ProvRemRule58Digest PDF

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3rd Year EH402 1st Sem.

2017
Provisional Remedies
Rule 58 Case Digests
A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J FEBRUARY 19, 2013
ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO A. HENSON and ANGEL S. ONG

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES RAMON M. BATO, JR., ISAIAS P.
DICDICAN and EDUARDO B. PERALTA, JR.
Facts:
The plaintiffs Ricafort asked the RTC to declare null and void the August 15, 2011
annual stockholders’ meeting, including all proceedings taken alleging that they were
not given prior notice and that the notice announced a time and venue of the meeting
different from those set forth in the Bylaws. RTC agreed with the plaintiffs Ricafort and
Nationwide Development Corporation was directed to: (a) issue a new notice to all
stockholders for the conduct of an annual stockholders’ meeting and (b) hold the annual
stockholders meeting within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order.
Four separate petitions for certiorari were forthwith filed in the CA by some members of
the new Board and by NADECOR to assail the validity of the RTC order, all with
application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction. 15th Division of the CA denied the application for TRO and/or preliminary
injunction.
Complainants filed an administrative case alleging that the respondent Justices are
guilty of grave misconduct, conduct detrimental to the service, gross ignorance of the
law, gross incompetence, and manifest partiality
Issues:
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A) WON CA Special 14th Division acted upon the unverified "Third Motion to Resolve"
and "Supplement to the Third Urgent Motion to Resolve with Manifestation" in CA-G.R.
SP No. 122784, which contained new factual matters, and then issued a writ of
preliminary injunction, without notice and hearing as required in Section 5 of Rule 58;
B) WON it was irregular for Justice Bato, who sat as acting senior member vice the
regular ponente, Justice Lantion, who was on a 15-day leave of absence to have
penned the questioned Resolution notwithstanding that the consolidated CA Petitions
had not been re-raffled to him.
C) WON Section 5 of Rule VI of the Internal Rules of the CA (IRCA) authorizes the two
present regular Division members, Justices Dicdican and Peralta, to act on the
application, not Justice Bato.
D) WON the effect of the writ of preliminary injunction is not to merely preserve
the status quo but to dispose of the main case on the merits.
Held:
A) Section 4 of Rule VI of the 2009 IRCA provides that "[T]he requirement of a hearing
for preliminary injunction is satisfied with the issuance of a resolution served upon the
party sought to be enjoined requiring him to comment on the said application within the
period of not more than ten (10) days from notice." The CA was justified in dispensing
with the requisite hearing on the application for injunctive writ, since the so-called "new
and substantial matters" raised in the third urgent motion in CA-G.R. SP No. 122784
and in the supplement thereto were in fact not previously unknown to respondents
Ricafort, and they had already been previously ordered to comment on the said
application, at the time when the said "subsequent" matters were already obtaining.
The CA Special 14th Division needed only to rely on the TRO resolution of the 11th
Division as well as on the Comment Ad Cautelam of respondents Ricafort to find a basis
to issue its preservative writ of preliminary injunction, and whether the third urgent
motion of petitioners and their supplement thereto were verified, or whether a hearing
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was held thereon, were immaterial to the issuance of the writ. The members of the
Special 14th Division acted collectively and in good faith and their Resolution granting a
writ of preliminary injunction in the consolidated CA petitions enjoys a presumption of
regularity.
B) Justice Bato, sitting as acting senior member of the Special 14th Division of the CA,
had authority to act on the urgent motions to resolve the petitioners’ application for writ
of preliminary injunction. Justice Bato was designated by a valid, transparent and
regular raffle as acting senior member of the 14th Division, in addition to his duties as
regular senior member of the SECOND DIVISION, to act on all cases submitted to the
FOURTEENTH DIVISION, for final resolution and/or appropriate action, except
ponencia, from June 1 to 15, 2012 or until Justice Lantion reports back for duty. This
holds true with the other Division/s wherein Justice Lantion participated or took part as
regular member or in an acting capacity.
That there was no re-raffle of the consolidated CA petitions to a new ponente is not
denied, but rather only a designation of Justice Bato to sit as acting senior member of
the 14th Division vice Justice Lantion. But because of the urgent nature of the
application for writ of preliminary injunction, which was an offshoot of the consolidated
CA petitions, and the assigned ponente thereof, Justice Lantion, was on a wellness
leave, the Clerk of Court of the 14th Division, Atty. Real, transferred the said cases to
Justice Bato, the acting senior member temporarily sitting in the place of the original
ponente, Justice Lantion, so that he could promptly attend to the urgent motion.
C) There is nothing in the IRCA which would have required the Division Clerk of Court
to transmit the urgent motion for action only to the two present regular members of the
14th Division. We agree with Justice Dicdican that the complainants would have been
correct if the absent member of the Division was not the ponente herself but either of
the other members. This implies that the ponente if present can act upon the urgent
motion alone or with another member present, provided that the action or resolution "is
submitted on the next working day to the absent member or members of the Division for
ratification, modification or recall."
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D) A preliminary injunction is not a ponencia but an order granted at any stage of an

action prior to final judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. It is
settled that as an ancillary or preventive remedy, a writ of preliminary injunction may be
resorted to by a party to protect or preserve his rights and for no other purpose during
the pendency of the principal action. Its object is to preserve the status quo until the
merits of the case are passed upon. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a
provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. On the other hand, ponencia refers to the
rendition of a decision in a case on the merits, which disposes of the main controversy.
In this case, the main issue in the four CA petitions is the validity of the RTC’s Order
declaring as void and of no effect NADECOR’s stockholders’ meeting.
Rule 58
Case no. 2 G.R. No. 179665 April 3, 2013
SOLID BUILDERS, INC. and MEDINA FOODS INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, Respondent.
Facts:
 China Banking Corporation (CBC) granted several loans to Solid Builder, Inc.
(SBI) amounting to P139,999.224.34, exclusive of interests and other charges.
The loan was secured by with surety agreements and mortgage of parcels of
lands in Quezon City (Loyola Grand Villas) and Rizal (New Cubao Property)
excuted by Medina Foods Industries, INc. (MFII).
 Subsequently, SBI requested CB to rescontruct their loans, reduce interest and

penalties and implement dacion en pago of the property in Rizal.
 CBC replied that the loans had been completely restructured and suggested the
updating of the obligation to avoid paying interests and charges. But as to the
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dacion en pago, CBC suggested SBI to exhaust all possibilities to sell the
property themselves, being a real estate company.
 SBII defaulted in the payments and CBC initiated foreclosure proceedings.
 SBI and MFII filed a complaint ―To Compel Execution of Contract and for
Performance and Damages, With Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order‖ to enjoin the foreclosure proceedings.
Petitioner’s Contention:
 SBII further claims the interests, penalties and charges to be iniquitous and
unconscionable.
 A grounds for Preliminary Injunction, SBII contended that:
 entitled to the reliefs because the continuance of which will work injustice to the
plaintiffs; that such acts are in violation of the rights of plaintiffs and, if not
enjoined/restrained, will render the judgment sought herein ineffectual.
 they are exempt from filing of a bond considering the demands of BC are patent
nullities but they are still willing to post bond if the Court requires them to.
Respondent’s Contention:
 SBI executed ten promissory notes stipulating that the interest rate shall be at
18.5% per annum voluntarily and willingly
 SBI was delinquent in the payment of the principal as well as the interest thereon
ISSUE:
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WON SBI is entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction?
RTC Ruling:
 SBII was entitled to the Writ of Preliminary Injunction as the requisites has been
met.
 There is necessity to prevent serious damage considering the number of parcels

of land involved and that foreclosure would diminish the source of income of SBI.
CA Ruling:
CA ruled that the granting of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and the Denial of the Motion
to Dissolve such was tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion by the RTC.
SC Ruling:
 A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to

judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from
a particular act or acts which must be granted only in the face of actual and
existing substantial rights
 It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party’s substantive

rights or interests pending the final judgment in the principal action.
 A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or
extraordinary situation which should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a
litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned.
 Two important requisite conditions, namely:

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(1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and

(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be
proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an
irreparable injury
 as the "Strong Arm of Equity," only be extended in cases of great injury
where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in
damages
 As debtor-mortgagors, however, SBI and MFII do not have a right to prevent the
creditor-mortgagee CBC from foreclosing on the mortgaged properties simply on
the basis of alleged "usurious, exorbitant and confiscatory rate of interest.

 the basis of the right claimed by SBI and MFII remains to be controversial
or disputable as there is still a need to determine whether or not, upon
consideration of the various circumstances surrounding the agreement of the
parties, the interest rates and penalty charges are unconscionable.
 Where the parties stipulated in their credit agreements, mortgage contracts and
promissory notes that the mortgagee is authorized to foreclose the mortgaged
properties in case of default by the mortgagors, the mortgagee has a clear
right to foreclosure in case of default.
 As to the requirement of irreparable injury, the injury that SBI and MFII may
suffer in case of foreclosure of the mortgaged properties will be purely monetary
and compensable by an appropriate judgment in a proper case against CBC.
 The case show that there was failure to satisfy the requisites for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The injunctive writ issued by the
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trial court should therefore be lifted and dissolved.
The petition is hereby DENIED.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2063, RTJ-07-2064, and RTJ-07-2066
Republic of the Philippines, et. al. vs Honorable Judge Caguioa
In the very fresh cases of AM No. RTJ-07-2063, Republic v. Judge Caguioa; AM No.
RTJ-07-2064, CIR v. Judge Caguioa; and AM No. RTJ-07-2066, Burns Jr. v. Judge
Caguioa, June 2009, the Philippine Supreme Court dismissed veteran trial
judge Ramon S. Caguioa whose sala is located in the lucrative city of Olongapo, the site
of the rich Subic Freeport where multi-billion companies do business.
―Ignorance of the law is the mainspring ofs injustice. Judges are called upon to exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Basic rules
should be at the palm of their hands their inexcusable failure to observe basic laws and
rules will render them administratively liable,‖ the Court said.
Facts:
The first administrative case stemmed from the civil case Indigo Distribution Corp. Inc v.
Secretary of Finance filed before Judge Caguioa’s court. Indigo, et al., importers and
traders licensed to operate inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, have been granted by
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) certificates of registration and tax exemptions.
Indigo, et al. filed a case before Judge Caguioa’s sala when SBMA, pursuant to RA
7227 (An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations into Other Public
uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose,
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Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes), subsequently required them to pay
corresponding duties and taxes on their importation of cigars, cigarettes, liquors and
wines
Judge Caguioa granted Indigo’s petition for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction
and approved the injunction bond amounting to P1 million for all petitioners. During the
pendency of Republic’s appeal before the High Court, Judge Caguioa granted various
ex parte motions for interventions of different corporations claiming to be similarly
situation with Indigo and allowed them to ride on the injunctive bond posted by Indigo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not public respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess in jurisdiction in peremptorily and unjustly issuing the injunctive writ in
favor of private respondents despite the absence of the legal requisites for its issuance.
RULING:
The High Court ruled that taxes are the lifeblood of the government and it is of public
interest that the collection of which should not be restrained. It held that the applicants
for the writ showed no clear and unmistakable right that was material and substantial to
warrant the issuance of writ, nor the urgency and necessity of such. Worst, Judge
Caguioa, in his issuance of the said writ, had failed to observe due process when the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the Republic, was not served copies
of the motions for intervention.
In a similar case, Judge Caguioa erroneously issued a temporary restraining order and
writ of preliminary injunction in the petition for mandamus filed by District Collector of
Customs in the Port of Subic Andres D. Salvacion, Jr. against his then would-be
replacement Gracia Z Caringal, et al. Subsequently, he enjoined the CIR and the
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Finance Secretary to observe and respect his issuances.
On appeal, the CA ruled that Judge Caguioa should have dismissed the case for
improper venue. The CA said that the petition for mandamus, which relates to the acts
of officers, must be filed in the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area
covering said officers, which in this case was Manila because the main office of
Commission was in Manila.
The High Court said that Judge Caguioa’s issuance of the writ in the above case did not
satisfy the legal requisite for its issuances and was enforced outside his territorial
jurisdiction. It upheld the CA ruling that the applicant had failed to establish that he has
a clear and unmistakable right that was violated so as to warrant the issuance of an
injunction.
Judge Caguioa was also found guilty of simple misconduct and ordered suspended
from office without pay for three months in a third administrative case which stemmed
from another civil case. The case against his co-respondent Sheriff Christopher T.
Perez, however, was dismissed for lack of merit. The Court said Sheriff Perez cannot be
faulted for implementing a writ of execution pursuant to Judge Caguioa’s order.
The High Court held that Judge Caguioa did not adjudicate any rights of the parties and
resolved no other matter except the dismissal of the case on the ground
of prescription. Thus, his order to place private respondents in possession of the
disputed property is not necessarily included in or necessary to the judgment of the
dismissal of the case on the ground of ―prescription.‖
The High Court said that the execution was highly improper because of the fact that
Judge Caguioa has been apprised of the pendency of the reversion suits filed by the
Republic involving the same parcels of land in another Olongapo RTC.
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CASE DIGEST
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2321 October 3, 2012
SPOUSES JESUS G. CRISOLOGO and NANNETTE B . CRISOLOGO, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE GEORGE E. OMELIO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Davao
City, Respondent.
FACTS:
PETITIONERS are plaintiffs in a collection suit raffled to RTC, Branch 15, Davao City.
They obtained a favorable judgment which had become final and executory on March 3,
2010. Accordingly, a Writ of Execution dated June 15, 2010 was issued for the
satisfaction of said final judgment. Subsequently, a Notice of Sale was issued by Sheriff
Robert M. Medialdea, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court on the subject properties.
However, the properties involved were already acquired by JEWM prior to the finality of
judgment. Aggrieved with the said decision, JEWM filed a complaint for Cancellation of
Lien, with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the Register of Deeds,
Davao City, Sheriff Robert Medialdea, JOHN and JANE DOES, and all persons acting
under their directions on September 16, 2010. JEWM also filed a complaint of an
indirect contempt against Sheriff Medialdea and requiring the Register of Deeds of City
of Davao to cancel the auction sale annotated on the TCTs of the subject properties in
favor of the Sps. Crisologo. This case was granted by the respondent Judge and
ordered the Register of Deeds of City of Davao to cancel any registration or annotation
of the subject Sheriff’s Certificates of Sale at the back of TCTs without notifying the Sps.
Crisologo.
Service of summons was made only upon the Register of Deeds and Sheriff Robert
Medialdea. The notice of hearing for the preliminary injunction was likewise served only
upon defendants Register of Deeds and Sheriff Robert Medialdea. Sps. Crisologo,
through their counsel, were pleading before Judge Omelio to recognize their entry of
appearance as real parties in interest under defendants John and Jane Does in the
hearing for preliminary injunction on 22 of September 2010. The case involved the
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cancellation of several liens carried over in TCT Nos. T-325675 and T-325676, including
the liens in favor of Sps. Crisologo. However, Judge Omelio refused to recognize Sps.
Crisologo due to lack of legal standing. Judge Omelio bases his refusal to recognize
Sps. Crisologo on the ground of lack of the proper Motion to Intervene with Pleading-in-
Intervention. Judge Omelio argues that Sps. Crisologo are not indispensable parties
because their participation is not indispensable in the determination of whether or not
the subsequent liens annotated on the titles of the subject properties may be properly
cancelled.
Sps. Crisologo claim that the case should not have proceeded because no summons
were made upon the John and Jane Does impleaded in the complaint. Since
defendants John and Jane Does are unidentified persons, summons must be made with
leave of court and by publication. Judge Omelio, on the other hand, claims that the
requirements for service of summons are not applicable where the parties claiming
entitlement to summons have already appeared in court during the hearing of the
petition.
Sps. Crisologo further claim that JEWM filed a Motion to Render Judgment Granting
Plaintiff the Relief Prayed for with Memorandum Attached on 6 December 2010. The
motion, however, was heard on 8 December 2010, in violation of the three-day notice
requirement.
The Spouses now charged the respondent Judge of gross ignorance of the law, grave
abuse of discretion, gross dereliction of duty and manifest bias for the acts showed by
the latter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of the charges.
HELD:
YES. We find Judge Omelio guilty of gross ignorance of the law for the following acts:
(a) refusing to recognize Sps. Crisologo as indispensable party; (b) granting a
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contentious motion that was in violation of the three-day notice rule; (c) not complying
with the rules on summons; and (d) rendering a decision in an indirect contempt case
that cancels an annotation of a certificate of sale without notifying the buyer, in violation
of the latter’s right to due process. Accordingly, we impose upon Judge George E.
Omelio the penalty of fine of Forty Thousand Pesos (P 40,000.00), with a warning that
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Mendoza v Ubiadas
In Civil Case No. 427-0-99, plaintiff Alexander Panganiban and his co-plaintiffs
filed a complaint with the RTC for "Declaration of Nullity of the Election of the Board of
Directors and Committee Officers of the Olongapo Subic Castillejos San Marcelino
Transport Service and Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.," with a prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondent
judge issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the members of the Board of
Directors and officers of the cooperative, for a period of twenty (20) days from receipt of
the order. Respondent judge likewise scheduled a hearing on the petition for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
The scheduled hearing on 10 November 1999 was later reset to 12 November
1999. No hearing, however, evidently took place, and all that the records would indicate
was that respondent judge resolved to consider "all the pending incidents, i.e., the
plaintiffs’ Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and the
defendants’ Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss," submitted for resolution. Respondent
judge issued an order granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of
the plaintiffs, thereby enjoining the defendants. An administrative complaint was filed
against the respondent judge.
ISSUE: WON the Rjudge is administratively liable.
HELD: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent judge to be
administratively liable. In this instance, the complaint, filed on 21 October 1999, sought
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction
against herein complainant and the members of the Board of Directors and officers of
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the cooperative. Respondent judge would appear to have issued, on 28 October 1999,
the temporary restraining order in favor of the plaintiffs and while he did so in view of the
perceived urgency of the case involved, he, however, failed to conduct a hearing on the
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction within the time prescribed
therefor. Respondent judge offered no explanation on why the scheduled hearing on 12
November 1999 did not take place before the writ of preliminary injunction was granted
on 17 November 1999, constraining Judge Asdala, to whom the case was re-raffled
following respondent judge’s inhibition, to nullify the writ of preliminary injunction issued
by respondent judge for having been effected without prior notice and hearing.
Barbieto Vs. CA
Several Complaint-Affidavits were filed before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
the Military and other Law Enforcement Offices (ODO-MOLEO) by various personnel of
the 4th Infantry Division, PA, against Maj. Gen. Barbieto and his alleged bagman Staff
Sergeant Roseller A. Echipare charging the latter two with grave misconduct and
violation of Republic Act No. 6713. They were charged the following: (a) extortion of
amounts ranging from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 from applicants in order to guarantee
their enlistment in the Philippine Army; (b) extortion of money from soldiers seeking
reinstatement, in exchange for Maj. Gen. Barbietos approval of their reinstatement,
despite previous disapproval of said soldiers requests for reinstatement by the 4th
Infantry Division Reinstatement Board; and (c) anomalies in the clearing of payroll of the
Balik Baril program fund of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
RULING of ODO-MOLEO:
ODO-MOLEO ordered the preventive suspension of Maj. Gen. Barbieto and S/Sgt.
Echipare for six months.
Barbieto filed for reconsideration. Simultaneous with the proceedings before the ODO-
MOLEO, the Army Investigator General (AIG) was also conducting an investigation on
the same charges against Maj. Gen. Barbieto and S/Sgt. Echipare. The AIG approved
and subsequently, an Order for the Arrest and Confinement of Major General Barbieto
AFP and SSG Echipare was issued by Lt. Yano.
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The Office of the Army Judge Advocate (OAJA) recommended the immediate trial of
Maj. Gen. Barbieto and S/Sgt. Echipare before the General Court Martial and the
endorsement of the case to the AFP General Headquarters for the conduct of General
Court Martial Proceedings.
Without waiting for the MR of the preventive suspension, Barbieto filed before the Court
of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. CA requested
submission of comments.
RULING of the Court of Appeals:
DENIED.
After due consideration of the factual circumstances of the instant case, we find no
compelling reason to issue an injunctive writ and/or temporary restraining order. The
surrounding facts underpinning [Maj. Gen. Barbieto]s plea for the issuance of an
injunctive relief are intimately related to and inextricably intertwined with the issues
raised in the instant Petition for Certiorari. Moreover, [Maj. Gen. Barbieto] failed to
demonstrate extreme urgency, as well as great or irreparable injury that he may suffer
while the instant Petition is pending adjudication.
Here, [Maj. Gen. Barbieto] failed to at least show a clear and unmistakable right entitling
him to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
He filed for MR but was still denied.
ISSUE: WON he was denied due process
At the onset, the Court must clarify that Maj. Gen. Barbieto is actually seeking a
TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of two distinct
orders, issued by two different persons, in two separate proceedings: (1) the preventive
suspension order issued by the ODO-MOLEO in OMB-P-A-08-0201-B; and (2) the
Order of Arrest issued by Lt. Gen. Yano as CG-PA in view of the impending General
Court Martial Trial.
RULING:
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Section 2, Rule IV of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals provides the
following procedure in the case of a petition involving an urgent matter, such as an
application for a TRO:
Sec. 2. Action by the Presiding Justice. When a petition involves an urgent
matter, such as an application for writ of habeas corpus or temporary restraining
order, and there is no way of convening the Raffle Committee or calling any of its
members, the Presiding Justice may conduct the raffle or act on the petition,
subject to raffle on the next working day in accordance with Rule III hereof.
Noticeably, under the aforementioned circumstances, the Presiding Justice of the Court
of Appeals may even, by himself, act on an urgent application for a TRO. There is no
mention at all of the requirement that the Presiding Justice must hold a summary
hearing prior to granting or denying such an application.
As for a preliminary injunction, Section 4, Rule VI of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court
of Appeals lays down the following procedure:
Sec. 4. Hearing on Preliminary Injunction. The requirement of a hearing on an
application for preliminary injunction is satisfied with the issuance by the Court of
a resolution served upon the party sought to be enjoined requiring him to
comment on said application within a period of not more than ten (10) days from
notice. Said party may attach to his comment documents which may show why
the application for preliminary injunction should be denied. The Court may
require the party seeking the injunctive relief to file his reply to the comment
within five (5) days from receipt of the latter.
If the party sought to be enjoined fails to file his comment as provided for in the
preceding paragraph, the Court may resolve the application on the basis of the
petition and its annexes.
The preceding paragraphs, notwithstanding, the Court may, in its sound
discretion, set the application for a preliminary injunction for hearing during which
the parties may present their respective positions or submit evidence in support
thereof.
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Based on the foregoing rule, the Court of Appeals clearly satisfied the requirement of a
hearing when, in its Resolution dated 4 April 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 102874, it
directed respondents to submit their comment on Maj. Gen. Barbietos prayer for the
issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction within ten days from notice.[29]
While it is true that the right to due process safeguards the opportunity to be heard and
to submit any evidence one may have in support of his claim or defense, the Court has
time and again held that where the opportunity to be heard, either through verbal
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the party can present its side or defend its
interest in due course, there is no denial of due process. What the law proscribes is the
lack of opportunity to be heard.
The last paragraph of Section 4, Rule VI of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals also proves false Maj. Gen. Barbietos contention that the actual conduct of a
hearing on an application for preliminary injunction is mandatory. Said rule explicitly
states that the setting of a hearing on such an application is left to the sound discretion
of the appellate court. Hence, it is not enough for Maj. Gen. Barbieto to show that no
hearing on his application for TRO and/or preliminary injunction was conducted by the
Court of Appeals, but he must also be able to convince this Court that the appellate
court gravely abused its discretion in choosing not to conduct such a hearing. Maj. Gen.
Barbieto likewise failed in this regard
Now, is Lt. Gen. Yanos issuance of the Order of Arrest under the aforedescribed
circumstances violative of Maj. Gen. Barbietos right to liberty and due process? The
Court accords to Lt. Gen. Yano the presumption of good faith and regularity in the
issuance of said Order of Arrest, having done the same in the course of the
performance of his official duties. Other than this, the Court cannot make any more
pronouncements on the matter. Suffice it to say that the need for a more extensive
determination of said question, by itself, already negates Maj. Gen. Barbietos insistence
of a clear and well-established right that warrants the protection of a TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. Where the complainants (or in this case, petitioners) right is
doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper.
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The prevailing rule is that the courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction
that would in effect dispose of the main case without trial. Otherwise, there would be a
prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof, since
such issuance would assume the proposition that Maj. Gen. Barbieto is inceptively
bound to prove.
Spouses Estares V Court of Appeals (case 7)
On May 21, 1999, petitioner Spouses Estares filed a complaint for Damages and
Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction against private respondent Prominent Lending &
Credit Corporation (PLCC) before the RTC Branch 24, Bian, Laguna.
They alleged that: on January 12, 1998, they obtained a loan from PLCC for 800k
secured by a real estate mortgage; the promissory note and the real estate mortgage
were falsified because they affixed their signatures on two blank documents; the
monthly interest of 3.5% and 3% penalty on each delayed monthly interest are different
from the 18% interest per annum to which they agreed to; for failure to pay their
obligation despite repeated demands, PLCC filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure
with the Provincial Sheriff and on June 8, 1999, the Sheriff sent a Notice of Extrajudicial
Sale to the Estares spouses.
Accordingly, the Estares spouses sought to declare as null and void the promissory
note and the real estate mortgage for not reflecting their true agreement. In the interim,
they prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin PLCC from taking possession of the mortgaged property and proceeding with
the extrajudicial sale scheduled on July 13, 1999 at 10:00 a.m.
On June 30, 1999, the Estares spouses amended their complaint to include the
Register of Deeds of Laguna-Calamba Branch, the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna and
Sheriff IV Arnel G. Magat as party-defendants.
On July 12, 1999, the trial court issued a TRO in favor of the Estares spouses. The
parties subsequently agreed to maintain the status quo until August 20, 1999.
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On August 6, 1999, PLCC filed its Answer with Counterclaim alleging that the
Estares spouses were duly apprised of the terms and conditions of the loan. It opposed
the prayer for restraining order on the ground that there is no factual and legal basis for
its issuance since the Estares spouses fear of eviction is false.
At the hearing on the Estares spouses application for a writ of preliminary injunction,
Rosenda P. Estares testified that: the loan proceeds of P637,000.00, received on
January 12, 1998, was used in the improvement and renovation of their boarding house;
they did not question PLCC in writing why they only received P637,000.00; when they
received the Statement of Account, they did not question the figures appearing therein;
when they received PLCCs demand letter, they went to the formers office not to
question the loans terms but merely to request for extension of 3 months to pay. In
opposition to the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, PLCC presented its
manager, Rey Arambulo, who testified that the Estares spouses were duly apprised of
the terms and conditions of the loan. On August 18, 1999, the trial court denied the
Estares spouses application for a writ of preliminary injunction, holding that the latter
failed to establish the facts necessary for an injunction to issue.
On August 31, 1999, the Estares spouses filed a motion for reconsideration. During
the hearing on the motion for reconsideration on September 17, 1999, Eliseo P. Estares
(Eliseo for brevity) moved that he be allowed to testify on the circumstances of the loan
but the trial court denied it. On October 1, 1999, the trial court denied the motion for
reconsideration.
On December 7, 1999, the Estares spouses filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition in the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion upon the trial court in issuing
the denying writ of preliminary injunction and motion for reconsideration.
On December 14, 1999, without giving due course to the petition, the CA issued a
Resolution requiring the PLCC to file its comment to the petition. The action on the
Estares spouses application for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction was deferred
and held in abeyance until after receipt of the comment.
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With no restraining order enjoining him, Sheriff Magat conducted an auction sale on
January 5, 2000, with PLCC as highest bidder for P1,500,000.00.
In its Comment dated January 15, 2000, PLCC claimed that the trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the Estares spouses application for a writ
of preliminary injunction since the latter failed to prove their right to injunctive relief and
the action sought to be enjoined has been rendered moot by the auction sale conducted
on January 5, 2000.
On April 17, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit, holding that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Estares spouses application for a
writ of preliminary injunction since the latter failed to prove the requisites for the
issuance thereof. [
The Estares spouses then moved for reconsideration of the April 17, 2000 decision.
In addition, they prayed that the auction sale on January 5, 2000, as well as the minutes
of auction sale and certificate of sale, be declared null and void not only because there
was no publication of the notice of auction sale but the auction sale preempted the
Court of Appeals in the disposition of the case and was conducted in defiance of the
Resolution dated December 14, 1999.
On July 7, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the Estares spouses motion for
reconsideration
Summary of Digest (FACTS)
Spouses Estares obtain a loan, which eventually was foreclosed, they challenge the
foreclosure as well as the extra judicial sale because according to them the loan
agreement was falsified but in reality, they were inform about the terms and conditions
including the alleged falsified interest, and that they only complain about such after they
signed and when their property will now be foreclose and prior before that they infact
acknowledge the debt by asking extension. In short, utangan jud sila pero hadlok sila
ma forclose ila property, mao ni seek sila og injunction.
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They failed to prove the right to such injunctive relief, they failed to establish the
requirements.
held: NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Generally, injunction is a preservative

remedy for the protection of substantive rights or interests. It is not a cause of action in
itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. The controlling reason
for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby
prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before
their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be
resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences
which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. The application of the
writ rests upon an alleged existence of an emergency or of a special reason for such an
order before the case can be regularly heard, and the essential conditions for granting
such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges facts which appear to be
sufficient to constitute a cause of action for injunction and that on the entire showing
from both sides, it appears, in view of all the circumstances, that the injunction is
reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of plaintiff pending the litigation.
The Estares spouses had the burden in the trial court to establish the
following requirements for them to be entitled to injunctive relief: (a) the existence
of their right to be protected; and (b) that the acts against which the injunction is to be
directed are violative of such right.To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner must
show, inter alia, the existence of a clear and unmistakable right and an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Thus, an injunctive remedy
may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation.The
Estares spouses failed to establish their right to injunctive relief. They do not deny that
they are indebted to PLCC but only question the amount thereof. Their property is by
their own choice encumbered by a real estate mortgage. Upon the nonpayment of the
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loan, which was secured by the mortgage, the mortgaged property is properly subject to
a foreclosure sale.
Rosendas testimony sealed the fate of the necessity of the writ of preliminary
injunction. She admitted that: they did not question PLCC in writing why they only
received P637,000.00; they did not question the figures appearing in the Statement of
Account when they received it; and, when they received PLCCs demand letter, they
went to the formers office not to question the loans terms and conditions but merely to
request for extension of three months to pay their obligation. She acknowledged that
they only raised the alleged discrepancy of the amount loaned and the amount
received, as well as the blank documents which they allegedly signed, after PLCC
initiated the foreclosure proceedings
It must be stressed that the assessment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction involve findings of facts ordinarily left to the trial court
for its conclusive determination.As such, a trial courts decision to grant or to deny
injunctive relief will not be set aside on appeal unless the court abused its discretion. In
granting or denying injunctive relief, a court abuses its discretion when it lacks
jurisdiction, fails to consider and make a record of the factors relevant to its
determination, relies on clearly erroneous factual findings, considers clearly irrelevant or
improper factors, clearly gives too much weight to one factor, relies on erroneous
conclusions of law or equity, or misapplies its factual or legal conclusions.
MABAYO FARMS, INC., vs. CA G.R. No. 140058. August 1, 2002
Facts:
Bureau of Lands declared Francisco Domingo, Reynaldo Florida, Cornelio Pilipino

and Severino Vistan, lawful possessors of Lot 1379 of the Morong, Bataan Cadastre
who had been in open, notorious, and exclusive possession since 1933 in the concept
of owners. The Bureau then directed them to confirm their titles over the property by
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filing the appropriate applications for the portions of the property respectively occupied
by them. Petitioner bought the respective portions of Domingo, Florida, Pilipino and
Vistan and entered into a compromise settlement with six other persons occupying the
property, whose applications had been rejected by the Bureau. Petitioner then filed an
application for land registration which was contested by several oppositors. The trial
court decided the land registration case in petitioners favor. The losing parties appealed
to the Court of Appeals who affirmed the lower courts decision.
A group of occupants entered the land, destroyed the fences and drove away
livestock owned by petitioner. Petitioner filed a complaint for injunction with damages,
with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. The trial court issued the temporary
restraining order (TRO) and the sheriff served copies on the defendants. The sheriff
accompanied petitioners president to the property where they found five (5) persons
cultivating the land. The latter refused to give their names or receive copies of the TRO.
They claimed that they were only farm workers of a certain Antonio Santos who
allegedly owned the land. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the defendants or persons acting on their behalf from entering and cultivating
the disputed property. The aforementioned writ was also served upon respondent who
was occupying a portion of Lot No. 1379. Private respondent filed a special civil action
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, averred that he only learned about the writ of
preliminary injunction on February 16, 1999, when he secured a copy of the order. He
claimed that he was an innocent purchaser for value of the property from Francisco,
Armando, and Conchita, all surnamed Alejandro and the injunction prevented him from
using his property. He alleged that he was not a party to Civil Case No. 6695 and that it
was grave abuse of discretion for the trial court to enforce the injunctive writ against him
since it did not have jurisdiction over him. The appellate court decided in private
respondents favor.
Issue: Is private respondent bound by the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
trial court?
Ruling:
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No. We are unable to say that the writ applied to private respondent. The order
merely stated [L]et a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining and restraining
the defendants or any person or persons acting in their place or stead from further
entering and cultivating the said land of the plaintiff subject matter of this case until
further order from the Court. The persons specifically enjoined in the order were the
defendants in the civil case or persons acting in their stead. Petitioner itself admitted
that private respondent was not a defendant in the case since at the institution of the
case, he (private respondent) did not have a right over any portion of petitioners lot.
Neither was he a trespasser then. Also, nothing in the records indicate that private
respondent was acting on behalf of any of the defendants. Taking all these into
consideration, we must hold that the writ of preliminary injunction thus cannot be made
to apply to private respondent.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to final

judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. As an ancillary or
preventive remedy, a writ of preliminary injunction may therefore be resorted to by a
party to protect or preserve his rights and for no other purpose during the pendency of
the principal action. Its object is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case
can be heard. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an
adjunct to a main suit. Thus, a person who is not a party in the main suit, like private
respondent in the instant case, cannot be bound by an ancillary writ, such as the writ of
preliminary injunction issued against the defendants in Civil Case No. 6695. He cannot
be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that to make the injunctive writ applicable
against private respondent, petitioner should have impleaded the latter as an additional
defendant.
MIWP inc vs CA
FACTS: In 1973, license was issued to Milagros Matuguina to operate logging
businesses under her group Matuguina Logging Enterprises. MIWPI was established in
1974 with 7 stockholders. Milagros Matuguina became the majority stockholder later on.
Milagros later petitioned to have MLE be transferred to MIWPI. Pending approval of
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MLE’s petition, Davao Enterprises Corporation filed a complaint against MLE before the
District Forester (Davao) alleging that MLE has encroached upon the area allotted for
DAVENCOR’s timber concession. The Investigating Committee found MLE guilty as
charged and had recommended the Director to declare that MLE has done so. MLE
appealed the case to the Ministry of Natural Resources. During pendency, Milagrosa
withdrew her shares from MIWPI. Later, MNR Minister Ernesto Maceda found MLE
guilty as charged. Pursuant to the finding, DAVENCOR and Philip Co requested
Maceda to order MLE and/or MIWPI to comply with the ruling to pay the value in pesos
of 2352.04 m3 worth of timbers. The Minister then issued a writ of execution against
MIWPI. MIWPI filed a petition for prohibition before the Davao RTC. The RTC ruled in
favor of MIWPI and has ordered to enjoin the Minister from pursuing the execution of
the writ. DAVENCOR appealed and the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. MIWPI
averred that it is not a party to the original case (as it was MLE that was sued – a
separate entity). That the issuance of the order of execution by the Minister has been
made not only without or in excess of his authority but that the same was issued
patently without any factual or legal basis, hence, a gross violation of MIWPI’s
constitutional rights under the due process clause.
ISSUE: Was the Petitioner denied due process when it was adjudged liable with MLE
for encroaching upon the timber concession of DAVENCOR in the respondent Minister's
order of Execution?
Is the petitioner a transferee of MLE's interest, as to make it liable for the latters illegal
logging operations in DAVENCORs timber concession, or more specifically, is it
possible to pierce the veil of MIWPIs corporate existence, making it a mere conduit or
successor of MLE?
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of MIWPI. Generally accepted is the principle that no man
shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case
not bound by judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner an execution can be
issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. There
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is no basis for the issuance of the Order of Execution against the MIWPI. The same was
issued without giving MIWPI an opportunity to defend itself and oppose the request of
DAVENCOR for the issuance of a writ of execution against it. In fact, it does not appear
that MIWPI was at all furnished with a copy of DAVENCOR’s letter requesting for the
Execution of the Minister’s decision against it. MIWPI was suddenly made liable upon
the order of execution by the respondent Secretary’s expedient conclusions that MLE
and MIWPI are one and the same, apparently on the basis merely of DAVENCOR’s
letter requesting for the Order, and without hearing or impleading MIWPI. Until the
issuance of the Order of execution, MIWPI was not included or mentioned in the
proceedings as having any participation in the encroachment in DAVENCOR’s timber
concession. This action of the Minister disregards the most basic tenets of due process
and elementary fairness. The liberal atmosphere which pervades the procedure in
administrative proceedings does not empower the presiding officer to make conclusions
of fact before hearing all the parties concerned. (SHORT VERSION OF THE RULING)
Indeed a judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action. It is
elementary that strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the
court and such judgment is not available as an adjudication either against or in favor of
such other person. A decision of a court will not operate to divest the rights of a person
who has not and has never been a party to a litigation, either as plaintiff or as
defendant. Execution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to the
action, and not against one who, not being a party in the action has not yet had his day
in court.
The writ of execution must conform to the judgment, which is to be executed, as it may
not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Nor may it go beyond the terms
of the judgment which sought to be executed. Where the execution is not in harmony
with the judgment, which gives it life and exceeds it, it has pro tanto no validity. To
maintain otherwise would be to ignore the constitutional provision against depriving a
person of his property without due process of law.
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The writ of execution issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources on January 8, 1987
clearly varies the term of his Decision of October 1, 1986, inasmuch as the Writ includes
the MIWPI as party liable whereas the Decision only mentions Milagros
Matuguina/MLE.
There is no basis for the issuance of the Order of Execution against the petitioner. The
same was issued without giving the petitioner an opportunity to defend itself and oppose
the request of DAVENCOR for the issuance of a writ of execution against it. In fact, it
does not appear that petitioner was at all furnished with a copy of DAVENCORs letter
requesting for the Execution of the Honorable Secretarys decision against it. Petitioner
was suddenly made liable upon the order of execution by the respondent Secretarys
expedient conclusions that MLE and MIWPI are one and the same, apparently on the
basis merely of DAVENCORs letter requesting for the Order, and without hearing or
impleading MIWPI. Until the issuance of the Order of execution, petitioner was not
included or mentioned in the proceedings as having any participation in the
encroachment in DAVENCORs timber concession. This action of the respondent
Secretary disregards the most basic tenets of due process and elementary fairness.
We do not agree. Essentially, Prohibition is a remedy to prevent inferior courts,

corporations, boards or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with
which they have not been vested by law. As we held in Mafinco Trading Corporation vs.
Ople, et al, in a certiorari or prohibition case, only issues affecting the jurisdiction of the
tribunal, board and offices involved may be resolved on the basis of undisputed facts.
The issue of whether or not petitioner is an alter ego of Milagros Matuguina/MLE, is one
of fact, and which should have been threshed out in the administrative proceedings, and
not in the prohibition proceedings in the trial court, where it is precisely the failure of the
respondent Minister of Natural Resources to proceed as mandated by law in the
execution of its order which is under scrutiny.
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Assuming, arguendo, that prohibition is the proper remedy for determining the propriety
of piercing the separate personality of petitioner with its stockholders, the evidence
presented at said trial does not warrant such action.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with a personality separate and distinct from
that of persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons
composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders
or those of the entities connected with it. Conversely, a stockholder cannot be made to
answer for any of its financial obligations even if he should be its president. But when
the juridical personality of the corporation is used to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, the corporation shall be considered as a mere
association of persons, and its responsible officers and/or stockholders shall be
individually. For the same reasons, a corporation shall be liable for the obligations of a
stockholder, or a corporation and its successor-in-interest shall be considered as one
and the liability of the former attach to the latter.
But for the separate juridical personality of a corporation to be disregarded, the

wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed.
In the case at bar, there is, insufficient basis for the appellate courts ruling that MIWPI is
the same as Matuguina. The trial courts observation is enlightening.
FEDERICO DECANO, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ROMEO F. EDU, as Acting Commissioner of Land Transportation and CIPRIANO
POSADAS, as Acting Registrar, Land Transportation Commission, Dagupan City
Agency, respondents
Facts: On September 12, 1962, the then Undersecretary of Public Works and
Communications issued to Federico Decano a temporary appointment to the position of
janitor in the Motor Vehicles Office, Dagupan City Agency, with compensation at the
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rate of P1,440.00 per annum. The appointment having been approved by the
Commissioner of Civil Service, the said appointee assumed office served for almost four
years, or until Cipriano Posadas, as Acting Registrar of Land Transportation
Commission (LTC), received a telegram from Romeo F. Edu, in his then capacity as
Acting Commissioner LTC, terminating Decano's services effective as of the close of
business on that day.
Petitioner filed at CFI a petition for "Mandamus and Injunction" claiming that the officials
of the LTC acted without power and in excess of authority in removing him from the
service, and therefore praying of the court to declare as null and void the order for his
removal, to declare him entitled to the position, to compel payment of his salary, and to
enjoin respondents from ousting him from his position as janitor. A writ of preliminary
injunction was issued by the trial court.
While agreeing with respondent Edu that petitioner's appointment as janitor was
temporary and therefore the he could be ousted from his position at any time with or
without cause, the lower court nevertheless held that petitioner's removal was null and
void upon the ground that under the law, the Commissioner of Land Transportation
was not the appointing authority insofar as the position of petitioner and an other
minor positions in his office were concerned; and thus lacking the power of
appointment, said respondent had neither the power of removal.
There is no question that petitioner could be removed from office at any time, for the
acceptance of a temporary appointment divests an appointee of the right to security of
tenure against removal without cause. He could therefore be removed at the pleasure of
the appointing official.
But this is not to say that petitioner could be removed by the respondent since the latter
was not the official who appointed him but the Undersecretary acting for the Secretary
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of Public Works and Communications nor had said respondent been granted by law the
power of removal.
Per section 79(d) of the Revised Administrative Code, it is the department head,
upon the recommendation of the chief of the bureau or office concerned, who has the
power to "appoint all subordinate officers and employees whose appointment is not
expressly vested by the law in the President of the Philippines; and it is also the
department head who may remove or punish such employees, except as especially
provided otherwise in the Civil Service Law." It appears that this provision has been
precisely applied in the appointment of petitioner, for upon the recommendation of the
then Administrator of the defunct Motor Vehicles Office, it was signed and issued by the
Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications.
It should be further noted that after petitioner's aforementioned appointment as janitor,

RA No. 4136 known as the Transportation and Traffic Code created the Land
Transportation Commission from which law respondent Edu is supposed to have
derived his powers as Commissioner. Perusal of this law however shows nothing
that vests in the said commissioner any power to appoint or to remove
employees in that new office. On the contrary, the placement of said commission
under the Department of Public Works and Communications is specifically provided.
Hence, the power to appoint, and the corollary power to remove, employees in the LTC
thus remained with the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. As generally
the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint, it follows that the termination of
petitioner's services by respondent Edu, who then had no power to appoint, was without
authority and therefore null and void.
Respondents argued the fact that the petition for mandamus with injunction was filed in
the CFI of Pangasinan while respondent Edu holds office in Quezon City which, they
claim, is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the said court. Acosta vs Alvendia: Sec.
44 (h) of the Judiciary Act, jointly or alternatively with sec. 4, Rule 65 of the Rules
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of Court and/or section 2 of Rule 58, ruled that a court of first instance has no
jurisdiction to require or control the execution of an act committed beyond the limits of
its territorial jurisdiction. The Acosta ruling of non-jurisdiction does not apply, however,
to the facts and circumstances at bar.
Here, petitioner seeks primarily the annulment of his dismissal, mandamus and
injunction being then merely coronary remedies to the main relief sought, and what is
prayed to be enjoined, as in fact the trial court did enjoin by preliminary injunction, is the
implementation of the termination order against the petitioner. It is true that the order of
dismissal was issued by respondent Edu, but it was to be implemented in Dagupan City
by his subordinate officer. The order terminating the services of respondent was a fait
accompli and this he had done without authority. The injunction must be taken only to
restrain the implementation of respondent Edu's order by his co-respondent whose
official station at Dagupan City is within the territorial boundaries of the trial court's
jurisdictional district.
In the case of Gonzales vs. Secretary of Public Works wherein the only question raised
was whether the CFI of Davao had jurisdiction to entertain a case the main purpose of
which was to prevent the enforcement of a decision of the Secretary of Public Works
who was in Manila this Court held that, inasmuch as the acts sought to be restrained
were to be performed within the territorial boundaries of the province of Davao,
the CFI of Davao had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case, and to issue the
necessary injunction order.
The national official stationed at Quezon City was impleaded as respondent in the
Pangasinan court. Mr. Edu was joined as respondent not for injunction purposes
but mainly for testing the legality of his dismissal order and his transmittal
thereof to his co-respondent registrar at Dagupan City to implement the same and
terminate the services of the petitioner in Dagupan City.
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As held by the Court in the 1965 case of Gayacao, where the issue is the correctness of
a national official's decision, the provincial courts have equal jurisdiction with the Manila
courts to review decisions of national officials, as otherwise litigants of ted means would
practically be denied access to the courts of the localities where they reside and where
the questioned acts are sought to be enforced.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes stressed on behalf of the Court that: It is easy to see that if the
contested ruling of the court below is sustained, the same would result not only
in hardship to litigants of limited means, practically amounting to denial of access to the
courts, but would also unnecessarily encumber the Manila courts whose dockets are
already over — burdened. Actually, the power of provincial courts of first instance to
review administrative decisions of national officials has been consistently recognized.
As we have held time and again, imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure
are to be disregarded except where substantial rights would otherwise be prejudiced.
DAGUPAN ELECTRIC CORPORATION, ISABELITA L. LLAMES, PRIMO C.

NARVAEZ and JOSE T. APIGO,petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ERNANI CRUZ PANO, DISTRICT JUDGE OF THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH XVIII and MC ADORE FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT INCORPORATED, respondents.
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Facts: DECORP is a domestic corporation and that pursuant to its business, it was
granted the requisite franchise to operate and maintain electric services in the City of
Dagupan and other towns in Pangasinan; that it has its principal office in Quezon City
although its generating plant is located in Pangasinan; that MC Adore Finance and
Investment, Inc., is also a domestic corporation with office in Quezon City; that said
private respondent owns and operates the MC Adore International Palace Hotel at
Dagupan City
MC Adore is a customer of the DECORP; That for failure on the part of private
respondent MC Adore to pay its September and October 1978 bills, the petitioner
served a Notice of Disconnection on November 25, 1978 that unless payment is made
within the usual period of 48 hours, the disconnection of service will be made. Private
respondent filed a complaint with a prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction before
the CFI of Rizal in Quezon City; that on the same day, the presiding judge issued an
order granting the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the
petitioner DECORP and its agents to "restore immediately not later than 5:00 P.M.,
December 7, 1978, the electrical power of the McAdore International Palace Hotel.
Issue: WON the CFI of Rizal. Branch XVIII at Quezon City, has jurisdiction over Civil
Case No. Q-26502 entitled "MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc. vs. Dagupan
Electric Corporation, et al." and, as a corollary issue, whether the respondent judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction ordering the Dagupan Electric Corporation. to restore the connection of the
electric power to the hotel in Dagupan City owned and operated by MC Adore Finance
and Investment Corporation.
Held: The Court of First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City has jurisdiction over Civil
Case No. Q-26502. The Dagupan Electric Corporation has its principal office in Quezon
City where the business of the corporation is managed by the Board of Directors.
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Decisions of the said corporation are made in Quezon City. The employees of the
Dagupan Electric Corporation in Dagupan City merely carry out the orders issued by the
officials of said corporation in Quezon City. Hence the acts sought to be restrained are
being committed in Quezon City.
The respondent judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned order directing the Dagupan Electric Corporation to restore the connection
of the electric power to the hotel owned by MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc. The
record shows that the respondent judge conducted hearings and gave the parties full
opportunity to present their evidence before issuing the orders sought to be set aside.
It is clear from the foregoing order that the respondent judge did not act capriciously or
whimsically in ordering the Dagupan Electric Corporation to restore the connection of
the electric power to the hotel in Dagupan City of the MC Adore Finance and
Investment, Inc..
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY LANDLESS RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION INC. (COCLAI),

Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
the NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (NHA), respondents.
Facts:
1. The land subject of the dispute is Lot No. 1982 of Cad. 237 consisting of about
12.82 hectares located at Cagayan de Oro City. Said parcel of land was formerly
a timberland.
2. On September 4, 1956, the Bureau of Forestry released the said land as
alienable and disposable public land.
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3. Subsequently, on January 29, 1964, the Bureau of Lands granted authority to the
COCLAI to survey the land in question for purposes of subdivision into residential
lots.
4. By virtue of said authority, the COCLAI engaged the services of a geodetic
engineer to prepare the subdivision survey which was submitted to the Bureau of
Lands.
5. On March 31, 1964, the Bureau of Lands, after conducting an ocular survey,
required the COCLAI, in behalf of its members, to file a miscellaneous
Sales Application over the land in question which the latter did.
a. The said sales application was however held in abeyance by the
Bureau of Lands pending the final outcome of the civil case filed by
the Republic of the Philippines and the City of Cagayan de Oro
against Benedicta Macabebe Salcedo, et al. for the annulment of
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-257 covering the land in question
then pending before the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. L-
41115. In said case, the COCLAI was a party-intervenor.
6. Meanwhile, on August 22, 1979, the NHA filed an expropriation proceeding
before the former in CFI Misamis Oriental at Cagayan de Oro City to acquire
Cadastral Lot No. 1982, including the land involved in this case, located at
Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City.
7. In said case, the COCLAI intervened claiming that instead of being paid the
amount of P300,000.00, they prefer to acquire residential lots in any housing
area of NHA. Upon learning of the pending suit before the Supreme Court
involving the annulment of the title over the same land, the NHA sought the
suspension of the expropriation proceedings.
8. SC declared the land covered thereby as public land.
9. Regional Land Director of Region 10 informed the Director of Lands that the
members of COCLAI were occupying portions of the said lot by virtue of the
Survey Authority issued and the COCLAIs subdivision survey had already been
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submitted to the Central Office for verification and approval but was held in
abeyance.
10. On May 10, 1983, the President of the Philippines issued Proclamation No.
2292 reserving the entire area of Cadastral Lot No. 1982 for the Slum
Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) Project to be implemented by the
NHA.
11. On May 19, 1983, the Bureau of Lands, through its Regional Director, issued
an order rejecting the subdivision survey previously submitted by the
COCLAI.
12. Sometime in November, 1986, the NHA, through its agents, Virgilio Dacalos and
Engr. Vicente Generalao, the area manager and project engineer, respectively
with the help of the policemen and claiming authority under P.D. 1472,
demolished the structures erected by the COCLAI members. This action
prompted the COCLAI to file a forcible entry and damages case against the
NHA employees and police officers with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 3, Cagayan de Oro City docketed as Civil Case No. 11204.
13. After due hearing, the MTCC rendered judgment to restore the COCLAI
members to their respective actual possession of the portions of Lot.
Issue: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling (a) that the National Housing
Authority (NHA) is entitled to the injunction prayed for; and (b) that NHA has a better
right to the possession of Lot No. 1982, as a necessary consequence of ownership.
Held: As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain
the status quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or
threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard.
As such, injunction is accepted as the strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy to

be used cautiously, as it affects the respective rights of the parties, and only upon full
conviction on the part of the court of its extreme necessity.
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Its issuance rests entirely within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of
the case and is generally not interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse.
Moreover, it may only be resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his
rights or interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action.
Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be

present: 1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and
2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.
Hence, it should only be granted if the party asking for it is clearly entitled thereto.
In the case at bench, the Court of Appeals was justified in ruling that NHA was
entitled to the writ of injunction.
- The reason is that, while Civil Case No. 11204 for forcible entry was pending on
appeal (before the Regional Trial Court), Special Patent No. 3551 was issued by
then President Corazon Aquino
o which covered the lot subject of the dispute and by virtue thereof, an
Original Certificate of Title in the name of NHA was issued by the
Register of Deeds of CDO
- So, when petitioner moved for the issuance of a writ of execution before
the MTCC on July 23, 1990, a certificate of title had already been issued to
NHA. In view of this intervening development, NHA filed a complaint for quieting
of title before the Regional Trial Court of CDO. Thus, it was only proper for the
Court of Appeals to direct the Regional Trial Court, where Civil Case No.
90-337 was pending, to grant the writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
the enforcement of the decision of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11204 as
there was a material change in the status of the parties with regard to the
said land.
o Clearly, the government, through the NHA will be prejudiced by the
impending enforcement of the decision in Civil Case No. 11204 which
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directs the said agency to restore the members of petitioner to their

respective possession on portions of Lot No. 1982.
- Petitioner claims that Special Patent No. 3351 issued by then President Corazon
Aquino and the corresponding issuance by the Register of Deeds of Original
Certificate in the name of NHA had entrusted only the administration of the
disputed lot to the said agency but not the ownership thereof. It is illegal for
NHA to claim ownership over the said land.
- Furthermore, petitioner also claims that respondent Court overlooked the fact
that the issues on ownership and possession are sub-judice before RTC,
Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City in Civil Case ;No. 90-337. Hence, it concludes
that the appellate court cannot pass upon these issues as there is still no final
judgment on said civil case.
- The Original Certificate of Title (No. P-3324) issued to respondent NHA
serves as a concrete and conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to the
property.
o Accordingly, once a decree of registration is issued under
the Torrens systems and the one year period from the issuance of the
decree of registration has lapsed, without said decree being controverted
by any adverse party, the title becomes perfect and cannot later on be
questioned.
- Furthermore, in the case at bench, the original certificate of title was issued by
the Register of Deeds, under an administrative proceeding pursuant to Special
Patent No. 3551. Thus, it is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued
under a judicial registration proceeding as the land covered by said
certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the
Public Land Law.
- Hence, said certificate of title enjoys the presumption of having been issued by
the register of deeds in the regular performance of its official duty.
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- Respondent is not merely the administrator of the said lot. It cannot be

denied that Proclamation No. 2290 gave authority to the NHA to dispose of
Lot No. 1982.
- On the other hand, petitioners only basis for claiming the disputed lot is lawful
entry and possession for an extended period of time and, as a matter of fact,
there is a final judgment in its favor in the case for forcible entry before the
MTCC. As to this, settled is the rule that, in an action for forcible entry, the only
issue involved is mere physical possession (possession de facto)and not
juridical possession (possession de jure) nor ownership.
o As the case filed before the lower court is only one for forcible entry, it is
indicative that the legal title over the said property is not disputed by the
petitioner. There has been no assertion of ownership over the land, only
that of prior possession. At any rate, the judgment rendered in the
ejectment case is effective only with respect to possession and in no
wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land.
- Indeed, petitioner has no legal leg to stand as regards ownership because its
Miscellaneous Sales Application was not acted upon nor favorably considered by
the Bureau of Lands.
- In effect, petitioners occupation of the land in question, after the denial of
its application for Miscellaneous Sales Patent, became subsequently
illegal. Petitioners members have, as a consequence, become squatters whose
continuous possession of the land may now be considered to be in bad
faith. This is unfortunate because squatters acquire no legal right over the land
they are occupying.
- Although as a general rule, a court should not, by means of a preliminary
injunction, transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party
to another, this rule admits of some exceptions. For example, when there is
a clear finding of ownership and possession of the land or unless the
subject property is covered by a torrens title pointing to one of the parties
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as the undisputed owner. In the case at bench, the land subject of the suit
is covered by a torrens title under the name of NHA.
10. Carino v Capulong
Facts: By virtue of a ―Contract of Lease with option to Buy‖ entered into with Light
Bringer School (LBS) on 14 May 1990, AMA Computer College (AMA) took possession
of the premises of the former located at Marfori Heights, Davao City so LBS transferred
its operation elsewhere in Davao City.
AMA sent a letter of intent to operate as an educational institution in Davao City to

DECS Regional Director Venancio R. Nava. The latter reminded the institution about the
provisions of the Rules and Regulations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 specifically Article
E, Section 7, Rule III hat the filing of the application shall be at least one (1) year before
the opening of classes‖ and the ―provisions of the Private School Law reiterated in the
Education Act of 1992 which prohibits the operation of unauthorized schools and
courses. Nevertheless, AMA announced its opening through news and print media and
even started enrolling students.
DECS inspection team was sent to the premise of AMA to look into the case. The team
found out that there was indeed defiance with the DECS directive. Hence, military
assistance was requested by the Regional Director to effect the closure of AMA
Computer College, Inc., Davao City. The AMA’s officer-in-charge requested that the
closure be held in abeyance for fifteen (15) days, which the Regional Director denied on
the same day.
AMA filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for prohibition, certiorari and mandamus
against the Hon. Isidro Carino, DEC’s Secretary and Atty Venancio R. Nava, Regional
Director, Department of Education, Culture and Sports.
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Respondent judge issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary

injunction upon the filing of petitioners of a bond in the amount of P500, 000.00. Hence
the present petition, claiming that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Issues: whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge on issuing a preliminary injunction.
Held:
Petition granted.
As a rule, a writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or preventive remedy, may only

be resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interest, and for no other
purpose, during the pendency of the principal action. Before a writ of preliminary
injunction may be issued, there must be a clear showing by the complainant that there
exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is directed are
violative of said right.
In the case at bar, the private respondents' application for a permit to operate AMACC-
Davao City as an educational institution was denied by the petitioners. Otherwise
stated, the private respondents do not have a permit to operate or a certificate of
recognition from the government to undertake educational or school operations. In fine,
the private respondents do not have any existing right that needed to be protected
during the pendency of their principal action for mandamus. Hence, the "closing" and/or
"padlocking" of AMACC-Davao City would not and did not violate any right of the private
respondents.
Moreover, it is not the function of the writ of preliminary injunction to restrain a public
officer from performing a duty imposed by law or to permit the doing of that which is
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declared unlawful. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 and its implementing Rules and
regulations, the establishment and operation of schools are subject to the prior
authorization of the government. And as sanctions for operating without permit, the
DECS is authorized either to impose the total closure of school and/or to disqualify the
school from conferring title or degree in the non-recognized program or course or
studies.
In directing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, the respondent Judge
reasoned out that the private respondents "need full protection for by law against
irreparable damage that they may sustain by virtue of the closure order."
In this connection, it would suffice to state that the mere "possibility of irreparable
damage, without proof of an actually existing right, is no ground for an injunction, being
a mere damnum absque injuria."
11. Dagupan Electric Corporation vs. Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano
Facts: DECORP is a legislative franchise holder to operate and maintain for profit
electric services within its franchised area comprising the City of Dagupan and the
towns of Sta. Barbara, Calasiao, San Jacinto and San Fabian. MC Adore is a customer
of the petitioner. MC Adore failed to pay its September and October 1978 bills
prompting DECORP to serve a notice of disconnection. Unless payment is made within
the usual period of 48 hours, the disconnection of service will be made. After the
expiration of such period when no payment was made, the petitioner corporation
disconnected the electrical services to the former.
MC Adore filed a complaint for damages with writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against the petitioner corporation. The Judge issued an ex part Order for a preliminary
mandatory injunction, commanding the petitioner corporation as well as its agents to
restore electricity immediately the electrical power of MC Adore. MC Adore was
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accommodating visitors.
Issues: Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the Dagupan Electric Corporation.
To restore the connection of the electric power to the hotel in Dagupan City owned and
operated by MC Adore Finance and Investment Corporation.
Held:
The respondent judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned order directing the Dagupan Electric Corporation to restore the connection
of the electric power to the hotel owned by MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc. The
record shows that the respondent judge conducted hearings and gave the parties full
opportunity to present their evidence before issuing the orders sought to be set aside.
This case involves the disconnection of the electrical power of

plaintiff's MC Adore International Palace Hotel in Dagupan by
Defendant Dagupan Electric Corporation on November 27, 1978.
Upon filing of the Complaint on December 6, 1978 and in view of
the representation of plaintiff that it had commitments to foreign and
local patrons, and that it is unable to operate the hotel, this Court
issued mandatory injunction on December 6, 1978 and set the case
for hearing on December 11, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock.
The mandatory injunction was not enforced as executive officials of
Dagupan Electric Co. could not located. At the hearing of December
I 1, i 978, in view of defendant's representation that plaintiff was in
arrears in electric bills for almost half a million pesos, this Court
suspended enforcement of the writ pending a fun hearing. The
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hearing was reset for December 15, 1978 on which date the Court
(received) the evidence and (heard the) arguments of the parties.
From the evidence and arguments adduced by parties, it is

undisputed that the controversy between the parties arose from the
act of defendant in changing the billing of plaintiff for June 1978
from P25,380.70 to P80,243.62. Dagupan sent the original bill for
P25,380.70 on July 10, 1978; recalled the bill and changed the
billing to P80,243.62, after Dagupan personnel found a reversal of
the polarity of the wiring of MC Adore. The new billing was based on
the average consumption of the hotel from July 12 to July 17, 1978.
It is not contested that the electric meter installed on the premises

was intact and no tampering thereon was made. The unpaid bills as
of November is only P138,000.00, and not half a million, as earlier
manifested.
Dagupan's action in disconnecting electric service is apparently

premised at its finding that the electric meter did not faithfully reflect
the power consumption for June 1978; on the other hand, plaintiff
suspects that adjustments were made by Dagupan which resulted
in an increased consumption reading. It is the stance of plaintiff that
its power consumption was reduced because of an energy
conservation program; that the reading for the first month of
operation was quite high because of the testing made on its central
airconditioning system.
There is clearly a dispute as to the correct power consumption of

plaintiff and it does not appear to be fair that defendant should by
unilateral action terminate its services to plaintiff in the absence of
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any clear and definite finding that a reversal of the polarity of the
hotel wirings had caused an abnormal drop in meter reading.
Defendant appears to rely heavily on the report of Margarito
Gatbonton, Utilities Regulation Engineer of the Board of Power,
dated September 4, 1978. This report however has not yet been
approved by the Board of Power.
It would also be prejudicial to the public interest that operation of

plaintiff's hotel worth 75 million pesos, in which the Development
Bank of the Philippines has an exposure of almost 57 million (75%)
should be paralyzed because of this dispute.
On the question of jurisdiction, both parties are residents of Quezon

City, as they have their principal offices in Quezon City. The
disconnection order was initiated and had its life and source in
Quezon City. The mandatory injunction is addressed to the
corporation in Quezon City. The Dagupan plant acts only upon
order of its officers in Quezon City.
The cases cited by defendant are in opposite In Tan (64 SCRA 364)
the injunctive order was addressed to officials with official residence
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga. Moreover, in the cases where the Supreme Court ruled
that the district court has improperly issued the writ (Palanan 22
SCRA 1186; Ruiz, 38 SCRA 559, Cudiamat 22 SCRA 695, and
Tan, 64 SCRA 364) no private right of ownership was involved.
Rather they involved licenses or privileges granted by government
agencies with offices located beyond the district court's territorial
jurisdiction. Where private rights are involved the Supreme Court
had upheld the issuance of the writ. In Gonzales vs. Secretary of
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Public Works and Communications, (18 SCRA 297) the injunction

against the Secretary of Public Works who had his office in Manila,
issued by the Court of First Instance of Davao, was upheld. This
involved the demolition of a dam in Davao.
Here we have a case of the interference of plaintiff's property rights,

with situs in Quezon City by a corporation situs with situs in Quezon
City. The exercise of will by defendant had its origin in Quezon City.
This Court can grant relief when that exercise of will causes
irreparable prejudice as in the instant case.
The Court therefore finds the Motion for Reconsideration to without

merit and denies the same.
The writ of mandatory injunction issued by this Court on December

6, 1978 is reinstated and its immediate enforcement is ordered.
It is clear from the foregoing order that the respondent judge did not act capriciously or
whimsically in ordering the Dagupan Electric Corporation to restore the connection of
the electric power to the hotel in Dagupan City of the MC Adore Finance and
Investment, Inc.
12. Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Association Inc. v CA
Facts: The land subject of the dispute was formerly a timberland. On September 4,
1956, the Bureau of Forestry released the said land as alienable and disposable public
land.
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Subsequently, the Bureau of Lands issued Survey Authority No. 16-64 granting
authority to the COCLAI to survey the land in question for purposes of subdivision into
residential lots. By virtue of said authority, the COCLAI engaged the services of a
geodetic engineer to prepare the subdivision survey that was submitted to the Bureau of
Lands. The Bureau of lands, after conducting an ocular survey, required COCLAI to file
a miscellaneous Sales Application over the land in question.
The said sales application was however held in abeyance by the Bureau of Lands
pending the final outcome of the civil case filed by the Republic of the Philippines and
the City of Cagayan de Oro against Benedicta Macabebe Salcedo, et al. for the
annulment of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-257. Later it was declared as public land.
Meanwhile, the NHA filed an expropriation proceeding before the former Court of First
Instance of Misaims Oriental at Cagayan de Oro City including the land involved in this
case, located at Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City.
On October 1982, the SocGen furnished the Bureau of lands, Manila with a copy of the
SC decision prompting the District Land officer in Cagayan de or City to appropriate
action for inventory of each and every portion of said land. However, on May 10, 1983,
The President of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 2292 reserving entire area os
the land for the Slum improvement and Resettlement Project to be implemented by the
NHA.
Sometime in November, 1986, the NHA through the area manager and protect
engineer, respectively with the help of the policemen and claiming authority under P.D
1472, demolished the structures erected by the COCLAI members. This action
prompted the COCLAI to file a forcible entry and damages case against the NHA
employees and police officers with the MTCC. The MTCC decision was in favour of the
COCLAI members. Hence, the NHA prayed for the issuance of a preliminary injunction
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to restrain the enforcement of the said decision.
Issues: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling (a) that the National
Housing Authority (NHA) is entitled to the injunction prayed for; and (b) that NHA has a
better right to the possession of Lot No. 1982, as a necessary consequence of
ownership.
Held: Dismissed.
The CA was justified in ruling that NHA was entitled to the writ of injunction. The
reason is that, while Civil Case No. 11204 for forcible entry was pending on appeal
before the Regional Trial Court, Special Patent No. 3551 was issued by then President
Corazon Aquino which covered the lot subject of the dispute and by virtue thereof, an
Original Certificate of Title in the name of NHA was issued by the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan de Oro City on January 3, 1990. So, when petitioner moved for the issuance
of a writ of execution before the MTCC on July 23, 1990, a certificate of title had already
been issued to NHA. In view of this intervening development, NHA filed a complaint for
quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. Thus, it was
only proper for the Court of Appeals to direct the Regional Trial Court,where Civil Case
No. 90-337 was pending, to grant the writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
enforcement of the decision of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11204 as there was a
material change in the status of the parties with regard to the said land. Clearly, the
government, through the NHA will be prejudiced by the impending enforcement of the
decision in Civil Case No. 11204 which directs the said agency to restore the members
of petitioner to their respective possession on portions of Lot No. 1982.
Although as a general rule, a court should not, by means of a preliminary injunction,

transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to another, this rule
admits of some exceptions. For example, when there is a clear finding of ownership and
possession of the land or unless the subject property is covered by a torrens title
pointing to one of the parties as the undisputed owner. In the case at bench, the land
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subject of the suit is covered by a torrens title under the name of NHA.
A writ of injunction should issue so as not to render moot and academic any decision
which the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 90-337 will render and in order to
prevent any irreparable injury which respondent may sustain by virtue of the
enforcement of the decision of the MTCC.
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MIAA)

vs. CA, HON. MULINGTAPANG OF RTC OF PASAY CITY, and K SERVICES
COMPANY
Facts:
K Services began providing porters for the domestic passenger terminal of the
Manila International Airport (now the Ninoy Aquino International Airport) under a
provisional permit for the period from January 1, 1976 to April 30, 1976. Sometime in
February 1987, MIAA gave notice that the services of K Services would be terminated
on February 20, 1987. In response, K Services filed a petition for injunction on with the
RTC of Pasay City. On December 26, 1989, the RTC ruled that MIAA could terminate
its contract with K Services at any time. K Services appealed the said decision which
was denied by the CA. As K Services did not appeal, the decision of the Court of
Appeals became final and executory. Shortly after, K Services received a letter from
MIAA General Manager which stated: Due to certain administrative problems that are
preventing us from taking over, please continue operating said service until further
notice from us. So, K Services continued to provide porters for Domestic Terminal I and
expanded its operations to cover Domestic Terminal II upon the alleged verbal
assurance of MIAAs officers that MIAAs policy was to relinquish porterage operations to
the private sector. K Services likewise claimed that MIAA officers also gave verbal
assurance that K Services would not be replaced with another porterage contractor
without a public bidding in which K Services could participate.
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However, on December 1, 1992, General Manager Cunanan gave written notice to

K Services to wind up its operations as Management has decided to take over the
aforecited services at the Domestic Passenger Terminals I and II. K Services opposed
the takeover. It filed on December 18, 1992 a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction and Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order with the RTC of Pasay
City. Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued a
temporary restraining order against MIAA. On January 20, 1993, the trial court granted
the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by K Services.
Issue:
Whether or not K Services was entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction

granted by the trial court.
Held:
No. The requisites necessary for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
are: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2)
an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The duty of
the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine
whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are present in the case
before it.
In the instant case, however, the trial courts order of January 20, 1993 was, on
its face, bereft of basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. There were no
findings of fact or law in the assailed order indicating that any of the elements essential
for the grant of a preliminary injunction existed. The trial court alluded to hearings during
which the parties marked their respective exhibits and the trial court heard the oral
arguments of opposing counsels. However, it cannot be ascertained what evidence was
formally offered and presented by the parties and given weight and credence by the trial
court. The basis for the trial courts conclusion that K Services was entitled to a writ of
preliminary injunction is unclear. Absent a preliminary finding by the trial court that K
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Services possessed the right to continue as MIAAs concessionaire, MIAAs termination

of K Services was not sufficient in itself to establish that there was an invasion of K
Services right.
The parties do not dispute that the last contract between MIAA and K Services had
already expired. K Services claim to an Extended/Expanded Contract is anchored on
the letter from General Manager. However, this letter expressly stipulated that the
extension would only be until further notice from MIAA. K Services itself admitted in its
initial petition for prohibition filed before the trial court that it hesitated to accept the
offer because of the transiency and impermanence of the extension. Taken together,
these factors indicate that the parties intended and understood that the extension was
merely a temporary arrangement. There is likewise no basis for K Services contention
that its services as the porterage contractor cannot be terminated unless a public
bidding is held to determine its replacement. MIAAs charter, as provided for in
Executive Order No. 903, grants the MIAA ample authority to take over directly
porterage operations within the airport. Against this law, K Services claims of verbal
assurances from MIAAs officers cannot prevail.
Both the trial court, in its order of August 5, 1993, and the Court of Appeals, in its
Amended Decision, found that the injunctive writ was necessary to prevent serious
damage or irreparable loss to K Services. The Court has ruled, however, that the
possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for
an injunction. Where the complainants right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not
proper. A finding that the applicant for preliminary injunction may suffer damage not
capable of pecuniary estimation does not suffice to support an injunction, where it
appears that the right of the applicant is unclear or disputed.
[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1746.September 26, 2003]
ROGER F. BORJA, complainant, vs.JUDGE ZORAYDA H. SALCEDO, respondent.

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FACTS:
Roger F. Borja accuses Presiding Judge Zorayda H. Salcedo of the Regional Trial Court
(Branch 32) of San Pablo City of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
discretion in issuing a temporary restraining order (TRO) in Civil Case, entitled, Damaso
T. Ambray vs. San Pablo City Water District, represented by General Manager Roger
Borja, et al., without complying with the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Complainant alleges that the civil case was filed with the RTC of San Pablo City and on
the same day, assigned by raffle to Branch 32, presided over by respondent Judge.The
following day, respondent Judge issued an Order granting the TRO.
Complainant claims that the procedure followed by respondent Judge violated Rule 58
Section 4 [b-c-d], 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the following grounds:
(a) Being a multi-sala court, it is the Executive Judge that may issue an ex-parte TRO
good for 72 hours.
(b) The notice of raffle was not preceded or contemporaneously accompanied, by

service of summons, with the complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicants affidavit
and bond.
(c) Respondent Judge who was assigned to the case did not conduct the required
summary hearing with notice and in the presence of the parties within 24 hours after the
Sheriffs return of service and/or the records are received by the branch selected by
raffle.
(d) The TRO was issued ex-parte without the required bond and without alleging that
the matter is of extreme urgency and applicant would suffer grave or irreparable injury.
(e) Complainant did not ask for the issuance of a preliminary injunction on January 4,
2001 in the morning.
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Respondent judge submitted her comment informing the Court that she is adopting as
her comment the Indorsement, an earlier administrative case also filed by herein
complainant against her but which was dismissed by this Court for lack of merit.She
likewise emphasized her denial of partiality, ignorance of the law, bias and so forth
being attributed to her by complainant for the reverse is true as it has been her desire to
always observe impartiality, fairness, and dedication in the administration of justice.
Judge Marivic T. Balisi-Umali explained her actions in resolving the Motion to Dissolve
Temporary Restraining Order that he dissolved the TRO because it was issued in
violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 20-95.
He humbly submits that Judge Salcedo inhibited herself from the case which was
thereafter re-raffled to his sala. The motion to Dissolve TRO had to be resolved.
Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez submitted his Report, pertinent portions of
which read as follows:
We find that respondent judge failed to comply with Administrative Circular No. 20-95.
No order setting a summary hearing on the application for temporary restraining order
was furnished the defendants. A TRO may however be issued ex-parte if the matter is
of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise unless it is
issued immediately. Under such circumstances, the executive judge shall issue the
TRO effective only for seventy-two (72) hours from its issuance.But such a procedure
is not applicable to respondent judge because she is not the executive judge of
RTC, San Pablo City.
Concerning the dissolution of the questioned TRO by Judge Marivic T. Balisi-Umali, we

find the same to be proper. Judge Umali has satisfactorily explained that she granted
the defendants motion to dissolve TRO only after Judge Salcedo inhibited herself from
trying the case and the case re-raffled to the formers sala.
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ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Judge Salcedo acted in grave abuse of authority and conduct
prejudicial to the proper administration of justice when he issued a TRO whothout
conducting a summary hearing.
2. Whether or not the dissolution of the TRO by Judge Umali was proper under the rule
that no court has the authority to nullify the judgments or processes of another court
they having co-equal power or to grant the same reliefs.
HELD:
The recommendations of the OCA are well taken.
Administrative Circular No. 20-95 provides:
1. Where an application for temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary

injunction is included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading filed with the trial court,
such complaint or initiatory pleading shall be raffled only after notice to the adverse
party and in the presence of such party or counsel.
2. The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a
summary hearing conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the records are
transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The records shall be transmitted
immediately after raffle.
3. If the matter is of extreme urgency, such that unless a TRO is issued, grave
injustice and irreparable injury will arise, the Executive Judge shall issue the TRO
effective only for seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but shall immediately summon
the parties for conference and immediately raffle the case in their presence. Thereafter,
before the expiry of the seventy-two (72) hours, the Presiding Judge to whom the case
is assigned shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be
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extended for another period until a hearing in the pending application for preliminary
injunction can be conducted. In no case shall the total period of the TRO exceed twenty
(20) days, including the original seventy-two (72) hours, for the TRO issued by the
Executive Judge.
4. With the exception of the provisions which necessarily involve multiple-sala

stations, these rules shall apply to single-sala stations especially with regard to
immediate notice to all parties of all applications for TRO.
In this case, it is not disputed that respondent judge issued a TRO without conducting
the required summary hearing. There is no showing that it falls under the exceptional
circumstances enumerated by the afore-quoted administrative circular where a TRO
may be issued by the Executive Judge before assignment by raffle to a judge without
first conducting a summary hearing.
As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Good faith and
absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses in
which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.
We find the explanation of respondent in the present case to be insufficient to excuse

her from observing strict compliance with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No.
20-95.
There are differences in the requisites for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and in the life of a TRO when it is issued by an Executive Judge and when it is issued
by a Presiding Judge of a court. In Adao vs. Lorenzo,we clarified:
If the matter is of extreme urgency, such that unless a TRO is issued, grave injustice
and irreparable injury will arise, the Executive Judge shall issue the TRO effective only
for seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but shall immediately summon the parties for
conference and immediately raffle the case in their presence. Thereafter, before the
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expiry of the seventy-two (72) hours, the Presiding Judge to whom the case is assigned
shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be extended for
another period until a hearing in the pending application for preliminary injunction can
be conducted. In no case shall the total period of the TRO exceed (20) days, including
the original seventy-two (72) hours, for the TRO issued by the Executive Judge. On the
other hand, if the TRO was issued after Civil Case No. 3391 had been raffled to Branch
2 and respondent judge issued it in his capacity as Acting Judge, then he should have
complied with the following provision of Administrative Circular No. 20-95, par. 2:
The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a
transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The records shall be transmitted
In this case, respondent judge issued the questioned TRO in her capacity as Presiding
Judge. She should have known that a summary hearing was indispensable. Clearly,
respondent Judge Salcedo erred in issuing the questioned TRO without conducting the
necessary hearing first. Only the executive judge may issue a TRO ex parte, under
exceptional circumstances and following a specified procedure herein-abovementioned.
In the present case, there is neither allegation nor proof that respondent judge was
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, corruption or any other ill-motive. However, it
cannot be ignored that barely a year before the filing of the present administrative
complaint, another administrative case had been lodged against respondent judge by
the same complainant concerning the issuance of a TRO in another civil case without
complying with the same requirements of Administrative Circular No. 20-95.
In other words, respondent judge had earlier been apprised of the provisions of
Administrative Circular No. 20-95 and therefore, it cannot be said that she is ignorant of
the law.For her conscious disregard of a a basic rule on the issuance of a TRO, Judge
Salcedo must be held administratively liable not for gross ignorance of the law but for
grave abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.
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For this reason, we find the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator to
fine respondent in the amount of P5,000.00 to be just and appropriate.
On the other hand, we accept the explanation of Judge Marivic T. Balisi-Umali regarding
her dissolution of the TRO issued by Judge Salcedo since it was issued in violation of
SC Circular No. 20-95. While the rule is that no court has the authority to nullify the
judgments or processes of another court they having co-equal power to grant the same
reliefs, said rule does not apply to this case for the simple reason that Judge Balisi-
Umali did not nullify the process of another court but she merely acted as the presiding
judge over a case that has been duly assigned to her Branch by raffle after herein
respondent had inhibited herself upon motion of the complainant.
18. Sayson Vs Zerna
Facts: On June 7, 1996, respondent issued a Temporary Restraining Order[3] in Civil
Case No. 07-373 in favor of the plaintiff, Napoleon Lee Sr.; and against the defendants -
- Francisco Lumayag, Jose Bravo and Ricardo Sayson -- as well as their agents, heirs
and representatives. The Order directed defendants to refrain from entering the parcel
of land covered by OCT No. P-11750, registered under the plaintiffs name in the
Registry of Deeds of Lanao del Norte. The disputed lot, which is situated in Barangay
Gumagamot, Lala, Lanao del Norte, has an area of 10,741 sq m. It is bounded
southeast, southwest, and northwest by the Gumagamot River; and northeast by the
property claimed by herein complainant.
In her verified Letter-Complaint, complainant sought injunction and damages from
respondent, whom she charged with bad faith in the issuance of the TRO without notice
and hearing. She claims that the TRO was issued with patent violation and disregard of
the constitutional right of due process of the undersigned who is not even a party to the
case, and that it was a clear disregard and disobedience to Supreme Court Circular No.
20-95 prohibiting judges from issuing Temporary Restraining Orders (TROs) without the
observance of the mandatory requirement of notice and summary hearing of the parties
concerned.
Issue: WON the TRO was validly issued
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Held: No, Administrative Circular No. 20-95 requires that an application for a TRO
shall be acted upon, only after all parties are heard in a summary hearing. It clearly
provides:
SUBJECT: RE: SPECIAL RULES FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDERS AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS.
1. Where an application for temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary

injunction is included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading filed with the trial court,
such complaint or initiatory pleading shall be raffled only after notice to the adverse
party and in the presence of such party or counsel.
2. The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a
transmitted to the branch selected by raffle.The records shall be transmitted
3. If the matter is of extreme urgency, such that unless a TRO is issued, grave injustice
and irreparable injury will arise, the Executive Judge shall issue the TRO effective only
for seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but shall immediately summon the parties for
conference and immediately raffle the case in their presence. Thereafter, before the
expiry of the seventy-two (72) hours, the Presiding Judge to whom the case is assigned
shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be extended for
another period until a hearing [o]n the pending application for preliminary injunction can
be conducted. In no case shall the total period x x x exceed twenty (20) days, including
the original seventy-two (72) hours, for the TRO issued by the Executive Judge.
x x x x x x x x x.
The Circular aims to restrict the ex parte issuance of a TRO only to cases of
extreme urgency, in order to avoid grave injustice and irreparable injury. [7] Such TRO
shall be issued only by the executive judge and shall take effect only for seventy-two
(72) hours from its issuance. Furthermore, within the said period, a summary hearing
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shall be conducted to determine whether the Order can be extended for another period
until a hearing on the pending application for preliminary injunction can be conducted.
Delbros Hotel Corporation v. IAC

Facts: Delbros financed, built, furnished and equipped ―Manila Hilton‖, and the
operation and management of which was granted to Hilton; for their respective
undertakings, Delbros was to receive a share in the gross operating profit (GOP) of the
hotel, while Hilton was entitled to a management fee equivalent to 5% of the gross
revenues and an incentive fee equivalent to 10% of the GOP of the hotel. In violation of
the terms of the agreement, Hilton a] refused, despite repeated demands, to remit to
Delbros its share in the GOP; b] transferred, without Delbros’ prior approval, a portion of
the reserve funds; and, c] used said operating funds for capital expenditures without the
consent of Delbros and in addition, Hilton grossly mismanaged the hotel and breached
the trust and confidence reposed upon it by Delbros, thereby causing Delbros to default
in its amortization to the GSIS.
On 27 February 1985, petitioner filed a complaint for termination of agreement and
damages, with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against private respondents Hilton Hotel International and Richard
Chapman, in his capacity as the General Manager of Manila Hilton.
In their Answer with Compulsory counterclaim, defendants Hilton and Chapman
specifically denied the allegations of Delbros and set forth affirmative defenses. On 21
March 1985, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by Judge Dayrit against Hilton
and Chapman enjoining them from performing certain actions pertaining to the
operation, management and administration of the business and affairs of the hotel.
Meanwhile, on 12 April 1985 Delbros filed a motion to admit a Supplemental Complaint,
which was admitted 2 days thereafter. Defendants then filed an ex-parte motion for an
extension of 12 days on July 6, 1986 to answer the supplemental complaint, which was
not received by the trial court until 16 July 1985. On 9 July 1985, Delbros filed a motion
to declare defendants in default with respect to the supplemental complaint. Said motion
was granted by the court thereby allowing Delbros to present its evidence ex-parte in
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support of its supplemental complaint. On 15 July 1985 the lower court rendered a
judgment by default confirming as legal and valid the termination of the management
agreement between Delbros and Hilton. Delbros then moved for the execution of the
judgment which was granted on 03 September 1985 thru Special Order.
Thus, Hilton instituted a petition for certiorari with prayer for a restraining
order/preliminary injunction to assail the Special Order of 03 September for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. On 05
September 1985, a TRO enjoining the implementation and/or enforcement of the
Special Order was issued.
Issue: (1) WON private respondents Hilton and Chapman should be declared in default
for failure to file an answer to the Supplemental Complaint?
(2) Can a TRO continue to be enforced beyond 20 days from its issuance, contrary to
par. 8 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines relative to the implementation of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1981?
Held: (1) NO. This is a reversible error. Fundamentally, default orders are taken on the
legal presumption that in failing to file an answer, the defendant does not oppose the
allegations and relief demanded in the complaint. In the case at bar, however, no such
presumption can arise vis-a-vis the Answer filed by HILTON and Chapman to the
original complaint; their institution of the certiorari proceedings in AC-G.R. No. SP-
06474 in opposition to petitioner's attempt to interfere with and/or take over the control
and management of the hotel pendente lite; and their vigorous opposition to the
admission of the supplemental complaint under consideration. These factors, of which
the trial judge had full knowledge and notice, should have cautioned him from
precipitately rendering the default order as well as the default judgment.
"A supplemental pleading is not like an amended pleading — substitute for the
original one. It does not supersede the original, but assumes that the original pleading is
to stand, and the issues joined under the original pleading remain as issues to be tried
in the action." 12 While it is conceded that there is authority in support of a default
judgment being predicated upon defendant's failure to answer a supplemental
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complaint, 13 the same cannot apply here. The reason is that although in the
supplemental complaint, the relief prayed for was altered from termination of the
management contract to judicial confirmation of its termination, the basic and principal
issue of whether or not petitioner was entitled to terminate the management contract,
remained. As this basic issue had been previously traversed and joined by the Answer
filed by HILTON and Chapman, there was no necessity for requiring them to plead
further to the Supplemental Complaint. Consequently, the trial judge did not have a
legal ground for declaring them in default for such failure to plead.
(2) The provision in the Interim Rules and Guidelines adverted to reads in full thus-.
8. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; issuance of restraining

order. — No preliminary injunction shall be granted without notice to the
defendant. if it shall appear from the facts shown by affidavits or by
verified complaint, that great or irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the Court to which the
application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a restraining
order to be effective only for a period of twenty days from date of its
issuance, Within said twenty day period, the court must cause an order to
be served on the defendant, requiring him to show cause, at a specified
time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, and determine
within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be
granted, and shall accordingly issue the corresponding order. In the event
that the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the restraining
order is deemed automatically vacated.
The applicability of the above-quoted provision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court,
now the Court of Appeals, can hardly be doubted. Indeed, if paragraph 8 of the Interim
Rules were not intended to apply to temporary restraining orders issued by the
respondent Court, there would have been absolutely no reason for the inclusion of said
paragraph in the Interim Rules. The limited life-span of temporary restraining orders
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issued by the regional trial courts and municipal trial courts is already provided for in
B.P. Blg. 224. It was precisely to include the Intermediate Appellate Court within the
same limitation as to the effectivity of its temporary restraining orders that B.P. Blg. 224
was incorporated in the Interim Rules, with the significant change of the word "judge" to
"court", so as to make it clear and unequivocal that the temporary restraining orders
contemplated therein are those issued not only by trial judges but also by justices of the
appellate court.
Private respondents argue that it is impractical to apply paragraph 8 of the

Interim Rules to the respondent court because the latter's processes are enforceable
throughout the country and there could be instances when the twenty-day period of the
effectivity of a temporary restraining order would lapse before it is served on the parties
concerned. This allegation appears to be more illusory and imaginary than real. Private
respondents have not cited any single, actual instance when such eventuality had
occurred. Its possibility is deemed remote and unlikely considering the present state of
fast and efficient modes of communication as well as the presumed eagerness of a
party-litigant who has secured a temporary restraining order to have the same
immediately served on the parties concerned with the least waste of time.
[G.R. No. 121517. March 31, 2000]
RAY U. VELASCO, JOSEYMOUR P. ECOBIZA, WILHELM BARLIS AND BERNABE
ALABASTRO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FIRMWOOD DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION AND STA. CLARA HOUSING INDUSTRIES, INC., respondents.
Facts:
A civil action was filed sometime in 1987 with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City by
Naty Dy, Sencio Dy and Denver Builders Supply, Inc., against Nordy Diploma, Corazon
Diploma, George Diploma and Sta. Clara Housing Industries, Inc.
The complaint alleged that:
 on 31 October 1987 Naty Dy of Denver Builders Supply and Nordy Diploma of
Sta. Clara Housing Industries, Inc. entered into a "joint partnership venture"
agreement to operate the Sta. Clara plant in Davao City;
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 that Naty Dy contributed a huge sum of money to the partnership which still owed
her P13,623,265.69;
 that defendants unilaterally dissolved the partnership and started to dispose
the goods and stocks thereof so that plaintiffs sought a judicial termination of
the partnership as well as for accounting and damages.
Plaintiffs also prayed for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction against defendants including STA. CLARA, which was granted by the trial
court.
The defendants and STA. CLARA questioned the order in a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court granted the petition and set aside the writ
of preliminary injunction. Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals
however, the Dy spouses and DENVER elevated the matter to this Court.
The petition elicited a temporary restraining order against the Diplomas and STA.
CLARA enjoining the latter, their agents, representatives and/or any person or persons
acting upon their orders or in their place and stead from withdrawing and/or further
disposing of the plywood inventory in Sta. Clara Housing Industries, Inc. plant or
warehouse.
Based on reports that several crates of plywood were being hauled out of the premises
of STA. CLARA by the Diplomas in violation of the temporary restraining order issued
by this Court, Joseymour Ecobiza, Deputy Sheriff of RTC-Br. 13, Davao City,
accompanied by Atty. Bernabe Alabastro, caused to be seized eleven (11) crates of
plywood allegedly being transported to Tefasco Wharf at Ilang, Davao City. These
crates had the markings of STA. CLARA and Firmwood Development Corporation.
Respondent FIRMWOOD filed a complaint for delivery of personal property and
damages as well as attorneys fees against herein petitioners and counsel for plaintiffs.
FIRMWOOD alleged in its complaint that since it owned the eleven (11) crates of
plywood seized by petitioners it had the right to the possession thereof or to the
payment of the value of the plywood seized in case delivery could not be made. It also
prayed for reimbursement of its expenses of P5,000.00, P50,000.00 for temperate
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damages, another P50,000.00 for exemplary damages and still another P50,000.00 for
attorneys fees.
On 11 January 1988 this Court set aside the temporary restraining order it issued on 4
September 1987 in G.R. No. 79586. Ncm
Petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim alleging that respondent FIRMWOOD
was not the owner of the eleven (11) crates of plywood they seized but respondent
STA. CLARA, hence, FIRMWOOD was not entitled to the recovery thereof.
Petitioners contended that they had the authority to seize the crates of plywood and put
them under custodia legis by virtue of the temporary restraining order issued by this
Court.
Respondent STA. CLARA filed a complaint in intervention alleging that:
 it had a legal interest in the matter in litigation it being answerable for damages
arising from a warranty to deliver the goods to respondent FIRMWOOD;
 that the latter was the true and lawful owner of the eleven (11) crates of plywood
which were milled for it by respondent STA. CLARA; and,
 that since the temporary restraining order issued by this Court had been lifted,
respondent STA. CLARA continued to enjoy the conduct of its regular business
without interference from any person, entity or even court.[3]
Petitioners also filed their answer to the complaint in intervention denying ownership of
respondent FIRMWOOD over the crates of plywood and asserting STA. CLARAs
ownership thereof.
Respondent FIRMWOOD filed a Motion for Summary Judgment alleging that aside from
the amount of damages due it there was no genuine issue as to any material fact of the
case, STA. CLARA having confirmed FIRMWOODs ownership over the eleven (11)
crates of plywood; and further contending that petitioners did not have the authority to
hold the property in custodia legis.
TRIAL COURT’S DECISION:
The trial court granted private respondents motions for summary judgment and
ordered petitioners and their privies and agents to release from their possession
and custody the eleven (11) crates of plywood and deliver the same to
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respondents FIRMWOOD and/or STA. CLARA, or in case of loss, to pay their

declared value of P140,000.00 or such amount as may be proved during the hearing for
the purpose only of determining their actual value as well as the total amount of
damages private respondents could prove against petitioners.[4]
It issued another order directing petitioners to pay the amounts incurred by respondent
FIRMWOOD in filing the complaint, i.e., P390.00 for filing fee, another P390.00 for the
Judiciary Development Fund, P25.00 for sheriffs fee, plus attorneys fees of P20,000.00
for respondent FIRMWOOD and P30,000.00 for respondent STA. CLARA.
Petitioners appealed the two (2) orders of the trial court to the Court of Appeals which
however dismissed the appeal and affirmed the questioned orders.
APPELLATE COURT’S DECISION:
The appellate court held that the pleadings, annexes and affidavits of private
respondents in support of their respective motions for summary judgment were
sufficient to overcome petitioners' opposition and to justify the finding that there was no
legitimate defense to the action.
It also held that the Courts resolution of lifting the temporary restraining order issued
had mooted whatever claim petitioners had over the seized property.
The Court of Appeals also sustained the award of damages by the trial court to
respondent FIRMWOOD whose property was wrongfully attached or seized under Rule
60, Sec. 7, of the Rules of Court, as amended.
Petitioners appealed to the SC and assert the following:
 Respondent FIRMWOOD is not the true and lawful owner of the eleven (11)
crates of plywood; hence its representations in its complaint for delivery of
personal property before the trial court were false and made in bad faith.
 That the crates of plywood seized by petitioner deputy sheriff Joseymour Ecobiza
pursuant to the temporary restraining order were still in custodia legis and could
not be the subject of an action for replevin; and,
 that the temporary restraining order issued by this Court was lifted only on 13
January 1988 or long after the complaint for replevin was instituted.
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 Petitioners further contend that their admission that the owner of the plywood at
that time was respondent STA. CLARA cannot be the basis for summary
judgment because there are triable issues that need to be resolved, namely: (a)
whether the seizure of the plywood by petitioner Ecobiza by virtue of this Courts
temporary restraining order was lawful; (b) whether the subject plywood can be
replevied even if it were in custodialegis; and, (c) whether respondent
FIRMWOOD has any cause of action against petitioners. Ncmmis
ISSUES:
a. Whether the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of private
respondents was proper (It was PROPER)
b. Whether the award of damages to private respondents was correct. (Yes, it is
CORRECT. It is binding and conclusive between the parties.)
HELD:
We find no cogent reason to sustain the petition.
Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, now Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as
amended, which gives authority to trial courts to grant relief by summary judgment is
intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed
and certain from the pleadings, admissions and affidavits. This rule does not vest in
the court summary jurisdiction to try the issues on pleadings and affidavits but
gives the court limited authority to enter summary judgment only if it clearly
appears that there is no genuine issue of material fact.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court is not authorized to decide an issue of
fact but to determine whether the pleadings and records before the court create
an issue of fact to be tried.[5] It is impossible to state a general rule for determining
whether a genuine issue of fact exists in a particular case. The determination will
depend upon the particular circumstances of each case. Nevertheless, the language
used by courts may be used as reference in making a determination in particular cases.
Where the motion is made by a claimant, the defending party must show that he has a
plausible ground of defense, something fairly arguable and of a substantial character.[6]
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Applying these legal principles, we find that the trial court committed no error in
rendering a summary judgment.
The material averments of the complaint of respondent FIRMWOOD state that
FIRMWOOD is the owner of eleven (11) crates of plywood which were taken or seized
by petitioners but the seizure was not for tax assessment or by virtue of execution or
attachment. While the answer of petitioners alleged that the owner of the plywood was
respondent STA. CLARA, and not FIRMWOOD, petitioners admitted that the goods
contained the label and markings of FIRMWOOD.[7] STA. CLARA filed its complaint in
intervention[8]stating that it was joining FIRMWOOD in its suit to recover possession of
the plywood seized and detained by petitioners; that FIRMWOOD was the true and
lawful owner of the subject property as the same was milled by STA. CLARA for
FIRMWOOD; that STA. CLARA had the right to the possession of the plywood in order
that it could discharge its obligation under a warranty to deliver the goods to
FIRMWOOD; and finally, that the temporary restraining order previously issued by this
Court which was the basis of petitioners in seizing the goods had already been lifted.
In their answer to the complaint in intervention, petitioners had deemed admitted the
ownership and right of possession of STA. CLARA over the plywood taken by them and
the fact that the temporary restraining order of this Court by virtue of which the seizure
was effected had already been lifted. Petitioners admitted in their answer to the
complaint in intervention that if they were "not maliciously dragged into this unfounded
suit, subject plywood would have been turned over to the Intervenor (Sta. Clara) which
is the owner x x x x"[9] Scnc m
The remaining issue raised by petitioners in objecting to the reliefs prayed for in the
complaints of private respondents is whether petitioners possessed the authority to
seize and hold under their custody the crates of plywood by virtue of the temporary
restraining order of this Court which undisputedly had been lifted and of no more force
and effect.[10]
There is therefore absent in this case any genuine issue of fact but a question
purely of law. It has been held that even the existence of an important or
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complicated question of law where there is no issue as to the facts is not a bar to
a summary judgment.[11]
The Trial Court and CA settled that based on the records that the right of possession of
the eleven (11) crates of plywood belonged to respondents STA. CLARA and/or
FIRMWOOD and the only disagreement of the parties was that the property could not
be disposed of by respondent STA. CLARA because of the temporary restraining order
issued by this Court which allegedly gave authority to petitioner Deputy Sheriff Ecobiza
to seize the crates of plywood necessary to protect the outcome of case. In rendering
summary judgment in favor of private respondents in the replevin case, the trial court
found them to be entitled to the possession of the subject property wrongfully detained
by petitioners as the temporary restraining order from which they derived their authority
to seize the property had already been lifted and set aside.
Petitioners allege that during the time they effected the seizure of the plywood they had
the authority to do so as they were implementing the temporary restraining order which
was then in full force and effect.
- This contention has no merit. It is a basic procedural postulate that a
preliminary injunction which necessarily includes a temporary restraining order
should never be used to transfer the possession or control of a thing to a
party who did not have such possession or control at the inception of the
case.[12] The temporary restraining order issued merely restrained respondent
STA. CLARA and all its agents and representatives from withdrawing and
disposing of the plywood inventory in STA. CLARAs plant or warehouse until
further orders from this Court.[13]
- The order did not contain any directive whatsoever to any of the petitioners to
seize property belonging to STA. CLARA or to keep the property seized in their
possession.
- The petitioners, by what they did, took the law into their own hands without
any specific order from this Court; hence, the seizure made by them was
void and illegal even if the intention of petitioners was to prevent the alleged
violation of the temporary restraining order.
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- Any violation of the injunction or temporary restraining order which is in full force
or effect constitutes contempt of court and is punishable as such, and the
remedy of the aggrieved party is to institute contempt proceedings where the
court in appropriate cases may punish the violator for the purpose of
preserving and enforcing the rights of the persons for whose protection the
injunction or restraining order was granted.
Clearly, with the subsequent lifting of the temporary restraining order the subject crates
of plywood seized by petitioners devoid of legal authority were never placed at any time
under custodia legis that would prevent private respondents from recovering their
possession over the same. The amount of damages directed by the trial court to be
paid to private respondents by petitioners arising from the wrongful taking of the
property is a factual matters binding and conclusive upon this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals of 31
January 1995 affirming the orders of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Petitioners are
directed to deliver the possession of the eleven (11) crates of plywood to private
respondents, or in case of loss or inability to restore possession thereof as required, to
pay private respondents the declared value thereof in the amount of P140,000.00, and
to pay private respondent Firmwood Development Corporation (FIRMWOOD) attorneys
fees of P20,000.00 plus P805.00 for filing fee, Judiciary Development Fund and sheriff's
fee, and also to respondent Sta. Clara Housing Industries, Inc. (STA. CLARA) attorneys
fees of P30,000.00 as fixed by the trial court. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED. Sdaa miso
Ticzon et al. vs. Video Post Manila, Inc.

GR No. 136342
Facts:
Petitioners were employed by respondent as video editor and computer graphic
artist. They had a common clause in their employment contract prohibiting them from
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within 2 years from termination of their employment, from working in a business or

company that was engaged in similar business or that might compete with respondent.
They resigned on Nov. 1995 and on Dec 1995 to Jan. 1996, they applied for
employment with petitioner Omni post which hired them.
Respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners and requested the
RTC to issue a TRO and Preliminary Injunction to enjoin petitioners from working with
Omni Post as video editors. The RTC granted the request. Finding, within the order
granting the writ, that the Clause 5 was valid and reasonable and only limited to trade.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied due to lack of
verification.
A contempt case was also filed against Petitioners for violating the preliminary
injunction as it is alleged that they continued to work for Omni Post despite the issuance
of the writ.
Petitioners then filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 to the CA questioning
the issuance of the writ particularly that the RTC prejudged the case by deciding on the
validity of Clause 5 when only the propriety should have been answered. But the CA
denied the petition because the issues raised were moot and academic since the 2 year
prohibitive period had already elapsed.
Issues:
WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition as moot and academic
WON the CA and RTC prejudged the case in ruling on the validity of Clause 5 when the
only issue to be resolved was the propriety of the issuance of the writ.
Ruling:
Petition has no merit, but the trial court is ordered to hear on the merits of the case.
First, it is clear from the ruling of the CA that they only declared moot and academic
the issue of whether the lower court had erred in granting the questioned Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. Hence, the appellate court held that there was no longer any
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reason to decide whether the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ. It was that
issue that was mooted, not the entire case. The decision wouldve been clearer had the
CA simply ordered the remand of the case back to the trial court for hearing on the main
case of damages.
On the argument of petitioners that the contempt case against them precludes the
mootness of this case, suffice it to say that such contempt case may proceed
independently of our ruling here. There is no finding on the validity of the Writ; therefore,
the court a quo hearing the contempt case may make its own determination. That is a
function more suitably exercised by the trial court rather than by this Court.
Unquestionably, the contempt case has not even reached this Court.
On the issue of damages, It is settled that these injunctive reliefs are preservative
remedies for the protection of substantive rights and interests. Injunction is not a cause
of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. When the
act sought to be enjoined ha[s] become fait accompli, only the prayer for provisional
remedy should be denied. However, the trial court should still proceed with the
determination of the principal action so that an adjudication of the rights of the parties
can be had. Thus the case should be remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits.
Second, we find no prejudgment on the part of the trial court. What is abundantly
clear is the provisional nature of its finding on the validity of Clause 5 which, it clarified,
was "for purposes of the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction."
Moreover, even if that proviso in the employment contracts is found to be valid, the case
is not yet resolved, since Respondent Video Post must prove the following with
sufficient evidence: the violation of such clause by petitioners, the fact that it suffered
damages due to the petitioners' acts, and the amount of such damages. Therefore, the
declaration of the validity of Clause 5 does not dispose of the entire case. Several
factual matters must be still addressed. Unfortunately, petitioners jumped the gun. They
chose to question the interlocutory orders of the trial court and prematurely tried to
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appeal the entire case. In the interest of due process, we cannot allow them to short-
circuit court processes.
In injunctive matters, even the cases cited by petitioners recognize the principle allowing
lower courts judicial discretion, the exercise of which should not be interfered with
except where there is manifest abuse. There is no reason to disturb such exercise here.
BACOLOD CITY WATER
DISTRICT VS LABAYEN
FACTS:
Bacolod City Water District (BACIWA) is a water district established pursuant to PD
198 as a government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter. It is in
the business of providing safe and potable water to Bacolod City. Bacolod City filed a
case against BACIWA. BACIWA sought to increase water rates, which Bacolod City
opposes. Bacolod City alleged that the proposed water rates would violate due
process as they were to be imposed without the public hearing required under LOI
700 andPD 1479.
Lower Court's Ruling: The RTC issued an Order commanding BACIWA to stop,
desist and refrain from implementing the proposed water rates for the year 2000.
Eventually, the RTC issued the assailed Decision granting the final injunction, which
allegedly confirmed the previous preliminary injunction. Motion for reconsideration
was denied for lack of merit. Appellate Court's Ruling: The CA dismissed BACIWA's
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether the order issued by the RTC is a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction
Supreme Court's Ruling: The sequence of events and the proceedings that
transpired in the RTC make a clear conclusion that the Order issued was a temporary
restraining order and not a preliminary injunction. Injunction is a judicial writ, process
or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It
may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the
main action. The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary
remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident
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of an independent action or proceeding. Under the law, the main action for injunction
seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from, and should not
be confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole object of
which is to preserve the status quo untll the merits can be heard. A restraining order,
on the other hand, is issued to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the
applicationfor preliminary injunction which cannot be issued ex parte. Under Rule 58
of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order with a limited
life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If before the expiration of the twenty (20)-
day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary
restraining order would be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken by
the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the said twenty (20)
days, the temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day by
the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.
Hence, in the case at bar, since no preliminary injunction was issued, the temporary
restraining order granted automatically expired after twenty (20) days under the
Rules. The fact that respondent court merely ordered the respondent[,] its agents,
representatives or any person acting in his behalf to stop, desist and refrain from
implementing in their billings the new water rate increase which will start on March 1,
2000 without stating the period for the restraint does not convert the temporary
restraining order to a preliminary injunction.
The rule against the non-extendibility of the twenty (20)-day limited period of
effectivity of a temporary restraining order is absolute if issued by a regional trial
court. The failure of respondent court to fix a period for the ordered restraint did not
lend the temporary restraining order a breath of semi-permanence which can only be
characteristic of a preliminary injunction. The twenty (20)-day period provided by the
Rules of Court should be deemed incorporated in the Order where there is an
omission to do so. It is because of this rule on non-extendibility that respondent City
was prompted to move that hearings be set for its application of a preliminary
injunction. Respondent City cannot take advantage of this omission by respondent
trial court.
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CENTRAL BANK v CA
FACTS:
The Monetary Board prohibited Island Bank from doing business in the Philippines and
the Bank Superintendent took charge of said bank's assets by reason of insolvency and
the alleged discovery of Island’s unsound banking practices.
Gregorio Flores tried to withdraw from Island bank his time deposit of P200,000.00, with
interest but the bank refused to allow such withdrawal because its assets had already
been taken over by the Central Bank. He then brought suit against Island Bank praying
that the bank be sentenced to pay him, with interest. The Central Bank intervened and
adverted to its having forbidden Island Bank to do business, its having taken over its
assets, and its having instituted judicial proceedings for liquidation of Island in
consequence of which the liquidation court acquired exclusive jurisdiction over all claims
against Island, inclusive of Flores' application to withdraw his time deposit.
The trial court dismissed the complaint without prejudice to the plaintiffs filing his claim
with the liquidation court. The CA, however, overturned this judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not an ordinary action for the recovery of a time deposit may be
maintained against a savings bank, independently of the proceedings instituted in
another court by the Central Bank for judicial assistance and supervision in the
liquidation of said bank.
RULING: NO. All claims against the insolvent bank should be filed in the liquidation
proceeding. The pendency of the liquidation proceedings in court vests in the same
exclusive jurisdiction, to the exclusion of other courts, over all matters pertaining to the
liquidation of the Island Savings Bank.
The judicial liquidation is a pragmatic arrangement designed to establish due process
and orderliness in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate the proliferation of litigations
and to avoid injustice and arbitrariness. In the liquidation proceedings, the Central Bank
and the Superintendent of Banks, with court assistance and supervision, will gather all
the assets of the bank, convert them into cash and distribute the net assets to
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depositors and other creditors their proportionate share after payment of reasonable
costs of the proceedings.
A contrary rule would be productive of injustice, mischief and confusion. If after the bank
is declared insolvent, suits by some depositors could be maintained and judgments
would be rendered for the payment of their deposits and then such judgments would be
considered preferred credits. To recognize such judgments as entitled to priority would
mean that depositors in insolvent banks would rush to the courts to secure judgments
and the latter would be swamped with suits of that character. Moreover, to enforce the
judgment would cause the bank's assets to be unduly depleted to the obvious prejudice
of other depositors and creditors. That inequitable situation could not have been
contemplated by the framers of the General Banking Act.
ZACARIAS C. AQUINO, petitioner, vs. FRANCISCO SOCORRO and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:
CA, upon petition of Francisco Socorro, issued a writ of preliminary injunction in his
favor upon his posting a 1,000 bond. This is to restrain Aquino from entering, cutting,
hauling, selling and/or exporting logs from the forest area which was subject of litigation.
However, Aquino filed a counterbond of 2000 which immediately dissolved the prior writ.
Aquino then filed with the CA a claim for damages amounting to 199,000 on account of
the wrongful issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. However, this was denied by
the CA for lack of bad faith and malice in the part of Socorro.
Aquino contends that the CA erred in denying his claim for damages on the ground of
want of bad faith and malice on the part of the respondent Socorro in filing the petition
for certiorari re the main case and securing the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction. He invokes the provisions of Section 9, Rule 58 in relation to Section 20,
Rule 57, of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: whether Aquino's claim for damages on account of the improvident issuance by
the respondent appellate court of the writ of preliminary injunction should be dismissed
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on the ground that he has failed to show or prove bad faith and malice on the part of the
respondent Socorro in obtaining the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.||
HELD: (NO)
This Court said that "damages sustained as a result of a wrongfully obtained injunction
may be recovered upon the injunction bond required to be filed with the court. The
statutory undertaking of the bond is that it shall answer for all damages which the party
to be restrained may sustain by reason of the injunction if the court should finally decide
that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto. Malice or lack of good faith is not an element of
recovery on the bond. This must be so, because to require malice as a prerequisite
would make the filing of the bond a useless formality.
Moreover, the court said that there is nothing in the ROC which allows recovery of
damages other than upon the bond pledged by the party suing for an injunction. Under
this provision, the party restrained, if he can recover anything, can recover only by
reason of and upon the bond — the only security and protection conceded to him by the
rules. Consequently, the rule limits the amount of recovery in a suit on an injunction
bond to the sum thus fixed, the amount measuring the extent of the assumed liability.
An application for damages on account of the improvident issuance of a preliminary
injunction writ must be governed by the same principles applicable to an action for the
wrongful bringing of an action. Before the respondent's liability can attach, it must
appear that he filed his petition for certiorari re the main action and obtained the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction maliciously and without probable cause.
These two essential requisites, malicious prosecution and lack of probable cause, are
neither alleged nor proved in this case before us. Nothing in the record tends to
establish the liability of the respondent Socorro.
PCIB et al, vs. CA G.R. No. 114951. July 18, 2003
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 31251 nullifying the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
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in Civil Case No. 91-2495 (Case A for brevity) dated February 23, 1993 lifting the writ
of preliminary injunction earlier issued by the said RTC.
Legend:
R- Ley Construction, LC Builders, MCC & Spouses Manuel and Janet Ley
P – Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB)
Case A – Civil Case No 91-2495
Case B - Civil Case No. 93-65135
Case C - Civil Case No 93-
FACTS:
• Ni loan si R of 98,800,000 from P
• Iyang gi prenda as security the ff properties:
a) Property in Mandaluyong TCT 43131
b) Property in Valenzuela TCT 6572 & 6580
c) 3 ka vchattel mortgage over some personal property
• Wa kabayad di gipa extraducially forclose ni P, gi schedule nag auction sale
• R ni file ug complaint against PCIB and the sheriffs, for injunction and damages,
with TRO to enjoin the sale. Naa silay 8 ka causes of action. Sa RTC of Makati ni Civil
Case No 91-2495.
• RTC of Makati thereafter issued a TRO temporarily restraining sheriffs from
proceeding with the auction as scheduled
• The application for issuance of preliminary injunction was set for hearing.
• P filed a motion to dismiss, denied. RTC issued an order granting a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the auction sales
• P filed a MR- denied.
• P filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus sa CA. Denied.
Meanwhile, nagpulig abogado si R. From Quisimbing Torres and Evangelista,
gipulihans San Vicente De Leon & Associates.
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• P then filed an answer to R’s complaint with a second motion to lift the
preliminary injunction. And served a copy to San Vicente De Leon and Associates.
• San Vicente thru a manifestation, said di sila abogado ni P aning kasoha.
Kaduha nibalibad.
• P thru a counter manifestation, said that abogado na ninyo unya binding nang
notice gihatag diha. And prayed to the court to order R to indicate kinsa jud ila
abogado. a copy of this manifestation was SERVED TO R. Also the second motion to
lift the preliminary injunction gi SERVE pud ni R ani tyma. Para sure makadawat jd
sila. Wa sila mu oppose sa motion ug wa pud sila motunga sa hearing on the said
motion..
• Therafter, R ni hire ni Atty. Malaya as counsel aning case A. Ni appearance nis
Malaya pero wa gihapon mu oppose/comment sa motion.
• Thus, thereafter, RTC issued an order LIFTING the writ of preliminary
injunction.
• Thus the sheriffs issued a notice of sale adtong mga properties, and schedule
the sale of the same. Katong sa Mandaluyong ug sa Venezuela properties, and the
CHATTELS
• Si R, instead of filing with the RTC Makati an MR of its order lifting the
injunction, ni file nuon sa laing court- which was raffled to RTC Manila BRANCH 34, a
complaint for injunction + damages against P with a TRO to enjoin the auction of the
CHATTELS (not the Real Properties ha) as scheduled, alleging that wa sila nahatagi
ug notice of the sale. This was named Civil Case No. 93-65135 (NOTE: for brevity,
this is Case B)
In opposition, P filed a motion to dismiss
• RTC Manila BRANCH 34 granted and issued TRO.
• Meanwhile, R thru Atty Malaya proceeded with Case A by filing a motion to
admit Reply and set for hearing
• Meawhile, the foreclosure sale of the REAL Properties proceeded, and as

highest bidder, PCIB ka angkon.
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• Therafter, R, now thru Qusimbing Torres and Evangelista Law Office, filed an
emergency motion for reconsideration with a application in RTC MAKATI for temporary
restraining order of the February 23, 1993 Order of the court lifting the writ of
preliminary injunction previously issued, for the reinstatement of the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the court on October 16, 1991, and for the expansion of the
coverage of the said writ.
They alleged that wa sila kadawat sa copy adtong second motion to lift the writ
of preliminary injunction and alleged nga Atty Malaya was merely their collaborating
counsel
Palag si P, ingon xa Atty Malaya is their counsel of record ato tyma and alleged
nga guilty of forum shopping si R when it filed a petition for TRO sa RTC Manila
However, RTC of Makati did not issue any TRO
• Meanwhile, also, the RTC of MANILA Branch 34, granted the motion to dismiss
by P. The court ratiocinated that it had no power to interfere by injunction with the
judgment or orders of the RTC of Makati of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction.
R did not file MR
Thus, deputy sherrif issued a notice of sale on the CHATTELS setting a date for
auction.
• Barely 4 days after the dismissal abovementioned, R, thru Atty Malaya, filed
another complaint against P and sheriff to enjoin the sale and, this time, it was raffled
to RTC Manila BRANCH 54.
• RTC MANILA BRANCH 54 issued a TRO enjoining the auction of the
CHATTELS. This was named Civil Case No 93-65757 (NOTE: For brevity, this is
CASE C)
• Meanwhile, R, this time thru Qusimbing Law Office, filed a petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus with the COURT OF APPEALS for nullification of the order of RTC
Makati in Case A, lifting the preliminary injunction it previously issued. Also asked for a
TRO enjoining the auction of the CHATTELS, even though this same subject was also
pending in RTC Manila on 2 different cases Case B and Case C.
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R alleged that they were denied their right to due process kay katong second
motion ni P to lift preliminary injunction, wa daw sila na tagai ug copy kay instead sa
Quisimbing Law office ihatag, didto ni P gihatag sa San Vicente Law Office, in which
San Vicente was their counsel only in the CA case but in the RTC Makati case, it was
still Qusimbing, thus ineffectual daw tong copy gihatag ni P, thus R was denied due
process daw.
• CA agreed and set aside, and declared as null and void, the RTC Makati lifting
the preliminary injunction.
CA held that R was indeed denied his right to due process
CA held that R did not engage in forum shopping
• Meanwhile, in Case C, the RTC Manila branch 54, dismissed the complaint of R
holding that R engaged in forum shopping and that it was improper for the said court to
interfere with a case pending in RTC Makati (Case A) being a court of equal rank, and
more so with pending certiorari filed in the CA.
ISSUE:
1. W/N R was denied their right to due process
2. W/n R engaged in forum shopping
HELD:
1. NO.
What the law abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity to
be heard. Hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process when he had been
afforded the opportunity to present his side.
As long as a party is given the opportunity to be heard either through oral
arguments or through pleadings, such as a motion for reconsideration, and defend his
interest in due course, he would have no reason to complain for it is this opportunity to
be heard that makes up the essence of procedural due process
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In this case, the private respondents were accorded their right to due process
but by their negligence they failed to take the appropriate immediate remedies to
protect their rights and interests.
It is safe to presume that Atty. Malaya did confer with the Quisumbing Torres &
Evangelista Law Office and that the private respondents turned over to their new
counsel the copy of petitioner PCIBs second motion that had been served on them.
However, the private respondents, through their counsel Atty. Malaya, failed to file
any comment or opposition to the second motion of petitioner PCIB. It was not
unreasonable for the RTC of Makati to assume that the private respondents would no
longer file any opposition to or comment on the petitioners second motion, and thus
resolved petitioner PCIBs second motion.
2. YES.
The CA erred in holding that the private respondents did not indulge in forum
shopping when they filed their complaints for injunction in the RTC of Manila in Civil
Cases Nos. 93-65135 and 93-65757 despite the pendency of their complaint for
injunction in Civil Case No. 91-2495 with the RTC of Makati
It is clear as day that the private respondents filed their complaints in Civil
Cases Nos. 93-65135 and 93-65757 for injunctive relief after the RTC of Makati set
aside on February 23, 1993 the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by it. In
so doing, the private respondents are guilty of forum shopping.
It bears stressing that the essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple
suits involving the same parties for the same cause or action, either simultaneously or
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment or other relief. It exists
where the essential requisites of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment
in one case will amount to res judicata in another.
The private respondents even brazenly violated the principle of judicial stability,
which essentially states that the judgment or order of a court of competent jurisdiction
may not be interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction for thee simple
reason that the power to open, modify or vacate the said judgment or order is not only
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possessed but is restricted to the court in which the judgment or order is rendered or
issued.
The private respondents were able to frustrate the February 23, 1993 Order of
the RTC of Makati not only once but three times, through temporary restraining orders
issued by the RTC of Manila, and through the assailed decision of the CA. The two
branches of the RTC of Manila saw through the nefarious ploy of the private
respondents and issued separate orders dismissing the complaints on the
ground of litis pendentia, forum shopping, and violation of the principle of judicial
stability.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31251 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
complaint of the private respondents in Civil Case No. 91-2495 is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. This is without prejudice to the liability for contempt of the counsels for
the private respondents for violation of the Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 on forum
shopping, as may be determined by the trial courts concerned.

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SY 2016-

3rd Year EH402 1st Sem.

Rule 58 Case Digests

A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J FEBRUARY 19, 2013

ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO A. HENSON and ANGEL S. ONG

D) A preliminary injunction is not a ponencia but an order granted at any stage of an

 Subsequently, SBI requested CB to rescontruct their loans, reduce interest and

 SBII defaulted in the payments and CBC initiated foreclosure proceedings.

 A grounds for Preliminary Injunction, SBII contended that:

WON SBI is entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction?

 There is necessity to prevent serious damage considering the number of parcels

 A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to

 It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party’s substantive

 Two important requisite conditions, namely:

(1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and

trial court should therefore be lifted and dissolved.

The petition is hereby DENIED.

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2063, RTJ-07-2064, and RTJ-07-2066

Republic of the Philippines, et. al. vs Honorable Judge Caguioa

Finance Secretary to observe and respect his issuances.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of the charges.

Spouses Estares V Court of Appeals (case 7)

Summary of Digest (FACTS)

held: NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Generally, injunction is a preservative

MABAYO FARMS, INC., vs. CA G.R. No. 140058. August 1, 2002

Bureau of Lands declared Francisco Domingo, Reynaldo Florida, Cornelio Pilipino

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to final

We do not agree. Essentially, Prohibition is a remedy to prevent inferior courts,

But for the separate juridical personality of a corporation to be disregarded, the

FEDERICO DECANO, petitioner-appellee,

It should be further noted that after petitioner's aforementioned appointment as janitor,

DAGUPAN ELECTRIC CORPORATION, ISABELITA L. LLAMES, PRIMO C.

CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY LANDLESS RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION INC. (COCLAI),

As such, injunction is accepted as the strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy to

Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be

directs the said agency to restore the members of petitioner to their

- Respondent is not merely the administrator of the said lot. It cannot be

10. Carino v Capulong

AMA sent a letter of intent to operate as an educational institution in Davao City to

Respondent judge issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary

As a rule, a writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or preventive remedy, may only

11. Dagupan Electric Corporation vs. Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano

This case involves the disconnection of the electrical power of

From the evidence and arguments adduced by parties, it is

It is not contested that the electric meter installed on the premises

Dagupan's action in disconnecting electric service is apparently

There is clearly a dispute as to the correct power consumption of

It would also be prejudicial to the public interest that operation of

On the question of jurisdiction, both parties are residents of Quezon

Public Works and Communications, (18 SCRA 297) the injunction

Here we have a case of the interference of plaintiff's property rights,

The Court therefore finds the Motion for Reconsideration to without

The writ of mandatory injunction issued by this Court on December

12. Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Association Inc. v CA

to restrain the enforcement of the said decision.

Although as a general rule, a court should not, by means of a preliminary injunction,

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MIAA)

However, on December 1, 1992, General Manager Cunanan gave written notice to

Whether or not K Services was entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction

Services possessed the right to continue as MIAAs concessionaire, MIAAs termination

[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1746.September 26, 2003]

ROGER F. BORJA, complainant, vs.JUDGE ZORAYDA H. SALCEDO, respondent.