Government of Hongkong v.

Olalia,
Laws applicable: Right to bail under Bill of rights
Facts.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were
issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The
petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private
respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.

The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same in
extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject to the following
conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby
undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and
will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further
appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited
in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own
motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if

they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further
desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and
personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees
from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the
corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge.
Hence, this instant petition.

Issue:
WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

Ruling:
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the
Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right
being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
 

On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill
of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in
a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

Maximo Calalang Vs A. D. Williams Et. Al; ,

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice    

Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to
the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one
year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and

2)  along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from theSecretary 
of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and
control the use of and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications.
The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor
of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the
rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and
pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but
of the riding public as well.

Issue:

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security
of all the people?

Ruling:

No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable,
or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,vs.EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-

Appellant G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

Marital Rape, VawC

Facts:

 Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children.

                On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her
husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence
in Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her
shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.

                As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause
marital problems between her and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and
fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm.
However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and,
sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was
physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into
submission.

                One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the
matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested
separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: “Why are
you lying on the cot?”, and to instantaneously order: “You transfer here to our bed.”

                KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal
pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier.
He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor.
Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.

                The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire
to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his
hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.

                The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to
resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides.
KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.
                The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster,41 stretched her legs apart and
rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and
succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to
protest by desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do that to me because I’m not feeling well.”

                Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the rape
charges as her revenge because he took over the control and management of their businesses,
and to cover up her extra-marital affairs.

Issue:

 Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

Ruling:

YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their wives’
bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.

Violation of equal protection clause

 The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms
of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal
protection clause.

The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be
unconstitutional.

Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution
for the rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the
marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping
her.

Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist’s legal
relationship with his victim.

According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists
within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her
will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and
its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.

Ichong v Hernandez

Equal Protection Clause

Legislature Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." Its
purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil from having a stranglehold
upon people’s economic life. In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main
provisions of the Act are:
(1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade;
(2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business
on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are
forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural
persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of
juridical persons; ….and etc.

Petitioner Lao H. Ichong brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that Republic Act
1180 is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting
under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner
attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:

(1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law;
(2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof;
(3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that the Act was
passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the
Constitution in the interest of national economic survival.

Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act 1180 violates the equal protection of laws.

Held/Ruling:
No. According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then
provided that police power cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a
contract. The enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State. The law
does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist
for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the
due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

G.R.No.151445     
April 11, 2002
Lim v. Executive Secretary

Incorporation Clause

Facts

Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the armed
forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take partin "Balikatan 02-
1” on January 2002.  The Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of joint military
maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into
by the Philippines and the United States in 1951.  The exercise is rooted from the international
anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the 3 commercial
aircrafts hijacking that smashed into twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City
and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. allegedly by the al-Qaeda headed by the Osama
bin Laden that occurred on September 11, 2001.

Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the
constitutionality of “Balikatan-02-1”. They were subsequently joined by SANLAKAS and
PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-list organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention.
Lim and Ersando filed suits in their capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers. SANLAKAS
and PARTIDO on the other hand, claimed that certain members of their organization are
residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly affected by the operations being
conducted in Mindanao.

The petitioners alleged that “Balikatan-02-1” is not covered by the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)
between the Philippines and the United States. Petitioners posited that the MDT only provides
for mutual military assistance in case of armed attack by an external aggressor against the
Philippines or the US. Petitioners also claim that the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) does not
authorize American Soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine Territory.

Issue:
Is the “Balikatan-02-1” inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution?

Ruling
NO. Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the
filing of a new petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court -
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts

Doctrine of Importance to the Public

Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the
Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws that they
have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of
procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition.

Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the doctrine
of separation of powers, which enjoins upon the department of the government a becoming
respect for each other's act, this Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant
petition.

The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities,"
the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide
scope of undertakings subject only to the approval of the Philippine government. The sole
encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel
must "abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular,
from any political activity." All other activities, in other words, are fair game.