Critical Perspectives on Accounting (1990) 1, 217-238

FROM T E C H N I Q U E S TO IDEOLOGIES:
A N A L T E R N A T I V E PERSPECTIVE ON THE
A U D I T FUNCTION
CHRISTOPHER HUMPHREY AND PETER MOIZER*
University o f Manchester and *University o f Leeds

A significant body of accounting research has highlighted the socially

constituted nature of accounting and the diversity of roles and functions
that accounting performs~ To date, however, there has been little attempt to
apply this literature to a consideration of the nature of audit work and the
processes of audit judgement. In contrast, much of the audit judgement
research tends to adopt a unitary perspective, seeking to explore the
comparative technical advantage of "expert" auditors or to develop
rationalistic models of audit judgement. Such audit research sits rather
uneasily with the growing concern about the potential erosion of standards
of professional audit conduct and the ability of auditors to serve a "public
watch-dog" function in the face of severe commercial pressures.
This paper views auditing as a socially-constituted activity. Using a series
of interviews with audit managers focusing on the planning of audit work,
the paper illustrates the differing functions that audit activities can serve. As
well as a techno-rational function designed to enhance audit quality, the
activity of audit planning also serves both significant ideological and
marketing functions (the former designed to legitimize the choice and
extent of audit work, and the latter designed to maintain and if possible
increase the fee income from the client). As such, the paper's findings serve
to cast doubt on the ability of the auditing profession to deliver the audit
service traditionally demanded by society.

"Audit is a social phenomenon. It has no purpose or value except in its

practical usefulness. It is wholly utilitarian. The function has evolved in
response to a perceived need of individuals or groups in society who seek
information or reassurance about the conduct or performance of others in
which they have an acknowledged or legitimate interest" (Flint, 1988, p. 14).
"Price Waterhouse is continually refining its audit approach, adding
efficiencies and maximising the use of new and emerging technologies in
order to meet clients' auditing and other professional service needs... Our
approach has universal applicability and results in a tailored, effective audit
of each entity's financial statements" (Walker & Pierce, 1988, p. 1)

In recent years, a significant b o d y of accounting research has challenged the

traditional v i e w of accounting as a neutral, scientific p h e n o m e n o n ; a
technical-rational craft serving to enable organizational effectiveness. Instead,
accounting has been portrayed as socially constructed, as a contextually
d e p e n d e n t activity w h i c h is both social and political in itself and capable of
serving a diversity of roles and functions (see, for example, Burchell et aL,
This paper was presented at the Critical Perspectives on Auditing SYmposium, New York, April
29-30, 1990.
Address for correspondence: Professor Chris Humphrey, University of Manchester, bept, of
Accounting and Finance, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, U.K.
Received 15 April 1990; accepted 5 June 1990.
217
1045-2354/90/030217 + 22 $03.00/0 (~ 1990 Academic Press Limited
218 C. Humphrey and P. Moizer

1980; 1985; Hopwood, 1985, 1987; Loft, 1986; Nahapiet, 1988; Ansari & Euske,
1987; Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Rosenberg et al., 1982). In particular, such
research has sought to examine processes of accounting change. Rather than
viewing accounting change as a process of technical elaboration and im-
provement, historical analyses have started to examine the way accounting
becomes implicated in, and in turn is shaped, by wider organizational, social
and political processes (see Hopwood, 1987; Armstrong, 1985, 1987; Miller &
O'Leary, 1987; Loft, 1986; Merino & Neimark, 1982). Underlying much of this
research has been a desire to challenge, and expose, any claims that
accounting may have had to a "natural," objective status. Instead, accounting
has been portrayed as an inter-subjective meaning system, competing with
other such systems for recognition in a problematic, socially dependent reality
(Hopwood, 1985). In so doing, notions of neutrality have been rejected, with
accounting being seen as an interested activity, serving certain interests
through its construction of particular forms of reality (Tinker et al., 1982;
Cooper & Sherer, 1984). As such, unintended consequences of accounting
functioning have been examined not from the perspective of factors to be
changed in the rational pursuit of any accounting "potential," but rather
treated as evidence of the tensions and conflicts created by the increasing
encroachment of the accounting craft on other aspects of organizational life
(Hopwood, 1987, p. 293).
Implicit in such critical perspectives on accounting is a model of society that
is conflict based. As Cooper & Sherer (1984) argued, the study of accounting
benefits from an approach that recognizes power and conflict in society
"instead of assuming a basic harmony of interests in society which permits an
unproblematic view of the social value of accounting reports" (p. 218). It is
through the pursuit of specific sectional interests that accounting has been
seen to serve other than a purely technical-rational function aiding decision
making. Thus, accounting systems and reports have been regarded not just as
"answer machines" but also as ammunition and rationalization machines
(Burchell et aL, 1980) to be used in an ideological fashion to legitimize
particular activities or to rationalize or mystify past behaviour in ways which
can protect and bolster certain interests (also see Meyer & Rowan, 1977;
Wildavsky, 1978; Cooper & Sherer, 1984).
In the light of such a challenging, de-mystifying research agenda, it is
appropriate to ask where stands associated research on the nature of audit
practices and technologies? At a time when the audit profession is frequently
regarded as in a state of crisis or metaphorically at the "crossroads" (Hines,
1989b; Zeff, 1987; Armstrong & Vincent, 1988), and where a major debating
notion of an expectations gap continually illuminates conflicting perspectives
on the nature and purpose of the audit function (Kaplan, 1987; Humphrey,
1990), it would be reasonable to expect such a research philosophy to provide
fruitful insights into the reflective and constitutive properties of audit prac-
tices. However, critical theory has rarely been applied to audit practice. Most
studies have tended to examine such practices from a rather one-dimensional
perspective, using many of the assumptions that critical accounting research
has sought to attack. Audit approaches are treated as sets of techniques
designed to satisfy unitary client needs and to be changed in ways which
 From techniques to ideologies 219

enhance the effectiveness of the audit function in serving such needs.

Auditors are frequently portrayed as expert decision makers, who either as
disinterested, respected professionals or rational economic individuals, seek
to act unquestioningly in the public interest. With many studies seeking to
improve and enhance audit techniques, by rectifying the errors of the past
with better "answer machines," the relevance of Hopwood's (1987) criticisms
of conventional accounting research cannot be understated. He argued that
such research has provided a "history of inadequacy, ignorance and obsoles-
cence when accounting was not what it should be, peppered with only
occasional moments of enlightenment when accounting moved nearer to
realising its potential" (p. 291)..Hopwood saw such an inadequate depiction of
accounting history as resulting from a predominant resort to bodies of
knowledge external to accounting itself and the consequent failure to engage
in studies of accounting in action and the developments that have emerged
from the contextual practice of the craft.
Audit judgement research has frequently noted its failure to explain
adequately the nature of auditors' decision precesses and the functioning of
audit techniques (see Johnson et al., 1989; Wright, 1988; Abdolmohammadi
and Wright, 1987; B6dard, 1989). With such techniques continuing to be
applied in a conflict-ridden environment (typified by the disturbing stubborn-
ness of the audit expectations gap to disappear), it is our view that more
fruitful progress in understanding the nature and operation of the audit
process can be achieved by studying auditing as a socially constructed,
contextually dependent phenomenon, capable of serving a variety of roles
and functions. This paper uses a series of interviews with 18 audit managers
in large and medium sized audit firms in Manchester and London, England to
illustrate the socially constructed nature of auditing practices. The interviews
focused on the audit planning process, an activity which was known to be of
increasing importance to the audit methodologies of the 1980s (a fact
reflected in a number of studies--see Ganz, 1987; Walker & Pierce, 1988;
Turley, 1989; Houle & Plamondon, 1986) but which also offered a conveniently
accessible way of studying the processes by which auditors determined the
nature and sufficiency of audit work. As Peters et al. (1989) note, the audit
planning process can be regarded as an e x - a n t e rehearsal of the entire audit
process (p. 360). Apart from a technical-rational function designed to enhance
audit quality, the interviews revealed audit planning activities to be serving
both significant ideological and marketing functions (the former designed to
legitimize the choice and extent of audit work, and the latter designed to
maintain and if possible increase fee income from the client). By exploring
these functions, and the changing role of the audit planning process, this
paper seeks to facilitate a greater integration of critical perspectives on the
nature of the audit/accountancy profession and the specific functioning of
audit practices, in particular, the paper's findings serve to add support to
those who have increasingly questioned the audit profession's ability, as
presently structured, to serve the "public watch-dog" function traditionally
demanded by society (see Zeff, 1987; Kaplan, 1987; Tinker, 1985).
The paper is divided into three main sections. The first part of the paper
examines the present state of relevant audit research, considering the limited
220 C. Humphrey and P. Moizer

application of critical perspectives to analyses of audit practice but also

identifying a number of indicators in such research pointing to the merit of
adopting a conflict-based perspective. Treating auditing as a socially con-
structed phenomenon, the paper then provides an alternative perspective on
the nature of the audit function through its study of the audit planning
process. The paper concludes by considering the implication of its findings in
the light of the growing literature on the audit expectations gap and the
resultant questioning of auditor independence.

The Profession of Auditing and Audit Practice--An Uneasy Relationship?

In reviewing recent critiques of the audit profession, it is possible to
distinguish two main strands of analysis: first, those who have expressed
concern with an apparent de-professionalization of the audit function and
second, those who have challenged the very nature and meaning of the term
"professional."

Auditing--a Profession or a Business?

A growing number of studies have drawn attention to the undesirable
consequences of recent developments concerning the audit profession and its
reactions and responses to the phenomenon of an "audit expectation gap"
(see Zeff, 1987; Kaplan, 1987; Stevens, 1988; CACA, 1988). A predominant
focus of these analyses has been the issue of audit independence and the
extent to which auditors serve corporate management rather than wider
societal interests. At one level, the provision of management advisory
services has been pin-pointed as a threat to audit independence. As Tinker
(1985) noted "despite the economic benefits of audit and attestation work,
revenue from management advisory services now rivals that from auditing for
some of the Big Eight firms, thereby weakening the motivational basis to
resolve social conflicts in the favour of public interests, rather than corporate
client interests" (p. 204). Other arguments have questioned the very nature of
the auditor-client relationship. As Zeff (1987) commented:
"a symptom of the times is the very fact that auditors refer to companies as
the 'client.' The real client is not the reporting entity but the investors and
creditors on whose behalf the audit is conducted . . . . Yet, when is the last
time that partners in an audit firm with which you are familiar actually
consulted users, or read magazines to which users or their advisers
contribute articles, in order to gain a better appreciation of the uses to
which financial reports are put?" (p. 68).
Kaplan (1987) felt that auditors had shunned the unglamorous role of sceptical
guardian of the .public for the more charismatic posture of the business
advisor and confidante. " H o w much more exciting to be thought of as
management's 'creative' confidante, thinking up 'aggressive' interpretations
of those confining rules of accounting, rather than some nit-picking bean
counter" (p. 7). He coupled this movement with increased desires for
economic g r o w t h - - t o boost audit firm revenues by expanding and broaden-
ing the client base. As Kaplan noted, the auditor who loses clients is not
rewarded, regardless of the circumstances surrounding such loss. Likewise,
 From techniques to ideologies ~2~

Zeff (1987) recollected a senior practitioner noting that the " w o r s t thing a
senior partner can do these days is to lose a client over a matter of principle."
With perceived d o w n w a r d pressures on audit fees, firms were seen as
maintaining growth rates through the provision of other services. As Stevens
(1988) noted,
"Salesmanship, once a dirty word to accountants, is no.~v critical to the
management process and, in many cases, has become the fastest route to
promotion and partnership. When Arthur Young or Touche Ross or Price
Waterhouse wins a new audit client (more than likely on a loss-leader fee),
it uses that opening to bombard the client with sales pitches designed to
develop business for the firm's full inventory of services" (p. 41).

Such an emphasis on growth has also been seen as having a negative

effect, not just on the appearance, but also on actual levels of audit quality, by
forcing audit staff to cut corners to ensure that profit targets are reached
(Stevens, 1986; Zeff, 1987; Armstrong & Vincent, 1988; Brannigan, 1987)--a
process made possible because of the difficulty of making an ex-post
evaluation of audit quality (Moizer, 1988).
The value of audit independence and concern about threats to it have also
repeatedly been emphasized in professional and governmental studies of the
audit expectations gap (see AICPA, 1977; Metcalfe, 1978; AICPA, 1987; Miller,
1986; CACA, 1988; ICAEW, 1986). As John Dingell noted at the opening of his
committee's investigation,
"The system begins with the corporate managers and directors, whose
actions are to be audited, going out and choosing the auditor. They hire the
independent audit firm, determine the fees to be paid and have the power
to fire the auditor for any reason. The independent audit firm often provides
tax and management consulting services to the same corporation it audits.
Can we really expect an audit firm to remain independent when its audit
fees, and perhaps substantial consulting fees, are directly related to
pleasing the corporate managers being audited?"

Other expressed concerns have related to the degree of professional

scepticism applied by auditors, particularly in relation to assumptions of
management integrity (AICPA, 1987) and the disarming practice whereby
auditors have supported contradictory client management interests when
petitioning the SEC to allow certain accounting treatments (Metcalfe, 19781.
Some studies have, in response, emphasized the lack of empirical evidence
underlying such concerns (see Benston, 1985) and the powerful market
mechanisms deterring poor quality audit work (Hall, 1988). However, oi~hers
have sought to negate such claims by stressing the unobservability of audit
quality. Kaplan (1987) argued that, with audit failures usually involving
bankrupt companies, many audit failures may be camouflaged by a
company's continuing solvency. The Dingell Committee also stressed the
private nature of audit practice.
"it is impossible to understand the operations of the auditors themselves
since all we know is the little they choose to tell us. Likewise, when auditors
make mistakes, we do not know the causes of those mistakes because the
investigation results are sealed from public view as a condition of an
out-of-court settlement" (J. Dingell,.quoted in Miller, 1986).
222 C. Hnmphrey and P. Moizer

Kaplan felt that the decentralized multi-office organization of the large audit
firms (also see Briloff, 1981) was serving to negate any reputation effects
("Just because the Boston office, say, had some trouble does not mean that
the Houston office should be affected")--forcing audit quality to the level of
the lowest common denominator. On a similar theme, Moizer (1988) argued
that the stronger economic incentive for auditors was not to improve audit
quality but to improve their image with company management and users
through public relations exercises and the provision of more observable
"non-audit" services.
Implicit in some of these studies drawing attention to independence
threats is a concern with an apparent de-professionalization of the audit
profession--whose behaviour contemporarily is more befitting of a business
or an industry than that of the traditional, selfless disinterested professional,
the guardian of the public interest. As Zeff (1987) noted, in calling for ethical
codes concerning the scope of services and adherence to professionalism,
" w e can, and we must, play a role in restoring professional values. We are,
after all, members of a profession. Not a trade. And not a union" (p. 68). For
Zeff and others (see Tweedie, 1987), it is possible to detect a yearning for a
return to some golden age when "professionalism" and "independence"
were king. In the words of Lord Benson (1984), auditors "must be willing to
speak their minds without fear or favour. They must not allow themselves to
be put under the control and dominance of any person or organization which
could impair this independence" (p. 18).

Challenging the Nature of Professionalism

Some researchers, however, have sought to challenge this resort to "profes-

sionalism." Adopting a deeper critical perspective, several studies have
started to question the whole nature of concepts such as "professionalism,"
"independence" and "public interest" (see Willmott, 1986; 1989; Tinker et al.,
1982; Tinker, 1985; Robson & Cooper, 1989; Hines, 1988; 1989a, 1989b; Booth
& Cocks, 1989). The intention here has been to "contribute to the unmasking of
the [accounting/audit] profession's technical image by examining the role of
its professional associations in exploiting and regulating the power invested
in the accounting function" (Willmott, 1986, p. 556). By attending to the
contested nature of such concepts as "the public interest" (Cooper & Sherer,
1984) and claims to the "technical," Willmott (1989) saw such research as
serving to deconstruct the authority of accounting, thereby facilitating more
democratic, publicly accountable forms of allocating society's scarce re-
sources (p. 327). From this perspective, professions are seen primarily as
political bodies, ~ls private interest governments seeking principally to defend
and advance their members' interests (Willmott, 1986). Symbolic traits of
independence, trustworthiness, altruism etc. are treated as socially con-
structed concepts (Willmott, 1986; Hines, 1989b), and exposed as professional
mystiques that together with the existence of professional monopolies of
labour and mutually dependent relationships with the state, serve to enhance
the remuneration of members of professions. In short, it has been argued that
the self-regulating monopoly privileges granted to professions are "more a
 From techniques to ideologies 223

reflection of their position and role within the social division of labour than an
acknowledgement of any distinctive, politically neutral technical attributes or
competences they may possess" (Wiilmott, 1986, p. 564; Johnson, 1980).
What this particular approach has highlighted is the power of the
profession's claims to a body of knowledge, and the maintenance of the
validity of claims even where no coherent body of knowledge exists (Cooper
& Robson, 1989; Boland, 1982). As Hines (1989b) commented, accountants
compete for work not on the basis of a body of accounting knowledge, but on
claims to an accounting knowledge, or the appearance and image of
accounting knowledge (p. 85). In support of such a view, Hines referred to the
continual undertaking of conceptual framework projects by the accounting
profession. Whilst apparent failures from a functional or technical perspective,
such projects could be regarded as having served important legitimising and
strategic roles by promoting appearances of, and aspirations to, accounting
knowledge (also see Hopwood, 1988; Booth & Cocks, 1989). Such practices
were seen as facilitating the profession's maintenance of the status quo and
staving off competition or government intervention through increased regula-
tion (Hines, 1989b, p. 89).
In a similar vein, Willmott (1990) argued that the accounting profession had
successfully defended its self-regulating monopoly by "maintaining the idea
that it serves the public interest" (p. 322). He saw the strength of this claim
reflected in, and enhanced by, the frequent lack of illumination of what
comprises the "public interest," and the unquestioning assumption that it is
best served by an accounting profession "capable of voluntarily and impar-
tially generating, applying and enforcing reliable principles and standards"
(Willmott, 1989, p. 322). Willmott suggested that the apparent neutrality of
accounting is underpinned by a prior naturalization of the value of capitalism
as a provider and allocator of capital: "Because business interests are
unproblematically equated with national interests, the form and content of
accounting and auditing is regarded as non-partisan or apolitical" (p. 323).
This lack of questioning as to whether the prevailing economic system, and
accounting's role within it, is in the "public interest" has placed the
accounting profession in a reactionary role, defending and preserving a
naturalized status quo~which in turn, paradoxically, serves to strengthen the
profession's independent and selfless image (Willmott, p. 327).
By recognizing the strength of the profession's power base, it becomes
easier to understand why the numerous debates over independence and
concerns about the provision of management advisory services have had so
little impact on the nature of audit regulation. Frequently arising after a major
corporate scandal (Tricker, 1982), the profession has successfully managed to
dampen down debate until the next scandalhprincipally because the nature
of the debate has never served to challenge seriously the notion of "inde-
pendence" and the linkage between an "independent" audit function and the
public interest. Indeed, some in the profession have suggested that its own
reaction to "corporate scandals," implicating the operation of a particular
audit function, has sometimes been rather immature. As Olson (1973) noted,
such scandals should be regarded as a natural way of life. The profession's
usual response to repeated questioning of the effects of the increasing
224 C, H e m p h r e y a n d P o M o i z e r

proportion of revenues received from management and other non-audit

services has been to restate its traditional position that independence is a
state of mind; that an auditor can be trusted to serve the public interest; and
that any restrictions would merely add to the costs of regulation without
producing any noticeable benefit (Willmott, 1986; Turley et al., 1990). Hence,
the technical, conservative image of the profession, combined with a lack of
public accountability for its actions, appears so far to have disarmed or
suspended the critical faculties of clients, politicians and academics alike
(Sikka, Willmott & Lowe, 1989; Willmott, 1989).

Audit Piannhtg Activities: A Plurality of Functions

This section of the paper reports the findings of 18 interviews with audit
managers in nine large and medium sized accounting firms. The interviews
were semi-structured and involved discussing with the audit manager the
processes by which she or he had planned a specific audit that they were
responsible for (selected in advance of the interview). The audit planning
process was selected for the focus of study because it was known to be an
activity receiving increased emphasis in the methodologies of audit firms and
because it also offered a convenient way of analysing the processes by which
auditors determine the sufficiency of audit work (see Peters et al., 1989). From
such discussions, it was possible to identify a number of roles served by
audit activities, ranging from the technical to the ideological and the
entrepreneurial,

Audit Planning: A Valuable Technique

The interviews with audit managers provided some confirmation of the
technical functioning of audit planning activities (in accordance with the
perspective traditionally adopted in studies of auditors' planning
judgements--see Kaplan & Reckers, 1984, 1988; Wright, 1988; Boritz, 1986;
Peters et aL, 1989). The following quotes reflect the importance that managers
placed on the planning process as an ex-ante control function:
"Good planning removes the potential for cock-ups.., identifies problems,
focuses resources on them, gets the right resources in and stops people
wasting time on areas we are not bothered with."
"Planning makes the most effective use of time spent on a client's premises
during the audit. All the objectives are clearly defined at the start, so we
don't have people charging up blind alleys, checking stuff that we don't
particularly want checking anyway."
"By preparing your plan, you are proposing and resolving questions that
would otherwise be left and create big problems. Planning avoids changing
things piecemeal, which results in inefficiency and increases risk as well."
The first part of the interview basically consisted of the audit managers
describing in relatively general terms the processes they went through in
planning the particular audit and the factors they brought into consideration
in undertaking such work. In presenting and explaining such activities, the
managers put forward a view of audit planning similar in most respects to
that contained in any audit manual or practical auditing textbook. Such
 From techniques to ideologies 2,25

literature has identified four main elements to audit planning---strategic

planning, audit work planning, time scheduling and personnel planning (see
Ganz, 1987). Interviewees generally referred to activities that could be
classified under these headings, although several referred to an additional
classification--the planning of non-audit services (see below). The major task
delegated in the planning process was the preparation of the audit planning
memorandum, which was nearly always done by the audit senior, unless it
was a new audit assignment in which case the manager took a more active
role. The degree of delegation, and in turn the power of the planning process
as an e x - a n t e control function allowing control at a distance (Roberts &
Scapens, 1989), was highly dependent on the manager's perceptions of the
skill and ability of the senior and the audit team. As one manager
commented:
"If I got a senior i hadn't requested, or I was not too confident with the
team, t would inevitably have to delegate a lot less to him or pay a lot more
review (sic) to what he is doing. I would be out at the client's fairly
regularly, popping in for an hour on the way home and, therefore, I would
be on top of him all the time and not waiting for him to call me. I would be
stopping him going up areas that are immaterial or not relevant and get
him going down the route I want him to go to avoid wasting time."

An important purpose of the interviews was to attempt to get behind these

broad and quite rationalistic overviews of the audit planning process, to study
the factors and forces underlying the choices and actions that auditors were
undertaking in planning their audits. Accordingly, the audit managers were
asked to describe and explain the planning processes they went through on
one specific audit, the procedures that they adopted in determining what was
a sufficient amount of audit work and the extent to which, and reasons why,
the planning processes for the period under consideration were any different
than in previous years. The audit planning activities of the managers were
l e s s scientific and rationalistic than the views c o m m o n l y expressed in
traditional auditing texts, audit manuals (see, for example, Walker & Pierce,
1988) and the vast majority of audit judgement research. In particular, they
illustrated the ideological nature of audit practices; the legitimating roles that
certain activities serve both internal and external to the audit firm; and the
falsity of any claims that have been made regarding the 'natural' status of
auditing knowledge and practices. The remainder of the paper documents
such illustrations.

How Much Audit Work is Enough A Matter of Judgement?

"The audit manual provides certain rules which enable good judgement to
be made."
"It is very hard to say how much work is enough. You always have a
materiality figure built into your thinking ... but there is no set figure for
materiality. It is just a gut feeling ... it is quite a judgemental approach."
As the first of the above quotes suggests, a significant influence on the
determination of levels of audit work was the firm's audit manual. The
detailed rules and principles it laid down were seen as facilitating " g o o d
226 C. Humphrey and P. Moizer

judgement." In determining the extent of audit work, all interviewees stated

that the Auditing Standards and Guidelines (published regularly by the
Auditing Practices Committee--a joint committee of the major accountancy
bodies) had little influence on their actions. Many saw them as having merely
codified existing practice, or as setting a minimum standard for smaller audit
firms (with some interviewees stating that by the time any such guidelines
were published, their own (large) firms audit procedures had further de-
veloped). Their generality was also seen as hindering their use within the firm,
with the more detailed audit manual being noted as a regular source for the
settlement of internal disputes on the extent of audit work. Some inter-
viewees, however, did discuss one way that they had found the standards and
guidelines useful--as a legitimating device, used to justify the need for a
particular audit test to be performed in any external dispute with client
management. As one audit manager commented, "'1 will throw them at the
client."
In explaining the usefulness of the audit manual, a frequently mentioned
attribute was its ability to narrow differences in the approaches and judge-
ments of audit teams within the firm. This was usually illustrated by reference
to the firm's sampling plan, where again an external legitimation function was
noted. As one manager stated, such a plan,
"should narrow down differences of old where sample sizes were purely
judgemental. It should be particularly helpful in defence to a court action. It
is a way of unifying the whole approach of what the firm sees as a fair
audit."
Meyer & Rowan (1977) argued that institutionalized activities have legitimacy
based on the supposition that they are rationally effective. From this
perspective, it is possible to see documents such as profession-wide auditing
standards and guidelines, audit manuals and audit planning memorandums
as potentially serving ideological functions, helping to define what is respon-
sible and rational actions and opinions, thereby legitimating certain audit
practices and also imposing a particular construction of reality on the conduct
and discourse of auditors. Meyer & Rowan saw potential conflicts between
ceremonial rules and practices and efficiency as being resolved by two
interrelated devicesmdecoupling and the logic of confidence (p. 356). To-
gether the decoupling of work practices and their effects and the confidence
and faith of "internal participants and external constituents" in such practices
were seen as buffering the organization from "the inconsistencies and
anomalies involved in technical activities" (p. 357).
The audit managers were also asked to explain the relationship between the
sampling plan and the overall level of confidence to which they worked when
arriving at their'audit opinion. Their replies revealed that for most of them it
was an act of faith.
" W e work to 95% confidence. We are given figures (from sampling tables)
that are supposedly statistically correct but to be honest I have not got a
clue whether they are or not but we are told they are. So if you follow the
audit manual, you come out at 95% confidence."
"Sample sizes are set using a pre-set standard. If you are testing a key
control, the sample is 72 invoices or documents. Why it is 72, I don't
know---it is a statistical programme that we use."
 From techniques to ideologies 227

"Don't ask me how we arrive at 3% of turnover as an overall materiality

figure. It is a statistical figure provided in the audit manual."
For some, any doubts that they had regarding the sufficiency of sample sizes
were dispelled by a belief in their compatibility with what other major auditing
firms were doing. As one manager noted,
"We have a manual which lays down the minimum acceptable levels of
sample sizes that the firm will accept. Frankly, I don't know where we get
these from. I imagine they are devised statistically, for they ought to be, but
I am not sure. They are roughly in line with our competitors. We are all
doing, I think, a similar amount of w o r k . . , if we are going to say accounts
give a true and fair view, 95% confidence seems to be the figure banded
around in the market place. It is not actually a figure that appears in our
documentation, but it is 95% for everybody."
Another important source of assurance regarding the appropriateness of
audit work planned was provided by making reference to the previous years
audit, which illustrated the incremental nature of audit planning. As one
manager commented:
"The initial stage is probably dictated to a large extent by what we did last
year. There is no point in throwing everything out of the window and
starting completely afresh. It makes things a lot easier to ask how was this
audit area looked at last year and perhaps refine it a bit more. All working
papers from last year are there on file and I wouldn't anticipate someone
writing a new sales audit programme off the top of his head. You look to
last year's file."
Waller & Felix (1984) in discussing the notion of learning from experience,
suggested that the auditor's tendency to search for confirmatory, rather than
disconfirmatory, evidence, and a lack of complete feedback were likely to
make auditors over confident in their judgement ability and the adequacy of
planned auditing procedures. Some evidence in support of Such assertions
was provided by the interviews when managers noted that it was satisfactory
to f o l l o w closely last years audit plan, so long as nothing had gone w r o n g on
that audit. As one manager noted, 'The starting point is always last years
audit planning m e m o r a n d u m (APM) and de-briefing m e m o . . . The senior will
probably use last years APM too much. It may often turn out to be identical,
but that doesn't necessarily matter if last year's went alright'.
That there is nothing inherently " n a t u r a l " and " u n c h a l l e n g e a b l e " in what
auditors do was also illustrated by Dirsmith & Covaleski (1985) when pointing
to the legitimating functions served by certain audit practices and the
de-coupling between what gets audited and what gets documented. In
particular, some partners stressed the value of a "free form impressions
audit" (in which they w o u l d spend a week at the client's premises informally
trying to get a deep understanding of the business). As such, the construction
of a more formal audit approach was seen as serving a legitimating function,
documenting and corroborating the partners' impressions and facilitating the
client's acceptance of any adjustments that the auditors wished to be made to
the financial statements. Turley (1988) stressed the general lack of any clearly
defined framework in audit manuals for linking the specified practices for
collecting audit evidence. Sections entitled " a u d i t p h i l o s o p h y " usually con-
tained statements of procedures rather than an explication of underlying
~8 C. Humphrey and P. Moizer

concepts. In this respect, Turley had much sympathy with Mautz & Sharaf's
(1961) view that auditors saw auditing as a "series of practices and proce-
dures, methods and techniques, a way of doing with little need for the
explanations, descriptions, reconciliations and arguments so frequently
lumped together as theory" (p. 1).
One manager attempted to explain the logic underlying the sampling plans
in his firm's audit manual. In his view, the audit manual had been written on
the assumption that staff would not follow the sampling plans. Hence, he
believed that all the recommended sample sizes had been artificially in-
creased to accommodate the reductions that staff would make when opera-
tionalizing the plans:
"What they (the authors of the manual) did was that they knewwe wouldn't
use MUS [Monetary Unit Sampling] techniques (it's not cost-effective) so to
play safe they just doubled the sample sizes. It's as scientific as that"
(emphasis added).
Another manager cast doubt on the comfort value of consensus. In discussing
his knowledge of other firms' procedures, he noted that in "most of the audit
files that I have seen, there is no evidence of w h y they have picked the
number of items (to test)." However, for the vast majority of interviewees, any
problems that they experienced in explaining the determination of audit work
levels were accommodated by reiterating the nature of professional judge-
ment. For some interviewees, the audit manual was consistently portrayed as
merely establishing a loose framework in which expert audit judgement could
be exercised. As one manager noted, " w e regard the audit as a thinking
process. All we do is lay out a f r a m e w o r k . . , each client is different," whilst
another manager noted in respect of materiality decisions, " w e do not set
materiality levels for errors--it is judgement at the end of the day, looking at
things as a whole." However, several managers having started out explaining
the extent of audit work in terms of the audit manual's sampling plans, then
retreated behind the mystical qualities of audit judgement when experiencing
difficulty explaining the logic behind the numbers coming out of such plans.
Thus, when one act of faith was seen as questionable another was invoked to
replace it and justify action.
"At the end of the day, it is a question of judgement and however
sophisticated your tables are, it comes down to judgement.., the way we
do it tends to make it difficult to statistically extrapolate our results so we
tend to have to use judgement always."
"'We don't follow tables in the manual blindly. We use them as a guide. At
the end of the day, it is the judgement of the partner as to whether we have
done enough work."
In discussing the judgemental nature of the audit process, a theme common
to all interviews was that the flexibility and adaptability of audit work had
increased in recent years. This was seen to be as a result of the introduction of
risk-based audit approaches. The use of standardized forms and question-
naires was stated to have been reduced in several firms and whilst some
managers spoke of a tendency to follow what was done last year, the
emphasis was much reduced.
 From techniques to ideologies 229
"5-6 years ago, there was a tendency to take last years audit programmes,
photocopy them and do them again ... now we are forced into looking at
where the risks are."

New Audit Approaches--Exploring the Process of Change

"There can be little doubt that the concept of audit risk has been one of the
most significant influences on the development of audit methodology in the
last decade. Although the degree to which audit risk is recognised in firms'
approaches varies, partners of nearly all the firms interviewed in the
methodology study were keen to point out that the risk concept is either
already part of or being introduced into their approach. Clearly at present
firms like to characterise their methodologies as risk-based approaches"
(Turley, 1988, p. 111).
In stating the increased emphasis on risk analysis, Turley (p. 113) also noted
that in some cases it appeared to have been picked up as a "buzz w o r d " and
pressed into service w i t h o u t due consideration of its meaning, On the whole
he concluded that justifications for the application of risk to the audit process
were sparse and not well articulated. In identifying the changing nature of
audit activities, the interviews with audit managers sought explicitly to
address such an issue. What did they see as the reasons and rationales for
making such changes? What had been w r o n g with existing audit approaches?
In what ways were the new approaches better? In exploring these issues, the
interviews serve to highlight the socially constructed nature of auditing
activities and the analysis of the nature of, and motivation for, the recent
changes cast considerable doubt on traditional perceptions of auditors'
independence and societal responsibilities.
In discussing this change process, and the resultant increased importance
of audit planning activities, audit managers tended to identify two main
reasons for the changes. At one level, the change to a risk-based approach
was viewed as a way of enhancing the effectiveness of the audit in detecting
material errors. Previously heavily standardized approaches were seen as
having stifled initiative and to have encouraged a rather abstracted and
inflexible set of audit practices--with the resultant danger that audit work was
more a procedural form filling exercise than a thinking, adaptive process
actively seeking the detection of material errors. In particular, audit managers
singled out the importance of understanding the business of the auditee.
Without understanding the business and the way in which company manage-
ment controlled the business, it was suggested that the audit work was highly
likely to miss major errors.
The second reason noted by audit managers, however, provided a contex-
tual explanation for the changing nature of audit practice, thereby reiterating
its socially constructed nature. The pressure being exerted on audit fees by
client company management was frequently seen as having stimulated the
audit firms to re-examine their audit methodologies and to become more
"efficient." As the f o l l o w i n g quotes illustrate:
"As the market place becomes more competitive, we have got to do
cheaper audits, do them quicker. This means continually reassessing areas
where we need to put time into, where we may have commercial exposure,
and reduce time in areas where we don't have commercial exposure."
230 C. Humphrey and P. Moizer
"1 think the change in planning evolved from a necessity from all the big
firms under fee pressure to look very closely at what they did, why they did
it and if they had to do it, they refined internally.., rather than doing it
from a quality aspect and making the world better, they were under
enormous economic pressure from clients to be more efficient."
As the latter quote indicates, the apparent t i g h t e n i n g 1 of the audit market, and
the resultant need to be more c o m m e r c i a l l y aware and to reduce 'over-
auditing' had significant implications for the status of audit planning activities.
In s u m m a r y , better audit p l a n n i n g was the tool to deliver m o r e efficient
audits:
"Planning has become more important in that you have to identify the
right sort of areas to concentrate your time on, whereas before you sort of
went along and sprayed your ticks all over the place. Now time is at a
minimum and you have to use that time as effectively as possible."
"The only way you are going to do this (perform more efficient audits) is by
doing planning properly--if I didn't plan it properly I would spend four
times as much on review. Review points are much more minor if the audit
is well planned."
"the pressure on time caused by fees has forced people into sitting down at
the outset and thinking about what extra things they can cut out without
affecting audit quality."
In discussing the effect of such pressure on audit procedures, some managers
stressed the benefits of better co-ordination, that the audit plan is " o n l y as
good as the client's p l a n " w h i l s t others spoke of e l i m i n a t i n g " n o n - e s s e n t i a l "
audit tasks. However, in explaining the m e a n i n g of " n o n - e s s e n t i a l , " audit
managers began to reveal the c o n t e x t u a l l y d e p e n d e n t nature of audit
efficiency, and the particular influence of client c o m p a n y m a n a g e m e n t in
determining w h a t w o r k is performed. For instance, one m a n a g e r noted, " f o r
clients keen to cut the audit fee, we suggest rotational p l a n s . . , w h e r e w e
don't attend a stock-take of a branch." Other managers stated that the audit
planning m e m o r a n d u m (APM) was being given ( w i t h o u t any materiality
figures or costings of audit work) to client c o m p a n y m a n a g e m e n t in advance
of the c o m m e n c e m e n t of detailed audit testing as a w a y of e n s u r i n g that the
audit was constructed on a proper appreciation of the nature of the
c o m p a n y ' s business. As one m a n a g e r c o m m e n t e d , such an action " h e l p s to
make sure that we have got o u r a s s u m p t i o n s right and to make sure that we
are doing it (the audit) in the right w a y . "

Keeping the "Client" Happy

Giving the A P M ' t o client c o m p a n y m a n a g e m e n t was also seen as a w a y of
i m p r o v i n g the visibility of the quality of audit work, thereby protecting audit
fees. The lack of v i s i b i l i t y of audit quality w a s an issue raised by several
managers. As one noted w h e n c o m p a r i n g his firm to other b u s i n e s s e s - - " w e
are not selling a n y t h i n g different to Marks and Spencer, except that no-one
can see o u r services." Others laid stress on the significance of input-criteria of
quality such as the attire of audit staff; h o w audit staff dealt w i t h c o m p a n y
 From techniques to ideologies 231

employees, etc. (see Moizer, 1988; Harper, 1989). According to one manager,
"the way that staff portray themselves on client premises usually gives a far
better indictation of how the audit has gone than the actual working papers,
as the client does not see them. All he can see is whether they (the staff)
were on the ball or not--were they asking the right questions? were they
coming late and going early?"
The benefit of giving the APM to the client management was, according to
one manager, that " t h e y can now see that we are planning the job sensibly
and have something tangible to read to see w h y they are paying £100 000."
In discussing the need to impress client c o m p a n y management, however,
the audit managers spoke of a problem which w e n t deeper than just the
visibility of quality audit work. In many ways, audit managers appeared to be
responding to a situation where the traditional audit product was not valued
by client management. As such, changes taking place in audit practice were
not just about moving to a risk-based approach, but about altering the
traditional compliance based nature of the audit function. Auditing was no
longer just concerned with credibility assessment, but was also about serving
a more advisory role to client management, as the following c o m m e n t
indicates:
"We want to relate much more to the client and his business so he will
think more favourably of us as a firm and that we do understand him and
feel we really are his business advisers and guardian. The real objective is
to turn away from an internally excellent system of auditing which was very
rigid in its application to a more flexible and creative approach to our
client's problems."
Such a shift also had implications for the nature of audit planning. Apart
from using the APM in a defensive marketing function, as a justifying device
to fight off attempts to reduce audit fees, audit managers spoke of using
planning activities in a more proactive form:
"our planning is not just audit planning. It is planning to give the client the
service he wants. Planning to provide other services has become part and
parcel of audit planning."
"We are adapting much more to the market place. We are very much now
planning audits to at the same time think what other services could be
provided to the client."
Audit managers spoke in this respect about using the planning function to
identify areas "outside the mainstream audit where you feel you can provide
an additional service to the client." One manager noted that as a matter of
routine,
"free time will be given to the client by a treasury management consultant,
who would come and spend time with the client, saying to him, look, this is
how you run your business. It's good, but do you realise by doing this (e.g.
entering loan swaps, currency options, etc.) you can attract big savings."
Another manager stressed that financial directors were no longer looking
for just an audit report, but for people w h o understood the business and could
come up not just with "control errors" but also with "fairly good business
232 C. Humphrey and P. Moizer

ideas." The benefit of providing such services, for some managers, was that
they were more visible than the audit work and more likely to be appreciated
by the client management. In some cases, audit managers also stated that the
benefit of planning to try and provide other services was that they were a way
of offsetting any "losses" on audit work. With the increasing frequency of
audits being put out to "competitive tender," earning revenues from other
services offered a vital supplement to the " l o s s - l e a d i n g " audit activity. As one
manager commented, client management "'do not want a 50% increase in
fees, so you have to do it (the new audit) for the same price and look to sell
them other services as well." The powerful influence that corporate manage-
ment appeared to be having in shaping the nature of audit work was
illustrated by one manager when discussing the importance of providing
other services (whether billed or not).
"We have to deliver a useful product to the client because if we don't they
won't have us back for the audit."

A Question Of Independence
"1 see my job as having a satisfied client who at the end of the day pays
his fee and always feels we are just a phone call away if he has a problem.
A client who regards us as once a year visitors is a client where I am not
doing a good job."
"You get introduced to them (members of the business community), go to
places where they might be. so you join the right golf club, the right
squash club etc. You get encouraged to live in the right area where they
might live~all very subtle ways."
In documenting the changing nature of audit practice and the increasing
emphasis on risk-adaptive, business-oriented approaches, one particular issue
stands o u t - - n a m e l y , that of auditor independence, or to be more precise the
portrayal by audit managers of an audit function increasingly dependent on
the dictates of corporate management. In the interviews, audit managers
made no reference to any wider societal interests regarding the audit function,
nor to any particular responsibilities of auditors in that direction. The client
was referred to u n a m b i g u o u s l y in the form of client company management.
Compliance-based audit techniques were increasingly being complemented
by provision of what management regarded as more useful services; audit
plans were submitted for management's checking and a p p r o v a l - - t h e very
group whose fidelity and stewardship were being " i n d e p e n d e n t l y " examined;
certain previously essential audit tests were apparently now deemed non-
essential, even being traded to suit the fee preferences of management. With
audit managers stressing the importance of maintaining close client relations,
and the critical nature of their ability to generate new business and greater fee
income ("at the end of the day everything flows through to the bottom line"),
the overriding impression that was given by the interviewees was a view of
auditors far removed from that of the disinterested professional. Indeed,
instead of the traditional postulates and concepts of independence, socially
responsible etc. propounded in auditing texts (Lee, 1986; Flint, 1988), a good
case could be put forward for the construction of a new set of concepts based
on the genre of salespersons, marketeers and hawkers.
 From techniques to ideologies 2.33

Similar concerns have been raised in a few other studies of auditors and
audit methodologies. Turley's (1989) study of the audit methodologies of
major UK accounting firms challenged the traditional "professional" orienta-
tion of audit practices. In contrast to the views expressed by Mautz & Sharaf
(1961, p. 239), that a "profession exists to compensate its members more or
less handsomely, but to serve society," Turley found little mention of any
societal obligations in the firms' audit manuals or any discussion of the
perceived benefits flowing from the enhancement of information credibility
provided by the audit. The major benefits referred to were in terms of the
audit as a commercial service to client company management. "It frequently
appears that what is important is how the client company perceives the
benefits" (p. 108). These benefits not only included seeking to perform
standard audit tests in a more efficient manner, but also concerned "audit
by-products" such as aiming to provide "constructive advice" to company
management and drawing on the findings of audit work to suggest the
provision of other "chargeable" services. Dirsmith & Covaleski (1985), in
examining the nature of informal communications in public accounting
firms, identified a number of paradoxes impacting on the nature of audit
work. In particular, they concluded that the business perspective (as against
the "professional" perspective) of auditing was being increasingly formally
stressed at the audit manager and audit senior level. Harper (1989) in an
ethnomethodological study of auditors' work environments noted the empha-
sis placed by audit partners on the role of salesmanship, with partners openly
admitting that they were in effect "salesmen" (p. 167).
Any question that the professional, independent status of auditing was
being impaired by the changing nature of audit practice was, however, firmly
dismissed by audit managers. Interviewees generally expressed surprise that
such a matter should have been raised in the interview. Professional integrity
and independence of mind was not something that was in doubt. A reduced
audit fee would not comprise the quality of work performed on an audit.
Auditors could be relied on to know when there were conflicts of interest and
to act in a way which would not compromise their professional judgement. It
would be naive, though, to consider such assertions and confirmations of
independence in isolation of the context in which they were provided. Clearly,
if audit managers are asked directly whether they are independent, it is only
to be expected that they reply in the affirmative. However, when coupled with
the managers' descriptions of the way that audit practices were responding to
the demands of client management, such affirmations serve to illustrate the
very strength of the managers' belief in their professional integrity. Indeed,
any manager concerned about her/his professional independence could
scarcely have described so freely the growing business and marketing
orientation of their work and their inability to explain the logic behind
sampling procedures and choices as to the extent of audit work. Ultimately, it
is this contrast between the auditors' faith in their professional integrity and
competence, and the scepticism and concern of interested observers, user
groups and regulatory organizations that is central to the notion of an audit
expectations gap. It is again indicative of the social and political power of the
auditing profession that it has for so-long managed to waive away concerns
234 C. Humphrey and P. Moizer

about the audit function by emphasizing the acclaimed status of auditors'

professional standards and attributing audit failures to the unfortunate acts of
certain wayward, unrepresentative individuals rather than to any inherent
limitations or institutional biases in the nature of a self-regulated audit
function. As Willmott (1986, p. 576) concluded,
"the historical and contemporary response of the profession to market and
state pressure for reform has been to re-affirm its technical, politically-
neutral role and to represent its defensiveness and disorganised responses
as necessary adjustments, made in the public interest, to further improve
the quality and value of 'professional' service."

Concluding Comments

The primary aim of this paper has been to illustrate the socially constructed
nature of auditing and the diversity of roles that audit activities can serve.
Through the example of audit planning activities, the paper has revealed a
variety of technical, ideological and marketing roles served by such activities.
In so doing, the socially constructed, contextually dependent nature of audit
activities has been made evident. An especially notable finding to arise out of
the interviews with the audit managers was the influence that client company
management appeared to be having on the nature and extent of their audit
work, and the lack of any distinction between company management and the
real consumers of the audit service. Wider societal obligations had no
apparent place or cause to enter the audit planning process. The consumer
was client company management.
The preceding section of the paper closed with a consideration of the
reaction of auditors to concerns as to their vulnerability to, and apparent
dependence on, the demands of company management. Their reaction, with
its assertive assurances as to the unquestioning status of professional
integrity and competence brought the discussion back to the central theme
that has occupied, even haunted, the continuing debates on the notion of an
audit expectations gap. Those arguing that auditors are under-performing
have periodically been subsumed by the overriding power of the profession's
claim to the ethereal notions of independence and integrity; almost a scenario
of "trust in us and a rosier dawn awaits." In the past, claims that auditors are
becoming deprofessionalized, by not being grounded in the specifics of
operational practice, have been susceptible to dismissal as the abstract
meanderings of the ignorant, or the overtly conspiratorial--or as Hall (1988)
classified it, the expressions of people with "an issue in search of a
controversy." An important aim of this paper has been to facilitate debate on
such matters by getting closer to the day-to-day work of auditors and the
choices they made in determining the nature and extent of audit work. By
adopting a critical perspective and treating auditing as a socially constructed
phenomenon, the paper has attempted to strip away some of the mystiques
associated with audit practice and to reveal the shaky ground on which
certain taken-for-granted assumptions about audit work are based. In coming
up ultimately against the rarefied concept of "professional audit judgement,"
 From techniques to ideologies 235

the paper serves to illustrate certain limitations of the research technique it

employed to study audit practice. At the same time, though, the deconstruct-
ing and demystifying properties provided by the theoretical framework used
to inform and make sense of the interview findings has served to emphasize
the gaping hole in existing audit judgement research, and has thereby
presented a challenging research agenda for the future.
Too often audit judgement research applies a narrowly one-dimensional
perspective to the auditor's decision process, intent more on prediction than
explanation. By concentrating on the development of decision aids and the
construction of rationalistic models of auditor behaviour (Johnson et al., 1989;
Peters et al., 1989), even when some researchers have concluded that auditors
do not follow any well defined models (see Daniel, 1988 re risk assessment),
such research has wittingly, or unwittingly, served to legitimate and further
mystify the nature of audit expertise. Indeed, it would seem possible to draw
quite closeparallels with the way that conceptual framework projects have
helped to legitimize the rationality of accounting standard setting processes
(see Tinker, 1985; Hines, 1989b; Hopwood, 1988). The findings of this paper
point quite clearly for the need for such research to become more contextually
awarc to be grounded more in the operational activities of auditors, to
recognize explicitly the conflicts and contradictions in their working environ-
ment and the processes by which such conflicts are accommodated.
Above all, audit judgement research needs to start from the premise that
professional expertise is not exogenously determined but is socially con-
structed. It needs to recognize that experts within a profession can be deemed
such because they give the appearance of having a claim to a unique body of
knowledge (Hines, 1989b). We submit that this topic is deserving of a more
challenging analysis than that recently proffered in a review of audit
judgement research:
"The evidence accumulated from behavioural studies indicates that expert
auditors do not behave differently from novice auditors. This conclusion
seems counter-intuitive and will probably be very difficult to defend before
an auditor who has studied for years, is still taking training courses, and is
working very hard to get more experience and become a partner" (B~dard,
1989, p. 121).
Until audit judgement researchers are prepared seriously to accommodate
alternative ontological perspectives on the nature of the audit function; to
move away from the acontextual nature of much behavioural and cognitive
research approaches; to see methodological debates as more than " n o w i n "
situations (per Watts & Zimmerman, 1990, p. 149); it is highly likely that
Tinker's (1985, p. 205) comments on the effect of the dominance of a
neo-classical perspective in accounting research will retain a continuing
appropriateness:
"Research has become a quest for the irrelevant and the arcane: the study
of refined statistical procedures used to annihilate trivial problems and the
contemplation of obtuse economic models that promise answers to real
problems, but only in the always distant long run., These exercises in
scholastic irrelevancy are generously supported by a profession that is
relieved to have its academics running aimlessly through the woods."
236 C. Humphrey and P. Moizer

Acknowledgements
The helpful c o m m e n t s and suggestions of Linda Kirkham on an earlier version of this
paper are gratefully a c k n o w l e d g e d .

Notes

1. The increased competitiveness of the audit market has been a source of continuing debate for
a number of years (see Metcalfe, 1978; Cooper & Robson, 1989; Moizer & Turley, 1989). What
is important for the purposes of this paper is that managers perceived that they were operating
under increased commercial pressure, whether internally or externally generated.

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