Reviewer in Constitutional Law I

By: Atty. Victoria V. Loanzon

I. National Territory
Question: What is the right of innocent passage?
Answer: The right of innocent passage to the territorial waters of States is customary
international law. In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now
codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea
or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their
exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law,
thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No modern State can
validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in
accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from
the international community. (Magallona v. Ermita, 655 SCRA 476, 501)

Question: What is the nature of UNCLOS?

Answer: UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a
multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zone (i.e., the
territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical
miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the
baselines], and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. (Id., 489)

Question: What are the modes of acquisition or loss of territory under international
law?
Answer: Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely,
loss) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing
multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply
with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial
claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III and are instead governed by the rules on
general international law. (Id., 491)

Question: What is the consequence of classifying the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal
as Regimes of Islands?
Answer: Far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal, Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as “Regime(s) of
Islands” under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of UNCLOS III
manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda
obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any “naturally formed
area of land, surrounded by water, which above water at high tide,” such as portions of
the KIG, qualifies under the category of “regime of islands,” whose islands generate their
own baselines. (Id., 497)

Question: What are the two elements of archipelagic principle?

Answer: The two elements of archipelagic principle are:
The claim that the waters around, between and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, irrespective of their breadth and dimensions are parts of internal waters.
The straight baseline method of delineating the territorial sea which consists of drawing
straight lines connecting the appropriate points on the coast without departing to any
appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast. (Bernas, Primer, 2001edition, page 6)

Separation of Powers
Question: What is the principle of separation of powers?
Answer: The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in the Philippine system
of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in the
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156)

Question: Is there judicial supremacy under the Constitution?

Answer: There is no judicial supremacy under the Constitution for the Court only
applies and interprets the laws. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in
truth all that is involved in what is termed “judicial supremacy” which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution. (Id., p. 158)

Question: May the Supreme Court scrutinize the internal proceedings of Congress?
Answer: The Supreme Court cannot look into the internal proceedings of the House of
Representatives except if the rights of private individuals are involved. In a case
involving the question of whether it may look into the processes of the House of
Representatives, the Supreme Court held: “In this case no rights of private individuals
are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House,
chose to transfer the dispute to this Court.  We have no more power to look into the
internal proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our
shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown. Petitioners must
realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere
which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our
constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government,
more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an
alleged violation of the rules of the House. The Court must accordingly decline the
invitation to exercise our power.” (Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268, 289)

Blending of powers
Question: What is the principle of blending of powers?
Answer: The principle of blending of powers is a principle where certain acts of a
government agency or official require the performance of another act by other person
or organ of the government to complete and validate them. The principle shows an
implication of separation of powers—the interdependence of the branches of the
government.
Question: Cite instances where the principle blending of power is applied under the
1987 Constitution.
Answer: The following provisions show that the principle of blending of powers is
applied under the 1987 Constitution:
The grant of amnesty by the President will be valid only upon the concurrence of the
majority of the members of Congress. (Section 19, par. 2, Art. VII)
The appointment of the members of the Judiciary may be made by the President only
upon recommendation of the Judicial and Bar Council. (Sections 8(5) and 9, Art. VIII)
Every bill passed by Congress shall, before it becomes a law, shall be presented to the
President who shall sign it if he approves it. (Section 27(1), Art. VI)
The ratification by the President of any treaty will be effective only if the Senate give its
concurrence by at least two-thirds of all its members. (Section 21, Art. VII)

Non-delegation of legislative power

Question: What is the principle of delagata potestas non potest delegari?
Answer: The principle of delagata potestas non potest delegari means that all the
powers of the branches of the government are merely delegated to them by the people.
They enjoy these powers as delegated duty. They cannot delegate the responsibility of
carrying out the delegated tasks to some other agencies without violating the
delegation.

Undue delegation of legislative power

Question: How is the essential factor to consider whether there is an undue
delegation of legislative power?
Answer: To determine whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power,
the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The
legislature does not abdicate its function when it describes what job must be done, who
is to do it, and what is the scope his authority. (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481)

Question: Enumerate the exceptions to the rule on non-delegation of legislative

power:
Answer: The exceptions to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power are:
Delegation to local governments of the power to enact ordinances.
Delegation to the President under the Constitution of the emergency power (Section 23,
2, Art. VI) and the determination of tariff rates. (Section 28, 2, Art. VI)
The power of the people under the concepts of referendum and initiative.

Question: What are the tests for valid delegation of powers to administrative
agencies?
Answer: The tests for valid delegation of rule-making power to administrative agencies
are:
The delegating law must (a) be complete in itself as it must set forth therein the policy
to be carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard or the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform
in the performance of his functions. (Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 – The
President cannot create local government units.)
Please read cases involving Checks and Balances.

II. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Question: What is the doctrine of constitutional supremacy?
Answer: Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates
any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private
purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution
is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in
every statute and contract. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408, 431)

Question: When President Aquino declared a revolutionary government, did the

Filipinos continue to enjoy the protection of their rights?
Answer: In the absence of a Constitution, citizens remain to be protected by the
international agreements which the revolutionary government did not repudiate upon
accession to power. The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de
jure government, assumed responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which the Philippines is a
signatory.  Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State “to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant.”   Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the
revolutionary government had the duty to insure that “[n]o one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence.”  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which the Philippines
is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property.”  Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it
as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the
Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding
on the State.  The revolutionary government is also obligated under international law to
observe the rights of individuals under the Declaration. (Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 104768.  July 21, 2003, 407 SCRA 10)

Nature of Constitutional Provisions

Question: What is a self-executing provision?
Answer: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article
II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants
may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-
executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are
fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred
to the legislature for action. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408, 437)

Question: What is the nature of the Filipino First Policy?

Answer: Section 10, second paragraph of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that (i)n the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that—qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when the Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own
inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267
SCRA 408, 437)

Question: Are the provisions under National Economy and Patrimony of the
Constitution self-executing provisions?
Answer: The provisions of the National Economy and Patrimony are non-self executing.
The Supreme Court held in Tanada v. Angara: It is true that in the recent case of Manila
Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et. al., this Court held that
Section 10, second paragraph of Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rule for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.
However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to
the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather
than the rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Section 10 of Article XII is
self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing
provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in
the WTO Agreement.

Question: Cite some self-executing provisions under Articles II and XII of the
Constitution.
Answer: The following are self-executing provisions under Articles II and XII:
Right to health under Sec. 15, Art II (Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792)
Right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Sec. 16. Art. II (Ibid.)
Policy of full disclosure under Sec. 28 ( Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel)
Preference of Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony under Sec. 10 Art. XII (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,
supra).

Question: What are the modes of internalization of international law?

Answer: Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere
of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies
when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force
of domestic law. (Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III,
535 SCRA 265, 289)

Question: What is the nature of generally accepted principles of international law?

Answer: The Supreme Court characterized the “generally accepted principles of
international law” contemplated under Section 2, Article II of the Constitution as norms
of general or customary international law that are binding on all states (Razon, Jr. v.
Tagitis, 606 SRA 598, 673).

Note: The Supreme Court said that the rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva
conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of
international law. “Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation
even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our
Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined
to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as contained in treaties to
which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.” (Kuroda v. Jalandoni, 83
Phil. 171)

Question: What is the nature of the right to return to one’s country?

Answer: The right to return to one’s country is customary international law. The right
to return to one’s country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but right to
return may be considered as a generally accepted principle of international law and,
under the Constitution, is part of the law of the land. (Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA
668, 687)

Question: What is the nature of the right not be arbitrarily deprived of his
property?
Answer: The right not to be arbitrarily deprived of his property is generally accepted
principle of international law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides in
its Article 17(2) that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Although the
signatories to the Declaration do not intend it as a legally binding document, being only
a declaration, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the
generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. (Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, 135 SCRA 706)

Fundamentals of States, Government and Sovereignty

Question: Distinguish between government and state.
Answer: The following are the basic distinctions between government and state: In the
first place, the government is an essential mark of the state. There cannot be a state
without a government; but there can be a government without there being a state. In the
second place, a state possesses the quality of permanence, while a government may
come and go, leaving the state to continue unimpaired and unaffected. The government
of a state may be overthrown, and another government set up; but the state remains,
with the same personality. In the third place, the state is an ideal person, the
government is the instrumentality of this political unity. (Arguego, Principles of Political
Science, 1976 edition, pp.19-20)

Question: Distinguish between state and nation.

Answer: The following are the distinctions between state and nation: First, a state is
primarily a juristic or political concept; while a nation is primarily a racial or ethnic one.
Second, there can be a nation without there being a state; but where there is a state,
there is at least one nation. Third, a state may be made up of one or more nations, as is
the case with the United States; and a nation may occupy two or more states, like the
American nation, the German nation, or the Jewish nation. Fourth, a state presupposes a
government and a definite territory; while these are not necessary to the existence of a
nation. (Arguego, 21)

Sovereignty
Question: Define sovereignty.
Answer: Sovereignty is the supreme power to command and enforce obedience, the
power to which, legally speaking, all interests are practically subject, and all wills
subordinate. (Arguego, 38)
According to Garner, the essential characteristics of sovereignty are: (1) perpetuity; (2)
comprehensiveness; (3) exclusiveness; (b) absolutism; (5) inalienability; and (6) unity
(Id.)

Question: What are the aspects of sovereignty?

Answer: The two aspects of sovereignty are:
Legal sovereignty which refers to the supreme authority to enact laws. The legal
sovereign in the words of James Bryce is “no other person than him to whose directions
the law attributes legal force, the person or body in whom resides as of right the
ultimate power of laying down general rules.”
Political sovereignty which determines the person or body to be in power. It is, in other
words, the sovereignty of the electorate; or in its general sense, the sovereignty of the
whole body politic.

The legislature represents the legal sovereign; the electorate or the whole people, the
political sovereign. These do not imply the recognition of dual sovereignty, for
sovereignty is the not divisible; rather, they are manifestations of one and the same
sovereignty. (Arguego, 38-39)

Question: What is the concept of auto limitation of sovereignty?

Answer: By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of
sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state
power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact.
(Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, 66)
The sovereignty of the State therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered
absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very
nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty
stipulations (Id., 67).

Citizen Armed Force

Question: Enumerate the classification of reserved force units.
Answer: Section 13 of Republic Act 7077 essentially creates a classification of the
Reserved Force units of the country’s citizen armed force. The three units of this
Reserved Citizen Armed Force are the (a) Ready Reserve; (b) Standby Reserve; and (c)
Retired Reserve. These units do not, until mobilized, perform the work of the regular
armed forces. They are essentially needed only to cope with an actual war, invasion,
rebellion or any other extreme emergency. (Cabarrus, Jr., PAF v. Secretary of National Defense,
G.R. No. 180966, June 13, 2012)

Armed Forces
Question: What is the composition of the armed forces?
Answer: The armed forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force
which shall undergo military training and serve as may be provided by law. It shall keep
a regular force necessary for the security of the State. (Section 4, Art. XVI)

Question: What is the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines?
Answer: The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces shall not exceed
three years. However, in times of war or other national emergency declared by the
Congress, the President may extend such tour of duty (Section 5[7], Art. XVI).

Question: May an active member of the armed forces participate in partisan

political activity?
Answer: No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan
political activity, except to vote. (Section 5[3], Art. XVI)

Note: The following cases deal with the “Hello Garci” tapes where it was alleged that
there was participation of the some members of the Armed Forces in the re-election bid
of President Arroyo:
In Gen. Gudani et al. v. Chief of Staff Gen. Senga, the Court held that the President may
restrict the movement of the members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines under the
principle of command responsibility.
In COMELEC Commissioner Garcilliano v. House of Representatives, the Court enjoined
the congressional inquiry on the “Hello Graci” for violation of R.A. 4200 (Anti-Wire
Tapping Law).

Question: May active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines be eligible to
appointment to civilian positions?
Answer: No member of the armed forces in active service shall, at any time, be
appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the government
including government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of their subsidiaries.
(Section 5[4], Art. XVI)

Question: When does human life begin?

Answer: The Supreme Court said that the undeniable conclusion, whether it be taken
from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance and more importantly,
following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, is that a zygote is a human
organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-
defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization. The Court further said that the
fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being complete
with DNA and 46 chromosomes. The Court further said that: “Implantation has been
conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To
adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the
Constitution.” (Imbong, et. al., v. Ochoa, et. al., G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014)
Question: May health care providers be compelled to render health care procedures
if it will violate their religious beliefs?
Answer: Health care providers cannot be compelled to render health care procedures if
it will violate their religious beliefs except in cases of emergency. The Supreme Court
struck down the provision in the RH law which punishes health care providers who will
refuse to perform reproductive health services based on their religious conviction as
violative of freedom of religion. Nonetheless, the Court held that the principle
recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law: While generally healthcare service
providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it
would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening
cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the
right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a
medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily
placing the life of a mother in grave danger. The Court stressed, however, that in a
conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is
morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the
resulting death to one should not be deliberate. (Id.)

Question: What is the nature of constitutional directive in the allocation of highest

budget to education?
Answer: While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution,
Congress is mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education” in order to
“insure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents
through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfilment,” it
does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the
power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of
other state policies or objectives. (Guingona, Jr. v Carague, 196 SCRA 221, 227)

III. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Question: What is the nature of the legislative power of Congress?
Answer: The legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to
such limitations, as are found in the Republic’s Constitution. (Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil.
192, 212)

Question: What is the scope of the power of initiative granted to the electorate
under the Constitution?
Answer: The power of initiative covers all acts of local government units, including
resolutions of the Sangguniang Bayan. The Constitution clearly includes not only
ordinances but resolutions as well as appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section
32 of Article VI provides: “The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system
initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can
directly propose and enact laws or approve any act or law or part thereof and passed by
the Congress, or local legislative body xxx.”
An act includes a resolution. Black defines resolution as an act as “an expression of will
or purpose…it may denote something done…as a legislature, including not merely
physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards, and
determinations xxx.” It is basic that a law should be contrasted in harmony with and not
in violation of the Constitution. (Garcia v. Commission on Elections, 237 SCRA 279, 291)

Question: What are the procedural limitations to the power to enact laws?
Answer: No, bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its members three days before its final passage. (Section 26[2], Art. VI)
Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed. (Section 26(2), Art.
VI)
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase in public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. (Section 24, Art. VI)

Question: When may the presidential certification be dispensed with the approval
of a bill?
Answer: The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of
printing but also of reading the bill on separate days. There phrase “except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc.” Section 26(2) of
Article VI, qualifies two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has
passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and
distributed three days before it is finally approved. (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,
235 SCRA 630, 664)

Question: Is the factual basis of presidential certification open for judicial review?
Answer: The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus or declaration of martial law under Section 18 of Article VII, or the existence of a
national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President
under Section 23(2) of Article VI, is subject to judicial review because basic rights of
individuals may be at hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills,
which involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills
are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard
of review. (Id., 666)

Question: What are the substantive limitations to the power to enact laws?
Answer: The substantive limitations to the power to enact laws are:
Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws.
Congress cannot enact ex post facto or bill of attainder (Section 22, Art. III).
No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
without its advice and concurrence. (Section 30, Art. VI)
Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the
operation of the government specified in the budget. (Section 25[1], Art. VI)
Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed
in the title thereof. (Section 26[1], Art. VI)
Congress cannot enact a law granting a title of royalty or nobility. (Section 31, Art. VI)
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid or employed, directly
or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary
as such, is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium. (Section 29 [2], Art. VI)

Question: Can the Senate version of the appropriations bill prevail over the version
of the House of Representatives?
Answer: Yes, the Senate version of the appropriations bill can prevail over the version
of the House of Representatives. The bi-cameral committee conference can agree to
adopt the Senate version despite the fact that the Constitution mandates the
appropriation bill must originate from the House of Representatives. The argument of
petitioners that the said presidential decrees did not meet the requirement and are
therefore inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI of the Constitution which
requires, among others, that “all appropriations, xxx bills authorizing increase of public
debt” must be passed by Congress and approved by the President is untenable.
Certainly, the framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that existing laws in the
statute books including existing presidential decrees appropriating public money are
reduced to mere “bills” that must again go through the legislative mill. The only
reasonable interpretation of said provisions of the Constitution which refer to “bills” is
that they mean appropriation measures still to be passed by Congress. If the intention of
the framers thereof were otherwise they should have expressed their decision in a more
direct and express manner (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630).

Question: Under what circumstance may the President exercise his veto proper in
appropriation measures?
Answer: Inappropriate provisions in an appropriation bill may be vetoed by the
President as they are to be treated as items for purposes of the veto. Explicit is the
requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to
some “particular appropriation” therein. According to the Supreme Court, if the
challenged “provisions” do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation, they
should be considered as items for the purpose of the President’s veto power (Gonzales
v. Macaraig, 391 SCRA 452, 467).

Question: What are the constitutional limitations to the power to appropriate?

Answer: The constitutional limitations to the power to appropriate are:
Congress may not increase the appropriation recommended by the President for the
operation of the government. (Section 25[1], Art.VI)
A special appropriation bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended and shall
supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be
raised by a corresponding revenue proposal. (Section 25[4], Art. VI)
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriation. However, the
President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice, the
Constitutional Commission may, by law, be authorized to transfer funds within their
respective departments and offices provided: (a) the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting an item in the general appropriation laws; and (b) the funds so transferred
must come from their savings. (Section 25[5], Art. VI)
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation bill unless it
relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. (Section 25[2], Art. VI)
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid or employed, directly
or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary
as such, is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium. (Section 29 [2], Art. VI)

Question: What is the doctrine of automatic re-appropriation?

Answer: When Congress fails to enact the general appropriation bill for the ensuing
fiscal year by the end of any fiscal year, the General Appropriation Law for the
preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and in effect
until the general appropriation bill is passed by Congress. (Section 25 [7], Art. VI)

Question: Does the President have the power of impoundment under the
Constitution?
Answer: The President does not enjoy the power of impoundment under the
Constitution. Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to
spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget
authority of any type (PHILCONSA v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506).

Question: What is the doctrine of augmentation?

Answer: Under the doctrine of augmentation, the transfer of funds or appropriations by
law is impermissible or illegal. However, the President, the Senate President, the
Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice, the Constitutional Commission may, by law, be
authorized to transfer funds within their respective departments and offices provided:
(a) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting an item in the general appropriation
laws; and (b) the funds so transferred must come from their savings. (Section 25[5],
Art. VI)

Note: The relevant cases here are: Araullo v. President Aquino; Demetria v. Alba; and
Goh v. Bayron.

Question: What are to requisites for a valid augmentation?

Answer: The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), supra,
must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the
Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their
respective offices; and
The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices. (Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III,
President of the Republic of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014, 728
SCRA 1, 131-132).

Note: By providing that the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be
authorized to augment any item in the GAA “for their respective offices,” Section 25 (5),
supra, has delineated borders between their offices, such that funds appropriated for
one office are prohibited from crossing over to another office even in the guise of
augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds cross-
border transfers or cross-borders augmentations (Araullo v. Aquino III, 728 SCRA 1,
157).

Question: Are cross-border transfer of funds allowed under the Constitution?

Answer: Cross-border transfers of funds, whether as an augmentation or aid to other
agencies, are unconstitutional. Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-
border transfers of funds, the plain text of Section 25(5) of Article VI, disallowing cross-
border transfers was disobeyed. Cross-border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as
aid, were prohibited under Section 25(5). (Id., p. 164)

Question: What are the guiding principles in determining what savings mean under
the contemplation of the power of augmentation?
Answer: The first principle is that Congress wields the power of the purse. Congress
decides how the budget will be spent; what PAPS to fund; and the amounts of money to
be spent for each PAP.
The second principle is that the Executive, as the department of the Government tasked
to enforce the laws, is expected faithfully to execute the GAA and to spend the budget in
accordance with the provisions of the GAA. The Executive is expected to faithfully to
implement the PAPs for which Congress allocated funds, and limit the expenditures
within the allocations, unless exigencies result to deficiencies for which augmentation is
authorized, subject to conditions provided by law.
The third principle is that in making the President’s power to augment operative under
the GAA, Congress recognizes the need for flexibility in budget execution. In so doing,
Congress diminishes its own power of the purse, for it delegates a fraction of its power
to the Executive. But Congress does not thereby allow the Executive to override its
authority over the purse as to let the Executive exceed its delegated authority.
And the fourth principle is that savings should be actual. “Actual” denotes something
that is real or substantial, or something that exists presently in fact, as opposed to
something that is merely theoretical, possible, potential or hypothetical (Araullo v.
Aquino III, 728 SCRA 1, 136).

Question: Define Pork Barrel.

Answer: The Supreme Court defined the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of
rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds,
primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations
of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members.

Question: What are the two types of pork barrel?

Answer: The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary
funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-
sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized
into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization
through various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In the case of Belgica v.
Ochoa, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as
Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows
individual legislators to wield a collective power; and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is defined as a kind of lump-sum,
discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner of its
utilization. (Belgica, et. al., v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)

Question: Does the congressional pork barrel conform to the principle of separation
of powers?
Answer: Congressional Pork Barrel System violates the principle of separation of
powers. According to the Supreme Court, these post-enactment measures which govern
the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to
functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue
of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate
in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including
"the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation
and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle. The
fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated – from
the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or
any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. That the said
authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its
unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore
abandon its ruling in Philconsa* which sanctioned the conduct of legislator’s
identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such,
respondents’ reliance on the same falters altogether.” (Id.)

Note: *PHILCONSA v. DBM Sec. Enriquez resolved the issue of the nature of the
Countryside Development Fund. In that case, the Court held that there was no
interference on the part of the members of Congress in identifying projects for its
congressional districts as the act is purely recommendatory.

Question: Are there permissible post-enactment congressional measures?

Answer: Yes, there are permissible post-enactment congressional measures. Any post-
enactment congressional measure should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In
particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) Scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation; and
(2) Investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power
of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. (ABAKADA GURO v. Purisima, G.R.
No. 166715, August 14, 2008)

Legislative Investigations
Question: What is the scope of the power of congressional inquiry?
Answer: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected. (Section 21, Art. VI)

Note: In Balag v. Senate, the Court upheld the constitutional protection of Balag to his
right of liberty.

Question: What are the limitations on the conduct of congressional inquiry?

Answer: Section 21 has made explicit the limitations on the power of legislative
investigation: (1) it must be in aid of legislation; (2) it must be in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure; and (3) the rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected.

Question: What is the rule on publication in the conduct of congressional inquiry?

Answer: The publication of the rules of procedure gives the notice that is required for
due process since investigations can affect the rights of non-members of Congress.
Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is ‘continuing,’ as it is not
dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its
members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business, the Senate of each
Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it.
(Neri v. Senate, G.R. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77; 564 SCRA 152)

Note: Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “[t]) the
Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure.” The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of
which had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitute
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[l]aws shall
take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the
Officail Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.” (Garcillano
v. House of Representatives, 575 SCRA 170, 190-191)
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet
form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tanada v. Tuvera ruling which
requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules ‘shall take effect seven
(7) days after publication in two (3) newspapers of general circulation,” precluding any
other form of publication.
Publication in accordance with Tanada is mandatory to comply with the due process
requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who
violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate (Id., 195,
citing Jusitce Carpio).

Question: Who may be summoned to a congressional inquiry?

Answer: The Court in Senate v. Ermita specified who may and who may not be
summoned to Section 21 hearings. Under this rule, even a Department Head, who is an
alter ego of the President, may be summoned. Anyone, except the President and Justices
of the Supreme Court, may be summoned.
Question: What is the basis of the power of Congress to compel appearance in the
conduct of congressional inquiry?
Answer: The power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution find their
basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal
branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by
refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its
power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is
by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the
President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress
except through the power of impeachment. It is based on the President’s being the
highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal
branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. By the same
token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry.
Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member
thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal
autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary. (Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA
1)

Question: May the prevent appearance of members of cabinet in legislative inquiry

under Sections 21 and 22 of the Constitution?
Answer: In Senate v. Ermita, Executive Order No. 464 was issued by the President
directing cabinet and other officials of the Executive Department to secure permission
of the President first before attending any invitation from the Congress to appear as
resource persons in its investigation. It was challenged for impinging the power of the
Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation. In resolving the petition, the SC
interprets the nature and scope of the power of investigations of the Congress under
Section 21 and Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution.
Section 1 of E.O. 464 cannot be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries
in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
However, the Court held that Section 1 of E.O. 464, in view of its specific reference to
Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries
in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of
department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22
of Article VI. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1,
limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under
Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the
question hour is discretionary on their part.

Question: What is the extent of the questions which may be propounded to a witness
during the conduct of the congressional inquiry?
Answer: Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a
legislative body to make, The court said that the investigating committee has the power
to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course
to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the
jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the
exercise of power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a
Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness
to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry.
But from this it does not follow that every question that may be propounded to a
witness must be material to any proposed or possible legislation. In other words, the
materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of
the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The
reason is that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and
character of the action itself is determined by the sum total of the information to be
gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information
elicited from a single question. (Renault v. Nazazreno, 87 Phil. 29, 49)

Question: May Congress cite a person in contempt during the conduct of

congressional inquiry?
Answer: The exercise by the Congress or by any of its committees of the power to
punish contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation. As the branch of the
government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, it
can assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it. Such power is sui
generis, as it attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se, but to the
sovereign character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate
branches of government (Standard Charter Bank (Philippine Branch) v. Senate
Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 541 SCRA 456, 474).

Question: Who may claim executive privilege?

Answer: Only the President may claim executive privilege. Executive privilege is
recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the
fulfilment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those
instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly
important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus
premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an
exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the
necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing
that obligation in a particular case. In light of this highly exceptional nature of the
privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the
privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on
her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By
order of the President," which means that he personally consulted with her. The
privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in
the executive. (Neri v. Various Committees of the Senate)

Note: Congress has the right to know the nature of executive privilege claimed by
refusing official. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers
the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the
President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the
President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in
the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. That the
message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of
privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to
the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it
has requested. (Neri v. Various Senate Committees, supra)
In Sereno v. COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND RELATED MATTERS (CTRM) OF THE
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (G.R. No. 175210, February
01, 2016), the Court held that the information sought fell within the concept of
established privilege provided by jurisprudence under Section 3 (c) of Rule IV of the
Rules Implementing R.A. No. 6713, the May 23, 2005 meeting being regarded as a
closed-door Cabinet meeting.

Question: May the President prevent members of the armed forces from testifying
before legislative investigations?
Answer: The President has constitutional authority to prevent member of the armed
forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry by virtue of his power as commander-
in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable
under military justice. (Gudani v. Senga, 496 SCRA 671, 701)

Note: If the President is not inclined to allow the appearance, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. (Id.)

Question: What is the basis for the authority to prevent military officers from
attending legislative inquiry?
Answer: The ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before
Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as
commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces.
The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same
limitations as in executive privilege (Id.).

Residence qualification for members of Congress

Question: What is the concept of residence as a qualification to seek a public office?
Answer: When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birth place to improve
his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or
business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from the place of
his professional or business activities; so there he registers as voter as he has the
qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose
the officials who are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin,
has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a
place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute
abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and
longing of every person to return to the place of his birth. This strong feeling of
attachment to the place of one’s birth must be overcome by positive proof of
abandonment for another. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 301)

Legislative apportionment
Question: What is legislative apportionment?
Answer: Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the
determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or other
subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative
body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to
equalize population and voting power among the districts. Reapportionment, on the
other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by
changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation. (Bagabuyo v. Commission on Elections, 573 SCRA 290)

Question: Is a legislative district a political unit?

Answer: A legislative district is not a political unit. It is not a political subdivision
through which functions of government are carried out. It can more appropriately be
described as a representative unit that may or may not encompass the whole of a city or
a province, but unlike the latter, it is not a corporate unit. Not being a corporate unit, a
district does not act for and in behalf of the people comprising the district; it merely
delineates the areas occupied by the people who will choose a representative in their
national affairs (Id.).

Question: Does the creation of a congressional district require a plebiscite?

Answer: Since a legislative district is not a political subdivision, there is no need to
conduct a plebiscite.

Question: Is plebiscite required in the creation of a local government unit?

Answer: As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an "instrumentality of the
state in carrying out the functions of government." As a corporate entity with a distinct
and separate juridical personality from the State, it exercises special functions for the
sole benefit of its constituents. It acts as "an agency of the community in the
administration of local affairs" and the mediums through which the people act in their
corporate capacity on local concerns. In light of these roles, the Constitution saw it fit to
expressly secure the consent of the people affected by the creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundaries of local government units through a plebiscite (Id.).

Party-list System
Question: What are the four parameters under the party list system?
Answer: The four parameters under the party-list system are:
Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of Representatives
is the maximum number of seats available to party-list organizations such that there is
automatically one party-list seat for every four existing district representative.
Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a
party-list organization one seat. The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first
round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two percent of the total party-list
votes.
The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats,
shall be distributed to the party-list organizations including those that received less
than two percent of the total votes. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold as it applies to the allocation of the additional seats is now unconstitutional
because this threshold mathematically and physically prevents the filing up of the party-
list seats.
The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to
prevent any party from dominating the party-list system. (BANAT v. COMELEC, 592
SCRA 295, 313)

Question: What is the formula in the computation of additional seats under the
BANAT v. COMELEC?
Answer: In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be
included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-
percenter.  Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional
seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed
seats.  Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. In declaring the two percent threshold
unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional to the two-percenters.  The
percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the
number of votes garnered by each party by the total number of votes cast for party-list
candidates.  
There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is
multiplied by the remaining available seats, which is the difference between the
maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the guaranteed seats of the
two-percenters.  The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the
remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available
seats. Second, step is to assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until
all available seats are completely distributed.   All of the remaining seats are distributed
in the second round of seat allocation.  Finally, there is a need to apply the three-seat
cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
(BANAT v. COMELEC, supra).

Question: Are invalid votes considered in the appreciation of the admissible votes
for the party-list elections?
Answer: The total votes cast for the party-list system include those votes made for
party-list groups indicated in the ballot regardless of the pendency of their motions for
reconsideration or petitions before any tribunal in relation to their cancellation or
disqualification cases. However, votes made for those party-list groups whose
disqualification attained finality prior to the elections should be excluded if the
electorate is notified of the finality of their disqualification by the Commission on
Elections. The divisor shall also not include invalid votes. (Alliance for Rural and
Agrarian Reconstruction, Inv. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192803, December
10, 2013, 712 SCRA 54, 89)

Question: Who may participate under the party list system?

Answer: The following may participate under the party-list system:
National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector. A national political party which participates in the party list
system is precluded from fielding candidates in the regular congressional district.
Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidate in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or
lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisher folk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.

Question: What are the guidelines governing the nominees under the party list
system?
Answer: A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent
the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of the
sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or those who lack “well-
defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must
have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national
and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
National, regional and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some
of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified. (Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 204486,
April 2, 2013, 694 SCRA 486)

Note: One need not be a bonafide member of the party list to become its nominee. It is
sufficient that one believes and supports the advocacy of the accredited sectoral party.

Parliamentary Privileges
Question: What is the rationale behind the parliamentary privileges extended to the
members of Congress?
Answer: Parliamentary privilege of speech and debate aims to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge the public trust with firmness and success for
it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that
he should be protected from the resentment of everyone, however powerful, to whom
the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense. (Osmena, Jr. v. Pendatun)

Question: What utterances are protected under the parliamentary privilege

speech?
Answer: To come under the privilege, it is not essential that the Congress be in session
where the utterance is made. What is essential is that the utterance must constitute
“legislative action,” that is, it must be part of the deliberative and communicative
process by which legislators participate in committee or congressional proceedings in
the consideration of proposed legislation or of other matters which the Constitution has
place within the jurisdiction of the Congress. (Bernas, Primer,2011: 233)
Note: In Pobre v. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, the Court upheld the parliamentary
privilege of Sen. Defensor-Santiago despite the fact that she referred to the Supreme
Court as a court of idiots and that she could spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban.

Question: What are the restrictions on the parliamentary privilege of freedom from
arrest?
Answer: The parliamentary privilege of freedom from arrest is limited to (a) offenses
punishable by not more than six years while (b) the Congress is in session. The privilege
is not applicable to members of the Congress who has been convicted already.

Note: In People v. Jalosjos, the Court held that after his conviction, Congressman Jalosjos
cannot invoke his freedom from arrest.
In Sen. Trillanes v. Hon. Judge Pimentel, the Court held that during his trial, Sen.
Trillanes cannot be allowed to attend the plenary sessions in the Senate and to
participate in the Committee hearings of which he is a member.

Question: Cite the prohibitions which are imposed by the Constitution upon
members of Congress.
Answer: The prohibitions which are imposed by the Constitution upon members of
Congress are:
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during
his term without forfeiting his seat. (Section 13, Art. VI)
No member of the Congress shall be appointed to any office which may have been
created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
(Section 10, Art. VI)
No member of Congress may appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the
Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. (Section 14, Art.
VI).
No member of Congress shall directly or indirectly be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporations, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. (Section 14, Art. VI)
No member of Congress shall intervene in any matter before any office of the
government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account
of his office. (Section 14, Art. VI)

Question: What are the non-legislative powers of Congress?

Answer: The non-legislative powers of Congress include the following:
By vote of 2/3rd of both House, in joint session assembled, voting separately, Congress
shall have the sole power to declare the existence of war. (Section 23[3], Art. VI)
The Senate’s power to concur treaties or international agreements entered into by the
President requiring at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate. (Section 21, Art. VI).
To act as canvassing body for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections and to
proclaim the persons duly elected. (Section 4, paragraphs 5 and 6, Art. VII)
The power to concur to the amnesty granted by the President. (Section 19, Art. VII)
The House of Representatives has the power to initiate the impeachment process
against any of the impeachable officers enumerated in the Constitution. (Section 3[1],
Art. XI)
The Senate’s power to try and decide all impeachment cases. (Section 3[6], Art. XI)

Question: Is the act of committing plagiarism in a ponencia considered an

impeachable offense?
Answer: Only Congress, as the exclusive disciplining authority of all impeachable
officers, can decide in a non-criminal, non-civil proceeding whether a sitting Justice of
this Court has committed plagiarism. Plagiarism is a betrayal of public trust because, as
the majority puts it, “to plagiarize is to steal and pass off as one’s own the ideas of
another.” (In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. against Associate Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo, 642 SCRA 11, February 8 , 2011, Carpio, Dissenting, 31-32)

Journal
Question: What is a congressional journal?
Answer: A journal is the official record of the proceedings of the House concerned. It is
the official repository of the business and activities undertaken by the House or the
Senate. Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings. (Section 16[6], Art. VII)

Question: What is the probative value of the journal?

Answer: The Journal is conclusive upon the courts. (United States v. Pons, 34 Phil. 729)

Note: In United States v. Pons, the Court had the occasion to discuss the concept of sine
die (without a day). It held that it is customary under parliamentary rules to literally
stop the clock and consider all matters approved after 12 midnight of the session last to
be considered as they were approved on the day itself.

Enrolled Bill
Question: What is the Enrolled Bill doctrine?
Answer: Under the Enrolled Bill doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the
House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that such bill was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.
(Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268)

Question: What is the probative value of enrolled bill?

Answer: The enrolled bill is the official copy of approved legislation and bears the
certification of the presiding officer of the legislative body. The respect due to a coequal
department requires the courts to accept the certification of the presiding officer of the
legislative body as conclusive assurance that the bill so certified is authentic. (Bernas,
Primer, 239).

Electoral Tribunal
Question: What is the primary function of the electoral tribunal?
Answer: Although the composition of the Electoral Tribunal is predominantly
legislative, the function of this body is purely judicial, to be discharged, on the basis
solely of legal considerations without regard to political, personal and other irrelevant
considerations. (Lerias v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 202 SCRA 808,
818)
The Electoral Tribunal of each House is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of their respective members. (Section 17, Art. VI).

Commission on Appointments
Question: What is the principal function of the Commission on Appointments?
Answer: The principal function of the Commission on Appointments is either to confirm
or reject nominations made by the President in the exercise of his power to appoint.
(Section 18, Art. VI)

Question: Who are the public officers subject to confirmation by the Commission of
Appointments?
Answer: The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
All members of the Civil Service Commission, the COMELEC and the Commission on
Audit as well as the four regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council are subject to
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. (Section 16, Article VII)

Question: What are the conditions for the grant of emergency powers to the
President?
Answer: The conditions for the grant of emergency powers to the President are:
The existence of war or other national emergency.
The authority to exercise emergency power must be in virtue of a law enacted by the
Congress.
The exercise of power must be in pursuance to a declared national policy.
The exercise of emergency power must be for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as may be imposed by the Congress.

IV. THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Immunity from suit
Question: What is the nature of the immunity from suit of the President?
Answer: Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of
the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court while serving as such
(David v. PGMA, infra). The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of
immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free
from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
government is a job that, aside from being from requiring all of the office holder’s time,
also demands undivided attention. (Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393, 399).

Question: Cite the rules of succession under the Executive Branch.

Answer: The rules are:
The Vice-President shall ACT as President if the President-elect fails to qualify until a
President is qualified or if a President shall not have been chosen until a President shall
have been chosen and qualified (Section 7, Art. VII).
The Vice-President shall ACT as President
When the President is unable to discharge the powers of the presidency and he
voluntary make the declaration himself by transmitting his written declaration to the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House.
When the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency but
he does not voluntarily declare himself unable for any reason, the majority of the
members of the cabinet shall make such declaration by transmitting their written
declaration to the Senate President and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
(Section 11, Art. VII).
The Vice-President shall BECOME President
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect died or is
permanently incapacitated.
In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the
President (Section 7, Art. VII).
The Senate President or the Speaker of the House of Representative, if the former is
unable, shall ACT as President until a President or Vice-President shall have been
elected or qualified, if no President or Vice-president shall have chosen or qualified or
where both shall have died or become permanently incapacitated or in case of death,
permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of both the President and the
Vice-President (Section 8, Art. VII).

Question: What are the prohibitions on the President, Vice-President and members
of the Cabinet, their assistants and deputies?
Answer: The prohibitions are:
They shall not hold any other office or employment during the tenure, unless otherwise
provided in the Constitution.
They shall not, during their tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries.
They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office (Section 13, Art.
VII)

Question: What are the powers of the President?

Answer: The powers of the President are:
Execute the laws of the land
Appointment and removal
Control over the executive departments, bureaus and offices
Military power
Pardoning power
Diplomatic power
Supervisory power over all local governments
Contract loan
Residual power

Note: Constitutional provisions providing for the diplomatic power of the President
include:
The President is the head of State and the repository of executive power (Section 1, Art.
VII)
The President shall nominate with the consent of the Commission on Appointment,
among others, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls (Section 16, Art. VII)
The President may enter into a treaty or executive agreement with the concurrence of at
r two-thirds of all the members of the Senate (Section 21, Art. VII)
The President may contract foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
(Section 21, Art. VII)

Executive Privilege
Question: What is the nature of executive privilege?
Answer: Executive privilege is the power of the President to withhold certain types of
information from the courts, the Congress, and ultimately the public. The types of
information include those which are of a nature that disclosure would subvert military
or diplomatic objectives, or information about the identity of persons who furnish
information of violations of law, or information about internal deliberations comprising
the process by which government decisions are reached (Bernas, Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, 2012edition, page 835)

Note: Confidential information which are covered by executive privilege include:

Conversations and correspondence between the President and other officials of the
government.
Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national
security should not be divulged.
Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive agreements.
Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings. (Sereno v. Committee on Trade and Related
Matters)
Matters affecting national security and public order (Senate v. Ermita 448 SCRA 1, 26)

Diplomatic negotiations privilege: Diplomatic negotiations are recognized as privileged

in this jurisdiction but such privilege is only presumptive. (Akbayan Citizens Action
Party [“AKBAYAN”) v. Aquino, 558 SCRA 468, 518)
The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative
process and presidential communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the
rational for the confidential character of diplomatic negotiations, deliberative process,
and presidential communications is similar, if not identical (Id., p. 521).

Question: What is the deliberative process privilege?

Answer: Deliberative process covers documents reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Notably, the privileged status of
such documents rests, not on the need to protect national security but, on the “obvious
realization that officials will not communicate candidly a month themselves if each
remark is a potential item of discovery and from page news,” the objective of the
privilege being to enhance the quality of agency decisions (Id., 520-521).

Power of Appointment
Question: What are the four groups of officers whose appointments are subject to
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments?
Answer: These four (4) groups are: First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel, or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided by law; Third, those whom the President may
be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone (Sarmiento III v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549,
553-554). The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by
nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments,
the President appoints (Id.).
Other officers whose appointment are subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments are:
The regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council
The Chairman and the Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission
The Chairman and the Commissioners of the Commission on Elections
The Chairman and the Commissioners of the Commission on Audit
Members of the Regional Consultative Commission
Sectoral Representatives of the House of Representatives

Note: Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights not subject to confirmation. Since
the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not among the
positions mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments, it follows that the appointment by the President of the
Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of the
Commission on Appointments. To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman
and Members of the Commission of Human Rights is not specifically provided for in the
Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission,
the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are
expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments (Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 160, 170-171).

Question: What are the limitations on the power to appoint?

Answer: The limitations are:
The President may not appoint his spouse and relatives by consanguinity and affinity
within the fourth civil degree during his term as members of the Constitutional
Commissions, Office of the Ombudsman, or as secretaries, undersecretaries, chairmen,
or heads of bureaus or offices, including government owned and controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. (Section 13, Art. VII)
The President or acting President cannot exercise the power of appointment two
months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety. (Section 15, Art. VII)
Appointment in the Judiciary shall be made upon recommendation of the Judicial and
Bar Council. (Section 8, Art. VII).
Appointments extended by the Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked
by the elected President within ninety days from his assumption. (Section 14, Art. VII)

Question: Will the prohibition on midnight appointment cover appointments in the

Judiciary?
Answer: Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article
VII, the court held that it does have any doubt that the Constitutional Commission
confined the prohibition to appointments made in Executive Department. The framers
did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their
establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening for judicial
positions to the unhurried and deliberative prior process of the JBC ensured that there
would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary (De Castro v. Judicial and
Bar Council [JBC], 615 SCRA 666, 742).

Question: What is the nature of an acting appointment?

Answer: The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It
is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment
of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an
alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President
must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the
permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. (Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, 472
SCRA 587, 598)

Question: Discuss the distinctions between ad interim appointment and

appointment in acting capacity.
Answer: Both ad interim appointment and appointment in acting capacity are effective
upon acceptance. But ad interim appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extend anytime there is a vacancy.
Moreover ad interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments
for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission
on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important
offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments (Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, 472 SCRA 587, 600).

Question: May an elective official hold any other position?

Answer: The view that an elective official may be appointed to another position if
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut difference
in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Section 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution.
While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive
official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first
paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule
against appointment or designation of an elective official to other government posts,
except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head
of the economic and planning agency; the Vice-President, who may be appointed
Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council. (Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568, 574-575)

Question: May the President remove an appointive official through impeachment?

Answer: Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the
power to remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are
also removable by him. The exception to this is when the law expressly provides
otherwise—that is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or
authority other than the appointing power. In some cases, the Constitution expressly
separates the power to remove from the power of the President’s power to appoint.
Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the Supreme
Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President. However,
Members of the Supreme Court may be removed after impeachment proceedings
initiated by Congress (Section 2, Article XI), while judges of lower courts may be
removed only by the Supreme Court by virtue of its administrative supervision over all
its personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The Chairpersons and Commissioners of
the Civil Service Commission [Section 1(2), Article IX (B)], the Commission on Elections
[Section 1(2), Article IX(C)], and the Commission on Audit [Section 1(2), Article IX(D)]
shall likewise be appointed by the President, but they may be removed only by
impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself shall be
appointed by the President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be removed only by
impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). (Gonzales III V. Office of the President, 679 SCRA
614, 654)

Power of control
Question: What is the extent of power of control?
Answer: The power to control means the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter. It does not include the power to remove an
officer or employee in the executive department. The power merely applies to the
exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent
himself of the act. It only means that the President may set aside the judgment or action
taken by a subordinate in the performance of his duties.
(Ang-Angco v. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619).

Question: What is the doctrine of qualified political agency?

Answer: All executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents
of the Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or the law that he act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts
of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil.
451, 463).

Question: What is the scope of the power of the President to create ad hoc
investigative body? Answer: The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid
him in ensuring the faithful execution of the laws is inherent in the President’s powers
as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and
to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or
in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010, 637 SCRA 78, 158)

Note: The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws—in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency—is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That the
authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this
power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that
he is bereft of such authority (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No.
192935, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78, 158).

Commander-in-Chief and Martial Law Powers

Question: What is the scope of the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President?
Answer: The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law (Section 18, Art. VII).
Section 18 of Article VII grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of
graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power,
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to
declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires
the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that
public safety requires the exercise of such power.

Question: When may the President exercise the calling out power?
Answer: The only criterion is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may
call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
(Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, 421 SCRA 656, 669)
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in
suppressing lawless violence, invasion, and rebellion. This involves ordinary police
action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered
illegal or ultra vires (David v. PGMA, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006). Calling-out power
cannot validate any of the following acts: (a) arrests and seizures without judicial
warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and
press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, as they are powers which
can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid
declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. (Id.)

Question: What are the constitutional checks to prevent possible abuses in the
exercise to declare martial law?
Answer: The constitutional checks are:
The Congress, voting separately, by a vote of at least a majority of all the members, in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, as the case
maybe (Section 18, Art. VII).
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof. The Supreme Court must promulgate
its decision within thirty days from the date of filing of the petition (Id.).

Note: The power of Congress to review the basis of the declaration of martial is
automatic. It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress
act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.  They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a
sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension,
only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on
the ground, a power that the President does not have. Consequently, although the
Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the
Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather
than initiated.  Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the
Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final
rampart.  The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of
Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. (Fortun, et. al. v.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et. al., G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012)

Question: What are the grounds for the declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus?
Answer: The grounds are:
invasion or rebellion, when public safety requires it.

Note: A declaration of rebellion at most, only gives notice to the nation that such a state
exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the
declaration may wreak emotional effects upon the perceived enemies of the State, even
on the entire nation. The Supreme Court’s mandate is to probe only into the legal
consequences of the declaration. The Court found that such declaration is devoid of any
legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written (Sanlakas
v. Executive Secretary, 421 SCRA 656).

Pardoning power
Question: What is the nature of the pardoning power of the President?
Answer: The pardoning power of the President is a private, though official act, and its
exercise rests on the absolute and uncontrollable discretion of the President. The reason
for its exercise is not open to judicial scrutiny. It proceeds from the power of the
President to execute the laws. ( US v. Guarin, 30 Phil. 85)

Question: What are the limitations to the pardoning power of the President?
Answer: The limitations to the pardoning power of the President are:
It can only be exercised after conviction by final judgment.
It cannot extend to cases of impeachment.
It cannot be exercised on matters involving violation of election laws, unless favourably
recommended by the Commission on Elections.
Pardon cannot extinguish civil liability awarded to third persons.
Pardon does not restore offices forfeited or vacated after conviction.

Note: Pardoned official cannot claim back position which was forfeited by virtue of
conviction in the criminal case. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a
mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense would be
grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing
power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor
moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction. (Monsanto v.
Factoran, Jr., 170 SCRA 190, 200)

Residual power
Question: What is the nature of the residual power of the President?
Answer: The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than
the sum of specific powers so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power is
inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has be executive
(Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668).

Residual power is the unstated power residing in the President to do anything which is
not forbidden by the Constitution and designed to promote and safeguard the welfare of
the people founded on his duty as steward of the people and protector of peace.
(Aguirre, Postulates in Constitutional Law 1, 199 edition, p. 170)

V. THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Question: What is the nature of judicial power?
Answer: The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not option before the
Supreme Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because the Court is not legally
disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the
controversy may be referred. Otherwise, the Court would be shirking from its duty
vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with
authority thus, the Court is duty bound to take cognizance of the petitions before it. In
the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, “jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a
solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would
be a dereliction of duty” (Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., 415 SCRA 44, 158).
Question: What is the power of judicial review?
Answer: The power of judicial review is the power of the Supreme Court to declare a
law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. It includes the power to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government
(sec. 1, 5, Art. VIII).

Question: What are the requisites of exercise of the power of judicial review?
Answer: The requisites of judicial review are:
Actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial review.
The person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity.
The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Question: What is an actual case or controversy?

Answer: An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite of
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is definite and concrete, touching the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest; a real and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief (David v. PGMA, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006).

Question: What is the general rule on moot and academic cases?

Answer: The Supreme Court cannot decide moot and academic cases. A moot and
academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of practical use or value.
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of
mootness.

Note: Exceptions to mootness principle

There is a grave violation of the Constitution.
The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved.
When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar and the public.
The case is capable of repetition yet evading review ( David v. PGMA, supra).

Standing to sue
Question: Who has the legal standing to sue?
Answer: Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded
standing to sue, provided the following requirements are met:
The cases involved constitutional issues.
For taxpayer, there must be a chain of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the
tax measure is unconstitutional.
For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law
in question.
For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early.
For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes
upon their prerogatives as legislators. (Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel)

Question: What matters are outside the power of judicial review?

Answer: In deciding to take jurisdiction over a petition for constitutionality of a statute
or any act of branches of government, the Supreme Court will not review the wisdom of
the decision of the Executive in taking the questioned action or of the Congress in
enacting the assailed statute. (Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, 49, 1997)

Political question
Question: What is a political question?
Answer: A political question refers to those issues which under the Constitution are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or regard to which full
discretionary authority has been e delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. (Marcos v. Manglapus, supra)

Note: Criteria for determining whether a question is political -

A “textually demonstrable” constitutional commitment of the issue to the political
branches.
Lack of manageable standards for judicial resolution.
A need for finality in the action of the political branches.
Difficulty or impossibility of devising effective judicial remedies (Baker v. Carr)

Question: What are the guarantees of judicial independence under the

Constitution?
Answer: The guarantees of judicial independence under the Constitution are:
The members of the judiciary shall hold office during good behaviour until they reach
the age of seventy or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office (Sec.
11, Art. VIII)
The judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be
reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and,
after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released (Sec. 3, Art. VIII)
Members of the Supreme Court are removable only by impeachment on grounds
provided in the Constitution (sec. 2, Art. XI).
The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot be increased by law without its
advice and concurrence (Sec. 30, Art. VI)
Congress shall not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated
in Section 5, Article VIII (Sec. 2, par. 2, Art. VIII)
No law shall be passed reorganizing the judiciary when it will undermine the security of
tenure of its members (Sec. 2, par. 2, Art. VIII)
Appointment to the Judiciary shall be made upon recommendation of the Judicial and
Bar Council without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (Sec. 9,
par. 1, Art. VIII)
Members of the Supreme Court and other lower courts shall not be designated to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (sec. 12, Art. VIII).
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive power to discipline and remove judges of lower
courts (Sec. 11, Art. VIII)
The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof (Sec. 6, Art. VIII)

Question: What is the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?

Answer: The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court includes -
Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus.
Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may
require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of
the judge concerned.
Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service
Law (Sec. 5, Art. VIII).

VI. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

Question: Cite the common provisions which govern the three constitutional
commissions?
Answer: The common provisions applicable to the Constitutional Commissions are:
Prohibitions to hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
Proscription against engaging in the practice of their profession or in active
management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the
function of their office.
Injunction against financial interest, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by the government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Enjoyment of fiscal autonomy.
Authority to promulgate their respective rules concerning pleadings and practice before
it or before any of its offices, provided such rules shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights.
The decisions of the Commissions may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of the copy of the decision.
The Commission is authorized to appoint their officials and employees in accordance
with law. (Sections 1 to 8, Art. IX-A)

Question: What are provisions which guarantee the independence of the

Constitutional Commissions?
Answer: The provisions which guarantee the independence of the Constitutional
Commissions are:
The salary of the Chairman and Commissioners shall be fixed by law and shall not be
decreased during their tenure.
The members of the Commission have a fixed term of office.
The members of the Commission cannot be removed from office except by
impeachment and upon their expiration of their term.
The Commission enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriation shall be
automatically and regularly released (Id.).

Question: Is the Civil Service Commission covered by “No report-no release” policy of
the DBM?
Answer: The “No report-no release” policy of the DBM violates the Constitution.
“Automatic release” of approved annual appropriations to commissions vested with
fiscal autonomy should be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to them
maybe imposed. (Civil Service Commission v. Department of Budget and Management,
464 SCRA 115)

Note: The Constitution prohibits the temporary or acting appointment of any member
of the Commission (Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C). The appointment by the President of a
temporary Chairman for the COMELEC is unconstitutional. (Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac, 192
SCRA 357)
Please see the ruling of the Court in Matibag v. Commissioner Benipayo et al.

A. Civil Service Commission

Question: What is the scope of the civil service?
Answer: The Civil Service Commission embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government owned- or
controlled corporations with original charters. (Sec. 2, 1, Art. IX)
No officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause provided by law. (Sec. 2, Art. IX-B)
Note: Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and
fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-
determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination.

B. Commission on Audit
Question: What are the powers and functions of the Commission on Audit?
Answer: The powers and functions of the Commission on Audit are:
Examine and audit all forms of government revenues.
Examine and audit all forms of government expenditures.
Settle government accounts.
Define the scope and techniques for its auditing procedures.
Promulgate accounting and auditing rules including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures.
Decide administrative cases involving expenditure of public funds (Art. XI-B).

Note: The auditing authority of the Commission over government-owned corporations

extends only to those with original charters.

Agencies under the post-audit authority of the COA

Constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy
under this Constitution.
Autonomous state colleges and universities.
Other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
Such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from
or through the government, which are required by law or by the granting institution to
submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity (Id.).

Question: Is the promotional appointment to the position of the Chairman of the

Commission valid?
Answer: Yes, it is valid. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment,
provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the
unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and
provided further that the vacancy in the position of the Chairman resulted from death,
resignation, disability or removal by impeachment (Funa v. The Chairman, Commission
on Audit, G.R. No. 192791, April 14, 2012).

C. Commission on Elections
Question: What is the scope of the powers of the COMELEC?
Answer: The Commission on Elections possesses quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative
powers. Its main function is to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. (sec. 2 (1) (2),
Art. IX-C)

Question: Can the COMELEC prosecute?

Answer: The Commission on Elections is vested with the power to conduct preliminary
investigation and prosecution of election offenses. (People v. Delgado, 189 SCRA 715)

Note: The COMELEC is composed of a Chairman and six (6) Commissioners.

Qualifications of members of the Commission are:
They shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines.
At least thirty-five years of age at the time of their appointment.
They must be holders of a college degree. The majority of the members, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years.
They must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately
preceding elections (sec. 1(1), Art. IX-C).
 VII. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Question: Define public office.
Answer: Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. (Sec. 1, Art. XI).

Question: Enumerate the impeachable officers under the Constitution.

Answer: The impeachable officers under the Constitution are:
President
Vice-President
Members of the Supreme Court
Members of the Constitutional Commissions
Ombudsman

Question: What are the grounds for impeachment?

Answer: The grounds for impeachment are:
Culpable violation of the Constitution
Treason
Bribery
Graft and corruption
Other high crimes
Betrayal of public trust

Question: Discuss the steps to be followed in impeachment.

Answer: The steps to be followed in impeachment are:
A member of the House of Representatives, or any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by a member of the House, may file a verified complaint.
The complaint is included in the Order of Business of the House of within three (3) days
thereafter.
The proper Committee of the House conducts the hearing after which, by a majority of
all the members of the committee, submits a report to the House within sixty (60) days
from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution.
The resolution of the Committee shall be calendared for consideration of the House
within ten (10) session days from receipt of the resolution.
The House will either affirm or override the recommendation of the committee by a
vote of at least one-third of all the members of the House. The vote of each member shall
be recorded.
If, the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least 1/3 of all the
members of the House, the same shall constitute as the Articles of Impeachment and
forthwith forwarded to the Senate for trial and decision (Sec. 1 [2,3,4], Art. XI).

Note: The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
When sitting as an impeachment body, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. No
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of
the Senate.

Question: When is an impeachment complaint initiated?

Answer: The term to “initiate” refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled
with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The initiation takes place by the
act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House
Committee on Justice or, by filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3(5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period (Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261)

Question: What constitutes a political question in impeachment proceedings?

Answer: The determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense is a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislature ( Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, supra).

Note: The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment

complaint is an exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making power of
the House of Representatives which committed such determinative function to public
respondent. In the discharge of its discretion, the House has formulated determinable
standards as to the form and substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential
considerations behove the Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duly to
effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of the
minimum constitutional guidelines. (Gutierrez v. House of Representatives on Justice,
643 SCRA 198, 239-241)

Question: What are the effects of impeachment?

Answer: Removal from office of the impeached official and disqualification to hold any
office under the Republic of the Philippines.

Question: What is the nature of a freeze order?

Answer: A freeze order is meant to have temporary effect; it was never intended to
supplant or replace the actual forfeiture cases where the provisional remedy—which
means, the remedy is an adjunct of or an incident to the main action—of asking for the
issuance of an asset preservation order from the court where the petition is filed is
precisely available. For emphasis, a freeze order is both a preservatory and pre-emptive
remedy. (Ligot v. Republic, G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013, 692 SCRA 509, 540)

Read the following cases:

Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan
Rep. Erice v. RTC-Caloocan
Ombudsman Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, Mayor Binay et. al.
Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals
Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission

VIII. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Question: What are goals of the national economy?
Answer: The goals of the national economy are:
More equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth
Sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the
benefit of the people
An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged (Sec. 1, Art. XII)

Question: What is covered by the regalian doctrine?

Answer: Regalian doctrine covers all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and other natural resources are owned by the State.
(Sec. 2, Art. XII)

Question: What are the limits imposed on the jura regalia of the state under Section
2 of Article XII?
Answer: The limits imposed on the jura regalia of the state under Section 2 of Article XII
are:
Only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated.
The exploration, development, and utilization of all natural resources shall be under the
supervision of the State either by directly undertaking such exploration, development,
and utilization or through co-exploration, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with qualified persons or corporations.
All agreements with the qualified private sector maybe for only a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years.
The twenty-five year limit is not applicable to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, for which
beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of grant.
The use and enjoyment of the marine wealth of the archipelagic waters, territorial sea,
and exclusive economic zone shall be reserved for Filipino citizens.
Utilization of natural resources in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons may be allowed on a
small scale to Filipino citizens or cooperatives—with priority for subsistence fishermen
and fish workers (Bernas, Primer on the 1987 Constitution, page 461).

Question: Enumerate the lands of public domain.;

Answer: Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be
further classified according to the uses to which they may be devoted. (Sec. 3, Art. XII)

Question: What are the rules on the disposition of agricultural lands of the public
domain?
Answer: The rules on the disposition of agricultural lands of the public domain are
Private corporations or associations may not acquire alienable lands of the public
domain.
Qualified individuals may acquire a maximum of 12 hectares of alienable lands of public
domain by purchase, homestead or grant.
Private corporations may hold alienable lands of the public domain by lease up to a
maximum of 1,000 hectares and for a period of twenty-five years renewable for another
twenty-five years.
Qualified individuals may lease land of the public domains up to a maximm of 500
hectares. (Sec. 3, Art. XII)
Question: What is the proscription on the transfer of private lands to aliens?
Answer: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain. (Sec. 7, Art. XII)

Note: An alien husband has no capacity or personality to question the sale of the parcel
of land by his wife, even if the same was acquired during their marriage, even on the
claim that he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal
property, for such a theory would permit indirect contravention of the constitutional
prohibition on ownership by aliens of private land in the Philippines. (Cheezman v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 193 SCRA 93)

Note: The Supreme Court has rules that where a Filipino citizen sells land to an alien
who later sells the land to a Filipino, the invalidity of the first transfer is corrected by a
subsequent sale to a citizen. Similarly, where the alien who buys the land subsequently
acquires Philippine citizenship, the sale is validated since the purpose of the
constitutional ban has been achieved. In short, the law disregards the constitutional
disqualification of the buyer to hold land if the land is subsequently transferred to a
qualified party, or the buyer himself becomes a qualified party. (Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority, 403 SCRA 1, 28-29; La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 445
SCRA 1, 91-92)

Note: A foreigner may own a condominium unit because the prohibition on aliens is
only from acquiring land (Hulst v. PR Builders, G.R. No. 156364, September 25, 2008).

Question: What is the proscription on the grant of franchise for public utility to
aliens?
Answer: No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of
a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall franchise, certificate or authority be
exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. (Sec. 11, Art. XII)

Question: What is a public utility?

Answer: A public utility is a utility corporation which renders service to the general
public for compensation. Its essential feature is that its service is not confined to
privileged individuals but is open to an indefinite public. The public or private character
of a utility does not depend on the number of persons who avail of its services but on
whether or not it is open to serve all members of the public who may require it. (Iloilo
Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Public Utility Board, 44 Phil. 551)

Question: What is the state policy on the ownership of educational institutions?

Answer: Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and
mission boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens.
The Congress may, however, require increased Filipino equity participation in all
educational institutions. The control and administration of educational institutions shall
be vested in citizens of the Philippines (Sec. 4[2], Art. XIV).
Question: Can a winning bidder modify any provision of the awarded contract?
Answer: If the winning bidder is allowed to later include or modify certain provisions in
the contract awarded such that the contract is altered in any material respect, then the
essence of fair competition in the public bidding is destroyed. A public bidding would be
a farce if, after the contract is awarded, the winning bidder may modify the contract and
include provisions which are favorable to it that were not previously made available to
the other bidders. The government cannot enter into a contract with the highest bidder
and incorporated substantial provisions beneficial to him, not included or contemplated
in the terms and specifications upon which the bids were invited. (Power Sector Assets
and Liabilities Management Corporation v. Pozzolanic Philippines Incorporated, G.R. No.
183789, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 214, 232)

IX. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Question: What is the doctrine of state immunity from suit?
Answer: The Constitution declares, rather superfluously, that the State may not be sued
without its consent. This provision is merely recognition of the sovereign character of
the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule insulating it from the
jurisdiction of the courts of justice. (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1993 edition, p. 29)
The doctrine is sometimes called as the “royal prerogative of dishonesty.” (Id., p. 33)

Note: To Justice Holmes, the doctrine of non-suability is based not any formal
conception or obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that there can be
no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends.
Another justification is the practical consideration that the demands and the
inconveniences of litigation will divert the time and resources of the State from the
more pressing matters demanding its attention, to the prejudice of the public welfare.
(Id.)

Question: When is a suit against the State?

Answer: The suit is against the State (a) when the Republic is sued by name; (b) when
the suit is against an unincorporated government agency; and (c) when the suit is on its
face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimately liability will belong
not the officer but to the government. In all these instances, suability depends on
whether the State has consented to be sued.

Question: How is consent to be sued be done?

Answer: The consent of the State to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. There
is an express consent when there is a law expressly granting authority to sue the State
or any of its agencies. There is implied consent: (1) When the state enters into a private
contract, unless the contract is merely incidental to the performance of a governmental
function (Santos v. Santos, 92 Phil. 281); (2) When the state enters into an operation
that is essentially a business operation, unless the business operation is merely
incidental to the performance of a governmental function, as for instance, arrastre
service (Mobil Philippines v. Customs Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA 1120); and (3) When a
state sues a private party, unless the suit is entered into only to resist a claim (Lim v.
Brownell, 107 Phil. 344)
Question: What are the tests to determine whether government should be
impleaded as party in suits against its officers?
Answer: If the action is for the recovery of title or right of possession to the property
held by the officers or agents in behalf of the government, the suit may prosper even if
the government is not impleaded. If, however, the action would impose a financial
burden or an obligation to the government, then the government as a rule, must be
impleaded, otherwise the suit will not prosper (Lim v. Nelson, 87 Phil. 328).

If the suit against a public officer will result to direct liability of the State and not merely
of the officer, the suit is in reality against the State. The action is dismissible unless the
State gives consent to be sued.

Question: Is the defense of immunity from suit by the government absolute?

Answer: Non-suability principle cannot be a shield for injustice. The doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice on a citizen. (Ministerio v. Court of First Instance, 40 SCRA 464, 470)

Please consider the ruling of the Court in Urbano v. Solicitor General Chavez where the
Court ruled that the Solicitor General cannot be represented by lawyers from the Office
of the Solicitor General for criminal charges filed against him in his personal capacity.

Question: Can foreign states be sued in the local courts?

Answer: The doctrine of non-suability of State is available also to foreign States. They
may not be sued in the local courts. The added basis in this case is the principle of the
sovereign equality of States, under which one State cannot assert jurisdiction over
another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. To do so would
unduly vex the peace of nations. (Id.)

Question: What are the rules when a foreign state enters into a contract with
private individuals?
Answer: If the contract is entered into by the foreign government as part of its
governmental acts (jure imperii), then, there is no waiver of the non-suability principle.
However, if the contract is entered into in its proprietary capacity (jure gestionis), then,
there is a waiver of the non-suability principle.
Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal. It
must be given explicitly or by necessary implication (Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon,
G.R. No. 154705, June 26, 2003).

Mass media and advertising industry

Question: What is the state policy on the ownership of mass media?
Answer: The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citizens of
the Philippines, or to corporations, cooperatives or associations, wholly owned and
managed by such citizens. The Congress shall regulate or prohibit monopolies in
commercial mass media when the public interest so requires. No combinations in
restraint of trade or unfair competition therein shall be allowed. (Section 11 [1], Art.
XIV)

Question: What is the state policy on the advertising industry?

Answer: The advertising industry is impressed with public interest, and shall be
regulated by law for the protection of consumers and the promotion of the general
welfare. Only Filipino citizens or corporations or association at least seventy percentum
of the capital of which is owned by such citizens shall be allowed to engage in the
advertising industry. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body or
entities in such industry shall be limited to their proportionate share in the capital
thereof, and all the o and managing officers of such entities must be citizens of the
Philippines. (Section 11[2], Art. XIV)

X. AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION

Question: What are the modes of amending the Constitution?
Answer: The modes of amending the Constitution are:
Through Constituent Assembly, that is the Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all
its members.
Through Constitutional Convention.
By the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. (Sections1 and 2, Art. XVII)

Question: What are the modes of revising the Constitution?

Answer: The modes of revision of the Constitution are:
Through Constituent Assembly, that is the Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all
its members.
Through Constitutional Convention (Section 1, Art. XVII)

Question: What is the manner by which the constitutional convention is organized?

Answer: The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its members, call a
Constitutional Convention, or by a majority vote of all of its members, submit to the
electorate the question of calling such a convention. (Section 3, Art. XVII)

Question: Discuss how changes in the Constitution are ratified.

Answer: Any amendment to, or revision of, the Constitution under Section 1 of Article
XVII shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plesbicite which
shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later ninety days after the approval of such
amendment. Any amendment under Section 2 of Article XVII shall be valid when ratified
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty
days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of
the sufficiency of the petition. (Section 4, Art. XVII)