EN BANC respondent resorted to crudely underhanded tactics directed at the opposing litigant's
counsel, i.e., herein complainant, by personally attacking the latter through various
[A.C. No. 7088. December 4, 2018.]
ATTY. HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR. , complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZAL
BALBIN respondent.
P. BALBIN,
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE , J : p
For the Court's resolution is a veri ed complaint/a davit 1 dated March 1, 2006
led before the Court by complainant Atty. Herminio Harry L. Roque, Jr. (complainant)
against respondent Atty. Rizal P. Balbin (respondent) praying that the latter be
subjected to disciplinary action for his alleged unprofessional conduct.
The Facts
Complainant alleged that he was the plaintiff's counsel in a case entitled
FELMAILEM, Inc. v. Felma Mailem , docketed as Civil Case No. 2004-307 before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 77 (MeTC). Shortly after securing a
favorable judgment for his client, 2 herein respondent — as counsel for the defendant,
and on appeal — started intimidating, harassing, blackmailing, and maliciously
threatening complainant into withdrawing the case led by his client. According to
complainant, respondent would make various telephone calls and send text messages
and e-mails not just to him, but also to his friends and other clients, threatening to le
disbarment and/or criminal suits against him. Further, and in view of complainant's
"high pro le" stature, respondent also threatened to publicize such suits in order to
besmirch and/or destroy complainant's name and reputation. 3
Initially, respondent moved for an extension of time to le his comment, 4 which
was granted by the Court. 5 However, respondent failed to le his comment despite
multiple notices, prompting the Court to repeatedly ne him and even order his arrest. 6
To date, the orders for respondent's arrest 7 remain unserved and are still standing. 8
Eventually, the Court dispensed with respondent's comment and forwarded the records
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for its investigation, report, and
recommendation. 9
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation 1 0 dated August 3, 2016, the Investigating
Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly,
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar infractions in the future shall
merit more severe sanctions. 1 1 CAIHTE
The Investigating Commissioner found that instead of availing of the procedural
remedies to assail the adverse MeTC ruling in order to further his client's cause,
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modes of harassment and intimidation. According to the Investigating Commissioner,
such acts constitute a gross violation of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), and the fact that respondent failed to cow complainant into
submission cannot mitigate his liability as the same reveals respondent's distastefully
disturbing moral character. 1 2
In a Resolution 1 3 dated May 27, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the
Investigating Commissioner's report and recommendation in toto.
The Issue before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be
administratively sanctioned for the acts complained of.
The Court's Ruling
Lawyers are licensed o cers of the courts who are empowered to appear,
prosecute, and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities, and liabilities
are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the Bar imposes upon them
certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must
conduct themselves honorably and fairly. 1 4 To this end, Canon 8 of the CPR
commands, to wit:
CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.
Case law instructs that "[l]awyers should treat their opposing counsels and other
lawyers with courtesy, dignity[,] and civility. A great part of their comfort, as well as of
their success at the bar, depends upon their relations with their professional brethren.
Since they deal constantly with each other, they must treat one another with trust and
respect. Any undue ill feeling between clients should not in uence counsels in their
conduct and demeanor toward each other. Mutual bickering, unjusti ed
recriminations[,] and offensive behavior among lawyers not only detract from the
dignity of the legal profession, but also constitute highly unprofessional conduct
subject to disciplinary action." 1 5
In this case, respondent's underhanded tactics against complainant were in
violation of Canon 8 of the CPR. As aptly pointed out by the Investigating
Commissioner, instead of availing of remedies to contest the ruling adverse to his
client, respondent resorted to personal attacks against the opposing litigant's counsel,
herein complainant. Thus, it appears that respondent's acts of repeatedly intimidating,
harassing, and blackmailing complainant with purported administrative and criminal
cases and prejudicial media exposures were performed as a tool to return the
inconvenience suffered by his client. His actions demonstrated a misuse of the legal
processes available to him and his client, especially considering that the aim of every
lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them.
1 6 More signi cantly, the foregoing showed respondent's lack of respect and
despicable behavior towards a colleague in the legal profession, and constituted
conduct unbecoming of a member thereof.
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 Furthermore, respondent's aforesaid acts of threatening complainant with the
ling of baseless administrative and criminal complaints in an effort to strong-arm the
latter and his client into submission not only contravened the Lawyer's Oath, which
exhorts that a lawyer shall "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same," but also violated Canon 19
and Rule 19.01 of the CPR. In Aguilar-Dyquiangco v. Arellano, 1 7 the Court held:
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer
shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law," reminding legal
practitioners that a lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct
ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. In
particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a "lawyer shall employ only fair and
honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to
obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding." Under this Rule, a
lawyer should not le or threaten to le any unfounded or baseless
criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed
to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw
their own cases against the lawyer's client . 1 8 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
DETACa
To aggravate further respondent's administrative liability, the Court notes that
respondent initially moved for an extension of time to le comment but did not le the
same, prompting the Court to repeatedly ne him and order his arrest. Such audacity on
the part of respondent — which caused undue delay in the resolution of this
administrative case — is a violation of Canon 11, Canon 12, Rule 12.03, and Rule 12.04
of the CPR, which respectively read:
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 12 — A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 12.03 — A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to le
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the
same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
Rule 12.04 — A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.
Verily, respondent's acts of seeking for extension of time to le a comment, and
thereafter, failing to le the same and ignoring the numerous directives not only
indicated a high degree of irresponsibility, but also constituted utter disrespect to the
judicial institution. The orders of the Court are not to be construed as a mere request,
nor should they be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively; and the
obstinate refusal or failure to comply therewith not only betrays a recalcitrant aw in
the lawyer's character, but also underscores his disrespect to the lawful orders of the
Court which is only too deserving of reproof. 1 9 Undoubtedly, the Court's patience has
been tested to the limit by what in hindsight amounts to a lawyer's impudence and
disrespectful bent. At the minimum, members of the legal fraternity owe courts of
justice respect, courtesy, and such other becoming conduct essential in the promotion
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of orderly, impartial, and speedy justice. What respondent has done was the exact
opposite; hence, he must be disciplined accordingly. 2 0
Having established respondent's administrative liability, the Court now
determines the proper penalty to be imposed on him.
Case law provides that in similar instances where lawyers made personal attacks
against an opposing counsel in order to gain leverage in a case they were involved in,
the Court has consistently imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law. In Reyes v. Chiong, Jr. , 2 1 the lawyer who led a baseless civil suit
against an opposing counsel just to obtain leverage against an estafa case being
handled by such lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years. Similarly, in Vaflor-Fabroa v. Paguinto, 2 2 the erring lawyer was suspended for the
same period for not only causing the ling of baseless complaints against the
opposing counsel, but also in failing/refusing to le a comment in the administrative
case against her despite obtaining an extension to le the same. In view of the
foregoing, the Court nds it appropriate to increase the penalty to be meted out to
respondent to suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. ATICcS
WHEREFORE , respondent Atty. Rizal P. Balbin is found guilty of violating Canon
8, Canon 11, Canon 12, Rule 12.03, Rule 12.04, Canon 19, and Rule 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years, effective immediately upon his receipt of this
Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
Further, he is DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this
Decision to enable it to determine when his suspension from the practice of law shall
take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to: (1) the O ce of the Bar Con dant to
be appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney; (2) the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for its information and guidance; and (3) the O ce of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
ORDERED
Bersamin, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, Del Castillo, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Tijam,
A.B. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J.C. Reyes, Jr. and Hernando, JJ., concur.
Carandang, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
* On leave.
1. Rollo, pp. 1-21.
2. See Decision dated November 9, 2005 penned by Judge Donato H. De Castro; id. at 22-25.
3. See id. at 476-477.
4. See Motion for Extension to File Comment dated June 13, 2006; id. at 36.
5. See Notice of Resolution dated December 4, 2006; id. at 37.
6. See Notices of Resolution dated March 19, 2008 (id. at 41-42), August 10, 2009 (id. at 46-47),
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 April 13, 2011 (id. at 51-52), and January 23, 2013 (id. at 130-131).
7. See Warrant of Arrest dated April 13, 2011 (id. at 53-54) and Alias Order of Arrest and
Commitment dated January 23, 2013 (id. at 132-133).
8. See Resolution dated April 17, 2013; id. at 152-153.
9. Id. at 152.
10. Id. at 474-482. Signed by Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco.
11. Id. at 481-482.
12. See id. at 480-481.
13. See Notice of Resolution in Resolution No. XXII-2017-1106 signed by National Secretary
Patricia-Ann T. Prodigalidad; id. at 472-473.
14. Reyes v. Chiong, Jr., 453 Phil. 99, 104 (2003), citing Cui v. Cui, 120 Phil. 725, 729 (1964).
15. Id. at 106, citing Narido v. Linsangan, 157 Phil. 87, 91 (1974).
16. See id., citing Aguinaldo v. Aguinaldo, 146 Phil. 726, 731 (1970).
17. 789 Phil. 600 (2016).
18. Id. at 616, citing Pena v. Aparicio, 552 Phil. 512, 523 (2007).
19. See Vaflor-Fabroa v. Paguinto, 629 Phil. 230, 236 (2010), citing Sebastian v. Bajar, 559 Phil.
211, 224 (2007).
20. See Spouses Lopez v. Limos, 780 Phil. 113, 123 (2016).
21. Supra note 14.
22. Supra note 19.
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THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 2409. January 29, 1988.]
MACIAS complainant, vs. BENJAMIN B. MALIG ,
MANUEL Y. MACIAS,
respondent.
DECISION
FELICIANO , J : p
This is an administrative case instituted by complainant Atty. Manuel Y. Macias
against respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Malig for suspension or disbarment upon
grounds of malpractice and violation of the lawyer's oath.
The charges made by Atty. Macias in his sworn Complaint dated 14 June 1982,
may be summed up as follows:
"1. He [Atty. Malig] acted as counsel for Rosario M. Llora in Special
Proceedings No. 70878 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila although
Atty. Macias was still her attorney of record.
2. He harassed Atty. Macias to withdraw his appearance in: (a) Special
Proceeding No. 70878, and (b) Civil Case No. 73335 of the then Court of First
Instance of Manila, which became G.R. No. L-34395 of this Honorable Court; and
he intimidated Atty. Macias into signing: (a) the Waiver (Exhibit 'C'), (b) the
Substitution of Counsel in Civil Case No. 73335 (Exhibit 'R'), and (c) the
substitution of counsel in Special Proceeding No. 70878 (Exhibit 'S').
3. He did not substitute Atty. Macias in Civil Case No. 65763 but
claimed for himself the attorney's fees of Atty. Macias.
4. He extorted from Atty. Macias, the sum of P10,000.00.
5. He corruptly induced the late Judge Joel Tiangco to lift Atty. Macias'
attachment on a property belonging to the Lloras without notice to Atty. Macias.
6. He actively assisted the Lloras to dispose of all their properties in
the Philippines and remit the proceeds to Australia in fraud of Atty. Macias." 1
In turn, respondent Atty. Malig in his "Comment with Countercharges" dated 1
September 1982 sought the disbarment of complainant Atty. Macias. The
countercharges against Atty. Macias are the following:
"1. Atty. Macias made an unethical solicitation of case — the
settlement of the estate of Rosario Legarda de Valdes.
2. He instituted a patently baseless and malicious action, Civil Case
No. 109585, before the Regional Trial Court in Manila for attorney's fees and
damages against Antonio Ma. Llora, Rosario M. Llora and their family-owned
corporations.
3. He maliciously and irresponsibly charged Atty. Malig and his clients
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 with having 'exacted' and 'extorted' from him the sum of P10,000.00.
4. He maliciously and irresponsibly charged Atty. Malig and the late
Judge Joel Tiangco with corruption in the lifting of an attachment.
5. He made an unethical representation of a client.
6. He maliciously and irresponsibly charged Atty. Malig and his clients,
the Llora spouses, with fraudulent disposition of the latter's properties and salting
the proceeds [in] Australia." 2
After considering the complaint, respondent's Comment with Countercharge,
complainant's "Reply to Comment and Answer to Countercharge" dated 6 October
1982 and respondent's "Reply" dated 14 December 1982, the Court, by a Resolution
dated 26 January 1983, resolved to refer this case to the O ce of the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation. On 13 November 1986, the Solicitor
General forwarded to the Court his Report and Recommendation dated 22 September
1986.
It appears from the record that complainant Macias had been counsel for the
Legarda family (including Rosario Legarda de Valdes) during the 1960s. A Retainer
Agreement was eventually formalized on 31 December 1968, which Agreement de ned
the scope and nature of the services complainant was to render for the family including
companies that Don Benito Legarda, Doña Rosario Legarda de Valdes and Doña Teresa
Legarda might form.
On 15 September 1969, Doña Rosario Legarda de Valdes died. Gen. Basilio
Valdes, widower of Doña Rosario, and Rosario M. Llora, a legally adopted daughter of
Gen. and Mrs. Valdes, requested complainant Macias to cause their substitution for the
late Doña Rosario Legarda de Valdes in the pending cases and proceedings involving
the decedent.
On 26 January 1970, Gen. Valdes died, leaving Rosario M. Llora, married to
Antonio Ma. Llora, as successor-in-interest. In 1972, Rosario M. Llora and her husband
retained respondent Malig as counsel and executive o cer of the various companies
that the Lloras owned. Not long afterwards, the spouses Llora decided that they
wanted to be represented by respondent Malig in all their pending cases. Mr. Llora
advised the complainant of their desire, and requested him to withdraw from any cases
he was then handling for Mrs. Llora or her parents, so that the Lloras could consolidate
all their legal business, as it were, in the hands of Malig.
Complainant led in Special Proceedings No. 70878 (testate proceedings of
Doña Filomena Legarda, mother of the deceased Doña Rosario Legarda de Valdes) a
"Motion to allow and direct payment of legal services rendered to the estate," dated 10
December 1973, asking the Probate Court to x and determine the fees payable to
complainant from the estate for services rendered in the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, and to direct payment by the administrator to the complainant of the
fees so xed and determined. Because she would be affected by whatever amount the
Court would x as attorney's fees to be paid by the estate and charged against the
interest of the heirs, Mrs. Llora opposed the Motion. Mrs. Llora alleged that a prior
agreement on attorney's fees, dated 22 November 1969, between complainant and the
administrator of the estate should control the amount of fees payable to complainant.
Complainant had previously indicated to Mrs. Llora that he felt he should be paid an
amount equivalent to eight percent (8%) of the distributive share corresponding to Mrs.
Valdes and now to Mrs. Llora in the estate of Doña Filomena Legarda. Pending
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resolution of complainant's Motion, a conference was called by the heirs of Doña
Filomena Legarda to deal with the payment of attorney's fees to Macias. Agreement
was reached by the parties: Complainant Macias would execute a waiver of his claim
for attorney's fees insofar as the share of Mrs. Llora was concerned and would execute
written "Substitution(s) of Counsel" in the several cases he had been handling for Mrs.
Llora or her predecessors-in-interest; Mrs. Llora would, in turn, withdraw her Opposition
to complainant's Motion to allow and direct payment of legal services in Special
Proceedings No. 70878.
On 22 July 1976, the Probate Court in Special Proceedings No. 70878 issued an
order awarding complainant P286,102.91 as attorney's fees. The court order was silent
in respect of the waiver executed by complainant in favor of the Lloras. Mrs. Llora
called complainant's attention to the failure of the order to refer to the waiver by
complainant. Mrs. Llora subsequently led a Motion for Reconsideration asking the
court to reduce the award to attorney's fees to complainant by an amount equivalent to
her share in such payment.
Pending resolution of Mrs. Llora's Motion, complainant sent the Lloras a letter
dated 2 December 1976, which covered: an explanation that the award was not against
the heirs in their personal capacity, but against the estate of Doña Filomena as an
expense of administration; a request that Mrs. Llora's Motion for Reconsideration be
withdrawn; an account of his meeting with some of the heirs of Doña Filomena and their
counsel inside the Chambers of the Probate Judge on 19 November 1976, during which
he agreed to the reduction of the award, now in the amount of P219,602.91 (this
amount was arrived at after deducting earlier payments totalling P66,500.00 from the
original amount of P286,102.91) by P34,602.91 making him entitled to only
P185,000.00; and an advice that ultimately all the twenty-two (22) heirs of Doña
Filomena would be sharing 1/22 of the net payable amount of P185,000.00, which is
equivalent to P8,000.00 more or less. This letter notwithstanding, the Lloras required
complainant to issue a postdated check payable to Mrs. Llora in the amount of
P10,000.00, which complainant immediately did on 15 December 1976. On 21
December 1976, the day when the postdated check became due, complainant obtained
an order of the Probate Court, approving the agreement reached at the 19 November
1976 conference, which reduced the amount of attorney's fees to P185,000.00 and
enjoining the parties to keep full faith with the undertaking. This order enabled
complainant to obtain immediate payment from the estate of Doña Filomena.
On 15 July 1977, complainant instituted a civil suit against the Lloras and their
family-owned corporations, docketed as Civil Case No. 109585, for the nulli cation of
the waiver, for the refund of P10,000.00 paid to Mrs. Llora and for the payment of
attorney's fees in the amount ranging from P750,000.00 to P3,000,000.00 — covering
the legal services he allegedly rendered over the preceding thirty (30) years to Mrs.
Llora's predecessors-in-interest, Gen. and Mrs. Basilio Valdes which, according to
complainant, redounded to Mrs. Llora's bene t. Complainant succeeded in attaching
one of the properties of the Lloras' RML Realty Development Corporation, after posting
a bond of P25,000.00. The levy was soon discharged in an order issued by the late
Judge Joel Tiangco dated 6 March 1979 upon approval of the counter-bond of
P200,000.00 posted by the RML Realty Development Corporation through its counsel,
the Ozaeta, Romulo Law O ces. This discharge was later a rmed by the Court of
Appeals in an order dated 31 August 1979. Still later, on 15 June 1982, complainant
instituted this administrative complaint against respondent Malig.
The Solicitor General considered both the charges of complainant Macias
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 against respondent Malig and the countercharges of respondent Malig against
complainant Macias.
In respect of the charges of complainant Macias against respondent Malig, the
Solicitor General found the evidence presented by complainant as insu cient to
sustain his charges against respondent:
"1. Atty. Malig has the right to represent Rosario M. Llora in opposing
Atty. Macias' motion for the payment of his attorney's fees for the simple reason
that Atty. Macias cannot possibly act as her counsel in opposing his own motion.
Moreover, Atty. Macias did not automatically become also the counsel of Rosario
M. Llora upon the death of his client Rosario Legarda de Valdes.
2. Atty. Malig cannot be guilty of harassment and intimidation
because he merely performed his duties as counsel for the Llora spouses and had
even no participation in the negotiation for the execution of the Waiver (Exhibit
"C"), the Substitution of Counsel in Civil Case No. 73335 and Special Proceeding
No. 70878 (Exhibits "R" and "S", respectively). In fact, he was not even present in
the conference held by Atty. Macias, Atty. Eduardo Hernandez, Antonio M. Llora
and other heirs where Atty. Macias himself suggested the preparation of said
documents.
3. The Substitution of Counsel in Civil Case No. 65763 (Exhibit "6")
clearly shows that Atty. Malig actually substituted Atty. Macias in said case on
March 31, 1974.
4. The P10,000.00 paid by Atty. Macias was in consideration of the
withdrawal of the appeal interposed by Rosario M. Llora from the award of
attorney's fees to Atty. Macias. The check (Exhibit "12") paid by Atty. Macias
shows that the payee was Rosario M. Llora and it was deposited in her account.
Atty. Malig therefore did not extort it from Atty. Macias.
5. Atty. Macias himself admitted that he has no personal knowledge
that Atty. Malig induced Judge Joel Tiangco to lift the attachment and that they
have any relationship. On the contrary, the attachment was property lifted by the
trial court after Atty. Macias made his comment on it. Thus, the then Court of
Appeals dismissed Atty. Macias' petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the
said discharge of attachment.
6. The two deeds of sales (Exhibits M" and "N") are insu cient to
show that Atty. Malig assisted the Llora spouses to dispose of their properties in
the Philippines and remit the proceeds to Australia in fraud of Atty. Macias. While
they refer to the lands owned by the corporations owned by the Llora spouses, the
RML Realty Development Corporation is precisely engaged in the real estate
business. Besides, since the Llora spouses have already emigrated to Australia,
their dispositions of their properties in the Philippines were in good faith."
After careful examination of the records of this case, the Court agrees with the above
ndings of the Solicitor General that complainant Macias' charges against respondent
Malig were indeed not substantiated. LLpr
The Solicitor General also found that the countercharges of respondent Malig
against complainant Macias, had not been adequately proved:
"On the other hand, the countercharges have not also been proved by
sufficient evidence and are without merit for the following reasons:
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1. As the counsel for 22 years since 1947 of Dr. Basilio J. Valdes and
his wife Rosario Legarda de Valdes, it is only natural for him to inquire whether he
will still continue his legal services upon the death of Rosario Legarda de Valdes.
To immediately stop his legal services without rst inquiring from her heirs would
prejudice the estate of Rosario Legarda de Valdes. His solicitation [of information
on] whether his legal services are still needed [was] therefore justi ed and made
in good faith.
2. It would be premature to conclude that the Civil Case No. 109855
instituted by Atty. Macias is patently baseless and malicious. The case is still
pending decision by the Regional Trial Court in Manila. In any case, it was led by
Atty. Macias in good faith.
3. The term 'extorted' in the pleadings of Atty. Macias is not unethical
but a common legal term descriptive of the overt act complained of. Since he
believes in good faith that he was prejudiced by such act, he cannot be accused
of charging Atty. Malig maliciously and irresponsibly.
4. Believing in good faith through the information of the branch clerk
of court that Atty. Malig is related to Judge Joel Tiangco whom he induced to lift
the attachment, Atty. Macias could likewise not be accused of charging Atty.
Malig maliciously and irresponsibly.
5. Atty. Macias could not have made an unauthorized representation
of Rosario M. Llora in Civil Case No. 65763, because the trial of the case had been
completed in February, 1973, and he signed the substitution of counsel only in
March 1974. It is only the writing and ling of the brief in C.A.-G.R. No. 63025 of
the then Court of Appeals (Exhibit "P") which incidentally bene ted Rosario M.
Llora after March 31, 1974.
6. With knowledge of the sales covered by the two deeds of sale
(Exhibit "M" and "N"), Atty. Macias believes in good faith that Atty. Malig is
assisting his clients in disposing of their properties in the Philippines and in
remitting the proceeds to Australia when they emigrated to defraud him of his
attorney's fees. Especially so that the case Atty. Macias led against the Llora
spouses for attorney's fees is still pending decision."
With respect to most of the specific countercharges of respondent Malig against
complainant Macias, the Court agrees with the general conclusion of the Solicitor
General that these countercharges have not been adequately proved. In respect of Item
No. 2 above, which relates to Civil Case No. 109855 commenced by complainant
Macias against his former clients for claimed attorney's fees, complainant Macias is
entitled to the bene t of a presumption of good faith. The Court would observe,
however, that presumption is one juris tantum only, persisting until the nal resolution
of Civil Case No. 109855 should prove otherwise. Item No. 6 above is related to, but not
dependent upon, Item No. 2 above. In Item No. 6, complainant Macias by charging that
respondent Malig was assisting Rosario M. Llora and her husband in disposing of their
properties and remitting the proceeds thereof to Australia in fraud of complainant
Macias, was in effect accusing both respondent Malig and the spouses Llora of bad
faith and fraud. The Court nds it very di cult to believe that complainant Macias could
have supposed, in good faith, that his former clients would emigrate to Australia and
dispose of their properties in the Philippines for the sole or principal purpose of
defrauding him of attorney's fees. The records is bare of any suggestion that
complainant Macias had previously investigated the truth of the charge which he so
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 readily hurled against both respondent Malig and the spouses Llora. The fact that the
Lloras had earlier successfully objected to the amount of fees complainant Macias
sought to charge the estate of Dona Filomena Legarda, plus the fact that Macias soon
thereafter commenced his suit against the Lloras for very large amounts of alleged
fees, strongly suggest that the charge of bad faith and fraud against the Lloras and
respondent Malig, was born out of improper motives.
The Court is not prepared to condone by passing over subsilentio the
misconduct of which complainant and respondent are guilty one vis-a-vis the other.
Each party here has shown himself to be too ready to believe the other guilty of serious
misconduct in the practice of the profession to which they both belong while
vehemently asserting his own good faith. Each party here was too anxious and willing
to make serious accusations against the other which the exertion of reasonable
diligence along with simple courtesy would have shown to be unwarranted by the facts
and the records. Each attorney here was too prone to use intemperate and offensive
language in describing the professional behavior of the other. Complainant Macias
insisted that respondent Malig "extorted" P10,000.00 from him. The dictionary meaning
of "to extort" is "to obtain from an unwilling or reluctant person by physical force,
intimidation or the abuse of legal or o cial authority" (Webster's Third New
International [1981 ed.]). Clearly, extortion is an unethical act and may well be criminal.
"Harassment" and "intimidation" are other similarly unethical and offensive acts that
complainant Macias so freely ascribed to respondent Malig. "Corruption" with which
complainant Macias accused both respondent Malig and the deceased Judge Tiangco
is an even more deplorable term. Upon the other hand, respondent Malig was not to be
outdone and referred to complainant Macias as a "denizen" of "a jungle" who "prey[s]
upon his brother lawyer [and] his [own] clients" and likened him to "a baneful snake
biting the hand of the client who fed him" (Comment with Countercharge, Rollo, p. 27).
Complainant Macias and respondent Malig are not, however, in pari delicto. For
purposes of determining appropriate penalties, in respect of complainant Macias, the
Court takes judicial notice of the fact that this is not the rst time that complainant
Macias has been found guilty of using "improper and unethical language." In Beatriz L.
Gonzales v. Court of First Instance of Manila, et al., G.R. No. L-34395, this Court, in a
Resolution dated 29 July 1981, held certain statements made by complainant Macias in
pleadings led before this Court as "intemperate, tactless and offensive" and as
constituting "contempt of court in facie curiae" for which complainant Macias was
"severely reprimanded" and warned that, for a repetition of the offense, a more drastic
penalty would be imposed. prLL
The Court would also take judicial notice of the fact that complainant Macias has
more than once in the past been rebuked by this Court in relation to his conduct vis-a-
vis clients and former clients. 3
The Solicitor General concluded his Report and Recommendation in the following
manner:
"Court dockets are severely clogged with litigation which demand prompt
attention, but such desirable action can not be fully realized when members of the
bar are the ones who themselves file administrative cases against each other only
to have them withdrawn as soon as their personal egos have been assuaged. If
the members of the bar can not restrain their tempers when their sensibility to
criticism is involved, it becomes di cult for said o cers of the court to restrain
their own clients against commencing and pursuing innocuous litigation.
Moreover, such conduct diminishes the opportunity of the Supreme Court to
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discipline erring members of the Bar. For contributing to this unwanted
consequence in the administration of law, complainant and counter-complainant
in Case No. 2409 should be severely disciplined by the imposition of heavy ne in
addition to being subjected to stern censure by the Supreme Court.
IX. RECOMMENDATION
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the charges and
countercharges between Atty. Macias and Atty. Malig be dismissed for
insu ciency of evidence and lack of merit, but both parties should be severely
disciplined by the imposition of heavy ne in addition to being subjected to stern
censure by the Supreme Court."
We hold that complainant Macias and respondent Malig are both guilty of
conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an o cer of the court. Lawyers must at all times
treat each other, and as well their clients, former clients and the rest of the community,
with that personal dignity, courtesy and civility rightly demanded of members of the
ancient and learned profession of the law.
ACCORDINGLY, the charges of complainant Macias against respondent Malig
and the countercharges (save Item No. 6) of respondent Malig against complainant
Macias are hereby DISMISSED for their failure to substantiate the same and for lack of
merit. Complainant Macias is hereby REPRIMANDED AND SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months for acts unbecoming a lawyer and an
o cer of the court. Respondent Malig is also hereby REPRIMANDED and FINED
P5,000.00, for acts unbecoming a lawyer and an o cer of the court. In addition, they
are each WARNED that commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be
more severely penalized by the Court. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the
Personal Records of complainant and respondent lawyers in the Bar Confidant's Office.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. As summarized in the Report and Recommendation, dated 22 September 1986, by the
Solicitor General, p. 2.
2. As summarized in the Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General, supra, p. 10.
3. In Intestate Estate of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson, etc.; Macias v. del Rosario, 45 SCRA
381 (1972), this Court through Mr. Justice Makasiar said:
". . . It should be noted from his said memorandum that the late Julian Wolfson
expressly hoped that his sister will deliver to petitioner-appellant at her convenience
only the comparatively meager sum of P500.00, the lowest accorded to his former
employees by the late Julian A. Wolfson, who expressed the same hope that Rosina at
her convenience will deliver to three of his employees P10,000.00 each and to two
remaining employees P1,000.00 each, less taxes. It is likewise significant that the
deceased Julian Wolfson preferred to leave his last instructions to Ricardo Vito Cruz,
his accountant, and not to petitioner-appellant, an experienced lawyer of long standing
and Julian's former assistant for several years in his law firm. Considering these
circumstances, the unusual interest on the part of petitioner appellant in insisting in
filing a separate probate proceeding and in seeking his own appointment as
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 administrator of Rosina's estate is rather curious, to say the least.
A respectable and self-respecting member of the Bar would consider indelicate such
an act and would restrain his hand in being too officious under the circumstances. He
would not institute several actions to protect his interest, when one suit will suffice,
thus minimizing the clogging of the dockets of the courts.
Petitioner-appellant's pretension that he was not aware of the petition filed on
August 13, 1966 by Atty. Arturo del Rosario for the probate of the will and codicils of
Rosina in the same Special Proceedings No. 63866, even if true, does not justify his
initiating another proceeding for the same purpose, separate from and independent of
Special Proceedings No. 63866. In this connection, his pretension cannot be believed;
because he was the one who filed on January 10, 1966, Special Proceedings No.
63866 in behalf of appellee Ricardo Vito Cruz whose appointment as special
administrator he secured and whose appointment as regular administrator he prayed
for. Upon knowing of the existence of Rosina's will and codicils, petitioner-appellant
would reasonably be expected to examine and study the records of Special
Proceedings No. 63866 long before he filed on October 25, 1966 his separate petition
for probate of the same will and codicils assigned to Branch VI, and consequently he
must have necessarily discovered the existence in the record of Special Proceedings
No. 63866 of the petition for probate filed by Atty. Arturo del Rosario. Because such a
petition would nullify his obvious desire to have a hand in the administration of
Rosina's estate through his former client, appellee Ricardo Vito Cruz, feigning
ignorance of the petition of Atty. Arturo del Rosario, he filed a separate independent
petition for probate which is docketed as Special Proceedings No. 67302 hoping
thereby to preserve the chances of his claim being recognized by the court and of
being appointed regular administrator, instead of filing the same petition in special
Proceedings No. 63866 for the conversion of the said proceedings from intestate to
testate. This act on his part reveals a motive that is hardly flattering to him as a
member of the bar and as an officer of the court." (45 SCRA at 393-395; Emphasis
supplied).
Again, in Macias v. Vito Cruz, et al., 49 SCRA 80 (1973), this Court, speaking once
more through Mr. Justice Makasiar, said;
"The trial court, in the challenged order appointing Ricardo Vito Cruz, ancillary
administrator of the estate in the Philippines of Rosina, instead of appellant Macias,
found, among others, that Ricardo Vito Cruz was appointed special administrator in
January 12, 1966 at the instance of oppositor-appellant Macias himself, who, as then
counsel of Vito Cruz, instituted Special Proceeding No. 63866 over the estate of
Rosina; that as such special administrator, Vito Cruz has 'indubitably . . . performed his
functions well; that all the estate, inheritance, income and real estate taxes due the
Philippine Government had been paid by Vito Cruz as such special administrator; that
there is nothing left to be done except to pay the creditors, if any, and thereafter to
dispose of the estate in accordance with the law; that the Wells Fargo Bank as
domiciliary executor named in the codicil and so appointed by the California Court and
the University of Michigan as the residuary and principal beneficiary named in the will
and codicils of Rosina, nominated Vito Cruz for administrator; that Vito Cruz as such
nominee should be preferred since he is qualified (Johannes v. Harvey, 43 Phil. 117,
179); that Vito Cruz is named as a beneficiary of the amount of P10,000.00 in the
memorandum of Julian to Rosina, very much greater than the sum of P500.00 allotted
for oppositor-appellant, the smallest amount in the said memorandum (pp. 18-19,
appellant's brief in L-29235); that the alleged former employees of the decedent who
allegedly indorsed him are not named in Rosina's will and that their alleged interest in
her estate must first be established before they can be legally allowed to intervene in
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the proceedings; that the University of Michigan as principal and residuary beneficiary,
flatly rejected oppositor-appellant Macias' solicitation for its support in his bid to be
appointed as ancillary administrator; and that appellant Macias violated his duty as
previous counsel of Vito Cruz 'to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client . . .' (Sec. 20[e], Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court, as well as Canon No. 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics concerning
his obligation 'to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his
secrets or confidences . . .') when appellant Macias, despite the adverse ruling of the
court upon objection of counsel for Vito Cruz, insisted in testifying on matters which
were privileged communications between him as lawyer and Vito Cruz as his former
client, which obligation survives the termination of the lawyer-client relationship (pp.
124-129, ROA).
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, there is no showing that respondent Judge Manuel Barcelona gravely abused
his discretion in appointing respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz as ancillary administrator of
Rosina's estate in Special Proceeding No. 63866.
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that Rosina's executor and the University of Michigan as the
residuary beneficiary to whom the bulk of Rosina's estate shall eventually pertain,
never questioned any of the actuations of respondent administrator Ricardo Vito Cruz
in his administration of both the estates of Julian and Rosina nor the challenged
orders of the respondent Judges granting partial distribution of the estates. Yet
petitioner-appellant, riding on his claim to an insignificant amount of P500.00, has
taken upon himself the officious duty of appearing to be the champion of the other
beneficiaries, whose identities have not been ascertained as the former dependents of
Rosina and her parents. This Court would not want to entertain the impression that
petitioner-appellant would demean himself by regarding himself as a dependent of
Rosina, simply because she once contracted his services as a lawyer to file ejectment
cases in her behalf. The other members of the Philippine Bar would certainly not
subscribe to appellant's position on this point." (49 SCRA at 101-104; Emphasis
supplied).
Finally, in Macias v. Uy Kim, et al., 45 SCRA 251 (1972), Justice Makasiar had
occasion to rebuke complainant Macias once more on behalf of the Court:
". . . The Court cannot ignore the proclivity or tendency of appellant herein to file
several actions covering the same subject matter or seeking substantially identical
relief, which is unduly burdening the courts. Coming from a neophyte, who is still
unsure of himself in the practice of the law, the same may be regarded with some
understanding. But considering appellant's ability and long experience at the bar, this
filing identical suits for the same remedy is reprehensible and should merit rebuke." (45
SCRA at 264; Emphasis supplied)
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 EN BANC
[Adm. Case No. 778 . August 14, 1936.]
BENEDICTO M. JAVIER , complainant, vs . SILVERIO Q. CORNEJO ,
respondent.
The complainant in his own behalf.
The respondent in his own behalf.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEYS; PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT; CODE OF ETHICS. — The lawyer
owes entire "devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability", to the end that
nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied (Code
of Ethics, adopted by the American Bar Association and the Philippine bar Association,
No. 15; In re Tionko [1922], 43 Phil., 191, 194).
2. ID.; ID.; COURT'S DISAPPROVAL OF UNJUSTIFIABLE RECRIMINATIONS
BETWEEN ATTORNEYS. — Mutual bickerings and unjusti able recriminations between
brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive
any sympathy from this court.
DECISION
LAUREL J :
LAUREL, p
The respondent Silverio Q. Cornejo, a practising lawyer of Lipa, Batangas, is
charged with malpractice (a) for trying to collect from a brother attorney a sum of
money by means of threat, and (b) for having instigated Severina Paz Teodoro to le a
complaint against the herein complainant, Attorney Benedicto M. Javier, for malpractice
(Administrative Case No. 757) knowing fully well that the charges therein preferred
were malicious, flimsy and unfounded.
The complainant in support of his rst charge refers to a letter dated December
2, 1935, in which demand was made upon him by the respondent for the delivery of
P195 representing the amount collected and received by the said complainant by virtue
of a judgment rendered in a certain civil case in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
wherein Severina Paz Teodoro was the judgment creditor and the herein complainant
was her counsel. In the same letter the complainant was given ten days within which to
turn over the said P195, otherwise a complaint would be led against him in this court.
He was furthermore urged to settle the matter in due time for the preservation not only
of his good name but also that of the legal profession.
We nd nothing improper in this letter of the respondent to the complaint which
would justify us in taking disciplinary action against the respondent. The letter is an
extra-judicial demand for the payment of a sum of money which Severina Paz Teodoro
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had represented to the respondent as owing to her and which she sought to recover
through his professional services. It was an honest effort on the part of the respondent
to serve the interests of his client. The lawyer owes entire "devotion to the interest of
his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability", to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him,
save by the rules of law, legally applied (Code of Ethics, adopted by the American Bar
Association and the Philippine Bar Association, No. 15; In re Tionko [1922], 43 Phil.,
191, 194).
As to the second ground, it is alleged that the respondent in connivance with one
Gregorio Tapia, induced Severina Paz Teodoro to accuse the herein complainant before
this court of malpractice. It appears that herein complainant was respondent in
Administrative Case No. 757 of this court upon a charge of unlawful conversion of a
judgment fund amounting to P195 pertaining to his client, Severina Paz Teodoro. This
charge, however, was dismissed by resolution of this court on July 10, 1936. Now the
complainant comes back against the herein respondent and charges him with having
maliciously instigated the ling of the complaint in the aforesaid Administrative Case
No. 757.
We nd that Administrative Case No. 757 was instituted in this court on March
18, 1936 and that respondent Silverio Q. Cornejo intervened as counsel for the
complainant therein on December 2, 1935. But long before these dates, Severina Paz
Teodoro and her son Feliciano Patena had already been demanding from the herein
complainant the return of the amount alleged to be due them (Exhibits B and C). The
last demand letter (Exhibit C) was made on March 23, 1931, and its receipt
acknowledged by the herein complainant in the same month (Exhibit E). This letter
demanded the payment of the remaining balance of P166.50 from the sum which the
herein complainant had collected and received as judgment fund of his erstwhile client
Severina Paz Teodoro, and also advised that upon his failure to remit the amount
demanded, the matter would be brought to the attention of this court. The complainant
in Administrative Case No. 757, therefore, already knew on March 23, 1931, long before
the respondent Silverio Q. Cornejo entered the scene, where to seek relief.
It should be observed, in this connection, that mutual bickerings and unjusti able
recriminations, between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal
profession and will not receive any sympathy from this court.
The complaint against the respondent is dismissed for lack of merit. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz and Recto, JJ., concur.
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 SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 6396. October 25, 2005.]
ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO , complainant, vs . ATTY. VIRGIL R.
CASTRO , respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA J :
TINGA, p full respect from her staff. 6
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled invectives at a Clerk of
Court. Members of the bar decorum must at all times comfort themselves in a manner
befitting their noble profession.
Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. On 8 May 2003, she led with the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a
Complaint-Affidavit 1 with supporting documents 2 against respondent Atty. Virgil R.
Castro for Unprofessional Conduct, speci cally violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 8
and Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 3 The charge in the complaint
is summed up as follows:
Respondent Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice-President of IBP-
Nueva Vizcaya Chapter. On 5 May 2003, respondent went to complainant's o ce to
inquire whether the complete records of Civil Case No. 784, entitled Sps. Crispino
Castillano v. Sps. Federico S. Castillano and Felicidad Aberin , had already been
remanded to the court of origin, MCTC Dupax del Norte, Alfonso Castaned, Nueva
Vizcaya. It must be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of either party
in Civil Case No. 784.
Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been transmitted
since a certi ed true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals should rst be
presented to serve as basis for the transmittal of the records to the court of origin. To
this respondent retorted scornfully, "Who will certify the Court of Appeals' Decision, the
Court of Appeals? You mean to say, I would still have to go to Manila to get a certi ed
true copy?" Surprised at this outburst, complainant replied, "Sir, it's in the Rules but you
could show us the copy sent to the party you claim to be representing." Respondent
then replied, "Then you should have noti ed me of the said requirement. That was two
weeks ago and I have been frequenting your o ce since then, but you never bothered
to notify me." Complainant replied, "It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you of the said
requirement."
Respondent then answered, "You mean to say it is not your duty to remand the
record of the case?" Complainant responded, "No, Sir, I mean, it's not our duty to notify
you that you have to submit a copy of the Court of Appeals' decision." Respondent
angrily declared in Ilocano, "Kayat mo nga saw-en, awan pakialam yon? Kasdiay?" ("You
mean to say you don't care anymore? Is that the way it is?") He then turned and left the
o ce, banging the door on his way out to show his anger. The banging of the door was
so loud it was heard by the people at the adjacent RTC, Branch 30 where a hearing was
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taking place. 4
After a few minutes, respondent returned to the o ce, still enraged, and pointed
his nger at complainant and shouted, " Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan
mo nga ibales kaniak ah!" ("Vulva of your mother! If you are harboring ill feelings against
my client, don't turn your ire on me!") Complainant was shocked at respondent's words
but still managed to reply, "I don't even know your client, Sir." Respondent left the o ce
and as he passed by complainant's window, he again shouted, " Ukinnam nga babai!"
("Vulva of your mother, you woman!") 5
Complainant suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her
o ce of which she was, and still is, the head and in front of her staff. She felt that her
credibility had been tarnished and diminished, eliciting doubt on her ability to command
The Complaint-Affidavit, led three days after the incident, was supported by an
Affidavit 7 signed by employees of RTC-Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed the
incident. The Affidavit narrated the same incident as witnessed by the said employees.
A Motion to File Additional A davit/Documentary Evidence was led by complainant
on 25 September 2003. 8
On 26 May 2003, the CBD-IBP issued an Order 9 requiring respondent to submit
his answer to the complaint. Respondent submitted his Compliance 1 0 dated 18 June
2003. Respondent explained that he was counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 847,
entitled Sps. Federico Castillano, et al. v. Sps. Crispin Castillano, et al ., led with the RTC
of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30. He learned of the nality of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 64962 with respect to Civil Case No. 847 before the lower court.
Prior to the incident, he went to the o ce of the complainant to request for the
transmittal of the records of the case to the MCTC and the complainant reassured him
of the same. aCTcDH
Respondent admits having inquired about the status of the transmittal of the
records on 5 May 2003. However, he has no explanation as to what transpired on that
day. Instead, he narrates that on 25 May 2003, twelve days after the incident, the
records had not yet been transmitted, and he subsequently learned that these records
were returned to the court of origin.
The hearing for the administrative complaint before the CBD was set on 25
September 2003 by the Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. However, on
said date, only complainant appeared. The latter also moved that the case be
submitted for resolution. 1 1 Respondent later on led a Manifestation stating that the
reason for his non-appearance was because he was still recuperating from physical
injuries and that he was not mentally t to prepare the required pleadings as his vehicle
was rained with bullets on 19 August 2003. He also expressed his public apology to the
complainant in the same Manifestation. 1 2
Complainant led a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on the
next hearing date in view of respondent's public apology, adding that respondent
personally and humbly asked for forgiveness which she accepted. 1 3
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded
and warned that any other complaint for breach of his professional duties shall be dealt
with more severely. 1 4 The IBP submitted to this Court a Notice of Resolution adopting
and approving the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. 1 5
At the onset, it should be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of
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 Civil Case No. 784. Had he been counsel of record, it would have been easy for him to
present the required certi ed true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals. He
need not have gone to Manila to procure a certi ed true copy of the decision since the
Court of Appeals furnishes the parties and their counsel of record a duplicate original
or certified true copy of its decision.
His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records
were already transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record
and there being no authorization from either the parties to represent them, respondent
had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court.
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 8.02 — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer,
without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief
against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil
Case No. 784, respondent deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the
counsel of record of that case. It does not matter whether he did so in good faith.
led a case against respondent pending before this Court. 1 9 We, however, cannot
acknowledge such allegation absent any evidence showing the veracity of such claim.
No affidavits to that effect were submitted by either Atty. Asuncion or Atty. Lambino.
Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact
that respondent had apologized to the complainant and the latter had accepted it. This
is not to say, however, that respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People
are accountable for the consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent
afterwards. The fact remains that things done cannot be undone and words uttered
cannot be taken back. Hence, he should bear the consequences of his actions.
The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their
brethren. This esteem cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by arti ce
or contrivance. It is born of sharp contexts and thrives despite con icting interest. It
emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and skills in the honorable
performance of professional duty. 2 0
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of
TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that any similar infraction with be
dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Bar Con dant for
appropriate annotation in the record of the respondent. cSIADH

Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case No.
784, respondent acted rudely towards an o cer of the court. He raised his voice at the
clerk of court and uttered at her the most vulgar of invectives. Not only was it ill-
mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did all these to a woman and in
front of her subordinates.
Footnotes
As held in Alcantara v. Atty. Pe anco , 1 6 respondent ought to have realized that
this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public 1.
estimation and erode public respect for it. 1 7 These acts violate Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and
2.
Rule 8.01, to wit:
3.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely re ect on
his tness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life behave in
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Canon 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel. HIACac
Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that
lawyers conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow
lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They
must act honorably, fairly and candidly towards each other and otherwise conduct 4.
themselves without reproach at all times. 1 8
5.
As correctly evaluated by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not
categorically deny the charges in the complaint. Instead, he gave a lengthy narration of 6.
the prefatory facts of the case as well as of the incident on 5 May 2003. 7.
Complainant also alleged in her Complaint-Affidavit that respondent's
uncharacteristic behavior was not an isolated incident. He has supposedly done the
same to Attys. Abraham Johnny G. Asuncion and Temmy Lambino, the latter having
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SO ORDERED.
Puno, J., Austria-Martinez and Callejo, JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., is on leave.
Rollo, pp. 2-4.
Id. at 5-9.
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the integrated bar.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely re ects on his tness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.02 — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or
favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or
neglectful counsel.
Id. at 2 and 5.
Id. at 3 and 6.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 5-6. It is signed by Carmelita E. Caoile, Thelma R. Moya, Nestor L. Rojo, William F.
Jandoc and Jovencio Guyod. The names of Ruben Panganiban and Eliezer Ordonez are
a xed on the Affidavit but do not bear their signatures. An attached Explanation, id. at
7, clari es that Ruben Panganiban did not sign the A davit as he did not witness the
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 whole incident, having left the o ce during the height thereof. Eliezer Ordonez, on the SECOND DIVISION
other hand, was able to observe the whole incident but was out of the province at the
time of filing of the complaint and was therefore unable to sign the Affidavit.
[G.R. No. 114732. August 1, 2000.]
8. Id. at 79-93.
ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED (now deceased) substituted by one of
9. Id. at 47.
her heirs, CARMEN MATILDE M. TIONGCO, petitioner, vs. HON.
10. Id. at 48-53. RICARDO M. ILARDE, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Br. 26, JOSE B. TIONGCO and ANTONIO G. DORONILA, JR. ,
11. TSN, 25 September 2005, p. 11; Rollo, p. 105. See also Order dated 25 September 2003, respondents.
Id at 94.
12. Id. at 107. Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
13. Id. at 111. Jose B. Tiongco in his own behalf and for the other respondents.
14. The Report and Recommendation was filed with the IBP by the Investigating
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. Id at 115-117. SYNOPSIS
15. Id at 114.
On October 17, 1990, petitioner Estrella Tiongco Yared led an amended complaint
16. 441 Phil. 514 (2002). for annulment of a davit of adjudication, sales, transfer certi cates of title, reconveyance
17. Id. at 520. and damages against private respondents Jose B. Tiongco and Antonio Doronila, Jr.
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Iloilo City. To protect her interest, petitioner
18. Id. at 519 citing De Ere v. Rubi, 320 SCRA 617 (1999). caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the Transfer Certi cates of Title of the
subject properties. On December 14, 1993, the respondent judge issued a Decision
19. Id at 3.
dismissing petitioners' complaint and private respondent's counterclaim on the ground
20. Atty. Reyes v. Atty. Chiong, Jr., 453 Phil. 99, 107 (2003) citing AGPALO, LEGAL ETHICS that the petitioner's cause of action had already prescribed. On December 17, 1993,
(1989), p. 95. petitioner led a notice of appeal. Respondent Tiongco then led a motion for cancellation
of notice of lis pendens. Her rst and second motions for reconsideration were denied. He
then led his third Motion for Reconsideration which was found to be persuasive, hence, in
an Order dated February 14, 1994, the respondent judge granted the cancellation of a
notice of lis pendens. When the petitioner led a motion for reconsideration, the court a
quo reversed its order on the ground, among others, that the records had been ordered
elevated to the Court of Appeals. Respondent Tiongco led a motion for reconsideration
and the respondent judge issued this assailed order which installed an earlier order
cancelling the notice of lis pendens on the ground that the lis pendens is not a matter
litigated in the appeal and the records have not yet been transmitted to the appellate court.
Feeling that a motion for reconsideration would be fruitless, petitioner led the instant
petition.
The Court dismissed the petition, there being a clear violation of the doctrine of
judicial hierarchy which the Court has taken pains to emphasize in past jurisprudence. Only
the presence of exceptional and compelling reasons justi ed a disregard of the rule.
Petitioner has failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to her failure to comply with
or non-observance of the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason why the petition
could not have been brought before the Court of Appeals, considering all the more that the
appeal of the main case was already before it. Had petitioner brought the petition before
the Court of Appeals, the same could, and would have been consolidated with the appeal,
thereby bringing under the competence of the said court all matters relative to the action,
including the incidents thereof.

SYLLABUS
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 1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; DOCTRINE OF LIS PENDENS; PURPOSE.
— The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and necessity, the
purpose of which is to make known to the whole world that properties in litigation are still
within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of
the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation.
2. ID.; ID.; NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS; DEFINED. — The notice of lis pendens is an
announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, and serves
as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk,
or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN IT IS PROPER. — Rule 13, Section 14 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure and Section 76 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree provide the statutory bases for a notice of lis pendens. From
these provisions, it is clear that such a notice is proper only in: a) An action to recover
possession of real estate; b) An action to quiet title thereto; c) An action to remove clouds
thereon; d) An action for partition; and d) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court
directly affecting title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the building thereon.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT NECESSARY TO PROVE OWNERSHIP OR INTEREST OVER
THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE AFFECTED THEREBY. — All petitioner has to do is to
assert a claim of possession or title over the subject property to put the property under
the coverage of the rule. It is not necessary for her to prove ownership or interest over the
property sought to be affected by lis pendens. cCaDSA
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; GROUNDS FOR CANCELLATION. — Whether as a matter of
procedure or substance, the rule is that a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on
two (2) grounds, namely (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of
the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the
party who caused it to be recorded.
6. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY; FAILURE TO
OBSERVE SAID DOCTRINE IS A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF PETITION; CASE AT BAR. —
The petition should be dismissed, there being a clear violation of the doctrine of judicial
hierarchy that we have taken pains to emphasize in past jurisprudence. . . . Only the
presence of exceptional and compelling reasons justi ed a disregard of the rule. Petitioner
has failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to her failure to comply with or non-
observance of the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason why the instant petition
could not have been brought before the Court of Appeals, considering all the more that the
appeal of the main case was already before it. . . . Had petitioner brought the instant
petition before the Court of Appeals, the same could, and would, have been consolidated
with the appeal, thereby bringing under the competence of the said court all matters
relative to the action, including the incidents thereof.
7. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; A
LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD
HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST
OPPOSING COUNSEL; VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR. — Respondent Tiongco has achieved a
remarkable feat of character assassination. His verbal darts, albeit entertaining in a
eeting way, are cast with little regard for truth. However, he does nothing more than to
obscure the issues, and his reliance on the fool's gold of gossip betrays only a shocking
absence of discernment. To this end, it will be wise to give him an object lesson in the
elementary rules of courtesy by which we expect members of the bar to comport
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themselves. These provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility are pertinent:
CANON 8 — A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND
CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING
TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL. Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. . . .
Rule 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language
before the courts.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE INVITES THE DISCIPLINARY
AUTHORITY OF THE COURT. — In Romero v. Valle , we stated that a lawyer's actuations, "
[a]lthough allowed some latitude of remarks or comment in the furtherance of the cause
he upholds, his arguments, both written or oral, should be gracious to both court and
opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman
to another." Otherwise, his use of intemperate language invites the disciplinary authority of
the court. We are aghast at the facility with which respondent Atty. Jose B. Tiongco
concocts accusations against the opposing party and her counsel, although it is of public
record that in Tiongco v. Deguma, et al ., we dismissed as totally unfounded his charge of
fraudulent conspiracy and public scandal against petitioner, Major Tiongco, Atty. Deguma
and even the latter's superior at the Public Attorney's O ce, Atty. Napoleon G. Pagtanac.
His lexicon of insults, though entertaining, do not nd a ready audience in us, and he should
be, as he is hereby, warned accordingly: Homines qui gestant, quiqui auscultant crimina, si
meo arbitratu liceat, omnis pendeat, gestores linguis, auditores auribus.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR. J :
LEON JR., p
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Order dated March
17, 1994 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 26, which reinstated an earlier
order cancelling the notice of lis pendens annotated on the back of Transfer Certi cates of
Title Nos. T-92383 and T-5050, of the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo City covering Lots 3244
and 3246, respectively, located in Iloilo City. HCSEcI
The relevant facts are summarized as follows:
On October 17, 1990, petitioner Estrella Tiongco Yared led an amended complaint
2 before the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch XXVI, against private
respondents Jose B. Tiongco and Antonio Doronila, Jr. Docketed as Civil Case No. 19408,
the action was one for "annulment of a davit of adjudication, sales, transfer certi cates of
title, reconveyance and damages."
In brief, the amended complaint alleged that respondent Tiongco, on the basis of an
a davit of adjudication dated April 17, 1974 alleging that he is the sole surviving heir of
the previous owner, Maria Luis de Tiongco, succeeded in having the subject properties
registered in his name, to the prejudice of the other surviving heir of the previous owner,
petitioner among them. Petitioner and respondent Tiongco's father were siblings, and both
were among several heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco. The aforesaid a davit of adjudication
was registered with the O ce of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City on May 10, 1974.
Petitioner prayed that the properties be reconveyed to the original registered owners,
subject to partition among the lawful heirs, and that respondent Tiongco be ordered to pay
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 damages and costs.
To protect her interest in the properties during the pendency of the case, petitioner
caused to be annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-52547, T-4666 and T-52546,
3 which covered Lot Nos. 3244, 3246 and 1404, respectively. TCT Nos. T-92383 and T-
5050 were derived or transferred from TCT Nos. T-52547 and T-4666 respectively and
registered in the name of Tiongco.
After respondent Jose B. Tiongco led his answer, trial ensued during which, on
three separate occasions, he led motions seeking the cancellation of the notices of lis
pendens. 4 All these motions were denied. 5
On December 14, 1993, the respondent judge issued a Decision 6 dismissing
petitioner's complaint and private respondent's counterclaim. The trial court found that
petitioner's cause of action had already prescribed.
Petitioner led a notice of appeal 7 on December 17, 1993. As before, respondent
Tiongco led a motion for cancellation of the notices of lis pendens 8 dated December 21,
1993; this was denied in an Order dated January 10, 1994. 9 He led a "Second Motion for
Reconsideration" 1 0 which was also denied in an Order dated January 26, 1994. 1 1
Displaying remarkable tenacity, respondent Tiongco led a "Third Motion for
Reconsideration." 1 2 This time, however, his arguments proved persuasive. In an Order 1 3
dated February 14, 1994, the respondent judge ruled to wit:
In the light of the ruling laid down in Magdalena Homeowners Association,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 325; 330 (1990), cited in Vda. De Kilayko vs.
Tengco, 207 SCRA 600; 614-615 (1992), that "the continuance or removal of a
notice of lis pendens is not contingent on the existence of a nal judgment in the
action and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof" so that the notices of lis
pendens in the case at bar may, on proper grounds, be cancelled notwithstanding
the non- nality of the judgment of this Court brought about by plaintiff's appeal
and considering the nding of this Court that plaintiff's action had already
prescribed, which nding is based on the admitted fact that the questioned deed
of adjudication was registered way back of May 10, 1974 so that the possibility
of this nding being reversed is quite remote if not totally nil and, considering
further, the circumstances obtaining in this case, among which are: (1) that the
criminal complaint for perjury led by plaintiff against defendant Jose B. Tiongco
based on the same deed of adjudication had already been dismissed with nality
also on the ground of prescription; (2) that the occupants of the property who
were alleged as formerly paying rentals to herein plaintiff, Estrella Tiongco Yared,
had already recognized defendant's ownership and had long stopped paying
rentals to plaintiff without the latter intervening, much less, contesting the
decision in Civil Case No. 15421 where defendant Jose B. Tiongco was declared
with nality as the true and lawful owner of Lots Nos. 3244 and 3246; and (3)
that, if at all, the present claim of plaintiff covers but a very small portion of
subject lots consisting only a total of about 64 square meters hence, it would be
unfair to the defendant who has torrens title covering the parcels of lands solely
in his name to have the same subjected to the harsh effect of such a
encumbrance; the Court, in view of all the foregoing considerations and upon
further review of the records, hereby reconsiders its stand on the subject matter of
lis pendens and so holds that the continued annotation of subject notices of lis
pendens is intended to molest the defendant, Jose B. Tiongco, and is not
necessary to protect the rights of plaintiff as such rights, if any, are now
foreclosed by prescription.
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This time, it was petitioner's turn to seek reconsideration. 1 4 On March 4, 1994, the
public respondent issued an Order 1 5 reversing himself on the ground that (1) it had
already lost jurisdiction over the case due to the expiration of the last day to appeal of
both parties, (2) the notice of appeal has been approved, and (3) the records had been
ordered elevated to the Court of Appeals.
Private respondent Tiongco led another motion for reconsideration 1 6 against the
Order dated March 4, 1994. On March 17, 1994, the respondent judge issued the order,
subject of this petition, which is quoted hereunder:
Considering that under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, although
appeal had already been perfected, the Court, prior to the transmittal of the
records to the appellate court, may issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated
by the appeal and considering that in the case at bar, lis pendens is not a matter
litigated in the appeal and the records have not as yet been transmitted to the
appellate court so that this Court still has jurisdiction to issue the Order of
February 14, 1994 cancelling the notices of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-
92383 covering Lot 3244 and on TCT No. T-5050 covering lot 3246 and
considering further, that the said Order does not direct cancellation of lis pendens
annotated on TCT No. T-89483 covering Lot no. 1404 which contains a total area
of 1,587 square meters where the area of 64 square meters claimed by plaintiff
can very well be taken; as prayed for by the defendant Jose B. Tiongco, the Order
of March 4, 1994 is hereby reconsidered and set aside and the Order of February
14, 1994 is hereby reconsidered and set aside and the Order of February 14, 1994
cancelling the notices of lis pendens on TCT No. T-92383 covering lot 3244 and
on TCT No. T-5050 covering lot 3246 is hereby reinstated.
On April 5, 1994, the Register of Deeds cancelled the annotation of notices of lis
pendens. 1 7
Feeling that a motion for reconsideration would be fruitless, petitioner led the
instant special civil action for certiorari, alleging that:
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY
AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF
THE NOTICES OF LIS PENDENS ANNOTATED AT THE BACK OF THE
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE THAT ARE THE SUBJECT OF THE CIVIL CASE NO.
19408, AS THESE ARE AMONG THE DOCUMENTS THAT ARE SOUGHT TO BE
DECLARED NULL AND VOID BY THE HEREIN PETITIONER.
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and necessity,
the purpose of which is to make known to the whole world that properties in litigation are
still within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat
of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. 1 8 The notice of lis pendens is an
announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, and serves
as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk,
or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property. 1 9
Rule 13, Section 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 2 0 and Section 76 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, 2 1 otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree
provide the statutory bases for a notice of lis pendens. From these provisions, it is clear
that such a notice is proper only in:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
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 b) An action to quiet title thereto;
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting title to the
land or the use or occupation thereof or the building thereon. 2 2
Thus, all petitioner has to do is to assert a claim of possession or title over the
subject property to put the property under the coverage of the rule. 2 3 It is not necessary
for her to prove ownership or interest over the property sought to be affected by lis
pendens.
Whether as a matter of procedure 2 4 or substance, 2 5 the rule is that a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled only on two (2) grounds, namely (1) if the annotation was for
the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not
necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded. 2 6
The petition should be dismissed, there being a clear violation of the doctrine of
judicial hierarchy that we have taken pains to emphasize in past jurisprudence.
Thus, we ruled in Vergara v. Suelto 2 7 that:
[t]he Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if its is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by fundamental charter and
immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of
dealing with causes in the rst instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-
called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or
where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction
should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court
of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose
acts for some reason or another, are not controllable by the Court of Appeals.
Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the
Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the
speci c action for the writ's procurement must be presented. This is and should
continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must
strictly observe.
We reaffirmed this policy in People v. Cuaresma, 2 8 thus:
. . . A last word. This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari
(as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction)
is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly
Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their
respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court,
with the Court of Appeals (formerly Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior
to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's
competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken
as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There
is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of
appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum
for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
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writs against rst level ("inferior") courts should be led with the Regional Trial
Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation
of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
speci cally set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to
prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the
restriction on the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra —
resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction" — was evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of
the burden of dealing with applications for the extraordinary writs which, but for
the expansion of the Appellate Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would have had
to be filed with it.
The Court feels the need to rea rm that policy at this time, and to enjoin
strict adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency
on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called
extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and
adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land. The
proceeding at bar is a case in point. The application for the writ of certiorari
sought against a City Court was brought directly to this Court although there is no
discernible special and important reason for not presenting it to the Regional Trial
Court. IEcaHS
The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration, for the
information and guidance of all concerned, that it will not only continue to
enforce the policy, but will require a more strict observance thereof . (italics
supplied)
Notwithstanding these pronouncements, parties persisted in disregarding the
judicial hierarchy. As we noted in Santiago v. Vasquez, 2 9
One nal observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a
propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of
a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy
of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite
the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their
original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought
therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon
the precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant
delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be
remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier
of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain
direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a
remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
This policy found further application in People v. Court of Appeals , 3 0 Aleria v. Velez ,
31 a nd Tano v. Socrates . 3 2 Only the presence of exceptional and compelling reasons
justified a disregard of the rule. 3 3
Petitioner has failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to her failure to
comply with or non-observance of the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason
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 why the instant petition could not have been brought before the Court of Appeals,
considering all the more that the appeal of the main case was already before it. In
Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 3 4 we ruled, to wit:
The notice of lis pendens — i.e., that real property is involved in an action —
is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court where the action is
pending. The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure.
It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise,
or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own
risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary
transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and
subordinate to those which may be nally determined and laid down therein. The
cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the
action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time.
And its continuance or removal — like the continuance or removal or removal of a
preliminary attachment of injunction — is not contingent on the existence of a
final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.
In the case at bar, the case had properly come within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in virtue of the perfection of the plaintiff's
appeal. It therefore had power to deal with and resolve any incident in connection
with the action subject of the appeal, even before nal judgment . The rule that no
questions may be raised for the rst time on appeal have reference only to those
affecting the merits of the action, and not to mere incidents thereof, e.g.,
cancellation of notices of lis pendens, or, to repeat, the grant or dissolution of
provisional remedies. [italics supplied]
Had petitioner brought the instant petition before the Court of Appeals, the same
could, and would, have been consolidated with the appeal, thereby bringing under the
competence of the said court all matters relative to the action, including the incidents
thereof.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the disposition of the instant case will
be incomplete without a reference to the improper and unethical language employed by
respondent Jose B. Tiongco, who is also counsel for private respondents, in his pleadings
and motions led both before us and the court a quo. It is his belief that counsel for
petitioner, Atty. Marciana Deguma, "a rambunctious wrestler-type female of 52 who does
not wear a dress which is not red, and who stampedes into the courtroom like a mad fury
and who speaks slang English to conceal her faulty grammar," 3 5 is impelled by less than
noble reasons in serving as counsel for petitioner. Her ulterior motive? "[T]o please and
tenderize and sweeten towards her own self the readily available Carmelo M. Tiongco," 3 6 a
retired police major described by respondent Tiongco as Atty. Deguma's " niño bonito," 3 7
"an unmarried mestizo with curly hair who lives with plaintiff for being houseless" 3 8 who
rents a place on the subject property sought to be recovered by petitioner. Atty. Deguma,
apparently an unmarried maiden of a certain age, is variously described by respondent
Tiongco as "a love-crazed female Apache [who] is now ready to skin defendant alive for not
being a bastard," 3 9 and a "horned spinster and man-hungry virago and female bull of an
Amazon who would stop at nothing to molest, harrass (sic) and injure defendant — if only
to please and attract police-major Carmelo Tiongco Junior — the deeply desired object of
her unreciprocated affections — who happens not to miss every chance to laugh at her
behind her back." 4 0 He claims that Atty. Deguma, a lawyer with the Public Attorney's
O ce, is engaged in a game of one-upmanship with a fellow employee, in that "she
happens to be ambitious enough to secretly (that what she thought) plot to put one over
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her o ce-mate who simply netted a corporal (if not a private) by aiming at no less than an
IMDC major — hoping to catch him by sheer brass and audacity." 4 1 In so doing, Atty.
Deguma is using the PAO as a "marriage bureau for her own bene t." 4 2 Respondent
Tiongco predicts that nothing good will come out of opposing counsel's scheme since,
quoting Voltaire, "outside of virtue, ther's (sic) no happiness." 4 3
Respondent Tiongco has achieved a remarkable feat of character assassination. His
verbal darts, albeit entertaining in a eeting way, are cast with little regard for truth.
However, he does nothing more than to obscure the issues, and his reliance on the fool's
gold of gossip betrays only a shocking absence of discernment. To this end, it will be wise
to give him an object lesson in the elementary rules of courtesy by which we expect
members of the bar to comport themselves. These provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility are pertinent:
HIAcCD
CANON 8 — A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS
AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL
VOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language before the courts.
In Romero v. Valle , 4 4 we stated that a lawyer's actuations, "[a]lthough allowed some
latitude of remarks or comment in the furtherance of the cause he upholds, his arguments,
both written or oral, should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and be of
such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another." Otherwise, his
use of intemperate language invites the disciplinary authority of the court. 4 5 We are aghast
at the facility with which respondent Atty. Jose B. Tiongco concocts accusations against
the opposing party and her counsel, although it is of public record that in Tiongco v.
Deguma, et al., 4 6 we dismissed as totally unfounded his charge of fraudulent conspiracy
and public scandal against petitioner, Major Tiongco, Atty. Deguma and even the latter's
superior at the Public Attorney's O ce, Atty. Napoleon G. Pagtanac. His lexicon of insults,
though entertaining, do not nd a ready audience in us, and he should be, as he is hereby,
warned accordingly: Homines qui gestant, quiqui auscultant crimina, si meo arbitratu liceat,
omnis pendeat, gestores linguis, auditores auribus. 4 7
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1. Annex "A" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 27.
2. Annex "B" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 28-38.
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 3. Annex "C" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 39-40. v. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 325, 330 (1990).

4. Annexes "D", "I" and "Q" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 41-46, 59-61 and 80, respectively. 23. Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 311.

5. Annexes "F", "K", "R" and "T" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 52, 67, 81-82 and 86, respectively. 24. 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 13, Section 14.

6. Annex "U" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 87-97. Notices of Lis Pendens.

7. Annex "V" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 98. xxx xxx xxx

8. Annex "W" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 99-101. The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order
of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
9. Annex "EE" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 144-146. adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it
to be recorded.
10. Annex "II" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 150-153.
25. PD 1529, Sec. 77.
11. Annex "JJ" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 156.
Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be
12. Annex "KK" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 157-165. cancelled upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose
13. Annex "MM" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 171-172. of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party
who caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon
14. Annex "NN" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 173-182. verified petition of the party who caused the registration thereof.

15. Annex "PP" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 185. 26. Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 544, 549 (1998).

16. Annex "QQ" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 186-189; also Supplemental Motion for 27. 156 SCRA 753, 766 (1987).
Reconsideration, Annex "RR", pp. 190-195.
28. 172 SCRA 415, 423-424 (1989).
17. Rollo, pp. 202-205.
29. 217 SCRA 633, 651-652 (1993).
18. Tan v. Lantin, 142 SCRA 423, 425 (1986).
30. 301 SCRA 566, 569-570 (1999).
19. Villanueva v. Court of Appeal, 281 SCRA 298, 306 (1997); Yu v. Court of Appeals, 251
SCRA 509, 513 (1995). 31. 298 SCRA 611, 618-619 (1998).

20. Section 14. Notice of Lis Pendens. — In an action affecting the title or the right of 32. 278 SCRA 154, 172-174 (1997); see also Pearson v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 295
possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is SCRA 27, 42 (1998).
claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in 33. See Fortich v. Corona, 289 SCRA 624 (1998) and Philippine National Bank v. Sayo, 292
which the properly is situated a notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall SCRA 202 (1998).
contain the names of the parties and the object of the action or defense, and a
description of the property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing 34. 184 SCRA 325, 330-331 (1990).
such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property affected
thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only 35. Rollo, p. 214.
of its pendency against the parties designated by their real names.
36. Rollo, pp. 220-221.
21. Sec. 76. Notice of Lis Pendens. — No action to recover possession of real estate, or to
quiet title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition, or other 37. Rollo, p. 211.
proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting the title to land or the use or 38. Rollo, p. 112.
occupation thereof or the buildings thereon, and no judgment, and no proceeding to
vacate or reverse any judgment, shall have any affect upon registered land as against 39. Rollo, p. 43.
persons other than the parties thereto, unless a memorandum or notice stating the
institution of such action or proceeding and the court wherein the same is pending, as 40. Rollo, p. 44.
well as the date of the institution thereof, together with a reference to the number of the
certificate of title, and an adequate description of the land affected and the registered
41. Rollo, p. 60.
owner thereof, shall have been filed and registered. 42. Rollo, p. 48.
22. Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 307; Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. 43. Rollo, p. 221.
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 44. 147 SCRA 197, 202 (1987), reiterated in People v. Taneo, 284 SCRA 251, 267 (1998). SECOND DIVISION
45. E. PINEDA, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS 92 (1995 ed.), citing Surigao Mineral
Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1 (1970). [A.C. No. 5768. March 26, 2010.]

46. G.R. No. 133619, October 26, 1999. ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR. , complainant, vs . ATTY. EDWIN
47. "You title-tattlers, and those who listen to slander, by goodwill shall all be hanged — the SR. respondent.
Z. FERRER, SR.,
former by their tongues, the latter by their ears."

DECISION

ABAD J :
ABAD, p

This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to have hurled

invectives upon another lawyer and filed a baseless suit against him.
The Facts and the Case
On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. led a
complaint-a davit 1 with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice of law, or
imposition of appropriate disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer,
Sr. for the following offenses:
1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiff's counsel in Civil
Case 7040, led a reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that contained
abusive, offensive, and improper language which insinuated that Atty. Barandon
presented a falsified document in court.
2. Atty. Ferrer led a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil Case
7040 for alleged falsi cation of public document when the document allegedly
falsi ed was a notarized document executed on February 23, 1994, at a date
when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer nor was assigned in Camarines Norte.
The latter was not even a signatory to the document. TDESCa

3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court (MTC)

Daet before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened Atty.
Barandon saying, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat
ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang
abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur,
hindi kayo taga-rito."
4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsi cation of public document
without bothering to check the copy with the O ce of the Clerk of Court and, with
gross ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a notarized document is
presumed to be genuine and authentic until proven otherwise.

5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his rst disbarment case
against repeating his unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge for sexual
harassment of an o ce secretary of the IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte; a
related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and criminal cases for libel and
grave threats that Atty. Barandon led against him. In October 2000, Atty. Ferrer
asked Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily time record of his son who worked with
the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, Department of Justice. When
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 Atty. Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer repeatedly harassed him with in ammatory
language.
Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to dismiss:
1. Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for
examination, Atty. Barandon led charges of libel and grave threats against him.
These charges came about because Atty. Ferrer's clients led a case for
falsification of public document against Atty. Barandon.
2. The offended party in the falsi cation case, Imelda Palatolon,
vouchsafed that her thumbmark in the waiver document had been falsified.
3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the threatening remarks
against Atty. Barandon, the MTC Daet was already in session. It was improbable
that the court did not take steps to stop, admonish, or cite Atty. Ferrer in direct
contempt for his behavior.
4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his allegations
that Atty. Ferrer was drunk on December 19, 2000 and that he degraded the law
profession. The latter had received various citations that speak well of his
character.
5. The cases of libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon led
against Atty. Ferrer were still pending. Their mere ling did not make the latter
guilty of the charges. Atty. Barandon was forum shopping when he led this
disbarment case since it referred to the same libel and grave threats subject of the
criminal cases.
In his reply a davit, 2 Atty. Barandon brought up a sixth ground for disbarment.
He alleged that on December 29, 2000 at about 1:30 p.m., while Atty. Ferrer was on
board his son's taxi, it gured in a collision with a tricycle, resulting in serious injuries to
the tricycle's passengers. 3 But neither Atty. Ferrer nor any of his co-passengers helped
the victims and, during the police investigation, he denied knowing the taxi driver and
blamed the tricycle driver for being drunk. Atty. Ferrer also prevented an eyewitness
from reporting the accident to the authorities. 4 DTAIaH
Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsi cation case against him had already been
dismissed. He belittled the citations Atty. Ferrer allegedly received. On the contrary, in
its Resolution 00-1, 5 the IBP-Camarines Norte Chapter opposed his application to
serve as judge of the MTC of Mercedes, Camarines Sur, on the ground that he did not
have "the quali cations, integrity, intelligence, industry and character of a trial judge"
and that he was facing a criminal charge for acts of lasciviousness and a disbarment
case filed by an employee of the same IBP chapter.
On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the
IBP-CBD submitted to this Court a Report, recommending the suspension for two years
of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on record to
prove Atty. Ferrer's violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040, the
falsi cation of the plaintiff's a davit despite the absence of evidence that the
document had in fact been falsi ed and that Atty. Barandon was a party to it. The
Investigating Commissioner also found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening
remarks imputed to him in the presence of other counsels, court personnel, and
litigants before the start of hearing.
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On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV-2002-225, 6
adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation but
reduced the penalty of suspension to only one year.
Atty. Ferrer led a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied it in its
Resolution 7 of October 19, 2002 on the ground that it had already endorsed the matter
to the Supreme Court. On February 5, 2003, however, the Court referred back the case
to the IBP for resolution of Atty. Ferrer's motion for reconsideration. 8 On May 22, 2008
the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation 9
of the Investigating Commissioner that denied Atty. Ferrer's motion for
reconsideration. 1 0
On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer led a Comment on Board of Governors' IBP
Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008. 1 1 On August 12, 2009 the Court resolved to treat
Atty. Ferrer's comment as a petition for review under Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Atty. Barandon led his comment, 1 2 reiterating his arguments before the IBP.
Further, he presented certi ed copies of orders issued by courts in Camarines Norte
that warned Atty. Ferrer against appearing in court drunk. 1 3
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating
Commissioner erred in nding respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges against
him; and
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is justified.
The Court's Ruling
We have examined the records of this case and nd no reason to disagree with
the ndings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating
Commissioner.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of
legal pro ciency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to
administrative liability. 1 4
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to
conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers
and avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Speci cally, in Rule 8.01, the
Code provides:
Rule 8.01. — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Atty. Ferrer's actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that
he imputed to Atty. Barandon the falsi cation of the Salaysay Affidavit of the plaintiff in
Civil Case 7040. He made this imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that
the affidavit had been falsified and that Atty. Barandon authored the same. aHIDAE
Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsi cation in a proper
forum and without using offensive and abusive language against a fellow lawyer. To
quote portions of what he said in his reply with motion to dismiss:
1. That the answer is fraught with grave and culpable
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 misrepresentation and "FALSIFICATION" of documents, committed to All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed o cers of the courts who are
mislead this Honorable Court, but with concomitant grave responsibility mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence they must conduct
of counsel for Defendants, for distortion and serious misrepresentation themselves honorably and fairly. 2 0 Atty. Ferrer's display of improper attitude,
to the court, for presenting a grossly "FALSIFIED" document, in violation arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a
of his oath of o ce as a government employee and as member of the lawyer and o cer of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent
Bar, for the reason, that, Plaintiff, IMELDA PALATOLON, has never transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold.
executed the "SALAYSAY AFFIDAVIT", wherein her ngerprint has been
falsi ed, in view whereof, hereby DENY the same including the ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFI RMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of the IBP
a rmative defenses, there being no knowledge or information to form Board of Governors in CBD Case 01-809 and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Edwin Z.
a belief as to the truth of the same, from pars. (1) to par. (15) which are Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of law for one year effective upon his receipt of this
all lies and mere fabrications, su cient ground for "DISBARMENT" of Decision.
the one responsible for said falsification and distortions.” 1 5 Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Ferrer's personal record as an
The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use digni ed language in their attorney with the O ce of the Bar Con dant and a copy of the same be served to the
pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal system. 1 6 IBP and to the O ce of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the
land.
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal SO ORDERED.
profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code provides:
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.
Rule 7.03. — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
re ect on his tness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal Footnotes
profession.
1. Rollo, pp. 2-9.
Several disinterested persons con rmed Atty. Ferrer's drunken invectives at Atty.
Barandon shortly before the start of a court hearing. Atty. Ferrer did not present 2. Id. at 71.
convincing evidence to support his denial of this particular charge. He merely presented 3. Id. at 73.
a certi cation from the police that its blotter for the day did not report the threat he
supposedly made. Atty. Barandon presented, however, the police blotter on a 4. Id. at 74-75.
subsequent date that recorded his complaint against Atty. Ferrer.
5. Id. at 120.
Atty. Ferrer said, " Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng
pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na 6. Id. at 137.
rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito. " 7. Id. at 164.
Evidently, he uttered these with intent to annoy, humiliate, incriminate, and discredit
Atty. Barandon in the presence of lawyers, court personnel, and litigants waiting for the 8. Id. at 203.
start of hearing in court. These language is unbecoming a member of the legal
9. Id. at 585-600.
profession. The Court cannot countenance it.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be 10. Id. at 584.
digni ed and respectful, be tting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of 11. Id. at 601-606.
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial
forum. 1 7 Atty. Ferrer ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only 12. Id. at 728-734.
bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it.
13. Id. at 740-741.
Whatever moral righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was negated by the way he chose to
express his indignation. SaIEcA 14. Garcia v. Bala, A.C. No. 5039, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 85, 91.
Contrary to Atty. Ferrer's allegation, the Court nds that he has been accorded 15. Rollo, p. 12.
due process. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. 1 8 So 16. Saberon v. Larong, A.C. No. 6567, April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 359, 368.
long as the parties are given the opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of
17. De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals Justices, 454 Phil. 718, 727 (2003).
due process are satisfactorily complied with. 1 9 Here, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner gave Atty. Ferrer all the opportunities to le countless pleadings and 18. Batongbakal v. Zafra, 489 Phil. 367, 378 (2005).
refute all the allegations of Atty. Barandon.
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 19. Calma v. Court of Appeals, 362 Phil. 297, 304 (1999). SECOND DIVISION
20. Atty. Reyes v. Atty. Chiong, Jr., 453 Phil. 99, 104 (2003).
[G.R. No. 133090. January 19, 2001.]

REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL BECHTEL BUILDERS, INC. ,

petitioners, vs . HON. DOLORES S. ESPAÑOL, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch 90, Imus, Cavite ,
respondent.

Bugaring, Piedad and Oliva and Associates Law Offices for petitioners.
Dolores S. Español in her own behalf.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner, counsel of plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1266-96 pending in the sala of
respondent judge, was declared guilty of contempt of court during the hearing held on the
motion for contempt against the Register of Deeds. It appeared that despite respondent
judge's contrary order, petitioner persisted in having his documentary evidence marked
while the newly appointed opposing counsel for the Deputy Register of Deeds was then
reviewing the case. Petitioner even uttered words insulting to the court such as that "he
knows better than the latter as he has won all his certiorari cases in the appellate courts
and that he was going to move for the inhibition of the presiding judge for being
antagonistic to his client." Petitioner was incarcerated for three (3) days and ordered to
pay a ne of P3,000.00. Petitioner led a motion for reconsideration on the same day and
the following day a motion praying for resolution of his motion for reconsideration, but the
motions were unacted upon. He served his sentence. To clear his name, he led a petition
with the Court of Appeals praying for the annulment of the order citing him in direct
contempt and the reimbursement of the P3,000.00 ne, but the appellate court a rmed
the order of the trial court. It, however, ordered the reimbursement of P1,000.00 in excess
of the P2,000.00 limit prescribed by the Rules of Court. Aggrieved, petitioner resorted to
this recourse.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings.
The persistent conduct of counsel in de ance with the court's order of compliance
with the orderly proceeding constitutes direct contempt. In imposing a ne of P3,000.00,
respondent judge exceeded the ceiling of P2,000.00 under SC Circular No. 22-95. Thus, the
excess of P1,000.00 must be returned to petitioner. The three (3) days period of
imprisonment meted out to petitioner was justi ed and within the 10-day limit prescribed
in Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; DIRECT CONTEMPT; PERSISTENT CONDUCT OF

COUNSEL TO HAVE HIS DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE MARKED, INTERRUPTING OPPOSING
COUNSEL AND THE COURT, CONSTITUTES DEFIANCE OF COURT'S SYSTEM. — The
conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary evidence marked to the extent
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 of interrupting the opposing counsel and the court showed disrespect to said counsel and During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on December 5,1996,
the court, was de ant of the court's system for an orderly proceeding, and obstructed the the following incident transpired:
administration of justice. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is
ATTY. BUGARING:
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration For the plaintiff, your Honor, we are ready.
of justice. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as
in the case at bar, and can be punished summarily without hearing. Hence, petitioner ATTY. CORDERO:
cannot claim that there was irregularity in the actuation of respondent judge in issuing the Same appearance for the defendant, your Honor.
contempt order inside her chamber without giving the petitioner the opportunity to defend
himself or make an immediate reconsideration. The records show that petitioner was cited ATTY. BUGARING:
in contempt of court during the hearing in the sala of respondent judge, and he even led a
Your Honor please, we are ready with respect to the prosecution of our motion for
motion for reconsideration of the contempt order on the same day.
contempt, your Honor. May we know from the record if the Register of
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MAXIMUM FINE IS P2,000.00; REFUND OF EXCESS ORDERED. — Deeds is properly notified for today's hearing.
Although respondent judge was justi ed in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court,
COURT:
she erred in imposing a ne in the amount of P3,000.00 which exceeded the ceiling of
P2,000.00 under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which took effect on Will you call on the Register of Deeds.
November 16, 1995. It was not established that the ne was imposed in bad faith. The
Court of Appeals thus properly ordered the return of the excess of P1,000.00. Aside from INTERPRETER:
the ne, the three days imprisonment meted out to petitioner was justi ed and within the Atty. Diosdado Concepcion, He is here, your Honor.
10-day limit prescribed in Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
ATTY. BUGARING:

We are ready, your Honor.

DECISION
COURT:

DE LEON, JR. J :
LEON JR., p
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated March 6, 1998
of the Court of Appeals 1 a rming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, declaring petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in direct
contempt of court.
The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing held on December 5,
1996 of Civil Case No. 1266-96 entitled "Royal Becthel 2 Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis
Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al.", for Annulment of Sale and Certi cates of Title, Speci c
Performance and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order in the sala of respondent judge Dolores S. Español of the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite.
Pursuant to a motion led by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc.,
the trial court issued an order on February 27, 1996 directing the Register of Deeds of
the Province of Cavite to annotate at the back of certain certi cates of title a notice of
lis pendens. Before the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite could comply with
said order, the defendant Spouses Alvaran on April 15, 1996, led a motion to cancel lis
pendens. On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel
Builders, Inc., led an opposition to the motion to cancel lis pendens. On August 16,
1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens was granted by the court. Petitioner led a
motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the defendants. On November 5,
1996, petitioner led an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996, led a
Rejoinder to Opposition and a Motion for Contempt of Court. 3
There is a motion for contempt in connection with the order of this Court which
directed your o ce to register lis pendens of the complaint in connection
with this case of Royal Becthel Builder, Inc. versus spouses Luis Alvaran
and Beatriz Alvaran, et al.
ATTY. CONCEPCION:
Your Honor, I just received this morning at ten o' clock [in the morning] the
subpoena.
ATTY. BUGARING:
May we put it on record that as early as November 6, 1996, the O ce of the
Register of Deeds was furnished with a copy of our motion, your Honor
please, and the record will bear it out. Until now they did not le any
answer, opposition or pleadings with respect to this motion.
ATTY. CONCEPCION:
Well I was not informed because I am not the Register of Deeds. I am only the
Deputy Register of Deeds and I was not informed by the receiving clerk of
our o ce regarding this case. As a matter of fact I was surprised when I
received this morning the subpoena, your Honor.
ATTY. BUGARING:
Your Honor please, may we put that on record that the manifestation of the
respondent that he was not informed.
cSaCDT

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 COURT: ATTY. BUGARING:

That is recorded. This is a Court of record and everything that you say here is Yes, your Honor, in fact that is not my personal problem your Honor please, that
recorded. is personal to that guy your Honor please if this representation is being . . .
.
ATTY. BUGARING:
COURT:
Yes your Honor please, we know that but we want to be speci c because we will
be [ ling] a case against this receiving clerk who did not [inform] him your That is very shallow, don't give that alibi.
Honor please, with this manifestation of the Deputy of the Register of
Deeds that is irregularity in the performance of the o cial duty of the clerk ATTY. BUGARING:
not to inform the parties concerned. At any rate, your Honor please, we are going to mark our documentary evidence
COURT: as part of our motion for contempt, your Honor please.

Counsel, the Court would like to nd out who this fellow who is taking the video
recording at this proceedings. There is no permission from this Court that COURT:
such proceedings should be taken.
What has the Register of Deeds got to say with this matter?
ATTY. BUGARING:
ATTY. CONCEPCION:
Your Honor, my Assistant. I did not advise him to take a video he just
accompanied me this morning. Well as I have said before, I have not received any motion regarding this
contempt you are talking. I am willing now to testify.
COURT:
ATTY. BUGARING:
Right, but the video recording is prepared process and you should secure the
permission of this Court. Your Honor I am still of the prosecution stage, it is not yet the defense. This is a
criminal proceedings, contempt proceedings is a criminal.
ATTY. BUGARING:
ATTY. CONCEPCION:
Actually, I did not instruct him to take some video tape.
Your Honor please, may I ask for the assistance from the Fiscal.
COURT:
COURT:
Why would he be bringing camera if you did not give him the go signal that shots
should be done. If this is going to proceed, we need the presence of a Fiscal or a counsel for the
Register of Deeds.
ATTY. BUGARING:
ATTY. CONCEPCION:
This Court should not presume that, your Honor please, we just came from an
occasion last night and I am not yet come home, your Honor please. I Can I appoint an outside lawyer not a Fiscal but a private counsel, your Honor.
could prove your Honor please, that the contents of that tape is other
matters your Honor please. I was just surprised why he took video tape COURT:
your Honor please, that we ask the apology of this Court if that offend this That is at your pleasure. The Court will consider that you should be amply
Court your Honor please. represented.
COURT: ATTY. CONCEPCION:
It is not offending because this is a public proceedings but the necessary As a matter of fact I have a lawyer here, Atty. Barzaga if he is willing . . . .
authority or permission should be secured.
ATTY. BARZAGA 4 :
ATTY. BUGARING:
Yes, your Honor, I will just review the records.
In fact I instructed him to go out, your Honor.
ATTY. BUGARING:
COURT:
Anyway your Honor please, I will not yet present my witness but I will just mark
After the court have noticed that he is taking a video tape. our documentary exhibits which are part of the record of the case and
thereafter your Honor please . . . .
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 COURT:
You wait for a minute counsel because there is a preparation being done by
newly appointed counsel of the respondent, Atty. Barzaga is considered as
the privately hired counsel of the register of deeds and the respondent of
this contempt proceedings. How much time do you need to go over the
record of this case so that we can call the other case in the meanwhile.
ATTY. BARZAGA:
Second call, your Honor.
COURT:
Are you ready Atty. Barzaga?
ATTY. BARZAGA:
Yes, your Honor. Well actually your Honor, after reviewing the record of the case
your Honor, I noticed that the motion for contempt of Court was led on
November 6, 1966 and in paragraph 6 thereof, your Honor it is stated that,
'the record of the case shows up to the ling of this motion, the Register as
well as the Deputy Register Diosdado Concepcion of the O ce of the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, did not comply with the Court
Orders dated February 27, 1996, March 29, 1996, respectively.' However,
your Honor, Atty. Diosdado Concepcion has shown to me a letter coming
from Atty. Efren A. Bugaring dated September 18, 1996 addressed to the
Register regarding this notice of Lis Pendens pertaining to TCT Nos. T-
519248, 519249 and 519250 and this letter request, your Honor for the
annotation of the lis pendens clearly shows that it has been already
entered in the book of primary entry. We would like also to invite the
attention of the Hon. Court that the Motion for Contempt of Court was led
on November 6, 1996. The letter for the annotation of the lis pendens was
made by the counsel for the plaintiff only on September 18, 1996, your
Honor. However, your Honor, as early as August 16, 1996 an Order has
already been issued by the Hon. Court reading as follows, 'Wherefore in
view of the above, the motion of the defendant is GRANTED and the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, is hereby directed to CANCEL
the notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of Certi cate of Title Nos.
519248, 51949 (sic) and 51950 (sic).'
ATTY. BUGARING:
Your Honor please, may we proceed your Honor, will rst mark our documentary
evidence. TSIaAc
COURT:
You wait until the Court allows you to do what you want to do, okay. The counsel
has just made manifestation, he has not prayed for anything. So let us
wait until he is nished and then wait for the direction of this Court what to
do to have an orderly proceedings in this case.
ATTY. BARZAGA:
Considering your Honor, that the issues appear to be a little bit complicated your
Honor, considering that the order regarding the annotation of the lis
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pendens has already been revoked by the Hon. Court your Honor, we just
request that we be given a period of ten days from today your Honor,
within which to submit our formal written opposition your Honor.
COURT:
Counsel, will you direct your attention to the manifestation led earlier by Atty.
Tutaan in connection with the refusal of the Register of Deeds to annotate
the lis pendens because of certain reasons. According to the manifestation
of Atty. Tutaan and it is appearing in the earlier part of the record of this
case, the reason for that is because there was a pending subdivision plan,
it is so stated. I think it was dated March, 1996. May I have the record
please.
ATTY. BARZAGA:
Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
This Court would like to be enlightened with respect to that matter.
ATTY. BARZAGA:
Well, according to Atty. Diosdado Concepcion he could already explain this, your
Honor.
COURT:
Have it properly addressed as part of the manifestation so that this court can be
guided accordingly. Because this Court believes that the root of the matter
started from that. After the submission of the . . . . what are you suppose to
submit?
ATTY. BARZAGA:
Comment your Honor, on the motion to cite Atty. Diosdado Concepcion in
contempt of Court.
COURT:
After the submission of the Comment and furnishing a copy of the comment to
the counsel for the plaintiff, this Court is going to give the counsel for the
plaintiff an equal time within which to submit his reply.
ATTY. BUGARING:
Your Honor please, it is the position of this representation your Honor please, that
we will be marking rst our documentary evidence because this is set for
hearing for today, your Honor please.
COURT:
If you are going to mark your evidence and they do not have their comment yet
what are we going to receive as evidence.
ATTY. BUGARING:
If your Honor please . . .
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 COURT: ATTY. BUGARING:

Will you listen to the Court and just do whatever you have to do after the Because we could not find any sort of justice in town.
submission of the comment.
COURT:
ATTY. BUGARING:
Do that right away.
I am listening, your Honor please, but the record will show that the motion for
contempt was copy furnished with the Register of Deeds and Diosdado ATTY. BUGARING:
Concepcion. We are ready to present our witness and we are deprive to present our witness.
COURT: COURT:
Precisely, if you are listening then you will get what the Court would want to do. You have presented a witness and it was an adverse witness that was presented.
This should be an orderly proceedings and considering that this is a Court
of record the comment has to be in rst then in your reply you can submit ATTY. BUGARING:
your evidence to rebut the argument that is going to be put up by the
respondent and so we will be able to hear the case smoothly. I did not . . .

ATTY. BUGARING: COURT:

My point here your Honor please, is that the respondent had been long time With respect to this, the procedure of the Court is for the respondent to le his
furnished of this contempt proceedings. With a copy of the motion they comment.
should have led it in due time in accordance with the rules and because it ATTY. BUGARING:
is scheduled for trial, we are ready to mark our evidence and present to this
Court, your Honor. Well your Honor please, at this point in time I don't want to comment on anything
but I reserve my right to inhibit this Honorable Court before trying this case.
COURT:
COURT:
(Banging the gavel) Will you listen.
You can do whatever you want.
ATTY. BUGARING:
ATTY. BUGARING:
I am listening, your Honor.
Yes, your Honor, that is our prerogative your Honor.
COURT:
COURT:
And this Court declares that you are out of order.
As far as this Court is concerned it is going to follow the rules.
ATTY. BUGARING:
ATTY. BUGARING:
Well, if that is the contention of the Court your Honor please, we are all o cers of
the Court, your Honor, please, we have also — and we know also our Yes, your Honor, we know all the rules.
procedure, your Honor.
COURT:
COURT:
Yes, you know your rules that's why you are putting the cart ahead of the horse.
If you know your procedure then you follow the procedure of the Court rst and
then do whatever you want. ATTY. BUGARING:

ATTY. BUGARING: No your Honor, I've been challenged by this Court that I know better than this
Court. Modestly (sic) aside your Honor please, I've been winning in many
Yes, your Honor please, because we could feel the antagonistic approach of the certiorari cases, your Honor.
Court to this representation ever since I appeared your Honor please and I
put on record that I will be filing an inhibition to this Hon. Court. COURT:

COURT: Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite you for contempt of Court.
(Banging the gavel) You call the police and I am going to send this lawyer
Do that right away. (Banging the gavel) in jail. (Turning to the Sheriff)

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 ATTY. BUGARING:
I am just manifesting and arguing in favor of my client your Honor please.
COURT:
You have been given enough time and you have been abusing the discretion of
this Court.
ATTY. BUGARING:
I am very sorry your Honor, if that is the appreciation of the Court but this is one
way I am protecting my client, your Honor.
COURT:
That is not the way to protect your client that is an abuse of the discretion of this
Court. (Turning to the Sheriff) "Will you see to it that this guy is put in jail."
(pp. 29-42. Rollo)
Hence, in an Order dated December 5, 1996, Judge Español cited petitioner in direct
contempt of court, thus:
During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were present
together with one (1) operating a video camera who was taking pictures of the
proceedings of the case while counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring was making
manifestation to the effect that he was ready to mark his documentary evidence
pursuant to his Motion to cite (in contempt of court) the Deputy Register of Deeds
of Cavite, Diosdado Concepcion.
The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did
not cause the appearance of the cameraman to take pictures, however, he
admitted that they came from a function, and that was the reason why the said
cameraman was in tow with him and the plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the imsy
explanation given, the counsel sent out the cameraman after the Court took
exception to the fact that although the proceedings are open to the public and
that it being a court of record, and since its permission was not sought, such
situation was an abuse of discretion of the Court.
When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested
that he needed the services of counsel and right then and there appointed Atty.
Elpidio Barzaga to represent him, the case was allowed to be called again. On the
second call, Atty. Bugaring started to insist that he be allowed to mark and
present his documentary evidence in spite of the fact that Atty. Barzaga was still
manifesting that he be allowed to submit a written pleading for his client,
considering that the Motion has so many rami cations and the issues are
complicated.
At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to mark his
documentary evidence and was raring to argue as in fact he was already
perorating despite the fact that Atty. Barzaga has not yet nished with his
manifestation. As Atty. Bugaring appears to disregard orderly procedure, the Court
directed him to listen and wait for the ruling of the Court for an orderly
proceeding. AaHDSI
While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt
like doing so. Thus, the Court declared him out of order, at which point, Atty.
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Bugaring ared up and uttered words insulting the Court; such as: 'that he knows
better than the latter as he has won all his cases of certiorari in the appellate
Courts, that he knows better the Rules of Court; that he was going to move for the
inhibition of the Presiding Judge for allegedly being antagonistic to his client,'
and other invectives were hurled to the discredit of the Court.
Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct contempt and
order the Court's sheriff to arrest and place him under detention.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and the fact that Atty. Rexie Efren
Bugaring committed an open de ance, even challenging the Court in a
disrespectful, arrogant, and contumacious manner, he is declared in direct
contempt of Court and is sentenced to three (3) days imprisonment and payment
of a ne of P3,000.00. His detention shall commence immediately at the
Municipal Jail of Imus, Cavite. 5
Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day sentence at the Imus
Municipal Jail, and paid the fine of P3,000.00. 6
While serving the rst day of his sentence on December 5, 1996, petitioner led a
motion for reconsideration of the Order citing him in direct contempt of court. The next
day, December 6, 1996, petitioner led another motion praying for the resolution of his
motion for reconsideration. Both motions were never resolved and petitioner was released
on December 8, 1996. 7
To clear his name in the legal circle and the general public, petitioner led a petition
before the Court of Appeals praying for the annulment of the Order dated December 5,
1996 citing him in direct contempt of court and the reimbursement of the ne of
P3,000.00 on grounds that respondent Judge Dolores S. Español had no factual and legal
basis in citing him in direct contempt of court, and that said Order was null and void for
being in violation of the Constitution and other pertinent laws and jurisprudence. 8
The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of the transcript of
stenographic notes of the hearing held on December 5, 1996, it was obvious that the
petitioner was indeed arrogant, at times impertinent, too argumentative, to the extent of
being disrespectful, annoying and sarcastic towards the court. 9 It a rmed the order of
the respondent judge, but found that the ne of P3,000.00 exceeded the limit of P2,000.00
prescribed by the Rules of Court, 1 0 and ordered the excess of P1,000.00 returned to
petitioner. On March 6, 1998, it rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
assailed order dated December 5, 1996 issued by the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED with the modi cation that the excess ne of P1,000.00 is ORDERED
RETURNED to the petitioner.
Before us, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals this lone error:
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
ASSAILED ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH TO PETITIONER'S
SUBMISSIONS SMACKS OF OPPRESSION AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, HENCE IT
COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION. 1 1
Petitioner insists that a careful examination of the transcript of stenographic notes
of the subject proceedings would reveal that the contempt order issued by respondent
judge had no factual and legal basis. It would also show that he was polite and respectful
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 towards the court as he always addressed the court with the phrase "your honor please."
We disagree.
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No.
22-95 provides:
Direct contempt punished summarily. — A person guilty of misbehavior in
the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court or judge,
offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a
witness, or to subscribe an a davit or deposition when lawfully required to do so,
may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court or judge and punished by
a ne not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10)
days, or both, if it be a superior court, or a judge thereof, or by a ne not exceeding
two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be an
inferior court.
We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that petitioner's alleged
deference to the trial court in consistently addressing the respondent judge as "your Honor
please" throughout the proceedings is belied by his behavior therein:
1. the veiled threat to le a petition for certiorari against the trial court (pp. 14-15,
tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 41-42, Rollo) is contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer
shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts".
2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in
favor of the other party (pp. 13-14, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 40-41, Rollo)
is against Rule 11.04, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which enjoins lawyers from attributing to a judge "motives not supported
by the record or have no materiality to the case".
3. behaving without due regard to the trial court's order to maintain order in the
proceedings (pp. 9-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 36-40, Rollo) is in utter
disregard to Canon 1 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which makes it
a lawyer's duty to "maintain towards the courts (1) respectful attitude" in
order to maintain its importance in the administration of justice, and
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates
lawyers to "observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others".
4. behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the time
he was making representations in behalf of the other party, was rudely
interrupted by the petitioner and was not allowed to further put a word in
edgewise (pp. 7-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 34-39, Rollo) is violative of
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canon 22 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer to conduct himself
with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
5. the refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of
Cavite, through counsel, to exercise his right to be heard (Ibid) is against
Section 1 of Article III, 1997 Constitution on the right to due process of law,
Canon 18 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which mandates a lawyer
to always treat an adverse witness "with fairness and due consideration,"
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and Canon 12 of Code of Professional Responsibility which insists on a
lawyer to "exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice."
The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioner's
use of the phrase "your honor please." For, after using said phrase he manifested
utter disrespect to the court in his subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior
from an o cer of the Court cannot and should not be countenanced, if proper
decorum is to be observed and maintained during court proceedings. 1 2
Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary evidence
marked to the extent of interrupting the opposing counsel and the court showed
disrespect to said counsel and the court, was de ant of the court's system for an orderly
proceeding, and obstructed the administration of justice. The power to punish for
contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and
consequently, to the due administration of justice. 1 3 Direct contempt is committed in the
presence of or so near a court or judge, as in the case at bar, and can be punished
summarily without hearing. 1 4 Hence, petitioner cannot claim that there was irregularity in
the actuation of respondent judge in issuing the contempt order inside her chamber
without giving the petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make an immediate
reconsideration. The records show that petitioner was cited in contempt of court during
the hearing in the sala of respondent judge, and he even led a motion for reconsideration
of the contempt order on the same day. 1 5
Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his emotions in
espousing the case of his client — by persisting to have his documentary evidence marked
despite the respondent judge's contrary order — he did so in the honest belief that he was
bound to protect the interest of his client to the best of his ability and with utmost
diligence.
The Court of Appeals aptly stated:
But "a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause"
(Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 656). He should not forget that he is an
o cer of the court, bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in
the speedy and e cient administration of justice pursuant to Canon 12, Canons
of Professional Responsibility (Gomez v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis
City, 249 SCRA 432, 439). He should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure
to defeat the ends of justice per Rule 10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility, or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes, in accordance with Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of
the same Canons (Ibid).
"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts
in the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or
obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such lawyer's duty." 1 6
Although respondent judge was justi ed in citing petitioner in direct contempt of
court, she erred in imposing a ne in the amount of P3,000.00 which exceeded the ceiling
of P2,000.00 under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which took effect on
November 16, 1995. It was not established that the ne was imposed in bad faith. The
Court of Appeals thus properly ordered the return of the excess of P1,000.00. Aside from
the ne, the three days imprisonment meted out to petitioner was justi ed and within the
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 10-day limit prescribed in Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as amended. EN BANC
It is our view and we hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals did not commit any
reversible error in its assailed decision. ETIDaH
[A.C. No. 219 . September 29, 1962.]

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals is LAPUT petitioner, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO E.
CASIANO U. LAPUT, F.
hereby AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite is ordered to REMOTIGUE, ATTY. FORTUNATO R. PATALINGHUG , respondents.
return to the petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000.00 out of the original
fine of P3,000.00.
Casiano U. Laput in his own behalf.
SO ORDERED.
F.E.F. Remotigue in his own behalf.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur. F. R. Patalinghug in his own behalf.

Footnotes SYLLABUS

1. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona and concurred in by Associate Justice 1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES FOR UNETHICAL
Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes and Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria, Fourth Division.
CONDUCT; APPEARANCE AS COUNSEL AFTER CLIENT HAS DISMISSED FORMER
2. Spelled as Becthel in CA Decision. COUNSEL NOT IMPROPER. — A lawyer was dismissed by his client because the latter
no longer trusted him. In his stead the client contracted the services of another lawyer,
3. CA Decision, pp. 1-2, Rollo, pp. 51-52; Comment of respondent Judge Español, Rollo, pp. 82- who, to safeguard the interest of his client, prepared the papers for the revocation of
83. the power of attorney previously executed in favor of the rst lawyer. After the second
4. Also spelled as Bargaza in the petition. lawyer had led his appearance in court, the rst lawyer voluntarily withdrew as counsel
and, simultaneously, led a motion for the payment of his attorney's fees. Held: The
5. Rollo, pp. 49-50. appearance of the second lawyer is not unprofessional, unethical or improper; the rst
lawyer's voluntary withdrawal as counsel and his ling of a motion for the payment of
6. CA Decision, pp. 16-17, Rollo, pp. 66-67.
his fees amounted to an acquiescence to the appearance of the second lawyer.
7. Rollo, p. 67.

8. Rollo, p. 67. DECISION

9. Rollo, p. 69.

10. Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 22-95, LABRADOR J :
LABRADOR, p

which took effect on November 16, 1995.

This is an original complaint led with this Court charging respondents with
11. Petition, p. 22, Rollo, p. 33.
unprofessional and unethical conduct in soliciting cases and intriguing against a
12. CA Decision, pp. 22-23, Rollo, pp. 71-73. brother lawyer, and praying that respondents be dealt with accordingly.
13. Cabilan vs. Ramolete, 192 SCRA 674, 678 [1990]. The facts which led to the ling of this complaint are as follows: In May, 1952,
petitioner was retained by Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera to handle her case (Sp. Proc,
14. Id., p. 679. No. 2-J) in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled "Testate Estate of Macario
Barrera". By January, 1955, petitioner had contemplated the closing of the said
15. Rollo, pp. 14, 17.
administration proceedings and prepared two pleadings: one, to close the proceedings
16. CA Decision, p. 23, Rollo, p. 73. and declare Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera as universal heir and order the delivery to her
of the residue of the estate and, second, a notice for the rendition of nal accounting
and partition of estate. At this point, however, the administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de
Barrera refused to counter-sign these two pleadings and instead advised petitioner not
to le them. Some weeks later, petitioner found in the records of said proceedings that
respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug had led on January 11, 1955 a written
appearance as the new counsel for Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera. On February 5, 1955
petitioner voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as counsel for Mrs. Barrera. On
February 7, 1955, the other respondent, Atty. Francisco E. F. Remotigue, entered his
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 appearance, dated February 5, 1955. acquiescence to the appearance of respondent Atty. Patalinghug as counsel for the
Complainant here alleges that the appearances of respondents were unethical widow. This should estop petitioner from now complaining that the appearance of Atty.
and improper for the reason that they had nursed the desire to replace the petitioner as Patalinghug was unprofessional.
attorney for the estate and the administratrix and, taking advantage of her goodwill, Much less could we hold respondent Atty. Remotigue guilty of unprofessional
intrigued against the preparation of the nal inventory and accounting and prodded conduct inasmuch as he entered his appearance, dated February 5, 1955, only on
Mrs. Barrera not to consent to petitioner's decision to close the administration February 7, same year, after Mrs. Barrera had dispensed with petitioner's professional
proceedings; that before their appearance, they brought petitioner's client to their law services on January 11, 1955, and after petitioner had voluntarily withdrawn his
o ce and there made her sign four documents captioned "Revocation of Power of appearance on February 5, 1955.
Attorney" and sent the same by mail to several corporations and establishments where With respect to the preparation by Atty. Patalinghug of the revocations of power
the estate of Macario Barrera is owner of certi cates of stocks and which documents of attorney as complained of by petitioner, the Solicitor General found that the same
purported to disauthorize the petitioner from further collecting and receiving the does not appear to be prompted by malice or intended to hurt petitioner's feelings, but
dividends of the estate from said corporations, when in fact and in truth the purely to safeguard the interest of the administratrix. Evidently, petitioner's pride was
respondents fully knew that no power of attorney or authority was given to the hurt by the issuance of these documents, and felt that he had been pictured as a
petitioner by his client, the respondents' motive being to embarrass petitioner to the dishonest lawyer; for he led a case before the City Fiscal of Cebu against Atty.
o cials, lawyers and employees of said corporations, picturing him as a dishonest Patalinghug and the widow for libel and falsi cation. It was shown, however, that the
lawyer and no longer trusted by his client — all with the purpose of straining the case was dismissed.
relationship of the petitioner and his client, Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera; and that Atty.
Patalinghug entered his appearance without notice to petitioner. No su cient evidence having been submitted to sustain the charges, these are
hereby dismissed and the case closed.
In answer, respondent Atty. Patalinghug stated that when he entered his
appearance on January 11, 1955 the administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera had Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and
already lost con dence in her lawyer, the herein petitioner, and had in fact already with Makalintal, JJ., concur.
her a pleading dated January 11, 1955, entitled "Discharge of Counsel for the
Administration and Motion to Cite Atty. Casiano Laput", which she herself had led with
the court.
In answer, respondent Atty. Remotigue stated that when he led his appearance
on February 7, 1955, the petitioner has already withdrawn as counsel.
After separate answers were led by the respondents, the Supreme Court
referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Solicitor General recommended the complete exoneration of respondents.
It appears and it was found by the Solicitor General that before respondent Atty.
Fortunato Patalinghug entered his appearance, the widow administratrix had already
led with the court a pleading discharging the petitioner, Atty. Casiano Laput. If she did
not furnish Atty. Laput with a copy of the said pleading, it was not the fault of Atty.
Patalinghug but that of the said widow. It appears that the reason why Mrs. Barrera
dismissed petitioner as her lawyer was that she did not trust him any longer, for one
time she found out that some dividend checks which should have been sent to her were
sent instead to petitioner, making her feel that she was being cheated by petitioner.
Moreover, she found that withdrawals from the Philippine National Bank and Bank of
the Philippine Islands have been made by petitioner without her prior authority.
We see no irregularity in the appearance of respondent Atty. Fortunato
Patalinghug as counsel for the widow; much less can we consider it as an actual
grabbing of a case from petitioner. The evidence as found by the Solicitor General
shows that Atty. Patalinghug's professional services were contracted by the widow, a
written contract having been made as to the amount to be given him for his
professional services.
Petitioner's voluntary withdrawal on February 5, 1955, as counsel for Mrs. Barrera
after Atty. Patalinghug had entered his appearance, and his (petitioner's) ling almost
simultaneously of a motion for the payment of his attorney's fees, amounted to an
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 EN BANC
[A.C. No. 434 . September 29, 1962.]
LAPUT complainant, vs. FRANCISCO E.F. REMOTIGUE ,
CASIANO U. LAPUT,
respondent.
DECISION
LABRADOR J :
LABRADOR, p
This is an original complaint — a sequel to Adm. Case No. 219 — led with this
Court charging the respondent with malice, bad faith, and misrepresentation when the
latter allegedly led motions in court without notice to complainant, thereby
committing unfair and unethical practices bordering on dishonesty, all to the prejudice
of said complainant.
Complainant alleges that by virtue of a duly recorded "Attorney's Lien" entered
into the records of Special Proceedings No. 2-J of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
he has in his lawful possession records and papers of the estate under administration,
among which are transfer certi cates of title to all real properties of the estate located
in Cebu province; that on February 21, 1966 and on September 16, 1957, the
respondent, without notice to complainant, led with the probate court motions praying
that complainant be directed to surrender the aforesaid certi cates of title, and on
December 3, 1958, another motion, without notice, praying that he be issued owner's
duplicate copies of the certi cates of title on the ground that the same were lost, the
respondent knowing all along that complainant is in lawful possession of said
certi cates of title; and that with the duplicate titles, respondent and his client Mrs.
Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera (formerly the client of complainant) sold without notice
the lots covered thereby, all of which, aside from being unfair and unethical, were
prejudicial to complainant's recorded lien to the said lots and titles in question.
Respondent denied any knowledge of the recorded lien of complainant and his
retention of records and transfer certi cates of title. Respondent also denied that he
was the author of the rst motion complained of; that the second motion prayed for an
order directing complainant to turn over to them the certi cates of title; or that he led
another motion alleging that they lost the Torrens titles to the estate lots, the true facts
being that the administratrix, on December 3, 1958, led a "Petition for the Issuance of
Duplicate Owner's copy", for the reason that she could not locate said transfer
certi cate of title in spite of diligent action; that as early as November 18, 1958, the
administratrix sought authority from the court to sell real property of the estate in order
to satisfy several indebtedness of the estate; that the court nally approved the sales
made, on October 8, 1959, in spite of the written opposition of complainant; and that if
he (respondent) had known that the transfer certi cates of title in question were in the
possession of complainant, he could have taken an easier procedure by merely asking
Atty. Laput to produce them.
The Solicitor General, to whom this Court referred this case for investigation,
report and recommendation, found that since January 11, 1955, when the widow, Mrs.
Barrera, led the pleading entitled "Discharge of Counsel for the Administration and
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Motion to Cite Atty. Casiano U. Laput", complainant herein (Atty. Laput) was already
asked by the widow in that pleading "to turn over all the records, bank books, other
pertinent papers and documents of the above entitled case which I have handed him;
and assets, if any, to the undersigned administratrix pending my appointment of a new
lawyer for the administration" and that although Atty. Laput was not served a copy of
this pleading, he must have come across it inasmuch as from time to time, he went over
the records of Special Proceedings No. 2-J of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and
yet Atty. Laput did not comply with the request of the widow to turn over to her all the
records of her case.
In a motion dated September 16, 1957, led before the Court of First Instance of
Cebu in said special proceedings, respondent asked the court to order Atty. Laput "to
surrender to the administratrix or to the Court the passbook in the Philippine National
Bank of the deposits of the estate and all such other documents in his possession and
belonging to the estate . . .". By virtue of this motion, the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
on October 17, 1957, ordered complainant Laput "to surrender and deposit with the
clerk of court, within ten days from notice, the passbook of the estate's deposit in the
Philippine National Bank, Cebu Branch, and of the documents belonging to the estate in
his possession."
The Solicitor General found that in spite of all the above-mentioned pleadings,
motions, and order of the Court, complainant stubbornly kept to himself the transfer
certi cates of title in question, and so it would seem that complainant was the one at
fault.
The Solicitor General also found that after complainant was discharged by the
administratrix, his claim for attorney's fees in the sum of P26,561.48 out of a total of
P31,329.15, was already collected by him from the estate during his incumbency as the
lawyer for the administratrix; that the Court of First Instance of Cebu had xed, as early
as December 19, 1955, the amount of P4,767.67 as the balance to be paid to Attorney
Laput, later on increased to P5,699.66, and that in spite of such fixing by the court of his
attorney's fees and the order of payment to him of the balance of P5,699.66 by the
estate, as early as December 27, 1955, which order was later a rmed by the Court of
Appeals, complainant Laput pretended that all throughout the years following 1955 of
the date of his ling the present complaint, he (Atty. Laput) believed that he had still the
right to retain the certificates of title in question.
An examination of the motions complained of by Atty. Laput shows that
respondent's answers are correct; and it is therefore clear from all the foregoing that
respondent did not act with malice or bad faith. Hence, the recommendation of the
Solicitor General for respondent's complete exoneration should be, as it hereby, is
approved.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon,
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
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FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-3593. March 23, 1907.]
STATES plaintiff, vs . C.W. NEY and JUAN GARCIA
THE UNITED STATES,
BOSQUE , defendants.
Attorney-General Araneta, for plaintiff.
C.W. Ney, for defendants.
SYLLABUS
1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; SUBSCRIPTION TO PLEADINGS. — Under
section 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, pleadings must be subscribed by the party
or his attorney. The subscription of the names of other persons is impliedly prohibited
and is illegal; nor can a subscription by an agent, other than an admitted attorney, be
recognized.
2. ATTORNEY AT LAW. — A person not admitted to the bar may not hold
himself out to the public as engaged in the practice of law, either alone or as
associated with a practicing attorney under a firm name.
3. ID.; CONTEMPT. — An attempt to practice law by a person who has by
order of this court been refused admission to the bar, is a disobedience of such order
and is contempt of court, not qualified by the fact that an appeal has been taken from
the order.
4. ID.; ID. — The repeated irregular signature of pleadings by an attorney in
the name of a firm improperly constituted, with one partner, who, by an order of this
court, had been denied the right to practice, and the participation by him in an act of
contempt committed by such partner, is misbehavior which renders him guilty of
contempt under section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
DECISION
TRACEY J :
TRACEY, p
This proceeding is to punish the defendants for contempt.
In the year 1902 this court decided that the defendant, J. Garcia Bosque, was not
entitled to admission to practice law in the Philippine Islands, upon the ground that
after the change of sovereignty he had elected to remain a Spanish subject and as such
was not quali ed for admission to the bar ( In re Bosque, 1 Phil. Rep., 88), and an order
was entered accordingly.
In the year 1904 he made an arrangement with the defendant Ney, a practicing
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attorney, to carry on business together, sending out a circular signed "Ney & Bosque,"
stating that they had established an of ce for the general practice of law in all the
courts of the Islands and that Bosque would devote himself especially to consultation
and of ce work relating to Spanish law. The paper was headed "Law Of ce — Ney &
Bosque. Juan G. Bosque, jurisconsulto español — C.W. Ney, abogado americano."
Since that time the defendant Bosque has not personally appeared in the courts,
and with one exception, occurring through an inadvertance, papers from the of ce were
signed not with the rm name alone nor with any designation of the rm as attorneys,
but with the words "Ney & Bosque — C.W. Ney, abogado."
On two occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and the other on September 15, 1906,
this court refused to consider petitions so singed with the names of the defendants
and the practice being repeated, on the 2nd day of October, 1906, ordered the papers
sent to the Attorney-General to take appropriate action thereon, and he thereupon
instituted this proceeding.
The defendants disclaim any intentional contempt, and defend their acts as being
within the law.
Section 102 of the Code of Civil procedure, providing that every pleading must be
subscribed by the party or his attorney, does not permit, and by implication prohibits, a
subscription of the names of any other persons, whether agents or otherwise; therefore
a signature containing the name of one neither a party nor an attorney was not a
compliance with this section, nor was it aided by the too obvious subterfuge of the
addition of the individual name of a licensed attorney. The illegality in this instance was
aggravated by the fact that one of the agents so named was a person residing in these
Islands to whom this court had expressly denied admission to the bar. The papers in
question were irregular and were properly rejected. We refuse to recognize as a
practice any signature of names appended to pleadings or other papers in an action
other than those speci ed in the statute. A signature by agents amounts to a signing by
non-quali ed attorneys, the of ce of attorney being originally one of agency. ( In re
Cooper, 22 N.Y., 67.) We do not, however, mean to discountenance the use of a suitable
firm designation by partners, all of whom have been duly admitted to practice.
It is to be noted that we are not now considering an application for the
suspension or removal of the defendant Ney from his of ce as attorney. The defendant
Bosque, not being an of cer of the court, could not be proceeded against in that way,
and probably for that reason the Attorney-General instituted this form of proceeding.
Should either of these defendants be thus punished for contempt?
Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contempt as follows:
"1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,
judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge;
"2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his
official duties or in his official transactions."
Where the law de nes contempt, the power of the courts is restricted to
punishment for acts so defined. (Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S., 505.)
As to the rst subdivision of this section, no direct order or command of this
court has been disobeyed or resisted by the defendant Ney. The only order that the
defendant Bosque can have disobeyed is the one denying him the right to practice law.
This order, however, was directly binding upon him, notwithstanding proceedings taken
for its review, and any hope on his part of ultimately reversing it furnished no excuse for
its violation. Even had he been entitled under the statute to practice law without any
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 license from the court and without an application to it, yet its order made on his own
petition. A mandate of the court, while in force, must be obeyed. The irregular signature
to papers, though af xed by his associate, had his authorization and constitutes a
substantial attempt to engage in practice. Moreover the rm circular in setting forth the
establishment of an of ce for the general practice of law in all the courts of the Islands,
amounted to an assertion of his right and purpose, not effectively quali ed by the
addition that he would devote himself to consultation and of ce work relating to
Spanish law. Spanish law plays an important part in the equipment of a lawyer in the
Archipelago, standing on a different footing from the law of other foreign countries, in
regard to which a skilled person might as a calling, advise without practicing law. The
fact stated on the circular that he was a Spanish lawyer did not amount to a disclaimer
of his professional character in the Islands. Independent of statutory provisions, a
foreigner is not by reason of his status disquali ed from practicing law. One of the
most eminent American advocates was an alien barrister admitted to the bar after a
contest in the court of New York State. ( In re Thomas Addis Emmett, 2 Cain's Cases,
386.) Consequently the conduct of the defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of
an order made in a proceeding to which he was a party.
Under the second subdivision of the section cited, Bosque is obviously not
answerable, inasmuch as he was not an of cer of the court. On the other hand, under
this subdivision, the defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is liable if his conduct
amounted to misbehavior. We are of the opinion that it did. In the offense of Bosque in
holding himself out as a general practitioner Ney participated, and for the improper
signature of the pleadings he was chie y and personally responsible. It is impossible to
say that the signature itself was a violation of the law, and yet hold guiltless the man
who repeatedly wrote it. Moreover we regret to add that his persistent and rash
disregard of the rulings of the court has not commended him to our indulgence, while
the offensive character of certain papers recently led by him forbids us from
presuming on the hope of his voluntarily conforming to the customary standard of
members of the bar.
The judgment of the court is that each of the defendants is ned in the sum of
200 pesos, to be paid into the of ce of the clerk of this court within ten days, with the
costs de oficio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, and Willard, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., does not concur in the result.
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SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139281. September 29, 1999.]
SUAREZ petitioners, vs . ARSENIO
SPOUSES ROMUALDO and NORA SUAREZ,
AL. respondents.
SALAZAR, ET AL.,
SYNOPSIS
Andres Culanag misrepresented himself to be Atty. Filemon A. Manangan and he
appeared as counsel in this case. However, during the hearing of the "Motion to Expunge
All Pleadings Filed by Atty. Filemon A. Manangan with Motion to Hold Him in Contempt of
Court and to Dismiss the Petition," which was led by respondents, Culanag admitted
before this Court that he is not a lawyer.
Hence, the Court declared him guilty of indirect contempt and sentenced him to
three months imprisonment.
SYLLABUS
REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; INDIRECT CONTEMPT; PERSON
MISREPRESENTING HIMSELF AS LAWYER BEFORE COURT IS GUILTY THEREOF. —
Considering respondents' "Motion to Expunge All Pleadings Filed by Atty. Filemon A.
Manangan with Motion to Hold Him in Contempt of Court and to Dismiss the Petition" and
said Atty. Manangan's admission at the hearing this morning, September 29, 1999, that he
is not a lawyer entitled to practice law in the Philippines, and that he is the same "Filemon
A. Manangan" who was found by this Court in G.R. No. 82760 ( Filemon Manangan v. Court
of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 28) decided on August 30, 1990, to be in reality
Andres Culanag who is not a member of the Philippine Bar, but despite these facts he has
continued to misrepresent himself to be an attorney-at-law and has appeared as counsel
for petitioners in this case, Atty. Filemon A. Manangan, who is in reality Andres Culanag, is
hereby declared guilty of indirect contempt of this Court. cSCTEH
RESOLUTION
Considering respondents' "Motion to Expunge All Pleadings Filed by Atty. Filemon A.
Manangan with Motion to Hold Him in Contempt of Court and to Dismiss the Petition" and
said Atty. Manangan's admission at the hearing this morning, September 29, 1999, that he
is not a lawyer entitled to practice law in the Philippines, and that he is the same "Filemon
A. Manangan" who was found by this Court in G.R. No. 82760 ( Filemon Manangan v. Court
of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 28) decided on August 30, 1990, to be in reality
Andres Culanag who is not a member of the Philippine Bar, but despite these facts he has
continued to misrepresent himself to be an attorney-at-law and has appeared as counsel
for petitioners in this case, "Atty. Filemon A. Manangan, who is in reality Andres Culanag, is
hereby declared guilty of indirect contempt of this Court. Wherefore, he is hereby
sentenced to three (3) months imprisonment to be served at the Headquarters of the
National Bureau of Investigation, Taft Avenue, Manila, until further orders from this Court. dctai
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 SO ORDERED. cdphil

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

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