THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 5333. October 18, 2000

ROSA YAP PARAS, complainant, vs. ATTY. JUSTO DE JESUS

PARAS, Respondent.

DECISION

MELO, J:

This has reference to a case for disbarment initiated by

complainant Rosa Yap Paras against her husband, Atty. Justo
de Jesus Paras. The parties exchanged tirades and barbs in
their copious pleadings, hurling invectives, cutting remarks
and insults at each other. Reduced to its essentials, Rosa
Paras charged her husband with dishonesty and falsification
of public documents, harassment and intimidation, and
immorality for siring a child with another woman.
Respondent denied the allegations, contending that his wife,
in cahoots with her family, is out to destroy and strip him of
his share in their multi-million conjugal assets.

The parties come from wealthy families in Negros Oriental.

They were married on May 21, 1964 and have two grown-up
children. They have vast sugarlands and other businesses.
Respondent was a Municipal Judge for 14 years and served
as Mayor in their town for 2 terms during the administration
of President Aquino. Complainant is a businesswoman.
Sometime in 1988, their marriage fell apart when due to
"marital strain that has developed through the years,"
respondent left his wife and children to live with his mother
and sister in Dumaguete City and thence started his law
practice. Complainant, in the meantime, filed a case for the
dissolution of their marriage, which case is still pending in
court.

The complaint charged:

DISHONESTY, FALSIFICATION and FRAUD

 respondent obtained loans from certain banks in the name
of complainant by counterfeiting complainant's signature,
falsely making it appear that complainant was the
applicant for said loans. Thereafter, he carted away and
misappropriated the proceeds of the loans.

. . . to guarantee the above loans, respondent mortgaged

some personal properties belonging to the conjugal
partnership without the consent of complainant.

GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT AND CONCUBINAGE

Respondent is . . . engaged in the immoral and criminal act of

concubinage as he maintained an illicit relationship with one
Ms. Jocelyn A. Ching, siring an illegitimate child with her
while married to complainant.

UNETHICAL AND UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Respondent abused courts of justice and misused his legal

skills to frighten, harass and intimidate all those who take a
position diametrically adverse to his sinister plans by
unethically filing complaints and other pleadings against
them. He utilized strategies to obstruct justice.

OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

(Respondent) utilized strategies to obstruct justice. In the

criminal actions initiated against him, respondent used his
legal skills not to prove his innocence but to derail all the
proceedings.

(Complaint, Rollo, p. 2)

In his Answer, respondent interposed the following

defenses:

(1) On the Charge of Falsification of Public Documents:

That during the sugarboom in the 1970's, his wife executed

in his favor a Special Power of Attorney to negotiate for an
agricultural or crop loan authorizing him "to borrow money
and apply for and secure any agricultural or crop loan for
sugar cane from the Bais Rural Bank, Bais City . . ." (Rollo,
Annex "3", p. 262)

(2) On the Charge of Forgery:

That the Report of the National Bureau of Investigation

which found that "the questioned signatures (referring to
the alleged forged signatures of complainant) and the
standard sample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS were written by
one and the same person"(Annex "B" of the Complaint,
Rollo, p. 26) was doctored, and that his wife filed against
him a string of cases for falsification of public documents
because he intends to disinherit his children and bequeath
his inchoate share in the conjugal properties to his own
mother.

(3) On the Charge of Grossly Immoral Conduct and

Concubinage:

That this is a malicious accusation fabricated by his brother-

in-law, Atty. Francisco D. Yap to disqualify him from getting
any share in the conjugal assets. He cites the dismissal of
the complaint for concubinage filed against him by his wife
before the City Prosecutor of Negros Oriental as proof of his
innocence.

Respondent, however, admits that he, his mother and sister,

are solicitous and hospitable to his alleged concubine, Ms.
Jocelyn Ching and her daughter, Cyndee Rose (named after
his own deceased daughter), by allowing them to stay in
their house and giving them some financial assistance,
because they pity Ms. Ching, a secretary in his law office,
who was deserted by her boyfriend after getting her
pregnant.

(4) On the Charge of Obstruction of Justice:

That "the legal remedies pursued by (him) in defense and
offense are legitimate courses of action done by an
embattled lawyer."

The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines investigated the complaint against
respondent summarizing the causes of action as follows:

(1) Falsification of complainant's signature and misuse of

conjugal assets; and

(2) Immorality and criminal acts of concubinage with one

Ms. Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching (for) siring an illegitimate child with
her while married to complainant, and, abandonment of his
own family.

(Rollo, Report of the IBP, p. 34)

No actual hearing was conducted as the parties agreed to

merely submit their respective memoranda, depositions, and
other pieces of evidence attached to their pleadings.

Thereafter, the CBD found respondent guilty as charged and

recommended:

(1) Respondent's suspension from the practice of law for

three (3) months on the first charge; and

(2) Respondent's indefinite suspension from the practice of

law on the second charge.

(ibid., p. 57)

The CBD held that the dismissal of the criminal cases against
respondent for falsification and use of falsified documents
(Criminal Case No. 11768) and for concubinage (I.S. No. 93-
578) will not bar the filing of an administrative case for
disbarment against him. In a criminal case, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is required for conviction, while in an
administrative complaint, only a preponderance of evidence
is necessary.

The CBD gave credence to the NBI Report that "the

questioned signatures (referring to the signatures appearing
in the loan agreements, contracts of mortgage, etc.) and the
standard sample signatures of respondent were written by
one and the same person." This affirms the allegation of
complainant Rosa Yap Paras that her husband forged her
signatures in those instruments. Respondent denies this but
his denial was unsubstantiated and is, therefore, self-
serving.

In finding respondent liable for Immorality, the CBD relied

heavily on the uncontroverted sworn affidavit-statements of
respondent's children and three other eyewitnesses to
respondent's illicit affair with Ms. Jocelyn Ching. For a better
appreciation of their statements, their affidavits are hereby
reproduced in full. Thusly,

"I, DAHLIA Y. PARAS, of legal age, single, resident of Bindoy,

Negros Oriental, but presently living in Dumaguete City, after
being duly sworn hereby depose and say:

1. I am a nurse by profession. I finished my BSN degree at

the College of Nursing, Silliman University.

2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras and my father Justo J. Paras.

My father has left the family home in Bindoy and now lives at
his mother's house at San Jose Ext., Dumaguete City.

3. My father has a "kabit" or concubine by the name of Ma.

Jocelyn Ching. They have a child named Cyndee Rose, who
was delivered at the Silliman University Hospital Medical
Center on July 19, 1990.

4. Jocelyn used to be the secretary of my father and Atty.

Melchor Arboleda when they practice law together in 1988 to
1989. Their relationship started in 1989. When she became
pregnant, my father rented an apartment for her at the
Amigo Subdivision, Dumaguete City.

5. Following delivery of the baby, my father built a house for

Jocelyn in Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental. My father
spend time there often with Jocelyn and their child.

6. I used to visit my father at San Jose Extension these past

years, and almost every time I was there, I would see
Jocelyn, sitting, watching TV, serving coffee in my father's
law office, and one time, she was washing my father's
clothes.

7. I first saw their child Cyndee Rose in 1992, about early

May, at San Jose Extension. I was there to ask for my
allowance. He was there at the time, and when I looked at
Cyndee Rose closely, I became convinced that she was my
father's daughter with Jocelyn.

8. Incidentally, I had an elder sister also named Cindy Rose

(now deceased).

9. In September 1992 when I went to visit my father, I saw

toys and child's clothes in my father's room.

10. Whenever, I saw Jocelyn at San Jose Extension, I wanted

to talk to her or be alone with her, but she would
deliberately avoid me. I could see that she was hiding
something from me." p. 109, Records.

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT

xxx

1. . . . sometime during the period of April-September, 1992,

I made several visits to my father at his mother's house in
San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City, where he had moved
after he left our home in Bindoy;
2. That these visits were made on different times and
different days of the week;

3. That most of my visits, I would meet a woman who was

also living at my father's place. This woman is now known to
me to be Ma. Jocelyn Ching;

4. That my basis for observing that Ms. Ching was living in

my father's house is that during my visits, whether during
office hours or after office hours, I would meet her at my
father's place, not his office; she was wearing house clothes
and slippers, such as skimpy clothes, shorts and T-shirt, not
street or office clothes; she was generally unkempt, not
made up for work or going out; on one occasion, I even saw
her, washing my father's clothes as well as a small child's
clothing; and she conducted herself around the house in the
manner of someone who lived there;

5. That on one of my visits, I confirmed that Ms. Ching was

living with my father from Josie Vailoces, who was then a
working student living at my father's place;

6. Ms. Vailoces subsequently confirmed under oath the fact

that my father and Ms. Jocelyn Ching were living together as
husband and wife at my father's place in a deposition taken
in connection with Civil Case No. 10613, RTC-Dumaguete
City, Branch 30, the Honorable Enrique C. Garovillo,
presiding. A copy of the transcript of the deposition of Ms.
Vailoces is already part of the record of this case. For
emphasis, photocopies of the pertinent portion of the written
deposition of Josie Vailoces is hereto attached as Annexes
"A"and "A-1." p. 111, Records

Respondent's son has this to say:

"I, RHOUEL Y. PARAS, 15 years old, single, resident of

Bindoy, Negros Oriental, but presently living in Dumaguete
City, after being duly sworn according to law, depose and
say:
1. I am a high school student at the Holy Cross Highhool,
Dumaguete City.

2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras, and my father Justo J.

Paras, a lawyer.

3. My father has left our home in Bindoy, and now lives at his
mother's house in San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City. He is
not giving us support any more.

4. However, from October 1991 to December 1992, I was

getting my allowance of P50.00 a week. I would go to their
house at San Jose Extension and personally ask him for it.

5. In October 1992, between 11:30 AM and 1:00 PM, I went

to San Jose Extension for my weekly allowance. I asked
Josephus, an adopted son of my father's sister, if my father
was around. Josephus said my father was in his room.

6. So I went direct to his room and because the door was not
locked, I entered the room without knocking. There I saw my
father lying in bed side by side with a woman. He was only
wearing a brief. The woman was wearing shorts and T-shirt.

7. They both appeared scared upon seeing me. My father

hurriedly gave me P100.00 and I left immediately because I
felt bad and embarrassed.

8. Before that incident, I used to see the woman at my

father's house in San Jose Extension. Every time I went to
see my father, she was also there.

9. I later came to know that she was Ms. Jocelyn Ching, and
that she was my father's "kabit" or concubine.

10. I am no longer getting my weekly allowance from my

father." p. 112, Records

Added to the foregoing sworn statements of respondent's

children is the damaging statement under oath of Virgilio
Kabrisante who was respondent's secretary when
respondent was a mayor of Bindoy, Negros Oriental which
reads as follows:

"I, VIRGILIO V. KABRISANTE, of legal age, married, Filipino,

a resident of Malaga, Bindoy, Negros Oriental, after having
been sworn in accordance with law, do hereby depose and
state that:

1. I personally know Justo J. Paras, having been his

secretary during his incumbency as Mayor of Bindoy, Negros
Oriental. In fact, through the latter's recommendation and
intercession, I was later on appointed as OIC Mayor of the
same town from December 1986 to January 1987.

2. When Justo J. Paras decided to practice law in Dumaguete

City, I became his personal aide and performed various
chores for the same. As his personal aide, I stayed in the
same house and room with the latter.

3. Sometime in January 1989, Justo J. Paras confided to me

that he felt attracted to my lady friend named Ma. Jocelyn A.
Ching. He then requested me to invite the latter to a dinner
date at Chin Loong Restaurant.

4. Conveying the invitation which was accepted by Ma.

Jocelyn Ching, the latter, Justo J. Paras and myself then had
dinner at the above-mentioned restaurant.

5. At the behest of Justo J. Paras, I invited Ma. Jocelyn A.

Ching, on several occasions, always to a picnic at a beach in
Dauin, Negros Oriental. Said invitations were always
accepted by the latter.

6. At each of the above-mentioned picnics, I observed that

Justo J. Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching had become more
and more intimate with each other.

7. Sometime in March 1989, at around 7:00 o'clock in the

evening on a Friday, I accompanied Justo J. Paras to the area
in front of the Silliman University Medical Center, where he
said he was going to meet someone.

8. After waiting for a few minutes, Ma. Jocelyn Ching arrived

and immediately boarded at the back seat of the Sakbayan
vehicle I was driving for Justo J. Paras. The latter then
requested me to drive both of them (Justo Paras and Ma.
Jocelyn A. Ching) to Honeybee Motel somewhere in Sibulan,
Negros Oriental.

9. When we arrived there, Justo J. Paras asked me to wait

for them outside the room, while he and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching
entered the said room.

10. I waited outside the room for about two (2) hours after
which the two of them emerged from the room. We then
proceeded to Chin Loong to eat supper.

11. After eating supper, we dropped Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching off

in front of the Dumaguete City Cockpit.

12. This meeting was repeated two more times, at the same
place and always on a Friday.

13. On April 3, 1988, I went home to Bindoy and stopped

working for Justo Paras." pp. 56-57, Records.

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT

xxx

1. Sometime in May 1989, I returned to Dumaguete City to

look for a job, having been jobless since I left Dumaguete
City to go home to Bindoy, Negros Oriental.

2. While looking for a job, I stayed at the house where my

friend, Bernard Dejillo was staying at Mangnao, Dumaguete
City. My friend Bernard Dejillo was occupying a room at the
second floor of the said house which he shared with me.
3. Sometime in the last week of May 1989, in the course of
my job hunting, I met Justo J. Paras. Having not seen each
other for some time, we talked for a while, discussing
matters about the barangay elections in Bindoy, Negros
Oriental.

4. When our discussion was finished, Justo J. Paras asked me

where I was staying, to which I answered that I was staying
at the aforementioned house. He then requested me to find
out if there was an available room at the said house which he
could rent with Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching. I told him that I would
have to ask my friend Bernard Dejillo about the matter.

5. When I arrived at the house that evening, I asked my

friend Bernard Dejillo about the matter, to which the latter
signified his approval. He told me that a room at the first
floor of the same house was available for rental to Justo
Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching.

6. The next day, I immediately informed Justo J. Paras of

Bernard Dejillo's approval of his request.

7. Sometime in the first week of June 1989, Ma. Jocelyn

Ching moved in to the room she had rented at the first floor
of the house I was also staying at.

8. Almost every night thereafter, Justo J. Paras would come

to the house and stay overnight. When he came at night
Justo J. Paras and I would converse and while conversing,
drink a bottle of Tanduay Rum. Oftentimes, Ma. Jocelyn
Ching would join in our conversation.

9. After we finish drinking and talking, Justo J. Paras and Ma.

Jocelyn Ching would enter the room rented and sleep there,
while I would also go upstairs to my room.

10. The next morning I could always observe Justo J. Paras

came out of said room and depart from the house.
11. The coming of Justo J. Paras to the house I was staying
ceased after about one (1) month when they transferred to
another house.

12. I myself left the house and returned to Bindoy, Negros

Oriental some time in June 1989.

13. Sometime in January 1993, on a Saturday at about

noontime, I went to the house of Justo J. Paras to consult
him about a Kabataang Barangay matter involving my son.
When I arrived at his house, I noticed that the same was
closed and there was no one there.

14. Needing to consult him about the above-mentioned

matter, I proceeded to the resthouse of Justo J. Paras
located at Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental.

15. When I arrived at the said resthouse, Justo J. Paras was

not there but the person in charge of the said resthouse
informed me that Justo J. Paras was at his house at
Barangay Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental. The same
person also gave me directions so that I could locate the
house of Justo J. Paras he referred to earlier.

16. With the help of the directions given by said person, I

was able to locate the house of Justo J. Paras.

17. At the doorway of the said house, I called out if anybody

was home while knocking on the door.

18. After a few seconds, Ma. Jocelyn Ching opened the door.
Upon seeing the latter, I asked her if Justo J. Paras was
home. She then let me in the house and told me to sit down
and wait for a while. She then proceeded to a room.

19. A few minutes later, Justo J. Paras came out of the same
room and sat down near me. I noticed that the latter had
just woke up from a nap.
20. We then started to talk about the matter involving my
son and sometime later, Ma. Jocelyn Ching served us coffee.

21. While we were talking and drinking coffee I saw a little

girl, about three (3) years old, walking around the sala,
whom I later came to know as Cyndee Rose, the daughter of
Justo J. Paras and Ma. Jocelyn Ching.

22. After our conversation was finished, Justo J. Paras told

me to see him at this office at San Jose Extension,
Dumaguete City, the following Monday to discuss the matter
some more.

23. I then bid them goodbye and went home to Bindoy,

Negros Oriental.

24. I am executing this affidavit as a supplement to my

affidavit dated 22 July 1993." pp. 58-60, Records

(ibid., pp. 44-52)

The CBD likewise gave credence to the sworn affidavits and

the deposition of two other witnesses, namely, Salvador de
Jesus, a former repairman of the Paras' household, and,
Josie Vailoces, a working student and former ward of the
Paras' family, who both gave personal accounts of the illicit
relationship between respondent and Jocelyn Ching, which
led to the birth of Cyndee Rose. De Jesus swore that while
doing repair works in the Paras' household he observed Ms.
Ching and Cyndee Rose practically living in the Paras' house
(p. 85, Rollo, Annex "H"). Vailoces, on the other hand,
deposed that she was asked by respondent Paras to deliver
money to Ms. Ching for the payment of the hospital bill after
she gave birth to Cyndee Rose. Vailoces was also asked by
respondent to procure Cyndee Rose Paras' baptismal
certificate after the latter was baptized in the house of
respondent; she further testified that in said baptismal
certificate, respondent appears as the father of Cyndee Rose
which explains why the latter is using the surname "Paras."
(p. 87, Annex "I", Rollo)
The findings and the recommendations of the CBD are
substantiated by the evidentiary record.
ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANT'S SIGNATURE

The handwriting examination conducted by the National

Bureau of Investigation on the signatures of complainant
Rosa Yap Paras and respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis--vis
the questioned signature "Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in the
questioned bank loan documents, contracts of mortgage and
other related instrument, yielded the following results:

CONCLUSION:

1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO

J. PARAS were written by one and the same person.

2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA

YAP PARAS were not written by one and the same person.

(Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;)

The NBI did not make a categorical statement that

respondent forged the signatures of complainant. However,
an analysis of the above findings lead to no other conclusion
than that the questioned or falsified signatures of
complainant Rosa Y. Paras were authored by respondent as
said falsified signatures were the same as the sample
signatures of respondent.

To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special

Power of Attorney (SPA) executed in his favor by
complainant to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan
from the Bais Rural Bank of Bais City. Instead of exculpating
respondent, the presence of the SPA places him in hot water.
For if he was so authorized to obtain loans from the banks,
then why did he have to falsify his wife's signatures in the
bank loan documents? The purpose of an SPA is to especially
authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign for and on behalf of the
principal using his own name.
ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE

The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The

affidavit-statements of his children and three other persons
who used to work with him and have witnessed the acts
indicative of his infidelity more than satisfy this Court that
respondent has strayed from the marital path. The baptismal
certificate of Cyndee Rose Paras where respondent was
named as the father of the child (Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108);
his naming the child after his deceased first-born daughter
Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn Ching and the child to
live in their house in Dumaguete City bolster the allegation
that respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms. Ching,
the mother of his illegitimate child.

It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not

only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of
law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining
in the practice of law (People vs. Tunda, 181 SCRA 692
[1990]; Leda vs. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]). In the case
at hand, respondent has fallen below the moral bar when he
forged his wife's signature in the bank loan documents, and,
sired a daughter with a woman other than his wife. However,
the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution,
and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects
the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
Court and as a member of the bar (Tapucar vs. Tapucar,
Adm. Case No. 4148, July 30, 1998). Disbarment should
never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired
(Resurrecion vs. Sayson, 300 SCRA 129 [1998]).

In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS on
the charge of falsifying his wife's signature in bank
documents and other related loan instruments; and for ONE
(1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of
immorality and abandonment of his own family, the penalties
to be served simultaneously. Let notice of this decision be
spread in respondent's record as an attorney, and notice of
the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
the courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,

concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 9387               June 20, 2012

(Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1562)

EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VENANCIO B. PADILLA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:

This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez (complainant) against her lawyer, Atty.
Venancio B. Padilla (respondent) of Padilla Padilla Bautista Law Offices, for his alleged negligence
in the handling of her case.

The records disclose that complainant and her husband were the respondents in an ejectment case
filed against them with the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).

In a Decision dated 28 June 2002, penned by Judge Rosmari D. Carandang (Judge Carandang), the
1 

RTC ordered that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of complainant be cancelled; and that the latter
pay the complainant therein, Elisa Duigan (Duigan), attorney’s fees and moral damages.

Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Thereafter, the Court of
Appeals (CA) ordered them to file their Appellants’ Brief. They chose respondent to represent them
in the case. On their behalf, he filed a Memorandum on Appeal instead of an Appellants’ Brief. Thus,
Duigan filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. The CA granted the Motion in a Resolution dated 16
2 

December 2003.

No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution dismissing the appeal was filed by the couple.
Complainant claims that because respondent ignored the Resolution, he acted with "deceit,
unfaithfulness amounting to malpractice of law." Complainant and her husband failed to file an
3 

appeal, because respondent never informed them of the adverse decision. Complainant further
claims that she asked respondent "several times" about the status of the appeal, but "despite
inquiries he deliberately withheld response [sic]," to the damage and prejudice of the spouses.4

The Resolution became final and executory on 8 January 2004. Complainant was informed of the
Resolution sometime in July 2005, when the Sheriff of the RTC came to her house and informed her
of the Resolution.

On 9 September 2005, complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint with the Committee on Bar
5 

Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), seeking the disbarment of respondent on the
following grounds: deceit, malpractice, and grave misconduct. Complainant prays for moral damages
in the amount of ₱ 350,000.
Through an Order dated 12 September 2005, Director of Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan ordered
6 

respondent to submit an answer to the Complaint. In his Counter-Affidavit/Answer, respondent

7 

prayed for the outright dismissal of the Complaint.

Respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of complainant. He averred that prior to the
mandatory conference set by the IBP on 13 December 2005, he had never met complainant,
because it was her husband who had personally transacted with him. According to respondent, the
husband "despondently pleaded to me to prepare a Memorandum on Appeal because according to
him the period given by the CA was to lapse within two or three days." Thus, respondent claims that
8 

he filed a Memorandum on Appeal because he honestly believed that "it is this pleading which was
required." 9

Before filing the Memorandum, respondent advised complainant’s husband to settle the case. The
latter allegedly "gestured approval of the advice." 10

After the husband of complainant picked up the Memorandum for filing, respondent never saw or
heard from him again and thus assumed that the husband heeded his advice and settled the case.
When respondent received an Order from the CA requiring him to file a comment on the Motion to
Dismiss filed by Duigan, he "instructed his office staff to contact Mr. Hernandez thru available means
of communication, but to no avail." Thus, when complainant’s husband went to the office of
11 

respondent to tell the latter that the Sheriff of the RTC had informed complainant of the CA’s
Resolution dismissing the case, respondent was just as surprised. The lawyer exclaimed, "KALA KO
BA NAKIPAG AREGLO NA KAYO." 12

In his 5 January 2009 Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. found that
13 

respondent violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code). He
recommended that respondent be suspended from practicing law from 3 to 6 months.

The board of governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XIX-2010-452 on 28 August 2010. Therein,
they resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six months.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He prayed for the relaxation of the application of the
14 

Canons of the Code. On 14 January 2012, the IBP board of governors passed Resolution No. XX-
2012-17 partly granting his Motion and reducing the penalty imposed to one-month suspension from
15 

the practice of law.

Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, acting Director for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa,
through a letter addressed to then Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, transmitted the documents
16 

pertaining to the disbarment Complaint against respondent.

We adopt the factual findings of the board of governors of the IBP. This Court, however, disagrees
with its Decision to reduce the penalty to one-month suspension. We thus affirm the six-month
suspension the Board originally imposed in its 28 August 2010 Resolution.

Respondent insists that he had never met complainant prior to the mandatory conference set for the
disbarment Complaint she filed against him. However, a perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal filed
in the appellate court revealed that he had signed as counsel for the defendant-appellants therein,
including complainant and her husband. The pleading starts with the following sentence:
17 

"DEFENDANT[S]-APPELLANTS, by counsel, unto this Honorable Court submit the Memorandum

and further allege that: x x x." Nowhere does the document say that it was filed only on behalf of
18 

complainant’s husband.
It is further claimed by respondent that the relation created between him and complainant’s husband
cannot be treated as a "client-lawyer" relationship, viz:

It is no more than a client needing a legal document and had it prepared by a lawyer for a fee. Under
the factual milieu and circumstances, it could not be said that a client entrusted to a lawyer handling
and prosecution of his case that calls for the strict application of the Code; x x x
19

As proof that none of them ever intended to enter into a lawyer-client relationship, he also alleges
that complainant’s husband never contacted him after the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal.
According to respondent, this behavior was "very unusual if he really believed that he engaged" the
former’s services. 20

Complainant pointed out in her Reply that respondent was her lawyer, because he accepted her
21 

case and an acceptance fee in the amount of ₱ 7,000.

According to respondent, however, "[C]ontrary to the complainant’s claim that he charged ₱ 7,000 as
acceptance fee," "the fee was only for the preparation of the pleading which is even low for a
Memorandum of Appeal: x x x." 22

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the
duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyer’s duty to
23 

serve the client with competence and diligence. Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty.
24 

According to respondent, he merely drafted the pleading that complainant’s husband asked from
him. Respondent also claims that he filed a Memorandum of Appeal, because he "honestly believed"
that this was the pleading required, based on what complainant’s husband said.

The IBP Investigating Commissioner’s observation on this matter, in the 5 January 2009 Report, is
correct. Regardless of the particular pleading his client may have believed to be necessary, it was
respondent’s duty to know the proper pleading to be filed in appeals from RTC decisions, viz:

Having seen the Decision dated 18 June 2002 of the trial court, respondent should have known that
the mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals for said Decision is by ordinary appeal under Section
2(a) Rule 41 of the1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In all such cases, Rule 44 of the said
Rules applies. 25

When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice of Appeal.
Consequently, what should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed cases or Rule 44 of the Rules on
Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the appellant’s brief be filed after the records of the case have
been elevated to the CA. Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know this procedure. Canon 5
of the Code reads:

CANON 5 — A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal
education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the
practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and
jurisprudence.

The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon 5 duty have been expounded in Dulalia,
Jr. v. Cruz, to wit:
26 
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance
and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the
existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It
is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with
such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as
members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

In his MR, respondent begged for the consideration of the IBP, claiming that the reason for his
failure to file the proper pleading was that he "did not have enough time to acquaint himself
thoroughly with the factual milieu of the case." The IBP reconsidered and thereafter significantly
reduced the penalty originally imposed.

Respondent’s plea for leniency should not have been granted.

The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the facts of the case does
not excuse his negligence.

Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation. While it is true that respondent was not complainant’s lawyer from the trial to the
appellate court stage, this fact did not excuse him from his duty to diligently study a case he had
agreed to handle. If he felt he did not have enough time to study the pertinent matters involved, as
he was approached by complainant’s husband only two days before the expiration of the period for
filing the Appellant’s Brief, respondent should have filed a motion for extension of time to file the
proper pleading instead of whatever pleading he could come up with, just to "beat the deadline set
by the Court of Appeals." 27

Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was given notice of the fact that he filed the wrong
pleading. However, instead of explaining his side by filing a comment, as ordered by the appellate
court, he chose to ignore the CA’s Order. He claims that he was under the presumption that
complainant and her husband had already settled the case, because he had not heard from the
husband since the filing of the latter’s Memorandum of Appeal.

This explanation does not excuse respondent’s actions.

First of all, there were several remedies that respondent could have availed himself of, from the
moment he received the Notice from the CA to the moment he received the disbarment Complaint
filed against him. But because of his negligence, he chose to sit on the case and do nothing.

Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their case. His
failure to do so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code, which reads:

18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least respondent could have
done was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel. He could have
thus explained why he was no longer the counsel of complainant and her husband in the case and
informed the court that he could no longer contact them. His failure to take this measure proves his
28 

negligence.
Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on Duigan’s Motion to
Dismiss is negligence on his part.  Under 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in
1âwphi1

handling the client’s case, viz:

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their negligence in fulfilling
their duty would render them liable for disciplinary action.
29

Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates his duties to his
client, he engages in unethical and unprofessional conduct for which he should be held
accountable. 30

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Venancio Padilla is found guilty of violating Rules 18.02, 18.03,
18.04, as well as Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, he is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a member of the
bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country for their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5098 : April 11, 2012]

JOSEFINA M. ANIÑON, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CLEMENCIO SABITSANA, JR.,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve this disbarment complaint against Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr. who is
charged of: (1) violating the lawyer’s duty to preserve confidential information received
from his client;[1] and (2) violating the prohibition on representing conflicting interests.
[2]
cralaw

In her complaint, Josefina M. Aniñon (complainant) related that she previously engaged
the legal services of Atty. Sabitsana in the preparation and execution in her favor of a
Deed of Sale over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law husband, Brigido
Caneja, Jr. Atty. Sabitsana allegedly violated her confidence when he subsequently filed
a civil case against her for the annulment of the Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L.
Cañete, the legal wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr. The complainant accused Atty. Sabitsana of
using the confidential information he obtained from her in filing the civil case.

Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the complainant in the preparation and
execution of the Deed of Sale. However, he denied having received any confidential
information. Atty. Sabitsana asserted that the present disbarment complaint was
instigated by one Atty. Gabino Velasquez, Jr., the notary of the disbarment complaint
who lost a court case against him (Atty. Sabitsana) and had instigated the complaint for
this reason.

The Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

In our Resolution dated November 22, 1999, we referred the disbarment complaint to
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation dated
November 28, 2003, IBP Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo Jr. found Atty. Sabitsana
administratively liable for representing conflicting interests. The IBP Commissioner
opined:

In Bautista vs. Barrios, it was held that a lawyer may not handle a case to nullify a
contract which he prepared and thereby take up inconsistent positions.  Granting that
Zenaida L. Cañete, respondent’s present client in Civil Case No. B-1060 did not initially
learn about the sale executed by Bontes in favor of complainant thru the confidences
and information divulged by complainant to respondent in the course of the preparation
of the said deed of sale, respondent nonetheless has a duty to decline his current
employment as counsel of Zenaida Cañete in view of the rule prohibiting representation
of conflicting interests.

In re De la Rosa clearly suggests that a lawyer may not represent conflicting interests
in the absence of the written consent of all parties concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. In the present case, no such written consent was secured by
respondent before accepting employment as Mrs. Cañete’s counsel-of-record.  x x x

x          x          x

Complainant and respondent’s present client, being contending claimants to the same
property, the conflict of interest is obviously present. There is said to be inconsistency
of interest when on behalf of one client, it is the attorney’s duty to contend for that
which his duty to another client requires him to oppose. In brief, if he argues for one
client this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client. Such is
the case with which we are now confronted, respondent being asked by one client to
nullify what he had formerly notarized as a true and valid sale between Bontes and the
complainant. (footnotes omitted)[3]

The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. Sabitsana be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year. [4]

The Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

In a resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt
and approve the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after finding it
to be fully supported by the evidence on record, the applicable laws and rules. [5] The
IBP Board of Governors agreed with the IBP Commissioner’s recommended penalty.

Atty. Sabitsana moved to reconsider the above resolution, but the IBP Board of
Governors denied his motion in a resolution dated July 30, 2004.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for representing
conflicting interests.

The Court’s Ruling

After a careful study of the records, we agree with the findings and
recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.

The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the
highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must
prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to
his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to
state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an
expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part,
is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions
with the client.[6]  Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing
conflicting interests, a matter covered by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility quoted below:
Rule 15.03. -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

“The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation

where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated
action.”[7] The prohibition also applies even if the “lawyer would not be called upon to
contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that
there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the
disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated.” [8] To be held
accountable under this rule, it is “enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of
whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the
lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the
duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.” [9]

Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of the above
rule is present in a given case.

One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one
client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client.  Thus, if a
lawyer’s argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for
the other client, there is a violation of the rule.

Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new

relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-
dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer
would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential
information acquired through their connection or previous employment. [10] [emphasis
ours]

On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, we find substantial evidence to support
Atty. Sabitsana’s violation of the above rule, as established by the following
circumstances on record:

One, his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect her interest
over a certain property. The records show that upon the legal advice of Atty. Sabitsana,
the Deed of Sale over the property was prepared and executed in the complainant’s
favor.

Two, Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Cañete to discuss the latter’s legal interest over
the property subject of the Deed of Sale. At that point, Atty. Sabitsana already had
knowledge that Zenaida Cañete’s interest clashed with the complainant’s interests.

Three, despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients, Atty.
Sabitsana accepted the engagement from Zenaida Cañete.

Four, Atty. Sabitsana’s actual knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two
clients was demonstrated by his own actions: first, he filed a case against the
complainant in behalf of Zenaida Cañete; second, he impleaded the complainant as the
defendant in the case; and third, the case he filed was for the annulment of the Deed of
Sale that he had previously prepared and executed for the complainant.

By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one client against another
client in the same action; he also accepted a new engagement  that entailed him to
contend and oppose the interest of his other client in a property in which his legal
services had been previously retained.

To be sure, Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides an

exception to the above prohibition. However, we find no reason to apply the exception
due to Atty. Sabitsana’s failure to comply with the requirements set forth under the
rule. Atty. Sabitsana did not make a full disclosure of facts to the complainant and to
Zenaida Cañete before he accepted the new engagement with Zenaida Cañete.  The
records likewise show that although Atty. Sabitsana wrote a letter to the complainant
informing her of Zenaida Cañete’s adverse claim to the property covered by the Deed of
Sale and, urging her to settle the adverse claim; Atty. Sabitsana however did not
disclose to the complainant that he was also being engaged as counsel by Zenaida
Cañete.[11]  Moreover, the records show that Atty. Sabitsana failed to obtain the written
consent of his two clients, as required by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Accordingly, we find — as the IBP Board of Governors did — Atty. Sabitsana guilty of
misconduct for representing conflicting interests. We likewise agree with the penalty of
suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law recommended by the IBP Board of
Governors. This penalty is consistent with existing jurisprudence on the administrative
offense of representing conflicting interests.[12]

We note that Atty. Sabitsana takes exception to the IBP recommendation on the ground
that the charge in the complaint was only for his alleged disclosure of confidential
information, not for representation of conflicting interests. To Atty. Sabitsana, finding
him liable for the latter offense is a violation of his due process rights since he only
answered the designated charge.

We find no violation of Atty. Sabitsana’s due process rights. Although there was indeed
a specific charge in the complaint, we are not unmindful that the complaint itself
contained allegations of acts sufficient to constitute a violation of the rule on the
prohibition against representing conflicting interests.  As stated in paragraph 8 of the
complaint:

Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. accepted the commission as a Lawyer of ZENAIDA CANEJA, now
Zenaida Cañete, to recover lands from Complainant, including this land where lawyer
Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. has advised his client [complainant] to execute the second sale[.]

Interestingly, Atty. Sabitsana even admitted these allegations in his answer. [13] He also
averred in his Answer that:

6b. Because the defendant-to-be in the complaint (Civil Case No. B-1060) that he
would file on behalf of Zenaida Caneja-Cañete was his former client (herein
complainant), respondent asked [the] permission of Mrs. Cañete (which she granted)
that he would first write a letter (Annex “4”) to the complainant proposing to settle the
case amicably between them but complainant ignored it. Neither did she object to
respondent’s handling the case in behalf of Mrs. Cañete on the ground she is now
invoking in her instant complaint. So respondent felt free to file the complaint against
her.[14]

We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to
be informed of the charge against oneself and to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. [15] These opportunities
were all afforded to Atty. Sabitsana, as shown by the above circumstances.

All told, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.[16] In the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession. We likewise aim to ensure the proper and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proven
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an
attorney.[17] This is all that we did in this case. Significantly, we did this to a degree
very much lesser than what the powers of this Court allows it to do in terms of the
imposable penalty. In this sense, we have already been lenient towards respondent
lawyer.cralaw

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and

recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the
practice of law.

Atty. Sabitsana is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this
Decision so that we can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take
effect.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6116               August 1, 2012

ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Engr. Gilbert
Tumbokon against respondent Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco for grave dishonesty, gross misconduct
constituting deceit and grossly immoral conduct.

In his Complaint, complainant narrated that respondent undertook to give him 20% commission,
1 

later reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees the latter would receive in representing Spouses Amable
and Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he referred, in an action for partition of the estate of the late
Benjamin Yap (Civil Case No. 4986 before the Regional Trial Court of Aklan). Their agreement was
reflected in a letter dated August 11, 1995. However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed
2 

commission notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees amounting to 17% of the total estate or about
₱ 40 million. Instead, he was informed through a letter dated July 16, 1997 that Sps. Yap assumed
3 

to pay the same after respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney's fees from 25% to 17%. He
then demanded the payment of his commission which respondent ignored.
4 

Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards required of
his profession for having abandoned his legal wife, Milagros Hilado, with whom he has two children,
and cohabited with Mae FlorGalido, with whom he has four children. He also accused respondent of
engaging in money-lending business without the required authorization from the
5 

BangkoSentralngPilipinas.

In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a 25% contingent fee
basis, and advanced all the expenses. He disputed the August 11, 1995 letter for being a forgery
and claimed that Sps. Yap assumed to pay complainant's commission which he clarified in his July
16, 1997 letter. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for the corresponding
sanction against complainant's counsel, Atty. Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a baseless complaint. 6

In the Resolution dated February 16, 2004, the Court resolved to refer this administrative case to the
7 

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report
and Recommendation dated October 10, 2008, the Investigating IBP Commissioner recommended
8 

that respondent be suspended for one (1) year from the active practice of law, for violation of the
Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code). The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the same in
its Resolution No. XIX-2010-453 dated August
9 
28, 2010. Respondent moved for reconsideration which was denied in Resolution No. XIX-2011-141
10 

dated October 28, 2011.

After due consideration, We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are
expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and
fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their
clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code. Lawyers may, thus, be
11 

disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional or in
their private capacity.

In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had attended the execution of the August 11,
1995 letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the payment of
complainant's commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent has
violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to
12 

divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases
which do not obtain in the case at bar.

Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal family to cohabit
with his mistress with whom he begot four children notwithstanding that his moral character as well
as his moral fitness to be retained in the Roll of Attorneys has been assailed. The settled rule is that
betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful
and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. Consequently, We find no reason to disturb
13 

the IBP's finding that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
14 

which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to have been sufficiently
established.  A "business" requires some form of investment and a sufficient number of customers to
1âwphi1

whom its output can be sold at profit on a consistent basis. The lending of money to a single person
15 

without showing that such service is made available to other persons on a consistent basis cannot
be construed asindicia that respondent is engaged in the business of lending.

Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, We are minded
that the power to disbar should be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and as member of the bar, or the misconduct borders on the criminal, or committed under
16 

scandalous circumstance, which do not obtain here. Considering the circumstances of the case, We
17 

deem it appropriate that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year as recommended.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO is found GUILTY of violation of the

Lawyer’s Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon
9 of the same Code and SUSPENDED from the active practice of law ONE (1) YEAR effective upon
notice hereof. Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a
member of the Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6368               June 13, 2012

FIDELA BENGCO AND TERESITA BENGCO, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. PABLO S. BERNARDO, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainants Fidela G. Bengco (Fidela) and Teresita N.
1 

Bengco (Teresita) against respondent Atty. Pablo Bernardo (Atty. Bernardo) for deceit, malpractice,
conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and violation of his duties and oath as a lawyer.

The acts of the respondent which gave rise to the instant complaint are as follows:

That sometime on or about the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997, Atty. Pablo Bernardo
with the help and in connivance and collusion with a certain Andres Magat [wilfully] and illegally
committed fraudulent act with intent to defraud herein complainants Fidela G. Bengco and Teresita
N. Bengco by using false pretenses, deceitful words to the effect that he would expedite the titling of
the land belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City who are the acquaintance of complainants
herein and they convinced herein complainant[s] that if they will finance and deliver to him the
amount of [₱]495,000.00 as advance money he would expedite the titling of the subject land and
further by means of other similar deceit like misrepresenting himself as lawyer of William Gatchalian,
the prospective buyer of the subject land, who is the owner of Plastic City at Canomay Street,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and he is the one handling William Gatchalian’s business transaction and
that he has contracts at NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and REGISTER OF DEEDS which
representation he well knew were false, fraudulent and were only made to induce the complainant[s]
to give and deliver the said amount ([₱]495,000.00) and once in possession of said amount, far from
complying with his obligation to expedite and cause the titling of the subject land, [wilfully], unlawfully
and illegally misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to his personal use and
benefit and despite demand upon him to return the said amount, he failed and refused to do so,
which acts constitute deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and Violation of
Duties and Oath as a lawyer. 2

In support of their complaint, the complainants attached thereto Resolutions dated December 7,
1998 and June 22, 1999 of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sto. Tomas and
3  4 

Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando,
Pampanga, respectively, finding probable cause for the filing of the criminal information against both
5 

Atty. Bernardo and Andres Magat (Magat) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando,
Pampanga, Branch 48, charging them with the crime of Estafa punishable under Article 315, par.
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

The respondent was required to file his Comment. On September 24, 2004, the respondent filed an
6 

undated Comment, wherein he denied the allegations against him and averred the following:
7 

2. He had not deceived both complainants between the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22,
1997 for purposes of getting from them the amount of [₱]495,000.00. It was Andy Magat
whom they contacted and who in turn sought the legal services of the respondent. It was
Andy Magat who received the said money from them.
 3. There was no connivance made and entered into by Andy Magat and respondent. The
arrangement for titling of the land was made by Teresita N. Bengco and Andy Magat with no
participation of respondent.

4. The acceptance of the respondent to render his legal service is legal and allowed in law
practice.8

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

On February 16, 2005, the IBP ordered the respondent to submit a verified comment pursuant to
Rule 139-B, Section 6 of the Rules of Court as it appeared that the respondent’s undated comment
filed with the Court was not verified.
9

On March 15, 2005, respondent through counsel requested for an additional fifteen (15) days from
March 17, 2005, or until April 1, 2005, within which to comply due to his medical confinement. 10

Thereafter, on April 4, 2005, the respondent filed a second motion for extension praying for another
11 

20 days, or until April 22, 2005, alleging that he was still recovering from his illness.

On August 3, 2005, the case was set for mandatory conference. The respondent failed to appear;
12 

thus, the IBP considered the respondent in default for his failure to appear and for not filing an
answer despite extensions granted. The case was then submitted for report and recommendation. 13

Based on the records of the case, Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala made the
following findings:

[O]n or before the period from 15 April 1997 to 22 July 1997, respondent with the help and in
connivance and collusion with a certain Andres Magat ("Magat"), by using false pretenses and
deceitful words, [wilfully] and illegally committed fraudulent acts to the effect that respondent would
expedite the titling of the land belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City, who were the
acquaintance of complainants.

Respondent and Magat convinced complainants that if they finance and deliver to them the amount
of [₱]495,000.00 as advance money, they would expedite the titling of the subject land. Respondent
represented himself to be the lawyer of William Gatchalian, the owner of Plastic City located at
Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, who was allegedly the buyer of the subject land once it
has been titled. Respondent and Magat also represented that they have contacts at NAMREA,
DENR, CENRO and the Register of Deeds which representation they knew to be false, fraudulent
and were only made to induce complainants to give and deliver to them the amount of
[₱]495,000.00. Once in possession of the said amount, far from complying with their obligation to
expedite and cause the titling of the subject land, respondent and Magat [wilfully], unlawfully and
illegally misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to their personal use and
benefit and despite demand upon them to return the said amount, they failed and refused to do so.

In view of the deceit committed by respondent and Magat, complainants filed a complaint for Estafa
against the former before the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court, of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto.
Tomas, Pampanga. In the preliminary investigation conducted by the said court, it finds sufficient
grounds to hold respondent and Magat for trial for the crime of Estafa defined under par. 2(a) of Art.
315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The case was transmitted to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for appropriate action as per Order dated 7 December 1998.
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga
conducted a re-investigation of the case. During the re-investigation thereof, Magat was willing to
reimburse to complainants the amount of [₱]200,000.00 because according to him the amount of
[₱]295,000.00 should be reimbursed by respondent considering that the said amount was turned
over to respondent for expenses incurred in the documentation prior to the titling of the subject land.
Both respondent and Magat requested for several extensions for time to pay back their obligations to
the complainants. However, despite extensions of time granted to them, respondent and Magat
failed to fulfil their promise to pay back their obligation. Hence, it was resolved that the offer of
compromise was construed to be an implied admission of guilt. The Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
believes that there was no reason to disturb the findings of the investigating judge and an
Information for Estafa was filed against respondent and Magat on 8 July 1999 before the Regional
Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga.

The failure of the lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice on several
occasions and appear on the scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders
of the court and illustrates his despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer which deserves
disciplinary sanction x x x.

From the facts and evidence presented, it could not be denied that respondent committed a crime
that import deceit and violation of his attorney’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
under both of which he was bound to ‘obey the laws of the land.’ The commission of unlawful acts,
specially crimes involving moral turpitude, acts of dishonesty in violation of the attorney’s oath,
grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers (Rule 138,
Section 27, RRC).

The misconduct complained of took place in 1997 and complainants filed the case only on 16 April
2004. As provided for by the Rules of Procedure of the Commission of Bar Discipline, as amended,
dated 24 March 2004, "A complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes
in two (2) years from the date of the professional misconduct" (Section 1, Rule VIII).
14

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that:

x x x [R]espondent ATTY. PABLO A. BERNARDO be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO YEARS

from receipt hereof from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.  15

On February 1, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2007-065, viz:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo
is hereby ordered, the restitution of the amount of [₱]200,000.00 within sixty (60) days from receipt
of notice with Warning that if he does not return the amount with in sixty days from receipt of this
Order then he will be meted the penalty of Suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. 16

On May 16, 2007, the respondent promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid
17 

Resolution of the IBP. The respondent averred that: (1) the IBP resolution is not in accord with the
rules considering that the complaint was filed more than two (2) years from the alleged misconduct
and therefore, must have been dismissed outright; (2) he did not commit any misrepresentation in
convincing Fidela to give him money to finance the titling of the land; (3) he was hired as a lawyer
through Magat who transacted with Teresita as evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement signed 18 

by the latter; (4) he was denied due process when the Investigating Commissioner considered him
as in default after having ignored the representative he sent during the hearing on August 3, 2005;
and (5) he long restituted the amount of ₱225,000.00 not as an offer of compromise but based on
his moral obligation as a lawyer due to Teresita’s declaration that he had to stop acting as her legal
counsel sometime in the third quarter of 1997. The respondent pointed out the admission made by
Fidela in her direct testimony before the RTC that she received the amount, as evidenced by
photocopies of receipts.

In an Order dated May 17, 2007 issued by the IBP, the complainant was required to comment within
19 

fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

In her Comment, Fidela explained that it took them quite some time in filing the administrative case
20 

because they took into consideration the possibility of an amicable settlement instead of a judicial
proceeding since it would stain the respondent’s reputation as a lawyer; that the respondent went
into hiding which prompted them to seek the assistance of CIDG agents from Camp Olivas in order
to trace the respondent’s whereabouts; that the respondent was duly accorded the opportunity to be
heard; and finally, that no restitution of the ₱200,000.00 plus corresponding interest has yet been
made by the respondent.

On June 21, 2008, Fidela filed a Manifestation stating that the RTC rendered a decision in the
21 

criminal case for Estafa finding the accused, Atty. Bernardo and Magat "guilty of conspiracy in the
commission of Estafa under Article 315 par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and both are sentenced
to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum." 22

In a Letter dated March 23, 2009, addressed to the IBP, Fidela sought the resolution of the present
23 

action as she was already 86 years of age. Later, an Ex-parte Motion to Resolve the Case dated
24 

September 1, 2010 was filed by the complainants. In another Letter dated October 26, 2011, Fidela,
being 88 years old, sought for Atty. Bernardo’s restitution of the amount of ₱200,000.00 so she can
use the money to buy her medicine and other needs.

The Court adopts and agrees with the findings and conclusions of the IBP.

It is first worth mentioning that the respondent’s defense of prescription is untenable. The Court has
held that administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse of considerable time from
the commission of the offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase
the administrative culpability of a lawyer. Otherwise, members of the bar would only be emboldened
to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private
complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated
from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for.
25

Further, consistent with his failure to file his answer after he himself pleaded for several extensions
of time to file the same, the respondent failed to appear during the mandatory conference, as
ordered by the IBP. As a lawyer, the respondent is considered as an officer of the court who is called
upon to obey and respect court processes. Such acts of the respondent are a deliberate and
contemptuous affront on the court’s authority which can not be countenanced.

It can not be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As vanguards
of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard
of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the people’s faith and confidence in the
judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined – whether in their professional or in their
private capacity – for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor. 26
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.

Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

There is no question that the respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admitted in
his answer that his legal services were hired by the complainants through Magat regarding the
purported titling of land supposedly purchased. While he begs for the Court’s indulgence, his
contrition is shallow considering the fact that he used his position as a lawyer in order to deceive the
complainants into believing that he can expedite the titling of the subject properties. He never denied
that he did not benefit from the money given by the complainants in the amount of ₱495,000.00.

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is
the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the
primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves. 27

It is likewise settled that a disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a criminal action filed
against a lawyer despite having involved the same set of facts. Jurisprudence has it "that a finding of
guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case.
Conversely, the respondent’s acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively." 28

In Yu v. Palaña, the Court held that:

29 

Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers
belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of
criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts
and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings. Besides, it is not sound judicial
policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may be
acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission to, and
continuing membership in, the legal profession during the whole period that the criminal case is
pending final disposition, when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They
are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for preserving courts of justice from
the official ministration of persons unfit to practice law. The attorney is called to answer to the court
for his conduct as an officer of the court. (Citations omitted)
30 

As the records reveal, the RTC eventually convicted the respondent for the crime of Estafa for which
he was meted the penalty of sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum. Such criminal
conviction clearly undermines the respondent’s moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. Rule 138,
Section 27 provides that:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party without authority to do so.

In view of the foregoing, this Court has no option but to accord him the punishment commensurate to
all his acts and to accord the complainants, especially the 88-year old Fidela, with the justice they
utmost deserve. 1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is found guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice hereof.

Further, the Court ORDERS Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo (1) to RETURN the amount of ₱200,000.00 to
Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco within TEN (10) DAYS from receipt of this Decision and (2) to
SUBMIT his proof of compliance thereof to the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant within
TEN (10) DAYS therefrom; with a STERN WARNING that failure to do so shall merit him the
additional penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232               April 10, 2012

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE CADER P. INDAR, Presiding Judge and Acting, and Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City and Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao,
respectively, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative complaint for gross misconduct and dishonesty against respondent Judge
Cader P. Indar, Al Haj (Judge Indar), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14,
Cotabato City and Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao.

This case originated from reports by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City to the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) that they have received an alarming number of decisions,
resolutions, and orders on annulment of marriage cases allegedly issued by Judge Indar.

To verify the allegations against Judge Indar, the OCA conducted a judicial audit in RTC-Shariff
Aguak, Branch 15, where the Audit Team found that the list of cases submitted by the Local Civil
Registrars of Manila and Quezon City do not appear in the records of cases received, pending or
disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15. Likewise, the annulment decisions did not exist in the
records of RTC-Cotabato, Branch 14. The Audit Team further observed that the case numbers in the
list submitted by the Local Civil Registrars are not within the series of case numbers recorded in the
docket books of either RTC-Shariff Aguak or RTC-Cotabato.

At the same time, the Audit Team followed-up Judge Indar’s compliance with Deputy Court
Administrator (DCA) Jesus Edwin A. Villasor’s 1st Indorsement, dated 15 February 2010, relative to
the letter of Ms. Miren Galloway, Manager-Permanent Entry Unit, Australian Embassy, Manila
1 

(Australian Embassy letter), asking confirmation on the authenticity of Judge Indar’s decision, dated
23 May 2007, in Spec. Proc. No. 06-581, entitled "Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan V. Aguiling," for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. As regards this case, the Audit Team found that Spec. Proc. No.
06-584 does not exist in the records of cases filed, pending or disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak.

Subsequently, the Audit Team made the following conclusions:

1. The list in Annexes A; A-1; A-2 and A-3 are not found in the list of cases filed, pending or
decided in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak [Maguindanao] which is based
in Cotabato City, nor in the records of the Office of the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court,
Cotabato City;

2. There are apparently decisions of cases which are spurious, as these did not pass
through the regular process such as filing, payment of docket fees, trial, etc. which are now
circulating and being registered in Local Civil Registrars throughout the country, the extent of
which is any body’s guess;

3. The authenticity of the signatures appearing thereon could only be validated by

handwriting experts of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);
 4. The participation of any lower court officials and/or employees could not be ascertained
except probably through a more thorough discreet investigation and or entrapment; [and]

5. There is a possibility that more of this (sic) spurious documents may appear and cause
damage to the Court’s Integrity.2

Meanwhile, in compliance with DCA Villasor’s Indorsement and in response to the Australian
Embassy letter, Judge Indar explained, in a Letter dated 10 March 2010, that "this court is a Court of
General Jurisdiction and can therefore act even on cases involving Family Relations. Hence, the
subject decision rendered by this Court annulling the marriage of your client is VALID and she is free
to marry."
3

In a Memorandum dated 26 April 2010, the OCA recommended that (1) the matter be docketed as a
regular administrative matter; (2) the matter be assigned to a Court of Appeals Justice for
Investigation, Report, and Recommendation; and (3) Judge Indar be preventively suspended,
pending investigation.

In a Resolution dated 4 May 2010, the Court En Banc (1) docketed this administrative matter as
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232, and (2) preventively suspended Judge Indar pending investigation of this
4 

case.

The case was initially raffled to Justice Rodil V. Zalameda of the Court of Appeals, Manila for
investigation. The case was re-raffled to Justice Angelita A. Gacutan (Justice Gacutan) of the Court
of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro due to its proximity to the Regional Trial Courts involved.

Justice Gacutan set the case for hearing on several dates and sent the corresponding notices of
hearing to Judge Indar at his known addresses, namely, his official stations in RTC-Cotabato and
RTC-Shariff Aguak and residence address.

The first notice of hearing dated 21 June 2010, which was sent via registered mail and private
courier LBC, scheduled the hearings on 14, 15, and 16 July 2010 and directed Judge Indar to submit
in affidavit form his explanation. The LBC records show that this notice, which was delivered to
Judge Indar’s official stations, was received by one Mustapha Randang on 28 June 2010.

The scheduled hearing was postponed and reset to 20, 21 and 22 July 2010. The notice of
postponement was sent to Judge Indar via registered mail on 6 July 2010 to his official stations and
was received again by Mustapha Randang on 8 July 2010.

Judge Indar failed to attend the hearing as rescheduled and to submit the affidavit as required. Thus,
in an Order of 23 July 2010, Justice Gacutan directed Judge Indar to explain his non-appearance,
and reset the hearing to 10 and 11 August 2010. The Order was sent to his residence address in M.
Tan Subdivision, Gonzalo Javier St., Rosary Heights, Cotabato City. The LBC report indicated that
the Order was received by a certain Mrs. Asok.

Justice Gacutan also sent a letter dated 23 July 2010 addressed to Atty. Umaima L. Silongan (Atty.
Silongan), Acting Clerk of Court of RTC-Cotabato, directing her to serve the notice of hearing
scheduled on 10 and 11 August 2010 to Judge Indar and to report the steps taken to effect service
of the same. Atty. Silongan submitted a Return of Service, informing that the notices sent to Judge
Indar had remained unserved, as the latter left Cotabato City in April 2010 and his location since
then was unknown.
In a Resolution of 28 September 2010, this Court directed Justice Gacutan to conduct further
investigation to determine the authenticity of the questioned decisions allegedly rendered by Judge
Indar annulling certain marriages. The Court required Justice Gacutan to ascertain whether the
cases were properly filed in court, and who are the parties responsible for the issuance of the
questioned decisions, and to submit a report thereon within 60 days from receipt of the Resolution.

In compliance with the Court’s Resolution, Justice Gacutan directed the Local Civil Registrars of
Manila and Quezon City and Atty. Silongan to submit certified true copies of the questioned
decisions and to testify thereon.

Only the Civil Registrars were present during the hearings on 4 and 5 November 2010. Their
testimonies are summarized as follows:

"Testimonies of Ma. Josefina Encarnacion A. Ocampo, City Civil Registrar of Manila

TSN, November 4, 2010

As City Civil Registrar, she is mandated to receive all registered documents that will affect the status
of the person like the birth, death and marriage contract, court decrees regarding annulment,
adoption, legitimization, the affidavit using the surname of the father, naturalization, the selection of
citizenship, etc. The documents are forwarded to their office after they are being registered by the
concerned parties.

In the case of annulment of marriage, a copy of the decision is submitted to the Civil Registrar by the
one who had his marriage annulled. Per administrative order, it is the duty of the Clerk of Court to
furnish them a copy of the Decision. After the copies of decisions are submitted to them, they are
mandated to verify the authenticity of the decision by writing a verification letter to the Clerk of Court
before making the annotation or changing the parties’ status.

She identified the list of cases of annulment of marriages and petitions changing status of persons
(annexes "A-1" and "A-2") which all came from a court in Cotabato. All the cases listed in A-2 have
already been confirmed or annotated in the records of the Manila Civil Registry. She affirmed that
the said cases in the list were certified true by the clerk of court. As their duty to annotate the said
decrees to their records are merely ministerial, they do not question the decrees however peculiar
they may seem.

The cases listed in the document marked as Annex A-2 were also cases that came from Cotabato
City for their annotation. Although these cases have been certified true by the Clerk of Court, their
annotation and confirmation were held in abeyance due to the on-going investigation of Judge
Indar."

"Testimony of Salvador Cariño,

Chief of Records Division, City Civil Registrar of Quezon City

TSN, November 4, 2010

He generally supervises the retrieval of all the records or documents in their office. He also signs
certified true copies of birth, marriage contract, death certificate and certified true copies of Court’s
decisions furnished to them by different courts.
With regards the decisions issued by the Court in provinces, once the Judge issued the decision
regarding the annulment, the parties concern should first register the decision to the Local Civil
Registrar where the court is situated. After they receive the decision from the Administrative Division,
they would call or write the concerned Local Civil Registrar to authenticate or verify the records. He
identified the cases coming from a Cotabato court that were submitted to them for annotation.

The subject decisions listed in the annexes which were decided by a court in Cotabato City were
already annotated and verified. However he could not ascertain who from the court verified the
authenticity or existence of such decisions as he was not the one who personally called to verify and
authenticate them from the court where the listed Decisions/Orders originate." 5

The Civil Registrar of Manila submitted copies of Decisions, Orders and Resolutions, all signed by
Judge Indar, in forty three (43) cases for annulment of marriage, correction of entry and other similar
cases from RTC-Cotabato City, Branch 15. All the decisions were accompanied by the
corresponding Letter of Atty. Silongan, affirming each of the decisions as true and authentic based
on the records, while thirty six (36) of such decisions are accompanied by Atty. Silongan’s
certification affirming the genuineness of Judge Indar’s signature affixed on the Decisions. 6

On the other hand, the Civil Registrar of Quezon City submitted twenty five (25) Decisions, Orders,
and Resolutions issued by RTC-Cotabato City, Branch 15, which were transmitted to the Registrar’s
office for annotation and recording. All the Decisions were signed by Judge Indar, and accompanied
by Certificates of Finality affirming the genuineness of Judge Indar’s signature appearing above the
name of Judge Cader P. Indar. The Certificates of Finality were issued by Atty. Silongan and in one
case, by Abie Amilil, the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court. 7

Meanwhile, Atty. Silongan, despite notice, failed to attend the hearing. She explained in a
Manifestation of 8 November 2010 that she received the Notice only on 8 November 2010 because
she was on leave from 1 October 1 to 30 November 2010. Thus, the hearing was reset to 11 and 12
January 2011. However, on the scheduled hearing, Atty. Silongan still failed to appear.

Justice Gacutan sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to locate the
whereabouts of Judge Indar, as well as of Atty. Silongan. After several exchanges of
correspondence, the NBI, in a Letter dated 22 March 2011, provided the residence addresses of
both Judge Indar and Atty. Silongan.

Meanwhile, Judge George C. Jabido (Judge Jabido), Acting Presiding Judge of RTC-Shariff Aguak,
Branch 15, was directed to verify the authenticity of the records of the subject Decisions and to
appear at the hearing on 29 March 2011. The hearing was canceled due to the judicial
reorganization in the Court of Appeals.

This administrative matter was re-raffled to Justice Abraham B. Borreta (Justice Borreta) since
Justice Gacutan was reassigned to Manila effective 11 April 2011. Justice Borreta set the hearing on
27 to 29 June 2011. Notices of hearing were sent to Judge Indar and Atty. Silongan at the addresses
provided by the NBI and at their previous mailing addresses. The registered mails addressed to
Judge Indar were returned for the following reasons: (1) "addressee out of town, move to another
place" and (2) addressee "unknown." The Notice sent to Atty. Silongan was also returned and per
LBC report, the consignee has moved to an unknown address.

Judge Jabido, who was notified of the hearing, testified that:

In compliance with the directive of the Investigating Justice to verify the authenticity of the records of
the listed decisions, judgments and orders, he issued memos to the officers of the Court, the Branch
Clerk of Court, the docket clerk, directing them to produce and secure copies of the minutes and
other documents related therein. He personally checked the records of the RTC. The Records of the
RTC are bereft of evidence to show that regular and true proceedings were had on these cases.
There is no showing that a docket fee has been paid for each corresponding cases. There is also no
showing that the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared. There is also no record
that a hearing was conducted. No stenographic notes of the actual proceedings were also made. He
could not also determine when the said cases were submitted for decision as it was not calendared
for that purpose.8

Judge Jabido also submitted a report, portions of which read:

The undersigned took extra efforts to locate any record of the cases involving the parties as
enumerated in the list. The undersigned even issued Memorandum to the Branch Clerk of Court, the
docket clerk and other responsible officers of the Court to produce and secure copies of any
pleading/documents related to these cases enumerated in the list but his efforts proved futile, hence:

a) to this Court, there is no record on file of all the enumerated cases contained in the list.

b) to this Court, it is bereft of any evidence on whether the Hon. Judge Indar conducted a
hearing in these cases.

xxxx

There is absence of any record showing compliance of the same. It is hereby submitted that the
manner upon which the questioned annulment and correction cases, as contained herein in the
attached list, allegedly decided by the Hon. Judge Indar were commenced are clearly doubtful.

Firstly, there is no showing of compliance on the rules prescribed.

xxxx

There is no showing that a verified Petition was officially filed in writing and giving (sic) an
opportunity for the Respondents to be heard by himself or by counsel. x x x 9

To support his findings, Judge Jabido submitted: (1) copies of the Letters and Memoranda
mentioned in the report; (2) the Calendar of Cases in RTC-Cotabato, Branch 15, on various dates
from the period starting April 2007 to 20 October 2009; and (3) the Docket Inventory in Civil Cases,
Criminal Cases and Other Cases for the period of January to December 2009 in RTC-Cotabato,
Branch 15.

Subpoenas were sent to some of the parties in the questioned decisions, namely: Grace Elizarde
Reyes (Special Case No. 1049), Buenaventura Mojica (Apl. Proc. No. 08-1931), Marie Christine N.
Florendo (Civil Case No. 519), Jesse Yamson Faune, Jr. (Special Civil Case 08-2366), Rosemarie
Tongson Ramos (Special Case No. 08-1871) and Melissa Sangan-Demafelis (Spl. Proc. 07-2262) to
determine whether they filed the petitions for annulment of marriage and whether proceedings were
actually had before Judge Indar’s sala in relation to their cases. All the subpoenas were returned to
the Court of Appeals.

In his Report dated 2 September 2011, Justice Borreta first determined whether the requirements of
due process had been complied with since there was no proof that Judge Indar personally and
actually received any of the notices sent to him in the course of the investigation.
Justice Borreta differentiated administrative due process with judicial due process. He stated that
"while a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative
proceedings since they rest upon different principles."

Justice Borreta noted that all possible means to locate Judge Indar and to personally serve the court
notices to him were resorted to. The notices of hearing were sent to Judge Indar’s known addresses,
namely, his sala in RTC-Cotabato Branch 14 and RTC-Shariff Aguak Branch 15, and at his
residence address. However, none of the notices appeared to have been personally received by
Judge Indar.

Notwithstanding, Justice Borreta concluded that the requirements of due process have been
complied with. Justice Borreta stated that Judge Indar was aware of a pending administrative case
against him. The notice of this Court’s Resolution of 4 May 2010, preventively suspending Judge
Indar, was mailed and sent to him at his sala in RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15.

Justice Borreta proceeded to determine Judge Indar’s administrative liability, and found the latter
guilty of serious misconduct and dishonesty.

According to Justice Borreta, Judge Indar’s act of issuing decisions on annulment of marriage cases
without complying with the stringent procedural and substantive requirements of the Rules of Court
for such cases clearly violates the Code of Judicial Conduct. Judge Indar made it appear that the
annulment cases underwent trial, when the records show no judicial proceedings occurred.

Moreover, Judge Indar’s act of "affirming in writing before the Australian Embassy the validity of a
decision he allegedly rendered," when in fact that case does not appear in the court’s records,
constitutes dishonesty.

Justice Borreta recommended the dismissal of Judge Indar from service, and the investigation of
Atty. Silongan, who is not included as respondent in this case, on her participation in the certification
of the authenticity of the spurious Decisions.

The sole issue in this case is whether Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty.

We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice.

The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which govern the conduct of
disciplinary and non-disciplinary proceedings in administrative cases, clearly provide that technical
rules of procedure and evidence do not strictly apply to administrative proceedings. Section 3, Rule I
of the Uniform Rules states:

Section 3. Technical Rules in Administrative Investigations. –Administrative investigations shall be

conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and evidence
applicable to judicial proceedings.

In Cornejo v. Gabriel, the Court held that notice and hearing are not indispensable in administrative
10 

investigations, thus:

The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative proceeding and not
with a judicial proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on constitutional Law, has
well said, due process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by means of
which the Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive or
administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is
a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings it is otherwise since
they rest upon different principles. In certain proceedings, therefore, of an administrative
character, it may be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and
hearing are not essential to due process of law. x x x (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
11 

It is settled that "technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative
proceedings. Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense." It is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against
12 

him is decided. Otherwise stated, in the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to
13 

be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. 14

The Court emphasized in Cornejo the Constitutional precept that public office is a public
15 

trust, which is the underlying principle for the relaxation of the requirements of due process of law in
16 

administrative proceedings, thus:

Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to
consider an office as "property." It is, however, well settled in the United States, that a public office
is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is
a public trust or agency. (Emphasis supplied)
17 

In this case, Judge Indar was given ample opportunity to controvert the charges against him. While
there is no proof that Judge Indar personally received the notices of hearing issued by the
Investigating Justices, the first two notices of hearing were received by one Mustapha Randang of
the Clerk of Court, RTC-Cotabato, while one of the notices was received by a certain Mrs. Asok, who
were presumably authorized and capable to receive notices on behalf of Judge Indar.

Further, Judge Indar cannot feign ignorance of the administrative investigation against him because
aside from the fact that the Court’s Resolution suspending him was mailed to him, his preventive
suspension was reported in major national newspapers. Moreover, Judge Indar was repeatedly sent
18 

notices of hearings to his known addresses. Thus, there was due notice on Judge Indar of the
charges against him. However, Judge Indar still failed to file his explanation and appear at the
scheduled hearings. Consequently, the investigation proceeded ex parte in accordance with Section
4, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. 19

Public office is a public trust. This constitutional principle requires a judge, like any other public
20 

servant and more so because of his exalted position in the Judiciary, to exhibit at all times the
highest degree of honesty and integrity. As the visible representation of the law tasked with
21 

dispensing justice, a judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner that would merit the
respect and confidence of the people. 22

Judge Indar miserably failed to live up to these exacting standards.

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, the Court explained the difference between simple
23 

misconduct and grave misconduct, thus:

The Court defines misconduct as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." The misconduct is grave
if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to
disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished
from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.
In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases which do not
exist in the records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. There is nothing to show that (1) proceedings were had on the
questioned cases; (2) docket fees had been paid; (3) the parties were notified of a scheduled
hearing as calendared; (4) hearings had been conducted; or (5) the cases were submitted for
decision. As found by the Audit Team, the list of case titles submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of
Manila and Quezon City are not found in the list of cases filed, pending or decided in RTC, Branch
15, Shariff Aguak, nor in the records of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Cotabato City. In other words, Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued
decisions on the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any showing that such cases
underwent trial and complied with the statutory and jurisprudential requisites for voiding marriages.
Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct.

The Court condemns Judge Indar’s reprehensible act of issuing Decisions that voided marital
unions, without conducting any judicial proceedings. Such malfeasance not only makes a mockery of
marriage and its life-changing consequences but likewise grossly violates the basic norms of truth,
justice, and due process. Not only that, Judge Indar’s gross misconduct greatly undermines the
people’s faith in the judiciary and betrays public trust and confidence in the courts. Judge Indar’s
utter lack of moral fitness has no place in the Judiciary. Judge Indar deserves nothing less than
dismissal from the service.

The Court defines dishonesty as:

x x x a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of

honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray." 24

In this case, Judge Indar issued Decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases when in fact
he did not conduct any judicial proceedings on the cases. Not even the filing of the petitions
occurred. Judge Indar made it appear in his Decisions that the annulment cases complied with the
stringent requirements of the Rules of Court and the strict statutory and jurisprudential conditions for
voiding marriages, when quite the contrary is true, violating Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
which mandates that a judge "perform official duties honestly."

As found by the Audit Team, the list of cases submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and
Quezon City do not appear in the records of cases received, pending, or disposed by RTC-Shariff
Aguak, Branch 15, which Judge Indar presided. The cases do not likewise exist in the docket books
of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC-Cotabato. The Audit Team also noted that the case numbers
in the list are not within the series of case numbers recorded in the docket books of either RTC-
Shariff Aguak or RTC-Cotabato.

Moreover, Judge Jabido, Acting Presiding Judge of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, verified the
records of the trial court and found nothing to show that proceedings were had on the questioned
annulment cases. There was nothing in the records to show that (1) petitions were filed; (2) docket
fees were paid; (3) the parties were notified of hearings; (4) hearings were calendared and actually
held; (5) stenographic notes of the proceedings were taken; and (6) the cases were submitted for
decision.

Among the questioned annulment decrees is Judge Indar’s Decision dated 23 May 2007, in Spec.
Proc. No. 06-581, entitled "Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan V. Aguiling." Despite the fact that no
proceedings were conducted in the case, Judge Indar declared categorically, in response to the
Australian Embassy letter, that the Decision annulling the marriage is valid and that petitioner is free
to marry. In effect, Judge Indar confirms the truthfulness of the contents of the annulment decree,
highlighting Judge Indar’s appalling dishonesty.

The Court notes that this is not Judge Indar’s first offense. In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953, the Court
25 

imposed on him a fine of ₱10,000 for violating Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, when he
issued a preliminary injunction without any hearing and prior notice to the parties. In another
case, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2069, the Court found him guilty of gross misconduct for committing
26 

violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and accordingly fined him ₱25,000.

Since this is Judge Indar’s third offense, showing the depravity of his character and aggravating the
27 

serious offenses of gross misconduct and dishonesty, the Court imposes on Judge Indar the
28 

ultimate penalty of dismissal from the service, with its accessory penalties, pursuant to Section 11,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. 29

This administrative case against Judge Indar shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding
against him as a member of the Bar, in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. This Resolution
30 

entitled "Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who
are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of
the Philippine Bar," provides:

Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the

Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are
based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the
Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally
recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a
disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member
of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause
why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member
of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or
resolution. (Emphasis supplied)

Indisputably, Judge Indar’s gross misconduct and dishonesty likewise constitute a breach of the
following Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful act.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION.

In addition, Judge Indar’s dishonest act of issuing decisions making it appear that the annulment
cases underwent trial and complied with the Rules of Court, laws, and established jurisprudence
violates the lawyer’s oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court." Such
violation is also a ground for disbarment. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of
a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)

In Samson v. Caballero, where the Court automatically disbarred the respondent judge, pursuant to
31 

the provisions of AM. No. 02-9-02-SC, the Court held:

Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and
show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as
member of the Bar." The rule does not make it mandatory, before respondent may be held liable as
a member of the bar, that respondent be required to comment on and show cause why he should
not be disciplinary sanctioned as a lawyer separately from the order for him to comment on why he
should not be held administratively liable as a member of the bench. In other words, an order to
comment on the complaint is an order to give an explanation on why he should not be held
administratively liable not only as a member of the bench but also as a member of the bar. This is
the fair and reasonable meaning of "automatic conversion" of administrative cases against justices
and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of
A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by treating an
administrative complaint filed against a member of the bench also as a disciplinary proceeding
against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the rule. Thus, a disciplinary proceeding as a member
of the bar is impliedly instituted with the filing of an administrative case against a justice of the
Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a first- or second-level
court.

It cannot be denied that respondent’s dishonesty did not only affect the image of the judiciary, it also
put his moral character in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continue in the practice of law.
Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a
continuing requirement to the practice of law. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable
profession and attain its basic ideals, those counted within its ranks should not only master its tenets
and principles but should also accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral
character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the
possession of legal learning. (Emphasis supplied)

Considering that Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty, constituting violations of
the Lawyer’s Oath, and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Judge Indar deserves disbarment.

In so far as Atty. Silongan, is concerned, we adopt Justice Borreta’s recommendation to conduct an

investigation on her alleged participation in the authentication of the questioned Decisions.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Cader P. Indar, Al Haj, Presiding Judge of the
RTC, Branch 14, Cotabato City and Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak,
Maguindanao, guilty of Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty for which he is DISMISSED from the
service, with forfeiture of all benefits due him, except accrued leave benefits, if any, with prejudice to
re-employment in any branch of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.1âwphi1
Judge Indar is likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into Judge Indar’s record as a member of the bar and notice
of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

The Office of the Court Administrator is ORDERED to investigate Atty. Umaima L. Silongan, Acting
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City, on her alleged participation in the
authentication of the questioned Decisions on the annulment of marriage cases issued by Judge
Indar.

Let copies of this Decision be forwarded to the Local Civil Registrars of the City of Manila and
Quezon City, the same to form part of the records of Decisions of Judge Indar on the annulment of
marriages filed with their offices.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216               June 26, 2012
(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2788-RTJ)

STATE PROSECUTORS II JOSEF ALBERT T. COMILANG and MA. VICTORIA SUÑEGA-

LAGMAN, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 36, CALAMBA
CITY, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by State Prosecutors Josef Albert T. Comilang
(State Prosecutor Comilang) and Ma. Victoria Suñega-Lagman (State Prosecutor Lagman) against
respondent Judge Arnaldo Medel B. Belen (Judge Belen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Calamba City, Branch 36, for manifest partiality and bias, evident bad faith, inexcusable abuse of
authority, and gross ignorance of the law.

The Facts

State Prosecutor Comilang, by virtue of Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP) Order No.
05-07 dated February 7, 2005, was designated to assist the Office of the City Prosecutor of Calamba
City in the prosecution of cases. On February 16, 2005, he appeared before Judge Belen of the RTC
of Calamba City, Branch 36, manifesting his inability to appear on Thursdays because of his inquest
duties in the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office of Laguna. Thus, on February 21, 2005, he moved that all
cases scheduled for hearing on February 24, 2005 before Judge Belen be deferred because he was
set to appear for preliminary investigation in the Provincial Prosecutor's Office on the same day.

Instead of granting the motion, Judge Belen issued his February 24, 2005 Order in Criminal Case
No. 12654-2003-C entitled People of the Philippines v. Jenelyn Estacio ("Estacio Case") requiring
him to (1) explain why he did not inform the court of his previously-scheduled preliminary
investigation and (2) pay a fine of ₱500.00 for the cancellation of all the scheduled hearings.

In response, State Prosecutor Comilang filed his Explanation with Motion for Reconsideration,
followed by a Reiterative Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Early Resolution. On May
30, 2005, Judge Belen directed him to explain why he should not be cited for contempt for the
unsubstantiated, callous and reckless charges extant in his Reiterative Supplemental Motion, and to
pay the postponement fee in the amount of ₱1,200.00 for the 12 postponed cases during the
February 17, 2005 hearing.

In his comment/explanation, State Prosecutor Comilang explained that the contents of his
Reiterative Supplemental Motion were based on "his personal belief made in good faith and with
grain of truth." Nonetheless, Judge Belen rendered a Decision dated December 12, 2005 finding
State Prosecutor Comilang liable for contempt of court and for payment of ₱20,000.00 as penalty.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied on February 16, 2006, he filed a motion to post a
supersedeas bond to stay the execution of the said Decision, which Judge Belen granted and fixed
in the amount of ₱20,000.00.
On April 12, 2006, State Prosecutor Comilang filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94069 assailing Judge Belen’s May 30, 2005 Order and
December 12, 2005 Decision in the Estacio Case. On April 24, 2006, the CA issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) enjoining Judge Belen from executing and enforcing his assailed Order and
1 

Decision for a period of 60 days, which was subsequently extended with the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
2

Notwithstanding the TRO, Judge Belen issued an Order on September 6, 2007 requiring State
3 

Prosecutor Comilang to explain his refusal to file the supersedeas bond and to appear on
September 26, 2007 to explain why he should not be cited indirect contempt of court. In his
Compliance, State Prosecutor Comilang cited the CA’s injunctive writ putting on hold all actions of
4 

the RTC relative to its May 30, 2005 Order and December 12, 2005 Decision during the pendency of
CA-G.R. SP No. 94069. He also manifested that he was waiving his appearance on the scheduled
5 

hearing for the indirect contempt charge against him.

Nevertheless, Judge Belen issued an Order dated September 26, 2007 directing State Prosecutor
6 

Comilang to explain his defiance of the subpoena and why he should not be cited for indirect
contempt. Judge Belen likewise ordered the Branch Clerk of Court to issue a subpoena for him to
appear in the October 1, 2007 hearing regarding his failure to comply with previously-
issued subpoenas on September 18, 2007, and on October 8, 2007 for the hearing on the non-filing
of his supersedeas bond. State Prosecutor Comilang moved to quash the subpoenas for having
7 

been issued without jurisdiction and in defiance to the lawful order of the CA, and for the inhibition of
Judge Belen.

In an Order dated October 1, 2007, Judge Belen denied the motion to quash subpoenas, held State
8 

Prosecutor Comilang guilty of indirect contempt of court for his failure to obey a duly
served subpoena, and sentenced him to pay a fine of ₱30,000.00 and to suffer two days'
imprisonment. He was also required to post a supersedeas bond amounting to ₱30,000.00 to stay
the execution of the December 12, 2005 Decision. 9

Aggrieved, State Prosecutor Comilang filed a complaint-affidavit on October 18, 2007 before the
10 

Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging Judge Belen with manifest partiality and malice,
evident bad faith, inexcusable abuse of authority, and gross ignorance of the law in issuing the show
cause orders, subpoenas and contempt citations, in grave defiance to the injunctive writ issued by
the CA. State Prosecutor Comilang alleged that Judge Belen's acts were intended to harass,
oppress, persecute, intimidate, annoy, vex and coerce him, and to place him in a disadvantageous
and compromising position, as he was prosecuting the libel case instituted by herein complainant
State Prosecutor Lagman against Judge Belen when he was still a practicing lawyer, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 15332-SP and pending before Branch 32 of the RTC of San Pablo City. This libel
case eventually became the basis for Administrative Case No. 6687 for disbarment against Judge
Belen.

To further show Judge Belen’s flagrant violation of his oath of office, State Prosecutors Comilang
and Lagman jointly filed a letter-complaint dated September 28, 2007 addressed to the Office of the
11 

Chief Justice, which the OCA treated as a supplemental complaint. They averred that State
Prosecutor Jorge Baculi, who found probable cause to indict Judge Belen with libel in Criminal Case
No. 15332-SP, was also harassed and oppressed by Judge Belen with his baseless and malicious
citation for contempt and with the use of foul, unethical and insulting statements.

The Action and Recommendation of the OCA

The OCA directed Judge Belen to comment on State Prosecutors Comilang and Lagman's charges
against him.

In his Joint Comment dated March 7, 2008, Judge Belen claimed that the allegations against him
12 

are factually misplaced and jurisprudentially unmeritorious, as his assailed orders were issued in
accordance with the Rules of Court and settled jurisprudence. He explained that the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the CA only enjoined him from enforcing, executing and
implementing the May 30, 2005 Order and December 12, 2005 Decision, but it never prohibited him
from asking State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his failure to comply with the order requiring the
posting of supersedeas bond to defer the implementation of the mentioned judgment, in accordance
with Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He thus prayed for the dismissal of the instant
administrative complaint, claiming to have discharged his judicial functions not in a gross, deliberate
and malicious manner.

In its Report dated November 27, 2009, the OCA found Judge Belen to have violated Section 4,
13 

Rule 71 of the Rules of Court by failing to separately docket or consolidate with the principal case
(the Estacio Case) the indirect contempt charge against State Prosecutor Comilang. It also found
Judge Belen to have blatantly violated the injunctive writ of the CA when he issued the orders
requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain why he failed to post a supersedeas bond which,
given the antecedents of his administrative cases, showed manifest bias and partiality tantamount to
bad faith and grave abuse of authority.

Judge Belen was likewise found to have violated the following provisions of the Code of Judicial
Conduct:

Canon 2 – A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF

IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES

Rule 2.01 – A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.

Canon 3 – A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH

IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE ADJUDICATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

Rule 3.01 – A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.

Thus, the OCA recommended, inter alia, that Judge Belen be adjudged guilty of manifest bias and
partiality, grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law and accordingly, be dismissed
from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice
to reemployment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned and controlled corporations and government financial institutions.

The Issue

The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether Judge Belen's actuations showed manifest
partiality and bias, evident bad faith, grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law
warranting his dismissal from service as RTC Judge of Branch 36, Calamba City.

The Ruling of the Court

After a careful evaluation of the records of the instant case, the Court concurs with the findings and
recommendations of the OCA, but only in part.

Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt may be

initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or
any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon
full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the
court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard
and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the
contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphasis supplied)

Indirect contempt proceedings, therefore, may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by the
court through an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt; or (2) by a verified petition and upon compliance with the
requirements for initiatory pleadings. In the second instance, the verified petition for contempt shall
14 

be docketed, heard and decided separately unless the court in its discretion orders the contempt
charge, which arose out of or related to the principal action, to be consolidated with the main action
for joint hearing and decision.

In this case, the contempt charge was commenced not through a verified petition, but by Judge
Belen motu proprio through the issuance of an order requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to show
cause why he should not be cited for indirect contempt. As such, the requirements of the rules that
the verified petition for contempt be docketed, heard and decided separately or consolidated with the
principal action find no application. Consequently, Judge Belen was justified in not directing the
contempt charge against State Prosecutor Comilang to be docketed separately or consolidated with
the principal action, i.e., the Estacio Case.

However, Judge Belen blatantly violated the injunctive writ issued by the CA enjoining the
implementation of his May 30, 2005 Order and December 12, 2005 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
94069.

A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main case subject to the latter’s
outcome. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the court hears fully the merits of the
case. Its primary purpose is not to correct a wrong already consummated, or to redress an injury
already sustained, or to punish wrongful acts already committed, but to preserve and protect the
rights of the litigants during the pendency of the case. The status quo should be that existing ante
15 

litem motam or at the time of the filing of the case.16

The CA's Resolution dated July 12, 2006 states in part:

17 

In order not to render the issues in this case moot and academic, We had in our Resolution of April
24, 2006 granted a Temporary Restraining Order for 60 days from notice directing the respondent
Judge to refrain from executing his order of May 30, 2005 and decision of December 12, 2005
declaring petitioner in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a postponement fee of P1,200 and
penalty of P20,000. Considering that the TRO is about to expire, for the same reasons provided
under Section 3(b) and (c) Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue, to
be effective during the pendency of this case, ordering the respondent Judge to refrain from
enforcing his disputed issuances of May 30, 2005 and December 12, 2005. The petitioner is
exempted from posting the bond, since no private interests are affected in this case.

As aptly pointed out by the OCA, the CA's disquisition is clear and categorical. In complete
disobedience to the said Resolution, however, Judge Belen proceeded to issue (1) the September 6,
2007 Order requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his refusal to file the supersedeas bond
18 

and to require his presence in court on September 26, 2007, as well as to explain why he should not
be cited for indirect contempt; (2) the September 26, 2007 Order seeking State Prosecutor
19 

Comilang's explanation for his defiance of the subpoena requiring his presence at the hearing of
even date, and directing, once again, his attendance at the next hearing on October 1, 2007 and to
explain once more why he should not be cited for indirect contempt; and (3) the October 1, 2007
Order finding State Prosecutor Comilang guilty of indirect contempt and sentencing him to pay a fine
20 

of ₱30,000.00 and to suffer two days' imprisonment.

Hence, in requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his non-filing of a supersedeas bond, in
issuing subpoenas to compel his attendance before court hearings relative to the contempt
proceedings, and finally, in finding him guilty of indirect contempt for his non-compliance with the
issued subpoenas, Judge Belen effectively defeated the status quo which the writ of preliminary
injunction aimed to preserve.

In the case of Pesayco v. Layague, the Court succinctly explained:

21 

No less than the Code of Judicial conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the laws and
maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence is a mark of a good judge. A judge must be
acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with procedural rules. When a judge displays
an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our
courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes
the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a
sign of incompetence. Basic rules of procedure must be at the palm of a judge’s hands.

Thus, this Court has consistently held that a judge is presumed to know the law and when the law is
so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Verily, failure to follow
basic legal commands embodied in the law and the Rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law,
from which no one is excused, and surely not a judge. 22

This is because judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes
and procedural laws.  They must know the laws and apply them properly in good faith as judicial
1âwphi1

competence requires no less. Moreover, refusal to honor an injunctive order of a higher court
23 

constitutes contempt, as in this case, where Judge Belen, in contumaciously defying the injunctive
24 

order issued by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 94069, was found guilty of indirect contempt in CA-G.R.
SP No. 101081. 25

Judge Belen's actuations, therefore, cannot be considered as mere errors of judgment that can be
easily brushed aside. Obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law or procedure amounts
to inexcusable abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law. Likewise, citing State Prosecutor
Comilang for indirect contempt notwithstanding the effectivity of the CA-issued writ of injunction
demonstrated his vexatious attitude and bad faith towards the former, for which he must be held
accountable and subjected to disciplinary action.
Accordingly, in imposing the proper penalty, the Court takes note of Judge Belen’s previous
administrative cases where he was penalized in the following manner:

Docket No. Case Title Charge Penalty

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119 Mane v. Judge Belen 26

Conduct Unbecoming Reprimand, with
of a Judge warning that a
repetition of the same
or similar acts shall
merit a more serious
penalty
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2176 Baculi v. Judge Belen 27
Gross Ignorance of the Suspended for 6
Law months without salary
and other benefits, with
stern warning that a
repetition of the same
or similar acts shall
merit a more serious
penalty
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2242 Correa v. Judge Belen 28
Conduct Unbecoming Fined for
of a Judge PhP10,000.00 with
stern warning that a
repetition of the same
or similar acts shall
merit a more serious
penalty
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2139 Belen v. Judge Belen 29
Violation of Section 4 Fined for PhP11,000
of Canon 1 and with stern warning that
Section 1 of Canon 4 a repetition of the
of the New Code of same or similar acts
Judicial Conduct shall merit a more
serious penalty

Our conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who have a mastery of the principles of law,
who discharge their duties in accordance with law. Hence, with the foregoing disquisitions and
30 

Judge Belen’s previous infractions, which are all of serious nature and for which he had been
severely warned, the Court therefore adopts the recommendation of the OCA to mete the ultimate
penalty of dismissal against Judge Belen for grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the
law. The Court can no longer afford to be lenient in this case, lest it give the public the impression
that incompetence and repeated offenders are tolerated in the judiciary. 31

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, having been found guilty of grave abuse
of authority and gross ignorance of the law, is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all
benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in the government
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned and controlled
corporations and government financial institutions. He shall forthwith CEASE and DESIST from
performing any official act or function appurtenant to his office upon service on him of this Decision.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the records of Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen with the
Court.1âwphi1
SO ORDERED.

Adm. Case No. 3066 - December 3, 2001

J.K. MERCADO AND SONS AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, INC., and SPOUSES JESUS and
ROSARIO K. MERCADO, complainants, v. ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA and JOSE RONGKALES
BANDALAN, respondents.

RESOLUTION

VITUG, J.:

A complaint for disbarment against Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera was filed by J.K. Mercado and Sons
Agricultural Enterprises, Inc., and the spouses Jesus Mercado and Rosario Mercado. The complaint was
an offshoot of an action, entitled "Rosario P. Mercado ('R. Mercado') vs. Jesus R. Mercado ('J.
Mercado'), Mercado and Sons and Standard Fruits Corporation ('Stanfilco')," docketed Civil Case No.
17215, for dissolution and liquidation of conjugal partnership, accounting, support with
support pendente lite,  annulment of contract, reconveyance or recovery of possession of conjugal
share, partition, damages and attorney's fees. The case was assigned to Branch 14 of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City presided over by Judge Jose Bandalan. Rosario Mercado was represented by
respondent Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera.

On 15 December 1986, the case was decided in favor of Rosario Mercado who was awarded the sum
of a little over P9 million. A writ of execution was issued and notices of garnishment were served on
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation ("RCBC") at Claveria, Davao City; RCBC at Tagum, Davao del
Norte; and Traders Royal Bank at R. Magsaysay Avenue, Davao City, where the total amount of
P1,270,734.66 was garnished .

On 26 February 1987, Rosario Mercado terminated the services of respondent and tendered the
amount of P350,000.00 by way of attorney's fees. She demanded an accounting and the turn-over of
the money still in the custody of respondent but the latter refused, claiming that he was entitled to
P2,254,217.00 attorney's fees. Failing to recover the amount, Rosario Mercado filed a complaint for
disbarment against respondent.

The matter was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The IBP Board of Governors, on 23 March 1993, adopted Resolution No. X-93-41, recommending the
suspension for one (1) year of Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera from the practice of law.

The Court, in its resolution of 26 October 1999, affirmed the IBP recommendation with modification
that respondent Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera be suspended from the practice of law for only six (6)
months. Respondent was likewise ordered to return to Rosario Mercado the amount in excess of
P350,000.00 still in his possession, without prejudice to whatever judicial action he might wish to take
to recover his unsatisfied attorney's fees, if any, the resolution directing at the same time that his
suspension would stand until he would have satisfactorily shown to the Court his compliance
therewith.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied with finality in the resolution of
the Court, dated 02 February 2000, a copy of which was received by respondent on 22 February 2000.

The following pleadings were thereafter filed before the Court:

a) An urgent motion, dated 13 March 2000, filed by respondent praying that the remaining period of
his suspension be lifted;

b) A motion for leave to file and admit a manifestation and motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution, dated 15 March 2000, filed by Rosario Mercado;

c) A manifestation and motion, dated 15 March 2000, filed by Rosario Mercado, praying that a writ of
execution be issued compelling respondent to pay or return to her the sum of P396,692.20;

d) A motion for leave to file and admit a manifestation, dated 27 March 2000, filed by Rosario
Mercado, praying for the imposition of appropriate sanction against respondent;

e) A letter, dated 11 February 2000, of Mr. Jose Elises, and another letter of of 08 March 2000 of
Capt. Edward Ranada from Davao City, inquiring whether or not respondent could practice law
pending the resolution of his motion for reconsideration; and

f) A comment and opposition, dated 31 March 2000, filed by respondent relative to the manifestation
and motion for the issuance of a writ of execution filed by Rosario Mercado.

On 24 May 2000, respondent informed the Court that in compliance with its resolution of 26 October
1999, he had voluntarily returned to Rosario Mercado the amount of P114,042.28 or the excess of
P350,000.00 still in his possession.

On 12 July 2000, the Court issued a resolution to the effect that the effectivity of suspension of
respondent should be reckoned from his receipt, on 22 February 2000 of the resolution, dated 2
February 2000, of the Court (denying with finality the motion for reconsideration). The Court took
note of the court appearances of, and pleadings signed by, respondent during his period of suspension
from the practice of law. Respondent was required to explain his infractions. Meanwhile, the Court
resolved to remand to the IBP the issue regarding the determination of the exact amount given by
complainant to respondent and the amount to be returned by respondent.

On 25 October 2000, the Court issued another resolution referring to the IBP, for investigation, report
and recommendation, the matter of respondent's alleged unauthorized practice of law.

The IBP, in its report of 08 October 2001, made the following findings:

As to the issue of how much money is still in respondent's possession -

"To summarize, respondent was able to disburse and/or account to complainant the following, to wit:

Amount deposited to complainant's TRB

and Metrobank account P300,000.00

Additional amount received by

complainant, as admitted 10,000.00

Amount received by complainant from CBC

garnished funds 5,000.00

Amount received by complainant by way of

BPI drafts & plane fare 52,000.00
 Respondent's expenses in connection with
Civil Case No. 17,215 and three CA cases 57.832.67

  P424,832.67

"Deducting said amount from the amount received by respondent by way of garnished funds from
several banks in Davao City would leave a balance of P845,901.89 (P1 ,270, 734.56 minus
P424,832.67).

"Since respondent was allowed to retain for himself the amount of P350,000.00 by way of attorney's
fees and respondent voluntarily paid and/or returned to complainant the amount P114,042.28 per BPI
Manager's Check 497289 in compliance with the Supreme Court directive, such amounts should be
deducted or applied against respondent's accountability of P845,901.89. Therefore, respondent still
has in his possession the amount of P381,859.61, after deducting the attorney's fees and the
voluntary payment by respondent. Thus,

Amount received by respondent P1 ,270,

 
by way of garnished funds 734.56

Less: Disbursements/Deductions
 
as discussed above 424.832.67

Amount to be accounted for by

 
respondent P845,901.89

Less: (1) Respondent's

 
attorney's fees P350,000.00

(2) Amount voluntarily returned

by respondent 114.042.28 464.042.28

Amount still in respondent's

 
possession P381,859.61

"Respondent is obliged to deliver to complainant the amount of P381,859.61 pursuant to Rule 16.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand."

Anent the alleged unauthorized practice of law by respondent during the period of his
suspension -

a) Re: His appearance before Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation ("HIGC") and the filing of
the Manifestation on Amicable Settlement.  -

"There is no doubt that respondent's appearance before the HIGC and his subsequent filing of the
Manifestation on Amicable Settlement constitute practice of law in violation of his suspension order. A
cursory reading of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the proceedings before the HIGC
on 24 February 2000 (Exhibit 'D' to 'D-14,' Complainant's Formal Offer of Documentary
Evidence) reveal that respondent's purpose in appearing before the HIGC is to attend the scheduled
preliminary conference. During the preliminary conference, the parties - Atty. De Vera, the Hearing
Officer, and the opposing counsel - discussed the facts and circumstances of the case. They also
discussed the possibility of an amicable settlement. These are acts which require legal expertise,
training and experience.

"Respondent explained in his affidavit that he was at HIGC precisely to inform the hearing officer of
his suspension. Considering the delicate nature of his situation, respondent should have, at the start
of the preliminary conference, explicitly manifested in open court regarding his suspension. Assuming
that respondent did not really intend to appear as counsel in said preliminary conference, his
appearance as counsel was clearly evident when he subsequently filed the Manifestation on Offer of
Amicable Settlement. Practice of law includes signing and filing of pleadings."

b) Re: His appearance in People vs. Jailen Paul.  -

"Respondent's ex-parte  direct examination of Mrs. Eva Antipuesto was a flagrant and blatant violation

of his suspension order. Having been suspended effective 22 February 2000, respondent should have
refrained from performing acts constituting practice of law - which include conducting a direct
examination of a witness. Respondent's explanation that he was constrained to conduct a direct
examination because of constant pleas by complainant, Ms. Eva Antipuesto, to speed up the case
cannot justify respondent's violation of his suspension order. Besides, considering that he was under
the control and supervision of the public prosecutor, respondent should have allowed the public
prosecutor Danilo Bello, who was present on 29 February 2000 hearing, to conduct the direct
examination. No amount of explanation can change the fact [that] respondent conducted the direct
examination knowing fully well that he was suspended by Supreme Court from the practice of law. As
to the Motion to Reset filed by respondent in the said case, the same constitutes practice of law."

c) Re: His appearance in "People vs. Nilda Cuison Go and People vs. Neolito Egot" on 07 March  2001.
-

"As regards to the alleged appearance by respondent in the 'Nilda Cuison Go' case, complainant
Mercado was not able to show convincing proof that respondent actively practiced law by appearing as
private prosecutor in said case. The Certification issued by the Clerk of Court III cannot be considered
a proof that respondent actively practiced law. Respondent was able to explain fully that his
appearance was only to verify the case status of the case. However, respondent's appearance in the
'Neolito Egot' [case] is considered practice of law because he appeared before the court and
represented himself as private prosecutor. Respondent's subsequent desistance is of no moment
because there was intent on his part to appear as private prosecutor."

d) Re: His appearance in "People of the Phils. vs. Edgardo Estareja."  -

"After a careful study of the parties' claims and defenses, respondent's appearance on 1 June 2000 for
the promulgation of Decision and the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration constitute practice of law
in defiance of the Supreme Court Resolution. It appears that respondent did not, merely attend' the
promulgation of the judgment, respondent acted and appeared as counsel for the accused and actively
participated in the proceedings. As a matter of fact, after the promulgation of the decision, respondent
manifested in open court their intention to appeal and respondent even gave his comments on the
Decision of the trial court. These are acts that can be performed only by a lawyer who is authorized to
practice law. Needless to say, he was also acting as counsel for the accused when he filed the Motion
for Reconsideration."

e) Re: His appearance as legal counsel  of the LAKAS-NUCD before the Board of Canvasser
on 17 May  2000. -

"Respondent admitted having appeared at the canvassing in question but claims that his participation
therein was 'merely like that of a non-lawyer acting as representative of Governor Del Rosario and
Representative Floreindo.' When LAKAS-NUCD hired the services of respondent, he was hired not as a
mere representative of its candidates. Respondent was hired to protect the interest of its candidates in
accordance with the election laws. Reading from the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the
canvassing, there was an active and actual exercise of his legal knowledge and expertise. Thus, his
appearance constitutes practice of law."

f) Re: Complaint  of Atty. Honesto Cabarroguis. -

"After a careful study of complainant's allegation, complainant Atty. Cabarroguis failed to provide this
Office convincing evidence that respondent actually passed on 'notes' to his son to guide the latter in
his direct examination. The act of passing a 'piece of paper' inside the courtroom during the trial does
not involve legal expertise or the application of legal knowledge and therefore does not constitute
practice of law."

g) Re: Complaint  of Mr. Jailen Paul. -

"Exhibit 'EE' is a Manifestation dated 21 May 2001 signed by respondent requesting for a resetting of
the case. Exhibit 'FF' is the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing on 10 October
2000 of the case 'People of the Philippines vs. Jailen Paul' before the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City. Exhibit 'GG' is an Urgent Motion to Reset dated 3 October 2000 signed by Francis Arnold De Vera
(for Eduardo De Vera).

"The pleadings filed clearly show that respondent De Vera practiced law during his suspension. The
practice of law includes filing of pleadings before the courts.

h) Re: Pleadings filed by respondent during his suspension. -

"In the following cases, respondent violated his suspension order and practiced law when he signed
the following pleadings which were filed before the regular courts.

"Urgent Manifestation with motion to defer Issuance of Writ of Execution (Exhibit 'T' , Complainant's

Formal Offer of Exhibit) dated 07 June 2000 in the case 'Socorro Tiongko et at., vs. Loreto Rosca,'
Civil Case No. 3241-8-96;

"Urgent Ex-Parte Request Reiterating Urgent Prayer for 20-Day TRO (Exhibit 'U') dated 7 June 2000 in
the case, Republic of the Philippines vs. Estate of Vicenta Tongko, Civil Case No. 27-544-99;

"Defendant's Pre-Trial Brief (Exhibit 'V') dated 30 May 2000 in the case 'Alcrej Corporation vs. Raquel
Camisura and Cesar Camisura,' Civil Case No. 2815-F-96;

"Defendant's Pre-Trial Brief (Exhibit 'W') dated 30 May 2000 in the case 'Ricardo Gahol et al., versus
Eliseo Gatapia' Civil Case No. 2817-F-96;

"Defendant's Pre-Trial Brief (Exhibit 'X') dated 30 May 2000 in the case 'Ricardo Gahol, et al. vs. Eliseo
Gatapia' Civil Case No. 2818-F-96; and

"Ex-Parte Urgent Request to Set Continuation of Hearing Contempt Incident (Exhibit 'Z')  dated 23
June 2000 in the case 'Panabo Public Market Vendors Estension Association, Inc. vs. Municipality of
Panabo,' Civil Case No. 89-23.

The IBP concluded that, in numerous occasions during the period of his suspension, respondent
engaged in the practice of law despite the absence of an order from the Supreme Court lifting his
suspension and that, on the basis of the evidence presented by the parties, respondent still had in his
possession the excess amount of P381,859.61 due and owing in favor of Rosario Mercado.
Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, as well
as legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience.1 One
is entitled to practice law if he has been duly admitted to the bar and there maintains a good standing.

The findings of the IBP would disclose that respondent indeed actively engaged in the practice of law
during the period of his suspension. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law by this Court
for six months, which took effect on 22 February 2000 (date of receipt by respondent of the Court's
resolution of 2 February 2000). A review of the records would indicate that respondent was last
reported to have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law on 1 June 2000 (when he appeared in
the promulgation of decision in the case of People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Estareja). Thereforth,
it would appear that he started to refrain from the practice of law. The Investigating Commissioner
reported that the exact sum still due from respondent to the complainant would amount to
P381,859.61, a finding amply supported by the records.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo C, de Vera is hereby DIRECTED to return to Rosario

Mercado the amount of P381,859.61, and his suspension from the practice of law shall be lifted once
he would have shown to the satisfaction of the Court his compliance therewith.

Melo, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, JJ., concur

A.C. No. 7472               March 30, 2010

LIGAYA MANIAGO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LOURDES I. DE DIOS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated April 2, 2007 filed by Ligaya Maniago,
seeking the disbarment of Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios for engaging in the practice of law despite having
been suspended by the Court.

Complainant alleged that she filed a criminal case against Hiroshi Miyata, a Japanese national,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Olongapo City, Branch 73, for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 603, docketed as Criminal Case No. 699-2002. The accused was represented by Atty. De Dios,
with office address at 22 Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. Complainant then learned from the RTC
staff that Atty. De Dios had an outstanding suspension order from the Supreme Court since 2001,
and was, therefore, prohibited from appearing in court. Complainant further alleges that there is a
civil case (Civil Case No. 355-0-2005) and another case (Special Proceeding No. M-6153) filed
against Miyata before the RTC, Makati City, Branch 134, where Atty. De Dios appeared as his
counsel. Complainant averred that Atty. De Dios ought to be disbarred from the practice of law for
her flagrant violation and deliberate disobedience of a lawful order of the Supreme Court.

In her Comment, Atty. De Dios admitted that there were cases filed against her client, Miyata. She,
however, denied that she was under suspension when she appeared as his counsel in the cases.

Respondent explained that an administrative case was indeed filed against her by Diana de
Guzman, docketed as A.C. No. 4943, where she was meted the penalty of 6-month suspension. She
served the suspension immediately upon receipt of the Court’s Resolution on May 16, 2001 up to
November 16, 2001. In a Manifestation filed on October 19, 2001, respondent formally informed the
Court that she was resuming her practice of law on November 17, 2001, which she actually did.

A problem arose when Judge Josefina Farrales, in her capacity as Acting Executive Judge of the
RTC, Olongapo City, erroneously issued a directive on March 15, 2007, ordering respondent to
desist from practicing law and revoking her notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008.
Knowing that the directive was rather questionable, respondent, nonetheless, desisted from law
practice in due deference to the court order. Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion for Clarification
with the Supreme Court on account of Judge Farrales’ letters to all courts in Olongapo City and to
some municipalities in Zambales, which "gave the impression that Atty. De Dios is not yet allowed to
resume her practice of law and that her notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008 is
revoked." Acting on the said motion, the Court issued a resolution on April 23, 2007 in this wise:

A.C. No. 4943 (Diana de Guzman v. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios) – Respondent’s Urgent Motion for
Clarification dated 14 March 2007 praying that the Court declare her to have served her six (6)
months (sic) suspension and her resumption of law practice on 17 November 2001 onwards as
proper is NOTED.
Considering the motion for clarification, the Court resolves to DEEM Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios to have
SERVED her six (6) month suspension and her recommencement of law practice on 17 November
2001 as PROPER pursuant to the Resolution dated 30 January 2002.

Respondent averred that for the period stated in the affidavit of complainant Maniago, during which
she allegedly practiced law, she was neither suspended nor in any way prohibited from practice. The
complaint, she added, was baseless and malicious, and should be dismissed outright.

In the Resolution dated September 12, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation. Initially, the OBC directed the
complainant to file a supplemental affidavit, stating therein the exact period of appearances of Atty.
De Dios and the particular courts where respondent appeared as counsel in the following cases: (1)
Criminal Case No. 699-2002; (2) Civil Case No. 355-0-2005; and (3) Sp. Proc. No. M-6153.

In compliance therewith, complainant submitted a Supplemental Affidavit in the vernacular, which

reads:

2. Sa Criminal Case No. 699-2002 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Hiroshi Miyata ay
[nagsimulang] mag[-]appear si Atty. Lourdes de Dios mula April 9, 2003, na [naka-]attach
ang Certification mula sa Branch 73[,] Regional Trial Court[,] Olongapo City.

3. Sa Civil Case No. 355-0-2006 ay [nagsimulang] mag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios noong

October 10, 2005, nakasaad din ito sa Certification mula sa Branch 73, Regional Trial Court
of Olongapo City. At sa Sp. Proc. No. M-6153 ay ito ay na[-]ifile ni Atty. de Dios noong
September 26, 2005 at hanggang ngayon ay pending pa sa Court of Appeals.

4. Bilang karagdagan po ay naka[-]attach ang Certified Xerox Copy ng Minutes of the

Session ng Subic Municipal Trial Court na kung saan ay nag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios sa
Civil Case No. 042-01 entitled Andrea Lorenzo, plaintiff, -versus- Simeon Pullido noong
December 14, 2001.

5. At makikita rin po sa Annex A-5 ng Comment ni Atty. de Dios, x x x -

5.[a.] Nag file ng kaso si Atty. Lourdes de Dios noong May 17, 2001 entitled Shirley
Pagaduan vs. Danilo Pagaduan[,] Civil Case No. 234-0-2001. Ito ay ginawa ni Atty. de Dios
isang (1) araw pa lamang mula magsimula ang kanyang suspension noon[g] May 16, 2001.

5.b. Nag file din ng kaso si Atty. de Dios noong May 18, 2001 entitled Filmixco versus Dr.
Ma. Perla Tabasondra-Ramos and Dr. Ricardo Ramos Civil Case No. 236-0-2001. Ito ay
dalawang (2) araw mula magsimula ang suspension ni Atty. de Dios noong May 16, 2001.

5.c. At nag notaryo si Atty. de Dios ng isang (a) affidavit executed by Carolina C. Bautista
noong May 16, 2001, (b) Affidavit executed by Jessica Morales-Mesa on May 17, 2001 at (c)
isang Statement of non-liability of Alfredo C. Diaz on May 16, 2001. Ang mga pag notaryo na
ito ay ginawa noong nagsimula na ang suspension ni Atty. de Dios noong May 16, 2001.

6. Ginawa ko ang Supplemental Affidavit na ito bilang patunay sa mga nakasaad base sa
aking personal na kaalamanan at mga dokumentong hawak ko upang ipakita na nilabag ni
Atty. de Dios ang kanyang suspension base sa sulat ni Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar
Confidant Ma. Cristina B. Layusa na may petsang 12 February 2007 at sa admission ni Atty.
de Dios na nagsimula ang kanyang suspension noong May 16, 2001.
A Supplemental Comment was thereafter filed by respondent, stating that there were no new
matters raised in the Supplemental Affidavit, and asserting that "the opinion of Bar Confidant, Atty.
Ma. Cristina B. Layusa, as contained in her letter dated 12 February 2007, cannot supersede the
Resolution dated April 23, 2007 of this Honorable Court." According to her, the resolution should be
the "final nail to the coffin of this case."

On November 18, 2008, the OBC submitted its Memorandum for the Court’s consideration.

The OBC explained that the letter adverted to by complainant in her affidavit was the OBC’s reply to
an inquiry made by the Office of the Court Administrator regarding the status of Atty. De
Dios.1 Therein, the OBC made it clear that the lifting of the suspension order was not automatic,
following the pronouncement of the Court in J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc.
and Spouses Jesus and Rosario K. Mercado, complainants v. Atty. Eduardo de Vera and Jose
Rongkales Bandalan, et al. and Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera v. Atty. Mervyn G. Encanto, et al., which
states:

The Statement of the Court that his suspension stands until he would have satisfactorily shown his
compliance with the Court’s resolution is a caveat that his suspension could thereby extend for more
than six months. The lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period
stated in the Court’s decision, and an order from the Court lifting the suspension at the end of the
period is necessary in order to enable [him] to resume the practice of his profession. 2

Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyer must first present proof(s) of his compliance by
submitting certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and from the Executive Judge that
he has indeed desisted from the practice of law during the period of suspension. Thereafter, the
Court, after evaluation, and upon a favorable recommendation from the OBC, will issue a resolution
lifting the order of suspension and thus allow him to resume the practice of law. The OBC alleged
that it was unfortunate that this procedure was overlooked in A.C. No. 4943, where Atty. De Dios
was able to resume her practice of law without submitting the required certifications and passing
through the OBC for evaluation. In order to avoid confusion and conflicting directives from the Court,
the OBC recommended that the Court adopt a uniform policy on the matter of the lifting of the order
of suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law. 1avvphi1

The Court notes the Report and Recommendation of the OBC.

It must be remembered that the practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege and, as such, must
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s
public responsibilities.3 Whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the
trust and confidence of his clients and of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of
the Supreme Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering
within its Bar, to withdraw that privilege. 4 However, as much as the Court will not hesitate to
discipline an erring lawyer, it should, at the same time, also ensure that a lawyer may not be
deprived of the freedom and right to exercise his profession unreasonably.

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED that the following guidelines be observed
in the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:

1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the
Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;
 2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt
thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The
denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory;

3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement
with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has
desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his
or her suspension;

4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to
the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or
her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;

5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent’s compliance with the
order of suspension;

6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a
ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.

SO ORDERED.
NORIEL MICHAEL J. RAMIENTAS, Petitioner, v. ATTY. JOCELYN
P. REYALA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO,  J.:

Before Us are Manifestations1 filed by the abovequoted parties in

response to Supreme Court (SC) En Banc Resolution2 dated 7 March
2006, wherein we resolved to require them to manifest, within ten
(10) days from notice, whether they are willing to submit the case
at bar for decision/resolution on the basis of the pleadings already
on record.

The present controversy stemmed from an Administrative

Complaint3 filed by Noriel Michael J. Ramientas on 16 February 2004
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission on
Bar Discipline, seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Jocelyn
P. Reyala. The complaint was anchored on respondent Reyala's
alleged violative acts: (1) submitting a pleading before the Court of
Appeals bearing the forged signature of another lawyer; and (2) her
continuous handling of a case while working in the Court of Appeals;
both contrary to a) Articles 171,4 182,5 1846 and 3557 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC); b) the Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers; and c) conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.

Hearing on the merits thereafter ensued.

In its Resolution No. XVII-2005-171 passed on 17 December 2005,

the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt the recommendation
of Atty. Edmund T. Espina, Investigating Commissioner, finding
respondent Reyala guilty of the abovementioned violative acts. It,
however, modified the recommended penalty to be imposed from
six (6) months suspension (from the practice of law) to two (2)
years, with the corresponding warning that a repetition of any
breach of her professional duties will be dealt with more severely.8

On 13 February 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant, SC, received

a letter dated 30 January 2006, from Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan,
Director for Bar Discipline of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
addressed to SC Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, stating
therein that:

We are transmitting herewith the following documents pertaining to

the above9 case pursuant to Rule 139-B:

1. Notice of the Resolution;

2. Records of the case consisting of Volume I 1-185 pages.

In the interregnum, however, respondent Reyala submitted10 to the

IBP an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution
suspending her.

On 7 March 2006, the SC En Banc, acting on the letter and

transmittal, resolved to require complainant Ramientas and
respondent Reyala to manifest whether they are willing to submit
the case for decision/resolution based on the pleadings and
documents already on record.

Both parties submitted their compliance thereto.

In his Manifestation,11 complainant Ramientas acceded to the

submission of the case for decision/resolution based on the
pleadings already on record.

Respondent Reyala, on the other hand, demurred12 to such

submission for the meantime considering that the Motion for
Reconsideration she earlier filed before the IBP remained unresolved
to date. Further, she stated that when she scheduled said motion
for hearing, she was informed13 by the IBP that it was precluded
from acting on the aforesaid motion as it had already transmitted to
this Court the whole records of the particular case together with
Resolution No. XVII-2005-171, which recommended that she be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. Thus, she
prayed that her motion for reconsideration be decided first by the
IBP Board of Governors before submitting the case for
decision/resolution to this Court.
Prefatorily, a reading of the By-Laws of the IBP will reveal that a
motion for reconsideration of its resolution or order is a prohibited
pleading. - 2 of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the IBP provides that:

SEC. 2. Prohibited Pleadings. The following pleadings shall not be

allowed, to wit:

xxx

c. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of resolution or order.

xxx

Parenthetically, at first glance, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the

rules governing the disbarment and discipline of attorneys, shows
that there is no provision regarding motions for reconsideration of
resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors suspending respondent
lawyers. However, worth noting is the fact that neither does it
particularly proscribe the filing of such motions. '12 (b) of Rule 139-
B of the Rules of Court reads:

SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. - x x x

xxx

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership,

determines that the respondent should be suspended from the
practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth
its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole
record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme
Court for final action. (Emphasis supplied.)

xxx

Hence, this impasse.

A judicious review of our current jurisprudence will reveal that said

impasse is more ostensible than real. Our pronouncement in the
case of Halimao v. Villanueva,14 promulgated close to two decades
after the effectivity of the IBP By-Laws,15 effectively amended the
latter in so far as motions for reconsideration of IBP resolutions in
disciplinary cases against lawyers are concerned.

In the Halimao case, we took the occasion to articulate our stance

respecting motions for reconsideration of resolutions of the IBP
Board of Governors in disciplinary cases against lawyers. This Court
was confronted therein with somewhat the same set of
circumstance as the case at bar in that after the IBP Board of
Governors transmitted to us its resolution adopting the
recommendation of the investigating commissioner dismissing the
disbarment complaint against respondent Villanueva for being
barred by res judicata, complainant Halimao filed a motion for
reconsideration. The latter opposed such motion on the ground that
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court does not provide for such a
possibility of review. In resolving the issue, this Court, through Mr.
Justice Mendoza, held that:

Although Rule 139-B, '12 (c) makes no mention of a motion for

reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history suggests that
such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed within 15
days from notice to a party. Indeed, the filing of such motion
should be encouraged before resort is made to this Court as
a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford
the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct any
error it may have committed through a misapprehension of facts or
misappreciation of the evidence.16 (Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, the aforequoted ruling amended the IBP By-Laws in that it

effectively removed a motion for reconsideration from the roster of
proscribed pleadings in the level of the IBP. It must be remembered
that it is well within the Court's power to amend the By-Laws of the
IBP - ' 77 of the same vests in this Court the power to amend,
modify or repeal it, either motu proprio or upon recommendation of
the IBP Board of Governors.

Prescinding from the above, though the aforequoted ruling involves

'12 (c)17 of Rule 139-B, nothing in the decision contradicts its
application to '12 (b) of the same rule, thus, it now stands that a
motion for reconsideration of IBP resolutions may be filed by an
aggrieved party within the period stated.
A point of clarification, however, is in order. While in
the Halimao ruling we nevertheless treated the motion for
reconsideration filed by Atty. Villanueva as his Petition for
Review before this Court within the contemplation of Rule 139-B, -
12 (c), such action on our part was necessitated by "expediency." In
the case at bar, acknowledging the raison d'être for the allowance of
motions for reconsideration of resolutions of the IBP in disciplinary
cases against lawyers, which is the exhaustion of administrative
remedies as expressly recognized by the same Halimao ruling, the
remand of the case at bar back to the IBP is in order. This course of
action rests upon the presumption that when the grievance
machinery is afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will
decide the same correctly,18

Certainly, prudence dictates that the IBP be given the opportunity to

correct its mistakes, if any, by way of motions for reconsideration
before this Court takes cognizance of the case. This is to further
insure that the grievance procedure will be allowed to duly run its
course - a form of filtering process, particularly respecting matters
within the competence of the IBP, before we step in.

In fine, though such remand will hold back the advancement of the
case, nevertheless, it bears emphasizing that it is equally important
that the IBP be afforded the opportunity to set things as it should
be. Observance of this basic principle is a sound practice and policy
and should never be compromised at the altar of expediency.

In concurrence with the above, now, therefore, BE IT RESOLVED, as

it is hereby resolved, that in accordance with our ruling in Halimao
v. Villanueva,19 pertinent provisions of Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline, as contained in the
By-Laws of the IBP, particularly - 1 and - 2, are hereby deemed
amended. Accordingly, - 1 of said rules now reads as follows:

SECTION. 1. Pleadings. - The only pleadings allowed are verified

complaint, verified answer, verified position papers and motion for
reconsideration of a resolution . [Emphasis supplied.]

And in - 2, a motion for reconsideration is, thus, removed from the

purview of the class of prohibited pleadings.
Further, the following guidelines shall be observed by the IBP in
respect of disciplinary cases against lawyers:

1. The IBP must first afford a chance to either party to file a motion
for reconsideration of the IBP resolution containing its findings and
recommendations within fifteen (15) days from notice of receipt by
the parties thereon;

2. If a motion for reconsideration has been timely filed by an

aggrieved party, the IBP must first resolve the same prior to
elevating to this Court the subject resolution together with the
whole record of the case;

3. If no motion for reconsideration has been filed within the period

provided for, the IBP is directed to forthwith transmit to this Court,
for final action, the subject resolution together with the whole
record of the case;

4. A party desiring to appeal from the resolution of the IBP may file
a Petition for Review before this Court within fifteen (15) days from
notice of said resolution sought to be reviewed; and cralawlibrary

5. For records of cases already transmitted to this Court where

there exist pending motions for reconsideration filed in due time
before the IBP, the latter is directed to withdraw from this Court the
subject resolutions together with the whole records of the cases,
within 30 days from notice, and, thereafter, to act on said motions
with reasonable dispatch.

Consistent with the discussions hereinabove set forth, let the whole
record of this case be immediately remanded to the IBP for the
proper disposition of respondent Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyala's motion for
reconsideration.

SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 1678             December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the
practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved
and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. 1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance
as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he
returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question,
however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when
he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138
(Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in
the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice
of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties
and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so delicately affected with public
interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for
enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him
unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued
exercise of his professional privilege. 4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of
the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the
statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant
for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. 6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of
educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations; 8 taking the lawyer’s
oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate
of the license to practice.10

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing
requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual
membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement; 13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the
legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control. 14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the
Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently,
the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege
denied to foreigners.16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another
country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17 Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen
of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership
in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority
for a license or permit to engage in such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who
reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure
from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to

compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar
Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED
 THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 5024. February 20, 2003

ARSENIA T. BERGONIA, complainant, v. Atty. ARSENIO A.

MERRERA, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A motion for extension to file an appellants brief carries with it the

presumption that the applicant-lawyer will file the pleading within
the period granted. Failure to so file the brief without any
reasonable excuse is a violation of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility. For such violation, a lawyer may be administratively
sanctioned, especially if it results in damage to the client.

The Case

This administrative case stems from an Affidavit-Complaint[1 filed

by Arsenia T. Bergonia on March 2, 1999, seeking the disbarment of
Atty. Arsenio A. Merrera for violating Canons 12 and 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Complainant alleged that his
inexcusable negligence, while acting as her counsel, caused the
unceremonious dismissal of her appeal. Specifically, despite
obtaining two extensions, he still failed to file the required
appellants brief in the Court of Appeals. After a careful consideration
of the Complaint and respondents Comment[2 thereon dated
November 22, 1999, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maalas November 15, 2001

Report[3 recommending the six-month suspension of respondent
from the practice of law was adopted and approved by the IBP
Board of Governors in its June 29, 2002 Resolution No. XV-2002-
236. On August 15, 2002, the Notice of the IBP Resolution[4 and
that of the Commissioners Report were forwarded to the Office of
the Bar Confidant by Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, director for bar
discipline of the IBP.[5

The Facts

Complainant, together with her relatives, filed a case for the

quieting of title (docketed as Civil Case No. U-4601) against her
niece Josephine Bergonia, as well as Spouses Rodolfo and Remedios
Parayno and their minor daughter Gretchen.[6 After due trial, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 49,
[7 promulgated its Decision in favor of the Parayno spouses and
their daughter.[8 On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial
court[9 and the Decision became final and executory.[10 cräläwvirtualibräry

Since the disputed land was still in the possession of complainant,

the Paraynos instituted Civil Case No. U-6061 to recover possession.
[11 After the Answer was filed, respondent became her counsel of
record. After due trial, Branch 48[12 of the same RTC rendered its
Decision[13 ordering her to vacate the premises and to surrender
possession thereof to the Parayno spouses.

Thereafter, complainant appealed the RTC judgment to the CA.

Respondent, as counsel, received a Notice to File Brief[14 on
December 17, 1997. Acting on his Motion for extension to file the
appellants brief,[15 the CA in its February 18, 1998 minute
Resolution[16 granted him until March 17, 1998 to do so. Even
before the first extension had lapsed, however, he again filed an
Urgent Second Motion for extension to file brief,[17 praying that he
be given until April 16, 1998 to submit the required pleading. The
CA again granted his Second Motion.[18 Eventually, the deadline,
which had already been extended twice, lapsed without his filing the
appellants brief. Hence, the CA, upon motion of the appellees,
dismissed the appeal in its June 25, 1998 Resolution.[19

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

Commissioner Maala found respondent guilty of inexcusable

negligence. She rejected his explanation that he had already
advised complainant not to pursue the appeal even before the filing
of the Notice of Appeal. In fact, after the appellee filed a Motion to
Dismiss the appeal, he even filed an Opposition, thus raising
complainants hopes of eventual victory.

If respondent thought it was best to dispense with the appellants

brief, he should have filed a manifestation or motion to that effect.
Instead, he opposed the Motion to Dismiss and asked for further
extensions of time. His actions clearly showed how negligent and
irresponsible he had been in filing the brief.

The board of directors of the IBP concurred with Commissioner

Maala that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law
for six (6) months.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the IBP.

Respondents Administrative Liability

Rule 12.03, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,

requires all the members of the bar to observe the following:

A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file

pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do
so.

Expressly stated is the requirement to show good and sufficient

cause for requests of extension of time to file appellate briefs.
Section 12 of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court provides that an
extension of time for the filing of a brief shall not be allowed, except
when there is good and sufficient cause, and only when the motion
is filed before the expiration of the extension sought.

From time to time, a request for extension becomes necessary

when an advocate needs more time to study the clients position.
Generally, such request is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. Lawyers who, for one reason or another, decide to dispense
with the filing of the required pleading, should promptly manifest
this intent to the court. It is necessary for them to do so in order to
prevent delay in the disposition of the case. Those who file motions
for extension in bad faith misuse the legal process, obstruct justice,
[20 and thus become liable to disciplinary action.[21 cräläwvirtualibräry

A lawyer who requests an extension must do so in good faith and

with a genuine intent to file the required pleading within the
extended period. In granting the request, the court acts on the
presumption that the applicant has a justifiable reason for failing to
comply with the period allowed. Without this implied trust, the
motion for extension will be deemed to be a mere ruse to delay or
thwart the appealed decision. The motion will thus be regarded as a
means of preventing the judgment from attaining finality and
execution and of enabling the movant to trifle with procedure and
mock the administration of justice.

In this case, respondent twice moved for an extension of time to file

the required appellants brief. In his first Motion, he alleged that he
had a hectic daily schedule of hearings and other pressures from
work. In his next Motion, he claimed he had acute arthritis and
asthmatic attacks. The granting of his two Motions implied that he
had been given ample time either to finish researching his case or
to withdraw his appeal. Yet, he still failed to file the required brief.
In its June 25, 1998 Resolution, the CA noted that the appellees
Motion to Dismiss the appeal was filed only after forty (40) days
from the expiration of the last extension.

Respondent claims that he never planted false hopes in the mind of

complainant. Upon receiving the Decision in Civil Case No. U-6061,
he purportedly advised her that her chances of winning in the
appellate court were slim, because the ownership of the disputed
land had already been adjudicated to the other party in Civil Case
No. U-4601. He avers that he tried to persuade her to accept her
defeat like a good soldier.

We are not persuaded. If, indeed, respondent failed to convince

complainant to drop her appeal, he should have just withdrawn his
appearance. Based on his arguments in his Opposition to the Motion
for Execution and Demolition, however, we do not believe that he
even tried to convince her to withdraw the appeal. We are inclined
to believe that this excuse was merely an afterthought to justify his
negligence.

Moreover, respondent claims that after filing the Motions for

Extension, he surmised that the appeal would be useless, because
he could not show sufficient cause to reverse the Decision.

This justification is even more inexcusable. Respondent, should

have checked first if there was a good ground to support the appeal.
If there was none, he should have been forthright in his evaluation
of the case.

Lawyers should fully familiarize themselves with the causes of their

clients before advising the latter on the soundness of litigating. If
they find that the intended suit is devoid of merit or that the
pending action is defenseless,[22 they should promptly inform and
dissuade their clients accordingly.

Assuming that respondent indeed tried to persuade complainant to

abandon the appeal, he should have manifested to the CA that he
had decided not to file the appellants brief anymore, instead of just
letting the period lapse. His contention that he could not find the
appropriate jurisprudence to support her case is too flimsy to be
credible. A competent and ethical lawyer would have at least tried
to persuade the CA with reason and logic.

Respondent alleges that complainant knew of the dismissal of the

appeal. That she had referred the Motion for Execution and
Demolition to him for comment allegedly showed that she had
already given up her desire to pursue her appeal. He pointed out
that if she had indeed blamed his inexcusable negligence for its
dismissal, then she would not have referred that Motion to him.

We are not convinced. Anyone would have done what complainant

did, because no one else would know the case better than ones
lawyer. Contrary to respondents allegation, we do not read any
intention on her part to withdraw the appeal, which showed that she
wanted to oppose the execution of the Decision.
We concur in the IBPs finding that respondent was negligent in the
performance of his duties as counsel for complainant, and that his
negligence was inexcusable. If indeed it was true that he found her
case to be futile, he should have just withdrawn the appeal, instead
of filing several Motions for extension to file the appellants brief.

Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioners

honorable membership in the legal profession.[23 Lawyers are
required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play
and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with
their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and the
courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to
conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and
discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients. Canon
18.03 of the Code requires that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith
renders him liable.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Arsenio A. Merrera is hereby found guilty of

violating Canons 12 and 18 of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months from receipt of this Decision. This Decision
is immediately executory.
A.C. No. 3056               August 16, 1991

FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON respondent.

PER CURIAM:p

This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant Attorney
Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for short),
filed against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter's
irregular actuations with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of
Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision. The present complaint charges the
respondent with the following offenses:

1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without sufficient justification, to
act within reasonable time (sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with
Assignment and the eventual issuance and transfer of the corresponding 163 transfer
certificates of titles to the GSIS, for the purpose of obtaining some pecuniary or material
benefit from the person or persons interested therein.

2. Conduct unbecoming of public official.

3. Dishonesty.

4. Extortion.

5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending
official transaction before him.

6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p. 10, Rollo.)

As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent Register of Deeds to register
some 163 deeds of sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G mortgaged to
GSIS by the lot buyers. There was no action from the respondent.

Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve or deny registration of the
uniform deeds of absolute sale with assignment. Still no action except to require V & G to submit
proof of real estate tax payment and to clarify certain details about the transactions.

Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent Renomeron suspended the
registration of the documents pending compliance by V & G with a certain "special arrangement"
between them, which was that V & G should provide him with a weekly round trip ticket from
Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of
respondent's Quezon City house and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives.

On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he would act favorably on the 163
registrable documents of V & G if the latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and send money for
a round trip plane ticket for him.

The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000) was sent to respondent
through his niece.

Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare, respondent imposed
additional registration requirements. Fed up with the respondent's extortionate tactics, the
complainant wrote him a letter on May 20, 1987 challenging him to act on all pending applications for
registration of V & G within twenty-four (24) hours.

On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163 certificates of title to
the GSIS on the uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale with assignment were ambiguous as
to parties and subject matter. On May 26, 1987, Attorney Collantes moved for a reconsideration of
said denial, stressing that:

... since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of nearly fifteen (15)
years or for a sum total of more than 2,000 same set of documents which have been
repeatedly and uniformly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City
under Attys. Modesto Garcia and Pablo Amascual Jr., it is only during the incumbency of
Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron, that the very same documents of the same tenor have been
refused or denied registration ... (p. 15, Rollo.)

On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator, National Land
Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration Authority [LRA]).
In a Resolution dated July 27,1987 (Consulta No. 1579), the NLTDRA ruled that the questioned
documents were registrable. Heedless of the NLTDRA's opinion, respondent continued to sit on V &
Gs 163 deeds of sale with assignment.

Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on June 4, 1987
administrative charges (docketed as Adm. Case No. 87-15), against respondent Register of Deeds.

Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio directed respondent to
explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken against him. Respondent
was further asked whether he would submit his case on the basis of his answer, or be heard in a
formal investigation.

In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges of extortion and of directly
receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with the official transactions awaiting
his action.

Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to hear Attorney

Collantes' charges against him, Attorney Renomeron waived his right to a formal investigation. Both
parties submitted the case for resolution based on the pleadings.

The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended dropping the charges of: (1)
dishonesty; (2) causing undue injury to a party through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and (3) gross ignorance of the law and procedure. He opined that the
charge of neglecting or refusing, in spite repeated requests and without sufficient justification, to act
within a reasonable time on the registration of the documents involved, in order to extort some
pecuniary or material benefit from the interested party, absorbed the charges of conduct
unbecoming of a public official, extortion, and directly receiving some pecuniary or material benefit
for himself in connection with pending official transactions before him.

Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio on

February 22, 1988, recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez that the respondent:
(1) be found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents
presented to him for registration; and (3) be warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt
with more severely.

After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoñez found respondent guilty of grave
misconduct.

Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample evidence
supports the Investigating Officer's findings that the respondent committed grave
misconduct.

The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to him for
registration and, notwithstanding representations by the parties interested for expeditious
action on the said documents, he continued with his inaction.

The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the registration of the
documents involved; that he himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said
documents to Administrator Bonifacio after he formally denied the registration thereof, that
the Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the said documents in
question; and that, such resolution of the Administrator notwithstanding, the respondent still
refused the registration thereof but demanded from the parties interested the submission of
additional requirements not adverted to in his previous denial.

x x x           x x x          x x x

In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the respondent claims that he
neither touched nor received the money sent to him, on record remains uncontroverted the
circumstance that his niece, Ms. de la Cruz, retrieved from him the amount of P800.00 earlier
sent to him as plane fare, not in the original denomination of P100.00 bills but in P50.00 bills.
The respondent had ample opportunity to clarify or to countervail this related incident in his
letter dated 5 September 1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but he never did so.

... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being new in office cannot serve to mitigate
his liability. His being so should have motivated him to be more aware of applicable laws,
rules and regulations and should have prompted him to do his best in the discharge of his
duties. (pp. 17-18, Rollo.)

Secretary Ordoñez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino that Renomeron be dismissed

from the service, with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and with prejudice to re-
employment in the government service, effective immediately.
As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the Philippines, by Adm. Order No.
165 dated May 3, 1990, dismissed the respondent from the government service (pp. 1419, Rollo).

Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA, Attorney
Collantes also filed in this Court on June 16, 1987, a disbarment complaint against said respondent.

The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer,
may also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official. The answer is yes, for
his misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer.

The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968),
imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a
source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other
disciplinary action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).

As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:

A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon
him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders
rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. fair, speedy, and efficient
administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that
demands that in his every exertion the only criterion he that truth and justice triumph. This
discipline is what as given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From
a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-
speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility— all of which, throughout the centuries, have been
compendiously described as moral character.

Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest
order.  A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed
1âwphi1

by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the
quest of truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader. (Apostacy in the
Legal Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790; emphasis supplied.)

The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
requires public officials and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5,
subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material
interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting
gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by the
functions of their office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids
a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of
Professional Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule
103).

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession. (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.)

This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice
the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the
highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269,
278).

The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public official
have demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law (Bautista vs. Judge
Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He should
therefore be disbarred.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be disbarred from the
practice of law in the Philippines, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4018             March 8, 2005

OMAR P. ALI, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is a verified petition for disbarment1 filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found
guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City.

It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by
complainant against respondent. In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate
issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu,
Mona Abdullah,2 Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and
Amenola Bauduli Datu; and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli
Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali
Datus are relatives of respondent. 3

The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The investigating officer, Enrique
Basa, absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him, thus:

It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to prove his case but that
he has no case at all against respondent Mosib Ali Bubong. Wherefore, premises
considered, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint against respondent be
dismissed for lack of merit and evidence.4

The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in a report dated 08
September 1992, then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges of
illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents. He, however, found respondent guilty of
grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the criminal case
for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter's co-
accused. As a result of this finding, Secretary Drilon recommended respondent's dismissal from
service.

On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 41
adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering respondent's dismissal
from government service. Respondent subsequently questioned said administrative order before this
Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition5 claiming that the Office of the
President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office. He also insisted that
respondents6 in that petition violated the laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V.
Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he
abdicated his authority to resolve the administrative complaint against him (herein respondent).

In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition "for failure on the part of
petitioner to sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the questioned order."7 Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
with finality in our Resolution of 15 November 1994.

On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before us, seeking the
disbarment of respondent. Complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent had
"proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney" 8 and that he poses a
"serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession." 9

In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of TCT No.
T-2821 in the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law 10 and jurisprudence support his
stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications
for land registration on the basis only of the documents presented by the applicants. In the case of
the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion,
hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.

Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for
violation of the Anti-Squatting Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the latter's co-
defendants. Respondent explains that his participation in said case was a result of the two
subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who required him to produce the
various land titles involved in said dispute. He further claims that the dismissal of said criminal case
by the Secretary of Justice was based solely on the evidence presented by the parties.
Complainant's allegation, therefore, that he influenced the outcome of the case is totally unjustified.

Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995, 11 this Court referred this matter to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. Acting on this resolution, the IBP
commenced the investigation of this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C.
Fernandez issued the following order relative to the transfer of venue of this case. The pertinent
portion of this order provides:

ORDER

When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent appeared.

The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have the reception of
evidence vis-à-vis this case be done in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the president of
the local IBP Chapter. Both parties agreed. Accordingly, transmit the records of this case to
the Director for Bar Discipline for appropriate action. 12

On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving Commissioner
Fernandez's recommendation for the transfer of venue of this administrative case and directed the
Western Mindanao Region governor to designate the local IBP chapter concerned to conduct the
investigation, report, and recommendation.13 The IBP Resolution states:

Resolution No. XII-96-153

Adm. Case No. 4018
Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong

RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for

the Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the Western Mindanao Region
Governor George C. Jabido to designate the local IBP Chapter concerned to conduct the
investigation, report and recommendation.
Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar Discipline, wrote a letter
dated 23 October 1996 addressed to Governor George C. Jabido, President of IBP Cotabato
Chapter requesting the latter to receive the evidence in this case and to submit his recommendation
and recommendation as directed by the IBP Board of Governors. 14

In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato Chapter 15 informed the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) that the investigating panel 16 had sent notices to both
complainant and respondent for a series of hearings but respondent consistently ignored said
notices. The IBP Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by recommending that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for five years.

On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for the transmittal of the
records of this case to the Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter of the IBP pursuant to Resolution No.
XII-96-153 as well as Commissioner Fernandez's Order dated 23 February 1996.

Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter to
comment on respondent's motion.17 Complying with this directive, the panel expressed no opposition
to respondent's motion for the transmittal of the records of this case to IBP Marawi City. 18 On 25
September 1998, Commissioner Fernandez ordered the referral of this case to IBP Marawi City for
the reception of respondent's evidence.19 This order of referral, however, was set aside by the IBP
Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIII-98-268 issued on 4 December 1998. Said resolution
provides:

RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the transmittal
of the case records of the above-entitled case to Marawi City, rather he is directed to re-
evaluate the recommendation submitted by Cotabato Chapter and report the same to the
Board of Governors.20

Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08 October 1998 a motion
praying that the recommendation of the IBP Cotabato Chapter be stricken from the
records.21 Respondent insists that the investigating panel constituted by said IBP chapter did not
have the authority to conduct the investigation of this case since IBP Resolution XII-96-153 and
Commissioner Fernandez's Order of 23 February 1996 clearly vested IBP Marawi City with the
power to investigate this case. Moreover, he claims that he was never notified of any hearing by the
investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter thereby depriving him of his right to due process.

Complainant opposed22 this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of laches. According to

complainant, the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter expressly states
that respondent was duly notified of the hearings conducted by the investigating panel yet despite
these, respondent did nothing to defend himself. He also claims that respondent did not even bother
to submit his position paper when he was directed to do so. Further, as respondent is a member of
IBP Marawi City Chapter, complainant maintains that the presence of bias in favor of respondent is
possible. Finally, complainant contends that to refer the matter to IBP Marawi City would only entail
a duplication of the process which had already been completed by IBP Cotabato Chapter.

In an Order dated 15 October 1999,23 Commissioner Fernandez directed IBP Cotabato Chapter to

submit proofs that notices for the hearings conducted by the investigating panel as well as for the
submission of the position paper were duly received by respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty.
Jabido, a member of the IBP Cotabato Chapter investigating panel, furnished Commissioner
Fernandez with a copy of the panel's order dated 4 August 1997. 24 Attached to said order was
Registry Receipt No. 3663 issued by the local post office. On the lower portion of the registry receipt
was a handwritten notation reading "Atty. Mosib A. Bubong."
On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, Chairman of the
Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao, to reevaluate the report and recommendation
submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter. This directive had the approval of the IBP Board of Governors
through its Resolution No. XIV-2001-271 issued on 30 June 2001, to wit:

RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor C. Fernandez for the

Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the CBD Mindanao to conduct an
investigation, re-evaluation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of
notice.25

Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her father, Omar P. Ali,
complainant in this case. According to her, her father passed away on 12 June 2002 and that in
interest of peace and Islamic brotherhood, she was requesting the withdrawal of this case. 26

Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP CBD to direct the chairman
of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao to designate and authorize the IBP Marawi City-
Lanao del Sur Chapter to conduct an investigation of this case.27 This motion was effectively denied
by Atty. Pedro S. Castillo in an Order dated 19 July 2002. 28 According to Atty. Castillo –

After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special attention made on the
report of the IBP Cotabato City Chapter, the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit of
respondent, the undersigned sees no need for any further investigation, to be able to make a
re-evaluation and recommendation on the Report of the IBP Chapter of Cotabato City.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of Marawi City, Zamboanga del
Norte is hereby denied. The undersigned will submit his Report to the Commission on Bar
Discipline, IBP National Office within ten (10) days from date hereof.

In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto the findings and conclusion of IBP
Cotabato Chapter ratiocinating as follows:

The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the Decision by the Office of the
President in Administrative Case No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein
respondent was found guilty of Grave Misconduct in:

a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and,

b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law.

And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. In the
Comment filed by respondent in the instant Adminsitrative Case, his defense is good faith in
the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821 and a denial of the charge of manipulating the criminal
complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law, which by the way, was filed against
respondent's relatives. Going over the Decision of the Office of the President in
Administrative Case No. 41, the undersigned finds substantial evidence were taken into
account and fully explained, before the Decision therein was rendered. In other words, the
finding of Grave Misconduct on the part of respondent by the Office of the President was fully
supported by evidence and as such carries a very strong weight in considering the
professional misconduct of respondent in the present case.
 In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for amending or disturbing the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP Chapter of South Cotabato. 29

In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with
modification, the afore-quoted Report and Recommendation of Atty. Castillo. The modification
pertained solely to the period of suspension from the practice of law which should be imposed on
respondent – whereas Atty. Castillo concurred in the earlier recommendation of IBP Cotabato
Chapter for a five-year suspension, the IBP Board of Governors found a two-year suspension to be
proper.

On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the IBP which the latter
denied as by that time, the matter had already been endorsed to this Court. 30

The issue thus posed for this Court's resolution is whether respondent may be disbarred for grave
misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the government. We resolve this question in
the affirmative.

The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has
joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules
governing the conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a government official is of such nature as
to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a
member of the bar on such grounds.31 Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a
government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a
government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a
violation of his oath a member of the legal profession. 32

Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron,33 we ordered the disbarment of
respondent on the ground of his dismissal from government service because of grave misconduct.
Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we declared –

[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress upon
him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders
rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient
administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that
demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This
discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From
a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-
speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility – all of which, throughout the centuries, have been
compendiously described as moral character. 34

Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig,35 this Court found sufficient basis to
disbar respondent therein for gross misconduct perpetrated while she was the Officer-in-Charge of
Legal Services of the Commission on Higher Education. As we had explained in that case –

… [A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which
might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty
and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public
faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her
brethren in private practice.36 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, respondent's grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and
subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of
his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules
governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his
unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the
bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads:

Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote
or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Respondent's conduct manifestly undermined the people's confidence in the public office he used to
occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his
knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to
practice law.

As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainant's daughter, requesting for the
withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this nature
cannot be "interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution,
withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same." 37 As we have
previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:38

… A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest

of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the
record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is
premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the
official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called
the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administrative of justice.39

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the
respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 3731             September 7, 2007

MANUEL S. SEBASTIAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMILY A. BAJAR, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

On 18 October 1991, Manuel S. Sebastian (complainant) filed a disbarment complaint against Atty.
Emily A. Bajar (respondent) for "obstructing, disobeying, resisting, rebelling, and impeding final
decisions of Regional Trial Courts, the Court of Appeals and of the Honorable Supreme Court, and
also for submitting those final decisions for the review and reversal of the DARAB, an administrative
body, and for contemptuous acts and dilatory tactics."

The Facts

Complainant alleged the following:

1. Respondent is a lawyer of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance (BALA) of the

Department of Agrarian Reform who represented Fernando Tanlioco (Tanlioco) in numerous
cases which raised the same issues.1 Tanlioco is an agricultural lessee of a land owned by
complainant’s spouse and sister-in-law (landowners). The landowners filed an Ejectment
case against Tanlioco on the basis of a conversion order of the land use from agricultural to
residential. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment ordering Tanlioco’s ejectment
subject to the payment of disturbance compensation. 2 The RTC’s judgment was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals3 and the Supreme Court.4

2. Respondent, as Tanlioco’s counsel, filed another case for Specific Performance to

produce the conversion order. The RTC dismissed the complaint due to res judicata and lack
of cause of action.5

3. Respondent filed a case for Maintenance of Possession with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board. The case raised the same issues of conversion and disturbance
compensation.6

4. Respondent has violated Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since she
misused the rules of procedure through forum-shopping to obstruct the administration of
justice.7

On 18 November 1991, the Court issued a resolution requiring respondent to comment on the
complaint lodged against her.8

After a second Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Comment, 9 respondent submitted her
Comment alleging the following:
 1. Complainant is not the real party-in-interest. He is also not authorized to prosecute the
disbarment suit.10

2. Respondent has fulfilled allegiance to the "Attorney’s Oath" and performed duties in
accordance with Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. 11

3. Respondent’s client, Tanlioco, merely availed of all legal remedies to obtain benefits
secured for him by law.12

On 10 March 1992, complainant filed his Reply. Complainant alleged that respondent did not
confront the issues of her disbarment squarely but raised issues that were decided upon with finality
by the courts.13

On 25 March 1992, the Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to file a Rejoinder within 10
days from notice.14

On 3 June 1992, complainant filed a Manifestation dated 2 June 1992 stating that respondent failed
to comply with the 25 March 1992 Court Resolution to file a Rejoinder. 15

On 7 October 1992, the Court ordered respondent to show cause why she should not be subjected
to disciplinary action for failure to comply with the Court’s 25 March 1992 Resolution. The Court also
required respondent to Comment on the complainant’s 2 June 1992 Manifestation. 16

On 3 February 1993, respondent filed a Manifestation alleging that she had substantially complied
with the Court’s orders relative to her defenses. She advised the Court that she had transferred to
the Public Attorney’s Office and since she was no longer a "BALA lawyer," the cases involved in this
proceeding had become moot and academic.17

On 1 March 1993, the Court issued a Resolution stating that the administrative case against
respondent "has not been mooted and nothing set out in her ‘Manifestation’ excuses her failure to
obey this Court’s Resolutions of 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992." 18 The Court had also resolved
to impose a fine of P500 or imprisonment of five days and to require respondent to comply with the
25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992 Resolutions. 19

On 24 August 1993, complainant filed a Manifestation stating that respondent had not complied with
the Court’s orders.20

On 29 September 1993, the Court issued a Resolution ordering the arrest of respondent for
detention at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for five days. The Court reiterated that
respondent should comply with the 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992 Resolutions. 21

On 20 October 1993, the NBI arrested respondent. The NBI detained respondent for five days and
released her on 25 October 1993. 22

On 10 November 1993, the Court issued a Resolution referring the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for hearing and decision. 23

On 11 November 1993, respondent filed a Rejoinder. Respondent claimed that complainant had no
legal personality to file this case.24 Respondent also alleged that she was merely protecting the
interest of Tanlioco as she was sworn to do so in her oath of office. Respondent contended that "she
had comported herself as [an] officer of the court, at the risk of being disciplined by the latter if only
to impart truth and justice."25

On 22 November 1995, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose (Investigating Commissioner

Jose) submitted his report and recommendation to the IBP. Investigating Commissioner Jose
enumerated respondent’s violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility that rendered her
unfit to continue the practice of law:

1. Respondent appealed a case for purposes of delay which amounted to an obstruction of

justice.26

2. Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. The duplication or multiplication of
suits should be avoided,27 and respondent’s acts were tantamount to forum-shopping which
is a reprehensible manipulation of court processes and proceedings. 28

3. Respondent uttered disrespectful language and shouted at everybody during the hearing
on 25 May 1995.29 The want of intention is not an excuse for the disrespectful language
used.

On 4 October 1996, the IBP transmitted to the Court a copy of IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149 dated
30 March 1996. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Investigating Commissioner
Jose’s recommendation that respondent be "suspended indefinitely from the practice of law for
Unethical Practices and attitude showing her propensity and incorrigible character to violate the
basic tenets and requirements of the Code of Professional Responsibility rendering her unfit to
continue in the practice of law."30 Governor Angel R. Gonzales recommended her "outright
disbarment."31

In its 20 January 1997 Resolution, the Court noted the IBP Resolution suspending respondent
indefinitely.32

On 13 April 1999, the Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) to circularize the resolution of the IBP dated 30 March 1996 suspending respondent
indefinitely from the practice of law.33

On 7 June 1999, the OCA, through Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, issued Circular No. 30-
99 informing all courts that respondent had been suspended indefinitely.

On 30 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion to Consider the Case Closed and Terminated.
Respondent apologized for her demeanor and prayed that the suspension be lifted. 34

On 16 June 2003, the Court issued a Resolution referring the case to the IBP for report and
recommendation.35

On 29 August 2003, Investigating Commissioner Demaree J.B. Raval (Investigating Commissioner

Raval) conducted a hearing. Respondent claimed that she did not receive any notice of the OCA’s
Circular on her indefinite suspension.36 Respondent alleged that the Court Resolution which she
received merely noted the IBP’s Resolution on her indefinite suspension. 37 Respondent claimed that
she only knew of the suspension when she filed an application for a judicial position in Mandaluyong
City.38
In the hearing, respondent admitted that she continued to practice law as a Prosecutor in
Mandaluyong City despite her suspension because she believed that a notation by the Court in the
20 January 1997 Resolution did not mean an implementation of the IBP’s Resolution on her
indefinite suspension.39

Due to the absence of complainant and his counsel, another hearing was held on 19 September
2003. Complainant’s counsel asserted that respondent had been practicing law in the midst of her
suspension and this constituted a violation of the suspension order which she wanted to be
lifted.40 Investigating Commissioner Raval asked respondent to present a valid ground to lift the
suspension order.41 Respondent requested that her detention for five days at the NBI be converted
into a five-year suspension, one year for every day of detention such that she would have served
five years of indefinite suspension. 42

Investigating Commissioner Raval then directed the parties to file simultaneously their Verified
Position Papers.43

In his Position Paper and Comment, complainant posited that respondent’s motion did not state valid
grounds to convince the Court to lift the suspension order. Complainant stated that by continuing to
practice law, "she is flaunting her defiance of the Supreme Court by showing that she can hoodwink
another branch of government." 44 Complainant also prayed for respondent’s disbarment due to the
gravity of her offense.45

In respondent’s Position Paper, she reiterated that complainant is not the real party-in-interest since
the property that was litigated was owned by complainant’s wife. She asserted that she never
betrayed her client’s cause, she was never unfaithful to her oath, and it was complainant who filed
this case for harassment. Respondent prayed that the case be considered closed and terminated
due to lack of merit.46

Respondent also sent a letter to Investigating Commissioner Raval and attached a copy of a
Resolution in a Preliminary Investigation case which she handled. Respondent contended that in this
Preliminary Investigation case, she recommended its dismissal because the offended party was not
the real party-in-interest.47

Respondent insisted that complainant did not have the personality to file the disbarment complaint
against her; hence, it should have been dismissed outright. 48

After the parties filed their position papers, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-
2004-229 dated 16 April 2004. The IBP adopted Investigating Commissioner Raval’s Report and
Recommendation that respondent be disbarred for her "manifest flagrant misconduct in disobeying
the SC Order of her Indefinite Suspension." 49

As culled from the records, the Court had merely noted IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149 which
recommended respondent’s indefinite suspension. "The term ‘noted’ means that the Court has
merely taken cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious
deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter — it does not imply agreement or
approval."50 Hence, the penalty of indefinite suspension imposed by the IBP Board of Governors has
not attained finality. Section 12 of Rule 139-B provides:

Section 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors. —

xxx
 (b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole
record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
(Emphasis supplied)

Necessarily, the Court will now give its "final action" on this complaint.

The Ruling of the Court

After a careful review of the records, the Court finds the evidence on record sufficient to support the
IBP’s findings. However, the Court disagrees with the penalty imposed on respondent.

Administrative proceedings against lawyers are sui generis51 and they belong to a class of their
own.52 They are neither civil nor criminal actions but rather investigations by the Court into the
conduct of its officer.53 They involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. 54

A disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the administration of justice from the
misconduct of its officers. This Court requires that its officers shall be competent, honorable, and
reliable men in whom the public may repose confidence. 55 "Lawyers must at all times faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to their clients. Their conduct must
always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any
professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity,
and good demeanor — or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court." 56

Clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the penalty in disbarment or
suspension proceedings.57

The evidence presented shows that respondent failed to comply with the Court’s lawful orders in two
instances:

1. In the 25 March 1992 Court Resolution, respondent was required to file a rejoinder within
10 days from notice. However, she only submitted the rejoinder on 11 November 1993 after
she was detained at the NBI for five days for failure to heed the Court’s order.

2. In the 7 October 1992 Court Resolution, respondent was required to comment on

complainant’s manifestation. She instead submitted a manifestation on 3 February 1993 or
almost four months thereafter. In her manifestation, respondent alleged that she had
substantially complied with the Court’s orders. However, the Court in its 1 March 1993
Resolution stated that nothing set out in respondent’s manifestation excused her failure to
obey the Court’s Resolutions.

These acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27,
Rule 13858 of the Rules of Court is in itself a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment.
Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes
utter disrespect to the judicial institution.59 Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. A Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be
complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively."60 Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with
the Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her
disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof." 61
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondent’s deference is
underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment
for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed upon a
lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes. 62

Respondent’s failure to comply with the Court’s directive to file a Rejoinder and to file a Comment
also constitutes gross misconduct. The Court defined gross misconduct as "any inexcusable,
shameful, flagrant, or unlawful conduct on the part of the person concerned in the administration of
justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of a cause." It is a
"conduct that is generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose." 63

In Bernal Jr. v. Fernandez,64 the Court held that failure to comply with the Court’s directive to
comment on a letter-complaint constitutes gross misconduct and insubordination, or disrespect.
In Cuizon v. Macalino,65 a lawyer’s failure to comply with the Court’s Resolutions requiring him to file
his comment was one of the infractions that merited his disbarment.

Furthermore, respondent’s defenses are untenable. Firstly, respondent contends that complainant is
not the real party-in-interest since the property that was litigated was owned by complainant’s wife.
The Court is not persuaded with this defense.

The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest
must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person who called the attention
of the court to a lawyer’s misconduct "is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the
outcome."66 "A compromise or withdrawal of charges does not terminate an administrative complaint
against a lawyer."67

In Heck v. Santos,68 the Court held that "any interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate
disciplinary proceedings." The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor
is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment
proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure
of proof of the charges.69

Secondly, respondent avers that she merely availed of all the legal remedies for her client. In Suzuki
v. Tiamson,70 the Court enunciated that "while lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of
their clients and zeal in the defense of their client’s rights, they should not forget that they are first
and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice." Respondent’s act of filing cases with identical issues in other venues
despite the final ruling which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is beyond
the bounds of the law. "To permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the
supposed rights of their clients is to defeat one of the purposes of the state — the administration of
justice."71

Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. Respondent, acting as Tanlioco’s counsel,
filed cases for Specific Performance and Maintenance of Possession despite the finality of the
decision in the Ejectment case which involves the same issues. The Court held that "an important
factor in determining the existence of forum-shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the
parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. 72 Indeed, "while a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and
administration of justice."73

Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal but within the bounds of the law. It is evident from the records that respondent filed other cases
to thwart the execution of the final judgment in the Ejectment case. Clearly, respondent violated the
proscription in Canon 19.

The penalty of suspension or disbarment is meted out in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. In this case, respondent
has shown her great propensity to disregard court orders. Respondent’s acts of wantonly disobeying
her duties as an officer of the court show an utter disrespect for the Court and the legal profession.
However, the Court will not disbar a lawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish
the desired end.

Respondent’s acts constitute gross misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders of a
superior court. Respondent also violated Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Her
suspension is consequently warranted.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Emily A. Bajar is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of THREE YEARS effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department
of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
BM 1153

A.C. No. 7474               September 9, 2014

PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51, SORSOGON
CITY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court has had enough of the respondent, a law
practitioner, who had engaged in the unethical practice of filing frivolous administrative cases against
judges and personnel of the courts because the latter filed a motion to inhibit the complainant from
hearing a pending case. Hence, the complainant has initiated this complaint for the disbarment of
respondent on the ground of gross misconduct and gross violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Antecedents

On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S.Dealca entered his appearance in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Philip William Arsenault" then pending in Branch 51 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Sorsogon City, presided by complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid.  Atty.1

Dealca sought to replace Atty. Vicente Judar who had filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the
accused. But aside from entering his appearance as counsel for the accused, Atty. Dealca also
moved that Criminal Case No. 2006-6795 be re-raffled to another Branch of the RTC "[c]onsidering
the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned," where" he
does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases
handled by the undersigned." 2

Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca’s motion to re-raffle through an order issued on February 14,
2007,  viz:
3

xxxx

This Court will not allow that a case be removed from it just because of the personal sentiments of
counsel who was not even the original counsel of the litigant.

Moreover, the motion of Atty. Dealca is an affront to the integrity of this Court and the other Courts in
this province as hewould like it to appear that jurisdiction over a Family Court case is based on his
whimsical dictates.

This was so because Atty. Dealca had filed Administrative as well as criminal cases against this
Presiding Judge which were all dismissed by the Hon. Supreme Court for utter lack ofmerit. This is
why he should not have accepted this particular case so as not to derail the smooth proceedings in
this Court with his baseless motions for inhibition. It is the lawyer’s duty to appear on behalf of a
client in a case but not to appear for a client to remove a case from the Court. This is unethical
practice in the first order.

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Motion of Atty. Juan S. Dealca is hereby DENIED.
Relative to the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused filed by Atty. Vicente C. Judar dated
January 29, 2007, the same is hereby DENIED for being violative of the provisions of Section 26 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

So also, the Appearance of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as new counsel for accused Philip William
Arsenault is likewise DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint  in the Office of the Bar Confidant citing Atty.
4

Dealca’sunethical practice of entering his appearance and then moving for the inhibition of the
presiding judge on the pretext of previous adverse incidents between them.

On April 10, 2007, we treated the complaint as a regular administrative complaint, and required Atty.
Dealca to submit his comment. 5

In his comment-complaint,  Atty. Dealca asserted that Judge Madrid’s issuance of the February 14,
6

2007 order unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused of the right to counsel, to due
process, and to a fair and impartial trial; that Judge Madrid exhibited bias in failing to act on the
motion to lift and set aside the warrant ofarrest issued against the accused; and that it should be
Judge Madrid himself who should be disbarred and accordingly dismissed from the Judiciary for
gross ignorance of the law.

On July 17, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the IBP for appropriate investigation,report and
recommendation.  Several months thereafter, the Court also indorsed pertinent documents in
7

connection with A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ, entitled "Joseph Yap III v. Judge Jose L. Madrid
and Court Stenographer MerlynD. Dominguez, both of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 51,
Sorsogon City" (Yap v. Judge Madrid). 8

On June 6, 2007, the Court in Yap v. Judge Madriddismissed for its lack of merit the administrative
complaint against Judge Madrid for allegedly falsifying the transcript of stenographic notes of the
hearing on March 4, 2005 in Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled Joseph D. Yap V, et al. v. Joseph H.
Yap III, but referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation the propensity of Atty. Dealca to file administrative or criminal complaints against
judges and court personnel whenever decisions, orders or processes were issued adversely to him
and his clients.
9

In compliance with the referral,the IBP-Sorsogon Chapter submitted its report with the following
findings and recommendation: 10

xxxx

The documentary evidence offered by complainants show that respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca filed
by himself (1) Bar Matter No. 1197 and acting as counsel for the complainants (2) Adm. Matter OCA
IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ; (3) OMB-L-C-05-0478-E;(4) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ and (5)
Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ. These five (5) cases are factual evidence of the cases that
respondent had filed by himself and as counsel for the complainants against court officers, judges
and personnel as a consequence of the IBP Election and incidents in cases that respondent had
handled as counselfor the parties in the said cases.

It will be noted that in Bar Matter No. 1197, the respondents were judges (Judge Jose L. Madrid &
Judge Honesto A. Villamor) and lawyers in IBP Sorsogon Chapters, who are no doubt officers of the
court, and the case aroused (sic) out ofthe unfavorable consensus of the IBP chapter members that
was adverse to the position of the respondent. The other four (4) cases aroused [sic] out of the
cases handled by respondent for the complainants who failed to secure a favorable action from the
court.

Specifically, Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ was a result of the case before the sala of
Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51) entitled "Alita P. Gomez vs. Rodrigo Jarabo, et al.," for: Accion
Publiciana and Damages, that was handled by respondent for the complainant Alita Gomez. OMB-L-
C-0478-E was an off shoot of Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V,
et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for: Support pending before the sala ofcomplainant Judge Jose L.
Madrid (RTC 51). Respondent, after an unfavorable decision against defendant Joseph H. Yap III,
entered his appearance and pleaded for the latter. As a result of an adverse order, this ombudsman
case arose.

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ was also a result of the Civil Case No. 5403 entitled
"Salve Dealca Latosa vs. Atty. Henry Amado Roxas, with Our Lady’s Village Foundation and Most
Reverend Arnulfo Arcilla, DD as third party defendant that was heard, tried, decided and pending
execution before the sala of Judge Honesto A. Villamor (RTC 52).

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ was also a consequence of Civil Case No. 2001-
6842 entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for Support pending
before the sala of complainant JudgeJose L. Madrid (RTC 51).

All these four (4) cases are precipitated by the adverse ruling rendered by the court against the
clients of the respondent that instead of resorting to the remedies available under the Rules of
Procedure, respondent assisted his clients in filing administrative and criminal case against the
judges and personnel of the court.

The other documentary evidence of the complainants such as the (a) VERIFIED COMPLAINT dated
March 7, 2003 in Civil Service Case entitled "EDNA GOROSPE-DEALCA vs. JULIANA
ENCINASCARINO, et al.; (b) NOTICE OF RESOLUTION on October 22, 2005 in Adm. Case No.
6334 entitled "SOFIAJAO vs. ATTY. EPIFANIA RUBY VELACRUZ-OIDA" passed by the Board
ofGovernors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines which Resolution No. XVII-2005-92 provides:
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner dismissing the case for lacks (sic) merit; (c) RESOLUTION of the Third Division of the
Supreme Court dated February 1, 2006 in Administrative Case No. 6334 (Sofia Jao vs. Epifania
Ruby Velacruz-Oida) – The notice of resolution dated October 22, 2005 ofthe Integrated Bar ofthe
Philippines (IBP) dismissing the case for lack of merit; (d) VERIFIED COMPLAINT in Adm. Case No.
6334 dated February 17, 2004 entitled "Sofia Jao vs. Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida" for:
Malpractice (Forum Shopping), and (e) ORDER dated January 18, 2007 by Acting Presiding Judge
RAUL E. DE LEON in Criminal Cases Nos. 2451 to 2454 entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Cynthia Marcial, et al. For: Falsification of Medical Records" which provides for the dismissal of the
cases against all the accused, do not show participation on the part of the respondent that he signed
the pleadings, although the verified complaint is one executed by the wife of the respondent.
Moreover, these cases are pertaining to persons other than judges and personnel of the court that
are not squarely covered by the present investigation against respondent, although, it is an
undeniable fact that respondent had appeared for and in behalf of his wife, the rest of the
complainants in the Civil Service Case and Sofia Jao against Land Bank of the Philippines, the latter
case resulted in the administrative case of Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida, respondent’s sister
member of the Bar. All these documentary evidence from (a) to (e) are helpful in determining the
"PROPENSITY" of the respondent as a member of the bar in resorting to harassment cases instead
of going through the procedures provided for by the Rules of Court in the event of adverse ruling,
order or decision of the court.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that in view of the above-foregoings [sic], a

penalty of SUSPENSION in the practice of law for a period of six (6) monthsfrom finality of the
decision be ordered against respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca.

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately submitted his Report and

Recommendation  finding Atty. Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of
11

Professional Responsibility by filing frivolous administrative and criminalcomplaints; and

recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the practice of law for one year because his
motion to inhibit Judge Madrid was devoid of factual or legal basis, and was grounded on purely
personal whims.

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41,  the IBP Board of Governors modified the recommendation and
12

dismissed the administrative complaint for its lack of merit, thus:

RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit. Judge
Madrid filed a petition,  which the IBP Board of Governors treated as a motion for reconsideration,
13

and soon denied through its Resolution No. XX-2012-545. 14

Issues

(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolousadministrative and criminal complaints against judges and
court personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility?

(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge Madrid in
Criminal Case No. 2006-6795?

Ruling of the Court

We REVERSE Resolution No. XX-2012-545.

Atty. Dealca must guard against his own impulse of initiating unfounded suits

Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the administrative and criminal cases he filed against judges
and court personnel, including Judge Madrid. He argues that as a vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound
to bring and prosecute cases against unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court personnel. 15
We see no merit in Atty. Dealca’s arguments.

Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high sense of
vigilance to weed out from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and inefficient or undeserving court
personnel, any acts taken in that direction should be unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self
interest. The noble cause of cleansing the ranks of the Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is for
that reason that Atty. Dealca’s complaint against Judge Madrid has failed our judicious scrutiny, for
the Court cannot find any trace of idealism or altruismin the motivations for initiating it. Instead, Atty.
Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for harassment, considering that, as
IBP Commissioner Hababag pointed out,  his bringing of charges against judges, court personnel
16

and even his colleagues in the Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being
adverse to his clients or his side. He well knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of
propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor harassment could be a substitute for resorting tothe
appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim of every lawsuit should be to
render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them. 17

The Lawyer’s Oath is a source ofobligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation thereof by
an attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action.  The oath
18

exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit." These are not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must
be upheld and keep inviolable. 19

As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to initiate
groundless, false or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly embodied inRule 1.03, Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility thuswise:

Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding
or delay any man’s cause.

His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly administration
of justice must not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the whims and caprices ofhis
clients and temper his clients’ propensities to litigate,  so must he equally guard himself against his
20

own impulses of initiating unfounded suits. While it is the Court’s duty to investigate and uncover the
truth behindcharges against judges and lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them from unfounded
suits that are intended to vex and harass them, among other things. 21

Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts in the proper
administration of justice. He disregarded his mission because his filing of the unfounded complaints,
including this one against Judge Madrid, increased the workload of the Judiciary. Although no
person should be penalized for the exercise ofthe right to litigate, the right must nonetheless be
exercised in good faith.  Atty. Dealca’s bringing of the numerous administrative and criminal
22

complaints against judges, court personnel and his fellow lawyers did not evince any good faith on
his part, considering that he made allegations against them therein that he could not substantially
prove, and are rightfully deemed frivolous and unworthy of the Court’s precious time and serious
consideration.

Repeatedly denying any wrongdoing in filing the various complaints, Atty. Dealca had the temerity to
confront even the Court with the following arrogant tirade, to wit:

With due respect, what could be WRONG was the summary dismissal of cases filed against erring
judges and court personnel ‘for lack of merit’, i.e. without even discussing the facts and the law of
the case.23
Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute resolutions the Court could have promulgated in
frequently dismissing his unmeritorious petitions. His arrogant posturing would not advance his
cause now. He thereby demonstrated his plain ignorance of the rules of procedure applicable to the
Court.The minute resolutions have been issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions by the
Court.  Whenever the Court then dismisses a petition for review for its lack of merit through a minute
24

resolution, it is understood that the challenged decision or order, together with all its findings of fact
and law, is deemed sustained or upheld,  and the minute resolution then constitutes the actual
25

adjudication on the merits of the case. The dismissal of the petition, or itsdenial of due course
indicates the Court’s agreement with and its adoption of the findings and conclusions of the court a
quo. 26

The requirement for stating the facts and the law does not apply to the minute resolutions that the
Court issuesin disposing of a case. The Court explained why in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals: 27

The [Supreme] Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them
as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual
in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord
with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition
is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The
resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal basis.

xxxx

The Court is not ‘duty bound’ to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to
formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its
evaluation of a case.

The constitutionality of the minute resolutions was the issue raised in Komatsu Industries (Phils.),
Inc. v. Court of Appeals.  The petitioner contended that the minute resolutions violated Section
28

14,  Article VIII of the Constitution. The Court, throughJustice Regalado, declared that resolutions
29

were not decisions withinthe constitutional contemplation, for the former "merely hold that the
petition for review should not be entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so
understood it; and the petition to review the decisionof the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right
but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial since, for
one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeal’s decision." It pointed
out that the constitutional mandate was applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e., given
due course to and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the
petition was being refused due course, with the resolutions for that purpose stating the legal basis of
the refusal. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on the petition and the subsequent pleadings,
decided to deny due course to the petition and stated that the questions raised were factual, or there
was no reversible error in the lower court’s decision, there was a sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement. 30

II

Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have "in good grace inhibited himself" upon his
motion toinhibit in order to preserve "confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary."  However, IBP
31

Commissioner Hababag has recommended that Atty. Dealca be sanctioned for filing the motion to
inhibit considering that the motion, being purely based on his personal whims, was bereft of factual
and legal bases. 32
The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is warranted.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered to appear, prosecute and defend the legal
causes for their clients. As a consequence, peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are
devolved upon them by law. Verily, their membership in the Bar imposes certain obligations upon
them. 33

In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility pertinently state:

Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

xxxx

Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or haveno
materiality to the case.1âwphi1

In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the
courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts
that guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a
very shaky foundation. 34

The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the following averment, to wit:

Considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned, he
does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, andthe latter does not also hear cases
handled by the undersignedx x x.  (Bold emphasis supplied)
35

Atty. Dealca’s averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cases being handled by him directly
insinuated that judges could choose the cases they heard, and could refuse to hear the cases in
which hostility existed between the judges and the litigants or their counsel. Such averment, if true at
all, should have been assiduously substantiated by him because it put in bad light not only Judge
Madrid but all judges in general. Yet, he did not even include any particulars that could have
validated the averment. Nor did he attach any document to support it.

Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge
who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case
must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Thus, it
was incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to establish by clear and convincing evidence the ground of bias
and prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid from participating in a particular trial in which Atty.
Dealca was participating as a counsel.  The latter’s bare allegations of Judge Madrid’s partiality or
36

hostility did not suffice,  because the presumption that Judge Madrid would undertake his noble role
37

to dispense justice according to law and the evidence and without fear or favor should only be
overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.  As such, Atty. Dealca clearly
38

contravened his duties as a lawyer as expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule 11.04, supra.

On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is not the first administrative complaint to be
ever brought against Atty. Dealca.  In Montano v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines,  we reprimanded
1avvphi1
39

him for violating Canon 22 and Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
warned him that a repetition of the same offense would be dealt with more severely. Accordingly,
based on the penalties the Court imposed on erring lawyers found violating Canon 1, Rule
1.03,  and Canon 11, Rule 11.04  of the Code, we deem appropriate to suspend Atty. Dealca from
40 41

the practice of law for a period one year. ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES
respondent ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03 and Canon 11, Rule
11. 04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for
one year effective from notice of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in
the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty.
Dealca's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED
NESTOR B. FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR., Complainants, v. ATTY.
DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review filed by Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez assailing the
February 19, 2009 Resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) suspending him from the practice of law for a period of six months for
breach of Rule 12.03,2 Canon 12,3 Canon 17,4 Rule 18.03,5 and Canon 186 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He likewise assails the June 26, 2011 Resolution 7 of the
IBP Board of Governors denying his motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows: chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the

affairs of the homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon City.  On January 7,
1993, the Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander filed a civil suit for damages against
the Association and Ely Mabanag8  before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 104 for building a concrete wall which abutted their property and denied them
of their right of way. The spouses Santander likewise alleged that said concrete wall
was built in violation of Quezon City Ordinance No. 8633, S-71 which prohibits the
closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise refusing to the public or vehicular traffic
the use of or free access to any subdivision or community street. 9  The Law Firm of
Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel for the Association,
with respondent as the counsel of record and handling lawyer.  After trial and hearing,
the RTC rendered a decision10 on October 4, 1996 in favor of the Spouses Santander.
The Association, represented by said law firm, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
On February 5, 1999, the CA issued a Resolution 11 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577 dismissing
the appeal on the ground that the original period to file the appellant’s brief had expired
95 days even before the first motion for extension of time to file said brief was filed.
The CA also stated that the grounds adduced for the said motion as well as the six
subsequent motions for extension of time to file brief were not meritorious.  The CA
resolution became final.

Eight years later or on April 11, 2007, complainants Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido
Victoria, Jr., as members of the Association, filed a Complaint 12 for Disbarment against
respondent before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) for violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule
18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his negligence in handling the appeal and willful violation of
his duties as an officer of the court.

In his Verified Answer with Counter Complaint, 13 respondent denied administrative

liability. He claimed that although his law firm represented the homeowner’s association
in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577, the case was actually handled by an associate lawyer in his
law office.  As the partner in charge of the case, he exercised general supervision over
the handling counsel and signed the pleadings prepared by said handling lawyer. Upon
discovery of the omissions of the handling lawyer, appropriate sanctions were imposed
on the handling lawyer and he thereafter personally took responsibility and spent
personal funds to negotiate a settlement with Federico Santander at no cost to the
Association. No damage whatsoever was caused to the Association.

Respondent likewise alleged that after he defeated complainant Figueras in the election
for President of the homeowner’s association in 1996, Figueras and his compadre,
complainant Victoria, stopped paying their association dues and other assessments.
Complainants and other delinquent members of the association were sanctioned by the
Board of Directors and were sued by the association before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). In retaliation, complainants filed the present disbarment
case against him and several other cases against him and other officers of the
association before the HLURB to question, among others, the legitimacy of the
Association, the election of its officers, and the sanctions imposed by the Association.
Thus, he concluded that the disbarment case was filed to harass him. Respondent
added that complainants have no personality to file the disbarment complaint as they
were not his clients; hence, there was likewise no jurisdiction over the complaint on the
part of the IBP-CBD.

As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the disbarment case
for lack of merit, the imposition of sanctions on complainants, and the payment of
damages for the filing of the baseless complaint for disbarment.

On October 3, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found respondent

liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03 of
Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 thereof, and recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three to six months,
with warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.14crallawlibrary

On February 19, 2009, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-
2009-1415 adopting the recommendation with modifications as follows: chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution [as] Annex “A”; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s breach of Rule 12.03, Canon
12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03 and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Diosdado B. Jimenez is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months.  The Warning imposed against respondent is hereby deleted.

Respondent sought reconsideration of the resolution but his motion was denied in IBP
Resolution No. XIX-2011-480 dated June 26, 2011.16  The IBP Board of Governors
noted that respondent’s motion was a mere reiteration of matters already discussed
and there were no substantial grounds to disturb the February 19, 2009 Resolution.

Respondent now comes to this Court essentially raising the issue whether the IBP
correctly found him administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon
17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds that the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law is proper.

The Court finds no merit in respondent’s contention that complainants have no

personality to file a disbarment case against him as they were not his clients and that
the present suit was merely instituted to harass him.

The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real
party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases.  In fact, the
person who called the attention of the court to a lawyer’s misconduct “is in no sense a
party, and generally has no interest in the outcome.” 17 crallawlibrary

In Heck v. Judge Santos,18 the Court held that “[a]ny interested person or the
court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings.”  The right to institute
disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person
complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing.  Disbarment proceedings are
matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of
proof of the charges.

The Court agrees with the IBP that respondent had been remiss in the performance of
his duties as counsel for Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. Records
show that respondent filed the first motion for extension of time to file appellant’s
brief 95 days after the expiration of the reglementary period to file said brief, thus
causing the dismissal of the appeal of the homeowner’s association. To justify his
inexcusable negligence, respondent alleges that he was merely the supervising lawyer
and that the fault lies with the handling lawyer. His contention, however, is belied by
the records for we note that respondent had filed with the CA an Urgent Motion for
Extension, which he himself signed on behalf of the law firm, stating that a previous
motion had been filed but “due to the health condition of the undersigned counsel…he
was not able to finish said Appellants’ Brief within the fifteen (15) day period earlier
requested by him.”19  Thus, it is clear that respondent was personally in charge of the
case.

A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting

the latter’s interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf
of his client, respondent had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule
12.04,20 Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every
member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it
his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.  Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the same Code also states that: chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Canon 18—A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03.—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

In In Re: Atty. Santiago F. Marcos21 the Court considered a lawyer’s failure to file brief
for his client as amounting to inexcusable negligence. The Court held: chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with
utmost diligence. (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief
for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. (People vs. Villar,
46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed
by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the
speedy administration of justice. (Canons 21 and 22, Canons of Professional
Ethics; People vs. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).

It has been stressed that the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred
or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion. 22 
The penalties for a lawyer’s failure to file a brief or other pleading range from
reprimand,23 warning with fine,24 suspension25 and, in grave cases, disbarment.26  In the
present case, we find too harsh the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months.  Under
the circumstances, we deem the penalty of suspension for one month from the practice
of law to be more commensurate with the extent of respondent’s violation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is found

administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.04, Canon 12 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  He is suspended from the practice of law for
one (1) month effective from finality of this Resolution, with warning that a repetition of
the same or similar violation shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all the courts in the Philippines, and spread on the personal record of
respondent lawyer in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6490               July 9, 2013
(Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1054)

LILIA TABANG AND CONCEPCION TABANG, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This case involves a complaint for disbarment directly filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) charging respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott of engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). 1

Complainants alleged that sometime in 1984 and 1985, complainant Lilia Tabang sought the advice
of Judge Eustaquio Gacott, respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott’s father. Lilia Tabang intended to
purchase a total of thirty (30) hectares of agricultural land located in Barangay Bacungan, Puerto
Princesa, Palawan, which consisted of several parcels belonging to different owners. Judge Gacott
noted that under the government’s agrarian reform program, Tabang was prohibited from acquiring
vast tracts of agricultural land as she already owned other parcels. Thus, Judge Gacott advised her
to put the titles of the parcels under the names of fictitious persons. 2

Eventually, Lilia Tabang was able to purchase seven parcels and obtained the corresponding
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) under the names of fictitious persons, as follows:

1. TCT No. 12475 – Amelia Andes;

2. TCT No. 12476 – Wilfredo Ondoy;

3. TCT No. 12790 – Agnes Camilla;

4. TCT No. 12791 – Leonor Petronio;

5. TCT No. 12792 – Wilfredo Gomez;

6. TCT No. 12793 – Elizabeth Dungan; and

7. TCT No. 12794 – Andes Estoy.3

Later, complainants Lilia and Concepcion Tabang decided to sell the seven parcels as they were in
need of funds for their medication and other expenses. Claiming that he would help complainants by
offering the parcels to prospective buyers, respondent Glenn Gacott borrowed from Lilia Tabang the
TCTs covering the parcels.4

About a year after respondent borrowed the titles and after he failed to negotiate any sale,
complainants confronted respondent. Respondent then told the complainants that he had lost all
seven titles.5
On the pretext of offering a remedy to complainants, respondent advised them to file petitions in
court for re-issuance of titles. Pretending to be the "authorized agent-representative" of the fictitious
owners of the seven parcels, Lilia Tabang filed petitions for re-issuance of titles. 6

In the course of the proceedings, the public prosecutor noticed similarities in the signatures of the
supposed owners that were affixed on the Special Powers of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed in
favor of Lilia Tabang. The public prosecutor, acting on his observation, asked the court to have the
supposed owners summoned.7

Seeking to avoid embarrassment, Lilia Tabang had the petitions voluntarily dismissed without
prejudice to their being re-filed.8

Subsequently, Lilia Tabang filed a new set of petitions. This time, she changed the fictitious owners’
signatures in the hope of making them look more varied. 9

Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had filed a new set of petitions, respondent executed several
documents that included revocations of SPAs and various affidavits of recovery purportedly signed
by the parcels’ (fictitious) owners. Respondent then caused the annotation of these documents on
the TCTs of the seven parcels.10

Also, respondent caused the publication of notices where he represented himself as the owner of the
parcels and announced that these were for sale. 11 Later, respondent succeeded in selling the seven
parcels. He received a total of ?3,773,675.00 from the proceeds of the sales. 12

Alleging that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit, complainants filed
their complaint directly with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on February 3, 2003. The case was
docketed as Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Case No. 03-1054.

In his defense, respondent alleged that the owners of the seven parcels were not fictitious and that
they had voluntarily sold the seven parcels. He added that Lilia Tabang had been merely the broker
for the seven parcels and that she had unsuccessfully demanded a "balato" of twenty percent (20%)
from the proceeds of the sale of the seven parcels. He alleged that after she had been refused to be
given a "balato," Lilia Tabang had threatened to defame him and seek his disbarment. 13

In her Report and Recommendation dated March 4, 2004, 14 IBP Investigating Commissioner Lydia A.
Navarro found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. She recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months.

In a Resolution dated April 16, 2004,15 the IBP Board of Governors adopted the report of
Commissioner Navarro. However, the IBP Board of Governors increased the penalty to disbarment.
Thereafter, the case was referred to the Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.

In a Resolution dated September 29, 2004, 16 the Supreme Court remanded the case to the IBP. The
Court noted that majority of the pieces of evidence presented by complainants were mere
photocopies and affidavits and that the persons who supposedly executed such documents were
neither presented nor subpoenaed. Thus, there could not have been adequate basis for sustaining
the imposition of a penalty as grave as disbarment.
The case was then assigned to Investigating Commissioner Dennis B. Funa. Hearings were
conducted on March 22, 2005; October 7, 2005; July 18, 2006; August 29, 2006; November 7, 2006;
February 23, 2007; and July 25, 2007.17

The complainants presented several witnesses. One was Dieter Heinze, President of the Swiss
American Lending Corporation.18 Heinze testified that in April 2001, a friend introduced him to
respondent who, in turn, introduced himself as the owner of seven (7) parcels in Puerto Princesa
City, Palawan. They agreed on the purchase of a lot priced at ₱900,000.00. His company, however,
paid only ₱668,000.00. Heinze noted that his company withheld payment upon his realization that
Lilia Tabang had caused the annotation of an adverse claim and upon respondent’s failure to
produce Leonor Petronio, the alleged lot owner.

Another of complainants’ witnesses was Atty. Agerico Paras.19 He testified that Heinze introduced
him to respondent who, in turn, introduced himself as the owner of seven (7) parcels in Puerto
Princesa City, Palawan. They agreed on the purchase of a lot priced at ₱2,300,000.00. He paid for
the said parcel in two (2) installments. Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had caused the annotation of
an adverse claim, he wrote to respondent asking him to either work on the cancellation of the claim
or to reimburse him. He added that respondent was unable to produce Amelia Andes, the ostensible
owner of the parcel he had purchased.

Teodoro Gallinero, another buyer of one of the seven parcels, also testified for complainants. 20 He
testified that in February 2001, he was introduced to respondent who claimed that several parcels
with a total area of thirty (30) hectares were owned by his mother. Gallinero agreed to purchase a
parcel for the price of ₱2,000,000.00 which he paid in cash and in kind (L-300 van).

Complainant Lilia Tabang also testified on the matters stated in the Complaint. 21

On July 25, 2007, Commissioner Funa required the complainants to submit their Position Paper.
Respondent filed his Motion for Reconsideration and the Inhibition of Commissioner Funa who,
respondent claimed, deprived him of the chance to cross-examine complainants’ witnesses, and was
"bent on prejudicing"22 him.

Commissioner Funa then inhibited himself. Following this, the case was reassigned to Investigating
Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco.

In the meantime, with the Supreme Court En Banc’s approval of the IBP-CBD’s Rules of Procedure,
it was deemed proper for an Investigating Commissioner to submit his/her Report and
Recommendation based on matters discussed during the mandatory conferences, on the parties’
Position Papers (and supporting documents), and on the results of clarificatory questioning (if such
questioning was found to be necessary). As such, respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration was
denied, and he was required to file his Position Paper. 23

On July 30, 2009, respondent filed his Position Paper. 24 Subsequently, the case was deemed
submitted for Commissioner Limpingco’s Report and Recommendation.

In his Position Paper, respondent noted that he filed criminal complaints against Lilia Tabang on
account of Tabang’s statement that she had fabricated the identities of the owners of the seven (7)
parcels. He claimed that since 1996, he had relied on the Torrens Titles of the seven (7) owners who
were introduced to him by Lilia Tabang. He asserted that Lilia Tabang could not have been the
owner of the seven (7) parcels since the SPAs executed by the parcels’ owners clearly made her a
mere agent and him a sub-agent. He also assailed the authenticity of the public announcements
(where he supposedly offered the seven 7 parcels for sale) and Memorandum of Agreement. He
surmised that the signatures on such documents appearing above the name "Glenn C. Gacott" had
been mere forgeries and crude duplications of his own signature.

In his Report and Recommendation dated August 23, 2010, 25 Commissioner Limpingco found
respondent liable for gross violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR. He likewise noted that respondent was
absent in most of the hearings without justifiable reason, in violation of Rule 12.04 of the CPR. 26 He
recommended that respondent be disbarred and his name, stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

On October 8, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution 27 adopting the Report of
Investigating Commissioner Limpingco.

On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration. 28

Respondent then filed his Notice of Appeal with the IBP on August 8, 2011.

On August 17, 2011, respondent filed before the Supreme Court his Urgent Motion for Extension of
Time (to file Petition for Review/Appeal). On September 20, 2011, the Court granted respondent’s
Motion and gave him an extension of thirty (30) days to file his Appeal. The Supreme Court warned
respondent that no further extension will be given. Despite this, respondent filed two (2) more
Motions for Extension – the first on September 29, 2011 and the second on November 3, 2011 –
both of which were denied by the Court.

Despite the Court’s denials of his Motions for Extension, respondent filed on December 14, 2011 a
Motion to Admit Petition for Review/Appeal (with attached Petition/Appeal). This Motion was denied
by the Court on April 17, 2012.

For resolution is the issue of whether or not respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus warranting his
disbarment.

After a careful examination of the records, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and
recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco and the IBP Board of Governors. It is clear that
respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR
when he executed the revocations of SPAs and affidavits of recovery and in arrogating for himself
the ownership of the seven (7) subject parcels.

While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang herself engaged in illicit activities, the
complainant’s own complicity does not negate, or even mitigate, the repugnancy of respondent’s
offense. Quite the contrary, his offense is made even graver. He is a lawyer who is held to the
highest standards of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. Perverting what is expected of him,
he deliberately and cunningly took advantage of his knowledge and skill of the law to prejudice and
torment other individuals. Not only did he countenance illicit action, he instigated it. Not only did he
acquiesce to injustice, he orchestrated it. Thus, We impose upon respondent the supreme penalty of
disbarment.

Under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court (Rules), a lawyer may be disbarred for any of the
following grounds:

deceit;

malpractice;
 gross misconduct in office;

grossly immoral conduct;

conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;

violation of the lawyer's oath;

willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and

willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.

It is established in Jurisprudence that disbarment is proper when lawyers commit gross misconduct,
dishonesty, and deceit in usurping the property rights of other persons. By way of examples:

In Brennisen v. Contawi:29 Respondent Atty. Ramon U. Contawi was disbarred for having used a
spurious SPA to mortgage and sell property entrusted to him for administration.

In Sabayle v. Tandayag:30 One of the respondents, Atty. Carmelito B. Gabor, was disbarred for
having acknowledged a Deed of Sale in the absence of the purported vendors and for taking
advantage of his position as Assistant Clerk of Court by purchasing one-half (1/2) of the land
covered by said Deed of Sale knowing that the deed was fictitious.

In Daroy v. Legaspi:31 The Court disbarred respondent Atty. Ramon Legaspi for having converted to
his personal use the funds that he received for his clients.

Nevertheless, recourse to disbarment must be done with utmost caution. As this Court noted in
Moran v. Moron:32

Disbarment should never be imposed unless it is evidently clear that the lawyer, by his serious
misconduct, should no longer remain a member of the bar. Disbarment is the most severe form of
disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution,
only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and
moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. Accordingly,
disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe – such as a reprimand,
suspension, or fine – would accomplish the end desired. 33

Moreover, considering the gravity of disbarment, it has been established that clearly preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify its imposition.34

As explained in Aba v. De Guzman,35 "[p]reponderance of evidence means that the evidence

adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto."36

Per Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules, a court may consider the following in determining
preponderance of evidence:

All the facts and circumstances of the case;

The witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the
facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony;

The witnesses’ interest or want of interest and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
ultimately appear in the trial; and

The number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the
greater number.

In this case, complainants have shown by a preponderance of evidence that respondent committed
gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.

Specifically, complainants have shown not only through Lilia Tabang’s testimony but more so
through the testimonies of Dieter Heinze, Atty. Agerico Paras, and Teodoro Gallinero that:

respondent misrepresented himself as the owner of or having the right to dispose of the subject
parcels;

respondent actively sought to sell or otherwise dispose of the subject parcels;

respondent perfected the sales and received the proceeds of the sales – whether in cash or in kind –
of the subject parcels;

such sales were without the consent or authorization of complainants; and

respondent never remitted the proceeds of the sales to complainants.

More importantly, complainants’ witnesses showed that when respondent had been confronted with
Lilia Tabang’s adverse claims and asked to substantiate the identities of the supposed owners of the
subject parcels, he had failed to produce such persons or even show an iota of proof of their
existence. In this regard, the testimonies of Dieter Heinze, Atty. Agerico Paras, and Teodoro
Gallinero are particularly significant in so far as they have been made despite the fact that their
interest as buyers is contrary to that of complainants’ interest as adverse claimants.

In contrast, respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant's allegations.

Respondent’s defense centered on his insistence that the owners of the seven parcels were not
fictitious and that they had voluntarily sold the seven parcels. Respondent also evaded the
allegations against him by flinging counter-allegations. For instance, he alleged that Lilia Tabang had
unsuccessfully demanded a "balato" from the proceeds of the sale of the subject parcels and that
after she had been refused, she threatened to defame respondent and seek his disbarment. In
support of this allegation, he pointed out that he had filed criminal complaints against Lilia Tabang.
He also surmised that the signatures on the subject documents appearing above the name "Glenn
C. Gacott" were mere forgeries and crude duplications of his signature.

Per Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,37 the burden of proof is vested upon the party who
alleges the truth of his claim or defense or any fact in issue. Thus, in Leave Division, Office of
Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator v. Gutierrez 38 where a party resorts to bare
denials and allegations and fails to submit evidence in support of his defense, the determination that
he committed the violation is sustained.
It was incumbent upon respondent to prove his allegation that the supposed owners of the seven
parcels are real persons. Quite the contrary, he failed to produce the slightest proof of their identities
and existence, much less produce their actual persons. As to his allegations regarding Lilia Tabang’s
supposed extortion and threat and the forgery or crude duplication of his signature, they remain just
that – allegations. Respondent failed to aver facts and circumstances which support these claims.

At best, respondent merely draws conclusions from the documents which form the very basis of
complainants’ own allegations and which are actually being assailed by complainants as inaccurate,
unreliable, and fraudulent. Respondent makes much of how Lilia Tabang could not have been the
owner of the seven (7) parcels since her name does not appear on the parcels’ TCTs 39 and how he
merely respected the title and ownership of the ostensible owners. 40 Similarly, he makes much of
how Lilia Tabang was named as a mere agent in the SPAs.41 However, respondent loses sight of the
fact that it is precisely the accuracy of what the TCTs and SPAs indicate and the deception they
engender that are the crux of the present controversy. In urging this Court to sustain him,
respondent would have us rely on the very documents assailed as fraudulent.

Apart from these, all that respondent can come up with are generic, sweeping, and self-serving
allegations of (1) how he could not have obtained the TCTs from Tabang as "it is a standing policy of
his law office not to accept Torrens title [sic] unless it is related to a court case" 42 and because "[he]
does not borrow any Torrens title from anybody and for whatever purpose;" 43 (2) how complainants
could not have confronted him to demand the return of the TCTs and how he could not have told
them that he lost the TCTs because "[a]s a lawyer, [he] always respects and recognizes the right of
an owner to keep in his custody or possession any of his properties of value;" 44 and (3) how he could
not have met and talked with Lilia Tabang for the engagement of his services only to refuse Lilia
Tabang because legal practice constituted his livelihood, and there was no reason for him to refuse
an occasion to earn income.45

Rather than responding squarely to complainants’ allegations, respondent merely embarks on

conjectures and ascribes motives to complainants. He accuses Lilia Tabang of demanding a "balato"
of twenty percent (20%) from the proceeds of the sale of the seven parcels, and of threatening to
defame him and to seek his disbarment after she had been refused.  This evasive posturing
1âwphi1

notwithstanding, what is clear is that respondent failed to adduce even the slightest proof to
substantiate these claims. From all indications, Lilia Tabang had sufficient basis to file the present
Complaint and seek sanctions against respondent.

Given the glaring disparity between the evidence adduced by complainants and the sheer lack of
evidence adduced by respondent, this Court is led to no other reasonable conclusion than that
respondent committed the acts of which he is accused and that he acted in a manner that is
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that
"a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to
the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State – the
administration of justice – as an officer of the court." 46 Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain
not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing."47

Respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly short of the high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing required of him. Quite the contrary, he employed his knowledge and skill of
the law as well as took advantage of the credulity of petitioners to secure undue gains for himself
and to inflict serious damage on others. He did so over the course of several years in a sustained
and unrelenting fashion and outdid his previous wrongdoing with even greater, more detestable
offenses. He has hardly shown any remorse. From how he has conducted himself in these
proceedings, he is all but averse to rectifying his ways and assuaging complainants’ plight.
Respondent even foisted upon the IBP and this Court his duplicity by repeatedly absenting himself
from the IBP’s hearings without justifiable reasons. He also vexed this Court to admit his Appeal
despite his own failure to comply with the much extended period given to him, thus inviting the Court
to be a party in delaying complainants’ cause. For all his perversity, respondent deserves none of
this Court’s clemency.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, having clearly violated the Canons of
Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct, is DISBARRED
and his name ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. Let a copy of this
Decision be attached to respondent's personal record as attorney.

SO ORDERED
 CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT INCORPORATED, Complainant, v. NICOLAS C.
TORRES, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court’s resolution is the Complaint 1 dated October 30, 2008 filed by
complainant CF Sharp Crew Management Incorporated (complainant) against
respondent Nicolas C. Torres (respondent), charging him with violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Facts

Complainant is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged
in overseas maritime employment.2 It hired respondent, a medical doctor and a lawyer
by profession, as its Legal and Claims Manager who was tasked, inter alia, to serve as
its legal counsel and to oversee the administration and management of legal cases and
medical-related claims instituted by seafarers against complainant’s various principals.
Among the cases respondent handled in his capacity as Legal and Claims Manager were
the claims of seafarers Bernardo R. Mangi (Mangi), Rodelio J. Sampani (Sampani),
Joseph C. Delgado (Delgado), and Edmundo M. Chua (Chua). 3 cralawlawlibrary

In its administrative complaint, it was alleged that per respondent’s request,

complainant issued checks in the amounts of P524,000.00, P652,013.20, P145,650.00,
P97,100.00, and P296,808.40 as settlement of the respective claims of Mangi,
Sampani, Delgado, and Chua.4 However, complainant later discovered that, save for the
check in the amount of P145,650.00 issued to Delgado, respondent never gave the
checks to the seafarers and instead, had them deposited at International Exchange
Bank, Banawe, Quezon City Branch, under Account No. 003-10-06902-1. 5 With respect
to Sampani, complainant also discovered that he only received the amounts of
P216,936.00 and P8,303.00 or a total of P225,239.00 out of the requested amount of
P652,013.20, through checks not issued by complainant. 6 cralawlawlibrary

On October 30, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline directly received the instant complaint and on even date, issued an
Order7 requiring respondent to file an answer, but the latter failed to do so. Neither did
respondent appear in the mandatory conference scheduled on March 20, 2009 nor did
he file his position paper.8 cralawlawlibrary

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation9 dated August 1, 2009, the IBP Investigating

Commissioner found respondent administratively liable for violating the CPR, and
accordingly recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for one (1) year.10
cralawlawlibrary

The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent had indeed requested and was
issued checks as settlement of the respective claims of Mangi, Sampani, Delgado, and
Chua on the pretense that the requested amounts represented what was lawfully due
them.11 However, instead of giving the said checks to the named seafarers, he
deposited the same at the International Exchange Bank, Banawe, Quezon City Branch,
under Account No. 003-10-06902-1,12 except for the check in the amount of
P145,650.00 issued to Delgado.13 cralawlawlibrary

Meanwhile, respondent belatedly filed his Verified Answer (With Motion to Re-Open
Investigation)14 on March 24, 2010. He explained that he was not able to timely file an
answer because complainant supplied a wrong address to the IBP and filed non-bailable
criminal cases against him which caused his detention in a regular prison cell and, thus,
his inability to comply with the IBP’s directives. 15cralawlawlibrary

On the merits of the complaint, respondent maintained that the seafarers’ claims had
long been settled and that the release documents signed by the named seafarers were
already in actual custody and possession of the complainant. 16 He further contended
that he only signed the dorsal portions of the checks as a form of guaranty of their
genuineness17 and that he could not have encashed them as they were all payable to a
particular payee.18 Lastly, respondent claimed that when he resigned in August 2008,
complainant forced him to sign promissory notes to reimburse certain amounts which
had not been accounted for by the latter in exchange for his clearance documents. 19 But
before he was able to settle the promissory notes, he was already arrested in
connection with the criminal cases filed by complainant against him. 20 cralawlawlibrary

In a Resolution21 dated December 29, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously

adopted and approved the aforesaid report and recommendation with modification,
increasing the recommended period of suspension from the practice of law to two (2)
years, and ordering respondent to return the full amount of money he received from
complainant which is legally due to the seafarers, with legal interest, within thirty (30)
days from receipt of notice.

Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration22 on April 22, 2013 which was,
however, denied in a Resolution23 dated March 8, 2014.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for violating the CPR.

The Court’s Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings of the IBP in
its report and recommendation, except as to: (a) the recommended penalty to be
imposed upon respondent; and (b) the monetary award in favor of the complainant.

It is fundamental that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly
fiduciary and ascribes to a lawyer a great degree of fidelity and good faith. 24 The highly
fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the
money or property collected or received for or from his client. 25 This is the standard laid
down by Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR, which read: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.

Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. x x x.

In the foregoing light, it has been held that a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand
the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics.26
cralawlawlibrary

In this case, the IBP Investigating Commissioner correctly found that complainant had
duly proven its charges against respondent. In particular, complainant had exposed
respondent’s modus operandi of repeatedly requesting the issuance of checks
purportedly for the purpose of settling seafarers’ claims against the complainant’s
various principals, only to have such checks (except for the check in the amount of
P145,650.00 issued to Delgado) deposited to an unauthorized bank account,
particularly International Exchange Bank, Banawe, Quezon City Branch, under Account
No. 003-10-06902-1. It is well-settled that “when a lawyer receives money from the
client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the
money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his
client.”27 This, respondent failed to do.

Clearly, respondent’s acts of misappropriation constitute dishonesty, abuse of trust and

confidence reposed in him by the complainant, and betrayal of his client’s interests
which he is duty-bound to protect.28 They are contrary to the mandate of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the CPR which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.” Such malfeasance is not only unacceptable,
disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; it also reveals a basic moral flaw
that makes him unfit to practice law.29 cralawlawlibrary

Anent the proper penalty for respondent’s acts, the Court deems it proper to modify the
penalty recommended by the IBP. Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where
lawyers misappropriated their clients’ money, the Court imposed upon them the
ultimate penalty of disbarment from the practice of law. In Arellano University, Inc. v.
Mijares III,30 the Court disbarred the lawyer for misappropriating his client’s money
intended for securing a certificate of title on the latter’s behalf. Similarly, in  Freeman v.
Reyes,31 the same penalty was imposed upon the lawyer who misappropriated the
insurance proceeds of her client’s deceased husband.

As already discussed, respondent’s conduct of misappropriating complainant’s money

has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession. He has definitely fallen below the
moral bar when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful, and grossly immoral
acts.32 As a member of the Bar, he is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen
the trust and confidence reposed in him by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal profession.33 Membership in the legal profession is a privilege, and
whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of his clients and the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty
of the Court to withdraw the same,34 as in this case. In view of the foregoing,
respondent deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment from the practice of law.

Likewise, the Court cannot concur with the IBP’s recommendation regarding the return
of the settlement money respondent received from complainant, considering, among
others, that it was not specifically prayed for in the latter’s administrative complaint
and that the civil liability of respondent therefor may already be the subject of existing
cases involving the same parties.

WHEREFORE, respondent Nicolas C. Torres is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01,

Canon 1 and Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his
name ordered STRICKEN OFF from the roll of attorneys.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent’s record in this Court as attorney.
Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 ATTY. POLICARIO I. CATALAN, JR., Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSELITO M.
SILVOSA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty.
Joselito M. Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three causes of action against Atty.
Silvosa; (1) Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for
which he previously appeared as prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then colleague
Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros.Toribio) for P30,000; and (3) the Sandiganbayan
convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No. 27776 for direct bribery. Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa (Comm. Funa)
held Atty. Silvosa liable only for the first cause of action and recommended the penalty
of reprimand. The Board of Governors of the IBP twice modified Comm. Funa s
recommendation: first, to a suspension of six months, then to a suspension of two
years.

Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa
appeared as public prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00, "People of the Philippines
v. SPO2 Elmor Esperon y Murillo, et al." (Esperon case), for the complex crime of
double frustrated murder, in which case Atty. Catalan was one of the private
complainants. Atty. Catalan took issue with Atty. Silvosa s manner of prosecuting the
case, and requested the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Atty. Silvosa.

In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private
counsel in a case where he previously appeared as public prosecutor, hence violating
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 1 Atty. Catalan also alleged that,
apart from the fact that Atty. Silvosa and the accused are relatives and have the same
middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest bias in the accused s favor. Atty. Silvosa
caused numerous delays in the trial of the Esperon case by arguing against the position
of the private prosecutor. In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor Guillermo Ching granted Atty.
Catalan s request to relieve Atty. Silvosa from handling the Esperon case. The RTC
rendered judgment convicting the accused on 16 November 2005. On 23 November
2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for the accused, filed a motion to
reinstate bail pending finality of judgment of the Esperon case.

In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In a
case for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalan s brother was a respondent, Pros.
Toribio reviewed the findings of the investigating judge and downgraded the offense
from frustrated murder to less serious physical injuries. During the hearing before
Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio testified that, while still a public prosecutor at the time,
Atty. Silvosa offered her P30,000 to reconsider her findings and uphold the charge of
frustrated murder.

Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayan s
decision in Criminal Case No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on 18
May 2006. Nilo Lanticse (Lanticse) filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa before the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Despite the execution of an affidavit of
desistance by the complainant in a homicide case in favor of Lanticse s father-in-law,
Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still remained in detention for more than two years.
Atty. Silvosa demanded P15,000 from Lanticse for the dismissal of the case and for the
release of Cadinas. The NBI set up an entrapment operation for Atty. Silvosa. GMA 7 s
television program Imbestigador videotaped and aired the actual entrapment operation.
The footage was offered and admitted as evidence, and viewed by the Sandiganbayan.
Despite Atty. Silvosa s defense of instigation, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty.
Silvosa. The dispositive portion of Criminal Case No. 27776 reads: ςrαlαω

WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt,
of the crime of direct bribery and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of:ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r† Ï…αl  lαω  lιbrαrà ¿

(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, one year, one
month and eleven days of prision correccional, as minimum, up to three years, six
months and twenty days of prision correccional, as maximum;

(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency; and cralawlibrary

(C) All other accessory penalties provided for under the law.
chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.2 ςrνll

In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned as
prosecutor from the Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The trial court released its
decision in the Esperon case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the accused s bail.
Atty. Silvosa claims that his appearance was only for the purpose of the reinstatement
of bail. Atty. Silvosa also denies any relationship between himself and the accused.

On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribio s allegations as
"self-serving" and "purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan] and his puppeteer to pursue
persecution."

On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan and is under probation, he asserts that "conviction under the 2nd
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral turpitude
since the act involved do [sic] not amount to a crime. " He further claims that "it is not
the lawyer in respondent that was convicted, but his capacity as a public officer, the
charge against respondent for which he was convicted falling under the category of
crimes against public officers x x x."

In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 September 2008, Comm. Funa found that: ςrαlαω

As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility [are] quite clear. [Atty. Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal
Case No. 10246-00. [Atty. Silvosa s] attempt to minimize his role in said case would be
unavailing. The fact is that he is presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of
said case and has made himself familiar with the parties of the case. Such would
constitute sufficient intervention in the case. The fact that, subsequently, [Atty. Silvosa]
entered his appearance in said case only to file a Motion to

Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still constitute a violation of Rule 6.03 as such act
is sufficient to establish a lawyer-client relation.

As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that
occurred more than seven (7) years ago. In this instance, the conflicting allegations are
merely based on the word of one person against the word of another. With [Atty.
Silvosa s] vehement denial, the accusation of witness [Pros.] Toribio stands alone
unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take note that the alleged incident occurred more than
seven (7) years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before this disbarment case was filed on
November 2006. Such a long period of time would undoubtedly cast doubt on the
veracity of the allegation. Even the existence of the bribe money could not be
ascertained and verified with certainty anymore.

As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly points out that herein complainant has
no personal knowledge about the charge of extortion for which [Atty. Silvosa] was
convicted by the Sandiganbayan. [Atty. Catalan] was not a party in said case nor was
he ever involved in said case. The findings of the Sandiganbayan are not binding upon
this Commission. The findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a disbarment
proceeding. No evidence has been presented relating to the alleged extortion case.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the First
Charge in violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be
given the penalty of REPRIMAND.

Respectfully submitted.3 ςrνll

In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Comm. Funa and
suspended Atty. Silvosa from the practice of law for six months. In another Resolution
dated 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors increased the penalty of Atty.
Silvosa s suspension from the practice of law to two years. The Office of the Bar
Confidant received the notice of the Resolution and the records of the case on 1 March
2012.

We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first cause of action and modify its
recommendations in the second and third causes of action.

Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that "A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in said service." Atty. Silvosa, on the hand, relies on
Rule 2.01 which provides that "A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons the
cause of the defenseless or the oppressed" and on Canon 14 which provides that "A
lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy."
We agree with Comm. Funa s finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he
entered his appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa
conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of facts."

Atty. Silvosa s attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two occasions
can only be described as desperate. He claims his participation as public prosecutor was
only to appear in the arraignment and in the pre-trial conference. He likewise claims his
subsequent participation as collaborating counsel was limited only to the reinstatement
of the original bail. Atty. Silvosa will do well to take heed of our ruling in Hilado v.
David:4ςrνll

An attorney is employed that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer

or counselor when he is listening to his client s preliminary statement of his case, or
when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client s
pleadings, or advocating his client s pleadings, or advocating his client s cause in open
court.

x    x    x

Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney
and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is
designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but
as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said in
another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to
whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts
in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar s wife, not only to keep inviolate the client s
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only
thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.

Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies although

the attorney s intentions were honest and he acted in good faith. 5 ςrνll

Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribio s accusation of bribery and casts doubt on its veracity
by emphasizing the delay in presenting a complaint before the IBP. Comm. Funa, by
stating that there is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the facts with certainty, in
effect agreed with Atty. Silvosa. Contrary to Comm. Funa s ruling, however, the records
show that Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio and failed. Pros. Toribio
executed her affidavit on 14 June 1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt, and had
it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter.
There was no reason for Pros. Toribio to make false testimonies against Atty. Silvosa.
Atty. Silvosa, on the other hand, merely denied the accusation and dismissed it as
persecution. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough
that he denies the charges against him. He must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of
morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. 6 Atty. Silvosa failed in this
respect.
Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative complaint
against a member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a respondent.
Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from
the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of
the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm
of the Court.7ςrνll

We disagree with Comm. Funa s ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding are not
binding in a disbarment proceeding.

First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There can be
no doubt of the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts
and doings of public officers which a citizen feels are incompatible with the duties of the
office and from which conduct the public might or does suffer undesirable
consequences.8 Section 1, Rule 139-B reads: Ï‚rαlαω

Section 1. How Instituted. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of

attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall
state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits
of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court
or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in government
service.

x    x    x

It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the complainant in Criminal Case No.
27776, and that Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not presented as a witness in
the present case. There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayan s judgment in Criminal
Case No. 27776 is a matter of public record and is already final. Atty. Catalan
supported his allegation by submitting documentary evidence of the Sandiganbayan s
decision in Criminal Case No. 27776. Atty. Silvosa himself admitted, against his
interest, that he is under probation.

Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment.

Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.9 Section 27, Rule 138 provides: Ï‚rαlαω

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds

therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis supplied) cralawlibrary

In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction. 10 ςrνll

Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v.
COMELEC,11 ςrνll

we ruled: ςrαlαω

By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of
direct bribery: ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r† Ï…αl  lαω  lιbrαrà ¿

1. the offender is a public officer;

2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or

through another;

3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer
with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act
which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing
something which it is his official duty to do; and cralawlibrary

4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with
the performance of his official duties.
chanrobles virtual law library

Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender
agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains
from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious
intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen
and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and
position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly
contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In
all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. (Italicization in the
original)

Atty. Silvosa s representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing
Pros. Toribio merit at least the penalty of suspension. Atty. Silvosa s final conviction of
the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment under
Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa s
conviction of the crime. We are constrained to impose a penalty more severe than
suspension because we find that Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting
standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar. His excuse that his
conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer, is unacceptable
and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The practice of law is a
privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise this privilege.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his
name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent s personal
record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to the Office of the Court Administration for circulation to all courts in
the country.

SO ORDERED.
 URBAN BANK, INC, PETITIONER, VS. MAGDALENO M. PEÑA, RESPONDENT.

[G. R. NO. 145822]

DELFIN C. GONZALEZ, JR., BENJAMIN L. DE LEON, AND ERIC L. LEE,

PETITIONERS, VS. MAGDALENO M. PEÑA, RESPONDENT.

[G. R. NO. 162562]

MAGDALENO M. PEÑA, VS. URBAN BANK, INC., TEODORO BORLONGAN,

DELFIN C. GONZALEZ, JR., BENJAMIN L. DE LEON, P. SIERVO H. DIZON, ERIC L.
LEE, BEN T. LIM, JR., CORAZON BEJASA, AND ARTURO MANUEL, JR.,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

These consolidated petitions began as a simple case for payment of services rendered
and for reimbursement of costs. The case spun a web of suits and counter-suits
because of: (1) the size of the award for agent's fee rendered in favor of Atty.
Magdaleno Peña (Peña) - PhP24,000,000 - rendered by the trial court; (2) the
controversial execution of the full judgment award of PhP28,500,000 (agent's fee plus
reimbursement for costs and other damages) pending appeal; and (3) the finding of
solidary liability against Urban Bank, Inc., and several of its corporate officers and
directors together with the concomitant levying and sale in execution of the personal
(even conjugal) properties of those officers and directors; and (4) the fact that assets
with declared conservative values of at least PhP181 Million which, together with
those with undeclared values could reach very much more than such amount, [1] were
levied or sold on execution pending appeal to satisfy the PhP28.5 Million award in favor
of Atty. Peña. Incidentally, two supersedeas bonds worth PhP80 Million (2.8 times the
amount of the judgment) were filed by Urban Bank and some of its officers and
directors to stay the execution pending appeal.

Had the four attendant circumstances not afflicted the original case, it would have been
an open-and-shut review where this Court, applying even just the minimum equitable
principle against unjust enrichment would have easily affirmed the grant of fair
recompense to Atty. Peña for services he rendered for Urban Bank if such had been
ordered by the trial court.

That Atty. Peña should be paid something by Urban Bank is not in dispute - the Court of
Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bago City, agreed on that. What
they disagreed on is the basis and the size of the award. The trial court claims that the
basis is an oral contract of agency and the award should be PhP28,5000,000; while, the
appellate court said that Atty. Peña can only be paid under the legal principle against
unjust enrichment, and the total award in his favor should only amount to
PhP3,000,000.

In the eyes of the trial court, the controlling finding is that Atty. Peña should be
believed when he testified that in a telephone conversation, the president of Urban
Bank, Teodoro Borlongan, a respondent herein, agreed to pay him for his services 10%
of the value of the property then worth PhP240,000,000, or PhP24,000,000. Costs and
other awards additionally amount to PhP4,500,000, for a total award of PhP28,500,000
according to the trial court. To the Court of Appeals, such an award has no basis, as in
fact, no contract of agency exists between Atty. Peña and Urban Bank. Hence, Atty.
Peña should only be recompensed according to the principle of unjust enrichment, and
that he should be awarded the amount of PhP3,000,000 only for his services and
reimbursements of costs.

The disparity in the size of the award given by the trial court vis-Ã -vis that of the Court
of Appeals (PhP28,500,000 v. PhP3,000,000) must be placed in the context of the
service that Atty. Peña proved that he rendered for Urban Bank. As the records bear,
Atty. Peña's services consisted of causing the departure of unauthorized sub-tenants in
twenty-three commercial establishments in an entertainment compound along Roxas
Boulevard. It involved the filing of ejectment suits against them, Peña's personal
defense in the counter-suits filed against him, his settlement with them to the tune of
PhP1,500,000, which he advanced from his own funds, and his retention of security
guards and expenditure for other costs amounting to more or less PhP1,500,000. There
is no claim by Atty. Peña of any service beyond those. He claims damages from the
threats to his life and safety from the angry tenants, as well as a vexatious collection
suit he had to face from a creditor-friend from whom he borrowed PhP3,000,000 to
finance the expenses for the services he rendered Urban Bank.

At the time the award of PhP28,500,000 by the trial court came out in 1999, the net
worth of Urban Bank was PhP2,219,781,104.[2] While the bank would be closed by
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) a year later for having unilaterally declared a
bank holiday contrary to banking rules, there was no reason to believe that at the time
such award came out it could not satisfy a judgment of PhP28,500,000, a sum that was
only 1% of its net worth, and a miniscule 0.2% of its total assets of
PhP11,933,383,630.[3] In fact, no allegation of impending insolvency or attempt to
abscond was ever raised by Atty. Peña and yet, the trial court granted execution
pending appeal.

Interestingly, Peña had included as co-defendants with Urban Bank in the RTC case,
several officers and board directors of Urban Bank. Not all board directors were sued,
however. With respect to those included in the complaint, other than against Teodoro
Borlongan, Corazon Bejasa, and Arturo Manuel, no evidence was ever offered as to
their individual actions that gave rise to Atty. Peña's cause of action - the execution of
the agency contract and its breach - and yet, these officers and directors were made
solidarily liable by the trial court with Urban Bank for the alleged breach of the alleged
corporate contract of agency. Execution pending appeal was also granted against them
for this solidary liability resulting in the levy and sale in execution pending appeal of not
only corporate properties of Urban Bank but also personal properties of the individual
bank officers and directors. It would have been interesting to find out what drove Atty.
Peña to sue the bank officers and directors of Urban Bank and why he chose to sue only
some, but not all of the board directors of Urban Bank, but there is nothing on the
record with which this analysis can be pursued.

Before us are: (a) the Petitions of Urban Bank (G. R. No. 145817) and the De Leon
Group (G R. No. 145822) questioning the propriety of the grant of execution pending
appeal, and (b) the Petition of Atty. Peña (G. R. No. 162562) assailing the CA's decision
on the substantive merits of the case with respect to his claims of compensation based
on an agency agreement.

Ordinarily, the final resolution by the Supreme Court of an appeal from a trial court
decision would have automatic, generally-understood consequences on an order issued
by the trial court for execution pending appeal. But this is no ordinary case, and the
magnitude of the disproportions in this case is too mind-boggling that this Court must
exert extra effort to correct whatever injustices have been occasioned in this case.
Thus, our dispositions will include detailed instructions for several judicial officials to
implement.

At core, these petitions can be resolved if we answer the following questions:

1. What is the legal basis for an award in favor of Peña for the services he rendered to
Urban Bank? Should it be a contract of agency the fee for which was orally agreed on
as Peña claims? Should it be the application of the Civil Code provisions on unjust
enrichment? Or is it to be based on something else or a combination of the legal
findings of both the RTC and the CA? How much should the award be?

2. Are the officers and directors of Urban Bank liable in their personal capacities for the
amount claimed by Peña?

3. What are the effects of our answers to questions (1) and (2), on the various results
of the execution pending appeal that happened here?

Factual Background of the Controversy

Urban Bank, Inc. (both petitioner and respondent in these two consolidated cases),
[4]
 was a domestic Philippine corporation, engaged in the business of banking. [5] The
eight individual respondents in G. R. No. 162562 were officers and members of Urban
Bank's board of directors, who were sued in their official and personal capacities. [6] On
the other hand, Benjamin L. De Leon, Delfin C. Gonzalez, Jr., and Eric L. Lee,
(hereinafter the de Leon Group), are the petitioners in G. R. No. 145822 and are three
of the same bank officers and directors, who had separately filed the instant Petition
before the Court.

Petitioner-respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña (Peña) [7] is a lawyer by profession and

was formerly a stockholder, director and corporate secretary of Isabel Sugar Company,
Inc. (ISCI).[8]

ISCI owned a parcel of land[9] located in Pasay City (the Pasay property). [10] In 1984,
ISCI leased the Pasay property for a period of 10 years. [11] Without its consent[12] and in
violation of the lease contract,[13] the lessee subleased the land to several tenants, who
in turn put up 23 establishments, mostly beer houses and night clubs, inside the
compound.[14] In 1994, a few months before the lease contract was to expire, ISCI
informed the lessee[15] and his tenants[16] that the lease would no longer be renewed
and that it intended to take over the Pasay property[17] for the purpose of selling it.[18]
Two weeks before the lease over the Pasay property was to expire, ISCI and Urban
Bank executed a Contract to Sell, whereby the latter would pay ISCI the amount of
PhP241,612,000 in installments for the Pasay property. [19] Both parties agreed that the
final installment of PhP25,000,000 would be released by the bank upon ISCI's delivery
of full and actual possession of the land, free from any tenants. [20] In the meantime, the
amount of the final installment would be held by the bank in escrow. The escrow
provision in the Contract to Sell, thus, reads:

"The SELLER (ISCI) agrees that from the proceeds of the purchase prices of the subject
Property (Pasay property), the BUYER (Urban Bank) shall withhold the amount of PHP
25,000,000.00 by way of escrow and shall release this amount to the SELLER only
upon its delivery to the BUYER of the full and actual possession and control of
the Subject Property, free from tenants, occupants, squatters or other
structures or from any liens, encumbrances, easements or any other
obstruction or impediment to the free use and occupancy by the buyer of the
subject Property or its exercise of the rights to ownership over the subject
Property, within a period of sixty (60) days from the date of payment by the BUYER of
the purchase price of the subject Property net of the amounts authorized to be
deducted or withheld under Item II (a) of this Contract. [21] (Emphasis supplied)

ISCI then instructed Peña, who was its director and corporate secretary, to take over
possession of the Pasay property[22] against the tenants upon the expiration of the
lease. ISCI's president, Mr. Enrique G. Montilla III (Montilla), faxed a letter to Peña,
confirming the latter's engagement as the corporation's agent to handle the eviction of
the tenants from the Pasay property, to wit:[23]

MEMORANDUM

TO:          Atty. Magdaleno M. Pena

Director

FROM:    Enrique G. Montilla III

President

DATE:     26 November 1994

You are hereby directed to recover and take possession of the property of the
corporation situated at Roxas Boulevard covered by TCT No. 5382 of the
Register of Deeds for Pasay City immediately upon the expiration of the
contract of lease over the said property on 29 November 1994. For this purpose
you are authorized to engage the services of security guards to protect the property
against intruders. You may also engage the services of a lawyer in case there is a need
to go to court to protect the said property of the corporation. In addition you may take
whatever steps or measures are necessary to ensure our continued possession of the
property.

(sgd.) ENRIQUE G. MONTILLA III

President[24]

On 29 November 1994, the day the lease contract was to expire, ISCI and Urban Bank
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[25] over the Pasay property for the amount agreed
upon in the Contract to Sell, but subject to the above escrow provision. [26] The title to
the land was eventually transferred to the name of Urban Bank on 05 December 1994.
[27]

On 30 November 1994, the lessee duly surrendered possession of the Pasay property to
ISCI,[28] but the unauthorized sub-tenants refused to leave the area.[29] Pursuant to his
authority from ISCI, Peña had the gates of the property closed to keep the sub-tenants
out.[30] He also posted security guards at the property, [31] services for which he
advanced payments.[32] Despite the closure of the gates and the posting of the guards,
the sub-tenants would come back in the evening, force open the gates, and proceed to
carry on with their businesses.[33] On three separate occasions, the sub-tenants tried to
break down the gates of the property, threw stones, and even threatened to return and
inflict greater harm on those guarding it.[34]

In the meantime, a certain Marilyn G. Ong, as representative of ISCI, faxed a letter to

Urban Bank - addressed to respondent Corazon Bejasa, who was then the bank's Senior
Vice-President - requesting the issuance of a formal authority for Peña. [35] Two days
thereafter, Ms. Ong faxed another letter to the bank, this time addressed to its
president, respondent Teodoro Borlongan.[36] She repeated therein the earlier request
for authority for Peña, since the tenants were questioning ISCI's authority to take over
the Pasay property.[37]

In response to the letters of Ms. Ong, petitioner-respondent bank, through individual

respondents Bejasa and Arturo E. Manuel - Senior Vice-President and Vice-President,
respectively - advised Peña[38] that the bank had noted the engagement of his services
by ISCI and stressed that ISCI remained as the lawyer's principal. [39]

To prevent the sub-tenants from further appropriating the Pasay property, [40] petitioner-
respondent Peña, as director and representative of ISCI, filed a complaint for
injunction[41] (the First Injunction Complaint) with the RTC-Pasay City. [42] Acting on
ISCI's prayer for preliminary relief, the trial court favorably issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO),[43] which was duly implemented.[44] At the time the First
Injunction Complaint was filed, a new title to the Pasay property had already been
issued in the name of Urban Bank.[45]

On 19 December 1994, when "information reached the judge that the Pasay property
had already been transferred by ISCI to Urban Bank, the trial court recalled the TRO
and issued a break-open order for the property. According to Peña, it was the first time
that he was apprised of the sale of the land by ISCI and of the transfer of its title in
favor of the bank."[46] It is not clear from the records how such information reached the
judge or what the break-open order was in response to.

On the same day that the TRO was recalled, petitioner-respondent Peña immediately
contacted ISCI's president, Mr. Montilla, who in turn confirmed the sale of the Pasay
property to Urban Bank.[47] Peña told Mr. Montilla that because of the break-open order
of the RTC-Pasay City, he (Peña) would be recalling the security guards he had posted
to secure the property. Mr. Montilla, however, asked him to suspend the planned
withdrawal of the posted guards, so that ISCI could get in touch with petitioner-
respondent bank regarding the matter.[48]
Later that same day, Peña received a telephone call from respondent Bejasa. After Peña
informed her of the situation, she allegedly told him that Urban Bank would be retaining
his services in guarding the Pasay property, and that he should continue his efforts in
retaining possession thereof. He insisted, however, on talking to the Bank's president.
Respondent Bejasa gave him the contact details of respondent Borlongan, then
president of Urban Bank.[49]

The facts regarding the following phone conversation and correspondences are highly-
controverted. Immediately after talking to respondent Bejasa, Peña got in touch with
Urban Bank's president, respondent Borlongan. Peña explained that the policemen in
Pasay City were sympathetic to the tenants and were threatening to force their way
into the premises. He expressed his concern that violence might erupt between the
tenants, the city police, and the security guards posted in the Pasay property.
Respondent Borlongan supposedly assured him that the bank was going to retain his
services, and that the latter should not give up possession of the subject land.
Nevertheless, petitioner-respondent Peña demanded a written letter of authority from
the bank. Respondent Borlongan acceded and instructed him to see respondent Bejasa
for the letter.[50]

In the same telephone conversation, respondent Borlongan allegedly asked Peña to

maintain possession of the Pasay property and to represent Urban Bank in any legal
action that might be instituted relative to the property. Peña supposedly demanded
10% of the market value of the property as compensation and attorney's fees and
reimbursement for all the expenses incurred from the time he took over land until
possession was turned over to Urban Bank. Respondent Borlongan purportedly agreed
on condition that possession would be turned over to the bank, free of tenants, not
later than four months; otherwise, Peña would lose the 10% compensation and
attorney's fees. [51]

Later that afternoon, Peña received the bank's letter dated 19 December 1994, which
was signed by respondents Bejasa and Manuel, and is quoted below:

This is to confirm the engagement of your services as the authorized

representative of Urban Bank, specifically to hold and maintain possession of
our abovecaptioned property [Pasay property] and to protect the same from
former tenants, occupants or any other person who are threatening to return
to the said property and/or interfere with your possession of the said property
for and in our behalf.

You are likewise authorized to represent Urban Bank in any court action that you may
institute to carry out the aforementioned duties, and to prevent any intruder, squatter
or any other person not otherwise authorized in writing by Urban [B]ank from entering
or staying in the premises.[52] (Emphasis supplied)

On even date, ISCI sent Urban Bank a letter, which acknowledged ISCI's engagement
of Peña and commitment to pay for any expenses that may be incurred in the course of
his services. ISCI's letter reads:
This has reference to your property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City [Pasay
property] which you purchased from Isabela Sugar Company under a Deed of Absolute
Sale executed on December 1, 1994.

In line with our warranties as the Seller of the said property and our undertaking to
deliver to you the full and actual possession and control of said property, free from
tenants, occupants or squatters and from any obstruction or impediment to the free use
and occupancy of the property by Urban Bank, we have engaged the services of
Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña to hold and maintain possession of the property and
to prevent the former tenants or occupants from entering or returning to the
premises. In view of the transfer of the ownership of the property to Urban Bank, it
may be necessary for Urban Bank to appoint Atty. Peña likewise as its authorized
representative for purposes of holding/maintaining continued possession of the said
property and to represent Urban Bank in any court action that may be instituted for the
abovementioned purposes.

It is understood that any attorney's fees, cost of litigation and any other
charges or expenses that may be incurred relative to the exercise by Atty.
Peña of his abovementioned duties shall be for the account of Isabela Sugar
Company and any loss or damage that may be incurred to third parties shall be
answerable by Isabela Sugar Company. [53] (Emphasis supplied)

The following narration of subsequent proceedings is uncontroverted.

Peña then moved for the dismissal of ISCI's First Injunction Complaint, filed on behalf
of ISCI, on the ground of lack of personality to continue the action, since the Pasay
property, subject of the suit, had already been transferred to Urban Bank. [54] The RTC-
Pasay City dismissed the complaint and recalled its earlier break-open order. [55]

Thereafter, petitioner-respondent Peña, now in representation of Urban Bank, filed a

separate complaint[56] (the Second Injunction Complaint) with the RTC-Makati City, to
enjoin the tenants from entering the Pasay property.[57] Acting on Urban Bank's
preliminary prayer, the RTC-Makati City issued a TRO. [58]

While the Second Injunction Complaint was pending, Peña made efforts to settle the
issue of possession of the Pasay property with the sub-tenants. During the negotiations,
he was exposed to several civil and criminal cases they filed in connection with the task
he had assumed for Urban Bank, and he received several threats against his life. [59] The
sub-tenants eventually agreed to stay off the property for a total consideration of
PhP1,500,000.[60] Peña advanced the payment for the full and final settlement of their
claims against Urban Bank.[61]

Peña claims to have borrowed PhP3,000,000 from one of his friends in order to
maintain possession thereof on behalf of Urban Bank. [62] According to him, although his
creditor-friend granted him several extensions, he failed to pay his loan when it became
due, and it later on became the subject of a separate collection suit for payment with
interest and attorney's fees.[63] This collection suit became the basis for Atty. Peña's
request for discretionary execution pending appeal later on.
On 07 February 1995, within the four-month period allegedly agreed upon in the
telephone conversation, Peña formally informed Urban Bank that it could already take
possession of the Pasay property.[64] There was however no mention of the
compensation due and owed to him for the services he had rendered.

On 31 March 1995, the bank subsequently took actual possession of the property and
installed its own guards at the premises.[65]

Peña thereafter made several attempts to contact respondents Borlongan and Bejasa by
telephone, but the bank officers would not take any of his calls. On 24 January 1996, or
nearly a year after he turned over possession of the Pasay property, Peña formally
demanded from Urban Bank the payment of the 10% compensation and attorney's fees
allegedly promised to him during his telephone conversation with Borlongan for
securing and maintaining peaceful possession of the property. [66]

Proceedings on the Complaint for Compensation

On 28 January 1996, when Urban Bank refused to pay for his services in connection
with the Pasay property, Peña filed a complaint [67] for recovery of agent's compensation
and expenses, damages and attorney's fees in RTC-Bago City in the province of Negros
Occidental.[68] Interestingly, Peña sued only six out of the eleven members of the Board
of the Directors of Urban Bank.[69] No reason was given why the six directors were
selected and the others excluded from Peña's complaint. In fact, as pointed out, Atty.
Peña mistakenly impleaded as a defendant, Ben Y. Lim, Jr., who was never even a
member of the Board of Directors of Urban Bank; while, Ben T. Lim, Sr., father and
namesake of Ben Y. Lim, Jr., who had been a director of the bank, already passed away
in 1997.[70]

In response to the complaint of Atty. Peña, Urban Bank and individual bank officers and
directors argued that it was ISCI, the original owners of the Pasay property, that had
engaged the services of Peña in securing the premises; and, consequently, they could
not be held liable for the expenses Peña had incurred. [71]

On 28 May 1999, the RTC-Bago City[72] ruled in favor of Peña, after finding that an
agency relationship had indeed been created between him and Urban Bank. The eight
directors and bank officers were found to be solidarily liable with the bank for the
payment of agency's fees. The trial court thus ordered Urban Bank and all eight
defendant bank directors and officers whom Peña sued to pay the total amount of
PhP28,500,000 (excluding costs of suit):

WHEREFORE, premised from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering

defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the following amounts:

1. P24,000,000 as compensation for plaintiff's services plus the legal rate of

interest from the time of demand until fully paid;
2. P3,000,000 as reimbursement of plaintiff's expenses;
3. P1,000,000 as and for attorney's fees;
4. P500,000 as exemplary damages;
5. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[73]

Urban Bank and the individual defendant bank directors and officers filed a common
Notice of Appeal,[74] which was given due course.[75] In the appeal, they questioned the
factual finding that an agency relationship existed between the bank and Peña. [76]

Although they put up a single defense in the proceedings in the lower court, Urban
Bank and individual defendants contracted different counsel and filed separate Briefs on
appeal in the appellate court.

In its Brief,[77] Urban Bank[78] assigned as errors the trial court's reliance on the

purported oral contract of agency and Peña's claims for compensation during the
controverted telephone conversation with Borlongan, which were allegedly incredible.

Meanwhile, Benjamin L. de Leon, Delfin Gonzalez, Jr., and Eric L. Lee (the De Leon
Group),[79]  the petitioners in the instant Petition docketed as G. R. No. 145822, argued
that, even on the assumption that there had been an agency contract with the bank,
the trial court committed reversible error in holding them - as bank directors - solidarily
liable with the corporation.[80]

On the other hand, Teodoro Borlongan, Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo Manuel, Jr., Ben Y.
Lim, Jr., and P. Siervo H. Dizon (the Borlongan Group) [81] reiterated similar arguments
as those of the De Leon Group, adding that the claimed compensation of 10% of the
purchase price of the Pasay property was not reasonable.[82]

Peña refuted all of their arguments [83] and prayed that the trial court's Decision be
affirmed.[84]

Acting favorably on the appeal, the Court of Appeals [85] annulled the Decision of the
RTC-Bago City and ruled that no agency relationship had been created. Nevertheless, it
ordered Urban Bank to reimburse Peña for his expenses and to give him reasonable
compensation for his efforts in clearing the Pasay property of tenants in the amount of
PhP3,000,000, but absolved the bank directors and officers from solidary liability. The
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the May 28, 2000 Decision [sic]
and the October 19, 2000 [sic] Special Order of the RTC of Bago City, Branch 62, [86] are
hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. However, the plaintiff-appellee [Peña] in CA
GR CV No. 65756 is awarded the amount of P3 Million as reimbursement for
his expenses as well as reasonable compensation for his efforts in clearing
Urban Bank's property of unlawful occupants. The award of exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and costs of suit are deleted, the same not having been sufficiently
proven. The petition for Indirect Contempt against all the respondents is DISMISSED for
utter lack of merit. [87] (Emphasis supplied)

Peña duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the unfavorable CA Decision. [88] The
appellate court, however, denied his motion.[89] The CA Decision and Resolution were
appealed by Peña to this Court, through one of the three consolidated Rule 45 Petitions
before us (G. R. No. 162562).
 Execution Pending Appeal

On 07 June 1999, prior to the filing of the notice of appeal of Urban Bank and individual
bank officers,[90] Peña moved for execution pending appeal[91] of the Decision rendered
by the RTC-Bago City,[92] which had awarded him a total of PhP28,500,000 in
compensation and damages.[93]

In supporting his prayer for discretionary execution, Peña cited the pending separate
civil action for collection filed against him by his creditor-friend, who was demanding
payment of a PhP3,000,000 loan.[94] According to Peña, he had used the proceeds of the
loan for securing the bank's Pasay property. No other reason for the prayer for
execution pending appeal was given by Peña other than this collection suit. [95]

In opposition to the motion, Urban Bank countered that the collection case was not a
sufficient reason for allowing execution pending appeal. [96]

On 29 October 1999, the RTC-Bago City, through Judge Henry J. Trocino, [97] favorably
granted Peña's motion and issued a Special Order authorizing execution pending
appeal.[98] In accordance with this Special Order, Atty. Josephine Mutia-Hagad, the clerk
of court and ex officio sheriff, issued a Writ of Execution[99] on the same day.[100] The
Special Order and Writ of Execution were directed at the properties owned by Urban
Bank as well as the properties of the eight individual bank directors and officers.

On 04 November 1999, affected by the trial court's grant of execution pending appeal,
Urban Bank[101] filed a Rule 65 Petition with the CA to enjoin the Special Order and Writ
of Execution issued by the trial court with a prayer for a TRO. [102]

On 09 November 1999, the appellate court favorably granted the TRO and preliminarily
prohibited the implementation of the Special Order and Writ of Execution. [103]

On 12 January 2000, the CA eventually granted Urban Bank's Rule 65 Petition, and the
RTC's Special Order and Writ of Execution, which permitted execution pending appeal,
were annulled. The appellate court ruled: [104]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Special Order and writ of execution,
both dated October 29, 1999, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondents are directed to desist from further implementing the writ of execution and
to lift the garnishment and levy made pursuant thereto. [105]

On 02 February 2000, Peña moved for the reconsideration of the CA's Decision;
[106]
 while petitioners filed their corresponding Comment/Opposition

thereto.[107]

During the pendency of Peña's Motion for Reconsideration, Urban Bank declared a bank
holiday on 26 April 2000 and was placed under receivership of the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC).[108]

In its Amended Decision dated 18 August 2000, the CA [109] favorably granted Peña's
Motion for Reconsideration, and reversed its earlier Decision to allow execution pending
appeal.[110] The appellate court found that the bank holiday declared by the BSP after
the promulgation of its earlier Decision, PDIC's receivership of Urban Bank, and the
imminent insolvency thereof constituted changes in the bank's conditions that would
justify execution pending appeal.[111]

On 29 August 2000, Urban Bank and its officers moved for the reconsideration of the
Amended Decision.[112] The De Leon Group subsequently filed several Supplemental
Motions for Reconsideration.[113] Thereafter, respondents Teodoro Borlongan and
Corazon M. Bejasa also filed their separate Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration,
[114]
 as did petitioner Ben T. Lim, Jr.[115]

On 19 October 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit and the other subsequent Supplemental Motions for Reconsideration for
being filed out of time.[116] The appellate court also ordered Peña to post an indemnity
bond.[117] The Amended Decision and the Resolution were the subjects of several Rule
45 Petitions filed by Urban Bank and individual petitioners (G. R. Nos. 145817, 145818
and 145822).

On the same day the CA denied its Motion for Reconsideration, the De Leon Group
immediately moved for the stay of execution pending appeal upon the filing of a
supersedeas bond.[118]

On 31 October 2000, the CA[119] granted the stay of the execution upon the filing by the
De Leon Group of a PhP40,000,000 bond in favor of Peña. [120] Peña moved for the
reconsideration of the stay order.[121]

In its Resolution dated 08 December 2000,[122] the appellate court denied Peña's Motion
for Reconsideration and a stay order over the execution pending appeal was issued in
favor of the De Leon Group, after they had filed their supersedeas bond. [123] The stay of
execution pending appeal, however, excluded Urban Bank. [124]

On 08 December 2000, Peña posted his indemnity bond as required by the CA. [125]

As mentioned earlier, Urban Bank, the De Leon Group, and the Borlongan Group filed
around December 2000 separate Rule 45 Petitions in this Court, to assail the
unfavorable CA Amended Decision and Resolution that affirmed the execution pending
appeal. The details of these Rule 45 Petitions will be discussed in detail later on.

In the meantime, Export and Industry Bank (EIB) submitted its proposal for
rehabilitation of Urban Bank to the BSP, and requested that the troubled bank be
removed from receivership of the PDIC. On 12 July 2001, or almost a year after the
Court of Appeals amended its decision to allow execution pending appeal, the
rehabilitation plan of Urban Bank was approved by the Monetary Board of the BSP.
[126]
 Thus, the Monetary Board subsequently lifted PDIC's statutory receivership of the
bank.[127]

On 14 September 2001, Urban Bank, trying to follow the lead of the De Leon Group,
made a similar request with the Court of Appeals for approval of its own supersedeas
bond,[128] for the same amount of PhP40,000,000, and prayed that the execution of the
RTC-Bago City's Decision against it be stayed as well. [129]

Sometime in September and October 2001, Urban Bank began receiving notices of levy
and garnishment over its properties. After it received Notice of the impending public
execution sale of its shares in the Tagaytay Highlands International Golf Club, [130] Urban
Bank reiterated its request for the approval of the supersedeas bond with the Court of
Appeals and the issuance of the corresponding stay order. [131]

The appellate court, however, merely noted Urban Bank's motion on the ground that
there was no showing whether a petition to the Supreme Court had been filed or given
due course or denied.[132]

After the denial by the Court of Appeals of Urban Bank's motion for approval of its
supersedeas bond, some of the levied properties of Urban Bank and the other bank
officers were sold on public auction. The table below lists the properties that appear on
record to have been levied and/or sold on execution pending appeal and the
approximate value of some of these properties. They do not include properties covered
by the Petition docketed as G. R. No. 145818.

Table of Levied, Garnished and/or Executed Properties Pending Appeal

Owner/ Property Estimated Value or Price Total Remarks

Defendant Description at Public Auction Amount
Urban Bank Three Club As of 06 December 1999, 4,800,000
Shares Tagaytay one share was selling at
Highlands P1.6 Million.[134]
International
Golf Club[133]
Atty. Peña was
Three Club
one of the
Shares in Makati
As of 06 December 1999, winning bidders
Sports, Club, Inc.
MSCI Club Shares "A" in the auction
(MSCI)
and "B" were selling at sale together
[Covered by 2,000,000[137]
PhP650,000 and with his creditor
Stock Certificate
PhP700,000, respectively. friend, Roberto
Nos. A-1893, A- [136]
Ignacio, and
2305 and B-762]
[135] Atty. Ramon
Ereñeta.
85 Condominium The highest bid price 85,000,000 Intervenor
Units in the obtained for the Unimega
Urban Bank condominium units was  purchased the 10
Plaza, Makati PhP1M at the time of the condominium
City[138] execution sale.[139] units in the
auction sale for
P1M each or a
 total of P10 M.
[140]

A 155 sqm.
condominium
unit, Makati City 12,400,000
(CCT No.
57697) [141]
A 12.5 sqm. Estimates are based on
condominium report of Urban Bank[142]
parking space
(Parking Three,
500,000
Unit P-46) in
Makati City
(CCT No.
57698)[143]
A 64,677 sqm.
land in Tagaytay Value based on estimate of
35,572,350
City (TCT No. Urban Bank[145]
20471)[144]
Teodoro One Club Share Borlongan's club share was 1,000,000 Notice of Sale on
Borlongan in Manila Polo estimated to be valued at Execution on
Club (No. 3433) P1,000,000.[147] Personal
[146]
Property dated
25 August
2000[148]
One Club Share One club share was
in Subic Bay estimated to be valued at 500,000
Yacht Club[149] P500,000.[150]
One Club Share As of 06 December 1999,
in Baguio one share was selling at 870,000
[151]
Country Club P870,000.[152]
As of 06 December 1999,
MSCI Club Shares "A"
One Club Share and "B" were selling at
650,000
in MSCI[153] PhP650,000 and
PhP700,000 respectively.
[154]

No estimate available on
Real Property[155]
record.
Delfin C. One Club Share Gonzales' club share was 4,000,000 Notice of Sale on
Gonzales, in Manila Polo estimated to be valued at Execution on
Jr. Club (No. 3818) P4,000,000.[157] Personal
[156]
Property dated
25 August
2000[158]
One Club Share Gonzales' club share was
in Baguio estimated to be valued at 1,077,000
Country Club.[159] P1,077,000.[160]
One Club Share
in Alabang Gonzales' club share was
Country Club estimated to be valued at 2,000,000
(Member No. P2,000,000.[162]
550)[161]
30,585 shares of
stock in D. C.
P20.00 per share[164] 611,700
Gonzales, Jr.,
Inc. [163]
40 Shares of
stock in D. C.
P50.00 per share[166] 2,000
Gonzales, Jr.,
Inc.[165]
Benjamin L. One Club Share De Leon's Share was 5,050,000 Notice of Sale on
de Leon in Manila Polo estimated at P4 M for the Execution on
Club (with share and P1.05 M for the Personal
Associate associate membership.[168] Property dated
Membership) 25 August
[No. 0597][167] 2000[169]
One Club Share
in MSCI (Stock De Leon's share was
450,000
Certificate No. estimated at P450,000.[171]
A-175)[170]
One Club Share
As of 06 December 1999,
in Baguio
one share was selling at 870,000
Country Club
least P870,000.[173]
(5523)[172]
P. Siervo G. No records
Dizon available as to
properties levied,
garnished or
executed pending
 appeal.
Eric L. Lee One Club Share Lee's' club share was 4,000,000 Notice of Sale on
in Manila Polo estimated to be valued at Execution on
Club (2038)[174] P4,000,000.[175] Personal
Property dated
25 August
2000[176]
One Club Share Lee's club share was
in Manila Golf estimated to be valued at 15,750,000
Club, Inc.[177] P15,750,000.[178]
One Club Share
in Sta. Elena Lee's club share was
Golf Club, Inc. estimated to be valued at 2,000,000
(Class "A" P2,000,000.[180]
Share) [179]
Notice of Sale on
Two Club Shares
Execution on
in Tagaytay Lee's club shares were
Personal
Highlands Int'l estimated to be valued at 1,000,000
Property dated
Golf Club, P1,000,000.[182]
25 August
Inc. [181]
2000[183]
One Club Share Lee's club share was
in Subic Yacht estimated to be valued at 500,000
Club[184] P500,000.[185]
60,757 Shares of
stock in EQL
P20.00 per share 1,214,140
Properties, Inc.
[186]

40 Shares of
stock in EQL
P50.00 per share 2,000
Properties,
Inc. [187]
Cash garnished
from BPI 100,000
Account[188]
Ben T. Lim, No records
Jr. available as to
properties levied,
garnished or
executed pending
 appeal.
Corazon Real Property[189] No estimated value.
Bejasa
Arturo Real Property[190] No estimated value.
Manuel, Jr.,
TOTAL VALUE 181,919,190

The sum of PhP181,919,190 does not include many other properties and it is not
difficult to believe that the total value covered reached more than that. [191] In summary,
the estimated values and/or purchase prices at the auction sale of the properties of
Urban Bank and its officers amounted to no less than PhP181,919,190 already. This
amounts to almost six times the value of the award given by the trial court. Otherwise
stated, Peña, as judgment creditor, was overly secured by the levied and/or garnished
properties for the amount of PhP28,500,000, where the judgment award was still
subject of reversal on appeal.

On 22 October 2001, Urban Bank, with respect to its pending Rule 45 Petition in this
Court, moved for the approval of its PhP40,000,000 supersedeas bond [192] and
requested that the Court stay the execution pending appeal. [193] Peña opposed the
motion on the ground that it had already been rendered moot and academic by the sale
of the properties of the bank.[194]

On 23 October 2002, or almost a year after some of the condominium units were sold
in a public auction, EIB, as the successor of Urban Bank, expressed to the sheriff of
RTC-Bago City an intent to redeem the said condominium units. [195] Thus, EIB tendered
three manager's checks in the total amount of PhP22,108,800 [196] to redeem the
properties that were previously under the name of Urban Bank. [197] Although the trial
court noted the bank's Manifestation,[198] the sheriff returned the EIB's manager's
checks. Thus, on 29 October 2002, EIB, through a motion, was prompted to turn over
the checks to the trial court itself.[199]

When Urban Bank supposedly failed to redeem the condominium units according to the
sheriff,[200] final Certificates of Sale were issued in favor of Unimega on 04 November
2002.[201] Upon the latter's motion, RTC-Bago City, in its Order dated 13 November
2002, ordered the Register of Deeds of Makati to transfer the Condominium Certificates
of Title to the name of Unimega.[202] It has not been shown, though, whether this Order
was followed.

This Court, acting on Urban Bank's earlier motion to approve its supersedeas bond,
granted the same in its Resolution dated 19 November 2001. [203] Peña moved for
reconsideration of the approval,[204] but his motion was subsequently denied by the
Court.[205]

Proceedings in the Supreme Court (G. R. Nos. 145817, 145818 & 145822)

On 21 December 2000, Urban Bank,[206] represented by its receiver, PDIC,[207] filed a

Rule 45 Petition with this Court (docketed as G. R. No. 145817) to assail the CA's
Amended Decision and Resolution granting execution pending appeal. [208] In response,
Peña moved for the denial of the petition on the grounds of lack merit, violation of the
rule against forum shopping, and non-payment of docket fees, among others. [209] In a
separate Comment,[210] Peña also argued that the appellate court had committed no
error when it considered the bank's "imminent insolvency" as a good reason for
upholding the validity of the execution pending appeal.

On the other hand, the Borlongan Group[211] filed a separate Rule 45 Petition

questioning the same Decision and Resolution, docketed as G. R. No. 145818. [212] This
Court initially denied their petition on the ground that it failed to sufficiently show that
the CA committed reversible order.[213] The Borlongan Group twice moved for the
reconsideration of the denial of their petition; but the Court nonetheless denied both
motions for lack of merit.[214] This denial of the petition in G. R. No. 145818 became
final and executory, with the issuance of the Entry of Judgment. [215]

Meanwhile, another Rule 45 Petition (G. R. No. 145822) [216] was filed by the De Leon
Group, assailing the same Decisions of the appellate court. The Court also preliminarily
denied this petition on the ground that the De Leon Group failed to file the appeal
within the reglementary period and to pay certain fees. [217]

Despite the denial of the Rule 45 Petition in G. R. No. 145822 filed by the De Leon
Group, the Court nonetheless ordered that the case be consolidated with Urban Bank's
own Rule 45 Petition in G. R. No. 145817. [218] The Court subsequently gave due course
to both of these petitions.[219]  In compliance with the Court's Order, [220] Urban
Bank[221] and the De Leon Group[222] filed their respective Memoranda.

As detailed earlier, the Court granted and approved Urban Bank's supersedeas bond
and stayed the execution pending appeal.

Considering the favorable stay of execution pending appeal, EIB, as the new owner and
successor of Urban Bank, immediately wrote to tell [223] the corporate secretary of MSCI
not to effect the cancellation or transfer of Urban Bank's three MSCI stock certificates
previously sold in a public auction. [224] In reply, MSCI explained that since there was no
injunction or stay order, it had no other option but to comply with the trial court's Order
for the transfer. Eventually, however, it could not effect the transfer of one of the
shares to Peña because a club share had already been previously registered in his
name, and the club's bylaws prohibited a natural person from owning more than one
share.[225] Meanwhile, one of the winning bidders in the public auction sale of the MSCI
shares wrote to the latter to demand that the club share previously owned by Urban
Bank be transferred to him.[226]

On 04 February 2002, considering the conflicting claims of Urban Bank (through EIB)
and the winning bidders of the club shares, MSCI filed a Motion for Clarification of the
Court's Resolution staying the execution pending appeal. [227]

In its Motion for Clarification dated 06 August 2002, Urban Bank likewise requested
clarification of whether the stay order suspended, as well, its right to redeem the
properties sold at a public auction.[228] The copy of Urban Bank's motion for clarification
intended for Peña was mistakenly sent to the wrong counsel.
In its Resolution dated 13 November 2002, the Court explained that its earlier stay
order prohibited the MSCI from transferring the shares, and that the one-year period
for redemption of the bank's properties was likewise suspended:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby RESOLVES to clarify that as a consequence of its

approval of the supersedeas bond, the running of the one-year period for
petitioner Urban Bank to redeem the properties sold at the public auctions
held on October 4, 11 and 25, 2001 as well as the consolidation of the titles in
favor of the buyers, is SUSPENDED OR STAYED. MSCI is also prohibited from
transferring petitioner Urban Bank's MSCI club shares to the winning bidders in the
execution sale held on October 11, 2001.[229] (Emphasis supplied)

On 09 December 2002, Peña moved that the Court's Resolution be recalled, because he
was not given an opportunity to be heard on Urban Bank's Motion for Clarification,
which was sent to a different counsel.[230] Interposing its objection, the bank argued
that the error in mistakenly sending the Motion for clarification to a different counsel
was by sheer inadvertence,[231] but Peña was nonetheless aware of the motion, and that
the
Court's clarification did not create or diminish his rights in any case. [232]

The Motion for Clarification filed by Urban Bank, the Court's Resolution dated 13
November 2002 and Peña's Omnibus Motion praying for the recall of the said Resolution
became the subject of an administrative case (Administrative Case No. 6332), which
was treated as a separate matter and later on de-consolidated with the instant
Petitions.[233] The Court had even called for an executive session[234] in which Peña,
among others, appeared and was questioned by the then members of the Court's First
Division, namely retired Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Justices Jose Vitug, Antonio Carpio
and Adolfo Azcuna. Although the Petitions had earlier been assigned to Justice Carpio,
he has since taken no part in the proceedings of this case and this resulted in the re-
raffling of the Petitions. The transfer and unloading of the case by the subsequently
assigned Justices as well as Peña's numerous motions for inhibition and/or re-raffle has
likewise cause considerable delay in the disposition of the instant Petitions and the
Administrative Case.

Unimega, which was the winning bidder of some of the publicly executed condominium
units of Urban Bank, moved to intervene in the case and to have the Court's same
Resolution suspending the one-year period of redemption of the properties be
reconsidered.[235] Unimega claimed that ownership of the bank's titles to the 10
condominium units had already been transferred to the former at the time the Court
issued the Resolution; and, thus, there was no more execution to be suspended or
stayed. Only Urban Bank[236] opposed the motion[237]of intervenor Unimega on the
ground that the latter was not a buyer in good faith, and that the purchase price was
grossly disproportional to the fair market value of the condominium units. [238]

The Court eventually granted the Motion to Intervene considering that the intervenor's
title to the condominium units purchased at the public auction would be affected,
favorably or otherwise, by the judgment of the Court in this case. However, it held in
abeyance the resolution of intervenor's Motion for Reconsideration, which might
preempt the decision with respect to the propriety of execution pending appeal.
[239]
 Thereafter, the bank adopted its earlier Opposition to the intervention as its answer
to Unimega's petition-in-intervention.[240] Also in answer thereto, the De Leon Group
adopted its earlier Manifestation and Comment. [241]

Intervenor Unimega then requested that a writ of possession be issued in its favor
covering the 10 condominium units sold during the public auction. [242] The Court
required the parties to file their comments on the request. [243] The Lim[244] and
Borlongan Groups[245] manifested separately that they would not be affected by a
resolution of the request of intervenor Unimega, since the latter was not among the
contending parties to the incident. Peña similarly interposed no objection to the
issuance of the writ of possession.[246] In contrast, Urban Bank opposed the application
of Unimega on the ground that the latter was not entitled to possession of the levied
properties, because the rules of extrajudicial foreclosure were not applicable to
execution sales under Rule 39, and that intervenor was also not a buyer in good faith.
[247]
 In a similar vein, the De Leon Group opposed the application for a writ of
possession, and further argued that the Court had already suspended the running of
the one-year period of redemption in the execution sale. [248] Accordingly, intervenor
Unimega countered that the right of redemption of the levied properties had already
expired without having been exercised by the judgment debtor. [249]

In summary, the Court shall resolve the substantial issues in the following: (a) the
Petition of Peña (G. R. No. 162562) assailing the CA's decision on the substantive
merits of the case with respect to his claims of compensation based on an agency
agreement; and (b) the Petitions of Urban Bank (G. R. No. 145817) and the De Leon
Group (G R. No. 145822) questioning the propriety of the grant of execution pending
appeal.

OUR RULING

Peña is entitled to payment for compensation for services rendered as agent of

Urban Bank, but on the basis of the principles of unjust enrichment
and quantum meruit, and not on the purported oral contract.

The Court finds that Peña should be paid for services rendered under the agency
relationship that existed between him and Urban Bank based on the civil law principle
against unjust enrichment, but the amount of payment he is entitled to should be
made, again, under the principle against unjust enrichment and on the basis
of quantum meruit.

In a contract of agency, agents bind themselves to render some service or to do

something in representation or on behalf of the principal, with the consent or authority
of the latter.[250] The basis of the civil law relationship of agency is
representation, [251] the elements of which include the following: (a) the relationship is
established by the parties' consent, express or implied; (b) the object is the execution
of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (c) agents act as representatives and not
for themselves; and (d) agents act within the scope of their authority. [252]

Whether or not an agency has been created is determined by the fact that one is
representing and acting for another.[253] The law makes no presumption of agency;
proving its existence, nature and extent is incumbent upon the person alleging it. [254]

With respect to the status of Atty. Peña's relationship with Urban Bank, the trial and the
appellate courts made conflicting findings that shall be reconciled by the Court. On one
end, the appellate court made a definitive ruling that no agency relationship existed
at all between Peña and the bank, despite the services performed by Peña with respect
to the Pasay property purchased by the bank. Although the Court of Appeals ruled
against an award of agent's compensation, it still saw fit to award Peña with
Ph3,000,000 for expenses incurred for his efforts in clearing the Pasay property of
tenants.[255]  On the other extreme, the trial court heavily relied on the sole telephone
conversation between Peña and Urban Bank's President to establish that the principal-
agent relationship created between them included an agreement to pay Peña the huge
amount of PhP24,000,000. In its defense, Urban Bank insisted that Peña was never
an agent of the bank, but an agent of ISCI, since the latter, as seller of the Pasay
property committed to transferring it free from tenants. Meanwhile, Peña argues on the
basis of his successful and peaceful ejectment of the sub-tenants, who previously
occupied the Pasay property.

Based on the evidence on records and the proceedings below, the Court
concludes that Urban Bank constituted Atty. Peña as its agent to secure
possession of the Pasay property. This conclusion, however, is not
determinative of the basis of the amount of payment that must be made to
him by the bank. The context in which the agency was created lays the basis
for the amount of compensation Atty. Peña is entitled to.

The transactional history and context of the sale between ISCI and Urban Bank of the
Pasay property, and Atty. Peña's participation in the transfer of possession thereof to
Urban Bank provide crucial linkages that establish the nature of the relationship
between the lawyer and the landowner-bank.

The evidence reveals that at the time that the Contract to Sell was executed on 15
November 1994, and even when the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed two weeks
later on 29 November 1994, as far as Urban Bank was concerned, Peña was nowhere in
the picture. All discussions and correspondences were between the President and
Corporate Secretary of Urban Bank, on one hand, and the President of ISCI, on the
other. The title to the Pasay property was transferred to Urban Bank on 5 December
1994. Interestingly, Peña testifies that it was only on 19 December 1994 that he
learned that the land had already been sold by ISCI to Urban Bank, notwithstanding the
fact that Peña was a director of ISCI. Peña was not asked to render any service for
Urban Bank, neither did he perform any service for Urban Bank at that point.

ISCI undertook in the Contract to Sell, to physically deliver the property to Urban Bank,
within 60 days from 29 November 1994,[256] under conditions of "full and actual
possession and control ..., free from tenants, occupants, squatters or other structures
or from any liens, encumbrances, easements or any other obstruction or impediment to
the free use and occupancy by the buyer of the subject Property or its exercise of the
rights to ownership over the subject Property...." [257] To guarantee this undertaking,
ISCI agreed to the escrow provision where PhP25,000,000 (which is a little over 10% of
the value of the Pasay property) would be withheld by Urban Bank from the total
contract price until there is full compliance with this undertaking.

Apparently to ensure that ISCI is able to deliver the property physically clean to Urban
Bank, it was ISCI's president, Enrique Montilla who directed on 26 November 1994 one
of its directors, Peña, to immediately recover and take possession of the property upon
expiration of the contract of lease on 29 November 1994. [258] Peña thus first came into
the picture as a director of ISCI who was constituted as its agent to recover the Pasay
property against the lessee as well as the sub-tenants who were occupying the property
in violation of the lease agreement. [259] He was able to obtain possession of the property
from the lessee on the following day, but the unauthorized sub-tenants refused to
vacate the property.

It was only on 7 December 1994, that Urban Bank was informed of the services that
Peña was rendering for ISCI. The faxed letter from ISCI's Marilyn Ong reads:

Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña, who has been assigned by Isabela Sugar Company,
Inc., to take charge of inspecting the tenants would like to request an authority
similar to this from the Bank, as new owners. Can you please issue something like this
today as he needs this.[260]

Two days later, on 9 December 1994, ISCI sent Urban Bank another letter that reads:

Dear Mr. Borlongan, I would like to request for an authorization from Urban Bank as per
attached immediately - as the tenants are questioning the authority of the
people there who are helping us to take over possession of the property.
(Emphasis supplied)[261]

It is clear from the above that ISCI was asking Urban Bank for help to comply with
ISCI's own contractual obligation with the bank under the terms of the sale of the Pasay
property. Urban Bank could have ignored the request, since it was exclusively the
obligation of ISCI, as the seller, to deliver a clean property to Urban Bank without any
help from the latter.

A full-bodied and confident interpretation of the contracts between ISCI and Urban
Bank should have led the latter to inform the unauthorized sub-tenants that under its
obligation as seller to Urban Bank, it was under duty and had continuing authority to
recover clean possession of the property, despite the transfer of title. Yet, what
unauthorized sub-tenant, especially in the kind of operations being conducted within
the Pasay property, would care to listen or even understand such argument?

Urban Bank thus chose to cooperate with ISCI without realizing the kind of trouble that
it would reap in the process. In an apparent attempt to allow the efforts of ISCI to
secure the property to succeed, it recognized Peña's role in helping ISCI, but stopped
short of granting him authority to act on its behalf. In response to the two written
requests of ISCI, Urban Bank sent this letter to Peña on 15 December 1994:

This is to advise you that we have noted the engagement of your services by Isabela
Sugar Company to recover possession of the Roxas Boulevard property formerly
covered by TCT No. 5382, effective November 29, 1994. It is understood that your
services have been contracted by and your principal remains to be the Isabela
Sugar Company, which as seller of the property and under the terms of our Contract
to Sell dated November 29, 1994, has committed to deliver the full and actual
possession of the said property to the buyer, Urban Bank, within the stipulated
period. [262] (Emphasis supplied)

Up to this point, it is unmistakable that Urban Bank was staying clear from making any
contractual commitment to Peña and conveyed its sense that whatever responsibilities
arose in retaining Peña were to be shouldered by ISCI.

According to the RTC-Bago City, in the reversed Decision, Atty. Peña only knew of the
sale between ISCI and Urban Bank at the time the RTC-Pasay City recalled the TRO and
issued a break-open order:

"... when information reached the (Pasay City) judge that the Pasay property had
already been transferred by ISCI to Urban Bank, the trial court recalled the TRO and
issued a break-open order for the property. According to Peña, it was the first time that
he was apprised of the sale of the land by ISCI and of the transfer of its title in favor of
the bank."[263]

There is something contradictory between some of the trial court's factual findings and
Peña's claim that it was only on 19 December 1994 that he first learned of the sale of
the property to Urban Bank. It is difficult to believe Peña on this point considering: (1)
that he was a board director of ISCI and a sale of this significant and valuable property
of ISCI requires the approval of the board of directors of ISCI; and (2) that ISCI twice
requested Urban Bank for authority to be issued in his favor (07 and 9 December
1994), 12 and 10 days before 19 December 1994, since it would be contrary to human
experience for Peña not to have been informed by an officer of ISCI beforehand that a
request for authority for him was being sent to Urban Bank.

The sequence of fast-moving developments, edged with a sense of panic, with respect
to the decision of the RTC-Pasay City to recall the temporary restraining order and issue
a break-open order on 19 December 1994 in the First Injunction Complaint, is highly
enlightening to this Court.

First, Peña allegedly called up the president of ISCI, Montilla, who, according to Peña,
confirmed to him that the Pasay property had indeed been sold to Urban Bank.

Second, Peña allegedly told Montilla that he (Peña) would be withdrawing his guards
from the property because of the break-open order from the RTC-Pasay City.

Third, Montilla requested Peña to suspend the withdrawal of the guards while ISCI gets
in touch with Urban Bank.

Fourth, apparently in view of Montilla's efforts, Bejasa, an officer of Urban Bank called
Peña and according to the latter, told him that Urban Bank would continue retaining his
services and for him to please continue with his effort to secure the property.

Fifth, this statement of Bejasa was not enough for Peña and he insisted that he be
enabled to talk with no less than the President of Urban Bank, Borlongan. At this point,
Bejasa gave him the phone number of Borlongan.
Sixth, immediately after the conversation with Bejasa, Peña calls Borlongan and tells
Borlongan that violence might erupt in the property because the Pasay City policemen,
who were sympathetic to the tenants, were threatening to force their way through the
property.

At this point, if indeed this conversation took place, which Borlongan contests, what
would have been the response of Borlongan? Any prudent president of a bank, which
has just purchased a PhP240,000,000 property plagued by unauthorized and unruly
sub-tenants of the previous owner, would have sought to continue the possession of
ISCI, thru Peña, and he would have agreed to the reasonable requests of Peña.
Borlongan could also have said that the problem of having the sub-tenants ejected is
completely ISCI's and ISCI should resolve the matter on its own that without bothering
the bank, with all its other problems. But the specter of violence, especially as night
was approaching in a newly-bought property of Urban Bank, was not something that
any publicly-listed bank would want publicized. To the extent that the violence could be
prevented by the president of Urban Bank, it is expected that he would opt to have it
prevented.

But could such response embrace the following legal consequences as Peña claims to
have arisen from the telephone conversation with Borlongan: (1) A contract of agency
was created between Peña and Urban Bank whereby Borlongan agreed to retain the
services of Peña directly; (2) This contract of agency was to be embodied in a written
letter of authority from Urban Bank; and (3) The agency fee of Peña was to be 10% of
the market value as "attorney's fees and compensation" and reimbursement of all
expenses of Peña from the time he took over the land until possession is turned over to
Urban Bank.

This Court concludes that the legal consequences described in statements (1) and (2)
above indeed took place and that the facts support them. However, the evidence does
not support Peña's claim that Urban Bank agreed to "attorney's fees and compensation"
of 10% of the market value of the property.

Urban Bank's letter dated 19 December 1994 confirmed in no uncertain terms Peña's
designation as its authorized representative to secure and maintain possession of the
Pasay property against the tenants. Under the terms of the letter, petitioner-respondent
bank confirmed his engagement (a) "to hold and maintain possession" of the Pasay
property; (b) "to protect the same from former tenants, occupants or any other
person who are threatening to return to the said property and/or interfere with your
possession of the said property for and in our behalf"; and (c) to represent the bank
in any instituted court action intended to prevent any intruder from entering or
staying in the premises.[264]

These three express directives of petitioner-respondent bank's letter admits of no other

construction than that a specific and special authority was given to Peña to act on
behalf of the bank with respect to the latter's claims of ownership over the property
against the tenants. Having stipulated on the due execution and genuineness of the
letter during pretrial,[265] the bank is bound by the terms thereof and is subject to the
necessary consequences of Peña's reliance thereon. No amount of denial can overcome
the presumption that we give this letter - that it means what it says.
In any case, the subsequent actions of Urban Bank resulted in the ratification of Peña's
authority as an agent acting on its behalf with respect to the Pasay property. By
ratification, even an unauthorized act of an agent becomes an authorized act of the
principal.[266]

Both sides readily admit that it was Peña who was responsible for clearing the property
of the tenants and other occupants, and who turned over possession of the Pasay
property to petitioner-respondent bank. [267] When the latter received full and actual
possession of the property from him, it did not protest or refute his authority as an
agent to do so. Neither did Urban Bank contest Peña's occupation of the premises, or
his installation of security guards at the site, starting from the expiry of the lease until
the property was turned over to the bank, by which time it had already been vested
with ownership thereof. Furthermore, when Peña filed the Second Injunction Complaint
in the RTC-Makati City under the name of petitioner-respondent bank, the latter did not
interpose any objection or move to dismiss the complaint on the basis of his lack of
authority to represent its interest as the owner of the property. When he successfully
negotiated with the tenants regarding their departure from its Pasay property, still no
protest was heard from it. After possession was turned over to the bank, the tenants
accepted PhP1,500,000 from Peña, in "full and final settlement" of their claims against
Urban Bank, and not against ISCI.[268]

In all these instances, petitioner-respondent bank did not repudiate the actions of Peña,
even if it was fully aware of his representations to third parties on its behalf as owner of
the Pasay property. Its tacit acquiescence to his dealings with respect to the Pasay
property and the tenants spoke of its intent to ratify his actions, as if these were its
own. Even assuming arguendo that it issued no written authority, and that the oral
contract was not substantially established, the bank duly ratified his acts as its agent by
its acquiescence and acceptance of the benefits, namely, the peaceful turnover of
possession of the property free from sub-tenants.

Even if, however, Peña was constituted as the agent of Urban Bank, it does not
necessarily preclude that a third party would be liable for the payment of the agency
fee of Peña. Nor does it preclude the legal fact that Peña while an agent of Urban Bank,
was also an agent of ISCI, and that his agency from the latter never terminated. This is
because the authority given to Peña by both ISCI and Urban Bank was common - to
secure the clean possession of the property so that it may be turned over to Urban
Bank. This is an ordinary legal phenomenon - that an agent would be an agent for the
purpose of pursuing a shared goal so that the common objective of a transferor and a
new transferee would be met.

Indeed, the Civil Code expressly acknowledged instances when two or more principals
have granted a power of attorney to an agent for a common transaction.[269] The
agency relationship between an agent and two principals may even be considered
extinguished if the object or the purpose of the agency is accomplished. [270] In this case,
Peña's services as an agent of both ISCI and Urban Bank were engaged for one shared
purpose or transaction, which was to deliver the property free from unauthorized sub-
tenants to the new owner - a task that Peña was able to achieve and is entitled to
receive payment for.
That the agency between ISCI and Peña continued, that ISCI is to shoulder the agency
fee and reimbursement for costs of Peña, and that Urban Bank never agreed to pay him
a 10% agency fee is established and supported by the following:

First, the initial agency relationship between ISCI and Peña persisted. No proof was
ever offered that the letter of 26 November 1994 of Mr. Montilla of ISCI to Peña, for the
latter "to immediately recover and take possession of the property upon expiration of
the contract of lease on 29 November 1994" was terminated.  It is axiomatic that the
appointment of a new agent for the same business or transaction revokes the previous
agency from the day on which notice thereof was given to the former agent. [271] If it is
true that the agency relationship was to be borne by Urban Bank alone, Peña should
have demonstrated that his previous agency relationship with ISCI is incompatible with
his new relationship with Urban Bank, and was thus terminated.

Second, instead, what is on the record is that ISCI confirmed the continuation of this
agency between Peña and itself and committed to pay for the services of Peña, in its
letter to Urban Bank dated 19 December 1994 which reads:

In line with our warranties as the Seller of the said property and our undertaking to
deliver to you the full and actual possession and control of said property, free from
tenants, occupants or squatters and from any obstruction or impediment to the free use
and occupancy of the property  by Urban Bank, we have engaged the services of
Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña to hold and maintain possession of the property and
to prevent the former tenants or occupants from entering or returning to the
premises. In view of the transfer of the ownership of the property to Urban Bank, it
may be necessary for Urban Bank to appoint Atty. Peña likewise as its authorized
representative for purposes of holding/maintaining continued possession of the said
property and to represent Urban Bank in any court action that may be instituted for the
abovementioned purposes.

It is understood that any attorney's fees, cost of litigation and any other
charges or expenses that may be incurred relative to the exercise by Atty.
Peña of his abovementioned duties shall be for the account of Isabela Sugar
Company and any loss or damage that may be incurred to third parties shall be
answerable by Isabela Sugar Company. [272] (Emphasis supplied)

Third, Peña has never shown any written confirmation of his 10% agency fee, whether
in a note, letter, memorandum or board resolution of Urban Bank. An agency fee
amounting to PhP24,000,000 is not a trifling amount, and corporations do not grant
their presidents unilateral authority to bind the corporation to such an amount,
especially not a banking corporation which is closely supervised by the BSP for being a
business seriously imbued with public interest. There is nothing on record except the
self-serving testimony of Peña that Borlongan agreed to pay him this amount in the
controverted telephone conversation.

Fourth, while ordinarily, uncontradicted testimony will be accorded its full weight, we
cannot grant full probative value to the testimony of Peña for the following reasons: (a)
Peña is not a credible witness for testifying that he only learned of the sale of the
property of 19 December 1994 when the acts of ISCI, of Urban Bank and his own up to
that point all indicated that he must have known about the sale to Urban Bank; and (b)
it is incredible that Urban Bank will agree to add another PhP24,000,000 to the cost of
the property by agreeing to the agency fee demanded by Peña. No prudent and
reasonable person would agree to expose his corporation to a new liability of
PhP24,000,000 even if, in this case, a refusal would lead to the Pasay City policemen
and unauthorized sub-tenants entering the guarded property and would possibly erupt
in violence.

Peña's account of an oral agreement with Urban Bank for the payment of
PhP24,000,000 is just too much for any court to believe. Whatever may be the
agreement between Peña and ISCI for compensation is not before this Court. This is not
to say, however, that Urban Bank has no liability to Peña. It has. Payment to him is
required because the Civil Code demands that no one should be unjustly enriched at
the expense of another. This payment is to be measured by the standards of quantum
meruit.

Amount of Compensation

Agency is presumed to be for compensation. But because in this case we find no

evidence that Urban Bank agreed to pay Peña a specific amount or percentage of
amount for his services, we turn to the principle against unjust enrichment and on the
basis of quantum meruit.

Since there was no written agreement with respect to the compensation due and owed
to Atty. Peña under the letter dated 19 December 1994, the Court will resort to
determining the amount based on the well-established rules on quantum meruit.

Agency is presumed to be for compensation. [273] Unless the contrary intent is shown, a

person who acts as an agent does so with the expectation of payment according to the
agreement and to the services rendered or results effected. [274] We find that the agency
of Peña comprised of services ordinarily performed by a lawyer who is tasked with the
job of ensuring clean possession by the owner of a property. We thus measure what he
is entitled to for the legal services rendered.

A stipulation on a lawyer's compensation in a written contract for professional services

ordinarily controls the amount of fees that the contracting lawyer may be allowed to
collect, unless the court finds the amount to be unconscionable. [275] In the absence of a
written contract for professional services, the attorney's fees are fixed on the basis
of quantum meruit,[276] i.e., the reasonable worth of the attorney's services.[277]When an
agent performs services for a principal at the latter's request, the law will normally
imply a promise on the part of the principal to pay for the reasonable worth of those
services.[278] The intent of a principal to compensate the agent for services performed
on behalf of the former will be inferred from the principal's request for the agents. [279]

In this instance, no extra-ordinary skills employing advanced legal training nor

sophisticated legal maneuvering were required to be employed in ejecting 23 sub-
tenants who have no lease contract with the property owner, and whose only authority
to enter the premises was unlawfully given by a former tenant whose own tenancy has
clearly expired. The 23 sub-tenants operated beer houses and nightclubs, ordinary
retail establishments for which no sophisticated structure prevented easy entry. After
Peña succeeded in locking the gate of the compound, the sub-tenants would open the
padlock and resume their businesses at night. Indeed, it appears that only security
guards, chains and padlocks were needed to keep them out. It was only the alleged
connivance of Pasay City policemen that Peña's ability to retain the possession was
rendered insecure. And how much did it take Peña to enter into a settlement agreement
with them and make all these problems go away? By Peña's own account,
PhP1,500,000 only. That means that each tenant received an average of PhP65,217.40
only. Surely, the legal services of Peña cannot be much more than what the sub-
tenants were willing to settle for in the first place. We therefore award him the
equivalent amount of PhP1,500,000 for the legal and other related services he rendered
to eject the illegally staying tenants of Urban Bank's property.

The Court of Appeals correctly reversed the trial court and found it to have acted with
grave abuse of discretion in granting astounding monetary awards amounting to a total
of PhP28,500,000 without any basis.[280] For the lower court to have latched on to the
self-serving claims of a telephone agreement as sufficient support for extending a
multi-million peso award is highly irregular. Absent any clear basis for the amount of
the lawyer's compensation, the trial court should have instinctively resorted to quantum
meruit, instead of insisting on a figure with circumstantial and spurious justification.

We cannot also agree with the Decision penned by Judge Edgardo L. Catilo
characterizing Pena's 10% fee as believable because it is nearly congruent to the PhP25
Million retention money held in escrow for ISCI until a clean physical and legal turn-
over of the property is effected:

We now come to the reasonableness of the compensation prayed for by the plaintiff
which is 10% of the current market value which defendants claim to be preposterous
and glaringly excessive. Plaintiff [Peña] testified that defendant Borlongan agreed to
such an amount and this has not been denied by Ted Borlongan. The term "current
market value of the property" is hereby interpreted by the court to mean the current
market value of the property at the time the contract was entered into. To interpret it
in accordance with the submission of the plaintiff that it is the current market value of
the property at the time payment is made would be preposterous. The only evidence on
record where the court can determine the market value of the property at the time the
contract of agency was entered into between plaintiff and defendant is the
consideration stated in the sales agreement between Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. and
Urban bank which is P241,612,000.00. Ten percent of this amount is a reasonable
compensation of the services rendered by the plaintiff considering the "no cure, no pay"
arrangement between the parties and the risks which plaintiff had to undertake. [281]

In the first place, the Decision of Judge Catilo makes Peña's demand of an agency fee
of PhP24 Million, an additional burden on Urban Bank. The Decision does not make the
retention money responsible for the same, or acquit Urban Bank of any liability to ISCI
if it pays the PhP24 Million directly to Pena instead of ISCI. In the second place, the
amount of money that is retained by transferees of property transactions while the
transferor is undertaking acts to ensure a clean and peaceful transfer to the transferee
does not normally approximate a one-to-one relationship to the services of ejecting
unwanted occupants. They may be inclusive of other costs, and not only legal costs,
with enough allowances for contingencies, and may take into consideration other
liabilities as well. The amount can even be entirely arbitrary, and may have been
caused by the practice followed by Urban Bank as advised by its officers and lawyers or
by industry practice in cases where an expensive property has some tenancy problems.
In other words, Judge Catilo's statement is a non sequitur, is contrary to normal human
experience, and sounds like an argument being made to fit Peña's demand for a
shocking pay-out.

In any case, 10% of the purchase price of the Pasay property - a staggering
PhP24,161,200 - is an unconscionable amount, which we find reason to reduce. 
Neither will the Court accede to the settlement offer of Peña to Urban Bank of at least
PhP38,000,000 for alleged legal expenses incurred during the course of the
proceedings,[282] an amount that he has not substantiated at any time.

Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty to public service, not

money, is the primary consideration.[283] The principle of quantum meruit applies if
lawyers are employed without a price agreed upon for their services, in which
case they would be entitled to receive what they merit for their services, or as much as
they have earned.[284] In fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by
a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, one may consider factors such as the time
spent and extent of services rendered; novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
importance of the subject matter; skill demanded; probability of losing other
employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case; customary charges for
similar services; amount involved in the controversy and the resulting benefits for the
client; certainty of compensation; character of employment; and professional standing
of the lawyer.[285]

Hence, the Court affirms the appellate court's award of PhP3,000,000 to Peña, for
expenses incurred corresponding to the performance of his services. An additional
award of PhP1,500,000 is granted to him for the services he performed as a lawyer in
securing the rights of Urban Bank as owner of the Pasay property.

II

The corporate officers and directors of Urban Bank are not solidarily or
personally liable with their properties for the corporate liability of Urban Bank
to Atty. Peña.

The obligation to pay Peña's compensation, however, falls solely on Urban Bank. Absent
any proof that individual petitioners as bank officers acted in bad faith or with gross
negligence or assented to a patently unlawful act, they cannot be held solidarily liable
together with the corporation for services performed by the latter's agent to secure
possession of the Pasay property. Thus, the trial court had indeed committed grave
abuse of discretion when it issued a ruling against the eight individual defendant bank
directors and officers and its Decision should be absolutely reversed and set aside.

A corporation, as a juridical entity, may act only through its directors, officers and
employees.[286] Obligations incurred as a result of the acts of the directors and officers
as corporate agents are not their personal liabilities but those of the corporation they
represent.[287] To hold a director or an officer personally liable for corporate obligations,
two requisites must concur: (1) the complainant must allege in the complaint that the
director or officer assented to patently unlawful acts of the corporation, or that the
officer was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith; and (2) the complainant must clearly
and convincingly prove such unlawful acts, negligence or bad faith. [288] "To hold a
director, a trustee or an officer personally liable for the debts of the corporation and,
thus, pierce the veil of corporate fiction, bad faith or gross negligence by the director,
trustee or officer in directing the corporate affairs must be established clearly and
convincingly."[289]

Peña failed to allege and convincingly show that individual defendant bank directors and
officers assented to patently unlawful acts of the bank, or that they were guilty of gross
negligence or bad faith. Contrary to his claim, the Complaint [290] in the lower court
never alleged that individual defendants acquiesced to an unlawful act or were grossly
negligent or acted in bad faith.[291] Neither is there any specific allegation of gross
negligence or action in bad faith that is attributable to the individual defendants in
performance of their official duties.

In any event, Peña did not adduce any proof that the eight individual defendants
performed unlawful acts or were grossly negligent or in bad faith. Aside from the
general allegation that they were corporate officers or members of the board of
directors of Urban Bank, no specific acts were alleged and proved to warrant a
finding of solidary liability. At most, petitioners Borlongan, Bejasa and Manuel were
identified as those who had processed the agency agreement with Peña through their
telephone conversations with him and/or written authorization letter.

Aside from Borlongan, Bejasa and Manuel, Atty. Peña in the complaint pointed to no
specific act or circumstance to justify the inclusion of Delfin C. Gonzalez, Jr., Benjamin
L. de Leon, P. Siervo H. Dizon, Eric L. Lee, and Ben T. Lim, Jr., except for the fact that
they were members of the Board of Directors of Urban Bank at that time. That the five
other members of the Board of Directors were excluded from Peña's complaint
highlights the peculiarity of their inclusion. What is more, the complaint mistakenly
included Ben Y. Lim, Jr., who had not even been a member of the Board of Directors
of Urban Bank. In any case, his father and namesake, Ben T. Lim, Sr., who had been a
director of the bank at that time, had already passed away in 1997.

In ruling for the solidary liability of the other bank directors, the decision of the trial
court hinged solely on the purported admission of Arturo Manuel, Jr., that the
transactions with Atty. Peña were approved by the Board of Directors:

In this case, plaintiff testified as to the personal participation of defendants Ted

Borlongan and Corazon Bejasa in the subject transaction. On the other hand, with
respect to the other defendants, it was the defendants themselves, through witness
Arturo Manuel, Jr., who admitted that all the transactions involved in this case
were approved by the board of directors. Thus, the court has sufficient basis to
hold the directors jointly and severally liable with defendant Urban Bank, Inc.
[292]
 (Emphasis supplied)

The Decision of the RTC-Bago City must be utterly rejected on this point because its
conclusion of any cause of action, much less actual legal liability on the part of Urban
Bank's corporate officers and directors are shorn of any factual finding. That they
assented to the transactions of the bank with respect to Atty. Peña's services without
any showing that these corporate actions were patently unlawful or that the officers
were guilty of gross negligence or bad faith is insufficient to hold them solidarily liable
with Urban Bank. It seems absurd that the trial court will hold the impleaded selected
members of the Board of Directors only, but not the others who also purportedly
approved the transactions. Neither is the reason behind the finding of "solidariness"
with Urban Bank in such liability explained at all. It is void for completely being devoid
of facts and the law on which the finding of liability is based.

The Court of Appeals correctly rejected the claim of personal liability against the
individual petitioners when it held as follows:

The plaintiff-appellee's complaint before the court a quo does not point to any particular
act of either one or all of the defendants-appellants that will subject them to personal
liability. His complaint merely asserts that defendant Borlongan and Atty. Bejasa acted
for and in behalf of Urban Bank in securing his services in protecting the bank's newly
acquired property. Hence, We cannot allow the same.[293]

Peña had argued that individual defendant bank directors and officers should be held
personally and solidarily liable with petitioner-respondent bank, since they failed to
argue for limited corporate liability.[294] The trial court subscribed to his reasoning and
held that the failure to resort to the said defense constituted a waiver on the part of
individual defendants.[295] The Court is not persuaded.

As the complainant on the trial court level, Peña carried the burden of proving that the
eight individual defendants performed specific acts that would make them personally
liable for the obligations of the corporation. This he failed to do. He cannot capitalize on
their alleged failure to offer a defense, when he had not discharged his responsibility of
establishing their personal liabilities in the first place. This Court cannot sustain the
individual liabilities of the bank officers when Peña, at the onset, has not persuasively
demonstrated their assent to patently unlawful acts of the bank, or that they were
guilty of gross negligence or bad faith, regardless of the weaknesses of the defenses
raised. This is too basic a requirement that this Court must demand sufficient proof
before we can disregard the separate legal personality of the corporation from its
offices.

Hence, only Urban Bank, not individual defendants, is liable to pay Peña's compensation
for services he rendered in securing possession of the Pasay property. Its liability in this
case is, however, without prejudice to its possible claim against ISCI for reimbursement
under their separate agreements.

III

Considering the absolute nullification of the trial court's Decision, the

proceedings arising from the execution pending appeal based on the said
Decision is likewise completely vacated.

Since the trial court's main Decision awarding PhP28,500,000 in favor of Peña has been
nullified above, the execution pending appeal attendant thereto, as a result, no longer
has any leg to stand on and is thus completely vacated.

To recall, prior to the filing of Urban Bank of its notice of appeal in the main case,
[296]
 Peña moved on 07 June 1999 for execution pending appeal [297] of the Decision,
[298]
 which had awarded him a total of PhP28,500,000 in compensation and damages.
[299]
 In supporting his prayer for discretionary execution, Peña cited no other reason
than the pending separate civil action for collection filed against him by a
creditor, who was demanding payment of a PhP3,000,000 loan. [300]According to him,
he had used the proceeds of the loan for securing the bank's Pasay property. [301] In
opposition to the motion, Urban Bank countered that the collection case was not a
sufficient reason for allowing execution pending appeal. [302]

Favorably acting on Peña's motion, the RTC-Bago City, through Judge Henry J. Trocino,
[303]
 issued a Special Order authorizing execution pending appeal on the basis of Peña's
indebtedness to his creditor-friend.[304] In accordance with this Special Order, Atty.
Josephine Mutia-Hagad, the clerk of court and ex officio sheriff, expeditiously issued a
Writ of Execution on the same day.[305] The trial court's Special Order and Writ of
Execution were the subjects of a Rule 65 Petition filed by Urban Bank with the CA. [306]

Both the Special Order and Writ of Execution are nullified for two reasons:

(1) Since the Decision of the RTC-Bago City is completely vacated, all its issuances
pursuant to the Decision, including the Special Order and the Writ of Execution are
likewise vacated; and

(2) The Special Order authorizing execution pending appeal based on the collection suit
filed against Atty. Peña had no basis under the Rules of Court, and the same infirmity
thus afflicts the Writ of Execution issued pursuant thereto.

Since the Decision of the RTC-Bago City is

vacated, all orders and writs pursuant thereto
are likewise vacated.

Considering that the Special Order and Writ of Execution was a result of the trial court's
earlier award of PhP28,500,000, the nullification or complete reversal of the said award
necessarily translates to the vacation as well of the processes arising therefrom,
including all the proceedings for the execution pending appeal.

Considering the unconscionable award given by the trial court and the unjustified
imposition of solidary liability against the eight bank officers, the Court is vacating the
Decision of the RTC-Bago City Decision. The trial court erroneously made solidarily
liable Urban Bank's directors and officers without even any allegations, much less proof,
of any acts of bad faith, negligence or malice in the performance of their duties. In
addition, the trial court mistakenly anchored its astounding award of damages
amounting PhP28,500,000 on the basis of the mere account of Atty. Peña of  a
telephone conversation, without even considering the surrounding circumstances and
the sheer disproportion to the legal services rendered to the bank.

A void judgment never acquires finality.[307] In contemplation of law, that void decision
is deemed non-existent.[308] Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum.[309] Hence, the
validity of the execution pending appeal will ultimately hinge on the court's findings
with respect to the decision in which the execution is based.

Although discretionary execution can proceed independently while the appeal on the
merits is pending, the outcome of the main case will greatly impact the execution
pending appeal, especially in instances where as in this case, there is a complete
reversal of the trial court's decision. Thus, if the decision on the merits is completely
nullified, then the concomitant execution pending appeal is likewise without any effect.
In fact, the Rules of Court expressly provide for the possibility of reversal, complete or
partial, of a final judgment which has been executed on appeal. [310] Precisely, the
execution pending appeal does not bar the continuance of the appeal on the merits, for
the Rules of Court explicitly provide for restitution according to equity and justice in
case the executed judgment is reversed on appeal. [311]

Considering that the Decision of the RTC-Bago City has been completely vacated and
declared null and void, it produces no effect whatsoever. Thus, the Special Order and
its concomitant Writ of Execution pending appeal is likewise annulled and is also
without effect. Consequently, all levies, garnishment and sales executed pending appeal
are declared null and void, with the concomitant duty of restitution under the Rules of
Court, as will be discussed later on.

In any case, the trial court's grant of execution

pending appeal lacks sufficient basis under the
law and jurisprudence.

We rule that the pendency of a collection suit by a third party creditor which credit was
obtained by the winning judgment creditor in another case, is not a sufficiently good
reason to allow execution pending appeal as the Rules of Court provide. Execution
pending appeal is an extraordinary remedy allowed only when there are reasons to
believe that the judgment debtor will not be able to satisfy the judgment debt if the
appeals process will still have to be awaited. It requires proof of circumstances such as
insolvency or attempts to escape, abscond or evade a just debt.

In Florendo v. Paramount Insurance, Corp.,[312] the Court explained that the execution

pending appeal is an exception to the general rule that execution issues as a matter of
right, when a judgment has become final and executory:

As such exception, the court's discretion in allowing it must be strictly construed and

firmly grounded on the existence of good reasons. "Good reasons," it has been
held, consist of compelling circumstances that justify immediate execution lest
the judgment becomes illusory. The circumstances must be superior, outweighing
the injury or damages that might result should the losing party secure a reversal of the
judgment. Lesser reasons would make of execution pending appeal, instead of an
instrument of solicitude and justice, a tool of oppression and inequity. (Emphasis
supplied)

Indeed, the presence or the absence of good reasons remains the yardstick in allowing
the remedy of execution pending appeal, which should consist of exceptional
circumstances of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage that the losing
party may suffer, should the appealed judgment be reversed later. [313] Thus, the Court
held that even the financial distress of the prevailing company is not sufficient reason to
call for execution pending appeal:
In addressing this issue, the Court must stress that the execution of a judgment before
its finality must be founded upon good reasons. The yardstick remains the presence or
the absence of good reasons consisting of exceptional circumstances of such urgency as
to outweigh the injury or damage that the losing party may suffer, should the appealed
judgment be reversed later. Good reason imports a superior circumstance that will
outweigh injury or damage to the adverse party. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to
show "paramount and compelling reasons of urgency and justice." Petitioner cites as
good reason merely the fact that "it is a small-time building contractor that could ill-
afford the protracted delay in the reimbursement of the advances it made for the
aforesaid increased costs of . . . construction of the [respondent's] buildings."

Petitioner's allegedly precarious financial condition, however, is not by itself a

jurisprudentially compelling circumstance warranting immediate execution.
The financial distress of a juridical entity is not comparable to a case involving a natural
person -- such as a very old and sickly one without any means of livelihood, an heir
seeking an order for support and monthly allowance for subsistence, or one who dies.

Indeed, the alleged financial distress of a corporation does not outweigh the long
standing general policy of enforcing only final and executory judgments. Certainly, a
juridical entity like petitioner corporation has, other than extraordinary execution,
alternative remedies like loans, advances, internal cash generation and the like to
address its precarious financial condition. (Emphasis supplied)

In Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals,[314] the Court denied

execution pending appeal to a juridical entity which allegedly was in financial distress
and was facing civil and criminal suits with respect to the collection of a sum of money.
It ruled that the financial distress of the prevailing party in a final judgment which was
still pending appeal may not be likened to the situation of a natural person who is ill, of
advanced age or dying as to justify execution pending appeal:

It is significant to stress that private respondent Falcon is a juridical entity and not a
natural person. Even assuming that it was indeed in financial distress and on
the verge of facing civil or even criminal suits, the immediate execution of a
judgment in its favor pending appeal cannot be justified as Falcon's situation
may not be likened to a case of a natural person who may be ill or may be of
advanced age. Even the danger of extinction of the corporation will not per
se justify a discretionary execution unless there are showings of other good
reasons, such as for instance, impending insolvency of the adverse party or the appeal
being patently dilatory. But even as to the latter reason, it was noted in Aquino vs.
Santiago (161 SCRA 570 [1988]), that it is not for the trial judge to determine the merit of
a decision he rendered as this is the role of the appellate court. Hence, it is not within
competence of the trial court, in resolving a motion for execution pending appeal, to
rule that the appeal is patently dilatory and rely on the same as its basis for finding
good reason to grant the motion. Only an appellate court can appreciate the dilatory
intent of an appeal as an additional good reason in upholding an order for execution
pending appeal which may have been issued by the trial court for other good reasons,
or in cases where the motion for execution pending appeal is filed with the appellate
court in accordance with Section 2, paragraph (a), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

What is worse, only one case was actually filed against Falcon and this is the complaint
for collection filed by Solidbank. The other cases are "impending", so it is said. Other
than said Solidbank case, Falcon's survival as a body corporate cannot be
threatened by anticipated litigation. This notwithstanding, and even assuming that
there was a serious threat to Falcon's continued corporate existence, we hold that it is
not tantamount nor even similar to an impending death of a natural person. The
material existence of a juridical person is not on the same plane as that of human life.
The survival of a juridical personality is clearly outweighed by the long standing general
policy of enforcing only final and executory judgments. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the trial court supported its discretionary grant of execution based on the
alleged collection suit filed against Peña by his creditor friend for PhP3,000,000:

It has been established that the plaintiff secured the loan for the purpose of using the
money to comply with the mandate of defendant bank to hold and maintain possession
of the parcel of land in Pasay City and to prevent intruders and former tenants from
occupying the said property. The purpose of the loan was very specific and the same
was made known to defendant bank through defendant Teodoro Borlongan. The loan
was not secured for some other purpose. Truth to tell, the plaintiff accomplished his
mission in clearing the property of tenants, intruders and squatters, long before the
deadline given him by the defendant bank. The plaintiff was assured by no less than the
President of defendant bank of the availability of funds for his compensation and
reimbursement of his expenses. Had he been paid by defendant bank soon after he had
fulfilled his obligation, he could have settled his loan obligation with his creditor.

Defendants were benefitted by the services rendered by the plaintiff. While plaintiff has
complied with the undertaking, the defendants, however, failed to perform their
obligation to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff stands to suffer greatly if the collection case against him is not
addressed. Firstly, as shown in Exhibit "C", plaintiff's total obligation with
Roberto Ignacio as of May 1999 is PhP24,192,000.00. This amount, if left
unpaid, will continue to increase due to interest charges being imposed by the
creditor to the prejudice of plaintiff. Secondly, a preliminary attachment has
already been issued and this would restrict the plaintiff from freely exercising his rights
over his property during the pendency of the case.

In their opposition, defendants claim that plaintiff's indebtedness is a ruse, however,

defendants failed to adduce evidence to support its claim.

The court finds that the pendency of the case for collection of money against plaintiff is
a good reason for immediate execution. [315]

The mere fact that Atty. Peña was already subjected to a collection suit for payment of
the loan proceeds he used to perform his services for Urban Bank is not an acceptable
reason to order the execution pending appeal against the bank. Financial distress
arising from a lone collection suit and not due to the advanced age of the party is not
an urgent or compelling reason that would justify the immediate levy on the properties
of Urban Bank pending appeal. That Peña would made liable in the collection suit filed
by his creditor-friend would not reasonably result in rendering illusory the final
judgment in the instant action for agent's compensation.
Peña's purported difficulty in paying the loan proceeds used to perform his services
does not outweigh the injury or damages that might result should Urban Bank obtain a
reversal of the judgment, as it did in this case. Urban Bank even asserts that the
collection suit filed against Peña was a mere ruse to provide justification for the
execution pending appeal, no matter how flimsy.[316] As quoted above, the trial court
noted Atty. Peña's total obligation to his creditor-friend as of May 1999 was already the
incredible amount of PhP24,192,000.00, even when the Complaint dated 03 April 1999
itself, which spawned the collection suit included only a prayer for payment of
PhP3,500,000 with attorney's fees of PhP100,000.[317] It seems absurd that Atty. Peña
would agree to obtaining a loan from his own friend, when the Promissory Notes
provided for a penalty of 5% interest per month or 60% per annum for delay in the
payment.[318] It sounds more like a creative justification of the immediate execution of
the PhP28.5 Million judgment notwithstanding the appeal.

In fact, the Court of Appeals noted Atty. Peña's admission of sufficient properties to
answer for any liability arising from the collection suit arising from his creditor-friend.
In initially denying the execution pending appeal, the appellate court held that:

On the other hand, private respondent's claim that the only way he could pay his
indebtedness to Roberto Ignacio is through the money that he expects to receive from
petitioners in payment of his services is belied by his testimony at the hearing
conducted by the trial court on the motion for execution pending appeal wherein
petitioners were able to secure an admission from him that he has some assets which
could be attached by Roberto Ignacio and that he would probably have other assets left
even after the attachment.[319]

Hence, to rule that a pending collection suit against Atty. Peña, which has not been
shown to result in his insolvency, would be to encourage judgment creditors to
indirectly and indiscriminately instigate collection suits or cite pending actions, related
or not, as a "good reason" to routinely avail of the remedy of discretionary execution.
[320]
 As an exception to the general rule on execution after final and executory
judgment, the reasons offered by Atty. Peña to justify execution pending appeal must
be strictly construed.

Neither will the Court accept the trial court's unfounded assumption that Urban Bank's
appeal was merely dilatory, as in fact, the PhP28,500,000 award given by the trial court
was overturned by the appellate court and eventually by this Court.

Moreover, at the time the Special Order of Judge Henry Trociño of the RTC-Bago City
came out in 1999, Urban Bank had assets worth more than PhP11 Billion and had a net
worth of more than PhP2 Billion. There was no reason then to believe that Urban Bank
could not satisfy a judgment of PhP28,500,000, a sum that was only 1% of its net
worth, and 1/5 of 1% of its total assets of PhP11,933,383,630. [321] Urban Bank was
even given a Solvency, Liquidity and Management Rating of 82.89 over 100 by no less
than the BSP[322] and reportedly had liquid assets amounting to PhP2,036,878. [323] In
fact, no allegation of impending insolvency or attempt to abscond was ever raised by
Atty. Peña and yet, the trial court granted execution pending appeal.

Since the original order granting execution pending appeal was completely void for
containing no justifiable reason, it follows that any affirmance of the same by the Court
of Appeals is likewise void.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals in the case docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55667,
finding a new reason for granting execution pending appeal, i.e., the receivership of
Urban Bank, is likewise erroneous, notwithstanding this Court's ruling in Lee v. Trocino.
[324]
 In accordance with the subsequent Resolution of the Court in abovementioned case
of Lee v. Trocino,[325] we directly resolve the issue of the insufficiency of the reasons
that led to the grant of execution pending appeal.

In cases where the two or more defendants are made subsidiarily or solidarily liable by
the final judgment of the trial court, discretionary execution can be allowed if all the
defendants have been found to be insolvent. Considering that only Urban Bank, and
not the other eight individual defendants, was later on considered by the Court of
Appeals to have been "in danger of insolvency," is not sufficient reason to allow
execution pending appeal, since the liability for the award to Peña was made (albeit,
mistakenly) solidarily liable together with the bank officers.

In Flexo Manufacturing Corp. v. Columbus Food, Inc., and Pacific Meat Company, Inc.,
[326]
 both Columbus Food, Inc., (Columbus Food) and Pacific Meat Company, Inc.,
(Pacific Meat) were found by the trial court therein to be solidarily liable to Flexo
Manufacturing, Inc., (Flexo Manufacturing) for the principal obligation of
PhP2,957,270.00. The lower court also granted execution pending appeal on the basis
of the insolvency of Columbus Food, even if Pacific Meat was not found to be
insolvent. Affirming the reversal ordered by the Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that
since there was another party who was solidarily liable to pay for the judgment debt,
aside from the insolvent Columbus Food, there was no good reason to allow the
execution pending appeal:

Regarding the state of insolvency of Columbus, the case of Philippine National Bank v.
Puno, held:

"While this Court in several cases has held that insolvency of the judgment debtor or
imminent danger thereof is a good reason for discretionary execution, otherwise to
await a final and executory judgment may not only diminish but may nullify all chances
for recovery on execution from said judgment debtor, We are constrained to rule
otherwise in this particular case. In the aforecited cases, there was either only
one defeated party or judgment debtor who was, however, insolvent or there
were several such parties but all were insolvent, hence the aforesaid rationale
for discretionary execution was present. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that,
assuming MMIC is insolvent, its co-defendant PNB is not. It cannot, therefore, be
plausibly assumed that the judgment might become illusory; if MMIC cannot
satisfy the judgment, PNB will answer for it. It will be observed that, under the
dispositive portion of the judgment hereinbefore quoted, the liability of PNB is either
subsidiary or solidary.

Thus, when there are two or more defendants and one is not insolvent, the
insolvency of a co-defendant is not a good reason to justify execution pending
appeal if their liability under the judgment is either subsidiary or solidary. In
this case, Pacific was adjudged to be solidarily liable with Columbus. Therefore, the
latter is not the only party that may be answerable to Flexo. Its insolvency does not
amount to a good reason to grant execution pending appeal. (Emphasis
supplied)

Similarly, the trial court in this case found Urban Bank and all eight individual bank
officers solidarily liable to Atty. Peña for the payment of the PhP28,500,000 award.
Hence, had the judgment been upheld on appeal, Atty. Peña could have demanded
payment from any of the nine defendants. Thus, it was a mistake for the Court of
Appeals to have affirmed execution pending appeal based solely on the receivership of
Urban Bank, when there were eight other individual defendants, who were solidarily
liable but were not shown to have been insolvent.  Since Urban Bank's co-defendants
were not found to have been insolvent, there was no good reason for the Court of
Appeals to immediately order execution pending appeal, since Atty. Peña's award could
have been satisfied by the eight other defendants, especially when the de Leon Group
filed its supersedeas bond.

It seems incongruous for Atty. Peña to be accorded the benefit of erroneously

impleading several bank directors, who had no direct hand in the transaction, but at the
same time, concentrating solely on Urban Bank's inability to pay to justify execution
pending appeal, regardless of the financial capacity of its other co-defendants. Worse,
he capitalized on the insolvency and/or receivership of Urban Bank to levy or garnish
properties of the eight other individual defendants, who were never shown to have been
incapable of paying the judgment debt in the first place. The disposition on the
execution pending appeal may have been different had Atty. Peña filed suit against
Urban Bank alone minus the bank officers and the same bank was found solely liable for
the award and later on declared under receivership.

In addition, a judgment creditor of a bank, which has been ordered by the BSP to be
subject of receivership, has to fall in line like every other creditor of the bank and file
its claim under the proper procedures for banks that have been taken over by the PDIC.
Under Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7653, otherwise known as the New Central Bank
Act,  which prevailed at that time, once a bank is under receivership, the receiver shall
immediately gather and take charge of all the assets and liabilities of the bank and
administer the same for the benefit of its creditors and all of the bank's assets shall be
considered as under custodial legis and exempt from any order of garnishment, levy,
attachment or execution.[327] In the Minute Resolution of the Monetary Board of the
BSP, Urban Bank was not only prevented from doing business in the Philippines but its
asset and affairs were placed under receivership as provided for under the same law.
[328]
 In fact, even Peña himself assured the PDIC, as receiver of Urban Bank, that he
would not schedule or undertake execution sales of the bank's assets for as long as the
bank remains in receivership.[329] Until the approval of the rehabilitation or the initiation
of the liquidation proceedings, all creditors of the bank under receivership shall stand
on equal footing with respect to demanding satisfaction of their debts, and cannot be
extended preferred status by an execution pending appeal with respect to the bank's
assets:

... [t]o execute the judgment would unduly deplete the assets of respondent bank to
the obvious prejudice of other creditors. After the Monetary Board has declared that a
bank is insolvent and has ordered it to cease operations, the Board becomes the trustee
of its assets for the equal benefit of all the depositors and creditors. After its insolvency,
one creditor cannot obtain an advantage or preference over another by an attachment,
execution or otherwise. Until there is an approved rehabilitation or the initiation
of the liquidation proceedings, creditors of the bank stand on equal footing
with respect to demanding satisfaction of their debts, and cannot be afforded
special treatment by an execution pending appeal with respect to the bank's
assets.[330] (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, assuming that the CA was correct in finding a reason to justify the execution
pending appeal because of the supervening event of Urban Bank's closure, the
assumption by the EIB of the liabilities of Urban Bank meant that any execution
pending appeal can be granted only if EIB itself is shown to be unable to satisfy Peña's
judgment award of PhP28,500,000. That is not at all the case. In just one particular
sale on execution herein, EIB offered to answer in cash for a substantial part of Peña's
claims, as evidenced by EIB's capacity and willingness to redeem the executed
properties (condominium units sold to intervenor Unimega) by tendering manager's
checks for more than PhP22 Million[331] which is already 77.57% of Peña's total award
from the trial court.[332] The fact that EIB's offer to take over Urban Bank means it was
able to satisfy the BSP's concern that all legitimate liabilities of Urban Bank be duly
discharged.

As an exception to the general rule that only final judgments may be executed, [333] the
grant of execution pending appeal must perforce be based on "good reasons." These
reasons must consist of compelling or superior circumstances demanding urgency which
will outweigh the injury or damages suffered, should the losing party secure a reversal
of the judgment or final order.[334] The circumstances that would reasonably justify
superior urgency, demanding interim execution of Peña's claims for compensation
and/or damages, have already been settled by the financial capacity of the eight other
co-defendants, the approval of the supersedeas bonds, the subsequent takeover by
EIB, and the successor bank's stable financial condition, [335] which can answer for the
judgment debt. Thus, Peña's interest as a judgment creditor is already well-protected.

While there is a general rule that a final and executory judgment in the main case will
render moot and academic a petition questioning the exercise of the trial court's
discretion in allowing execution pending appeal, we find it necessary to rule
categorically on this question because of the magnitude of the aberrations that
attended the execution pending appeal in the Decision of the RTC-Bago City.

Irregularities in the Levy and Sale

on Execution Pending Appeal

Assuming that the Special Order granting execution pending appeal were valid, issues
have been raised on alleged irregularities that mar the levy and sale on execution of the
properties of Urban Bank and its officers and directors. Many of the facts have not been
sufficiently litigated before the trial and appellate courts for us to fully rule on the issue,
nevertheless, from what is on record, the following are the observations of this Court:

First, contrary to the general rules on execution, no opportunity was given to Urban
Bank or the other co-defendants to pay the judgment debt in cash or certified check.
[336]
 Before proceeding on the levying and garnishing personal and real properties,
demand must be made by the sheriff against the judgment debtors, Urban Bank and
the eight other individual bank officers, for the immediate payment of the award
subject of the execution pending appeal. It has not been shown whether Urban Bank
and its officers and directors were afforded such an opportunity.  Instead of garnishing
personal properties of the bank, the sheriff inexplicably proceeded to levy substantial
real properties of the bank and its officers at the onset.

Second, assuming that Urban Bank and its officers did not possess sufficient cash or
funds to pay for the judgment debt pending appeal, they should have been given the
option to choose which of their properties to be garnished and/or levied. In this case,
Urban Bank exercised its option by presenting to the sheriff various parcels of land,
whose values amount to more than PhP76,882,925 and were sufficient to satisfy the
judgment debt.[337] Among those presented by the bank, only the property located in
Tagaytay was levied upon by the sheriff.[338] No sufficient reason was raised why the
bank's chosen properties were rejected or inadequate for purposes of securing the
judgment debt pending appeal. Worse, the Sheriff proceeded with garnishing and
levying on as many properties of Urban Bank and its officers, in disregard of their right
to choose under the rules.

Third, the public auction sales conducted in the execution pending appeal sold more
properties of Urban Bank and the directors than what was sufficient to satisfy the debt.
Indeed, the conservative value of the properties levied herein by the sheriff amounting
to more than PhP181,919,190, consisting of prime condominium units in the heart of
the Makati Business district, a lot in Tagaytay City, shares in exclusive clubs, and
shares of stock, among others, was more than sufficient to answer for
the PhP28,500,000 judgment debt six times over. Rather than stop when the
properties sold had approximated the monetary award, the execution sale pending
appeal continued and unduly benefitted Atty. Peña, who, as judgment creditor and, at
times, the winning bidder, purchased most of the properties sold.

Fourth, it was supremely disconcerting how Urban Bank, through its successor EIB, was
unduly deprived of the opportunity to redeem the properties, even after presenting
manager's checks[339] equal to the purchase price of the condominium units sold at the
execution sale. No reason was offered by the trial court [340] or the sheriff[341] for
rejecting the redemption price tendered by EIB in order to recover the properties
executed and sold in public auction pending appeal.

Finally, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that there was already a sufficient
supersedeas bond given to answer for whatever monetary award will be given in the
end. To recall, the De Leon Group had already tendered a supersedeas bond of
PhP40,000,000 in the Court of Appeals to prevent execution pending appeal over their
properties. In fact, even Urban Bank tendered a separate supersedeas bond of equal
amount with this Court, for a total of PhP80,000,000 to secure any judgment to be
awarded to Atty. Peña. That execution sales over the properties of judgment debtors
proceeded despite the three-fold value of securities compared to the amount of the
award indicates bad faith, if not malice, with respect to the conduct of the execution
pending appeal.

Inasmuch as the RTC Decision has already been vacated and an independent finding
has been made by this Court of the complete nullity of the order granting execution
pending appeal, it follows that all acts pursuant to such order and its writ are also void.
It does not follow however, that the Court's Decision in Co v. Sillador,[342] is nullified,
inasmuch as an equally-important legal doctrine - the immutability of Supreme Court
final decisions - is also to be considered. In any case, the factual circumstances and the
ruling on that case were limited to the actions of Sheriff Allan Sillador with respect to
properties levied under the same Special Order and Writ of Execution, which were
subject of third party claims made by the spouses of Teodoro Borlongan, Corazon
Bejasa and Arturo Manuel, Jr.[343] It does not encompass other specific events and acts
committed in the course of the execution pending appeal that may warrant
administrative or disciplinary actions. Having said that, this Court leaves it to the
parties to explore avenues for redress in such a situation.

The observation on the irregularities above-enumerated are made for the purpose of
correcting the injustice that has been committed herein, by allowing the Court to
pursue the question of who was responsible for such gross violation of the rules on
execution, and for the Court to find measures to improve the safeguards against abuse
of court processes. It is for this reason that the Office of the Court Administrator will be
given a special task by the Court on this matter. Judge Henry Trocino of RTC-Bago City,
who issued the Special Order and had supervisory authority over the proceedings of the
execution pending appeal, would have been included under such administrative
investigation by the Office of the Court Administrator, were it not for his retirement
from the judicial service.

The Court's Suspension Order

of Execution Pending Appeal

Acting on Atty. Peña's Omnibus Motion dated 09 December 2002 [344] and Unimega's
Motion for Reconsideration dated 10 December 2002 [345] with respect to the Court's
Order dated 13 November 2002[346]  that clarified the earlier stay order against the
execution pending appeal,[347] the Court hereby denies both motions. The Court is fully
correct in suspending the period for the running of the redemption period of the
properties of Urban Bank and its officers and directors that were levied and subject of
execution sale to satisfy the judgment debt in favor of Atty. Peña, the Court having
conclusively determined that the supersedeas bond filed was sufficient and considering
the subsequent finding that the said execution pending appeal lacks any sufficient
ground for the grant thereof.

As to the theory of Atty. Peña that the actuations of Justice Carpio, the then ponente of
this case, in drafting the questioned Order  should positively impact his motion for
reconsideration of the same, the Court finds this argument utterly devoid of merit.

In the first place, that questioned Order was not the decision of only a single member
of the Court, Justice Carpio, but of the entire division to which he belonged, then
composed of retired Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Justices Jose Vitug, Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago and Adolfo Azcuna. This Order was affirmed by the same Division as its duly-
promulgated order. In relation to this, the affirmation by the Division of this Order
demonstrates that there is no truth to Atty. Peña's claim that Justice Carpio fabricated
the Order.

In the second place, Atty. Peña's claim of undue interest against Justice Carpio
specifically with respect to the latter having the instant case transferred to his new
Division, is based on ignorance of the system of assignment of cases in the Supreme
Court.  When a reorganization of the Court takes place in the form of a change in the
composition of Divisions, due to the retirement or loss of a member, the Justices do not
thereby lose their case assignments but bring the latter with them to their new
Divisions.[348] The cases are then transferred to the Justices' new Divisions, by way of
the corresponding request from each justice. Each justice is in fact, required to make
this request, otherwise the rollo of the cases of which he is Member-in-Charge will be
retained by a Division in which he is no longer a member. Indeed, Atty. Peña's
imagination has gotten the better of him.

Thirdly, his insinuation (which he denies) that Justice Carpio may have been bribed
because the latter has a new Mercedes Benz [349] is highly offensive and has no place
where his points should have been confined to legal reasons and arguments.

Incidentally, Atty. Peña has voiced the fear in the Letter of Complaint filed in the
Court's Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, [350] which he brought against
the ponente of this Decision, that she will suppress material information regarding the
issuance of the Order suspending the redemption period because of her close
relationship to Justice Carpio. Contrary to this fear, this Decision is frontally disposing
of this claim by stating that there is no basis to believe that the questioned Order was
anything than the joint decision of the five members of the then First Division, and that
his arguments in his motion to reconsider does not persuade this Court to vary in any
form the questioned order. Moreover, our disposition of this case renders moot his
motion to reconsider the order.

It must be emphasized that the prolonged resolution of the procedural issue in the
Petitions in G. R. Nos. 145817 and 145822 on the execution pending appeal is due in
no small part to the delays arising from Peña's peculiar penchant for filing successive
motions for inhibition and re-raffle.[351] The Court cannot sanction Peña's repeated
requests for voluntary inhibition of members of the Court based on the sole ground of
his own self-serving allegations of lack of faith and trust, and would like to reiterate, at
this point, the policy of the Court not to tolerate acts of litigants who, for just about any
conceivable reason, seek to disqualify a judge (or justice) for their own purpose, under
a plea of bias, hostility, prejudice or prejudgment. [352] The Court cannot allow the
unnecessary and successive requests for inhibition, lest it opens the floodgates to
forum-shopping where litigants look for a judge more friendly and sympathetic to their
cause than previous ones.[353]

Restitution of the Bank's Executed Properties

The Court is still confronted with the supervening acts related to the execution pending
appeal and the reversal of the award of damages, which affect the rights of the parties
as well as of the intervenors to the case, specifically, intervenor Unimega. In completely
resolving the differing claims and performing its educational function, the Court shall
briefly encapsulate and restate the operational rules governing execution pending
appeal when there has been a reversal of the trial court's Decision on the award of
damages in order to guide the parties as well as the bench and bar in general. The
necessity of making these detailed instructions is prompted by the most natural
question an ordinary person with a sense of justice will ask after reading the facts: How
can an obligation to pay for the services of a lawyer so that 23 unwanted tenants leave
a corporation's property lead to   the loss or the impairment of use of more
than PhP181 Million worth of properties of that corporation and of its officers and
directors? Obviously, this Court must undertake corrective actions swiftly.

The rule is that, where the executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or
annulled - on appeal or otherwise - the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of
restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the
circumstances.[354] The Rules of Court precisely provides for restitution according to
equity, in case the executed judgment is reversed on appeal. [355] "In an execution
pending appeal, funds are advanced by the losing party to the prevailing party with the
implied obligation of the latter to repay the former, in case the appellate court
cancels or reduces the monetary award."[356]

In disposing of the main case subject of these Petitions, the Court totally reversed the
staggering amount of damages given by the trial court, and limited on a quantum
meruit basis the agent's compensation to PhP4,500,000 only. However, properties of
Urban Bank and individual petitioners have been garnished and levied upon in the
amount of supposedly more than PhP85,399,350.[357]

Applying the foregoing rules, petitioner-respondent bank is entitled to complete and full
restitution of its levied properties, subject to the payment of the PhP4,500,000.
Meanwhile, petitioners bank officers, all of whom have not been found individually or
solidarily liable, are entitled to full restitution of all their properties levied upon and
garnished, since they have been exonerated from corporate liability with respect to the
bank's agency relationship with Peña.

Considering the monetary award to Peña and the levy on and execution of some of its
properties pending appeal, Urban Bank, now EIB, may satisfy the judgment in the main
case and at the same time fully recover all the properties executed owing to the
complete reversal of the trial court's awarded damages. It must immediately and fully
pay the judgment debt before the entire lot of levied properties, subject of the
execution pending appeal, is restored to it. [358]

Due to the complete reversal of the trial court's award for damages, which was the
basis of the Special Order and Writ of Execution allowing execution pending appeal,
intervenor Unimega and other bidders who participated in the public auction sales are
liable to completely restore to petitioner-respondent bank all of the properties sold and
purchased therein. Although execution pending appeal is sanctioned under the rules
and jurisprudence, when the executed decision is reversed, the premature execution is
considered to have lost its legal bases. The situation necessarily requires equitable
restitution to the party prejudiced thereby.[359] As a matter of principle, courts are
authorized at any time to order the return of property erroneously ordered to be
delivered to one party, if the order is found to have been issued without jurisdiction. [360]

As a purchaser of properties under an execution sale, with an appeal on the main case
still pending, intervenor Unimega knew or was bound to know that its title to the
properties, purchased in the premature public auction sale, was contingent on the
outcome of the appeal and could possibly be reversed. Until the judgment on the main
case on which the execution pending appeal hinges is rendered final and executory in
favor of the prevailing judgment creditor, it is incumbent on the purchasers in the
execution sale to preserve the levied properties. They shall be personally liable for their
failure to do so, especially if the judgment is reversed, as in this case. [361] In fact, if
specific restitution becomes impracticable - such as when the properties pass on to
innocent third parties - the losing party in the execution even becomes liable for the full
value of the property at the time of its seizure, with interest. The Court has ruled:

When a judgment is executed pending appeal and subsequently overturned in the

appellate court, the party who moved for immediate execution should, upon return of
the case to the lower court, be required to make specific restitution of such property of
the prevailing party as he or any person acting in his behalf may have acquired at the
execution sale. If specific restitution becomes impracticable, the losing party in
the execution becomes liable for the full value of the property at the time of its
seizure, with interest.

While the trial court may have acted judiciously under the premises, its action resulted
in grave injustice to the private respondents. It cannot be gainsaid that it is incumbent
upon the plaintiffs in execution (Arandas) to return whatever they got by means of the
judgment prior to its reversal. And if perchance some of the properties might
have passed on to innocent third parties as happened in the case at bar, the
Arandas are duty bound nonetheless to return the corresponding value of said
properties as mandated by the Rules. (Emphasis supplied)[362]

In this case, the rights of intervenor Unimega to the 10 condominium units bought
during the public auction sale under the Special Order are rendered nugatory by the
reversal of the award of unconscionable damages by the trial court. It cannot claim to
be an innocent third-party purchaser of the levied condominium units, since the
execution sale was precisely made pending appeal. It cannot simply assume that
whatever inaction or delay was incurred in the process of the appeal of the main
Decision would
automatically render the remedy dilatory in character.[363] Whatever rights were
acquired by intervenor Unimega from the execution sale under the trial court's Special
Orders are conditional on the final outcome of the appeal in the main case. Unlike in
auction sales arising from final and executory judgments, both the judgment creditor
and the third parties who participate in auction sales pending appeal are deemed to
knowingly assume and voluntarily accept the risks of a possible reversal of the decision
in the main case by the appellate court.

Therefore, intervenor Unimega is required to restore the condominium units to Urban

Bank. Although the intervenor has caused the annotation of the sale and levied on the
titles to those units, the titles have remained under the name of the bank, owing to the
supersedeas bond it had filed and the Court's own orders that timely suspended the
transfer of the titles and further execution pending appeal.

The obligation to restore the properties to petitioner-respondent bank is, however,

without prejudice to the concurrent right of intervenor Unimega to the return of the
PhP10,000,000 the latter paid for the condominium units, which Peña received as
judgment creditor in satisfaction of the trial court's earlier Decision. [364] Consequently,
intervenor's earlier request for the issuance of a writ of possession [365] over those units
no longer has any leg to stand on. Not being entitled to a writ of possession under the
present circumstances, Unimega's ex parte petition is consequently denied.
Upon the reversal of the main Decision, the levied properties itself, subject of execution
pending appeal must be returned to the judgment debtor, if those properties are still in
the possession of the judgment creditor, plus compensation to the former for the
deprivation and the use thereof.[366]  The obligation to return the property itself is
likewise imposed on a third-party purchaser, like intervenor Unimega, in cases wherein
it directly participated in the public auction sale, and the title to the executed
property has not yet been transferred. The third-party purchaser shall, however, be
entitled to reimbursement from the judgment creditor, with interest.

Considering the foregoing points, the Court adopts with modification the rules of
restitution expounded by retired Justice Florenz D. Regalado in his seminal work on civil
procedure,[367] which the appellate court itself cited earlier.[368] In cases in which
restitution of the prematurely executed property is no longer possible, compensation
shall be made in favor of the judgment debtor in the following manner:

a. If the purchaser at the public auction is the judgment creditor, he must pay the full
value of the property at the time of its seizure, with interest.

b. If the purchaser at the public auction is a third party, and title to the property has
already been validly and timely transferred to the name of that party, the
judgment creditor must pay the amount realized from the sheriff's sale of that property,
with interest.

c. If the judgment award is reduced on appeal, the judgment creditor must return to
the judgment debtor only the excess received over and above that to which the former
is entitled under the final judgment, with interest.

In summary, Urban Bank is entitled to complete restoration and return of the properties
levied on execution considering the absolute reversal of the award of damages, upon
the payment of the judgment debt herein amounting to PhP4,500,000, with interest as
indicated in the dispositive portion. With respect to individual petitioners, they are
entitled to the absolute restitution of their executed properties, except when restitution
has become impossible, in which case Peña shall be liable for the full value of the
property at the time of its seizure, with interest. Whether Urban Bank and the bank
officers and directors are entitled to any claim for damages against Peña and his
indemnity bond is best ventilated before the trial court, as prescribed under the
procedural rules on execution pending appeal.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES Atty. Magdaleno Peña's Petition for Review dated 23

April 2004 (G. R. No. 162562) and AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the Court of
Appeals' Decision dated 06 November 2003 having correctly found that the Regional
Trial Court of Bago City gravely abused its discretion in awarding unconscionable
damages against Urban Bank, Inc., and its officers. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Bago City dated 28 May 1999 is hence VACATED.

Nevertheless, Urban Bank, Inc., is ORDERED to pay Atty. Peña the amount of
PhP3,000,000 as reimbursement for his expenses and an additional PhP1,500,000 as
compensation for his services, with interest at 6% per annum from 28 May 1999,
without prejudice to the right of Urban Bank to invoke payment of this sum under a
right of set-off against the amount of PhP25,000,000 that has been placed in escrow for
the benefit of Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. The Complaint against the eight other
individual petitioners, namely Teodoro Borlongan (+), Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin
L. de Leon, P. Siervo G. Dizon, Eric L. Lee, Ben Y. Lim, Jr., Corazon Bejasa, and Arturo
Manuel, Jr., is hereby DISMISSED.

The Petitions for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioners Urban Bank (G. R. No.

145817) and Benjamin L. de Leon, Delfin Gonzalez, Jr., and Eric L. Lee (G. R. No.
145822) are hereby GRANTED under the following conditions:

a. Urban Bank, Teodoro Borlongan, Delfin C. Gonzalez, Jr., Benjamin L. de Leon, P.

Siervo H. Dizon, Eric L. Lee, Ben Y. Lim, Jr., Corazon Bejasa, and Arturo Manuel, Jr.,
(respondent bank officers) shall be restored to full ownership and possession of all
properties executed pending appeal;

b. If the property levied or garnished has been sold on execution pending appeal and
Atty. Magdaleno Peña is the winning bidder or purchaser, he must fully restore the
property to Urban Bank or respondent bank officers, and if actual restitution of the
property is impossible, then he shall pay the full value of the property at the time of its
seizure, with interest;

c. If the property levied or garnished has been sold to a third party purchaser at the
public auction, and title to the property has not been validly and timely
transferred to the name of the third party, the ownership and possession of the
property shall be returned to Urban Bank or respondent bank officers, subject to the
third party's right to claim restitution for the purchase price paid at the execution sale
against the judgment creditor;

d. If the purchaser at the public auction is a third party, and title to the property has
already been validly and timely transferred to the name of that party, Atty.
Peña must pay Urban Bank or respondent bank officers the amount realized from the
sheriff's sale of that property, with interest from the time the property was seized.

The Omnibus Motion dated 09 December 2002 filed by Atty. Peña and Motion for
Reconsideration dated 10 December 2002 filed by Unimega with respect to the Court's
Order dated 13 November 2002 is hereby DENIED.

The Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to conduct an investigation into the
possible administrative liabilities of Atty. Josephine Mutia-Hagad, the then RTC-Bago
City's Clerk of Court, and Allan D. Sillador, the then Deputy Sheriff of Bago City, for the
irregularities attending the execution pending appeal in this case, including all judicial
officers or sheriffs in the various places in which execution was implemented, and to
submit a report thereon within 120 days from receipt of this Decision.

The Office of the Court Administrator is also directed to make recommendations for the
prevention of abuses of judicial processes in relation to executions, especially those
pending appeal, whether thru administrative circulars from this Court or thru a revision
of the Rules of Court, within 30 days from submission of the report on administrative
liabilities adverted to above. Let a copy of the Court's Decision in this case be sent to
the Office of the Court Administrator.
The Presiding Judge of RTC Bago City shall make a full report on all incidents related to
the execution in this case, including all returns on the writ of execution herein.

Because so much suspicious circumstances have attended the execution in this case by
the Regional Trial Court of Bago City, the proceedings with respect to any restitution
due and owing under the circumstances shall be transferred to the Regional Trial Court
in the National Capital Region, Makati City, a court with venue to hear cases involving
Urban Bank/Export and Industry Bank whose headquarters is located in Makati City.
The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is ordered to include the
execution of the Decision and the proceedings for the restitution of the case in the next
available raffle.

The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, to which the case shall be raffled, is hereby
designated as the court that will fully implement the restorative directives of this
Decision with respect to the execution of the final judgment, return of properties
wrongfully executed, or the payment of the value of properties that can no longer be
restored, in accordance with Section 5, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The parties are
directed to address the implementation of this part of the Decision to the sala to which
the case will be raffled.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[A.C. No. 6332 : April 17, 2012]

IN RE: SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION DATED 28 APRIL 2003 IN G.R. NOS.

145817 AND 145822

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Factual Background

This administrative case originated when respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña filed an
Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 30
January 2003[1] (the subject Motion to Inhibit) in two consolidated petitions involving
respondent that were pending before the Court. [2] This motion is directed against the
then ponente of the consolidated petitions, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, and reads in
part:cralaw

PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAGDALENO M. PEÑA, pro se, respectfully states:

1. Despite all the obstacles respondent has had to hurdle in his quest for justice against
Urban Bank and its officials, he has remained steadfast in his belief that ultimately, he
will be vindicated and the wrongdoers will get their just deserts [sic]. What
respondent is about to relate however has, with all due respect, shaken his
faith in the highest Court of the land. If an anomaly as atrocious as this can
happen even in the august halls of the Supreme Court, one can only wonder if
there is still any hope for our justice system.

2. Private respondent wishes to make clear that he is not making a sweeping accusation
against all the members of this Honorable Court. He cannot however remain tight-
lipped in the face of the overwhelming evidence that has come to his knowledge
regarding the actuation of the ponente of this Honorable Division.

3. In the evening of 19 November 2002, private respondent received a call from the
counsel for petitioners, Atty. Manuel R. Singson (through his cell phone number
09189137383) who very excitedly bragged that they had been able to secure an order
from this Honorable Court suspending the redemption period and the consolidation of
ownership over the Urban Bank properties sold during the execution sale.  Private
respondent was aghast because by them, more than two weeks had lapsed since the
redemption period on the various properties had expired.  At that juncture in fact,
Certificates of Final Sale had already been issued to the purchasers of the properties.
The only step that had to be accomplished was the ministerial act of issuance of new
titles in favor of the purchasers.

4. Private respondent composed himself and tried to recall if there was any pending
incident with this Honorable Court regarding the suspension of the redemption period
but he could not remember any.  In an effort to hide his discomfort, respondent
teased Atty. Singson about bribing the ponente to get such an order. Much to
his surprise, Atty. Singson did not even bother to deny and in fact explained that they
obviously had to exert extra effort because they could not afford to lose the properties
involved (consisting mainly of almost all the units in the Urban Bank Plaza in Makati
City) as it might again cause the bank (now Export Industry Bank) to close down.

5. Since private respondent himself had not received a copy of the order that Atty.
Singson was talking about, he asked Atty. Singson to fax him the “advance” copy that
they had received. The faxed “advance” copy that Atty. Singson provided him bore the
fax number and name of Atty. Singson’s law office.  A copy thereof is hereto attached
as Annex “A”.

6. Private respondent could not believe what he read. It appeared that a supposed
Motion for Clarification was filed by petitioners through Atty. Singson dated 6 August
2002, but he was never furnished a copy thereof.  He asked a messenger to
immediately secure a copy of the motion and thereafter confirmed that he was not
furnished a copy.  His supposed copy as indicated in the last page of the motion was
sent to the Abello Concepcion Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) Law Offices. ACCRA, however,
was never respondent’s counsel and was in fact the counsel of some of the petitioners.
Respondent’s copy, in other words, was sent to his opponents.

7. The Motion for Clarification was thus resolved without even giving respondent an
opportunity to comment on the same. In contrast, respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 19 November 2001 had been pending for
almost a year and yet petitioners’ motions for extension to file comment thereon [were]
being granted left and right.

8. In view of these circumstances, private respondent filed on 10 December 2002, an

Urgent Omnibus Motion (to Expunge Motion for Clarification and Recall of the 13
November 2002 Resolution).  He filed a Supplement to the said motion on 20 December
2002.

9. While private respondent was waiting for petitioners to respond to his motion, he
received sometime last week two documents that confirmed his worst fears. The two
documents indicate that this Honorable Court has not actually granted petitioners’
Motion for Clarification.  They indicate that the supposed 13 November 2002
Resolution of this Honorable Court which Atty. Singson had bragged about
WAS A FALSIFIED DOCUMENT!

10. What private respondent anonymously received were two copies of the official
Agenda of the First Division of this Honorable Court for 13 November 2002, the
date when the questioned Resolution was supposedly issued.  In both copies
(apparently secured from the office of two different members of the Division, one of
which is the copy of the ponente himself), it is clearly indicated that the members
of the Division had agreed that petitioners’ Motion for Clarification and Urgent
Motion to Resolve were merely NOTED and NOT GRANTED contrary to what
was stated in the 13 November 2002 Resolution. This makes the 13 November
2002 Resolution (at least the version that was released to the parties) a falsified
document because it makes it appear that a Resolution was issued by the First
Division granting petitioners’ Motion for Clarification when in fact no such
Resolution exists.  The real Resolution arrived at by the First Division which
can be gleaned from the Agenda merely NOTED said motion.  Copies of the two
Agenda are hereto attached as Annexes “B” and “C.”

11. At this point, private respondent could not help but conclude that this anomaly was
confirmatory of what Atty. Singson was bragging to him about. The clear and
undeniable fact is the Honorable members of this Division agreed that
petitioners’ Motion for Clarification would only be NOTED but
the ponente  responsible for the 13 November 2002 Resolution misrepresented
that the same was GRANTED.

12. Respondent is not just speculating here.  He is CERTAIN that the ponente has a
special interest in this case. Recently, he also found out that the ponente made a
special request to bring this case along with him when he transferred from the Third
Division to the First Division. Respondent has a copy of the Resolution of this Honorable
Court granting such request (hereto attached as Annex “D”). Indeed, this circumstance,
considered with all the foregoing circumstance, ineluctably demonstrates that a major
anomaly has occurred here.

13. In view of these, private respondent is compelled to move for the inhibition of the
ponente from this case. This matter should be thoroughly investigated and respondent
is now carefully considering his legal options for redress.  It has taken him seven years
to seek vindication of his rights against petitioners, he is not about to relent at this
point.  In the meantime, he can longer expect a fair and impartial resolution of this
case if the ponente does not inhibit himself.

14. This Honorable Court has time and again emphasized the importance of impartiality
and the appearance of impartiality on the part of judges and justices. The ponente will
do well to heed such pronouncements.

15. Finally, it is has now become incumbent upon this Honorable Court to clarify its real
position on the 19 November 2001 Resolution. It is most respectfully submitted that in
order to obviate any further confusion on the matter, respondent’s Urgent Omnibus
Motion dated 09 December 2002 (as well as the Supplement dated 19 November 2002)
should be resolved and this Honorable Court should confirm that the stay order
contained in the 19 November 2001 Resolution does not cover properties already sold
on execution. xxx (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

In support of his claims to inhibit the ponente, Atty. Peña attached to the subject

Motion to Inhibit two copies of the official Agenda for 13 November 2002 of the
First Division of this Court, which he claimed to have anonymously received through
the mail.[3] He also attached a copy of the Court’s internal Resolution regarding the
transfer of the case from the Third Division to the First Division, upon the request of
Justice Carpio, to establish the latter’s alleged special interest in the case. [4]
In response, the Court issued a resolution on 17 February 2003 to require Atty. Peña
and Atty. Manuel R. Singson, counsel of Urban Bank in the consolidated petitions, to
appear before the Court on 03 March 2003 for an Executive Session. [5]

The reason for the required appearance of the two lawyers in the Executive Session is
explained in the Court’s Resolution dated 03 March 2003. [6] It states:

The executive session started at 10:20 a.m. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. formally
opened the executive session and then requested Associate Justice Jose C.
Vitug to act as chair. Justice Vitug stated that the executive session was called
because the Court is perturbed by some statements made by respondent Atty.
Magdaleno Peña involving strictly confidential matters which are purely
internal to the Court and which the latter cites as grounds in his “Urgent
Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion.”

Respondent/movant Atty. Magdaleno Peña and counsel for petitioner Atty. Manuel R.
Singson attended the session.

The matters under inquiry were how respondent was able to obtain copies of
the documents he used as annexes in his motion to inhibit, and whether the
annexes are authentic.

The court also clarified that these matters were to be taken as entirely different and
apart from the merits of the main case.

Justice Vitug called the attention of respondent to the three (3)  annexes attached to
the motion to inhibit, Annexes “B”, “C” and “D,” questioned how the latter was able
to secure copies of such documents which are confidential to the Court and for
the sole use of the Office of  the Clerk of Court, First Division and the Justices
concerned.

Annex “B” is alleged to be a photocopy of the supplemental agenda of the First Division
for November 13, 2002 (pages 61-62), with an entry in handwriting reading “10 AC” on
the left side and what appear to be marginal notes on the right side of both pages. 
Annex “C” is alleged to be a photocopy of the same supplemental agenda of the First
Division for November 13, 2002, with marginal notes on the right side of pages 61-62. 
Annex “D” appears to be a photocopy of the resolution dated September 4, 2002 of the
Third Division transferring the instant case to the First Division (an internal resolution).

Atty. Peña was made to understand that all his statements taken during this executive
session were deemed under oath.  Atty. Peña acceded thereto.

Atty. Peña was asked whether he knows any personnel of the Court who could possibly
be the source. Atty. Peña replied in the negative and added that he obtained those
documents contained in the annexes through ordinary mail addressed at his residence
in Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, sometime in the second or third week of January
2003; but failed to give the exact date of his receipt.  He said Annexes “B” and “C”
were contained in one envelope while Annex “D” was mailed in a separate envelope. He
did not bring the envelopes but promised the Court he would do his best to locate
them.  On questions by the Chief Justice, Atty. Peña admitted that the envelopes may
no longer be found.  He was unable to respond to the observation of the Chief Justice
that the Court would be in no position to know whether the envelopes he would later
produce would be the same envelopes he allegedly received. Atty. Peña further
admitted that his office did not stamp “Received” on the envelopes and the contents
thereof; neither did he have them recorded in a log book.

When asked by the Chief Justice why he relied on those annexes as grounds for his
motion to inhibit when the same were coursed only through ordinary mail under
unusual circumstances and that respondent did not even bother to take note of the
postal marks nor record the same in a log book, Atty. Peña answered that he was
100% certain that those documents are authentic and he assumed that they
came from Manila because the Supreme Court is in Manila.

At this juncture, Atty. Peña was reminded that since he assured the authenticity of
Annexes “B”, “C” and “D”, he should be willing to accept all the consequences if it turns
out that there are no such copies in the Supreme Court or if said annexes turn out to be
forged. Atty. Peña manifested that he was willing to accept the consequences.

When further asked by the Court whether he had seen the original that made him
conclude that those photocopies are authentic, he replied in the negative, but he
believed that they are official documents of the Court inasmuch as he also
received a copy of another resolution issued by the Court when the same was
faxed to him by Atty. Singson, counsel for petitioner.

Atty. Peña expressed his disappointment upon receiving the resolution because he was
not even furnished with a copy of petitioner’s motion for clarification, which was
resolved. He found out that his copy was addressed to Abello Concepcion Regala and
Cruz Law Offices, which was never respondent’s counsel and was in fact the counsel of
some of the petitioners.

He also expressed misgivings on the fact that the motion for clarification was acted
upon even without comment from him, and he admitted that under said
circumstances, he made imputation of bribery as a joke.

As to the statement of the Chief Justice making it of record that Justice Carpio and
Justice Azcuna denied that Annex “B” is their copy of pp. 61 and 62 of the agenda,
Justice Carpio also said that per verification, Annex “B” is not Justice Santiago’s copy.
Thus, Justice Carpio added that Annex “B” does not belong to any of the Justices of the
First Division.  It was also pointed out that each of the Justices have their
respective copies of the agenda and make their own notations thereon. The
official actions of the Court are contained in the duly approved minutes and
resolutions of the Court.

Meanwhile, Justice Vitug called the attention of both Atty. Peña and Atty. Singson to
paragraphs 3 and 4 of respondent’s “Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve
Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion, which contain the following allegations: “(Atty.
Singson) very excitedly bragged that they had been able to secure an order from this
Honorable Court suspending the redemption period and the consolidation of ownership
over the Urban Bank properties sold during the execution sale. Private respondent was
aghast because by then, more than two weeks had lapsed since the redemption period
on the various properties had expired.  In an effort to hide his discomfort, respondent
(Atty. Peña) teased Atty. Singson about bribing the ponente to get such an order. 
Much to his surprise, Atty. Singson did not even bother to deny and in fact explained
that they obviously had to exert extra effort because they could not afford to lose the
properties involved.”

For his part, Atty. Singson admitted that he faxed a copy of the resolution dated
November 13, 2002 to Atty. Peña and expressed his belief that there was nothing
wrong with it, as the resolution was officially released and received by his office. He
explained that his staff merely copied the parties in the resolution of February 13, 2002
when the motion for clarification was prepared.  Hence, the respondent was
inadvertently not sent a copy.

Atty. Singson further denied the allegations made in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the motion
to inhibit, reasoning that all he said was about the suspension of the redemption period
which was the subject of the motion for clarification.  Atty. Singson branded as false the
allegation of Atty. Peña that he, Atty. Singson, resorted to bribery in order that the
suspension of the redemption period would be granted.

On questions by the Chief Justice, Atty. Peña admitted that he was only joking
to Atty. Singson when on the cellular phone he intimated that Justice Carpio
could have been bribed because he has a new Mercedes Benz. When pressed
many times to answer categorically whether Atty. Singson told him that
Justice Carpio was bribed, Atty. Peña could not make any candid or forthright
answer.  He was evasive.

After further deliberation whereby Atty. Peña consistently replied that his only source of
the documents in the annexes is the regular mail, the Court Resolved to require Atty.
Magdaleno Peña within fifteen (15) days from today to SHOW CAUSE why he should
not be held in contempt and be subjected to disciplinary action as a lawyer if
he will not be able to satisfactorily explain to Court why he made gratuitous
allegations and imputations against the Court and some of its members that
tend to cast doubt or aspersion on their integrity.

Atty. Manuel Singson was also required to submit within fifteen (15) days from today
his response to the allegations of Atty. Peña, particularly those in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6
of respondent’s motion to inhibit.

The Court excused Attys. Peña and Singson from the executive session at 11:35 a.m.
and resumed its regular session on the agenda.

In connection with the pleadings filed in these cases, the Court Resolves to GRANT the
motion by counsel for petitioner praying that intervenor-movant Unimega Properties’
Holdings Corp. be directed to furnish aforesaid counsel with a copy of the motion for
reconsideration and intervention and that they be granted an additional period of ten
(10) days within which to file comment thereon and require said intervenor-movant
to SUBMIT proof of such service within five (5) days from notice.

The manifestation and comment of petitioners in G.R. No. 145882, Benjamin de Leon,
et al., on the motion for reconsideration with intervention by Unimega Property
Holdings Corp. is NOTED. (Emphasis supplied)

Atty. Peña duly submitted his Compliance with the Court’s Order, where he stated that:
[7]

PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAGDALENO M. PEÑA, pro se, respectfully submits the following

explanation in compliance with the Resolution of this Honorable Court dated 3 March
2003:

1. This Honorable Court in its 3 March 2003 Resolution required respondent to show
cause why he should not be held in contempt and be subjected to disciplinary action as
a result of the allegations he made in his “Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve
Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion” dated 30 January 2003. As this Honorable Court
stated during the 3 March 2003 hearing, the members of the Court were “perturbed” by
some statements respondent made in the motion.

2. At the outset, respondent wishes to apologize for the distress his statements may
have caused the members of this Honorable Court.  While such distress may have been
the unavoidable consequence of his motion to inhibit the ponente, it was certainly not
his intended result.

3. In the course of the discussion during the 3 March 2003 hearing, it appeared that
this Honorable Court was most concerned with how respondent was able to secure
Annexes “B” and “C” of his motion (referring to the two copies of the Supplemental
Agenda of the First Division for 13 November 2002) and why respondent used those
documents as basis for his Urgent Motion to Inhibit.

4. Respondent had explained that he received the two annexes by ordinary mail at his
residence in Brgy. Ubay, Pulupandan, Negros Occidental sometime during the second
week of January.  The sender of the document was unknown to respondent because
there was no return address.  Despite efforts to locate the envelope in which these
documents came, he was unable to do so.

5. Respondent has no record keeper or secretary at his residence.  Since he is often in

Manila on business, it is usually the househelp who gets to receive the mail.  While he
had given instructions to be very careful in the handling of documents which arrive by
registered mail, the envelopes for Annexes “A” and “B” may have been
misplaced or disposed by the househelp because it did not bear the stamp
“registered mail.”

6. When respondent read the documents, he had absolutely no reason to doubt their
authenticity.  For why would anyone bother or go to the extent of manufacturing
documents for the benefit of someone who does not even know him?  The documents
contained a detailed list of the incidents deliberated by this Honorable Court on 13
November 2002.  Definitely, not just anyone could have access to such information. 
Moreover, respondent subsequently received another mail from apparently the same
sender, this time containing a pink copy of this Honorable  Court’s 4 September 2002
Resolution (Annex “D”, Urgent Motion to Inhibit) transferring this case from the Third
Division to the First Division.  The receipt of this last document somehow
confirmed to respondent that whoever sent him the copies of the
Supplemental Agenda really had access to the records of this Honorable Court.

7. Respondent wishes to reiterate that the main basis of his motion to inhibit was the
information relayed to him by Atty. Singson during their telephone conversation on 19
November 2002.  As stated in respondent’s Urgent Motion to Inhibit, while Atty.
Singson did not categorically claim that they had bribed the ponente to secure the 13
November 2002 resolution, however, he made no denial when respondent, in
order to obtain information, half-seriously remarked that this was the reason
why the ponente had a brand new car.  Atty. Singson retorted that obviously, they
had to take extra-ordinary measures to prevent the consolidation of ownership of the
properties sold as the bank may again close down.  Indeed, one would normally be
indignant upon being accused of bribery but Atty. Singson even chuckled and instead
justified their “extra-ordinary” efforts.

8. Respondent very well knew that mere suspicion was not enough. An implied
admission of bribery on the part of Atty. Singson, sans evidence, may not have been
sufficient basis for a motion to inhibit.  However, respondent did not have to look far for
evidence. Atty. Singson in not denying the allegation of bribery is considered an
admission by silence, under Section 32 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.  Further, Atty.
Singson faxed to him the “advance copy” of the 13 November 2002 Resolution.  To
respondent, that was solid evidence and in fact to this day, Atty. Singson fails to
explain exactly when, from whom, and how he was able to secure said advance copy.
The records of this Honorable Court disclosed that Atty. Singson’s official copy of the 13
November 2002 Resolution was sent to him by registered mail only on 20 November
2002 (a copy of the daily mailing report is hereto attached as Annex “A”).  Why then
was he able to fax a copy to respondent on 19 November 2002 or a day before the
resolution was released for mailing?

9. Despite all these, respondent hesitated to file a motion to inhibit.  He only finally
decided to proceed when he received the copies of the Supplemental Agenda. To
emphasize, the Supplemental Agenda merely confirmed what Atty. Singson had earlier
told him.  Contrary to the apparent impression of this Honorable Court, respondent’s
motion is not primarily anchored on anonymously received documents but on the word
of petitioner’s counsel himself. The copies of the Supplemental Agenda are merely
corroborative (albeit extremely convincing) evidence.

10. Indeed, any conscientious lawyer who comes into possession of the information
relayed by Atty. Singson and the copies of the Supplemental Agenda would bring them
to the attention of this Honorable Court. In doing so, respondent was compelled by a
sense of duty to inform this Honorable Court of any apparent irregularity that has come
to his knowledge. It was not done out of spite but a deep sense of respect.

11. In all honesty, respondent had been advised by well-meaning friends to

publicize the incident and take legal action against the parties
involved. Instead, respondent decided that a motion to inhibit before this Honorable
Court was the most appropriate channel to ventilate his concerns.  Respondent is not
out to cast aspersions on anybody, most especially members of this Honorable Court.
He had to file the Urgent Motion to Inhibit because he sincerely believed, and still firmly
believes, that he could not get impartial justice if the ponente did not recuse himself.
12. Respondent sincerely regrets that documents considered confidential by
this Honorable Court leaked out and assures this Honorable Court that he had
absolutely no hand in securing them.  Respondent just found himself in a position
where he had to come out with those documents because his opponent was crude
enough to brag that their “extra-ordinary” efforts to secure a stay order from a certain
ponente had bore fruit. Respondent has devoted at least seven years of his life to this
cause. He almost lost his life and was nearly driven to penury fighting this battle.
Certainly, he cannot be expected to simply raise his hands in surrender.

13. At this point, respondent is just relieved that it was confirmed during the 3 March
2003 hearing that Annex “C” of his Urgent Motion to Inhibit is a faithful
reproduction/“replica” of the relevant portions of the Supplemental Agenda (TSN dated
3 March 2003, pp. 72-73 and 81) on record with the first Division.  With this,
respondent rests his case. [8] (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, Atty. Singson, as part of his Compliance and Affidavit dated 28 July
2003,[9] categorically denied having bragged to Atty. Peña and that he did not employ
“extra efforts” to obtain a favorable suspension order from the Court. [10]

After considering and evaluating the submissions made by the two lawyers, the Court
ordered that a formal investigation be undertaken by the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) on the actions of Atty. Peña.[11] The Court’s Resolution dated 28 April 2003 in the
consolidated petitions, which is the subject matter of this separate administrative case,
reads:

On January 30, 2003, respondent Magdaleno M. Peña filed an Urgent Motion to Inhibit
the ponente of the instant case.  Respondent Peña attached to his Urgent Motion Annex
“B”, a copy of pp. 61-62 of the First Division’s Agenda of 13 November 2002. 
Respondent Peña claimed that Annex “B” bears the recommended actions, in
handwritten notations, of a member of the Court (First Division) on Item No. 175 of the
Agenda.  Item No. 175(f) refers to the Urgent Motion for Clarification filed by petitioner
on 7 August 2002. The purported handwritten notation on Annex “B” for Item No. 175
(f) is “N”, or to simply note the motion.  However, the Court issued a Resolution on 13
November 2002 granting the Urgent Motion for Clarification. In his Urgent Motion to
Inhibit, respondent Peña claimed that the Resolution of 13 November 2002 was
forged because the recommended and approved action of the Court was to
simply note, and not to approve, the Urgent Motion for Clarification.

Thus, respondent Peña stated in his Urgent motion to Inhibit:

“9. While private respondent was waiting for petitioners to respond to his motion, he
received sometime last week two documents that confirmed his worst fears.  The two
documents indicate that this Honorable Court had not actually granted petitioners’
Motion for Clarification.  They indicate that the supposed 13 November 2002 Resolution
of this Honorable Court which Atty. Singson had bragged about WAS A FALSIFIED
DOCUMENT!

10. What private respondent anonymously received were two copies of the official
Agenda of the First Division of this Honorable Court for 13 November 2002, the date
when the questioned Resolution was supposedly issued.  In both copies (apparently
secured from the office of two different members of the Division, one of which is the
copy of the ponente himself), it is clearly indicated that the members of the Division
had agreed that petitioners’ Motion for Clarification and Urgent Motion to Resolve were
merely NOTED and NOT GRANTED contrary to what was stated in the 13 November
2002 Resolution.  This makes the 13 November 2002 Resolution (at least the version
that was released to the parties) a  falsified document because it makes it appear that
a Resolution was issued by the First Division granting petitioners’ Motion for
Clarification when in fact no such Resolution exists. The real Resolution arrived at by
the First Division which can be gleaned from the Agenda merely NOTED said motion. 
Copies of the two Agenda are hereto attached as Annexes “B” and “C”.

11.  At this point, private respondent could not help but conclude that this anomaly was
confirmatory of what Atty. Singson was bragging about. The clear and undeniable fact
is the Honorable members of this Division agreed that petitioner’s Motion for
Clarification would only be NOTED but the ponente responsible for the 13 November
2002 Resolution misrepresented that the same was GRANTED.”

On 3 March 2003, the Court called respondent Peña and Atty. Manuel Singson, counsel
for petitioner Urban Bank, to a hearing to determine, among others, the authenticity of
the annexes to respondent Peña’s Urgent Motion to Inhibit, including Annex “B”.  In the
hearing, respondent Peña affirmed the authenticity of the annexes and even manifested
that he was willing to accept the consequences if the annexes, including Annex “B”,
turned out to be forgeries.

In the same hearing, the members of the Court (First Division) informed
respondent Peña that the handwritten notations on Annex “B” did not belong
to any of them. In particular, Justice Carpio, to whom the case was assigned and the
apparent object of respondent Peña’s Urgent Motion to Inhibit as the “ponente
responsible for the 13 November 2002 Resolution,” stated that his recommended action
on Item No. 175(f) was “a & f, see RES,” meaning on Items 175(a) and (f), see
proposed resolution.  In short, the handwritten notations on Annex “B”,
purportedly belonging to a member of the Court, were forgeries. For ready
reference, attached as Annexes “1” and “2” to this Resolution are a copy of pp. 61-62
of Justice Carpio’s 13 November 2002 Agenda, and a copy of Justice Carpio’s
recommended actions for the entire 13 November 2002 Agenda, respectively.

In the same hearing, the Court directed respondent Peña to show cause why he should
not be held in contempt and subjected to disciplinary action for submitting the annexes
to his Motion to Inhibit. In his Compliance dated 3 April 2003, respondent Peña
did not give any explanation as to why he attached “B” to his Urgent Motion to
Inhibit.  In fact, in his Compliance, respondent Peña did not mention at all Annex “B”.
Respondent Peña, however, stated that he “just found himself in a position where he
had to come out with those documents because his opponent was crude enough to brag
that their ‘extra-ordinary’ efforts to secure a stay order from a certain ponente had
bore fruit.”  In petitioner’s Opposition to the Urgent Motion to Inhibit, Atty. Singson
stated that he “categorically denied that he had bragged to PEÑA about the Resolution
of this Honorable Court dated November 13, 2002 and that extra efforts have been
exerted to obtain the same.”
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby DIRECTS the Office of the Bar
Confidant to conduct a formal investigation of respondent Atty. Magdaleno M.
Peña for submitting to the Court a falsified document, Annex “B”, allegedly
forming part of the confidential records of a member of the Court, in support
of his Motion to Inhibit that same member of the Court. The Office of the Bar
Confidant is directed to submit its findings, report and recommendation within 90 days
from receipt of this Resolution.[12] (Emphasis supplied.)

During the proceedings with the OBC, Attys. Peña[13] and Singson[14] duly submitted
their respective Affidavits.

While the administrative case was still pending, some of the other parties in the
consolidated petitions – specifically, Benjamin L. de Leon, Delfin Gonzalez, Jr., and Eric
L. Lee, (the De Leon Group), the petitioners in G.R. No. 145822 – manifested before
the Court other malicious imputations allegedly made by Atty. Peña during the course
of the proceedings in the said petitions. They moved that these be considered as
sufficient and additional basis to cite him for contempt of court. [15] The Court likewise
referred this matter to the OBC.[16]

In reply to the accusations leveled against him by the De Leon Group, respondent Peña
denied having used abrasive, insulting and intemperate language in his pleadings; and
argued that his statements therein were privileged and could not be used as a basis for
liability.[17] He also accused Urban Bank and its directors and officers of violating the
rule against forum shopping by dividing themselves into separate groups and filing
three Petitions (G.R. Nos. 145817, 145818 and 145822) against the same Decision of
the Court of Appeals with the same causes of actions and prayers for relief. [18]

The OBC thereafter conducted a hearing, wherein respondent Peña and Atty. Singson
appeared and testified on matters that were the subject of the administrative cases.
[19]
 Several hearings were also held with respect to the additional contempt charges
raised by the De Leon Group. Thereafter, respondent Peña filed his Memorandum. [20]

The OBC submitted to the Court its Report on the instant administrative case and made
recommendations on the matter (the OBC Report). As a matter of policy, this Court
does not quote at length, nor even disclose the dispositive recommendation of the OBC
in administrative investigations of members of the bar. However, Atty. Peña, despite
the fact that the OBC Report is confidential and internal, has obtained, without
authority, a copy thereof and has formally claimed that this Court should apply to
him the non-penalty of an admonition against him, as recommended by the OBC. [21]

Furthermore, he has already voiced suspicion that the present ponente of the

consolidated petitions[22] from which this separate administrative case arose, Justice
Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, would exclude or suppress material evidence found in the
OBC report from her ponencia in the parent case in alleged gratitude to the alleged help
that Justice Carpio had given her by allegedly recommending her to the Supreme Court.
[23]
 The specific allegation on the supposed loyalty by one Member of the Court to
another, without any extrinsic factual basis to support it, is too undignified to warrant a
response in this Decision. To allay his fears that Justice Sereno would participate in any
undue attempt to suppress material evidence, the Court shall summarize and quote
from the OBC Report the four charges of professional misconduct in connection with the
instant administrative case.

On the first charge of gratuitous imputations against members of the Court, the OBC
found that respondent Peña gave the impression that some anomaly or irregularity was
committed by the Court’s First Division in issuing the questioned 13 November 2002
Resolution. According to respondent, Justice Carpio, the then ponente of the
consolidated petitions, purportedly changed the action of the First Division from simply
“NOTING” the motion for clarification filed by Urban Bank to “GRANTING” it altogether.
The OBC opines that although respondent Peña may appear to have been passionate in
the subject Motion to Inhibit, the language he used is not to be considered as malicious
imputations but mere expressions of concern based on what he discovered from the
internal documents of the Court that he had secured.[24] Moreover, the OBC ruled that
respondent did not make a direct accusation of bribery against Justice Carpio, and the
former’s remark about the latter having received a new Mercedes Benz was not made in
the presence of the court, but was uttered in a private mobile phone conversation
between him and Atty. Singson.[25] Respondent’s profound apologies to the Court were
also taken cognizance by the OBC, which suggests the imposition of a simple warning
against any such future conduct.[26]

Further, the OBC recommended the dismissal of the second charge that respondent

supposedly submitted falsified documents to this Court as annexes in the subject
Motion to Inhibit, specifically Annex “B” which appears to be a photocopy of the agenda
of the First Division on 13 November 2002 with some handwritten notes. [27] It reasoned
that the submission of falsified documents partakes of the nature of a criminal act,
where the required proof is guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but respondent Peña is not
being charged with a criminal offense in the instant case. The OBC noted the statement
of the Clerk of Court during the 03 March 2003 Executive Session that Annex “B” does
not exist in the records.[28]

On the third charge for contempt against respondent filed by the De Leon Group and
Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, their counsel, the OBC likewise suggests the dismissal of the
same. To recall, respondent submitted pleadings in the consolidated petitions where he
allegedly charged Atty. Vinluan of having used his influence over Justice Arturo B.
Buena to gain a favorable resolution to the benefit of his clients. [29] The OBC suggests
that respondent be acquitted of the charge of using abrasive and disrespectful language
against Members of the Court and his fellow lawyers, but nevertheless recommends
that respondent be advised to refrain from using unnecessary words or statements in
the future.[30]

Finally, the OBC desisted from making a finding on the fourth charge of forum-
shopping leveled by respondent Peña against Urban Bank and the individual bank
directors. In his counter-suit, respondent accused the bank and its directors and
officers of having violated the rule against forum-shopping by splitting into three
distinct groups and filing three separate petitions to question the unfavorable decision
of the Court of Appeals.[31] However, since not all the parties to the consolidated
petitions participated in the hearings in the instant case, the OBC recommends that
separate proceedings be conducted with respect to this counter-suit in order to afford
Urban Bank and all of the concerned directors and officers, including their respective
counsel, to defend themselves and present witnesses and/or evidence in support of
their cause.[32]

Taking the foregoing in consideration, the OBC submitted the following

recommendations for approval of this Court:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully recommended the

following:

A.  On the charge of gratuitous allegations:

1. To DISMISS the charge on the ground that the statements in his Motion to Inhibit,
etc., do not constitute malicious imputations as he was merely expressing his concern
of what he has discovered based on the documents he has obtained. However, let this
case serve as his FIRST WARNING, being an officer of the court, to be more cautious,
restraint and circumspect with his dealings in the future with the Court and its Member.

2. To ADMONISH respondent for making such non-sense and unfounded joke against
Honorable Justice Antonio T. Carpio the latter deserves due respect and courtesy from
no less than the member of the bar. Likewise, Atty. Singson should also be ADVISED to
be more cautious in his dealing with his opposing counsel to avoid misconception of
facts.

B.   On the charge of falsification:

1. To DISMISS the charge of submitting falsified documents on ground of lack of legal

basis.  A charge of submitting falsified documents partakes of the nature of criminal act
under Art. 172 of the Revised penal Code, and the quantum of proof required to hold
respondent guilty thereof is proof beyond reasonable doubt. This is to avoid conflicting
findings in the criminal case.  The administrative proceedings of the same act must
await of the outcome in the criminal case of falsification of document.

C.   On the contempt of court filed by private complainant:

1. To DISMISS the charge considering that the statements cited by Atty. Peña in his
pleadings previously filed in related cases, while it may appear to be offending on the
part of the complainant, but the same do not categorically contain disrespectful,
abusive and abrasive language or intemperate words that may tend to discredit the
name of the complainant. Respondent merely narrated the facts based of his own
knowledge and discoveries which, to him, warranted to be brought to the attention of
the court for its information and consideration. He must be ADVISED however, to
refrain from using unnecessary words and statements which may not be material in the
resolution of the issued raised therein.

D.  On the counter-charge of forum-shopping

1. To RE-DOCKET the counter-charge of forum shopping, as embodied in the Comment

dated 22 August 2003 of Atty. Peña, as a separate administrative case against the
petitioners and counsels in G.R. 145817, G.R. No. 145818 and G.R. No. 145822;

2. To FURNISH the petitioners and their counsel a copy of the said comment dated 22
August 2003 for their information.

3. To REQUIRE the petitioners and their counsel, SINGSON VALDEZ & ASSOCIATES,
represented by ATTY. MANUEL R. SINGSON, ANGARA ABELLO CONCEPCION REALA &
CRUZ represented by ATTY. ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, ATTY. STEPHEN GEORGE S. D.
AQUINO and ATTY. HAZEL ROSE B. SEE to comment thereon within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof.[33] (Emphasis supplied)

ISSUES

In these administrative matters, the salient issues for the Court’s consideration are
limited to the following:

(a)     whether respondent Peña made gratuitous allegations and imputations against
members of the Court;

(b)     whether he can be held administratively liable for submitting allegedly “falsified
documents” consisting of internal documents of the court;

(c)      whether he can likewise be held administratively liable for the contempt charges
leveled against him in the Manifestation and Motion filed by the De Leon Group; and

(d)     whether Urban Bank and the individual bank directors and officers are guilty of
forum shopping.

OUR RULING

A.      First Charge: Malicious and Groundless Imputation of Bribery and

Wrongdoing against a Member of the Court.

We do not adopt the recommendation of the OBC on this charge.

Respondent Peña is administratively liable for making gratuitous imputations of bribery

and wrongdoing against a member of the Court, as seen in the text of the subject
Motion to Inhibit, his statements during the 03 March 2003 Executive Session, and his
unrelenting obstinacy in hurling effectively the same imputations in his subsequent
pleadings. In moving for the inhibition of a Member of the Court in the manner he
adopted, respondent Peña, as a lawyer, contravened the ethical standards of the legal
profession.

As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and judicial officers.[34] They are to abstain from offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the court[35] and must refrain from attributing to
a judge motives that are not supported by the record or have no materiality to the
case.[36]

While lawyers are entitled to present their case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of foul and abusive language. [37] Language abounds
with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.[38] A lawyer’s language should be forceful but
dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the
dignity of the legal profession.[39]

In the subject Motion for Inhibition, respondent Peña insinuated that the then ponente
of the case had been “bribed” by Atty. Singson, counsel of Urban Bank in the
consolidated petitions, in light of the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution,
suspending the period of redemption of the levied properties pending appeal. The
subject Motion to Inhibit reads in part:

4.         Private respondent [Peña] composed himself and tried to recall if there was any
pending incident with this Honorable Court regarding the suspension of the redemption
period but he could not remember any. In an effort to hide his discomfort,
respondent teased Atty. Singson about bribing the ponente to get such an
order. Much to his surprise, Atty. Singson did not even bother to deny and in fact
explained that they obviously had to exert extra effort because they could not afford to
lose the properties involved (consisting mainly of almost all the units in the Urban Bank
Plaza in Makati City) as it might cause the bank (now Export Industry Bank) to close
down.[40] (Emphasis supplied.)

During the 03 March 2003 Executive Session by the First Division of this Court,
respondent Peña explained that his reference to the bribe was merely a “joke” in the
course of a telephone conversation between lawyers:

CHIEF JUSTICE DAVIDE:

Regarding that allegation made by Atty. Peña on [sic] when you made mention earlier
of him saying about Justice Carpio?

ATTY. SINGSON:

Yes, Your Honor, he said “kaya pala may bagong Mercedez  [sic] si Carpio, eh.”

CHIEF JUSTICE:

He said to you that?

ATTY. SINGSON:

Yes, that was what he was referring to when he said about bribery.

xxx             xxx             xxx

ATTY. PEÑA:

First of all I would like to … everything that he said, he told me that he got, they got a
stay order, it is a stay order from the Supreme Court through Justice Carpio and
then I gave that joke. That was just a joke really. He got a new Me[r]cedez [sic]
Benz, you see, he was the one who told me they got a stay order from the Supreme
Court through Justice Carpio, that was what happened …

CHIEF JUSTICE:

You mean you made a joke?

ATTY. PEÑA:

You Honor?

CHIEF JUSTICE;

You made a joke after he told you supposedly that he got (interrupted)

ATTY. PEÑA:

He got a stay order from Justice Carpio.

CHIEF JUSTICE:

And you say that is the reason why he got a new Mercedez [sic] Benz, you
made it as a joke?

ATTY. PEÑA:

Your Honor, that is a joke between lawyers.

CHIEF JUSTICE;

That is correct, you are making it as a joke?

ATTY. PEÑA:

Your Honor, I think, because how they got (interrupted)

CHIEF JUSTICE:

If it were a joke why did you allege in your motion that it was Atty. Singson
who said that Justice Carpio was bribed or the ponente was bribed, is that also
another joke?[41] (Emphasis supplied.)

Respondent Peña insinuated ill motives to the then ponente of the consolidated

petitions with respect to the issuance of the 13 November 2003 Resolution. To
respondent’s mind and based on his interpretation of the two copies of the Agenda
which he anonymously received, the First Division agreed only to simply note Urban
Bank’s Motion for Clarification. Nevertheless, the questioned Resolution, which Atty.
Singson sent to him by facsimile, had instead granted the Motion. Hence, respondent
Peña attributed the modification of the action of the First Division to simply “note” the
Motion, one apparently unfavorable to respondent Peña, to Justice Carpio, who had
supposedly received a Mercedes Benz for the supposedly altered resolution.

However, as pointed out by the Court in the Resolution dated 03 March 2003, each
Justice has his own respective copy of the Agenda, where he can make his own
handwritten notations on the action for each item and case, but “[t]he official actions of
the Court are contained in the duly approved minutes and resolutions of the
Court.”[42] Hence, contrary to the insinuations made by respondent Peña, Justice Carpio
had not altered the action of the First Division in granting Urban Bank’s Motion for
Clarification in the consolidated petitions, as in fact, this was the approved resolution
agreed upon by the Justices then present. The ponente of the case
had not recommended that the Motion for Clarification be simply noted, but in fact, had
referred to a separate resolution, i.e., “a) & f) – See RES.,” disposing of the said item
(F) including item (A), which is the Motion to Inhibit Associate Justice Artemio
Panganiban. In addition to the official minutes of the 13 November 2002 Session,
[43]
 Justice Carpio submitted for the record his written recommendation on the agenda
item involving the consolidated petitions, to prove that this was his recommendation,
and the minutes confirm the approval of this recommendation. [44]

The Court, through a unanimous action of the then Members of the First Division, had
indeed adopted the recommended and proposed resolution of Justice Carpio, as the
then ponente, and granted the Motion for Clarification filed by Urban Bank. It is
completely wrong for respondent Peña to claim that the action had been issued without
any sufficient basis or evidence on record, and hence was done so with partiality. A
mere adverse ruling of the court is not adequate to immediately justify the imputation
of such bias or prejudice as to warrant inhibition of a Member of this Court, absent any
verifiable proof of specific misconduct. Suspicions or insinuations of bribery involving a
member of this Court, in exchange for a favorable resolution, are grave accusations.
They cannot be treated lightly or be “jokingly” alleged by parties, much less by counsel
in pleadings or motions. These suspicions or insinuations strike not only at the stature
or reputation of the individual members of the Court, but at the integrity of its decisions
as well.[45]

Respondent Peña attempts to draw a connection and direct correlation between Urban
Bank’s failure to furnish him a copy of its Motion for Clarification, purportedly denying
him an opportunity to refute the allegations therein, and the supposedly corrupt means
by which the unfavorable Resolution was thereby obtained. This is completely untenable
and irresponsible. Had he simply confined the issue to an alleged deprivation of due
process, then there would hardly be any controversy regarding his conduct as a lawyer
and an officer of the Court. The purported lack of notice of the Motion for Clarification
filed the bank in the consolidated petitions could have been raised as a valid concern for
judicial resolution. Instead, respondent Peña insinuates ill motives on the part of
Members of the Court imputing the failure of a private party to give him due notice to
be, in effect, a failure of the Court. This merits the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary
powers over him as a member of the Bar. To allege that bribery has been committed by
members of the judiciary, a complainant – especially, a lawyer – must go beyond mere
suspicions, speculations, insinuations or even the plain silence of an opposing counsel.

Based on the two lawyers’ disclosures during the 03 March 2003 Executive Session,
respondent Peña appears to have been caught by surprise by his telephone
conversation with Atty. Singson, who informed him of the suspension of the redemption
period by the Court and its issuance of a Stay Order over the execution pending appeal.
The astonishment of respondent would seem natural, since he was caught unawares of
Urban Bank’s Motion for Clarification, which was the subject matter of the 13 November
2002 Resolution. His supposed joke, which he himself initiated and made without
provocation, was disdainful all the same, as it suggested that the bank had obtained
the Order from this Court in exchange for an expensive luxury automobile.

Atty. Peña cannot be excused for uttering snide and accusatory remarks at the expense
of the reputation and integrity of members of this Court, and for using those
unsubstantiated claims as basis for the subject Motion for Inhibition. Instead of
investigating the veracity of Atty. Singson’s revelations, respondent read too much into
the declarations and the purported silence of opposing counsel towards his joke.
Respondent made unfounded imputations of impropriety to a specific Member of the
Court. Such conduct does not befit a member of the legal profession and falls utterly
short of giving respect to the Court and upholding its dignity.

Respondent Peña’s defense that the allegation of bribery and collusion between Justice
Carpio, Atty. Singson and the petitioners was a “joke” fails to convince, as in fact, he
was deadly serious about the charges he raised. Respondent insisted that his alleged
insinuation of ill motives was just a “joke” between two lawyers engaged in a private
telephone conversation regarding the case. Although the courts and judicial officers are
entitled to due respect, they are not immune to criticisms nor are they beyond the
subject matter of free speech, especially in the context of a private conversation
between two individuals. In this case, though, respondent himself was responsible for
moving the private matter into the realm of public knowledge by citing that same “joke”
in his own Motion for Inhibition filed before this Court. In general, courts will not act as
overly sensitive censors of all private conversations of lawyers at all times, just to
ensure obedience to the duty to afford proper respect and deference to the former.
Nevertheless, this Court will not shy away from exercising its disciplinary powers
whenever persons who impute bribery to judicial officers and bring such imputations
themselves to the court’s attention through their own pleadings or motions.

Contrary to his assertion that the accusation of bribery was only made in jest,
respondent has never backed down since he first made the accusation in
January 2003 and continually raises as an issue in the consolidated petitions
how Justice Carpio purportedly changed the agreed action of the First Division
when he issued the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution, even after the
Court in the 03 March 2003 Executive Session had precisely explained to him
that no impropriety had attended the issuance of the said Resolution. In the
Motions to Inhibit dated 21 January 2010[46] and 22 August 2011,[47] he
repeatedly insists on the “anomalous/unusual circumstances” surrounding the
issuance by Justice Carpio of the same questioned Resolution, which was
allegedly contrary to the handwritten notes made in the copies of the Agenda that he
received. Respondent Peña most recently capitalized on the purported alteration or
falsification supposedly committed by Justice Carpio by filing an ethics complaint
against the latter, where he alleged that:

Sometime thereafter, respondent Peña received a copy of the Suppl [sic] Agenda – 1st
Division of this Honorable Court with a notation in handwriting “10AC” on the left side
and marginal notes on the right side. A perusal thereof, reveals that when this
Honorable Court took up the matter of the Motion for Clarification of petitioner Urban
Bank, this Honorable Court merely “N” or “Noted” the Motion for Clarification of
petitioner Urban Bank and did not grant the same.

xxx             xxx             xxx

Considering the foregoing (I was not furnished a copy of the Motion for Clarification, or
required to comment by the Honorable Justice Carpio and opposing counsel, Atty.
Singson, being able to secure an advance copy of the assailed 13 November 2002
Resolution), the matter brought out in the Executive Session and the admission made
by Atty. Enriqueta Vidal and the Honorable Hilario Davide and the Honorable Justice
Vitug with regard to his copy of the Suppl [sic] Agenda – 1 st Division of this Honorable
Court which was sent to respondent Peña was correct and that the Motion for
Clarification was merely “N” or “NOTED”. However, the Honorable Justice Carpio issued
a Resolution “Granting” the Motion for Clarification.

Therefore, the Honorable Justice Carpio issued the 13 November 2002

Resolution in an anomalous/falsified manner and in clear contravention of this
Honorable Court’s Decision to merely “Note” the same. A clear judicial
administrative violation.[48] (Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, the bribery “joke” which respondent himself initiated has gotten the better of
him. Respondent has convinced himself of the veracity of his own malicious insinuations
by his own repetitious allegations in his subsequent pleadings.

The Court in the past refrained from imposing actual penalties in administrative cases in
the presence of mitigating factors, such as the acknowledgment of the infraction and
the feeling of remorse.[49] In this case, the “profound” apologies[50] offered by
respondent Peña for his insinuations against Justice Carpio are insincere and
hypocritical, as seen by his later actions. Although he expressed remorse for having
caused the Court distress because of his statements, [51] he refuses to acknowledge any
unethical conduct on his part for his unfounded accusations against the actions of
Justice Carpio with respect to the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution. Worse, he
has persisted in attributing ill-motives against Justice Carpio, even after the latter had
recused himself from the case since 2003.

This is not the first time that respondent resorted to initiating unfounded and
vicious attacks against the integrity and impartiality of Members of this Court.
Earlier in the proceedings of the consolidated petitions, respondent assailed
how retired Justice Arturo B. Buena showed bias in favor of the De Leon Group,
when the latter’s petition in G.R. No. 145822 was reinstated on a second motion for
reconsideration:[52]

It has come to the attention and knowledge of herein respondent that petitioner’s
counsel has been making statement to the effect that they could get a favorable
resolution from the Supreme Court, on their second motion for
reconsideration. In short, petitioners’ counsel is practically saying that they are sure
to get the Supreme Court to entertain the second motion for reconsideration even if it
violates the rules.[53]
1. The motion for voluntary inhibition is directed at Justice Buena because it was he
who penned the challenged Resolution, which granted the second motion for
reconsideration in violation of the Rules. It was he who crafted, drafted and finalized
the said Resolution. It was he who tried to justify the violation of the Rules. It was
from Justice Buena’s office that contents of the challenged Resolution was
apparently “leaked” to the petitioners’ counsel long before its promulgation.[54]

What miracle did Atty. Vinluan perform and what phenomenon transpired? Why are
herein petitioners “very special” in the eyes of Justice Buena? [55]

It is quite obvious that the partiality of Justice Buena has been affected by his
relationship with Atty. Vinluan, as evidenced by the above-described facts and
circumstances.[56]

Surprisingly, Justice Arturo B. Buena, the assigned ponente, reinstated the

petition without any explanation whatsoever, and in gross violation of Sec. 4,
Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. This was highly irregular by
itself. But what made reinstatement more suspicious was the fact that even before the
release of the Resolution reinstating the petition in G. R. No. 145822, the counsel for
petitioners, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, was already boasting that he would be able to
reinstate their petition. Obviously, even before the release of the Resolution in
question, Atty. Vinluan already knew what Justice Buena’s resolution would be.
[57]
 (Emphasis supplied.)

In no less than six motions,[58] he similarly accused former Chief Justice Artemio V.

Panganiban of prejudice based on his affiliation with the Rotary Club, wherein some of
the directors and officers of Urban Bank were also members. He even claimed that
Justice Panganiban went to Urban Bank to meet with some of the directors and officers,
who consulted him on the legal issues arising from criminal suits in relation to the facts
of the main petitions, citing only an unnamed “reliable source”:

The friendship and close relationship of the three (Justice Panganiban and Urban Bank’s
Arsenio ‘Archit’ Bartolome and Teodoro ‘Ted’ Borlongan) went beyond their being
Rotarians. As a matter of fact, Justice Panganiban was seen a couple of times going to
Urban Bank to see Archit and/or Ted, before the bank’s closure. Respondent has also
discovered, through a reliable source, that Justice Panganiban was known to
have been consulted, and his legal advice sought, by Borlongan and
Bartolome, in connection with the above-entitled cases, while the same was still
pending with the Court of Appeals and in connection with the four (4) criminal cases
filed the with the MTC [Municipal Trial Court] at Bago City by herein respondent against
Borlongan, et al., for “introducing falsified documents in a judicial proceeding”. In the
latter cases, it was even Justice Panganiban who furnished a copy of the SC
Decision in Doris Ho vs. People (his own ponencia) to Bartolome and
Borlongan, for the purpose of giving his friends a legal basis in questioning the
issuance of the warrants of arrest against Borlongan and the rest of his co-
accused in Criminal Case Nos. 6683 to 6686, MTC Bago City (now appealed to
Supreme Court; see Footnote No. 1 below). [59] (Emphasis supplied.)

Lastly, respondent Peña raised the issue of “unmitigated partiality” against retired

Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura on the ground that the latter resolved a
separate case involving related issues to the main petitions in favor of the opposing
parties:

3. The Petitioners in G. R. No. 143591, entitled “Teodoro C. Borlongan, et al., v.

Magdaleno M. Peña, et al”, are also the same petitioners in the above-entitled
consolidated cases G. R. Nos. 145817 and 145822; and the respondents in the above-
entitled consolidated case G. R. No. 162562. Under the circumstances, herein
private respondent is ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN that the extreme bias and
prejudice of Justice Nachura against him in G. R. No. 143591 would certainly
be carried over to the above-entitled consolidated cases.[60] (Emphasis supplied.)

Not only has respondent Peña failed to show sincere remorse for his malicious
insinuations of bribery and wrongdoing against Justice Carpio, he in fact continually
availed of such unethical tactics in moving for the inhibition of eleven Justices of the
Court.[61] Indeed, his pattern of behavior can no longer be seen as isolated incidents
that the Court can pardon given certain mitigating circumstances. Respondent Peña has
blatantly and consistently cast unfounded aspersions against judicial officers in utter
disregard of his duties and responsibilities to the Court.

In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,[62] the Court chose to indefinitely suspend Atty. Alan

Paguia, when the latter imputed devious motives and questioned the impartiality of
members of the Court, despite its earlier warnings:

The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by
anyone against the Court for, if well-founded, can truly have constructive effects in the
task of the Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of
our people’s faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged
by it to practice law in the Philippines.

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed,
should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious
motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the
Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the
dispensation of justice.

Respondent Peña’s actions betray a similar disrespectful attitude towards the Court that
cannot be countenanced especially for those privileged enough to practice law in the
country. To be sure, Atty. Paguia has just been recently reinstated to the practice of
law after showing sincere remorse and having renewed his belief and respect for the
Court, almost eight years from the time the penalty was imposed. Thus, the Court
orders respondent Peña be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law for his
apparently irredeemable habit of repeatedly imputing unfounded motives and partiality
against members of the Court.

B. Second Charge: Submission of Falsified Internal Court Documents.

We likewise reject the recommendation of the OBC with respect to the second charge.

It must be noted that the Court, in its Resolutions dated 03 March 2003 and 28 April
2003, expressed administrative concern over Atty. Peña’s behavior on three points: (1)
his submission of a falsified court document, (2) his access to Supreme Court
documents that are highly restricted and confidential, and (3) his use of court
documents (genuine or false) in his pleadings.

Respondent Peña submitted a falsified internal court document, Annex “B,” had illegal
access to confidential court documents, and made improper use of them in the
proceedings before this Court. The Court directed the initial investigation by the OBC
based on the charge that respondent Peña had submitted a falsified document to this
Court.[63] The charge of falsification stems from his submission of an alleged copy of the
Court’s Agenda[64] (Annex “B”) purportedly belonging to a member of the Division
handling the case. The pertinent portion of the subject Motion to Inhibit reads:

10. What private respondent anonymously received were two copies of the Official
Agenda of the First Division of this Honorable Court for 13 November 2002, the date
when the questioned Resolution was supposedly issued. In both copies (apparently
secured from the office of two different members of the Division, one of which
is the copy of the ponente himself), it is clearly indicated that the members of the
Division had allegedly agreed that petitioners’ Motion for Clarification and Urgent Motion
to Resolve were merely NOTED and NOT GRANTED contrary to what was stated in the
13 November 2002 Resolution  (at least the version that was released to the parties) a
falsified document because it makes it appear that a Resolution was issued by the First
Division granting petitioners’ Motion for Clarification when in fact no such Resolution
exists. The real Resolution arrived at by the First Division which can be gleaned from
the Agenda merely NOTED said motion. Copies of the two Agenda are hereto attached
as Annexes “B” and “C”.[65] (Emphasis supplied.)

During the 03 March 2003 Executive Session, respondent Peña expressed his absolute
conviction that the document attached as Annex “B” was an exact copy of the Agenda
of the then ponente of the case.[66] It was later discovered, however, that no such copy
existed, either in the latter’s records or in those of any other member of the Division
concerned:

CHIEF JUSTICE:

We make of record again that insofar as Annex B is concerned it was

confirmed by the Office of the Clerk of Court of this Division that the original of
that does not appear in the record, is not in the record and that nobody, none
of the members of the division has a copy of, that copy of Annex B of your
pleading does not come from anyone of the members of the division. That is the
position of the Court now as explained earlier. Specifically Mr. Justice Carpio said that
Annex B, specifically with that capital A. capital C preceded by 10 did not come from his
office, was not based on the document in his office and that is also true to each of the
members of this Division.[67] (Emphasis supplied.)

The falsification, subject of the instant administrative case, lies in the fact that
respondent Peña submitted to the Court a document he was absolutely certain, at the
time of such submission, was a copy of the Agenda of the then ponente. In supporting
the subject Motion to Inhibit, respondent misled the Court by presenting a document
that was not what he claimed it to be. Contrary to the assurances made in the same
motion[68] he made allegations that were false and submitted documents that were not
borne out by the records of this case. Instead of verifying the contents of Annex “B,”
which came to him through dubious means, he unquestioningly accepted their
genuineness and veracity. Despite the Court’s own explanation that Annex “B” does not
exist, he continues to insist on its existence.

Candor and truthfulness are some of the qualities exacted and expected from members
of the legal profession.[69] Thus, lawyers shall commit no falsehood, nor shall they
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. [70] As disciples of truth, their
lofty vocation is to correctly inform the court of the law and the facts of the case and to
aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. [71] Courts are entitled to
expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. [72] In
the instant case, the submission of a document purporting to be a copy of the Agenda
of a member of this Court is an act of dishonesty that puts into doubt the ability of
respondent to uphold his duty as a disciple of truth.

Respondent Peña would argue, however, that falsification – as a criminal act under the
Revised Penal Code – was not judicially established during the proceedings of the OBC
investigation and, thus, he cannot be held liable for falsification. The comparison of the
present administrative and disciplinary proceedings with a criminal charge of
falsification is misplaced.

The subject matter of administrative proceedings is confined to whether there is

administrative liability for the submission of a falsified document – namely Annex “B,”
which respondent Peña claims (albeit mistakenly) to be a genuine copy of the Agenda
of the  ponente. The issue, then, is whether he transgressed the ethical standards
demanded of lawyers, by which they should be truthful in their dealings with and
submissions to the Court. The investigation clearly does not include the determination
of criminal liability, which demands a different modicum of proof with respect to the use
of falsified documents. At this time, the Court makes no definitive pronouncement as to
the guilt of respondent over his violation of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
regarding the use of falsified documents.

In brief, respondent led this Court to believe that what he submitted was a faithful
reproduction of the ponente’s Agenda, just to support the subject Motion to Inhibit. The
original of the purported copy was later found to have been inexistent in the court’s
records. Regardless of whether or not Annex “B” was criminally falsified or forged is
immaterial to the present disposition. What is now crucial is whether respondent was
candid and truthful in claiming absolute certainty with respect to the genuineness and
authenticity of his submissions.

The assertion of respondent Peña that the typewritten contents of Annexes “B” and “C”
appear to be genuine and accurate is unconvincing and cannot exonerate him from
liability. Although Annex “C” was determined to be in the Court’s records, [73] the bare
similarity of its typewritten contents with those of Annex “B” will not shield him from
disciplinary action. Although the typewritten contents of the two Agendas appear
identical, the handwritten notes located at the right-hand side are
different. Respondent, in fact, claims that the handwritten notes come from two
different members of the Division, one of them the then ponente of the case.
The subject Motion to Inhibit is anchored on the veracity of the handwritten remarks –
not on the printed contents – which are allegedly contrary to the substance of the
Court’s 13 November 2002 Resolution faxed to him by Atty. Singson. Respondent Peña
cannot claim the genuineness of Annex “B” (which is not in the records), based on the
apparent identity of its printed contents with those of Annex “C” (which is in the
records). The handwritten notes are markedly different and, according to him, made by
two different members of the Court. In his Motion to Inhibit, respondent failed to
substantiate his assertion that Annex “B” and the notes made therein belonged to any
member of this Court.

More importantly, the Court notes that respondent Peña has not explained, to the
Court’s satisfaction, how he managed to obtain internal and confidential
documents.

Respondent Peña would have the Court believe that he happened to obtain the two
copies of the Agenda (Annexes “B” and “C”) and the internal Resolution (Annex “D”) in
two separate envelopes anonymously sent via ordinary mail. He supposedly received
them sometime during the second or the third week of January 2002 in his home-cum-
office in Pulupandan, Negros Occidental.[74] He, however, failed to present the
envelopes containing the documents, but explained that these may have already been
thrown away, since he had no system of recording incoming communications in his
home/office in the province. The Court is not persuaded by his account of the receipt of
these restricted court documents.

The Agenda, the Court’s action thereon, as well as the Resolution (Annex “D”), are
internal documents that are accessible only to court officers, [75] who are bound by strict
confidentiality. For respondent Peña to have been able to secure originals or
photocopies of the Court’s Agenda is disturbing because that ability implies a breach of
the rules of strict confidentiality in the Court. Notably, the Agenda purportedly sent to
him did not contain all the items for deliberation by the Court’s First Division for that
day; the copies sent were limited to the incidents pertaining to his pending case. This
circumstance can hardly be considered as random, since the exact item (Item No. 175)
of concern for him – specifically, the Court’s action on Urban Bank’s Motion for
Clarification –was what had been sent directly to his provincial home/office, and what
he conveniently acquired thereby.

The Court finds it hard to believe that confidential court records just coincidentally and
anonymously appeared in the provincial home/office of respondent Peña through
ordinary mail. Also incredible is his explanation that the envelopes that contained the
documents, and that could have led to the identification of their source were
opportunely misplaced or thrown away, despite the grave importance he had ascribed
to them. It is highly improbable that a personnel of the Court would breach the rules of
strict confidentiality[76] to send to litigants or their counsel the Court’s Agenda, together
with handwritten notes and the internal resolutions of the Court, without any prodding
or consideration, and even at the risk of incurring grave criminal and administrative
penalties.[77] Respondent Peña’s account of having lost the envelopes appears too
convenient an excuse to assuage the Court’s skepticism towards this breach of
confidentiality within its own halls.

Worse, respondent Peña flaunted his continued access – as recent as 2010 – to other
internal and confidential records in the proceedings of this case. Despite the
administrative proceedings leveled against him for having “illicitly” obtained the
confidential Agenda of the Court’s First Division, he brazenly resorted again to such
unethical behavior by surreptiously acquiring no less than the confidential and still
unreleased OBC Report on the very administrative case of which he himself is the
subject.

In his Motion to Vacate/Recall dated 20 February 2010, [78] respondent Peña prayed that
the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution be recalled on the ground that there was
a mistake in its issuance based on the copies of the Agenda he had mysteriously
received. In support of this motion, he casually cited and attached a photocopy of the
confidential OBC Report.[79] This OBC Report has not been released to any party, and
was then in fact still under deliberation by this Court. Curiously, the attached photocopy
bears marks corresponding to the unreleased copy of the signed OBC Report, as it
actually appears in the rollo of the administrative case.[80] Unfortunately,
respondent did not explain in the said motion how he was able to obtain a copy thereof.

Regardless of the means employed by respondent, his acquisition of the OBC Report
from the Court’s own records already speaks of an appalling pattern of unethical
behavior that the Court will no longer ignore. Even as he was the subject of an
administrative case for obtaining confidential court records, he continued to have
access to other internal documents of the Court. His actions have established that he is
incorrigible and not likely to change. His continued obstinacy in disregarding ethical
standards and ignoring the rule of confidentiality of court records deserves nothing less
than the ultimate penalty of disbarment from the profession.

Moreover, in the subject Motion to Inhibit, respondent Peña even tried to bolster his
claim that the then ponente of the case had a special interest in the case by attaching
an internal resolution of the Court.[81] In the said Internal Resolution dated 04
September 2002, the two consolidated petitions (G.R. Nos. 145817 and 145822) were
transferred from the Third Division to the First Division, where Justice Carpio was
subsequently assigned.[82] How respondent Peña was again able to secure this internal
document is another disturbing mystery in this case, especially since the resolution was
sent by the Third Division Clerk of Court to the First Division Clerk of Court, the Raffle
Committee and the Judicial Records Office only, and not to any of the parties. Similar to
the copies of the Agenda of the First Division, respondent Peña again purportedly
received this Internal Resolution by mail.[83] What is more alarming in this instance is
that he received not just any photocopy of the Court’s Resolution, but a pink
copy itself, the very same material used for such internal resolutions in the Court’s
records. As he himself admitted, respondent Peña could not have gotten hold of the
said internal Resolution, which was on its face declared an internal matter, without
the assistance of a person who had access to the records of his case in the Court.

This claimed “major anomaly” of the transfer of the case, which is being decried by
respondent in the subject Motion to Inhibit, stems from his gross misunderstanding of
the internal rules of the Court.

Upon the reorganization of the members of various Divisions due to the retirement of
other Justices, the cases already assigned to a Member-in-Charge are required to be
transferred to the Division to which the Member-in-Charge moves. [84] Hence, in this
case, Justice Carpio, similar to other members of the Court at that time, did not lose his
case assignments but brought them with him when he transferred to the First Division.
In fact, the transfers of the assigned cases to the new Division are made by request
from the Member-in-Charge, because otherwise the rollo of the cases of which he is
Member-in-Charge will be retained by a Division in which he is no longer a member.
Thus, the transfer of the two consolidated petitions to the First Division that is being
heavily criticized by respondent Peña was simple compliance with the established
internal procedures of the Court, and not attributable to any undue interest or malicious
intention on the part of the then ponente to retain the case for himself. Respondent had
raised “irresponsible suspicions”[85] against the integrity of the ponente without any
understanding of the Supreme Court’s processes in the transfer of cases.

Respondent Peña had, in fact, previously used this deplorable tactic of obtaining
internal court records to call for the inhibition of Justices of the Court. In previously
moving for the inhibition of Justice Buena, he assailed how supposedly the retired
Justice violated the rules with respect to a second motion for reconsideration when the
latter reinstated the Petition of the De Leon Group in G.R. No. 145822. Respondent
attributed the special treatment extended by Justice Buena to his supposed association
with the De Leon Group’s counsel, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan of the ACCRA Law Office. To
establish this special treatment, he attached a complete copy of the Minutes of the
Division[86] composed of 58 pages and showing 77 cases dismissed by the Court due to
failure to pay the required fees, which Justice Buena allegedly did not reinstate:

10.  A review of the records of the Supreme Court will show that for the past several
months alone, seventy-seven petitions were dismissed by the Supreme Court, mainly
for failure to pay the required fees. Out of that number, NONE WERE REINSTATED upon
the filing of a SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. If Justice Buena willingly
disregarded the Rules by reinstating petitioners’ petition (De Leon Group Petition in G.
R. No. 145822) upon the filing of a second motion for reconsideration, then he should
have reinstated also the aforesaid 77 cases in order to be fair. At the very least, he
should now reinstate all of said 77 cases if only to show that he is not biased in favor of
herein petitioners. He could not and will not do so, however, because those cases are
not favored ones. Photocopies of the case titles and numbers, as well as the resolutions
dismissing the aforesaid seventy-seven cases, consisting of 58 pages, are attached
hereto collectively as Annex “A”.[87]

Respondent Peña was able to attach to this motion for inhibition the portions of the
Court’s Minutes on 12 April 2000, 07 February 2001, 12 February 2001, 14 February
2001, 26 February 2001, 28 March 2001, 14 April 2001, 18 April 2001, 26 April 2001,
16 May 2001, 11 July 2001, 08 August 2001, 13 August 2001, 20 August 2001, 29
August 2001, 05 September 2001, 24 September 2001, 08 October 2001 and others
which were undated. The attached Minutes pointed to specific cases which were
dismissed for failure to pay the necessary fees, among others. It was unclear if the
cases were specifically assigned to Justice Buena or if respondent Peña represented any
of the parties therein.

Nevertheless, what stands out is that he obtained confidential Minutes of the Court
pertaining to other cases, which specifically dismissed or denied petitions on the failure
of the parties to pay necessary fees. This could not have just been mere coincidence
again since it required some legal understanding and familiarity with the cases in order
to be able to sift through and identify the kinds of cases, which were dismissed or
denied on such grounds. Although the parties to these cases were notified and given
copies of the Court’s resolutions, what respondent Peña obtained were the actual copies
of the Minutes that included other items in the Court’s Agenda and that were not
released to the public. Under the Court’s own Internal Rules, only the Minutes pertinent
to the parties are those that are distributed to the parties concerned. [88] Yet, respondent
was able to attach wholesale Minutes of dozens of cases to his pleading.

Although the above confidential documents that were accessed by respondent – totaling
58 pages in all – are not the subject of the investigation of the administrative case, his
previous receipt or acquisition of the minutes of the Court as early as 2000 confirm in
no uncertain terms his access to internal records of the Court, not just of his case, but
of other pending cases and that this access has continued as late as 2010. It seems
rather ironic that respondent Peña would accuse his fellow lawyers of allegedly having
an “inside track” to members of the Court, when he in turn, on record, had
mysteriously easy access to confidential court documents. That internal documents of
the Court (whether voluminous or in relation to his case or otherwise) would suddenly
find themselves in the hands of respondent Peña through registered mail is too
incredible for this Court to attribute any good faith on his part.

Even if the Court were to give some modicum of credence to the unlikely story of how
respondent Peña came upon these internal documents, it looks with disapproval upon
his actions with respect to those documents, which were supposedly sent to him
anonymously. If indeed lawyers were sent official judicial records that are confidential
in nature and not easily accessible, the ethical recourse for them would be to make a
candid and immediate disclosure of the matter to the court concerned for proper
investigation, and not as proof to further the merits of their case. In fact, respondent
himself acknowledged that reporting the “leaked out” documents was a duty he owed to
the Court[89] – more so in this case, since the documents were sent anonymously and
through dubious circumstances.

No issue would have arisen with respect to his continuing fitness to be a member of the
legal profession, if he had simply reported his receipt of the “leaked” court documents,
and nothing more. Yet, he not only failed to immediately disclose the suspicious
circumstances of his having obtained confidential court records; he even had the
tenacity to use the documents sent through suspicious means to support his request for
inhibition. As a lawyer, he should have known better than to hinge his motions and
pleadings on documents of questionable origins, without even verifying the authenticity
of the contents by comparing them with sources of greater reliability and credibility.

If respondent Peña entertained doubts as to the veracity of the Division’s actions with
respect to the pending incidents in his case, as allegedly embodied in the anonymous
Agendas sent to him, then he should have simply checked the records to verify the
genuineness of the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution faxed to him by Atty.
Singson. It is through officially released resolutions and decisions that parties and their
counsel are informed of and guided by the Court’s actions on pending incidents, and not
by the confidential and handwritten notes of the individual members of the Court.
Respondent’s wholesale reliance on copies of the Agenda purported to be those of
individual members of the Court and anonymously sent to him is grossly misplaced.
The Court has already explained that there was in fact no discrepancy between the
agreed upon action of the Division and the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution,
contrary to the assertions of respondent Peña. He grounded the subject Motion to
Inhibit on the fact that the anonymously sent copies of the Agenda indicate that the
Motion for Clarification filed by Urban Bank should simply be noted,[90] but it was
instead granted by the Court. The Court, however, made clear during the 03 March
2003 Executive Session, that there was nothing irregular about annotating the first item
with “SEE RES” (See Resolution) and marking the rest of the incidents with “N” (Noted).
In fact, these annotations conform with the recommended actions submitted by the
ponente for that particular item.[91] The Resolution identified in the first item governs
and contains the actual disposition of two of the incidents in the pending case. [92] To be
sure, what governs as the final action of the Court en banc or in Division is
the minutes of the proceedings,[93] which lists the dispositions of the items taken up
during the session, reviewed by the members, and finally approved by the Chief Justice
or the Division chairperson. Contrary to respondent’s suspicions, the action taken by
the Division in its 13 November 2002 Session was accurately reflected in the questioned
Resolution released by the Court.

Respondent Peña has no one else to blame but himself, since he “allegedly,” blindly and
mistakenly relied on “anonymously sent” unverified photocopies of the Court’s Agenda,
in order to support his call for the inhibition of a member of the Court. Neither can he
rely on the alleged “bragging” of Atty. Singson – which the latter denies – to impute ill
motive to judicial officers. Whether Atty. Singson actually exerted “extraordinary
efforts” to secure the suspension Order or freely divulged it in their telephone
conversation, respondent should have been more circumspect in making grave
accusations of bribery (jokingly or not) without any extrinsic evidence or proof to back
up his claim.

Respondent Peña is sanctioned for knowingly using confidential and internal court
records and documents, which he suspiciously obtained in bolstering his case. His
unbridled access to internal court documents has not been properly explained. The
cavalier explanation of respondent Peña that this Court’s confidential documents would
simply find themselves conveniently falling into respondent’s lap through registered
mail and that the envelopes containing them could no longer be traced is unworthy of
belief. This gives the Court reason to infer that laws and its own internal rules have
been violated over and over again by some court personnel, whom respondent Peña
now aids and abets by feigning ignorance of how the internal documents could have
reached him. It is not unreasonable to even conclude that criminal liabilities have been
incurred in relation to the Revised Penal Code [94] and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, with Atty. Peña benefitting from the same. [95] Respondent’s actions clearly
merit no other penalty than disbarment.

This second penalty of disbarment is all the more justified by the earlier imposition of
an indefinite suspension. If taken together, these two violations already speak of
respondent Peña’s inherent unworthiness to become a member of the Bar. Although an
indefinite suspension opens up the possibility of future reinstatement after a clear
showing of remorse and a change of ways (as in the case of Atty. Paguia), respondent
has shown to be incorrigible and no longer deserves the compassion of the Court. Not
only has respondent thumbed his nose on the integrity of the persons occupying the
Bench by casting grave aspersions of bribery and wrongdoing, he has also showed
disdain for the sanctity of court procedures and records by his haughty display of illegal
access to internal Supreme Court documents.

C. Third Charge: Respondent Peña’s insinuations of wrongdoing and collusion

between members of the Court and another counsel.

Aside from attributing bribery to the ponente, respondent Pena’s allegations of collusion

between previous members of the Court and the counsel for the De Leon Group are
unfounded and contravene the ethical duties of respondent to the Court and his fellow
lawyers. His actions reveal a pattern of behavior that is disconcerting and
administratively punishable.

However, considering the ultimate penalty of disbarment earlier imposed on respondent

Peña, the Court no longer finds the need to squarely rule on the third charge, as any
possible administrative liability on this matter would be a mere superfluity.

D. Fourth Charge: The charge of forum shopping is not the proper subject of
the present allegations of administrative misconduct.

The counter-charge of forum shopping has been made by respondent Peña against
petitioners and their respective counsel in his defense. [96] However, this is already
beyond the scope of the subject matter of this administrative case. It will be recalled
that he assailed the fact that Urban Bank, the De Leon Group, and the other group of
bank officers filed three separate Petitions (G.R. Nos. 145817, 145818 and 145822,
respectively) before the Court. They all questioned therein the rulings of the appellate
court affirming the grant of execution pending appeal.

Considering that this claim is the subject of administrative penalties, and that other
interested parties did not participate in the investigation conducted by the OBC herein,
prudence and equity dictate that the Court reserve judgment for the meantime until the
subject is fully ventilated and all parties are given an opportunity to argue their cases.

The charges of forum shopping are hereby dismissed without prejudice to the filing
and/or hearing of separate administrative complaints [97] against petitioners Urban Bank,
Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo E. Manuel, Jr., P. Siervo H. Dizon, Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr.,
Benjamin L. de Leon and Eric L. Lee, and their respective counsel of record. Considering
their deaths, petitioners Teodoro C. Borlongan and Ben T. Lim, Sr., can no longer be
included in any future administrative action in relation to these matters. On the other
hand, Ben Y. Lim, Jr., was mistakenly impleaded by respondent Peña and therefore, is
not a real and direct party to the case.

EPILOGUE

As parting words, the Court herein highlights the disorder caused by respondent Peña’s
actions in the administration of justice. In order to foreclose resort to such abhorrent
practice or strategy in the future, the Court finds the need to educate the public and the
Bar.

Lawyers shall conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their
professional colleagues.[98] They shall not, in their professional dealings, use language
that is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.[99] Lawyers shall use dignified language
in their pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal system. [100] The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of a judicial
forum.[101]

The Court cannot countenance the ease with which lawyers, in the hopes of
strengthening their cause in a motion for inhibition, make grave and unfounded
accusations of unethical conduct or even wrongdoing against other members of the
legal profession. It is the duty of members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justness of the cause with which they are charged. [102]

It has not escaped the Court’s attention that respondent Peña has manifested a
troubling history of praying for the inhibition of several members of this Court or for the
re-raffle of the case to another Division, on the basis of groundless and unfounded
accusations of partiality. A sampling of his predilection for seeking the inhibition of, so
far, eleven Justices of this Court, in an apparent bid to shop for a sympathetic ear,
includes the following:

1. Peña’s Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Artemio V. Panganiban) dated 12

January 2001;
2. Urgent Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Arturo Buena) dated 20 August
2001;
3. 3. Letter Complaint (Re: Justice Buena) dated 28 October 2001;
4. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 18 February 2002;
5. Reply  (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 15 March 2001;
6. Urgent Motion to Inhibit (re: ponente) dated 30 January 2003;
7. Motion to Inhibit  (Re: Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing) dated 08 July
2004;
8. Motion to Inhibit  (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 28 December 2004;
9. Motion to Inhibit  (Re: Justice Eduardo Antonio B. Nachura) dated 17
December 2007;
10.Motion for Inhibition (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 28 December 2004;
11.Reiteratory Motion to Recuse dated 03 March 2006  (Re: Justice
Panganiban);
12.Motion to Inhibit  (Re: Justice Nachura) dated 07 January 2008;
13.Urgent Consolidated Motion to Reiterate Request for Inhibition (Re:
Justice Antonio T. Carpio) dated 02 June 2008;
14.Urgent Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justice Presbitero J. Velasco) dated 10
July 2008;
15.Supplement to the Urgent Motion for Re-Raffle  (Re: Justices Conchita
Carpio Morales and Dante O. Tinga) dated 04 August 2008;
16.Urgent Consolidated Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justices Carpio Morales,
Tinga and Velasco) dated 14 August 2008;
17.Urgent Consolidated Motion for Re-Raffle  (Re: Justices Arturo D. Brion,
Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Carpio Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Quisumbing)
dated 28 August 2008;
18.Motion to Inhibit  (Re: Justice Carpio) dated 21 January 2010;
19.Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justices Carpio Morales and Ma.
Lourdes P. A. Sereno) dated 30 March 2011;
 20.Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit dated 22 August 2011 (Re: Justice Sereno);
and
21.Very Urgent Motion to Re-Raffle dated 01 September 2011 (Re: Justices
Carpio, Jose Perez and Sereno).

The grounds for inhibition of the Justices in these motions of respondent ranged from
flimsy and sparse relations between the parties and the members of the Court to wild
accusations of partiality on mere conjectures and surmises. For example, respondent
accused former Chief Justice Panganiban of bias based on his affiliation with the Rotary
Club, in which the late Teodoro Borlongan, then President of Urban Bank, was likewise
an officer.[103] He moved for the inhibition of Justice Sereno on the ground that she was
“a close judicial ally” of Justice Carpio, and in turn, the latter, according to respondent,
was antagonistic toward him during the Court’s 03 March 2003 Executive Session in this
administrative case.[104]

Meanwhile, respondent recently sought to have the case re-raffled from the Court’s
Third Division because Justice Jose Portugal Perez, a member thereof, was allegedly
appointed to the Court through the endorsement of former Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita, who was a close ally of the then Chairman Emeritus of Urban Bank, former
President Fidel V. Ramos.[105]  He similarly sought the inhibition of Justice Dante O.
Tinga for his close professional and political ties with former President Ramos. [106] He
likewise assailed the partiality of Justice Arturo D. Brion, considering he is a law school
classmate and fraternity brother of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, who was then
Presidential Legal Counsel of former President Ramos. Thus, according to respondent
Peña, “President Ramos, through Justice Corona, will most likely exercise his influence
over the Honorable Justice Brion.”[107]

Curiously, in asking for the inhibition of Justice Nachura for his alleged partiality in
favor of Urban Bank because of his decision in a related case [108] and his prior
appointment as Undersecretary of Education during the Ramos presidency, respondent
Peña impliedly prayed that his case be specifically retained in the Court’s Third Division.
[109]
 Respondent’s peculiar request, which was not included in his other motions, gives
the impression that in his quest to have Justice Nachura inhibit himself, respondent
nonetheless did not want his case to be raffled out of the Third Division. If his only
intention was to raise the possibility of bias against Justice Nachura alone, then it would
not matter whether his case remained with the Third Division, with another member
being designated to replace Justice Nachura, or raffled to another Division altogether.
Respondent Peña’s odd prayer in his motion for inhibition bore signs of an intent to
shop for a forum that he perceived to be friendly to him, except for one member.

In Chin v. Court of Appeals,[110] the Court warned against litigants’ contumacious

practice in successively asking for the inhibition of judges, in order to shop for one who
is more friendly and sympathetic to their cause:

We agree that judges have the duty of protecting the integrity of the judiciary as an
institution worthy of public trust and confidence. But under the circumstances here, we
also agree that unnecessary inhibition of judges in a case would open the floodgates to
forum-shopping. More so, considering that Judge Magpale was not the first judge that
TAN had asked to be inhibited on the same allegation of prejudgment. To allow
successive inhibitions would justify petitioners’ apprehension about the
practice of certain litigants shopping for a judge more friendly and
sympathetic to their cause than previous ones.

As held in Mateo, Jr. v. Hon. Villaluz, the invitation for judges to disqualify themselves
need not always be heeded. It is not always desirable that they should do so. It might
amount in certain cases to their being recreant about their duties. It could also be an
instrument whereby a party could inhibit a judge in the hope of getting another more
amenable to his persuasion. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court’s warning in Chin  applies squarely to the multiple and successive requests for
inhibition and re-raffle filed by respondent Peña. Lest other litigants follow his lead, the
Court condemns in no uncertain terms the practice of shopping for a justice, most
especially in the highest tribunal of the land. This abhorrent practice is indeed one of
the reasons why this administrative case has dragged on for years. Not only does it
impute ill motive and disrepute to the members of the Court, but it likewise delays the
administration of justice.

Oddly enough, respondent Peña has been less concerned about the inordinate delay in
resolving the case than about making sure that the “wrong” or “unfriendly” Justices – in
his perception – do not sit and rule on the issues. He has thrived on the protracted
interruptions caused by his numerous motions for inhibition and re-raffle, resulting in
the case languishing in this Court for years and clogging its dockets. Respondent stands
out for this disorderly behavior and must be made an example so that litigants be
reminded that they cannot bend or toy with the rules of procedure to favor their
causes. Worse, respondent has thrown no less than the rules of basic courtesy in
imputing sinister motives against members of the Court.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Peña has violated several
canons of professional and ethical conduct expected from him as a lawyer and an officer
of the court. His conduct, demeanor and language with respect to his cause of action –
in this Court, no less – tend to undermine the integrity and reputation of the judiciary,
as well as inflict unfounded accusations against fellow lawyers. Most disconcerting for
this Court is his uncanny ability to obtain confidential and internal court records and to
use them shamelessly in his pleadings in furtherance of his cause.

In addition, the Court cannot just make short shrift of his inclination towards casually
moving for the inhibition of Justices of the Court based on unfounded claims, since he
has not shown remorse or contrition for his ways. Atty. Peña has shown and displayed
in these proceedings that he has fallen short of the ethical standards of the noble
profession and must be sanctioned accordingly. cralaw

PREMISES CONSIDERED, for violating Canons 8, 10 and 11 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility and for failing to give due respect to the Courts and his
fellow lawyers, respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Peña’s personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and other copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.

The En Banc Clerk of Court is directed to INVESTIGATE how respondent was able to

secure copies of the following: (a) copies of the Agenda dated 13 November 2002 of
the Court’s First Division, attached as Annexes “B” and “C” of respondent Peña’s Urgent
Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 30 January
2003; (b) the Internal Resolution dated 04 September 2002, attached as Annex “D” of
the same motion; (c) the Report and Recommendation dated 11 December 2007,
issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant, attached as Annex “5” of respondent Peña’s
Motion to Vacate/Recall dated 20 February 2010; and (d) the Minutes of the Court,
consisting of 58-pages, attached as Annex “A” of the Reply (to Petitioners’ Opposition to
Motion to Urgent Motion to Inhibit) dated 31 October 2001 filed by respondent Peña.
She is further required to SUBMIT such an investigation report with recommendations
on the administrative and disciplinary liabilities, if any, of all court personnel possibly
involved therein, as well as suggestions for protecting confidential and internal court
documents of pending cases within NINETY (90) DAYS from receipt of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. NO. 151983-84 : July 31, 2008]

JOSE MAX S. ORTIZ, Petitioner, v. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure seeking to modify or partially reconsider the Decision 1 dated 22
August 2001 and Resolution2 dated 9 January 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 54576-77, insofar as the award of attorney's fees is concerned. Herein petitioner
Jose Max S. Ortiz prays that this Court affirm the award of attorney's fees equivalent to
10% of the monetary award adjudged by the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) in its Decisions dated 21 July 1995 and 25 July 1995 in NLRC Cases No. V-
0255-943 and No. V-0068-95,4 respectively. Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to the
said attorney's fees.

Petitioner is a member of the Philippine Bar who represented the complainants in NLRC
Cases No. V-0255-94 and No. V-0068-95 instituted against herein private respondent
San Miguel Corporation sometime in 1992 and 1993.

Private respondent, on the other hand, is a corporation duly organized and existing
under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. It is primarily
engaged in the manufacture and sale of food and beverage particularly beer products.
In line with its business, it operates breweries and sales offices throughout the
Philippines.5 The complainants in NLRC Cases No. V-0255-94 and No. V-0068-95 were
employees at private respondent's Sales Offices in the provinces.

NLRC Case No. V-0255-94 (Aguirre Cases)

In 1992, several employees from the Bacolod, Cadiz, and Himamaylan Beer Sales
Offices filed with the Labor Arbiter separate complaints against private respondent for
illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement with backwages; elevation of
employment status from casual-temporary to regular-permanent reckoned after six
months from the start of complainants' employment; underpayment of salaries; non-
payment of holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, allowances and sick leaves; non-
payment of benefits under the existing Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA);
attorney's fees; moral, exemplary and other damages; and interest. The foregoing
complaints were consolidated and initially docketed as RAB Cases No. 06-01-10031-92;
06-01-10048-92; 06-01-10049-92; 06-02-10210-92; 06-02-10211-92; and 06-03-
10255-92 (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Aguirre Cases). After conducting
a full-blown trial, the parties were given the opportunity to submit their respective
memoranda. Subsequently, the cases were submitted for resolution.

On 30 June 1994, Labor Arbiter Reynaldo J. Gulmatico (Labor Arbiter Gulmatico)

rendered a Decision6 in the Aguirre Cases finding all the complainants to have been
illegally dismissed. He ordered complainants' reinstatement to their previous or
equivalent positions without loss of seniority rights. He also ordered private respondent
to pay the complainants (1) full backwages and other CBA benefits in the total amount
of P6,197,952.88; (2) rice subsidy or its monetary equivalent; and (3) attorney's fees
equivalent to 10% of the monetary award or in the amount of P619,795.28. Labor
Arbiter Gulmatico, however, dismissed complainants' claim for overtime pay, holiday
pay, 13th month pay differential, service incentive leave pay, moral damages and all
other claims for lack of merit. 7

Unsatisfied with Labor Arbiter Gulmatico's monetary and economic awards,

complainants appealed to the NLRC, where the Aguirre Cases were collectively docketed
as NLRC Case No. V-0255-94. The NLRC would later render a Decision dated 21 July
1995 in the Aguirre Cases affirming the Decision of Labor Arbiter Gulmatico, with the
following modifications: (1) granting sales commission to the complainants and
adopting their computation thereof in their Appeal Memorandum 8 filed before the NLRC;
(2) adjusting and/or reducing the amounts awarded to complainants Alfredo Gadian,
Jr., Renato Junsay, Agustines Llacuna, and Florencio de la Piedra depending on the
dates they were employed; (3) determining that Modesto Jabaybay, who died on 28
December 1993, was to receive only the amount of P356,128.02; (4) declaring that all
the complainants except Romeo Magbanua, who withdrew his complaint, were entitled
to whatever benefits were given under the CBA; and (5) that complainants Romeo
Magbanua and Modesto Jabaybay shall no longer be reinstated. 9

Private respondent moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid 21 July 1995 NLRC
Decision, but its motion was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution 10 dated 27 February
1996.

NLRC Case No. V-0068-95 (Toquero Case)

While the Aguirre Cases were still pending resolution by Labor Arbiter Gulmatico, three
other employees at the San Carlos Sales Office filed with the Labor Arbiter a similar
complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent in 1993. Their complaint was
docketed as RAB Case No. 06-07-10404-93 (hereinafter referred to as the Toquero
Case).

On 26 December 1994, Labor Arbiter Ray Allan T. Drilon (Labor Arbiter Drilon) rendered
his Decision11 in the Toquero Case also ruling that the three complainants were illegally
dismissed. Thus, he ordered the complainants' immediate reinstatement to their former
positions without loss of seniority rights. He ordered private respondent to pay
complainants (1) backwages and other benefits in the amount of P572,542.50; (2) all
benefits, privileges and rights enjoyed by the private respondent's regular employees in
the total amount of P339,055.00; (3) a total of 159 sacks of rice ration; (4) sales
commissions based on the monthly sales of beer sold by their office for the last three
years; and (5) attorney's fees in the amount of P91,159.75.12

Again, the complainants were not contented with Labor Arbiter Drilon's Decision, and
they appealed their case to the NLRC which was then docketed as NLRC Case No. V-
0068-95. On 25 July 1995, the NLRC rendered a Decision modifying the 26 December
1994 Decision of Labor Arbiter Drilon by ordering the private respondent to pay the
complainants the following: (1) additional awards of sales commission; (2) tailoring
allowance; (3) monetary equivalent of their uniform for two years consisting of 24 sets
of t-shirts and 6 pairs of pants; and (4) attorney's fees of 10% of the total monetary
award or P198,296.95.13

In its Resolution14 dated 9 October 1995, the NLRC partially granted private

respondent's motion for reconsideration by allowing the deduction from the award of
backwages any earnings of complainants elsewhere during the pendency of their case. 15

CA-G.R. SP No. 54576-77

Failing to get a favorable ruling from the NLRC in both the Aguirre  and Toquero Cases,
private respondent elevated the NLRC Decisions to this Court via a Petition for
Certiorari, where they were docketed as G.R. No. 124426 16 and G.R. No. 122975,
respectively.17 On 15 July 1996, this Court issued a Resolution 18 consolidating the two
cases. In another Resolution19 dated 30 June 1999, this Court referred the said cases to
the Court of Appeals conforming to its ruling in St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC and
Bienvenido Aricayos.20 The Court of Appeals accepted the consolidated cases in its
Resolution21 dated 7 September 1999, and docketed the same as CA-G.R. SP No.
54576-77.

While the private respondent's Petitions for Certiorari were pending before the Court of
Appeals, all but one of the remaining complainants in the Aguirre and Toquero
Cases appeared on various dates before Labor Arbiters Gulmatico and Drilon, and in the
presence of two witnesses, signed separate Deeds of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim 22 in
favor of private respondent. Based on the Deeds they executed, the complainants
agreed to settle their claims against private respondent for amounts less than what the
NLRC actually awarded. Private respondent withheld 10% of the total amount agreed
upon by the parties in the said Deeds as attorney's fees and handed it over to
petitioner.

Private respondent then attached the Deeds of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim to its
Manifestation and Motion23 filed before the appellate court. On 22 August 2001, the
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision24 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54576-77 affirming the NLRC
Decision dated 21 July 1995 and Resolution dated 27 February 1996 in the Aguirre
Cases, only insofar as it concerned complainant Alfredo Gadian, Jr. (complainant
Gadian), the only complainant who did not execute a Deed of Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim. With respect to the other complainants in the Aguirre and Toquero Cases,
their complaints were dismissed on account of their duly executed Deeds of Release,
Waiver and Quitclaim.25

Private respondent moved for the partial reconsideration of the 22 August 2001
Decision of the Court of Appeals, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the 22
August 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 54576-77, which
affirmed the 21 July 1995 Decision and 27 February 1996 Resolution of the NLRC in the
Aguirre Cases, insofar as complainant Gadian was concerned; and the dismissal of
complainant Gadian's complaint against private respondent for lack of
merit.26 Complainant Gadian and his counsel, herein petitioner, for their part, likewise
moved for the partial reconsideration of the same Decision of the appellate court
praying that the award of attorney's fees of 10% should be based on the monetary
awards adjudged by the NLRC.27 In a Resolution28 dated 9 January 2002, the appellate
court denied both motions.
 [G.R. NO. 151421 and No. 151427

Private respondent appealed before this Court by filing a Petition for Review, docketed
as G.R. No. 151421 and No. 151427. However, private respondent's Petition was
denied due course by this Court in a Resolution 29 dated 18 March 2002 for failure of the
private respondent to show that a reversible error had been committed by the appellate
court. The Court also denied private respondent's motion for reconsideration. 30 The
denial of the private respondent's Petition in G.R. No. 151421 and No. 151427 became
final and executory on 24 July 2002.31

[G.R. NO. 151983-84

Petitioner filed this present Petition for Review on his own behalf, docketed as G.R. No.
151983-84, praying that this Court grant him attorney's fees equivalent to those
awarded by the NLRC in the Aguirre and Toquero Cases. He makes the following lone
assignment of error in his Petition:

THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION IN NOT AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES BASED ON THE ORIGINAL
AWARD MADE BY THE NLRC-FOURTH DIVISON.32

In his Memorandum,33 petitioner posits the following issues:

I. WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITION RAISES A QUESTION OF LAW.

II. WHETHER PETITIONER IS A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST TO FILE THE PRESENT

PETITION.

III. WHETHER PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY'S FEES ON TOP OF

WHAT WAS ALREADY RECEIVED. 34

Petitioner alleges that the Decision of the appellate court was prejudicial only insofar as
it failed to grant 10% attorney's fees based on the monetary and economic awards
adjudged by the NLRC in its Decisions in the Aguirre and Toquero Cases. Considering
that the only complainant who did not execute a Deed of Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim, namely, complainant Gadian, obtained a favorable judgment from the Court
of Appeals, he was no longer interested in pursuing an appeal; and petitioner is, thus,
constrained to bring the present Petition, with himself as the forced petitioner, for the
purpose of recovering the aforesaid attorney's fees.

In the instant Petition, petitioner is claiming additional attorney's fees, representing the
difference between the amount as decreed in the NLRC Decisions in the Aguirre and
Toquero Cases and the amount he already received from private respondent, equivalent
to the 10% attorney's fees the latter withheld from the amounts it actually paid to the
complainants who signed the Deeds of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim.

Petitioner avows that he is entitled to attorney's fees based on the monetary awards as
stated in the Decisions of the NLRC in the Aguirre and Toquero Cases because (1) the
Deeds of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim executed by all but one of the complainants
during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP. No. 54576-77 before the Court of Appeals were
done without his conformity; (2) he, together with his assistant lawyers, had invested
substantial time and effort for more than seven or eight years and even spent
considerable amounts of personal money for the prosecution of these consolidated
cases from the Labor Arbiter up to this Court; hence, it would be grossly unfair for the
petitioner to receive only 10% of the financial assistance given to the complainants by
virtue of the Deeds of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim they signed; and (3) petitioner's
right to attorney's fees has become vested after rendering painstaking legal services to
the complainants, making him and his collaborating counsels entitled to the full amount
of attorney's fees as awarded by the NLRC.

While this Court concedes that the instant Petition for Review raises a question of law, it
denies the Petition for lack of merit and lack of petitioner's standing to file the same.

This Court has consistently ruled that a question of law exists when there is a doubt or
controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. On the other hand, there is
a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the alleged truth or
falsehood of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, it must involve no
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them.35 The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation
given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate
court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in
which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact. 36

In the case at bar, the core issue presented by the petitioner is with respect to the
amount of attorney's fees to which he should be entitled: whether he is entitled to the
amount of attorney's fees as adjudged by the NLRC in its Decisions in the Aguirre and
Toquero Cases or only to the 10% of the amounts actually paid to his clients, the
complainants who signed the Deeds of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim.

The aforesaid issue evidently involves a question of law. In determining whether the
petitioner should be entitled to the attorney's fees stated in the NLRC Decisions, this
Court does not need to go over the pieces of evidence submitted by the parties in the
proceedings below to determine their probative value. What it needs to do is ascertain
and apply the relevant law and jurisprudence on the award of attorney's fees to the
prevailing parties in labor cases.

Article 111 of the Labor Code, as amended, specifically provides:

ART. 111. ATTORNEY'S FEES. - (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the
culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount
of wages recovered.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to demand or accept, in any judicial or
administrative proceedings for the recovery of the wages, attorney's fees which exceed
ten percent of the amount of wages recovered. (Emphasis supplied.)

In PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission 37 citing Dr.
Reyes v. Court of Appeals,38 this Court enunciated that there are two commonly
accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. In its
ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by
his client for the legal services the former has rendered to the latter. The basis of this
compensation is the fact of the attorney's employment by and his agreement with the
client. In its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees are deemed indemnity for damages
ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The instances in
which these may be awarded are those enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code,
specifically paragraph 739 thereof, which pertains to actions for recovery of wages, and
is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award
shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof. 40 Article 111
of the Labor Code, as amended, contemplates the extraordinary concept of attorney's
fees.

Still according to PCL Shipping, Article 111 is an exception to the declared policy of
strict construction in the awarding of attorney's fees. Although express findings of fact
and law are still necessary to prove the merit of the award, there need not be any
showing that the employer acted maliciously or in bad faith when it withheld the wages.
In carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's provisions and implementing
regulations, the employee's welfare should be the primordial and paramount
consideration. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal
and compassionate spirit of the law as provided in Article 4 of the Labor Code, which
states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the
Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor
of labor"; and Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that "in case of doubt, all
labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and
decent living for the laborer."41

Based on the foregoing, the attorney's fees awarded by the NLRC in its Decisions in
the Aguirre and Toquero Cases pertain to the complainants, petitioner's clients, as
indemnity for damages; and not to petitioner as compensation for his legal services.
Records show that the petitioner neither alleged nor proved that his clients, the
complainants, willingly agreed that the award of attorney's fees would accrue to him as
an additional compensation or part thereof.

What the complainants explicitly agreed to in their individual Deeds of Release, Waiver,
and Quitclaim was that the 10% attorney's fees of the petitioner shall be deducted from
the amount of the gross settlement. Provision 8 of the Deeds of Release, Waiver
and Quitclaim reads:

8. x x x. As a client, I have the right to decide on the matter of whether to settle my

case and the amount of the settlement, which right I am now exercising without
prejudice to my counsel's claim to the legally mandated 10% attorney's fees. As a
matter of fact, I had requested and [herein private respondent] has complied with it,
that [private respondent] deduct from the gross settlement 10% representing
attorney's fees of [herein petitioner] and make a check payable to the latter in such
amount.42 (Emphasis supplied.)

The foregoing provision cannot be taken to mean that the complainants concerned
agreed that the attorney's fees awarded by the NLRC pertained to petitioner as
additional compensation or part thereof since (1) the Deeds were executed between
complainants and private respondent, the petitioner was not even a party to the said
documents; and (2) private complainants' request that private respondent withhold
10% attorney's fees to be payable to petitioner was in relation to the amount of gross
settlement under the Deeds and not to the amounts awarded by the NLRC. In fact,
petitioner challenges the due execution of the Deeds, and may not now take an
inconsistent position by using the provisions of the very same Deeds as proof that
complainants impliedly or expressly agreed that the attorney's fees awarded by the
NLRC pertained to him under the ordinary concept of attorney's fees.

Thus, this Court has no recourse but to interpret the award of attorney's fees by the
NLRC in its extraordinary concept. And since the attorney's fees pertained to the
complainants as indemnity for damages, it was totally within the complainants' right to
waive the amount of said attorney's fees and settle for a lesser amount thereof in
exchange for the immediate end to litigation. Petitioner cannot prevent complainants
from compromising and/or withdrawing their complaints at any stage of the
proceedings just to protect his anticipated attorney's fees.

Even assuming arguendo that the complainants in the Aguirre and Toquero Cases did

indeed agree that the attorney's fees awarded by the NLRC should be considered in
their ordinary concept, i.e., as compensation for petitioner's services, we refer back to
Article 111 of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides that the attorney's fees
should be equivalent to 10% of the amount of wages recovered. Since the complainants
decided to settle their complaints against the private respondent, the amounts actually
received by them pursuant to the Deeds of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim are the
amounts "recovered" and the proper basis for determining the 10% attorney's fees.

Petitioner cannot claim further to be a real party in interest herein for the very same
reasons already discussed above.

It is elementary that it is only in the name of a real party in interest that a civil suit
may be prosecuted.43 Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, provides:

SEC. 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

The established rule is that a real party in interest is one who would be benefited or
injured by the judgment, or one entitled to the avails of the suit. The word "interest,"
as contemplated by the Rules, means material interest or an interest in issue and to be
affected by the judgment, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved
or a mere incidental interest. Stated differently, the rule refers to a real or present
substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent,
subordinate, or consequential interest. As a general rule, one who has no right or
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an
action.44

The afore-quoted rule has two requirements: 1) to institute an action, the plaintiff must
be the real party in interest; and 2) the action must be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest. Necessarily, the purposes of this provision are 1) to prevent the
prosecution of actions by persons without any right or title to or interest in the case; 2)
to require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the
action; 3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and 4) to discourage litigation and keep it
within certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy. 45

In the case at bar, it is beyond cavil that the petitioner is not the real party in interest;
hence, he cannot file this Petition to recover the attorney's fees as adjudged by the
NLRC in its Decisions dated 21 July 1995 and 25 July 1995 in the Aguirre and Toquero
Cases, respectively. To reiterate, the award of attorney's fees pertain to the prevailing
parties in the NLRC cases, namely, the complainants, all but one of whom no longer
pursued their complaints against private respondent after executing Deeds of Release,
Waiver and Quitclaim. Not being the party to whom the NLRC awarded the attorney's
fees, neither is the petitioner the proper party to question the non-awarding of the
same by the appellate court.

In addition, as found by the Court of Appeals, when the complainants executed their
respective Deeds of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim, petitioner already received
attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the amounts paid to the complainants in
accordance with the Deeds, as evidenced by several cash vouchers and checks payable
to petitioner46 and signed by his representative.47 Even petitioner himself admitted this
fact.

This would show that petitioner has been compensated for the services he rendered the
complainants. It may do well for petitioner to remember that as a lawyer, he is a
member of an honorable profession, the primary vision of which is justice. The practice
of law is a decent profession and not a money-making trade. Compensation should be
but a mere incident.48

If petitioner earnestly believes that the amounts he already received are grossly
deficient, considering the substantial time and efforts he and his assistant lawyers
invested, as well as the personal money he expended for the prosecution of
complainants' cases for more than seven or eight years, then petitioner's remedy is not
against the private respondent, but against his own clients, the complainants. He
should file a separate action for collection of sum of money against complainants to
recover just compensation for his legal services, and not the present Petition for Review
to claim from private respondent the attorney's fees which were adjudged by the NLRC
in favor of complainants as the prevailing parties in the Aguirre and Toquero Cases. chanrobles virtual law library

Finally, as stated earlier, petitioner assails the Deeds of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim
executed by the complainants for being executed without his conformity and, thus, in
violation of the requirements of the Labor Code. Such argument is specious.

There is no specific provision in the Labor Code, as amended, which requires the
conformity of petitioner, as the complainants' counsel, to make their Deeds of Release,
Waiver and Quitclaim valid. The only requisites for the validity of any Deed of Release,
Waiver and Quitclaim are the following: (1) that there was no fraud or deceit on the
part of any of the parties; (2) that the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and
reasonable; and (3) that the contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law.49 In this case, it cannot be questioned that those requisites were completely
satisfied, making the Deeds of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim individually executed by
the complainants valid.

Moreover, both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals found the Deeds of Release, Waiver
and Quitclaim to be validly and willfully executed by the complainants. The Court of
Appeals ruled:

Further, as correctly stated by the [herein private respondent], to wit:

'The separate Deeds of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim were all executed and signed by
the private respondents concerned before the Labor Arbiter, Hon. Reynaldo Gulmatico,
who handled the case a quo and rendered the decision in favor of [complainants
therein]. As a matter of course, a Labor Arbiter asks, and even explains, to the person
executing a quitclaim before him about the contents and the implications thereof. It is
only after the Labor Arbiter has satisfied himself that the quitclaim involved was
voluntarily executed by the person concerned and that there is a substantial
consideration involved would he sign it.'

"While quitclaims executed by employees are commonly frowned upon as contrary to

public policy and are ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the employees'
legal rights, there are legitimate waivers that represent a voluntary and reasonable
settlement of laborers' claims which should be respected by the courts as the law
between the parties."50

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5581               January 14, 2014

ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Petition for Disbarment  dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose Bunagan-
1

Bansig (Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for Gross Immoral
Conduct.

In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan
(Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the
certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila.  Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie
2

R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.

However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another

marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a
certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan,
Manila. 3

Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal
existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never
been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.

Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still
subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which
renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.

In a Resolution  dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a comment
4

on the instant complaint.

Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the copy of the Court's
Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No. 30639. Thus, the Court, in a
Resolution  dated March 17, 2003, resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not
5

be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment on the complaint against
him.6

On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion  praying that respondent's failure
7

to file his comment on the complaint be deemed as a waiver to file the same, and that the case be
submitted for disposition.

On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an administrative case
was filed against him, he did not know the nature or cause thereof since other than Bansig's
Omnibus Motion, he received no other pleading or any processes of this Court. Respondent,
however, countered that Bansig's Omnibus Motion was merely a ploy to frighten him and his wife
from pursuing the criminal complaints for falsification of public documents they filed against Bansig
and her husband. He also explained that he was able to obtain a copy of the Court's Show Cause
Order only when he visited his brother who is occupying their former residence at 59-B Aguho St.,
Project 3, Quezon City. Respondent further averred that he also received a copy of Bansig's
Omnibus Motion when the same was sent to his law office address.

Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's
husband, Bansig knew his law office address, but she failed to send a copy of the complaint to him.
Respondent suspected that Bansig was trying to mislead him in order to prevent him from defending
himself. He added that Bansig has an unpaid obligation amounting to ₱2,000,000.00 to his wife
which triggered a sibling rivalry. He further claimed that he and his wife received death threats from
unknown persons; thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new residences, i.e., in Sampaloc, Manila
and Angeles City. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of the complaint and be given time to
file his answer to the complaint.

In a Resolution  dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish respondent
8

with a copy of the administrative complaint and to submit proof of such service; and (b) require
respondent to file a comment on the complaint against him.

In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of the
administrative complaint was furnished to respondent at his given address which is No. 238
Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 2167. 9

On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment despite receipt of
the complaint, the Court resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure.
10

On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation,  reiterated that he has yet to receive a copy of the
11

complaint. He claimed that Bansig probably had not complied with the Court's Order, otherwise, he
would have received the same already. He requested anew that Bansig be directed to furnish him a
copy of the complaint.

Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy of the
complaint, and required Bansig to furnish a copy of the complaint to respondent. 12

On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation,  lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly
13

undertaken by respondent in what was supposedly a simple matter of receipt of complaint. Bansig
asserted that the Court should sanction respondent for his deliberate and willful act to frustrate the
actions of the Court. She attached a copy of the complaint and submitted an Affidavit of Mailing
stating that again a copy of the complaint was mailed at respondent's residential address in Angeles
City as shown by Registry Receipt No. 3582.

On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the Resolution dated July
7, 2003 despite service of copy of the complaint by registered mail. 14

On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order dated
May 16, 2005 sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subd. under Registry Receipt
No. 55621, with notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise required Bansig to submit the correct and present
address of respondent. 15
On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated in his
correspondence with the Court No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City as
his residential address. However, all notices served upon him on said address were returned with a
note "moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that in Civil Case No. 59353, pending before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, respondent entered his appearance as
counsel with mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon
City."
16

On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16,
2005 to respondent at his new address at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon
City.
17

On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order dated May 16,
2005, for failure to file his comment on this administrative complaint as required in the Resolution
dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a FINE of ₱1,000.00
payable to the court, or a penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if said fine is not paid, and (b)
REQUIRE Atty. Celera to COMPLY with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing the comment
required thereon. 18

In a Resolution  dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to comply with the
19

Court's Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (1) DISPENSE
with the filing by respondent of his comment on the complaint; (2) ORDER the arrest of Atty. Celera;
and (3) DIRECT the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to (a) ARREST and
DETAIN Atty. Celera for non-compliance with the Resolution dated June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT
a report of compliance with the Resolution. The Court likewise resolved to REFER the complaint to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.20

However, the Return of Warrant  dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa,
21

Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that respondent cannot be located
because neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City cannot be located.
During surveillance, it appeared that the given address, i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon
City was a vacant lot with debris of a demolished building. Considering that the given address
cannot be found or located and there were no leads to determine respondent's whereabouts, the
warrant of arrest cannot be enforced.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's Resolution,
reported that as per their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View
Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.

Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several notices.
Thus, in an Order dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of the IBP-CBD,
declared respondent to be in default and the case was submitted for report and recommendation.
The Order of Default was received by respondent as evidenced by a registry return receipt.
However, respondent failed to take any action on the matter.

On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that
respondent Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law.

RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers.  The issue to be determined is whether
22

respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an
administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or
failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer
the charges against him despite numerous notices.

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence,
the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise
its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing
and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to
justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.23

In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second
marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified
xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of
Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on
May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the
second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage
issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states that respondent
Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at
the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.

Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent entered
into a second marriage while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. We note that the second
marriage apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative
that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second
marriage with Alba.

The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are
admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.

Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible in
evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second marriage while the first
marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates would already
have been sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages entered into by respondent. The
certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. For
purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent
are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit
to continue as a member of the Bar. 24

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of
the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act
of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral
conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. 25

This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondent’s defiant stance
against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring him to file
his comment on the complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of more than 10
years, the Court has issued numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but respondent
seemed to have preselected only those he will take notice of and the rest he will just ignore. The
Court has issued several resolutions directing respondent to comment on the complaint against him,
yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to have not received a copy of
the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint against him. Ironically, however,
whenever it is a show cause order, none of them have escaped respondent's attention. Even
assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached him, he cannot, however, feign
ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is pending before this Court which he could have
easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.

The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this case;
accommodating respondent's endless requests, manifestations and prayers to be given a copy of
the complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced by numerous affidavits of service, have
relentlessly tried to reach respondent for more than a decade; sending copies of the Court's
Resolutions and complaint to different locations - both office and residential addresses of
respondent. However, despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach respondent, the latter, however
conveniently offers a mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When said excuse seemed no
longer feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking, respondent’s acts were
deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the disposition of the case and to
evade the consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is respondent’s deplorable
disregard of the judicial process which this Court cannot countenance.

Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension
or disbarment. Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree
of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a
mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively." Respondent’s
obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his
character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving
of reproof."
26

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful
orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, guilty
of grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of
continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of
law and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately. 1âwphi1

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it
in the personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.

SO ORDERED.
 MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, Complainant, v. ATTY. BEDE S.
TABALINGCOS, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office or the Bar
Confidant, complainant Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bcde S.
'L1halingcos (resrondent) with unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or
Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of fees to complainant, and gross immorality
for marrying two other women while respondent s first marriage was subsisting. 1 ςrνll

In a Resolution2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court required

respondent to file a Comment, which he did on 21 March 2005. 3 The Complaint was
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the record. 4 ςrνll

On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a
Notice5 setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on 05 July 2005.
During the conference, complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel and
respondent. They submitted for resolution three issues to be resolved by the
Commission as follows: ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r† Ï…αl  lαω  lιbrαrà ¿

1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment

of fees to complainant

2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and

3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice. 6 ςrνll

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The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers.
Respondent filed his verified Position Paper,7 on 15 July 2005 while complainant
submitted his on 01 August 2005.8 ςrνll

Complainant s Accusations

Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a

financial consultant to assist the latter on technical and financial matters in the latter s
numerous petitions for corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts. Complainant
claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to P 50,000 for
every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would handle, in addition to ten
percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. He alleged that, from February to
December 2002, respondent was able to rake in millions of pesos from the corporate
rehabilitation cases they were working on together. Complainant also claimed that he
was entitled to the amount of P 900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as
a result of his work with respondent, and a total of P 4,539,000 from the fees paid by
their clients.9 Complainant appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting the
computation of the fees he believes are due him.

Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in

violation of Section 27 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent
set up two financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel
Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise his legal services and solicit
cases. Complainant supported his allegations by attaching to his Position Paper the
Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane, 10 letter-proposals to clients signed by
respondent on various dates11 and proofs of payment made to the latter by their
clients.12
ςrνll

On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing

two counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was
subsisting. He submitted a Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the
Civil Registrar General-National Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S.
Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted marriage thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with
Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in Dasmarinas, Cavite; the second time on 28
September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Piñon in the City of Manila; and the third on
07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila. 13 ςrνll

Respondent s Defense

In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that
complainant was not an employee of his law firm Tabalingcos and Associates Law
Office14 but of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., where the former is a major
stockholder.15 Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional and
incompetent in performing his job as a financial consultant, resulting in the latter s
dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they presented in their court cases. 16 Respondent
also alleged that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding the payment
of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents
showing that the salary of complainant had been paid. 17 ςrνll

As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He

contended that his law firm had an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.,
whereby the firm would handle the legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case;
and that the latter would attend to the financial aspect of the case such as the
preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court. To support this
contention, respondent attached to his Position Paper a Joint Venture Agreement dated
10 December 2005 entered into by Tabalingcos and Associates Law Offices and Jesi and
Jane Management, Inc.;18 and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena, Vice-President
for Operations of the said company. 19ςrνll

On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by

William Genesis, a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having
no probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself. 20 Respondent did
not specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with
two other women.
On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage
Contracts.21 To the said Motion, he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage
Contracts referred to in the Certification issued by the NSO. 22 The appended Marriage
Contracts matched the dates, places and names of the contracting parties indicated in
the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the three marriages entered into by
respondent. The first marriage contract submitted was a marriage that took place
between respondent and Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15 July 1980. 23 The
second marriage contract was between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Piñon, and it
took place at the Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September
1987.24 The third Marriage Contract referred to a marriage between respondent and
Mary Jane E. Paraiso, and it took place on 7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the
second and third Marriage Contracts, respondent was described as single under the
entry for civil status.

On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed
by complainant, claiming that the document was not marked during the mandatory
conference or submitted during the hearing of the case.25 Thus, respondent was
supposedly deprived of the opportunity to controvert those documents. 26 He disclosed
that criminal cases for bigamy were filed against him by the complainant before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent further informed the Commission
that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena
Piñon at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Biñan, Laguna, where it was docketed as
Civil Case No. B-3270.27 He also filed another Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at the RTC-Calamba, where it was docketed as Civil
Case No. B-3271.28 In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that
there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly
executed with Rowena Piñon and Pilar Lozano on different occasions. He prayed for
their annulment, because they were purportedly null and void.

On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a

clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007.29 While complainant manifested to the
Commission that he would not attend the hearing, 30 respondent manifested his
willingness to attend and moved for the suspension of the resolution of the
administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had filed with
the RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of the Marriage Contracts he discovered to be
bearing his name.31 ςrνll

On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original

copies of two (2) Informations filed with the RTC of Manila against respondent, entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos." 32 The first criminal case,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257125, was for bigamy for the marriage contracted
by respondent with Ma. Rowena Garcia Piñon while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was
still valid.33 The other one, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257126, charged
respondent with having committed bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary Jane
Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still subsisting. 34 Each of the
Informations recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for his provisional liberty as
accused in the criminal cases.35ςrνll

On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the same
proceeding, the Commission denied his Motion to suspend the proceedings pending the
outcome of the petitions for nullification he had filed with the RTC Laguna. Thus, the
Commission resolved that the administrative case against him be submitted for
resolution.36
ςrνll

IBP s Report and Recommendation

On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and

Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent. 37 The first charge,
for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack
of merit. The Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the proper
courts since it was only empowered to determine respondent s administrative liability.
On this matter, complainant failed to prove dishonesty on the part of respondent. 38 On
the second charge, the Commission found respondent to have violated the rule on the
solicitation of client for having advertised his legal services and unlawfully solicited
cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. It failed, though, to
point out exactly the specific provision he violated. 39
ςrνll

As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross
immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. It found that complainant was able to
prove through documentary evidence that respondent committed bigamy twice by
marrying two other women while the latter s first marriage was subsisting. 40 Due to the
gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission recommended that he be disbarred,
and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. 41 ςrνll

On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
154, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.42 On 01 August 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
arguing that the recommendation to disbar him was premature. He contends that the
Commission should have suspended the disbarment proceedings pending the resolution
of the separate cases he had filed for the annulment of the marriage contracts bearing
his name as having entered into those contracts with other women. He further contends
that the evidence proffered by complainant to establish that the latter committed
bigamy was not substantial to merit the punishment of disbarment. Thus, respondent
moved for the reconsideration of the resolution to disbar him and likewise moved to
archive the administrative proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he
separately filed with the RTC of Laguna for the annulment of Marriage Contracts. 43ςrνll

On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration
and affirmed their Resolution dated 15 April 2008 recommending respondent s
disbarment.44 ςrνll

The Court s Ruling

The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.

First Charge: ςrαlαω

Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees

While we affirm the IBP s dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not
concur with the rationale behind it.

The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the former s
share in the fees, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule
9.0245 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to
divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed
to practice law. Based on the allegations, respondent had agreed to share with
complainant the legal fees paid by clients that complainant solicited for the respondent.
Complainant, however, failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove the existence of
that agreement.

We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a

layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and
void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering
that complainant s allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly
dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.

Second Charge:

Unlawful solicitation of clients

Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal
services through various business entities. Complainant submitted documentary
evidence to prove that Jesi & Jane Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc.
were owned and used as fronts by respondent to advertise the latter s legal services
and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations and
ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to
point out the specific provision that was breached.

A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities
mentioned in the report to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services, purporting
to be specialized in corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he
violated Rule 2.0347 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the
purpose of profit.

A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation.

Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in
such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer s duties as a member of the bar.
This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the
procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak
for indirect solicitation on the lawyer s behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a
lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law. 48 ςrνll

It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a
vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure professional employment;
specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases. Annex "C" 49 of the Complaint is a
letterhead of Jesi & Jane

Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal services.
The letter clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees,
respondent would render legal services related to the former s loan obligation with a
bank. This circumvention is considered objectionable and violates the Code, because
the letter is signed by respondent as President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and
not as partner or associate of a law firm.

Rule 15.0850 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client
whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in
those occupations related to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical
considerations governing the attorney-client relationship may be operative in one and
not in the other.51 In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not clear whether
respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.

Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this
practice by respondent, we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for
violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.

Third Charge:

Bigamy

The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To
substantiate this allegation, complainant submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage
Contracts entered into by respondent with three (3) different women. The latter
objected to the introduction of these documents, claiming that they were submitted
after the administrative case had been submitted for resolution, thus giving him no
opportunity to controvert them.52 We are not persuaded by his argument.

We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the
qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the
procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:53 Ï‚rνll

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of
pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing
of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a
lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the
past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of
law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest
because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also
qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack
of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal
cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For the
court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by convincing and satisfactory proof.54 In this case, complainant submitted
NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the
latter s first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the
second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a
negative pregnant. He did not dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but
denied that he contracted those two other marriages. He submitted copies of the two
Petitions he had filed separately with the RTC of Laguna one in Biñan and the other in
Calamba to declare the second and the third Marriage Contracts null and void. 55 ςrνll

We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.

We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed
the authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the
Marriage Contracts presented by complainant to prove the former s marriages to two
other women aside from his wife. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these
Marriage Contracts bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing
evidence proving that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a
member of the bar. The documents were certified by the NSO, which is the official
repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and death of a
person. Having been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is accorded
much evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In this case,
respondent has not presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents.

According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages,
he filed civil actions to annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions
for Annulment and found that his allegations therein treated the second and the third
marriage contracts as ordinary agreements, rather than as special contracts
contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on marriage. He did not invoke any
grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its amendment by the Family
Code. Respondent s regard for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements indicates
either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance of the law
on what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code
provisions.

What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into
marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v.
Alejandro,56 we held thus:Ï‚rαlαω

We have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of
misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them
not only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their
continued membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the
misconduct was committed in the lawyer s professional capacity or in his private life.
This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and
reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private
affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in
doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment
of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The administration of justice, in which the
lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court, demands a high degree of
intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts and clients may rightly
repose confidence in him.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a

member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral
conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court.58 ςrνll

Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his
name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S.
Tabalingcos as follows: ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ

1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.

3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral

conduct.
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Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S.
Tabalingcos in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the
Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6593               February 4, 2010

MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA, Respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit1 and a supplemental affidavit2 for disbarment

against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty.
Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them
with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:

1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on June 23,
1962 at San Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes
xxx

2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely, Mat
Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna
Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;

3. x x x x

4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my daughters,
Madeleine confided to me that sometime on the later part of 1987, an unknown caller talked
with her claiming that the former is a child of my husband. I ignored it and dismissed it as a
mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told me that sometime on
August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at the Robinson’s Department Store at Ermita,
Manila together with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida
Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively x x x

5. x x x x

6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the Certificate of
Live Birth of the child, stating among others that the said child is their daughter and that Atty.
Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong
sometime on 1978.

7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida
Valencia at their residence x x x

8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed
financial support to the prejudice of our children who stopped schooling because of financial
constraints.

xxxx
That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in the same affidavit,
Atty. Romana P. Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not only mental
anguish but also besmirch reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights; x x x

In his Counter-Affidavit,3 Atty. Garrido denied Maelotisea’s charges and imputations. By way of

defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia
David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and
Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood
his "bad boy" image before she married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the
years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia
to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial
difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his
children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools;
all graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course. 4 Atty.
Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced her profession for the
past ten (10) years.

Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of the
bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December
26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer.

In her Counter-Affidavit,5 Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She
explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them
was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty.
Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido,
as they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship
with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty.
Garrido build a house for his second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper
party to this suit because of her silence; she kept silent when things were favorable and beneficial to
her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.

In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline:

First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings 6 in view of the criminal complaint
for concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity 7 (of
marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit.

Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss8 the complaints after the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City declared the marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea "an absolute nullity."
Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no
personality to file her complaints against them. The respondents also alleged that they had not
committed any immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido was already a widower, and the
acts complained of were committed before his admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline also denied this motion.9

Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the respondents,
arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six
(6) children.10 The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied this motion. 11
On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating Commissioner
San Juan) submitted her Report and Recommendation for the respondents’ disbarment. 12 The
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of Governors) approved
and adopted this recommendation with modification under Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July
30, 2004. This resolution in part states:

x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of morality
required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality.
However, the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the
complaint.

Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied
his motion under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.

Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He submits that
under the circumstances, he did not commit any gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment.
He also argues that the offenses charged have prescribed under the IBP rules.

Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain his
profession; he is already in the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an upright and
irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation.

In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-
Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition. She
recommends a modification of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand, advancing the view that
disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his acts
and tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty.
Risos-Vidal also notes that no other administrative case has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido.

THE COURT’S RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors against Atty.
Garrido, and to reject its recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.

General Considerations

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure – such as the verification of pleadings and
prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance
by the complainant – do not apply in the determination of a lawyer’s qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar.13 We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this
ruling.14 First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a
matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. 15 The admission qualifications are
also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of
qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter
of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in
a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or
her own;16 effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the
attention of the Court.
As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the
filing of the complaint is not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied
for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a member of the legal
profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were committed
before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo, 17 the
possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to
warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar
does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question
concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer. 18 Admission to
the practice only creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to
become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even after
admission to the Bar.19

Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of
the Court over the members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power to
admit applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the implementation of this constitutional authority
is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly states that a member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any
deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission
to the practice of law.

In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment
proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotisea’s affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect
of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a
witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of
withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the
Court’s examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance. We
cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the
evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for
her personal financial interest in continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. 20 Immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency.21 We make these distinctions as the
supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.22

In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an unlawful
second marriage or multiple marriages.

In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,23 the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and

subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. We ruled that the respondent’s pattern of
misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and family – institutions that this society looks up
to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-
being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate
other than disbarment awaited the wayward respondent.

In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage with his
first wife was subsisting. We held that the respondent’s act of contracting the second marriage was
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. The lack of good moral character required by the
Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to the Bar.

Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma, 25 where the respondent secretly
contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the
respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of members of the Bar. In
particular, he made a mockery of marriage – a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity.
We also declared his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality.

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido
established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not
only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.

First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and during
the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this
Court that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not
mutually exclusive.

Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already

married to Constancia.26 This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a
prohibited relationship.

Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence
of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission
of a crime.

Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages
were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and emotional implications of his
actions on the two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by his second marriage.

Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of
Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.

Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a
lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not "valid."

Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an
apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in place.

Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual
relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life
with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years.

Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the position
advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act
of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal knowledge, to escape liability for his past
actions by having his second marriage declared void after the present complaint was filed against
him.
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically,
violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyer’s oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.

He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the
Bar.27 As a lawyer, he violated his lawyer’s oath, 28 Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court,29 and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 30 all of which commonly require him
to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he
entered this second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly
admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.

He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which commands that he "shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct"; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that "[a] lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession"; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession."

As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would set a
good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law
and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives, he discredited the legal
profession and created the public impression that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be
used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In this case, he also used the law
to free him from unwanted relationships.

The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms
expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.31 Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. 32 Lawyers are at all
times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation. 33 Needless to state, those
whose conduct – both public and private – fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after
appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized. 34

Atty. Valencia

We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should be
administratively liable under the circumstances for gross immorality:

x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they got
married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions, for good moral character is required as a
condition precedent to admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction whether the misconduct
was committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. Again, the claim that his
marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve respondents from responsibility x x x
Although the second marriage of the respondent was subsequently declared null and void the fact
remains that respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of morality required of them as
members of the Bar.35

Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality. 36 To have good
moral character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that
he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the
estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is known. 37 The requirement
of good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect
the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from
themselves.38 Each purpose is as important as the other.

Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already
knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he
already had a family. As Atty. Garrido’s admitted confidante, she was under the moral duty to give
him proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years
during the subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge
that he had an outstanding second marriage. These circumstances, to our mind, support the
conclusion that she lacked good moral character; even without being a lawyer, a person possessed
of high moral values, whose confidential advice was sought by another with respect to the latter’s
family problems, would not aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person
seeking advice, thereby effectively alienating the other person’s feelings and affection from his wife
and family.

While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garrido’s marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the
fact remains that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary
decency would have required her to ward off Atty. Garrido’s advances, as he was a married man, in
fact a twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she should have said no to
Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him,
upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their
children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencia’s presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even
left his second family and six children for a third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of
immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law.1avvphi1

We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencia’s expressed belief that Atty. Garrido’s second marriage to
Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the
strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido’s
marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief.

The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the country.
Given that this marriage transpired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido’s second
marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino
tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty. Valencia’s claim that she
agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a
subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage in Hongkong 39 leads us to the opposite
conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any charge of
bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we
cannot help but note that Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of
using the surname of her "husband." Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did
not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this marriage.
Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all "sharing" her husband with another woman. This, to us,
is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencia’s perverse sense of moral values.

Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencia’s actions grossly immoral.
Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all
appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family. Her actions were also
unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on
his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two
previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencia’s conduct could not but be scandalous
and revolting to the point of shocking the community’s sense of decency; while she professed to be
the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty.
Garrido, and did not object to sharing her husband with the woman of his second marriage.

We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She
simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality.40 In Barrientos v. Daarol,41 we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of
good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to
these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the legal
profession.

Conclusion

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law
through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances
concretely show the lawyer’s lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to
withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to disbar
is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects
the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court. 42

We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of them. The
records show the parties’ pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of
mental and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them for the responsibilities and duties
imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.

While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garrido’s plea for compassion and his act of supporting his
children with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his
demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances are commendable traits of character.

In like manner, Atty. Valencia’s behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates a
basic and serious flaw in her character, which we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the
dignity of the legal profession and without placing the integrity of the administration of justice into
question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full
participant in a love triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and

(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty.
Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P. Valencia
from the Roll of Attorneys. SO ORDERED.

DOMADO DISOMIMBA SULTAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. CASAN

MACABANDING, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is an administrative complaint1 filed on May 14, 2008 before the Office of the Bar
Confidant by Domado Disomimba Sultan (complainant) against Atty. Casan
Macabanding (respondent) for allegedly having notarized a falsified affidavit.

The Facts

According to the complainant, he ran for the position of Mayor for the Municipality of
Buadipuso Buntong, Lanao del Sur in 2007. He filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
dated March 29, 2007 with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for the May 14,
2007 elections.2 cralawlawlibrary

Thereafter, an Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy for Municipal

Mayor3 (Affidavit of Withdrawal) dated April 10, 2007 was notarized and submitted by
the respondent to the COMELEC, withdrawing the complainant’s candidacy without the
latter’s knowledge or authorization.

When the complainant learned of this, he wrote a letter 4 dated April 18, 2007 and
submitted an Affidavit5 to Mamangcoday Colangcag (Colangcag), Acting Election Officer
of the COMELEC in Buadipuso Buntong, Lanao del Sur. The complainant alleged that he
neither executed the Affidavit of Withdrawal nor authorized anybody to prepare a
document to withdraw his COC. He asked that the withdrawal be ignored and that his
name be retained on the list of candidates.

On May 16, 2007, the complainant filed a petition with the COMELEC to count the votes
cast in his favor. The complainant also filed a criminal complaint on May 17, 2007 with
the Prosecutor’s Office of Marawi City against Abdulmojib Moti Mariano (Mariano) who
was another candidate for the mayoralty position, the respondent, and Colangcag for
Falsification of Public Documents.6 Information7 was thereby filed against the
respondent and Colangcag which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 5842-08 in the
Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del Sur, Marawi City.

Meanwhile, the COMELEC Second Division found merit in the complainant’s petition and
ordered the reinstatement of his name in the list of candidates for the position of mayor
in its Resolution8 dated June 12, 2007. All votes cast in favor of the complainant were
also counted. Thus, Mariano elevated the matter to the COMELEC en banc, which issued
a subpoena requiring the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to study the signature
appearing on the Affidavit of Withdrawal. Subsequently, the NBI transmitted its
Questioned Documents Report No. 428-9079 to the COMELEC en banc, stating that the
signature in the Affidavit of Withdrawal and the specimen signatures of the complainant
were not written by one and the same person.10 cralawlawlibrary
On May 14, 2008, the complainant filed the present administrative complaint against
the respondent with prayer for his disbarment. After the respondent filed his
comment11 on the complaint, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and
recommendation.12 cralawlawlibrary

The respondent countered that the instant administrative case was filed against him as
political harassment because his family supported the complainant’s opponent,
Mariano.13 He admitted that he notarized the affidavit after it was signed by the
complainant voluntarily and in the presence of witnesses and thereafter, submitted the
same to the COMELEC. However, the complainant changed his mind when Mariano, who
was the only remaining mayoralty candidate, refused to pay millions of pesos to the
complainant.14 The respondent withheld the identity of the witnesses allegedly to avoid
problems within their family.

On July 1, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and

Recommendation,15 recommending “that the respondent be suspended from the active
practice of law for six (6) months and two (2) years as notary public.” 16
cralawlawlibrary

On May 15, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIX-2011-
29717 adopting the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A” and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering respondent’s irregular notarization and submission of
complainant’s Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy to the COMELEC
without complainant’s knowledge and authorization, Atty. Casan Macabanding is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
and SUSPENDED from being commissioned as Notary Public for two (2) years. 18 chanrobleslaw

The respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 19 which the IBP Board of Governors
denied in its Resolution No. XX-2014-7620 dated March 8, 2014 for being a mere
reiteration of matters already threshed out and taken into consideration. 21 cralawlawlibrary

Issue

WHETHER THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE BASED ON

THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT.

Ruling of the Court

The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP but modify the penalty imposed.

The complainant presented the findings of the NBI which are hereunder reproduced: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

FINDINGS:
Laboratory and scientific comparative examination of the specimens submitted, under
stereoscopic microscope and magnifying lenses, with the aid of photographic
enlargements (Comparison charts), reveal that there exist fundamental, significant
differences in writing characteristics/habits between the questioned signature “DOMADO
DISOMIMBA” (written in Arabic characters/alphabet), on one hand, and the sample
specimen signatures “DOMADO DISOMIMBA” (written in Arabic characters/alphabet),
on the other hand, such as in:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

- Structural pattern of characters/elements

- Direction of strokes
- Proportion characteristics
- Other minute identifying details

CONCLUSION:
Based on the above FINDINGS, the questioned signature “DOMADO DISOMIMBA”
(written in Arabic characters/alphabet), on one hand, and the sample specimen
signatures “DOMADO DISOMIMBA” (written in Arabic characters/alphabet), on the other
hand, WERE NOT WRITTEN by one and the same person. 22 (Underscoring and emphasis
in the original)

The respondent maintained that the NBI officer who examined the complainant’s
signature is not an expert in Arabic language and thus, could not give an expert opinion
regarding a signature written in Arabic language. 23 cralawlawlibrary

On this score, the Court refers to Mayor Abdulmojib Moti Mariano v. Commission on
Elections and Domado Disomimba Sultan,24 wherein the Court resolved with finality the
dismissal of Mariano’s petition before the Court alleging that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering the complainant’s
reinstatement in the list of mayoralty candidates.

Mariano’s petition challenged the issuances of the COMELEC which were anchored on its
finding that the affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy imputed to the complainant was
forged. It was dismissed by the Court in the Resolution dated August 19, 2008. On
October 9, 2008, the complainant was then proclaimed as the duly-elected mayor of
Buadiposo Buntong, Lanao del Sur, having obtained the highest number of votes
(4,078). Mariano filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the COMELEC’s failure
to avail of the services of an Arabic expert was tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion.25 The Court denied the motion and addressed the issue raised in this wise: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Contrary to petitioner’s basic stance, a handwriting expert does not have to be a

linguist at the same time. To be credible, a handwriting expert need not be familiar
with the language used in the document subject of his examination. The nature of his
examination involves the study and comparison of strokes, the depth and
pressure points of the alleged forgery, as compared to the specimen or
original handwriting or signatures.26 (Emphasis and underscoring ours)

In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is

preponderance of evidence. In Rodica v. Lazaro,27 the Court expounded: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In Siao v. Atty. De Guzman, Jr., this Court reiterated its oft[-] repeated ruling that in
suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence,
and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove her allegations by
preponderant evidence. Elaborating on the required quantum of proof, this Court
declared thus: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a
whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is
preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and
circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence,
their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of
witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the
greater number.
x x x x28 (Citation omitted)

The complainant adduced preponderant evidence that his signature was indeed forged
in an affidavit which the respondent notarized and submitted to the COMELEC.
Consequently, the respondent should be held administratively liable for his
action. “Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed
upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no
falsehood or consent to the doing of any. The Code of Professional Responsibility
also commands him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct
and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.” 29 “It should
be noted that a notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a notary public
must discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public interest, with
accuracy and fidelity. A notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and
faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most
importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal
transactions.”30 In fact, the respondent admitted that the affidavit was notarized in his
office without the presence of the complainant. 31 cralawlawlibrary

In Carlito Ang v. Atty. James Joseph Gupana,32 the respondent therein was suspended
from the practice of law for one year; his notarial commission was revoked and he was
also disqualified from reappointment as notary public for a period of two years for
notarizing an affidavit of loss without the presence of the party acknowledging the
document.

The same sanctions were imposed against the erring lawyer in Agbulos v.
Viray,33 where the respondent therein admitted “that not only did he prepare and
notarize the subject affidavit but he likewise notarized the same without the affiant’s
personal appearance. He explained that he did so merely upon the assurance of his
client Dollente that the document was executed by complainant.” 34 cralawlawlibrary

In Isenhardt v. Real,35 the respondent therein was subjected to similar penalties when

he notarized a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) supposedly executed by the
complainant. It was proven by documentary evidence that the complainant was in
Germany at that time and therefore could not have appeared before the respondent to
have the SPA notarized.

The complainant in  Linco v. Lacebal36 filed an administrative case against the

respondent notary public for notarizing a deed of donation despite the latter’s
knowledge that the purported donor had already passed away on an earlier date. For
this reason, the respondent’s notarial commission was revoked and he was disqualified
from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years. Furthermore, he
was suspended from the practice of law for one year.

Thus, based on prevailing jurisprudence, the penalties meted out against a lawyer
commissioned as a notary public who fails to discharge his duties as such are: the
revocation of notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary
public for a period of two years, and suspension from the practice of law for one year.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Casan Macabanding is found administratively liable for misconduct

and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. Further, his notarial
commission, if any, is REVOKED and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as
Notary Public for a period of two (2) years, with a stern warning that repetition of the
same or similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED
to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable it to determine
when the revocation of his notarial commission and his disqualification from being
commissioned as notary public shall take effect.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this
Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of Atty. Casan Macabanding.

SO ORDERED. cralawred
 MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA, Complainant, v. ATTY. DANILO S.
SAMSON, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The Court has often reminded members of the bar to live up to the standards and
norms of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high
standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation.
Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private fail this scrutiny have to
be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized. 1
ςrνll

Complainant Maria Victoria B. Ventura filed on July 29, 2004 a Complaint 2  for Ï‚rνll

Disbarment or Suspension before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

Commission on Bar Discipline against respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson for "grossly
immoral conduct."

In her complaint, complainant alleged that

2. The herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA executed a Sworn Statement

dated 19 April 2002 and a Supplemental-Complaint dated 10 May 2002 stating therein
that the crime of RAPE was committed against her person sometime in December, 2001
and on 19 March 2002 when she was merely thirteen (13) years of age by herein
Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, then thirty eight (38) years old, married to
Teresita B. Samson, Filipino and resident of Barangay 5, San Francisco, Agusan Del
Sur, Philippines.

3. In his Counter-Affidavit, herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON admitted that

sexual intercourse indeed transpired between the herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA
B. VENTURA and himself.

4. After the conduct of preliminary investigation, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Agusan Del Sur, Philippines issued a RESOLUTION dated 10 June 2002 dismissing the
charge of RAPE and finding the existence of probable cause for the crime of QUALIFIED
SEDUCTION and issued the corresponding INFORMATION for QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
on 04 July 2002.

5. Thereafter, the herein Complainant filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated

26 August 2002 which was denied in the RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 of the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur.

6. The aforesaid RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 was elevated to the Department
of Justice, by way of a PETITION FOR REVIEW, and is pending resolution by the
Department of Justice.
 xxx

8. The act/s committed by the herein Respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson against the
herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA as hereinbefore stated clearly
constitute "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
of the Philippines which provides for a penalty of "DISBARMENT or SUSPENSION of an
Attorney by the SUPREME COURT."

Complainant narrated in her Sworn Statement3  that sometime in December 2001, at

ςrνll

around midnight, she was sleeping in the maids room at respondents house when
respondent entered and went on top of her. Respondent kissed her lips, sucked her
breast, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She felt pain and found
blood stain in her panty. She stated that another incident happened on March 19, 2002
at respondents poultry farm in Alegria, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. Respondent
asked her to go with him to the farm. He brought her to an old shanty where he
sexually abused her. Thereafter, respondent gave her five hundred pesos and warned
her not to tell anyone what had happened or he would kill her and her mother.

In her Supplemental-Complaint,4  complainant averred that respondent allowed her to

ςrνll

sleep in his house after her mother agreed to let her stay there while she studied at the
Agusan National High School. She further stated that on the night she was sexually
abused, she was awakened when respondent went on top of her. She struggled to free
herself and shouted, but respondent covered her mouth and nobody could hear as
nobody was in the house. Complainant also claimed that on March 19, 2002, between
5:00 p.m. to 6:00 pm, respondent forced her to ride a multi-cab. When they arrived at
his poultry farm in Alegria, respondent dragged her to a dilapidated shack. She resisted
his advances but her efforts proved futile.

Respondent alleged in his Answer5  that Ï‚rνll

2. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraph 2 of the complaint to the effect that
Maria Victoria Ventura filed a complaint against him for Rape at the Provincial
Prosecutors Office with qualification that the said complaint for Rape was dismissed.
Respondent, however, has no knowledge or information as to the truth of the allegation
that she was 13 years.

xxx

5. Respondent vehemently denies the truth of the allegations in paragraph 8 of the

complaint to the effect that the acts of respondent in having sex with complainant
constitute grossly immoral conduct. The truth is that the act of respondent in having
sex with complainant was done with mutual agreement after respondent gave money to
complainant. Respondent respectfully submits that his act of having sex with
complainant once does not constitute grossly immoral conduct.

There is no human law that punishes a person who has sex with a woman with mutual
agreement and complainant accepts compensation therefore. Having sex with
complainant once with just compensation does not amount to immoral conduct.
 xxx

6. The complaint is instigated by Corazon Ventura who was an employee at the Law
Office of respondent herein. The said Corazon Ventura entertained hatred and had a
grudge against the herein respondent who terminated her services due to
misunderstanding.

7. The filing of the Criminal Case against respondent as well as this Administrative Case
is a well orchestrated and planned act of Corazon Ventura as vengeance against
respondent as a result of her separation from the employment in the Law Office of the
respondent. This claim is supported by the Affidavit of Natividad Ruluna, the former
Office Clerk at the Law Office of respondent.

8. To show that Corazon Ventura desires to get back at respondent, she demanded
from respondent to settle with her and demanded the payment of the amount of
P2,000,000.00; otherwise she will file a case against him in Court for Rape and for
disbarment. Respondent did not come across with Corazon Ventura, the latter made
good her threats and filed the criminal case for Rape. [sic] When the case for rape did
not prosper because the Prosecutor dropped the Rape Case, Corazon Ventura sent word
to respondent that she is amenable for the amount of P400,000.00. In effect, Corazon
Ventura wanted to extort from respondent so that she can get even with him and his
wife for separating her from the employment;

9. Complainant is a woman of loose moral character. This is supported by the Affidavit

of Patronio Punayan, Jr. which is hereto attached as Annex "3". And Corazon Ventura
can afford to utilize Maria Victoria Ventura as her instrument in putting down the
respondent herein because Maria Victoria Ventura is not her biological daughter and she
knows before hand that her ward has a questionable reputation. The fact that Corazon
Ventura is not the biological mother of Maria Victoria Ventura is shown by the pre-trial
order in Criminal Case No. 5414.

xxx

Respondent has not violated any grounds mentioned in this rule. Respondent
respectfully submits that his having sex with complainant with just compensation once
does not amount to immoral conduct. For who among men will not yield to temptation
when a woman shall invite him for sex?

Attached to respondents Answer is his Counter-Affidavit 6  which he submitted to the

ςrνll

Provincial Prosecutor. He alleged therein that complainant usually stayed late at night
with her male friends when her mother was out of the house. He claimed that he heard
rumors that complainant had sexual affairs with different boys. Respondent narrated
that on March 19, 2002, he saw complainant with some of her classmates near their
rented house. Complainant told him that they wanted to go out to swim but they did
not have money. When she asked if he could spare some amount, he gave her money.
He told her in jest that he wanted to see her that afternoon and go to a place where
they could be alone, and he was surprised when she agreed. He just thought that for
complainant, sex is a common thing despite her age. At around 5:00 p.m., he fetched
complainant at her house. She casually walked towards the car and boarded it. He told
her that they will not check in a lodging house because people might recognize him.
Upon reaching his poultry farm, respondent met his farm worker and asked him if he
could use the latters hut. The farm worker agreed and they went straight to the hut.

Inside the farm workers hut, complainant did not hesitate in entering the room.
Respondent did not notice any involuntariness on her part as she undressed herself. He
asserted that they had sexual intercourse based on their mutual understanding.
Thereafter, the complainant dressed up and walked back to the multi-cab where she
waited for him. He told her not to tell anyone about what had happened, to which she
replied "natural buang kay motug-an" meaning, shes not crazy as to tell anyone. He
alleged that she accepted the money he gave because she needed to buy some things
but her mother did not give her any allowance. Respondent insisted that what
happened between them was the first and the last incident. He claimed that he was
able to confirm that complainant is no longer a virgin.

It likewise appears that the Investigating Prosecutors found that probable cause exists
for respondent to stand trial for qualified seduction. 7  The charge of rape, however, was
ςrνll

dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. An Information was filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Agusan del Sur, Branch 6, but complainant who was not satisfied with
the dismissal of the rape charge, filed a motion for reconsideration. When said motion
was denied, complainant filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice
(DOJ). However, the DOJ sustained the findings of the prosecutor.

Then, on December 14, 2006, complainant and her mother appeared before the public
prosecutor and executed their respective Affidavits of Desistance. 8  Complainant stated
ςrνll

that what happened between respondent and her in March 2002 was based on mutual
understanding. Thus, she was withdrawing the complaint she filed against respondent
before the RTC as well as the one she filed before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline. Accordingly, the criminal case against respondent was dismissed. 9 ςrνll

In its Report and Recommendation10  dated October 10, 2007, the IBP Commission on
ςrνll

Bar Discipline recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of one year
from the practice of law for immorality with the warning that repetition of the same or
similar act will merit a more severe penalty.

On November 10, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-
2007-237, to wit: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent is found guilty of
immorality, the victim is a minor, respondent and his wife was victims guardians and
for being a married man, Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for five (5) years with Stern Warning that repetition of the same or
similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. 11 ςrνll

Complainant now moves to reconsider the IBP Resolution. She argues that the penalty
imposed by the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity and depravity of the offense.
She contends that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by forcing himself to
have sexual intercourse with a young and innocent lass of 13 years of age. He also took
advantage of his moral ascendancy over complainant considering that she was then
staying at respondents residence. Moreover, there was a betrayal of the marital vow of
fidelity considering that respondent was a married man. She insists that this detestable
behavior renders respondent unfit and undeserving of the honor and privilege which his
license confers upon him.Thus, complainant prays that the penalty of disbarment be
imposed.12ςrνll

Meanwhile, respondent also filed a Motion for Reconsideration 13  of the IBP Resolution.
ςrνll

He asserts that complainant has not presented any proof of her minority. Likewise,
during the sexual encounter, complainant was not under their custody. He contends
that complainants mother even testified that her daughter stayed at respondents house
only until February 2002. He further stresses that because of his admission and
remorse, and since this is the first time he has been found administratively liable, he is
entitled to a reduction of the penalty to one year suspension from the practice of law.

The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

xxx

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

xxx

Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,14  the possession of good moral character is

ςrνll

both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the

bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of
members of the bar to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar.15  Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it
ςrνll

in the lawyers public or private activities, which tends to show said lawyer deficient in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension
or disbarment.

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a
moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community.16  Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal
ςrνll

act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed

under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of
decency.17ςrνll

From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of
respondent himself, we find that respondents act of engaging in sex with a young lass,
the daughter of his former employee, constitutes gross immoral conduct that warrants
sanction. Respondent not only admitted he had sexual intercourse with complainant but
also showed no remorse whatsoever when he asserted that he did nothing wrong
because she allegedly agreed and he even gave her money. Indeed, his act of having
carnal knowledge of a woman other than his wife manifests his disrespect for the laws
on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. Moreover, the fact that
he procured the act by enticing a very young woman with money showed his utmost
moral depravity and low regard for the dignity of the human person and the ethics of
his profession.

In Cordova v. Cordova,18  we held that the moral delinquency that affects the fitness of
ςrνll

a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a
mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.

Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant, then
a 13-year-old minor,19  who for a time was under respondents care. Whether the sexual
ςrνll

encounter between the respondent and complainant was or was not with the latters
consent is of no moment. Respondent clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral
and highly reprehensible act. Such conduct is a transgression of the standards of
morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly states that a member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for,
among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is
required to take before admission to the practice of law. It bears to stress that
membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed
by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where
circumstances concretely show the lawyers lack of the essential qualifications required
of lawyers.20 ςrνll

Likewise, it was held in Maligsa v. Cabanting 21  that a lawyer may be disbarred for any
ςrνll

misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be

wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court. Similarly, in Dumadag v. Lumaya, 22  the Court
ςrνll

pronounced: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid
standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for
remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to
practice law.

The fact that complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance during the pendency of this
case is of no moment. Complainants Affidavit of Desistance cannot have the effect of
abating the instant proceedings in view of the public service character of the practice of
law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern. A case of
suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant
as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its
undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts. A disbarment case is
not an investigation into the acts of respondent but on his conduct as an officer of the
court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. 23 ςrνll

Illicit sexual relations have been previously punished with disbarment, indefinite or
definite suspension, depending on the circumstances.24  In this case, respondents gross
ςrνll

misbehavior and unrepentant demeanor clearly shows a serious flaw in his character,
his moral indifference to sexual exploitation of a minor, and his outright defiance of
established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and
place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but
appropriate disciplinary action.25
ςrνll

The Court is mindful of the dictum that the power to disbar must be exercised with
great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.
Thus, where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end
desired, disbarment should never be decreed.26  However, in the present case, the
ςrνll

seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears
to be the most appropriate penalty.27 ςrνll

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby DISBARRED for Gross

Immoral Conduct, Violation of his oath of office, and Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the
records of respondent in the Office of the. Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the
Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and circulated to all courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately. ςrαlαωlιbrαr

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4973               March 15, 2010

SPOUSES MANUEL C. RAFOLS, JR. and LOLITA B. RAFOLS, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the
erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts
and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons
whose utter disregard of their lawyer’s oath has proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust
reposed in them as members of the bar. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

– Rivera v. Corral, A.C. No. 3548, July 4, 2002, 384 SCRA 1.

By its Board Resolution No. 1 dated March 7, 1998, the South Cotabato-Sarangani-General Santos
City (SOCSARGEN) Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) resolved to refer to the
IBP Board of Governors in Manila, for appropriate action and investigation, the purported anomaly
involving Judge Teodoro Dizon Jr. and Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr.1 Thus, on March 24, 1998, Atty.
Joeffrey L. Montefrio, the SOCSARGEN IBP Chapter President, transmitted the referral to the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA).

The matter involving Judge Dizon, Jr., which was docketed as Administrative Matter (AM) No. RTJ-
98-1426 entitled Manuel C. Rafols and Lolita C. Rafols v. Judge Teodoro Dizon, Jr., RTC, General
Santos City, Branch 37,2 was resolved in a per curiam decision promulgated on January 31,
2006,3 whereby the Court dismissed Judge Dizon, Jr. from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits,
except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government or any of its
subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies, including government-owned and government -controlled
corporations.

In the same per curiam decision, the Court reiterated its resolution of October 21, 1998 for the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) to conduct an investigation of the actuations of Atty. Barrios, Jr.
(respondent), and to render its report and recommendation.

Hence, this decision.

Antecedents

The anomaly denounced by the SOCSARGEN IBP Chapter was narrated in the joint affidavit dated
March 3, 1998 of Spouses Manuel C. Rafols, Jr. and Lolita B. Rafols (complainants), 4 whose
narrative was corroborated by the affidavit dated March 11, 1998 of Larry Sevilla; 5 the affidavit dated
March 16, 1998 of Allan Rafols;6 and the affidavit dated March 16, 1998 of Daisy Rafols, 7 all of which
were attached to the letter of the IBP Chapter President. Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa, then Deputy Clerk
of Court and Bar Confidant, referred for appropriate action a copy of the letter and affidavits to then
Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo.
In turn, then Senior Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez filed with the Court an
Administrative Matter for Agenda, recommending in relation to Atty. Barrios, Jr., as follows:

xxx

5. The Office of the Bar Confidant be FURNISHED with a copy of the letter-note and its attachments
so that it may conduct its own investigation in the matter with respect to the actuations of Atty.
Ricardo Barrios, Jr.8

xxx

In the resolution dated October 21, 1998, the Court approved the recommendations, 9 and directed
the Office of the Bar Confidant to investigate the actuations of the respondent, and to render its
report and recommendation thereon.

Proceedings of the OBC

Only the respondent appeared during the hearing before the OBC. Denying the charges against him,
he sought the dismissal of the complaint and re-affirmed the contents of his comment. Despite
notice, the complainants did not appear before the OBC. However, the complainants and the
respondent had testified during the administrative hearing involving Judge Dizon, Jr. before Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Jose Sabio Jr. as the Investigating Justice. Also testifying thereat were
the complainants’ witnesses, namely: Allan Rafols, Daisy Rafols and Larry Sevilla.

A. Evidence for the Complainants

The complainants were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6209 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
General Santos City, wherein they sought the cancellation of a deed of sale. Civil Case No. 6209
was assigned to Branch 37 of the RTC, presided by Judge Dizon, Jr. The complainants were
represented by the respondent, paying to him ₱15,000.00 as acceptance fee.

On December 22, 1997, at 9:30 a.m., the respondent visited the complainants at their residence and
informed complainant Manuel that the judge handling their case wanted to talk to him. The
respondent and Manuel thus went to the East Royal Hotel’s coffee shop where Judge Dizon, Jr. was
already waiting. The respondent introduced Manuel to the judge, who informed Manuel that their
case was pending in his sala. The judge likewise said that he would resolve the case in their favor,
assuring their success up to the Court of Appeals, if they could deliver ₱150,000.00 to him. As he
had no money at that time, Manuel told the judge that he would try to produce the amount. The
judge then stated that he would wait for the money until noon of that day. Thus, Manuel left the
coffee shop together with the respondent, who instructed Manuel to come up with the money before
noon because the judge badly needed it. The two of them went to a lending institution, accompanied
by Allan Rafols, but Manuel was told there that only ₱50,000.00 could be released the next day.
From the lending institution, they went to the complainants’ shop to look for Ditas Rafols, Allan’s
wife, who offered to withdraw ₱20,000.00 from her savings account.

On their way to the bank, Manuel, Allan and Ditas dropped off the respondent at the hotel for the
latter to assure Judge Dizon, Jr. that the money was forthcoming. Afterwards, Ditas and Manuel
withdrew ₱20,000.00 and ₱30,000.00 from their respective bank accounts, and went back to the
hotel with the cash. There, they saw the judge and his driver, who beckoned to them to go towards
the judge’s Nissan pick-up then parked along the highway in front of the hotel. Manuel alighted from
his car and approached the judge. Manuel personally handed the money to the judge, who told
Manuel after asking about the amount that it was not enough. Thereafter, Manuel entered the hotel’s
coffee shop and informed the respondent that he had already handed the money to the judge.

On December 24, 1997, at about 6:00 a.m., the respondent again visited the complainants. He was
on board the judge’s Nissan pick-up driven by the judge’s driver. The respondent relayed to the
complainants the message that the judge needed the balance of ₱100,000.00 in order to complete
the construction of his new house in time for the reception of his daughter’s wedding. However, the
complainants managed to raise only ₱80,000.00, which they delivered to the respondent on that
same day.

On January 20, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. called up the complainants’ residence and instructed their
son to request his parents to return his call, leaving his cell phone number. When Manuel returned
the call the next day, the judge instructed Manuel to see him in his office. During their meeting in his
chambers, the judge demanded the balance of ₱30,000.00. Manuel clarified to the judge that his
balance was only ₱20,000.00 due to the previous amount given being already ₱80,000.00. The
judge informed him that the amount that the respondent handed was short. Saying that he badly
needed the money, the judge insisted on ₱30,000.00, and even suggested that the complainants
should borrow in order to raise that amount.

On January 22, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. called the complainants to inquire whether the ₱30,000.00
was ready for pick up. After Manuel replied that he was ready with the amount, the judge asked him
to wait for 20 minutes. The judge and his driver later arrived on board his Nissan pick-up. Upon
instructions of the judge’s driver, the complainants followed the Nissan pick-up until somewhere
inside the Doña Soledad Estate, Espina, General Santos City. There, the judge alighted and
approached the complainants and shook their hands. At that point, Manuel handed ₱30,000.00 to
the judge. The judge then told Manuel that the RTC judge in Iloilo City before whom the perpetuation
of the testimony of Soledad Elevencionado-Provido was made should still testify as a witness during
the trial in his sala in order for the complainants to win. The judge persuaded the complainants to
give money also to that judge; otherwise, they should not blame him for the outcome of the case.

The complainants were forced to give money to the judge, because they feared that the judge would
be biased against them unless they gave in to his demands. But when they ultimately sensed that
they were being fooled about their case, they consulted Larry Sevilla, their mediamen friend, and
narrated to Sevilla all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. They agreed that the
details should be released to the media. The exposẻ was published in the Newsmaker, a local
newspaper.

Thereafter, the respondent and Judge Dizon, Jr. made several attempts to appease the
complainants by sending gifts and offering to return a portion of the money, but the complainants
declined the offers.

According to the complainants, the respondent demanded ₱25,000.00 as his expenses in securing
the testimony of Soledad Elevencionado-Provido in Iloilo City to be used as evidence in their civil
case. In addition, the respondent requested the complainants to borrow ₱60,000.00 from the bank
because he wanted to redeem his foreclosed Isuzu Elf, and because he needed to give ₱11,000.00
to his nephew who was due to leave for work abroad.

B. Evidence for the Respondent

In his verified comment dated March 22, 2006,10 the respondent confirmed that the complainants
engaged him as their counsel in Civil Case No. 6209. His version follows.
On December 22, 1997, the respondent introduced Manuel to Judge Dizon, Jr. inside the East Royal
Hotel’s coffee shop. The respondent stayed at a distance, because he did not want to hear their
conversation. Later, Manuel approached the respondent and gave him ₱2,000.00. When the
respondent asked what the money was for, Manuel replied that it was in appreciation of the former’s
introducing the latter to the judge. The respondent stated that Manuel did not mention what
transpired between the latter and the judge; and that the judge did not tell him (respondent) what
transpired in that conversation.

Two days later, the respondent again visited the complainants at their house in General Santos City
on board the judge’s Nissan pick-up driven by the judge’s driver, in order to receive the ₱80,000.00
from the complainants. The amount was being borrowed by the judge for his swimming pool. Later
on, the judge told the respondent to keep ₱30,000.00 as a token of their friendship. After Manuel
handed the ₱80,000.00, the respondent and the judge’s driver headed towards Davao City, where,
according to the judge’s instruction, they redeemed the judge’s wristwatch for ₱15,000.00 from a
pawnshop. The driver brought the remaining amount of ₱35,000.00 to the judge in his home.

On January 27, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. visited the respondent at the latter’s house to ask him to
execute an affidavit. Declining the request at first, the respondent relented only because the judge
became physically weak in his presence and was on the verge of collapsing. Nonetheless, the
respondent refused to notarize the document.

In that affidavit dated January 27, 1998,11 the respondent denied that Judge Dizon, Jr. asked money
from the complainants; and stated that he did not see the complainants handing the money to the
judge. He admitted that he was the one who had requested the judge to personally collect his unpaid
attorney’s fees from the complainants with respect to their previous and terminated case; and that
the judge did not ask money from the complainants in exchange for a favorable decision in their
case.

On January 28, 1998, the respondent returned to the complainants’ residence, but was surprised to
find complainant Lolita crying aloud. She informed him that the judge was again asking an additional
₱30,000.00 although they had given him ₱30,000.00 only the week before. She divulged that the
judge had told her that their case would surely lose because: (a) they had engaged a counsel who
was mahinang klase; (b) the judge hearing Civil Case No. 5645 in Iloilo and the woman who had
testified in Civil Case No. 6029 had not been presented; and (c) they would have to spend at least
₱10,000.00 for said judge’s accommodations in General Santos City.12

On January 31, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. went to the house of the respondent, but the latter was not
home. The judge left a note addressed to the complainants, and instructed the respondent’s
secretary to deliver the note to the complainants along with a gift (imported table clock). 13 According
to the respondent, the complainants consistently refused to accept the gift several times; it was later
stolen from his house in Cebu City.

On February 1, 1998, the respondent delivered the note and gift to the complainants, but the latter
refused to receive it, telling him that they were no longer interested to continue with the case. At the
same time, the complainants assured him that they bore no personal grudge against him, because
they had a problem only with Judge Dizon, Jr.

On February 24, 1998, the respondent went to the National Bureau of Investigation Regional Office,
Region XI, and the Philippine National Police Regional Office, Region XI, both in Davao City, to
request the investigation of the matter. 14
On March 2, 1998, the respondent paid Judge Dizon, Jr. a visit upon the latter’s request. In that
meeting, the respondent told the judge about the refusal of the complainants to accept the judge’s
gift and about their decision not to continue with the case.15

On the next day, Judge Dizon, Jr. sent a note to the respondent to inform him that the judge had
raised the amount that he had borrowed from the complainants. 16 The judge requested the
respondent to tell the complainants that he (Judge Dizon, Jr.) was going to return whatever he had
borrowed from them. However, the complainants informed the respondent that he should tell the
judge that they were no longer interested in getting back the money.

The respondent made a follow-up at the NBI and PNP Regional Offices in Davao City of his request
for assistance after Manuel mentioned to him that he (Manuel) knew of many armed men ready at
any time to help him in his problem with the judge.

Report and Recommendation of the OBC

In its Report and Recommendation dated May 15, 2008, 17 the OBC opined that the administrative
case against the respondent could not be dismissed on the ground of failure to prosecute due to the
complainants’ failure to appear in the scheduled hearing despite due notice.

Based on the facts already established and identified, as rendered in the decision dated January 21,
2006 in Manuel Rafols and Lolita B. Rafols v. Judge Teodoro A. Dizon, 18 the OBC rejected the
respondent’s denial of any knowledge of the transaction between his clients and the judge.

The OBC recommended:

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully recommended that

respondent ATTY. RICARDO BARRIOS, Jr. be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
years with a stern warning that a repetition of similar act in the future will be dealt more severely."

Ruling of the Court

We approve and adopt the report and recommendations of the OBC, which we find to be fully and
competently supported by the evidence adduced by the complainants and their witnesses, but we
impose the supreme penalty of disbarment, which we believe is the proper penalty.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which governs the disbarment and suspension of
attorneys, provides:

Section 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by the Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers constitute malpractice.
The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the shoulders of the
complainant. The Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the
complaint by clearly preponderant evidence that warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty. 19 As a
rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges made against him
until the contrary is proved. An attorney is further presumed as an officer of the Court to have
performed his duties in accordance with his oath.20

Here, the complainants successfully overcame the respondent’s presumed innocence and the
presumed regularity in the performance of his duties as an attorney of the complainants. The
evidence against him was substantial, and was not contradicted.

To begin with, the respondent’s denial of knowledge of the transaction between the complainants
and Judge Dizon, Jr. was not only implausible, but also unsubstantiated. It was the respondent
himself who had introduced the complainants to the judge. His act of introducing the complainants to
the judge strongly implied that the respondent was aware of the illegal purpose of the judge in
wanting to talk with the respondent’s clients. Thus, we unqualifiedly accept the aptness of the
following evaluation made in the OBC’s Report and Recommendation, viz:

xxx Being the Officer of the Court, he must have known that meeting litigants outside the court is
something beyond the bounds of the rule and that it can never be justified by any reason. He must
have known the purpose of Judge Dizon in requesting him to meet the complainants-litigants outside
the chamber of Judge Dizon. By his overt act in arranging the meeting between Judge Dizon and
complainants- litigants in the Coffee Shop of the East Royal Hotel, it is crystal clear that he must
have allowed himself and consented to Judge Dizon’s desire to ask money from the complainants-
litigants for a favorable decision of their case which was pending before the sala of Judge Dizon. 21

Secondly, the respondent’s insistence that he did not see the complainants’ act of handing the
money to the judge is unbelievable. In his comment, the respondent even admitted having himself
received the ₱80,000.00 from the complainants, and having kept ₱30,000.00 of that amount
pursuant to the instruction of the judge as a token of the friendship between him and the judge. 22 The
admission proved that the respondent had known all along of the illegal transaction between the
judge and the complainants, and belied his feigned lack of knowledge of the delivery of the money to
the judge.

Thirdly, his attempt to explain that the complainants had given the money to the judge as a loan, far
from softening our strong impression of the respondent’s liability, confirmed his awareness of the
gross impropriety of the transaction. Being the complainants’ attorney in the civil case being heard
before the judge, the respondent could not but know that for the judge to borrow money from his
clients was highly irregular and outrightly unethical. If he was innocent of wrongdoing, as he claimed,
he should have desisted from having any part in the transaction. Yet, he did not, which rendered his
explanation unbelievable. Compounding the unworthiness of his explanation was his admission of
having retained ₱30,000.00 of the "borrowed" money upon the judge’s instruction.

And, lastly, the OBC has pointed out that the respondent’s act of requesting the NBI Regional Office
in Davao City to investigate was an afterthought on his part. We agree with the OBC, for the
respondent obviously acted in order to anticipate the complainants’ moves against him and the
judge. To be sure, the respondent sensed that the complainants would not simply forgive and forget
the mulcting they had suffered at the hands of the judge and their own attorney from the time that
the complainants assured him that they were no longer interested to get back their money despite
their being very angry at the judge’s greed.
Overall, the respondent’ denials were worthless and unavailing in the face of the uncontradicted
evidence showing that he had not only personally arranged the meeting between Manuel and Judge
Dizon, Jr., but had also communicated to the complainants the judge’s illegal reason for the meeting.
It is axiomatic that any denial, to be accepted as a viable defense in any proceeding, must be
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. This need derives from the nature of a denial as
evidence of a negative and self-serving character, weightless in law and insufficient to overcome the
testimony of credible witnesses on affirmative matters. 23

II

The practice of law is a privilege heavily burdened with conditions. 24 The attorney is a vanguard of
our legal system, and, as such, is expected to

maintain not only legal proficiency but also a very high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and
fair dealing in order that the people’s faith and confidence in the legal system are ensured. 25 Thus,
he must conduct himself, whether in dealing with his clients or with the public at large, as to be
beyond reproach at all times.26 Any violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession
justifies the imposition on the attorney of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and
disbarment.27

Specifically, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins an attorney from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, or deceitful conduct.28 Corollary to this injunction is the rule that an attorney shall at all
times uphold the integrity and dignity of the Legal Profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.291avvphi1

The respondent did not measure up to the exacting standards of the Law Profession, which
demanded of him as an attorney the absolute abdication of any personal advantage that conflicted in
any way, directly or indirectly, with the interest of his clients. For monetary gain, he disregarded the
vow to "delay no man for money or malice" and to "conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best
of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients" that he
made when he took the Lawyer’s Oath.30 He also disobeyed the explicit command to him as an
attorney "to accept no compensation in connection with his client’s business

except from him or with his knowledge and approval." 31 He conveniently ignored that the relation
between him and his clients was highly fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and
confidential character.32

Verily, the respondent was guilty of gross misconduct, which is "improper or wrong conduct, the
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment." 33 Any gross
misconduct of an attorney in his professional or private capacity shows him unfit to manage the
affairs of others, and is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment,
because good moral character is an essential qualification for the admission of an attorney and for
the continuance of such privilege.34

The conclusion that the respondent and the disgraced Judge Dizon, Jr. were conspirators against
the former’s own clients, whom he was sworn to protect and to serve with utmost fidelity and
morality, is inevitable for the Court to make in this administrative case. And, being conspirators, they
both deserve the highest penalty. The disbarment of the respondent is in order, because such
sanction is on par with the dismissal of Judge Dizon, Jr.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is disbarred.

This decision shall be entered in the records of Atty. Barrios, Jr. as a member of the Philippine Bar.

Copies of the decision shall be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for record purposes; and to the Court Administrator, for circulation to all courts
nationwide.

SO ORDERED.
 FELIPE B. ALMAZAN, SR., Complainant, v. ATTY. MARCELO B. SUERTE-
FELIPE, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Marcelo B. Suerte-Felipe

(respondent) for malpractice as a notary public, among others.

The Facts

In a Complaint1 dated April 27, 2006, complainant Felipe B. Almazan, Sr. (complainant)

charged respondent, previously of the Public Attorney’s Office, 2 for malpractice and
gross negligence in the performance of his duty as a notary public and/or lawyer,
alleging that the latter, despite not having been registered as a notary public for the
City of Marikina, notarized the acknowledgment of the document entitled “Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Juliana P. Vda. De Nieva”3  dated “25th day of
1999” (subject document), stating that he is a “notary public for and in the City of
Marikina.”4 Said document was one of the attachments to the Amended
Complaint5 dated August 14, 2003 filed in Civil Case No. 03-849-MK entitled “Esperanza
Nieva Dela Cruz [(as represented by respondent)] v. Brita T. Llantada [(as represented
by complainant)].” To prove his claim, complainant attached a Certification 6 dated May
26, 2005 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Marikina City, certifying that per the court’s record, respondent is not a
commissioned notary public for the City of Marikina from March 30, 1994 to the date of
issuance.

In a Resolution7 dated July 5, 2006, the Court required respondent to file his

Comment8 which he eventually submitted on February 13, 2007 after proper service. In
said pleading, respondent admitted that he indeed notarized the acknowledgment of
the subject document but denied that he was not commissioned as a notary public at
that time.9 To prove his defense, he attached a Certification10 dated August 23, 2006
issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pasig City, certifying the fact of
his appointment as notary public for the City of Pasig and in the Municipalities of
Taguig, Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong for the years 1998-1999 under
Appointment No. 98.11 Further, respondent, thru the comment, incorporated his own
administrative complaint against complainant for malpractice and harassment of a
fellow lawyer in view of the filing of the instant administrative case against him. 12
cralawred

In response, complainant filed a Reply13 dated April 26, 2007 asserting that he has the
legitimate right to file the administrative complaint against respondent for his unlawful
act of notarization, which is not an act of harassment as respondent claims. He also
draws attention to the fact that the subject document was incompletely dated and yet
notarized by respondent.14 cralawred

In a Resolution15 dated July 11, 2007, the Court, inter alia, referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
Eventually, both parties appeared during the mandatory conference held on April 30,
2008.16cralawred

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In a Report and Recommendation17 dated September 22, 2008, the IBP Investigating

Commissioner found respondent guilty for violating the Notarial Law and the lawyer’s
oath, reasoning that he could not notarize the acknowledgment of the subject
document in Marikina City as it was outside the territorial limits of his jurisdiction. To
this end, the Investigating Commissioner pointed out that in the acknowledgment of the
subject document, it was categorically stated that respondent is a notary public for and
in the City of Marikina, Province of Rizal, of which he was not, hence, violating the
Notarial Law. Moreover, respondent likewise violated the lawyer’s oath, specifically its
mandate for lawyers, to obey the laws and do no falsehood. 18 cralawred

In view of the foregoing, it was thus recommended that respondent be suspended for a
period of two (2) years from the practice of law. However, since it does not appear that
he was still commissioned as a notary public, the Investigating Commissioner did not
recommend that he be disqualified as such. 19cralawred

In a Resolution20 dated October 9, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and

approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with
modification, decreasing the penalty of suspension to one (1) year, with immediate
revocation of notarial commission if presently commissioned, and disqualification from
being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years.

On reconsideration,21 the IBP Board of Governors, in a Resolution 22 dated March 8,

2014, modified the penalty stated in its previous resolution, imposing, instead, the
penalty of reprimand with warning, and disqualification from being commissioned as a
notary public for the decreased period of one (1) year.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court concurs with the findings of the IBP except as to the penalty.

As the Investigating Commissioner correctly observed, respondent, who himself

admitted that he was commissioned as notary public only in the City of Pasig and the
Municipalities of Taguig, Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong for the years 1998-1999,
could not notarize the subject document’s acknowledgment in the City of Marikina, as
said notarial act is beyond the jurisdiction of the commissioning court, i.e., the RTC of
Pasig. The territorial limitation of a notary public’s jurisdiction is crystal clear from
Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice: 23
cralawred
Sec. 11.  Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may perform
notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning
court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in
which the commissioning court is made, unless either revoked or the notary public has
resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

Said principle is equally echoed in the Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V,
Volume I of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, 24 of which Section
240, Article II states:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Sec. 240. Territorial jurisdiction. – The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall
be co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of
Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do
any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. (Emphases supplied)

For misrepresenting in the said acknowledgment that he was a notary public for and in
the City of Marikina, when it is apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not,
respondent further committed a form of falsehood which is undoubtedly anathema to
the lawyer’s oath. Perceptibly, said transgression also runs afoul of Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”

In the case of Tan Tiong Bio v. Atty. Gonzales,25 citing Nunga v. Atty. Viray,26 the Court
instructively expounded on infractions similar to that of respondent: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

While seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident, respondent’s act of

notarizing documents in a place outside of or beyond the authority granted by
his notarial commission, partakes of malpractice of law and falsification. While
perhaps not on all fours because of the slight dissimilarity in the violation involved,
what the Court said in Nunga v. Viray is very much apropos:
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a
time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be
subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without such
commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the
Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when
he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate
falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall
squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides: “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.”
It cannot be over-emphasized that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. Far from it. Notarization is invested with substantive public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Hence, the
requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public are treated with a
formality definitely more than casual.27 (Emphases supplied)

With respondent’s liability herein established, and considering further the attendant
circumstances of this case, take for instance, that he is a first time offender and that he
had already acknowledged his wrongdoings,28 the Court finds that suspension for a
period of six (6) months29 from the practice of law would suffice as a penalty. In
addition, he is disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of
one (1) year and, his notarial commission, if currently existing, is hereby revoked. 30
cralawred

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Marcelo B. Suerte-Felipe is found GUILTY of

malpractice as a notary public, and violating the lawyer’s oath as well as Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon
his receipt of this Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely. He is likewise DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of one (1) year and his notarial
commission, if currently existing, is hereby REVOKED.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondent’s personal record as attorney. Further, let copies of this
Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED. cralawlaw library

A.C. No. 8391               November 23, 2010
[Formerly CBD Case No. 06-1631]

MANUEL C. YUHICO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint1 dated January 10, 2006 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty.
Fred L. Gutierrez (Gutierrez) filed by Manuel C. Yuhico (Yuhico) for violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Complainant Yuhico alleged that he met Gutierrez at the Office of the City Prosecutor in Pasig City
on May 4, 2005. Yuhico was there to testify at the preliminary investigation of a Complaint for Estafa
against one Jose S. Chicharro, who was then being represented by Gutierrez. He claimed that they
eventually became acquainted as they frequently saw each other during the hearings of the case.

On June 24, 2005, Yuhico averred that Gutierrez phoned him and asked for a cash loan of
₱30,000.00. Gutierrez then claimed that he needed money to pay for the medical expenses of his
mother who was seriously ill. Yuhico immediately handed the money. In turn, Gutierrez promised to
pay the loan very soon, since he was expecting to collect his attorney's fees from a Japanese client.

On June 28, 2005, Gutierrez again asked Yuhico for a loan, this time in the amount of ₱60,000.00,
allegedly to pay the medical expenses of his wife who was also hospitalized. Again, Yuhico readily
issued to Atty. Gutierrez an Equitable PCI Bank check amounting to ₱60,000.00. 2 Again, Gutierrez
promised to pay his two loans totalling to ₱90,000.00 "within a short time."

On July 12, 2005, Yuhico asked Gutierrez to pay his loans. Atty. Gutierrez failed to pay. In a text
message on July 12, 2005 at 2:47 p.m., Atty. Gutierrez stated:

I really don't know how to say this as I don't want to think that I may be taking advantage of our
friendship. You see i've long expected as substantial attorney's fees since last week from my client
Ogami from japan. It's more or less more than 5m and its release is delayed due to tax and the law
on money laundering. From my estimate it wud be collected by me on or b4 august 5. N the
meantime I am quite in a financial difficulty as everyone is.

Later, Yuhico alleged that Gutierrez attempted to borrow money from him again. He said Gutierrez
claimed that his daughter needed ₱70,000.00 to pay the fees required to take the licensure
examination in the U.S. Medical Board. Gutierrez assured him that he will pay all his debts on or
before August 10, 2005. In his text message on July 12, 2005 at 3:05 p.m., Atty. Gutierrez said:

As you are aware of these past few days were really great trials 4 me. My mother died, my wife got
sick and now my bro in law died. These events led me to struggling finances. To get me going I tried
to sel my car but my buyer backed out. Now my immediate problem is the amt of 70thousand which
my daughter needs for her payment sa US medical board. I dnt want her to miss this opportunity.
Can u help me again? I will pay all my debts on or b4 Aug.10 pls. Thanks.

However, this time, Yuhico refused to lend Gutierrez any amount of money. Instead, he demanded
from Gutierrez the payment of his debts. Gutierrez then sent another text message to Yuhico on July
12, 2005 and requested him to give him another week to pay his debts. Gutierrez failed to make the
payment.

Yuhico repeatedly requested the payment of loans from Gutierrez from August to December 2005.
Gutierrez, on the other hand, for numerous times promised to pay, but always failed to do so. At one
point, Gutierrez even asked Yuhico's account number and promised to deposit his payment there,
but he never deposited the payment.

On December 5, 2005, Yuhico's counsel sent a demand letter 3 to Gutierrez to pay his debts, but to
no avail.

Thus, Yuhico filed the instant complaint against Gutierrez before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).

On January 12, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed Gutierrez to submit his Answer on the complaint against
him.4

In his Answer,5 Gutierrez claimed that Yuhico was the one who offered to lend him money in
gratitude for the assistance he extended to the latter when he was under threat by his clients. He,
however, admitted that he accepted the loan due to compelling circumstances. Gutierrez added that
he has no intention of evading his obligation to pay his debts, but he is currently in financial distress,
thus, he cannot pay his debts yet. He claimed he will pay his debts when his financial condition
improves.

On March 24, 2006, both parties were directed to appear at the mandatory conference before the
IBP-CBD. Gutierrez failed to attend on two occasions.

On June 9, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed both parties to submit their respective position papers.

Likewise, during the clarificatory hearing before the IBP-CBD, only the complainant's counsel
attended. There was no appearance on the part of Gutierrez.

In his Position Paper, Yuhico manifested that the Supreme Court, in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez,6 had
already disbarred Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross misconduct, in view of his failure to pay
his debts and his issuance of worthless checks.

Subsequently, in a Resolution dated December 11, 2008, the, IBP-CBD found Gutierrez guilty of
non-payment of just debts and ordered him to return the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos
(₱90,000.00) to Yuhico, with interest until full payment.

In view of the previous disbarment of Gutierrez, the IBP-CBD recommended to the Court that,
instead of rendering the instant case moot, Gutierrez should be disbarred anew effective upon the
expiration of the sanction pursuant to the March 26, 2004 Supreme Court Decision. The IBP-CBD
explained that while we do not have jurisprudence on the issue of double or multiple disbarment, the
American jurisprudence, however, recognizes double or multiple disbarments as well as the
minimum requirement of five (5) years for readmission to the Bar.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649, resolved to
adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve it with modification as to the
payment of the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (₱90,000.00), this time, without interest.

We sustain the findings of the IBP, but with modification as to its recommendations.

We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer
may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only
legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the
people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt
payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values
and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 7

In the instant case, there is no question as to Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of the loan he
contracted and his failure to pay the same leaves no room for interpretation. Neither can he justify
his act of non-payment of debt by his dire financial condition. Gutierrez should not have contracted
loans which are beyond his financial capacity to pay. 1avvphi1

Likewise, we cannot overlook Gutierrez's propensity of employing deceit and misrepresentations for
the purpose of obtaining debts without the intention of paying them. Records show Gutierrez's
pattern of habitually making promises of paying his debts, yet repeatedly failing to deliver. The series
of text messages he sent to Yuhico promising to pay his loans, while simultaneously giving excuses
without actually making good of his promises, is clearly reprehensible. Undoubtedly, his acts
demonstrate lack of moral character to satisfy the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as
professionals and as officers of the court.

We also note that in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez,8 the Court had already disbarred Gutierrez from the
practice of law for gross misconduct due to non-payment of just debts and issuance of bouncing
checks.

In view of the foregoing, while we agree with the findings of the IBP, we cannot, however, adopt its
recommendation to disbar Gutierrez for the second time, considering that Gutierrez had already
been previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP pointed out, we do not have double or multiple
disbarment in our laws or jurisprudence. Neither do we have a law mandating a minimum 5-year
requirement for readmission, as cited by the IBP. Thus, while Gutierrez's infraction calls for the
penalty of disbarment, we cannot disbar him anew.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649 dated December 11, 2008, of the IBP, which found
FRED L. GUTIERREZ guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT, is AFFIRMED. He is ORDERED to PAY the
amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (₱90,000.00) to the complainant immediately from receipt of this
decision with interest.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished and properly recorded in the Office of the Bar Confidant, to
be appended to the personal record of Gutierrez; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the
Office of the Court Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

This Decision shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERE

Adm. Case No. 6148               January 22, 2013

FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO, Respondent.

RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) filed by respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo
(respondent) who seeks to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.

Records show that in the Decision1 dated February 27, 2004, the Court disbarred respondent from
the practice of law for having contracted a bigamous marriage with complainant Florence Teves and
a third marriage with one Josephine Constantino while his first marriage to Helen Esparza was still
subsisting, which acts constituted gross immoral conduct in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The dispositive portion of the subject
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality and is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law. He is likewise ORDERED to show satisfactory evidence to the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and to this Court that he is supporting or has made provisions for
the regular support of his two children by complainant.

Let respondent’s name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.2

Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal for Compassion and Mercy 3 which
the Court denied with finality in the Resolution4 dated June 1, 2004. Eight years after or on June 4,
2012, respondent filed the instant Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy)5 seeking

judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. The Court initially treated the present
suit as a second motion for reconsideration and accordingly, denied it for lack of merit in the
Resolution dated September 4, 2012.6 On December 18, 2012, the same petition was endorsed to
this Court by the Office of the Vice President 7 for re-evaluation, prompting the Court to look into the
substantive merits of the case.

In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37,
Appealing for Clemency,8 the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for
judicial clemency, to wit:

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be
limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community
 with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for
the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reform.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years
ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal

acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency.9 (Citations omitted)

Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other candidate for
admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character. 10

Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds the instant petition meritorious.

Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal
profession and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children by complainant Teves
and maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown by the herein attached pictures. 11 Records
also show that after his disbarment, respondent returned to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and
devoted his time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her death in 2008. 12 In
2009, he was appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and thereafter,
assumed the position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/ Office-In-Charge in the Assessor’s
Office, which office he continues to serve to date. 13 Moreover, he is a part-time instructor at the
University of Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas College during the School Year 2011-
2012.14 Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-civic activities by helping his neighbors and
friends who are in dire need.

The following documents attest to respondent’s reformed ways: (1) Affidavit of Candida P.
Mabborang;15 (2) Affidavit of Reymar P. Ramirez;16 (3) Affidavit of Roberto D. Tallud; 17 (4)
Certification from the Municipal Local Government Office; 18 (5) Certification by the Office of the
Municipal Agriculturist/Health Officer, Social Welfare Development Officer; 19 (6) Certification from the
Election Officer of Enrile, Cagayan; 20 (7) Affidavit of Police Senior Inspector Jacinto T. Tuddao; 21 (8)
Certifications from nine (9) Barangay Chairpersons; 22 (9) Certification from the Office of the
Provincial Assessor;23 (10) Certification from the Office of the Manager, Magsaka ca Multi-Purpose
Cooperative;24 and (11) Certification of the Office of the Federation of Senior Citizens, Enrile
Chapter.25 The Office of the Municipal Treasurer also certified that respondent has no monetary
accountabilities in relation to his office26 while the Office of the Human Resource Management
Officer attested that he has no pending administrative case.27 He is not known to be involved in any
irregularity and/or accused of a crime. Even the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) attested that
he has no record on file as of May 31, 2011. 28

Furthermore, respondent’s plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Cagayan Chapter 29 and by his former and present colleagues. 30 His parish priest, Rev.
Fr. Camilo Castillejos, Jr., certified that he is faithful to and puts to actual practice the doctrines of
the Catholic Church.31 He is also observed to be a regular churchgoer.32 Records further reveal that
respondent has already settled his previous marital squabbles, 33 as in fact, no opposition to the
instant suit was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends regular support 34 to his children in
compliance with the Court’s directive in the Decision dated February 27, 2004.

The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time respondent was disbarred
and recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer product of Lemu National High School, 35 and his
fourteen (14) years of dedicated government service from 1986 to July 2000 as Legal Officer of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports; Supervising Civil Service Attorney of the Civil Service
Commission; Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer; and State Prosecutor of the Department of
Justice.36 From the attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds that respondent has
sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 5837 years of age, he still has productive years ahead of
him that could significantly contribute to the upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of
society. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers,
concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who have reformed their ways, 38 as in this
case.

Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered .reinstated to the practice of law.  He is, however,
1âwphi1

reminded that such privilege is burdened with conditions whereby adherence. to the rigid standards
of intellect, moral uprightness, and strict compliance with the rules and the law are continuing
requirements.39

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. Respondent Edmundo L.

Macarubbo is hereby ordered REINSTATED in the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9872               January 28, 2014

NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO and HILDA S. PRESBITERO, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This case originated from a complaint for disbarment, dated 26 May 2008, filed by Natividad P.
Navarro (Navarro) and Hilda S. Presbitero (Presbitero) against Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr.
(respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).

From the Report, dated 1July 2009, of the IBP-CBD, we gathered the following facts of the case:

On 4 April 2006, respondent signed a retainer agreement with Presbitero to follow up the release of
the payment for the latter’s 2.7-hectare property located in Bacolod which was the subject of a
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The agreement also
included the payment of the debts of Presbitero’s late husband to the Philippine National Bank
(PNB), the sale of the retained areas of the property, and the collection of the rentals due for the
retained areas from their occupants. It appeared that the DAR was supposed to pay ₱700,000 for
the property but it was mortgaged by Presbitero and her late husband to PNB for ₱1,200,000.
Presbitero alleged that PNB’s claim had already prescribed, and she engaged the services of
respondent to represent her in the matter. Respondent proposed the filing of a case for quieting of
title against PNB. Respondent and Presbitero agreed to an attorney’s fee of 10% of the proceeds
from the VOS or the sale of the property, with the expenses to be advanced by Presbitero but
deductible from respondent’s fees. Respondent received ₱50,000 from Presbitero, supposedly for
the expenses of the case, but nothing came out of it.

In May 2006, Presbitero’s daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo (Yulo), also engaged respondent’s
services to handle the registration of her 18.85-hectare lot located in Nasud-ong, Caradio-an,
Himamaylan, Negros. Yulo convinced her sister, Navarro, to finance the expenses for the
registration of the property. Respondent undertook to register the property in consideration of 30% of
the value of the property once it is registered. Respondent obtained ₱200,000 from Navarro for the
registration expenses. Navarro later learned that the registration decree over the property was
already issued in the name of one Teodoro Yulo. Navarro alleged that she would not have spent for
the registration of the property if respondent only apprised her of the real situation of the property.

On 25 May 2006, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro to finance his sugar
trading business. Respondent and Navarro executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and
agreed that the loan (a) shall be for a period of one year; (b) shall earn interest at the rate of 10%
per month; and (c) shall be secured by a real estate mortgage over a property located in Barangay
Alijis, Bacolod City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 304688. They also agreed that
respondent shall issue postdated checks to cover the principal amount of the loan as well as the
interest thereon. Respondent delivered the checks to Navarro, drawn against an account in
Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch, and signed them in the presence of Navarro.

In June 2006, respondent obtained an additional loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro, covered by a
second MOA with the same terms and conditions as the first MOA. Respondent sent Navarro,
through a messenger, postdated checks drawn against an account in Bank of Commerce, Bacolod
City Branch. Respondent likewise discussed with Navarro about securing a "Tolling Agreement" with
Victorias Milling Company, Inc. but no agreement was signed.

At the same time, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Presbitero covered by a third
MOA, except that the real estate mortgage was over a 263-square-meter property located in
Barangay Taculing, Bacolod City. Respondent sent Presbitero postdated checks drawn against an
account in Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch.

Presbitero was dissatisfied with the value of the 263-square-meter property mortgaged under the
third MOA, and respondent promised to execute a real estate mortgage over a 1,000-square-meter
parcel of land adjacent to the 4,000-square-meter property he mortgaged to Navarro.

However, respondent did not execute a deed for the additional security.

Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months. He was able to pay complainants a total
of ₱900,000. Thereafter, he failed to pay either the principal amount or the interest thereon. In
September 2006, the checks issued by respondent to complainants could no longer be negotiated
because the accounts against which they were drawn were already closed. When complainants
called respondent’s attention, he promised to pay the agreed interest for September and October
2006 but asked for a reduction of the interest to 7% for the succeeding months.

In November 2006, respondent withdrew as counsel for Yulo. On the other hand, Presbitero
terminated the services of respondent as counsel. Complainants then filed petitions for the judicial
foreclosure of the mortgages executed by respondent in their favor. Respondent countered that the
10% monthly interest on the loan was usurious and illegal. Complainants also filed cases for estafa
and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent.

Complainants alleged that respondent induced them to grant him loans by offering very high interest
rates. He also prepared and signed the checks which turned out to be drawn against his son’s
accounts. Complainants further alleged that respondent deceived them regarding the identity and
value of the property he mortgaged because he showed them a different property from that which he
owned. Presbitero further alleged that respondent mortgaged his 263-square-meter property to her
for ₱1,000,000 but he later sold it for only ₱150,000.

Respondent, for his defense, alleged that he was engaged in sugar and realty business and that it
was Yulo who convinced Presbitero and Navarro to extend him loans. Yulo also assured him that
Presbitero would help him with the refining of raw sugar through Victorias Milling Company, Inc.
Respondent alleged that Navarro fixed the interest rate and he agreed because he needed the
money. He alleged that their business transactions were secured by real estate mortgages and
covered by postdated checks. Respondent denied that the property he mortgaged to Presbitero was
less than the value of the loan. He also denied that he sold the property because the sale was
actually rescinded. Respondent claimed that the property he mortgaged to Navarro was valuable
and it was actually worth more than ₱8,000,000.

Respondent alleged that he was able to pay complainants when business was good but he was
unable to continue paying when the price of sugar went down and when the business with Victorias
Milling Company, Inc. did not push through because Presbitero did not help him. Respondent also
denied that he was hiding from complainants.

Respondent further alleged that it was Yulo who owed him ₱530,000 as interest due for September
to December 2005. He denied making any false representations. He claimed that complainants were
aware that he could no longer open a current account and they were the ones who proposed that his
wife and son issue the checks. Respondent further alleged that he already started with the titling of
Yulo’s lot but his services were terminated before it could be completed.

A supplemental complaint was filed charging respondent with accepting cases while under
suspension. In response, respondent alleged that he accepted Presbitero’s case in February 2006
and learned of his suspension only in May 2006.

After conducting a hearing and considering the position papers submitted by the parties, the IBP-
CBD found that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The IBP-CBD found that respondent borrowed ₱2,000,000 from Navarro and ₱1,000,000 from
Presbitero which he failed to pay in accordance with the MOAs he executed. The IBP-CBD found
that based on the documents presented by the parties, respondent did not act in good faith in
obtaining the loans. The IBP-CBD found that respondent either promised or agreed to pay the very
high interest rates of the loans although he knew them to be exorbitant in accordance with
jurisprudence. Respondent likewise failed to deny that he misled Navarro and her husband
regarding the identity of the property mortgaged to them. Respondent also mortgaged a property to
Presbitero for ₱1,000,000 but documents showed that its value was only ₱300,000. Documents also
showed that he sold that property for only ₱150,000. Respondent conspired with Yulo to secure
loans by promising her a 10% commission and later claimed that they agreed that Yulo would "ride"
on the loan by borrowing ₱300,000 from the amount he obtained from Navarro and Presbitero.
Respondent could not explain how he lost all the money he borrowed in three months except for his
claim that the price of sugar went down.

The IBP-CBD found that respondent misled Navarro and Presbitero regarding the issuance of the
postdated checks, and there was nothing in the records that would show that he informed them that
it would be his wife or son who would issue the checks. The IBP-CBD also found that respondent
had not been transparent in liquidating the money he received in connection with Presbitero’s VOS
with DAR. He was also negligent in his accounting regarding the registration of Yulo’s property which
was financed by Navarro.

The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for committing the following acts:

(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were from his own
account;

(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;

(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter lot he mortgaged to
her;

(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;

(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that it was
exorbitant; and

(6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the accounts
were already closed.
The IBP-CBD also found that respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he failed to properly account for the various funds he received from
complainants.

In addition, the IBP-CBD found that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits borrowing money from a client unless the client’s interest is fully
protected or the client is given independent advice.

On the matter of practicing law while under suspension, the IBP-CBD found that the records were
not clear whether the notice of suspension respondent received on 29 May 2006 was the report and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD or the final decision of this Court. The IBP-CBD likewise found that
there was insufficient evidence to prove that respondent mishandled his cases.

The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be meted the penalty of disbarment.

In Resolution No. XIX-2011-267 dated 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD with modification by reducing the recommended
penalty from disbarment to suspension from the practice of law for two years. The IBP Board of
Governors likewise ordered respondent to return the amount of his unpaid obligation to
complainants.

Complainants filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the penalty of disbarment be instead
imposed upon respondent.

The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The records show that respondent violated at least four provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that respondent agreed to pay a high
interest rate on the loan he obtained from her. He drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could no longer
pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA he drafted on the ground that the interest rate was
unconscionable. It was also established that respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to
Presbitero for ₱1,000,000 but he later sold the property for only ₱150,000, showing that he deceived
his client as to the real value of the mortgaged property. Respondent’s allegation that the sale was
eventually rescinded did not distract from the fact that he did not apprise Presbitero as to the real
value of the property.

Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to Navarro
belonged to his son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his name. He only claimed that
complainants knew that he could no longer open a current bank account, and that they even
suggested that his wife or son issue the checks for him. However, we are inclined to agree with the
IBP-CBD’s finding that he made complainants believe that the account belonged to him. In fact,
respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first batch of checks he issued to Navarro.
Respondent sent the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch of checks to Presbitero
through a messenger, and complainants believed that the checks belonged to accounts in
respondent’s name.
It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We have
ruled that conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyer’s professional
duties.  A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private
1

capacity.  The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
2

probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.
3

In this case, the loan agreements with Navarro were done in respondent’s private capacity. Although
Navarro financed the registration of Yulo’s lot, respondent and Navarro had no lawyer-client
relationship. However, respondent was Presbitero’s counsel at the time she granted him a loan. It
was established that respondent misled Presbitero on the value of the property he mortgaged as a
collateral for his loan from her. To appease Presbitero, respondent even made a Deed of
Undertaking that he would give her another 1,000-square-meter lot as additional collateral but he
failed to do so.

Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional
capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect to complainant
Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed respondent to draft the terms of the loan agreements.
Respondent drafted the MOAs knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later, using his
knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the same MOAs he prepared. He issued checks that
were drawn from his son’s account whose name was similar to his without informing complainants.
Further, there is nothing in the records that will show that respondent paid or undertook to pay the
loans he obtained from complainants.

Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the
duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.  We agree with
4

the IBP-CBD that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. In this case, the IBP-CBD pointed out that
respondent received various amounts from complainants but he could not account for all of them.

Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulo’s 18.85-hectare lot, claimed that respondent received
₱265,000 from her. Respondent countered that ₱105,000 was paid for real estate taxes but he could
not present any receipt to prove his claim. Respondent also claimed that he paid ₱70,000 to the
surveyor but the receipt was only for ₱15,000. Respondent claimed that he paid ₱50,000 for filing
fee, publication fee, and other expenses but again, he could not substantiate his claims with any
receipt. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, respondent had been less than diligent in accounting for the
funds he received from Navarro for the registration of Yulo’s property.

Unfortunately, the records are not clear whether respondent rendered an accounting to Yulo who
had since passed away.

As regards Presbitero, it was established during the clarificatory hearing that respondent received
₱50,000 from Presbitero. As the IBP-CBD pointed out, the records do not show how respondent
spent the funds because he was not transparent in liquidating the money he received from
Presbitero.
Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he received from his
client, Presbitero.  Indeed, his failure to return the excess money in his possession gives rise to the
1âwphi1

presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the
trust reposed in him by, the client.
5

Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client.

Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed ₱1,000,000 from his client Presbitero. At the time
he secured the loan, respondent was already the retained counsel of Presbitero.

While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated checks and real estate
mortgage, it turned out that respondent misrepresented the value of the property he mortgaged and
that the checks he issued were not drawn from his account but from that of his son. Respondent
eventually questioned the terms of the MOA that he himself prepared on the ground that the interest
rate imposed on his loan was unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued by respondent to
Presbitero were dishonored because the accounts were already closed. The interest of his client,
Presbitero, as lender in this case, was not fully protected. Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s
ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.  In his dealings with his client
6

Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his knowledge of the law as well as the trust and
confidence reposed in him by his client.

We modify the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors imposing on respondent the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for two years. Given the facts of the case, we see no reason
to deviate from the recommendation of the IBP-CBD imposing on respondent the penalty of
disbarment. Respondent failed to live up to the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair
dealing required of him as a member of the legal profession.  Instead, respondent employed his
7

knowledge and skill of the law and took advantage of his client to secure undue gains for
himself  that warrants his removal from the practice of law. Likewise, we cannot sustain the IBP
8

Board of Governors’ recommendation ordering respondent to return his unpaid obligation to

complainants, except for advances for the expenses he received from his client, Presbitero, that
were not accounted at all. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the
officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.  Our only concern is
9

the determination of respondent’s administrative liability.

10

Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file
against each other.  Nevertheless, when a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular
11

purpose involving the client-attorney relationship, he is bound to render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for that particular purpose.  If the lawyer does not use the money
12

for the intended purpose, he must immediately return the money to his client.  Respondent was
13

given an opportunity to render an accounting, and he failed. He must return the full amount of the
advances given him by Presbitero, amounting to ₱50,000.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 16,
Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court
DISBARS him from the practice of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision.
Atty. Solidum is ORDERED to return the advances he received from Hilda S. Presbitero, amounting
to ₱50,000, and to submit to the Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance with this order within
thirty days from finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the
personal records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.
EDGARDO AREOLA, Complainant, v. ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This refers to the administrative complaint 1 filed by Edgardo D. Areola (Areola) a.k.a.
Muhammad Khadafy against Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), from the
Public Attorney s Office (PAO) for violation of her attorney s oath of office, deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court, and for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In the letter-complaint dated November 13, 2006 addressed to the Honorable

Commissioners, Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), Areola stated that he was filing the complaint in behalf of his co-detainees Allan
Seronda, Aaron Arca, Joselito Mirador, Spouses Danilo Perez and Elizabeth Perez. He
alleged that on October 23, 2006, during Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the
Antipolo City Jail and called all detainees with pending cases before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 73, Antipolo City where she was assigned, to attend her
speech/lecture.2 Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her
speech:

"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging
praktikal sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na
hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang
pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong
mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si
Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon." 3

Atty. Mendoza allegedly said that as she is handling more than 100 cases, all detainees
should prepare and furnish her with their Sinumpaang Salaysay so that she may know
the facts of their cases and their defenses and also to give her the necessary payment
for their transcript of stenographic notes.4

Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in drafting their
pleadings and filing motions before the RTC Branch 73, Antipolo City, Atty. Mendoza
undermined his capability, to wit:

(1) Atty. Mendoza purportedly scolded detainee Seronda when she learned that the
latter was assisted by Areola in filing a Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Republic Act
No. 8942 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) in the latter’s criminal case for rape, which was
pending before the RTC, Branch 73, Antipolo City. She got angrier when Seronda
retorted that he allowed Areola to file the motion for him since there was nobody to
help him.

(2) Areola assisted Spouses Danilo and Elizabeth Perez in filing their Joint Motion for
Consolidation of Trial of Consolidated Offenses and Joint Motion to Plead Guilty to a
Lesser Offense. The spouses were likewise scolded for relying on the Complainant and
alleged that the respondent asked for P2,000.00 to represent them.

(3) Areola helped another co-detainee, Mirador in filing an "Ex-parte Motion to Plead
Guilty to a Lesser Offense". When Atty. Mendoza learned of it, she allegedly scolded
Mirador and discredited Areola.5

In her unverified Answer6 dated January 5, 2007, Atty. Mendoza asseverated that the
filing of the administrative complaint against her is a harassment tactic by Areola as the
latter had also filed several administrative cases against judges in the courts of Antipolo
City including the jail warden of Taytay, Rizal where Areola was previously detained.
These actuations show that Areola has a penchant for filing various charges against
anybody who does not accede to his demand.7 Atty. Mendoza contended that Areola is
not a lawyer but represented himself to his co-detainees as one. 8 She alleged that the
motions/pleadings prepared and/or filed by Areola were not proper.

After both parties failed to appear in the Mandatory Conference set by the IBP on
August 15, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner considered the non-appearance as a
waiver on their part. Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, both parties were required
to submit their respective position papers. 9

On December 29, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and
Recommendation.10 The Investigating Commissioner stated that the Complainant is
knowledgeable in the field of law. While he may be of service to his fellow detainees, he
must, however, be subservient to the skills and knowledge of a full fledged lawyer. He
however found no convincing evidence to prove that Atty. Mendoza received money
from Areola’s co-detainees as alleged. The charges against Atty. Mendoza were also
uncorroborated, viz:

There is no convincing evidence that will prove that the respondent received money
from the inmates since the charges are uncorroborated. In fact, the complainant is not
the proper party to file the instant case since he was not directly affected or injured by
the act/s being complained of. No single affidavits of the affected persons were
attached to prove the said charges. Hence, it is simply hearsay in nature. 11

Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and
their relatives to approach the judge and the fiscal "to beg and cry" so that their
motions would be granted and their cases against them would be dismissed. To the
Investigating Commissioner, this is highly unethical and improper as the act of Atty.
Mendoza degrades the image of and lessens the confidence of the public in the
judiciary.12 The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Mendoza be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months. 13

In a Notice of Resolution14 dated November 19, 2011, the Board of Governors resolved

to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.

Atty. Mendoza sought to reconsider the Resolution 15 dated November 19, 2011 but the
IBP Board of Governors denied her motion in its Resolution 16 dated May 10, 2013. The
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors was transmitted to the Court for final action
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12, Paragraph b17 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The Court’s Ruling

After a judicious examination of the records, the Court finds that the instant Complaint
against Atty. Mendoza profoundly lacks evidence to support the allegations contained
therein. All Areola has are empty assertions against Atty. Mendoza that she demanded
money from his co-detainees.

The Court agrees with the IBP that Areola is not the proper party to file the Complaint
against Atty. Mendoza. He is not even a client of Atty. Mendoza. He claims that he filed
the Complaint on behalf of his co-detainees Seronda, Arca, Mirador and Spouses Perez,
but it is apparent that no document was submitted which would show that they
authorized Areola to file a Complaint. They did not sign the Complaint he prepared. No
affidavit was even executed by the said co-detainees to substantiate the matters Areola
raised. Consequently, the Court rejects Areola’s statements, especially as regards Atty.
Mendoza’s alleged demands of money.

The Court agrees with the observations of the Investigating Commissioner that Areola
initiated this complaint when he felt insulted because Atty. Mendoza refused to
acknowledge the pleadings and motions he prepared for his co-detainees who are PAO
clients of Atty. Mendoza.18 It appears that Areola is quite knowledgeable with Philippine
laws. However, no matter how good he thinks he is, he is still not a lawyer. He is not
authorized to give legal advice and file pleadings by himself before the courts. His
familiarity with Philippine laws should be put to good use by cooperating with the PAO
instead of filing baseless complaints against lawyers and other government authorities.
It seems to the Court that Areola thinks of himself as more intelligent and better than
Atty. Mendoza, based on his criticisms against her. In his Reply 19 , he made fun of her
grammatical errors and tagged her as using carabao english20 . He also called the PAO
as "Pa-Amin Office"21 which seriously undermines the reputation of the PAO. While
Areola may have been frustrated with the way the PAO is managing the significant
number of cases it deals with, all the more should he exert efforts to utilize his
knowledge to work with the PAO instead of maligning it.

Interestingly, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the
judge and plead for compassion so that their motions would be granted. This admission
corresponds to one of Areola’s charges against Atty. Mendoza?that she told her clients "
Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso
noon." Atty. Mendoza made it appear that the judge is easily moved if a party resorts
to dramatic antics such as begging and crying in order for their cases to be dismissed.

As such, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made
irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system." Rule 15.07 states that "a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance
with the laws and the principles of fairness."
Atty. Mendoza’s improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal
system. Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external
forces or factors22 according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendoza’s careless remark is
uncalled for.

It must be remembered that a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice. To that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any
means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the
pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical. 23

In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the penalty of suspension for two (2) months
as excessive and not commensurate to Atty. Mendoza’s infraction. Disbarment and
suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be
imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing
and satisfactory proof.24 The Court notes that when Atty. Mendoza made the remark
"Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso
noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or malice. While her remark was
inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment is not disparaging and reproachful so as
to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary.

In several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual
penalties in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondent’s length
of service, the respondent’s acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feeling of
remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations,
respondent’s advanced age, among other things, have had varying significance in the
Court’s determination of the imposable penalty. 25 The Court takes note of Atty.
Mendoza’s lack of ill-motive in the present case and her being a PAO lawyer as her main
source of livelihood.26 Furthermore, the complaint filed by Areola is clearly baseless and
the only reason why this was ever given consideration was due to Atty. Mendoza’s own
admission. For these reasons, the Court deems it just to modify and reduce the penalty
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza GUILTY
of giving improper advice to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is accordingly meted out the penalty of
REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will
be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8761               February 12, 2014

WILBERTO C. TALISIC, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PRIMO R. RINEN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This is an administrative case instituted by complainant Wilberto C. Talisic (Wilberto) against Atty.
Primo R. Rinen  (Atty. Rinen), charging the latter with falsification of an Extra Judicial Partition with
1

Sale  which allowed the transfer to spouses Benjamin Durante and Eleonor Lavifia (Spouses
2

Durante) of a parcel of land formerly owned by Wilberto's mother, Aurora Corpuz (Aurora). The
property, measuring 3,817 square meters and situated in Barangay Langgas, Infanta, Quezon, was
formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-4875 under Aurora's name.  After Atty. Rinen
3

filed his comment on the complaint, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline, for investigation, report and recommendation. 4

Wilberto claimed that his mother Aurora died on May 7, 1987, leaving behind as heirs her spouse,
Celedonio Talisic, and their three children, namely: Arlene Talisic Villarazo, Wilberto and Alvin
Corpuz Talisic. It was only after his father’s death on November 2, 2000 that Wilberto and his
siblings knew of the transfer of the subject parcel via the subject deed. While Wilberto believed that
his father’s signature on the deed was authentic, his and his siblings’ supposed signatures were
merely forged. Wilberto also pointed out that even his name was erroneously indicated in the deed
as "Wilfredo".5

For his defense, Atty. Rinen denied the charge against him and explained that it was only on April 7,
1994 that he came to know of the transaction between the Spouses Durante and the Talisics, when
they approached him in his office as the then Presiding Judge of the Municipal

Trial Court, Real, Quezon, to have the subject deed prepared and notarized. His clerk of court
prepared the deed and upon its completion, ushered the parties to his office for the administration of
oath.  The deed contained his certification that at the time of the document’s execution, "no notary
6

public was available to expedite the transaction of the parties." Notarial fees paid by the parties were
also covered by a receipt issued by the Treasurer of the Municipality of Real, Quezon. 7

After due proceedings, Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III (Commissioner Abelita)
issued the Report and Recommendation  dated November 20, 2012 for the cancellation of Atty.
8

Rinen’s notarial commission and his suspension from notarial practice for a period of one year.  The9

report indicated that per Atty. Rinen’s admission, the subject deed was prepared in his office and
acknowledged before him. Although there was no evidence of forgery on his part, he was negligent
in not requiring from the parties to the deed their presentation of documents as proof of identity. Atty.
Rinen’s failure to properly satisfy his duties as a notary public was also shown by the inconsistencies
in the dates that appear on the deed, to wit: "1994 as to the execution; 1995 when notarized; [and]
entered as Series of 1992 in the notarial book x x x." 10

In the meantime, Atty. Rinen filed a motion for reconsideration  of Commissioner Abelita’s
11

recommendation. The IBP Board of Governors, nonetheless, adopted and approved on March 20,
2013, via Resolution No. XX-2013-247, the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation. 12

The Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the IBP.

"[F]aithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or
jurat is sacrosanct."  "The notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect. Notarization
13

of a private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity.  Thus, notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it
1âwphi1

engages public interest in a substantial degree x x x." 14

It must then be stressed that, "a notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a notary public
must discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and
fidelity."  Towards this end, the Court emphasized in Bautista v. Atty. Bernabe  that "[a] notary public
15 16

should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons
who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed will enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the affiant." 17

In the present case, Atty. Rinen did not deny his failure to personally verify the identity of all parties
who purportedly signed the subject document and whom, as he claimed, appeared before him on
April 7, 1994. Such failure was further shown by the fact that the pertinent details of the community
tax certificates of Wilberto and his sister, as proof of their identity, remained unspecified in the
subject deed’s acknowledgment portion. Clearly, there was a failure on the part of Atty. Rinen to
exercise the due diligence that was required of him as a notary public ex-officio. The lapses he
committed in relation to such function then justified the recommendations presented by the IBP.

The fact that Atty. Rinen was a trial court judge during the time that he administered the oath for the
subject deed did not relieve him of compliance with the same standards and obligations imposed
upon other commissioned notaries public. He also could not have simply relied on his clerk of court
to perform the responsibilities attached to his function, especially as it pertained to ensuring that the
parties to the document were then present, performing an act that was of their own free will and
deed. "Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public
interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public."  It converts
18

a private document into a public one, making it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity. Thus, "notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties."  Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public
19

instruments would be undermined. 20

WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Court REVOKES the
notarial commission which Atty. Primo R. Rinen may presently have, and DISQUALIFIES him from
being commissioned as a notary public for one year, effective immediately. He is WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe sanction. He is
DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Resolution to enable it to determine
when the revocation of his notarial commission and his disqualification from being commissioned as
notary public shall take effect.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty.
Primo R. Rinen's personal record. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 CARLITO ANG, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAMES JOSEPH GUPANA, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 139–B, Section 12(c) of the Rules of
Court assailing Resolution Nos. XVII–2005–1411 and XVIII–2008–6982 of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP Board of Governors
found respondent Atty. James Joseph Gupana administratively liable and imposed on
him the penalty of suspension for one year from the practice of law and the revocation
of his notarial commission and disqualification from reappointment as notary public for
two years.

The case stemmed from an affidavit–complaint 3 filed by complainant Carlito Ang against
respondent. Ang alleged that on May 31, 1991, he and the other heirs of the late
Candelaria Magpayo, namely Purificacion Diamante and William Magpayo, executed an
Extra–judicial Declaration of Heirs and Partition 4 involving Lot No. 2066–B–2–B which
had an area of 6,258 square meters and was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT ) No. (T–22409)–6433. He was given his share of 2,003 square meters designated
as Lot No. 2066–B–2–B–4, together with all the improvements thereon. 5 However,
when he tried to secure a TCT in his name, he found out that said TCT No. (T–22409)–
6433 had already been cancelled and in lieu thereof, new TCTs 6 had been issued in the
names of William Magpayo, Antonio Diamante, Patricia Diamante, Lolita D. Canque,
Gregorio Diamante, Jr. and Fe D. Montero.

Ang alleged that there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent had a direct
participation in the commission of forgeries and falsifications because he was the one
who prepared and notarized the Affidavit of Loss 7 and Deed of Absolute Sale8 that led to
the transfer and issuance of the new TCTs. Ang pointed out that the Deed of Absolute
Sale which was allegedly executed by Candelaria Magpayo on April 17, 1989, was
antedated and Candelaria Magpayo’s signature was forged as clearly shown by the
Certification9 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cebu. Further, the certified true copy of page 37, Book No. XII, Series of 1989 of
respondent’s Notarial Report indubitably showed that Doc. No. 181 did not refer to the
Deed of Absolute Sale, but to an affidavit. 10 As to the Affidavit of Loss, which was
allegedly executed by the late Candelaria Magpayo on April 29, 1994, it could not have
been executed by her as she died11 three years prior to the execution of the said
affidavit of loss.

Ang further alleged that on September 22, 1995, respondent made himself the
attorney–in–fact of William Magpayo, Antonio Diamante, Patricia Diamante, Lolita
Canque, Gregorio Diamante, Jr. and Fe D. Montero, and pursuant to the Special Power
of Attorney in his favor, executed a Deed of Sale 12 selling Lot No. 2066–B–2–B–4 to Lim
Kim So Mercantile Co. on October 10, 1995. Ang complained that the sale was made
even though a civil case involving the said parcel of land was pending before the RTC of
Mandaue City, Cebu.13

In his Comment,14 respondent denied any wrongdoing and argued that Ang is merely
using the present administrative complaint as a tool to force the defendants in a
pending civil case and their counsel, herein respondent, to accede to his wishes.
Respondent averred that Ang had filed Civil Case No. Man–2202 before Branch 55 of
the Mandaue City RTC. He anchored his claim on the Extra–judicial Declaration of Heirs
and Partition and sought to annul the deed of sale and prayed for reconveyance of the
subject parcel of land. During the pre–trial conference in Civil Case No. Man–2202, Ang
admitted that he is not an heir of the late Candelaria Magpayo but insisted on his claim
for a share of the lot because he is allegedly the son of the late Isaias Ang, the
common–law husband of Candelaria Magpayo. Because of his admission, the notice
of lis pendens annotated in the four certificates of title of the land in question were
ordered cancelled and the land effectively became available for disposition. Ang sought
reconsideration of the order, but a compromise was reached that only one TCT (TCT
No. 34266) will be annotated with a notice of lis pendens. Respondent surmised that
these developments in Civil Case No. Man–2202 meant that Ang would lose his case so
Ang resorted to the filing of the present administrative complaint. Thus, respondent
prayed for the dismissal of the case for being devoid of any factual or legal basis, or in
the alternative, holding resolution of the instant case in abeyance pending resolution of
Civil Case No. Man–2202 allegedly because the issues in the present administrative
case are similar to the issues or subject matters involved in said civil case.

Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,

to whom the case was referred for investigation, report and recommendation,
submitted her Report and Recommendation15 finding respondent administratively liable.
She recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three
months. She held that respondent committed an unethical act when he allowed himself
to be an instrument in the disposal of the subject property through a deed of sale
executed between him as attorney–in–fact of his client and Lim Kim So Mercantile Co.
despite his knowledge that said property is the subject of a pending litigation before the
RTC of Mandaue City, Cebu. The Investigating Commissioner additionally found that
respondent “delegated the notarial functions to the clerical staff of their office before
being brought to him for his signature.” This, according to the commissioner, “must
have been the reason for the forged signatures of the parties in the questioned
document…as well as the erroneous entry in his notarial register….” 16 Nonetheless, the
Investigating Commissioner merely reminded respondent to be more cautious in the
performance of his duties as regards his infraction of his notarial duties. She held,
Respondent should have been more cautious in his duty as notary public which requires
that the party subscribing to the authenticity of the document should personally appear
and sign the same before respondent’s actual presence. As such notary public
respondent should not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the bar in accordance with Rule
9.0117 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 18
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On November 12, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVII–
2005–141,19 adopting the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but modifying the
recommended penalty. Instead of suspension for three months, the Board
recommended the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year and
revocation of respondent’s notarial commission and disqualification from reappointment
as notary public for two years.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, 20 arguing that it was neither illegal nor
unethical for a lawyer to accept appointment as attorney–in–fact of a client to sell a
property involved in a pending litigation and to act as such. He further contended that
granting that his act was unethical, the modified penalty was evidently too harsh and
extremely excessive considering that the act complained of was not unlawful and done
without malice.

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XVIII–
2008–69821 denying respondent’s motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution
No. XVII–2005–141. Hence, this petition for review.

Respondent reiterates that being commissioned by his own clients to sell a portion of a
parcel of land, part of which is involved in litigation, is not per se illegal or unethical.
According to him, his clients got his help to sell part of the land and because they were
residing in different provinces, they executed a Special Power of Attorney in his favor. 22

We affirm the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding respondent

administratively liable.

After reviewing the records of the case, the Court finds that respondent did not act
unethically when he sold the property in dispute as the sellers’ attorney–in–fact
because there was no more notice of lis pendens annotated on the particular lot sold.
Likewise, the Court finds no sufficient evidence to show that the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Candelaria Magpayo on April 17, 1989 was antedated.

However, the Court finds respondent administratively liable for violation of his notarial
duties when he failed to require the personal presence of Candelaria Magpayo when he
notarized the Affidavit of Loss which Candelaria allegedly executed on April 29, 1994.
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law, explicitly
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sec. 1. x x x

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents
in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or
document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made
under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate
shall so state.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the party acknowledging must appear before the
notary public or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments
or documents.23 In the case at bar, the jurat of the Affidavit of Loss stated that
Candelaria subscribed to the affidavit before respondent on April 29, 1994, at Mandaue
City. Candelaria, however, was already dead since March 26, 1991. Hence, it is clear
that the jurat was made in violation of the notarial law. Indeed, respondent averred in
his position paper before the IBP that he did not in fact know Candelaria personally
before, during and after the notarization24 thus admitting that Candelaria was not
present when he notarized the documents.

Time and again, we have held that notarization of a document is not an empty act or
routine.25 Thus, in Bernardo v. Atty. Ramos,26 the Court emphasized the significance of
the act of notarization, to wit: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized.

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making
that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.

For this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in
the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity
of this form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence a notary public should not
notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and
truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the
notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and
to ascertain that the document is the party’s free act and deed.
A notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge
his powers and duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and
fidelity.27 It devolves upon respondent to act with due care and diligence in stamping
fiat on the questioned documents. Respondent’s failure to perform his duty as a notary
public resulted in undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the
function of notarization. Hence, he should be liable for his infraction, not only as a
notary public but also as a lawyer.

As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the

sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy
impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal
solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such
responsibility is incumbent upon respondent and failing therein, he must now accept the
commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. 28 As the Court has held
in Flores v. Chua,29
Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his
shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood
or consent to the doing of any. The Code of Professional Responsibility also
commands him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and
to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession…. (Emphasis
supplied.)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Respondent likewise violated Rule 9.01, Canon 9, of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified
person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member
of the Bar in good standing.” Respondent averred in his position paper that it had been
his consistent practice to course through clerical staff documents to be notarized. Upon
referral, said clerical staff investigates whether the documents are complete as to the
fundamental requirements and inquires as to the identity of the individual signatories
thereto. If everything is in order, they ask the parties to sign the documents and
forward them to him and he again inquires about the identities of the parties before
affixing his notarial signature.30 It is also his clerical staff who records entries in his
notarial report. As aforesaid, respondent is mandated to observe with utmost care the
basic requirements in the performance of his duties as a notary and to ascertain that
the persons who signed the documents are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein. In merely relying on his clerical staff to determine the completeness of
documents brought to him for notarization, limiting his participation in the notarization
process to simply inquiring about the identities of the persons appearing before him,
and in notarizing an affidavit executed by a dead person, respondent is liable for
misconduct. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, the revocation of his
notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a
period of two years and suspension from the practice of law for one year are in order. 31

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. James Joseph Gupana is found administratively liable

for misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year. Further, his
notarial commission, if any, is REVOKED and he is disqualified from reappointment as
Notary Public for a period of two years, with a stern warning that repetition of the same
or similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this
Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842               February 24, 2014
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2491-MTJ]

REX M. TUPAL, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO, Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City,
Negros Occidental, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Municipal trial court judges cannot notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they
will solemnize.

Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint against Judge Remegio V.
Rojo for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law. 1

Judge Remegio V. Rojo presides Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental. Judge Rojo allegedly solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. He
instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation  and issued them to the contracting parties.  He notarized
2 3

these affidavits on the day of the parties’ marriage.  These "package marriages" are allegedly
4

common in Bacolod City. 5

Rex annexed to his complaint-affidavit nine affidavits of cohabitation all notarized by Judge Rojo. All
affidavits were notarized on the day of the contracting parties’ marriages.  The affidavits contained
6

the following jurat:

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this [date] at Bacolod City, Philippines.

(sgd.)
HON. REMEGIO V. ROJO
Judge 7

For notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized, Judge Rojo
allegedly violated Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990.  Circular No. 1-90 allows municipal trial
8

court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected with their
official functions and duties. Rex argues that affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a
judge’s official functions and duties as solemnizing officer.  Thus, Judge Rojo cannot notarize ex
9

officio affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized.

Also, according to Rex, Judge Rojo allegedly violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Judge
Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without affixing his judicial seal on the affidavits. He also did
not require the parties to present their competent pieces of evidence of identity as required by law.

These omissions allegedly constituted gross ignorance of the law as notarial rules "[are] x x x simple
and elementary to ignore." 10

Judge Rojo commented on the complaint.  He argued that Rex was only harassing him. Rex is the
11

father of Frialyn Tupal. Frialyn has a pending perjury case in Branch 5 for allegedly making false
statements in her affidavit of cohabitation. Rex only filed a complaint against Judge Rojo to delay
Frialyn’s case.12

Judge Rojo did not deny notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation. He argued that notarizing affidavits
of cohabitation was connected with his official functions and duties as a judge.  The Guidelines on
13

the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary  does not prohibit judges from
14

notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize.  Thus, Judge
15

Rojo did not violate Circular No. 1-90.

Judge Rojo also argued that he did not violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He is a judge,
not a notary public. Thus, he was not required to affix a notarial seal on the affidavits he notarized. 16

Also, Judge Rojo argued that he need not notarize the affidavits with the parties presenting their
competent pieces of evidence of identity. Since he interviewed the parties as to the contents of their
affidavits, he personally knew them to be the same persons who executed the affidavit.  The parties’
17

identities are "unquestionable."18

Judge Rojo alleged that other judges in Bacolod City and Talisay City also notarized affidavits of
cohabitation of parties whose marriage they solemnized.  He pleaded "not to make him [complainant
19

Tupal’s] doormat, punching bag and chopping block"  since other judges also notarized affidavits of
20

cohabitation.

In its report dated July 30, 2013, the Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge Rojo violated
Circular No. 1-90. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge Rojo be fined
₱9,000.00 and sternly warned that repeating the same offense will be dealt with more severely.

The Office of the Court Administrator ruled that affidavits of cohabitation are documents not
connected with municipal trial court judges’ official functions and duties. Under the Guidelines on the
Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary,  a judge’s duty is to personally examine
21

the allegations in the affidavit of cohabitation before performing the marriage ceremony.  Nothing in
22

the Guidelines authorizes judges to notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they
will solemnize.

Since Judge Rojo notarized without authority nine affidavits of cohabitation, the Office of the Court
Administrator recommended a fine of ₱1,000.00 per affidavit of cohabitation notarized. 23

The issue is whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross
ignorance of the law.

This court finds Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross
ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as notaries public. However, they
may do so only in their ex officio capacities. They may notarize documents, contracts, and other
conveyances only in the exercise of their official functions and duties. Circular No. 1-90 dated
February 26, 1990 provides:

Municipal trial court (MTC) and municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judges are empowered to
perform the function of notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as
amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised
Administrative Code. But the Court hereby lays down the following qualifications on the scope of this
power:

MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the notarization of documents
connected only with the exercise of their official functions and duties x x x. They may not, as notaries
public ex officio, undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts
and other acts of conveyances which bear no direct relation to the performance of their functions as
judges. The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their extra-judicial
activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties, but also prohibits them from
engaging in the private practice of law (Canon 5 and Rule 5.07).

They may also act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their
courts’ territorial jurisdiction. They must certify as to the lack of lawyers or notaries public when
notarizing documents ex officio:

However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still municipalities which have
neither lawyers nor notaries public, rules that MTC and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities or
circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in the capacity as notaries public ex officio, perform
any act within the competency of a regular notary public, provided that: (1) all notarial fees charged
be for the account of the Government and turned over to the municipal treasurer (Lapena, Jr. vs.
Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and, (2) certification be made in
the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or
circuit.
24

Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not connected with the
exercise of his official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits of
cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public were lacking in his court’s territorial
jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.

Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally interview the contracting
parties and examine the requirements they submitted.  The parties must have complied with all the
25

essential and formal requisites of marriage. Among these formal requisites is a marriage license. 26

A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have all the qualifications and
none of the legal disqualifications to contract marriage.  Before performing the marriage ceremony,
27

the judge must personally examine the marriage license presented. 28

If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years and have no
legal impediment to marry, they are exempt from the marriage license requirement.  Instead, the
29

parties must present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths.  The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally examine the affidavit of
30

cohabitation as to the parties having lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
the absence of any legal impediment to marry each other.  The judge must also execute a sworn
31

statement that he personally ascertained the parties’ qualifications to marry and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.  Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:
32

Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
Section 5 of the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary also
provides:

Sec. 5. Other duties of solemnizing officer before the solemnization of the marriage in legal
ratification of cohabitation. — In the case of a marriage effecting legal ratification of cohabitation, the
solemnizing officer shall (a) personally interview the contracting parties to determine their
qualifications to marry; (b) personally examine the affidavit of the contracting parties as to the fact of
having lived together as husband and wife for at least five [5] years and the absence of any legal
impediments to marry each other; and (c) execute a sworn statement showing compliance with (a)
and (b) and that the solemnizing officer found no legal impediment to the marriage.

Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary,
the person who notarizes the contracting parties’ affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the judge who
will solemnize the parties’ marriage.

As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine
whether the parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal impediment to
marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties’ affidavit of cohabitation.

Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with the judge’s official function and
duty to solemnize marriages. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to
examine the parties’ requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of
cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the affidavit’s statements before performing
the marriage ceremony. Should there be any irregularity or false statements in the affidavit of
cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to admit that he solemnized the marriage despite
the irregularity or false allegation.

Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they will
solemnize. Affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with their official function and
duty to solemnize marriages.

Judge Rojo admitted that he notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties "on the same day [he
solemnized their marriages]."  He notarized documents not connected with his official function and
33

duty to solemnize marriages. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.

Judge Rojo argued that the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
Judiciary does not expressly prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation. Thus, he
cannot be prohibited from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation.

To accept Judge Rojo’s argument will render the solemnizing officer’s duties to examine the affidavit
of cohabitation and to issue a sworn statement that the requirements have been complied with
redundant. As discussed, a judge cannot objectively examine a document he himself notarized.
Article 34 of the Family Code and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members
of the Judiciary assume that "the person authorized by law to administer oaths" who notarizes the
affidavit of cohabitation and the "solemnizing officer" who performs the marriage ceremony are two
different persons.

Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90 only prohibits municipal trial court judges from notarizing
"private documents x x x [bearing] no direct relation to the performance of their functions as
judges."  Since a marriage license is a public document, its "counterpart," the affidavit of
34

cohabitation, is also a public document. Thus, when he notarizes an affidavit of cohabitation, he

notarizes a public document. He did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
An affidavit of cohabitation remains a private document until notarized. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document, "[rendering the document] admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity."  The affidavit of cohabitation, even if it serves a "public purpose,"
35

remains a private document until notarized.

Thus, when Judge Rojo notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he notarized nine private documents.
As discussed, affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a judge’s official duty to solemnize
marriages. Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.

Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90’s purpose is to "eliminate competition between judges and
private lawyers in transacting legal conveyancing business."  He cited Borre v. Judge Moya  where
36 37

this court found City Judge Arcilla guilty of violating Circular No. 1-90 for notarizing a deed of sale.
Judge Rojo argued that when he notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he did "not compete with
private law practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal conveyancing business."  Thus, he
38

did not violate Circular No. 1-90.

In Borre, Judge Arcilla notarized a deed of sale. This is the context in which this court stated that
"[judges] should not compete with private [lawyers] or regular notaries in transacting legal
conveyancing business." 39

At any rate, Circular No. 1-90’s purpose is not limited to documents used to transact "legal
conveyancing business." So long as a judge notarizes a document not connected with his official
functions and duties, he violates Circular No. 1-90.

Thus, in Mayor Quiñones v. Judge Lopez, Jr.,  this court fined Judge Lopez for notarizing a
40

certificate of candidacy. In Ellert v. Judge Galapon, Jr.,  this court fined Judge Galapon for notarizing
41

the verification page of an answer filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.
The documents involved in these cases were not used to transact "legal conveyancing business."
Nevertheless, this court found Judge Lopez and Judge Galapon guilty of violating Circular No. 1-90.

Since Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were not connected with his official
function and duty to solemnize marriages, he violated Circular No. 1-90.

Also, Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public
are lacking in Bacolod City. Failure to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in the
municipality or circuit of the judge’s court constitutes violation of Circular No. 1-90.42

That other judges have notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriages they
solemnized does not make the practice legal. Violations of laws are not excused by practice to the
contrary.43

All told, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.

Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if the
signatory is not personally known to him. Otherwise, the notary public must require the signatory to
present a competent evidence of identity:

SEC. 2. Prohibitions. – x x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document -

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

A competent evidence of identity guarantees that the person appearing before the notary public is
the signatory to the instrument or document to be notarized. If the notary public does not personally
know the signatory, he must require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity.

In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo notarized, he only stated that the parties
subscribed and swore to their affidavits before him. Judge Rojo did not state that the parties were
personally known to him or that the parties presented their competent pieces of evidence of identity.
Thus, Judge Rojo violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

Judge Rojo argued that he personally knew the parties to the affidavits of cohabitation. They
personally appeared before him to subscribe to their affidavits of cohabitation. He also interviewed
them on their qualifications to contract marriage. Thus, the parties to the affidavit of cohabitation
need not present their competent pieces of evidence of identity. 44

That the parties appeared before Judge Rojo and that he interviewed them do not make the parties
personally known to him. The parties are supposed to appear in person to subscribe to their
affidavits. To personally know the parties, the notary public must at least be acquainted with
them.  Interviewing the contracting parties does not make the parties personally known to the notary
45

public.

For violating Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice nine times, Judge Rojo is
guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Judge Rojo argued that he notarized the affidavits of cohabitation in good faith. He cited Santos v.
Judge How  where this court held that "[g]ood faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
46

improper considerations x x x"  were defenses against gross ignorance of the law charges. His good
47

faith in notarizing affidavits of cohabitation should not hold him administratively liable.

However, this court also held in Santos that "good faith in situations of fallible discretion [inheres]
only within the parameters of tolerable judgment x x x."  Good faith "does not apply where the issues
48

are so simple and the applicable legal principles evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins
of error." 49

Circular No. 1-90 requires judges to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their courts’
territorial jurisdiction before notarizing documents. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires
notaries public to personally know the signatory to the document they will notarize or require the
signatory to present a competent evidence of identity. These are basic legal principles and
procedure Judge Rojo violated. Failure to comply with these basic requirements nine times is not
good faith.

Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct on integrity,  "[j]udges shall ensure that not only is their
50

conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer."  If 51
the law involved is basic, ignorance constitutes "lack of integrity."  Violating basic legal principles
52

and procedure nine times is gross ignorance of the law.

This court may impose the following sanctions for gross ignorance of the law or procedure, it being a
serious charge: 53

a. dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-
owned or controlled corporations; 54

b. suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months;  or
55

c. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00. 56

This court does not condone violations of law. Judges have been dismissed from the service for
gross ignorance of the law. However, Judge Rojo may have been misled by other judges’ practice of
notarizing affidavits of cohabitation in Bacolod City and Talisay City. Thus, this court finds
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for six (6) months sufficient sanction.

Trial court judges are advised to strictly comply with the requirements of the law.  They should act
1âwphi1

with caution with respect to affidavits of cohabitation. Similar breach of the ethical requirements as in
this case will be dealt with strictly.

WHEREFORE, Judge Remegio V. Rojo, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental is SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE without salary and other
benefits for SIX (6) MONTHS. His suspension is effective upon service on him of a copy of this
resolution.

SERVE copies of this resolution to all municipal trial courts in Bacolod City and Talisay City.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10164               March 10, 2014

STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

On August 9, 2002, complainant spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet (complainants) filed a
complaint against respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren (Atty. Guaren) before the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CED), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the services of Atty. Guaren for the titling
of a residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres; that Atty. Guaren asked for a fee of Ten
Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) including expenses relative to its proceeding; that it was agreed that
full payment of the fee shall be made after the delivery of the title; that Atty. Guaren asked for an
advance fee of One Thousand Pesos (Pl,000.00) which they gave; that Atty. Guaren took all the
pertinent documents relative to the titling of their lot-certified true copy of the tax declaration, original
copy of the deed of exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan, and original copy of the
waiver; that on March 10, 1997, Atty. Guaren asked for additional payment of Six Thousand Pesos
(₱6,000.00) which they dutifully gave; that from 1997 to 2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren
about the case and each time he would say that the titling was in progress; that they became
bothered by the slow progress of the case so they demanded the return of the money they paid; and
that respondent agreed to return the same provided that the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(₱5,000.00) be deducted to answer for his professional fees.

Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship between
them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in a case pending before the
Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).

Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged complainants an acceptance fee of ₱10,000.00, but
denied that the amount was inclusive of expenses for the titling of the lot. He claimed, however, that
he received the payment of ₱1,000.00 and ₱6,000.00; that their agreement was that the case would
be filed in court after the complainants fully paid his acceptance fee; that he did not take the
documents relative to the titling of the lot except for the photocopy of the tax declaration; and that he
did not commit betrayal of trust and confidence when he participated in a case filed against the
complainants in MCTC explaining that his appearance was for and in behalf of Atty. Ervin
Estandante, the counsel on record, who failed to appear in the said hearing.

In the Report and Recommendation,  dated August 24, 2012, the Investigating Commissioner found
1

Atty. Guaren to have violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility when he accepted the titling
of complainants’ lot and despite the acceptance of ₱7,000.00, he failed to perform his obligation and
allowed 5 long years to elapse without any progress in the titling of the lot. Atty. Guaren should also
be disciplined for appearing in a case against complainants without a written consent from the latter.
The CBD recommended that he be suspended for six (6) months.
In its May 20, 2013 Resolution,  the IBP Board of Governors, adopted and approved with
2

modification the Report and Recommendation of the CBD, suspending Atty. Guaren from the
practice of law for three (3) months only.

The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Board of Governors on the unethical conduct of Atty.
Guaren, except as to the penalty.

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is
the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the
primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves. 3

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of ₱7,000.00 as partial
payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for the
titling of complainants' lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his
client with competence and diligence when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him. 1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren is found GUILTY of having violated Canons 17
and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a
similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of
the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
ERMELINDA LAD VDA. DE DOMINGUEZ, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-
FACT, VICENTE A. PICHON, Complainant, v. ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON,
SR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

Complainant Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez (complainant) was the widow of the
late Felipe Domiguez who died in a vehicular accident in Caraga, Davao Oriental, on
October 18, 1995, involving a dump truck owned by the Municipality of Caraga.
Aggrieved, complainant decided to file charges against the Municipality of Caraga and
engaged the services of respondent Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron, Sr. (Atty. Agleron). On
three (3) occasions, Atty. Agleron requested and received from complainant the
following amounts for the payment of filing fees and sheriff’s fees, to wit: (1) June 3,
1996 - P3,000.00; (2) June 7, 1996 - P1,800.00; and September 2, 1996 - P5,250.00
or a total of P10,050.00. After the lapse of four (4) years, however, no complaint was
filed by Atty. Agleron against the Municipality of Caraga. 1 crallawlibrary

Atty. Agleron admitted that complainant engaged his professional service and received
the amount of P10,050.00. He, however, explained that their agreement was that
complainant would pay the filing fees and other incidental expenses and as soon as the
complaint was prepared and ready for filing, complainant would pay 30% of the agreed
attorney’s fees of P100,000.00. On June 7, 1996, after the signing of the complaint, he
advised complainant to pay in full the amount of the filing fee and sheriff’s fees and the
30% of the attorney’s fee, but complainant failed to do so. Atty. Agleron averred that
since the complaint could not be filed in court, the amount of P10,050.00 was deposited
in a bank while awaiting the payment of the balance of the filing fee and attorney’s
fee.2
crallawlibrary

In reply,3 complainant denied that she did not give the full payment of the filing fee and
asserted that the filing fee at that time amounted only to P7,836.60.

In the Report and Recommendation,4 dated January 12, 2012, the Investigating

Commissioner found Atty. Agleron to have violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him, and recommended
that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of four (4) months.

In its April 16, 2013 Resolution, 5 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of
Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with modification that Atty. Agleron be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of only one (1) month.

The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors except as to
the penalty imposed.

Atty. Agleron violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that: chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client with
competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion
regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. 6 He owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. 7 crallawlibrary

In the present case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the complaint against the
Municipality of Caraga, Davao Oriental, despite the fact that it was already prepared
and signed. He attributed his non-filing of the appropriate charges on the failure of
complainant to remit the full payment of the filing fee and pay the 30% of the
attorney’s fee. Such justification, however, is not a valid excuse that would exonerate
him from liability. As stated, every case that is entrusted to a lawyer deserves his full
attention whether he accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming that complainant had
not remitted the full payment of the filing fee, he should have found a way to speak to
his client and inform him about the insufficiency of the filing fee so he could file the
complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked professionalism in dealing with complainant
and showed incompetence when he failed to file the appropriate charges.

In a number of cases,8 the Court held that a lawyer should never neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence renders him liable for disciplinary action
such as suspension ranging from three months to two years. In this case, the Court
finds the suspension of Atty. Agleron from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
months sufficient.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION.  Accordingly, respondent ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, SR. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt
with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records
of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its
chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2151               March 11, 2014

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE EDWIN C. LARIDA, JR., RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A mysterious early Sunday morning fire in the records room of a courthouse set off a series of red
flags pointing to anomalous acts allegedly committed by its inhabitants. It led to the resignation of a
clerk of court after he had formally denounced the Presiding Judge for committing various anomalies
and irregularities that are now the subjects of this administrative case against the Presiding Judge.

Antecedents

At around 7:50 a.m. on October 12, 2008, a Sunday, a fire occurred at the records room of Branch
18 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City. The fire, although declared under control by
8:10 a.m., was extinguished only ten minutes later. Recovered from the records room were a 1.5 liter
plastic bottle containing gasoline, a container of glue, and a candle.  Atty. Stanlee D.C. Calma, the
1

Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 18, immediately reported the fire as a clear case of arson to the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).  On October 13, 2008, then Court Administrator Jose
2

Portugal Perez, now a Member of the Court, formed and dispatched an investigative team consisting
of lawyers from the OCA to conduct an investigation upon the instructions of Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno. The investigative team started interviewing the personnel of Branch 18, including Atty.
Calma, in the afternoon of October 13, 2008, and their declarations aided the review starting on
October 14, 2008 of the records of the cases decided and pending in Branch 18.

In the course of its investigation, the investigative team uncovered anomalies supposedly committed
by Presiding Judge Edwin G. Larida (Judge Larida), namely:

1. violation of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008, in authorizing the detail of locally-funded

employees to his court without obtaining permission from the Supreme Court, and in allowing
them to take custody of court records and to draft court orders and decisions for him;

2. knowingly allowing detailed employees Jason Marticio, Larry Laggui and Napoleon
Cabanizas to demand commissions from bonding companies in exchange for the issuance
of release orders;

3. extorting money from detained accused Raymund Wang, with the help of Jason Marticio
and Larry Laggui;

4. defying the directive of the Supreme Court in Administrative Order No. 132-2008, dated 15
September 2008, to stop from trying and hearing cases and to instead, decide cases already
submitted for decision;

5. releasing the accused on bail in Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03 for Violation of Section 8,
Article II, RA 9165 (Manufacturing or Engaging in the Manufacture of, in a Clandestine
 Laboratory, Large Quantity of Metamphetamine Hydrochloride, Commonly Known as Shabu)
despite their positive identification as the perpetrators of the crime;

6. granting a motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. TG-5307-06 without a
case record and without requiring a comment from the prosecutor; and

7. granting a petition for the issuance of owner's duplicate copies of various titles in LRC
case No. TG-06-1183 under questionable circumstances. 3

Upon recommendation of the OCA, and on the basis of the investigation report, the Court resolved
on November 18, 2008 to:

a) x x x

b) DIRECT Judge Larida to cease and desist from hearing and deciding cases at RTC,
Branch 18, Tagaytay City;

c) DESIGNATE Judge Larida as Assting Judge of RTC, Branch 74, Malabon City to decide
inherited cases submitted for decision and already beyond the reglementary period to decide
in the aforesaid court;

d) DIRECT Messrs. Jayson A. Marticio and Larry G. Laggui to report back to the City
Government of Tagaytay, effective immediately;

e) PROHIBIT Messrs. Marticio, Laggui and Napoleon Cabanizas, Jr., from entering the
premises of RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City;

xxxx

i) REVOKE the designation of Judge Emma S. Young, RTC, Branch 36, Manila, as Assisting Judge
of RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 132-2008 dated September
15, 2008, and instead, DESIGNATE Judge Young as Acting Presiding Judge thereat effective
immediately and to continue until further orders from the Court. x x x

The Court further Resolved to REFER the instant administrative complaint against Judge Larida to
(a) the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for RAFFLE among the justices thereat within five
(5) days from notice hereof and (b) the Court of Appeals Justice to whom the complaint will be
raffled for INVESTIGATION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION thereon within sixty (60) days
from the date of the raffle.
4

In the meantime, Jayson A. Marticio, a locally-funded employee formerly detailed in Branch 18, and
who was among those barred by the Court from entering the RTC’s premises in the aftermath of the
arson incident, presented a letter-complaint dated October 20, 2008  whereby he denounced the
5

following anomalies and irregularities committed by the RTC staff of Branch 18, to wit:

1. That the court staff are practicing the "duty system" wherein a court employee will be
assigned to report early in order to punch in their daily time cards;

2. That a certain "Rommel" and other court employees were asking commissions from
bondsmen, specifically, the Monarch Insurance Company which he avers has connections
with the Office of the Clerk of Court;
 3. That Clerk of Court Stanlee Calma and Legal Researcher Diana Ruiz are soliciting
monetary considerations from litigants in exchange for fast and favorable decisions;

4. That Clerk of Court Calma received a huge amount of money and a Pajero from a certain
"Norma" in exchange for a favorable decision in an election protest; and

5. That there are court employees who seek his assistance in drafting decisions/orders and
use the same to ask for considerations from litigants. 6

Marticio’s letter-complaint was consolidated with A.M. RTJ-08-2151, the case involving Judge
Larida.  The consolidated cases were assigned to Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario of the Court
7

of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation.

On February 20, 2009, Investigating Justice Rosario re-set the pre-trial of the cases to March 5,
2009, with a specific order for Marticio to personally appear on that date.  On March 5, 2009,
8

Marticio did not appear at the pre-trial. The Process Server’s Return showed,  however, that the
9

order for Marticio to personally appear before the Investigating Justice was not served on him
because he had meanwhile ceased to be connected with the City Government of Tagaytay City, and
could not also be found at his last known address. Whereupon, the staff members of Branch 18
whom Marticio had denounced sought the immediate dismissal of his letter complaint.  Deeming 10

Marticio’s failure to inform the Investigating Justice and the OCA of his whereabouts as a
manifestation of his lack of interest to pursue the matter, the Investigating Justice recommended the
dismissal of his letter-complaint. 11

The representatives of the OCA and Judge Larida appeared before the Investigating Justice and
presented their evidence.

The Investigating Justice thereafter submitted a report on his findings to the Court, and
recommended as follows:

1. for failing to strictly comply with the provisions of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008, it is
recommended that respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. be STERNLY WARNED that the
commission of a similar act will be dealt with more severely;

2. for failing to supervise and control his subordinates diligently, it is recommended that
respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. be REPRIMANDED with warning that a commission
of a similar act will be dealt with more severely;

3. for immediately granting Jayson Espiritu's motion to quash in Criminal Case No. TG-5307-
06 without giving the prosecution a chance to comment thereon or file an opposition thereto,
it is recommended that respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. be STERNLY WARNED that
a repetition of a similar act will warrant a more severe penalty.

There being no substantial evidence to support the charges of –

a) extorting money from detained accused Raymund Wang;

b) defying the directive of Supreme Court in Administrative Order No. 132-2008;

c) improperly granting bail in Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03;

 d) receiving a bribe in exchange for granting Jayson Espiritu's motion to quash the
information in Criminal Case No. TG-5307-06;

e) granting a petition for the issuance of owner's duplicate copies of various titles in LRC
Case No. TG-06-1183 under questionable circumstances; and

f) involvement in the fire that razed RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City;

it is recommended that the foregoing charges be DISMISSED and respondent Judge Edwin G.
Larida, Jr., be ABSOLVED of liability for the same.12

Ruling

The Court partly adopts the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Justice.

1.

Violation of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 by authorizing the detail of locally-funded employees
to Branch 18 without obtaining permission from the Court, and by allowing them to take custody of
court records and to draft court orders and rulings for him Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 dated
March 11, 2008 (Guidelines in the Detail of Locally-Funded Employees to the Lower
Courts)  relevantly stated as follows:
13

The Presiding Judge/Executive Judge shall submit to the SC through the OCA, within one (1) month
from receipt of this administrative circular, an inventory of all locally-funded employees detailed in
their respective court branches including the OCC, specifying their names, position titles, assigned
duties and duration of the detail. In addition, the Presiding Judge/Executive Judge shall regularly
review the necessity for such details as well as the performance of the locally-funded employees,
and recommend to the SC through the OCA the revocation of the detail for those whose services are
no longer necessary in the lower courts or those with unsatisfactory or poor performance.

As of October 14, 2008, the locally-funded employees detailed in Branch 18 were Ofelia Parasdas,
Myrna Lontoc, Jayson Marticio, Larry Laggui and Jaime Apaga.  However, Judge Larida did not
14

submit or cause to be submitted to the Court within one month from receipt of Administrative Circular
No. 28-2008 an inventory of all locally-funded employees detailed in Branch 18.

Atty. Calma claimed further that Judge Larida had allowed Marticio to draft orders and decisions for
Branch 18 in contravention of paragraph 3 of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008,  viz:
15

Considering the confidentiality of court records and proceedings, locally-funded employees shall
simply assist in the performance of clerical works, such as receiving of letters and other
communications for the office concerned, typing of address in envelopes for mailing, typing of
certificate of appearance, and typing of monthly reports. They shall not be given duties involving
custody of court records, implementation of judicial processes, and such other duties involving court
proceedings. However, they may perform functions appertaining to that of a messenger, janitor and
driver, if these positions are provided in the plantilla of the Local Government Unit (LGU).
16

To support Atty. Calma’s claim, the OCA presented copies of the court orders drafted by Marticio in
the period from February 4 to February 15, 2008 bearing Marticio’s initials and signatures on which
Judge Larida had either written the word "Finalize" or signed in other instances.17
Likewise, Atty. Calma attested that Judge Larida had allowed Laggui to handle confidential court
records in violation also of paragraph 3 of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008. 18

In his judicial affidavit, Judge Larida asserted that he had tasked Atty. Calma to make and send to
the Court the inventory of the detailed locally-funded employees, but the latter did not comply.  He
19

denied that Marticio had continued drafting court orders after the effectivity of Administrative Circular
No. 28-2008 on March 11, 2008, because Marticio had been limited to doing legal research
afterwards.  He admitted that Laggui had handled court records at his behest, but insisted that such
20

handling had been limited to the physical carrying of records between his chambers and the staff
room for only a fleeting moment. 21

The Investigating Justice rendered the following evaluation of the charges and the corresponding
explanations of Judge Larida, to wit:

Based on the foregoing evidence, this Investigating Justice finds that although respondent Judge
failed to comply with the submission of an inventory of locally-funded personnel detailed to his office,
pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 28-2008, it cannot be said that such failure was entirely his
fault.

In the first place, the preparation of such inventory is an administrative function that properly pertains
to the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Calma. Since it was Atty. Calma who first read about
Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 in the newspaper and even brought the same to the attention of
respondent Judge, he should have prepared the required inventory for respondent Judge's
signature. The record is bereft of any evidence or allegation that despite a prepared inventory ready
for his signature, respondent Judge willfully refused to sign and submit the same to the Supreme
Court.

Second, aside from the orders prepared by Jayson Marticio between 4 and 15 February 2008, there
is no showing that he continued to draft court orders after the effectivity of Administrative Circular
No. 28-2008 on 11 March 2008.

Third, Larry Laggui’s act of physically carrying court records to and from respondent Judge’s
chambers and the staff room appears to be a messengerial activity allowed by Administrative
Circular No. 28-2008. Laggui can hardly be said to have exercised "custody" over the court records
since he had no participation in their safekeeping.

Nevertheless, respondent Judge’s act of not submitting the required inventory, allowing detailed
employees to draft court orders and/or have access to court records evinces laxity in respondent
Judge’s control and supervision over his office. A judge is tasked with the administrative supervision
over his personnel and he should always see to it that his orders are promptly enforced and that
case records are properly stored. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the judge to see to it that the
personnel of the court perform their duties well and to call the attention of the clerk of court when
they fail to do so.

Having failed to strictly comply with the provisions of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008, it is
recommended that respondent Judge be STERNLY WARNED that the commission of a similar act
will be dealt with more severely.22

We find Judge Larida to have committed several lapses, specifically the non-submission to the Court
of the required inventory of locally-funded employees, and his allowing Marticio to draft court orders.
Such lapses manifested a wrong attitude towards administrative rules and regulations issued for the
governance and administration of the lower courts, to the extent of disregarding them, as well as a
laxity in the control of his Branch and in the supervision of its functioning staff.

The omission to submit the inventory should not be blamed on Atty. Calma as the Branch Clerk of
Court.  Although it was very likely that Judge Larida had tasked Atty. Calma to do and submit the
1avvphi1

inventory in his behalf, Judge Larida as the Presiding Judge himself remained to be the officer
directly burdened with the responsibility for doing so. The basis for saying so is the text of
Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 itself. Judge Larida could neither shirk from, nor avoid, nor
evade the responsibility of submitting the inventory within one month from notice under any guise or
reason. This meant that if Atty. Calma did not comply with his instruction, Judge Larida should have
himself assumed the responsibility of compliance. With Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 being
effective on March 11, 2008 yet, his failure to send the inventory as late as October 2008 definitely
established his non-compliance with its directive.

Paragraph 3 of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 also confined the service of locally-funded
employees to giving assistance in the performance of clerical works, like receiving letters and other
communications for the Branch, typing of addresses on envelopes for mailing, typing of certificates
of appearance, and typing of monthly reports. Such employees were not to have the custody of court
records, or to have anything to do with the implementation of judicial processes, or to discharge
other duties involving court proceedings beyond the merely clerical. The prohibition was intended to
preserve the confidentiality of court records and proceedings, because such employees were not
employed in the Judiciary.

Judge Larida admitted in his judicial affidavit that Marticio had drafted court orders and had done
legal research in Branch 18. Under the circumstances, his claim of discontinuing Marticio’s drafting
activities upon the effectivity of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 on March 11, 2008, assuming it
to be true, did not diminish or excuse his violation if he still permitted Marticio to do legal research
work thereafter. Legal research was an activity that was more than clerical. Clearly, Judge Larida did
not comply with Administrative Circular No. 28-2008, which was a less serious charge under Section
9 of Rule 140, Rules of Court, as amended. 23

Section 11 of Rule 140, Rules of Court, as amended, delineates the sanctions to be meted out for a
less serious charge, as follows:

Section 11. Sanctions. – x x x

xxxx

B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be
imposed:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more
than three (3) months; or

2. A fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00.

xxxx

However, Judge Larida’s unrebutted explanation that he had instructed Atty. Calma to prepare and
send the inventory, while not entirely absolving him, evinced his intention to comply. Trial judges
have usually delegated various reporting tasks to their clerks of court or other members of their staff
in order to gain more time for their adjudications and other important written work. We should
presume, therefore, that malice had not motivated his non-compliance with Administrative Circular
No. 28-2008. His explanation to that effect merited treating his lack of malice as a mitigating
circumstance in his favor.

2.

Knowingly allowing detailed employees

to solicit commissions from bonding companies

Regarding this charge, the Investigating Justice found thusly:

The OCA next charges respondent Judge with having allowed detailed employees, Jayson Marticio
and Larry Laggui, and respondent Judge's personal driver, Napoleon Cabanizas, Jr., to solicit
commissions from bonding and surety companies.

According to the judicial affidavit of former Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Stanlee D.C. Calma, the
manager of Monarch Insurance Company, Inc. complained to him that despite the proper filing of the
bail bond policy and the payment of legal fees, there would be a delay of up to 3 days in the
issuance of release orders for the accused unless the bonding company gave the "commission"
solicited by Jayson Marticio, Larry Laggui and Napoleon Cabanizas, Jr. Monarch Insurance
Insurance and other bonding companies supposedly told Atty. Calma that Jayson Marticio, Larry
Laggui and Napoleon Cabanizas, Jr. solicited "commissions" ranging from ₱500.00 up to 2% of the
amount of bail imposed.

By way of illustration, the OCA presented Criminal Case No. TG-5955-08 entitled People vs. Benito
Bobis. In said case, Monarch Insurance posted the bail bond on 17 June 2008, respondent Judge
signed the release order of the accused on 18 June 2008, but the release order was issued only on
20 June 2008.

In accordance with his duties as Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Calma reported the improper
solicitation to respondent Judge, who allegedly remarked, "Sabi ko nga sa kanila mag 'lie low muna."

Thereafter, respondent Judge confronted Jayson Marticio, Larry Laggui and Napoleon Cabanizas,
Jr. in the presence of the representative of Monarch Insurance and told them to stop asking for
commissions. However, according to Atty. Calma, what respondent Judge really said was that
Marticio et al. should refrain from demanding "commissions" and it was up to the bonding companies
to give them any amount. 24

Based on the foregoing, Judge Larida was not unaware of the solicitations by Marticio, Laggui and
Cabanizas from the complaining bonding company. The solicitations were surely irregular and
improper activities undertaken by persons visibly working for the courts. Considering that such
activities were committed with his knowledge, Judge Larida should have done more than merely
confronting them in the presence of the representative of the complaining bonding company, and
then and there merely telling them to stop the solicitations. He should have instead immediately
caused or called for their investigation and, if the evidence warranted, seen to their proper criminal
prosecution. The firmer action by him would have avoided the undesirable impression that he had
perversely acquiesced to their activities. He thus contravened the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
imposed on him the duty to take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against court personnel
for unprofessional conduct of which he would have become aware, to wit:
Rule 3.10 A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court
personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.

Accordingly, Judge Larida was guilty of unbecoming conduct, a light charge under Section 10, Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, as amended. 25

3.

Charge of soliciting money from the accused

in Criminal Case No. TG-2969-98.

On this charge, the Investigating Justice found and recommended as follows:

In Criminal Case No. TG-2969-98, the accused, Raymund Wang, was charged with selling 275.9665
grams of shabu. According to former Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Calma, a certain Necita Ramos
(kumare of Raymund Wang) called him up to ask if there was already a decision in the case.
Further, Necita Ramos informed Atty. Calma that a certain "Jake" or "James" had visited Wang in
the Trece Martirez Provincial Jail to ask ₱100,000.00 allegedly "pang birthday ni Judge." Wang gave
"Jake" or "James" the cellphone number of Necita Ramos and the two purportedly negotiated the
amount down to ₱50,000.00. However, Necita Ramos did not pay the amount solicited.

After receiving the information, Atty. Calma supposedly informed respondent Judge that certain
people might be using his name but the latter only said that the problem is that people are accusing
others but are afraid to show up.

Thereafter, Atty. Calma did his own investigation and found out that the cellphone number calling
Necita Ramos belonged to Jayson Marticio. Armed with this information, Atty. Calma and Necita
Ramos went to the Office of the City Prosecutor. However, no statements were taken and no action
was done. Upon verification by the audit team of the OCA, the Office of the City Prosecutor opined
that the suspicion of Atty. Calma and Necita Ramos would not prosper since their bases were all
hearsay.

For his part, respondent Judge denied that Atty. Calma informed him of this incident. In his Judicial
Affidavit, respondent Judge averred that he had asked his legal researcher, Diana Ruiz, to prepare a
digest of the case but she prepared, instead a decision acquitting Wang. This allegedly triggered a
suspicion in respondent Judge that Diana Ruiz and Atty. Calma were selectively preparing decisions
and placing them inside his chambers, but before he could investigate, a fire gutted the court.

Based on the foregoing testimonies on record, it is apparent that the charge against respondent
Judge of soliciting money from accused Wang has not been proved. Apart from the hearsay
testimony of Atty. Calma, there is no legal or factual basis to conclude that "James" or "Jake" is
actually Jayson Marticio and that "James" or "Jake" solicited money from Wang with the authority of
respondent Judge. Therefore, it is recommended that this charge against respondent Judge be
DISMISSED. 26

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Justice, and dismiss the charge for
lack of evidence proving that Judge Larida solicited a bribe from the accused in Criminal Case No.
TG-2969-98.

It is truly proper to emphasize at this point that a charge of bribery against a judge is easy to concoct
and difficult to disprove; hence, the Court always demands that the complainant present a panoply of
evidence in support of the accusation.  A mere affidavit attesting that a judge demanded a bribe in
27

exchange for the exoneration of an accused being tried before him is not sufficient. In order that an
accusation of this nature is not to be considered a fairy tale, competent and reliable evidence other
than the testimony of a lone witness needs to be adduced. Every administrative complaint levelled
against a sitting judge must be examined with a discriminating eye, therefore, because its
consequential effects are by their nature highly penal, to the extent that the respondent judge may
face the sanction of dismissal from the service. Indeed, no judge should be disciplined for
misconduct unless the evidence against him is competent and sufficient.  Accordingly, the Court
28

rightfully rejects any imputation of judicial misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to sustain it.

4.

Defying Administrative Order No. 132-2008

In Administrative Order No. 132-2008, promulgated on September 15, 2008, the Court directed
Judge Larida: (1) to cease and desist from trying cases; (2) to concentrate on deciding the cases
submitted for decision, whether before him or before his predecessors; and (3) to give priority to
cases submitted for decision for more than five years already. The administrative order designated
Judge Emma S. Young as the Assisting Judge for Branch 18, with authority to conduct hearings.

The OCA charged Judge Larida with wilfully violating Administrative Order No. 132-2008 by
antedating several orders in order to anticipate or circumvent the effectivity of the administrative
order.

Anent this charge, the Investigating Justice has reported:

In his Judicial Affidavit, former Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Calma, accused respondent Judge of
continuing to issue interlocutory orders in certain cases even after the effectivity of Administrative
Order No. 132-2008 on 15 September 2008. Atty. Calma’s testimony is supported by the Judicial
Affidavit of civil docket clerk, Anita Goboy. Together, they enumerate the orders issued by
respondent Judge allegedly in violation of the Administrative Order, to wit:

1. Order dated 15 August 2008, granting the motions to consolidate and set for pre-trial Civil
Case Nos. TG-07-2588 entitled Tagaytay Properties & Holdings Corp. vs. Sps. Pascua, TG-
07-2589 entitled Tagaytay Properties & Holdings Corp. vs dela Vega; TG-07-2590 entitled
Tagaytay Properties & Holdings Corp. vs. Sps. Catolico; and TG-07-2592 entitled Tagaytay
Properties & Holdings Corp. vs. Sps. Mirandilla; but denying consolidation of TG-07-2591
entitled Tagaytay Properties & Holdings Corp. vs. Sps. Lomerio, Sr. with said cases;

2. Order, dated 15 September 2008, granting Urgent Ex-Parte Motion (to resolve motion to
cancel notice of lis pendens) in Civil Case No. TG-08-2743 entitled Osato-Agro Industrial
Development Corporation vs. AB Capital & Investment Corporation;

3. Order, dated 18 September 2008, granting plaintiff's prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction in SP No. TG-05-2519 entitled Metro Alliance vs. Phil. Trust Co.; and,

4. Order, dated 19 September 2008, denying defendant's motion to dismiss in SCA-TG-08-

2593 entitled Tagaytay Resort Development Corporation vs. Nazareno.

It is Atty. Calma’s conclusion that said orders were intentionally ante-dated by respondent Judge
based on the fact that the latter, through Larry Laggui, gave such orders to civil docket clerk Anita
Goboy only on 26 September 2008 although they all appear to have been signed or promulgated on
earlier dates, as above-enumerated. Since Administrative Order No. 132-2008 was already in effect
by then, Atty. Calma reasoned that the sole purpose of ante-dating the orders could only be the
circumvention of said Administrative Order.

For his part, respondent Judge declared that he signed the orders in question on the dates indicated
thereon and released them to the civil docket clerk on the same day. Respondent Judge, thus, was
surprised to find out that said orders were all uniformly released by Larry Laggui to the civil docket
clerk only on 26 September 2008. In any event, respondent Judge pointed out that since the civil
docket clerk had brought the matter to Atty. Calma's attention, the latter-being aware of the effectivity
of Administrative Order No. 132-2008—should have informed him about it and stopped the
promulgation on said date to avoid a violation of the Administrative Order. 29

We declare that the interlocutory orders concerned were signed on the dates indicated therein. The
claim of Atty. Calma and Anita Goboy to the effect that the foregoing orders had been antedated to
circumvent the mandate of Administrative Order No.132-200 was improbable in light of the following
relevant observations of the Investigating Justice, viz:

x x x. If it were true that Atty. Calma believed that their release on a date different from the date of
their signing amounted to an anomaly, then he should have immediately brought the same to the
attention of the presiding Judge. Atty. Calma’s act of instructing civil docket clerk Anita Goboy to
merely indicate at the back of said orders the date when she actually received them evinces a
certain degree of malice incongruent with his key and noble position in the court. 30

It is worth noting that only two of the affected orders were issued after the effectivity of
Administrative Order No. 132-2008, to wit:

1. the Order, dated 18 September 2008, granting plaintiff's prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction in SP No. TG-05-2519 entitled Metro Alliance vs. Phil Trust Co.; and

2. the Order, dated 19 September 2008, denying private defendant's motion to dismiss in
SCA-TG-08-2593 entitled Tagaytay Resort Development Corporation vs. Nazareno. 31

The two orders were issued by Judge Larida two and three days after the effectivity of Administrative
Order No. 132-2008. Even if the administrative order had taken effect immediately, the time when he
acquired actual notice of Administrative Order No. 132-2008 was not shown. On the other hand, that
our administrative circulars and issuances take time to reach the lower courts is a matter proper for
judicial notice. As such, his intent to violate or circumvent Administrative Order No. 132-2008 was
not proved.

Moreover, the Investigating Justice’s following observations are cogent, to wit:

According to the Memorandum submitted by the OCA to the Hon. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
"the administrative order was issued in view of the 139 cases submitted for decision in RTC, Branch
18, Tagaytay City which are already beyond the reglementary period to decide as reflected in the
monthly report of cases submitted by the aforesaid court for the month of April 2008."

Given the purpose of Administrative Order No. 132-2008, it would appear that the mandate given to
respondent Judge to "cease and desist from trying cases" was not meant to penalize him but was
given only as a remedial measure to ensure that he will spend his time writing the decisions of the
long-pending 139 undecided cases instead of trying and hearing other cases.
Hence, respondent Judge’s issuance of the 2 orders in question, on 18 and 19 September 2008,
respectively, while not in strict compliance with the letter of the Administrative Order, also do not
prevent the attainment of its purpose. Indeed, there is nothing on record to even hint at an improper
motive on the part of respondent Judge in issuing said orders apart from the obvious reason that
they were necessary in the disposition of interlocutory matters in these cases. 32

Hence, we dismiss the charge of circumventing Administrative Order No. 132-2008.

5.

Releasing the accused in Criminal Case

No. TG-432-03 on bail despite their being
positively identified as the perpetrators of the crime

The Investigating Justice found and recommended on this charge thuswise:

In Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03, the accused Leandro Go y Ling, Wen Li Chen, Daniel Co, Wilson
Li, Michael Fandag and Arnel Villaser were charged with Violation of Section 8, Article II, RA 9165
(Manufacturing or Engaging in the Manufacture of, in a Clandestine Laboratory, Large Quantity of
Metamphetamine Hydrochloride, Commonly Known as Shabu).

From the Memorandum of the OCA to the Hon. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, it appears that
arraignment proceeded on 7 December 2004; pre-trial commenced on 8 August 2005; and trial
ensued on 19 October 2005. On 24 March 2006, the Chinese accused (Go, Li Chen, Co and Li) filed
a petition to fix bail for their provisional liberty. The prosecution did not object thereto, and, instead
filed a formal offer of evidence on 3 May 2007, as it had, by then, finished with its presentation of
evidence. On 1 June 2007, the Chinese accused filed a memorandum in support of their petition for
bail. On June 14, 2007, respondent Judge granted the petition for bail of the accused.

In this administrative charge against respondent Judge, the OCA questions his grant of bail to the
accused for the reasons that: (1) the crime they are accused of is a capital offense, and the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution
indicates that 2 witnesses positively identified the accused as the perpetrators of the crime; and (2)
there are suspicious circumstances surrounding the release of the resolution granting bail to the
accused. 33

xxxx

In this case, after the prosecution finished presenting its evidence, respondent Judge came to the
conclusion that the evidence of the accused's guilt was not strong and so granted their petition for
bail.

However, the OCA disputes respondent Judge’s assessment of the guilt of the accused based on
the evaluation made by Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Stanlee D.C. Calma of the transcript of
stenographic notes on the case that 2 witnesses for the prosecution had positively identified the
accused as the perpetrators of the crime. 34

xxxx

On the other hand, respondent Judge defends his grant of bail in his Judicial Affidavit as follows:
Q: OCA was faulting you for stating in your resolution that there was no positive identification of the
accused when the transcript of stenographic notes say otherwise. What can you say to this?

A: The lack or the improper identification of the accused was just one of the grounds I cited to grant
the petition. My assessment of the evidence on this matter was arrived at on two grounds: 1. failure
of police officer Eusebio to positively identify the accused in his direct testimony, and 2. the failure of
another prosecution witness Mr. Basilio to positively identify the accused taking his entire testimony
into consideration, the direct and cross.

xxxx

52. Q: What can you say to the allegations of Atty. Calma that you had a meeting together with some
concerned court personnel in your chamber purposely to discuss the resolution specifically on the
matter of positive identification?

A: Indeed it transpired but I stood pat on my decision.

The matter of determining whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion that
remains with the judge. Such discretion must be sound and exercised within reasonable bounds. In
this case, it appears that respondent Judge gave a lot of thought to the petition for bail before
granting it, even going to the extent of consulting with some of his court personnel on the matter
after receiving the evidence of the prosecution. After much cogitation, respondent Judge exercised
his judicial discretion and came to the conclusion that the evidence against the accused was not
strong and they were not positively identified as the perpetrators of the crime.

Respondent Judge’s appreciation of the evidence against the accused lies within his sound
discretion. This mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed on the Branch Clerk
of Court, who cannot be allowed to supplant his personal opinions for that of the judge.

As long as there was no irregularity in the proceedings adopted in the grant of bail, judicial discretion
must be respected and considered to have been rendered within reasonable bounds.

Respondent Judge’s lack of malice or bad faith in granting bail to the accused in Criminal Case No.
TG-4382-03 is underscored by the proceedings that transpired thereafter. According to the
Memorandum of the OCA to the Hon. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, on 2 July 2007, the
prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration of the 14 June 2007 resolution granting bail. The
motion was set for hearing and the accused were mandated to appear before the court. Upon failure
of the accused (except Li and Li Chen) to attend the hearing, respondent Judge canceled their cash
bail and issued warrants for their arrest. Further, upon motion of the prosecution, respondent Judge
issued a hold-departure order against the accused on 23 July 2007. 35

We concur with the foregoing findings and recommendation of the Investigating Justice.

Verily, the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused in Criminal Case No.
TG-4382-03 was strong for purposes of resolving the petition for bail was a matter of judicial
discretion for Judge Larida as the trial judge. Only he could competently resolve the matter of bail.
His exercise of discretion must be sound and reasonable. In the view of the Investigating Justice,
Judge Larida, having given a lot of thought to the petition for bail before granting it, soundly and
reasonably exercised his discretion thereon. Unless an appropriate judicial review would show him
to have acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or whimsically in doing so, his granting of the petition for bail
should be upheld and respected.
This administrative investigation could not be the occasion to review Judge Larida’s granting of bail.
Only the proper superior court could say whether his exercise of discretion in resolving the petition
for bail was sound and reasonable. Thus, Atty. Calma’s adverse conclusion based on the transcript
of the proceedings to the effect that the Prosecution’s witnesses had positively identified the
accused could not effectively contradict Judge Larida’s determination of the issue of bail.

Whether the identification in Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03 was positively made or not was a matter
for the judicial perception of Judge Larida only. In these proceedings, he explained his reasons for
granting bail. We must respect his explanation. The accused in Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03 were
charged with the manufacture of methamphetamine hydrochloride. The relevant testimony of the
Prosecution’s witnesses was to the effect that at the time the police arrested them on July 12, 2003
the accused were loading boxes unto various trucks and vans, with the boxes being later on
determined to contain illegal substances.  As such, the testimony did not establish the manufacture
36

of methamphetamine hydrochloride, the non-bailable offense charged, but a bailable lesser offense.
Judge Larida’s June 14, 2007 resolution granting the petition for bail reflected the distinction, viz:

In the ensuing enforcement of the search warrant issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Silang,
Cavite, several containers and sacks were found in the house described therein which were
suspected to be essential chemicals in the manufacture of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
prohibited drug. But there was no evidence to establish that the accused had something to do with
the presence of these alleged illegal substances in the house subject of the search warrant. The
accused were not caught inside the house which the prosecution claims to be a clandestine shabu
laboratory. But the "Chinese-looking persons" were apprehended outside the clandestine laboratory,
outside its gates. They were arrested in flagrante delicto loading the containers of illegal substances
onto the vans/trucks outside the house. Loading them onto a motor vehicle does not fall within the
purview of the word "manufacture" of prohibited drugs otherwise, we are stretching the meaning of
the term a bit too far.
37

Aside from assailing the resolution granting the petition for bail, Atty. Calma maintained that the
resolution had been released under suspicious circumstances considering that the defense counsel,
Atty. Albert T. Villaseca, had already gone to the RTC ready to post the cash bail of ₱200,000.00 for
each of the accused even prior to the release of the June 14, 2007 resolution granting bail. 38

Anent this, Atty. Villaseca explained his presence in Branch 18 in the following manner:

2. Q: On June 18, 2007 at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning, where were you?

A: I was at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite before the Honorable Judge Norberto
J. Quisumbing, Jr. I just came from the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite as I initially
attended the hearing of Criminal Case No. B-2002-623 titled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff,
versus, Benedicto Baraquilles Maliksi, Accused," for Homicide. The case was postponed as the
Prosecutor in said case was sick. I have with me a "Certified True Copy" of the "Minutes" which I
signed together with the "Order" of the Honorable Judge Eduardo Israel Tanguangco both dated
June 18, 2007.

3. Q: What were you doing at that time before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite at
the sala of the Honorable Judge Norberto J. Quisumbing, Jr.?

A: I attended the hearing and appeared as counsel for both of the accused in the case of People of
the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Guillermo Silla y Legaspi and Paulino Silla y Purificacion, Accused,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 10242-02 for Homicide.
4. Q: What document or documents, if any, do you have to show before this Honorable Court that on
June 18, 2007 at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning you attended and appeared before a criminal
case at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite before the sale (sic) of Honorable Judge
Norberto J. Quisumbing, Jr.?

A: I have with me the "Original Copy" of the Honorable Court's "Order" dated June 18, 2007 together
with a "Certified True Copy of my "Appearance" indicated by my two signatures therein and the
"Minutes of the Proceedings" in the case of People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Guillermo
Silla y Legaspi and Paulino Silla y Purificacion, Accused, docketed as Criminal Case No. 10242-02
for Homicide.

5. Q: At about what time did you leave the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite after you
attended and appeared in the case you are handling?

A: I left the courtroom at around 10:30 o’clock in the morning after my case was called.

6. Q: What did you [do] after you left the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite at around
10:30 o’clock in the morning of June 18, 2007?

A: I went to my office to get the records of another case I was handling that day in the afternoon and
briefly prepared for its afternoon hearing.

7. Q: what is this case all about?

A: It is a civil case for Annulment of Deed of Sale, Annulment of Title and Damages docketed as
Civil Case No. TG-2209 titled Benjamin Q. Diwa, et. al., Plaintiffs, versus, Maxima R. Matias and
International Exchange Bank, Defendants, pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Tagaytay City at the sala of the Honorable Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. which is scheduled to be
heard in the afternoon of June 18, 2007 at around 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

8. Q: What happened next after you arrived at your office to get the records and prepared (sic) for
this other case that you are handling in the afternoon of June 18, 2007?

A: At around 11:30 o'clock in the morning, I left my office in Imus, Cavite and together with my driver
and one of my office personnel, proceeded [to] Tagaytay City to attend to the hearing of my case.

9. Q: What happened next, if any?

A: I arrived at the parking ground of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City at around
12:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

10. Q: Then, what happened next?

A: Upon arriving at the office of the personnel and staff of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Tagaytay City, I was informed by my clients and a court personnel that all the cases scheduled in the
afternoon would be rescheduled to another date as there was an unusual incident which transpired
inside the courtroom earlier.

11. Q: What is that unusual incident which transpired earlier in the courtroom of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City?
A: I was informed that one of the accused in a rape case from the Provincial Jail of the Province of
Cavite took hostage of one of the court employees and that is the reason why all the cases
scheduled to be heard in the afternoon were rescheduled to another date.

12: Q: What document, if any, do you have to show before this Honorable Court that there was a
hostage taking incident that transpired in the morning of June 18, 2007 in side(sic) the courtroom of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City?

A: I have with me a "Certified True Copy" of the Police Blotter issued by SPO4 Samuel Baybay of
the Tagaytay City Police Station.

13. Q: What did you do after that?

A: I provided the court personnel with my available date, briefly talked to my clients and knowing that
our case was already postponed I inquired about the status of my other cases pending before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City.

14. Q: What happened next, after that?

A: As I (was) browsing upon the records of Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03 titled The People of the
Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Leandro Go y Lim, et al, Accused, for Violation of Sec. 8, Art. 2, RA
9165, I came across the resolution of the Honorable Court in our petition for bail.

15. Q: What happened next, if any?

A: I personally received a copy of the Honorable Court's Resolution and, thereafter, immediately and
excitedly informed the aunt of one of my clients as I know she would be very happy about it as my
clients have been innocently lingering in jail for almost four years and have already lost faith and
hope of ever having temporary liberty.

16. Q: What happened next, if any?

A: I informed the aunt of one of my clients the amount of the bond required to (be) posted in cash
and she told me to meet her at the Provincial Jail at Trece Martires City, Province of Cavite and give
her a copy of the Honorable Court's Resolution and she would provide for the amount of the cash
bond required by the Honorable Court.

17. Q: What happened next, if any?

A: I inquired from one of the court personnel that if we could post a cash bail bond that afternoon,
could my clients be ordered released, and what other documents the court requires to immediately
avail of the "order of Release."

18. Q: What happened next, if any?

A: After I was informed by one of the court personnel that since there are no cases to be heard that
afternoon and since all the cases will just be rescheduled to another date, they have a lot of time to
take care of the "Order of Release" of my clients as long as all the other court requirements for the
posting of the cash bail bond are complied with. I wasted no time and hurriedly left the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City. Proceeded to the Provincial Jail at Trece Martires City, Province of
Cavite to inform my clients about the Honorable Court's Resolution and to meet the aunt of one of
my clients who will take care of the cash bail bond required. On my way, I informed the aunt of my
client about the other requirements for the posting of the cash bail bond and prepared the Cash
Bond Undertaking of my clients in my laptop computer.

19. Q: What happened next, if any?

A: I arrived at the Provincial Jail at Trece Martires City, Province of Cavite before 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon. Delivered a copy of the Honorable Court's Resolution to the Provincial Jail Warden and
met the aunt of one of my clients who provided me with the cash in the amount of ₱400,000.00 for
the cash bail bond required, pictures of the accused together with the other requirements for the
cash bail bond. I explained the consequences of a Cash Bond Undertaking to my clients, have (sic)
them sign and subscribe to it and then notarized it.

20. Q: What happened next, if any?

A: I wasted no time and hurriedly left for Tagaytay City. Thereafter, I posted the cash bail bond and
submitted all the requirements to secure an "Order of Release" for my clients.

21. Q: What happened next, if any?

A: All documents I submitted were found in order by the personnel in charge. I was able to secure an
"Order of Release" for my clients. Thereafter, I again proceeded to the Provincial Jail at Trece
Martires City, Province of Cavite and delivered to the Provincial Jail Warden an copy of the "Order of
Release." 39

Atty. Calma’s bare allegations, which were obviously based on surmise and speculation, cannot be
preferred because Atty. Villaseca’s foregoing explanation of his presence in Branch 18 was
supported by authentic documents. Accordingly, we dismiss the charge of Judge Larida’s having
improperly granted bail in Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03.

6.

Charge of granting the motion to quash the

information in Criminal Case No. TG-5307-06

without a case record and without requiring a

comment from the public prosecutor

The Investigating Justice said regarding this charge:

In Criminal case No. TG-5307-06, Jayson Espiritu, among others, was charged with Murder and was
arrested on 6 August 2008 and detained at the Provincial Jail. On 22 August 2008, Jayson Espiritu
filed a motion to quash/dismiss information on the ground that he was a minor at the time of the
commission of the offense.

In an Order, dated 5 September 2008, respondent Judge set the motion to quash for hearing on
October 3, 2008 and gave the prosecution 15 days to file its comment/opposition thereto. However,
without waiting for the 15-day period to expire, respondent Judge granted Jayson Espiritu's motion to
quash on 15 September 2008.
According to the Judicial Affidavit of former Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Stanlee D.C. Calma, aside
from not giving the prosecution a chance to oppose Jayson Espiritu's motion to quash, respondent
Judge personally drafted the Order granting said motion without access to the records of the case.
Moreover, respondent Judge allegedly gave an advance copy of the Order granting the motion to
quash to the father of Jayson Espiritu, who, in turn, showed the same to the warden of the Provincial
Jail even before the court had personally served the same upon said warden on 26 September
2008. According to Atty. Calma, he was informed by the widow of the victim in said criminal case
that respondent Judge had been paid off to quash the information against Jayson Espiritu.

In his defense, respondent Judge explained that he granted Jayson Espiritu’s motion to quash
pursuant to RA 9344 because Jayson Espiritu was only a minor at the time of the commission of the
offense, as proved by his birth certificate attached to the motion. Respondent Judge denied having
received a pay-off to quash the information against Jayson Espiritu, and explained that he did not
wait for the comment/opposition of the prosecution because he followed the substance of the law
and acted swiftly in the best interests of the minor accused. Respondent Judge asserts that he
personally prepared the order on 15 September 2008. 40

Jayson Espiritu, the accused in Criminal Case No. TG-5307-06, was a minor of 15 years and 11
months at the time of the commission of the offense charged as borne out by the copy of his birth
certificate attached to the motion to quash. He was for that reason entitled to the quashal of the
information filed against him for being exempt from criminal liability based on Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006), which states as follows:

Section 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the
time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall
be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws. (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing notwithstanding, Judge Larida should not have acted on Espiritu’s motion to quash
without first giving the public prosecutor the opportunity to comment on the motion. That opportunity
was demanded by due process.  As a judge, he should exercise patience and circumspection to
41

ensure that the opposing sides are allowed the opportunity to be present and to be heard.  Only
42

thereby could he preclude any suspicion on the impartiality of his actuations.  But he cannot now be
43

sanctioned because it is a matter of public policy that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
corruption, the acts of a judge done in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action
although they are erroneous.  Considering that there was no fraud, dishonesty or corruption that
44

attended the omission of prior notice, we simply caution him against a repetition of the omission of
prior notice.

The Investigating Justice found the charge of bribery against Judge Larida unsupported by
competent evidence.  We concur. The records are bereft of the evidence that would establish the
45

charge. Innuendo and hearsay will not establish the accusation. We insist that any accusation of
bribery against a judicial officer should be made upon hard and firm evidence of it. Hence, we
dismiss the charge of bribery.
7.

Charge of granting under questionable circumstances

the petition for the issuance of owner’s duplicate copies
of various TCTs in LRC Case No. TG-06-1183

In its report, the investigating team from the OCA made the following observations with respect to
LRC Case No. TG-06-1183, to wit:

1. There was no hearing conducted to establish the jurisdiction of the court and subsequent
referral of the reception of evidence ex parte to Clerk of Court Desiree Macaraeg as
commissioner;

2. There was no proof to establish that the Register [of] Deeds of Tagaytay City, although
furnished with a copy of the petition, had actually received it;

3. There was no commissioner's report attached to the record relative to the reception of
evidence ex parte conducted on 5 & 10 May 2006;

4. The affidavit of loss of titles was presented by petitioner Santos to the Register of Deeds
only on 5 May 2006 at the same time the petition was allegedly heard by the commissioner;

5. Per minutes dated 10 May 2006, there appears the name [of] Fiscal Manuel D. Noche, for
the government, yet the TSN state[s] that there was no appearance of Fiscal Noche on 10
May 2006 or even the 5 May 2006 ex-parte hearing.

6. Petitioner's formal offer of evidence was admitted on 10 May 2007 when the same was
filed only on 11 May 2007. The order also made it appear that there is no objection
interposed by the City Prosecutor despite non-appearance thereof.

7. The comment of the Register of Deeds on petitioner's Urgent Manifestation alleging that
the Register of Deeds delivered the TCT’s to Marie Cruz although stated 4 September 2006
was filed in court only on 4 December 2006. 46

The Investigating Justice recommended the dismissal of the charge of irregularity for lack of
evidence and substantiation, thusly:

Although the Investigation Report details the legal proceedings in LRC Case No. TG-06-1183, and
certain documents from the case were offered in evidence for the complainant, the OCA did not fully
elaborate on the exact nature of this charge against respondent Judge. Moreover, during the cross-
examination of Diana Ruiz, the latter manifested a lack of knowledge over the events that transpired
in said LRC case. No other witnesses were presented to substantiate this charge. Therefore, it is
recommended that this charge against respondent Judge be DISMISSED. 47

The finding and recommendation by the Investigating Justice are well-taken.  The mere specification
1âwphi1

of accusations against Judge Larida could not demonstrate the veracity of the accusations
notwithstanding the attachment of all the documents allegedly in support of the accusations.
Evidence that was relevant and competent must have been adduced to support the accusation.
Diana Ruiz’s judicial affidavit attesting that the corresponding documents in support of the
investigating team’s accusations were faithful reproductions of the originals that formed part of LRC
Case No. TG-06-1183, without more, did not suffice to establish the commission of irregularities in
the disposition of the case. It is important to stress that the proceedings upon administrative charges
made against judicial officers should be viewed with utmost care, and such proceedings are
governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases, with the charges to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, by virtue of their nature as highly penal in character. 48

8.

Charge of liability for the fire

that occurred on October 12, 2008

Anent the fire that occurred in the records room of Branch 18, we absolve Judge Larida because no
evidence directly linking him to the arson incident was presented.  It further appears that at the time
49

of the occurrence of the fire, Judge Larida was hospitalized for a kidney injury that he had sustained
from a fall on the night of October 9, 2008. 50

Nevertheless, the OCA insisted on Judge Larida’s responsibility for the fire based on certain
circumstances, namely: (a) the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection revealed that access to the
courthouse was through the rear entrance,  and he admitted that such entrance was his access to
51

the courthouse;  (b) despite his being the Presiding Judge of Branch 18, he did not actively take part
52

in the investigation of the arson incident, thereby manifesting his lack of interest in or concern over
the burning of the courthouse;  and (c) he had a motive to burn the courthouse in order to destroy
53

the court’s case records that would reveal his wrongdoings. 54

However, Atty. Calma disclosed that aside from Judge Larida, utility workers Ofelia Parasdas and
Romelito Fernando, Judge Young, and Marticio all had keys to the entrance doors of the courthouse
(i.e., two front doors and one back door),  and that he (Atty. Calma), along with the clerk-in-charge of
55

the civil docket Anita Goboy and criminal docket clerk Romelito Fernando, were the only ones who
had access to the records room because only they knew the location of the key to the records
room. 56

Equally notable is that the forensic report denominated as Dactyloscopy Report No. F-129-08 issued
by the Philippine National Police Cavite Provincial Crime Laboratory Office on November 21,
2008  showed that one of the latent prints lifted from the crime scene belonged to Romelito
57

Fernando, a personnel who had testified against Judge Larida during the investigation.

Judge Larida denied his supposed lack of interest in the investigation of the arson incident by
reminding that he had immediately requested the NBI to investigate the arson incident upon learning
about it.  He explained that he had refrained from further actively participating in the investigation
58

because he had been barred by the OCA from reporting for work;  that unlike the staff members of
59

RTC Branch 18 who had continued to report for work and had been interviewed by the investigating
team, he had not been summoned for any interview; and that he also learned from the NBI agents
themselves that they had been ordered to cease from further investigating the fire upon the entry of
the OCA in the investigation.60

Imputing to Judge Larida the motive to burn the courthouse in order to destroy case records that
could expose his wrongdoings was baseless and speculative. We reject the imputation. Before any
judge should be disciplined for any offense, the evidence presented against him must be competent
and derived from personal knowledge. The judge ought not to be sanctioned except upon a proper
charge, and only after due investigation and with competent proof. 61

9.
Consolidated Penalty for Judge Larida

Judge Larida has been found guilty of a less serious charge for not complying with the directive of
Administrative Circular No. 28-2008 to send an inventory of locally-funded employees to the
Supreme Court within one month from notice of the circular, and of allowing locally funded
employees to perform more than merely clerical tasks; and of a light charge for unbecoming conduct
for not causing the investigation of the solicitations of commission from a bonding company
committed by three employees assigned to his court.

It is the sense of the Court to consolidate the imposable sanctions on Judge Larida into a single
penalty of suspension from office without pay for a period of two months, to be effective immediately
upon notice.

10.

Letter-complaint of Jayson Marticio

Pursuant to the recommendation of the Investigating Justice, we dismiss the letter complaint of
Marticio for lack of substantiation by him.

WHEREFORE, the Court:

1. IMPOSES ON Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. the penalty of SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE
WITHOUT PAY FOR A PERIOD OF TWO MONTHS, to be effective immediately upon
notice, with a warning that sterner sanctions will be meted out to him upon his commission of
similar acts or omissions;

2. DISMISSES the following charges against Judge Larida, Jr. for lack of evidence to support
them, namely: (a) Extorting money from detained accused Raymund Wang; (b) Defying the
directive of the Supreme Court in Administrative Order No. 132-2008; (c) Improperly granting
bail to the accused in Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03; (d) Receiving a bribe in exchange for
granting Jayson Espiritu' s motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. TG-5307-
06; (e) Granting under questionable circumstances the petition for the issuance of owner's
duplicate copies of various certificates of title in LRC Case No. TG-06-1183; and (j)
Involvement in the fire that razed the records room of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court
in Tagaytay City; and

3. DISMISSES the letter-complaint of Jayson Marticio dated October 20, 2008 due to his lack
of interest to prosecute it.

SO ORDERED.
 RE: MELCHOR TIONGSON, HEAD WATCHER, DURING THE 2011 BAR
EXAMINATIONS

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

This is an administrative case filed against Melchor Tiongson (Tiongson), head watcher
of the 2011 bar examinations held at the University of Santo Tomas, Manila (UST), for
bringing a digital camera inside the bar examination room, in violation of the
Instructions to Head Watchers.

The Facts

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) designated Tiongson, an employee of the Court
of Appeals (CA), to serve as head watcher for the 2011 Bar Examinations on 6, 13, 20
and 27 November 2011. Tiongson, together with the designated watchers, namely,
Eleonor V. Padilla (Padilla), Christian Jay S. Puruganan (Puruganan) and Aleli M. Padre
(Padre),  were assigned to Room No. 314 of  St. Martin De Porres Building in UST.

On 13 November 2011 or during the second Sunday of the bar examinations, Tiongson
brought his digital camera inside Room No. 314. Padilla, Puruganan and Padre alleged
that after the morning examination in Civil Law, while they were counting the pages of
the questionnaire,  Tiongson took  pictures of the Civil Law questionnaire using his
digital camera. Tiongson allegedly repeated the same act and took pictures of the
Mercantile Law questionnaire after the afternoon examination.

On the same day, Padilla reported Tiongson’s actions to Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar
Confidant Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa, who immediately investigated the report.
Padilla, Puruganan and Padre subsequently executed separate affidavits confirming
Tiongson’s actions. Upon demand by the OBC to explain, Tiongson admitted that he
brought his digital camera inside the bar examination room. He explained that he did
not surrender his new digital camera to the badge counter personnel because the
counter personnel might be negligent in handling his camera.

In a Memorandum dated 16 November 2011 addressed to the CA Clerk of Court Atty.

Teresita R. Marigomen, the OBC revoked and cancelled Tiongson’s designation as head
watcher for the remaining Sundays of the bar examinations.

In a Resolution dated 10 April 2012, the Court, upon recommendation of the Committee
on Continuing Legal Education and Bar Matters, required Tiongson to file his comment.

In his Comment dated 25 May 2012, Tiongson restated his admission that he brought
his digital camera inside the bar examination room.  Tiongson reiterated his explanation
for bringing his camera and  apologized  for his infraction.

The Report and Recommendation of the OBC

In a Report and Recommendation dated 19 February 2014, the OBC recommended that
Tiongson be disqualified indefinitely from serving as bar personnel, in any capacity, in
succeeding bar examinations.1 The OBC found Tiongson guilty of dishonesty and gross
misconduct for violating a specific provision in the Instructions to Head Watchers
prohibiting the bringing of cameras to the bar examination rooms. The OBC explained
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

During the conduct of the Annual Bar Examinations, the Office of the Bar Confidant
meticulously processes the selections of qualified applicants preferably employees and
officers from the Court of Appeals, Lower Courts and Outsiders. Qualified applicants
who are considered and designated as bar personnel to serve the bar examinations are
required to attend the scheduled briefing for them to be able to know their respective
actual functions during the bar examinations, otherwise, their names would be deleted
from the lists and would no longer be allowed to serve the bar examinations. During the
briefing, the Bar Confidant explained well all the provisions in the instructions for them
to be familiarized with and to understand their respective rules in the conduct of the
Bar Examinations. They are given the Instructions setting forth their respective actual
functions as well as the provisions on the causes for disqualification, revocation and
cancellation of their designation/ appointment as bar personnel to serve the bar
examinations.

x x x Tiongson attended the required briefing. He cannot, thus, pose any reason at all
bringing his digital camera inside the bar examinations room. This is [a] crystal clear
violation of the provisions in the Bar Personnel Instructions for the 2011 Bar
Examinations. x x x.2

The Ruling of the Court

We adopt the findings of the OBC, with modification as to the penalty.

In administrative proceedings, substantial evidence is the quantum of proof required for

a finding of guilt,3  and this requirement is satisfied if the employer has reasonable
ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct. 4 Misconduct
means transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by an employee. 5  Any transgression or deviation
from the established norm of conduct, work related or not, amounts to a misconduct. 6

In the present case, the OBC has proven with substantial evidence that Tiongson
committed a misconduct by violating the Instructions to Head Watchers for the bar
examinations.

The Instructions to Head Watchers issued by the OBC clearly provide that “bringing of
cellphones and other communication gadgets, deadly weapons, cameras, tape
recorders, other radio or stereo equipment or any other electronic device is strictly
prohibited.”7 Padilla, Puruganan and Padre, who were the watchers present in the
same examination room, attested that they witnessed Tiongson’s violation of this
provision during the second Sunday of the bar examinations.  Upon being called by the
OBC, Tiongson admitted that he indeed brought a digital camera inside the bar
examination room. Thus, we find that Tiongson’s transgression of the rules issued by
the OBC amounts to misconduct.
We, however, disagree with the OBC’s recommendation that Tiongson’s infraction
amounted to gross misconduct and dishonesty.

Misconduct is grave if corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
an established rule is present; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. 8 If any of the
elements to qualify the misconduct as grave is not manifest and is not proven by
substantial evidence, a person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable for
simple misconduct.9  On the other hand, dishonesty refers to a person’s disposition “to
lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty,
probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray.”10

We hold Tiongson liable for simple misconduct only, because the elements of grave
misconduct were not proven with substantial evidence, and Tiongson admitted his
infraction before the OBC.

The Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service 11 classify simple
misconduct as a less grave offense punishable by suspension for one month and one
day to six months for the first offense.  Under the same Rules,12 we can consider
Tiongson’s length of service in the CA of 14 years, more than ten years of service in the
bar examinations and his first time to commit an infraction as mitigating circumstances
in the imposition of penalty. Accordingly, we impose upon Tiongson the penalty of
suspension of one month and one day with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

As a CA employee, Tiongson disregarded his duty to uphold the strict standards

required of every court employee, that is, to be an example of integrity, uprightness
and obedience to the judiciary. Thus, he must be reminded that his infraction was
unbecoming of a court employee amounting to simple misconduct.

Finally, the Instructions to Head Watchers provide that any violation of the instructions
shall be a sufficient cause for disqualification from serving for the remainder of the
examinations and in future examinations. Thus, we modify the recommended penalty of
the OBC from indefinite disqualification to permanent disqualification from serving as
bar personnel, in any capacity, in succeeding bar examinations.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds MELCHOR TIONGSON, Clerk IV of the Court of

Appeals, GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT for violating the Instructions to Head
Watchers issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant. He is SUSPENDED for one month
and one day with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future
shall be dealt with more severely. He is also PERMANENTLY DISQUALIFIED from
serving as bar personnel, in any capacity, in succeeding bar examinations.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1806               April 7, 2014
(Formerly A.M. No. 11-4-36-MTCC)

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE BORROMEO R. BUSTAMANTE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, ALAMINOS
CITY, PANGASINAN, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The present administrative matter arose from the judicial audit of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, then presided by Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante
(Bustamante). Judge Bustamante retired on November 6, 2010.

Considering the impending retirement of Judge Bustamante, a judicial audit of the MTCC was
conducted on September 21, 2010 by a team from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In a
Memorandum  dated October 6, 2010, Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Raul Bautista Villanueva
1

(Villanueva) informed Judge Bustamante of the initial audit findings that, as of audit date, there were
35 cases for decision (21 of which were already beyond the reglementary period) and 23 cases with
pending incidents for resolution (19 of which were already beyond the reglementary period) in Judge
Bustamante’s court. At the end of his Memorandum, DCA Villanueva gave Judge Bustamante the
following directives:

1. EXPLAIN in writing within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof your failure to: [a] decide
within the reglementary period Civil Case Nos. 1847, 1870, 1937, 1978, 2056 and 2205,
LRC Nos. 28, 65 and 70, and Criminal Case Nos. 5428, 6468, 6469, 6558, 7222, 7721,
8163, 8390, 8395, 8654, 9022 and 9288; and, [b] resolve the incidents in Civil Case Nos.
1668 and 2132, Criminal Case Nos. 8004, 8005, 8006, 8580, 9015, 9016, 9190, 9191, 9196,
9232 and 9235;

2. DECIDE with dispatch the cases enumerated in item (I) above, and to SUBMIT copies of
the decisions to this Office within three (3) days after your compulsory retirement; and

3. RESOLVE with dispatch the incidents for resolution in the cases enumerated in item (II)
above, and to SUBMIT copies of the resolution to this Office within the same period indicated
in the immediately preceding paragraph. 2

Judge Bustamante submitted a letter  dated November 8, 2010,  addressed to DCA Villanueva, in
3 4

which he explained:

I have the honor to inform you that I have decided all the cases, Civil, LRC and Criminal Cases
submitted before my last day in office on November 5, 2010 except Civil Cases Nos. 1937 (Bustillo
vs. Sps. Rabago) and 2056 (Cale vs. Pader, et al.) because of lack of TSN taken when I was not yet
the Presiding Judge. I found out that there is [a] need to retake the testimonies of the witness
concerned so as to attain substantial justice.

As to why I failed to decide the said cases within the reglementary period, it was because of the
volume of work in this court. As it was noticed by the Auditors when they came over to audit, I have
already started deciding with drafts attached to the records but I was overtaken by more pressing
matters that I have to take immediate attention, like urgent motions, motions to dismiss, motions to
quash, approval of bails. All of these are in addition to my trial duties.

I have to work as early as 7:30 o’clock in the morning, and sometimes at 7:00 o’clock, with the desire
to finish everything on time. I burned my candle at night just [to] comply with my duties within the
time frame but because of human frailties, I failed to do so on time because as I said[,] of the volume
of work in this court. But nonetheless I have decided all the cases submitted for decision before I
retired except, as above stated, Civil Cases Nos. 1737 and 2056 because of the reasons already
stated.

Judge Bustamante further accounted for the cases with incidents for resolution, as follows:

In Civil Cases, I have resolved the demurrer to evidence in Civil Cases Nos. 1668 and 2132.
However, the motion to dismiss by defendant Celeste in Civil Case No. 2222, considering the
opposition of the plaintiff because of their counterclaim, I believed the motion needs further hearing,
hence, the motion was not resolved. Similarly, the motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 2254 needs
further hearing, and if no order setting the motion for hearing, it may be an oversight because of the
submission of several cases for decision almost at the same time.

In Criminal Cases, I have resolved the demurrer to evidence in Crim. Cases Nos. 9015 & 9016
(People vs. Paltep vda. De Perio) and Crim. Cases Nos. 9148 & 9149 (People vs. Anselmo, Jr.)
while Crim. Case No. 9196 was set for further hearing.

On the motion to suspend proceedings in Crim. Cases Nos. 9190 & 9191, it may have been an
oversight because these cases are the off-shoots of Civil Case No. 2222 and pre-trial conference for
the marking of documentary evidence has been subsequently set but the counsel for the accused
failed to appear.

The motion to dismiss in Crim. Cases Nos. 8615, 8616 & 8617, was not resolved because of the
prayer of the parties in open court for them to await the resolution of the civil cases they filed before
the Regional Trial Court, as they are working for the settlement of these civil cases, which may have
[an] effect in these cases.

The other incidents were set for hearing so that the court could judiciously resolve the matter. 5

In support of his compliance, Judge Bustamante submitted to the OCA copies of the decisions and
resolutions he referred to in his letter.

The OCA submitted to the Court its Memorandum  dated March 24, 2011, reporting viz:
6

(1) Judge Bustamante had decided 33 out of the 35 cases for decision in his court. Of the 33
cases decided by Judge Bustamante, 13 were still within the reglementary period while 20
were already beyond the reglementary period. Of the 20 cases Judge Bustamante had
decided beyond the reglementary period, 10 were decided more than a year after their
respective due dates (ranging from 1 year and 8 days to 4 years and 7 months beyond the
due dates) and 10 were decided within a year after their respective due dates (ranging from
5 days to 6 months beyond the due dates).

(2) Judge Bustamante had also resolved 6 out of the 23 cases with pending incidents in his
court, all of which were resolved beyond their respective reglementary periods (ranging from
 5 days to 3 years, 8 months, and 16 days after the due dates). As for the 17 other cases with
pending incidents in his court, Judge Bustamante reasoned that (a) the motions require
further hearing; (b) there is a need to await the resolution of other cases pending before
other courts; and (c) oversight. The OCA noted, though, that Judge Bustamante failed to
submit any order setting the pending incidents for hearing or holding in abeyance the
resolution of the same until the related cases before other courts have already been decided.

Unconvinced by Judge Bustamante’s explanations/reasons for his delay in deciding cases and
resolving pending incidents, the OCA recommended that:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, we respectfully recommend that retired Judge Borromeo R.

Bustamante, formerly of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, be FINED in
the amount of ₱20,000.00 for gross inefficiency.

In a Resolution  dated February 8, 2012, the case was re-docketed as a regular administrative
7

matter.

Judge Bustamante wrote the Court a letter dated July 3, 2013, stating that although he already
retired from the service on November 6, 2010, he has yet to receive his retirement benefits (except
for his accumulated leave credits), because of the pendency of the instant administrative matter
against him. Consequently, Judge Bustamante prayed that the administrative matter be resolved
soonest so he could already receive his retirement benefits or that his retirement benefits be
released but a certain amount commensurate to the fine that the Court might impose be withheld.

The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.

Decision-making, among other duties, is the primordial and most important duty of a member of the
bench. The speedy disposition of cases in the courts is a primary aim of the judiciary so the ends of
justice may not be compromised and the judiciary will be true to its commitment to provide litigants
their constitutional right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of their cases.
8

The Constitution, Code of Judicial Conduct, and jurisprudence consistently mandate that a judge
must decide cases within 90 days from submission. As the Court summed up in Re: Report on the
Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Br. 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar : 9

Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution states that judges must decide all cases within three
months from the date of submission. In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (Branch 1), Surigao City, the Court held that:

A judge is mandated to render a decision not more than 90 days from the time a case is submitted
for decision. Judges are to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the
period specified in the Constitution, that is, 3 months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or
memorandum. Failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against
the defaulting judge, absent sufficient justification for his non-compliance therewith.

Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should administer justice
without delay. Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 states that judges shall dispose of the court's business promptly
and decide cases within the required periods. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana, the
Court held that:
A judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without an extension
granted by this Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required period constitutes
gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.

The Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Canon 3, Rule 3.05 mandates judges to attend promptly
to the business of the court and decide cases within the periods prescribed by law and the Rules.
Under the 1987 Constitution, lower court judges are also mandated to decide cases within 90 days
from submission.

Judges must closely adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct in order to preserve the integrity,
competence and independence of the judiciary and make the administration of justice more efficient.
Time and again, we have stressed the need to strictly observe this duty so as not to negate our
efforts to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long
plagued our courts.

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Garcia-Blanco, the Court held that the 90-day reglementary
period is mandatory. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period constitutes a ground for
administrative liability except when there are valid reasons for the delay. (Citation omitted.)

This Court has always emphasized the need for judges to decide cases within the constitutionally
prescribed 90-day period. Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives
the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Not only does it magnify the cost of
seeking justice, it undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards,
and brings it to disrepute.
10

A member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service to the 90-day requirement; he/she should
instead persevere in its implementation.  Heavy caseload and demanding workload are not valid
11

reasons to fall behind the mandatory period for disposition of cases.  The Court usually allows
12

reasonable extensions of time to decide cases in view of the heavy caseload of the trial courts. If a
judge is unable to comply with the 90-day reglementary period for deciding cases or matters, he/she
can, for good reasons, ask for an extension and such request is generally granted.  But Judge
13

Bustamante did not ask for an extension in any of these cases. Having failed to decide a case within
the required period, without any order of extension granted by the Court, Judge Bustamante is liable
for undue delay that merits administrative sanction.1âwphi1

Equally unacceptable for the Court is Judge Bustamante’s explanation that he failed to decide Civil
Case Nos. 1937 and 2056 because of the lack of Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN). These
two cases were allegedly heard when he was not yet the presiding judge of the MTCC. Relevant
herein is the ruling of the Court in Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan : 14

The Constitution provides that a case shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
In Administrative Circular No. 28, dated July 3, 1989, the Supreme Court provided that "A case is
considered submitted for decision upon the admission of the evidence of the parties at the
termination of the trial. The ninety (90) days period for deciding the case shall commence to run from
submission of the case for decision without memoranda; in case the court requires or allows its filing,
the case shall be considered submitted for decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or the
expiration of the period to do so, whichever is earlier. Lack of transcript of stenographic notes shall
not be a valid reason to interrupt or suspend the period for deciding the case unless the case was
previously heard by another judge not the deciding judge in which case the latter shall have the full
period of ninety (90) days from the completion of the transcripts within which to decide the same." x
x x (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
The OCA reported that contrary to his claim, Judge Bustamante substantially heard Civil Case Nos.
1937 and 2056, until the two cases were submitted for decision on November 20, 2009 and
February 27, 2010, respectively. Even if it were true that the two cases were heard by the previous
presiding judge of the MTCC, there is no showing that from the time the cases had been submitted
for decision until Judge Bustamante’s retirement on November 6, 2010, Judge Bustamante made an
effort to have the TSN completed. Although technically, the 90-day period would have started to run
only upon the completion of the TSN, the Court finds Judge Bustamante’s lack of effort to have the
TSN completed as the root cause for the delay in deciding the two cases.

The Court is likewise unconvinced that the pending incidents in several cases were left unresolved
because of the need for further hearings in the same. The incidents were already submitted for
resolution and, as the OCA observed, Judge Bustamante only saw the need for further hearings in
said cases after the conduct of the judicial audit. In addition, Judge Bustamante did not submit any
order setting the cases for hearing.

Least acceptable of Judge Bustamante’s explanations for his delay in deciding cases and/or
resolving pending incidents was oversight. A judge is responsible, not only for the dispensation of
justice but also for managing his court efficiently to ensure the prompt delivery of court services.
Since he is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions, he should
know the cases submitted to him for decision or resolution, especially those pending for more than
90 days.15

There is no dispute that Judge Bustamante failed to decide cases and resolve pending incidents
within the reglementary period, and without authorized extension from the Court and valid reason for
such failure, Judge Bustamante is administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision or
order.

Under the amendments to Rule 140  of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or
16

order is a less serious charge, for which the respondent judge shall be penalized with either (a)
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three
months; or (b) a fine of more than ₱10,000.00, but not more than ₱20,000.00.

Considering the significant number of cases and pending incidents left undecided/unresolved or
decided/resolved beyond the reglementary period by Judge Bustamante; as well as the fact that
Judge Bustamante had already retired and can no longer be dismissed or suspended, it is
appropriate to impose upon him a penalty of a fine amounting to ₱20,000.00, to be deducted from
his retirement benefits.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds retired Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante, former Presiding Judge of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, GUILTY of undue delay in rendering
decisions and orders, and imposes upon him a FINE of ₱20,000.00, to be deducted from his
retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200               April 2, 2014
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)

ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Decision the administrative complaints  filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana

1

(complainant) against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent), Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
2, Batangas City.

The records show that the administrative complaints arose from the case "In the Matter of the
Petition to have Steel Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate Rehabilitation with
Prayer for the Approval of the Proposed Rehabilitation Plan," docketed as SP. Proc. No. 06-7993,
where the respondent was the presiding judge. The complainant was the Executive Vice President
and Chief Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP), a company then under
rehabilitation proceedings.

i. Complaint

In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the complainant alleged that in the course of SP.
Proc. No. 06-7993, the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of
Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the Performance of Duty, Grave
Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe the
Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as shown by the
following instances:

1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver over
SCP’s objections and despite serious conflict of interest in being the duly appointed
rehabilitation receiver for SCP and, at the same time, the external legal counsel of most of
SCP’s creditors; he is also a partner of the law firm that he engaged as legal adviser.

2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as "consultative

meetings" in her Order  dated May 11, 2007) in places outside her official jurisdiction (i.e., a
2

first class golf club, a hotel and sports club facilities in Metro Manila) and where she
arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters and features of the rehabilitation plan she wanted
to approve for SCP. She also announced in the meetings that she would prepare the
rehabilitation plan for SCP.

3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the
respondent dictated to him. Thus, the respondent exceeded the limits of her authority and
effectively usurped and pre-empted the rehabilitation receiver’s exercise of functions.

4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-record so
that there would be no record that she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).
 5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss the case
without the knowledge and presence of SCP and its creditors.

6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza’s financial adviser
and, at the same time, as her financial adviser to guide her in the formulation and
development of the rehabilitation plan, for a fee of ₱3.5M at SCP’s expense. Anonas is also
the cousin-in-law of the managing partner of Atty. Gabionza’s law firm.

7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against SCP,

leading to EPCIB’s filing of a motion to create a management committee.

8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (so that SCP
could confront EPCIB’s witnesses to prove the allegation that there was a need for the
creation of a management committee), the respondent denied SCP’s requests and delayed
the issuance of the order until the last minute.

9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCP’s counsel, Atty.
Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every attempt to speak; refused to recognize his
appearances in court; and made condescending and snide remarks.

10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Interim
Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the rehabilitation plan
beyond the 180 days given to her in the Rules, without asking for permission to extend the
period from the Supreme Court (SC).

11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules (the
court’s power to approve the rehabilitation plan) to include the power to amend, modify and
alter it.

12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter in
EPCIB’s favor and made comments and rulings in the proceedings that raised concerns
regarding her impartiality.

13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special interest and
personal involvement in the case.

ii. Supplemental Complaint

The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint  dated April 14, 2008 where he alleged that
3

the respondent committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her photographs in a social
networking website called "Friendster" and posted her personal details as an RTC Judge, allegedly
for the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also posed with her upper body barely covered
by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st Indorsement  dated March 18, 2008, referred
4

the complaints to the respondent for comment.

a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint

The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she admitted that she crafted
a workable, feasible rehabilitation plan best suited for SCP, she maintained that she did so only to
render fairness and equity to all the parties to the rehabilitation proceedings. She also submitted that
if indeed she erred in modifying the rehabilitation plan, hers was a mere error of judgment that does
not call for an administrative disciplinary action. Accordingly, she claimed that the administrative
complaints were premature because judicial remedies were still available. 5

The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit informal meetings and conferences. On
the contrary, she argued that informal meetings are even encouraged in view of the summary and
non-adversarial nature of rehabilitation proceedings. Since Section 21, Rule 4 of the Rules  gives the
6

rehabilitation receiver the power to meet with the creditors, then there is all the more reason for the
rehabilitation judge, who has the authority to approve the plan, to call and hold meetings with the
parties. She also pointed out that it was SCP which suggested that informal meetings be called and
that she only agreed to hold these meetings on the condition that all the parties would attend.

As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period, she contended that she approved the
rehabilitation plan within the period prescribed by law. She argued that the matter of granting
extension of time under Section 11, Rule 4 of the Rules  pertains not to the SC, but to the
7

rehabilitation court.

The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias and partiality. First, she claimed that her
denial of the complainant’s motion for inhibition was not due to any bias or prejudice on her part but
due to lack of basis. Second, she argued that her decision was not orchestrated to favor EPCIB, as
evidenced by the fact that EPCIP itself (as some other creditors did) promptly appealed her decision
to the Court of Appeals (CA). Third, she did not remove Atty. Gabionza as SCP’s rehabilitation
receiver because she disagreed that the grounds the complainant raised warranted his removal.

She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of interest. Lastly, she maintained that the rest of
the complainant’s allegations were not substantiated and corroborated by evidence.

The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely abuse her authority in not issuing a
subpoena as Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation of the Rules
specifically states that the court may decide matters on the basis of affidavits and other documentary
evidence.

On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained that the allegations were not proven and
substantiated by evidence. Finally, the respondent also believed that there was nothing improper in
expressing her ideas during the informal meetings.

b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental Complaint

In her comment  on the supplemental complaint, the respondent submitted that the photos she
8

posted in the social networking website "Friendster" could hardly be considered vulgar or lewd. She
added that an "off-shouldered" attire is an acceptable social outfit under contemporary standards
and is not forbidden. She further stated that there is no prohibition against attractive ladies being
judges; she is proud of her photo for having been aesthetically made. Lastly, she submitted that the
ruling of the Court in the case of Impao v. Judge Makilala  should not be applied to her case since
9

the facts are different.

On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a reply,  insisting that the respondent’s acts of posting
10

"seductive" pictures and maintaining a "Friendster" account constituted acts of impropriety, in

violation of Rules 2.01,  2.02  and 2.03,  Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
11 12 13
In a Resolution  dated September 9, 2009, the Court re-docketed the complaints as regular
14

administrative matters, and referred them to the CA for investigation, report and recommendation.

The CA’s Report and Recommendation

On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, the Investigating Justice, conducted a
hearing, followed by the submission of memoranda by both parties. In her January 4, 2010 Report
and Recommendation,  Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complaints were partly meritorious.
15

She found that the issues raised were judicial in nature since these involved the respondent’s
appreciation of evidence.

She also added that while the CA resolved to set aside the respondent’s decision in the rehabilitation
proceedings, it was not by reason of her ignorance of the law or abuse of authority, but because the
rehabilitation plan could no longer be implemented in view of SCP’s financial predicament.

On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings, Justice
Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complainant failed to present any clear and convincing proof that the
respondent intentionally and deliberately acted against SCP’s interests; the complaint merely relied
on his opinions and surmises.

On the matter of the respondent’s inhibition, she noted that in cases not covered by the rule on
mandatory inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies within the discretion of the sitting judge and is
primarily a matter of conscience.

With respect to the respondent’s informal meetings, Justice Gonzales-Sison found nothing irregular
despite the out-of-court meetings as these were agreed upon by all the parties, including SCP’s
creditors. She also found satisfactory the respondent’s explanation in approving the rehabilitation
plan beyond the 180-day period prescribed by the Rules.

The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the respondent’s unnecessary

bickering with SCP’s legal counsel and ruled that her exchanges and utterances were reflective of
arrogance and superiority. In the words of the Justice Gonzales-Sison:

Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she instead brushed off the matter with what
would appear to be a conceited show of a prerogative of her office, a conduct that falls below the
standard of decorum expected of a judge. Her statements appear to be done recklessly and were
uncalled for. xxx. Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary states that: judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court
and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others whom
the judge deals in an official capacity. Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their
language at all times. Failure on this regard amounts to a conduct unbecoming of a judge, for which
Judge Austria should be held liable. 16

On the respondent’s Friendster account, she believes that her act of maintaining a personal social
networking account (displaying photos of herself and disclosing personal details as a magistrate in
the account) – even during these changing times when social networking websites seem to be the
trend – constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be legally justified by the public’s acceptance
of this type of conduct. She explained that propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to
the performance of all the activities of a judge and that judges shall conduct themselves in a manner
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CA’s May 16, 2006 Decision  in CA-G.R. SP No. 100941
17

finding that the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the creation of a
management committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing in accordance with the
procedures prescribed under the Rules. She ruled that such professional incompetence was
tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and recommended a fine of ₱20,000.00.
She also recommended that the respondent be admonished for failing to observe strict propriety and
judicial decorum required by her office.

The Action and Recommendation of the OCA

In its Memorandum  dated September 4, 2013, the OCA recommended the following:
18

RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court

that:

1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of Investigating Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison be

NOTED;

2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, Branch 2, Regional Trial Court, Batangas City,
Batangas, be found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a judge and for violation of Section 6,
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct;

3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos

(Php20,000.00); and

4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of impropriety

with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or any similar act will be dealt with more
severely.19

In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not guilty of gross
ignorance of the law as the complainant failed to prove that her orders were motivated by bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty or corruption.

The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings
were not supported by evidence. It accepted the respondent’s explanation in the charge of failure to
observe the reglementary period.

Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and gross incompetence
are judicial in nature, hence, they should not be the subject of disciplinary action. On the other hand,
on allegations of conduct unbecoming of a judge, violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety, the OCA shared Justice Gonzales-Sison’s
observations that the respondent’s act of posting seductive photos in her Friendster account
contravened the standard of propriety set forth by the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the imposition
of a fine on the respondent but modify the amount as indicated below. We sustain Justice Gonzales-
Sison’s finding of gross ignorance of the law in so far as the respondent ordered the creation of a
management committee without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The absence of a hearing was a
matter of basic due process that no magistrate should be forgetful or careless about.
On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority;
Irregularity in the Performance of Duty; Grave
Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection

It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the
averments of his complaint by substantial evidence.  In the present case, the allegations of grave
20

abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack of
circumspection are devoid of merit because the complainant failed to establish the respondent’s bad
faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere conjectures
and suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations.
"[M]ere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof." 21

"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent judge may not be held administratively liable for
gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial
functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases."22

Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are, at
best, legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are readily
available to the complainant. "An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every
irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such
as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal."  Errors committed by him/her in the exercise of
23

adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should be

assailed instead through judicial remedies. 24

On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality

We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on the part of the respondent baseless. The
truth about the respondent’s alleged partiality cannot be determined by simply relying on the
complainant’s verified complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a
judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to the person,
and to give equal right to the poor and rich.  There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove
25

the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. 26

In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances cited
by the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The complainant, too, failed to
adduce proof indicating the respondent’s predisposition to decide the case in favor of one party. This
kind of evidence would have helped its cause. The bare allegations of the complainant cannot
overturn the presumption that the respondent acted regularly and impartially. We thus conclude that
due to the complainant’s failure to establish with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the allegations of
bias and partiality must fail.

On the Charges of Grave Incompetence

and Gross Ignorance of the Law

We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance
of his official duties renders him liable.  "[A]s a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty
27

or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even
though such acts are erroneous." 28

In the present case, what was involved was the respondent’s application of Section 23, Rule 4 of the
Rules, which provides:
Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even over
the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the
rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable. 29

The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza, subject to the
modifications she found necessary to make the plan viable. The complainant alleged that in
modifying the plan, she exceeded her authority and effectively usurped the functions of a
rehabilitation receiver. We find, however, that in failing to show that the respondent was motivated
by bad faith or ill motives in rendering the assailed decision, the charge of gross ignorance of the law
against her should be dismissed. "To [rule] otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for
no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment." 30

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision, order or actuation of the
judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. It must
also be proven that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption  or had committed
31

an error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.

In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated by bad faith,
fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision approving the modified
rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare accusations, the complainant failed to substantiate his
allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed  and this Court cannot conclude
32

that bad faith intervened when none was actually proven.

With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the creation of a management committee
without first conducting an evidentiary hearing for the purpose, however, we find the error to be so
egregious as to amount to bad faith, leading to the conclusion of gross ignorance of the law, as
charged.

Due process and fair play are basic requirements that no less than the Constitution demands. In
rehabilitation proceedings, the parties must first be given an opportunity to prove (or disprove) the
existence of an imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of the debtor-company’s
assets and properties that are or may be prejudicial to the interest of minority stockholders, parties-
litigants or the general public.  The rehabilitation court should hear both sides, allow them to present
33

proof and conscientiously deliberate, based on their submissions, on whether the appointment of a
management receiver is justified. This is a very basic requirement in every adversarial proceeding
that no judge or magistrate can disregard.

In SCP’s rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not given at all the opportunity to present its evidence,
nor to confront the EPCIB witnesses. Significantly, the CA, in its May 16, 2006 decision, found that
the respondent’s act of denying SCP the opportunity to disprove the grounds for the appointment of
a management committee was tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. As aptly observed by
Justice Gonzales-Sison:

[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in creating a MANCOM without observing the
procedures prescribed under the IRPGICC clearly constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction.34

Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous order
that he renders, this does not mean that a judge need not observe due care in the performance of
his/her official functions.  When a basic principle of law is involved and when an error is so gross
35

and patent, error can produce an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance
of the law.  On this basis, we conclude that the respondent’s act of promptly ordering the creation of
36

a management committee, without the benefit of a hearing and despite the demand for one, was
tantamount to punishable professional incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.

On the Ground of Failure to Observe

the Reglementary Period

On the respondent’s failure to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Rules, we find the
respondent’s explanation to be satisfactory.

Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:

Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. – xxx

The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the lapse of
one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The court may grant an extension
beyond this period only if it appears by convincing and compelling evidence that the debtor may
successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance, however, shall the period for approving or disapproving
a rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen (18) months from the date of filing of the petition.37

Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the extension beyond the 180-day period carried
a good measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate with particularity whether the rehabilitation court
could act by itself or whether Supreme Court approval was still required. Only recently was this
uncertainty clarified when A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, the 2008 Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation, took effect.

Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:

Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall decide the petition within one (1) year from
the date of filing of the petition, unless the court, for good cause shown, is able to secure an
extension of the period from the Supreme Court. 38

Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the respondent’s approval of
the rehabilitation plan on December 3, 2007), we find no basis to hold the respondent liable for the
extension she granted and for the consequent delay.

On the Ground of Conduct

Unbecoming of a Judge

On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct states that:

SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the
judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court
staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.
39

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence
and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark
judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint.  He should choose his words and exercise
40
more caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of
gravitas.
41

As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas,  a judge should be
42

considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court; he should always keep his
passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. Furthermore, a
magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering
harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments.

Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon,  the Court declared that "although
43

respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in the
bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of court.

Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in
language."

Accordingly, the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s legal counsel, her expressions of
exasperation over trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide remarks, as well as her
condescending attitude, are conduct that the Court cannot allow. They are displays of arrogance and
air of superiority that the Code abhors.

Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent failed to observe judicial
temperament and to conduct herself irreproachably. She also failed to maintain the decorum
required by the Code and to use temperate language befitting a magistrate. "As a judge, [she]
should ensure that [her] conduct is always above reproach and perceived to be so by a reasonable
observer. [She] must never show conceit or even an appearance thereof, or any kind of
impropriety."44

Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and thus violated Section 6,
Canon 6 and Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

On the Ground of Impropriety

We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking sites in the Internet – a new
medium through which more and more Filipinos communicate with each other.  While judges are not
45

prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in social networking activities, we remind
them that they do not thereby shed off their status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the
same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday
activities. It is in this light that we judge the respondent in the charge of impropriety when she posted
her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.

Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge from
joining or maintaining an account in a social networking site such as Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to
freedom of expression. This right "includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and
impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers."  Joining a social networking
46
site is an exercise of one’s freedom of expression. The respondent judge’s act of joining Friendster
is, therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative
restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct
themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary.

This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their activities, whether
it be in the course of their judicial office or in their personal lives. In particular, Sections 1 and 2 of
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit impropriety and even the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities:

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial
office.

Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and appearance of
propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an "off-shouldered"
suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing.

To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must bear in
mind that what they communicate – regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of his or her
judicial duties – creates and contributes to the people’s opinion not just of the judge but of the entire
Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is especially true when the posts the judge makes are
viewable not only by his or her family and close friends, but by acquaintances and the general
public.

Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire she wore to
her family and close friends, but when she made this picture available for public consumption, she
placed herself in a situation where she, and the status she holds as a judge, may be the object of the
public’s criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber communications, particularly its speedy and wide-
scale character, renders this rule necessary.

We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem harmless and
inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As the visible
personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and thus
must accordingly comport themselves. 47

This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal matters.  The
1âwphi1

very nature of their functions requires behavior under exacting standards of morality, decency and
propriety; both in the performance of their duties and their daily personal lives, they should be
beyond reproach.  Judges necessarily accept this standard of conduct when they take their oath of
48

office as magistrates.

Imposable Penalty
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross
ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of the same
Rule, a serious charge merits any of the following sanctions:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations; provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3), but not
exceeding six (6), months; or

3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00, but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.

On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following:
(1) A fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and
( 4) Admonition with warning.

Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been administratively charged or found liable for
any wrongdoing in the past. Since this is her first offense, the Court finds it fair and proper to temper
the penalty for her offenses.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE
LAW for which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (₱21,000,00). Judge Austria is likewise
hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT
UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9317               June 4, 2014
(Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3615)

ADELIA V. QUIACHON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSEPH ADORA. RAMOS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ:

This is a disbarment case filed by Adelia V. Quiachon (complainant), against her lawyer, Atty.
Joseph Ador A. Ramos (respondent). The latter represented complainant, who was then the plaintiff
in a labor case filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and in a special
proceeding case filed before the Regional Trial Court (R TC).  Complainant charges respondent with
1

gross negligence and deceit in violation of Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.2

The Labor Arbiter (LA) granted complainant a favorable decision on 26 November 2007. Upon
appeal, it was reversed and set aside by the NLRC in its Decision dated 25 July 2008.  On 24
3

October 2008, the NLRC also denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on
complainant's behalf. A Petition for Certiorari was filed before the Court of Appeals (CA), but it
affirmed the NLRC's reversal of the LA's Decision. The Notice of the CA Decision was received by
respondent on 23 November 2010.

After the Petition was filed before the CA, complainant would always ask respondent about the
status of her case. The latter always told her that there was no decision yet.

Sometime in August 2011, while complainant was in respondent’s office waiting for him to arrive, she
noticed a mailman delivering an envelope with the title of her labor case printed thereon. 4

Complainant asked the secretary of respondent to open the envelope and was surprised to discover
that it contained the Entry of Judgment of the CA’s Decision. Thereafter, complainant tried
repeatedly to contact respondent, but to no avail. When she finally got to talk to him, respondent
assured her that "it was alright" as they still had six months to appeal the case to the Supreme
Court. After that final meeting, no updates on the labor case were ever communicated to
complainant.

With respect to the special proceeding case, the RTC of Roxas City dismissed it for lack of
jurisdiction. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed, but it was also denied. Once again, respondent
did nothing to reverse the RTC Decision. Consequently, the Entry of Judgment was received on 28
October 2008.

On 28 November 2011, complainant filed the instant disbarment Complaint  against respondent.
5

In his Comment,  respondent averred that complainant was informed of the status of the case. He
6

claimed that he had told complainant that he "cannot cite any error of law or abuse of discretion on
the part of the Court of Appeals’ decision that necessitates a Petition for Review with the Supreme
Court;"  thus, he supposedly advised her to "respect the decision of the Court of
7
Appeals."  Respondent prayed that a Decision be rendered dismissing the instant disbarment
8

Complaint for lack of merit.

In a Resolution  dated 13 June 2012, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
9

Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

During the pendency of the proceedings, specifically on 5 February 2013, complainant filed a Motion
to Withdraw Complaint. 10

In his Report and Recommendation dated 23 April 2013, IBP Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda
(Almeyda) declared:

True enough, it seems clear that respondent had been remiss in failing to update complainant in
what had happened to the cases being handled by respondent in behalf of complainant. There was a
failure to inform complainant (the client) of the status of the cases that thereafter prevented the client
from exercising her options. There was neglect in that regard. 11

However, in spite of finding neglect on respondent’s part, he recommended the dismissal of the case
against him, stating that "with the decision to withdraw the complaint, there does not appear basis to
go ahead with the proceedings since without the complaint, there will be no basis to make any
finding of liability."
12

On 11 May 2013, a Resolution was passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP resolving to adopt
and approve the Report and Recommendation of investigation commissioner Almeyda. The case
against respondent was dismissed with a warning that a repetition of the same act shall be dealt with
more severely.

This Court finds this to be an opportune time to remind the investigating commissioners and the
members of the Board of Governors of the IBP that the withdrawal of a disbarment case against a
lawyer does not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue an
administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar. 13

In the present case, Almeyda recommended the dismissal of the case against respondent, even
after finding that the latter had been negligent. On the basis of this finding, the latter was declared to
have "been remiss in failing to update complainant in what had happened to the cases being
handled by him in behalf of complainant."  Still, Almeyda recommended the dismissal of the case,
14

because "without the complaint, there will be no basis to make any finding of liability." 15

The Board of Governors of the IBP affirmed the recommendation.

The IBP Board of Governors should not have supported Almeyda’s stance.

The complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought
the matter to the attention of the Court.  There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary
16

proceedings against lawyers. The real question for determination in these proceedings is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar.  Public
17

interest is the primary objective. We explained why in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos,  viz.:18

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in
any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of
interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts
borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven x x
x. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good
citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants,
the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his
withdrawal of the charges x x x.

In this case, the IBP found that respondent violated Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.  Thus, it should have imposed the appropriate penalty despite the
1âwphi1

desistance of complainant or the withdrawal of the charges.

The failure of respondent to file an appeal from the CA Decision without any justifiable reason
deserves sanction. Lawyers who disagree with the pursuit of an appeal should properly withdraw
their appearance and allow their client to retain another counsel. 19

In Abay v. Montesino,  the respondent-lawyer and his client disagreed on the legal course to be
20

taken regarding the appealed case. The lawyer therein strongly advised the client to abandon the
appeal and to consider the other available remedies. The client, on the other hand, wanted to pursue
it. Without obtaining the assent of his client, the respondent-lawyer deemed it wise to abandon the
appeal without informing the former. In finding the respondent-lawyer guilty of negligence, the Court
explained:

Not filing an appellant's brief is prejudicial because, as happened in this case, such failure could
result in the dismissal of the appeal. The conduct of respondent shows that he failed to exercise due
diligence, and that he had a cavalier attitude towards the cause of his client. The abandonment by
the former of the latter's cause made him unworthy of the trust that his client reposed in him. Even if
respondent was "honestly and sincerely" protecting the interests of complainant, the former still had
no right to waive the appeal without the latter's knowledge and consent. If indeed respondent felt
unable or unwilling to continue his retainership, he should have properly withdrawn his appearance
and allowed the client to appoint another lawyer. 21

In the present case, respondent failed not only to keep the client informed of the status of the case,
but also to avail of the proper legal remedy that would promote the client's cause. It is clear that
respondent neglected the case entrusted to him.

All lawyers owe fidelity to their client's cause.  Regardless of their personal views, they must present
22

every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of that cause. 23

Whenever lawyers take on their clients' cause/s, they covenant that they will exercise due diligence
in protecting the client's rights; their failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention
expected of a good father of a family makes them unworthy of the trust reposed in them by their
client/s and make them answerable to the client, the courts and society. 24

In Pilapil v. Carillo,  this Court upheld the recommendation of the IBP to suspend a lawyer from the
25

practice of law for six months after finding that he had failed to file a petition for certiorari of the
adverse decision rendered in the case of his client despite the latter's repeated follow-ups.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos is found GUILTY of negligence and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is
WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney. Further, let copies of
this Decision be served on the IBP as well as on the court administrator, who is directed to circulate
these copies to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED
A.C. No. 9881               June 4, 2014
(Formerly CBD 10-2607)

ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. MANUEL T. MOLINA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ:

For resolution by this Court is the dismissal by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of
Governors of the administrative Complaint for DISHONESTY against respondent, Atty. Manuel
Molina. Atty. Molina allegedly advised his clients to enforce a contract on the complainant's client
who had never been a party to the agreement.

The facts are as follows:

The case involves a conflict between neighbors in a four-unit compound named "Times Square" at
Times Street, Quezon City. The neighbors are the following: 1) Mr. And Mrs. Gregorio M. Abreu,
clients of Atty. Paguia; 2) Mr. And Mrs. Wilson Lim, clients of respondent Molina; 3) Dr. and Mrs.
Eduardo Yap; and Dr. Belinda San Juan.

The clients of Atty. Molina entered into a contract with the other unit owners save for Mr. Abreu. The
agreement, covered by a document titled "Times Square Preamble," establishes a set of internal
rules for the neighbors on matters such as the use of the common right of way to the exit gate,
assignment of parking areas, and security. Mr. Abreu, the client of complainant, Atty. Paguia, was
not a party to the contract since the former did not agree with the terms concerning the parking
arrangements.

On 4 February 2010, Atty. Paguia filed a Complaint for Dishonesty  with the IBP Commission on Bar
1

Discipline against Atty. Molina  for allegedly giving legal advice to the latter’s clients to the effect that
2

the Times Square Preamble was binding on Mr. Abreu, who was never a party to the contract.

In his Answer,  Atty. Molina downplayed the case as a petty quarrel among neighbors. He
3

maintained that the Times Square Preamble  was entered into for purposes of maintaining order in
4

the residential compound. All homeowners, except Mr. Abreu, signed the document. 5

Respondent further stated in his Answer that Mr. and Mrs. Gregorio Abreu filed two cases against
his clients, Mr. And Mrs. William Lim, on the belief that Mr. Abreu was not bound by the Times
Square Preamble. The first case, was filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB), which was an action to declare the Times Square Preamble invalid. The second suit was
an action for declaratory relief. Both cases, according to respondent, were dismissed. 6

Respondent further claimed that another case had been filed in court, this time by his client, the
Lims. They were prompted to file a suit since Mr. Abreu had allegedly taken matters into his own
hands by placing two vehicles directly in front of the gate of the Lims, thus blocking the latter’s
egress to Times Street. The Lims filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, a
Complaint for Injunction and Damages, coupled with a prayer for the immediate issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-08-63579. According to respondent, the RTC granted the relief prayed for in an Order dated 12
December 2008. 7

Atty. Molina concluded that the above facts sufficiently served as his answer to the Complaint.

On 3 August 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez rendered a Report and

Recommendation. He recommended dismissal for lack of merit, based on the following grounds: 1)
the complaint consisted only of bare allegations; and 2) even assuming that respondent Molina gave
an erroneous legal advice, he could not be held accountable in the absence of proof of malice or bad
faith.
8

On 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIX-2011-210, adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. 9

Atty. Paguia filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 2 August 2011, but was denied by the IBP
Board of Governors on 29 December 2012.  Notices of the denial were received by the parties on 21
10

March 2013. 11

No petition for review has been filed with this Court.

It is worth noting that a case is deemed terminated if the complainant does not file a petition with the
Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution. This rule is derived
from Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B, which states:

(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less
than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision
exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless
upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise. (Underscoring
supplied)

In this case, Atty. Paguia received notice of the Board’s resolution on 21 March 2013, as evidenced
by a registry return receipt. To this date, this Court has yet to receive a petition for review from Atty.
Paguia. Thus, for his failure to file a petition for review with the Court within 15 days, this case is
deemed terminated pursuant to the above mentioned Section 12(c).

Nevertheless, we have gone over the records but we have no reason to deviate from the findings of
the IBP Board of Governors.

When it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be considered: quantum of
proof, which requires clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of proof, which is on the
complainant. 12

In the present case, we find that the Complaint is without factual basis. Complainant Atty. Paguia
charges Atty. Molina with providing legal advice to the latter’s clients to the effect that the Times
Square Preamble is binding on complainant’s client, Mr. Abreu, who was not a signatory to the
agreement. The allegation of giving legal advice, however, was not substantiated in this case, either
in the complaint or in the corresponding hearings. Nowhere do the records state that Atty. Paguia
saw respondent giving the legal advice to the clients of the latter. Bare allegations are not proof. 13
Even if we assume that Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal advice, he still cannot be held
administratively liable without any showing that his act was attended with bad faith or malice. The
rule on mistakes committed by lawyers in the exercise of their profession is as follows:

An attorney-at-law is not expected to know all the law. For an honest mistake or error, an attorney is
not liable. Chief Justice Abbott said that, no attorney is bound to know all the law; God forbid that it
should be imagined that an attorney or a counsel, or even a judge, is bound to know all the law. x x
x.
14

The default rule is presumption of good faith. On the other hand, bad faith is never presumed.  It is a
1âwphi1

conclusion to be drawn from facts. Its determination is thus a question of fact and is
evidentiary.  There is no evidence, though, to show that the legal advice, assuming it was indeed
15

given, was coupled with bad faith, malice, or ill-will. The presumption of good faith, therefore, stands
in this case.

The foregoing considered, complainant failed to prove his case by clear preponderance of evidence.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving the Decision
of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
OSELANO GUEVARRA, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL
EALA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a

Complaint for Disbarment1 before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty.
Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly
immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's)

then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as
her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary
Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed

that from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from
respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read
"I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late
at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes
did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts,
she replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal
or she was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent

together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted
them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.

On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday

celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her
family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation,
he left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went
to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings,
pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.

Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social

card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face, which card when
unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the
day of his wedding to Irene, reading:

My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking
down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may find
meaning in what you're about to do.

Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find

fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to
find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a
bigger plan for the two of us? cralaw library

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have
done everything humanly possible to love you. And today, as you
make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time
I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent together, up to the final
moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you
until the life in me is gone and until we are together again.

Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough
memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always remember though that
in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS

AND YOURS ALONE!

I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M

LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"2
Eternally yours,
NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly

parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to
later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He
also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about
January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she
was pregnant.

In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU

card on which the above-quoted letter was handwritten.

On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR

ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions
together. For instance, in or about the third week of September
2001, the couple attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can"
promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall
B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B
of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21.
Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture
was captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy
of the report is attached as Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the
original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous
relationship" supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an

adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the
Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship
was low profile and known only to the immediate members of
their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the
general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married
to Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) cralawlibrary

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's
wife and his apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family,
demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to
keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the
institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of paper." Morally
reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride
on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her
"until we are together again," as now they are.6 (Underscoring
supplied),

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of

the Complaint regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts
demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to
keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's
relationship with Irene was not under scandalous
circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own
family:

5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful

relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still
occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware
of Respondent's special friendship with Irene.

xxx

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the
institution of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere
piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted
handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant
and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the
formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary

Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution

and obey the laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an
inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family
(Article XV, Sec. 2).9

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the

Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to
uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's
wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own
family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery with
his wife, and degrades the legal profession.10 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of

the Complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the
acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low
profile special relationship with Irene is neither under
scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly
immoral conductas would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.11 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) cralawlibrary

To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that

Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the
Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to
the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live
Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the
father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born
on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.

Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO

DISMISS14 dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he
denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth
attached to the complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to
dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by
complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a
criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which
was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's
Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer were adopted as his
testimony on direct examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not
cross-examine complainant.17

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V.

San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION18 dated
October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently
proven.

The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be

disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility reading:

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage

in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly
dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January
28, 2006 briefly reading:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Case No. 02-936

Joselano C. Guevarra v.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED

AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and to APPROVE the  DISMISSAL  of the above-
entitled case for lack of merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the
original)

Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed

pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 13922 of the Rules of Court.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the

Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing
the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-
quoted 33-word Resolution shows.

Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of

complainant, that there is no evidence against him.24 The contention
fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:

While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000
(Exh. "C") and the news item published in the Manila
Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove
that respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with
complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record
which support the accusation of complainant against respondent.

It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002,

respondent through counsel made the following statements
to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an
adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of
the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship
was low profile and known only to immediate members of their
respective families . . ., and Respondent specifically denies the
allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that
under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to
his purely personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither
under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct . . ."

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an

admission that there is indeed a "special" relationship
between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken
together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise
Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that there was
indeed an illicit relationship between respondent and Irene
which resulted in the birth of the child "Samantha". In the
Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that
complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that
respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that the
respondent admitted his special relationship with Irene there is no
reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any
misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It
should be underscored that respondent has not categorically
denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene
Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) cralawlibrary

Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an

adulterous relationship with Irene, "adultery" being defined under
Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any
married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not
her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her,
knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently
declared void."26 (Italics supplied) What respondent denies
is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low
profile and known only to the immediate members of their
respective families."

In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the

pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in
effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated
otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression
which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of some
kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a
fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words
of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it
has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are
denied while the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal
knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje's
Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent
- a "lawyer," 38 years old - as the child's father. And the phrase
"NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE
AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature
attributed to Irene in the certificate28 with her signature on the
Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the
same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating
Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of
the child.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical

Center, in his January 29, 2003 Affidavit30 which he identified at the
witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the
Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel
Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer.31

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and

Irene has been sufficiently proven by more than
clearly preponderant evidence - that evidence adduced by one party
which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party
and, therefore, has greater weight than the other32 - which is the
quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a
lawyer.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.

They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil
and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof

beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for
disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all
that is required.33 (Emphasis supplied) cralawlibrary

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because

his relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. ─ A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by

a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action
includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary

agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment
or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.34

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for

disbarment or suspension uses the phrase "grossly immoral
conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual
intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334
of the Revised Penal Code reading:

ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in

the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under
scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or
shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

x x x x,

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has

sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.
"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or
without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly
immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances."35 The
case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a
married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the
affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following
pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:36

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had

an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet,
and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in
order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.

x   x   x

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of
sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to
warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so
with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if
not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal
law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and
immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vowsprotected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) cralawlibrary

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the
respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that
the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of
the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of
Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on
an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct
and indicative of an extremely low regard for the
fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable
behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the
treasured honor and privileges which his license confers
upon him.39 (Underscoring supplied) cralawlibrary
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before
admission to practice law which goes:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of

law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the
supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support
its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice,
and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the
courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God. (Underscoring supplied) cralawlibrary

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The

Family) of the Constitution reading:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the

foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209),

which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband
and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support."40

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code

of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and
Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer
from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law."

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the

investigation of the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a
Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that
complainant's petition for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to
Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant
filed against respondent and Irene "based on the same set of facts
alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been,
on motion of complainant, withdrawn.

The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting

complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:

Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final
resolution of the Petition for Review, we are inclined to grant the
same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated
July 3, 2000, which provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of
the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time
before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed
resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been
taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was

subsequently declared void ab initio  is immaterial.  The acts
complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and
void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed,
unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to
the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null
and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed
disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed
his unfitness to be a lawyer.

As for complainant's withdrawal of his Petition for Review before the

DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state that before complainant
filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for
Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution
on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon
City Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In
reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon
Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant
would, in the fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently
establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of
both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to
complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala,
and this she did when complainant confronted her about Eala's
frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also
personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two
occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew
Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was
married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual
abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant had once
more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit
relationship involving both respondents. This becomes all the more
apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street,
New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the
church where she had exchange marital vows with complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited.

Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's were always seen
there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address
whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The
happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje
had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks
too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be
a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout
after her separation from complainant. It was both respondent's
love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there
bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the
nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates
against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate
of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the
father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and
damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents.
Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate
is most certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and
Moje have not denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is
the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise
Moje.45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) cralawlibrary
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant
complainant's motion to withdraw his Petition for Review . But even
if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial,
if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would
not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is

not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of
legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables
one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this
Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different
capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal
case47 (Italics in the original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty.

Naldoza,48 held:

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.

They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil
and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-

06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for

grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation
of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be

made part of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the
Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
circulated to all courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162580             January 27, 2006

ELMAR O. PEREZ, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Fifth Division, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and LILY GOMEZ-
CATINDIG, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the July 25,
2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74456 which set aside and declared as
null and void the September 30, 2002 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84,
granting petitioner’s motion for leave to file intervention and admitting the Complaint-in-
Intervention3 in Civil Case No. Q-01-44847; and its January 23, 2004 Resolution 4 denying the motion
for reconsideration.

Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig 5 twice on May 16, 1968. The first
marriage ceremony was celebrated at the Central Methodist Church at T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita,
Manila while the second took place at the Lourdes Catholic Church in La Loma, Quezon City. The
marriage produced four children.

Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that they decided to separate from
each other. Upon advice of a mutual friend, they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican
Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed
to the Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-
fact to institute a divorce action under its laws.6

Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private respondents filed a joint petition for dissolution of conjugal
partnership with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. On June 12, 1984, the civil court in the
Dominican Republic ratified the divorce by mutual consent of Tristan and Lily. Subsequently, on
June 23, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, ordered the complete separation
of properties between Tristan and Lily.

On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United
States7 and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their union produced one offspring. 8

During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the
Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in
the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine law. When she
confronted Tristan about this, the latter assured her that he would legalize their union after he
obtains an annulment of his marriage with Lily. Tristan further promised the petitioner that he would
adopt their son so that he would be entitled to an equal share in his estate as that of each of his
children with Lily.9

On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Case No. Q-01-44847.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention 10 claiming that she has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation because she knows certain information which might aid the trial
court at a truthful, fair and just adjudication of the annulment case, which the trial court granted on
September 30, 2002. Petitioner’s complaint-in-intervention was also ordered admitted.

Tristan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the
order dated September 30, 2002 of the trial court. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and
declared as null and void the September 30, 2002 Order of the trial court granting the motion for
leave to file intervention and admitting the complaint-in-intervention.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition
filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion in disregarding her legal interest in the annulment case between Tristan and
Lily.

The petition lacks merit.

Ordinarily, the proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, if the error subject of
the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was granted by a court with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as alleged in this case, the proper remedy is
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. 11 This is based on the premise that in issuing
the assailed decision and resolution, the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of lack of jurisdiction and there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. A remedy is considered plain, speedy, and adequate if it will promptly relieve
the petitioner from the injurious effect of the judgment and the acts of the lower court. 12

It is therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to establish that the Court of Appeals acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated the assailed
decision and resolution.

We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal
violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act
at all in contemplation of law.13 The word "capricious," usually used in tandem with the term
"arbitrary," conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective
hand of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is
imperative.14

The Rules of Court laid down the parameters before a person, not a party to a case can intervene,
thus:

Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success
of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may,
with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. 15
The requirements for intervention are: [a] legal interest in the matter in litigation; and [b]
consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the original parties may be delayed or
prejudiced, or whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not. 16

Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, must be in the matter in litigation and of such
direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation
and effect of the judgment.17 Such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not simply
contingent and expectant.18

Petitioner claims that her status as the wife and companion of Tristan for 17 years vests her with the
requisite legal interest required of a would-be intervenor under the Rules of Court.

Petitioner’s claim lacks merit. Under the law, petitioner was never the legal wife of Tristan, hence her
claim of legal interest has no basis.

When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The
divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the
marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.19 Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be
governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status,
condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here
or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually
becomes successful in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such
absolute divorce.20

When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968, their marriage was governed by the provisions of
the Civil Code21 which took effect on August 30, 1950. In the case of Tenchavez v. Escano22 we held:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
present Civil Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and
neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the
foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country. (Emphasis added)

Thus, petitioner’s claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated abroad
lacks merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for
intervention is based.

Since petitioner’s motion for leave to file intervention was bereft of the indispensable requirement of
legal interest, the issuance by the trial court of the order granting the same and admitting the
complaint-in-intervention was attended with grave abuse of discretion. Consequently, the Court of
Appeals correctly set aside and declared as null and void the said order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated July 25, 2003 and
Resolution dated January 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74456
are AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015

DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY.

KAREN E. BAYDO, Respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint 1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar O.
Perez (Dr. Perez) with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty.
Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo)
(respondents) for gross immorality and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The Facts

In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since
the mid-1960’s when they were both students at the University of the Philippines, but
they lost touch after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig
and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr.
Perez.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez
(Gomez), having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in
Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of
Lourdes in Quezon City.3 Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only married Gomez
because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would make a scandal out
of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which could have jeopardized his
scholarship in the Harvard Law School.4 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a
foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry
her once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty.
Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez
claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and
valid and that there was no longer any impediment to their marriage. 5 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the
United States of America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named
Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.6 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since
the divorce decree that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and
Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty. Catindig about
it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he
obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the
Philippines. He also promised to legally adopt their son. 7 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their
union by filing a petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that
he would still have to get the consent of Gomez to the said petition. 8 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter 9 in the mail
informing her of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime
later, she came upon a love letter10 written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo
dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo,
promising to marry her once his “impediment is removed.” Apparently, five months into
their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their affair until
such time that he is able to obtain the annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001,
Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez. 11 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to
an upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was
frequently seen.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file their
respective comments, which they separately did on November 25, 2002. 14 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He
claimed, however, that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she
was incapable of complying with her marital obligations, as she had serious intimacy
problems; and that while their union was blessed with four children, their relationship
simply deteriorated.

Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They

then consulted Atty. Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the
agreement to separate and live apart could be implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that
the couple adopt a property regime of complete separation of property. She likewise
advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic for whatever
value it may have and comfort it may provide them. 16 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of
Attorney addressed to a Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican
Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws.
Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by the
Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a
Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23, 1984. 17 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the
divorce decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the
Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and
Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty.
Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA. 18 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his
previous marriage to Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez
because he loved her and that he was afraid of losing her if he did not. He merely
desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their relationship. 19 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he
left their home in October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing. 20 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his
relationship with Dr. Perez started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty.
Baydo joined his law firm only in September 1999; and that while he was attracted to
her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out
that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001. 21 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed
that Atty. Catindig began courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however
rejected Atty. Catindig’s romantic overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate
his feelings since he was married and that he was too old for her. She said that despite
being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason why she
resigned from his law firm.22 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from
notice.23
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an

Order24 setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on July 4, 2003,
which was later reset to August 29, 2003. During the conference, the parties
manifested that they were already submitting the case for resolution based on the
pleadings already submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit
their respective position papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig
and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on October 17, 2003 25 and October 20,
2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper 27 on October 24, 2003.

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD
issued a Report and Recommendation, 28 which recommended the disbarment of Atty.
Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty.
Catindig’s act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his previous
marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which
warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The Investigating Commissioner further
opined that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of
Atty. Catindig established a pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants
fustigation and his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was
reprehensible to the highest degree.

There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his official
and personal conduct, must display exemplary behavior. Respondent’s bigamous
marriage and his proclivity for extramarital adventurism have definitely caused damage
to the legal and teaching professions. How can he hold his head up high and expect his
students, his peers and the community to look up to him as a model worthy of
emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of morality? In contracting a second
marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well that he has a prior valid subsisting
marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an otherwise inviolable institution, a
serious outrage to the generally accepted moral standards of the community. 29
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge
against Atty. Baydo be dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present
clear and preponderant evidence in support of the alleged affair between the
respondents.

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution, 30 which
adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of the
IBP Board of Governors, claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying
solely on Dr. Perez’s uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that, under Section 1
of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a complaint for disbarment must be supported by
affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts. He said that despite the absence of any
corroborating testimony, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez’
testimony.

He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that he
never concealed the status of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted
that he had always been transparent with both Gomez and Dr. Perez.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution 32 dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty.
Catindig’s motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which
would warrant their disbarment.

Ruling of the Court

After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the
circumstances of this case, the Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of
the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. cralawred

In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the
general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character
is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also
remain intact in order to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and honored
fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such
character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the
resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because “vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his all.” 34 (Citation
omitted)
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be
removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours)
“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or
deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.” 35 Immoral
conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.
Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency.
The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from
conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct. 36 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a

grossly immoral conduct.

The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty.
Catindig’s own admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral;
it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.

Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a wedding in the Central Methodist
Church in 1968, which was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig
started pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his
first marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first marriage was
then already falling apart due to Gomez’ serious intimacy problems.

A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez,
dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in
the Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the same year. Atty.
Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that time that he moved heaven and earth
just so he could marry her right away – a marriage that has at least a semblance of
legality.

From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from
the court in the Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and
Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that he was still validly married
to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly
declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This
notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint
Atty. Catindig’s sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and
purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.

It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez
in the USA. Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained
valid, the logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the
added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent
marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that Dr.
Perez knew that their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to
various legal strategies in order to render a façade of validity to his otherwise invalid
marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is
reprehensible to the highest degree.

Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal
actions he resorted to in order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig
left her and their son. It was only at that time that he finally decided to properly seek
the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then already entranced
with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.

While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty.
Baydo, in itself, cannot be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part
of the pattern showing his propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be
misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty.
Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.

“The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as
such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which makes ‘a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage.’”37 In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is
warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship
with another woman who has borne him a child. 38 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one
definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own admission,
Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of
his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality
required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with
great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.
Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end
desired, disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the
seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears
to be the most appropriate penalty.

Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations against him are not credible since they
are uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court, deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig himself admitted
in his pleadings that he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous marriage
with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides ample basis for the
Court to render disciplinary sanction against him.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of
evidence to prove the claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is,
the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation,
an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed having an affair
and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against
lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required
in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. 39 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves
that the latter indeed received a letter informing her of the alleged relations between
the respondents; it does not prove the veracity of the allegations therein. Similarly, the
supposed love letter, if at all, only proves that Atty. Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter
professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in a relationship
with Atty. Catindig.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves

to ADOPT the recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality
and of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and circulated by the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial
courts.
The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of evidence.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL

BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of
homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of
Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of
"hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused
then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded
guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the
trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day to four (4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the
lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by
Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years,
counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the
1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then
probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En
Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.  He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however,
1

allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath
of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had
terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation
period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago
granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for
Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with
special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.  The essentiality of good moral
2

character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with
approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:

In Re Farmer:  3

xxx xxx xxx

This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the
applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which
he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements
necessary to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of
bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have
acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted
himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such
character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least
resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the
resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently
proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor,
and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney
at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the
administration of justice. . . .

xxx xxx xxx 4

In Re Application of Kaufman,  citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis

5

359, 210 NW 710:

It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate
from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise
in the practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant
for admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly
apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause
a minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for
admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the
conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral
character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil
must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a
lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has
established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the court
when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment
of his license.

In Re Keenan: 6

The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the
right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and
continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment
and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all
will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair
to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed
to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to
remain in it.
 Re Rouss: 7

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and
professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant
is not to punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the
examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.

Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8

Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not
only protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the
trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such
agents give? They are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents
and officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due
administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that both
those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them,
have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the
administration of justice.

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than
the possession of legal learning:

. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10
Ann./Cas. 187):

The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to
the practice of the law unless he covered an upright moral
character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if
anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice than
legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if
the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral
character the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that
he will become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great
calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his community — a Quirk, a
Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking
admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry
into the moral proceedings for disbarment:

Re Stepsay:  10

The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission
to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.

Re Wells:  11

. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California
Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears
that he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or
 suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that
in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which tends to
show the applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and general
morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish
his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the
bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the
general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal
profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a
perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law
and in our legal system as we know it. 12

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required
standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent)
infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul
Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such
injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life
and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed
trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death
like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible
behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral
character.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared
to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the
obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a
requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for
permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for
admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence
that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed
upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications
from responsible members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who
have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of
conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make
up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a
different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned
profession of the law.

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation,
of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any,
of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished
to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J. is on leave.
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC               October 15, 2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This case is concerned with charges that, in preparing a decision for the Court, a designated
member plagiarized the works of certain authors and twisted their meanings to support the decision.

The Background Facts

Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya and about 70 other elderly women, all members of the Malaya Lolas
Organization, filed with the Court in G.R. No. 162230 a special civil action of certiorari with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of Justice, and the Office of the Solicitor General.

Petitioners claimed that in destroying villages in the Philippines during World War II, the Japanese
army systematically raped them and a number of other women, seizing them and holding them in
houses or cells where soldiers repeatedly ravished and abused them.

Petitioners alleged that they have since 1998 been approaching the Executive Department,
represented by the respondent public officials, requesting assistance in filing claims against the
Japanese military officers who established the comfort women stations. But that Department
declined, saying that petitioners’ individual claims had already been fully satisfied under the Peace
Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Petitioners wanted the Court to render judgment, compelling the Executive Department to espouse
their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International
Court of Justice and other international tribunals.

On April 28, 2010, the Court rendered judgment dismissing petitioners’ action. Justice Mariano C.
del Castillo wrote the decision for the Court. The Court essentially gave two reasons for its decision:
it cannot grant the petition because, first, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative
under the Constitution and the law to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claim against Japan;
and, second, the Philippines is not under any obligation in international law to espouse their claims.

On June 9, 2010, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s decision. More than a
month later on July 18, 2010, counsel for petitioners, Atty. Herminio Harry Roque, Jr., announced in
his online blog that his clients would file a supplemental petition "detailing plagiarism committed by
the court" under the second reason it gave for dismissing the petition and that "these stolen
passages were also twisted to support the court’s erroneous conclusions that the Filipino comfort
women of World War Two have no further legal remedies." The media gave publicity to Atty.
Roque’s announcement.

On July 19, 2010, petitioners filed the supplemental motion for reconsideration that Atty. Roque
announced. It accused Justice Del Castillo of "manifest intellectual theft and outright
plagiarism"1 when he wrote the decision for the Court and of "twisting the true intents of the
plagiarized sources … to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment." 2 They charged Justice Del
Castillo of copying without acknowledgement certain passages from three foreign articles:

a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal
of International Law (2009);

b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law (2006); and

c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge University Press

(2005).

Petitioners claim that the integrity of the Court’s deliberations in the case has been put into question
by Justice Del Castillo’s fraud. The Court should thus "address and disclose to the public the truth
about the manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism" 3 that resulted in gross prejudice to the
petitioners.

Because of the publicity that the supplemental motion for reconsideration generated, Justice Del
Castillo circulated a letter to his colleagues, subsequently verified, stating that when he wrote the
decision for the Court he had the intent to attribute all sources used in it. He said in the pertinent
part:

It must be emphasized that there was every intention to attribute all sources, whenever due. At no
point was there ever any malicious intent to appropriate another’s work as our own. We recall that
this ponencia was thrice included in the Agenda of the Court en banc. It was deliberated upon during
the Baguio session on April 13, 2010, April 20, 2010 and in Manila on April 27, 2010. Each time,
suggestions were made which necessitated major revisions in the draft. Sources were re-studied,
discussions modified, passages added or deleted. The resulting decision comprises 34 pages with
78 footnotes.

xxxx

As regards the claim of the petitioners that the concepts as contained in the above foreign materials
were "twisted," the same remains their opinion which we do not necessarily share. 4

On July 27, 2010, the Court En Banc referred the charges against Justice Del Castillo to its
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, chaired by the Chief Justice, for investigation and
recommendation. The Chief Justice designated retired Justice Jose C. Vitug to serve as consultant
of the Committee. He graciously accepted.

On August 2, 2010, the Committee directed petitioners to comment on Justice Del Castillo’s verified
letter. When this was done, it set the matter for hearing.

In the meantime, on July 19, 2010, Evan Criddle wrote on his blog that he and his co-author Evan
Fox-Descent (referred to jointly as Criddle-Descent) learned of alleged plagiarism involving their
work but Criddle’s concern, after reading the supplemental motion for reconsideration, was the
Court’s conclusion that prohibitions against sexual slavery are not jus cogens or internationally
binding norms that treaties cannot diminish.

On July 23, 2010, Dr. Mark Ellis wrote the Court expressing concern that in mentioning his work, the
Court "may have misread the argument [he] made in the article and employed them for cross
purposes." Dr. Ellis said that he wrote the article precisely to argue for appropriate legal remedy for
victims of war crimes.

On August 8, 2010, after the referral of the matter to the Committee for investigation, the Dean of the
University of the Philippines (U.P.) College of Law publicized a Statement from his faculty, claiming
that the Vinuya decision was "an extraordinary act of injustice" and a "singularly reprehensible act of
dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land." The statement said that Justice
Del Castillo had a "deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors’ work," and that the Court’s
decision amounted to "an act of intellectual fraud by copying works in order to mislead and
deceive."5

On August 18, 2010 Mr. Christian J. Tams wrote Chief Justice Renato C. Corona that, although
relevant sentences in the Court’s decision were taken from his work, he was given generic reference
only in the footnote and in connection with a citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather than
with respect to the passages taken from his work. He thought that the form of referencing was
inappropriate. Mr. Tams was also concerned that the decision may have used his work to support an
approach to erga omnes concept (obligations owed by individual States to the community of nations)
that is not consistent with what he advocated.

On August 26, 2010, the Committee heard the parties’ submissions in the summary manner of
administrative investigations. Counsels from both sides were given ample time to address the
Committee and submit their evidence. The Committee queried them on these.

Counsels for Justice Del Castillo later asked to be heard with the other parties not in attendance so
they could make submissions that their client regarded as sensitive and confidential, involving the
drafting process that went into the making of the Court’s decision in the Vinuya case. Petitioners’
counsels vigorously objected and the Committee sustained the objection. After consulting Justice
Del Castillo, his counsels requested the Committee to hear the Justice’s court researcher, whose
name need not be mentioned here, explain the research work that went into the making of the
decision in the Vinuya case. The Committee granted the request.

The researcher demonstrated by Power Point presentation how the attribution of the lifted passages
to the writings of Criddle-Descent and Ellis, found in the beginning drafts of her report to Justice Del
Castillo, were unintentionally deleted. She tearfully expressed remorse at her "grievous mistake" and
grief for having "caused an enormous amount of suffering for Justice Del Castillo and his family." 6

On the other hand, addressing the Committee in reaction to the researcher’s explanation, counsel
for petitioners insisted that lack of intent is not a defense in plagiarism since all that is required is for
a writer to acknowledge that certain words or language in his work were taken from another’s work.
Counsel invoked the Court’s ruling in University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of
Appeals and Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine, 7 arguing that standards on plagiarism in the
academe should apply with more force to the judiciary.

After the hearing, the Committee gave the parties ten days to file their respective memoranda. They
filed their memoranda in due course. Subsequently after deliberation, the Committee submitted its
unanimous findings and recommendations to the Court.

The Issues

This case presents two issues:

 1. Whether or not, in writing the opinion for the Court in the Vinuya case, Justice Del Castillo
plagiarized the published works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis.

2. Whether or not Justice Del Castillo twisted the works of these authors to make it appear
that such works supported the Court’s position in the Vinuya decision.

The Court’s Rulings

Because of the pending motion for reconsideration in the Vinuya case, the Court like its Committee
on Ethics and Ethical Standards will purposely avoid touching the merits of the Court’s decision in
that case or the soundness or lack of soundness of the position it has so far taken in the same. The
Court will deal, not with the essential merit or persuasiveness of the foreign author’s works, but how
the decision that Justice Del Castillo wrote for the Court appropriated parts of those works and for
what purpose the decision employed the same.

At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another person’s language, thoughts, or ideas. To
plagiarize, as it is commonly understood according to Webster, is "to take (ideas, writings, etc.) from
(another) and pass them off as one’s own."8 The passing off of the work of another as one’s own is
thus an indispensable element of plagiarism.

The Passages from Tams

Petitioners point out that the Vinuya decision lifted passages from Tams’ book, Enforcing Erga
Omnes Obligations in International Law (2006) and used them in Footnote 69 with what the author
thought was a mere generic reference. But, although Tams himself may have believed that the
footnoting in this case was not "an appropriate form of referencing," 9 he and petitioners cannot deny
that the decision did attribute the source or sources of such passages. Justice Del Castillo did not
pass off Tams’ work as his own. The Justice primarily attributed the ideas embodied in the passages
to Bruno Simma, whom Tams himself credited for them. Still, Footnote 69 mentioned, apart from
Simma, Tams’ article as another source of those ideas.

The Court believes that whether or not the footnote is sufficiently detailed, so as to satisfy the
footnoting standards of counsel for petitioners is not an ethical matter but one concerning clarity of
writing. The statement "See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005)" in
the Vinuya decision is an attribution no matter if Tams thought that it gave him somewhat less credit
than he deserved. Such attribution altogether negates the idea that Justice Del Castillo passed off
the challenged passages as his own.

That it would have been better had Justice Del Castillo used the introductory phrase "cited in" rather
than the phrase "See" would make a case of mere inadvertent slip in attribution rather than a case of
"manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism." If the Justice’s citations were imprecise, it would
just be a case of bad footnoting rather than one of theft or deceit. If it were otherwise, many would
be target of abuse for every editorial error, for every mistake in citing pagination, and for every
technical detail of form.

The Passages from Ellis

and Criddle-Descent

Petitioners also attack the Court’s decision for lifting and using as footnotes, without attribution to the
author, passages from the published work of Ellis. The Court made the following statement on page
27 of its decision, marked with Footnote 65 at the end:
We fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally reprehensible as
well as legally prohibited under contemporary international law. 65 xxx

Footnote 65 appears down the bottom of the page. Since the lengthy passages in that footnote
came almost verbatim from Ellis’ article,10 such passages ought to have been introduced by an
acknowledgement that they are from that article. The footnote could very well have read:

65 In an article, Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime, Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law (2006), Mark Ellis said: The concept of rape as an international crime is
relatively new. This is not to say that rape has never been historically prohibited, particularly in war.
But modern-day sensitivity to the crime of rape did not emerge until after World War II. In the
Nuremberg Charter, the word rape was not mentioned. The article on crimes against humanity
explicitly set forth prohibited acts, but rape was not mentioned by name. (For example, the Treaty of
Amity and Commerce between Prussia and the United States provides that in time of war all women
and children "shall not be molested in their persons." The Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Between
his Majesty the King of Prussia and the United States of America, art. 23, Sept. 10, 1785, U.S.-
Pruss., 8 Treaties & Other Int'l Agreements Of The U.S. 78, 85. The 1863 Lieber Instructions
classified rape as a crime of "troop discipline." (Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International
Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Jus cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 Duke J. Comp. Int’l. L. 219,
224). It specified rape as a capital crime punishable by the death penalty (Id. at 236). The 1907
Hague Convention protected women by requiring the protection of their "honour." ("Family honour
and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice,
must be respected." Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws & Customs of War on Land, art. 46, Oct.
18, 1907. General Assembly resolution 95 (I) of December 11, 1946 entitled, "Affirmation of the
Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal"; General
Assembly document A/64/Add.1 of 1946; See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the
Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. Article 6(c)
of the Charter established crimes against humanity as the following:

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and

other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country
where perpetrated.

The Nuremberg Judgment did not make any reference to rape and rape was not prosecuted. (Judge
Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The International Criminal Tribunals Crime and Punishment in the
International Arena,7 ILSA J. Int’l. Comp. L. 667, 676.)  However, International Military Tribunal for
the Far East prosecuted rape crimes, even though its Statute did not explicitly criminalize rape. The
Far East Tribunal held General Iwane Matsui, Commander Shunroku Hata and Foreign Minister
Hirota criminally responsible for a series of crimes, including rape, committed by persons under their
authority. (The Tokyo Judgment: Judgment Of The International Military Tribunal For The Far East
445-54 (1977).

The first mention of rape as a specific crime came in December 1945 when Control Council Law No.
10 included the term rape in the definition of crimes against humanity. Law No. 10, adopted by the
four occupying powers in Germany, was devised to establish a uniform basis for prosecuting war
criminals in German courts. (Control Council for Germany, Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons
Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, 3 Official
Gazette Control Council for Germany 50, 53 (1946))
The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War was the first modern-
day international instrument to establish protections against rape for women. Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entry into force Oct. 20, 1950) [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention].Furthermore, the ICC, the ICTY, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) have significantly advanced the crime of rape by enabling it to be prosecuted as genocide, a
war crime, and a crime against humanity.

But, as it happened, the acknowledgment above or a similar introduction was missing from Footnote
65.

Next, petitioners also point out that the following eight sentences and their accompanying footnotes
appear in text on pages 30-32 of the Vinuya decision:

xxx In international law, the term "jus cogens" (literally, "compelling law") refers to norms that
command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are
considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be
modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority.71 1avvphi1

Early strains of the jus cogens doctrine have existed since the 1700s,72 but peremptory norms
began to attract greater scholarly attention with the publication of Alfred von Verdross's influential
1937 article, Forbidden Treaties in International Law.73 The recognition of jus cogens gained even
more force in the 1950s and 1960s with the ILC’s preparation of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (VCLT).74 Though there was a consensus that certain international norms had attained
the status of jus cogens,75 the ILC was unable to reach a consensus on the proper criteria for
identifying peremptory norms.

After an extended debate over these and other theories of jus cogens, the ILC concluded ruefully in
1963 that "there is not as yet any generally accepted criterion by which to identify a general rule of
international law as having the character of jus cogens."76 In a commentary accompanying the draft
convention, the ILC indicated that "the prudent course seems to be to x x x leave the full content of
this rule to be worked out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals."77
Thus, while the existence of jus cogens in international law is undisputed, no consensus exists on its
substance,77 beyond a tiny core of principles and rules.78

Admittedly, the Vinuya decision lifted the above, including their footnotes, from Criddle-Descent’s
article, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens.11 Criddle-Descent’s footnotes were carried into the Vinuya
decision’s own footnotes but no attributions were made to the two authors in those footnotes.

The Explanation

Unless amply explained, the above lifting from the works of Ellis and Criddle-Descent could be
construed as plagiarism. But one of Justice Del Castillo’s researchers, a court-employed attorney,
explained how she accidentally deleted the attributions, originally planted in the beginning drafts of
her report to him, which report eventually became the working draft of the decision. She said that, for
most parts, she did her research electronically. For international materials, she sourced these mainly
from Westlaw, an online research service for legal and law-related materials to which the Court
subscribes.

In the old days, the common practice was that after a Justice would have assigned a case for study
and report, the researcher would source his materials mostly from available law books and published
articles on print. When he found a relevant item in a book, whether for one side of the issue or for
the other, he would place a strip of paper marker on the appropriate page, pencil mark the item, and
place the book on his desk where other relevant books would have piled up. He would later
paraphrase or copy the marked out passages from some of these books as he typed his manuscript
on a manual typewriter. This occasion would give him a clear opportunity to attribute the materials
used to their authors or sources.

With the advent of computers, however, as Justice Del Castillo’s researcher also explained, most
legal references, including the collection of decisions of the Court, are found in electronic diskettes
or in internet websites that offer virtual libraries of books and articles. Here, as the researcher found
items that were relevant to her assignment, she downloaded or copied them into her "main
manuscript," a smorgasbord plate of materials that she thought she might need. The researcher’s
technique in this case is not too far different from that employed by a carpenter. The carpenter first
gets the pieces of lumber he would need, choosing the kinds and sizes suitable to the object he has
in mind, say a table. When ready, he would measure out the portions he needs, cut them out of the
pieces of lumber he had collected, and construct his table. He would get rid of the scraps.

Here, Justice Del Castillo’s researcher did just that. She electronically "cut" relevant materials from
books and journals in the Westlaw website and "pasted" these to a "main manuscript" in her
computer that contained the issues for discussion in her proposed report to the Justice. She used
the Microsoft Word program.12 Later, after she decided on the general shape that her report would
take, she began pruning from that manuscript those materials that did not fit, changing the positions
in the general scheme of those that remained, and adding and deleting paragraphs, sentences, and
words as her continuing discussions with Justice Del Castillo, her chief editor, demanded.
Parenthetically, this is the standard scheme that computer-literate court researchers use everyday in
their work.

Justice Del Castillo’s researcher showed the Committee the early drafts of her report in the Vinuya
case and these included the passages lifted from the separate articles of Criddle-Descent and of
Ellis with proper attributions to these authors. But, as it happened, in the course of editing and
cleaning up her draft, the researcher accidentally deleted the attributions.

First Finding

The Court adopts the Committee’s finding that the researcher’s explanation regarding the accidental
removal of proper attributions to the three authors is credible. Given the operational properties of the
Microsoft program in use by the Court, the accidental decapitation of attributions to sources of
research materials is not remote.

For most senior lawyers and judges who are not computer literate, a familiar example similar to the
circumstances of the present case would probably help illustrate the likelihood of such an accident
happening. If researcher X, for example, happens to be interested in "the inalienable character of
juridical personality" in connection with an assignment and if the book of the learned Civilist, Arturo
M. Tolentino, happens to have been published in a website, researcher X would probably show
interest in the following passage from that book:

xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence, they
cannot be alienated or renounced.15

xxx

_____________________________
15 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.
Because the sentence has a footnote mark (#15) that attributes the idea to other sources, it is
evident that Tolentino did not originate it. The idea is not a product of his intellect. He merely lifted it
from Von Tuhr and Valverde, two reputable foreign authors.

When researcher X copies and pastes the above passage and its footnote into a manuscript-in-the-
making in his computer, the footnote number would, given the computer program in use,
automatically change and adjust to the footnoting sequence of researcher X’s manuscript. Thus, if
the preceding footnote in the manuscript when the passage from Tolentino was pasted on it is 23,
Tolentino’s footnote would automatically change from the original Footnote 15 to Footnote 24.

But then, to be of use in his materials-gathering scheme, researcher X would have to tag the
Tolentino passage with a short description of its subject for easy reference. A suitable subject
description would be: "The inalienable character of juridical personality.23" The footnote mark, 23
From Tolentino, which researcher X attaches to the subject tag, serves as reminder to him to
attribute the passage in its final form to Tolentino. After the passage has been tagged, it would now
appear like this:

The inalienable character of juridical personality.23

xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence, they
cannot be alienated or renounced.24

xxx

_____________________________
23 From Tolentino.
24 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.

The tag is of course temporary and would later have to go. It serves but a marker to help researcher
X maneuver the passage into the right spot in his final manuscript.

The mistake of Justice Del Castillo’s researcher is that, after the Justice had decided what texts,
passages, and citations were to be retained including those from Criddle-Descent and Ellis, and
when she was already cleaning up her work and deleting all subject tags, she unintentionally deleted
the footnotes that went with such tags—with disastrous effect.

To understand this, in Tolentino’s example, the equivalent would be researcher X’s removal during
cleanup of the tag, "The inalienable character of juridical personality.23," by a simple "delete"
operation, and the unintended removal as well of the accompanying footnote (#23). The erasure of
the footnote eliminates the link between the lifted passage and its source, Tolentino’s book. Only the
following would remain in the manuscript:

xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence, they
cannot be alienated or renounced.43

_____________________________
43 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.

As it happened, the Microsoft word program does not have a function that raises an alarm when
original materials are cut up or pruned. The portions that remain simply blend in with the rest of the
manuscript, adjusting the footnote number and removing any clue that what should stick together
had just been severed.

This was what happened in the attributions to Ellis and Criddle-Descent. The researcher deleted the
subject tags and, accidentally, their accompanying footnotes that served as reminder of the sources
of the lifted passages. With 119 sources cited in the decision, the loss of the 2 of them was not
easily detectable.

Petitioners point out, however, that Justice Del Castillo’s verified letter of July 22, 2010 is
inconsistent with his researcher’s claim that the omissions were mere errors in attribution. They cite
the fact that the Justice did not disclose his researcher’s error in that letter despite the latter’s
confession regarding her mistake even before the Justice sent his letter to the Chief Justice. By
denying plagiarism in his letter, Justice Del Castillo allegedly perjured himself and sought to
whitewash the case.13

But nothing in the July 22 letter supports the charge of false testimony. Justice Del Castillo merely
explained "that there was every intention to attribute all sources whenever due" and that there was
never "any malicious intent to appropriate another’s work as our own," which as it turns out is a true
statement. He recalled how the Court deliberated upon the case more than once, prompting major
revisions in the draft of the decision. In the process, "(s)ources were re-studied, discussions
modified, passages added or deleted." Nothing in the letter suggests a cover-up. Indeed, it did not
preclude a researcher’s inadvertent error.

And it is understandable that Justice Del Castillo did not initially disclose his researcher’s error. He
wrote the decision for the Court and was expected to take full responsibility for any lapse arising
from its preparation. What is more, the process of drafting a particular decision for the Court is
confidential, which explained his initial request to be heard on the matter without the attendance of
the other parties.

Notably, neither Justice Del Castillo nor his researcher had a motive or reason for omitting attribution
for the lifted passages to Criddle-Descent or to Ellis. The latter authors are highly respected
professors of international law. The law journals that published their works have exceptional
reputations. It did not make sense to intentionally omit attribution to these authors when the decision
cites an abundance of other sources. Citing these authors as the sources of the lifted passages
would enhance rather than diminish their informative value. Both Justice Del Castillo and his
researcher gain nothing from the omission. Thus, the failure to mention the works of Criddle-Decent
and Ellis was unquestionably due to inadvertence or pure oversight.

Petitioners of course insist that intent is not material in committing plagiarism since all that a writer
has to do, to avoid the charge, is to enclose lifted portions with quotation marks and acknowledge
the sources from which these were taken.14 Petitioners point out that the Court should apply to this
case the ruling in University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals and
Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine. 15 They argue that standards on plagiarism in the academe
should apply with more force to the judiciary.

But petitioners’ theory ignores the fact that plagiarism is essentially a form of fraud where intent to
deceive is inherent. Their theory provides no room for errors in research, an unrealistic position
considering that there is hardly any substantial written work in any field of discipline that is free of
any mistake. The theory places an automatic universal curse even on errors that, as in this case,
have reasonable and logical explanations.
Indeed, the 8th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary defines plagiarism as the "deliberate and knowing
presentation of another person's original ideas or creative expressions as one's own." 16 Thus,
plagiarism presupposes intent and a deliberate, conscious effort to steal another’s work and pass it
off as one’s own.

Besides, the Court said nothing in U.P. Board of Regents that would indicate that an intent to pass
off another’s work as one’s own is not required in plagiarism. The Court merely affirmed the
academic freedom of a university to withdraw a master’s degree that a student obtained based on
evidence that she misappropriated the work of others, passing them off as her own. This is not the
case here since, as already stated, Justice Del Castillo actually imputed the borrowed passages to
others.

Second Finding

The Court also adopts the Committee’s finding that the omission of attributions to Criddle-Descent
and Ellis did not bring about an impression that Justice Del Castillo himself created the passages
that he lifted from their published articles. That he merely got those passages from others remains
self-evident, despite the accidental deletion. The fact is that he still imputed the passages to the
sources from which Criddle-Descent and Ellis borrowed them in the first place.

This is best illustrated in the familiar example above. After the deletion of the subject tag and,
accidentally, its footnote which connects to the source, the lifted passage would appear like this:

xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence,
they cannot be alienated or renounced.43

_____________________________
43 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.

Although the unintended deletion severed the passage’s link to Tolentino, the passage remains to be
attributed to Von Tuhr and Valverde, the original sources that Tolentino himself cites. The text and
its footnote reference cancel out any impression that the passage is a creation of researcher X. It is
the same with the passages from Criddle-Descent and Ellis. Because such passages remained
attributed by the footnotes to the authors’ original sources, the omission of attributions to Criddle-
Descent and Ellis gave no impression that the passages were the creations of Justice Del Castillo.
This wholly negates the idea that he was passing them off as his own thoughts.

True the subject passages in this case were reproduced in the Vinuya decision without placing them
in quotation marks. But such passages are much unlike the creative line from Robert Frost, 17 "The
woods are lovely, dark, and deep, but I have promises to keep, and miles to go before I sleep, and
miles to go before I sleep." The passages here consisted of common definitions and terms, abridged
history of certain principles of law, and similar frequently repeated phrases that, in the world of legal
literature, already belong to the public realm.

To paraphrase Bast and Samuels,18 while the academic publishing model is based on the originality
of the writer’s thesis, the judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis, which encourages
courts to cite historical legal data, precedents, and related studies in their decisions. The judge is not
expected to produce original scholarship in every respect. The strength of a decision lies in the
soundness and general acceptance of the precedents and long held legal opinions it draws from.

Third Finding
Petitioners allege that the decision twisted the passages from Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis. The
Court adopts the Committee’s finding that this is not so. Indeed, this allegation of twisting or
misrepresentation remains a mystery to the Court. To twist means "to distort or pervert the meaning
of."19 For example, if one lifts the lyrics of the National Anthem, uses it in his work, and declares that
Jose Palma who wrote it "did not love his country," then there is "twisting" or misrepresentation of
what the anthem’s lyrics said. Here, nothing in the Vinuya decision said or implied that, based on the
lifted passages, authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis supported the Court’s conclusion that the
Philippines is not under any obligation in international law to espouse Vinuya et al.’s claims.

The fact is that, first, since the attributions to Criddle-Descent and Ellis were accidentally deleted, it
is impossible for any person reading the decision to connect the same to the works of those authors
as to conclude that in writing the decision Justice Del Castillo "twisted" their intended messages.
And, second, the lifted passages provided mere background facts that established the state of
international law at various stages of its development. These are neutral data that could support
conflicting theories regarding whether or not the judiciary has the power today to order the Executive
Department to sue another country or whether the duty to prosecute violators of international crimes
has attained the status of jus cogens.

Considering how it was impossible for Justice Del Castillo to have twisted the meaning of the
passages he lifted from the works of Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis, the charge of "twisting" or
misrepresentation against him is to say the least, unkind. To be more accurate, however, the charge
is reckless and obtuse.

No Misconduct

On occasions judges and justices have mistakenly cited the wrong sources, failed to use quotation
marks, inadvertently omitted necessary information from footnotes or endnotes. But these do not, in
every case, amount to misconduct. Only errors that are tainted with fraud, corruption, or malice are
subject of disciplinary action.20 This is not the case here. Justice Del Castillo’s acts or omissions
were not shown to have been impelled by any of such disreputable motives. 21 If the rule were
otherwise, no judge or justice, however competent, honest, or dedicated he may be, can ever hope
to retire from the judiciary with an unblemished record. 22

No Inexcusable Negligence

Finally, petitioners assert that, even if they were to concede that the omission was the result of plain
error, Justice Del Castillo is nonetheless guilty of gross inexcusable negligence. They point out that
he has full control and supervision over his researcher and should not have surrendered the writing
of the decision to the latter.23

But this assumes that Justice Del Castillo abdicated the writing of the Vinuya decision to his
researcher, which is contrary to the evidence adduced during the hearing. As his researcher
testified, the Justice set the direction that the research and study were to take by discussing the
issues with her, setting forth his position on those issues, and reviewing and commenting on the
study that she was putting together until he was completely satisfied with it. 24 In every sense, Justice
Del Castillo was in control of the writing of the report to the Court, which report eventually became
the basis for the decision, and determined its final outcome.

Assigning cases for study and research to a court attorney, the equivalent of a "law clerk" in the
United States Supreme Court, is standard practice in the high courts of all nations. This is dictated
by necessity. With about 80 to 100 cases assigned to a Justice in our Court each month, it would be
truly senseless for him to do all the studies and research, going to the library, searching the internet,
checking footnotes, and watching the punctuations. If he does all these by himself, he would have to
allocate at least one to two weeks of work for each case that has been submitted for decision. The
wheels of justice in the Supreme Court will grind to a halt under such a proposition.

What is important is that, in this case, Justice Del Castillo retained control over the writing of the
decision in the Vinuya case without, however, having to look over his researcher’s shoulder as she
cleaned up her draft report to ensure that she hit the right computer keys. The Justice’s researcher
was after all competent in the field of assignment given her. She finished law from a leading law
school, graduated third in her class, served as Editor-in Chief of her school’s Law Journal, and
placed fourth in the bar examinations when she took it. She earned a master’s degree in
International Law and Human Rights from a prestigious university in the United States under the
Global-Hauser program, which counsel for petitioners concedes to be one of the top post graduate
programs on International Law in the world. Justice Del Castillo did not exercise bad judgment in
assigning the research work in the Vinuya case to her.

Can errors in preparing decisions be prevented? Not until computers cease to be operated by
human beings who are vulnerable to human errors. They are hypocrites who believe that the courts
should be as error-free as they themselves are.

Incidentally, in the course of the submission of petitioners’ exhibits, the Committee noted that
petitioners’ Exhibit J, the accusing statement of the Faculty of the U.P. College of Law on the
allegations of plagiarism and misinterpretation, was a mere dummy. The whole of the statement was
reproduced but the signatures portion below merely listed the names of 38 faculty members, in solid
rows, with the letters "Sgd" or "signed" printed beside the names without exception. These included
the name of retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, a U.P. professor.

Because the Committee declined to admit a mere dummy of Exhibit J, it directed Atty. Roque to
present the signed copy within three days of the August 26 hearing. 25 He complied. As it turned out,
the original statement was signed by only a minority of the faculty members on the list. The set of
signatories that appeared like solid teeth in the dummy turned out to be broken teeth in the original.
Since only 37 out of the 81 on the list signed the document, it does not appear to be a statement of
the Faculty but of just some of its members. And retired Justice V. V. Mendoza did not sign the
statement, contrary to what the dummy represented. The Committee wondered why the Dean
submitted a dummy of the signed document when U.P. has an abundance of copying machines.

Since the above circumstances appear to be related to separate en banc matter concerning the
supposed Faculty statement, there is a need for the Committee to turn over the signed copy of the
same to the en banc for its consideration in relation to that matter.

WHEREFORE, in view of all of the above, the Court:

1. DISMISSES for lack of merit petitioner Vinuya, et al.’s charges of plagiarism, twisting of

cited materials, and gross neglect against Justice Mariano C. del Castillo;

2. DIRECTS the Public Information Office to send copies of this decision to Professors Evan
J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Dr. Mark Ellis, and Professor Christian J. Tams at their
known addresses;

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to provide all court attorneys involved in legal research and
reporting with copies of this decision and to enjoin them to avoid editing errors committed in
the Vinuya case while using the existing computer program especially when the volume of
citations and footnoting is substantial; and
 4. Finally, DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to acquire the necessary software for use by the
Court that can prevent future lapses in citations and attributions.

Further, the Court DIRECTS the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards to turn over to the en
banc the dummy as well as the signed copy of petitioners’ Exhibit J, entitled "Restoring Integrity," a
statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law for the en banc’s
consideration in relation to the separate pending matter concerning that supposed Faculty
statement.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7430               February 15, 2012

MARTIN LAHM III and JAMES P. CONCEPCION, Complainants,

vs.
LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

Before us is a verified complaint filed by Martin Lahm III and James P. Concepcion (complainants)
1 

praying for the disbarment of Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. (respondent) for alleged gross
misconduct and violation of lawyer’s oath.

On June 27, 2007, the respondent filed his Comment to the complaint.
2 

In a Resolution dated July 18, 2007, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
3 

Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The antecedent facts, as summarized in the Report and Recommendation dated September 19,
4 

2008 of Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr. of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, are as
follows:

On September 5, 2006 a certain David Edward Toze filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the
Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission against the members of the
Board of Trustees of the International School, Manila. The same was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case
No. 00-07381-06 and raffled to the sala of the respondent. Impleaded as among the party-
respondents are the complainants in the instant case.

On September 7, 2006, David Edward Toze filed a Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents. The said Motion was set
for hearing on September 12, 2006 at 10:00 in the morning. A day after, on September 8, 2006, the
counsel for the complainants herein entered its appearance and asked for additional time to oppose
and make a comment to the Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents of David Edward Toze.

Thereafter, the respondent issued an Order dated September 14, 2006 that directs the parties in the
said case to maintain the status quo ante. The complainants herein sought the reconsideration of the
Order dated September 14, 200[6] x x x.

xxxx

On account of the Order dated September 14, 2006, David Edward Toze was immediately reinstated
and assumed his former position as superintendent of the International School Manila.

The pending incidents with the above-mentioned illegal dismissal case were not resolved, however,
the scheduled hearing for the issuance of a preliminary injunction on September 20, 2006 and
September 27, 2006 was postponed.
On January 19, 2007, the co-respondents of the complainants herein in the said illegal dismissal
case filed a motion for an early resolution of their motion to dismiss the said case, but the
respondent instead issued an Order dated February 6, 2007 requiring the parties to appear in his
Office on February 27, 2007 at 10:00 in the morning in order to thresh out David Edward Toze’ claim
of moral and exemplary damages.

xxxx

The respondent on the other maintains that the Order dated September 14, 2006 was issued by him
on account of [the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents that was filed by David Edward Toze, and of the
Entry of Appearance with Motion for Additional Time to File Comment that was thereafter filed by the
counsel for the herein complainants in the illegal dismissal case pending before the respondent.

The respondent maintains that in order to prevent irreparable damage on the person of David
Edward Toze, and on account of the urgency of [the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents of David
Edward Toze, and that the counsel for respondents in the illegal dismissal case have asked for a
relatively long period of fifteen days for a resetting, he (respondent) found merit in issuing the Order
dated September 14, 2006 that requires the parties to maintain the status quo ante.

xxx

The respondent argues that [the] instant case should be dismissed for being premature since the
aforementioned illegal dismissal case is still pending before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission, that the instant case is a subterfuge in order to compel the
respondent to inhibit himself in resolving the said illegal dismissal case because the complainants
did not assail the Order dated September 14, 2006 before the Court of Appeals under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.5

Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that: (1) the grounds cited by the
respondent to justify his issuance of the status quo ante order lacks factual basis and is speculative;
(2) the respondent does not have the authority to issue a temporary restraining order and/or a
preliminary injunction; and (3) the inordinate delay in the resolution of the motion for reconsideration
directed against the September 14, 2006 Order showed an orchestrated effort to keep the status quo
ante until the expiration of David Edward Toze’s employment contract.

Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be SUSPENDED for a period of

six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar incident will be dealt with more
severe penalty. 6

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-644 which 7 

adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The said resolution
further pointed out that the Board of Governors had previously recommended the respondent’s
suspension from the practice of law for three years in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 7314 entitled
"Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.".

The respondent sought to reconsider the foregoing disposition, but it was denied by the IBP Board of
8 

Governors in its Resolution No. XIX-2011-476 dated June 26, 2011.

The case is now before us for confirmation. We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that the
respondent should be sanctioned.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended
from the practice of law, inter alia, for gross misconduct and violation of the lawyer’s oath. Thus:

Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. – A member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (emphasis supplied)

A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Gross misconduct is any inexcusable,
9 

shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of
justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause.
The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. 10

Intrinsically, the instant petition wants this Court to impose disciplinary sanction against the
respondent as a member of the bar. However, the grounds asserted by the complainants in support
of the administrative charges against the respondent are intrinsically connected with the discharge of
the respondent’s quasi-judicial functions.

Nonetheless, it cannot be discounted that the respondent, as a labor arbiter, is a public officer
entrusted to resolve labor controversies. It is well settled that the Court may suspend or disbar a
lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his unfitness for the confidence and trust which
characterize the attorney and client relations, and the practice of law before the courts, or showing
such a lack of personal honesty or of good moral character as to render him unworthy of public
confidence. 11

Thus, the fact that the charges against the respondent were based on his acts committed in the
discharge of his functions as a labor arbiter would not hinder this Court from imposing disciplinary
sanctions against him.

The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has
joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules
governing the conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer’s misconduct as a government official is of such nature as
to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a
member of the bar on such grounds. 12

In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig, we stressed that:

13 

Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of
the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said
misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may
be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as OIC,
Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella
G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their
pending applications or requests before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the
respondent’s failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondent’s misconduct as a lawyer of the
CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer,
she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money
as consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.

xxx

A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence,
the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern
the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service.
This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the
utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their
professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.

For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend
to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of
the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise
said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree
of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice. (emphasis supplied and
14 

citations omitted)

In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., we ruled that an administrative case against a lawyer for acts
15 

committed in his capacity as provincial adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform – Regional
Arbitration Board may be likened to administrative cases against judges considering that he is part of
the quasi-judicial system of our government.

This Court made a similar pronouncement in Buehs v. Bacatan where the respondent-lawyer was
16 

suspended from the practice of law for acts he committed in his capacity as an accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board.

Here, the respondent, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs official
functions that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may be
approximated to administrative cases of judges whose decisions, including the manner of rendering
the same, were made subject of administrative cases.

As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official
duties renders him liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his
official capacity do not always constitute misconduct although the same acts may be erroneous.
True, a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error was made
with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice.17

While a judge may not always be held liable for ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that
he renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is sufficiently basic, lack of
conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Indeed, even though a judge may not
always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, that
relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his
adjudicatory prerogatives.18
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it.
Anything less would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. 19

In the case at bench, we find the respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Acting on the motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, the respondent issued the September 14, 2006 Order requiring the parties to maintain the
status quo ante until the said motion had been resolved. It should be stressed, however, that at the
time the said motion was filed, the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) is already in effect.

Admittedly, under the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiter has, in proper cases,
the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or restraining orders. Section 1, Rule XI of
the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that:

Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. – A preliminary injunction or restraining order may
be granted by the Commission through its Divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of
Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on the basis of the sworn
allegations in the petition that the acts complained of involving or arising from any labor dispute
before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.

If necessary, the Commission may require the petitioner to post a bond and writ of preliminary
injunction or restraining order shall become effective only upon the approval of the bond which shall
answer for any damage that may be suffered by the party enjoined, if it is finally determined that the
petitioner is not entitled thereto.

The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the Labor Arbiters only as an incident to the
cases pending before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of the
case, but excluding labor disputes involving strike or lockout. (emphasis supplied)

Nevertheless, under the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiters no longer has the
authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining orders. Under Section
1, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, only the NLRC, through its Divisions, may
issue writs of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining orders. Thus:

Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. - A preliminary injunction or restraining order may
be granted by the Commission through its Divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of
Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on the basis of the sworn
allegations in the petition that the acts complained of involving or arising from any labor dispute
before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party. (emphasis
supplied)

The role of the labor arbiters, with regard to the issuance of writs of preliminary injunctions and/or
writ of preliminary injunction, at present, is limited to reception of evidence as may be delegated by
the NLRC. Thus, Section 4, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that:

Section 4. Reception of Evidence; Delegation. - The reception of evidence for the application of a
writ of injunction may be delegated by the Commission to any of its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct
such hearings in such places as he may determine to be accessible to the parties and their
witnesses, and shall thereafter submit his report and recommendation to the Commission within
fifteen (15) days from such delegation. (emphasis supplied)

The foregoing rule is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. However, the respondent, in
violation of the said rule, vehemently insist that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order. On this point, the Investigating Commissioner aptly
ruled that:

The respondent should, in the first place, not entertained Edward Toze’s Verified Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents.
He should have denied it outright on the basis of Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Revised Rules of
Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission.

xxxx

The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter of the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission, should have been familiar with Sections 1 and 4 of the 2005 Revised Rules of
procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission. The first, states that it is the Commission of
the [NLRC] that may grant a preliminary injunction or restraining order. While the second, states
[that] Labor Arbiters [may] conduct hearings on the application of preliminary injunction or restraining
order only in a delegated capacity. 20

What made matters worse is the unnecessary delay on the part of the respondent in resolving the
motion for reconsideration of the September 14, 2006 Order. The unfounded insistence of the
respondent on his supposed authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, taken together with the delay in the resolution of the said motion for
reconsideration, would clearly show that the respondent deliberately intended to cause prejudice to
the complainants.

On this score, the Investigating Commissioner keenly observed that:

The Commission is very much disturbed with the effect of the Order dated September 14, 2006 and
the delay in the resolution of the pending incidents in the illegal dismissal case before the
respondent.

Conspicuously, Section 3 (Term of Contract) of the Employment Contract between David Edward
Toze and International School Manila provides that David Edward Toze will render work as a
superintendent for the school years August 2005-July 2006 and August 2006-July 2007.

The Order dated September 14, 2006 in effect reinstates David Edward Toze as superintendent of
International School of Manila until the resolution of the former’s Verified Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents.

Since the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School Manila is
about to expire or end on August 2007, prudence dictates that the respondent expediently resolved
[sic] the merits of David Edward Toze’s Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents because any delay in the resolution
thereof would result to undue benefit in favor of David Edward Toze and unwarranted prejudice to
International School Manila.

xxxx
At the time the respondent inhibited himself from resolving the illegal dismissal case before him,
there are barely four (4) months left with the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and
International School Manila.

From the foregoing, there is an inordinate delay in the resolution of the reconsideration of the Order
dated September 14, 2006 that does not escape the attention of this Commission. There appears an
orchestrated effort to delay the resolution of the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14,
2006 and keep status quo ante until expiration of David Edward Toze’s Employment Contract with
International School Manila come August 2007, thereby rendering the illegal dismissal case moot
and academic.

xxxx

Furthermore, the procrastination exhibited by the respondent in the resolution of [the] assailed Order
x x x should not be countenanced, specially, under the circumstance that is attendant with the term
of the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School Manila. The
respondent’s lackadaisical attitude in sitting over the pending incident before him for more than five
(5) months only to thereafter inhibit himself therefrom, shows the respondent’s disregard to settled
rules and jurisprudence.  Failure to decide a case or resolve a motion within the reglementary period
1âwphi1

constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the
erring magistrate x x x. The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter, is akin to judges, and enjoined to
decide a case with dispatch. Any delay, no matter how short, in the disposition of cases undermine
the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary x x x.  21

Indubitably, the respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the
strictures of the lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby occasioning
sanction from this Court.

In stubbornly insisting that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order contrary to the clear import of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,
the respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers
to "obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes".

All told, we find the respondent to have committed gross ignorance of the law, his acts as a labor
arbiter in the case below being inexcusable thus unquestionably resulting into prejudice to the rights
of the parties therein.

Having established the foregoing, we now proceed to determine the appropriate penalty to be
imposed.

Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the
22 

law is a serious charge, punishable by a fine of more than ₱20,000.00, but not exceeding
23 

₱40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not
exceeding six months, or dismissal from the service. 24

In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., the respondent-lawyer and provincial adjudicator, found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law, was suspended from the practice of law for six months. Additionally, in parallel
cases, a judge found guilty of gross ignorance of the law was meted the penalty of suspension for
25 

six months.
Here, the IBP Board of Governors recommended that the respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for six months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar incident would
be dealt with more severe penalty. We adopt the foregoing recommendation.

This Court notes that the IBP Board of Governors had previously recommended the respondent’s
suspension from the practice of law for three years in A.C. No. 7314, entitled "Mary Ann T. Flores v.
Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.". This case, however, is still pending.

It cannot be gainsaid that since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon
lawyers in the government service is more exacting than the standards for those in private practice.
Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public
accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor
of the interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere with the discharge of their
official functions.
26

At this point, the respondent should be reminded of our exhortation in Republic of the Philippines v.
Judge Caguioa, thus:
27 

Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges are called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Basic rules should be at the palm of their
hands. Their inexcusable failure to observe basic laws and rules will render them administratively
liable.  Where the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance with it constitutes
1âwphi1

gross ignorance of the law. "Verily, for transgressing the elementary jurisdictional limits of his court,
respondent should be administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law."

"When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a
principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the
position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in
bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority." (citations omitted)
28 

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. guilty of gross ignorance of the law
in violation of his lawyer’s oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court resolved to
SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a WARNING that
commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe
penalty.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance and likewise
be entered in the record of the respondent as attorney.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
A.C. No. 8392               June 29, 2010
[ Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2175 ]

ROSARIO T. MECARAL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DANILO S. VELASQUEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

Per Curiam:

Rosario T. Mecaral (complainant) charged Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez (respondent) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) 1 with Gross Misconduct
and Gross Immoral Conduct which she detailed in her Position Paper 2 as follows:

After respondent hired her as his secretary in 2002, she became his lover and common-law wife. In
October 2007, respondent brought her to the mountainous Upper San Agustin in Caibiran, Biliran
where he left her with a religious group known as the Faith Healers Association of the Philippines, of
which he was the leader. Although he visited her daily, his visits became scarce in November to
December 2007, prompting her to return home to Naval, Biliran. Furious, respondent brought her
back to San Agustin where, on his instruction, his followers tortured, brainwashed and injected her
with drugs. When she tried to escape on December 24, 2007, the members of the group tied her
spread-eagled to a bed. Made to wear only a T-shirt and diapers and fed stale food, she was
guarded 24 hours a day by the women members including a certain Bernardita Tadeo.

Her mother, Delia Tambis Vda. De Mecaral (Delia), having received information that she was weak,
pale and walking barefoot along the streets in the mountainous area of Caibiran, sought the help of
the Provincial Social Welfare Department which immediately dispatched two women volunteers to
rescue her. The religious group refused to release her, however, without the instruction of
respondent. It took PO3 Delan G. Lee (PO3 Lee) and PO1 Arnel S. Robedillo (PO1 Robedillo) to
rescue and reunite her with her mother.

Hence, the present disbarment complaint against respondent. Additionally, complainant charges
respondent with bigamy for contracting a second marriage to Leny H. Azur on August 2, 1996,
despite the subsistence of his marriage to his first wife, Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal.

In support of her charges, complainant submitted documents including the following: Affidavit 3 of
Delia dated February 5, 2008; Affidavit of PO3 Lee and PO1 Robedillo 4 dated February 14, 2008;
photocopy of the Certificate of Marriage5 between respondent and Leny H. Azur; photocopy of the
Marriage Contract6 between respondent and Shirley G. Yunzal; National Statistics Office
Certification7 dated April 23, 2008 showing the marriage of Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal to respondent on
April 27, 1990 in Quezon City and the marriage of Leny H. Azur to respondent on August 2, 1996 in
Mandaue City, Cebu; and certified machine copy of the Resolution 8 of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Naval, Biliran and the Information 9 lodged with the RTC-Branch 37-Caibiran, Naval,
Biliran, for Serious Illegal Detention against respondent and Bernardita Tadeo on complaint of herein
complainant.

Despite respondent’s receipt of the February 22, 2008 Order10 of the Director for Bar Discipline for
him to submit his Answer within 15 days from receipt thereof, and his expressed intent to "properly
make [his] defense in a verified pleading," 11 he did not file any Answer.
1avvphi1
On the scheduled Mandatory Conference set on September 2, 2008 of which the parties were duly
notified, only complainant’s counsel was present. Respondent and his counsel failed to appear.

Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III of the CBD, in his Report and
Recommendation12 dated September 29, 2008, found that:

[respondent’s] acts of converting his secretary into a mistress; contracting two marriages  with Shirley
and Leny, are grossly immoral which no civilized society in the world can countenance. The
subsequent detention and torture of the complainant is gross misconduct [which] only a beast may
be able to do. Certainly, the respondent had violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which reads:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.

xxxx

In the long line of cases, the Supreme Court has consistently imposed severe penalty for grossly
immoral conduct of a lawyer like the case at bar. In the celebrated case of Joselano Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Manuel Eala, the [Court] ordered the disbarment of the respondent for maintaining extra-
marital relations with a married woman, and having a child with her. In the instant case, not only did
the respondent commit bigamy for contracting marriages with Shirley Yunzal in 1990 and Leny Azur
in 1996, but the respondent also made his secretary (complainant) his mistress and subsequently,
tortured her to the point of death. All these circumstances showed the moral fiber respondent is
made of, which [leave] the undersigned with no choice but to recommend the disbarment of Atty.
Danilo S. Velasquez.13 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors of Pasig City, by Resolution 14 dated December 11, 2008, ADOPTED
the Investigating Commissioner’s findings and APPROVED the recommendation for the disbarment
of respondent.

As did the IBP Board of Governors, the Court finds the IBP Commissioner’s evaluation and
recommendation well taken.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the state upon those who show that
they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege.15 When a lawyer’s moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue

practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, it behooves him to meet the charges squarely and
present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to
keep his name in the Roll of Attorneys.16

Respondent has not discharged the burden. He never attended the hearings before the IBP to rebut
the charges brought against him, suggesting that they are true. 17 Despite his letter dated March 28,
2008 manifesting that he would come up with his defense "in a verified pleading," he never did.

Aside then from the IBP’s finding that respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he also violated the Lawyer’s Oath reading:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly
swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I
will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no
man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me
God, (underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.

The April 30, 2008 Resolution18 of the Provincial Prosecutor on complainant’s charge against
respondent and Bernardita Tadeo for Serious Illegal Detention bears special noting, viz:

[T]he counter-affidavit of x x x Bernardita C. Tadeo (co-accused in the complaint) has the effect of
strengthening the allegations against Atty. Danilo Velasquez. Indeed, it is clear now that there was
really physical restraint employed by Atty. Velasquez upon the person of Rosario Mecaral. Even as
he claimed that on the day private complainant was fetched by the two women and police officers,
complainant was already freely roaming around the place and thus, could not have been physically
detained. However, it is not really necessary that Rosario be physically kept within an enclosure to
restrict her freedom of locomotion. In fact, she was always accompanied wherever she would
wander, that it could be impossible for her to escape especially considering the remoteness and the
distance between Upper San Agustin, Caibiran, Biliran to Naval, Biliran where she is a resident. The
people from the Faith Healers Association had the express and implied orders coming from
respondent Atty. Danilo Velasquez to keep guarding Rosario Mecaral and not to let her go freely.
That can be gleaned from the affidavit of co-respondent Bernardita Tadeo. The latter being
reprimanded whenever Atty. Velasquez would learn that complainant had untangled the cloth tied on
her wrists and feet.19 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That, as reflected in the immediately-quoted Resolution in the criminal complaint against respondent,
his therein co-respondent corroborated the testimonies of complainant’s witnesses, and that the
allegations against him remain unrebutted, sufficiently prove the charges against him by clearly
preponderant evidence, the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a
lawyer.20

In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are grossly immoral and acts which constitute gross
misconduct, respondent has ceased to possess the qualifications of a lawyer. 21

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez, is DISBARRED, and his name ORDERED

STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. This Decision is immediately executory and ordered to be
part of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the
Philippines.

Let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all
courts.

SO ORDERED.