PEN DEVELOPMENT CORP. & LAS BRISAS RESORT CORP. Vs. MARTINEZ LEYBA, INC.

Facts:
In 1968, Martinez noticed that the construction of Las Brisas' fence seemed to encroach on its land.
Upon verification by surveyors, Martinez was informed that the fence of Las Brisas overlaps its
property. On 11 March 1968, Martinez sent a Letter informing Las Brisas that the fence it
constructed encroaches [sic] on Martinez's land and requested Las Brisas to refrain from further
intruding on the same. Las Brisa did not respond to Martinez's letter and continued developing its
land. Martinez sent two (2) more Letters dated 31 March 1970 and 3 November 1970 to Las Brisas
informing the latter of the encroachment of its structures and improvements over Martinez's titled
land.
On 31 July 1971, Las Brisas, through a certain Paul Naidas, sent a letter to Martinez, claiming that it
'can not [sic] trace the origin of these titles' (pertaining to Martinez's land). Las Brisas' improvements
have encroached upon. Despite the notices, Las Brisas continued developing its property.
Martinez sought the services of a licensed geodetic engineer to survey the boundaries of its land.
The verification survey plan Vs-04,00034, which was approved by the Regional Technical Director for
Lands of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), revealed that the building
and improvements constructed by Las Brisas occupied portions of Martinez's lands:
Martinez sent a letter to Las Brisas demanding the latter to cease and desist from unlawfully holding
portions of Martinez's land occupied by Las Brisas structures and improvements. Despite the said
demand, no action was taken by Las Brisas.
Martinez filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Cancellation of Title and Recovery of Ownership with
Damages against Las Brisas before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City Las Brisas denied that it
encroached on Martinez's land and that it constructed the Las Brisas Resort Complex within the land
covered by TCT No. 153101.
For its evidence in chief, plaintiff presented Nestor Quesada (direct, June 7, 2001; cross Ju1y 26,
2001) rested its case on October 4, 2001. Its Formal Offer of Evidence as filed with the Court on
November 15, 2001 wherein Court Order dated January 15, 2002, Exhibit A to U, inclusive of their
submarkings were admitted over the objections of defendant.
The defendant presented Eufracia Naidas (direct/cross on July 11, 2004), then rested its case on May
11, 2005, the Formal Offer of Evidence was filed in Court on June 10, 2005 wherein the Court Order
dated June 27, 2005, Exhibit 1 to 7 inclusive of submarkings were all admitted over plaintiff's
objections.
Considering that the defendant has raised the defense of the validity of T.C.T. No. N-21871 of the
Registry of Deeds, Marikina (Exhibit 1), and subsequently cancelled by T.C.T. No. 153101 as
transferred to the Pen Development Corp. (Exh. 2) and introduced substantial improvements
thereon which from the facts established and evidence presented during the hearings of the case it
cannot be denied that said title over the property in question is genuine and valid. Moreover, the
defendant obtained the property as innocent purchasers for value, having no knowledge of any
irregularity, defect, or duplication in the title.
having introduced substantial improvements on the property, if on the ground or assumption that
the case will be decided in favor of the plaintiff, that defendant should be, by law, entitled to be
reimbursed for the expenses incurred in purchasing and developing the property, the construction
cost of the building alone estimated to be Fifty-Five Million Pesos (P55,000,000.00) The Court denies
the Petition.
Issues:
WON petitioner is a possessor in bad faith
Ruling:
The Court denies the Petition.
Under the Manual on Land Survey Procedures of the Philippines, on Verification Surveys,
particularly, it is provided, thus:Section 146. The Regional Technical Director for Lands may issue
order to conduct a verification survey whenever any approved survey is reported to be erroneous, or
when titled lands are reported to overlap or where occupancy is reported to encroach another
property. Section 149. All survey work undertaken for verification purposes shall be subject of
verification and approval in the DENR-LMS Regional Office concerned and shall be designated as
Verification Surveys Vs). Pursuant to these provisions, respondent caused its property to be
surveyed, and on May 23, 1996, the Regional Technical Director of Lands approved the verification
survey under Verification Survey Plan Vs-04-000394.[22] This Verification Survey Plan revealed that
petitioners encroached on respondent's land... respondent filed Civil Case No. 97-4386.
Respondent's main evidence is the said Verification Survey Plan Vs-04-000394, which is a public
document. As a public document, it is admissible in evidence even without further proof of its due
execution and genuineness,[23] and had in its favor the presumption of regularity, To contradict the
same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant,
otherwise the document should be upheld.[24] The certification and approval by the Regional
Technical Director of Lands signifies the "technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said
plan."... On the other hand, petitioners' evidence consists mainly of the claim that their TCT 153101
is a valid title and that they purchased the land covered by it in good faith and for value. TI1ey did
not present evidence to contradict respondent's Verification Survey Plan VS-04-000394; in other
words, no evidence was presented to disprove respondent's claim of overlapping. Their evidence
only goes so far as proving that they acquired the land covered by TCT 153101 in good faith.
However, while it may be true that they acquired TCT 153101 in good faith and for value, this does
not prove that they did not encroach upon the respondent's lands.
In the issue of being a builder in bad faith, there is no question that petitioners should be held liable
to the respondent to their obstinate refusal to abide by the latter's repeated demands to cease and
desist from continuing their construction upon the encroached area. Petitioners' sole defense is that
they purchased their property in good faith and for value; but this does not squarely address the
issue of encroachment or overlapping. To repeat, while petitioners may have been innocent
purchasers for value with respect to their land, this does not prove that they are equally innocent of
the claim of encroachment upon the respondent's lands. The evidence suggests otherwise: despite
being appraised of the encroachment, petitioners turned a blind eye and deaf ear and continued to
construct on the disputed area. They did not bother to conduct their own survey to put the issue to
rest, and to avoid the possibility of being adjudged as builders in bad faith upon land that did not
long to them.
Under the Civil Code,Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another,
loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.Art. 450. The owner of the land on
which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work,
or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the
expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay
the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding
articles, the landowner is entitled to damages from the builder planter or sower.

Argument: In the Dissent of Caguioa, he stated that this is not a boundary issue where one builds a
structure on a land that belongs to another. In this case there is an overlap in the certificates of the
title belonging to different people.
In case of double registration where land has been registered in the name of two persons, priority of
registration is the settled rule. In the 1915 en bane case of Legarda v. Saleeby,the Court stated:

We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of
the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May this
rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the
other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent
purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his
vendor, that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the
earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.

He does not agree that Las Brisas is a builder in bad faith. Articles 449, 450 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which provide:

'Article 449. - He who builds, plants, or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is
built, planted or sown without right to indemnity. "

Article 450. - The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad
faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in
order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built,
planted or sowed, or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and
the sower the proper rent.'

But the definition of bad faith in the case of De Villa v. Trinidad “The facts and circumstances,
however, do not call for assessment of damages against appellants until after the filing of the
present suit on January 26, 1962 for only then could they be positively adjudged in bad faith in view
of their knowledge that there was an adverse claimant to the land. Trinidad's repossession of the
land on March 2, 1961 cannot be deemed in bad faith as it was pursuant to a court order legally
obtained, and as his possession before that time was in good faith.”

I agree that the factual approach is preferable over the indiscriminate application of the constructive
notice doctrine in cases of double registration with respect to the determination of the good faith or
bad faith of the possessor or builder who derives his right from the «second original certificate of
title». I must emphasize that, in this case, the issue of good faith or bad faith is being decided in
relation to possession, independently of ownership.

Following the en banc cases of Dizon, De Villa and Gatioan, I believe that Las Brisas could not be
faulted for relying on its own certificate of title which, until nullified or voided by a court of
competent jurisdiction, is incontrovertible or indefeasible - and it would be unjust to expect Las
Brisas to make a legal determination of the validity of its certificate of title. It should be mentioned
that Las Brisas bought the land in a foreclosure sale. Furthermore, Las Brisas should not be blamed
for the failure of the government agency concerned to ascertain the overlapping when it approved
the survey plan that became the basis for the application and approval of the confirmation of the
original title of Las Brisas' predecessor-in-interest, which overlapping also escaped the attention of
the court that granted the application and confirmed the title. To my mind, a full proof application of
the constructive notice doctrine requires that the defect or flaw in the title could be ascertained
from a competent and exhaustive due diligence on the subject titled property.

The fact that Las Brisas did not present its own survey, unlike MLI, is of no moment. What is crucial is
that the improvements that Las Brisas made were within the boundaries described in its title.
Because of this principle, MLI needed to file a complaint to directly question the validity of Las
Brisas' title which resulted to its partial nullity because a collateral attack on Las Brisas' Torrens title
is not allowed. Finally, even assuming that, as intimated by the ponencia, Las Brisas' initial -good
faith when it bought the property ceased when it received the seven letters from MLI, it is significant
to note that the latter filed the complaint for quieting of title/cancellation of title and recovery of
ownership only on March 24, 199734- almost 30 years from 1968 when MLI sent its first letter after
it noticed the construction of Las Brisas' fence within the contested area, and allowing Las Brisas to
develop the property and conducting its business therein, to put up a two-story building initially, and
in 1988, to expand and put up a multi-story conference center building that finished construction
sometime in 1995 sourced from bank loans and costing Las Brisas ₱55,000,000.00.36By no means
can this be considered as MLI seasonably availing of «the means established by the laws and the
Rules of Court,» such as a petition for injunction with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, to
protect MLI in its possession thereof or restore to MLI its possession over the same.
These circumstances indubitably taint MLI's good faith.

Under Article 453 of the Civil Code

If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted or sowed on the land of
another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the other shall be the
same as though both had acted in good faith. It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of
the landowner whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.
While MLI «opposed» the introduction of improvements by Las Brisas through the letters the former
sent to the latter, this «opposition» can only be considered as token. MLI should have seasonably
resorted to court action when Las Brisas kept ignoring its claim of ownership over the disputed
areas.

MLI is now barred by estoppel by laches to claim good faith insofar as the construction by Las Brisas
is concerned of the improvements, consisting mainly of a ₱55,000,000.00-worth multi-story building
that it introduced in the disputed areas. In this case, the doctrines of laches and estoppel are being
invoked in relation to the issue of possession and not with respect to ownership.

CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 180016

FACTS: Danilo Tangcoy, private plaintiff, and Lito Corpuz, petitioner, met at the Admiral Royale
Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Tangcoy was then engaged in the business of lending
money to casino players and, upon hearing that Tangcoy had some pieces of jewelry for sale, Corpuz
approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on
commission basis. Tangcoy agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the
following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and
another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even
date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to
return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting
the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When Tongcoy was able to meet the
petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to
him, but to no avail. A criminal complaint for estafa was filed against Corpuz. On the prosecution, it
was established that Tongcoy and Corpuz were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is
engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every collection made,
they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business with Tongcoy. However,
he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made to sign a
blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence
against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even
see. RTC and CA – accused is guilty of estafa.
ISSUE: 1. WON the demand to return the subject the subject jewelry, if unsold, or remit the
proceeds, if sold, is a valid demand under one of the elements of Estafa under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the
RPC?
RULING: YES. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word "demand" need
not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere
query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a
demand. As expounded in Asejo v. People: With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with
the CA that demand under this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court
observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be necessary, the
law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be interpreted in its general
meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present
a written demand as evidence is not fatal. In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally
inquired about the money entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a
demand, thus: x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence
of the crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or
property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be
established by other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar. In view of the foregoing and
based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the elements of the
crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as
shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60)
days, if unsold. There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those
pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or
after the agreed period despite demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
DECISION. Petition denied

Argument: In the dissenting opinion of Carpio, he voted to declare the first paragraph of Article 315
of Act No. 3815,
“ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of
the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by: 1st. The penalty of prisión
correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if
such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for
the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión
mayor or reclusión temporal, as the case may be.”
as amended (Code), mandating the imposition of maximum penalty based on the amount of the
fraud exceeding ₱22,000. I do so on the ground that imposing the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed in Article 315 of the Code in such a manner, unadjusted to inflation, amounts to cruel
punishment within the purview of Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution. By any objective
standard of comparison, crimes resulting in the deprivation of life or liberty are unquestionably more
serious than crimes resulting in the deprivation of property. By imposing a level of punishment for
estafa equal to more serious crimes such as homicide and kidnapping, Article 315’s system of
calibrating the maximum penalty based on the amount of fraud is plainly arbitrary and
disproportionate to the severity of the crime punished. Article 315 of the Code calibrates the
maximum penalty for estafa on an escalated basis once a threshold amount of fraud is crossed . The
penalty escalates on a ratio of one year imprisonment for every ₱10,000 fraud, with 20 years as
ceiling. By imposing a level of punishment for estafa equal to more serious crimes such as homicide
and kidnapping, Article 315’s system of calibrating the maximum penalty based on the amount of
fraud is plainly arbitrary and disproportionate to the severity of the crime punished.

The Cruel Punishment Clause ensures that the state interest is advanced without sacrificing
proportionality between the crime and punishment. In short, the Clause acts as constitutional brake
whenever Congress enacts punishment whose severity is gratuitous, wholly unconnected to the
purpose of the law. At the time the Code took effect in 1932, when US$1.00 was equivalent to ₱1.00,
the system of calibrated penalty under Article 315 based on the amount appropriated arguably
stayed clear of the Cruel Punishment Clause. The arbitrary differential treatment of estafa crosses
the line separating the exercise of valid legislative discretion and the Cruel Punishment Clause.

The breach of the Cruel Punishment Clause by Article 315’s system of calculating the maximum
penalty for estafa in excess of ₱22,000 means that only the minimum term of imprisonment
provided under Article 315 for such crime can be imposed on petitioner, namely, prision correccional
in its maximum period. This level of penalty is covered by the Indeterminate Sentence Law45 which
renders the next lower penalty, namely, prision correccional in its medium period, as the minimum
of the sentence. The same range of penalty applies to all other persons found guilty of violating
Article 315. PD 1689 amended Article 315 of the Code by adding a new mode of committing estafa47
and imposing the penalty of «life imprisonment to death» or «reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds ₱100,000.» Unlike Article 315, PD 1689 does not
calibrate the duration of the maximum range of imprisonment on a fixed time-to-peso ratio , but
rather provides a straight maximum penalty of death or reclusion perpetua.

Bong bong Marcos vs Leni Robredo

Facts: On January 21, 2019, the revision of ballots was completed except for a few ballot boxes. The
revision proceedings for the remaining ballot boxes and decrypted ballot images will continue on
January 28, 2019. In the interim, the Tribunal shall prepare for the use of decrypted ballot images in
the revision proceedings. After the revision proceedings, the next stage is the appreciation of the
ballots following the Guidelines of the Appreciation of Ballots which was published in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer on November 21, 2018.
After the 16 May 2016 national and local elections, Maria Leonor G. Robredo emerged as the winner
in the vice presidential race having garnered the highest votes, with 14,418,817, followed by
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. with 14,155,344 votes.
With a margin of 263,473 votes, Robredo’s claim to the position was questioned via an election
protest by Marcos on the grounds of fraud, anomalies, and irregularities.

The protest proceeded with the revision of the pilot provinces of Camarines Sur, Iloilo, and Negros
Occidental chosen by Marcos «due to the unusually high number of undervotes in provinces.»30
During the revision of the ballots from Camarines Sur, in an ex parte motion dated 05 April 2018,
Robredo sought for the PET to direct the head revisors to apply the 25% shading threshold
purportedly set by the COMELEC in the revision, recount, and re-appreciation of ballots.

The 10 April 2018 PET Resolution is presently the subject of Robredo’s Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration wherein she alleged that, as early as 6 September 2016, the PET was informed by
COMELEC, by way of a Letter to the then clerk of the tribunal, Atty. Felipa B. Anama, of the 25%
threshold used in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections. The said adoption of the 25% shading
threshold was adopted by COMELEC Robredo argues that both factual circumstances give PET a legal
basis to «impose a 25% threshold percentage in determining whether a vote is valid.

Issue: WON the vote is valid

Ruling:

Argument: the 10 April 2018 PET resolution, by refusing to acknowledge that the COMELEC has set
25% as the new shading threshold percentage, will constitute an ultra vires act because it
encroaches on the authority of the COMELEC not only to promulgate rules, but also on the manner
to promulgate such rules.

It is well-established in jurisprudence that there are three classifications of the powers of the
COMELEC: administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi judicial.

The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to «resolve controversies arising from
the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies[ ]
and all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications.»The Commission’s quasi-
legislative power «refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and
to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress.»41
Meanwhile, the administrative function points «to the enforcement and administration of election
laws.

In the exercise of such power, the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code Section 52
[ authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.»«

G.R. No. 213948

KNIGHTS OF RIZAL, Petitioner. 
vs.
DMCI HOMES, INC., DMCI PROJECT DEVELOPERS, INC., CITY OF MANILA, NATIONAL COMMISSION
FOR CULTURE AND THE ARTS, NATIONAL HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Facts:

On 1 September 2011, DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI-PDI) 3 acquired a 7,716.60-square meter

lot in the City of Manila, located near Taft Avenue, Ermita, beside the former Manila Jai-Alai Building
and Adamson University.4The lot was earmarked for the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila
condominium project.
On 2 April 2012, DMCI-PDI secured its Barangay Clearance to start the construction of its project. It
then obtained a Zoning Permit from the City of Manila's City Planning and Development Office
(CPDO) on 19 June 2012.5
Then, on 5 July 2012, the City of Manila's Office of the Building Official granted DMCI-PDI a Building
Permit, allowing it to build a "Forty Nine (49) Storey w/ Basement & 2 penthouse Level
Res'l./Condominium" on the property. 6
On 24 July 2012, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of the
Building Official to temporarily suspend the Building Permit of DMCI-PDI, citing among others, that
"the Torre de Manila Condominium, based on their development plans, upon completion, will rise
up high above the back of the national monument, to clearly dwarf the statue of our hero, and with
such towering heights, would certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas
Boulevard vantage point[.]"7
Building Official Melvin Q. Balagot then sought the opinion of the City of Manila's City Legal Officer
on whether he is bound to comply with Resolution No. 121. 8 In his letter dated 12 September 2012,
City Legal Officer Renato G. Dela Cruz stated that there is "no legal justification for the temporary
suspension of the Building Permit issued in favor of [DMCI-PDI]" since the construction "lies outside
the Luneta Park" and is "simply too far to I be a repulsive distraction or have an objectionable effect
on the artistic and historical significance" of the Rizal Monument. 9 He also pointed out that "there is
no showing that the [area of subject property has been officially declared as an anthropological or
archeological area. Neither has it ' been categorically designated by the National Historical Institute
as a heritage zone, a cultural property, a historical landmark or even a national treasure."
Subsequently, both the City of Manila and DMCI-PDI sought the opinion or the National Historical
Commission of the Philippines (NHCP) on the matter. In the letter 10 dated 6 November 2012 from
NHCP I Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno addressed to DMCI-PDI and the letter 11 dated 7
November 2012 from NHCP Executive Director III Ludovico D. Bado)f addressed to then Manila
Mayor Alfredo S. Lim, the NHCP maintained that the Torre de Manila project site is outside the
boundaries of the Rizal f.ark and well to the rear of the Rizal Monument, and thus, cannot possibly
obstruct the frontal view of the National Monument.
On 26 November 2013, following an online petition against the Torre de Manila project that
garnered about 7,800 signatures, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 146, reiterating its
directive in Resolution No. 121 1 enjoining the City of Manila's building officials to temporarily
suspend ~MCI-PDI's Building Permit. 12
In a letter to Mayor Joseph Ejercito Estrada dated 18 December 2013, DMCI-PIDI President Alfredo R.
Austria sought clarification on the controversy surrounding its Zoning Permit. He stated that since
the CPDO granted its Zoning Permit, DMCI-PDI continued with the application for the Building
Permit, which was granted, and did not deem it necessary to go through the process of appealing to
the local zoning board. He then expressed DMCI-PDI's willingness to comply with the process if the
City of Manila deemed it necessary. 13
On 23 December 2013, the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals (MZBAA) issued Zoning
Board Resolution No. 06, Series of 2013, 14 recommending the approval of DMCI-PDI's application for
variance. ;The MZBAA noted that the Torre de Manila project "exceeds the prescribed maximum
Percentage of Land Occupancy (PLO) and exceeds the prescribeµ Floor Area Ratio (FAR) as stipulated
in Article V, Section 17 of City Ordinance No. 8119[.]" However, the MZBAA still recommended the
approval of the variance subject to the five conditions set under the same resolution.
After some clarification sought by DMCI-PDI, the MZBAA issued Zoning Board Resolution No. 06-A,
Series of 2013, 15 on 8 January 2014, amending condition (c) in the earlier resolution. 16
On 16 January 2014, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 5, Series of 2014, 17 adopting
Zoning Board Resolution Nos. 06 and 06- A. The City Council resolution states that "the City Council
of Manila find[ s] no cogent reason to deny and/or reverse the aforesaid recommendation of the
[MZBAA] and hereby ratif[ies] and confirm[s] all previously issued permits, licenses and approvals
issued by the City [Council] of Manila for Torre de Manila[.]"
Issue:

The issues raised by the parties can be summed up into one main point: Can the Court issue a writ of
mandamus against the officials of the City of Manila to stop the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de
Manila project?
Court’s Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining
Order issued by the Court on 16 June 2015 is LIFTED effective immediately.

SC decision rationale:

The petition for mandamus lacks merit and must be dismissed.

There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila.
In Manila Electric Company v. Public Service Commission,53 the Court held that "what is not
expressly or impliedly prohibited by law may be done, except when the act is contrary to morals,
customs and I public order." This principle is fundamental in a democratic society, to protect the
weak against the strong, the minority against the majority, and the individual citizen against the
government. In essence, this principle, which is the foundation of a civilized society under the rule of
law, prescribes that the freedom to act can be curtailed only through law. Without this principle, the
rights, freedoms, and civil liberties of citizens can be arbitrarily and whimsically trampled upon by
the shifting passions of those who can spout the loudest, or those who can gather the biggest crowd
or the most number of Internet trolls. In other instances, 54 the Court has allowed or upheld actions
that were not expressly prohibited by statutes when it determined that these acts were not contrary
to morals, customs, and public order, or that upholding the same would lead to a more equitable
solution to the controversy. However, it is the law itself - Articles 1306 55 and 1409(1)56 of the Civil
Code - which prescribes that acts not contrary to morals, good customs, public order, or public policy
are allowed if also not contrary to law.
In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila project is "contrary to morals,
customs, and public order" or that it brings harm, danger, or hazard to the community. On the
contrary, the City of Manila has determined that DMCI-PDI complied with the standards set under
the pertinent laws and local ordinances to construct its Torre de Manila project.
There is one fact that is crystal clear in this case. There is no law prohibiting the construction of the
Torre de Manila due to its effect on the background "view, vista, sightline, or setting" of the Rizal
Monument.
Mandamus does not lie against the City of Manila.
The Constitution states that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 1property without due
process of law x x x." 61 It is a fundamental principle that no property shall be taken away from an
individual without due process, whether substantive or procedural. The dispossession of property, or
in this case the stoppage of the construction of a building in one's own property would violate
substantive due process.
The Rules on Civil Procedure are clear that mandamus only issues when there is a clear legal duty
imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the party
seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act.
In the present case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule for
that matter, that the construction of a building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the building is
within the background sightline or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is no legal duty on the
part of the City of Manila "to consider," in the words of the Dissenting Opinion, "the standards set
under Ordinance No. 8119" in relation to the applications of DMCI-PDI for the Torre de Manila since
under the ordinance these standards can never be applied outside the boundaries of Rizal
Park. While the Rizal Park has been declared a National Historical Site, the area where Torre de
Manila is being built is a privately-owned property that is "not pap: of the Rizal Park that has been
declared as a National Heritage Site in 1095," and the Torre de Manila area is in fact "well-beyond"
the Rizal Park, according to NHCP Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno. 62 Neither has the area of
the Torre de Manila been designated as a "heritage zone, a cultural property, a historical landmark
or even a national treasure."63
Also, to declare that the City of Manila failed to consider the standards under Ordinance No. 8119
would involve making a finding of fact. A finding lot fact requires notice, hearing, and the submission
of evidence to ascertain compliance with the law or regulation. In such a case, it is the Regional Trial
Court which has the jurisdiction to hear the case, receive evidence, make a proper finding of fact,
and determine whether the Torre de Manila project properly complied with the standards set by the
ordinance. In Meralco v. Public Service Commission, 64 we held that it is the cardinal right of a party in
trials and administrative proceedings to be heard, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof and to have such evidence
presented considered by the proper court or tribunal.
To compel the City of Manila to consider the standards under Ordinance No. 8119 to the Torre de
Manila project will be an empty exercise since these standards cannot apply outside of the Rizal Park
- and the Torre de Manila is outside the Rizal Park. Mandamus will lie only if the officials
The KOR also invokes this Court's exercise of its extraordinary certiorari power of review under
Section 1, Article VIII65 of the Constitution. However, this Court can only exercise its
extraordinary certiorari power if the City of Manila, in issuing the required permits and
licenses, gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Tellingly, neither
the majority nor minority opinion in this case has found that the City of Manila committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the permits and licenses to DMCI-PDI. Thus, there is no justification at
all for this Court to exercise its extraordinary certiorari power.
Moreover, the exercise of this Court's extraordinary certiorari power is limited to actual cases and
controversies that necessarily involve a violation of the Constitution or the determination of the
constitutionality or validity of a governmental act or issuance. Specific violation of a statute that
does not raise the issue of constitutionality or validity of the statute cannot, as a rule, be the subject
of the Court's direct exercise of its expanded certiorari power. Thus, the KOR's recourse lies with
other judicial remedies or proceedings allowed under the Rules of Court.
A FINAL WORD
It had been Rizal’s wish to die facing the rising sun. In his Mi Ultimo Adios, the poem he left for his
family the night before he was executed, Rizal wrote:
Yo muero cuando veo que el cielo se colora
Y al fin anuncia el dia tras lobrego capuz 108
[Ako’y mamamatay, ngayong namamalas
na sa Silanganan ay namamanaag
yaong maligayang araw na sisikat
sa likod ng luksang nagtabing na ulap.] 109
[I die just when I see the dawn break,
Through the gloom of night, to herald the day] 110
Yet at the point of his execution, he was made to stand facing West towards Manila Bay, with his
back to the firing squad, like the traitor the colonial government wished to portray him. He asked to
face his executioners, facing the East where the sun would be rising since it was early morning, but
the Spanish captain did not allow it. As he was shot and a single bullet struck his frail body, Rizal
forced himself, with his last remaining strength, to turn around to face the East and thus he fell on
his back with] his face to the sky and the rising sun. Then, the Spanish captain approached Rizal and
finished him off with one pistol shot to his head.
Before his death, Rizal wrote a letter to his family. He asked for a simple tomb, marked with a cross
and a stone with only his name and the date of his birth and death; no anniversary celebrations; and
interment at Paang Bundok(now, the Manila North Cemetery). Rizal never wanted his grave to be a
burden to future generations.
The letter never made it to his family and his wishes were not carried out. The letter was discovered
many years later, in 1953. By then, his remains had been entombed at the Rizal Monument,
countless anniversaries had been . celebrated, with memorials and monuments built throughout the
world.
Rizal's wish was unmistakable: to be buried without pomp or pageantry; to the point of reaching
oblivion or obscurity in the future. 111 For Rizal's life was never about fame or vainglory, but for the
country he loved dearly and for which he gave up his life.
The Rizal Monument is expressly against Rizal' s own wishes. That Rizal's statue now stands facing
West towards Manila Bay, with Rizal's back to the East, adds salt to the wound. If we continue the
present orientation of Rizal's statue, with Rizal facing West, we would be like the Spanish captain
who refused Rizal's request to die facing the rising sun in the East. On the other hand, if Rizal' s
statue is made to face East, as Rizal had desired when he was about to be shot, the background - the
blue sky above Manila Bay - would forever be clear of obstruction, and we would be faithful to
Rizal's dying wish.
Dissenting opinion of Leonen:

The object of the provision is a Filipino national culture. In relation to this object, it is the
State's duty to foster its preservation, enrichment, and development. Our Filipino national culture
should be based on the principle of unity in diversity. It grows «in a climate of free artistic and
intellectual expression. Clearly, the Constitution acknowledges that culture exists at various levels
and with many dimensions. In terms of social space, there is a national culture and local ones. There
is diversity also among cultures. Ours is a multi-ethnic, multi-vocal, and multi-lingual state. The
Constitutional provision further implies that there can be unity both in the diversity of our culture as
well as in their commonalities. Significantly, culture evolves. Intrinsic in the very concept of culture is
that it is dynamic.
Petitioner Knights of Rizal anchors its legal standing on its charter, Republic Act No. 646,
Section 2 of which provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 2. The purposes of this corporation shall be to study the teachings of Dr. Jose
Rizal, to inculcate and propagate them in and among all classes of the Filipino people,
and by words and deeds to exhort our citizenry to emulate and practice the examples
and teachings of our national hero; to promote among the associated knights the spirit
of patriotism and Rizalian chivalry; to develop a perfect union among the Filipinos in
revering the memory of Dr. Jose Rizal; and to organize and hold programs
commemorative of Rizal 's nativity and martyrdom.
SECTION 7. Preservation of the Filipino Heritage. - It is the duty of every citizen to
preserve and conserve the Filipino historical and cultural heritage and resources. The
retrieval and conservation of artifacts of Filipino culture and history shall be vigorously
pursued.
There was no indication of petitioner's Corporate Secretary Maximo Salazar's
community tax certificate number and competent evidence of identity. 17 The date of the
alleged special meeting when Diosdado Santos, Deputy Supreme Commander of petitioner,
was authorized by the Board to file the case, was also left blank. Moreover, there was no
showing of a direct injury to petitioner or a specific member of Knights of Rizal caused by the
construction of Torre de Manila. « its moral authority and capacity 'to inculcate and
propagate... Dr. Jose Rizal'»19 is too general and vague an interest to grant Knights of Rizal
legal standing to sue. Further, Knights of Rizal is not a citizen with the duty to preserve and
conserve historical and cultural heritage.