2:19-cv-01059-RAJ-JRC Document 55 - Defendants Response in Opposition To Coer Motion For Prelim Injunction (With Declarations)

Case 2:19-cv-01059-RAJ-JRC Document 55 Filed 03/16/20 Page 1 of 32
1 District Judge Richard A. Jones
6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
7 AT SEATTLE
8 STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al. No. 2:19-cv-01059-RAJ-JRC
Plaintiffs,
9 DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION
v. TO PLAINTIFFS CITIZENS OF THE EBEY’S
10 RESERVE FOR A HEALTHY, SAFE AND
The UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF PEACEFUL ENVIRONMENT AND PAULA
11 THE NAVY, et al., SPINA’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
12 Defendants,
NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR: 03/20/2020
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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... - 1 -
3 STATUTORY BACKGROUND ............................................................................................... - 2 -
4 I. The National Environmental Policy Act ......................................................................... - 2 -
5 II. The National Historic Preservation Act .......................................................................... - 3 -
6 FACTUAL BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................... - 3 -
7 STANDARD OF REVIEW ........................................................................................................ - 6 -
8 ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................................. - 6 -
9 I. COER fails to demonstrate irreparable harm. ................................................................. - 7 -
10 A. COER’s delay in seeking emergency relief undermines its assertion of irreparable
11 harm. ..................................................................................................................... - 8 -
12 B. COER fails to show that its alleged harm is irreparable. ...................................... - 9 -
13 C. COER fails to causally link its alleged harm to the agency action at issue. ....... - 11 -
14 II. Preliminary injunctive relief will harm the public interest. .......................................... - 12 -
15 III. The balance of equities weighs against preliminary injunctive relief........................... - 14 -
16 IV. COER fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success on its claims. ................................ - 16 -
17 A. COER’s NEPA claim lacks merit. ...................................................................... - 17 -
18 B. COER’s NHPA claim lacks merit....................................................................... - 22 -
19 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... - 24 -
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DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO COER’S ii U.S. Department of Justice
24 MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 150 M. Street, NE
No. 2:19-cv-01059-RAJ-JRC Washington, DC 20002
25
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2
Cases
Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures,
3 409 U.S. 1207 (1972) ............................................................................................................ - 14 -
4 Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell,
480 U.S. 531(1987) ........................................................................................................ - 7 -, - 9 -
5
Animal Def. Council v. Hodel,
6 840 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1988) .............................................................................................. - 16 -
Apache Survival Coal. v. United States,
7 21 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 1994) .................................................................................................. - 23 -
8 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
462 U.S. 87 (1983) .................................................................................................................. - 2 -
9 Cal Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy,
631 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2011) ................................................................................................ - 2 -
10
Camp v. Pitts,
11 411 U.S. 138 (1973) .............................................................................................................. - 16 -
Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton,
12
503 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2007) .................................................................................................. - 7 -
13 Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey,
938 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1991) .............................................................................................. - 23 -
14
Citizens of the Ebey’s Reserve for a Healthy, Safe & Peaceful Env’t v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy,
15 122 F. Supp. 3d 1068 (W.D. Wash. 2015).................. - 3 -, - 8 -, - 9 -, - 11 -, - 12 -, - 14 -, - 19 -
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
16 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) ............................................................................................................ - 9 -
17 Communities, Inc. v. Busey,

956 F.2d 619 (6th Cir. 1992) ................................................................................................ - 17 -
18 Conservation Cong. v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
720 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2013) ................................................................................................ - 6 -
19
CTIA - The Wireless Ass’n v. FCC,
20 466 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ................................................................................................ - 3 -
Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack,
21
636 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2011) ..................................................................................... - 9 -, - 16 -
22 Davis v. Latschar,
202 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ................................................................................................ - 3 -
23
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO COER’S iii U.S. Department of Justice
25
1 Gillons v. Shell Co. of California,

86 F.2d 600 (9th Cir. 1936) .................................................................................................... - 8 -
2
Greenpeace Action v. Franklin,
3 14 F.3d 1324 (9th Cir. 1992) ................................................................................................ - 17 -
In re Excel Innovations, Inc.,
4 502 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2007) .............................................................................................. - 11 -
5 Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. Schultz,

992 F.2d 977 (9th Cir.1993) ................................................................................................. - 18 -
6 Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
88 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1996) .................................................................................................... - 2 -
7
Kan. Health Care Ass’n v. Kan. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs.,
8 31 F.3d 1536 (10th Cir. 1994) ................................................................................................ - 8 -
Lands Council v. Mcnair,
9
537 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2008) ............................................................................ - 7 -, - 14 -, - 16 -
10 Lands Council v. McNair,
629 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) ................................................................................................ - 2 -
11
Mazurek v. Armstrong,
12 520 U.S. 968 (1997) ..................................................................................................... - 9 -, - 10 -
Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy,
13 460 U.S. 766 (1983) ................................................................................................................ - 9 -
14 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,

561 U.S. 139 (2010) ................................................................................................................ - 6 -
15 Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. F.A.A.,
161 F.3d 569 (9th Cir. 1998) ....................................................... - 2 -, - 17 -, - 18 -, - 21 -, - 23 -
16
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.,
17 463 U.S. 29 (1983) ................................................................................................................ - 24 -
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
18
177 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 1999) .................................................................................................. - 3 -
19 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.,
886 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2018) ................................................................................................ - 11 -
20
Nken v. Holder,
21 556 U.S. 418 (2009) ................................................................................................................ - 6 -
Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.,
22 No. C04-0666RSM, 2005 WL 1427696 (W.D. Wash. June 15, 2005) ................................ - 17 -
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DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO COER’S iv U.S. Department of Justice
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1 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,

817 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Or. 2011) ....................................................................................... - 9 -
2
Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Pub. Co.,
3 762 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1985) ................................................................................................ - 8 -
Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.,
4 265 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2001) .............................................................................................. - 20 -
5 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,

653 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2011) ................................................................................................ - 11 -
6 Presidio Golf Club v. Nat’l Park Serv.,
155 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 1998) .............................................................................................. - 10 -
7
Price Rd. Neighborhood Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp.,
8 113 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1997) ................................................................................... - 17 -, - 18 -
R.R. Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman,
9
312 U.S. 496 (1941) .............................................................................................................. - 12 -
10 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,
490 U.S. 332 (1989) ................................................................................................................ - 2 -
11
Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
12 867 F.3d 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ............................................................................................ - 19 -
Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep't of Trans.,
13 753 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1985) .............................................................................................. - 17 -
14 the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell,

632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011) ....................................................................................... - 6 -, - 7 -
15 Tribal Vill. of Akutan v. Hodel,
859 F.2d 662 ........................................................................................................................... - 7 -
16
Valenti v. Mitchell,
17 962 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1992) ................................................................................................... - 8 -
Vill. of Bensenville v. FAA,
18
457 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ................................................................................................ - 18 -
19 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,
456 U.S. 305 (1982) .............................................................................................................. - 12 -
20
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
21 555 U.S. 7 (2008) ........................................................................... - 6 -, - 7 -, - 12 -, - 14 -, - 16 -
Wisconsin Heritages, Inc. v. Harris,
22 490 F. Supp. 1334 (E.D. Wis. 1980)..................................................................................... - 22 -
23 Statutes
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO COER’S v U.S. Department of Justice
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1 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)................................................................................................................... - 2 -
2 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) ............................................................................................................... - 2 -

54 U.S.C. § 306108 .......................................................................................................... - 3 -, - 22 -
3
Regulations
4 36 C.F.R. § 800.1 ...................................................................................................................... - 22 -
40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) ................................................................................................................. - 2 -
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DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO COER’S vi U.S. Department of Justice
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1 INTRODUCTION
2 The Navy deploys carrier strike groups around the world to protect national security
3 interests. Before deployment, the Navy must ensure that its aviators are equipped with the
4 specialized skills required to successfully complete one of the most difficult and dangerous tasks
5 in military aviation: landing on a moving aircraft carrier. Pilots learn these critical skills through
6 training that includes a series of Field Carrier Landing Practices (“FCLPs”) onshore.
7 In 2014, Congress appropriated funds for the Navy to add more EA-18G (“Growler”)
8 aircraft to support the Navy’s airborne electronic attack mission. To ensure it has a sufficient
9 number of properly trained aviators ready to meet the increased need for the Growler, the Navy
10 determined that it must conduct up to 23,700 FCLPs at its Outlying Landing Field (“OLF”) in
11 Coupeville, which is part of Naval Air Station Whidbey Island. In accordance with the National
12 Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”), the
13 Navy thoroughly evaluated the potential effects of increasing air operations at Ault Field and
14 OLF Coupeville before it issued its Record of Decision (the “ROD”) in March 2019.
15 Now, a year later, Plaintiffs Citizens of the Ebey’s Reserve for a Healthy, Safe &
16 Peaceful Environment and Paula Spina (collectively, “COER”) seek emergency relief to enjoin
17 the Navy’s increased Growler flights. Limiting the Navy’s ability to train at OLF Coupeville
18 will disrupt the Navy’s complex training schedule and degrade the United States’ ability to meet
19 current threats. The Court should deny COER’s motion because COER fails to demonstrate that
20 the increased training operations will cause irreparable harm to its members and because the
21 balance of equities weighs in favor of the public interest. Additionally, COER fails to establish a
22 likelihood of success on the merits of its NEPA and NHPA claims.
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DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO COER’S -1- U.S. Department of Justice
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1 STATUTORY BACKGROUND
2 The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) governs a court’s review of an agency’s
3 compliance with NEPA and NHPA. See Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. F.A.A., 161 F.3d
4 569, 573 (9th Cir. 1998); Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754,
5 760 (9th Cir. 1996). Under the APA, a court must uphold an agency action unless the action is
6 “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . . ” 5
7 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). This standard is “highly deferential” and presumes the agency action is
8 valid. Cal Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1084 (9th Cir. 2011). The
9 Court is “most deferential” when the challenged action is “within the agency’s expertise.” Lands
10 Council v. McNair, 629 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat.
11 Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)).
12 I. The National Environmental Policy Act
13 To ensure informed decisions, NEPA requires an agency to analyze and disclose
14 significant environmental effects but requires nothing further. Robertson v. Methow Valley
15 Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989). “If the adverse environmental effects of the
16 proposed action are adequately identified and evaluated, the agency is not constrained by NEPA
17 from deciding that other values outweigh the environmental costs.” Id. NEPA requires that, for
18 “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,” a federal
19 agency must prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”), which is a detailed statement
20 on the environmental impact of the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). To determine
21 whether an action requires an EIS, the agency may prepare an environmental assessment. 40
22 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b).
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1 II. The National Historic Preservation Act
2 Section 106 of the NHPA requires federal agencies to consider the potential effects of
3 proposed actions on historic properties. 54 U.S.C. § 306108. The NHPA also requires federal
4 agencies to confer with the State Historic Preservation Officer and seek input from the Advisory
5 Council on Historic Preservation. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800,
6 805 (9th Cir. 1999). However, an agency is not required to engage in any particular preservation
7 activities. CTIA - The Wireless Ass’n v. FCC, 466 F.3d 105, 107 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting
8 Davis v. Latschar, 202 F.3d 359, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
9 FACTUAL BACKGROUND
10 The Navy has used OLF Coupeville to train its pilots and simulate the conditions and
11 procedures of landing on an aircraft carrier since 1967. See GRR_00150435. In January 2005,
12 the Navy announced that it would transition its electronic attack aircraft from the Prowler to the
13 Growler. See Citizens of the Ebey’s Reserve for a Healthy, Safe & Peaceful Environment v. U.S.
14 Dep’t of the Navy, 122 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1072 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (“COER I”). The Navy
15 analyzed the impacts of this transition in an Environmental Assessment (“EA”). Id. at 1073.
16 The Navy began operating Growler jets at the Naval Air Station Whidbey Island complex
17 (“NASWI”) in 2008. GRR_00030928; GRR_00150374.
18 In May 2013, the Navy began preparing an EA to evaluate the potential effects of basing
19 additional Growlers at NASWI. GRR_00060774. The Navy then published a Notice of Intent to
20 prepare an EIS to further analyze the impacts of adding more Growlers at NASWI. See
21 GRR_00061302. In July 2013, COER brought suit challenging the 2005 EA and claimed that
22 the Navy violated NEPA by not preparing an EIS (the “2013 Action”). COER I, 122 F. Supp. 3d
23 at 1072. Despite the Navy’s decision to prepare an EIS, COER moved this Court to enjoin the
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1 Navy’s Growler flights at OLF Coupeville until the Navy completed its EIS. See id. at 1072.
2 This Court denied COER’s request because COER “ha[d] not established a likelihood of success
3 on the merits, ha[d] not sufficiently demonstrated that its members will suffer irreparable harm
4 absent an injunction, and ha[d] not shown that the balance of equities or the public weigh[ed] in
5 its favor.” Id.
6 In September 2018, the Navy issued the anticipated Final EIS evaluating “the potential
7 environmental effects of continuing and expanding the existing Growler operations” as well as
8 analyzing “aircraft operations conducted in the vicinity of Ault Field and OLF Coupeville . . . . ”
9 GRR_00150144. The EIS analyzes the noise impacts of operations at NASWI. See generally
10 GRR_00150155-61. Based on its findings, the Navy issued the ROD on March 12, 2019,
11 authorizing the continuation and expansion of “existing EA-18G ‘Growler’ operations at the
12 NAS Whidbey Island complex” and the “increase [of] electronic attack capabilities by adding 36
13 operational aircraft to support an expanded U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) mission” among
14 other activities. GRR_00167641. The ROD authorizes the Navy to increase the complement of
15 Growler aircraft at the NASWI from 82 to 118 Growler aircraft. GRR_150238.
16 Before issuing the ROD, the Navy consulted with the Washington State Historic
17 Preservation Officer, Indian tribes, representatives of local government, the Advisory Council on
18 Historic Preservation, and other interested individuals and organizations, including COER.
19 GRR_00167660. After years of meetings and correspondence, see generally GRR_00164177-
20 83, the Navy and the consulting parties reached an impasse regarding the mitigation measures.
21 See GRR_00164171. In accordance with the NHPA, the Navy notified the Advisory Council on
22 Historic Preservation and requested the Council’s comments on the matter. Id. The Advisory
23 Council provided its findings and recommendations on the Navy’s decision to expand Growler
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1 operations. GRR_00167458-65. The Navy carefully considered the Council’s recommendations
2 and implemented several but declined to adopt others. GRR_00167574-78; GRR_00162674;
3 Decl. of Capt. Matthew Arny (“Arny Decl.”) ¶ 4. The Navy’s reasons for declining some of the
4 Council’s recommendations are documented in the administrative record. See id.
5 The Navy has made every effort to minimize impacts to the Central Whidbey Island
6 community. See, e.g. Arny Decl. ¶¶ 13, 14. (“During my time as Commanding Officer [since
7 September 2018], NASWI has not used the OLF during any weekend.”). But FCLPs must occur
8 at OLF Coupeville using Growlers at the current capacity for several reasons.
9 First, the Growler is a critical enabler of modern air combat and is the United States’ only
10 electronic attack aircraft. Decl. of Vice Admiral DeWolfe H. Miller (“Miller Decl.”) ¶ 8.
11 “Growlers are the first into combat, securing the electromagnetic operational domain by
12 jamming adversary systems and protecting U.S. and Allied forces from detection.” Id. ¶ 9.
13 Second, all of the Navy’s electronic attack squadrons are based at NASWI, which is
14 supported by OLF Coupeville. See Arny Decl. ¶ 5. OLF Coupeville, located just south of the
15 main base, is ideal for FCLPs because the surrounding landscape supports a realistic situation in
16 which the aircrew can successfully master the critical skills necessary to safely operate the
17 Growler at sea. See Arny Decl. ¶¶ 8-11. Training at OLF Coupeville is also necessary because it
18 allows other vital missions of the main base (NASWI) to continue unimpeded. Id. In addition,
19 detachment training to other locations is expensive and disruptive to the Navy’s complex and
20 interlocking system of training carrier strike groups. See Miller Decl. ¶¶ 14-17, 21-26.
21 Third, the Navy needs the ROD’s additional FCLPs to adequately train aircrews. See
22 Miller Decl. ¶¶ 17 (“A steady stream of trained aviators . . . is paramount to sustaining our
23 nation’s global presence and implementing our technological edge.”). “Performing an arrested
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1 landing onboard a moving aircraft carrier is widely known to be one of the most difficult and
2 dangerous tasks in the American military and is an incredibly perishable skill.” Decl. of Capt.
3 Eric P. Illston (“Illston Decl.”) ¶ 8. Thus, the Navy must continue performing the current
4 number of FCLPs at OLF Coupeville to protect America’s national security interests.
5 STANDARD OF REVIEW
6 A preliminary injunction is “a drastic and extraordinary remedy, which should not be
7 granted as a matter of course.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 165
8 (2010). Courts must reserve this “drastic remedy” for cases where a plaintiff makes “a clear
9 showing” that it is entitled to such relief. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22
10 (2008). To justify a preliminary injunction, the movant must show that “(1) it is likely to
11 succeed on the merits; (2) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted;
12 (3) the balance of equities tips in its favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public’s interest.”
13 Conservation Cong. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 720 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Winter, 555
14 U.S. at 20). Alternatively, “‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a hardship balance that
15 tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two
16 elements of the Winter test are also met.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127,
17 1132 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added). When one party is a United States agency, the public
18 interest and the agency’s interest merge, and the public interest weighs in favor of the agency’s
19 decision. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).
20 ARGUMENT
21 The Court should deny COER’s motion because (1) COER fails to show that it would be
22 irreparably harmed absent a preliminary injunction, (2) the public interest favors denying
23
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1 injunctive relief, (3) the balance of harms weighs against enjoining the Navy’s Growler flights at
2 OLF Coupeville, and (4) COER is not likely to succeed on the merits of its claims.
3 I. COER fails to demonstrate irreparable harm.
4 To obtain the extraordinary relief of a preliminary injunction, the movant must show that
5 it will likely suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.
6 Under this standard, a plaintiff must show its alleged irreparable injuries are “likely to occur,”
7 not merely “possible,” if action is not immediately enjoined before the court rules on the merits.
8 All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131. And contrary to COER’s suggestion
9 that injunctive relief is presumed in environmental cases, see Pl.’s Mot. for Preliminary
10 Injunction (“COER’s Mot.”), ECF No. 29 at 20 (citing N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, 503 F.3d
11 836, 843 (9th Cir. 2007)), the court cannot presume irreparable harm simply because COER
12 alleges environmental injuries. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545−46
13 (1987); Lands Council v. Mcnair, 537 F.3d 981, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008). In fact, alleged
14 environmental injuries may be outweighed by other considerations. See Tribal Vill. of Akutan v.
15 Hodel, 859 F.2d 662, 663−64 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting harm to the public interest weighed against
16 granting a preliminary injunction).
17 COER has not shown—and cannot show—that it will suffer imminent irreparable harm
18 absent a preliminary injunction. COER’s delay in seeking a preliminary injunction, its failure to
19 assert harms that are immediate and irreversible, and its inability to causally tie its alleged
20 injuries to the government action at issue all weigh against granting a preliminary injunction.
21
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1 A. COER’s delay in seeking emergency relief undermines its assertion of

irreparable harm.
2
“A preliminary injunction is sought upon the theory that there is an urgent need for
3
speedy action to protect the plaintiff’s rights. By sleeping on its rights a plaintiff demonstrates
4
the lack of need for speedy action.” COER I, 122 F. Supp. 3d at 1083. A plaintiff’s “long delay
5
before seeking a preliminary injunction implies a lack of urgency and irreparable harm.”
6
Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1985); Kan. Health
7
Care Ass’n v. Kan. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 31 F.3d 1536, 1543-44 (10th Cir. 1994)
8
(“[D]elay in seeking preliminary relief cuts against finding irreparable injury”).
9
Here, COER’s delay in filing its motion for a preliminary injunction undermines its
10
purported need for immediate relief. As COER concedes, the Navy increased Growler
11
operations immediately after the Navy issued the ROD on March 12, 2019. Pl.’s Mot. for
12
Preliminary Injunction (“COER’s Mot.”), ECF No. 29 at 7. Yet COER waited until February 13,
13
2020—almost a year later—to seek emergency relief. If the injuries from the increased Growler
14
flights are as immediate as COER claims, it is difficult to understand why it waited so long to
15
bring this motion. Indeed, this Court previously denied COER’s request for a preliminary
16
injunction because COER’s 16 month “delay [was] inconsistent with the purpose of a
17
preliminary injunction.” COER I, 122 F. Supp. 3d at 1083. As courts have recognized, “equity
18
aids the vigilant, not those who rest on their rights.” Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 299 (3d
19
Cir. 1992); see Gillons v. Shell Co. of California, 86 F.2d 600, 609 (9th Cir. 1936). COER’s
20
delay, particularly in light of the Navy’s prior expressed willingness to expedite dispositive
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briefing, belies COER’s assertion of irreparable harm.
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1 B. COER fails to show that its alleged harm is irreparable.
2 For an injury to be irreparable, a plaintiff must show that “[t]he injury complained of [is]
3 . . . of such imminence that there is a ‘clear and present’ need for equitable relief to prevent
4 irreparable harm.’” Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1290,
5 1316 (D. Or. 2011). An injunction should issue only where a plaintiff makes a “clear showing”
6 and presents “substantial proof” that the injunction is warranted. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520
7 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam). COER’s alleged harms fail to meet this standard.
8 Many of COER’s alleged harms are based on fears of hypothetical injuries. For example,
9 COER’s members complain about stress and anxiety over hypothetical future events, such as
10 aircraft crashes, Decl. of Paula Spina (“Spina Decl.”), ECF No. 42 ¶ 13, and attacks from Navy
11 supporters, Decl. of Jodi Hinkelman (“Hinkelman Decl.”), ECF No. 37 ¶ 10. Some declarants
12 also describe anger over the Navy’s Growler flights. Decl. of Maryon Attwood (“Attwood
13 Decl.”), ECF No. 30 ¶ 13. However, these alleged harms are not within the scope of NEPA or
14 the NHPA. See Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 775–79
15 (1983) (holding that merely disliking a government decision so much that an individual suffers
16 anxiety and stress does not have a sufficiently close connection to the physical environment for
17 NEPA to apply). As this Court noted when it denied COER’s last attempt to enjoin Growler
18 flights at OLF Coupeville, courts should exercise caution when considering complaints of
19 anxiety and stress related to government actions. COER I, 122 F. Supp. 3d at 1081. Not only are
20 these fears not cognizable under NEPA or the NHPA, they are insufficient to establish
21 irreparable harm. See Amoco, 480 U.S. at 545 (“improbable” versus “likely” weighs against
22 granting a preliminary injunction); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1151 (2013)
23 (plaintiffs cannot claim harm “based on their fears of hypothetical future harm . . . . ”); Ctr. for
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1 Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1171 n.6 (9th Cir. 2011) (suggesting that the standard for
2 harm at the preliminary injunction stage requires a higher threshold than the test under Article III
3 standing ).
4 Similarly, the economic injuries alleged by COER are not cognizable under NEPA or the
5 NHPA because economic interests alone do not fall within the zone of interest of either statute.
6 Presidio Golf Club v. Nat’l Park Serv., 155 F.3d 1153, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Purely
7 economic interests do not fall within the zone of interests to be protected by NEPA or NHPA.”).
8 COER submitted declarations from residents and public officials—none of whom represent
9 Coupeville residents—alleging negative effects to real estate values, business operations, and
10 tourism. Decl. of Kurt Blankenship (“Blankenship Decl.”), ECF No. 31 ¶¶ 6, 10; Decl. of Jamie
11 Stephens (“Stephens Decl.”), ECF No. 43 ¶¶ 5-6; Decl. of Michelle Sandoval (“Sandoval
12 Decl.”), ECF No. 41 ¶ 8; Spina Decl. ¶ 19. However, because neither NEPA nor the NHPA seek
13 to protect the economic harms proffered by COER, the Court should not consider them.
14 Even if the Court were to consider COER’s alleged economic harms, COER nevertheless
15 fails to present a “clear showing” that the action complained of will be remedied by an
16 injunction. Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972. COER submitted the declarations of two local
17 government leaders who allege the increase in Growler flights negatively impacts tourism and
18 real estate prices in their jurisdictions. Sandoval Decl. ¶ 8; Stephens Decl. ¶ 5–6. However, both
19 declarants failed to demonstrate that the source of airplane noise they have allegedly heard is
20 from Growlers participating in FLCPs at OLF Coupeville (rather than noise emanating from
21 other military and commercial aircraft flying over or near the areas in question). Indeed, both
22 declarants address noise from “[t]he Growlers that fly out of [NASWI]” but say nothing about
23 FCLPs at or around OLF Coupeville. Sandoval Decl. ¶ 5; Stephens Decl. ¶ 5–6. Without more,
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO COER’S - 10 - U.S. Department of Justice
25
1 such unfounded statements cannot serve as the basis for irreparable harm as they fail to establish
2 the causal connection required. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 886 F.3d
3 803, 819 (9th Cir. 2018) (requiring a sufficient causal connection between the alleged irreparable
4 harm and the activity to be enjoined).
5 C. COER fails to causally link its alleged harm to the agency action at issue.
6 “Speculative injury cannot be the basis for a finding of irreparable harm.” In re Excel
7 Innovations, Inc., 502 F.3d 1086, 1098 (9th Cir. 2007). Instead, a movant must establish a
8 “sufficient causal connection” between the alleged harm and the activity to be enjoined, such that
9 “the requested injunction [will] forestall the irreparable harm.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 886 F.3d at
10 819 (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2011)).
11 COER’s motion is devoid of the requisite causal link between its alleged harm and the
12 action it seeks to enjoin. For instance, multiple declarants complain of hearing loss or
13 anticipated hearing loss as a result of the Growler flights. However, not a single declarant
14 presented individualized information connecting increased exposure to noise resulting from the
15 Navy’s implementation of the ROD to the declarant’s hearing trouble. Further, COER has
16 offered no evidence that its members are suffering any different or greater amount of hearing
17 loss due to increased FCLPs than they allegedly did under pre-ROD levels. In light of the many
18 factors that affect a person’s hearing, the declarants’ broad claims regarding Growler noise and
19 supposed hearing loss fall short of the required “sufficient causal connection” between the
20 alleged irreparable harm and the activity to be enjoined. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n 886 F.3d at 819.
21 Finally, COER’s members’ alleged harm is also in part due to their own decisions to
22 move to an area zoned for high noise. A party cannot demonstrate irreparable harm if the harm
23 complained of is self-inflicted. Citizens of the Ebey's Reserve, 122 F. Supp. 3d at 1083. The
25
1 Navy has been conducting FCLPs at OLF Coupeville since 1967. COER I, 122 F. Supp. 3d at
2 1083. As a result, the area around OLF Coupeville “had been zoned for high intensity noise”
3 since 1992. Id. And all but one of the resident declarants moved to the area after the noise zones
4 were established. See Attwood Decl. ¶ 2 (2005); Blankenship Decl. ¶ 2 (2011); Blubaugh Decl.
5 ¶ 3 (2016); Brabanski Decl. ¶ 6 (1993); Browning Decl. ¶ 2 (2013); Hinkelman Decl. ¶ 2 (2019);
6 Porter Decl. ¶ 2 (1988); Spina Decl. ¶ 2 (2006); Thompson Decl. ¶ 3 (2007); Vaughn Decl. ¶ 2
7 (2004). The one declarant who moved to Coupeville prior to the 1992 noise zoning nevertheless
8 chose to build his retirement home there in 2014. Porter Decl. ¶ 6. COER fails to present even
9 one declarant who did not in some way act to cause the harms of which they complain.
10 Therefore, equitable concerns disfavor an injunction because all of those claiming harm
11 purchased or built homes in areas zoned for high noise levels in recognition of the Navy’s
12 ongoing FCLP training operations.
13 II. Preliminary injunctive relief will harm the public interest.
14 A federal court must deny a preliminary injunction, even where irreparable injury to the
15 movant exists, if the injunction is contrary to the public interest. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 22-23
16 (holding that even though plaintiffs showed a “near certainty” of irreparable injury to marine
17 mammals resulting from the Navy’s use of mid-frequency active sonar, that harm was
18 outweighed by the public interest in facilitating effective naval training exercises). “The history
19 of equity jurisdiction is the history of regard for public consequences in employing the
20 extraordinary remedy of the injunction.” R.R. Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 500
21 (1941). Thus, in “exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard
22 for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Weinberger
23 v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982).

25
1 Here, the FCLP activity that COER seeks to curtail directly supports the provisioning of
2 qualified aircrews in support of our national defense. Illston Decl. ¶¶ 20, 23; Miller Decl. ¶ 26.
3 Similar to the public interest in Winter, the FCLPs are effective training exercises and help
4 “refine[] the pilot’s skills needed during the last 15-18 seconds of flying prior to the aircraft
5 touching down.” Illston Decl. ¶ 9. Pilots must learn a precise landing approach: touchdown at
6 an exact spot of the runway and increase power to take off again without stopping because, on an
7 actual aircraft carrier, the pilot must immediately take off if the arresting hook or wires fail to
8 safely “trap” the aircraft. Id. ¶¶ 9, 15. “If the aircrew fails to immediately select full power upon
9 touchdown and the aircraft misses the arresting wire or the arresting wire fails, the aircraft will
10 be unable to regain enough airspeed to fly, crashing into the sea or into the aircraft carrier.” Id. ¶
11 15. FCLPs “help aircrews avoid such catastrophic consequences.” Id.
12 “Without the necessary skill sets created by repeated FCLPs, the Growler electronic
13 airborne attack aircrews needed by combatant commanders will not be able to deploy to aircraft
14 carriers in support of those missions.” Illston Decl. ¶ 23. As described in Vice Admiral Miller’s
15 classified declaration, the Growler is essential to our nation’s security, and the current level of
16 training at OLF Coupeville set forth in the ROD necessarily corresponds to the Department of
17 Defense’s strategy for defending against present threats to national security. See generally
18 Classified Decl. of Vice Admiral DeWolfe H. Miller (“Miller Decl. Classified”). In short, “[t]he
19 highly refined and technical work [of the FCLPs] is critical life-saving work that is necessary to
20 fulfill mission requirements.” Illston Decl. ¶ 23.
21 The public interest in national security strongly favors allowing the Navy to conduct
22 operations at Coupeville at the current rate and outweighs the alleged environmental or
23 procedural harms COER claims. The Supreme Court has instructed courts not to exercise their
25
1 equitable powers “loosely or casually” in cases involving claims of environmental damage.
2 Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 1005 (quoting Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. Students Challenging
3 Regulatory Agency Procedures, 409 U.S. 1207, 1217-18 (1972)). In the public interest, the
4 Court should deny Plaintiffs’ motion.
5 III. The balance of equities weighs against preliminary injunctive relief.
6 The balance of harms in this case tips strongly in favor of the Navy and the public
7 interest. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 23 (finding that “the Navy’s interest in effective, realistic
8 training” outweighed any claim of irreparable injury by plaintiffs); COER I, 122 F. Supp. 3d at
9 1084 (“OLF Coupeville offers a unique set of conditions that make it ideal for FCLP operations
10 that closely mirror conditions they will encounter when landing on an aircraft carrier at sea.”).
11 Limiting the number of FCLPs at Coupeville would result in fewer aircrews being prepared to
12 deploy, putting our national security at a heightened risk. See Illston Decl. ¶ 24; Miller Decl. ¶
13 26; see generally Miller Decl. Classified. As a result, this Court must weigh the benefit of—and
14 the public interest in—ensuring the United States has capable airborne electronic attack assets to
15 secure our nation against the speculative and narrow harms that COER has alleged.
16 Any decrease of FCLPs at OLF Coupeville will adversely affect naval aviation readiness
17 across the nation because Growlers deploy in a Carrier Air Wing with “a variety of diverse
18 aircraft” each of which must progress through their own individualized “complex, multi-year
19 training process” involving several phases that must be precisely synchronized to enable them to
20 train with surface ships and submarine elements. Miller Decl. ¶¶ 5, 14-15. Training the aircrew
21 is a “constant cycle” and synchronizing these training phases is critical to maintain these
22 perishable skills. Id. ¶¶ 16, 26; see also Illston Decl. ¶ 22 (observing that “increasing battlefield
23 demand” has increased the need for training aircrew). “The timing of the training is crucial
25
1 because each component of the aviator’s skill set must come together at the correct moment.”
2 Illston Decl. ¶ 20.
3 FCLP operations allow the aircrew to “master the necessary skills” for safely operating
4 and landing a jet onboard a moving aircraft carrier. Illston Decl. ¶ 7. In fact, FCLPs are the only
5 method available that nearly replicate “the rigors of carrier based operations.” Id. Because
6 landing on a moving aircraft carrier is very difficult and dangerous, the Navy’s aircrew must
7 prepare at airfields on land “where risks that could be encountered at sea can be mitigated to an
8 acceptable level.” Id. ¶ 8. During the FCLP, the aircrew practice their muscle memory and fine
9 motor skills while instructors identify their strengths and weaknesses and provide individualized
10 feedback. Id. ¶ 18. As Captain Illston explains, “the Navy’s aviator training pipeline is a long
11 and arduous path, progressing from developing general military aviation skills to specialized
12 platform-specific tactics and procedures. For a specialized aircraft such as the Growler, aircrew
13 training can take up to three years or more from coming into the Navy to flying in an operational
14 squadron.” Id ¶ 20. Thus, the Navy must be able to continue conducting FCLPs at the current
15 rate to “produce fully trained Growler squadrons in defense of the nation.” Miller Decl. ¶ 26; see
16 also Miller Decl. Classified.
17 Moreover, the Navy cannot shift FCLPs to Ault Field or other Navy installations across
18 the nation because “[a]irfield rates across the Navy are historically high” and there is simply no
19 excess capacity. Miller Decl. ¶¶ 22-25. Conducting FCLPs at Ault Field would produce “low
20 quality training” and interfere with “the other multiple missions of the base.” Arny Decl. ¶ 10
21 (describing that Ault Field “in no way resembles an aircraft carrier”). As Captain Arny explains,
22 “OLF Coupeville is necessary for supporting EA-18G Growler FCLPs” because it provides
23 effective training for the Navy—an interest the Supreme Court has found outweighs irreparable
25
1 harm. Winter, 555 U.S. at 23; Arny Decl. ¶ 8, 10. Even a short restriction on the number of
2 FCLPs at OLF Coupeville will have an immediate real-world impact on Naval operations. See
3 Miller Decl. ¶ 26; Illston Decl. ¶ 24.
4 COER has not demonstrated that the balance of harms tips in its favor. Indeed, the
5 balance tips sharply against it. COER has failed to satisfy any of the equitable considerations
6 required for emergency relief. Therefore, the Court should deny COER’s motion and need not
7 reach the merits at this time. See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1174 (9th Cir.
8 2011) (vacating preliminary injunction “without expressing any views on the merits”).
9 IV. COER fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success on its claims.
10 The Court’s review of the likelihood of success on the merits at the emergency injunction
11 stage must be in accordance with the APA’s highly deferential “arbitrary and capricious”
12 standard, which presumes the agency action to be valid. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d
13 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs COER and Paula
14 Spina asserted six claims for relief: three NEPA claims, one NHPA claim, and two claims under
15 the Endangered Species Act. See Am. Compl. at 30-36, ECF No. 16. However, in its motion for
16 a preliminary injunction, COER argued only its NEPA and NHPA claims. See COER’s Mot. at
17 9-20. COER fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success on its NEPA and NHPA claims. 1
18
1
As an initial matter, COER improperly proffered evidence from its expert, Jerry Lilly. See
19
COER’s Mot. at 11-12, 15-16. The Court should not consider Mr. Lilly’s opinions because “the
focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some
20
new record made initially in the reviewing court.” Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973).
COER fails to establish that Mr. Lilly’s extra-record materials fall within one of the four narrow
21
“exceptions to the general rule that review of agency action is limited to the administrative
record.” Animal Def. Council v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1988). While COER may
22
submit declarations to support its assertion of irreparable harm, COER may not submit extra-
record evidence to challenge the Navy’s methodologies because “the Ninth Circuit Court of
23
Appeals has made clear that consideration of extra-record evidence ‘to determine the correctness
25
1 A. COER’s NEPA claim lacks merit.
2 COER’s NEPA challenge rests on three arguments, none of which is persuasive. First,
3 COER claims that the Navy failed to adequately disclose and analyze environmental impacts by
4 assessing the Growler’s noise through the “average annual day” metric rather than the “average
5 busy day” metric. See COER’s Mot. at 10-14. Second, COER asserts that the Navy should have
6 analyzed an “enhanced” engine. Id. at 14. Third, COER argues that the Navy should have
7 measured the noise of pre-ROD Growler flights in a specific way to better evaluate the potential
8 impacts of increased flights. Id. at 14-16. As explained below, the Navy appropriately
9 considered the Growler’s impacts, and NEPA requires no more.
10 1. The Navy’s use of the “average annual day” method was neither
arbitrary nor capricious.
11
An agency has sound discretion to choose the scientific methodology used in an EIS
12
“even if, as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more persuasive.” Price Rd.
13
Neighborhood Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 113 F.3d 1505, 1511 (9th Cir. 1997)
14
(quoting Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1332 (9th Cir. 1992)); Morongo Band of
15
Mission Indians v. FAA, 161 F.3d 569, 578 (9th Cir. 1998); accord Communities, Inc. v.
16
Busey, 956 F.2d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 1992); Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep't of Trans., 753 F.2d 120, 128
17
(D.C. Cir. 1985). The Ninth Circuit has refused to “engage in a battle of the experts” regarding
18
issues such as air quality and noise because “when specialists express conflicting views, an
19
agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts.”
20
21
of wisdom of the agency’s decision is not permitted.’” Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. Nat’l Marine
22
Fisheries Serv., No. C04-0666RSM, 2005 WL 1427696, at *7 (W.D. Wash. June 15,
2005), aff’d, 460 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2006).
23
25
1 Price Rd., 113 F.3d at 1511 (internal quotation omitted); see also Inland Empire Pub. Lands
2 Council v. Schultz, 992 F.2d 977, 981 (9th Cir.1993) (“We are in no position to resolve this
3 dispute because we would have to decide that the views of [plaintiff’s] experts have more merit
4 than those of the [government’s] experts.” (internal citation omitted)). For example, in
5 Morongo, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s preferred “single-event noise impact” metric
6 and approved the FAA’s calculation of “average daily noise levels” because the agency was
7 entitled to deference. See 161 F.3d at 578-79; cf. Vill. of Bensenville v. FAA, 457 F.3d 52, 71
8 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (upholding FAA’s chosen modeling data and deferring to the agency’s
9 “professional judgment that the later data would not alter [FAA’s] conclusions”).
10 The Navy explained in detail the noise methodologies it employed to analyze the
11 Growler’s potential impact on the environment. See, e.g. GRR_00150243-45; GRR_00150333-
12 48; GRR_00159049-60; GRR_00159281-91; GRR_00161316-31. Similar to the agency in
13 Morongo, the Navy chose the day-night average sound level (“DNL”) metric because the “DNL
14 is the standard and federally accepted metric for assessing the community annoyance” from
15 aircraft noise. GRR_00150243. The DNL metric represents long-term exposure to noise and
16 therefore measures the cumulative impacts of multiple noise events. See GRR_00150253;
17 GRR_00150333. It is designed to account for all noise events during an assessment and does not
18 represent a sound level heard at any given time. See GRR_00150243; GRR_00150333.
19 COER contends that the Navy misused the DNL metric by applying the “average annual
20 day” methodology, which according to COER underestimates noise impacts. See COER’s Mot.
21 at 10-14, 24, n.13. However, as set forth in the Administrative Record, COER’s preferred
22 method—the “average busy day” computation—actually overestimates noise impacts because it
23 “encourages the use of the most conservative assumptions regarding projected airfield
25
1 operations.” See GRR_00150329. The busy day computation also fails to account for “the
2 benefit the Navy’s minimal weekend operations would have on those days, which are days when
3 people are less likely to be away from their homes at work.” GRR_00150254. COER suggests
4 that such benefit could be “readily” obtained through its preferred methodology. See COER’s
5 Mot. at 12. But, at the same time, COER does not show why the Navy’s chosen method is
6 unreasonable. See Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357, 1369 (D.C.
7 Cir. 2017) (“The agency’s methodology was reasonable, even where it deviated from what Sierra
8 Club would have preferred.”). Indeed, this Court previously found that COER “may not
9 challenge the use of DNL simply because some other metric exists that better suits its purposes.”
10 COER I, 122 F. Supp. 3d at 1079. As a result, COER’s mere disagreement with the Navy’s
11 analysis does not establish a NEPA violation.
12 Moreover, COER’s record citations support the Navy’s decision to use the annual day
13 rather than the busy day method. See COER’s Mot. at 11-13. For example, EPA’s Guidelines
14 for Noise Impact Analysis characterize the annual average as “a more exact estimate” than the
15 busy day average. See GRR_00008359. EPA’s Guidelines also state that “if the project being
16 analyzed involves a change in airport use (for example Sunday flights when there were
17 previously none) the noise level typical of an average busy day may lead to nonsensical results.”
18 Id. (emphasis added). EPA’s proposed Sunday flights example aligns with the Navy’s proposed
19 action here—an increase in “the number of days of OLF operations to support a larger number of
20 annual FCLPs.” GRR_00150254. Thus, the Navy reasonably analyzed the Growler’s impacts
21 by using the annual average.
22 Likewise, COER complains that the Navy’s common measure for Ault Field and OLF
23 Coupeville should be the busy day metric in recognition of the Navy’s need for a common
25
1 measure of noise analysis between the two airstrips. COER’s Mot. at 13 (citing GRR_150329).
2 However, COER’s complaint fails to acknowledge that Ault Field and OLF Coupeville do not
3 conduct FCLPs on the same days. See, e.g. GRR_00150214 (showing Ault Field and OLF
4 Coupeville active days as 110 and 34 in 2015; 130 and 10 in 2016; and 110 and 34 in 2017);
5 GRR_00015161 (noting active days in 1988 for FCLP operations at Ault Field and OLF
6 Coupeville were 176 and 143, respectively).
7 COER also attacks a few of the Navy’s explanations for not separately calculating the
8 DNLs for both FCLP and non-FCLP days and comparing the results. See COER’s Mot. at 12.
9 But this attack misconstrues the very reason for the Navy’s NEPA analysis: the Navy undertook
10 a NEPA review because it needed to increase existing Growler flights. GRR_00150141.
11 Accordingly, the Navy’s baseline should not be no Growler flights—i.e., “quiet days”—but
12 rather the difference in the increased flights. Thus, COER’s suggestion of separately calculating
13 the DNLs would not result in an accurate baseline for the Navy’s NEPA analysis.
14 Finally, the lone case COER cites in support of its busy day argument, Pacific Coast
15 Federation of Fishermen’s Association v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 265 F.3d 1028 (9th
16 Cir. 2001), is inapposite. In that case, the Ninth Circuit faulted an agency for wholly failing to
17 evaluate a proposed action’s short-term impacts. 265 F.3d at 1037. The court also found the
18 agency provided no record support for its conclusion regarding the proposed action’s long-term
19 effects. Id. at 1037−38. Here, the Navy forthrightly evaluated all relevant noise impacts and
20 provided well-reasoned analysis for its conclusions. See generally GRR_00150155-61 (index of
21 the Navy’s noise impact analysis). Thus, COER cannot establish the Navy’s use of the average
22 annual day metric was arbitrary or capricious.
23
25
1 2. The Navy is not using “enhanced” engines on its Growler flights.
2 COER’s second NEPA argument claims the EIS is deficient because it fails to assess the
3 noise impacts of Growlers using an allegedly “enhanced engine.” COER’s Mot. at 14. COER is
4 simply mistaken about the engines used in the Navy’s Growler aircraft. The only authority
5 COER provides in support of its claim of an enhanced engine is its own comment on this point.
6 See COER’s Mot. at 14 (citing GRR_00171303). In its comment, COER charges that Growlers
7 are “equipped with different engines” and cites to a fact sheet produced by the engine
8 manufacturer. See GRR_00171303. But the fact sheet states that “F414-GE-400 engines also
9 power Boeing’s EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft, also operational with the United
10 States Navy.” <https://www.geaviation.com/sites/default/files/datasheet-F414-Family.pdf> (last
11 visited March 13, 2020). And the F414-GE-400 engine is the engine referenced throughout the
12 EIS. See, e.g. GRR_00150245; GRR_00150389; GRR_00150771. Accordingly, the Navy
13 considered the appropriate engine. See Illston Decl. ¶ 21 (testifying that the Growler has been
14 equipped with the F414-GE-400 engine since the Navy began using the Growler at OLF
15 Coupeville).
16 3. The Navy did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in estimating the

Growler’s potential noise impacts.
17
18 The crux of COER’s third NEPA argument is that the Navy should have “validated” the
19 noise measurements that it used to predict the Growler’s impacts. COER’s Mot. at 14.
20 However, an agency is not obligated to “monitor actual noise levels” to evaluate a proposed
21 action’s potential environmental impacts. See Morongo, 161 F.3d at 577 (upholding FAA’s
22 decision to use estimated noise levels instead of measuring the noise in the area at issue).
23
25
1 “The noise environment for the Final EIS was modeled using a program called
2 NOISEMAP Version 7.3” and incorporated “the best available science.” GRR_00150333.
3 “NOISEMAP draws from a library of actual aircraft noise measurements obtained in a
4 controlled environment in order to obtain the most accurate measurements.” Id. (emphasis
5 added). The Navy used data from FA-18E/F “Super Hornet” flyovers in the NOISEMAP
6 program because the Super Hornet and Growler have “the same engines and airframes.” Id. The
7 Navy also accounted for nuances specific to the Growler aircraft and the terrain around OLF
8 Coupeville. See GRR_00150343. NOISEMAP’s actual military aircraft noise measurements
9 are in fact “validated through subsequent testing” and allow the Navy to compare “existing
10 conditions” with the proposed increase of Growler flights. See GRR_00150333. Thus, the Navy
11 reasonably relied on the noise measurements to make its predictions about the Growler’s
12 potential effects on the environment.
13 In addition, pursuant to Congress’ direction in the National Defense Authorization Act
14 for Fiscal Year 2020, the Navy selected NASWI to undertake a year-long study of the noise
15 impacts at a cost of $1.6 million. See Decl. of Dan Cecchini (“Cecchini Decl.”) ¶¶ 2-3.
16 Therefore, the Navy has committed to conduct the very monitoring that COER demands.
17 B. COER’s NHPA claim lacks merit.
18 The NHPA requires a federal agency to provide the State Historic Preservation Officer
19 and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation “a reasonable opportunity to comment” on a
20 proposed action. 54 U.S.C. § 306108; 36 C.F.R. § 800.1. However, the NHPA does not require
21 a federal agency to adopt the State’s or Council’s recommendations. Wisconsin Heritages, Inc.
22 v. Harris, 490 F. Supp. 1334, 1341 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (“The agency is not bound to follow the
23 dictates of the council but ‘shall take (the council’s) comments into account in reaching a final
25
1 decision in regard to the proposed undertaking.’”), cited with approval by Apache Survival Coal.
2 v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 913 (9th Cir. 1994). “[U]nder the rule of reason, a lead agency
3 does not have to follow [another agency’s] comments slavishly—it just has to take them
4 seriously.” Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
5 (upholding FAA’s discussion on increased noise impacts despite EPA’s criticism). And under
6 the APA standard of review, the court must defer to an agency’s ultimate decision to adopt or
7 reject the consulting parties’ recommendations. Morongo, 161 F.3d at 573 (“Decisions
8 regarding NHPA . . . are similarly reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard.”).
9 The Advisory Council recommended the Navy “develop a noise monitoring program to
10 measure actual direct and indirect effects” so that the Navy could have a “fuller understanding”
11 of the Growler’s effects. 2 GRR_00167464 (emphasis added). The Navy responded that its
12 “[n]oise modeling incorporates actual noise measurements” and allows the Navy to compare
13 several alternatives to the proposed action. GRR_00167575 (emphasis added). The Navy
14 further explained that the National Park Service measured the noise levels at the Ebey’s Landing
15 National Historic Reserve, and the Park Service’s noise measurements closely correlated with
16 the Navy’s noise modeling and reinforced its findings. Id. Therefore, the Navy concluded it did
17 not need to implement additional noise monitoring efforts. Id.
18 COER argues—without support—that the Navy should have meaningfully explained its
19 decision not to adopt the consulting parties’ recommendations. See COER’s Mot. at 17-20.
20 COER’s argument is misguided because the Navy need only articulate a “rational connection
21
2
Though COER contends that the Advisory Council “echoed” the State Historic Preservation
22
Officer’s position, COER’s Mot. at 18, the State Historic Preservation Officer’s
recommendations were limited to establishing grant programs and providing continued
23
mitigation for flight operations, GRR_00142375-76.
25
1 between the fact found and choices made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
2 Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). The Navy satisfied its obligation here by pointing out that the
3 noise modeling incorporates actual noise measurements and its modeling agreed with actual
4 noise levels measured by the National Park Service. Thus, the Navy’s rationale—that it had
5 already used actual noise inputs to understand the full effects of Growler flights—addressed the
6 fundamental reason for the Advisory Council’s recommendation to conduct noise monitoring.
7 Furthermore, the Navy intends to conduct the very monitoring recommended by the
8 consulting parties. See Cecchini Decl. ¶¶ 2-3. As explained above, the Navy will implement
9 real-time noise monitoring at NASWI. Id. The Navy will now obligate $1.6 million to
10 undertake this monitoring—far from the “low cost” COER suggests. Therefore, COER has
11 failed to establish that it is likely to prevail on its NHPA claim.
12 CONCLUSION
13 The Court should deny COER’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction because COER fails
14 to establish that increased FCLPs will likely harm COER’s members. COER also fails to
15 demonstrate that the public interest will be served by enjoining Naval operations. Indeed, the
16 public would be harmed by such an injunction because the Growler training flights are essential
17 to national security. Likewise, the balance of equities favors denying emergency relief. Finally,
18 COER fails to show a likelihood of success on its claims. Therefore, this Court should allow
19 continued training at current levels in support of national security. The United States believes
20 that this brief and supporting declarations provide sufficient basis to deny COER’s motion
21 without oral argument. However, and because of the importance of this issue, if oral argument
22 will be helpful or if the Court is inclined to grant COER’s requested relief, the Navy requests an
23 opportunity to be heard—telephonically, in light of the Court’s March 6, 2020 standing order.

25
1 Respectfully submitted this 16th day of March 2020.
2 PRERAK SHAH
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
3
By: /s/ Krystal-Rose Perez
4 BRIGMAN L. HARMAN
KRYSTAL-ROSE PEREZ
5 United States Department of Justice
Environment & Natural Resources Division
6 Natural Resources Section
150 M Street, NE
7 Washington, D.C. 20002
Tel: (202) 616-4119 (Harman)
8 (202) 305-0486 (Perez)
Fax: (202) 305-0506
9 Email: Brigman.Harman@usdoj.gov
Krystal-Rose.Perez@usdoj.gov
10
COBY HOWELL, Senior Trial Attorney
11 U.S. Department of Justice
Environment & Natural Resources Division
12 Wildlife & Marine Resources Section
1000 S.W. Third Avenue
13 Portland, OR 97204
Phone: (503) 727-1023
14 Fax: (503) 727-1117
Email: coby.howell@usdoj.gov
15
Attorneys for the Federal Defendants
16
OF COUNSEL
17 CARA JOHNSON
Senior Litigation Attorney
18 Department of the Navy Office of General Counsel
720 Kennon Street, SE Building 36, Room 233
19 Washington Navy Yard, DC 20374-5013
20
21
22
23
25
1
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2
I hereby certify that on March 16, 2020, I served a copy of the foregoing on counsel of
3
record electronically through the court’s CM/ECF system.
4
5 By: /s/ Krystal-Rose Perez

BRIGMAN L. HARMAN
6 KRYSTAL-ROSE PEREZ
United States Department of Justice
7 Environment & Natural Resources Division
Natural Resources Section
8 150 M Street, NE
Washington, D.C. 20002
9 Tel: (202) 616-4119 (Harman)
(202) 305-0486 (Perez)
10 Fax: (202) 305-0506
Email: Brigman.Harman@usdoj.gov
11 Krystal-Rose.Perez@usdoj.gov
12 COBY HOWELL, Senior Trial Attorney

U.S. Department of Justice
13 Environment & Natural Resources Division
Wildlife & Marine Resources Section
14 1000 S.W. Third Avenue
Portland, OR 97204
15 Phone: (503) 727-1023
Fax: (503) 727-1117
16 Email: coby.howell@usdoj.gov
17 Attorneys for the Federal Defendants
18
19
20
21
22
23
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO COER’S U.S. Department of Justice
25
Case 2:19-cv-01059-RAJ-JRC Document 55-1 Filed 03/16/20 Page 1 of 13
Distt‘iei‘ Judge RiehardiA. .Ienee
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR. THE- WESTERN ”DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT'SEATTLE .
10 eta-TE OF sHmG'Tewga ea, Ne. 2: 1 $63401 US$RAJJRC
.11 Plaintifl‘e}
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW ARNYE CARTAIN
“1.2 Y. ULS. NAVY
13‘ The UNITED" STATESIDEPARTMENT OF
THE NAVY, -e::.-.et.' ,
14 Defendants,
15
1.6 1;,CAPT Matthew Amy, US. 1*~I,a1.r-_Y-= do hereby deela'r-‘e-ae fellewa:
1? 1.. .215 the. Cemmanding-Offieer ef Naval A'ir'Stat'ien Whidbey Island (NASWDI am
1'3 jreepeneible-fer the. management, pereeflnel,'faeilitiee, prepertya safety, and security at this. air
.19
base. I. haee'a duty tegp'retrifle the naval eemmantleetatieneda here with a safe and effeetiYe
2:0 training .eflviremnent' that willgenaele them-ta depley in auppert ef military'epetatiefls amend the
'21 werld; The faeilities under my charge. include AuItField, the Seaplane Rage, and, the Outlying.
22 Landing-Field-(OLF) Ceupeville. -
2'3
24
25 ARNY DECLARATION ' —'1 — U.-S. Department .ef Juatiee
1:50 M,.Street__NE
Waehingten ILC. 20902 _
I Case 2:19-cv-01059-RAJ-JRC Document 55-1 Filed 03/16/20 Page 2 of 13
2. I was raisedin Alexandria, Virginiafiand- graduated frem‘ the United States Naval
Academy in 1993 with a Bacheler ef Science degree in Naaal'Architecture. As aNapal Flight
Officer (NFO), I flew in bath the-F-i.4B‘ and FfA—I'BF aircraft serving tears in Fighter Squa‘dren
“VB-102- and Attack Sqn'adren VF-A-l 0'3, and then served. as the Cemmanding-Officeref V'FA-
154. Ihaae. displayed enbeard the aircraft-Carriers USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CW T3),
USS JOIW.F.. KENNEDY (CV 67'), USED-WIGHT Di EISENHOWER‘fCVN 5.9) and USS
RONALD REAG-AN-(CW 76) while participating in Operatiens SOUTHERN WATCH,
IRAQI FREEDOM, and NEW DAWN in Iraq, ENDURW’G FREEDOM in Afghanistan,” and .
Operatien TOMODACHI presiding disaster: relief in Japan. I was al'se theA-ssistant Navigater
10 en USS ENTERPRISE (CW 65).at1d Operatiens Officer an US 3 ABRAHAM LINCOLN
1 1' (CHINE). While. I-hare spent-the maj why [If myfca'reer flying insthe PAM-and F-13 variants, I
1'2. hareile'g'ged' ester“ 3,000 flight hears. in- an “array ef military aircraft, .includillg the 'F-1 vii-NEED,
rs Pia—133mm“, Jae—39D,- ear—5., F416, TA-4- and 'accnlmulatingeverTOO arrested landings

“1.4 enheard-a'ircraft carriers at sea, As. an NBC! and as abase cemmander, lam intimately familiar
1.5 isti'th the facilities, equipment, manpewer- and. training necessary te suppert nasal-'avi'atien,
is. 3. This declaratien explains hew OLF Cenpesrille supp.ert's.-the vital training fer-aircraft
17 “can'ier aviaters, whese capabilities are crucial te ear natie'nal security.
_1 3' '4. In September of 20153,. I became the C'emr'nanding. Officer-cf NASWI and airing with.
19 the pest. inherited the leadership e'f the-'-'eng'ein'g Natienal Histeric Preservatien Act Sectien 106.
'20. Censultatien (Sectien' 106 “censnitatienJ' with the. 'Washingten State Histeric Preservatie'n
'21" Officer (WA SI—IPO). I. was 'persenally present te represent the Navy'at five ef ihe ”six
[22. censultati'en meetings. During” beth'the Grewler EI-SLprecess and Sectien 106'cen'suitatieri, the
"23.. Navydiscussed. the’histery and particular impedance ef OLE Oeupevflle and explained the
2'4
.25
ARNY DECLARATION - .2 — .Li.s. Daparhnentef'lnstice
_ 1-50 M. Street NE
Washingten n.-c. asses
training and qualification.process for carrier aviation, which it'suppcrts. As the Navy-is lead
for the Section 106- consultation, I fspcke-direc-tIY'with the WAiSHPO and thetother consulting
parties to understand“ their concerns and. find adequate. mitigation'for the acknowledged- adverse
effectthat increased occasions ofjet noise would have on Ehey’s Lending. National Historical
Reserve... Thelilavy offered one million dollars in projects to support the-historic appeal-ofthe
Reserve hut-ultimately, decided to terminate-the consultation when WA-ISHPO rejected this
offer. and-{demanded more” money. The. Navy received input “from the Prizi'visorj»r Council on
Historic Preservation (ACHP) and implemented several of the ACHP’s. recommendations,
including carrying“ out the proposed mitigation efforts. In particular, 1 have been. leading the
10. planning efforts poster'eccrd of decision to effectuate the Secretary.r of the Navy's-commitment.
1'1: to. provide the National.” Park Service with” $861,000 to preserve the historic Ferr)!“ House and
12: $20:d_00.to..design__and construct interpretive hiStorical “signs.- The“ planning and administrative
13+ wcrk to transfer and spend this money,r is already underway.
14 5. Commodore Elston-explainedthe tra'ining'__develc.pment off Ere-13G Growler aircrews as
' 1'5 well “as” how'FieId Carrier Landing;Practice-(FCLPs) are required to perfect: the skills'needed to-
I 16 peri‘orrn an aircraft carrier landing. MAS-”WI and .OL'F Coupeville.support-that training by
17 providingthe facilities-and services necessary to Commodore Illston‘sjElectronicia'ttack Wing.-
13' NASH“: also-provides these tacilit-ies and services to-Patrol. and Reconnaissance Wing 10,
19 flying P-B aircraft”: Fleet Logistics SupportSquadron .61 -,.a specialized Search and: Rescue
2t} helicopter unityand ten “other commands stationed aboard NASWI. As the Base Commander,
"21 lit istray--res1::'onsihilitpr to provide-each ofthese commands: with the-safe, secure, and efficient
2'2- facilities that allow-them to meet the operational demands thathave evolved-since the. creation
of NASWLand OLF Coupeville'in'the earl},r 1940s. As 'NASWIis: the only naval air station in
24'
'25: ARNY DECLARATION -3- ill-Srflepartment- of Justice

- iii} M Street NE
washin'gtcn EEC. ZUUDZ
the Paeifie Nerthweet, it haa'reiied' en the capabilities of OLF Ceupetetillete varying degreee-ae
the Navy flexed te- meet the 'natienal seeurity’ needs ef eaeh hiateriemement. .Hewever,
'NASWI has-eensi'stently been the heme ef ailNavy Elee'trjenie AttaekWAQ) squafltene in the.
United States fer everfiifl years. The militaryr installatie‘ae at. Ault' Field: and“ OLF Ceapeville
representerit'iea] -.infiastrueture-te' eur natienal' defense,.:_as these VAQ e'quadrene-tepresefltthe
e111}; A'ir'beme-Eleetrenie Attaek ESSEtS'iIIThE Ameri'eanxintrentery.
1.0
1 1'
132
13
1'4
15.
1.6”
17
13'
1-9-
. 20'
21
22'
23
24
”25
ARNY DECLARHTION -4— US. Department efJustice
151] M Street NE
Washiagten 11C. £00132
Case 2:19-cv-Q1059-RAJ-JRC Document 55-1 Filed 03/16/20 Page 5 of 13
.6. NASWI has three components: Ault'Field, Seaplane Base. and OLF Coupeville. Ault
Field, the primary aviation support component, is pictured below in Figure 1.2-2 of the E18:
10
11
12
13
t
‘12
14 in"
15
16
17
13
19
(‘MNHT‘ 5-“
20 2"";‘
Ir
21 it: --ur
_..l c“;- .11.
-.
1...... Im‘ a-I'T-n4' 4 I . II
I
a,
'_"
:._5Nw JNd Aw- "
.a
.22 —— {manned-r1; D hmflmnAm

Haul! 13:2
=1?” HEMHmlflg-imay - Hula-Mr
Generai location Map. Aerial -
23 All! Field
Mound. Islam {1111111w
24
ARNY DECLARATION .. 5 - U..S. Department ofJustice

150 M. Street NE
"Washington no. 2111102
3s represented in 'the_'fi-gure_ ahesej A1111; Field eentains the hangars, .niaintenanee'faeiliti'es,
'legistiesj and persennei suppert services.fer'th'e-zeeinniands at NASW-Ii Ault Field has anX
shaped .flmway' layeutthat ali ef'the aircraft statiened at this base, “and transieht'aireraftg use in
take. eff and land, marked as Runway 0W2? and Runway 14f32. Beth'runwaysj are 3,_{lflOjfeet
Ie'ng; and 200 feet-Wide. sent Field isavailahlefer use _?‘-days per. Week, 24 heurs per..day.
Aircraft ”generally take eff inte'the 1wind fer eptimuni safety and perferrnanee. As a result,
Runways-U? .and'3 2'. are-used less.Ifreu;p.1enti};r than Runways-I25 and I'di'a's the Wind and weather
e'enditiens typically fairer 25 and-I4. The grey area te the senthwest ef the” runways '- is the
pavedsui'faee eemrne'nly knew as the “flight line” where airerafi are parkedland stered.
10 NA-SWI-is hangars, air traffi'e. eent'rel tewer, and ether-”facilities. are at'taehed hi. this flight liner
1.1 Seaplane Bas'e,_.Nfl-S-‘Wlis seelend eenipenent, is heme te NASWI-i’s- seeendary services, like
l2 Inest ef'the- base heusing and seems re'ereat'ienai facilities and miner-tenants.- A-pert'ienef the
'1 3 Seaplane Base can be seen in the figure,.whil'e the-city ef OakII-iiarhei' lies adjacent te .beth.
.124 T. NASWI‘s'ihird .eenipenentj, OLF Cenperiiie, sits apprexi'niateiy eight miles te the
1.5 seuth efAt-ilt Fieldi in'a. feral area seu'theast :fre'rn the tense efCeupeifille in. central Whidbey
'1 6 Island. OLF' Ceupeville' is depieted hel'ew in Figure 1.2—3 ef the E18:
17
1-8
19
2.0
21
1 Whendese‘rihingamnwayr its name is taken frern its heading en theeernpass and shertened by.
22 renie'triri'g the “zere?” en either end. Because every .rimway eperates in. bethdireetiens, every
runway will have tWfl names,_'with- eaeh name being 130 degrees eppesite en the .eenipass. Fer
2’13: exarhple, runway 0.1’H25 heads 70 degrees en the 'eeinpass in .ene direetien and 250 degrees. .in the.
--ethei' direetien.
24
_ 2-5 ARNY DECLARATION —s— LLB. Department ef'Justiee

1-50 M. Street NE
Washingten .DiCL-ZDUOE;
HI lr‘ihrri1-F d
--..
I l
n. .
.‘l
' L
—~ Island-
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
I 3:
19 ‘-=-—-= IZZSII: High-In fill” 12-!

M" General tuition Map. Aerial-
Ofl (email:
'20 D Irma-amen Hm Had. Hand mum, “in
21
OLF Ceupeville consists ofene runway, Runway 14:32. Unlike Ault. Field, this runway is-
‘22
5,400 feet long and 200. feet wide. OLF Coupeville provides a dedicated location for EA-l B-G
'23
Growler FCLP's; it is not a multi-Irfission airbase like Ault Field. EA-118G Growler aircraft do
2'4
25 ARNY DECLARAITON - '7 - US; Department of Justice-

1.50 M. 51166.1: NE
Waehhlgt'c‘m [3.0. 20002
not stop there but instead only touch on tl'1e'ru1*rwaj»,_r before "immediate-1y taking off flgflifl'iri'the
FCLP process. There is no flight line or" parking apron. DLF Coupeville has the equipment ”to
siinulate carrier landings including appropriate marker lighting, a small control tower, fire-
fighting-.and'enrergency response equipment, but nonther facilities. ”As. at Ault Field”, seasonal
presailing wind and weather patterns, as well ”as the“ performance characteristics of'the'E-A-lBG
Growler,determine-whether RunWay’l 4 orr-Sfl-can- “support 'an- FCLP “each-day 'o'r-night.
8. The primary mission of’OLF Couperille isjto support E'A-JSG Growler [FEEL-Pa... OLF
Coupevilie: is necessary for supporting ”EA—I SG Growler .FCLPs-for- atleast three. reasons.
First, the landscape surrounding OLF Coupe'cille supports the replication ofa carrier landing
1.0 pattern, thereby}.r buildingand reinforcing the correct and vital habit patterns” and muscle
l 1" memoir},r for aircrews. Secondly, the darkness around the- O'LF trains aircrews to rely'on proper
12 techniques and not visual landmarks. Lastly, using the-'OLF for FCLPs allows the otherrital
1.3' missions ofthe base to continue unimpeded. Regarding the firstpoint, the OLE is. perched on a.
1.4 bluff, surrounded by relatively flat terrain. Thissallows the-oral flightpattern-of anFCLP to
.15 clonely resemble. the oval flight pattern; used on anxactual aircraft carrier. This pattern builds:
.126. battcrhabits for .aircrews than the flight .pattem used ats-Ault Field, because, Ault Field lies in a
It valley-and aircrews rnus't maneuver to avoid theIsurroundinghills. Mile an FCLP at Ault

1'3 Field-can still help train an aircrew, the flight pattern attailabl'e- at -O.LFC-oupeirille produces
1‘9 better training. that more closely resembles the-conditions:- ofan aircraft "carrier,
20 9. Second, thesurroundingrural landscape is relatively dark at night, mimicking the
21 complete darkn‘eSs often found at sea. Atnighta‘ carrier aircrew must locate the. aircraftxcarrier'
22 incomplete darkness and then perform the landing with. the-aid. of signal lights shining from
2'3 the aircraft carrier that guide the aircraft onto the-correctflightpath. Adar-k location is critical
2-4
25 Eli-NY [3‘_‘I§‘.C'llira1 EATION __-3 _. US Eflpfll‘flnflflt oflustice‘
15.0 M. StreetNE.
Washington DE. Efl'flfll
”te p‘erfe‘rming-this training because light pellutien er urban. lighting detracts- frem the vital
inferrnatien the aircrew must learn te receive frfem the ”aircrafil'carrie'r signal lights
Furthenneree excessive-urban: lighting enceurages pilets t'e rely ehyi‘sible. lighted landmarks
such as...gas'-stat_ie”ns-er shepping malls telecatethe cerrect- apprea‘eh te the landing field. The
availability ef'sueh' lighting landmarks can unintent-ienally create a negative-training effect.
Heavy-reliance en instrument-flyingis' critical te safely landing high perfeimanee aircraft
abeard a carrier at sea. There is littlernargin fer errerfln carrier landings, and the best way in
manage the-"risk is te tra”in-en1t.pi1ets'”te perferm. earrierlandings in ”FCLPs as precisely and
.c'ensistent'ly as” pessible. That means-relying primarily en instruments, 'eyen- in--itleal"weather-
1 U: cendiflens, beeauserelying-en- histrument's permits aleyel ef eens'isteney and precisien net
ll .etherwise; achievable. In-ether werds, excessive” urban lighting can premete'bad habits that.
1'2. reduce preficiency-and increase risk te ”the nasal aviater’and aircraft'at' sea.
13 10. '”Third? the OLF preyides a lecatien dedicated te FCLPs and ne ether-flight-eperatiens.
14 ”While it is pessible. te ”cendnct' FCLP-s at”. Anlt Field“, the main air base ef NASWI, 'deing ”se
1'5- .preduces Jew quality training andinterferes with the ether mnlt-ipletni’ssiens ef the base. Anti;
16 Field‘s. cenfigura'tien inne way resembles an aircraft carrier; and it sits in a-hrightly lit urban
17 area. .Furthermere,‘ FCLPs requirethe training. aircraft is seminate the'runway-s fer that eyen't
1,3 and create'abettl'eneck fer-ether'trainirig events.- Anlt Field. is a fully eperatienalgair base fer
is ether-aircraft senadrens besides carrier-baSed Eris-1:36 Greerfsquadrens, includingseyen

”20 Maritime ”Patrel. squadrens flying” P-3 Orien and P-S Pese‘iden-aircraft, ene Fleet Air
at Recennaissance squadren flying EP-S Aries aircraft, -_and.a_.;Search and.Re's'cee”,-detachment
22 flying 31-1—6013 helicepters. Anti Field alse snpperts'e'ther- transient aircraft eperatiens frem”
'23 time te time. These ether aircraft that ”'jfiilflll the ether impertant'misSiens te thetsurreuntiing”
24.
25 ARNY DECLARATION. -9- UiSf. Department .ef Justice

I 150 M. SHEE’E NE
Washingten' DE. 20002-
ceinniuni'ty rat the naval air .stati'en and threngheut' the Pacific area 'ef respen‘sihilityare then
relegatedte a- secend' er third prieritj; status as the},r wait fer FCLPs te finish 'befere. either
launching__'er landing. themselves. This leads tje. stacks ef aircraft thatmust. either leiter
everhead-er sit enl'th'e flight line; instead ef"aecernpl_ishii1g the training .er. maintenance needs“
that might -ethertvise eccnpy their time, “These resulting delays te:1aecernn1edate'FCLP's can
irmreaseeperatienal. rislc'te the Maritime Panel, Fleet Air Recennaissance,_ Anti-Submarine;
Warfare, and Search and Rescue missiens whentheir'nee'ds. are sidelined. Anlt Field hasitwe
eressedrunways' in an” X shape,:'se this means that ether aircraft cannet take eff'er land at the
base while FCLPs-are'b'eing perfermed .en an}:r .ef'thernnways. Cenverselyt OLF Cenpevillef. is
10' net anair base? just. apaved airstrip-With the asseciated equipment'ne'cessary fer FCLPs. By
1'1 cenducting FCLPsat‘ the OLF, ”the Navy»P cen'd'ncts mere effective training fer the aircrews-
.12. invelved and aliens the ether missie'n's eftheair' s'tatien tecentinne Uninterrupted...
13 1 1.. The Navy "selected Alternative 22% alter c'emplet'ien 'ef the EIS precess, which divided-
'14. the needed 29,-6.00-annna1 Est-1.86 Grever FCILPs..bettveen-$nlt Field and IOLF Ceupeville,
.315 with” 20% at $112k Field (539.09” annual. FC'LPs) and'fl'fl‘i’h at OLF Cenpeville (23.5700 annual
161 FCLPs). By'cenducting the prependerance ef FCLPs at the. dedicated facility thr‘ these
1 3’ epejratiens: the Navy. ensures-that'the cembatant eemmand'erisrneed 'fer expanded-EA-i'SG
18 Growler capabilities .dees net prevent NASWIi-s-ether tniss'ieiis item being negatively
1-9 impacted,i and as described-ah'ev.e,3_”ensures the ”meet effective FEE-LP training.
20 12. Additi‘enallyl since A-ult Field. lies in a 'pepnlated urban area? and 'OL-F Ceupeville lies
21 in a- less,.-pepulated rural =area,;shifting‘ FCLP's te OLF'Ceupevillerednces the arneuntef neise
2.22 expesnre te the greater penulati'en'ef Whidbey Island.
23'
2'4
25 ARNY DECLARATION” — 1.0 us. Dvpfll‘hnent-sef-Jus'tice

-
150 M. sneer NE.
Washingt'en .n..c.. 2eee2
da—____.._- . ...... .
1'3. NA'S Whitihey-lslan‘d has extensiare'nei'se abatement and .mitig'atien measures. These.
measures. 'eensist-ef'werking with em leeal-lsiand antljether. surreuuding-seeunty eemmunities
te medify flight-eperatiens_'te”rninimi2e aur impact when pes‘sihle. My staffand I 'meet ”elites
with elected effieialsg sehnel representatives; and eemmunity ergani-zatiens- and greups. When-
seheelsneti'fy- the NASWI S'eheelLiaisen Officer'aheut their testing schedulesg we adjust “eur
flights: ifweather eendit-iens andfiepleyment schedules allew. During. weekends, we minimize
flights at- OLF'Ceupettille te limit disturbanee. During my'tim'e as Cenunan‘din'g Gffieer,
HAS-WI has net- uSed the OLF during any weekend. Adlditienally, in an. attempt te make the
public mere aware ef'eur planned eperatiens, we sentinue-te publish flight. “schedules-fer OLF'
10 Ceupeville. en» the NASWI'E websites-and Faeeheek. page and in leeal media eutlets like the
.11- Whidhey News Times ene “week'in' advance. We Isencl thisiflight sehe‘dule te a wide range'ef
'12 area-media eutlets te. ensure-maximum ”di'sn'ihutien at“ the infermatien. NASWI-alse strives fer
13 transpareneyin thereutine maintenance that QL‘F Cetrpeville and its eampnsitesfaeitities. and
14 equipment semetimes requires.- NAB-WI ,selee'ts the-timingefjthese maintenanee events-
. 15 depending. upon the particular” needs ef‘the OLF, the prevailing weather eenditiens, and the
1.6 anticipated deployment sehedule fer Eta-18G: Grewler units. When NA-SWI desires the. OLF te'
17 eemplete maintenance er- repairs there, it will anneunee this via the same methetls that are used
13 ta pr'emul'gate the flight sehedule asan aid te the e'emmunit'y. I-make every-“effe'rtte minimize
the. Navy’s impaet .en-eur surreunding.'e'emmunities, ”while reeegnizing'. that flightjs'ehedules are
2t} dietatedhy depleyment needs fer. eemhat ep'min'anders- as well: as ether eenditiens sueh as
"21 weather eeustr'aiuts'.
: 22 I4. NASWI als'e werks hard te 1.iSten'te' the'iuput ef the 'eemmunity. Wehave “Ewe metheds
. 23' hywhieh- the'lee'al 'eemmtmitj,r 'e'an submit an aireraft neise eemplaint, byl'phene: through eur
24
'25. ARNY DECLARATION e ll - . UQS. De_partmeut.-ef..lustiee

150 M. Street NE
Washington DE. 20002
comment line at. (3 60) 257-6665 or by email at commentsNASWIMmil. Every day around
midnight the night shift Operations Duty” Officer (ODD) will transcribe all comments received
the previous day into the Noise Complaint Database. The CDC then emails a reportto group of
base officials listing the callers, their comments, and their contact info. Each complaint receives
a thorough analysis from the team and a recommendation to address the issue. When necessary,
a base official (primarily the Community Planning Liaison Officer) may communicate directly
with the complainant. If an operation warrants further investigation, we will do so internally.
The Operations Officer then relays any corrective. measures, if deemed necessary, to the
appropriate squadron or wing. If key information such as name, phone number-(email, home
'10 address, description of complaint, and time of event is missing, then the complaint is marked as
11 “incomplete,“ since we cannot track our operations in relation to their location. We track both
12 complete and incomplete complaints along with the total complaints in reporting. NASWI
13 expands these efforts to ensure that we are responsive to the .community and that we. have. an
14 open communication line to those who want to share their experiences with us.
15 15. In conclusion, Ault Field and OLF Coupevilleplay an irreplaceable role in the training
16 and preparation of Growler airerews, a vital military aviation capability. Distributing FCLP's
17 appropriately across the two locations with the predominant amount of FCLPs completed at
13 OLF Coupeville maximizes the operational capability of both Ault Field and OLF Coupeville
19 for not only FCLPs but also the many other national security-enhancing missions ofNASWI.
20 The FCLP events at OLF Coupeville are necessary for the proper functioning of the entire
21 NASWI complex and indiSpensable to the swift and efficient training, preparation, and
22 survivability of these Growler .aircrews, an essential component of the United S'tates‘ military
capabilities.
24
25 ARNY DECLARATION” - 12 - 1.1.3. Department of Justice-

150 M. Street NE
Washington no. 20002-
Case 2:19-cv-01059-RAJ-JRC Document 55-1 Filed 03/16/20 _ Page 13 of 13
”I hereby swear under penalty {if perjlury'pureuent tej '28 U.S,C, § 174.6 thetthe' feregeing
infermet'ien is true rend eerr'eet he the best ef my knowledge.
Dated ' this,” the Em day .ef Merehi. 2020
10
'1 1
1.2
l 3'
1-4:
15
1.36-
17
18
1'9
:20
21
223
2-3
2-4
25 ARNY DECLARATION ._ 13- -...-
US. Deperenent ef Justice
.150 M.- St'freet NE-
Waeh'inggen [1.6. .-2fl[}fl2.
District Judge Richard A. Jones
' IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

AT SEATTLE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, e! .21., No. 2:19-cv-01059-RAJ-RAC
1o Plaintiffs,
DECLARATION OF
11 V. J. DAN CECCHINI
12 The UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

THE NAVY, at £11.,
13
Defendants,
14
_ 15
I, J. Dan Cecchini, do hereby declare as follows:
16
1. As the Director, Environmental Planning and Terrestrial Resources in the Office of the
17
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Environment), I am responsible for deveIOping and
13
implementing regulations and policy to ensure Department of the Navy (DON) compliance with
19
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). I review and endorse all DON environmental
20
impact statements. I am also the DON’s senior representative on the Defense Noise Working
21
Group. In both of these roles, I ensure aircraft noise analyses conducted for NEPA efforts across
22
the DON are consistent with DON noise assessment protocols and take a hard look at noise
23
impacts on communities.
24
25
Case 2:19-cv-01059—RAJ-JRC Document 55-2 Filed 03/16/20 Page 2 of 2
2. Section 325 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 mandated
that the Secretary of the Navy conduct “real-time sound-monitoring at no fewer than two Navy
installations and their associated outlying landing fields on the west coast of the United States
where Navy combat coded PIA-18, EA-l SG, or F-35 aircraft are based and operate and noise
contours have been developed through noise modeling . . . . ” The law requires the Secretary of
the Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense committees that shall include the
monitoring results and a “comparison of such monitoring and the noise contours previously
developed with the analysis and modeling methods previously used . . . . ”
3. On January 10, 2020, the Navy briefed members of Congress on a proposal to implement
10 this real-time monitoring at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island and Naval Air Station Lemoore.
11 To meet this Congressional requirement, the Navy reprogrammed $1.6 million in appropriated
12 funds to develop a monitoring plan and provide contracting support to implement real-time noise
13 monitoring at these locations, beginning in summer 2020. The Navy will conduct this real-time
14 noise monitoring in accordance with the guidance published by the American National Standards
15 Institute, which represents the best available science.
16
17 I hereby swear under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 that the foregoing
18 information is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
19 Dated this 12‘“ day of March, 2020, in Washington, DC.
20
21
Cecchini
22 D1 ctor, Environmental Flaming and
Terrestrial Resources
23
DECLARATION OF J. DAN CECCHINI
24 U.S. Department of Justice
150 M. Street NE
25 No. 2:19-cv—01059-RAJ-RAC Washington D.C. 20002
6
7
8
AT SEATTLE
9
10 STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al., No. 2:19-cv-01059-RAJ-JRC
11 Plaintiff,
DECLARATION OF ERIC P. ILLSTON, CAPTAIN
12 v. U.S. NAVY
13 The UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

THE NAVY, et al.,
14 Defendants,
15
16 I, CAPT Eric Illston, U.S. Navy, do hereby declare as follows:
17 1. As the Commanding Officer of Electronic Attack Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet, I am
18 responsible for ensuring EA-18G Growler aircrews are trained and effective in safely flying EA-
19 18G Growlers as combat-ready Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) forces. Those forces provide
20 combatant commanders with more than just the technological capability of an aircraft and its
21 weapons; AEA personnel must also be ready to succeed and win in battle. I have a duty to
22 provide my squadrons with realistic and effective training that will enable them to deploy in
23 support of military operations around the world. The scope of my command spans fourteen (14)
24
25
ILLSTON DECLARATION -1-
1 squadrons consisting of over 3,500 personnel operating 160 EA-18G aircraft in support of
2 national strategic-level combat and non-combat operations around the world.
3 2. I was raised in Woodinville, Washington and graduated from the University of Puget
4 Sound in 1992 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Business. Commissioned in 1996, I earned
5 my wings as a Naval Aviator in 1999, and began flying the EA-6B Prowler and its successor the
6 EA-18G Growler. I served with the squadrons VAQ-141 and VAQ-140, as well as the Air Wing
7 Landing Signals Officer for Carrier Air Wing NINE. I have deployed onboard the aircraft
8 carriers USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 65), USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71), USS
9 JOHN C STENNIS (CVN 74), and USS DWIGHT D EISENHOWER (CVN 69) in support of
10 Operations SOUTHERN WATCH, IRAQI FREEDOM, and ENDURING FREEDOM. I have
11 also served as an Instructor Pilot, responsible for qualifying junior officers to land and operate
12 from aircraft carriers. I also served as the Commanding Officer of VAQ-130, deploying with
13 Carrier Air Wing THREE onboard USS HARRY S TRUMAN (CVN 75) in support of Operation
14 ENDURING FREEDOM. I have logged over 3000 flight hours in the EA-18G, EA-6B, F-18F,
15 T-45 and various other aircraft, accumulating 750 arrested landings onboard aircraft carriers at
16 sea. As a naval aviator and wing commander, I am intimately familiar with the equipment,
17 manpower, doctrine, and training necessary to prepare aircrews to deploy aboard aircraft carriers.
18 3. Carrier aviation is unlike any other type of military or commercial aviation. The ability
19 to safely operate an aircraft from the flight deck of an aircraft carrier is the culminatio n of
20 years of intense flight training in four broad phases: Ground school is the gateway to training
21 jets, followed by specialized training in assigned aircraft, and ultimately assignment to
22 operational squadrons that deploy to combat. Student Naval Aviators and Naval Flight
23 Officers (NFOs) spend their first formative months in Pensacola, Florida, learning basic
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25
1 aviation ground school topics and water survival training. Shortly thereafter, these young
2 officers begin basic flight school instruction by gaining foundational skills operating the T-6
3 Texan II, a propeller aircraft designed for initial basic aviation training. If they successfully
4 complete this phase, they move to an intermediate level of training to expand their skills.
5 During this phase, Student Naval Aviators begin operating the T-45 Goshawk jet trainer while
6 our Student NFOs are introduced to advanced navigation procedures and tactical problem sets,
7 which teach them how to make decisions in combat. If students succeed in all of these areas,
8 they may be selected for the jet community. They will then begin advanced jet training and
9 start flying more advanced aircraft, continuing to hone their skills at faster speeds, higher
10 altitudes and with added capabilities. Near the end of the advanced jet phase of training,
11 Student Naval Aviators train for an opportunity to earn their Initial Carrier Qualification by
12 operating a T-45 Goshawk training jet from the deck of an aircraft carrier solo, that is, without
13 an Instructor Aircrew in the aircraft with them. The demands of the near-end phase of training
14 are so great that during this phase the Student Naval Aviators are prevented from engaging in
15 any other type of training; carrier qualification is their singular focus. Via their Landing Signal
16 Officers (LSOs), the students are indoctrinated in all aspects of carrier aviation. LSOs are
17 experienced Naval Aviators, recognized for their exceptional knowledge of carrier aviation
18 procedures and are specially trained in instructing its principles.
19 4. The primary tool available to LSOs to inculcate safe carrier procedures to the students
20 are dedicated flight training sessions known as Field Carrier Landing Practices (FCLPs).
21 FCLPs are flight operations conducted at a land-based airfield or strip that attempt to mimic
22 the conditions of an aircraft carrier and build the skills and decision making necessary to safely
23 land a jet aircraft onboard a moving aircraft carrier. Much like the carrier qualification phase,
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1 FCLPs are a single- focus mission. FCLPs allow students to practice the landing pattern the
2 students will use when they are at the aircraft carrier; no other training is conducted during
3 these flights. If the Student Naval Aviators successfully qualify at the aircraft carrier and
4 complete advanced jet training, they receive their ‘Wings of Gold’ and continue to the next
5 phase of their training at a Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) for the specific front-line
6 aircraft they have been assigned to fly. The FRS trains all new electronic attack aviators
7 before they join either an expeditionary squadron or a carrier air wing squadron. The FRS also
8 trains aviators transitioning form other aircraft or returning from non-flying tours.
9 5. The Growler community is unusual in that there is only one FRS for the EA-18G,
10 VAQ-129, located at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island (NASWI), and seven EA-18G carrier
11 squadrons are also located at NASWI. Thus, for Growler carrier aircrew, the FRS and
12 operational phases of training are accomplished at the same location. At the FRS,
13 replacement aircrew learn to operate the EA-18G beginning with a basic familiarization phase
14 culminating in their ability to operate the aircraft to its fullest capabilities in combat and are
15 then considered “fleet ready.” The FRS is considered graduate level training as the ‘student’
16 moniker is dropped from the Naval Aviator and NFO titles, and they are referred to as
17 “replacement aircrew.” It is also important to note that the “crew concept” is introduced to the
18 replacement aircrew. In other words, the Naval Aviator and the Flight Officer are no longer
19 seen as two distinct individuals; instead, they are viewed as a single “aircrew” trained to
20 operate the EA-18G. Prior to this stage the Student Naval Aviators and NFOs experienced
21 different training syllabi; at the FRS their training syllabus is shared and made specific to the
22 EA-18G. Similar to the advanced jet training stage, the biggest hurdle in the FRS for
23 replacement aircrew is carrier qualification. For the Naval Aviators, who had previously
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1 carrier qualified in trainer jets, this is their second time experiencing carrier qualifications with
2 a new aircraft. For the NFOs, this is their first exposure to the carrier environment.
3 Additionally, for both Naval Aviators and NFOs this will be the first time they are expected to
4 operate safely around the aircraft carrier at night.
5 6. The replacement aircrew must successfully qualify in the EA-18G at the carrier to
6 complete their training. Akin to the advanced stage of jet training, the replacement aircrew are
7 not permitted to focus on other types of training. This process takes weeks of training
8 encompassing lectures, day and night simulators, and performing FCLPs at Ault Field and
9 OLF Coupeville, both day and night, to prepare the replacement aircrew to the point where
10 they have demonstrated to their LSOs the skills, safety margins, and predictability and
11 controllability to earn an opportunity to go to the carrier and try to qualify. After successful
12 completion of carrier qualifications and FRS completion, the aircrew graduate to their
13 operational Fleet squadron and continue to advance their tactical training and aeronautical
14 skills for combat and carrier operations.
15 7. Before an aircrew can deploy to their first operational aircraft carrier, the aircrew must
16 master the necessary skills to complete a carrier landing. What was once the sole focus of a
17 training syllabus at the FRS, quickly becomes routine as aircrews are expected to safely,
18 expeditiously, and successfully land aboard an aircraft carrier each and every time they fly.
19 Conducting FCLPs, which mimic the landing environment of an aircraft carrier, builds the
20 skills and decision-making necessary for aircrew to safely land a jet aircraft onboard a moving
21 aircraft carrier. FCLPs are the only tool available to LSOs that nearly replicate, though never
22 replace, the rigors of carrier based operations.
23
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1 8. Performing an arrested landing onboard a moving aircraft carrier is widely known to be
2 one of the most difficult and dangerous tasks in the American military and is an incredibly
3 perishable skill. Nighttime carrier landings are even more challenging than daytime landings.
4 At night, aviators lack the visual cues they rely on during daytime landings. It is often
5 impossible to discern the horizon or the ocean due to the complete lack of ambient lighting out
6 at sea, and this inability to perceive relative motion can result in vertigo and confusion.
7 Aviators must rely heavily on their flight instruments and training. FCLPs allow aircrew to
8 prepare to execute this maneuver at a location on land where risks that could be encountered at
9 sea can be mitigated to an acceptable level. To be clear, the risks inherent with landing at sea
10 cannot be overstated. FCLPs on land mitigate the risk of death at sea. The at-sea environment
11 is unforgiving and demands that aircraft and aircrew adhere to an incredibly stringent set of
12 altitude, airspeed, and flightpath restrictions in order to land on a moving ship without
13 crashing. During the final seconds of the landing, aviators make constant power corrections to
14 achieve the exact descent angle, alignment and airspeed so that the aircraft arresting hook
15 touches down in a precise location on an aircraft carrier runway that is moving away from
16 them as well as pitching up and down and rolling side to side. No matter the seniority or
17 experience of the aircrew, FCLPs are required to be performed to qualify a pilot to deploy to an
18 aircraft carrier. This requirement cannot be waived and pertains to training squadrons and
19 operational fleet squadrons alike (though the requirements differ somewhat between the two
20 organizations). For example, an FCLP must be performed close in time (within10 days) before
21 a squadron deploys to an aircraft carrier because the perishable skills needed to perform the
22 maneuver must peak just as they are needed.
23
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1 9. The entirety of an FCLP is designed to mimic as near as possible the metrics that the
2 aircrew will be expected to meet at sea. An FCLP refines the pilot’s skills needed during the
3 last 15-18 seconds of flying prior to the aircraft touching down. Essentially, the pilot must
4 perform a precise landing approach and touchdown to the simulated aircraft carrier deck
5 (landing field), precisely touch its wheels on the correct spot of the runway, and then increase
6 power and take off again without stopping1 . However, in order to reach those last 15-18
7 seconds, the aircrew must have maneuvered the aircraft in such a manner to meet strict
8 airspeed, altitude, and distance parameters. The FCLPs enhance the aircrews’ ability to
9 maneuver the aircraft to meet these demands.
10 10. An FCLP pattern (landing pattern) is dramatically different than any landing pattern
11 found in civilian or military flying because a typical recovery period at sea often has in excess
12 of a dozen aircraft trying to land within a short time frame. Throughout the aircraft recovery
13 process, the aircraft carrier itself must maintain a constant course and speed. This restriction
14 on the aircraft carrier’s maneuverability increases the aircraft carrier’s vulnerability to attack
15 and other hazards. Therefore, aviators must land on the carrier in rapid succession in order to
16 minimize the amount of time the carrier is restricted in maneuverability. The procedures we
17 instill in our aircrew are designed to reflect the needs of the fleet, which requires getting the
18 aircraft aboard safely and expeditiously. The difficulty in safely and expeditiously landing is
19 compounded by the high-performance nature of our aircraft. It is no small feat to transition an
20 aircraft from 350 knots (approximately 400 m.p.h.) to an approach speed of 135 knots
21
22
1 As discussed in Para. 15, a missed landing on an actual aircraft carrier requires the pilot to
23 immediately take off from the carrier deck to re-attempt the landing. FCLPs train pilots in this
necessary skill.
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1 (approximately 155 m.p.h.) and safely land aboard an aircraft carrier with a landing interval
2 allowing for all other aircraft recovering to land on the first pass. This process is truly a team
3 sport and all aircraft in the pattern must know what the other is doing or about to do. Thus,
4 learning how to operate in a landing pattern with other aircraft is critical to the aircrew’s
5 training. Aircrew must learn how to control spacing between fellow aircraft in the pattern to
6 avoid creating an airborne traffic jam. At sea, there is no divert airfield; all the airborne planes
7 must land on the carrier, and an airborne traffic jam can be deadly.
8 11. The FCLP and aircraft landing pattern itself is a left-hand turning racetrack pattern
9 oriented along a runway or ship's heading with one end of the ovals being a descent to landing.
10 At sea, the altitude of the landing pattern is 600 feet; ashore, each outlying field has individual
11 course rules and restrictions in place to mimic that profile as nearly as possible. The process
12 begins when the aircraft enters the landing pattern by performing a maneuver called the
13 "break" in which they arrive overhead the landing runway in use, flying upwind aligned with
14 the runways heading, traveling at 350 knots, and then turn 180 degrees. Aircrews take
15 inventory of what other aircraft are in the pattern and plan their "break turn" such that at the
16 end of 180 degrees of turn they are flying downwind at the appropriate distance behind the
17 aircraft preceding them and at the appropriate distance directly to the side of the center of the
18 runway, which they were just moments ago directly above. The distance from runway center
19 is known as "abeam distance" and is the first of many metrics my aircrew are trying to refine
20 throughout each FCLP pass they fly. Depending on aircraft configuration, gross weight, and
21 environmental factors such as cross wind components, the required abeam distance of the
22 aircraft will change from pass to pass. The abeam distance can range from 1.8-1.0 nautical
23 miles given changes in any one of the above factors. The abeam distance is vital to aircrew
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1 because their descending “approach turn” is anchored from that distance. The "approach turn"
2 is precision flying that includes 180 degrees of change, precise control of aircraft bank angle,
3 integrated throttle movements, critical control of the aircraft's energy state, and controlled
4 descent rates.
5 12. A properly executed approach turn will set an aircrew up for success in the last 15-18
6 seconds of flying before touching down. Due to the highly challenging and dynamic nature of
7 the approach turn, we try to limit the number of variables that a pilot must control. For
8 example, ideally the only variable in the approach turn equation should be the aircraft's abeam
9 distance. All other aspects of the approach turn (bank angle, descent rate, aircraft energy state,
10 altitudes) should be more or less held constant throughout the turn. This is a process that does
11 not come naturally and requires frequent repetition to make it second nature.
12 13. In the last 15-18 seconds of flight, the aircrew are solely focused on three things: the
13 “meatball,” line-up, and AOA. The "meatball" is the orange light source provided by the
14 Improved Fresnel Lens Optical Landing System (IFLOLS). The orange point light source is
15 referenced to a horizontal row of green lights known as the datums. The meatball is vertically
16 oriented and shows the pilot real-time where the aircraft is in reference to the datums, above or
17 below. These deviations directly correspond to where the aircraft is in relation to the ideal
18 glideslope. Too high and the aircraft misses all the arresting wires and has to quickly take off
19 and attempt another landing. Too low and the aircraft runs a very significant risk of flying into
20 the back of the aircraft carrier—possibly killing the aircrew and personnel aboard the carrier.
21 During line-up, the pilot is striving to maintain the aircraft on the centerline of the approach
22 corridor and the intended point of landing. Line-up serves several important purposes. First
23 and foremost, a faulty line up (left or right of centerline) results in the IFLOLS showing
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1 inaccurate information to the pilot. That is to say, the only time the IFLOLS is providing
2 accurate glideslope data to the pilot is when the aircraft is on centerline. Additionally, unlike a
3 traditional runway, the flight deck of an aircraft carrier is packed on both sides with parked
4 aircraft. The landing area itself is only approximately 90 feet wide. The wingspan of an EA-
5 18G with wings spread in a flight position is approximately 44 feet. Travelling at 135 knots,
6 this leaves little room for error.
7 14. Lastly, the pilot is concerned with AOA, or Angle-of-Attack. AOA is a measure of the
8 angle between the chord line of a wing and the relative wind hitting it. AOA is the Navy’s
9 best representation of the energy state of the aircraft. Airspeed alone is not an accurate
10 depiction of the energy state of the aircraft and does not sufficiently account for wing
11 performance; AOA on the other hand does. Because AOA is angular in nature, it reflects not
12 only the aircraft's energy state but its attitude (nose high or nose low) as well. The AOA of the
13 aircraft is critically important to manage because the aircraft should move neither too slowly
14 nor too fast. From the perspective of energy management, if an aircraft is too slow it is
15 underpowered, sluggish, and prone to settling ("falling" below ideal glideslope). If an aircraft
16 is too fast or above ideal AOA, it tends to float and has a higher overall approach speed, which
17 upon engaging an arresting gear wire, imparts a higher than designed or anticipated load on
18 both the aircraft and the arresting gear system. AOA deviations are also critical when
19 discussing the aircraft's attitude. An aircraft that is again too slow (below ideal AOA) presents
20 a high pitch profile (nose higher than optimal) which in turn lowers the arresting hook point
21 underneath the aircraft. This can lead to the hook engaging the very back of the aircraft carrier
22 or an earlier than anticipated arresting gear wire. An aircraft which is too fast (above ideal
23 AOA) presents a flatter (nose lower) attitude upon landing and can result in the arresting hook
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ILLSTON DECLARATION - 10 -
1 failing to contact any arresting gear wires and therefore failing to stop. Lastly, as with lineup,
2 any deviation from ideal AOA presents inaccurate meatball information to the pilot as the light
3 source is only programmed to provide accurate information to a pilot who is flying optimum
4 AOA and lined up on centerline. All of these factors must be visualized, processed, corrected
5 for, and assessed within that last 15-18 seconds of flying before the aircraft touches down.
6 Everything the aircrew did prior to this 15-18 seconds (the break maneuver, abeam distance
7 management, approach turn mechanics, and aircraft spacing) is designed to get them to as good
8 a start as possible for that last 15-18 seconds of high intensity flying. During this time, the
9 pilot is in rapid-fire fashion taking in "meatball, lineup, AOA" inputs and making appropriate
10 adjustments in order to land safely.
11 15. One of the goals of an FCLP is to ingrain into the pilot's muscle memory the need to
12 immediately select full power upon touchdown. Immediately selecting full power upon
13 touchdown is a crucial and lifesaving act that must become second nature. By immediately
14 selecting full power upon touchdown, the aircrew can safely fly away from the carrier deck in
15 the event the arresting hook fails to engage any wires (called a "bolter"), a wave-off (when the
16 LSO, who is standing on a catwalk next to the carrier deck, aborts the landing), or a
17 catastrophic failure of the arresting hook or wires to safely "trap" the aircraft. Within that
18 moment of a failed landing or touch-and-go landing the aircrew must learn to instantly
19 transition back from focusing on landing to focusing on other aircraft in the pattern and re-
20 establishing themselves in the flow with proper interval to attempt another landing. If the
21 aircrew fails to immediately select full power upon touchdown, and the aircraft misses the
22 arresting wire or the arresting wire fails, the aircraft will be unable to regain enough airspeed to
23
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1 fly, crashing into the sea or into the aircraft carrier . The FCLPs help aircrews to avoid such
2 catastrophic consequences.
3 16. Successfully accomplishing a properly flown pass results in the aircraft's arresting hook
4 engaging one of three or four arresting gear wires strung across the landing area. These wires
5 are spaced roughly 50 feet apart, held approximately four inches above the flight deck by leaf
6 spring devices, and designed to bring a 48,000 pound aircraft travelling 135 knots to full stop
7 within roughly 2.5 seconds and less than 200 feet.
8 Below, Figure 3.1-6 from the Final EIS provides a graphical representation of an FCLP.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
17. The purpose behind FCLPs can also be understood by watching video of aircraft conduct
20
actual landings on aircraft carriers. To watch a similar aircraft, an F/A-18 Hornet, conduct a
21
carrier landing at real speed see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sz7dluAFXb0 . To watch
22
another F/A-18 Hornet conduct a landing at night, see
23
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aV2A8cCG19E. These videos comport with my experience
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1 conducting day and night carrier landings in an EA-18 G Growler, which shares the same
2 fuselage and engines as a Hornet. They are a fair and accurate demonstration of the complexity
3 of safely landing on an aircraft carrier.
4 18. FCLPs are conducted day and night in almost every weather condition and can occur
5 several times over a 24 hour period. Aircrew will typically spend approximately 45 minutes in
6 the landing pattern during the course of an FCLP period and fly an average of 8-10 passes
7 (each pass being one complete trip around the pattern culminating in the last 15-18 seconds of
8 "meatball, lineup, AOA" flying). During these sessions muscle memory and fine motor skills
9 are practiced and instilled in our aviators. LSOs also use FCLPs as opportunities to test an
10 aircrew's responsiveness to their directions. Critical information pertaining to line-up, energy
11 state, and wave-offs are transmitted to the aircraft via radio and non-radio signals which
12 aircrew must obey. LSOs are continually assessing aircrew for their controllability,
13 predictability, and safety in flying passes. For their hard work, each individual aircrew
14 receives a highly personalized and detailed debrief on not just the FCLP session as a whole,
15 but for each of their passes flown. In an average FCLP session of five aircraft flying 10 passes
16 each, my LSOs debrief 50 passes to aircrew. Through this process aircrew trends, weaknesses,
17 and strengths are identified with tailored training plans and individualized feedback developed
18 by LSOs and provided to their aircrews. Personal and professional relationships are also
19 forged with the LSO, whose voice will be the only voice that aircrew hears while they're
20 landing on an aircraft carrier and one they will certainly want to hear if they are struggling to
21 bring their aircraft aboard.
22 19. As an LSO, I observed and graded 8,000 FCLPs and 30,000 carrier landings, providing
23 precise feedback to each aircrew to correct any deviations from the ideal landing pattern. As
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1 an LSO on three combat deployments, I have waved off more than 100 different aircraft,
2 preventing mishaps and saving lives. Once I had to wave off an F-14 that was too low on
3 approach. As the pilot responded to my calls by engaging full afterburner, his aircraft went
4 below the level of the flight deck and barely missed the back of the aircraft carrier as it was
5 climbing away from the water. That is just one example of how dangerous aircraft carrier
6 operations can be, and why FCLP training is so critically important to making it safer.
7 20. The ability to land on a carrier is a perishable skill that must be developed and
8 sustained, and one that is essential to the United States’ global military operations. Simulators,
9 while useful and used extensively to train aircrews, are no substitute for aircrew conducting
10 actual FCLPs. Simulators cannot replace the feel and physiological conditions experienced
11 during FCLPs, and the Navy has determined that using simulators alone to certify aircrews for
12 carrier landings is far too dangerous to accept. Each aircrew must complete real FCLPs in
13 order to gain certification to conduct an actual carrier landing, in order to mitigate the inherent
14 dangers of these difficult operations. In order to prepare EA-18G Growler aircrews of
15 Electronic Attack Wing for carrier operations, each aircrew must complete the FCLP training
16 process close in time to a deployment to an aircraft carrier. The timing of the training is
17 crucial because each component of the aviator’s skill set must come together at the correct
18 moment. As explained above, the Navy’s aviator training pipeline is a long and arduous path,
19 progressing from developing general military aviation skills to specialized platform-specific
20 tactics and procedures. For a specialized aircraft such as the Growler, aircrew training can take
21 up to three years or more from coming into the Navy to flying in an operational squadron.
22 21. As the Commander of Electronic Attack Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet, all EA-18G Growler
23 aircraft are under my command. I am intimately familiar with the equipment aboard this type
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1 of aircraft and am competent to testify about its installed engines. All EA-18G Growler
2 aircraft are equipped with twin F414-GE-400 engines. The Navy has never equipped the EA-
3 18G Growler aircraft with any other type of engines since the Navy began using the Growler at
4 OLF Coupeville. Nor has the Navy ever used the term ‘enhanced’ to describe the Growler
5 engines, and my command has no plans or instructions to change to any engines other than the
6 F414-GE-400 engines currently installed in the aircraft under my command.
7 22. In order to meet the increasing battlefield demand for AEA capabilities, the Navy
8 increased the complement of each EA-18G Growler carrier squadron from five (5) to seven (7)
9 aircraft per squadron, and will establish two (2) new squadrons. These increases have created
10 greater throughput need for training the aircrews who will meet those combat needs.
11 Therefore, the Navy also increased the EA-18 G Growler FRS from 17 to 27 aircraft, so that
12 aircrews can more quickly develop the skills necessary to graduate to enlarged EA-18G
13 Growler squadrons.
14 23. FCLPs are a crucial component of the United States’ increased AEA capacity and
15 capabilities. Without the necessary skill sets created by repeated FCLPs, the Growler
16 electronic airborne attack aircrews needed by combatant commanders will not be able to
17 deploy to aircraft carriers in support of those missions. The highly refined and technical work
18 that occurs at OLF Coupeville and Ault Field is critical life-saving work that is necessary to
19 fulfill mission requirements.
20 24. After completing the Environmental Impact Statement process, the Navy selected
21 Alternative 2A to meet the increased need for AEA capability. The Navy projects that up to
22 29,600 FCLPs annually (utilizing both Ault Field and OLF Coupeville) will be needed to
23 provide EA-18G Growler aircrews with the requisite skills. These operational numbers are not
24
25
1 determined by the number of aircraft but rather by the number of aircrews flying out of the
2 NAS Whidbey Island complex and their training requirements for skill maintenance and
3 certification prior to deployment. An inability to conduct up to 29,600 annual FCLPs would
4 cause my wing squadrons to be unable to deploy safely trained aircrews to meet the Airborne
5 Electronic Attack capability needed by combatant commanders. Furthermore, restricting or
6 inhibiting the ability of aircrews to conduct FCLPs at the right scheduled moment in the
7 training cycle of that particular squadron in preparation for a carrier deployment, will disrupt
8 the years-long pipeline of naval aviation training. Without flexibility to complete up to 29,600
9 annual FCLPs, my naval aircrews cannot perfect the skills needed to perform the most difficult
10 maneuver in all of aviation at the very moment in their training cycle when those skills are
11 needed most. As a result, aircrew deployment would be impacted, with national security
12 implications.
13 25. Sending aviators, instructors and maintenance personnel to detachments to other
14 airfields to obtain FCLP training disrupts the finely-tuned process of training naval aviators.
15 Travel to and from the detachment is a drain on our budget, as we must pay for travel, lodging
16 and per diem for the detachment personnel. It reduces the service life of the aircraft,
17 accelerating required maintenance. It also disrupts activity at NASWI, as FRS instructors,
18 LSOs and maintainers must travel to support the detachment and are therefore unavailable to
19 support ongoing training and maintenance demands for the Growler community. This
20 interrupts the training of the students who remain behind in the FRS and the maintenance cycle
21 for the overall Growler fleet.
22 26. In conclusion, FCLPs are a crucial component of EA-18G Growler training, and
23 without them, the Navy cannot provide our nation’s combatant commanders with the Airborne
24
25
District Judge Richard A. Jones

AT SEATTLE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, at al. No. 2:19-cv-01059-RAJ-JRC
Plaintiffs,
v. DECLARATION OF VICE
10 ADMIRAL DEWOLFE H.
The UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF MILLER III, U.S. NAVY
THE NAVY, e! 611.,
11
Defendants.
12
13 I, Vice Admiral DeWolfe H. Miller III, US. Navy, do hereby declare as follows:
14 1. I am a Naval Officer with over 38 years of commissioned service and experience. I
15 graduated from the US. Naval Academy in 1981, hold a Masters of Science from the National
16 Defense University, am a Syracuse University national security fellow, and graduated from the
17 Navy’s Nuclear Power Program in 2003. My training and Operational assignments have included
18 Training Squadron (VT) 19; Attack Squadron (VA) 56 aboard USS Midway (CV 41); Strike
I9 Fighter Squadron (VFA) 25 on the aircraft carrier USS Constellation (CV 64); VFA 131 and
20 VFA 34 both aboard the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69);
21 executive officer of USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70); commanding officer of USS Nashville (LPD
13); commanding officer of USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77); and as an admiral, commander
23
24
25
of Carrier Strike Group1 (CSG) TWO, participating in combat Operations in Operation Enduring
Freedom2 and Operation Inherent Resolve.3
2. In addition, I have served at Air Test and Evaluation Squadron (VX) 5; Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV N80) as aviation program analyst; Strike Fighter Weapons
School Atlantic; the Combined Air Operations Center during Operation Allied Force4 as deputy
director of naval operations; Office of Legislative Affairs for the Secretary of Defense;
Commander, Naval Air Force, US. Atlantic Fleet as aircraft carrier requirements officer; and as
an admiral at OPNAV as director for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (N2N6F2);
10 assistant deputy chief of naval operations for Warfare Systems (N9B); and as director, Air
11 Warfare (N98). I became Naval Aviation’s 8”" Commander, Naval Air Forces (“Air Boss”) and
12 Commander, Naval Air Force, US. Pacific Fleet in January 2018. My responsibilities as Air
13 Boss include manning, training, and equipping deployable, combat-ready Naval Aviation forces
14 for the entire US. Navy, including aircraft carriers and aviation squadrons, to win in combat. I
15 must ensure that we prepare naval aviators to safely and flawlessly execute all of their duties
1 A carrier strike group is comprised of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and its embarked air
wing, one guided-missile cruiser, guided-missile destroyers and a supply ship.
2 Operation Enduring Freedom began on October 7, 2001 in response to the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people. The operation began with American and British
bombing strikes against al-Queda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan.
3 Combined Joint Task Force-Operational Inherent Resolve was established by DoD on October
17, 2014 in reSponse to ongoing military actions against the risking threat posed by the Islamic
State of Iraqi and Syria (ISIS). During the Operation, US. Navy ships and assets deployed to the
Arabian Gulf to provide maritime security and support.
4 Operation Allied Force was a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched air
campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to stop the humanitarian catastrophe that
was unfolding in Kosovo in March 1999.
DECLARATION or vADM DEWOLFE H. MILLER, 111, us. NAVY
150 M. Street, NE
whether shore based, sea based, or in the air. Included in my responsibilities is ensuring the U.S.
military’s EA-l 8G Growlers are world-wide deployable and combat-ready to protect United
States, coalition and NATO forces. I ensure that EA- 1 8G Growlers are available to support
combat operations wherever our nation’s authorities ask.
3. This declaration addresses the impact that would be caused by any restriction on the
Navy’s ability to accomplish 23,700 field carrier landing practice operations (FCLPs) at
Outlying Field (OLF) Coupeville. This declaration will provide unclassified details of impacts to
the extent possible. I refer the court to my classified declaration for further information.
10
11 4. In March 2019, the Navy issued a record of decision (ROD) on the Final Environmental
12 Impact Statement (FEIS) to expand existing Growler Operations at Naval Air Station Whidbey
13 Island (NASWI) complex. The ROD increased the size of carrier squadrons from five to seven
14 aircraft, increased the aircrew in each squadron, and increased total training operations to support
15 the additional 36 total EA-ISG Growler aircraft at NASWI. The addition of aircraft and
16 personnel is critical to providing Combatant CommandersS with fully trained units that have
17 Growler electronic warfare capability, which is in high demand by Combatant Commanders. The
5 Combatant commands (and their commanders that lead them) are commands within the
Department of Defense within certain geographic or functional mission areas that provide
command and control of military forces in peace and war. There are 11 combatant commands:
Africa command (AFRICOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), Cyber Command
(CYBERCOM), European Command (EUCOM), Indo-Paciflc Command (INDOPACOM),
Northern Command (NORTHCOM), Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), Space Command
(SPACECOM), Special Operations Command (SOCOM), Strategic Command (STRATCOM),
and TranSportation Command (TRANSCOM).
DECLARATION OF VADM DEWOLFE H. MILLER, III, U.S. NAVY
U.S. Department ofJusticc
150 M. Street, NE
No. 2:19—cv-01059-RAJ-JRC Washington, DC 20002
ROD is critical to providing Combatant Commanders with fully trained units that are properly
manned, trained and ready with enhanced electronic attack capabilities and tactics. The ROD
ensures these units are properly trained to identify, track and target adversaries in a complex
electronic warfare environment and will increase aircrew training and proficiency in all aspects
of the Growler mission. both onboard aircraft carriers and on expeditionary missions.
Carrier-Based Naval Aviation
5. Carrier-based naval aviation units deploy aboard aircraft carriers operating around the
globe. National interests require the Speed, endurance, flexibility and autonomous nature of the
10 Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs). CSGs provide our national command authority with options,
11 access. and forward presence that allow for rapid reSponse to a wide spectrum of threats. The
12 carrier and its air wing support two of the Navy’s critical missions: (1) war fighting and security
13 and (2) deterrence through forward presence. The war-fighting mission calls for the Navy to be
14 able to bring military force to bear by projecting maritime and air power in regions of the world
15 far from the United States. CSGs serve as independent strike forces capable of engaging targets
16 at sea and hundreds of miles inland. The forward presence mission calls for demonstrations of
17 power projection through location of a maneuverable naval force and the performance of
18 fimctions other than warfare. including crisis response, deterrence, evacuation of non-
19 combatants, and humanitarian aid. Our ability to project credible combat power overseas is
20 critical to promotion and protection of US. interests -— deterring aggression, enhancing stability,
21 promoting interoperability with allies, and providing timely initial crisis response.
22

150 M. Street, NE
6. The nation’s aircraft carriers and associated air wings are the linchpins in the Navy’s
ability to fillfill its missions and are routinely among the first assets to a crisis. With
approximately 44 strike aircraft and 5-7 electronic attack aircraft embarked, aircraft carriers are a
potent and self—sufficient military force, able to move quickly throughout the world with an
unparalleled ability to deliver an array of precise “smart” munitions. Because the aircraft
deployed on the carrier operate at sea, they can be moved within range of a potential target
without the need to seek approval of a host nation. For example, the flexibility and efficacy of
carrier based power projection was clearly demonstrated when the USS Theodore Roosevelt
(CVN 71) transited the Strait of Hormuz to the Arabian Sea to conduct maritime security
10 operations to ensure vital shipping lanes off the Yemeni coast remained open and safe.
ll Following CVN 71 ’s move, an Iranian convoy also transiting toward Yemen reversed course,
12 underscoring the stabilizing effect a carrier force can have overseas.
13
14 7. Growlers are a unique and indiSpensable element of the CSG. Each CSG includes one
15 Growler squadron consisting of five to seven aircraft assigned to their wing to protect the strike
16 aircraft and engage in electronic warfare. CS Gs are allocated to our worldwide Combatant
17 Commanders who are required to maintain predetermined levels of combat capability. These
18 Combatant Commander requirements determine the number and pace at which Navy units and
19 assets train and deploy.
20
21 Airborne Electronic Attack
22 8. Growlers also support US. Army, US. Air Force, US. Marine Corps, and other Navy
23 missions as well as joint and allied missions with partner nations such as England, France, and
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Germany. The Navy’s Growler aircraft is the sole tactical Airborne Electronic Attack asset in
the United States military arsenal. In 2009, Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Department
of the Navy to maintain expeditionary airborne electronic attack capability indefinitely. No other
service maintains that capability today. Instead those services now rely on the Navy to provide
support to its aircraft using the Growler’s unique capabilities.
9. Growlers are the first into combat, securing the electromagnetic operational domain by
jamming adversary systems and protecting US. and Allied forces from detection. Growlers are
even critical for protection of stealth aircraft that are in use today. While stealth technologies like
10 the B—2 Bomber and E35 Joint Strike Fighter reduce detection by enemy radars, they are not
11 invisible. Growlers are needed to protect these high—value assets from enemy missile systems
12 during combat operations. Through electronic warfare (EW), Growlers provide U.S., Coalition,
13 and NATO forces a necessary advantage as they enter hostile territory, using the electromagnetic
14 Spectrum to their advantage while denying the enemy’s ability to do so. There are many devices
15 whose functions depend on the electromagnetic spectrum such as intelligence (satellite up/down
16 links), communications (cell phones and radios); positioning, navigating and timing (global
17 positioning system (GP 8)); and command and control (air traffic control radars). In order to
18 protect friendly forces, a military force must have unimpeded access to and use of the
19 electromagnetic spectrum. Electronic attack tactics prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use
20 of the electromagnetic spectrum by employing systems and weapons that use electromagnetic
21 energy for jamming, disruption, denial, or deception and in some cases destruction of enemy
22 electromagnetic equipment. Growlers protect CSGs, Marines landing ashore, or Army soldiers
23 and coalition troOps moving through adversary—held regions.

DECLARATION OF VADM DEWOLFE I-l. MILLER, III, U.S. NAVY
150 M. Street, NE
No. 2:19-cvv01059-RAJ-JRC Washington, DC 20002
10. The EA-lBG Growler has eleven weapon stations for carrying electronic mission systems
and weapons, which provides versatile mission capability. It can interrupt enemy air defense
systems both in air and on land using electronic measures. Furthermore, it shares Speed and
agility with the F/A-ISF Super Hornet because it has the same airframe and same engines.
Therefore, it is highly capable, effective, and survivable as an escort for aircraft, surface ships,
and aircraft carriers.
11. The ISA-18G Growler is also equipped with Advanced Electronically Scanned Array
10 (AESA) radar, which provides air-to-air and air-to-ground capability with detection, targeting,
11 tracking, and electronic protection modes. Further the ability of the EA-l 8G Growler to operate
12 from an aircraft carrier or from an expeditionary land base makes it a strategic asset and a
13 critically important weapons system in high demand around the world.
14
_ 15 12. The high demand for Growlers and their vital importance to the protection of our nation’s
16 military highlights the necessary increase provided for in the 2019 ROD. The Navy requires six
17 expeditionary Growler squadrons (five active duty and one reserve), and nine carrier-based
18 Growler squadrons to support the requirements from Combatant Commanders around the globe.
19
20 13. The increase in number and size of squadrons generates a need for additional personnel and
21 training for those personnel. The increase in personnel and training enabled by the 2019 ROD
22 eases the strain on Growler aircrews. Every combat element of the strike group, including the
23 EA-18G Growler, is either working up to deploy, is deployed, or is ending their deployment.

DECLARATION OF VADM DEWOLFE H. MILLER, 111, 1.1.8. NAVY
150 M. Street, NE
CSG deployments are generally limited to 7 to 8 months, and the Navy has established these
limits on deployment length because longer deployments take a toll on our personnel. Personnel
spend time away from home on deployment and for underway periods of training and exercises,
preparing to deploy. These absences from home make it extremely challenging to maintain a
stable, healthy family life.
Training
14. Over 70 total aircraft embarked on each aircraft carrier form a Carrier Air Wing. A
Carrier Air Wing is assembled from a variety of diverse aircraft, each contributing a specific
10 combat capability to the whole. Assembling the Carrier Air Wing depends on a complex, multi-
11 year training process known as the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (“O-FRP”) that integrates
12 aircraft from bases across the nation into an integrated fighting force. In broad outline, this plan
13 sets a specific schedule where individual elements of the Carrier Air Wing—Super Hornets,
14 Growlers, Hawkeyes, helicopters and others—begin their initial training, gaining tactical
15 proficiency in their assigned aircraft. Each aircraft community then trains with larger groups
16 including other air elements. For example, Super Hornets will train with Growler and Hawkeye
17 support, learning how to share information and gaining experience with the capabilities that
18 Growlers provide to the strike fighters. These combined aircraft elements then train with surface
19 ships and submarine elements in exercises that involve ever-greater complexity, culminating in a
20 composite training exercise prior to deployment of the CSG. Synchronizing these training
21 phases is critical, as the skills our sailors and aviators need for their deployments are perishable.
22 Each element (air, sea, and undersea) of a CSG must reach its training milestones at the

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appropriate time and be supported by preperly maintained equipment and a rested, deployable
CI‘EW .
15. The O-FRP ensures that thousands of sailors and aviators in hundreds of critical military
Specialties are trained and ready to operate as a CSG in which the air, sea, cyber, and undersea
assets work effectively and safely to protect the aircraft carrier and accomplish the mission. For
Growler squadrons, the O-FRP cycle consists of unit basic level training, which predominately
occurs at NASWI, and then follow-on intermediate and advanced level training with other forces
before a planned deployment and follow-on sustainrnent phase. Guidance doctrine calls for a full
10 3-year (36 month) O-FRP cycle for these aviation units, which begins and ends with a
11 maintenance period. FCLP training is conducted prior to all at-sea O-FRP evolutions.
12
13 16. Specifically for Growler aircrews, every EA-l 8G pilot and Naval Flight officer goes
14 through Fleet Replacement Squadron (“FRS”) training before assignment to an expeditionary or
15 carrier assigned squadron. This training occurs for both beginner replacement aircrew (Category
16 1), aircrew transitioning from other aircraft to Growlers (Category 2), and aircrew returning from
17 non-flying duty to deployable squadrons needing refresher training (Category 3). Training these
18 aircrews and then assigning them to squadron billets is a constant cycle. Personnel receive three
19 year orders to a unit. Therefore, in any given year, one third of the unit’s personnel (to include
20 both aircrews and maintenance crew) will be rotating out of the command and new personnel
21 will be arriving.
22

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17. A steady stream of trained aviators and aircraft maintenance personnel is paramount to
sustaining our nation’s global presence and implementing our technological edge. Capability and
capacity are necessary to train our naval aviation force. Capability comes from training
techniques and devices that not only replicate the anticipated warfighting domain, but develop
ingrained skills that will allow our force to prevail in combat. Capacity is the second challenge.
While training everyone to the highest standards with the newest equipment, many factors such
as managing professional development of individual aviators, flight hours on aircraft, access to
training landing fields and ranges, simulators and quality of life impact the effectiveness of our
training systems.
10
11 18. Naval aviators and maintenance personnel must train constantly in order to build
12 Specialized skills and achieve a level of proficiency performance that guarantees mission success
13 and safety in operation. But expanding operational commitments, increasingly complex and
14 integrated missions and declining budgets are testing naval aviation’s ability to effectively train
15 our forces for all possible missions. Therefore, naval aviation must maximize every training
16 opportunity with training environments and tools that replicate the operating environments,
17 realistic adversary tactics, and equipment and battlespace complexity. For example, the rapid
18 launch, recovery, refueling, and rearrning of tactical aircraft from an aircraft carrier is a complex
19 task involving pilots, maintenance personnel, and support personnel and represents a highly
20 specialized system of operations unique to naval aviation, which must be choreographed and
21 executed with precision. Personnel must learn how to launch, recover, refuel and rearm up to 45
22 aircraft, concurrently, at night, often in bad weather, on an aircraft carrier flight deck. In those
23 circumstances, safety is paramount: the constant threat posed by jet engine intakes and exhausts,
U.S. Department cf Justice
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turning propellers and moving aircraft makes the aircraft carrier flight deck an extremely
dangerous work environment.
19. One of the most difficult skills for a new pilot to learn and an experienced pilot to
maintain is the ability to safely land on an aircraft carrier at sea in all conditions including total
darkness and heavy seas. Training for this vital skill involves classroom, flight simulator, and in
the actual aircraft, practicing carrier landings in a controlled environment that closely replicates
the aircraft carrier at-sea. This live flight training is known as Field Carrier Landing Practice
(“FCLP”). Pilots of all carrier-based aircraft including Growler pilots conduct FCLP prior to
10 initial qualification, every at-sea period, and deployment in order to obtain, maintain, and
11 demonstrate proficiency in carrier landings. FCLP is conducted under the observation of a
12 landing signals officer (LSO) on the ground and in the controlled environment of a remote
13 airfield with a stationary runway that is wider and longer than the landing area of an aircraft
14 carrier that provides an acceptable margin of safety for landing practice. FCLP runways have a
15 painted “carrier box” for day landings, and lighting that replicates the carrier deck for night
16 landings with the regular runway lights are turned off. FCLP runways also must have an
17 Improved Fresnel Lens Optical Landing System (IFLOLS) and LSO station with lighting
18 controls and radios located next to the landn area of the runway. During FCLP each pilot flies
19 a landing pattern that replicates the landing pattern flown over the carrier at-sea, and performs
20 multiple landings in a single “FCLP period” usually lasting about 45 minutes. For the sake of
21 efficiency, multiple pilots (up to 5 usually) will share the same racetrack-shaped landing pattern,
22 alternately making an approach and practice landing approximately 45 to 60 seconds apart. So,
23 by nature, when FCLP is ongoing at an airfield, it usually disrupts, delays, and often inhibits the
DECLARATION OF VADM DEWOLFE H. MILLER, 11], U.S. NAVY
US. Department of Justice
150 M. Street, NE
use of the airfield by other aircraft. This is one reason why the Navy has chosen to build OLFs
for FCLP near naval air stations where carrier aircraft are homebased. In order to replicate the
darkness of the carrier at-sea, OLFs are sited in rural areas where cultural lighting is minimal and
does not provide artificial visual cues to the pilot that would reduce the fidelity of the simulation
and quality of training.
The Importance of NASWI
20. OLF Coupeville is a vital asset for FCLP training. OLF Coupeville is a part of NASWI,
which also includes Ault Field. NASWI is vital to Navy’s Growler mission and the training that
10 takes place there cannot be replicated anywhere else. For more than 45 years, the NASWI
11 complex has provided the home to the Navy’s tactical Electronic Warfare community, which
12 now includes a Growler training squadron, all U.S.—based Growler squadrons, substantial airfield
13 infrastructure, an outlying airfield, and training ranges for Growler operations. All Growlers are
14 homebased at NASWI. Considerations that necessitate the home-basing of Growlers at NASWI
15 include the location of suitable airfields that provide for the most realistic training environment;
16 the distance aircraft would have to travel to accomplish training; the expense of duplicating
17 capabilities that already exist at Ault Field; the operational readiness and synergy of the small
18 Growler community; access to training ranges, Special Use Airspace and military training
19 routesfi; effective use of existing infrastructure, management of aircraft inventories, simulators,
6 Special Use Airspace is FAA-designated airspace restricted for specific uses, while military
training routes are FAA designated airspace in which military aircraft are permitted to exceed
otherwise—applicable FAA regulations on airspeed.
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maintenance equipment, and logistical support; and effective use of personnel to improve
operational responsiveness and readiness.
21. FCLP training at OLF Coupeville cannot be sustained outside the NASWI complex.
OLF Coupeville is custom designed for Growler FCLP, to ensure aviators can safely land on an
aircraft carrier at-sea and cannot be replicated elsewhere. Landing on an aircraft carrier is
perhaps the most difficult operation in military aviation, and the requirements for FCLP airfields
ensure that each FCLP realistically trains naval aviators to land on an aircraft carrier. In order to
be suitable for FCLP, the airfield must have certain attributes, including (1)-Airf1eld elevation at
10 or below 1,000 feet above mean sea level, (2) a runway aligned with the prevailing winds, (3)
11 low ambient lighting to duplicate the at-sea carrier environment, (4) maximum transit distance
12 from the home field of 50 nautical miles, (5) an airfield that is not beneath the lateral limits of
13 Class B or C airspace, (6) an airSpace that permits the replication of the aircraft carrier landing
14 pattern, and (7) a MIC-14 Improved Fresnel Lens Optical Landing System? (“IFLOLS”), a
15 Manually Operated Visual Landing Aid System, and supporting equipment.
16
17 22. Other Navy airflelds are not viable for FCLPs for many reasons, including distance from
18 NASWI, lack of infrastructure, or lack of capacity. NAS North Island is located under the lateral
19 limits of Lindberg International Airport’s Class B Airspace, restricting the type of operations that
7 Navy only has 27 IFLOLS worldwide, and this equipment is no longer being manufactured.
The Navy would have to move an existing system or contract for the manufacture of an
additional IFLOLS if the FCLPs were to be conducted at an airfield that does not currently
support them.
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can be performed there, and, as the Navy’s west coast Master Helicopter Base for more than 185
Navy MH—6OR/S helicopters, air Operations at the field are saturated with helic0pter flight
Operations. Introduction of EAnl 8G FCLPs would create mutual interference and impart
operational inefficiencies and readiness impacts. NAS Point Mugu is also saturated. As the west
coast MQ-4C Triton forward operating base (FOB), airfield operations are frequently interrupted
by the lengthy process of MQ-4C taxi, takeoff, and landing which cannot be accomplished
during FCLP training. NAS Point Mugu based E~2D squadrons already experience difficulty in
accomplishing their FCLP training requirements, and the addition of EA-l 8G training
detachments would filrther interfere with local E-2D training.
10
11 23. Further, other Navy airfields across the country do not provide the conditions necessary
12 for FCLP training. NAS Fallon’s field elevation is well above the maximum elevation required
13 to replicate at-sea conditions (1,000’ MSL) and therefore is not suitable for EA-ISG FCLP
14 training. NALF San Clemente Island off the California coast does not have MK-14 IFLOLS or a
15 painted simulated carrier landing area for day operations and flush deck lighting to simulate the
16 carrier landing area which are required to log FCLP landings, and even if the Navy relocated one
17 of its few remaining MK-14 systems to San Clemente Island, it would only be suitable for night
18 FCLP. Naval Air Facility El Centre is an austere training facility intended to provide temporary
19 training detachment support to rotary-wing and undergraduate training squadrons as well as the
20 Navy’s Flight Demonstration Squadron (the “Blue Angels”). It has limited capability to provide
21 transient support functions and is not resourced to provide the necessary personnel, logistics, and
22 training support functions and facilities. East Coast facilities, in addition to being prohibitively
23 distant, endure saturation of their airfields. For example, NAS Oceana is the Navy’s east coast
150 M. Street, NE
Master Strike-Fighter Base, home to 14 fleet strike-fighter squadrons and an FRS, Operating
more than 230 aircraft (almost double the ISA-18G aircraft at NASWI). There is no excess
capability at this location. In addition, urban encroachment on the airfield creates high levels of
artificial lighting that detract from the quality of training, particularly for FRS training. Local
strike fighter squadrons compete for FCLP time at nearby NALF Fentress, the schedule of which
often extends well into the early morning hours. NALF Fentress has no capacity to support some
of all of the EA~18G FCLP requirements, in fact NALF Fentress has a well-documented
schedule capacity shortfall. It is the primary FCLP site for all of the Oceana—based FA-lSE/F
squadrons and supports a sizeable portion of the FCLP requirements for the E—2D and C-2A
10 communities at Norfolk.
11
12 24. Other Navy airfields also do not have the capacity to support Growler requirements.
13 Airfield utilization rates across the Navy are historically high. NAS Lemoore is the Navy’s west
14 coast Master Strike-Fighter Base, home to 17 fleet strike-fighter squadrons and two fleet
15 replacement squadrons (“FRS”) or more than 263 FA-18E, FA-IBF, and F-35C aircraft (more
16 than double the EA—l 8G aircraft at NASWI). NAS Lemoore is already operating above its
17 designated physical capacity. In addition, NAS Lemoore does not have an OLF that can be used
18 for FCLPs.
19
20 25. In addition to providing insufficient FCLP training, detachment training away from the
21 NASWI complex takes aircraft away from the home base for other aircrew training
22 Opportunities, reduces aircraft service life due to extensive transit, increases time personnel
23 spend away from their home base during critical months leading to a deployment, and requires
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not just aircrew and aircraft, but also aircraft maintenance personnel, making them unavailable at
Ault Field during the duration of the detachment. It can also create costly delays if a mishap
occurs, as maintenance and parts availability can be limited or nonexistent at detachment
locations, eSpecially for Growlers that are high performance aircraft that require sophisticated
and specialized maintenance equipment generally only available at Ault Field. In addition, a
squadron working in a detachment away from home is often given lower priority in scheduling
than the squadrons homebased at that airfield. The negative impact to operational readiness
resulting from detachment training is the reason why an FCLP capability is located in close
proximity to the home airfield.
10
11 26. Any injunction limiting flight operations at OLF Coupeville would have a critical impact
12 to not only NAS Whidbey Island and Operations at Ault Field but also on naval aviation
13 readiness across the nation. Throughout the year each aircraft community (Growlers, Super
14 Hornets, etc) progresses through the O-FRP training cycles to prepare for deployment. The
15 Growler community requires the use of OLF Coupeville to progress through their Specialized
16 training requirements, and limiting the Navy’s ability to meet this requirement at OLF
17 Coupeville will severely reduce our ability to produce fully trained Growler squadrons in defense
18 of the nation. Even a temporary reduction in operations would create a critical bottleneck of
19 trained aircrew. Currently, we are within 500 Operations of the pre-ROD levels. Based on
20 current training, we will reach that level in April. Growler FCLP cannot be accommodated at
21 other Navy airfields; therefore, even a temporary injunction will force the United States to accept
22 critically'degraded capability in a key weapon system as explained more fillly in my classified
23 declaration.
DECLARATION OF VADM DEWOLFE l-I. MILLER, III, U.S. NAVY

150 M. Street, NE
No. 2: 19—ev—01059-RAJ-JRC Washington, DC 20002
Caée 2:19-cv-01059—RAJ-JRC Document 55-4 Filed 03/16/20 Page 17 of 18
27. The Growler FCLP totals analyzed in the Navy’s FEIS represent the Navy’s best estimate
of the minimum necessary for adequate training. The Navy has made every effort to limit
Growler FCLP activity at OLF Coupeville to that which is strictly necessary to train, maintain,
and qualify Growler aviators for deployment as part of an integrated air wing timed to CSG
deployments, which includes meeting interim requirements for integrated training with other
naval assets. This training is time sensitive: For example, pilot proficiency must be completed
within 10 days of deployment. While the number of FCLPs at OLF Coupeville will vary from
year to year based on operational need for deployable pilots, aircrews and squadrons, limiting the
10 Navy to less than the number of Operations we have forecasted as necessary in the 2019 ROD
11 will degrade the U.S. airborne electronic attack capabilities in theaters of conflict around the
12 ' world.
13
14 28. In addition to this declaration, I have also submitted—through the Department of
15 Justice—a classified declaration for consideration in this proceedings. As detailed in my
16 classified declaration, there are real threats to our national security and any disruption to the O-
17 FRP, which would result from the curtailment of FCLPS at OLF Coupeville put our national
18 security and the Navy’s mission at risk.
19
2O I hereby swear under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 that the foregoing
21 ' information is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
22 Dated this 12th day of March, 2020 in Jacksonville, Florida .
23
' DECLARATION OF VADM DEWOLFE H. MlLLER, III, U.S. NAVY
150 M. Street, NE
J No. 2:19-cv-OIOS9-RAJ-JRC Washington, DC 20002
I
W/ME/
Lh-IE-UJNP-d
DeWolfe H. Miller III

Vice Admiral, United States Navy

150 M. Street, NE
Ne. 2: l9-ev—01059-RAJ-JRC Washington, DC 20002

2:19-cv-01059-RAJ-JRC Document 55 - Defendants Response in Opposition To Coer Motion For Prelim Injunction (With Declarations)

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2:19-cv-01059-RAJ-JRC Document 55 - Defendants Response in Opposition To Coer Motion For Prelim Injunction (With Declarations)

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Case 2:19-cv-01059-RAJ-JRC Document 55 Filed 03/16/20 Page 1 of 32

1 District Judge Richard A. Jones

6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8 STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al. No. 2:19-cv-01059-RAJ-JRC

3 STATUTORY BACKGROUND ............................................................................................... - 2 -

4 I. The National Environmental Policy Act ......................................................................... - 2 -

5 II. The National Historic Preservation Act .......................................................................... - 3 -

6 FACTUAL BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................... - 3 -

7 STANDARD OF REVIEW ........................................................................................................ - 6 -

9 I. COER fails to demonstrate irreparable harm. ................................................................. - 7 -

10 A. COER’s delay in seeking emergency relief undermines its assertion of irreparable

12 B. COER fails to show that its alleged harm is irreparable. ...................................... - 9 -

15 III. The balance of equities weighs against preliminary injunctive relief........................... - 14 -

16 IV. COER fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success on its claims. ................................ - 16 -

17 A. COER’s NEPA claim lacks merit. ...................................................................... - 17 -

18 B. COER’s NHPA claim lacks merit....................................................................... - 22 -

17 Communities, Inc. v. Busey,

1 Gillons v. Shell Co. of California,

5 Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. Schultz,

14 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,

1 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,

5 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,

14 the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell,

2 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) ............................................................................................................... - 2 -

22 likelihood of success on the merits of its NEPA and NHPA claims.

2 The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) governs a court’s review of an agency’s

6 “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . . ” 5

11 Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)).

12 I. The National Environmental Policy Act

13 To ensure informed decisions, NEPA requires an agency to analyze and disclose

20 on the environmental impact of the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). To determine

1 II. The National Historic Preservation Act

8 Davis v. Latschar, 202 F.3d 359, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).

17 (“NASWI”) in 2008. GRR_00030928; GRR_00150374.

5 its favor.” Id.

15 Growler aircraft at the NASWI from 82 to 118 Growler aircraft. GRR_150238.

19 GRR_00167660. After years of meetings and correspondence, see generally GRR_00164177-

1 operations. GRR_00167458-65. The Navy carefully considered the Council’s recommendations

2 and implemented several but declined to adopt others. GRR_00167574-78; GRR_00162674;

4 Council’s recommendations are documented in the administrative record. See id.

4 number of FCLPs at OLF Coupeville to protect America’s national security interests.

6 A preliminary injunction is “a drastic and extraordinary remedy, which should not be

19 decision. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).

3 I. COER fails to demonstrate irreparable harm.

16 granting a preliminary injunction).

1 A. COER’s delay in seeking emergency relief undermines its assertion of

1 B. COER fails to show that its alleged harm is irreparable.

4 harm and the activity to be enjoined).

12 ongoing FCLP training operations.

13 II. Preliminary injunctive relief will harm the public interest.

23 v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982).

11 15. FCLPs “help aircrews avoid such catastrophic consequences.” Id.

20 fulfill mission requirements.” Illston Decl. ¶ 23.

1 equitable powers “loosely or casually” in cases involving claims of environmental damage.

4 Court should deny Plaintiffs’ motion.

5 III. The balance of equities weighs against preliminary injunctive relief.

2 Illston Decl. ¶ 20.

16 also Miller Decl. Classified.

3 Miller Decl. ¶ 26; Illston Decl. ¶ 24.

9 IV. COER fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success on its claims.

1 A. COER’s NEPA claim lacks merit.

9 considered the Growler’s impacts, and NEPA requires no more.

11 Growler’s potential impact on the environment. See, e.g. GRR_00150243-45; GRR_00150333-