WORKS OF ST. BONAVENTURE Edited by GEORGE MARCIL, O.F.M. SAINT BONAVENTURE’S DISPUTED QUESTIONS ON THE MYSTERY OF THE TRINITY Introduction and Translation ‘ZACHERY HAYES, O.F.M., D. TH. “The Franciscan Institute St. Bonaventure University St. Bonaventure, New York 14778 2000THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS ON THE MYSTERY OF THE TRINITY Tue Texr or St. BONAVENTURE IN TRANSLATIONWith the help of divine grace, we intend to offer some reflections concerning the mystery of the trinity beginning with two questions as a preamble, The first of these is the foundation of all certain knowledge; the second is the foun- dation of all the knowledge of faith, The first is whether the existence of God is an indubitable truth; the second is whether it is a truth of faith that God is 2 trinity. QUESTION I CONCERNING THE CERTITUDE WITH WHICH THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IS KNOWN, AND CONCERNING THE FAITH BY WHICH THE TRINITY OF THE SAMB GOD IS BELIEVED ARTICLE 1 WHETHER THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IS AN INDUBITABLE TRUTH ‘In the first place, the question is raised as to whether the existence of God is an indubitable truth. There are three ways of arguing in favor of this, The fist way says: Every tuth that is impressed in all minds is an indubitable truth, The second way says: Every truth proclaimed by all creatures is an indobitable truth. And the thitd ‘way says: Every truth which, in itself, is most ceetain and most evident is an indubitable truth, ‘The first way shows both from authority and from proofs that the existence of God is impressed in all rational minds, and it proceeds in the following manner. 107108 ‘im oesrorED quesroNs ARGUMENTS IN AGREEMENT 41. In the third chapter of the fist book, Damascene writes: “The knowledge of God’s existence is naturally implanted in us." 2. Again, Hugh writes: “God has tempered the knowledge of Himself in man in such a way that while man can never totally comprchend what God is, yet at the same time, he can never be totally ignorant of the fact that God exists”* 3, Again, Boethius writes: “The desire for the true and the good is implanted in the minds of men.” But an inclination toward the true and the good presupposes knowledge thereof, Therefore, there is impressed in the minds of men a knowledge of the true and the good and a desire for that which is most desirable. But that good is God. Therefore, ete. 4. Again, in many places in his work On the Trinity’ Augustine says that the image consists in mind, knowledge and love; and the concept of image is applied to the soul because of its relatior God. If, therefore, it is impressed in the soul by nature that it is tan image of God, it follows that the soul has knowledge of God implanted in it by nature. But the fist thing knowable about God is that He exists, Therefore, this is naturally implanted in the human, mind. 5. Again, the Philosopher says that “it would be inappropriate for us to be in possession of the most noble habits and yet to know rothing of them.” And since the truth of God's existence i the most noble truth and the one most present to us, it would be inap- propriate that such a truth should remain hidden to the human a 4 implanted 6. Again, the desire for wisdom isis in the minds of ‘men since, as the Philosopher says: “By nature all men desire to know.” But that wisdom which is most desirable is the eternal ‘wisdom, Therefore, there is implanted in the human mind a desire for such wisdom above all else. But a3 we said earlier, love cannot exist unless there is some knowledge of the object loved. Therefore, it is necessary that some knowledge of that highest wisdom be impressed in the human mind, But this is Gest of all to know the existence of God, who is that wisdom. Therefore, ete. 3 De Fide Ortad; of seo c. 1. 21° De Sara p. 3, ¢ 1. * Lib. Ihde Conl, prosa 2, Tx. 2. 2s Mile 4, a, 4; XIV, © 80, 1, © LTT Puutr.c- 18 (18). "Lb, T Metophs cL. 1 ENOWLEDGE AND FAITE 109 7. Again, the desire for happiness is implanted in us in such a ‘way that no one can doubt that other mea wish to be happy, a8 Avgustine writes in many places.” But happiness is found in the highest good, which is God, Therefore, if such desire is impossible without some knowledge, i is necessary that the knowledge by which we know the existence of God as the highest good be iam- planted in the soul itself. 8. Again, a desire for peace is implanted in the soul to such an ‘extent that peace is sought cven through its opposite, and the desire ‘cannot be removed even from the damned and the demons, according to the City of God, 19.* Bat if there can be no peace for the rational ‘mind except in a being that is eternal and immutable, and if desire Ptesupposes some notion or some knowledge, then a knowledge of the eternal and immutable being is implanted in the rational spicit. 9. Again, a hatred of falsehood is implanted in the soul. But ‘every hatred takes its origin in love. Therefore, the love of truth is evea more firmly implanted in the soul; and this is especially truc with reference to that truth in whose likeness the soul is made. But if that i the frst truth, ie follows necessarily that some kaow- ledge of the Gist truth is implanted in the rational mind. The fact ‘that the human mind has an innate batted of falschood is apparent in the fact that no one wants to be deceived, as Augustine waites in the tenth book of his Confessions. In the fourteenth book of the City of God, Angustine shows that hatted is eaused by love: for no ‘one hates something unless he loves its opposite. 10. Again, the rational soul naturally has knowledge of itself ‘whereby the soul is present to and knowable to itself. But God is ‘most present to the soul and is knowsble in Himself. Therefore some Knowiedge of God Himself is implanted in the very soul. If you say that there is n0 similatity bere since the soul is propostional to itself whereas God is not proportional to the soul, I reply on the contrary that there is no parallel, because if proportionality were anccessatily required for knowledge, the soul could never come to knowledge of God since it ean be proportioned to Him neither by Tian sagitnthow Ca ton exieace of God I Indaba se s the existence is indubitable for the human mind as a truth chat is naturally cannot be in doubt except in matters about which there is no certain knowledge.110 [THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS ‘Again, the same point is shown in a second way as follows: Bvery teuth that is proclaimed by all creatuses is an indubitable truth, But all creatures cry out the existence of God. Therefore, etc. ‘That every creatuce proclaims the existence of God is shown from ten selfevident postulates and their presuppositions, 11. The fist is this: IF there is posterior being, then there is prior being, because there is nothing posterior except it be from something prior. But if the sum total of posterior being exists, there must necessarily be a first being. Therefore, if it is necessary to say that among creatures there is both posterior and prior, it is necessary that the sum total of creatures infers and cries out that there is a fest principle. 12, Again, if there is being that exists from another, there is also being that does not exist from another, because nothing can bring itself from non-being to being.” Therefore there must ne- cestarily be a frst principle of eduction, and this is found in the first being which is not educed from another. Therefore, if that being ‘which exists from another is called a created being, and that being ‘which doca not exist from another is called uoccested being — and this is God, then every eategory of being infers the existence of God, 13, Agtin, if there is possible being, there is a necessary being since that which is possible implies indifezence as to being or noo being. But nothing that is indifferent to being and nombeing can ‘exist except through something that is entirely determined with respect to being. Therefore, if that necessary being in which there is no posbiliy of non-existence is none other thin God, and if everything else has some degree of possibility, every category of being infers the existence of God. Eames 14, Again, if there is relative being, there is also absolute being, because the felative is never terminated except in the absolute. But an absolute being which depends on no other can only be a being that receives nothing from another. This is the fret being, and all other being is in some way dependent. Therefore itis necessary that every category of being infers the existence of God. 15. Again, if there is diminished being or qualified being, there i a being that exnts absolutely, because qualied being can either, exist nor be understood unless it is understood through unqualified being. Neither can diminished being exist or be understood except through perfect being, just as a privation cannot be understood S Aa, 17 Pie. e161), FM ex (baie 2) ven iay eb ce i Tigi! De npn, x #6. 9, Bi gecng erred we Tae 1 NOWLEDGE AND FARE mt ‘except with respect to a habit. Therefore, if every created being is being only in part, and if the uncreated being alone is absolute ‘and perfect being, it is necessary that any category of being infers and leads to the conclusion that God exists 16. Again, if there is being that exists because of another, there is also being that exists because of itself, otherwise nothing would bbe good.! But that which exists because of itself i none other than that being than which none is better, and this is God Himself. ‘Therefore since the sum total of other beings is ordered to Him, the sum total of beings infers God both as to being and as to under. standing. 11, Again, if thece is being by participation, there is also being by essence, since one cannot speak of participation except with sespect to some essential property which is had from another, since everything that exists accidentally is to be reduced to that’ which exists of itself? But every being other than the first being — which is God — has being by participation; the first being alone has being by essence. ‘Therefore, etc. 18. Again, if these is being in potency, there is being in act because a potency can be reduced to act only through a being in act, and there would be no potency unless it were capable of being seduced to act.18 If that being which is pure act and has no potency is none other than God, it is necessary that everything other than the first being infers the fact that God exists. 19. Again, if there is composite being, there is simple beiog, because a composite does not have being’ of itself.!® Therefore it is ecerary that tae its oxigin fom fomething that is simple ‘Bat the most simple being, having no trace of composition, is none i tan Geer bane Tien evap gece 20. Again, if there is changeable being, there is also unchangeable being nce — asthe Philosopher proves — movement whe it origin from a being at rest and terminates in « being at rest. If, therefore, that being which is entirely unchangeable is none other than the frst being — which is God — and if all others are created, and in as far as they are created, they are changeable, itis necessary that the existence of God is inferred by any category of being. Aveo 101 De Ang, ex. 25. 4% Bochn, De Hebdmadties Avo, XIF Mop. text. 52 (1, ¢ 10). 2 Reo, 1a Mepis ae 3 Qh. 9. a {etaph., ext, & 2 ie Cac, prop, BG Red of Be Visor, De Trin, 4 Ala of ng, 1 on tras Ciba Fis 38. itr" exe SS. HHL Met, text. 388 (KL, i Lis ds Cou prope