The special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were
likewise not present. While the minority of BBB was duly proven, the allegation of
stepfather-stepdaughter relationship was not established.
Although it was shown during the trial that Barcela was the common-law spouse or live-
in partner of the mother of victims AAA and BBB, this fact would not alter the crimes in
their qualified form inasmuch as the two separate informations did not specifically allege
such relationship as a qualifying circumstance. Otherwise, he would be deprived of his
right to be informed of the charge lodged against him.27 The relationship alleged in the
informations is different from that actually proven. Verily, the CA erred in convicting
Barcela of qualified rape in Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL and qualified rape by sexual
assault in Criminal Case No. 5526-SPL.
There being no qualifying circumstance attendant to the commission of rape in Criminal

Case No. 5517-SPL, Barcela should be convicted of simple statutory rape and should
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The award of damages should also be modified
in line with prevailing jurisprudence.28 AAA is thus awarded the amounts of ₱50,000.00
as civil indemnity; ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
In Criminal Case No. 5526-SPL, Barcela should be convicted with simple rape by
sexual assault, instead with the penalty of prision mayor as provided in Art. 266-B par. 7
of the RPC. Considering that there was neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance,
the penalty should be imposed in its medium period pursuant to Article 64(l)29 of the
RPC. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Barcela should be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty the minimum of which is prision correccional (6 months and 1 to 6
years) and the maximum of which is within the range of prision mayor, in its medium
period (8 years and 1 day to 10 years). More specifically, the Court imposes the penalty
ranging from five (5) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of
prision mayor, as maximum. The Court sustains the CA in awarding ₱30,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱30,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages
being consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.30
Criminal Case No. 5527-SPL
The Court also upholds Barcela’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 5527-SPL of Acts of
Lasciviousness committed against a child under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610, which reads:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female,
who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of
any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
imposed upon the following:
x x x x x x x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: x x x. (Italics supplied)
The elements of sexual abuse under the above provision are as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to

other sexual abuse; and
3. The child whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.31
Here, it was proven with certitude that Barcela had repeatedly molested BBB by
regularly touching her vagina since 2003 when she was still in Grade III. This act is
covered by the definition of "lascivious conduct" under Section 2 (h) of the Rules and
Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases promulgated to
implement R.A. No. 7610:
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through
clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction
of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or
opposite sex, with intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals
or private area of a person.
The circumstance of relationship, Barcela being the common-law husband of BBB’s

mother, cannot be considered as an ordinary aggravating circumstance to increase the
imposable penalty. While it is true that the alternative circumstance of relationship is
always aggravating in crimes against chastity32 (such as Acts of Lasciviousness),
regardless of whether the offender is a relative of a higher or lower degree of the
offended party, it is only taken into consideration under Article 15 of the Revised Penal
Code "when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate,
natural or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the
offender." The relationship between Barcela and BBB is not covered by any of the
relationships mentioned.1âwphi1
Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance is present, the penalty

should be imposed in its medium period.33 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
Barcela should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which is
prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period (8 years
and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months) and the maximum of which is within the range of
reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, in its medium period (17
years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years). Thus, the CA is correct in imposing the penalty
of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.1âwphi1 Likewise, the award of ₱20,000 as civil
indemnity; ₱15,000.00 as moral damages; ₱15,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the
fine of ₱15,000.00, are proper.34
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the March 19, 2013 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04961, which should read:
1. In Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL, finding accused-appellant Floro Buban

Barcela GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Statutory Rape
under subparagraph ( d) of Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, the Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and to pay AAA the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.0 ) as
civil indemnity; Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages, and
Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages.
2. In Criminal Case No. 5526-SPL, finding accused-appellant Floro Buban

Barcela GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Rape by
Sexual Assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, the Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of five (5) years of
prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
maximum; and to pay AAA in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00)
as civil indemnity; Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as moral damages; and
Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages.
3. In Criminal Case No. 5527-SPL, finding the accused-appellant Floro Buban

Barcela GUILTY of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to R.A. No.
7610, the Court 1 sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8)
years and !one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay
the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (Pl5,000.00) as fine; and to pay BBB the
amounts of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) as civil indemnity; Fifteen
Thousand Pesos (₱15,000.00) as moral damages; and ₱15,000.00 as exemplary
damages, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 2-21. Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang with
Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and Associate Justice Leoncia R.
Dimagiba, concurring.
2
Penned by Judge Francisco Dizon Pano; CA rollo, pp. 16-20.
3
Per this Court's Resolution dated 19 September 2006 in A.M. No. 04-11-09-SC,
as well as our ruling in People v. Cabalquinto (G.R. No. 167693, 19 September
2006, 502 SCRA 419), pursuant to Republic Act No. 9262 or the "Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004" and its implementing rules, the
real name of the victims and their immediate family members other than the
accused are to be withheld and fictitious initials are to be used instead. Likewise,
the exact addresses of the victims are to be deleted.
4
Id.
5
Rollo, pp. 62-82.
6
Id. at 68-71.
7
Id. at 38-50.
8
Id. at 43-44.
9
Records, p. 19.
10
Id. at 20.
11
Rollo, pp. 19-20.
12
People v. Nieto, 571 Phil. 220, 233 (2008).
13
People v. Dominguez, Jr., G.R. No. 180914, November 24, 2010, 636 SCRA
134, 161.
14
People v. Bon, 536 Phil. 897, 915 (2006).
15
People v. Francisco, 406 Phil. 947, 959 (2001).
16
People v. Crespo, 586 Phil. 542, 566 (2008).
17
People v. Valenzuela. G.R. No. 182057, February 6, 2009, 578 SCRA 157,
169.
18
People v. Tampos, 455 Phil. 844, 858 (2003).
19
People v. Bares, 407 Phil. 747, 764-765 (2000).
20
People v. Abulon, 557 Phil. 428, 447 (2007).
21
People v. Penaso, 383 Phil. 200, 210 (2000).
22
People v. Burce, 336 Phil. 283, 302 (1997).
23
People v. Arcilla, G.R. No. 181491, July 30, 2012, 677 SCRA 624, 634.
24
People v. Alemania, 440 Phil. 297, 306 (2002).
25
People v. Victor, 441 Phil. 798, 812 (2002).
26
365 Phil. 683, 706 (1999).
27
People v. Negosa, 456 Phil. 861, 877 (2003).
28
People v. Caoile, G.R. No. 203041, June 5, 2013.
29
Art. 64. Rule for application of penalties which contain three periods. – In cases
in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, xxx, the courts
shall observe for application of the penalty the following rules, xxx:
1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they

shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period. xxx
30
People v. Lindo, G.R. No. 189818, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 519, 534;
People v. Dominguez, G.R. No. 191065, June 13, 2011, 651 SCRA 791, 810-
811.
31
Malto v. People, 560 Phil. 119, 134 (2007).
32
People v. Montinola, 567 Phil. 387, 409 (2008).
33
Art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code, supra note 27.
34
Flordeliz v. People, G.R. No. 186441, March 3, 2010, 614 SCRA 225, 243.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155831 February 18, 2008
MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO, petitioner,

vs.
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 155840 February 18, 2008
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; RONALDO V. ZAMORA, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary; ROY V. SENERES, in his capacity as Chairman of the National Labor
Relations Commission (in lieu of RAUL T. AQUINO, in his capacity as Acting
Chairman of the National labor Relations Commission); and MA. LOURDES T.
DOMINGO, respondents.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 158700 February 18, 2008
The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE

PRESIDENT; and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, petitioners,
vs.
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced "superiority" which is enough to

dampen an employee’s spirit and her capacity for advancement. It affects her sense of
judgment; it changes her life.1
Before this Court are three Petitions for Review on Certiorari assailing the October 18,
2002 Resolution of the CA’s Former Ninth Division2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026. The
Resolution modified the December 14, 2001 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals’ Eleventh
Division, which had affirmed the Decision of the Office of the President (OP) dismissing
from the service then National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Chairman Rogelio
I. Rayala (Rayala) for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
All three petitions stem from the same factual antecedents.
On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic

Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before
Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
To support the Complaint, Domingo executed an Affidavit narrating the incidences of

sexual harassment complained of, thus:
xxxx
4. Sa simula ay pabulong na sinasabihan lang ako ni Chairman Rayala ng mga

salitang "Lot, gumaganda ka yata?"
5. Sa ibang mga pagkakataon nilalapitan na ako ni Chairman at hahawakan ang

aking balikat sabay pisil sa mga ito habang ako ay nagta-type at habang
nagbibigay siya ng diktasyon. Sa mga pagkakataong ito, kinakabahan ako.
Natatakot na baka mangyari sa akin ang mga napapabalitang insidente na
nangyari na noon tungkol sa mga sekretarya niyang nagbitiw gawa ng mga
mahahalay na panghihipo ni Chairman.
6. Noong ika-10 ng Setyembre, 1998, nang ako ay nasa 8th Floor, may nagsabi
sa akin na kailangan akong bumaba sa 7th Floor kung nasaan ang aming opisina
dahil sa may koreksyon daw na gagawin sa mga papel na tinayp ko. Bumaba
naman ako para gawin ito. Habang ginagawa ko ito, lumabas si Chairman
Rayala sa silid ni Mr. Alex Lopez. Inutusan ako ni Chairman na sumunod sa
kaniyang silid. Nang nasa silid na kami, sinabi niya sa akin:
Chairman: Lot, I like you a lot. Naiiba ka sa lahat.
At pagkatapos ako ay kaniyang inusisa tungkol sa mga personal na bagay sa

aking buhay. Ang ilan dito ay tungkol sa aking mga magulang, kapatid, pag-aaral
at kung may boyfriend na raw ba ako.
Chairman: May boyfriend ka na ba?
Lourdes: Dati nagkaroon po.
Chairman: Nasaan na siya?
Lourdes: Nag-asawa na ho.
Chairman: Bakit hindi kayo nagkatuluyan?
Lourdes: Nainip po.
Chairman: Pagkatapos mo ng kurso mo ay kumuha ka ng Law at ako ang

bahala sa iyo, hanggang ako pa ang Chairman dito.
Pagkatapos ay kumuha siya ng pera sa kaniyang amerikana at inaabot sa akin.
Chairman: Kuhanin mo ito.
Lourdes: Huwag na ho hindi ko kailangan.
Chairman: Hindi sige, kuhanin mo. Ayusin mo ang dapat ayusin.
Tinanggap ko po ang pera ng may pag-aalinlangan. Natatakot at kinakabahan na

kapag hindi ko tinanggap ang pera ay baka siya magagalit kasabay na rito ang
pagtapon sa akin kung saan-saan opisina o kaya ay tanggalin ako sa posisyon.
Chairman: Paglabas mo itago mo ang pera. Ayaw ko ng may makaka-

alam nito. Just the two of us.
Lourdes: Bakit naman, Sir?

Chairman: Basta. Maraming tsismosa diyan sa labas. But I don’t give
them a damn. Hindi ako mamatay sa kanila.
Tumayo na ako at lumabas. Pumanhik na ako ng 8th Floor at pumunta ako sa

officemate ko na si Agnes Magdaet. Ikinwento ko ang nangyari sa akin sa
opisina ni Chairman. Habang kinikwento ko ito kay Agnes ay binilang namin ang
pera na nagkakahalaga ng tatlong libong piso (PHP 3,000). Sinabi ni Agnes na
isauli ko raw ang pera, pero ang sabi ko ay natatakot ako baka magalit si Sir.
Nagsabi agad kami kay EC Perlita Velasco at sinalaysay ko ang nangyari. Sinabi
niya na isauli ko ang pera at noong araw ding iyon ay nagpasiya akong isauli na
nga ito ngunit hindi ako nagkaroon ng pagkakataon dahil marami siyang naging
bisita. Isinauli ko nga ang pera noong Lunes, Setyembre 14, 1998.
7. Noong huling linggo ng Setyembre, 1998, ay may tinanong din sa akin si

Chairman Rayala na hindi ko masikmura, at sa aking palagay at tahasang
pambabastos sa akin.
Chairman: Lot, may ka live-in ka ba?
Lourdes: Sir, wala po.
Chairman: Bakit malaki ang balakang mo?
Lourdes: Kayo, Sir ha! Masama sa amin ang may ka live-in.
Chairman: Bakit, ano ba ang relihiyon ninyo?
Lourdes: Catholic, Sir. Kailangan ikasal muna.
Chairman: Bakit ako, hindi kasal.
Lourdes: Sir, di magpakasal kayo.
Chairman: Huh. Ibahin na nga natin ang usapan.
8. Noong Oktubre 29, 1998, ako ay pumasok sa kwarto ni Chairman Rayala. Ito
ay sa kadahilanang ang fax machine ay nasa loob ng kaniyang kwarto. Ang nag-
aasikaso nito, si Riza Ocampo, ay naka-leave kaya ako ang nag-asikaso nito
noong araw na iyon. Nang mabigyan ko na ng fax tone yung kausap ko,
pagharap ko sa kanan ay nakaharang sa dadaanan ko si Chairman Rayala.
Tinitingnan ako sa mata at ang titig niya ay umuusad mula ulo hanggang dibdib
tapos ay ngumiti na may mahalay na pakahulugan.
9. Noong hapon naman ng pareho pa ring petsa, may nag-aapply na sekretarya

sa opisina, sinabi ko ito kay Chairman Rayala:
Lourdes: Sir, si Pinky po yung applicant, mag-papainterview po yata sa

inyo.
Chairman: Sabihin mo magpa-pap smear muna siya
Chairman: O sige, i-refer mo kay Alex. (Alex Lopez, Chief of Staff).
10. Noong Nobyembre 9, 1998, ako ay tinawag ni Chairman Rayala sa kaniyang

opisina upang kuhanin ko ang diktasyon niya para kay ELA Oscar Uy. Hindi pa
kami nakakatapos ng unang talata, may pumasok na bisita si Chairman, si Baby
Pangilinan na sinamahan ni Riza Ocampo. Pinalabas muna ako ni Chairman.
Nang maka-alis na si Ms. Pangilinan, pinapasok na niya ako ulit. Umupo ako.
Lumapit sa likuran ko si Chairman, hinawakan ang kaliwang balikat ko na pinipisil
ng kanang kamay niya at sinabi:
Chairman: Saan na ba tayo natapos?
Palakad-lakad siya sa aking likuran habang nag-didikta. Huminto siya

pagkatapos, at nilagay niya ang kanang kamay niya sa aking kanang balikat at
pinisil-pisil ito pagkatapos ay pinagapang niya ito sa kanang bahagi ng aking
leeg, at pinagapang hanggang kanang tenga at saka kiniliti. Dito ko inalis ang
kaniyang kamay sa pamamagitan ng aking kaliwang kamay. At saka ko sinabi:
Lourdes: Sir, yung kamay ninyo alisin niyo!
Natapos ko rin ang liham na pinagagawa niya pero halos hindi ko na

maintindihan ang na-isulat ko dahil sa takot at inis na nararamdaman ko.4
After the last incident narrated, Domingo filed for leave of absence and asked to be
immediately transferred. Thereafter, she filed the Complaint for sexual harassment on
the basis of Administrative Order No. 250, the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA
7877 in the Department of Labor and Employment.
Upon receipt of the Complaint, the DOLE Secretary referred the Complaint to the OP,
Rayala being a presidential appointee. The OP, through then Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora, ordered Secretary Laguesma to investigate the allegations in the
Complaint and create a committee for such purpose. On December 4, 1998, Secretary
Laguesma issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 280, Series of 1998,5 constituting a
Committee on Decorum and Investigation (Committee) in accordance with Republic Act
(RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.6
The Committee heard the parties and received their respective evidence. On March 2,
2000, the Committee submitted its report and recommendation to Secretary Laguesma.
It found Rayala guilty of the offense charged and recommended the imposition of the
minimum penalty provided under AO 250, which it erroneously stated as suspension for
six (6) months.
The following day, Secretary Laguesma submitted a copy of the Committee Report and
Recommendation to the OP, but with the recommendation that the penalty should be
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day, in accordance with AO 250.
On May 8, 2000, the OP, through Executive Secretary Zamora, issued AO 119,7 the
pertinent portions of which read:
Upon a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, I concur with the findings of
the Committee as to the culpability of the respondent [Rayala], the same having
been established by clear and convincing evidence. However, I disagree with the
recommendation that respondent be meted only the penalty of suspension for six
(6) months and one (1) day considering the circumstances of the case.
What aggravates respondent’s situation is the undeniable circumstance that he

took advantage of his position as the superior of the complainant. Respondent
occupies the highest position in the NLRC, being its Chairman. As head of said
office, it was incumbent upon respondent to set an example to the others as to
how they should conduct themselves in public office, to see to it that his
subordinates work efficiently in accordance with Civil Service Rules and
Regulations, and to provide them with healthy working atmosphere wherein co-
workers treat each other with respect, courtesy and cooperation, so that in the
end the public interest will be benefited (City Mayor of Zamboanga vs. Court of
Appeals, 182 SCRA 785 [1990]).
What is more, public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline
(Gano vs. Leonen, 232 SCRA 99 [1994]). Thus, a public servant must exhibit at
all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity, and "utmost devotion and
dedication to duty" (Sec. 4 (g), RA 6713), respect the rights of others and shall
refrain from doing acts contrary to law, and good morals (Sec. 4(c)). No less than
the Constitution sanctifies the principle that a public office is a public trust, and
enjoins all public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency (Section 1, Article XI, 1987
Constitution).
Given these established standards, I see respondent’s acts not just [as] a failure
to give due courtesy and respect to his co-employees (subordinates) or to
maintain good conduct and behavior but defiance of the basic norms or virtues
which a government official must at all times uphold, one that is contrary to law
and "public sense of morality." Otherwise stated, respondent – to whom stricter
standards must apply being the highest official [of] the NLRC – had shown an
attitude, a frame of mind, a disgraceful conduct, which renders him unfit to
remain in the service.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Rogelio I. Rayala, Chairman,

National Labor Relations Commission, is found guilty of the grave offense of
disgraceful and immoral conduct and is hereby DISMISSED from the service
effective upon receipt of this Order.
SO ORDER[ED].
Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the OP denied in a Resolution8 dated

May 24, 2000. He then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure
before this Court on June 14, 2000.9 However, the same was dismissed in a Resolution
dated June 26, 2000 for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.10 Rayala filed a Motion for
Reconsideration11 on August 15, 2000. In its Resolution12 dated September 4, 2000, the

Court recalled its June 26 Resolution and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals
(CA) for appropriate action.
The CA rendered its Decision13 on December 14, 2001. It held that there was sufficient
evidence on record to create moral certainty that Rayala committed the acts he was
charged with. It said:
The complainant narrated her story complete with details. Her straightforward
and uninhibited testimony was not emasculated by the declarations of
Commissioner Rayala or his witnesses. x x x
Moreover, Commissioner Rayala has not proven any vicious motive for Domingo
and her witnesses to invent their stories. It is very unlikely that they would perjure
themselves only to accommodate the alleged conspiracy to oust petitioner from
office. Save for his empty conjectures and speculations, Rayala failed to
substantiate his contrived conspiracy. It is a hornbook doctrine that conspiracy
must be proved by positive and convincing evidence (People v. Noroña, 329
SCRA 502 [2000]). Besides, it is improbable that the complainant would concoct
a story of sexual harassment against the highest official of the NLRC and thereby
expose herself to the possibility of losing her job, or be the subject of reprisal
from her superiors and perhaps public ridicule if she was not telling the truth.
It also held that Rayala’s dismissal was proper. The CA pointed out that Rayala was
dismissed for disgraceful and immoral conduct in violation of RA 6713, the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. It held that the OP
was correct in concluding that Rayala’s acts violated RA 6713:
Indeed, [Rayala] was a public official, holding the Chairmanship of the National
Labor Relations Commission, entrusted with the sacred duty of administering
justice. Occupying as he does such an exalted position, Commissioner Rayala
must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. He must comport
himself at all times in such a manner that the conduct of his everyday life should
be beyond reproach and free from any impropriety. That the acts complained of
were committed within the sanctuary of [his] office compounded the objectionable
nature of his wrongdoing. By daring to violate the complainant within the solitude
of his chambers, Commissioner Rayala placed the integrity of his office in
disrepute. His disgraceful and immoral conduct warrants his removal from
office.14
Thus, it dismissed the petition, to wit:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED

and Administrative Order No. 119 as well [as] the Resolution of the Office of the
President in O.P. Case No. 00-E-9118 dated May 24, 2000 are AFFIRMED IN
TOTO. No cost.
SO ORDERED.15
Rayala timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Justices Vasquez and Tolentino voted
to affirm the December 14 Decision. However, Justice Reyes dissented mainly because
AO 250 states that the penalty imposable is suspension for six (6) months and one (1)
day.16 Pursuant to the internal rules of the CA, a Special Division of Five was
constituted.17 In its October 18, 2002 Resolution, the CA modified its earlier Decision:
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated December [14], 2001 is MODIFIED to the

effect that the penalty of dismissal is DELETED and instead the penalty of
suspension from service for the maximum period of one (1) year is HEREBY
IMPOSED upon the petitioner. The rest of the challenged decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Domingo filed a Petition for Review18 before this Court, which we denied in our February
19, 2003 Resolution for having a defective verification. She filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which the Court granted; hence, the petition was reinstated.
Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review19 with this Court essentially arguing that he is
not guilty of any act of sexual harassment.
Meanwhile, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA’s October 18,
2002 Resolution. The CA denied the same in its June 3, 2003 Resolution, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, by a majority vote, public respondents’ Motion for

Reconsideration, (sic) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic then filed its own Petition for Review.20

On June 28, 2004, the Court directed the consolidation of the three (3) petitions.
G.R. No. 155831
Domingo assails the CA’s resolution modifying the penalty imposed by the Office of the
President. She raises this issue:
The Court of Appeals erred in modifying the penalty for the respondent from
dismissal to suspension from service for the maximum period of one year. The
President has the prerogative to determine the proper penalty to be imposed on
an erring Presidential appointee. The President was well within his power when
he fittingly used that prerogative in deciding to dismiss the respondent from the
service.21
She argues that the power to remove Rayala, a presidential appointee, is lodged with
the President who has control of the entire Executive Department, its bureaus and
offices. The OP’s decision was arrived at after affording Rayala due process. Hence, his
dismissal from the service is a prerogative that is entirely with the President.22
As to the applicability of AO No. 250, she argues that the same was not intended to
cover cases against presidential appointees. AO No. 250 refers only to the instances
wherein the DOLE Secretary is the disciplining authority, and thus, the AO does not
circumscribe the power of the President to dismiss an erring presidential appointee.
G.R. No. 155840
In his petition, Rayala raises the following issues:
I. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE ACTS

OF HEREIN PETITIONER DO NOT CONSTITUTE SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS
LAID DOWN BY THE En Banc RULING IN THE CASE OF AQUINO vs.
ACOSTA, ibid., AS WELL AS IN THE APPLICATION OF EXISTING LAWS.
II. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT IN A CASE FOR
SEXUAL HARASSMENT. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING
THAT IT IS AN OFFENSE THAT IS MALUM PROHIBITUM.
III. THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,

AND NOW, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HAS MISAPPLIED
AND EXPANDED THE DEFINITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE UNDER R.A. No. 7877, BY APPLYING DOLE A.O. 250, WHICH
RUNS COUNTER TO THE RECENT PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.23
Invoking Aquino v. Acosta,24 Rayala argues that the case is the definitive ruling on what
constitutes sexual harassment. Thus, he posits that for sexual harassment to exist
under RA 7877, there must be: (a) demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor;
(b) the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, re-employment, or continued
employment; or (c) the denial thereof results in discrimination against the employee.
Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish any sexual favor,
demand, or request from petitioner in exchange for her continued employment or for her
promotion. According to Rayala, the acts imputed to him are without malice or ulterior
motive. It was merely Domingo’s perception of malice in his alleged acts – a "product of
her own imagination"25 – that led her to file the sexual harassment complaint.
Likewise, Rayala assails the OP’s interpretation, as upheld by the CA, that RA 7877
is malum prohibitum such that the defense of absence of malice is unavailing. He
argues that sexual harassment is considered an offense against a particular person, not
against society as a whole. Thus, he claims that intent is an essential element of the
offense because the law requires as a conditio sine qua non that a sexual favor be first
sought by the offender in order to achieve certain specific results. Sexual harassment is
committed with the perpetrator’s deliberate intent to commit the offense.26
Rayala next argues that AO 250 expands the acts proscribed in RA 7877. In particular,
he assails the definition of the forms of sexual harassment:
Rule IV
FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Section 1. Forms of Sexual Harassment. – Sexual harassment may be

committed in any of the following forms:
a) Overt sexual advances;
b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection;
c) Request or demand for sexual favors including but not limited to going out on
dates, outings or the like for the same purpose;
d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for purposes of sexual

gratification which is generally annoying, disgusting or offensive to the victim.27
He posits that these acts alone without corresponding demand, request, or requirement
do not constitute sexual harassment as contemplated by the law.28 He alleges that the
rule-making power granted to the employer in Section 4(a) of RA 7877 is limited only to
procedural matters. The law did not delegate to the employer the power to promulgate
rules which would provide other or additional forms of sexual harassment, or to come up
with its own definition of sexual harassment.29
G.R. No. 158700
The Republic raises this issue:
Whether or not the President of the Philippines may validly dismiss

respondent Rayala as Chairman of the NLRC for committing acts of sexual
harassment.30
The Republic argues that Rayala’s acts constitute sexual harassment under AO 250.
His acts constitute unwelcome or improper gestures of affection and are acts or conduct
of a sexual nature, which are generally annoying or offensive to the victim.31
It also contends that there is no legal basis for the CA’s reduction of the penalty
imposed by the OP. Rayala’s dismissal is valid and warranted under the circumstances.
The power to remove the NLRC Chairman solely rests upon the President, limited only
by the requirements under the law and the due process clause.
The Republic further claims that, although AO 250 provides only a one (1) year
suspension, it will not prevent the OP from validly imposing the penalty of dismissal on
Rayala. It argues that even though Rayala is a presidential appointee, he is still subject
to the Civil Service Law. Under the Civil Service Law, disgraceful and immoral conduct,
the acts imputed to Rayala, constitute grave misconduct punishable by dismissal from
the service.32 The Republic adds that Rayala’s position is invested with public trust and
his acts violated that trust; thus, he should be dismissed from the service.
This argument, according to the Republic, is also supported by Article 215 of the Labor
Code, which states that the Chairman of the NLRC holds office until he reaches the age
of 65 only during good behavior.33 Since Rayala’s security of tenure is conditioned upon
his good behavior, he may be removed from office if it is proven that he has failed to live
up to this standard.
All the issues raised in these three cases can be summed up in two ultimate questions,
namely:
(1) Did Rayala commit sexual harassment?
(2) If he did, what is the applicable penalty?
Initially, however, we must resolve a procedural issue raised by Rayala. He accuses the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as counsel for the Republic, of forum shopping
because it filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026
and then filed a comment in G.R. No. 155840 before this Court.
We do not agree.
Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has
been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly securing a favorable opinion in
another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari.34 It consists of
filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.35
There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of the parties
or, at least, of the parties who represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of
the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same set of
facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered
in the other action will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or will
constitute litis pendentia.36
Reviewing the antecedents of these consolidated cases, we note that the CA rendered
the assailed Resolution on October 18, 2002. The Republic filed its Motion for
Reconsideration on November 22, 2002. On the other hand, Rayala filed his petition
before this Court on November 21, 2002. While the Republic’s Motion for
Reconsideration was pending resolution before the CA, on December 2, 2002, it was
directed by this Court to file its Comment on Rayala’s petition, which it submitted on
June 16, 2003.
When the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Republic filed its own Petition
for Review with this Court on July 3, 2003. It cited in its "Certification and Verification of
a Non-Forum Shopping" (sic), that there was a case involving the same facts pending
before this Court denominated as G.R. No. 155840. With respect to Domingo’s petition,
the same had already been dismissed on February 19, 2003. Domingo’s petition was
reinstated on June 16, 2003 but the resolution was received by the OSG only on July
25, 2003, or after it had filed its own petition.37
Based on the foregoing, it cannot be said that the OSG is guilty of forum shopping. We
must point out that it was Rayala who filed the petition in the CA, with the Republic as
the adverse party. Rayala himself filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA’s
December 21, 2001 Decision, which led to a more favorable ruling, i.e., the lowering of
the penalty from dismissal to one-year suspension. The parties adversely affected by
this ruling (Domingo and the Republic) had the right to question the same on motion for
reconsideration. But Domingo directly filed a Petition for Review with this Court, as did
Rayala. When the Republic opted to file a motion for reconsideration, it was merely
exercising a right. That Rayala and Domingo had by then already filed cases before the
SC did not take away this right. Thus, when this Court directed the Republic to file its
Comment on Rayala’s petition, it had to comply, even if it had an unresolved motion for
reconsideration with the CA, lest it be cited for contempt.
Accordingly, it cannot be said that the OSG "file[d] multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the
purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment."
We now proceed to discuss the substantive issues.
It is noteworthy that the five CA Justices who deliberated on the case were unanimous
in upholding the findings of the Committee and the OP. They found the assessment
made by the Committee and the OP to be a "meticulous and dispassionate analysis of
the testimonies of the complainant (Domingo), the respondent (Rayala), and their
respective witnesses." 38 They differed only on the appropriate imposable penalty.
That Rayala committed the acts complained of – and was guilty of sexual harassment –
is, therefore, the common factual finding of not just one, but three independent bodies:
the Committee, the OP and the CA. It should be remembered that when supported by
substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies
are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts.39 The principle, therefore,
dictates that such findings should bind us.40
Indeed, we find no reason to deviate from this rule. There appears no valid ground for
this Court to review the factual findings of the CA, the OP, and the Investigating
Committee. These findings are now conclusive on the Court. And quite significantly,
Rayala himself admits to having committed some of the acts imputed to him.
He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual harassment, because
Domingo did not allege in her complaint that there was a demand, request, or
requirement of a sexual favor as a condition for her continued employment or for her
promotion to a higher position.41 Rayala urges us to apply to his case our ruling
in Aquino v. Acosta.42
We find respondent’s insistence unconvincing.
Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the
wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and
administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently of the
others.43 This rule applies with full force to sexual harassment.
The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof
defines work-related sexual harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. – Work,

education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer,
manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor,
coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral
ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment,
demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other,
regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is
accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is
committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-
employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said
individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges;
or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or
classifying the employee which in a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under
existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive

environment for the employee.
This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties, defines the criminal aspect of the
unlawful act of sexual harassment. The same section, in relation to Section 6,
authorizes the institution of an independent civil action for damages and other
affirmative relief.
Section 4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the procedure for administrative

cases, viz.:
Sec. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related, Education or

Training Environment. – It shall be the duty of the employer or the head of the
work-related, educational or training environment or institution, to prevent or
deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the
procedures for the resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual
harassment. Towards this end, the employer or head of office shall:
(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation with and

jointly approved by the employees or students or trainees, through their
duly designated representatives, prescribing the procedure for the
investigation or sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions
therefor.
Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the proper

courts for unlawful acts of sexual harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this section (a) shall
include, among others, guidelines on proper decorum in the workplace
and educational or training institutions.
(b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual

harassment. The committee shall conduct meetings, as the case may be,
with other officers and employees, teachers, instructors, professors,
coaches, trainors and students or trainees to increase understanding and
prevent incidents of sexual harassment. It shall also conduct the
investigation of the alleged cases constituting sexual harassment.
In the case of a work-related environment, the committee shall be composed of

at least one (1) representative each from the management, the union, if any, the
employees from the supervisory rank, and from the rank and file employees.
In the case of the educational or training institution, the committee shall be

composed of at least one (1) representative from the administration, the trainors,
teachers, instructors, professors or coaches and students or trainees, as the
case maybe.
The employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall

disseminate or post a copy of this Act for the information of all concerned.
The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayala’s culpability is not to be determined solely on
the basis of Section 3, RA 7877, because he is charged with the administrative offense,
not the criminal infraction, of sexual harassment.44 It should be enough that the CA,
along with the Investigating Committee and the Office of the President, found
substantial evidence to support the administrative charge.
Yet, even if we were to test Rayala’s acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA
7877, he would still be administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a
"demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor." But it is not necessary that the
demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or
written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the
offender. Holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers across her
neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money
allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making
statements with unmistakable sexual overtones – all these acts of Rayala resound with
deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.
Likewise, contrary to Rayala’s claim, it is not essential that the demand, request or
requirement be made as a condition for continued employment or for promotion to a
higher position. It is enough that the respondent’s acts result in creating an intimidating,
hostile or offensive environment for the employee.45 That the acts of Rayala generated
an intimidating and hostile environment for Domingo is clearly shown by the common
factual finding of the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that Domingo
reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of
absence and requested transfer to another unit.
Rayala’s invocation of Aquino v. Acosta46 is misplaced, because the factual setting in

that case is different from that in the case at bench. In Aquino, Atty. Susan Aquino,
Chief of the Legal and Technical Staff of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), charged then
CTA Presiding Judge (now Presiding Justice) Ernesto Acosta of sexual harassment.
She complained of several incidents when Judge Acosta allegedly kissed her,
embraced her, and put his arm around her shoulder. The case was referred to CA
Justice Josefina G. Salonga for investigation. In her report, Justice Salonga found that
"the complainant failed to show by convincing evidence that the acts of Judge Acosta in
greeting her with a kiss on the cheek, in a `beso-beso’ fashion, were carried out with
lustful and lascivious desires or were motivated by malice or ill motive. It is clear from
the circumstances that most of the kissing incidents were done on festive and special
occasions," and they "took place in the presence of other people and the same was by
reason of the exaltation or happiness of the moment." Thus, Justice Salonga concluded:
In all the incidents complained of, the respondent's pecks on the cheeks of the
complainant should be understood in the context of having been done on the
occasion of some festivities, and not the assertion of the latter that she was
singled out by Judge Acosta in his kissing escapades. The busses on her cheeks
were simply friendly and innocent, bereft of malice and lewd design. The fact that
respondent judge kisses other people on the cheeks in the 'beso-beso' fashion,
without malice, was corroborated by Atty. Florecita P. Flores, Ms. Josephine
Adalem and Ms. Ma. Fides Balili, who stated that they usually practice 'beso-
beso' or kissing on the cheeks, as a form of greeting on occasions when they
meet each other, like birthdays, Christmas, New Year's Day and even Valentine's
Day, and it does not matter whether it is Judge Acosta's birthday or their
birthdays. Theresa Cinco Bactat, a lawyer who belongs to complainant's
department, further attested that on occasions like birthdays, respondent judge
would likewise greet her with a peck on the cheek in a 'beso-beso' manner.
Interestingly, in one of several festive occasions, female employees of the CTA
pecked respondent judge on the cheek where Atty. Aquino was one of Judge
Acosta's well wishers.
In sum, no sexual harassment had indeed transpired on those six occasions.

Judge Acosta's acts of bussing Atty. Aquino on her cheek were merely forms of
greetings, casual and customary in nature. No evidence of intent to sexually
harass complainant was apparent, only that the innocent acts of 'beso-beso'
were given malicious connotations by the complainant. In fact, she did not even
relate to anyone what happened to her. Undeniably, there is no manifest sexual
undertone in all those incidents.47
This Court agreed with Justice Salonga, and Judge Acosta was exonerated.
To repeat, this factual milieu in Aquino does not obtain in the case at bench. While
in Aquino, the Court interpreted the acts (of Judge Acosta) as casual gestures of
friendship and camaraderie, done during festive or special occasions and with other
people present, in the instant case, Rayala’s acts of holding and squeezing Domingo’s
shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, and the
inappropriate comments, were all made in the confines of Rayala’s office when no other
members of his staff were around. More importantly, and a circumstance absent
in Aquino, Rayala’s acts, as already adverted to above, produced a hostile work
environment for Domingo, as shown by her having reported the matter to an officemate
and, after the last incident, filing for a leave of absence and requesting transfer to
another unit.
Rayala also argues that AO 250 does not apply to him. First, he argues that AO 250
does not cover the NLRC, which, at the time of the incident, was under the DOLE only
for purposes of program and policy coordination. Second, he posits that even assuming
AO 250 is applicable to the NLRC, he is not within its coverage because he is a
presidential appointee.
We find, however, that the question of whether or not AO 250 covers Rayala is of no
real consequence. The events of this case unmistakably show that the administrative
charges against Rayala were for violation of RA 7877; that the OP properly assumed
jurisdiction over the administrative case; that the participation of the DOLE, through the
Committee created by the Secretary, was limited to initiating the investigation process,
reception of evidence of the parties, preparation of the investigation report, and
recommending the appropriate action to be taken by the OP. AO 250 had never really
been applied to Rayala. If it was used at all, it was to serve merely as an auxiliary
procedural guide to aid the Committee in the orderly conduct of the investigation.
Next, Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that sexual harassment is an
offense malum prohibitum. He argues that intent is an essential element in sexual
harassment, and since the acts imputed to him were done allegedly without malice, he
should be absolved of the charges against him.
We reiterate that what is before us is an administrative case for sexual harassment.

Thus, whether the crime of sexual harassment is malum in se or malum prohibitum is
immaterial.
We also reject Rayala’s allegations that the charges were filed because of a conspiracy
to get him out of office and thus constitute merely political harassment. A conspiracy
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. His bare assertions cannot stand
against the evidence presented by Domingo. As we have already ruled, the acts
imputed to Rayala have been proven as fact. Moreover, he has not proven any ill motive
on the part of Domingo and her witnesses which would be ample reason for her to
conjure stories about him. On the contrary, ill motive is belied by the fact that Domingo
and her witnesses – all employees of the NLRC at that time – stood to lose their jobs or
suffer unpleasant consequences for coming forward and charging their boss with sexual
harassment.
Furthermore, Rayala decries the alleged violation of his right to due process. He
accuses the Committee on Decorum of railroading his trial for violation of RA 7877. He
also scored the OP’s decision finding him guilty of "disgraceful and immoral conduct"
under the Revised Administrative Code and not for violation of RA 7877. Considering
that he was not tried for "disgraceful and immoral conduct," he argues that the verdict is
a "sham and total nullity."
We hold that Rayala was properly accorded due process. In previous cases, this Court
held that:
[i]n administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the
following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity
to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses
and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and
(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or
made known to the parties affected.48
The records of the case indicate that Rayala was afforded all these procedural due
process safeguards. Although in the beginning he questioned the authority of the
Committee to try him,49 he appeared, personally and with counsel, and participated in
the proceedings.
On the other point raised, this Court has held that, even in criminal cases, the
designation of the offense is not controlling, thus:
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the
offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these
being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the
crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions
complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and
enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be
sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime
charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What
facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be
determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes.
The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform
the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to
suitably prepare his defense.50
It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to disgraceful and

immoral conduct.51 Thus, any finding of liability for sexual harassment may also be the
basis of culpability for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
With the foregoing disquisitions affirming the finding that Rayala committed sexual
harassment, we now determine the proper penalty to be imposed.
Rayala attacks the penalty imposed by the OP. He alleges that under the pertinent Civil
Service Rules, disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension for a
period of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. He also argues that since he is
charged administratively, aggravating or mitigating circumstances cannot be
appreciated for purposes of imposing the penalty.
Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is suspension for six (6) months and one
(1) day to one (1) year, while the penalty for the second offense is dismissal.52 On the
other hand, Section 22(o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code of 198753 and Section 52 A(15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service54 both provide that the first offense of
disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one
(1) day to one (1) year. A second offense is punishable by dismissal.
Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold office during good
behavior until he or she reaches the age of sixty-five, unless sooner removed for
cause as provided by law or becomes incapacitated to discharge the duties of the
office.55
In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining authority,
who would determine whether there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC
Chairman. This power, however, is qualified by the phrase "for cause as provided by
law." Thus, when the President found that Rayala was indeed guilty of disgraceful and
immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have unfettered discretion to impose a
penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such offense. As cited above, the
imposable penalty for the first offense of either the administrative offense of sexual
harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of six (6) months and
one (1) day to one (1) year. Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President to
impose upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a penalty which can only
be imposed upon commission of a second offense.
Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took advantage of his high
government position, it still could not validly dismiss him from the service. Under
the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,56 taking undue
advantage of a subordinate may be considered as an aggravating circumstance57 and
where only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed.58Hence, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on Rayala
is suspension for one (1) year.
Rayala holds the exalted position of NLRC Chairman, with the rank equivalent to a CA
Justice. Thus, it is not unavailing that rigid standards of conduct may be demanded of
him. In Talens-Dabon v. Judge Arceo,59 this Court, in upholding the liability of therein
respondent Judge, said:
The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that complainant is one
of his subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision, he being
the executive judge. He took advantage of his position and power in order to
carry out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of he being in loco
parentis over his subordinate employees, respondent was the one who preyed
on them, taking advantage of his superior position.
In yet another case, this Court declared:

As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by more exacting work ethics. He
failed to live up to his higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his
moral perversity. And when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his
subordinate, he provides a justifiable ground for his dismissal for lack of trust and
confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of every employer to protect its
employees from oversexed superiors.60
It is incumbent upon the head of office to set an example on how his employees should
conduct themselves in public office, so that they may work efficiently in a healthy
working atmosphere. Courtesy demands that he should set a good example.61
Rayala has thrown every argument in the book in a vain effort to effect his exoneration.
He even puts Domingo’s character in question and casts doubt on the morality of the
former President who ordered, albeit erroneously, his dismissal from the service.
Unfortunately for him, these are not significant factors in the disposition of the case. It is
his character that is in question here and sadly, the inquiry showed that he has been
found wanting.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the October 18, 2002 Resolution of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026 is AFFIRMED. Consequently, the
petitions in G.R. Nos. 155831, 155840, and 158700 are DENIED. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* In lieu of Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, per Special Order No. 484,
dated January 11, 2008.
1
Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 387 Phil. 256, 265 (2000).
2
Special Division of Five. Resolution penned by Associate Justice Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr. Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes Jr., Edgardo P. Cruz, and
Mario L. Guariña III voted for the modification of the December 14, 2001
Decision, while Associate Justices Vasquez and Amelita G. Tolentino, voted to
affirm the same.
3
Penned by Associate Justice Vasquez Jr., with Associate Justices Reyes Jr.
and Tolentino, concurring.
4
Rollo (G.R. No. 155840), pp. 142-144.
5
Id. at 162.
6
The case was docketed as DOLE O.S. Adm. Case No. 02-0122298.
7
Denominated as OP Case No. 00-E-9118; rollo (G.R. No. 155840), pp. 238-
243.
8
Rollo (G.R. No. 155840), pp. 265-266.
9
Docketed as G.R. No. 143358, id. at 75-140.
10
Id. at 176-A.
11
Id. at 273-296.
12
Id. at 297.
13
Rollo (G.R. No. 155831), pp. 32-40.
14
Id. at 38.
15
Id. at 40.
16
Id. at 29.
17
Composed of Associate Justices Vasquez Jr., Reyes Jr., and Tolentino, with
additional members Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Mario L. Guariña III.
18
G.R. No. 155831.
19
G.R. No. 155840.
20
G.R. No. 158700.
21
Rollo (G.R. No. 155831), p. 16.
22
Id. at 19-20.
23
Rollo (G.R. No. 155840), pp. 24-25.
24
429 Phil. 498, 508-509 (2002).
25
Rollo (G.R. No. 155840), p. 33.
26
Id. at 52-53.
27
Rule IV, Section 1, AO 250.
28
Rollo (G.R. No. 155840), pp. 59-60.
29
Id. at 61-62.
30
Rollo (G.R. No. 158700), p. 11.
31
Id. at 13.
32
Id. at 22.
33
Id. at 29.
34
Santos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 164439, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 487, 493,
citing Repol v. Commission on Elections, 428 SCRA 321 (2004).
35
Young v. Spouses Sy, G.R. No. 157745 and G.R. No. 157955, September 26,
2006, 503 SCRA 151, 166, citing Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao, 448 SCRA
738, 743 (2005).
36
PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R.
No. 161110, March 30, 2006, 485 SCRA 632, 646-647, citing Philippine Nails
and Wires Corporation v. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., 445 Phil. 465
(2003); Prubankers Association v. Prudential Bank and Trust Company, 361 Phil.
744, 755 (1999); First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil.
280, 307 (1996).
37
Rollo (G.R. No. 158700), p. 158.
38
Court of Appeals Decision dated December 14, 2001, rollo (G.R. No. 155831),
p. 36.
39
R & E Transport, Inc. v. Latag, 467 Phil. 355, 364 (2004), citing Pabu-aya v.
Court of Appeals, 356 SCRA 651, 657 (2001); Philtranco Service Enterprises,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 351 Phil. 827, 835
(1998); Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 344
Phil. 860, 873 (1997).
40
See Insurance Services and Commercial Traders, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 395
Phil. 791, 801 (2000).
41
Rollo (G.R. No. 155840), p. 1138.
42
Supra note 24.
43
Office of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez, Adm. Matter No. P-89-290,
January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 1.
44
Rollo (G.R. No. 155831), p. 39.
45
REPUBLIC ACT 7877, Sec. 3 (a) (3); AO 250, Rule III, Sec. 3 (d).
46
Supra note 24.
47
Id. at 8-9.
48
Fabella v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 940, 952-953 (1997).
49
He filed a petition for the creation of a new Committee on Decorum and
Investigation composed of his peers (rollo [G.R. No. 155840], pp. 171-177]). This
was denied by Secretary Laguesma saying that the Committee was created
pursuant to the directive of the OP and its composition was in accord with
Section 4 of RA 7877 (pp. 210-203).
50
People v. Dimaano, G.R. No. 168168, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 647,
666-668.
51
AO 250, Rule VI, Sec. 8.
52
Id.
53
Executive Order No. 292.
54
Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 19-99.
55
Section 215, Presidential Decree No. 442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines),
as amended. (Emphasis supplied)
56
Supra note 54.
57
Section 53, id.
58
Section 54 (c), id.
59
328 Phil. 692, 708 (1996).
60
Villarama v. Golden Donuts, G.R. No. 106341, September 2, 1994.
61
Guidelines on Proper Decorum, Annex A, Administrative Order No. 250, Rules
and Regulations Implementing RA 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995) in
the Department of Labor and Employment.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 198732 June 10, 2013
CHRISTIAN CABALLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the January 28, 2011
Decision2 and September 26, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 27399-MIN which affirmed with modification the April 1, 2003 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 30 (RTC), finding petitioner Christian
Caballo (Caballo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 10(a), Article VI of
Republic Act No. 76104(RA 7610), otherwise known as the "Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," in relation to Section
2 of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse
Cases (Rules on Child Abuse Cases).
The Facts
On March 16, 1999, an Information5 was filed charging Caballo of violation of Section

10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 which was later amended on May 28, 1999, to include
statements pertaining to the delivery of private complainant AAA’s6 baby. The Amended
Information7 reads:
That undersigned Second Assistant City Prosecutor hereby accuses Christian Caballo
of the crime of Violation of Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610, committed as
follows:
That in or about the last week of March 1998, and on different dates subsequent
thereto, until June 1998, in the City of Surigao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a 23 year old man, in utter disregard
of the prohibition of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 and taking advantage of the
innocence and lack of worldly experience of AAA who was only 17 years old at that
time, having been born on November 3, 1980, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit sexual abuse upon said AAA, by persuading and inducing the
latter to have sexual intercourse with him, which ultimately resulted to her untimely
pregnancy and delivery of a baby on March 8, 1999, a condition prejudicial to her
development, to the damage and prejudice of AAA in such amount as may be allowed
by law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Surigao City, Philippines, May 28, 1999.
Upon arraignment, Caballo pleaded not guilty to the aforesaid charges.8
Based on the records, the undisputed facts are as follows:
AAA, then 17 years old, met Caballo, then 23 years old, in her uncle’s place in Surigao
City. Her uncle was a choreographer and Caballo was one of his dancers. During that
time, AAA was a sophomore college student at the University of San Carlos and resided
at a boarding house in Cebu City. On January 17, 1998, Caballo went to Cebu City to
attend the Sinulog Festival and there, visited AAA. After spending time together, they
eventually became sweethearts.9 Sometime during the third week of March 1998, AAA
went home to Surigao City and stayed with her uncle. In the last week of March of the
same year, Caballo persuaded AAA to have sexual intercourse with him. This was
followed by several more of the same in April 1998, in the first and second weeks of
May 1998, on August 31, 1998 and in November 1998, all of which happened in
Surigao City, except the one in August which occurred in Cebu.10 In June 1998, AAA
becamepregnant and later gave birth on March 8, 1999.11
During the trial, the prosecution asserted that Caballo was only able to induce AAA to
lose her virginity due to promises of marriage and his assurance that he would not get
her pregnant due to the use of the "withdrawal method." Moreover, it claimed that
Caballo was shocked upon hearing the news of AAA’s pregnancy and consequently,
advised her to have an abortion. She heeded Caballo’s advice; however, her efforts
were unsuccessful. Further, the prosecution averred that when AAA’s mother
confronted Caballo to find out what his plans were for AAA, he assured her that he
would marry her daughter.12
Opposed to the foregoing, Caballo claimed that during their first sexual intercourse,
AAA was no longer a virgin as he found it easy to penetrate her and that there was no
bleeding. He also maintained that AAA had (3) three boyfriends prior to him. Further, he
posited that he and AAA were sweethearts who lived-in together, for one (1) week in a
certain Litang Hotel and another week in the residence of AAA’s uncle. Eventually, they
broke up due to the intervention of AAA’s parents. At a certain time, AAA’s mother even
told Caballo that he was not deserving of AAA because he was poor. Lastly, he alleged
that he repeatedly proposed marriage to AAA but was always rejected because she was
still studying.13
The RTC’s Ruling
In a Decision dated April 1, 2003, the RTC found Caballo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610, in relation to Section 2 of the
Rules on Child Abuse Cases. Accordingly, it sentenced Caballo to suffer imprisonment
for an indeterminate period ranging from prision correccional, in its maximum period of
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to prision mayor in its
minimum period of six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum. It also
ordered Caballo to pay AAA moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00.14
Aggrieved, Caballo elevated the case to the CA.
The CA’s Ruling
In a Decision dated January 28, 2011,15 the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed with
modification the RTC’s ruling, finding Caballo guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of
RA 7610.
It ruled that while the Amended Information denominated the crime charged as violation
of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610, the statements in its body actually support a
charge of violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.16
On the merits of the case, it found that the evidence adduced by the prosecution clearly
showed that Caballo persuaded, induced and enticed AAA, then a minor, to have carnal
knowledge with him. Towards this end, Caballo repeatedly assured AAA of his love and
even went on to promise marriage to her. He also assured AAA that she would not get
pregnant because he would be using the "withdrawal method." Thus, it was upon these
repeated coaxing and assuring words that AAA succumbed to Caballo’s evil desires
which deflowered and got her pregnant. On this score, it observed that consent is
immaterial in child abuse cases involving sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct and
therefore, the sweetheart defense remains unacceptable.17 It also found basis to sustain
the award of moral damages.18
Caballo filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on September
26, 2011.19
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The core of the present controversy revolves around the interpretation of the phrase
"due to the coercion or influence of any adult" which would thereby classify the victim as
a "child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse" as found in Section 5, Article III
of RA 7610. Consequently, the interpretation which the Court accords herein would
determine whether or not the CA erred in finding Caballo guilty of violating paragraph
(b) of the same proviso.
In his petition, Caballo essentially argues that his promise to marry or his use of the
"withdrawal method" should not be considered as "persuasion" or "inducement"
sufficient to convict him for the aforementioned offense, asserting that these should be
coupled with some form of coercion or intimidation to constitute child abuse. He further
alleges that he and AAA were sweethearts which thus, made the sexual intercourse
consensual.
In its Comment,20 respondent advances the argument that there was "sexual abuse"
within the purview of RA 7610 as well as the Rules on Child Abuse Cases since it was
only upon Caballo’s repeated assurances and persuasion that AAA gave in to his
worldly desires. Likewise, it points out that the sweetheart theory, as relied on by
Caballo, deserves scant consideration in view of the Court’s ruling in Malto v. People
(Malto).21
The petition has no merit.
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertinently reads:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female,
who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of
any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
imposed upon the following: x x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim
is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article
335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised
Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the
penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be
reclusion temporal in its medium period x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As determined in the case of Olivarez v. CA (Olivarez),22 the elements of the foregoing

offense are the following:
(a) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(b) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse; and
(c) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
In this case, the existence of the first and third elements remains undisputed. Records
disclose that Caballo had succeeded in repeatedly having sexual intercourse with AAA
who, during all those instances, was still a minor. Thus, the only bone of contention lies
in the presence of the second element. On this note, the defense submits that AAA
could not be considered as a "child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse"
since the incidents to do not point to any form of "coercion" or "influence" on Caballo’s
part.
The argument is untenable.
To put things in proper perspective, it must be pointed out that RA 7610 was meant to
advance the state policy of affording "special protection to children from all forms of
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination and other conditions prejudicial
to their development" and in such regard, "provide sanctions for their commission."23 It
also furthers the "best interests of children" and as such, its provisions are guided by
this standard.24
Driven by the foregoing considerations, Congress crafted Article III of the same law in
order to penalize child prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse. Section 5 thereof
provides a definition of who is considered a "child exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse." As illumined in Olivarez,25 citing People v. Larin26 and Amployo v.
People,27 the final version of the aforesaid provision was a product of various
deliberations to expand its original coverage to cases where the minor may have been
coerced or intimidated into sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, not necessarily for
money or profit, viz:
The second element, i.e., that the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse, is likewise present. As succinctly explained in
People v. Larin:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the
child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any
other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group...
It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for
profit, but also one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in
lascivious conduct.
We reiterated this ruling in Amployo v. People:
... As we observed in People v. Larin, Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610 does not merely
cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but also one in which a child engages
in any lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation...
Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. In this case, Cristina
was sexually abused because she was coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge in
a lascivious conduct. Furthermore, it is inconsequential that the sexual abuse occurred
only once. As expressly provided in Section 3(b) of R.A. 7610, the abuse may be
habitual or not. It must be observed that Article III of R.A. 7610 is captioned as "Child
Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse" because Congress really intended to cover a
situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into lascivious conduct,
not necessarily for money or profit. The law covers not only child prostitution but also
other forms of sexual abuse. This is clear from the deliberations of the Senate:
Senator Angara. I refer to line 9, ‘who for money or profit.’ I would like to amend this, Mr.
President, to cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated
into this lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit, so that we can cover
those situations and not leave loophole in this section.
The proposal I have is something like this: WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY
OTHER CONSIDERATION OR DUE TO THE COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY
ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE, et cetera.
The President Pro Tempore. I see. That would mean also changing the subtitle of
Section 4. Will it no longer be child prostitution?
Senator Angara. No, no. Not necessarily, Mr. President, because we are still talking of
the child who is being misused for sexual purposes either for money or for
consideration. What I am trying to cover is the other consideration. Because, here, it is
limited only to the child being abused or misused for sexual purposes, only for money or
profit.
I am contending, Mr. President, that there may be situations where the child may not
have been used for profit or ...
The President Pro Tempore. So, it is no longer prostitution. Because the essence of
prostitution is profit.
Senator Angara. Well, the Gentleman is right. Maybe the heading ought to be
expanded. But, still, the President will agree that that is a form or manner of child abuse.
The President Pro Tempore. What does the Sponsor say? Will the Gentleman kindly
restate the amendment?
ANGARA AMENDMENT
Senator Angara. The new section will read something like this, Mr. President: MINORS,
WHETHER MALE OR FEMALE, WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER
CONSIDERATION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP
INDULGE IN SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, et cetera.
Senator Lina. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the
amendment is approved.
How about the title, ‘Child Prostitution,’ shall we change that too?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, to cover the expanded scope.
The President Pro Tempore. Is that not what we would call probable ‘child abuse’?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Subject to rewording. Is there any objection? [Silence]
Hearing none, the amendment is approved. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides that when a child
indulges in sexual intercourse or any lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence
of any adult, the child is deemed to be a "child exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse." In this manner, the law is able to act as an effective deterrent to quell all forms
of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination against children, prejudicial as
they are to their development.
In this relation, case law further clarifies that sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
under the coercion or influence of any adult exists when there is some form of
compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended
party’s free will.28 Corollary thereto, Section 2(g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases
conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of influence which manifests in a
variety of forms. It is defined as:
The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to

engage in or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in any way that
deprives a person of free will and substitutes another’s objective."29 Meanwhile,
"coercion" is the "improper use of x x x power to compel another to submit to the wishes
of one who wields it."30
In view of the foregoing, the Court observes that Caballo’s actuations may be classified
as "coercion" and "influence" within the purview of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610:
First, the most crucial element is AAA’s minority. It is undisputed that AAA was only 17
years old at the time of the commission of the crime and is hence, considered a child
under the law.31 In this respect, AAA was not capable of fully understanding or knowing
the import of her actions and in consequence, remained vulnerable to the cajolery and
deception of adults, as in this case.
Based on this premise, jurisprudence settles that consent is immaterial in cases

involving a violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; as such, the argument that AAA
and Caballo were sweethearts remains irrelevant. The Malto ruling is largely instructive
on this point:
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under
RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with
another person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish "those who commit the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse."
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5,

Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing
lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual
abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale
that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or
knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the
obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as
yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.
The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a sexual encounter may be
infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect
her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this
reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity
and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks
to afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination.
(Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly tempted
by the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is
presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or
sexual intercourse. x x x x32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Second, coupled with AAA’s minority is Caballo’s seniority. Records indicate that
Caballo was 23 years old at the time of the commission of the offense and therefore, 6
years older than AAA, more or less. The age disparity between an adult and a minor
placed Caballo in a stronger position over AAA so as to enable him to force his will upon
the latter.
Third, Caballo's actions effectively constitute overt acts of coercion and

influence.1âwphi1 Records reveal that Caballo repeatedly assured AAA of his love for
her, and even, promised to marry her. In addition, he also guaranteed that she would
not get pregnant since he would be using the "withdrawal method" for safety.
Irrefragably, these were meant to influence AAA to set aside her reservations and
eventually give into having sex with him, with which he succeeded.
Fourth, at least, with respect to the parties' first sexual encounter, it is observed that the
brash and unexpected manner in which Caballo pursued AAA to her room and pressed
on her to have sex with him, effectively placed her in, to a certain extent, a position of
duress .. An important factor is that AAA refused Caballo's incipient advances and in
fact, asked him to leave. However, AAA eventually yielded. Thus, it stands to reason
that she was put in a situation deprived of the benefit of clear thought and choice. In any
case, the Court observes that any other choice would, nonetheless, remain tarnished
due to AAA's minority as above-discussed.
Hence, considering that Caballo's acts constitute "coercion" and "influence" within the
context of the law, and that AAA indulged in sexual intercourse and/or lascivious
conduct with Caballo due to the same, she is deemed as a "child exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse"; as such, the second element of the subject offense
exists.
In fine, finding all elements to be present, the Court hereby sustains Caballo's conviction
for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 28, 2011 Decision and September
26, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 27399-MIN are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED .
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN**

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Designated Acting Chairperson in lieu of Justice Antonio T. Carpio per Special

Order No. 1460 dated May 29,2013.
** Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1461 dated May 29, 2013.
1
Rollo, pp. 8-27.
2
Id. at 30-45. Penned by Associate Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela, with
Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring.
3
Id. at 46-47. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, with Associate
Justices Melchor Quirino C. Sadang and Zenaida Galapate Laguilles, concurring.
4
"AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL
OISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."
5
Rollo, pp. 31-32.
That undersigned Second Assistant City Prosecutor hereby accuses

Christian Caballo of the crime of Violation of Section 10 (a) of Republic Act
No. 7610, committed as follows:
That in or about the last week of March 1998, and on different dates
subsequent thereto, in the City of Surigao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a 23 year
old man, in utter disregard of the prohibition of the provisions of Republic
Act No. 7610 and taking advantage of the innocence and lack of worldly
experience of AAA who was only 17 years old at that time, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse upon said
AAA, by persuading and inducing the latter to have sexual intercourse with
him, which ultimately resulted to her untimely pregnancy, a condition
prejudicial to her development, to the damage and prejudice of AAA in
such amount as may be allowed by law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Surigao City, Philippines, March 16, 1999.

6
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," and its implementing rules, the
real name of the victim, together with the names of her immediate family
members, is withheld, and fictitious initials instead are used to represent her, to
protect her privacy. See People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703, 705-709 (2006).
7
Rollo, p. 32.
8
Id. at 33.
9
Id. at 33.
10
Id. at 34-35.
11
Id. at 35-36
12
Id. at 33-36.
13
Id. at 36-37.
14
Id. at 31.
15
Id. at 30-45.
16
Id. at 40.
17
Id. at 41-43.
18
Id. at 44.
19
Id. at 46-47.
20
Id. at 58-76.
21
G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 643, 653-668.
22
G.R. No. 163866, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 465, 473.
23
Section 2, Article I of RA 7610 provides in part:
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles. – It is hereby declared
to be the policy of the State to provide special protection to children from
all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination and
other conditions prejudicial to their development; provide sanctions for
their commission and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence of
and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation and
discrimination. The State shall intervene on behalf of the child when the
parent, guardian, teacher or person having care or custody of the child
fails or is unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation and
discrimination or when such acts against the child are committed by the
said parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and custody of the
same.
It shall be the policy of the State to protect and rehabilitate children

gravely threatened or endangered by circumstances which affect or will
affect their survival and normal development and over which they have no
control.
24
Section 2, Article I of RA 7610 provides in part:
Section 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles. – x x x x
The best interests of children shall be the paramount consideration in all

actions concerning them, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, and legislative
bodies, consistent with the principle of First Call for Children as
enunciated in the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child.
Every effort shall be exerted to promote the welfare of children and
enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy life. (Emphasis
supplied)
25
Supra note 22, at 474-476.
26
G.R. No. 128777, October 7, 1998, 297 SCRA 309, 319-320.
27
G.R. No. 157718, April 26, 2005, 457 SCRA 282, 295.
28
People v. Abello, G.R. No. 151952, 25 March 2009, 582 SCRA 378, 395.
29
The Law Dictionary <http://thelawdictionary.org/undue-influence> (visited May
27, 2013)
30
The Law Dictionary, 2nd Ed. <http://thelawdictionary.org/Black’s Law
Dictionary coercion> (visited May 27, 2013)
31
Section 3 of RA 7610 provides:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. –
(a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen (18) years of age or those
physical or mental disability or condition x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
32
Malto v. People, supra note 21, at 661-663. (Citation omitted)
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 187226 January 28, 2015
CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS, Petitioner,

vs.
ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE WESTGROVE and/or SR. EDNA QUIAMBAO,
OSB, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Cheryll Santos Leus (petitioner) was hired by St. Scholastica's College Westgrove
(SSCW), a Catholic educational institution, as a non-teaching personnel, engaged in
pre-marital sexual relations, got pregnant out of wedlock, married the father of her child,
and was dismissed by SSCW, in that order. The question that has to be resolved is
whether the petitioner's conduct constitutes a ground for her dismissal.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1 dated September 24, 2008 and
Resolution2 dated March 2, 2009 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 100188, which affirmed the Resolutions dated February 28, 20073 and May 21,
20074 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)in NLRC CA No. 049222-06.
The Facts
SSCW is a catholic and sectarian educational institution in Silang, Cavite. In May 2001,
SSCW hired the petitioner as an Assistant to SSCW’s Director of the Lay Apostolate
and Community Outreach Directorate.
Sometime in 2003, the petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock.
When SSCW learned of the petitioner’s pregnancy, Sr. Edna Quiambao (Sr.
Quiambao), SSCW’s Directress, advised her to file a resignation letter effective June 1,
2003. In response, the petitioner informed Sr. Quiambao that she would not resign from
her employment just because she got pregnant without the benefit of marriage.5
On May 28, 2003, Sr. Quiambao formally directed the petitioner to explain in writing why
she should not be dismissed for engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and getting
pregnant as a result thereof, which amounts to serious misconduct and conduct
unbecoming of an employee of a Catholic school.6
In a letter7 dated May 31, 2003, the petitioner explained that her pregnancy out of
wedlock does not amount to serious misconduct or conduct unbecoming of an
employee. She averred that she is unaware of any school policy stating that being
pregnant out of wedlock is considered as a serious misconduct and, thus, a ground for
dismissal. Further, the petitioner requested a copy of SSCW’s policy and guidelines so
that she may better respond to the charge against her. On June 2, 2003, Sr. Quiambao
informed the petitioner that, pending the promulgation of a "Support Staff Handbook,"
SSCW follows the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992 MRPS) on the
causes for termination of employments; that Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS cites
"disgraceful or immoral conduct" as a ground for dismissal in addition to the just causes
for termination of employment provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code.8
On June 4, 2003, the petitioner, through counsel, sent Sr. Quiambao a letter,9 which, in
part, reads:
To us, pre-marital sex between two consenting adults without legal impediment to marry
each other who later on married each other does not fall within the contemplation of
"disgraceful or immoral conduct" and "serious misconduct" of the Manual of Regulations
for Private Schools and the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Your argument that what happened to our client would set a bad example to the
students and other employees of your school is speculative and is more imaginary than
real. To dismiss her on that sole ground constitutes grave abuse of management
prerogatives.
Considering her untarnished service for two years, dismissing her with her present
condition would also mean depriving her to be more secure in terms of financial
capacity to sustain maternal needs.10
In a letter11 dated June 6, 2003, SSCW, through counsel, maintained that pre-marital

sexual relations, evenif between two consenting adults without legal impediment to
marry, is considered a disgraceful and immoral conduct or a serious misconduct, which
are grounds for the termination of employment under the 1992 MRPS and the Labor
Code. That SSCW, as a Catholic institution of learning, has the right to uphold the
teaching of the Catholic Church and expect its employees to abide by the same. They
further asserted that the petitioner’s indiscretion is further aggravated by the fact that
she is the Assistant to the Director of the Lay Apostolate and Community Outreach
Directorate, a position of responsibility that the students look up to as rolemodel. The
petitioner was again directed to submit a written explanation on why she should not be
dismissed.
On June 9, 2003, the petitioner informed Sr. Quiambao that she adopts her counsel’s
letter dated June 4, 2003 as her written explanation.12
Consequently, in her letter13 dated June 11, 2003, Sr. Quiambao informed the petitioner
that her employment with SSCW is terminated on the ground of serious misconduct.
She stressed that pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults with no
impediment to marry, even if they subsequently married, amounts to immoral conduct.
She further pointed out that SSCW finds unacceptable the scandal brought about by the
petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock as it ran counter to the moral principles that
SSCW stands for and teaches its students.
Thereupon, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Regional
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Quezon City against SSCW and Sr. Quiambao
(respondents). In her position paper,14 the petitioner claimed that SSCW gravely abused
its management prerogative as there was no just cause for her dismissal. She
maintained that her pregnancy out of wedlock cannot be considered as serious
misconduct since the same is a purely private affair and not connected in any way with
her duties as an employee of SSCW. Further, the petitioner averred that she and her
boyfriend eventually got married even prior to her dismissal.
For their part, SSCW claimed that there was just cause to terminate the petitioner’s
employment with SSCW and that the same is a valid exercise of SSCW’s management
prerogative. They maintained that engaging in pre-marital sex, and getting pregnant as
a result thereof, amounts to a disgraceful or immoral conduct, which is a ground for the
dismissal of an employee under the 1992 MRPS.
They pointed out that SSCW is a Catholic educational institution, which caters
exclusively to young girls; that SSCW would lose its credibility if it would maintain
employees who do not live up to the values and teachings it inculcates to its students.
SSCW further asserted that the petitioner, being an employee of a Catholic educational
institution, should have strived to maintain the honor, dignity and reputation of SSCW as
a Catholic school.15
The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
On February 28, 2006, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision,16 in NLRC Case No.
6-17657-03-C which dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner. The LA found that
there was a valid ground for the petitioner’s dismissal; that her pregnancy out of
wedlock is considered as a "disgraceful and immoral conduct." The LA pointed out that,
as an employee of a Catholic educational institution, the petitioner is expected to live up
to the Catholic values taught by SSCW to its students. Likewise, the LA opined that:
Further, a deep analysis of the facts would lead us to disagree with the complainant that
she was dismissed simply because she violate[d] a Catholic [teaching]. It should not be
taken in isolation but rather it should be analyzed in the lightof the surrounding
circumstances as a whole. We must also take into [consideration] the nature of her work
and the nature of her employer-school. For us, it is not just an ordinary violation. It was
committed by the complainant in an environment where her strict adherence to the
same is called for and where the reputation of the school is at stake. x x x.17
The LA further held that teachers and school employees, both in their official and
personal conduct, must display exemplary behavior and act in a manner that is beyond
reproach.
The petitioner appealed to the NLRC, insisting that there was no valid ground for the
termination of her employment. She maintained that her pregnancy out of wedlock
cannot be considered as "serious misconduct" under Article 282 of the Labor Code
since the same was not of such a grave and aggravated character. She asserted that
SSCW did not present any evidence to establish that her pregnancy out of wedlock
indeed eroded the moral principles that it teaches its students.18
The Ruling of the NLRC
On February 28, 2007, the NLRC issued a Resolution,19 which affirmed the LA Decision
dated February 28, 2006. The NLRC pointed out that the termination of the employment
of the personnel of private schools is governed by the 1992 MRPS; that Section 94(e)
thereof cites "disgraceful or immoral conduct" as a just cause for dismissal, in addition
to the grounds for termination of employment provided for under Article 282 of the Labor
Code. The NLRC held that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock is a "disgraceful or
immoral conduct" within the contemplation of Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS and,
thus, SSCW had a valid reason to terminate her employment.
The petitioner sought reconsideration20 of the Resolution dated February 28, 2007 but it
was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution21 dated May 21, 2007.
Unperturbed, the petitioner filed a petition22 for certiorari with the CA, alleging that the
NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that there was a valid ground for her
dismissal. She maintained that pregnancy out of wedlock cannot be considered as a
disgraceful or immoral conduct; that SSCW failed to prove that its students were indeed
gravely scandalized by her pregnancy out of wedlock. She likewise asserted that the
NLRC erred in applying Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.
The Ruling of the CA
On September 24, 2008, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision,23 which denied
the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner. The CA held that it is the provisions of
the 1992 MRPS and not the Labor Code which governs the termination of employment
of teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools, explaining that:
It is a principle of statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a
particular case, that which was specially intended for the said case must prevail.
Petitioner was employed by respondent private Catholic institution which undeniably
follows the precepts or norms of conduct set forth by the Catholic Church. Accordingly,
the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools followed by it must prevail over the Labor
Code, a general statute. The Manual constitutes the private schools’ Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 or the Education Act of 1982. x x
x.24
The CA further held that the petitioner’s dismissal was a valid exercise of SSCW’s
management prerogative to discipline and impose penalties on erring employees
pursuant toits policies, rules and regulations. The CA upheld the NLRC’s conclusion
that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock is considered as a "disgraceful and
immoral conduct" and, thus, a ground for dismissal under Section 94(e) of the 1992
MRPS. The CA likewise opined that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock is
scandalous per segiven the work environment and social milieu that she was in, viz:
Under Section 94 (e) of the [MRPS], and even under Article 282 (serious misconduct) of
the Labor Code, "disgraceful and immoral conduct" is a basis for termination of
employment.
xxxx
Petitioner contends that her pre-marital sexual relations with her boyfriend and her
pregnancy prior to marriage was not disgraceful or immoral conduct sufficient for her
dismissal because she was not a member of the school’s faculty and there is no
evidence that her pregnancy scandalized the school community.
We are not persuaded. Petitioner’s pregnancy prior to marriage is scandalous in itself

given the work environment and social milieu she was in. Respondent school for young
ladies precisely seeks to prevent its students from situations like this, inculcating in
them strict moral values and standards. Being part of the institution, petitioner’sprivate
and public life could not be separated. Her admitted pre-marital sexual relations was a
violation of private respondent’s prescribed standards of conduct that views pre-marital
sex as immoral because sex between a man and a woman must only take place within
the bounds of marriage.
Finally, petitioner’s dismissal is a valid exercise of the employer-school’s management

prerogative to discipline and impose penalties on erring employees pursuant to its
policies, rules and regulations. x x x.25 (Citations omitted)
The petitioner moved for reconsideration26 but it was denied by the CA in its

Resolution27 dated March 2, 2009.
Issues
Essentially, the issues set forth by the petitioner for this Court’s decision are the
following: first, whether the CA committed reversible error in ruling that it is the 1992
MRPS and not the Labor Code that governs the termination of employment of teaching
and non-teaching personnel of private schools; and second, whether the
petitioner’spregnancy out of wedlock constitutes a valid ground to terminate her
employment.
The Ruling of the Court

The Court grants the petition.
First Issue: Applicability of the 1992 MRPS
The petitioner contends that the CA, in ruling that there was a valid ground to dismiss
her, erred in applying Section 94 of the 1992 MRPS. Essentially, she claims that the
1992 MRPS was issued by the Secretary of Education as the revised implementing
rules and regulations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 232 (BP 232) or the "Education Act of
1982." That there is no provision in BP 232, which provides for the grounds for the
termination of employment of teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools.
Thus, Section 94 of the 1992 MRPS, which provides for the causes of terminating an
employment, isinvalid as it "widened the scope and coverage" of BP 232.
The Court does not agree.
The Court notes that the argument against the validity of the 1992 MRPS, specifically
Section 94 thereof, is raised by the petitioner for the first time in the instant petition for
review. Nowhere in the proceedings before the LA, the NLRC or the CA did the
petitioner assail the validity of the provisions of the 1992 MRPS.
"It is well established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the
proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues,
and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered
by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To consider
the alleged facts and arguments belatedly raised would amount to trampling on the
basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process."28
In any case, even if the Court were to disregard the petitioner’s belated claim of the
invalidity of the 1992 MRPS, the Court still finds the same untenable.
The 1992 MRPS, the regulation in force at the time of the instant controversy, was
issued by the Secretary of Education pursuant to BP 232. Section 7029 of BP 232 vests
the Secretary of Education with the authority to issue rules and regulations to implement
the provisions of BP 232. Concomitantly, Section 5730 specifically empowers the
Department of Education to promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the
administration, supervision and regulation of the educational system in accordance with
the declared policy of BP 232.
The qualifications of teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools, as well as

the causes for the termination of their employment, are an integral aspect of the
educational system of private schools. Indubitably, ensuring that the teaching and non-
teaching personnel of private schools are not only qualified, but competent and efficient
as well goes hand in hand with the declared objective of BP 232 – establishing and
maintaining relevant quality education.31 It is thus within the authority of the Secretary of
Education to issue a rule, which provides for the dismissal of teaching and non-teaching
personnel of private schools based on their incompetence, inefficiency, or some other
disqualification.
Moreover, Section 69 of BP 232 specifically authorizes the Secretary of Education to

"prescribe and impose such administrative sanction as he may deem reasonable and
appropriate in the implementing rules and regulations" for the "[g]ross inefficiency of the
teaching or non-teaching personnel" of private schools.32 Accordingly, contrary to the
petitioner’s claim, the Court sees no reason to invalidate the provisions of the 1992
MRPS, specifically Section 94 thereof. Second Issue: Validity of the Petitioner’s
Dismissal
The validity of the petitioner’s dismissal hinges on the determination of whether
pregnancy out of wedlock by an employee of a catholic educational institution is a cause
for the termination of her employment.
In resolving the foregoing question,the Court will assess the matter from a strictly
neutral and secular point of view – the relationship between SSCW as employer and the
petitioner as an employee, the causes provided for by law in the termination of
suchrelationship, and the evidence on record. The ground cited for the petitioner’s
dismissal, i.e., pre-marital sexual relations and, consequently, pregnancy outof wedlock,
will be assessed as to whether the same constitutes a valid ground for dismissal
pursuant to Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.
The standard of review in a Rule 45

petition from the CA decision in
labor cases.
In a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, such as the instant petition,
where the CA’s disposition in a labor case is sought to be calibrated, the Court’s review
isquite limited. In ruling for legal correctness, the Court has to view the CA decision in
the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; the
Court has to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined
the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it,
not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct.33
The phrase "grave abuse of discretion" is well-defined in the Court’s jurisprudence. It

exists where an act of a court or tribunal is performed with a capricious or whimsical
exercise ofjudgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.34 The determination of the
presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion does not include an inquiry into the
correctness of the evaluation of evidence, which was the basis of the labor agency in
reaching its conclusion.35
Nevertheless, while a certiorari proceeding does not strictly include an inquiry as to the
correctness of the evaluation of evidence (that was the basis of the labor tribunals in
determining their conclusion), the incorrectness of its evidentiary evaluation should not
result in negating the requirement of substantial evidence. Indeed, when there is a
showing that the findings or conclusions, drawn from the same pieces of evidence, were
arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, they may be reviewed by
the courts. In particular, the CA can grant the petition for certiorariif it finds that the
NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, made a factual finding not supported by
substantial evidence. A decision that is not supported by substantial evidence is
definitely a decision tainted with grave abuse of discretion.36
The labor tribunals’ respective

conclusions that the petitioner’s
pregnancy is a "disgraceful or
immoral conduct" were arrived at
arbitrarily.
The CA and the labor tribunals affirmed the validity of the petitioner’s dismissal pursuant
to Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which provides that:
Sec. 94. Causes of Terminating Employment – In addition to the just causes

enumerated in the Labor Code, the employment of school personnel, including faculty,
may be terminated for any of the following causes:
xxxx
e. Disgraceful or immoral conduct;
xxxx
The labor tribunals concluded that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock, per se, is
"disgraceful and immoral"considering that she is employed in a Catholic educational
institution. In arriving at such conclusion, the labor tribunals merely assessed the fact of
the petitioner’s pregnancy vis-à-visthe totality of the circumstances surrounding the
same.
However, the Court finds no substantial evidence to support the aforementioned

conclusion arrived at by the labor tribunals. The fact of the petitioner’s pregnancy out of
wedlock, without more, is not enough to characterize the petitioner’s conduct as
disgraceful or immoral. There must be substantial evidence to establish that pre-marital
sexual relations and, consequently, pregnancy outof wedlock, are indeed considered
disgraceful or immoral.
The totality of the circumstances

surrounding the conduct alleged to
be disgraceful or immoral must be
assessed against the prevailing
norms of conduct.
In Chua-Qua v. Clave,37 the Court stressed that to constitute immorality, the

circumstances of each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in
light of the prevailing norms of conductand applicable laws.38Otherwise stated, it is not
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct per se that determines
whether the same is disgraceful or immoral, but the conduct that is generally accepted
by society as respectable or moral. If the conduct does not conform to what society
generally views as respectable or moral, then the conduct is considered as disgraceful
or immoral. Tersely put, substantial evidence must be presented, which would establish
that a particular conduct, viewed in light of the prevailing norms of conduct, is
considered disgraceful or immoral.
Thus, the determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or immoral involves a two-

step process: first, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
conduct; and second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis-à-visthe prevailing
norms of conduct, i.e., what the society generally considers moral and respectable.
That the petitioner was employed by a Catholic educational institution per se does not
absolutely determine whether her pregnancy out of wedlock is disgraceful or immoral.
There is still a necessity to determine whether the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock
is considered disgraceful or immoral in accordance with the prevailing norms of
conduct.
Public and secular morality should

determine the prevailing norms of
conduct, not religious morality.
However, determining what the prevailing norms of conduct are considered disgraceful
or immoral is not an easy task. An individual’s perception of what is moral or
respectable is a confluence of a myriad of influences, such as religion, family, social
status, and a cacophony of others. In this regard, the Court’s ratiocination in Estrada v.
Escritor39 is instructive.
In Estrada, an administrative case against a court interpreter charged with disgraceful

and immoral conduct, the Court stressed that in determining whether a particular
conduct can be considered as disgraceful and immoral, the distinction between public
and secular morality on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other, should be
kept in mind.40 That the distinction between public and secular morality and religious
morality is important because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality.41 The Court further explained that:
The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religiousx x x.
"Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order
but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms."
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and
morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might
regard as religious programs or agenda.The non-believers would therefore be
compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a
"compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its
actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby
also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support
the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its
citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-
class citizens. Expansive religious freedom therefore requires that government be
neutral in matters of religion; governmental reliance upon religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed

in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government
proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions
upon which depend the existence and progress of human society" and not because the
conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly,
moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence on those engaged
in public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral disapprobation
punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have
religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human
mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform
manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or
Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and
discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses.x x
x.42(Citations omitted and emphases ours)
Accordingly, when the law speaks of immoral or, necessarily, disgraceful conduct, it
pertains to public and secular morality; it refers to those conducts which are proscribed
because they are detrimental to conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society. Thus, in Anonymous v. Radam,43 an administrative case
involving a court utility worker likewise charged with disgraceful and immoral conduct,
applying the doctrines laid down in Estrada, the Court held that:
For a particular conduct to constitute "disgraceful and immoral" behavior under civil
service laws, it must be regulated on account of the concerns of public and secular
morality. It cannot be judged based on personal bias, specifically those colored by
particular mores. Nor should it be grounded on "cultural" values not convincingly
demonstrated to have been recognized in the realm of public policy expressed in the
Constitution and the laws. At the same time, the constitutionally guaranteed rights (such
as the right to privacy) should be observed to the extent that they protect behavior that
may be frowned upon by the majority.
Under these tests, two things may be concluded from the fact that an unmarried woman
gives birth out of wedlock:
(1) if the father of the child is himself unmarried, the woman is not ordinarily
administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct.It may be a not-so-
ideal situation and may cause complications for both mother and child but it does
not give cause for administrative sanction. There is no law which penalizes an
unmarried mother under those circumstances by reason of her sexual conduct or
proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried persons.
Neither does the situation contravene any fundamental state policy as expressed
in the Constitution, a document that accommodates various belief systems
irrespective of dogmatic origins.
(2) if the father of the child born out of wedlock is himself married to a woman
other thanthe mother, then there is a cause for administrative sanction against
either the father or the mother. In sucha case, the "disgraceful and immoral
conduct" consists of having extramarital relations with a married person. The
sanctity of marriage is constitutionally recognized and likewise affirmed by our
statutes as a special contract of permanent union. Accordingly, judicial
employees have been sanctioned for their dalliances with married persons or for
their own betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.
In this case, it was not disputed that, like respondent, the father of her child was
unmarried. Therefore, respondent cannot be held liable for disgraceful and immoral
conduct simply because she gave birth to the child Christian Jeon out of
wedlock.44 (Citations omitted and emphases ours)
Both Estrada and Radamare administrative cases against employees in the civil
service. The Court, however, sees no reason not to apply the doctrines enunciated in
Estrada and Radamin the instant case. Estrada and Radamalso required the Court to
delineate what conducts are considered disgraceful and/or immoral as would constitute
a ground for dismissal. More importantly, as in the said administrative cases, the instant
case involves an employee’s security of tenure; this case likewise concerns
employment, which is not merely a specie of property right, but also the means by which
the employee and those who depend on him live.45
It bears stressing that the right of an employee to security of tenure is protected by the
Constitution. Perfunctorily, a regular employee may not be dismissed unless for cause
provided under the Labor Code and other relevant laws, in this case, the 1992 MRPS.
As stated above, when the law refers to morality, it necessarily pertains to public and
secular morality and not religious morality. Thus, the proscription against "disgraceful or
immoral conduct" under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which is made as a cause for
dismissal, must necessarily refer to public and secular morality. Accordingly, in order for
a conduct tobe considered as disgraceful or immoral, it must be "‘detrimental (or
dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of
human society’ and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion
or the other."
Thus, in Santos v. NLRC,46 the Court upheld the dismissal of a teacher who had an
extra-marital affair with his co-teacher, who is likewise married, on the ground of
disgraceful and immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS. The Court
pointed out that extra-marital affair is considered as a disgraceful and immoral conduct
is an afront to the sanctity of marriage, which is a basic institution of society, viz:
We cannot overemphasize that having an extra-marital affair is an afront to the sanctity

of marriage, which is a basic institution of society. Even our Family Code provides that
husband and wife must live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Our laws, in implementing this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family underscore their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.47
The petitioner’s pregnancy out of
wedlock is not a disgraceful or
immoral conduct since she and the
father of her child have no
impediment to marry each other.
In stark contrast to Santos, the Court does not find any circumstance in this case which
would lead the Court to conclude that the petitioner committed a disgraceful or immoral
conduct. It bears stressing that the petitioner and her boyfriend, at the time they
conceived a child, had no legal impediment to marry. Indeed, even prior to her
dismissal, the petitioner married her boyfriend, the father of her child. As the Court held
in Radam, there is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother by reason of her sexual
conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried persons;
that neither does such situation contravene any fundamental state policy enshrined in
the Constitution.
Admittedly, the petitioner is employed in an educational institution where the teachings

and doctrines of the Catholic Church, including that on pre-marital sexual relations, is
strictly upheld and taught to the students. That her indiscretion, which resulted in her
pregnancy out of wedlock, is anathema to the doctrines of the Catholic Church.
However, viewed against the prevailing norms of conduct, the petitioner’s conduct
cannot be considered as disgraceful or immoral; such conduct is not denounced by
public and secular morality. It may be an unusual arrangement, but it certainly is not
disgraceful or immoral within the contemplation of the law.
To stress, pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no
impediment to marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock,
gauged from a purely public and secular view of morality, does not amount to a
disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.
Accordingly, the labor tribunals erred in upholding the validity of the petitioner’s
dismissal. The labor tribunals arbitrarily relied solely on the circumstances surrounding
the petitioner’s pregnancy and its supposed effect on SSCW and its students without
evaluating whether the petitioner’s conduct is indeed considered disgraceful or immoral
in view of the prevailing norms of conduct. In this regard, the labor tribunals’ respective
haphazard evaluation of the evidence amounts to grave abuse of discretion, which the
Court will rectify.
The labor tribunals’ finding that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock despite the
absence of substantial evidence is not only arbitrary, but a grave abuse of discretion,
which should have been set right by the CA.
There is no substantial evidence to

prove that the petitioner’s pregnancy
out of wedlock caused grave scandal
to SSCW and its students.
SSCW claimed that the petitioner was primarily dismissed because her pregnancy out
of wedlock caused grave scandal to SSCW and its students. That the scandal brought
about by the petitioner’s indiscretion prompted them to dismiss her. The LA upheld the
respondents’ claim, stating that:
In this particular case, an "objective" and "rational evaluation" of the facts and
circumstances obtaining in this case would lead us to focus our attention x x x on the
impact of the act committed by the complainant. The act of the complainant x x x eroded
the moral principles being taught and project[ed] by the respondent [C]atholic school to
their young lady students.48 (Emphasis in the original)
On the other hand, the NLRC opined that:
In the instant case, when the complainant-appellant was already conceiving a child
even before she got married, such is considered a shameful and scandalous behavior,
inimical to public welfare and policy. It eroded the moral doctrines which the respondent
Catholic school, an exclusive school for girls, is teaching the young girls. Thus, when
the respondent-appellee school terminated complainant-appellant’s services, it was a
valid exercise of its management prerogative. Whether or not she was a teacher is of no
moment. There is no separate set of rules for non-teaching personnel. Respondents-
appellees uphold the teachings of the Catholic Church on pre-marital sex and that the
complainant-appellant as an employee of the school was expected to abide by this
basic principle and to live up with the standards of their purely Catholic values. Her
subsequent marriage did not take away the fact that she had engaged in pre-marital sex
which the respondent-appellee school denounces as the same is opposed to the
teachings and doctrines it espouses.49 (Emphasis ours)
Contrary to the labor tribunals’ declarations, the Court finds that SSCW failed to adduce
substantial evidence to prove that the petitioner’s indiscretion indeed caused grave
scandal to SSCW and its students. Other than the SSCW’s bare allegation, the records
are bereft of any evidence that would convincingly prove that the petitioner’s conduct
indeed adversely affected SSCW’s integrity in teaching the moral doctrines, which it
stands for. The petitioner is only a non-teaching personnel; her interaction with SSCW’s
students is very limited. Itis thus quite impossible that her pregnancy out of wedlock
caused such a grave scandal, as claimed by SSCW, as to warranther dismissal.
Settled is the rule that in termination cases, the burden of proving that the dismissal of
the employees was for a valid and authorized cause rests on the employer. It is
incumbent upon the employer to show by substantial evidence that the termination of
the employment of the employees was validly made and failure to discharge that duty
would mean that the dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal.50 "Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequateto support a conclusion, even if other
minds equally reasonable mightconceivably opine otherwise."51
Indubitably, bare allegations do not amount to substantial evidence. Considering that

the respondents failed to adduce substantial evidence to prove their asserted cause for
the petitioner’s dismissal, the labor tribunals should not have upheld their allegations
hook, line and sinker. The labor tribunals’ respective findings, which were arrived at
sans any substantial evidence, amounts to a grave abuse of discretion, which the CA
should have rectified. "Security of tenure is a right which may not be denied on mere
speculation of any unclearand nebulous basis."52
The petitioner’s dismissal is not a

valid exercise of SSCW’s
management prerogative.
The CA be labored the management prerogative of SSCW to discipline its employees.

The CA opined that the petitioner’s dismissal is a valid exercise of management
prerogative to impose penalties on erring employees pursuant to its policies, rules and
regulations.
The Court does not agree.
The Court has held that "management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion
and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working
methods, time, place and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of
workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay off of workers
and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. The exercise of management
prerogative, however, is not absolute as it must beexercised in good faith and with due
regard to the rights of labor." Management cannot exercise its prerogative in a cruel,
repressive, or despotic manner.53
SSCW, as employer, undeniably has the right to discipline its employees and, if need
be, dismiss themif there is a valid cause to do so. However, as already explained, there
is no cause to dismiss the petitioner. Her conduct is not considered by law as
disgraceful or immoral. Further, the respondents themselves have admitted that SSCW,
at the time of the controversy, does not have any policy or rule against an employee
who engages in pre-marital sexual relations and conceives a child as a result thereof.
There being no valid basis in law or even in SSCW’s policy and rules, SSCW’s
dismissal of the petitioner is despotic and arbitrary and, thus, not a valid exercise of
management prerogative.
In sum, the Court finds that the petitioner was illegally dismissed as there was no just
cause for the termination of her employment. SSCW failed to adduce substantial
evidence to establish that the petitioner’s conduct, i.e., engaging in pre-marital sexual
relations and conceiving a child out of wedlock, assessed in light of the prevailing norms
of conduct, is considered disgraceful or immoral. The labor tribunals gravely abused
their discretion in upholding the validity of the petitioner’s dismissal as the charge
against the petitioner lay not on substantial evidence, but on the bare allegations of
SSCW. In turn, the CA committed reversible error in upholding the validity of the
petitioner’s dismissal, failing torecognize that the labor tribunals gravely abused their
discretion in ruling for the respondents.
The petitioner is entitled to

separation pay, in lieu of actual
reinstatement, full backwages and
attorney’s fees, but not to moral and
exemplary damages.
Having established that the petitioner was illegally dismissed, the Court now determines
the reliefs thatshe is entitled to and their extent. Under the law and prevailing
jurisprudence, "an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement as a matter
of right."54 Aside from the instances provided under Articles 28355 and 28456 of the Labor
Code, separation pay is, however, granted when reinstatement is no longer feasible
because of strained relations between the employer and the employee. In cases of
illegal dismissal, the accepted doctrine is that separation pay is available in lieu of
reinstatement when the latter recourse is no longer practical or in the best interest of the
parties.57
In Divine Word High School v. NLRC,58 the Court ordered the employer Catholic school
to pay the illegally dismissed high school teacher separation pay in lieu of actual
reinstatement since her continued presence as a teacher in the school "may well bemet
with antipathy and antagonism by some sectors in the school community."59
In view of the particular circumstances of this case, it would be more prudent to direct
SSCW to pay the petitioner separation pay inlieu of actual reinstatement. The continued
employment of the petitioner with SSCW would only serve to intensify the atmosphere
of antipathy and antagonism between the parties. Consequently, the Court awards
separation pay to the petitioner equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of
service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months considered as one (1) whole year, from
the time of her illegal dismissal up to the finality of this judgment, as an alternative to
reinstatement.
Also, "employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time
their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual
reinstatement but if reinstatement is no longer possible, the backwages shall be
computed from the time of their illegal termination up to the finality of the
decision."60 Accordingly, the petitioner is entitled to an award of full backwages from the
time she was illegally dismissed up to the finality of this decision.
Nevertheless, the petitioner is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages. "A
dismissed employee isentitled to moral damages when the dismissal is attended by bad
faith or fraud or constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or is done in a manner contrary
to good morals, good customs or public policy. Exemplary damages may be awarded if
the dismissal is effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner."61
"Bad faith, under the law, does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence.1âwphi1 It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of a known duty through some motive or
interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud."62
"It must be noted that the burden of proving bad faith rests on the one alleging it"63 since
basic is the principle that good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the
duty to prove the same.64 "Allegations of bad faith and fraud must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence."65
The records of this case are bereft of any clear and convincing evidence showing that
the respondents acted in bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in dismissing the
petitioner. That the petitioner was illegally dismissed is insufficient to prove bad faith. A
dismissal may be contrary to law but by itself alone, it does not establish bad faith to
entitle the dismissed employee to moral damages. The award of moral and exemplary
damages cannot be justified solely upon the premise that the employer dismissed his
employee without cause.66
However, the petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees in the amount of 10% of the total
monetary award pursuant to Article 11167 of the Labor Code. "It is settled that where an
employee was forced to litigate and, thus, incur expenses to protect his rights and
interest, the award of attorney’s fees is legally and morally justifiable."68
Finally, legal interest shall be imposed on the monetary awards herein granted at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annumfrom the finality of this judgment until fully paid.69
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is GRANTED.

The Decision dated September 24, 2008 and Resolution dated March 2, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100188 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The respondent, St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, is hereby declared guilty of illegal
dismissal and is hereby ORDERED to pay the petitioner, Cheryll Santos Leus, the
following: (a) separation pay in lieu of actual reinstatement equivalent to one (1) month
pay for every year of service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months considered as one
(1) whole year from the time of her dismissal up to the finality of this Decision; (b) full
backwages from the time of her illegal dismissal up to the finality of this Decision; and
(c) attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award. The
monetary awards herein granted shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annumfrom the date of the finality of this Decision untilfully paid. The case is
REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the computation of petitioner’s monetary awards.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alifio-Hormachuelos, with Associate
Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores, concurring; rollo,
pp. 148-156.
2
Id. at 170-170A.
3
Penned by Commissioner Tito F. Genilo, with Presiding Commissioner Lourdes
C. Javier and Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog III, concurring; id. at 125-131.
4
Id. at 146-147.
5
Id. at 76.
6
Id. at 77.
7
Id. at 78.
8
Id. at 79.
9
Id. at 80.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 84-85.
12
Id. at 82.
13
Id. at 83.
14
Id. at 60-73.
15
Id. at 86-94.
16
Rendered by LA Danna M. Castillon; id. at 104-110.
17
Id. at 108.
18
Id. at 111-124.
19
Id. at 125-131.
20
Id. at 133-145.
21
Id. at 146-147.
22
Id. at 35-58.
23
Id. at 148-156.
24
Id. at 153.
25
Id. at 153-155.
26
Id. at 157-169.
27
Id. at 170-170A.
28
Ayala Land, Inc. v. Castillo, G.R. No. 178110, June 15, 2011, 652 SCRA 143,
158.
29
Sec. 70. Rule-making Authority- The Minister Education, Culture and Sports
charged with the administration and enforcement of this Act, shall promulgate the
necessary implementing rules and regulations.
30
Sec. 57. Functions and Powers of the Ministry- The Ministry shall:
xxxx
3. Promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the administration,

supervision and regulation of the educational system in accordance with
declared policy;
xxxx
31
Sec. 3 of BP 232.
32
Sec. 69. Administrative Sanction- The Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports may prescribe and impose such administrative sanction as he may deem
reasonable and appropriate in the implementing rules and regulations
promulgated pursuant to this Act for any of the following causes:
x x x x 2. Gross inefficiency of the teaching or non-teaching personnel;
xxxx
33
Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corp./Mr. Ellena, et al., 613 Phil. 696, 707
(2009).
34
Jinalinan Technical School, Inc. v. NLRC (Fourth Div.), 530 Phil. 77, 82 (2006).
35
See G&S Transport Corporation v. Infante, 559 Phil. 701, 709 (2007).
36
See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Brion, J., INC Shipmanagement, Inc.
v. Moradas, G.R. No. 178564, January 15, 2014, 713 SCRA 475, 499-
500;Maralit v. PNB, 613 Phil. 270, 288-289 (2009).
37
G.R. No. 49549, August 30, 1990, 189 SCRA 117.
38
Id. at 124.
39
455 Phil. 411 (2003).
40
Id. at 587-588.
41
Id. at 591.
42
Id. at 588-590.
43
565 Phil. 321 (2007).
44
Id. at 327-328.
45
Id. at 329.
46
350 Phil. 560 (1998).
47
Id. at 569.
48
Rollo, p. 107.
49
Id. at 129-130.
50
Seven Star Textile Company v. Dy, 541 Phil. 468, 479 (2007).
51
Hon. Ombudsman Marcelo v. Bungubung, et al., 575 Phil. 538, 556 (2008),
citing Montemayor v. Bundalian, 453 Phil. 158, 167 (2003).
52
Escareal v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 99359, September
2, 1992, 213 SCRA 472, 489.
53
See Andrada v. National Labor Relations Commission, 565 Phil. 821, 839
(2007).
54
Quijano v. Mercury Drug Corporation, 354 Phil. 112, 121 (1998).
55
Article 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The
employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the
installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses
or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking
unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title,
by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and
Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of
termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the
worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least
his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of
closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to
serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be
equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be
considered one (1) whole year.
56
Article 284. Disease as ground for termination. An employer may terminate the
services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease
and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his
health as well as to the health of his co-employees: Provided, That he is paid
separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to one-half (1/2)
month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at least
six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
57
Leopard Security and Investigation Agency v. Quitoy, G.R. No. 186344,
February 20, 2013, 691 SCRA 440, 450-451.
58
227 Phil. 322 (1986).
59
Id. at 326.
60
Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. v. del Villar, 646 Phil. 587, 615 (2010).
61
Quadra v. Court of Appeals, 529 Phil. 218, 223-224 (2006).
62
Nazareno, et al. v. City of Dumaguete, 607 Phil. 768, 804 (2009).
63
United Claimants Association of NEA (UNICAN) v. National Electrification
Administration (NEA), G.R. No. 187107, January 31, 2012, 664 SCRA 483, 494.
64
Culili v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc.,G.R. No. 165381,
February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 338, 361.
65
Palada v. Solidbank Corporation, G.R. No. 172227, June 29, 2011, 653 SCRA
10, 11.
66
See Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corporation v. Binamira, G.R. No.
170464, July 12, 2010, 624 SCRA 705, 720.
67
Art. 111. Attorney’s Fees.
(a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party may be

assessed attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of wages
recovered.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to demand or accept, in any judicial
or administrative proceedings for the recovery of wages, attorney’s fees
which exceed ten percent of the amount of wages recovered.
68
Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corporation v. Binamira, supra note 65, at
721.
69
See Garza v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 180972, January
20, 2014, 714 SCRA 251, 274-275; Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871,
August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439, 458.
THIRD DIVISION
June 19, 2017
G.R. No. 218572
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
BILLIE GHER TUBALLAS y FAUSTINO, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Accused-appellant Billie Gher Tuballas y Faustino appeals the June 16, 2014
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05589 which affirmed
with modification the May 4, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
172 of Valenzuela City in Crim. Case Nos. 81 O-V-09 and 81 OA-V-09 finding accused-
appellant Billie Gher Tuballas y Faustino guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts
of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Accused-appellant was charged with two counts of rape under separate Informations,
the accusatory portions of which read:
Crim. Case No. 810-V-09
On or about November 12, 2009, in Valenzuela City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused BRYAN T. FLORENCIO, conspiring
together with the accused BILLIE GHER F. TUBALLAS and ZZZ3 , seventeen (17)
years old, acting with discernment, by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one AAA 4 , fifteen
(15) years old, against her will and without her consent as she was deprived of reason,
thereby subjecting said minor to sexual abuse which debased, degraded and demeaned
her intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being. CONTRARY TO LAW.5
CRIM. CASE No. 810A-V-09
On or about November 12, 2009, in Valenzuela City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused ZZZ, seventeen (17) years old, acting
with discernment, conspiring together with the accused BILLIE GHER F. TUBALLAS
and BRYAN T. FLORENCIO, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one AAA, fifteen (15)
years old, against her will and without her consent as she was deprived of reason,
thereby subjecting said minor to sexual abuse which debased, degraded and demeaned
her intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
The case against Bryan T. Florencio (Florencio) was dismissed on October 27, 2010
due to his death on October 15, 20107 , while ZZZ had not yet submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. Records show that before the filing of the case, ZZZ's custody
was turned over by the City Social Welfare and Development Office of Valenzuela to
ZZZ's mother. Notices were sent to ZZZ's mother to appear and bring her son to court
but the return showed that they were no longer residing at their given address. Warrants
of arrest were issued against ZZZ and his mother, but they still remain at large. 8
On arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the two charges. 9
The pertinent facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
AAA testified that in the morning of 12 November 2009, she and Arjay were invited by
accused ZZZ and accused-appellant to have a drink in the house of the latter. Joining
them were accused Bryan, Salvador Sanidad, a certain Renerio, as well as her friend
Mary. AAA got drunk and when she became dizzy she was taken by Arjay and ZZZ to a
room where she was told to sleep it off. She awakened when she felt somebody
touching her breast and saw that it was ZZZ. ZZZ was inside her in a pumping
movement. She tried to move but somebody was pinning her hand down. She saw
Bryan standing beside the sofa bed and accused-appellant taking a video of her and
ZZZ with his mobile phone. When they noticed that she was awake, ZZZ stopped what
he was doing and stood up. He was replaced by another man whom AAA did not know.
He too had carnal knowledge with her. Sometime around 1:00 o'clock p.m. Mary
awakened her and helped her fix herself with Arjay following to take her home. The next
day, she told her teacher what happened and her parents were called to a meeting in
the school and were apprised thereof. Afterwards, AAA and her parents proceeded to
the police station and to the Crime Laboratory.
AAA's testimony was substantially corroborated by her friend Mary and Arjay.
P/Insp. Cordero testified that he conducted a physical examination that included

examining the, genital and extragenital areas on (sic) AAA on 13 November 2009. He
noticed, among others, lacerations in her genitalia which could have been caused by a
blunt object or force or trauma that was inserted in the area like an erect penis.
After the prosecution rested its case, the defense presented accused-appellant.
The accused-appellant denied raping AAA and taking a video of her while she was
being raped. He admitted, however, the occurrence of a drinking session in his house
wherein ZZZ, AAA, Arjay, Mary, Salvador, Reneiro, Bryan and himself were all present.
He narrated that when AAA became drunk she kissed ZZZ, Bryan, and Arjay. Accused-
appellant told ZZZ not to give AAA another drink because she was already drunk and
flirting. Arjay also tried to stop AAA from drinking but did not (sic). After awhile AAA lay
down on the sofa. Arjay and ZZZ brought AAA to a room and left her there alone. Arjay
and ZZZ went outside while accusedappellant stayed in the living room and continued
to drink. While accused-appellant was cleaning up, he heard a commotion. He saw
Arjay and Salvador exchanging blows. Accused-appellant pacified the two and told
them to sit in the living room. At 2:00 o'clock p.m., AAA left the room where she was
taken and thirty (30) minutes later everybody left his house. 10
On May 4, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision11 finding accusedappellant guilty beyond

reasonable doubt for two counts of rape, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds accused Billie Gher Tuballas y
Faustino guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the two (2) counts of rape
charged against him and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the following penalties:
1. In Crim. Case No. 810-V-09, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. He is likewise ordered to pay AAA civil liability in the amount of
₱75,000.00; ₱75,000.00 for moral damages and ₱30,000.00 exemplary damages and
to pay the cost.
2. In Crim. Case No. 810A-V-09, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. He is likewise ordered to pay AAA civil liability in the amount of
₱75,000.00; ₱75,000.00 for moral damages and ₱30,000.00 exemplary damages and
to pay the cost.
Considering that accused Billie Gher Tuballas y Faustino has undergone preventive
imprisonment, he shall be credited in the services of his sentence with the full time
spent in detention subject to the conditions provided for by law.
This decision is not applicable to child in conflict with the law (sic) ZZZ who up to this
date has not yet submitted to the jurisdiction of this court.1avvphi1
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against accused ZZZ.
SO ORDERED.12
Hence, this appeal with accused-appellant raising this lone assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.13
Accused-appellant claimed that the intoxicated state of AAA, the victim, Arjay and Mary,
casts doubt on the veracity and accuracy of their statements. He further claimed that the
RTC erred in finding that a conspiracy existed between accused-appellant, ZZZ and
Florencio.
Article 266-A of the RPC provides that Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise

unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

present.
xxxxxx
Under the said provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or
intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when
the victim is under twelve years of age.
In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by three principles, to wit: (1) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of
the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense. 14
As a result of these guiding principles, credibility of the complainant becomes the single
most important issue. If the testimony of the victim is credible, convincing and consistent
with human nature, and the normal course of things, the accused may be convicted
solely on the basis thereof. 15
Time and again, We have held that when it comes to the issue of credibility of the victim
or the prosecution witnesses, the findings of the trial courts carry great weight and
respect and, generally, the appellate courts will not overturn the said findings unless the
trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the
case. This is so because trial courts are in the best position to ascertain and measure
the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation of the
witnesses' manner of testifying, their demeanor and behavior in court. Trial judges enjoy
the advantage of observing the witness' deportment and manner of testifying, her
"furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone,
calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath" - all of which are useful aids
for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. Trial judges, therefore,
can better determine if such witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to
weigh conflicting testimonies.
Again, unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected, for it
had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying and detect if they were lying.
The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are sustained
by the Court of Appeals. 16Especially so, in this case, where accused-appellant failed to
impute any ill-motive on the part of AAA to have impelled the latter to file a case of rape
against him. When there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the
complainant to testify against the accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission
of the crime, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full faith and
credence. 17
We have carefully examined the testimony of AAA and found the same to be credible,
spontaneous, straightforward and trustworthy, to wit:
MS. CAPONES
Q. AAA, how old are you?
A. I am 16 years old, ma'am.
Q. When is your birthday?
A. January 10, 1994, ma'am.

x x x x x x x x x
Q. Do you remember where you were in the morning of November 12, 2009?
A. Yes, ma'am.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. At 5:30 in the morning what were you doing in school?
A. When I went to the school Billie and my other classmates were there, ma'am.
Q. And what did you do upon arriving in school and seeing them?
A. We stayed in the school and Billy (sic) and ZZZ were forcing us to have a drinking
spree, ma'am.
Q. You mentioned Billy (sic) and ZZZ, who are they, how did you come to know them?
A. They are my classmates, ma'am.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. You stated a while ago that Billie and ZZZ invited you for a drink. What was your
reply to his invitation?
A. I refused because we have a class in Mape, ma'am.
Q. Was this the first time that they ever invited you for a drink?
A. No, ma'am.
Q. How many times have you been invited before?
A. Three (3) times including that incident, ma'am.
Q. Two (2) times before that. And have you ever joined them in any of these drinking
sprees?
A. No, ma'am.
Q. After you have said no to the invitation of Billie and ZZZ, what did you do?
A. Arjay and me went to school and they were left, ma'am.
Q. Does this mean that Billy (sic) and ZZZ did not go to class?
A. Yes, ma'am.
x x x x x x x x x1âwphi1
Q. What were your activities during the day?
A. Because it was a feast day and we have nothing to do, we were just practicing our
dance and our teacher told us to go to church, ma'am.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. So what did you do after your teacher told you to go to mass?
A. After that Billie and ZZZ were in the court and telling us it is better that we should not
have come to class, ma'am.
Q. After that conversation where did you go?
A. We went outside the school and they were following us and we went with them,
ma'am.
Q. You went with them to where?
A. In the house of Billie, ma'am.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. Upon reaching the house, what did you do?
A. ZZZ bought a drink, ma'am.
Q. Do you know the drink he bought?
A. Matador and lollipop, ma'am.
Q. What did you do with the Matador?
A. We drank it, ma'am.
Q. How much did you drink?
A. Five (5) shots I think, ma'am.
Q. Miss Witness are you used to drink that much alcohol?
A. No, ma'am.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. After drinking the five (5) shots how did you feel?
A. I felt dizzy, ma'am.
Q. Would you know how long did it take before you felt dizzy?
A. Long time, ma'am.
Q. What did you do after that?
A. Because I felt dizzy ZZZ told me to have a rest for a minute and they brought me to
the room and told me to sleep first, ma'am.
Q. So upon reaching the room what did you do?
A. I slept, ma'am.
Q. When did you wake up?

A. When I felt somebody was touching my body, ma'am.
Q. Were you able to identify or see what was it that you felt during that time?
A. ZZZ, ma'am.
MS. CAPONES
Your honor, we would like to put on record that the witness is crying.
Q. You were able to see ZZZ. What was he doing to you at that time?
A. He was touching my body and he was pumping ma'am.
Q. Would you remember which part of your body he was then touching?
A. My breast, ma'am.
Q. You said "may pumatong" can you elaborate on that?
A. (Witness crying)
COURT
Q. AAA what were you wearing when you saw ZZZ beside you?
A. My underwear was lowered, your Honor.
Q. But you still had your clothes on?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. And why did he lower your underwear?
A. Because he wanted to do something to me, ma'am.
Q. Can you state what he did to you exactly?
A. (Witness crying)
FISCAL MOLON:
May be we can continue hearing this case inside the chamber, your Honor.
A. His penis was inserted in my vagina that is why he is pumping, ma'am
Q. And when you saw him inserting his penis into your vagina what did you do?
A. I tried to move but there was somebody who was holding my hand, ma'am.
Q. Do you know who it was who was holding your hand?
A. No, but I only saw Billie and Bryan taking video at (sic) us and I think they were
amused on (sic) what ZZZ was doing to me, ma'am.
Q. So would you know if they noticed that you were aware of what was happening to
you?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. So what did you do when they saw you?
A. ZZZ stood up and told them "sige na nga tama na ito kahit bitin"
x x x x x x x x x
Q. You said after they noticed you that you were awake ZZZ stood up and what was
your condition?
A. I felt dizzy and when ZZZ stood up somebody again mounted on me, ma'am.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. What did the second person do?
A. The same thing ZZZ did to me, ma'am.
Q. The same thing meaning he also inserted his penis into your vagina?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. And how did you feel?
A. I was half-conscious but I know what they were doing, ma'am.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. Before we go to that. While the second person was mounting on you (sic), where
was Billie then?
A. When the first person mounted on me I saw Billie but when the second person
mounted on me I did not see Billie, your Honor. 18
AAA's foregoing testimony sufficiently established that ZZZ and another man, later
identified by Mary as Florencio, 19 had carnal knowledge with her. In this case, AAA was
clearly in an inebriated condition when ZZZ and Florencio raped her, since AAA
consumed five shots of hard liquor which she was not used to. When a woman,
especially a minor, alleges rape, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that
she has been raped. 20 When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts
are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her
relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to
which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and
sincerity. A young girl's revelation that she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary
submission to medical examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she
could be compelled to give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so
easily dismissed as mere concoction.21
As to the liability of accused-appellant, AAA positively testified that accused-appellant

was inside the room recording the whole incident. The same was corroborated by Mary
in her testimony. Likewise, Arjay testified22 that when he tried to stop ZZZ from what he
was doing to AAA, accused-appellant pulled and kicked him and pointed a sumpak at
him. Accused-appellant further threatened Arjay not to brag because the latter was in
the accused-appellant's territory, otherwise accused-appellant will kill Arjay.
To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to
have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.
Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular
purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and
growing out of the purpose intended.23 To establish the existence of conspiracy, direct
proof is not essential. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are
indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest.24
We quote with conformity the finding of the CA, as to accused-appellant's liability, to wit:
As correctly held by the court a quo, the act of the accused-appellant in preventing

Arjay from coming to the aid of AAA when she was being sexually abused by ZZZ
revealed that he was acting in confederation with ZZZ. And later when he saw that
Bryan too was sexually abusing the unconscious AAA (sic) did nothing to stop him but
instead went inside the room and closed the door presumably to watch the dastardly
deed being done. This action of accused-appellant showed his concurrence in the
criminal design of Bryan. Not to be forgotten is the fact that both AAA and Mary saw him
taking a video of ZZZ raping AAA.25
With the finding that conspiracy exists between ZZZ, Florencio and accused-appellant,
the latter is 1iable as a co-principal to the two counts of rape.
Accused-appellant alleged that AAA's testimony was inconsistent with the testimonies of
Mary and Arjay, such that AAA simply stated that as soon as she was taken to the
room, she immediately slept and was only awakened when she felt ZZZ touching her,
while Mary and Arjay both testified that AAA was taken to the room, twice. We find the
same immaterial to the charge of rape. Inaccuracies and inconsistencies are expected
in a rape victim's testimony. Rape is a painful experience which is often times not
remembered in detail. It causes deep psychological wounds that scar the victim for life
and which her conscious and subconscious mind would opt to forget. Inconsistencies in
the testimony of the witness with regard to minor or collateral matters do not diminish
the value of the testimony in terms of truthfulness or weight. 26 Thus, a few inconsistent
remarks in rape cases will not necessarily impair the testimony of the offended party.27
In contrast, accused-appellant's bare denial and alibi deserve scant consideration.

Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that alibi and denial cannot
prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of the complainant.
Alibi is an inherently weak defense, which is viewed with suspicion because it can easily
be fabricated. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with
strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. 28 AAA's positive and
straightforward testimony that accused-appellant was inside the room recording the
dastardly act of ZZZ and Florencio, and the testimony of Arjay that accused-appellant
threatened to kill him, deserve greater evidentiary weight than accused-appellant's
uncorroborated defenses.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The June 16, 2014 Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05589 finding Billie Gher Tuballas y
Faustino GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape is AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN BIENVENIDO L. REYES

ATTESTATION
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
Designated as additional membe.r as per Raffle dated March 15, 2017.
1
Penned byAssociate Justice Rodi! V. Zalameda and concurred in by Associate
Justices Ramon M. Sato, Jr. and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy, rol!o, pp. 2-19.
2
3
The accused's name is withheld, he being a minor at the time of the
commission of the crime, consistent with A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC dated November
24, 2009 (The Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) and Republic Act No.
9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) on confidentiality of proceedings
and records.
4
The real name of the victim and of the members of her immediate family are
withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610 otherwise known as the "Special
Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act" and
A.M. No. 12-7-15-SC entitled "Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation,
Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions and
Final Orders Using Fictitious Names".
5
Rollo, p.4.
6
Id.,pp.4-5.
7
CA rollo, p.12.
8
Id.
9
Records, pp. 45 and 50.
10
Rollo, pp. 6-7.
11
Supra, note 2.
12
CA rollo, p. 22.
13
CA rollo, p. 41.
14
People v. SPO I Arnulfo A. Aure and SPO I Marlon H. Fero/, G.R. No. 180451,
October 17, 2008.
15
Id.
16
People v. Anastacio Amistoso y Broca, G.R. No. 201447, January 9, 2013,
citing People v. Aguilar, G.R. No. 177749, December 17, 2007.
17
People v. Antonio Belga, G.R. No. 129769, January 19, 2001.
18
CA ratio, pp. 85-91.
19
Direct testimony of Mary Malto:
Para-legal CAPONES:
Q: Then after that what happened?
A: After that ZZZ, Billie and Salvador went outside of the house, ma'am.
And then Bryan went inside the room where AAA was, ma'am.
Q: Do you know why he went inside the second room?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: What did he do inside the room?
A: Bryan placed himself on top of AAA, ma'am.
Q: Did you see them on the bed, can you describe their clothing?
A: AAA was lying on the bed unconscious and her skirt was up, ma'am.";
20
People v. Edilberto Pusing y Tamar, G.R. No. 208009, July 11, 2016.
21
People v. Guillermo B. Cadano, Jr., G.R. No. 207819, March 12, 2014.
22
CA rollo, p. 107.
23
People v. Marcelino Collado y Cunanan, et. al., G.R. No. 185719, June 17,
2013.
24
People v. Datsgandawali y Capas and Nol Pagalad y Anas, G.R. No. 193385,
December 1,
25
Rollo, p. 15.
26
People v. Loreto Simido y Coronel, G.R. No. 208646, June 15, 2016.
27
People v. Ben Rubio y Acosta, G.R. No. 195239, March 7, 2012.
28
People v. Guillermo B. Cadano, Jr., G.R. No. 207819, March 12, 2014.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 204659, September 19, 2016
JESTER MABUNOT, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the

Decision2 and Resolution3 dated April 20, 2012 and October 29, 2012,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33353. The CA
affirmed but modified only as to the penalty imposed and damages awarded
the Judgment rendered on April 15, 2010 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bontoc, Mountain Province, Branch 36, in Criminal Case No. 2227,
convicting Jester Mabunot (petitioner) of violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7610,4Article VI, Section 10(a).5chanrobleslaw
Antecedents
The Information indicting the petitioner reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

That on or about Sept. 14, 2007, in the morning thereof, inside one of the
classrooms at the Paracelis National High School, Butigue, Paracelis,
Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
[petitioner,] with intent to physically abuse and with cruelty, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, box Shiva Baguiwan, a minor who
is 14 years and 5 months old, on the left side below her ribs[,] which caused
the latter to lose consciousness, to the damage and prejudice of the said
minor-victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Upon arraignment, the petitioner pleaded "not guilty."7chanrobleslaw
In the course of the trial, the prosecution offered the testimonies of: (a)
private complainant Shiva Baguiwan (Shiva); (b) Mercy Baguiwan, Shiva's
mother; (c) Melanie Lipawen (Melanie)8 and James Aquino (James), students
at Butigue National High School (BNHS); (d) PO2 Naida Dumjalan, Women
and Children's Desk Officer assigned to handle Shiva's complaint; and (e)
Dr. Jessie Guimbatan, government doctor who provided with Shiva medical
treatment.9chanrobleslaw
The evidence for the prosecution sought to establish that Shiva and the
petitioner were classmates at BNHS. On September 14, 2007, at around
11:00 a.m., Shiva and her group were sewing inside the classroom when the
petitioner, who was then under the influence of alcohol, arrived. The
petitioner twisted the arm of Michael Fontanilla, strangled James and boxed
William Thomas (William). The rest of their classmates ran away, but the
petitioner went after them. He boxed Shiva on her left flank leaving the
latter with a fractured rib. Shiva passed out and was thereafter taken to
Potia District Hospital, where she stayed for two days. Before finally leaving,
the petitioner also boxed Dennis Kenept (Dennis). Back then, Shiva was 14
years old, while the petitioner was 19. The petitioner dropped out from
BNHS after the incident.10chanrobleslaw
On its part, the defense presented the following as witnesses: (a) the
petitioner; (b) Consolacion Saludo (Consolacion), teacher at BNHS; (c)
Dennis; and (d) Eva Joy Malindao (Eva), also a student at
BNHS.11chanrobleslaw
The testimonies of the defense witnesses tend to prove that on September

14, 2007, at around 10:30 a.m., the class, to which both Shiva and the
petitioner belonged, was doing its Technology Livelihood Education project.
William suddenly threw an object at the petitioner's back. The petitioner
reacted by boxing William. When the petitioner stepped out of the room,
Dennis followed him and a fist fight ensued between the two. Shiva came to
pacify them, but she was shoved, causing her to fall to the ground. The
petitioner posited that since he and Dennis were grappling at that time,
there cannot be any certainty as to who actually injured
Shiva.12chanrobleslaw
Ruling of the RTC
On April 15, 2010, the RTC rendered its Judgment, the fallo of which reads
as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Wherefore, the Court finds that the [petitioner] is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged as principal by direct participation and is
hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) years, 9 months, and
11 days of prision correccional as minimum to seven (7) years and 4 months
of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay [Shiva] the amount of P25,000.00
as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages.
SO ORDERED.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The RTC convicted the petitioner on the basis of the grounds cited
below:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The evidence is positive and convincing that an act of cruelty and physical
abuse has been inflicted upon a female child of fourteen (14) years of age by
the [petitioner,] who was an adult of twenty (20) years of age. The credible
evidence clearly demonstrates that the [petitioner] boxed the left side of
[Shiva's] body causing excruciating pain[,] which made the latter feel dizzy
and lose consciousness. The medical findings confirm that a rib of [Shiva]
was fractured[,] which caused pain even long after the incident. It is not
hard to imagine that a bare fist of a twenty[-]year[-]old male could fracture
a rib of a frail fourteen[-]year[-]old female. The testimonies of [Shiva],
[Melanie], and [James] are found to be clear, candid and convincing
narrations of what happened, of how the [petitioner] maltreated and injured
[Shiva].
x x x [T]here is nothing on record which shows any evil or improper motive
on [the part of the prosecution witnesses] to falsely testify or frame up the
[petitioner,] hence, said testimonies are given full faith and credence x x x.
The physical and medical evidence[,] which show that [Shiva] suffered rib
fracture that caused great pain[,] highly corroborate and confirm that
[Shiva] was hurt by the [petitioner] with a hard fist blow, which made her
unconscious and [led her to] be hospitalized.
x x x [T]he defense of the [petitioner] that he did not box [Shiva], but that
the latter fell to the ground when she was shoved as she tried to pacify the
former and [Dennis,] who were exchanging blows and grappling with each
other, has to be taken with a grain of salt. x x x [I]t is highly improbable
that a young lass[,] who is not even related to the combatants [,] would
dare to put herself at risk to serious and inevitable injury by trying to pacify
two older male persons[,] who were exchanging hard blows. That would not
conform to ordinary human experience; the natural thing for the young girl
was to shout or run[,] which [Shiva] did but the [petitioner] still got near
and boxed her.
[It] is also highly indicated and very credibly established by the evidence
that the [petitioner] boxed and maltreated four other classmates. x x x All
these indicate that the [petitioner] was on a rampage and had no qualm[s]
about inflicting injury upon a helpless female classmate. At his age of twenty
x x x, and in addition to the fact that he was under the influence of liquor,
the [petitioner] easily terrorized and frightened his classmates. x x x The
denial of the [petitioner] can not be accorded greater evidentiary value than
the declarations of credible prosecution witnesses that the [petitioner] boxed
[Shiva] x x x.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ruling of the CA
In the appeal filed before the CA, the petitioner claimed that the injury
inflicted on Shiva was not intentional or deliberate. The petitioner insisted
that he could not have adopted a deliberate design to injure Shiva since he
was trading punches with Dennis. Further, Article 26515 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), and not R.A. No. 7610, should be the applicable provision. A
single and unintended act of shoving Shiva while the petitioner was engaged
in a fist fight with Dennis can hardly be considered as within the definition of
child abuse under R.A. No. 7610.16chanrobleslaw
On April 20, 2012, the CA affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty
imposed and the damages awarded. The CA instead sentenced the petitioner
to suffer imprisonment of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight months and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay Shiva actual
damages in the amount of P18,428.00.17chanrobleslaw
The CA explained its disquisition, viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

[T]he [petitioner] wants Us to weigh the credibility of prosecution
witnesses vis-a-vis the defense witnesses, a task entrusted to the trial court.
x x x [T]he trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of
witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying during the trial.
It is observed that although [Dennis], [Eva] and [Consolacion] testified for
the defense, the court a quo correctly ruled that their testimonies are
incredible and unworthy of belief. x x x [Consolacion] testified that she went
out of her classroom at about 10:30 o'clock in the morning of September 14,
2007 because of a commotion, but she failed to recognize the students
involved in the brawl. x x x
xxxx
Q: You said that you rushed outside, what did you see when you were
outside?
A: When I was at the porch, I have (sic) seen two boys boxing but I cannot
recognize them because I haven't taken my eyeglasses and it was twenty
(20) meters away.
xxxx
[The petitioner's] testimony revealed that Consolacion was at the second
floor of the building, hence, supporting the court a quo's conclusion
that Consolacion did not see the whole incident. x x x
xxxx
The court a quo likewise correctly dismissed [Dennis'] testimony as

doubtful since on cross-examination, he stated that he does not know
Michael Fontanilla and [James] when the [petitioner] himself revealed that
Fontanilla and [James] were their classmates.
x x x [Eva], who was then a third year high school student at [BNHS],
corroborated the [petitioner's] testimony that [Shiva] pacified [the
petitioner] and [Dennis]. We note, however, that she mentioned that [Shiva]
was shoved to the ground [w]hen their teacher, [Consolacion], shouted
which caused [the petitioner] and [Dennis] to run away. A perusal of
[Consolacion's] testimony, however, reveals that she directed the students
around to pacify [the petitioner] and [Dennis] then she saw a lady going
near the two boys fighting. Afterwhich, she did not witness any incident
anymore since she had to pacify her students[,] who were then coming out
of the classroom. There was no mention that she shouted at the [petitioner]
or [Dennis] after [Shiva] fell to the ground. x x x
x x x [P]rosecution witness [Melanie] bolstered [Shiva's] claim that the

[petitioner] boxed her. x x x.
xxxx
Q: How far are you (sic) from [the petitioner] when you said you saw him
boxed [sic] Shiva?
A: Just near him.
Q: Will you point from the witness stand?
A: x x x More or less 2 meters.
xxxx
x x x [James] likewise averred that he personally saw the [petitioner] boxed
[sic] [Shiva].He said:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxxx
Q: You said that [the petitioner] boxed Shiva, did you personally see [the
petitioner] boxed [sic] Shiva?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: What part of Shiva's body was hit?
A: In (sic) the left rib.
Q: How far are (sic) you from Shiva and [the petitioner] when you said you
saw [the petitioner] boxed [sic] Shiva?
A: x x x (4 to 5 meters).
xxxx
Under Subsection (b), Section 3 of [R.A. No. 7610], child abuse refers to
the maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or not, which includes any of
the following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and
emotional maltreatment;
xxxx
x x x [W]hen the incident happened, [Shiva] was a child entitled to the

protection extended by R.A. No. 7610 x x x. As defined [by] law, child abuse
includes physical abuse of the child, whether the same is habitual or
not. The act of [the petitioner] of boxing [Shiva's] left flank falls squarely
within this definition. x x x.
x x x As a statute that provides for a mechanism for strong deterrence

against the commission of child abuse and exploitation, [R.A. No. 7610] has
stiffer penalties for their commission.
xxxx
In the absence of any modifying circumstances, We find that the proper

penalty should be four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days
of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum[,] not the maximum term
imposed by the trial court which is much higher, i.e., "seven (7) years and
[four (4)] months of prision mayor." x x x.
x x x [Shiva] was able to prove actual damages in the amount of Php

18,428.00. The court a quo incorrectly awarded temperate damages in the
amount of Php 25,000.00 in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount since
such is proper only in cases when the victim died and no evidence of burial
and funeral expenses was presented in the trial court.18(Citations omitted
and underlining ours)
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in the
herein assailed Resolution19dated October 29, 2012.
Issues
Unperturbed, the petitioner presents for the Court's resolution the issues of
whether or not the CA committed reversible errors in (1) ruling that the
injury inflicted on Shiva was intentional and deliberate, and (2) applying the
much higher penalty provided for under Section 10 of R.A. No. 7610, instead
of Article 265 of the RPC for slight physical injuries.20chanrobleslaw
The petitioner claims that he and Dennis were trading punches when they
saw Shiva slump to the ground. In Dennis' testimony, he was uncertain as to
who actually shoved Shiva. Thus, the injury sustained by Shiva merely
resulted from an accident and is not within the contemplation of child abuse
under R.A. No. 7610.21chanrobleslaw
The petitioner also posits that Section 10 of R.A. No. 7610 penalizes acts of
child abuse which are not covered by the RPC. Assuming arguendo that the
petitioner caused Shiva's injury, Article 265 of the RPC should instead be
applied.22chanrobleslaw
In its Comment,23 the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the

petitioner raises factual issues. Besides, even if the merits of the petition are
to be considered, the prosecution witnesses, namely, Melanie and James,
positively identified the petitioner as the one, who had boxed Shiva. The RTC
and CA properly accorded probative weight to the testimonies of the
eyewitnesses.
Ruling of the Court
The Court affirms the conviction and the sentence, but imposes interest on
the amount of actual damages awarded by the CA.
On the propriety of the petitioner's conviction
In Villareal v. Aliga,24 the Court declared:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is
not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra
ordinem — beyond the ambit of appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial
review does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the
parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not include an
inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence. x x x It is not for
this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of
the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a
quo.25cralawredchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case at bar, the RTC and the CA uniformly accorded probative value
to the testimonies of two eyewitnesses, namely, Melanie and James, who
positively identified the petitioner as the one who had boxed Shiva.
Besides, even if the Court were to exercise leniency, a recalibration of the

parties' evidence would yield the same result. For one, the defense did not
impute and prove any ill motives on the part of the eyewitnesses in
testifying against the petitioner. Note that the two witnesses were
classmates of both the petitioner and Shiva, and they saw at close range
what had transpired. Further, the defense witnesses failed to amply refute
the statements of Melanie and James. Consolacion was 20 meters away from
where the fist fight between the petitioner and Dennis took place. She also
admitted that she was not wearing her eyeglasses then. On the other hand,
Eva's statements on what she saw were unclear. Anent Dennis' narrations,
he admitted his uncertainty as to who had shoved Shiva to the ground.
However, Melanie and James were categorical in identifying the petitioner as
the one who boxed Shiva. Dennis' declaration of uncertainty pales in
comparison to Melanie and James' positive testimonies. Dennis was then
trading punches with the petitioner, and understandably, his recollection of
the details of the event was not as comprehensive.
The petitioner also posits that since he and Dennis were exchanging punches
then, he could not have made a deliberate design to injure Shiva. Without
intent to harm Shiva, the petitioner insists that he deserves an acquittal.
The foregoing argument is untenable.
"When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are

deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly,
criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the
crime; otherwise, no crime is committed."26chanrobleslaw
The petitioner was convicted of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A.

No. 7610, a special law. However, physical abuse of a child is inherently
wrong, rendering material the existence of a criminal intent on the part of
the offender.
In the petitioner's case, criminal intent is not wanting. Even if the Court
were to consider for argument's sake the petitioner's claim that he had no
design to harm Shiva, when he swang his arms, he was not performing a
lawful act. He clearly intended to injure another person. However, it was not
Dennis but Shiva, who ended up with a fractured rib. Nonetheless, the
petitioner cannot escape liability for his error. Indeed, criminal liability shall
be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.27chanrobleslaw
On the application of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610
The petitioner avers that Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610 only
penalizes acts of child abuse which are not covered by the RPC. He insists
that the acts complained of should fall under Article 265 of the RPC, which
imposes a lighter penalty.
The claim is unpersuasive.
Article 265 of the RPC punishes physical injuries in general. On the other
hand, R.A. No. 7610 is intended to "provide special protection to children
from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination and
other conditions, prejudicial to their development."28 Child abuse refers to
the infliction of physical or psychological injury, cruelty to, or neglect, sexual
abuse or exploitation of a child.29 Physical injury includes but is not limited to
lacerations, fractured bones, turns, internal injuries, severe injury or serious
bodily harm suffered by a child.30chanrobleslaw
It is clear that Shiva was 14 years old when she received the blow, which
fractured her rib. Being a child, she is under the protective mantle of R.A.
No. 7610, which punishes maltreatment of a child, whether the sam habitual
or not.31 Moreover, the Implementing Rules and Regulation R.A. No. 7610
even explicitly refer to fractured bones as falling within coverage of physical
injuries, which may be inflicted on a child, for which an accused shall be held
liable. Further, under R.A. No. 7610, s penalties are prescribed to deter and
prevent violations of its provisions.
On the penalties imposed by the courts a quo
The RTC imposed upon the petitioner an indeterminate sentence of four (4)
years, nine (9) months, and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as
minimum, to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor as
maximum.
Subsequently, the CA modified the sentence to four (4) years, nine (9)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (IS

Law)32 provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished
by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for
the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum
shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
There are, however, instances when the penalties provided for in a special
law adopt the nomenclature of the penalties under the RPC. In such cases,
the ascertainment of the indeterminate sentence will be based on the rules
applied for those crimes punishable under the RPC.33chanrobleslaw
In Sanchez v. People, et al.,34 the Court is emphatic

that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[T]he penalty for Other Acts of Child Abuse is prision mayor in its minimum
period. This penalty is derived from, and defined in, the [RPC]. Although
R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, the rules in the [RPC] for graduating penalties
by degrees or determining the proper period should be applied. Thus, where
the special law adopted penalties from the [RPC], the [IS Law] will apply just
as it would in felonies. In People v. Simon, the Court applied the first clause
of Section 1 of the [IS Law] to cases of illegal drugs. In Cadua v. Court of
Appeals, the Court applied the same principle to cases involving illegal
possession of firearms. In those instances, the offenses were also penalized
under special laws. Finally, in Dulla v. Court of Appeals, a case involving
sexual abuse of a child as penalized under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A.
No. 7610, the Court likewise applied the same first clause of the [IS Law]. x
x x.35 (Citations omitted)
In the petitioner's case, the maximum imposable penalty is prision mayor in
its minimum period. The minimum period is fuither subdivided into three, to
wit: (a) six (6) years and one (1) day to six (6) years and eight (8) months,
as minimum; (b) six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seven
(7) years and four (4) months, as medium; and (c) seven (7) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to eight (8) years, as maximum.36 As there were no
established attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the CA
properly imposed the penalty of six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day as the maximum of the indeterminate sentence.
As to the minimum of the indeterminate sentence, Section the IS Law

provides that it shall be within the range of the per next lower to that
prescribed for the offense. The penalty next to prision mayor in its minimum
period is prision correccional maximum period. The CA imposed four (4)
years, nine (9) months eleven (11) days of prision correccional, which falls
within the maximum range thereof. The CA imposed the minimum
indeterminate penalty w the allowable range, and the Court now finds no
compelling reaso modify the same.
On Damages
The Court agrees with the CA's award of actual damages lieu of the
temperate damages imposed by the RTC. To conform, however, to recent
jurisprudence, the Court deems it proper to impos i an interest of six percent
(6%) per annum on the actual damages awarded to Shiva to be computed
from the date of the finality of this Resolution until fully paid.37chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals' Decision and

Resolution dated April 20, 2012 and October 29, 2312, respectively, in CA-
G.R. CR No. 33353, subject to the MODIFICATION that the actual damages
in the amount of P18,428.00 to be paid by petitioner, Jester Mabunot, to the
private complainant, Shiva Baguiwan shall be subject to an interest of six
percent (6%) per annum reckoned from the finality of this Resolution until
full payment.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Del Castillo,* and Perez, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
*
Designated additional Member per Raffle dated February 17, 2016 vice
Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza.
1
Rollo, pp. 4-12.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez, with Associate Justices Celia
C. Librea-Leagogo and Ramon A. Cruz concurring; id. at 15-36.
3
Id. at 38-39.
4
SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND
DISCRIMINATION ACT.
5
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and
Other Conditions i Prejudicial to the Child's Development. -
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's
development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No.
603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
xxxx
6
Rollo, p. 16.
7
Id. at 17.
8
Sometimes appears in the records as "Melany."
9
Rollo, p. 17.
10
Id. at 17-18.
11
Id. at 17.
12
Id. at 18-19.
13
Id. at 16.
14
Id. at 19-21.
15
Art. 265. Less serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall inflict
upon another physical injuries not described in the preceding articles, but
which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten days or more, or
shall require medical assistance for the same period, shall be guilty of less
serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.
Whenever less serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted with the
manifest intent to kill or offend the injured person, or under circumstances
adding ignominy to the offense in addition to the penalty of arresto mayor, a
fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.
Any less serious physical injuries inflicted upon the offender's parents,
ascendants, guardians, curators, teachers, or persons of rank, or persons in
authority, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, provided that, in the case of persons in authority, the deed
does not constitute the crime of assault upon such person.
16
Rollo, pp. 21-23.
17
Id. at 35.
18
Id. at 23-35.
19
Id. at 38-39.
20
Id. at 6.
21
Id. at 7-8, 10.
22
Id. at 10.
23
Id. at 45-49.
24
724 Phil. 47 (2014).
25
cralawred Id. at 62, citing First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the
Court of Appeals, 553 Phil. 540-541 (2007).
26
Garcia v. CA, 519 Phil. 591, 596 (2006).
27
REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 4(1).
28
R.A. No. 7610, Section 2.
29
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7610, Section 2(b).
30
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7610, Section 2(d).
31
R.A. No. 7610, Section 3(b); Please also see Sanchez v. People, et al., 606
Phil. 762, 775 (2209).
32
Act No. 4103, as amended, otherwise known as AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR
AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND PAROLE FOR ALL PERSONS CONVICTED
OF CERTAIN CRIMES BY THE COURTS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; TO
CREATE A BOARD OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND TO PROVIDE FUNDS
THEREFOR; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
33
Please see People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 234 SCRA 55.
34
606 Phil. 762 (2009).
35
Id. at 780.
36
Please see Rosaldes v. People, G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014, 737
SCRA 592, 608-609.
37
People v. Cruz, 714 Phil. 390, 400-401 (2013).
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No.177580 : October 17, 2008]
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. VICTORIO N.

MEDRANO,Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Challenged via Petition for Review on Certiorari are the Decision1 dated June

29, 2006 and Resolution dated April 2, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 931652which nullified the Decision dated July 19, 2004 of the
Office of the Ombudsman (petitioner), as modified, finding Victorio N.
Medrano (respondent) guilty of sexual harassment in the administrative
complaint against him and dismissed the said complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.
Sometime in May 2003, Ma. Ruby A. Dumalaog (Ma. Ruby), a teacher at

Jacobo Z. Gonzales Memorial National High School in Biñan, Laguna (the
school), filed a sworn letter-complaint3 before the Office of the Ombudsman
(for Luzon) charging her superior herein respondent, Officer-In-Charge (OIC)
of the school and concurrently the principal of San Pedro Relocation Center
National High School in San Pedro, Laguna, with (1) violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995), docketed as OMB-L-
C-03-0613-E (criminal case), and (2) grave misconduct, docketed as OMB-L-
A-03-0488 - E (administrative case).
The administrative complaint, in essence, alleged that in the afternoon of

March 28, 2003, respondent made sexual advances on Ma. Ruby and abused
her sexually.
In his Counter-Affidavit,4 respondent denied the charge, claiming that it was

"maliciously designed to harass and threaten him to succumb to Ma. Ruby's
demand that she be given a regular teaching post." He thus prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint.
While the administrative case was pending investigation, Ma. Ruby filed an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Preventive Suspension,5 alleging that respondent
was "using the powers of his office by utilizing his subordinates in harassing
her." By Order6 of July 29, 2003, petitioner granted the motion and ordered
the preventive suspension of respondent for six (6) months without pay.
Respondent, this time assisted by counsel, Atty. Alan P. Cabaero, moved for
the lifting of the preventive suspension Order on the ground that the
evidence of his guilt is not strong.7 It was denied.
Undaunted, respondent filed a Supplemental Motion for

Reconsideration8 alleging that the Schools Division Superintendent Lilia T.
Reyes had already designated Hereberto Jose D. Miranda as the new OIC of
the school in his stead, effective September 1, 2003. By Order9 of October
16, 2003, petitioner lifted the preventive suspension Order.
By Decision10 of July 19, 2004 rendered in the administrative case,

petitioner adjudged respondent guilty of grave misconduct and imposed
upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service.
With respect to the criminal case, petitioner, by Resolution11 of July 19,

2004, found probable cause to indict respondent for violation of the Anti-
Sexual Harassment Act of 1995. An information for violation of said Act,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 29190 before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Biñan, Laguna, was in fact filed.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of petitioner's issuances in both

cases. Respecting the administrative case,12 he assailed not only the
factual findings and conclusions of petitioner, but, for the first time, he
challenged its jurisdiction over the case. He argued that under Section 9 of
R.A. No. 4670 (the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers),
an administrative complaint against a public school teacher should be
heard by an investigating committee of the Department of Education Culture
& Sports, now Department of Education (DepEd), composed of the school
superintendent of the division where the teacher belongs, a representative
from a teachers' organization, and a supervisor of the division. He thus
prayed for the dismissal of the administrative case as petitioner has no
jurisdiction over it.
By Joint Order13 of April 8, 2005, petitioner affirmed its Resolution in the

criminal case but modified its Decision in the administrative case by finding
respondent guilty of sexual harassment, instead of grave misconduct, and
meted on him the penalty of suspension from the service for one (1) year,
without pay.
Dissatisfied, respondent filed a Petition for Review (with prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction)14 before the Court of Appeals, assailing petitioner's decision in
the administrative case, attributing to it grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ''
. . . assumed jurisdiction over the administrative case against
petitioner, although under R.A. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta
for Public School
Teachers, only the appropriate committee of the Department ofEducat
ion has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and try administrativecomplaints ag
ainst public school teachers.
II
. . . denied him his right to present before the Graft Investigation Officer the
text messages sent by complainant which would have established the fact
that the sexual harassment charge did not actually happen. x x x
III
. . . totally ignored his overwhelming evidence positively establishing his

presence in another place at the time the alleged acts of sexual harassment
were committed against complainant.
IV
. . . found him guilty of sexual harassment and imposed upon him the
penalty of one (1) year suspension from the service.15 (Underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary
By the now assailed Decision of June 29, 2006, the appellate court annulled
petitioner's July 19, 2004 Decision, as modified, in the administrative case
and dismissed the complaint on the sole ground that petitioner has no
jurisdiction over it. It held that although respondent raised the issue of
jurisdiction only after petitioner rendered an adverse decision, "the rule
on estoppel will not apply against [Medrano]" because such jurisdictional
issue was raised "when the case was still before the Ombudsman."16 It thus
found no need to address the other issues raised by respondent.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration17 of the appellate court's Decision was

denied by Resolution18 of April 2, 2007, hence, the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that it
(petitioner) has concurrent jurisdiction with the DepEd over the
administrative complaint against respondent.19
Instead of filing a comment on the present petition as directed, respondent

filed a Manifestation With Motion In Lieu Of Comment 20 praying that "the
instant petition be dismissed for being moot and academic" in view of the
execution of an Affidavit of Desistance21 by Ma. Ruby on September 17,
2007 before Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ramonito Delfin of Biñan,
Laguna, as well as the Order22 of even date issued by the MeTC of Biñan
dismissing the criminal case23 against him due to her lack of interest to
prosecute the case.
In her Affidavit of Desistance, Ma. Ruby stated, inter alia:
2. That in retrospect and after an objective and sincere review of the events
that led to the filing of the instant cases [referring to the criminal and
administrative cases], I am now fully enlightened that said incident was just
a product of mistake of fact and clear misunderstanding between me and the
accused/respondent, who after all,
was not actually criminally nor immorallymotivated to do any form of offense
/harm to my person. Thus, I
am nowretracting everything I said against the accused/respondent in my let
ter-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman dated May 13, 2003, which
became the basis for the filing of the criminal and administrative cases
against him;
3. That x x x, I am no longer interested in pursuing the criminal and

administrative cases I filed against Mr. Victorio N. Medrano, and is now
requesting the Honorable Court [referring to the trial court in the criminal
case], the Office of the Ombudsman or the Honorable Supreme Court with
whom the administrative case is pending, to dismiss the said cases.
(Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
Petitioner opposes respondent's move, contending that Ma. Ruby's Affidavit

of Desistance and the dismissal of the criminal case do not constitute legal
bases for dismissing the present petition and the administrative complaint.
The issues for resolution are:
1. Whether the petition has become moot and academic, Ma. Ruby having
executed an affidavit of desistance and the criminal case having been
dismissed due to her lack of interest to prosecute the same;
2. Whether petitioner has jurisdiction over the administrative complaint

against respondent; andcralawlibrary
3. Whether respondent is estopped to question petitioner's assumption of
jurisdiction over the administrative complaint.
With respect to the first issue, the Court holds in the negative.
The flaw in respondent's argument that the execution of Ma. Ruby's Affidavit
of Desistance and the dismissal of the criminal case must result in the
dismissal of the administrative case is that it ignores the whale of a
difference between those two remedies. In Gerardo R. Villaseñor and Rodel
A. Mesa v. Sandiganbayan and Louella Mae Oco-Pesquerra (Office of the
Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman),24 the Court stressed
the distinctand independent character of the remedies available to an
offended party against any impropriety or wrongdoing committed by a public
officer, thus:
Significantly, there are three kinds of remedies available against a public

officer for impropriety in the performance of his powers and the discharge of
his duties: (1) civil, (2) criminal, and
(3) administrative. These remediesmay be invoked separately, alternately, si
multaneously or successively. Sometimes, the same offense may be the
subject of all three kinds of remedies.
Defeat of any of the three remedies will not necessarily preclude resort tooth
er remedies or affect decisions reached thereat, as different degrees ofevide
nce are required in these several actions. In criminal cases, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is needed, whereas a mere preponderance of evidence will
suffice in civil cases. In administrative cases, only substantial evidence is
required.
It is clear, then, that criminal and administrative cases are distinct from each
other. The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are altogetherdi
fferent from administrative matters, such that the first two will notin
evitably govern or affect the third and vice versa. Verily, administrati
ve cases may proceed independently of the criminalproceedings.
At any rate, an affidavit of desistance (or recantation) is, as a rule, viewed

with suspicion and reservation because it can easily be secured from a poor
and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or for monetary
consideration.25 And there is always the probability that it would later be
repudiated, and criminal prosecution would thus be interminable.26 Hence,
such desistance, by itself, is not usually a ground for the dismissal of an
action once it has been instituted in court.27
The suspicious and unreliable nature of Ma. Ruby's Affidavit of Desistance is

evident. Firstly, her affidavit was executed only on September 17, 2007 or
more than three (3) years after petitioner had rendered its July 19,
2004 Decision, as modified by its Joint Order of April 8, 2005 finding
respondent guilty of sexual harassment. Secondly, unlike her six-page sworn
letter-complaint of May 13, 2003 wherein she narrated in her own Pilipino
dialect the factual details of respondent's acts complained of, Ma. Ruby's
one-page Affidavit of Desistance is couched in English with legal terms
and conclusions only one with a trained legal mind can formulate, e.g., "I am
now fully enlightened that said incident was just
a product of mistake of fact and clear misunderstanding between me and the
accused/respondent, who after all,
was notactually criminally nor immorally motivated to
do any form of offense/harm to my person." Thirdly, Ma. Ruby's Affidavit is
bereft of any factual particulars, engendering more questions that bolster its
unreliability, e.g.: What was the "misunderstanding" between her and
respondent? How was she "fully enlightened" about the whole incident? How
did she arrive at her conclusion that he "was not actually criminally nor
immorally motivated to do any form of offense/harm" against her person?
cralawred
In fine, the bases of respondent's plea to have the present petition

dismissed do not obliterate his liability in the administrative case subject of
the present petition.
In resolving the second issue - whether petitioner has jurisdiction over the

administrative complaint against respondent - it is necessary to examine the
source, nature and extent of the power and authority of the Ombudsman vis
- à-vis the provisions of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.
Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution "created the independent Office of

the Ombudsman." Hailed as the "protectors of the people," the Ombudsman
and his Deputies are bestowed with overreaching authority, powers,
functions, and duties to act on complaints against public officials and
employees, as provided in Sections 12 and 13 thereof, thus:
Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people,

shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against publicof
ficials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency orinstru
mentality thereof, including government-owned or controlledcorporations,
and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken
and the result thereof.
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the

following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act oromissio
n of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act oromissio
n appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient;
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or
employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with
original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or
to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of
duties;
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public
official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith;
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents
relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the
disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity
to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action;
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information

necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if
necessary, pertinent records and documents;
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so

warrant and with due prudence;
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud,

and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their
elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency;
andcralawlibrary
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure

and exercise such other powers orperform such functions or duties as may b
e provided by law. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
The above enumeration of the Ombudsman's far-reaching powers is not

exclusive as the framers of the Constitution gave Congress the leeway to
prescribe, by subsequent legislation, additional powers, functions or duties
to the Ombudsman, as mandated in Section 13(8), quoted above.
Pursuant to the constitutional command, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6770

(The Ombudsman Act of 1989) providing for the functional, structural
organization, and the extent of the administrative disciplinary authority of
the petitioner.28 The provisions of this law "apply
to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance" committed by
any officer or employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, "during his tenure in office."29 The acts or omissions which the
petitioner may investigate are quite extensive:
SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints.' The Ombudsman shall act

on allcomplaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though
in accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose;
or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
Its mandate is not only to "act promptly on complaints" against such public
officers or employees, but also to "enforce their administrative, civil and
criminal liability in everycase where the evidence warrants in order to promo
te efficient service by theGovernment to the people."30
R.A. No. 6770, however, restrains the petitioner from exercising its

disciplinary authority "over
officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Membersof Cong
ress and the Judiciary," thus:
SEC. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions.' The Office of

the Ombudsman shall
have disciplinary authority over all elective andappointive officials of the Gov
ernment and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled
corporations and their
subsidiaries, exceptover officials who may be removed only by impeac
hment or overMembers of Congress and the Judiciary.
SEC. 22. Investigatory Power.' The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the

power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by
officials removable by
impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verifiedcomplaint for impeachment,
if warranted.
In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of the government

and a private person, the Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have
jurisdiction to include such private person in the investigation and proceed
against such private person as the evidence may warrant. The officer or
employee and the private person shall be tried jointly and shall be subject to
the same penalties and liabilities. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
The above constitutional and statutory provisions taken together reveal the
manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow upon the
petitioner full administrative disciplinarypower over public officials and
employees except those impeachable officials, Members of Congress and of
the Judiciary.
When an administrativecharge is initiated against a publicschool teacher,

however, Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers specifically provides that the same shall be heard initially by
an investigating committee composed of the school superintendent of the
division, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any
existing provincial or national teachers' organization, and a supervisor of the
division, as members, thus:
SEC. 9. Administrative Charges. ' Administrative charges against

a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the
corresponding Schools Superintendent of the Divisionor a duly authorized
representative who should at least have the rank of a division supervisor,
where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in
its absence, any existing provincial or
national teachers' organization and asupervisor of the Division, the last two
to be designated by the Director of Public
Schools. The committee shall submit its findings and
recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from
termination of the hearings; Provided, however, That where the school
superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of
the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.
In Fabella v. Court of Appeals,31 the Court held:
The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta
for Public School Teachers,
which specifically covers administrative proceedingsinvolving public schoolt
eachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to
hear public schoolteachers' administrative cases should be composed of the
school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the
local or any existing provincial or national teachers' organization, and a
supervisor of the division. x x x.
xxx
The
aforementioned Section 9 of RA 4670, therefore, reflects the legislativeintent
to impose a standard and a separate set of proceduralrequirements in
connection with administrative proceedingsinvolving public schoolte
achers. x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
Significantly, The Ombudsman Act of 1989 recognizes the existence of some

"proper disciplinary authorit[ies]," such as the investigating committee of
the DepEd mentioned in Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers. Thus, Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989 directs that the
petitioner "may refer certaincomplaints to
the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriateadministrati
ve proceedings against erring public officers or employees."32
In light of this, the Court holds that the administrative disciplinary

authority of the Ombudsman over a public school teacher
is not an exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper
committee of the DepEd.
In the instant case, respondent, although designated as then OIC of a public

school and concurrently the school principal of another public school, is
undoubtedly covered by the definition of the term "teacher" under the
second paragraph of Section 2 of theMagna Carta for Public School
Teachers which provides:
SEC 2. Title - Definition.' This Act shall x x x apply to all public school
teachers except those in the professorial staff of state colleges and
universities.
As used in this Act, the term 'teacher' shall mean all persons engaged in the

classroom, in any level of instruction; on full time basis, including guidance
counselors, school librarians, industrial arts or vocational
instructors, and allother persons performing supervisory and/or administrati
ve functions in allschools, colleges and
universities operated by the Government or its politicalsubdivisions; but shall
not include school nurses, school physicians, school dentists, and other
school employees. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
Thus, the administrative complaint against respondent should have been

referred by petitioner to the proper committee of the DepEd for the
institution of appropriate administrative proceedings, in light of Section 23
of The Ombudsman Act of 1989.
This brings the Court to the third issue. While petitioner should have

desisted from hearing the administrative complaint against respondent and
referred it to the proper DepEd committee, given that it had already
concluded the proceedings and had rendered a decision thereon, respondent
is now barred from assailing petitioner's acts under the principle of estoppel.
He had actively participated in the administrative proceedings before
petitioner. In his Counter-Affidavit, he asked petitioner for affirmative
relief by seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint allegedly for
being baseless.33 From then on, he was assisted by counsel in filing several
motions. When he was preventively suspended for six months without pay,
he filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that "a new Order be issued
reversing or setting aside the preventive suspension Order."34 When this was
denied, he again filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration35 for the
lifting of his suspension since he was already replaced as OIC, which motion
was granted. It was only after petitioner had rendered an adverse Decision
that he, in a Motion for Reconsideration, impugned petitioner's assumption
of jurisdiction over his case. Verily, respondent cannot be permitted to
challenge petitioner's acts belatedly.
In applying the principle of estoppel in Alcala v. Villar,36 the Court held:
Respondent Jovencio D. Villar is the School Principal of Lanao National High

School, Pilar, Cebu City. In February 1998, x x x, teachers of Lanao National
High School, x x x, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative
complaint against respondent for dishonesty.
xxx
On June 22, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding

respondent guilty of dishonesty and dismissing him from the service. x x x.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals nullified and set aside the decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman on the ground that the latter was without
jurisdiction over the administrative complaints against public school
teachers. It ruled that the governing law is Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise
known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, and not Republic Act
No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989. x x x.
xxx
x x x, in Fabella v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that R.A. No. 4670, the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, specifically covers and governs
administrative proceedings involving public school teachers. x x x.
xxx
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals erred when it
nullifiedthe proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman. x x x. In Emin
v. De Leon, a public school teacher was administratively charged with and
found guilty of dishonesty under P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Law). The
Supreme Court ruled that R.A. No. 4670, the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, is the applicable law and that the Civil Service Commission does
not have jurisdiction over the administrative case. Nevertheless, the Court
affirmed the dismissal from the service of the public school teacher as the
latter was found to have been sufficiently afforded due process. x x x. Thus '
However, at this late hour, the proceedings
conducted by thepublic respondent CSC can no longer be
nullified on proceduralgrounds. Under the principle of estoppel by laches, p
etitioner isnow barred from impugning the CSC's jurisdiction over his case.
xxx
As held previously, participation by parties in the administrativeproceedings
without raising any
objection thereto bars them fromraising any jurisdictional
infirmity after an adverse decisionis rendered against them. x x x.
Notably, in his Counter-Affidavit, petitioner himself invoked the jurisdiction
of the Civil Service Commission by x x x further praying for 'any remedy or
judgment which under the premises are just and
equitable.' It is anundesirable practice of a party
participating in the proceedings, submitting his case for
decision and accepting the judgment only iffavorable, but attacking it for lac
k of jurisdiction when adverse.
xxx
In the same vein, respondent in the case should be barred under theprinci
ple of estoppel by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of theOmbud
sman. Therefore, the Court of Appeals should have resolved the appeal on
its merits, x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
The ruling by the Court of Appeals that estoppel will not apply against

respondent because he raised the issue of jurisdiction "when the case
was still before theOmbudsman"37 is thus bereft of merit.
The appellate court's citation of Duero v. Court of Appeals38 in which this

Court held that the therein private respondent Duero was not estopped from
questioning the RTC jurisdiction, despite his active participation in the
proceedings before it, is misplaced. For Duero involved lack of jurisdiction.
The present case involves concurrentjurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals

Decision of June 29, 2006 and Resolution of April 2, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No.
93165 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
Court of Appeals which is directed to decide the case on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
1
Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon and concurred in by
Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente;
2
Entitled "Victorino N. Medrano v. Ma. Ruby A. Dumalaog and Hon. Dep.
Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C. Fernandez."
3
4
Id. at 42 - 49.
5
Id. at 37-38.
6
Id. at 40-41.
7
Id. at 77-80.
8
Id. at 107-109.
9
Id. at 117-119.
10
Id. at 120-128.
11
Id. at 129-138.
12
Id. at 139-152.
13
In this Joint Order, Atty. Adoracion A. Agbada, Graft Investigation &
Protection Officer II, Office of the Ombudsman, proposed the denial of
respondent's separate motions for reconsideration of the July 19, 2004
Decision, but the proposal was modified by Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
Victor C. Fernandez as indicated in his marginal note therein, stating: "With
modification. Pls. see Memorandum of Dir. Gonzales dated May 27, 2005."
(Id. at 192-197) The Memorandum referred to contains the following
recommendation:
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it most respectfully recommended

that the proposed Joint Order dated 08 April 2005 insofar as the
recommendation in the criminal aspect is concerned be APPROVED. On the
other hand, the recommendation with respect to the administrative case be
DISAPPROVED. Respondent Victorio N. Medrano is hereby found guilty of
SEXUAL HARASSMENT under Republic Act No. 7877 and hereby meted the
penalty of ONE (1) YEAR SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE WITHOUT PAY." (Id. at
198-200).
14
Id. at 2-24.
15
Id. at 10-11.
16
Id. at 38, 41.
17
Id. at 244.
18
Id. at 275-276.
19
Petition, rollo, p. 13.
20
Id. at 72-73.
21
Appended to the Manifestation With Motion In Lieu Of Comment, id. at 74.
22
Id. at 75.
23
The acts complained of in the criminal case arose from the same incident
subject of the instant administrative case.
24
G.R. No. 180700, March 4, 2008. Vide Paredes v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 169534, July 30, 2007, 528 SCRA 577, 587-592; Barillo v. Gervacio,
G.R. No. 155088, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 561, 571-574; Ocampo v.
Office of the Ombudsman, 379 Phil. 21 (2000); Paredes, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, 322 Phil. 709, 730-731 (1996); Tan v. Commission on
Elections, 237 Phil. 353, 359 (1994).
25
Victoriano v. People, G.R. NOS. 171322-24, November 30, 2006, 509
SCRA 483, 491-492.
26
Id., citing People v. Ramirez, Jr., G.R. NOS. 150079-80, June 10, 2004,
431 SCRA 666, 676.
27
Id. at 677.
28
Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160675, June 16,
2006, 491 SCRA 92, 110, citing Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman, 248
SCRA 566 (1995).
29
Section 16 of R.A. No. 6770 provides:
"SEC. 16. Applicability.' The provisions shall apply to all kinds of

malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance that have been committed by
any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure
in office."
30
Section 13 of R.A. No. 6770 provides:
"SEC. 13. Mandate.' The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the

people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against
officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in e
verycase where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficientservice b
y the Government to the people." (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
31
346 Phil. 940, 953, 955-956 (1997), reiterated later in Emin v. Chairman
De Leon, 428 Phil. 172, 184 (2002) and in Alcala v. Villar, 461 Phil. 617
(2003).
32
Section 23 of the law provides:
"SEC. 23. Formal Investigation.' (1) Administrative investigations conducted
by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of
procedure and consistent with due process.
"(2) At its option, the Office of the

Ombudsman may refer certaincomplaints to the proper disciplinary authority
for the institution ofappropriate administrative proceedings against erring
public officers or employees, x x x.
x x x x." (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

33
CA rollo, p. 49.
34
Id. at 77, 79.
35
Id. at 107-110.
36
Supra note 31 at 620-626.
37
Assailed CA Decision of June 29, 2006, rollo, p. 41.
38
424 Phil. 12 (2002).
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 198732, June 10, 2013
CHRISTIAN CABALLO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the January

28, 2011 Decision2 and September 26, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27399-MIN which affirmed with modification
the April 1, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Comi of Surigao City, Branch
30 (RTC), finding petitioner Christian Caballo (Caballo) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No.
76104 (RA 7610), otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," in relation to
Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of
Child Abuse Cases (Rules on Child Abuse Cases).
The Facts
On March 16, 1999, an Information5 was filed charging Caballo of violation of

Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 which was later amended on May 28,
1999, to include statements pertaining to the delivery of private complainant
AAA’s6 baby. The Amended Information7 reads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
That undersigned Second Assistant City Prosecutor hereby accuses Christian

Caballo of the crime of Violation of Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610,
committed as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
subsequent thereto, until June 1998, in the City of Surigao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
23 year old man, in utter disregard of the prohibition of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7610 and taking advantage of the innocence and lack of
[worldly] experience of AAA who was only 17 years old at that time, having
been born on November 3, 1980, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit sexual abuse upon said AAA, by persuading and inducing
the latter to have sexual intercourse with him, which ultimately resulted to
her untimely pregnancy and delivery of a baby on March 8, 1999, a
condition prejudicial to her development, to the damage and prejudice of
AAA in such amount as may be allowed by law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Surigao City, Philippines, May 28, 1999.
Upon arraignment, Caballo pleaded not guilty to the aforesaid charges.8
Based on the records, the undisputed facts are as

follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
AAA, then 17 years old, met Caballo, then 23 years old, in her uncle’s place
in Surigao City. Her uncle was a choreographer and Caballo was one of his
dancers. During that time, AAA was a sophomore college student at the
University of San Carlos and resided at a boarding house in Cebu City. On
January 17, 1998, Caballo went to Cebu City to attend the Sinulog Festival
and there, visited AAA. After spending time together, they eventually
became sweethearts.9 Sometime during the third week of March 1998, AAA
went home to Surigao City and stayed with her uncle. In the last week of
March of the same year, Caballo persuaded AAA to have sexual intercourse
with him. This was followed by several more of the same in April 1998, in
the first and second weeks of May 1998, on August 31, 1998 and in
November 1998, all of which happened in Surigao City, except the one in
August which occurred in Cebu.10 In June 1998, AAA became pregnant and
later gave birth on March 8, 1999.11
During the trial, the prosecution asserted that Caballo was only able to
induce AAA to lose her virginity due to promises of marriage and his
assurance that he would not get her pregnant due to the use of the
"withdrawal method." Moreover, it claimed that Caballo was shocked upon
hearing the news of AAA’s pregnancy and consequently, advised her to have
an abortion. She heeded Caballo’s advice; however, her efforts were
unsuccessful. Further, the prosecution averred that when AAA’s mother
confronted Caballo to find out what his plans were for AAA, he assured her
that he would marry her daughter.12
Opposed to the foregoing, Caballo claimed that during their first sexual
intercourse, AAA was no longer a virgin as he found it easy to penetrate her
and that there was no bleeding. He also maintained that AAA had (3) three
boyfriends prior to him. Further, he posited that he and AAA were
sweethearts who lived-in together, for one (1) week in a certain Litang Hotel
and another week in the residence of AAA’s uncle. Eventually, they broke up
due to the intervention of AAA’s parents. At a certain time, AAA’s mother
even told Caballo that he was not deserving of AAA because he was poor.
Lastly, he alleged that he repeatedly proposed marriage to AAA but was
always rejected because she was still studying.13
The RTC’s Ruling
In a Decision dated April 1, 2003, the RTC found Caballo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610, in
relation to Section 2 of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases. Accordingly, it
sentenced Caballo to suffer imprisonment for an indeterminate period
ranging from prision correccional, in its maximum period of four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to prision mayor in its
minimum period of six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as
maximum. It also ordered Caballo to pay AAA moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00.14
Aggrieved, Caballo elevated the case to the CA.
The CA’s Ruling
In a Decision dated January 28, 2011,15 the CA dismissed the appeal and

affirmed with modification the RTC’s ruling, finding Caballo guilty of violating
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.
It ruled that while the Amended Information denominated the crime charged
as violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610, the statements in its
body actually support a charge of violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA
7610.16
On the merits of the case, it found that the evidence adduced by the
prosecution clearly showed that Caballo persuaded, induced and enticed
AAA, then a minor, to have carnal knowledge with him. Towards this end,
Caballo repeatedly assured AAA of his love and even went on to promise
marriage to her. He also assured AAA that she would not get pregnant
because he would be using the "withdrawal method." Thus, it was upon
these repeated coaxing and assuring words that AAA succumbed to Caballo’s
evil desires which deflowered and got her pregnant. On this score, it
observed that consent is immaterial in child abuse cases involving sexual
intercourse and lascivious conduct and therefore, the sweetheart defense
remains unacceptable.17 It also found basis to sustain the award of moral
damages.18
Caballo filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on

September 26, 2011.19
The Issue
The core of the present controversy revolves around the interpretation of the
phrase "due to the coercion or influence of any adult" which would
thereby classify the victim as a "child exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse" as found in Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. Consequently,
the interpretation which the Court accords herein would determine whether
or not the CA erred in finding Caballo guilty of violating paragraph (b) of the
same proviso.
In his petition, Caballo essentially argues that his promise to marry or his
use of the "withdrawal method" should not be considered as "persuasion" or
"inducement" sufficient to convict him for the aforementioned offense,
asserting that these should be coupled with some form of coercion or
intimidation to constitute child abuse. He further alleges that he and AAA
were sweethearts which thus, made the sexual intercourse consensual.
In its Comment,20 respondent advances the argument that there was "sexual

abuse" within the purview of RA 7610 as well as the Rules on Child Abuse
Cases since it was only upon Caballo’s repeated assurances and persuasion
that AAA gave in to his worldly desires. Likewise, it points out that the
sweetheart theory, as relied on by Caballo, deserves scant consideration in
view of the Court’s ruling in Malto v. People (Malto).21
The petition has no merit.
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertinently reads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male
or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited
inprostitution and other sexual abuse.

perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: x x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious

conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual
abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age,
the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape
rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the penalty
shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period x x x x (Emphasis and
As determined in the case of Olivarez v. CA (Olivarez),22 the elements of the

foregoing offense are the following:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
(a) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious

conduct;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(b) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or

subjected to other sexual abuse; and
(c) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

In this case, the existence of the first and third elements remains
undisputed. Records disclose that Caballo had succeeded in repeatedly
having sexual intercourse with AAA who, during all those instances, was
still a minor. Thus, the only bone of contention lies in the presence of the
second element. On this note, the defense submits that AAA could not be
considered as a "child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse" since
the incidents to do not point to any form of "coercion" or "influence" on
Caballo’s part.
The argument is untenable.
To put things in proper perspective, it must be pointed out that RA 7610 was
meant to advance the state policy of affording "special protection to children
from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination and other conditions prejudicial to their
development" and in such regard, "provide sanctions for their
commission."23 It also furthers the "best interests of children" and as such,
its provisions are guided by this standard.24
Driven by the foregoing considerations, Congress crafted Article III of the

same law in order to penalize child prostitution and other forms of sexual
abuse. Section 5 thereof provides a definition of who is considered a "child
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." As illumined in
Olivarez,25 citing People v. Larin26 and Amployo v. People,27 the final version
of the aforesaid provision was a product of various deliberations to expand
its original coverage to cases where the minor may have been coerced or
intimidated into sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, not necessarily for
money or profit, viz:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
The second element, i.e., that the act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, is likewise present. As
succinctly explained in People v. Larin:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual

abuse, when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group...
It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a child is
abused for profit, but also one in which a child, through coercion or
intimidation, engages in lascivious conduct.
We reiterated this ruling in Amployo v. People:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

... As we observed in People v. Larin, Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610 does
not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but also one
in which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or
intimidation...
Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the
child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence
of any adult. In this case, Cristina was sexually abused because she was
coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious conduct.
Furthermore, it is inconsequential that the sexual abuse occurred only once.
As expressly provided in Section 3(b) of R.A. 7610, the abuse may be
habitual or not. It must be observed that Article III of R.A. 7610 is captioned
as "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse" because Congress really
intended to cover a situation where the minor may have been
coerced or intimidated into lascivious conduct, not necessarily for
money or profit. The law covers not only child prostitution but also
other forms of sexual abuse. This is clear from the deliberations of the
Senate:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Senator Angara. I refer to line 9, ‘who for money or profit.’ I would like to
amend this, Mr. President, to cover a situation where the minor may have
been coerced or intimidated into this lascivious conduct, not necessarily for
money or profit, so that we can cover those situations and not leave
loophole in this section.
The proposal I have is something like this: WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR
ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR DUE TO THE COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF
ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE, et cetera.
The President Pro Tempore. I see. That would mean also changing the
subtitle of Section 4. Will it no longer be child prostitution?
Senator Angara. No, no. Not necessarily, Mr. President, because we are still
talking of the child who is being misused for sexual purposes either for
money or for consideration. What I am trying to cover is the other
consideration. Because, here, it is limited only to the child being abused or
misused for sexual purposes, only for money or profit.
I am contending, Mr. President, that there may be situations where the child

may not have been used for profit or ...
The President Pro Tempore. So, it is no longer prostitution. Because the

essence of prostitution is profit.
Senator Angara. Well, the Gentleman is right. Maybe the heading ought

to be expanded. But, still, the President will agree that that is a form or
manner of child abuse.
The President Pro Tempore. What does the Sponsor say? Will the Gentleman
kindly restate the amendment?
ANGARA AMENDMENT
Senator Angara. The new section will read something like this, Mr. President:
MINORS, WHETHER MALE OR FEMALE, WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY
OTHER CONSIDERATION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR
GROUP INDULGE IN SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, et cetera.
Senator Lina. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none,
the amendment is approved.
How about the title, ‘Child Prostitution,’ shall we change that too?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, to cover the expanded scope.

The President Pro Tempore. Is that not what we would call probable ‘child
abuse’?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Subject to rewording. Is there any objection?

[Silence] Hearing none, the amendment is approved. (Emphasis and
As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides

that when a child indulges in sexual intercourse or any lascivious
conduct due to the coercion or influence of any adult, the child is
deemed to be a "child exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse." In this manner, the law is able to act as an effective deterrent to
quell all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination
against children, prejudicial as they are to their development.
In this relation, case law further clarifies that sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists when there is
some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues
the free exercise of the offended party’s free will.28 Corollary thereto,
Section 2(g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual
abuse involves the element of influence which manifests in a variety
of forms. It is defined as:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a

child to engage in or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in

any way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another’s
objective."29 Meanwhile, "coercion" is the "improper use of x x x power to
compel another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it."30
In view of the foregoing, the Court observes that Caballo’s actuations may
be classified as "coercion" and "influence" within the purview of Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
First, the most crucial element is AAA’s minority. It is undisputed that AAA
was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime and is
hence, considered a child under the law.31 In this respect, AAA was not
capable of fully understanding or knowing the import of her actions and in
consequence, remained vulnerable to the cajolery and deception of adults,
as in this case.
Based on this premise, jurisprudence settles that consent is immaterial in

cases involving a violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; as such, the
argument that AAA and Caballo were sweethearts remains irrelevant.
The Malto ruling is largely instructive on this point:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child

abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is
unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish "[t]hose who commit the
act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse."
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving

violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having
sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is
exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense.
It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is
on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is
not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import
of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to
minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet
unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its
protection.
The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a sexual encounter
may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the
law should protect her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at
adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should not be deemed to have
validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act
of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special
protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise,
sexual predators like petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly
tempted by the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.)
In other words, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving
rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse. x x x
x32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Second, coupled with AAA’s minority is Caballo’s seniority. Records indicate

that Caballo was 23 years old at the time of the commission of the offense
and therefore, 6 years older than AAA, more or less. The age disparity
between an adult and a minor placed Caballo in a stronger position over AAA
so as to enable him to force his will upon the latter.
Third, Caballo's actions effectively constitute overt acts of coercion and

influence. Records reveal that Caballo repeatedly assured AAA of his love for
her, and even, promised to marry her. In addition, he also guaranteed that
she would not get pregnant since he would be using the "withdrawal
method" for safety. Irrefragably, these were meant to influence AAA to set
aside her reservations and eventually give into having sex with him, with
which he succeeded.
Fourth, at least, with respect to the parties' first sexual encounter, it is

observed that the brash and unexpected manner in which Caballo pursued
AAA to her room and pressed on her to have sex with him, effectively placed
hfr in, to a certain extent, a position of duress.. An important factor is that
AAA refused Caballo's incipient advances and in fact, asked hirri to leave.
However, AAA eventually yielded. Thus, it stands to reason that she was put
in a situation deprived bf the benefit of clear thought and choice. In any
case, the Court observes' that any other choice would, nonetheless, remain
tarnished due to AAA 's minority as above-discussed.
Hence, considering that Caballo's acts constitute "coercion" and "influence"

within the context of the law, and that AAA indulged in sexual intercourse
and/or lascivious conduct with Caballo due to the same, she is deemed as a
"child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse"; as such, the second
element of the subject offense exists.
In fine, finding all elements to be present, the Court hereby sustains

Caballo's conviction for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 28, 2011 Decision and
September 26, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No.
27399-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, (Acting Chairperson),* Del Castillo, Perez, and Leonen,** JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
*
Designated Acting Chairperson in lieu of Justice Antonio T. Carpio per
Special Order No. 1460 dated May 29, 2013.cralawlibrary
**
Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1461 dated May 29,
2013.cralawlibrary
1
Rollo, pp. 8-27.cralawlibrary
2
Id. at 30-45. Penned by Associate Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela, with
Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Leoncia R. Dimagiba,
concurring.cralawlibrary
3
Id. at 46-47. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, with
Associate Justices Melchor Quirino C. Sadang and Zenaida Galapate
Laguilles. concurring.cralawlibrary
4
"AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL
DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."
5
Rollo, pp. 31-32.
That undersigned Second Assistant City Prosecutor hereby accuses Christian
Caballo of the crime of Violation of Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610,
committed as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
subsequent thereto, in the City of Surigao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a 23 year old
man, in utter disregard of the prohibition of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 7610 and taking advantage of the innocence and lack of [worldly]
experience of AAA who was only 17 years old at that time, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse upon said
AAA, by persuading and inducing the latter to have sexual intercourse with
him, which ultimately resulted to her untimely pregnancy, a condition
prejudicial to her development, to the damage and prejudice of AAA in such
amount as may be allowed by law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Surigao City, Philippines, March 16, 1999.

6
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," and its implementing rules,
the real name of the victim, together with the names of her immediate
family members, is withheld, and fictitious initials instead are used to
represent her, to protect her privacy. See People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil.
703, 705-709 (2006).cralawlibrary
7
Rollo, p. 32.cralawlibrary
8
Id. at 33.cralawlibrary
9
10
Id. at 34-35.cralawlibrary
11
Id. at 35-36
12
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 643, 653-
668.cralawlibrary
22
G.R. No. 163866, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 465, 473.cralawlibrary
23
Section 2, Article I of RA 7610 provides in part:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles. – It is hereby declared to
be the policy of the State to provide special protection to children from all
forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination and other
conditions prejudicial to their development; provide sanctions for their
commission and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence of and
crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation and
discrimination. The State shall intervene on behalf of the child when the
parent, guardian, teacher or person having care or custody of the child fails
or is unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation and
discrimination or when such acts against the child are committed by the said
parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and custody of the same.
It shall be the policy of the State to protect and rehabilitate children gravely
threatened or endangered by circumstances which affect or will affect their
survival and normal development and over which they have no control.
24
Section 2, Article I of RA 7610 provides in part:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Section 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles. – x x x x

The best interests of children shall be the paramount consideration
in all actions concerning them, whether undertaken by public or private
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, and
legislative bodies, consistent with the principle of First Call for Children as
enunciated in the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child. Every
effort shall be exerted to promote the welfare of children and enhance their
opportunities for a useful and happy life. (Emphasis supplied)
25
Supra note 22, at 474-476.cralawlibrary
26
G.R. No. 128777, October 7, 1998, 297 SCRA 309, 319-320.cralawlibrary
27
G.R. No. 157718, April 26, 2005, 457 SCRA 282, 295.cralawlibrary
28
People v. Abello, G.R. No. 151952, 25 March 2009, 582 SCRA 378,
395.cralawlibrary
29
The Law Dictionary (visited May 27, 2013)
30
The Law Dictionary, 2nd Ed. (visited May 27, 2013)
31
Section 3 of RA 7610 provides:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. –
(a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen (18) years of age or those

physical or mental disability or condition x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
32
Malto v. People, supra note 21, at 661-663. (Citation omitted)
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 228779, October 08, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM

VILLAROS Y CARANTO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before this Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by the accused-appellant

William Villaros y Caranto (Villaros or accused-appellant) assailing the
Decision2 dated June 21, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 07650, which affirmed the Decision3 dated February 11, 2015 of the
BBB, CCC,4Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 12108 and
12109, finding Villaros guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
rape.
The Facts
Two (2) separate Informations were filed against the accused-appellant for
the rape of minor AAA,5 which read:
Criminal Case No. 12108
That on or about the 27th day of December 2009, in the Municipality of

[BBB],6 Province of [CCC], Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, and by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of complainant [AAA],7 a minor, thirteen
(13) years of age, against her will and without her consent, the said crime,
having been attended by the Qualifying Circumstances of Treachery, Evident
Premeditation, Abuse of Superior Strength and at Nighttime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
Criminal Case No. 12109
That on or about the 29th day of November 2009, in the Municipality of

[BBB],9 Province of [CCC], Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, and by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of complainant [AAA],10 a minor, twelve
(12) years of age, against her will and without her consent, the same crime,
having been attended by the Qualifying Circumstances of Treachery, Evident
Premeditation, Abuse of Superior Strength and at Nighttime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
The facts, as summarized by the RTC, are as follows:
On November 29, 2009, the victim went inside the bathroom beside the
room of accused Villaros. She was still there when accused Villaros peeped
inside. When the said victim came out from the room, the accused told her
to buy cigarettes. The victim could not look at the accused when she gave
the cigarette to him as he was then only wearing shorts. Upon receiving the
cigarette, the accused pulled the victim inside his bedroom and closed the
door. The door of the accused's bedroom is made from galvanized iron and
while inside, he also closed the curtains. Accused Villaros who was then
already naked told the victim to remove her clothes while he was covering
her mouth. At the said time at around 6 o'clock in the afternoon there were
no other persons inside the house because the victim's mother and
stepfather were at work. As the victim refuses (sic) to remove her clothes[,]
accused Villaros was the one who did so. The victim tried resisting but
accused Villaros covered her mouth with one hand while the other held her
hands. Even when the victim was petrified, she addressed the accused "Tito"
as a sign of respect. After removing the victim's clothes, accused Villaros
made her lie down on foam which he used as a bed. While crying, the
accused touches (sic) the private part of the victim for about twenty (20)
minutes and then mounted on top of her inserting his sexual organ into her
private part. When done, the accused told the victim to dress up which she
immediately did so and walked out of the room.
During the incident that transpired on December 27, 2009 at 6 o'clock in the
evening the victim was alone in the house when the accused again sexually
abused her. The victim cried and felt hurt when accused inserted his sexual
organ into her private part. One of the accused's hands covered the victim's
mouth while his other hand removes (sic) his shorts. The accused remained
on top of the victim for fifteen (15) minutes after the intercourse and then
hurriedly left. The accused warned the victim that he would hurt the victim's
siblings if she will not let him do what he wanted. The victim and her siblings
were all four (4) girls. The victim's next sibling is eleven (11) years old, the
third is four (4) and the youngest is one (1) year old. At the time of the
incident the siblings of the victim were in school playing. The incident
occurred inside the house of the victim because accused Villaros had access
thereto anytime.
The victim was already three (3) months pregnant when her relatives
discovered about what happened to her. The victim's belly was getting
bigger when her mother noticed her pregnant condition which was confirmed
positive by means of a test kit. It was then when the victim then confided to
her mother about the sexual ordeal committed upon her by the accused. At
present, the victim's baby girl is with her aunt in the province.12
A genital examination was conducted by PCI Joseph Palmero on AAA with

the consent of her mother. The said examination revealed that AAA had
"deep-healed lacerations at 3 o'clock and shallow-healed sealed laceration at
6 o'clock position of the hymen." Through the genital examination, it was
concluded that there was "definite evidence of abuse and sexual contact."13
On the other hand, the accused-appellant relied on denial and alibi to

establish his innocence. The version of the defense was summarized by the
RTC as follows:
For the defense, only accused William Villaros testified that he knows the
victim because she lives in the house of his brother [DDD],14 [who is also the
victim's] stepfather. Their houses are adjacent to one another. Accused
Villaros has no family of his own and it is his nephews and nieces who live
with him. Prior to his incarceration accused [was] a construction worker.
On November 29, 2009, the accused was at [EEE], [BBB], [CCC]15 repairing

a destroyed house. [EEE] is quite far from their house but is just a walking
distance away. They worked from 8 to 5 o'clock and on said date and after
work, accused Villaros went straight to a friend to sometimes drink alcohol.
When accused Villaros went home[,] he [cooked] dinner.
The accused denies that he had sex with the victim on November 29, 2009.
He claims that the victim is just trying to ruin his reputation. The accused
contends that the victim is angry with him for meddling in her fight with his
nephews and nieces.
From December 27, 2009 up to January, accused Villaros was at work in a

construction at [EEE], [BBB], [CCC]. While, on November 29, he was at
[FFF], [GGG], [CCC], renovating a house. Thus, there is no truth that he
raped the victim on December 27, 2009. The accused denies responsibility in
the victim getting pregnant. The accused does not know why the victim
would file a case against him.16
Ruling of the RTC
After trial on the merits, in its Decision17 dated February 11, 2015, the RTC
convicted Villaros of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the said
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 12108, finding accused William Villaros y Caranto

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape (Article 266-A 1
(a) & (b), in relation to Article 266-B, 1st paragraph of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353 and in further relation to Article
17 of the same Code) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the victim, [AAA], the amount of
fifty thousand pesos (Php50,000.00) as civil indemnity, fifty thousand
pesos (Php50,000.00) as moral damages and fifty thousand pesos
(Php50,000.00) as exemplary damages.
2. In Criminal Case No. 12109, finding accused William Villaros y Caranto
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape (Article 266-A 1
(a) & (b), in relation to Article 266-B, 1st paragraph of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353 and in further relation to Article
17 of the same Code) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the victim, [AAA], the amount of
fifty thousand pesos (Php50,000.00) as civil indemnity, fifty thousand
pesos (Php50,000.00) as moral damages and fifty thousand pesos
(Php50,000.00) as exemplary damages.
No pronouncement as to cost.
Accused William Villaros y Caranto is hereby ordered to be committed to the

[New Bilibid Prison] in Muntinlupa City for service of sentence.
Accused William Villaros y Caranto is to be credited for the time spent for his
preventive detention in accordance with Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by R.A 6127 and E.O 214.
SO ORDERED.18
The RTC found that AAA gave a substantial recount of her sexual ordeal in a
candid and straightforward manner which was actually even strengthened by
her cross-examination.19 The RTC also found Villaros' defense to be "lame,"
considering that he was not able to raise any substantial matter that would
negate the veracity of the allegations and testimony of the victim. The RTC
held that Villaros took advantage of his moral authority, as he was the
brother of the stepfather of the victim, and likewise employed force, threats,
and intimidation to accomplish his lewd design.20 The RTC, however, did not
appreciate any of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances alleged.
Aggrieved, the accused-appellant appealed to the CA.21
Ruling of the CA
In the questioned Decision22 dated June 21, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC's
conviction of the accused-appellant, and held that the prosecution was able
to sufficiently prove the elements of the crime charged.
The CA did not accord weight to any of the accused-appellant's assertions

which should supposedly taint AAA's testimony, namely that: (1) her
demeanor during and after the alleged rape incidents, which was supposedly
inconsistent with the natural reaction and behavior of a woman whose
person had been violated; (2) she did not shout for help despite supposedly
having the opportunity to do so; (3) there was no showing that AAA was
threatened not to report the incident; (4) contrary to what was impressed
upon the lower court, AAA could not have felt extreme fear as Villaros had
no moral ascendancy over her; and (5) despite her claim that she developed
fear towards Villaros after the incident on November 29, 2009, AAA still went
to their house and exposed herself to further abuse.23
The appellate court, however, modified the award of exemplary damages by

decreasing the same from P50,000.00 to P30,000.00, in accordance
with People v. Ramos.24
Hence, the instant appeal.
Issue
Proceeding from the foregoing, for resolution of this Court is the issue of
whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the accused-appellant.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious. The Court affirms the conviction of the

accused-appellant as the prosecution was able to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The two elements of rape — (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of
the girl, and (2) that such act was accomplished through the use of force or
intimidation25 — are both present as duly proven by the prosecution in this
case. AAA testified in detail how the accused-appellant committed the sexual
abuses,26 and this testimony was given weight and credence by both the RTC
and the CA. In rape cases, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the
lone, uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim, provided that her
testimony is clear, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature.
This is a matter best assigned to the trial court which had the first-hand
opportunity to hear the testimonies of the witnesses and observe their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude during cross-examination. Such matters
cannot be gathered from a mere reading of the transcripts of stenographic
notes. Hence, the trial court's findings carry great weight and substance.27
The accused-appellant, however, makes an issue out of supposed

inconsistencies in her testimony. First, the accused-appellant raised as issue
AAA's demeanor after the alleged rape incidents in that it was supposedly
"inconsistent with the natural reaction and behavior of a woman whose
person had been violated."28 The accused-appellant pointed out that AAA
testified that she would not have filed the case if she did not get
pregnant,29 and she, in fact, only complained because her mother found out
she was already pregnant. The accused-appellant added that there was no
showing that AAA was threatened not to report the incident. According to
the accused-appellant, "[t]he records show that the threat happened on the
second incident when the accused-appellant allegedly told her that he would
do the same to her siblings. It appeared that the threat was not even
immediate such that she could instantly succumb to fear."30
The Court is not persuaded. It is well settled that delay in making a criminal
accusation does not impair the credibility of a witness if such delay is
satisfactorily explained.31 In People v. Historillo32 (Historillo), the Court held
that failure of the complainant to immediately report the rape to the police
authorities does not detract from her credibility. Further, the Court in the
said case considered (1) the victim's age, (2) the accused's moral
ascendancy over the victim, and (3) his threats against her, in excusing the
delay in filing the case.
The same reasons justify the delay in the present case. Similar to the victim
in Historillo, AAA was also just 12 years old when the first rape incident was
committed, and was 13 years old when the same heinous act was repeated.
Likewise, a threat was similarly made by the accused-appellant in this case
which, no matter how much he tried to downplay its extent and the effect of
the same on the victim, became a significant factor in both the victim's
surrender to his lewd designs and her delay in reporting the crime to the
proper authorities. These, along with the fact that, as will be further
discussed later, the accused had moral ascendancy over the victim, the
Court holds that the delay in reporting the rapes to the authorities was
justified in this case. As the Court in People v. Pareja33 aptly stated:
Victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be expected to act within

reason or in accordance with society's expectations. It is unreasonable to
demand a standard rational reaction to an irrational experience, especially
from a young victim. One cannot be expected to act as usual in an unfamiliar
situation as it is impossible to predict the workings of a human mind placed
under emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there is a standard
reaction or behavior among victims of the crime of rape since each of them
had to cope with different circumstances.34
Accused-appellant also questions why AAA did not shout for help when, per
her testimony, her mouth was not covered as accused-appellant's one hand
was supposedly removing her clothes and the other held her hands.35
This argument deserves scant consideration. It is important to stress that

not all rape victims react the same way.36 Not every victim of a crime can be
expected to act reasonably and conformably with the expectation of
mankind.37 There is, unfortunately for accused-appellant, no typical reaction
or norm of behavior that ensue forthwith or later from victims of rape.38 It
should be true, most certainly, when dealing with an innocent and immature
child still of tender age.39 As the CA correctly held:
To consider the aforesaid claim would be tantamount to saying that fear is

not a natural reaction to something unfamiliar or unusual but only a reaction
that can easily be summoned or controlled, and its reasonableness,
dependent on the victim's relationship with the culprit; that if the rapist is
someone who has no moral ascendancy over the victim, it is a must for the
latter to shout at the top of her lungs for help and to struggle with all her
might before her rape claim can be given credence.40
In this connection, the accused-appellant brazenly blames the victim for

"exposing] herself to further abuse."41 According to the accused-appellant,
AAA "claimed that she developed fear towards the accused-appellant after
the incident on November 29, 2009, but still went at their house and
exposed herself to further abuse."42
This reasoning is outrageous, if not outright despicable. In his desperate

attempt to exculpate himself from criminal liability, the accused-appellant
turned on his victim who, to repeat, was a minor at the time the rape
incidents were committed, and blamed her for putting herself in a vulnerable
position in her own home. Grasping at straws, the accused-appellant not
only committed the abhorrent practice of victim-blaming so prevalent in
sexual abuse cases, but he also failed to recognize that he made the
irrational proposition that the victim should not have been comfortable in
her own abode. Worth pointing out is the fact that our laws and
jurisprudence regard our homes with much respect, so much so that our
criminal law punishes trespass to dwelling as an offense by itself,43 and
considers "dwelling" as an aggravating circumstance in determining the
exact liability in criminal prosecutions. Although it will not be used in
determining accused-appellant's exact penalty in this case, it bears
emphasis that:
"Dwelling" is considered an aggravating circumstance because primarily of

the sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode. According to
one commentator, one's dwelling place is a "sanctuary worthy of respect"
and that one who slanders another in the latter's house is more guilty than if
he who offends him elsewhere.45
As aptly rebutted by the CA:
Likewise, We find it unacceptable on the part of the accused-appellant to

even suggest that if there is any truth to [AAA]'s claim that she had been
raped, she should not have stayed at the family home after the alleged first
incident and exposed herself to further abuse. At the risk of being repetitive,
the victim here is a minor. She cannot be expected to think and act in a
rational manner. Nonetheless, it is unconscionable to blame the victim and
deprive her of the comfort of her family home just because she was
unfortunate enough to become the subject of accused-appellant's unbridled
lust. Why should the victim be the one to suffer for the beastly acts of
accused-appellant?46
The accused-appellant further shifts the blame on the victim by claiming that
she failed to establish that she employed significant resistance considering
that she did not allege that he used any weapon during the alleged rape
incidents.47 He additionally claimed that AAA could not have felt extreme fear
because he supposedly did not have moral ascendancy over her, he being
only a brother of her stepfather.48
These arguments are downright specious. The law does not impose on the
rape victim the burden of proving resistance.49 In rape, the force and
intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and
judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard
and fast rule.50The fact that the accused-appellant did not use any weapon is
immaterial, especially since the victim in this case was just 12 or 13 years
old at the time of the incidents. Moreover, this case involves a rape of a
close kin. In rapes committed by a close kin, it is not necessary that actual
force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the
place of violence or intimidation.51 The fact that the accused-appellant was
only a "brother of her stepfather" does not diminish the fact that he
exercised moral influence over the minor, much more so in this case where
they actually live together in the same house.
Finally, the accused-appellant puts in issue the supposed failure of the

testimony of the medico-legal officer to corroborate AAA's testimony.
According to the accused-appellant, the "laceration was not traced with
certainty to have been sustained on the date the [rapes incidents] were
allegedly committed. The [allegation] that AAA was raped on November 29,
2009 and December 27, 2009 remains as a mere possibility."52
The above contention is clearly without merit. The Court has held numerous
times in the past that a medical examination is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape.53 As the Court held in People v. Docena:54
Medical findings or proof of injuries, virginity, or an allegation of the

exact time and date of the commission of the crime are not essential
in a prosecution for rape. This is so because from the nature of the
offense, the only evidence that can oftentimes be offered to establish the
guilt of the accused is, as in the cases at bar, the complainant's testimony.
(Emphasis supplied)55
Further, as correctly found by the CA, the medico-legal officer's

responsibility is only limited to finding out whether or not there is enough
evidence to conclude that AAA was sexually abused.56 The medico-legal
officer was not tasked to point to specific dates on when exactly the victim
was abused, but merely to ascertain that she was indeed abused.
In a last-ditch effort to cast doubt on his guilt, accused-appellant offers alibi

and denial to prove that he did not rape AAA. According to him, he was
working in other villages within the same province at the dates of the alleged
rape incidents.57 He contended that the victim filed the case only because
she was angry at him for meddling in her fight with his nephews and
nieces.58
The Court has oft pronounced that both denial and alibi are inherently weak
defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of
the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. Thus, as
between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and
a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to
prevail.59 Further, the continuing case law is that for the defense of alibi to
prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place
when the crime was committed, but also that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity through clear
and convincing evidence.60
In the present case, accused-appellant was within the immediate vicinity of

the place of the crime. Even if the accused-appellant's explanation is to be
accepted as true, he was still within the same province as the place of the
crime. By his own admission, the village he was supposedly working at
during the time of the commission of the crime was "far from their house but
is just a walking distance away."61 As it was not physically impossible for him
to be at the place of the crime, his defense of alibi must thus necessarily fail.
With regard to the amount of damages, the Court deems it proper to adjust
the award of damages in consonance with People v. Jugueta62 Thus, the
accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay AAA, the amount of seventy-five
thousand pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, seventy-five thousand
pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages, and seventy-five thousand pesos
(P75,000.00) as exemplary damages. Interest at the rate of 6% per
annum on the monetary awards reckoned from the finality of this decision is
likewise imposed to complete the quest for justice and vindication on the
part of AAA.63
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The

Decision dated June 21, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
07650 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION by increasing each of
the awards for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages
from fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to seventy-five thousand pesos
(P75,000.00) for each case. Accordingly, accused-appellant William Villaros y
Caranto is hereby CONVICTED of the crimes charged.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe and A. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

J. Reyes, Jr.,*J., on wellness leave.

Teachers Harassed Cases

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Teachers Harassed Cases

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G.R. No.

177580 October 17, 2008

OMB, vs. MEDRANO,

CHARGE: (1) violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of

In his Counter-Affidavit,4 respondent denied the charge, claiming that it was "maliciously

Undaunted, respondent filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration8 alleging that

By Decision10 of July 19, 2004 rendered in the administrative case, petitioner adjudged

Respondent moved for reconsideration of petitioner’s issuances in both cases.

The issues for resolution are:

The suspicious and unreliable nature of Ma. Ruby’s Affidavit of Desistance is

Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution "created the independent Office of the

Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people,

(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure

The above enumeration of the Ombudsman’s far-reaching powers is not exclusive as

SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints.– The Ombudsman shall act

(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;

(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;

(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

SEC. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions.– The Office of the

In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of the government and a

When an administrative charge is initiated against a public school teacher, however,

SEC. 9. Administrative Charges. – Administrative charges against a teacher shall

In Fabella v. Court of Appeals,31 the Court held:

Significantly, The Ombudsman Act of 1989 recognizes the existence of some "proper

This brings the Court to the third issue. 3. Whether respondent is estopped to question

In applying the principle of estoppel in Alcala v. Villar,36 the Court held:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision of

G.R. No. 132164 October 19, 2004

CSC vs. BELAGAN

When the CREDIBILITY OF A WITNESS IS SOUGHT TO

"WHEREFORE, Resolution No. 966213 dated September 23, 1996 and

The dismissal of petitioner Belagan is lifted and he is hereby ordered to be

Thereafter, respondent forwarded to the DECS Regional Director his recommendation

On October 4, 1994, respondent was placed under suspension.

Ligaya also charged respondent with: (1) delaying the payment of the teachers’

On January 9, 1995, the DECS Secretary rendered a Joint Decision4 finding respondent

"WHEREFORE, foregoing disquisitions duly considered, decision is hereby

a) Respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the DECS Baguio

b) Respondent Baguio City Superintendent Allyson Belagan likewise

WHEREFORE, respondent Allyson Belagan is hereby found guilty of grave

On October 29, 1996, respondent seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration,

6. Pablo Ortiz vs. Gapuz (November 1, 1979) for ORAL DEFAMATION

7. C. Ballesteros vs. Gapuz (September 11, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION

9. Mr. Pananin (Beneco Personnel) (October 8, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION

13. Demolition Scandal (May 10, 1979)

14. Incident of June 13, 1979

15. Incident of August 25, 1979

16. Incident of August 26, 1979

17. Incident of September 2, 1978

18. Incident of September 9, 1979

19. Incident of September 10, 1979

20. Incident of September 13, 1979

21. Incident of September 21, 1979

22. Incident of September 21, 1979

23. Incident of September 23, 1979

In his comment, respondent maintains that Magdalena’s derogatory record undermines

The petition is impressed with merit.

The PIVOTAL ISSUE before us is whether complaining witness, Magdalena Gapuz, is

Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a

"SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions. –

"SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party’s witness. –A witness may be