Group 5 Cases: Mandatory and Directory Statutes Case: Reyes vs CA G.R. No.
118233 December 10, 1999
Case: Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc.,
vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 117188 August 7, 1997
Facts: Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association was organized on
February 8, 1983 as the association of homeowners and residents of
the Loyola Grand Villas. It was registered with the Home Financing
Corporation, the predecessor of herein respondent Home Insurance and
Guarantee Corporation (HIGC), as the sole homeowners' organization in
the said subdivision. For unknown reasons, LGVHAI did not file its
corporate by-laws.
In July, 1989, when Soliven, the developer and president of LGVHAI
inquired about the status of the corporation, the head of the legal
department of the HIGC, informed the former that LGVHAI had been
automatically dissolved because, among other reasons, it did not submit
its by-laws within the period required by the Corporation Code.Issue:
May the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from
the date of its incorporation, as mandated by Section 46 of the
Corporation Code, result in its automatic dissolution?
Held: No.The records of the deliberations of the Batasang Pambansa
No. 68 suggest that automatic corporate dissolution for failure to file the
by-laws on time was never the intention of the legislature. Moreover, the
law itself provides the answer to the issue propounded by petitioner.
Taken as a whole and under the principle that the best interpreter of a
statute is the statute itself (optima statuli interpretatix est ipsum
statutum), reveals the legislative intent to attach a directory, and not
mandatory, meaning for the word "must" in the first sentence of Section
46 of the Corporation Code.
There can also be no automatic corporate dissolution simply because
the incorporators failed to abide by the required filing of by-laws
embodied in Section 46 of the Corporation Code. There is no outright
"demise" of corporate existence. Proper notice and hearing are cardinal
components of due process in any democratic institution, agency or
society. In other words, the incorporators must be given the chance to
explain their neglect or omission and remedy the same.
Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of San Juan, Metro Manila
implemented several tax ordinances on the following:
1) Ord. No. 87 - imposing municipal tax on business of printing and
publication;
2) Ord. No. 91 - transfer tax on sale, donation, barter, or any other
mode of transferring ownership or title of real property;
3) Ord. No. 95 - social housing tax;
4) Ord. No. 100 - new rates of business taxes;
5) Ord. No. 101 - levying an annual “Ad Valorem” tax on real property.
These ordinances in question took effect in the months of September
and October 1992. However, it was only on May 21, 1993 that
petitioners filed an appeal with the Department of Justice assailing the
constitutionality of these tax ordinances allegedly because they were
promulgated without previous public hearings thereby constituting
deprivation of property without due process of law.
Respondent Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal for having been
filed out of time citing Section 187, R.A. No. 7160.
Sec. 187 of R.A. 7160, providesSec. 187 — Procedure for Approval and
Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public
Hearings. — The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and
revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this
Code:That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax
ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty
(30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who
shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of
the appeal:x x x
Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision
or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice
acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate
proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction. Issue: WON Sec.
187 of RA 7160 on process of appeal is mandatory and failures to
appeal within prescribe period renders the dismissal of the case.
Held: Yes. Clearly, the law requires that the dissatisfied taxpayer who
questions the validity or legality of a tax ordinance must file his appeal to
the Secretary of Justice, within 30 days from effectivity thereof.In case
the Secretary decides the appeals, a period also of 30 days is allowed
for an aggrieved party to go to court.But if the Secretary does not act
thereon, after the lapse of 60 days, a party could already proceed to
seek relief in court.These three separate periods are clearly given for
compliance as a prerequisite before seeking redress in a competent
court.Such statutory periods are set to prevent delays as well as
enhance the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial functions. For this
reason, the courts construe these provisions of statutes as mandatory.
Case: Gachon vs. Devera, Jr. G.R. No. 116695. June 20, 1997
Facts: A complaint for forcible entry was filed by, respondent Guevara
against petitioners Gachon and Guevara before the MTCC. Summons
was served on and received by petitioners directing them to file an
answer within the reglementary period of 10 days. However, petitioners
failed to do so because he was abroad. Petitioners filed with the MTCC
an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer. The MTCC
denied the motion on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading under
the Rule on Summary Procedure. It likewise denied all other pleadings
and MR.
The MTCC issued a decision resolving the complaint for forcible entry in
favor of herein private respondents. Aggrieved, they filed a petition for
certiorari and injunction before RTC. RTC likewise dismiss petition
Issue: Are the provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure on the
period of pleadings to be applied STRICTLY or LIBERALLY.
Held: Applied strictly.
Sec. 5. Answer. — Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the
defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof
on the plaintiff . . .
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. — Should the defendant fail to
answer the complaint within the period above provided, the Court, motu
proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
prayed for therein: . . .
The word "shall" ordinarily connotes an imperative and indicates the
mandatory character of a statute. This, however, is not an absolute rule
in statutory construction.
The import of the word ultimately depends upon a consideration of the
entire provision, its nature, object and the consequences that would
follow from construing it one way or the other.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain
acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered
absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the
orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature,
these rules are regarded as mandatory.
The Rule on Summary Procedure, in particular, was promulgated for the
purpose of achieving "an expeditious and inexpensive determination of
cases." For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits
altogether the filing of motions for extension of time. Consistent with this
reasoning is Section 6 of the Rule, which allows the trial court to render
judgment, even motu proprio, upon the failure of a defendant to file an
answer within the reglementary period.
Indeed, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, mandating the
promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure, authorizes the Court
to stipulate that the period for filing pleadings in cases covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure shall be “non-extendible.”It is clear that the
use of the word "shall" in the Rule on Summary Procedure underscores
the mandatory character of the challenged provisions. Giving the
provisions a directory application would subvert the nature of the Rule
on Summary Procedure and defeat its objective of expediting the
adjudication of suits.
Case: De Mesa vs Mencias G.R. No. L-24583 October 29, 1966
Facts: Francisco De Mesa and Maximino Argana were opponents for
the mayoralty of Muntinlupa, Rizal in the 1963 elections. De Mesa won
the election and thereafter proclaimed and assumed office. Meanwhile,
the defeated candidate Argana, filed an election protest against De
Mesa charging him of the perpetration of frauds, terrorism and other
irregularities in certain precincts. De Mesa, on the other hand filed a
counter-protest and sought to shift responsibility for irregularities to the
protestant and his followers. However, while the case is pending Mayor
De Mesa was assassinated.
Protestant Argana moved for the constitution of committees on revision
of ballots. Accordingly, the court a quo required the protestee's widow
and children to appear within fifteen days from notice in order to be
substituted for said protestee, if they so desired. They did not, however,
comply. Proceeding ex parte, on June 11, 1964, the protestant Argana
reiterated his move for the appointment of commissioners on revision of
ballots,
And so, without notice to the protestee and/or his legal representative —
as indeed none had thus far been named — the trial court granted the
motion aforesaid. With the constitution of the committee on revision of
ballots in which, incidentally, Ramon Antilon Jr. was motu proprio
named and then served as commissioner for the deceased protestee,
the trial court, in its decision of August 10, 1964 adjudged the protestant
Maximino Argana as the duly elected mayor of Muntinlupa, in the 1963
elections.
De Mesa’s widow and local chapter of the LP which deceased was
member filed a petition which include among others for the
reconsideration of the August 10, 1964 decision upon the ground that,
for failure to order the protestant to procure the appointment of a
legal representative of the deceased protestee after his widow and
children had failed to appear, pursuant to the applicable provisions of
the Rules of Court, it was legally improper for the trial court to have
proceeded ex parte with the election case
The trial court denied the movants' petition for leave to represent the
deceased protestee, and order stricken from the record their motion for
reconsideration and new trial and their cautionary notice of appeal. The
movants elevated the case to CA on a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with preliminary injunction.
Issue: WON Sec 17, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court connotes a
directory or mandatory compliance.
Held: Yes. The death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the
proceedings in the election protest filed against him, it may be stated as
a rule that an election contest survives and must be prosecuted to final
judgment despite the death of the protestee. With the death of De Mesa,
however, contingency not expressly provided for by the Revised
Election Code
was ushered in.
Nevertheless, precisely by express mandate of Rule 134 of the Rules of
Court, said rules, though not generally applicable to election cases, may
however be applied "by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient."
SEC. 17. Death of party.— After a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the
deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may
be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time,
the court may order the opposing party to produce the appointment of a
legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the
court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf
of the interest of the deceased. . . . (Rule 3.)
The trial court, it will be recalled in its order of May 6, 1964, required the
widow and children of the deceased protestee to appear and be
substituted for and on his behalf and to protect his interest in the case.
But when they failed to comply at the instance of the protestant,
declared said widow and children nonsuited, proceeded with the case
ex parte, and effectively blocked all attempts at intervention and/or
substitution in behalf of the deceased protestee.
It is our considered view that Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
applies to election contests to the same extent and with the same force
and effect as it does in ordinary civil actions. And we declare that unless
and until the procedure therein detailed is strictly adhered to,
proceedings taken by a court in the absence of a duly appointed
legal representative of the deceased protestee must be stricken
down as null and void.
Considering that, in the case at bar, the trial court failed to order the
protestant to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased protestee after the latter's widow and children had failed to
comply with the court order requiring their appearance to be substituted
in lieu of their predecessor, but instead — in derogation of the precepts
of the Rule in question and in the total absence of a legal representative
of the deceased protestee. It is no argument against this conclusion to
contend that the requirement for the procurement of a legal
representative of a deceased litigant is couched in the permissive term
"may" instead of the mandatory word "shall."
While the ordinary acceptations of these terms may indeed be resorted
to as guides in the ascertainment of the mandatory or directory
character of statutory provisions, they are in no wise absolute and
inflexible criteria in the vast areas of law and equity. Depending upon a
consideration of the entire provision, its nature, its object and the
consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other,
the convertibility of said terms either as mandatory or permissive is a
standard recourse in statutory construction.
"Where the statute provides for the doing of some act which is required
by justice or public duty, or where it invests a public body, municipality
or public officer with power and authority to take some action which
concerns the public interest or rights of individuals, the permissive
language will be construed as mandatory and the execution of the
power may be insisted upon as a duty" (Black, Interpretation of Laws,
pp. 540-543).
Case: Querubin vs. CA G.R. No. 2581 December 2, 1948
Facts: Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to
continue taking cognizance of the appeal in the election case of Fidel
Querubin vs. Felipe Mamuri, concerning the mayoralty of Ilagan. Isabel,
because of the expiration of the three-month period provided for in
section 178 of the Revised Election code, which read as follows:
“SEC.178. Appeal from the decision in election contests. – x x x. Such
appeal shall be decided within three months after the filing of the case
in the office of the clerk of court to which the appeal has been taken.”
The record of the appealed case was received by the Court of Appeals
on May 22, 1948. On August 23, 1948, petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that the three-month period provided
for by section 178 of the Revised Election Code expired on August 22,
1948, and that, consequently, the Court of Appeals had lost its
jurisdiction over the case.
Issue: Whether or not CA has jurisdiction in deciding the election case
although the required period to resolve it has expired
Held: YES. The lapse of the period of time provided for said section
should not have the effect of defeating the purposes of the system of
judicial settlement of protests. To dismiss an election contest or the
appeal taken therein because the respective courts, regardless of cause
or reason, have failed to render final decisions within the time limits of
said section, is to defeat the administration of justice upon factors
beyond the control of the parties.
The dismissal in such case will constitute a miscarriage of justice. The
speedy trial required by the law would be turned into a denial of justice.
Case: Marcelino vs. Cruz, Jr. G.R. No. 42428 March 18, 1983
Facts: A petition for prohibition and writ of habeas corpus to enjoin
respondent Judge Fernando Cruz, Jr. from promulgating his decision,
entitled People of the Philippines versus Bernardino Marcelino, and for
release from detention of petitioner, the accused in said case, on the
ground of loss of jurisdiction of respondent trial court over the case for
failure to decide the same within the period of ninety [90] days from
submission thereof.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of rape before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. Trial was conducted and the same was concluded
when the accused rested his case on August 4, 1975. On the date set
for promulgation of the decision, counsel for accused moved for
postponement, raising for the first time the alleged loss of jurisdiction of
the trial court for failure to decide the case within 90 days from
submission thereof for decision. Petitioner espouses the thesis that the
three-month period prescribed by Section 11[l] of Article X of the 1973
Constitution, being a constitutional directive, is mandatory in character
and that non-observance thereof results in the loss of jurisdiction of the
court over the unresolved case.
Issue: Whether or not the decision rendered beyond the period
prescribed in the Constitution is null and void.
Held: NO. The constitutional provision requiring that trial judges shall
decide a case within 90 days from submission is merely a procedural
rule and is not mandatory, but only directory. The provision in question
indicates that it falls within the exception rather than the general rule.
And there can be no doubt that said provision, having incorporated for
reasons of expediency, relates merely to matters of procedure.
The Supreme Court had at various times, upon proper application and
for meritorious reason, allowed judges of inferior courts additional time
beyond the three-month period within which to decide cases submitted
to them. The reason is that a departure from said provision would result
in less injury to the general public than would its strict application. To
hold that non-compliance by the courts with the aforesaid provision
would result in loss of jurisdiction, would make the courts, through which
conflicts are resolved, the very instrument to foster unresolved causes
by reason merely of having failed to render a decision within the allotted
term.