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VISION IAS
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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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VISION IAS
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LECTURE-1
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: BACK GROUND AND OVERVIEW
CONTENTS
1. INDIA’S RELATIONS: EVOLUTION OF INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY. ............................................................................ 3
1.1. Understanding Foreign Policy and International Relations ............................................................................. 3
1.2. Determinants: Actors and Factors Shaping India’s Foreign Policy .................................................................. 3
2. EVOLUTION OF INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY .............................................................................................................. 4
2.1. 1947-1962: Internationalist, Idealist and Non-Aligned India .......................................................................... 4
2.1.1. Panchsheel................................................................................................................................................ 4
2.1.2. Setback with China: 1962 ......................................................................................................................... 5
2.1.3. The Colombo Conference and Limits of Non-Aligned Movement ........................................................... 5
2.1.4. A brief overview of the Non Aligned Movement ..................................................................................... 5
2.2. 1962-1991: Period of Self Help Approach ....................................................................................................... 6
2.2.1. The Chinese Nuclear Test and After ......................................................................................................... 7
2.2.2. Changes with Continuity........................................................................................................................... 7
2.2.3. The Simla Agreement ............................................................................................................................... 7
2.3. 1991 and After: Era of “Pragmatic” Foreign Policy ......................................................................................... 8
2.3.1. Beginning of A New Era ............................................................................................................................ 9
3. LET US ADDRESS A KEY QUESTION ....................................................................................................................... 12
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3.1. Non-Alignment: Relevance of the Idea and the movement.......................................................................... 12

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3.2. Arguments in the context of Irrelevance of NAM ......................................................................................... 12

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3.2.1. Arguments in Defence of NAM and Non-Alignment .............................................................................. 12

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3.2.2. A Contemporary Assessment ................................................................................................................. 13

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4. SUPPLEMENTARY READING .................................................................................................................................. 15

4.1. India’s Policy of Non-Alignment .................................................................................................................... 15
4.2. Reasons for Non-Alignment .......................................................................................................................... 16
4.3. The Non-Aligned Movement ......................................................................................................................... 16
1 www.visionias.in ©Vision IAS

Syllabus of the Civil Services Examination clearly demarcates the boundaries of knowledge as far as the section
of International Relations (IR) is concerned. In the context of the examination, the significance of international
relations is mediated through India’s interaction with the world, factors that shape and influence it and the
consequences. The ideal way is to understand the sources, determinants, objectives, tools, methods, hindrances,
factors, actors, and developments in the context of India’s foreign policy and its relations with the world. Thus,
IR in this context is better understood as India’s Relations. And these relations are subject matter of India’s
foreign policy.
The lectures would broadly cover the following themes:
• India’s Foreign policy: Determinants, Evolution, Achievements, Challenges and key questions.
• Neighbors: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka Maldives, Pakistan, Afghanistan, SAARC
• Extended Neighborhood: South East Asia (ASEAN, Myanmar, Vietnam, Singapore); West Asia (GCC, Iran,
Saudi Arabia, UAE); East Asia and beyond (Japan, South Korea, Australia, Pacific Ocean- Indo Pacific,
FIPIC); Indian Ocean (Mauritius, IORA)
• Global Relations- Important Powers: China, USA, Russia, European Union, France Germany and United
Kingdom
• Regional Relations: Africa, Latin America (Brazil/MERCOSUR).
• Organizations and groupings
• Diaspora
• Key Issues in IR
• Feel Free to add your Own Notes in blank Spaces

Space below Intentionally Left Blank
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1. INDIA’S RELATIONS: EVOLUTION OF INDIA’S
FOREIGN POLICY.
1.1. UNDERSTANDING FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Foreign policy by definition is about the world around us. If you imagine a country as an individual then you
need to think of foreign policy as the way an individual negotiates with the environment around. So for Instance,
an individual operates through a set of identities, self definition and self interests and is enmeshed in a web of
relations (Family, friends, competitors, enemies etc.). An individual has certain desires and goals. Thus, based on
one’s capabilities one engages in making and shaping ones relation to achieve ones goals and desires. These
goals and desires for an individual are often related to security, prosperity and self-growth.
In case of sovereign nation states these goals and desires can be termed as National Interest. National interest
in its fine print may vary from time to time but at its heart has the security (military preparedness, internal and
external security ), prosperity (economic wellbeing e.g FDI, Trade, poverty eradication etc.) and status (political
position in the world order of the day e.g Membership of UN Security Council) of the country. Foreign policy is
both a statement of these interests and a blueprint to achieve them. According to J. Bandopadhyay it involves
an exercise of choice of ends and means in an international setting. In much simpler terms, foreign policy is a
nation protocol for making and maintaining relations with foreign countries. Thus, India’s foreign policy define,
articulates and pursues national interests in a world where these interests are in many ways dependent on
the actors and factors outside the boundaries of the country.
1.2. DETERMINANTS: ACTORS AND FACTORS SHAPING INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

The foreign policy of any country as well as its success or failure is determined by many factors. To name a few:
• History: Political Tradition and philosophical basis as in case of India peaceful coexistence as well as non
aggression are attributed to its history and culture and political tradition.
• Geography: location and resources- Geo-politics and Geo-strategy: Many rivers in India are transboundary
e.g Ganges, Brahmaputra, Teesta. Himalaya and the Indian Ocean are crucial for India’s security.
• Economic development: the development needs and stage of a country contribute to its foreign policy
choices and both in terms of means and ends.
• Domestic Milieu: Institutions, political atmosphere and consensus on National Interest, needs, ambitions
and capabilities, Leadership, bureaucracy.
• International Milieu: War, peace and stability e.g. a peaceful external environment is conducive for
economic growth and development.
In terms of means of foreign Policy Objectives on can count diplomatic tools, economic tools, and military
tools. One can better appreciate the significance of the above discussion in light of the evolution of India’s
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2. EVOLUTION OF INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY
2.1. 1947-1962: INTERNATIONALIST, IDEALIST AND NON-ALIGNED INDIA
Independent India’s foreign policy was the result of multiple factors such as the legacy of national movement
against the British rule, post-Second World War developments, domestic needs and personalities such as
Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Even the Indian constitution included a provision, under article 51, for
promotion of international peace and security, wherein the state shall Endeavour to:
(a) Promote international peace and security;
(b) Maintain just and honourable relations between nations;
(c) Foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one
another; and
(d) encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration.
The formative influence of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru is the feature of initial years of foreign policy of
India which left a long lasting impact and polarised opinions for years to come. His vision included special status
of India given its history, size and potential. It was a foreign policy predicated on internationalism, Afro-Asian
Solidarity, anti colonialism and non alignment in the era of cold war power politics dominated by the two
superpowers i.e. the USA and the USSR.
Even before India became Independent the Asian relations Conference was held in New Delhi from 23 March to
2 April 1947. Mr. Nehru observed “we stand at the end of an era and on the threshold of a new period of
history... Asia, after a long period of quiescence, has suddenly become important again in world affairs”.
India was the first to suggest plebiscite as a peaceful method for resolving the Junagadh dispute with Pakistan.
India made a similar offer for settling the Kashmir situation in 1947. The referral of Pakistan’s aggression in
Kashmir to the United Nations in December 1947 is seen by many as a mistake on the part of India’s leadership
in reposing its trust in international organisation such as the UN. According to J. Bandopadhyay Nehru’s attempt
to combine both idealism and realism in his policy towards Kashmir affected certain aspects of the Kashmir
diplomacy, and it would “conceivably have been different if dealt by someone else”. However, According to Rajiv
Sikri, Nehru “was ready to take the war to Pakistan in 1948 when things were getting difficult in Jammu and
Kashmir but was overruled by his British army chief. He took the Kashmir question to the United Nations under
pressure from the British Governor General of India.”
Nonetheless, this initial experience at the UN further cemented scepticism towards the western world in India’s
foreign policy. The result was a quest for charting a new path that involved newly independent countries of Asia
and Africa and equidistance from the power politics of the day.
In this phase three key features characterized India’s foreign policy conduct. First, India played a significant role
in multilateral institutions and particularly in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Second, it also emerged
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as a critical proponent of the nonaligned movement. Third, as a leader of the nonaligned movement it also
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made a significant contribution toward the process of decolonization. India’s in international participation was
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most visible in:

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• International Control Commission in Vietnam along with Canada and Poland (1954),
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Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea (1952-54)

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• United Nations Peacekeeping forces in the Belgian Congo (1960-1964)

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India’s activism in this phase also reflected in the arena of disarmament, specifically the nuclear weapons. As
one of the early proponents of a nuclear test ban treaty, in 1952 India introduced a draft resolution co-
sponsored with Ireland to bring about a global ban on nuclear tests.
2.1.1. PANCHSHEEL
In this period the approach towards foreign relations was further underlined by the “Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence”, known as the Panchsheel Treaty between China and India in 1954. They were enunciated in the
preamble to the "Agreement (with exchange of notes) on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China
and India", which was signed at Peking on 29 April 1954.This agreement stated the five principles as:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty.
2. Mutual non-aggression.
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
4. Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit.
5. Peaceful co-existence.
Internationalist, approach of foreign policy was also reflected in the active participation of India at the Asian-
African Conference in Bandung (Indonesia) 1955. This Conference was held in Bandung on April 18-24, 1955 and
gathered 29 Heads of States belonging to the first post-colonial generation of leaders from the two continents
with the aim of identifying and assessing world issues at the time and pursuing out joint policies in international
relations. The principles that would govern relations among large and small nations, known as the "Ten
Principles of Bandung", were proclaimed at that Conference. The Bandung conference paved way for the
creation of the Movement of Non-Aligned nations in 1961.
The Indus Water Treaty signed in Karachi on 19 September 1960 by Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru
and President of Pakistan Ayub Khan, was a testimony to progress made on contentious issues through
diplomatic means. However, even though India professed diplomacy as the preferred choice to resolve disputes,
it took certain stringent actions when required. For instance, when extensive diplomatic discussion with the
stubborn Salazar regime in Portugal produced a deadlock and Prime Minister Nehru faced increasing criticism
from a group of Afro-Asian leaders, India chose to use force to oust the Portuguese from their colonial enclave
in Goa in 1961.
2.1.2. SETBACK WITH CHINA: 1962
One of the key elements of a foreign policy based on the idea of nonalignment was the limitation of high
defence expenditures. Such a policy weakened the hard power capabilities of India. It was tested most acutely in
its relations with People’s Republic of China (PRC). India gave refuge to the Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama in
1959 and negotiations with the PRC reached a dead end in 1960. Consequently, India adopted, in the words of
Sumit Ganguly, a “strategy of compellence designed to restore what it deemed to be the territorial status quo
along the disputed Himalayan border”. It involved sending in lightly armed, poorly equipped and ill-prepared
troops to high altitudes without adequate supply lines. This policy, however, was proved to be ill conceived.
When in 1962 the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the PRC invaded India with extensive force, the Indian
military was unprepared to face the assault. The PLA inflicted considerable losses on the Indian forces and then
withdrew from some of the areas that they had entered. However, they did not vacate Axai Chin, an area of
more than 14,000 square miles, that they had initially claimed and it remains a bone of contention in India’s
relation with China.
2.1.3. THE COLOMBO CONFERENCE AND LIMITS OF NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT
Six of the non-aligned nations — Egypt, Burma, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Ghana and Indonesia, selected on the
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basis that they were all acceptable to India and China - met in Colombo on 10 December 1962. The proposals
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that emerged from the Colombo Conference stipulated a Chinese withdrawal of 20 km from the ceasefire line
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observed by China without any reciprocal withdrawal on India’s behalf. Although the mediation effort was
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encouraged, the failure of these six nations unequivocally to condemn China is deeply disappointed India.
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Nevertheless, India accepted the proposals while China accepted them in principle as the basis to start
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negotiations. Eventually the initiative withered away.

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Thus, 1962 war with China marked an end to a phase in India’s foreign policy marked by idealism with initial
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success and multiple legacies that India had to contend with in the future.
2.1.4. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT
Six years after Bandung, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries was founded on a wider geographical basis at
the First Summit Conference of Belgrade, which was held on September 1-6, 1961. The Conference was
attended by 25 countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Yemen, Myanmar, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus,
Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia,
Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia.

In 1960, in the light of the results achieved in Bandung, the creation of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries
was given boost during the Fifteenth Ordinary Session of the United Nations General Assembly, during which
17 new African and Asian countries were admitted to the UN. A key role was played in this process by the then
Heads of State and Government Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jawaharlal Nehru
of India, Ahmed Sukarno of Indonesia and Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, who later became the founding fathers
of the movement and its emblematic leaders.
The Bandung Principles were adopted later as the main goals and objectives of the policy of non-alignment.
The fulfilment of those principles became the essential criterion for Non-Aligned Movement membership; it is
what was known as the "quintessence of the Movement" until the early 1990s.
The Founders of NAM have preferred to declare it as a movement but not an organization in order to avoid
bureaucratic implications of the latter.
Primary of objectives of the non-aligned countries focused on:
• the support of self-determination, national independence and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
States;
• opposition to apartheid;
• non-adherence to multilateral military pacts and the independence of non-aligned countries from great
power or block influences and rivalries;
• the struggle against imperialism in all its forms and manifestations;
• the struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, foreign occupation and domination;
• disarmament;
• non-interference into the internal affairs of States and peaceful coexistence among all nations;
• rejection of the use or threat of use of force in international relations;
• the strengthening of the United Nations; the democratization of international relations;
• Socioeconomic development and the restructuring of the international economic system; as well as
international cooperation on an equal footing.
2.2. 1962-1991: PERIOD OF SELF HELP APPROACH

In the aftermath of the China war Nehru faced criticism at home, however there was none taller than him in the
domestic politics. Thus, changes in India’s approach after the debacle also begun under him. Most importantly,
India embarked on a substantial program of military modernization. It committed itself to the creation of a
million-strong army with ten new mountain divisions equipped and trained for high altitude warfare, a 45-
squadron air force with supersonic aircraft and a modest program of naval expansion.
Even under Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, after Nehru’s demise in 1964, India still did not formally
abandon the stated adherence to a policy of nonalignment. As a result, at the level of rhetoric and principle
nonalignment remained a constant feature of Indian foreign policy. India’s foreign policy behaviour, however,
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In this phase the shaping of cold war in Asia affected India as well. Pakistan had joined the US backed security
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initiatives such as the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and the Central Treaty Organisation
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(CENTO) in 1955. The United States had provided arms to Pakistan as well. For a brief period of military
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cooperation with India in the aftermath of the 1962 war, the United States disengaged itself from South Asia
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after the second India-Pakistan conflict in 1965 as it became increasingly preoccupied with the prosecution of
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the Vietnam War. During the 1965 war the US suspended military aid to both the countries. With this American
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disengagement from the subcontinent, Pakistan sought to expand the scope of its security cooperation with the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) to balance Indian power. This contributed to a growing security nexus between
India’s two major adversaries.
On the other hand facing difficulties in its relations with PRC and sensing an opportunity to expand its influence
in the subcontinent, the USSR mediated the Tashkent agreement between India and Pakistan in 1966.
In this phase, except for the pressure for tempering criticism on the Vietnam War, agricultural policy and
opening up of markets under the Johnson administration in 1966, the US mostly remained oblivious to India’s
concerns.

2.2.1. THE CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST AND AFTER
Following the Chinese nuclear test at Lop Nor in 1964, arguments were made in the parliament called for an
abandonment of nonalignment and even urged that India acquire an independent nuclear weapons option.
Prime Minister Shastri privately explored the possibility of help from the United States for nuclear security.
More importantly he declared India would not make nuclear weapons of its own. In 1966, Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi, who succeeded Mr. Shastri, also decided to seek a nuclear guarantee from the great powers. This effort,
however, brought no success. Hence, Prime Minister Gandhi authorized India’s Subterranean Nuclear
Explosions Project (SNEP) which led to India’s first nuclear test of May 1974.
It is important to note that India had signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) which came into existence in
1963. It was perhaps in the hope that the treaty would lead to further nuclear disarmament. However these
hopes remained hopes only. The Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which opened for signature in 1968
represented the inequities of global order. India opposed the treaty citing norms of sovereign equality, at the
same time the potential constraints of NPT on its own nuclear options was a key consideration.
2.2.2. CHANGES WITH CONTINUITY
In this phase, India’s foreign policy sought to sustain “two competing visions of world order”. On the one hand,
India still supported the cause of decolonization and continued to lead the cause representing the weaker
states in the international system. For example, it remained a staunch opponent of the apartheid regime in
South Africa; it was an unyielding supporter of the Palestinian cause. On the other hand, it also came to accept
the importance of defence preparedness and increasingly overcame its reservations about the use of force in
international politics.
Thus, in 1971 faced with the influx of millions of refugees from East Pakistan after the outbreak of a civil war,
India quickly moved ahead with a strategic vision to devise a political and diplomatic initiative backed by
military action against Pakistan. This strategy involved a security understanding with the Soviet Union to
counter possible Chinese involvement. Thus, India signed a 20-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and
Cooperation with the Soviet Union in August 1971. With the political leadership securing its interests on the
northern borders, Indian armed force moved swiftly into East Pakistan and helped the Mukti Bahini and the
leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman in the establishment of Bangladesh as an independent nation.
2.2.3. THE SIMLA AGREEMENT
In the aftermath of the war India adopted a magnanimous gesture as reflected in repatriation of more than
91,000 PoWs of Pakistan and the Simla Agreement signed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and President Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto of Pakistan on 2 July 1972. It was much more than a peace treaty seeking to reverse the consequences
of the 1971 war. It was a comprehensive blue print for good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan.
The following principles of the Agreement are, however, particularly noteworthy:
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• A mutual commitment to the peaceful resolution of all issues through direct bilateral approaches.
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To build the foundations of a cooperative relationship with special focus on people to people contacts.
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• To uphold the inviolability of the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, this is a most important CBM
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between India and Pakistan, and a key to durable peace.

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Thus, even though on the face of it the agreement is criticised by many a lost opportunity, it established the
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framework that India has continuously put forward as a template to resolve all disputes within a bilateral
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framework.
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A better understanding of the period requires appreciation of the fact that in July 1971, President Nixon's
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger secretly visited Beijing during a trip to Pakistan, and laid the
groundwork for Nixon's visit to China in 1972. This was in the aftermath of a Sino-Soviet rift. Ultimately PRC
entered the UN and assumed the seat in the Security Council in October 1971.
In the larger international economic context, India remained at the forefront of the Group of 77, a group
established in 1964 comprising of developing nations seeking fundamental changes in the global economic
order. Furthermore, the 1973 oil crisis in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war in the same year placed an economic
challenge before India. However, even as the leader of the developing countries India failed to obtain any

meaningful concessions as a resource-poor developing nation from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC). It was weakness in the economic capacity that prevented India from pursuing a nuclear
weapons program even after it 1974.
The mid 1970s saw India undergoing a period of political turmoil involving emergency and the emergence of the
Janata Party government in 1977 under Prime Minister Morarji Desai. The brief period of the Desai government
saw many pronouncements about altering the course of India including a move to “genuine non-alignment.
However, this period was a brief interlude and marked by much continuity in India’s foreign policy. The visit of
Minister of External Affairs Atal Bihari Vajpayee to China and the US president Jimmy Carter to India were key
developments of this period.
Events in the cold war dominated world in this period had a long-lasting impact on India. In this context the
year 1979 is important as three key developments proved that national interests of India were subject to
developments outside. Firstly, in February 1979 the revolution in Iran brought fundamental changes in West
Asian region. Secondly, the during November and December the events surrounding the seizure of Grand
Mosque in Saudi Arabia brought further upheaval in a region key to India. Thirdly, in December Soviet Union
invaded USSR in Afghanistan. While the consequences of first two events had an impact on India in the long
term, it’s the Soviet entry into Afghanistan that set in motion factors that had important consequences in terms
of India’s neighborhood specifically Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The United States renewed strategic relationship with Pakistan in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion. Under
General Zia-ul-Haq Pakistan became the frontline in the US efforts to bog down the Soviets in Afghanistan. This
entailed enhanced funding and military aid to Pakistan to be channelled in Afghanistan against the soviets
through the Afghan fighters. As a consequence with the objective of maintaining its military superiority over
Pakistan, India entered into a closer military cooperation relationship with the Soviet Union. However, this
perhaps dented the non-aligned credentials of India as it was forced to maintain an ambiguous stance on Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan.
Nonetheless, the Seventh NAM summit in March 1983 at New Delhi became an occasion for assuming
leadership of the multilateral forum of which India was a founding member. However, by this time the
membership of the group had grown to nearly a 100 as compared to 25 at its first Summit in Belgrade in 1961.
As astutely observed in one of the media reports of the era, “paradoxically, NAM has attained a spatial
expansion that would have astonished its founding fathers, including Jawaharlal Nehru; at the same time, it has
lost its cohesion and unity of objectives and purposes, and is unable to cope with the critical problems and
issues that cry out for urgent solutions.”
The assassination of PM Indira Gandhi in 1984 was followed by a transition to the tenure of Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi. In this period India undertook some steps towards modernisation of the economy and armed forces. In
1988 Rajiv Gandhi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit China since 1954 and establishing contacts
with Deng Xiaoping under whom China had ushered in new era of economic reforms. The initiative for regional
cooperation materialised in the formation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in
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1985. This period also saw greater involvement in the neighborhood including the signing of an agreement with
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Pakistan on not attacking each other nuclear installations, a visit followed in 1989 making it first visit of any
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Indian Prime Minister after Nehru’s visit in 1960. The India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord in 1987 and subsequent
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decision to send Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) in Sri Lanka had long lasting impact in the region. India’s
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assertion in the neighbourhood was further highlighted by “Operation Cactus” that involved military action
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against the coup in Maldives in 1988.

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At the end of this period India experienced greater political and economic instability such as the Bofors scandal,
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short lived coalition governments of Prime Ministers V.P. Singh and Chandrasekhar as well as the balance of
payment crisis. These developments accompanied by changes in the international environment led to the next
phase in India’s foreign policy.
2.3. 1991 AND AFTER: ERA OF “PRAGMATIC” FOREIGN POLICY

The disintegration of Soviet Union and the transformation of the international order with the end of cold war
made it imperative for India to chart a new course in foreign policy. At the beginning of the post cold war era in
international relations, the ascendance of US raised multiple questions on relevance of ideology in foreign
policy as well as the option of nonalignment. On the economic front the country was also confronted with an
unprecedented balance of payment crisis partly as a consequence of the first Gulf War of 1991. This situation
led to the choices that dramatically altered India’s domestic and international economic policies. This involved
the adherence to Washington Consensus backed by the IMF and the World Bank. Concretely, this meant
structural reforms that increased the role of market forces in exchange for immediate financial help. This also
meant a greater quest for foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to transform India’s economy. In order to make it an
attractive destination for FDI India, in this phase pursued multiple changes, such as:
• Giving up the commitment to import-substituting industrialization,
• Restructuring its vast public sector
• Dismantling the previous regime of regulations, licenses, permits and quotas.
At the same time India turned towards Southeast Asia in search for avenues that can be explored for
engagement in economic and strategic arena. Previously, in the duration of the cold war India had been largely
oblivious to the states of Southeast Asia. With the opening of its markets to foreign investment and an eye on
development of a viable export sector, the country embarked upon a “Look East policy” after 1991. While these
changes were afoot, the P.V. Narasimha Rao Government in 1992, in the context of the Oslo Accord between
Israel and the Palestinians, upgraded its diplomatic relations with Israel to the ambassadorial level.
With China the Narasimha Rao government continued a process that had been initiated during the Rajiv Gandhi
government. During the Prime Minister Narsimha Rao’s visit to China in September 1993 a land mark
agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the India -
China Border Area was signed. This was followed up by the visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin in 1996 when
another agreement on Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) in the Military Field was signed.
In the neighbourhood India reassessed its tactics to bring about transformation in relations with its neighbours.
The neighbourhood was identified as the first concentric circle of India’s foreign policy and in policy terms this
was reflected in the Gujral Doctrine of 1996, named so after the then Foreign Minister Inder Kumar Gujral .
The five key principles of Gujral Doctrine were as follows:
• With neighbours viz. Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka, India must not ask for reciprocity,
but should give all that it can in good faith and trust.
• No South Asian country would allow its territory to be used against the interest of another country
• No country would interfere in the internal affairs of another.
• South Asian Countries should respect each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty
• Countries of South Asia must settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations.
However, for most part in the 1990s the relations with Pakistan remained contentious. This was majorly on
account Pakistan’s role in the armed insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir since December 1989. With the
outbreak of the insurgency Pakistan’s leadership helped transform a largely internal militancy into an
ideologically charged proxy war. In this context and in view of the clandestine nuclear programme of Islamabad
concerns regarding conventional military balance played large on India’s security calculations.
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Coupled with the Pakistan factor, the calculation from nuclear threat posed by China drove India’s nuclear
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weapons program to its next stage. In this scenario, the successful extension of NPT in 1995 and the efforts by
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United States to complete the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which came up in 1996, coincided with
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India seriously considering its nuclear options. Thus, the Indian policymakers chose to exercise the nuclear
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option to thwart rising pressures to accede to the international nuclear regimes. India declared itself a fully
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fledged nuclear state after 5 nuclear tests at Pokharan in May 1998. This attracted sanctions from United
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States and the other great powers; and led to the recognition of India as a de facto nuclear power in the later
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years.
2.3.1. BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA
This was also the beginning of an era of new engagement with the United States, which involved bilateral
negotiations between US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and India’s Minister of External Affairs
Jaswant Singh (1998-2000). This was followed by a visit of President Clinton to India in 2000. The upswing in
these relations since this period culminated in the Civil Nuclear Deal of 2005 which de-facto recognized India as
a nuclear power as well as its responsible record on non-proliferation, thus paving way for an the beginning of
the end to its isolation at technology regimes such as the Multilateral Export Control Regimes (MECR).
Under Prime Minster Atal Bihari Vajpayee diplomacy with Pakistan, including a Bus trip involving the Prime
Minister across the Border in 1999, could not yield much results. The Lahore declaration of February 1999 was
followed by incursion in the Kargil region in Jammu and Kashmir. This led to a limited war between the two
nuclear states in 1999. Despite this provocation India exercised remarkable restraint and a large-scale war was
effectively avoided. Significantly, Washington sojourn of Pakistan’s then Prime Minister Nawaz Shariff was
marked by considerable coldness. This perhaps was the sign coming changes in the relation between India,
United States and Pakistan.
Terrorism which had been a key challenge for India became a key issue in global politics after the cold war and
especially since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York. In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on
the Indian parliament in December 2001 India resorted to a strategy of coercive diplomacy which yielded
limited results. India’s coercive options against the terror ploy were limited, as nuclear capability of Pakistan
meant greater possibility of a conflict escalating into a nuclear one and thus inviting the United States to
intervene. Thus, India has been seeking recognition of terrorism as a global scourge which requires a concerted
action by the international community. To this end India has been pursuing the Comprehensive Convention
Against International Terrorism at the United Nations since 1996, although without much success due to
difference in the international community. Nonetheless, the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, though a tragic occasion,
demonstrated a greater isolation of Pakistan and allowed for closer anti-terrorism cooperation between India
and the United States.
The changes in the international scenario presented certain choices in front of India and as a response multiple
changes were made. Nonetheless, its commitment to inclusive development and a just world order remain a
continuous facet of its policy. For instance, at the WTO negotiations, especially in the Doha development round,
India has spearheaded the concerns of the developing countries, the Doha declaration of 2001 is testimony to
the values that India still holds in the international sphere. Similarly, India, while upholding its national interests,
has not shied away from upholding the principles of equity and responsibility, as reflected in its role in the
Climate negotiations. Here too India has not shied away from forming a loose coalition with like minded nations
as Brazil, South Africa, and China (BASIC).
The economic profile of India ever since 1991 along with, it’s educated manpower, military and technological
prowess have acquired greater recognition. These factors have led India being labelled as emerging power and
a potential great power. During the global economic crisis of 2008, India played an important role in global
negotiations through mediums such as the G-20. Nonetheless, its quest for reforms at the United Nations, along
with the Group of 4, has not born results. Even so, through groupings such as BRICS India has expressed its
intention to reshape the global order through multilateral efforts.
These objectives, challenges, and opportunities have continued to shape foreign policymaking in India under
Prime Minister Narendra Modi since 2014. Thus, in the recent years neighbourhood has acquired new salience,
so have multiple engagements with key states in international relations. India’s membership of the Missile
Technology Control Regime (2016), Wassenaar Arrangement (2017) and Australia Group (2018) are certain
achievements of the recent years; however, the membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group remains a challenge
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On the basis of the discussion above we can

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1. Identify certain Achievements of this phase:

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• Economic growth
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• Recognised Nuclear capability

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• Key relations: US, Japan, Russia, South East Asia

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• Management of relations with China: improvement in trade despite persistence in differences on the
border question.
• End of isolation at technology regimes. e.g. the MTCR, Wassenar Arrangement and Australia Group.
• Multilateralism and multi-alignment to manage transition in the global order and pursue national
interest e.g. BASIC, BRICS, IBSA etc.
2. Key challenges that remain:
• Sustaining the country’s economic growth rate to utilise the demographic dividend,
• Ensuring energy security,
• resolving the country’s internal security problems within the framework of the constitution
• Strengthening the neighbours to ensure that they flourish politically, economically, and even
ecologically.
3. Strategically there are few questions that India needs to constantly engage with:
• How to manage the contentious relationship with Pakistan?
• How does India respond to the rise of China?
• What would be the shape of India’s relationship with the United States in the coming years?
• How to reshape the architecture of global governance (UN, IMF and World Bank, WTO etc.)?
• How to deal with the menace of terrorism as well as emerging challenges such as climate change?
We shall be looking into the ideas and concepts discussed in this lectures in greater detail in the context of
specific relations and organisations.
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3. LET US ADDRESS A KEY QUESTION
3.1. NON-ALIGNMENT: RELEVANCE OF THE IDEA AND THE MOVEMENT.
The Essay Paper of the Civil Services Mains Examination 2017 required the aspirants to write an essay on the
topic “Has the Non- Alignment Movement (NAM) lost its relevance in a multi-polar world?” This, perhaps, is a
testimony to the significance of the Non Aligned Movement, as it remains a key issue in understanding India’s
Foreign Policy trajectory.
Started in 1961, NAM now has 120 members. The countries of the Non-Aligned Movement represent nearly
two-thirds of the membership of the United Nations and 55% of the world population. In the Cold war period its
aim was to ensure "the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of non-aligned
countries" and "struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, and all forms of foreign
aggression, occupation, domination, interference or hegemony as well as against great power and bloc politics.
In the years since the Cold War's end, it has focused on developing multilateral ties and connections as well as
unity among the developing nations of the world, especially those within the Global South.
In contemporary times the questions on the relevance of NAM acquired salience since the end of Cold war. The
17th Summit of the NAM held in September 2016 in Margarita, Venezuela, was marked by the absence of
representation at the head of government level from India. This had happened only once before i.e. in 1979
when the then caretaker Prime Minister Mr. Charan Singh could not participate in the Havana Summit of the
NAM. Many view this as the distancing of India from NAM.
3.2. ARGUMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF IRRELEVANCE OF NAM

NAM has been pronounced irrelevant increasingly since the end of Cold War and especially since the advent of
the 21st century. In 2007 the then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice advised India to “move past old ways
of thinking” as the Non-Aligned Movement had lost its meaning. Ever since the inception of NAM some
commentators had felt that the:
• Word ‘non-alignment’ conveyed the wrong notion of neutrality and it only aimed at remaining unaligned.
• Many argue that NAM did not have any binding principles and that it was a marriage of convenience
among disparate countries. This criticism gained significance as the membership of NAM grew over the
years.
• Another argument in this context is that NAM countries did not come forward on any of the critical
occasions when India needed solidarity, such as the Chinese aggression in 1962 or the Bangladesh war in
1971.
• After the end of Cold war many argued that there was no basis of non-alignment after the end of
Superpower rivalry.
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3.2.1. ARGUMENTS IN DEFENCE OF NAM AND NON-ALIGNMENT

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In response to Condoleezza Rice’s statement, then Minster of External Affairs Mr. Pranab Mukherji reminded
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her that NAM played an important role on the issues such as decolonisation and its relevance in South-South
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cooperation cannot be written off in the contemporary world.

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• Many others such as former diplomat T.P. Sreenivasan, argue that the quintessence of non-alignment was
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freedom of judgment and action and it remained valid, whether there was one bloc or two.
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He also argues that seen in this context, non-military alliances can also be within the ambit of non-
alignment, which was subsequently characterised as ‘strategic autonomy’. In other words, India does not
have to denounce non-alignment to follow its present foreign policy.
• In response to lack of help on crucial, juncture Mr. Sreenivasan argued that the whole philosophy of NAM is
that it remains united on larger global issues, even if does not side with a member on a specific issue. India
itself has followed this approach, whenever the members had problems with others either inside or outside
the movement.

Historical genesis of the doctrine of non alignment in India can be traced to domestic context, which further led
to India spearheading the Non-Aligned Movement in the international sphere. Sumit Ganguly provides an
informed assessment, he argues that:
• Under Nehru, India followed an ideational foreign policy which involved multilateral institutions,
constraints on defence spending, and advocacy of decolonisation. These goals became embodied in the
doctrine of non-alignment.
• The policy was also in keeping with India’s national experience of colonialism. As a former colonized state
India was wary of limiting its foreign policy option’s through an alignment with either Superpower.
• Ideas embodied in the doctrine of non-alignement were in keeping with India’s historical and cultural
legacies.
• The moral stance of nonalignment against colonization and apartheid neatly dovetailed with India’s
Gandhian heritage.
• At the international level, the policy made sense as it enabled a materially weak state to play a role that
was considerably more significant than its capabilities would allow it to be.
Furthermore, the NAM in the 1970s and 1980s, it can be argued, served as a forum to channel India’s views on
many global issues such as:
• India’s deep dissatisfaction with the international order characterised as it was by economic, political, and
nuclear hierarchies.
• It was through NAM that India articulated the call for a new international economic order that would cater
for the special needs of the developing countries.
• Similarly, it was through NAM that India articulated the call for a new world information and
communication order to provide a greater voice for developing countries in global communications.
• NAM also served as a forum for India to articulate its views on global nuclear disarmament and the
discriminatory nature of the global nuclear order at the centre of which stood the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT).
3.2.2. A CONTEMPORARY ASSESSMENT
At the very outset one has to distinguish between the idea of non-alignment and the membership of Non
Aligned movement.
In the opinion of David M. Malone, “Non-alignment, in theory...allowed India to play the two superpowers and
their related blocs off against each other, although after the 1950s, India was not successful in doing so.” He also
argues that “the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) that Nehru played such a large role in bringing about and
shaping was a useful placeholder for India at a time when its leaders needed to devote the bulk of their time to
pressing internal challenges.”
In the opinion of former diplomat Rajiv Sikri:
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Non-alignment as a policy option for India, as distinct from the Non-Aligned Movement, was essentially
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about resisting pressures to join rival camps during the Cold War and about examining foreign policy
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options on merit. In short, it was about having an independent foreign policy. This national consensus
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remains very strong in India, and has nothing to do with the so-called ‘Cold War mentality’ as many
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analysts derisively claim.

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Similarly many like former diplomat G. Parthsarthy emphasize on drawing a distinction between being “non-
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aligned” and being a member of the “Non-Aligned Movement”, in contemporary times. In his words “non-
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alignment in the post-Cold War era is still relevant and really means the freedom to choose a wide range of
partners to cooperate with on different issues, to protect our national interests. Thus, while being non-aligned
gives us the flexibility to choose our partners and partnerships, the Non-Aligned Movement is a forum of little
relevance in today’s world.” As rightly pointed out by put by Shyam Saran, Non Aligned Movement is not what
determined India’s non alignment; rather it is India’s non alignment that facilitated the functioning of the
movement.
Furthermore, since the end of the Cold War, India has become a key member of various multilateral groupings:
• BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) for protecting and promoting its interests on climate change;
• G4 for pushing through reforms of the UN Security Council;
• G20 for managing the world economy;
• BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) to enhance
economic coordination with countries that are similarly placed;
• ASEAN-centred institutions,
• Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),
• Russia-India-China (RIC) grouping for pursuing political and security interests.
These engagements in multiple forums for varying economic, political and security purposes have, as argued by
Shashi Tharoor, made the Non-Aligned Movement “largely incidental” to India’s pursuit of its national interest
since the end of the Cold War. This view suggests that the idea of non-alignment remains relevant in terms of
strategic autonomy and has increasingly expressed in terms of multi-alignment. The NAM, on the other hand
needs to reinvent or reorient itself to remain relevant. This provides India both an opportunity and challenge.
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4. SUPPLEMENTARY READING
4.1. INDIA’S POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT
India, under the leadership of first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, was the first country to have adopted the
policy of non-alignment. India’s policy has been positive or dynamic neutralism in which a country acts
independently and decides its policy on each issue on its merit. Non-alignment is based on positive reasoning. It
is not a negative, middle of the road reluctance to distinguish between right and wrong. It does not mean that
a country just retires into a shell.
P M Nehru had declared in the US Congress in 1948, “Where freedom is menaced, or justice is threatened, or
where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral … our policy is not neutralist, but one of
active endeavour to preserve and, if possible, establish peace on firm foundations.” Commenting on India’s
foreign policy, K.M. Panikkar claims that India “has been able to build up a position of independence and, in
association with other states similarly placed, has been able to exercise considerable influence in the cause of
international goodwill.” In a way, this policy promotes Gandhiji’s belief in non-violence. The critics in early days
argued that India’s policy was to remain, “neutral on the side of democracy.”
Speaking in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) on December 4, 1947, Nehru had sought to remove the
impression that India’s non-alignment also meant neutrality. He had said:
We have proclaimed during this past year that we will not attach ourselves to any particular group. This
has nothing to do with neutrality or passivity or anything else. If there is a big war, there is no particular
reason why we should jump into it… We are not going to join a war if we can help it, and we are going to
join the side which is to our interest when the time comes to make the choice.
India wanted to prevent the international conflict after the horrors of the Second World War. Nehru said: “If
and when disaster comes it will affect the world as a whole… Our first effort should be to prevent that disaster
from happening.” Reiterating India’s resolve to keep away from power blocs, he said in 1949, “If by any chance
we align ourselves definitely with one power group, we may perhaps from one point of view do some good, but I
have not the shadow of doubt that from a larger point of view, not only of India but of world peace, it will do
harm. Because them we lose that tremendous vantage ground that we have of using such influence as we
possess… in the cause of world peace.”
Priorities of independent India’s foreign policy revolved around-
• economic development of the country,
• maintenance of independence of action in foreign affairs,
• safeguarding country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity
• and world peace.
India has firmly believed that these objectives can be achieved only by keeping away from power blocs, and
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exercising freedom of taking foreign policy decisions.

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Nehru was committed to western concept of liberalism and democracy. Nonetheless, he did not approve of
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the military alliance like NATO and SEATO initiated by the United States to contain communism. He opposed
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western alliances on the ground that they encouraged new form of colonialism; and also because these were
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likely to promote countermoves and race for armaments between the two camps. Nehru was impressed by
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socialism and strongly advocated the idea of democratic socialism. Nonetheless, he totally rejected the
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communist state as “monolithic” and described Marxism as an outmoded theory. Nehru was a combination of
a socialist and a liberal democrat. He was opposed to the very idea of power blocs in international relations.
India’s policy of non-alignment, therefore, was not to promote a third bloc, but to ensure freedom of decision-
making of the recently decolonized states. Non-alignment was promoted by India as a policy of peace, as
against the policy of confrontation.
India’s policy of non-alignment was against the status quo situation in international relations. That meant
opposition of colonialism, imperialism, racial discrimination and now of neo-colonialism. Also, non-alignment
rejects the concept of superiority of Super Powers. It advocates sovereign equality of all states. Furthermore,
non-alignment encourages friendly relations among countries. It is opposed to the alliances that divide the

world into groups of states, or power blocs. Non-alignment advocates peaceful settlement of international
disputes and rejects the use of force. It favours complete destruction of nuclear weapons and pleads for
comprehensive disarmament. It supports all efforts to strengthen the United Nations.
Thus, India’s policy of non-alignment emphasizes prioratising the social and economic problems of mankind.
India has always supported the demand for a new international economic order so that the unjust and
unbalanced existing economic order may be changed into a new and just economic order.
4.2. REASONS FOR NON-ALIGNMENT

India had adopted the policy of non-alignment as it did not want to lose its freedom of decision-making, and
because India’s primary concern soon after independence was economic development. The policy has been
sustained for five decades. Professor M.S. Rajan had mentioned seven reasons for adopting this policy initially.
• Firstly, it was felt that India’s alignment with either the US or the USSR bloc would aggravate international
tension, rather than promote international peace. Besides, the Indian Government left later than in view of
size, geopolitical importance and contribution to civilization, India had “a positive role to play in reducing
international tension, promoting peace and serving as a bridge between the two camps.”
• Secondly, India was neither a great power, nor could she allow herself to be treated as a nation of no
consequence. India was, however, potentially a great power. Non-alignment suited India’s “present needs to
keep out national identity” and on the other hand not to compromise “out future role of an acknowledged
Great Power.”
• Thirdly, India could not join either of the power blocs because of emotional and ideological reasons. We
could not join the Western (American) Bloc because many of its member countries were colonial powers or
ex-colonial powers, and some still practiced racial discrimination. We could not join the Eastern (Soviet) Blot
because communism, as an ideology, was completely alien to Indian thinking and way of life.
• Fourthly, like any sovereign country, India, who had just become sovereign, wanted to retain and exercise
independence of judgement, and not to “be tied to the apron-strings of another country.” It meant that
India wanted freedom to decide every issue on its merit.
• Fifthly, once India launched economic development plans, we needed foreign economic aid “it was both
desirable politically not to depend upon aid from one bloc only, and profitable to be able to get it from
more than one source.”
• Sixthly, non-alignment is in accordance with India’s traditional belief that “truth, right and goodness” are
not the monopoly of anyone religion or philosophy. India believes in tolerance. Therefore, the world
situation, called for tolerance and peaceful co-existence of both the systems, with India not aligning with any
of the blocs, nor being hostile to them.
• Lastly, the domestic political situation was also responsible for the adoption of the policy of non-
alignment. According to Professor Rajan, “By aligning India with either of the Blocks, the Indian Government
would have sown seeds of political controversy and instability in the country…”
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Whatever the actual reasons that may have promoted Nehru and his Government to adopt the policy of non-
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alignment, it is obvious that the people of India by and large supported the policy. Many other countries found
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it in their national interest to adopt this policy which led to the establishment of the Non-Alignment Movement.
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4.3. THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

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India was largely responsible for launching the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961. The basic concept for
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the group originated in 1955 during discussions that took place at the Asia-Africa Bandung Conference held in
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Indonesia. Subsequently, a preparatory meeting for the First NAM Summit Conference was held in Cairo, Egypt
from 5-12 June 1961. It was initiated by Nehru, Yugoslav President Joseph Brez Tito and Egyptian President
Colonel Nasser.
Twenty-five countries attended the first NAM conference held at Belgrade and presided over by Tito in
September 1961. Invitations were sent out by Nehru, Nasser and Tito after careful scrutiny of foreign policies of
proposed participants of the first NAM Summit.
The five criteria for joining NAM were:
• the country followed independent foreign policy based on non-alignment and peaceful co-existence;

• the country was opposed to colonialism and imperialism;
• it should not have been a member of a Cold War related military bloc;
• it should not have had a bilateral treaty with any of the Super Powers; and
• NAM should not have allowed any foreign military base on its territory.
NAM does not have a formal constitution or permanent secretariat, and its administration is non-hierarchical
and rotational. Decisions are made by consensus, which requires substantial agreement, but not unanimity.
At each Summit, a new Head of State formally becomes the chair, and assumes that position until the next
Summit. The chair is responsible for promoting the principles and activities of NAM, and the Foreign Ministry
and Permanent Mission in New York of the Chair's State assumes administrative responsibility.
Coordinating Bureau is an ambassadorial-level body, based at the United Nations in New York, reviews and
facilitates activities between the working groups, contact groups, task forces, and committees. It is also charged
with strengthening coordination and cooperation among NAM States. The Chair's Permanent Representative to
the UN in New York functions as the CoB chair. Troika Created in 1997, this body consists of past, serving and
future Chairs, and operates at the discretion of the incumbent chair.
The Non-Aligned Security Council Caucus consists of NAM countries who are elected to the UN Security
Council as rotating members. These States seek to adopt unified positions and to reflect the decisions and
positions adopted at NAM Summits and Ministerial Conferences.
The Joint Coordinating Committee of NAM and the Group of 77 members meets regularly in New York to
coordinate and promote the interests of developing countries in the international community. It was established
in 1994.
From its inception in 1961, the NAM has grown both quantitatively and qualitatively. In 2015, there were as
many as 120 members of NAM, 17 Observer States and 10 observer organizations.
Its summits are periodically held in which issues concerning international politics are discussed, and attempts are
made to evolve a common approach to various issues. Since the number of members has grown very large, it
often becomes difficult to adopt an approach that all countries can follow. The NAM lost some of its fervor after
the end of Cold War, though its relevance is claimed by various leaders.
NAM: Role after the Cold War:

Since the end of the Cold War and the formal end of colonialism, the Non-Aligned Movement has been forced
to redefine itself and reinvent its purpose in the current world system. A major question has been whether
many of its foundational ideologies, principally national independence, territorial integrity, and the struggle
against colonialism and imperialism, can be applied to contemporary issues.
The movement has emphasised its principles of multilateralism, equality, and mutual non-aggression in
attempting to become a stronger voice for the global South, and an instrument that can be utilised to promote
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the needs of member nations at the international level and strengthen their political leverage when negotiating
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with developed nations. In its efforts to advance Southern interests, the movement has stressed the importance
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of cooperation and unity amongst member states, but as in the past, cohesion remains a problem since the size
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of the organisation and the divergence of agendas and allegiances present the ongoing potential for
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While agreement on basic principles has been smooth, taking definitive action vis-à-vis particular
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international issues has been rare, with the movement preferring to assert its criticism or support rather than
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pass hard-line resolutions. The movement continues to see a role for itself, as in its view, the world’s poorest
nations remain exploited and marginalised, no longer by opposing superpowers, but rather in a uni-polar
world, and it is Western hegemony and neo-colonialism that the movement has really re-aligned itself against. It
opposes foreign occupation, interference in internal affairs, and aggressive unilateral measures, but it has also
shifted to focus on the socio-economic challenges facing member states, especially the inequalities manifested
by globalisation and the implications of neo-liberal policies. The Non-Aligned Movement has identified
economic underdevelopment, poverty, and social injustices as growing threats to peace and security.

Recent activities and positions of NAM:
Summits
13th Summit: 13th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia from 24-25
February 2003.
14th Summit: The 14th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement was
held in Havana, Cuba, from 11-16 September 2006.
15th Summit: On 15 July 2009, NAM concluded its 15th summit meeting at an Egyptian Red Sea Resort in Sharm
el-Sheikh.
16th Summit: from 26-31 August 2012, the 16th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the
Non-Aligned Movement was held in Tehran, Iran. During the conference, the Heads of State or Government
discussed a variety of issues, The Final Document contained positions on global, regional and sub-regional and
development, social and human rights issues.
17th Summit: On 17 September 2016, Venezuela hosted the 17th summit of the Non-Aligned Movement.
Attendance at the summit has dwindled in recent years; thirty-five heads of state attended in 2012 and only
ten attended in 2016. Discussions covered Palestine, the U.S.-Cuba relationship, and Venezuela’s political
climate.
18th Summit: Proposed to take place in Azerbaijan in 2019
Positions:
Criticism of US policy
In recent years the organization has criticized US foreign policy. The US invasion of Iraq and the War on
Terrorism, its attempts to stifle Iran and North Korea's nuclear plans, and its other actions have been denounced
as human rights violations and attempts to run roughshod over the sovereignty of smaller nations. The
movement’s leaders have also criticized the American control over the United Nations and other international
structures.
Self-determination of Puerto Rico
Since 1961, the group have supported the discussion of the case of Puerto Rico's self-determination before
the United Nations.
Self-determination of Western Sahara
Since 1973, the group have supported the discussion of the case of Western Sahara's self-determination before
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the United Nations. The Non-Aligned Movement reaffirmed in its meeting at (Sharm El Sheikh 2009) the support
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to the Self-determination of the Sahrawi people by choosing between any valid option, welcomed the direct
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conversations between the parts, and remembered the responsibility of the United Nations on the Sahrawi
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issue.
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Sustainable development
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The movement is publicly committed to the tenets of sustainable development and the attainment of
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the Millennium Development Goals, but it believes that the international community has not created conditions
conducive to development and has infringed upon the right to sovereign development by each member state.
Issues such as globalisation, the debt burden, unfair trade practices, the decline in foreign aid, donor
conditionalities, and the lack of democracy in international financial decision-making are cited as factors
inhibiting development.

Reforms of the UN
The Non-Aligned Movement has been quite outspoken in its criticism of current UN structures and power
dynamics, mostly in how the organisation has been utilised by powerful states in ways that violate the
movement’s principles. It has made a number of recommendations that would strengthen the representation
and power of ‘non-aligned’ states. The proposed reforms are also aimed at improving the transparency and
democracy of UN decision-making. The UN Security Council is the element considered the most distorted,
undemocratic, and in need of reshaping.
South-south cooperation
Lately the Non-Aligned Movement has collaborated with other organisations of the developing world, primarily
the Group of 77, forming a number of joint committees and releasing statements and document representing
the shared interests of both groups. This dialogue and cooperation can be taken as an effort to increase the
global awareness about the organisation and bolster its political clout.
Cultural diversity and human rights

The movement accepts the universality of human rights and social justice, but fiercely resists cultural
homogenisation. In line with its views on sovereignty, the organisation appeals for the protection of cultural
diversity, and the tolerance of the religious, socio-cultural, and historical particularities that define human rights
in a specific region.
Feel Free to add your Own Notes in blank Spaces

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VISION IAS
www.visionias.in
LECTURE-2
INDIA NEIGHBORHOOD: RELATIONS
Contents
1. INDIA-BANGLADESH RELATIONS: FRATERNAL FRIENDSHIP ................................................................................... 4
1.1. Background ...................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.2. Evolution .......................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.3. Recent Top Level Visits .................................................................................................................................... 5
1.4. River Waters .................................................................................................................................................... 5
1.4.1. The Teesta Dispute ................................................................................................................................... 5
1.5. The Border Issue .............................................................................................................................................. 6
1.6. The Borders and Boundaries: Key Agreements ............................................................................................... 6
1.6.1. The LBA ..................................................................................................................................................... 6
1.6.2. The Maritime Boundary Award ................................................................................................................ 7
1.6.2.1. Significance of the Maritime Boundary Award ..................................................................................... 7
1.7. Economic Cooperation and Trade ................................................................................................................... 8
1.8. Energy .............................................................................................................................................................. 8
1.9. Connectivity ..................................................................................................................................................... 8
1.10. Security .......................................................................................................................................................... 9
1.11. Issues to resolved and future challenges .................................................................................................... 10
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2. INDIA AND BHUTAN.............................................................................................................................................. 11

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2.1. Background and Evolution............................................................................................................................. 11

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2.2. Recent Dynamics ........................................................................................................................................... 11

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2.3. Hydropower ................................................................................................................................................... 12

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2.4. Economic Development ................................................................................................................................ 12

2.5. Security .......................................................................................................................................................... 12
2.5.1. Incidents in Doklam Area 2017- India-Bhutan-China: ............................................................................ 12
2.6. Concerns ........................................................................................................................................................ 13
3. INDIA AND NEPAL ................................................................................................................................................. 14
3.1. Background .................................................................................................................................................... 14
3.2. The Evolution of Democratic Process in Nepal.............................................................................................. 14
3.2.1. After 2015 ............................................................................................................................................... 15
3.2.2. Elections ................................................................................................................................................. 16
3.3. Recent Visits .................................................................................................................................................. 16
3.4. Security .......................................................................................................................................................... 16
3.5. Water Resources ........................................................................................................................................... 16
3.6. Power............................................................................................................................................................. 16
3.7. Trade .............................................................................................................................................................. 17
3.8. Connectivity ................................................................................................................................................... 17
3.9. Border Dispute............................................................................................................................................... 17
3.9.1. Challenges................................................................................................................................................... 18
4. THE BBIN FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................................................ 19
4.1. Vision of BBIN ................................................................................................................................................ 19
4.2. Potential ........................................................................................................................................................ 19
4.2.1. Recent Developments ............................................................................................................................ 19
5. INDIA-SRI LANKA................................................................................................................................................... 20
5.1. The Background ............................................................................................................................................. 20
5.2. Evolution of India Sri Lanka Relations ........................................................................................................... 20
5.2.1. Recent Visits ........................................................................................................................................... 21
5.3 Ethnic Issue ..................................................................................................................................................... 21
5.3.1. Fishermen Issue ...................................................................................................................................... 21
5.4. Economic Cooperation and Trade ................................................................................................................. 22
5.4.1. Development Cooperation ..................................................................................................................... 22
5.5. The China Factor ............................................................................................................................................ 23
5.5.1. India Interest .......................................................................................................................................... 23
6. INDIA-MALDIVES................................................................................................................................................... 24
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6.1. Background .................................................................................................................................................... 24

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6.2. Security .......................................................................................................................................................... 25

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6.3. Economic and Development Cooperation .................................................................................................... 25

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6.4. Democratic Transition in Maldives ................................................................................................................ 25

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6.5. Recent Dynamics ........................................................................................................................................... 26

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6.5.1. Options for India ......................................................................................................................................... 26

7. SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION (SAARC) ................................................................ 28
7.1. Background .................................................................................................................................................... 28
7.2. The Organisation ........................................................................................................................................... 28
7.3. Evolution ........................................................................................................................................................ 28
7.3.1. Factors Shaping the Agenda: Initial Phase ............................................................................................. 29

7.3.2. The SAARC Agenda ................................................................................................................................. 29
7.3.3. Principles of the SAARC Charter ............................................................................................................. 29
7.3.4. SAARC Regional Centres ......................................................................................................................... 29
7.4. Trade and Commerce: The SAARC Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA) .............................................. 30
7.4.1. Lack of Progress in SAPTA....................................................................................................................... 30
7.5. South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) ................................................................................................. 30
7.5.1. Steps to Strengthen SAFTA ..................................................................................................................... 31
7.5.2. SAFTA: Key Challenges............................................................................................................................ 31
7.5.3. Way Forward .......................................................................................................................................... 31
7.6. SAARC: Comparative Assessment.................................................................................................................. 31
7.6.1. Sluggish Progress: Views from Within .................................................................................................... 31
7.7. Causes for the Limited Progress of SAARC .................................................................................................... 32
7.7.1. Making SAARC Work................................................................................................................................... 32
7.8. India’s Contributions ..................................................................................................................................... 33
7.9. Recent Developments within SAARC............................................................................................................. 33
7.10. Deadlock at SAARC: Options for Regional Cooperation in South Asia ........................................................ 33
7.11. India’s Neighbourhood Policy: Neighbourhood First .................................................................................. 34
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1. INDIA-BANGLADESH RELATIONS: FRATERNAL
FRIENDSHIP
Map 2.1: Bangladesh
Image Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/graphics/maps/bg-map.gif
1.1. BACKGROUND
• India and Bangladesh share land and maritime boundaries, ethnic ties across borders as well as trans-
boundary rivers. Similarities in language, culture and development trajectory makes the relations special
• Geographical locations complement each other and present an opportunity for both to further develop
their connectivity links and economies.
• India played a significant role in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 by providing moral, material, military
and diplomatic support to the Mukti Bahini and the leadership of the Awami League, especially Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman.
• India was the first country to recognize Bangladesh as a separate and independent state.
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The 1972 India Bangladesh Treaty of Peace and Friendship laid the foundations of good relations between
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1.2. EVOLUTION
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assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the ascendance of the Military ruler Zia ur Rahman in the
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year 1975.
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• Bangladesh remained under Military or Quasi Military rule for 1975 to 1990.
• This period, for most part, the relations were marked by brief periods of raised expectations and longer
period coldness.
• Begum Khaleda Zia of Bangladesh Nationalist Pary (BNP) became the Prime Minister in 1991. In 1996
Awami League came to Power under Sheikh Hasina. In 2001 she lost to the BNP and Khaleda Zia. 2008 Saw
the victory of Awami league under Shiekh Hasina
• One of the worst periods in India-Bangladesh relations was between 2001 and 2006. Only minor protocols
or agreements were signed during this time and there was a surge in insurgency activities in the Northeast
with the United Liberation Front of Asom and the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland, among other

outfits, crossing the border for training.
• From 2009 onwards, as cross-border issues were addressed, bilateral relationship improved and progress
was made in some key areas.
• Recent years have seen remarkable shift in these relations, under different governments in New Delhi.
1.3. RECENT TOP LEVEL VISITS

• Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Shiekh Hasina Visited India in April 2017. Both Countries signed 22
agreements.
• Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Bangladesh in June 2015
• Prime Minister Manmohan Singh Visited Bangladesh in 2011
1.4. RIVER WATERS

• India and Bangladesh share 54 common rivers: Ganga and Brahmaputra are chief among them. Bangladesh
is a lower riparian state.
• Joint Rivers Water Commission was formed in 1972 for carrying out survey of the shared river systems.
• Farrakka Barrage constructed in 1975 by India to use water from Ganges to flush the Hooghly river and
keep the Kolkata Port operational, became a bone of contention. Bangladesh under general Zia confronted
India and tried to internationalise the issue.
• A settlement was finally reached in 1977, with a new government in India led by the Janata party, known as
the Farakka accord.
• The Ganges Waters Treaty was signed in 1996 for the sharing of waters of the River Ganges during the lean
season (January 1-May 31).
• On the Teesta River, an interim agreement was reached by both sides for water sharing in 1984. However,
a final agreement has been elusive. The West Bengal’s government’s opposes any such agreement
perceived to be unjust & insensitive to West Bengal’s water needs & demands.
1.4.1. THE TEESTA DISPUTE
• Historically, the root of the disputes over the river can be located in the report of the Boundary
Commission (BC), which was set up in 1947 under Sir Cyril Radcliffe to demarcate the boundary line
between West Bengal (India) and East Bengal (Pakistan, then Bangladesh from 1971). During East Bengal’s
days as a part of Pakistan, no serious dialogue took place on water issues between India and East Pakistan. In
1972, the India-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission was established.
• The Teesta river originates in Sikkim and flows through West Bengal as well as Bangladesh. India claims a
share of 55 percent of the river's water.
• The river is Bangladesh's fourth largest transboundary river for irrigation and fishing. The Teesta's
floodplain covers 2,750sq km in Bangladesh. Of the river's catchment - an area of land where water collects
- 83 percent is in India and 17 percent is in Bangladesh. That means more than one lakh hectares of land
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across five districts in Bangladesh are severely affected by withdrawals of the Teesta's waters in India, said
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the Observer Research Foundation. These five Bangladesh districts then face acute shortages during the dry
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season, it added.
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• In 1983, an ad hoc arrangement on sharing of waters from the Teesta was made, according to which
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Bangladesh got 36% and India 39% of the waters, while the remaining 25% remained unallocated.
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• After the Ganga Water Treaty, a Joint Committee of Experts was set up to study the other rivers. The
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committee gave importance to the Teesta. In 2000, Bangladesh presented its draft on the Teesta. The final
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draft was accepted by India and Bangladesh in 2010. In 2011, during then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh’s visit to Dhaka, a new formula to share Teesta waters was agreed upon between the political
leadership of the two countries.
• The 2011 interim deal - that was supposed to last 15 years - gave India 42.5 percent of the Teesta's waters
and gave Bangladesh 37.5 percent.
• West Bengal CM, Mamata Banerjee opposed this deal so it was shelved and remains unsigned. In fact, she
was scheduled to accompany the then PM Manmohan Singh to Bangladesh to sign that deal in 2011, but
cancelled the trip.
• West Bengal CM Mamata Banerjee has in the past countered Bangladesh’s argument citing the amount of
Teesta waters India already gives Bangladesh. "When we need a certain quantity of water to maintain our
Kolkata Port and fulfil the need of farmers, water is released from Teesta and Farakka barrages to
Bangladesh sacrificing the state's interest" she said in 2013.
• Hydropower on the Teesta is another point of conflict. There are at least 26 projects on the river mostly in
Sikkim, aimed at producing some 50,000MW.
• Mamta Banerjee has proposed sharing the waters of other rivers. As north Bengal is completely dependent
on the Teesta, she said, rivers like the Torsa and Manshai, which are closer to the border of India and
Bangladesh, are good options. The Torsa, in fact, has connectivity with Bangladesh's Padma river. The West
Bengal CM proposed that the two countries set up a commission to ascertain the level of water flowing
through the Torsa and the quantum of water that can be shared.
1.5. THE BORDER ISSUE

• India and Bangladesh share 4096.7 km. of border, which is the longest land boundary that India shares
with any of its neighbours.
• Before the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) came in to effect in 2015, the border was contentious due to
numerous exclaves and enclaves.
• For allowing Bangladesh access to its enclaves in West Bengal, the Government of India had agreed to lease
out a small corridor of land (Teen Bigha Corridor) in 1974, however, it faced strong domestic opposition
within India & the matter was finally resolved only in 1982. This generated needless friction over the delay in
implementation of the agreement
1.6. THE BORDERS AND BOUNDARIES: KEY AGREEMENTS

• A Coordinated Border Management Plan (CBMP) was signed in 2011 to synergize the efforts of both Border
Guarding Forces for more effective control over cross border illegal activities and crimes as well as for the
maintenance of peace and tranquility along the India-Bangladesh border.
• The Land boundary agreement (LBA) was implemented in 2015.
• Government of India has sanctioned barbed wire fencing to the extent of 3326.14 km along the Indo-
Bangladesh border. Out of this, fencing to the extent of 2731 km has been completed till March 2017.
• The settlement of the maritime boundary arbitration between India and Bangladesh, as per UNCLOS award
on July 7, 2014, paved the way for the economic development of this part of the Bay of Bengal and is seen as
beneficial to both countries.
1.6.1. THE LBA
India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement (LBA), was first signed in 1974. A protocol to this agreement was
signed in 2011.
The three outstanding issues were:
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o an un-demarcated land boundary of approximately 6.1 km

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o exchange of enclaves
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o unresolved adverse possession

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• The agreement was, Implemented in 2015, with the passage of relevant Act (100th Amendment Act) by the
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• This step not only removed all hurdles for the final settlement of borders, but also ensured the way for
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exchange of Enclaves and merger of Adverse Possessions by re-drawing the International Boundary (IB),
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also known as the Radcliffe Line.

• India transferred 111 enclaves with a total area of 17,160.63 acres to Bangladesh, while Bangladesh
transferred 51 enclaves with an area of 7,110.02 acres to India.
• As for Adverse Possessions, India received 2777.038 acres of land and transferred 2267.682 acres to
Bangladesh.
• Thus, the 2015 LBA implements the unresolved issues stemming from
o the un-demarcated land boundary—approximately 6.1-km long—in three sectors, viz. Daikhata-56
(West Bengal), Muhuri River–Belonia (Tripura) and Lathitila–Dumabari (Assam);
o exchange of enclaves; and

o Adverse possessions, which were first addressed in the 2011 Protocol.
• The nearly 14,000 residents of the Bangladeshi enclaves in India have decided to stay on and become
citizens as per the option given to them under the LBA. 971 residents of the Indian enclaves in Bangladesh,
out of the nearly 37,000, opted for Indian citizenship.
1.6.2. THE MARITIME BOUNDARY AWARD
• On 7 July 2014 a landmark judgment of the Hague-based Permanent Court of Attribution (PCA) awarded
Bangladesh an area of 19,467 sq km, four-fifth of the total area of 25,602 sq km disputed maritime
boundary in the Bay of Bengal with India.
• The UN Tribunal’s award clearly delineated the course of maritime boundary line between India and
Bangladesh in the territorial sea, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf within and beyond
200 nautical miles (nm).
• Now, Bangladesh’s maritime boundary has been extended by 118,813 sq km comprising 12 nm of territorial
sea and an EEZ extending up to 200 nm into the high seas. In addition, the ruling acknowledged Bangladesh’s
sovereign rights of undersea resources in the continental shelf extending as far as 345 nm in the high seas,
taking Chittagong coast as the base line.
• The verdict has been broadly accepted by both the countries as a positive development for further
consolidation of friendly relations
• India is also happy with the ruling and considers it as a diplomatic breakthrough for various reasons.
Among other gains, the verdict has recognised India’s sovereignty over New Moore Island and awarded
nearly 6000 sq km of the contested zone where the island had once existed.
Map 2.2India Bangladesh Maritime Boundary award
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Image Source: http://www.thedailystar.net/sites/default/files/upload-2014/gallery/image/arts/bay-win-cheers.jpg

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1.6.2.1. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MARITIME BOUNDARY AWARD

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The award is significant given the geo-strategic/political significance of greater Indian Ocean region and South
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Asian sub-region. Moreover, the award has wide security and economic implications not only for India and
Bangladesh but also for the entire Bay of Bengal region.
• The verdict would contribute towards establishing strategic partnerships among the nations sharing
borders in the Bay. The award is expected to have positive impact on emerging multilateral forum like
BIMSTEC.
• The verdict has been broadly accepted by both the countries as a positive development for further
consolidation of friendly relations especially given the geo-strategic/political significance of greater Indian
Ocean region and South Asian sub-region.
• By clearly delineating the maritime boundary between the two nations, the verdict could help boosting
coastal and maritime security in the region.
• It opened the door for exploration of oil and gas in the Bay—the site of huge energy reserves. India’s
discovery of natural gas in 2006 took place in a creek which is situated about 50 km south of the mouth of
the Hariabhanga river within the contested zone.
• The development of Fishery resources is another prospect.
• The award is expected to have positive impact on regional integration and emerging multilateral forum like
BIMSTEC. It may be noted that India has already settled its maritime borders with Sri Lanka, Myanmar and
Thailand.
1.7. ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND TRADE

• Bilateral trade between India and Bangladesh has grown steadily over the last decade. In the last five years,
total trade between the two countries has grown by more than 17%. India’s exports to Bangladesh in the
period July 2016 – March 2017 stood at US$ 4489.30 million and imports from Bangladesh during FY 2016-17
stood at US$ 672.40 million.
• There are estimates that the trade potential is at least four times the present level.
• Lines of Credit: In recent Year India has extended three lines of credit worth US$ 8 billion to Bangladesh for
a range of projects, including railway infrastructure, supply of Broad Gauge microprocessor-based
locomotives and passenger coaches, procurement of buses, and dredging projects. This is the largest
quantum of credit India has extended to any other country by far and comes at a highly concessional rate
of interest.
• Despite duty-free access, Bangladeshi exporters face high non-tariff barriers in the form of bureaucratic and
customs bottlenecks, delays due to manual clearance, visa problems, lack of banking services and
warehouse facilities at the border. The cost of cross-border trade is quite high.
• ‘Border Haats’, or markets across the India-Bangladesh border (currently four such haats are functional),
were a successful solution to increase legal business on the borders. Recently, Bangladesh and India have
agreed to set up six more haats along their borders.
1.8. ENERGY
• Power: Government-to-government power trade is 1,300 MW from India to Bangladesh.
• India’s state-run Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL) is building the Rampal coal-fired power plant in
Bangladesh.
• In the private sector, Reliance Power has won approval to set up a 750 MW LNG-based power plant and an
LNG terminal in Bangladesh, paving the way for $1.3 billion investment, and Adani Group is set to sell 3,000
MW power to Bangladesh.
• Connectivity: the focus has been road, rail, rivers, sea, transmission lines, petroleum pipelines, and digital
links that would give India access to the Northeast and to Southeast Asia through Bangladesh.
1.9. CONNECTIVITY
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• Two Trains services, Maitri and Bandhan, run between Kolkata and Dhaka.
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• The new Kolkata-Dhaka-Agartala bus service via Dhaka was started in 2016.
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• Trains are planned to run from Kolkata to Agartala via Dhaka, a project to be completed in 2019. on the
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• The two sides agreed to examine the request of Bangladesh to establish a new rail link between Panchagarh
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(Bangladesh) to Siliguri (India).

• Bangladesh-India coastal shipping began operationalisation in March 2016.
• In 2017 Bangladesh allowed Indian vessels to dock at Chittagong Port, the first time after 40 years. Indian
companies are interested in developing Payra Port.
• Trucks carrying Indian goods reached Tripura from Ashuganj port in Bangladesh on June 19 2016, making
the long-cherished idea of transshipment into reality
• Grid Connectivity: Bangladesh already draws 600 megawatt from the Indian grid, with another 500
megawatt to be added through the Bheramara-Bahrampur inter-connection.
• Diesel Pipeline: India is already constructing a Indo-Bangla friendship pipeline from Siliguri to Parbatipur
(In Bangladesh) for supply of high speed diesel as a grant-in-aid.
• If the two neighbors have their way, by mid-2020 India will cease to depend only on the Siliguri Corridor or
the Chickens Neck, the 22-km corridor near Siliguri in West Bengal that connects the Northeast with the rest
of the country.
• Waterways: Once the dredging in Bangladesh is complete, large vessels can move from Varanasi in National
Waterway 1 (NW-1, the Ganga) to NW-2 (Brahmaputra) and NW-16 (Barak) via Bangladesh river channels,
thereby reducing the over-dependence on the narrow stretch.
• An ambitious gas pipeline project with Bangladesh and Myanmar has been revived in 2017 at the
conceptual level. India can take this opportunity forward to consolidate regional connectivity.
Map 2.3 : India-Bangladesh Connectivity
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Image Source: http://images.indianexpress.com/2015/11/bangala.jpg

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1.10. SECURITY
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Security cooperation is a key area in the relations between the two countries.
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In 2013 the extradition treaty between the two countries came into effect. The implementation of this
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treaty saw the extradition of figures such as Anup Chetia of the ULFA.
• A MoU on Cyber Security was signed between the two countries in 2017.
• In recent years Bangladesh has also faced some serious challenges from terrorism and is an invaluable
partner in our fight against terrorism by India.
• The two countries cooperate on checking the smuggling and circulation of fake currency notes and
narcotics.
• Standard Operating Procedures for operationalisation of the MoU on Cooperation between the Coast
Guards between the two countries is in place.

1.11. ISSUES TO RESOLVED AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
• The Teesta River Water issue remains to be resolved
• Tipaimukh project on the Barak River has been a sensitive issue for Bangladesh.
• The issue of illegal immigration is a sensitive issue for India and especially in states such as Assam. Where
India remains sensitive to the issue of illegal immigrants, Bangladesh has consistently denied that
Bangladeshis are illegally migrating.
• Favourable Trade conditions are especially important for Bangladesh
• Rohingya issue- it is a sensitive issue involving the migration of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar to
Bangladesh. India as key regional player is expected to play a positive role in the issue in which China is also
actively involved.
• Bangladesh goes to elections in 2018. It would be especially sensitive time for the relations.
• The Agreement on Ganges Water would expire in 2026.
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2. INDIA AND BHUTAN
Map 2.4: Bhutan
Source: https https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bt.html
2.1. BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION

• From 1949 onwards the relations were governed by a Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship of 1949.
Article 2 of the treaty was significant wherein “the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice
of the Government of India in regard to its external relations.”
• Diplomatic relations between India and Bhutan were established in 1968 with the appointment of a
resident representative of India in Thimphu.
• The Kingdom of Bhutan was admitted as a member of the United Nations on 21st September 1971.
• The first democratic elections in Bhutan began in 2007
• The Indian-Bhutan Friendship Treaty, which was signed in New Delhi on 8th February 2007, has come into
force following the exchange of Instruments of Ratification between the two governments in Thimphu on
2nd March 2007.
• In the revised treaty of 2007, Article 2 was replaced with: “In keeping with the abiding ties of close
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friendship between Bhutan and India, the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Government of
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Republic of India shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests. Neither
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Government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of
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the other.” The 2007 Treaty has begun a new era in bilateral cooperation.
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Premier Wen Jiabao met Bhutanese Prime Minister Jigmi Y. Thinley for the first time.
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In June-July 2013 LPG and Kerosene subsidy withdrawal by India marked a brief episode of acrimony in the
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relationship.
2.2. RECENT DYNAMICS

• It was the first country visited by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014.
• King of Bhutan, Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuk, visited India in November 2017.
• Prime Minister of Bhutan Tshering Tobgay visited India in February 2018.
• Bhutan opened consulate office on 2 February 2018, in Guwahati, Assam.

2.3. HYDROPOWER
• Extensive cooperation in the field of development extends to the mutually beneficial sector of hydropower.
• Three Hydropower projects developed with Indian assistance are 1020 MW Tala Hydroelectric Project, 336
MW Chukha Hydroelectric Project, 60 MW Kurichhu Hydroelectric Project.
• Ten more projects have been agreed to. Of these three are already under construction – Punatsangchhu-I
Hydro Electric Project, Punatsangchhu–II and Mangedechhu HEPs.
• The Union Cabinet has approved the signing of an Inter Government Agreement (IGA) on four JV-mode
HEPs (Kholongchu, Wangchhu, Bunakha and Chamkharchhu) with Bhutan, and 15% GOI funding (DGPC’s
equity) for the 600 MW Kholongchhu HEP.
• Both countries have set a goal of goal of 10,000MW in hydropower by 2020
2.4. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

• India continues to be the largest trade and development partner of Bhutan.
• Planned development efforts in Bhutan began in the early 1960s. The First Five Year Plan (FYP) of Bhutan
was launched in 1961. Since then, India has been extending financial assistance to Bhutan’s FYPs.
• Standby Credit Facility: GoI extended a standby credit facility of Rs 1000 crores to RGoB to help Bhutan
overcome the rupee liquidity crunch. This Credit Facility was provided at a concessional interest rate of 5%
per annum. It is valid for 5 years.
• The new free trade agreement is in force since 29 July 2017, provides for a free trade regime between the
territories of India and Bhutan. The agreement also provides for duty-free transit of Bhutanese
merchandise for trade with third countries.
2.5. SECURITY
• President Ram Nath Kovind, in 2017, termed the security of India and Bhutan is “indivisible and mutual”-
• The Eastern Army Command and the Eastern Air Command both have integrated protection of Bhutan into
their role.
• The Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT), headed by a Major General, plays a critical role in training
Bhutanese security personnel.
• Recent incidents in the Doklam area underlined the significance of security cooperation between the two
countries.
• Both Countries maintain high level coordination on security issues. In this context the foreign Secretary,
National Security Advisor and Army Chief visited Thimphu in February 2018.
2.5.1. INCIDENTS IN DOKLAM AREA 2017- INDIA-BHUTAN-CHINA:
Map 2.5: India-Bhutan-China
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Source: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article12665125.ece/alternates/FREE_660/India%20Bhutan%20China
• Lacking any treaty describing the boundary, Bhutan and China continue negotiations to establish a common
boundary alignment to resolve territorial disputes arising from substantial cartographic discrepancies, the
most contentious of which lie in Bhutan's west along Chumbi salient.
• The incidents in Doklam area in 2017, involving Indian armed forces confronting the Chinese, to prevent
unilateral changes in the tri-junction border area, marked the example of close security cooperation
between India and Bhutan based on the treaty of friendship between the two countries.
2.6. CONCERNS
• As of July 2017, Bhutan’s debt to India for the three major ongoing projects: Mangdechhu, Punatsangchhu 1
and 2 is approximately ₹12,300 crores which accounts for 77% of the country’s total debt, and is 87% of its
GDP.
• While the cost of the 720 MW Mangdechhu project has nearly doubled in the past two years of
construction, both Punatsangchhu 1 and 2, each of 1200 MW have trebled in cost and been delayed more
than five years over the original completion schedule.
• Meanwhile, the interest repayment on projects that are being financed by India as 30% grant and 70%
loan at 10% annual interest is piling up.
• The demarcation of boundaries of Bhutan with China under the1988 and 1998 agreements remain process
in waiting. This has security implications for India and requires a new formulation.
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3. INDIA AND NEPAL
Map 2.6: Nepal
Image Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/np.html
3.1. BACKGROUND
• As close neighbours, India and Nepal share a unique relationship of friendship and cooperation
characterized by open borders and deep-rooted people-to-people contacts of kinship and culture.
• Nepal has an area of 147,181 sq. kms. and a population of 29 million. It shares a border of over 1850 kms in
the east, south and west with five Indian States – Sikkim, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand
– and in the north with the Tibet Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China
• The India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950 forms the bedrock of the special relations that exist
between India and Nepal.
• Under the provisions of this Treaty, the Nepalese citizens have enjoyed unparalleled national treatment in
India, availing facilities and opportunities at par with Indian citizens. Nearly 6 million Nepali citizens live
and work in India. Around 6,00,000 Indians are living/domiciled in Nepal.
3.2. THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN NEPAL

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• In 1951, the Nepali Monarch, King Tribhuwan, ended the century-old system of rule by hereditary Prime
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Ministers (the Ranas) and instituted a cabinet system that brought political parties into the government.
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• In December 1960, the then King Mahendra suspended the constitution, dissolved the elected parliament
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and dismissed the cabinet. He instituted a Panchayat system- hierarchical system of village, district and
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national councils.
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• In 1990 pro-democracy agitation co-ordinated by Nepali Congress Party(NCP) and leftist groups erupted.
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Street protests were suppressed by security forces resulting in deaths and mass arrests. King Birendra
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eventually bows to pressure and agrees to new democratic constitution.

• 1991 - NCP won first democratic elections. Girija Prasad Koirala becomes prime minister.
• The Maoist revolt began in 1995, it dragged on for more than a decade and resulted in the death of
thousands. Among other things, the rebels wanted the monarchy to be abolished.
• The Royal Family Massacre: On 1 June 2001 - Crown Prince Dipendra killed King Birendra, Queen
Aishwarya and several members of the royal family, before shooting himself. The king's brother,
Gyanendra was crowned king.
• 2005 February - King Gyanendra dismisses the government, restores an absolute monarchy and declares a
state of emergency, citing the need to defeat Maoist rebels.

• 2005 November - Maoist rebels and Seven Party Alliance (SPA) of parliamentary parties agreed on a
programme intended to restore democracy.
• 2006 April - King Gyanendra agreed to reinstate the parliament following weeks of violent strikes and
protests against direct royal rule as part of the Loktantra Movement.
• 2006 May - Parliament voted unanimously to curb the king's political powers. The government holds peace
talks with the Maoist rebels.
• Peace deal. In November 2006- The government signed a peace deal with the Maoists. The Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) - formally ended the decade-long insurgency.
• 2007 January - Maoist leaders entered parliament under the terms of a temporary constitution. In April
the Maoists joined an interim government, a move which brought them into the political mainstream. Later,
Maoists quit the interim government, demanding the abolition of the monarchy.
• End of monarchy: In December 2007 - Parliament approved the abolition of monarchy as part of peace deal
with Maoists, who agree to rejoin government.
• Elections to New Constituent Assembly: In April 2008 - Former Maoist rebels won the largest bloc of seats
in elections to the new Constituent Assembly (CA), but failed to achieve an outright majority. 2008 May -
Nepal became a republic.
• 2008 June - Maoist ministers resigned from the cabinet in a row over who should be the next head of state.
In July2008 - Ram Baran Yadav becomes Nepal's first president.
• 2008 August - Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda formed coalition government, with Nepali
Congress going into opposition. Later the same year Maoists left the government
• 2009 May - Prime Minister Prachanda resigned following a row with President Yadav over the integration of
former rebel fighters into the military and impasse over constitution continued.
• 2010 May - The Constituent Assembly (CA) voted to extend the deadline for drafting the constitution, the
first of four extensions.
• 2012 May - The Constituent Assembly (CA) is dissolved after failing to produce a draft constitution.
• Second Constituent Assembly: In November 2018 - The Communist Party of Nepal (UML) and Nepali
Congress shared the win in the second Constituent Assembly elections, pushing the former ruling Maoists
into third place and leaving no party with a majority.
• 2014 February -Nepali Congress leader Sushil Koirala was elected prime minister after securing
parliamentary support.
• 2014 November - Nepal and India sign a deal to build a $1bn hydropower plant on Nepal's Arun river to
counter crippling energy shortages.
3.2.1. AFTER 2015
• Earthquake: In April 2015 - A 7.8-magnitude earthquake struck Kathmandu and its surrounding areas killing
more than 8,000 people, causing mass devastation and leaving millions homeless.
• Donors Conference: At an international Donor’s conference in July 2015 in Nepal, India pledged 1 billion
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US$ in support of the reconstruction efforts. China was the Second largest donor with over 480 million US$
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• Landmark constitution: in September 2015 Nepal adopted a landmark constitution, which defined Nepal as
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a secular country, despite calls to delay voting after more than 40 people are killed in protests in Madhesi
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dominated Terai region.

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• This period also saw downturn in India Nepal relations based on blockade on the movement of goods from
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India to Nepal due to violence in the bordering areas dominated by the Madhesis.
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• 2015 October - K.P. Sharma Oli becomes the first prime minister to be elected under the new constitution.
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• 2016 February - Government lifts fuel rationing after the ethnic minority Madhesi communities, partially
backed by India, end a six-month border blockade in protest over the new constitution which they say is
discriminatory.
• 2016 July - Maoist party pulled out of the governing coalition. Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli resigns ahead
of a no-confidence vote in parliament.
• 2016 August - Parliament elects former communist rebel leader and Maoist party leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal
aka Prachanda as prime minister for the second time. In 2016, China and Nepal hold their first ever joint
military exercise.
• 2017 June - Pushpa Kamal Dahal was replaced as prime minister by the Congress leader Sher Bahadur Deuba
under a rotation agreement.
3.2.2. ELECTIONS
• In December 2017, Nepal held Parliamentary Elections. The Lower House, House of Representatives
(Pratindihi Sabha), comprises of 275 seats, out of which 165 are elected on the FPTP system and 110
through the proportional representation system.
• Elections for Upper house, National Assembly (Rashtiriya Sabha,) were held in February 2018, it has 59
members.
• The victory of left alliance including the Communist Party of Nepal and the Maoist Party ensured swearing in
of K.P. Oli as the new Prime Minister.
• It is apparent that the Mr. Oli has a clear tilt towards China, this perhaps adds to challenges in India Nepal
Relations.
3.3. RECENT VISITS

• In 2014, Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi visited Nepal twice – in August for a bilateral visit and in
November for the SAARC Summit – during which several bilateral agreements were signed.
• The Nepalese Prime Minister, Mr. K.P. Oli, was on a State visit to India from 19 to 24 February 2016. During
his visit several bilateral agreements were signed.
• Nepalese Prime Minister, Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ paid a state visit to India from 15-18
September 2016.
• Shri Pranab Mukherjee, Hon’ble President of India paid a state visit from 2-4 November, 2016
• Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba Visited New Delhi in 2017.
• Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj visited Nepal in February 2018
• Prime Minister K.P. Oli made his first state visit to India in April 2018, this marks the occasion for both sides
to take the relationship forward
3.4. SECURITY
• India has played a leading role in helping the Nepalese Army (NA) in its modernization through provision
of equipment and training. About 250+ training slots are provided every year for training of NA personnel in
various Indian Army Training institutions.
• The 10th Indo-Nepal Army Battalion level Joint Exercise was conducted at Saljhandi (Nepal) from 31 October
to 13 November 2016. The 11th Indo-Nepal Army Battalion level Joint Exercise, Surya Kiran, was conducted
at Pithoragarh (India) in March 2017.
• The Gorkha Regiment of the Indian Army is raised partly by recruitment from hill districts of Nepal.
Currently, about 32,000 Gorkha Soldiers from Nepal are serving in the Indian Army.
3.5. WATER RESOURCES

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• Cooperation in Water Resources primarily concerning the common rivers is one of the most important
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areas of our bilateral relations and has immense potential.

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• It is estimated that around 250 small and large rivers flow from Nepal to India and constitute an important
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part of the Ganges river basins.

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These rivers have the potential to become major sources of irrigation and power for Nepal and India, but
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without planning, are a source of devastating floods in Nepal’s Terai region, and the Indian States of Bihar
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and Uttar Pradesh.

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• A three–tier bilateral mechanism established in 2008, to discuss issues relating to cooperation in water
resources and hydropower between the two countries, has been working well.
• In November 2014 Nepal and India sign a deal to build a $1bn hydropower plant on Nepal's Arun river to
counter crippling energy shortages.
• The Commencement of Work on the Pancheshwar Multipurpose project on Mahakali river in 2017 is
expected to provide impetus to water resource cooperation between India and Nepal.
3.6. POWER
• India and Nepal have a Power Exchange Agreement since 1971 for meeting the power requirements in the
border areas of the two countries, taking advantage of each other's transmission infrastructure.
• There are more than twenty 132 KV, 33 KV and 11 KV transmission interconnections which are used both
for power exchange in the bordering areas and for power trade. For enhanced transmission of electricity,
short term augmentation of the existing grid has been completed.
• Under mid–term augmentation, with grant assistance from GoI, 132 KV Kataiya–Kushaha and 132 KV
Raxaul–Parwanipur transmission lines are being operationalized.
• For long–term augmentation of the cross–border grid infrastructure, with a funding of US$ 13.2 million
(from GoI’s US$ 100 Million LoC), the construction of a 400 KV Muzzafarpur– Dhalkebar transmission line is
in progress.
• On completion, the Muzzafarpur–Dhalkebar transmission line would allow import of up to 1000 MW of
power by Nepal from India and also export from Nepal to India.
• At present, the total supply of electricity to Nepal from India is about 400 MW.
• An Agreement on ‘Electric Power Trade, Cross-border Transmission Interconnection and Grid Connectivity’
between India and Nepal was signed on 21 October 2014.
3.7. TRADE
• Since 1996, Nepal’s exports to India have grown more than eleven times and bilateral trade more than
seven times; the bilateral trade that was 29.8% of total external trade of Nepal in year 1995-96 has reached
61.2% in 2015-16.
• The bilateral trade grew from IRs. 1,755 crores in 1995-96 to IRs.32294Crores (US$ 4.8 billion) in 2015-16
• Indian firms are the biggest investors in Nepal, accounting for about 40% of the total approved foreign
direct investments. There are about 150 Indian ventures operating in Nepal. They are engaged in
manufacturing, services (banking, insurance, dry port, education and telecom), power sector and tourism
industries. Some large Indian investors include ITC, Dabur India, Hindustan Unilever, VSNL, TCIL, MTNL, State
Bank of India, Punjab National Bank, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Asian Paints, CONCOR, GMR India
etc.
• The Union Budget 2018 increased the funding allocation of Nepal from 375 crores to 650 crores
• India accounts for 2/3rd of Nepals trade in Merchandise, 1/3rd in Services and 46% of FDIs. Almost 100
percent petroleum supplies to Nepal are from India.
• India’s FDI in Nepa till May 2017 stood at 5159.86 crores.
• 98 per cent of Nepal’s third country trade goes through India and to the port of Kolkata.
• In February 2016 India agreed on giving dedicated access to Nepal to the port of Vizag.
3.8. CONNECTIVITY
• The Augmentation of Jayanagar-Janakpur Railway line is in Progress between the two countries. Originally
built during the British rule this line was functional till 2014, when it was closed for up gradation.
• In 2017 India has also proposed a direct rail link to Kathmandu from Delhi & Kolkata.
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• Currently India and Nepal are connected by a directed bus service launched in 2014.
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• Both the countries are signatories to the BBIN Motor Vehicle Agreement as part of sub regional-
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connectivity efforts.
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3.9. BORDER DISPUTE

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• Delineation of boundary between India and Nepal is subject to the resolution over the territorial dispute on
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Susta and Kalapani areas.

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• The Kalapani row is over a 35 square km disputed area where the border is marked by the river Mahakali.
• The changing course of the Gandak river, known as Narayani in Nepal, has caused controversy around
Susta. Gandak forms the international boundary between Nepal and India.
• A British era agreement, known as the Treaty of Sugauli (1816), led to the demarcation of the international
boundary between India and Nepal. Another Supplementary Boundary Treaty was signed in December 1816
to settle the border dispute.
• In 1981, a Joint Technical Level Nepal-India Boundary Committee was set up, which after years of surveying
and deliberations delineated 98% of the India-Nepal border on 182 strip maps. But, Susta was not part of
this delineation.
• In 2007, these strip maps were presented to both countries for ratification.
• Nepal refused to sign the documents without resolving the Susta and Kalapani disputes India, too, did not
endorse the maps.
3.9.1. CHALLENGES
• Political transition in Nepal: Constitutional process and ethnic linkages invoving Madhesis, Tharus and
janajatis pose a key challenge to the future of the bilateral relations.
• Cooperation in developing water resources: Nepal has 43,000 MWs hydropower potential that is known to
be technically feasible and economically viable. However, major projects have not taken-off due to
considerations outside the realm of economics. Ironically, India is a net exporter of power to Nepal. Over
the years differences over over the 1954 Kosi Agreement and the 1959 Gandak Agreement, have become
cause of resentment in. Three large projects namely — Saptakosi with 5,000MW, Karnali-Chisapani with
11,000MW, and Pancheshwar with 6,500MW — have been stuck for 30 years. 27 survey licenses were
granted to India comapnies, but none of them is in the construction phase.
• The China Factor: China has showed renewed interest in Nepal following the constitutional logjam, the
earthquake in 2015 and the blockade on the Indo-Nepal borders in the same year. Changing political
leadership inn Nepal has shown inclination to use the China factor vis-a-vis India.
• In 2012, Nepal approved a $1.8 billion contract to China for the West Seti Hydropower Project.
• In November 2017 in a decision which could have far reaching consequences in the region and for China,
Nepal cancelled the Budhi Gandaki hydropower project which had been contracted to a Chinese company
Chinese company.
• In January 2018 China began providing broadband connectivity to Nepal which had been an Indian monopoly
hitherto.
• According to a World Bank report, Nepal needs to invest up to $18 million in infrastructure projects by 2020
to remove binding constraints to economic growth.
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4. THE BBIN FRAMEWORK
• In eastern sub-region comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN), the four South Asian nations
signed the BBIN Agreement in Thimphu and it was seen as a significant symbol of sub-regional unity.
• The BBIN initiative, for the time being, operates through inter-governmental Joint Working Groups (JWG)
comprising senior officials of respective governments, under the aegis of their respective Foreign Affairs
ministries but drawing in representatives of other concerned ministries/agencies of the government.
• Two such JWGs were set up, one on Trade, Connectivity and Transit, the other on Water Resources
Management, and Power/hydropower trade and Grid Connectivity.
4.1. VISION OF BBIN

• BBIN vision for the sub-region rests on Four pillars
o Trade, connectivity and transit.
o Investment in power generation and water management sectors.
o Cooperation in energy area, in power trade and converting national grids into a sub-regional grid.
o Contact between the peoples of the region.
4.2. POTENTIAL
• Once implemented thoroughly, they have the potential to increase India’s-regional trade within South Asia
by almost 60% and with the rest of the world by over 30%.
• This would be a visible advantage for South Asia with transport corridors transformed into economic
corridors.
• The BBIN Agreement signals that relations which were earlier characterized by trust-deficit among
countries are now decisively moving towards a national political consensus for cooperation among the
neighbours.
4.2.1. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
• India proposed a SAARC Motor Vehicle Agreement during the SAARC Summit in Kathmandu in November
2014. Due to objections from Pakistan, an agreement could not be reached.
• India instead pursued a similar motor vehicle agreement with the BBIN. The Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-
Nepal Motor Vehicles Agreement was signed on 15 June 2015.
• However, in 2017 Bhutan backed out from joining this agreement asking the other countries to continue
with operationalisation.
• India approved $1.08 Billion for construction and upgradation of 558 km long roads that
join Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal.
• The project will receive 50% funding from Asian Development Bank. The project is scheduled to be
completed by 2018.
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5. INDIA-SRI LANKA
5.1. THE BACKGROUND
• As Ceylon, it became independent in 1948; its name was changed to Sri Lanka in 1972.
• Ethnic issues-Sri Lanka comprises of various ethnic groups- Sinhalese 74.9%, Sri Lankan Tamil 11.2%, Sri
Lankan Moors or Muslims 9.2%, Indian Tamil 4.2%, other 0.5%
• Tamils were disenfranchised in 1949. The 1956 Sinhala Only Act further institutionalised the discrimination.
• Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was formed in 1976 and it was involved in an armed conflict with Sri
Lankan armed forces from 1983 to 2009.
Map 2.7: Sri Lanka
Map Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ce.html

• In 1987 India-Sri Lanka Agreement signed between Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President J.R.
Jayewardene sought to end the civil war in the island nation.
• This agreement envisaged the creation of provincial councils with autonomy enabled by the 13th
amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution.
• Also under the agreement, Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was sent to Sri Lanka's Northern and Eastern
provinces, to “guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities” between the Tamil separatist groups and
the government.
• However, the situation turned into a military confrontation between the IPKF and the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which refused to disarm and join the political mainstream.
• The IPKF-LTTE conflict that began on October 10, 1987, and lasted till 1990 saw the death of over 1,200
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Indian soldiers and 660 LTTE cadres.

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• The assassination of former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 further changed India’s attitude towards
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the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka

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• Civil War in Sri Lanka ended through military operation in 2009.

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5.2. EVOLUTION OF INDIA SRI LANKA RELATIONS

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• The relationship between India and Sri Lanka is more than 2,500 years old and both sides have built upon a
legacy of intellectual, cultural, religious and linguistic interaction.
• India and Sri Lanka commemorated the 2600th year of the attainment of enlightenment by Lord Buddha
(Sambuddhatva Jayanthi) through joint activities. These included the exposition of Sacred Kapilavastu Relics
in Sri Lanka that took place in August - September 2012.
• A Maritime agreement was signed by India and Sri Lanka in 1974. Where in India handed over the
uninhabited Kacchateevu.
• Signed in 1999, the India-Sri Lanka FTA entered into force in 2000
• 2009, 2012 and 2013 India votes in favour of resolutions asking for probe in Sri Lanka’s war against the
LTTE at the Human Rights Council.
• Change of governments in India in 2014 and Sri Lanka in 2015 provided an opportunity for fresh
engagement.
• A Civil Nuclear Agreement was signed between the two countries in 2015.
5.2.1. RECENT VISITS
• Prime Minister Modi was the Chief Guest at the International Vesak day Celebrations in Colombo in May
2017. It is PMs second trip to Sri Lanka since March 2015.
• Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe visitied India in April 2017, his third visit to the capital since
January 2015.
• India’s Sri Lanka policy, following the defeat of Mahinda Rajapaksa, has been centred on economic
cooperation and security concerns, and far less on political matters.
5.3 ETHNIC ISSUE

The nearly three-decade long armed conflict between Sri Lankan forces and the LTTE came to an end in May
2009. During the course of the conflict, India supported the right of the Government of Sri Lanka to act against
terrorist forces. At the same time, it also conveyed its deep concern at the plight of the mostly Tamil civilian
population, emphasizing that their rights and welfare should not get enmeshed in hostilities against the LTTE.
In this context India has undertaken the following efforts.
• India supported the 13th Amendment which involves autonomy to provinces and rights of the Tamil
minorities
• India is involved in the resettlement and rehabilitation efforts in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri
Lanka with Tamil Population
• The need for national reconciliation through a political settlement of the ethnic issue has been reiterated
by India at the highest levels. India's consistent position is in favour of a negotiated political settlement,
which is acceptable to all communities within the framework of a united Sri Lanka and which is consistent
with democracy, pluralism and respect for human rights.
• Domestically, sensitivity on ethnic ties continues to be evident in Tamil Nadu, e.g. the fishermen issue.
5.3.1. FISHERMEN ISSUE
• Both Indian and Sri Lankan fishermen have been fishing into Palk Bay area for centuries. Problem emerged
only after a maritime agreement was signed by India and Sri Lanka in 1974. In fact, initially the 1974 border
agreement did not affect fishing on either sides of the border.
• In 1976, through an exchange of letter, both India and Sri Lanka agreed to stop fishing in each other’s
waters. However, the agreement could not stop the fishermen from fishing in these waters, as fishermen
know no boundary.
• Both India and Sri Lankan fishermen have been known for entering into each other’s waters.
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• However, cases of arrest of Sri Lankan fishermen by Indian authorities are comparatively less since they
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mostly fish in the high seas by using multi-day crafts.

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• On the other hand, due to the dearth of multi-day fishing capability, Indian fishermen cannot shift their
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fishing effort from the Palk Bay area to the offshore areas of the Indian waters or way beyond the
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continental shelf.
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• Therefore, Indian fishermen have no other option but to fish into the Sri Lankan waters. While for the Sri
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Lankan authorities protecting their maritime boundary is important, for the Indian fishermen the priority is
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of securing their livelihood.

• In early 2017 India raised at the highest level the killing of an Indian fisherman near Katchatheevu islet in
Palk Straits by the Sri Lankan navy. Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Palaniswami wrote to Prime Minister
Narendra Modi seeking the release of 85 fishermen and their 128 boats under Sri Lankan custody.
• On the other hand Sri Lankan Fishermen too have been concerned about increasing trawling activities
from Indian boats in the region.
• The two countries set up a Joint Working Group in November 2016, and India has assured Sri Lanka to phase
out bottom trawling.

Map 2.8: Katchatheevu
Source: http://images.tribuneindia.com/cms/gall_content/2017/3/2017_3$largeimg08_Wednesday_2017_023048576.jpg

• Sri Lanka is one of the largest trading partners of India in South Asia.
• India in turn is Sri Lanka's largest trade partner globally.
• Trade between the two countries grew particularly rapidly after the entry into force of the India-Sri Lanka
Free Trade Agreement in March 2000.
• Bilateral trade in 2015 amounted to US $ 4.7 billion. Exports from India to Sri Lanka in 2015 were US$ 4.1
billion (up by 2.1%), while exports from Sri Lanka to India were US$ 645 million (up by 3.2%) (MEA December
2016).
• According to Sri Lankan Customs, bilateral trade in 2016 amounted to US $ 4.38 billion. Exports from India
to Sri Lanka in 2016 were US$ 3.83 billion, while exports from Sri Lanka to India were US$ 551 million.
• India is among the top four investors in Sri Lanka with cumulative investments of over US$ 1 billion since
2003.
5.4.1. DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
The conclusion of the armed conflict saw the emergence of a major humanitarian challenge, with nearly
300,000 Tamil civilians housed in camps for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The Government of India put in
place a robust programme of assistance to help the IDPs return to normal life as quickly as possible. This
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o construction of 50,000 housing units,

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o rehabilitation of the Northern Railway lines,

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o wreck-removal and rehabilitation of the KKS Harbour,

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o establishment of Vocational Training Centres,

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o construction of a Cultural Centre at Jaffna, restoration of Thiruketheeswaram Temple,

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o establishing an Agricultural Research Institute in the Northern Province

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• Sri Lanka is one of the major recipients of development credit given by the Government of India, with total
commitment of US$2.6 billion, including US$ 436 million as grants.
o A line of credit of $800 million for track laying and supply of rolling stock to support construction
railway lines in Northern Sri Lanka is already operational.
o In October 2014 the Pallai-Jaffna reconstructed railway track and signal system was inaugurated
thereby reconnecting Jaffna to Colombo by rail.
o Emergency Ambulance Service was launched in Sri Lanka on 28th July 2016 under Indian Grant
Assistance of US $ 7.55 million. The project involves deployment of 88 ambulances Western and
Southern provinces, setting up of an Emergency Response Center and first year of operations.
o Under another line of credit of $167.4 million, the tsunami-damaged Colombo-Matara rail link has been
repaired and upgraded.
5.5. THE CHINA FACTOR

• During the Mahinda Rajpaksha tenure(2005-2015) Tilt towards China was evident. This era saw projects
such as the Hamabntota port and Colombo port City granted to the Chinese.
• The construction of the Hambantota port was completed and operations began in 2010. It was part of a
slew of mega infrastructure projects launched by then Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa, whose
family hailed from the coastal city of Hambantota. All of them were funded by Chinese loans, which stoked
apprehension in New Delhi about the Rajapaksa government’s red carpet for Beijing.
• During the Current government: The Hambantota port has been handed over to China on 99 year lease as
part of a debt for equity swap.
• In May 2017, Sri Lanka had rejected Chinese request to dock a submarine on its port. However, in [previous
years sightings of Chinese submarine on the Sri Lankan coast has been reported multiple times.
• Sri Lanka is also a keen supporter of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)of China.
• Sri Lanka’s estimated national debt is $64.9 billion, of which $8 billion is owed to China—this can be
attributed to the high interest rate on Chinese loans. For the Hambantota port project, Sri Lanka borrowed
$301 million from China with an interest rate of 6.3%, while the interest rates on soft loans from the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank are only 0.25–3%. Interest rates of India’s line of credit to the
neighboring countries are as low as 1%, or even less in some cases.
5.5.1. INDIA INTEREST

• The Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport (MRIA) in Hambantota, 250 km south from Colombo, was built
with with Chinese assistance of $190 million, more than 90 per cent of the total cost. Today, MRIA is running
into losses and Sri Lanka is unable to pay back dues to China’s EXIM Bank. Ironically, Sri Lanka may now hand
over the airport to India so that it can repay the Chinese loan. India is in advanced talks with Sri Lanka to
operate the airport.
• India is also interested in developing container facilities at the Colombo Port and developing the
Trincomalee harbour
• The RBI initiative- Sri Lanka’s location is strategic for India’s maritime security, and China’s RBI – Maritime
Silk Route. India is strongly asserting against China which is trying to build strategic assets in the garb of
infrastructure projects all around India. India has conveyed to Sri Lanka its conerns about security and Sri
Lanka has assured of not allowing anything against India’s security interests. In the context of the
Hamabntota port India hopes that the security assurances inserted in the concession agreement would be
scrupulously upheld in the future.
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6. INDIA-MALDIVES
Map2.9: Maldives
Image Source: https://www.mapsofindia.com/neighbouring-countries-maps/maps/india-maldives.jpg
6.1. BACKGROUND
• An archipelago of 1,200 coral islands, spanning roughly 115 square miles, Maldives is Asia's smallest nation,
both by area and population.
• India was among the first to recognise Maldives after its independence in 1965 and to establish diplomatic
relations with the country.
• India established its mission at Malé in 1972.
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• Indian Army's 'Operation Cactus' foiled a coup in Maldives that was attempted by a pro-Eelam group in
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1988.
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• Indian Coast Guard's Dornier was the first to land at the Ibrahim Nasir Airport with relief and supplies
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after the tsunami of December 26, 2004.

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• India maintains a naval presence in Maldives, at the request of the Maldives, since 2009.
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• On December 5, 2014, India dispatched “ water aid” to the Maldivian capital of Male, after a fire destroyed
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the generator of its biggest water treatment plant.

• The first-ever presidential elections under a multi-candidate, multi-party system were held in October
2008 only to be removed in 2012 and replaced by Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom in a 2013 election.
• Abdulla Yameen has sought to weaken democratic institutions, jail his political opponents, restrict the
press, and exert control over the judiciary to strengthen his hold on power and limit dissent.
• The democratic turmoil caused the cancellation of Indian Prime Ministers Visit to the island nation in
2015.
• President Yameen visited India in April 2016.
• In 2018 the proclamation of emergency by President Yameen further stirred the situation in the island
country
6.2. SECURITY
• The location of Maldives in the Indian ocean makes it important from the perspective of maritime security.
It is situated in a mid-way between Strait of Malacca and Suez, which are the world’s busiest trade routes
and thousands of cargoes pass through these trade routes.
• At the same time, as Kerala and Lakshadweep are in close proximity to the Maldivian islands, there are
always India’s concerns about the possible use of Maldives’ territory against it.
• Maldives also occupies a special place in India’s foreign policy priority list because of increasing cases of
piracy in the Indian Ocean near Somalia and Strait of Malacca, which has made the position of Maldives
very important for establishing Naval bases for security in the Indian Ocean.
• The Trilateral Maritime Security Co-operation Initiative was launched by India, Sri Lanka and Maldives in
October 2011 at Male during the first National Security Adviser (NSA) level meeting on the subject. This
initiative involved the three littoral states to enhance maritime security in the neighborhood. There were
two subsequent meetings in 2013 and 2014.
• In 2014 it was decided that next meeting would be held in Maldives. However, it remains to be held.
• Prime Minister Modi was also scheduled to visit Maldives as part of his visit to the other three Indian Ocean
countries that took place in March 2015, but it was cancelled at the last moment due to internal political
developments in the Maldives.
• India has espoused SAGAR – Security and Growth for all in the Region – vision for the Indian ocean
• Indo-Maldivian Action Plan for defence that was concluded in 2016, The Action Plan envisages an
institutional mechanism at the level of the Defence Secretaries to further bilateral defence cooperation,
according to the Ministry of External Affairs. Development of ports, continuous training, capacity building
• India has installed three Coastal Surveillance Radar Systems in Maldives and had plans to setup 10 more
such facilities. However, further movement on this front has been delayed by recent events in Maldives.
6.3. ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

• India is a leading development partner and has established many of the leading institutions of Maldives
including the Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital (IGMH), Faculty of Engineering Technology (FET) and Faculty
of Hospitality & Tourism Studies (IMFFHTS).
• Currently, India has provided US $ 100 million Stand-by Credit facility (SCF) to Maldives, including long-
term loans and revolving credit for trade.
• Under new Line of Credit worth US$40 million offered by the Government of India to Maldives, the Overseas
Infrastructure Alliance (OIA) of India has been given a contract to construct 485 housing units in Maldives.
• India and Maldives signed a trade agreement in 1981, which provides for export of essential commodities.
Growing from modest beginnings, India-Maldives bilateral trade stood at Rs.700 crores (MEA, 2015).
6.4. DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN MALDIVES

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• Maumoon Abdul Gauoom served as the president of Maldives from 1978 to 2008.
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• In 2008 under pressure from the civil society democratic reforms were initiated and a new constitution
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• Mohamed Nasheed was the first democratically-elected President of Maldives in 2008. He was made to
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step down after a series of events that has been described in some quarters as a coup in 2012.
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• Ever since the Indian Ocean archipelago is witnessing political tussles.

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• Nasheed had taken refuge at Indian High Commission once, fearing arrest under the regime of his successor.
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• In 2013 Abdulla Yameen was elected president in 2013

• Nasheed Was jailed for 13 years in 2015 on terrorism charges, his conviction was widely condemned
internationally. In 2016 Mohd. Nasheed received poltical asylum in the UK.
• In June 2016 opposition groups united to form the Maldives United Opposition, with a purpose of restoring
democracy by removing Yameen.
• In recent times, India has been largely silent on the major assault on democratic institutions and the
Opposition in the archipelego nation, while most countries which have a stake in the region, including the
US, UK, and the European Union, have condemned the Yameen Government's transgressions.
• In February 2018 the Maldivian Supreme Court quashed the convictions of 9 opposition leaders including

Mohd. Nasheed and ordered their release. The court also reinstated 12 MPs disqualified by the election
commission, this meant the United Oppositio would have majority in the majlis or parliament with the
power to impeach the president.
• President Yameen responded by declaring a state of emergency and ordering the arrest of chief justice
Abdulla Saeed and another judge. This forced the remaining three judges to change court’s previous orders
to release opposition leaders.
6.5. RECENT DYNAMICS

• For China Maldives is a key link in its maritime silk road plan under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
• In December 2017, Maldives Signed a Free Trade Agreement with China, while endorsing its Maritime Silk
Road project shunned by India for its strategic implications in the Indian Ocean.Maldives’ strategy of
achieving economic progress by making use of its geographic advantages.
• In 2012 relations between India and Maldives came under a strain after Male had terminated the
agreement it entered into with GMR in 2010 for the modernisation of the Ibrahim Nasir International
Airport. The airport was taken over by the Maldives Airports Company Limited after legal tussle in which
GMR challenged the government’s deceision. Maldives government maintains the reason for cancellation of
the project was because "the contract was illegally awarded" by the then President Nasheed.
• The country's anti-graft watchdog has ruled out any corruption in the leasing of the international airport to
GMR. The airport expansion project was subsequently given to the Chinese company, which will plough in
US $ 800 million.
• GMR, meanwhile, won arbitration against the Maldives at Singapore based International Arbitration
Tribunal which awarded $270 million as compensation to the company.
• India is uneasy with Maldives's relationship with China. It is also believed that the new law passed by
Maldives, allowing absolute foreign ownership of land on the conditions that interested parties would
make a minimum investment of one billion dollar and reclaim 70 per cent land from the sea, will greatly
benefit China in expanding its foothold in the Indian Ocean.
• India’s concern is that China, with its strategic ally Pakistan, could use the Maldives as a strategic choke
point for India
• Country's former President Mohamed Nasheed has more than once even commented on Maldives' 'pro-
China' tilt.
6.5.1. OPTIONS FOR INDIA

• In the crisis ensued, in February 2018, since the judicial verdict and followed by announcements by President
Yameen of emergency, there were calls for India to intervene. Global and regional commentary on the issue
has focused on what India's options are for intervening in the Maldives.
• Former President Mohamed Nasheed, who is in exile in Sri Lanka, requested India to send an envoy, backed
by its military, to release the judges and political prisoners.
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• India on its part displayed its dismay over the imposition and then extension of emergency.
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• After the emergency was lifted on 22 2018, India welcomed it even while calling upon the Maldivian
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government to restore all Articles of the Constitution, to allow the Supreme Court and other branches of
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the judiciary to operate in full independence, to promote and support the free and proper functioning of
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Parliament, to implement the Supreme Court's Full Bench order of 1 February 2018 and to support a
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• As a neighbour whose security is closely intertwined with that of the Maldives, India wishes to see a
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stable, peaceful and prosperous Maldives that meets the aspiration of its citizens.
• In this context the following aspects are key for understanding India’s position:
o International actors such as the EU and USA have echoed India’s position.
o Direct intervention though seemed attractive was ruled out for the time being unlike in 1988, it is not
the Maldivian government but opposition that has asked for intervention. Also, it will further enhance
ties between China and Maldives.
o Conventional wisdom and recent experience confirm that foreign-imposed regime changes, overt or
covert, are doomed to failure.
o Furthermore, hard action could also be ruled out as India could not be sure how a new Government in
Malé, after a regime change, will behave with regard to Indian interests.
o New Delhi is wary of instability taking root in island nation where the radical Islamic State (IS) has
been making inroads.
• Maldives is a nascent democracy and is in the process of strengthening its institutions and capacity
building. In recent times also Maldives has professed an “India first” policy.
• India should remain committed to assist the Government and people of Maldives in their endeavours to
build a stable, democratic, peaceful and prosperous country. India needs to tread with extreme caution in
this sensitive area because the developments, so far, in the Maldives are a domestic issue and remain
within the ambit of the nation's "internal affairs".
• In this context, India should be actively engaged with all stakeholders in the reconciliation process in the
wake of recent developments, in order to ensure that they continue to take the democratic process forward.
• Coordination with international community would add to India’s options.
• Now, it remains to be seen how India manages to keep China at a distance, reinforcing its position of an
ultimate security provider in the South Asia region. •As the strategic competition between India and China
in the Indian Ocean gathers pace, we must be prepared to face such situations more frequently. We need to
craft a creative and dynamic strategy to counter them.
• As Admiral Arun Prakash has observed, certain fundamentals of geography and history are key to
remember here:
o From Male, the nearest Chinese port, Haikou (Hainan), is 2,700 miles as the crow flies and 3,400 miles
by sea. An aircraft would take 7-8 hours to cover this distance, overflying three countries, and a ship
would take 8-10 days to reach Male. Compare this to the flying time.
o From India the flying time is just over an hour, and sailing time of a little over 24 hours to cover the
500 miles between Male and the nearest Indian port/airport of Kochi.
• Indian Navy’s sterling performance in the 2004 tsunami relief effort is a reminder of how close India is to
Maldives both geographically and metaphorically.
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7. SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL
COOPERATION (SAARC)
Map2.9: SAARC countries
Image Source: http://media.economist.com/sites/default/files/cf_images/20051119/cas941.jpg
7.1. BACKGROUND
• South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was founded in Dhaka on 8 December 1985. Its
secretariat is based in Kathmandu, Nepal.
• SAARC has eight members (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri
Lanka).
• These eight nations of South Asia constitute 3 per cent of the world’s area, but house 21 per cent of the
global population. India, significantly, constitutes 70 per cent of SAARC’s area and population.
• The organization promotes multilateral cooperation and regional integration. It launched the South Asian
Free Trade Area in 2006.
• SAARC also has nine Observers (Australia, China, European Union, Iran, Japan, Mauritius, Myanmar, South
Korea and USA). SAARC maintains permanent diplomatic relations at the United Nations as an observer and
has developed links with multilateral entities.
• 19th SAARC Summit, scheduled to take place in 2015 in Islamabad, was postponed due to non participation
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of India and other countries owing to Pakistan's interference in the domestic affairs of other countries.
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7.2. THE ORGANISATION

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• The Charter Bodies are the main mechanisms of SAARC. These include the Summit, Council of Ministers,
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Standing Committee, Programming Committee, Technical Committees and Action Committees.

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• The Summit is the highest decision making authority in SAARC. These meetings are hosted biennially by
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the Member States in rotation in alphabetical order. The Member State hosting the Summit assumes the
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Chair of the Association until the next such meeting hosted by another Member State.
• The key outcome of the SAARC Summit is the Declaration. It contains decisions and directives of the Heads
of State or Government to strengthen regional cooperation in the agreed areas.
7.3. EVOLUTION
• The idea of SAARC itself was put on the table by Bangladeshi leader Ziaur Rehman in the late 1970’s and it
was Bangladesh which had actually pushed forward the idea of SAARC at initial stages.
• Dhaka pursued the idea of SAARC initially with a view to containing the “hegemony” of India in South
Asia, a view fuelled by the structural asymmetry between India and its smaller South Asian neighbors.
• India also on the other hand was not very enthusiastic about the idea of SAARC as it believed that given
the fact that its neighbors harboured too many apprehensions about it and this will hamper the prospects
of India at the organization, rather it will become a platform for bashing India.
• Pakistan also was not very enthusiastic about SAARC since its inception as it knew that SAARC would be
dominated by India (due to its sheer size).
7.3.1. FACTORS SHAPING THE AGENDA: INITIAL PHASE
The initial phase gave shaped the functioning of SAARC future as seen in the following:
• No Bilateral Issues: From the very inception of SAARC as an idea, India insisted that it would not agree to
the use of any international forum for discussion of bilateral disputes and would prefer to resolve them on
a bilateral level only.
• Small countries Apprehensive on Trade: The smaller countries on the other hand were not interested in
putting trade & commerce on the agenda of SAARC as they were apprehensive that such a move will flood
their market with Indian goods given the relatively larger size of Indian economy.
• Non-Controversial issues only: The SAARC agenda has focus on nine non-controversial areas of cooperation
known as -“SAARC integrated programme of action” or “Regional Program of action”. The nine areas were-
Agriculture & Rural development, Transport & Communication, Science & Technology, Culture, Health,
Population control, Sports and Arts.
7.3.2. THE SAARC AGENDA
• Regional Cooperation
• Regional Integration
• Multilaterlism
7.3.3. PRINCIPLES OF THE SAARC CHARTER
• Keeping the apprehensions of both India and its smaller neighbours in mind, SAARC developed a charter
which would guides its functioning based on:
o Sovereign equality.
o Territorial integrity.
o Political independence.
o Non interference in domestic matters.
7.3.4. SAARC REGIONAL CENTRES
Since 1989, a number of Regional Centres with specific mandates have been established to strengthen and
promote regional cooperation. The Regional Centres implement programme activities and are expected to
evolve into Centres of excellence in their respective areas.
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• SAARC Agriculture Centre (SAC), Dhaka

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Established in 1989 with the mandate to provide timely, relevant and universal access to information
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and knowledge resources to all the agricultural practitioners of the SAARC Member Countries to achieve
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their respective goals through networking agricultural knowledge and information systems by adopting
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the appropriate information and communication technologies, management practices and standards.
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• SAARC Energy Centre (SEC), Islamabad

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Established in 2006 with the mandate to act as a catalyst for the economic growth and development of
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South Asia region by initiating, coordinating and facilitating regional as well as joint and collective
activities on energy. SEC would provide technical inputs for the SAARC Working Group (and other)
meetings on Energy, and will facilitate accelerating the integration of energy strategies within the region
by providing relevant information, state-of-the-art technology and expertise.
SAARC Cultural Centre (SCC), Colombo, Sri Lanka
This center was established in 2009 with the mandate to promote regional unity through cultural
integration and intercultural dialogue and contribute towards preservation, conservation and protection
of South Asia’s cultural heritage within the framework of the SAARC Agenda for Culture.
• SAARC Tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS Centre (STAC), Kathmandu
This center was established in 1992 with the mandate to prevent and control Tuberculosis in the region
by coordinating efforts of the National TB Programmes of Member States; exchange of information,
research, capacity building and implement activities; collects, collates, analyses and disseminates
information on the latest developments and findings in the field of tuberculosis in the region and
elsewhere.
• SAARC Disaster Management Centre (SDMC), Delhi, India
This Centre was re-established in November 2016 for expanded role by merging four erstwhile SAARC
Centres viz. (1) SAARC Disaster Management Centre (SDMC – New Delhi, India); (2) SAARC
Meteorological Research Centre (SMRC – Dhaka, Bangladesh); (3) SAARC Forestry Centre (SFC –
Thimphu, Bhutan); (4) SAARC Coastal Zone Management Centre (SCZMC – Male, Maldives) with the
mandate to support Member States in their Disaster Risk Reduction initiatives through application of
Science & Technology, knowledge from multiple disciplines, exchange of best practices, capacity
development, collaborative research and networking in line with the Global Priorities / Goals and other
relevant frameworks adopted by Member States.
7.4. TRADE AND COMMERCE: THE SAARC PREFERENTIAL TRADE ARRANGEMENT

(SAPTA)
• The idea of including trade and commerce on the agenda of SAARC was first given a concrete form in 1993
with the signing of (SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) signed in Dhaka on the 11th of April
1993 which provided for the adoption of various instruments of trade liberalization on a preferential basis.
Another aspect was SAARC’s more economically developed countries agreed to assist the less developed
countries in the region. SAPTA was launched in 1995.
7.4.1. LACK OF PROGRESS IN SAPTA
• However, SAPTA could not make any desired progress promotion of intra-regional trade.
• The volume of intra-regional trade increased only marginally. The list of concessions offered under SAPTA
included 3857 tariff lines but the major limitation was the actual trade coverage of preferential trade
granted. The concessions granted by the countries were not substantial enough to increase the overall
trade of the region.
• Moreover, considering the poor state of relation among the member states of SAARC, SAPTA continued to
be a trade arrangement with very limited ambitions.
• Commodities that could actually be traded between countries were not included in the positive lists of the
countries.
• SAPTA had no mechanism to resolve trade related disputes.
SAPTA Suffered from the Following Drawbacks
1. No targets for tariff reduction were earmarked for individual countries.
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2. Countries were meant to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers in a gradual manner with no time limits.
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3. Countries provided a positive list (rather than a negative list of items) which could be traded under PTA.
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7.5. SOUTH ASIAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (SAFTA)

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• Another attempt was made to strengthen the economic integration of SAARC members with the
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implementation of the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) in 2006.

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• In 2004, SAARC summit at Islamabad SAFTA was signed and it was seen as an effort to give a new lease of life
to the idea of SAARC.
• SAFTA was operationalised from 2006 onwards & has the following features:
1. Member states will reduce tariff barriers in a time bound manner. Maximum tariff will be in the range
of 0-5%.
2. Non LDC’s of SAARC (India, Pakistan, Srilanka) had a timeframe of 7 years to reduce tariffs, while the
LDC’s were provided a time frame of 10 years. As per SAFTA, South Asia was to become a free trade
zone by 2016.
3. Instead of positive list, concept of sensitive list was introduced (sensitive list would include items which
would not be subjected to time bound commitment with regard to tariff reduction). However, it was
agreed upon that sensitive list would be revised regularly with the objective of bringing reductions.
4. A dispute resolution mechanism for tariff and non-tariff barriers related disputes was agreed upon.
5. A compensation clause was introduced- under SAFTA a compensation clause would be introduced to
make up for the loss of revenue of LDC’s as they maybe adversely impacted initially by FTA. They are to
be compensated with a development aid for a limited period.
7.5.1. STEPS TO STRENGTHEN SAFTA
At SAARC summit 2011- India has announced the removal of 46 textile items from India’s negative list
(a) India has also removed all the 25 items on sensitive list for Least Developed Countries (LDC’s) of SAARC.
(b) Steps have been taken to revive border hats at Meghalaya & Tripura border b/w India & Bangladesh.
(c) India has given five South Asian partners duty free access to 99.7% of their goods
7.5.2. SAFTA: KEY CHALLENGES
However SAFTA has continued to face certain challenges:
1. The nature of relations between India & Pakistan will always remain a crucial factor for the success of
SAFTA.
2. FTA’s have greater chances of success when the economies are complimentary, whereas South Asian
economies are more competitive in nature.
3. Absence of strong rail, road, air and port connectivity links between the various south Asian countries.
4. Number of non-tariff barriers exists that include strict visa-regime, differences in standardization and
customs practices.
7.5.3. WAY FORWARD
In a context when less than 10% of the region's internal trade takes place under SAARC Free Trade Area it is
imperative to look for ways to make SAFTA work. In recent times Track 2 initiatives, in the context of SAARC,
like the South Asian Forum have put forward following recommendations-
3. Enhancing connectivity across borders.
4. Creation of a South Asian brand
5. Liberalized visa regime for businesses & freedom to invest across borders.
7.6. SAARC: COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT

• As compared to other regional organizations SAARC is deemed to be an under performer.
• Least integrated Region: When compared to other regions at the global level, South Asia is one of the least
integrated regions of the world (as compared to Europe or South East Asia), as also argued by the World
Bank.
• Political issues between member countries have constantly superseded SAARC’s economic interests. The
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SAARC has not been able to significantly further economic integration. Nor has it been able to enhance trade
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considerably.
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• The volume of Intra SAARC stands at 5%, in contrast EU countries trade about 66% of their goods and
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services in their region, NAFTA reaches 53%, while ASEAN reaches 25%.
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• Ease of Movement: Under EU, European countries have established a common market for goods, a
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common currency, also it provides visa free travel for countries which are part of Schengen Agreement.
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Managing differences: ASEAN has moved forward to unify the region under what was called the ‘ASEAN
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Way’ based on the ideals of non-interference, informality, minimal institutionalisation, consultation and
consensus, non-use of force and non-confrontation.
7.6.1. SLUGGISH PROGRESS: VIEWS FROM WITHIN
• For the first time member countries at the Thimpu Summit in Bhutan, marking the 25 th anniversary, in
2010 expressed their frustration with SAARC’s sluggish progress.
• The then Prime Minister of India Manmoha Singh expressed his disappointment by saying that “the glass of
regional cooperation, regional development and regional integration is half empty” and emphasized that
“the region must be better connected, empowered, fed and educated” to achieve comparable success with
other regional organizations.
• In 2014 PM Narendra Modi in his speech at the 18th SAARC Summit in Kathmandu observed that “nowhere
in the world are collective efforts more urgent than in South Asia; and, nowhere else is it so modest.”
• He also observed that “Each of us (South Asian Countries) has taken our own initiatives. However, as SAARC
we have failed to move with the speed that our people expect and want”.
• In the inaugural conference of the SAARC in 1985, poverty eradication and improving the living standards
through mutual cooperation were the main themes. However, SAARC has clearly not been able to achieve
tangible outcomes on these fronts.
7.7. CAUSES FOR THE LIMITED PROGRESS OF SAARC

Some of the major reasons for the limited progress on the part of SAARC to take off in any concrete manner
has been due to-
1. Origin of SAARC- since its inception, SAARC was seen as a tool by some countries to contain India, while
India also harbored its own apprehensions that the organization may be used by smaller states to score
political points against it at multilateral forums.
2. India- Pakistan relations: bilateral difficulties between two of the largest members of SAARC have had
casted a long shadow over the idea of SAARC. Other members of SAARC have often argued that the SAARC
grouping has been crippled/ has been held back because of the fluctuating nature of their relationship.
Moreover, Pakistan has never supported the idea of strengthening SAARC as it fears that India will occupy
centre stage within the grouping.
3. The structural asymmetry between size of India & its South Asian neighbors provides a fertile ground for
apprehensions/insecurities to crop up between nations. In this context the advocacy of inclusion of China as
a member by Pakistan and now Nepal in recent times is to be seen as an attempt to counter India’s role.
4. High level of trust deficit between South Asian nations- as a result of pending border conflicts, water
sharing conflicts etc between the members of the region.
5. Lack of Political Stability amongst member states of SAARC- almost all the SAARC states have suffered from
political instability over the past two decades and this further complicates the efforts aimed at building
sustainable partnerships between South Asian states.
6. Lack of Implementation: What bars SAARC from achieving the desired effectiveness or speed is the lack of
implementation of the agreements on the part of the member states.
7.7.1. MAKING SAARC WORK

• A number of initiatives have been agreed upon by the member countries in the 16th SAARC summit held at
Thimpu in 2010 & 17th summit at Addu in 2011.
• Following steps have been suggested at the 16th summit-
o It was also realised that effective communication and public diplomacy is essential to reach out to
students, youth, private media, think tanks, civil society and institutions for economic development.
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This would be important to popularize the concept of regional cooperation and generate an interest
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among the people of the region on the activities of SAARC. It would essentially build the image of the
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o An ambitious vision has been adopted. For example: 2010-2020 has been declared “Decade of Intra-
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regional Connectivity in SAARC” when member countries themselves are hesitant to provide even
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o On the positive side, the SAARC Development Fund (SDF) was ratified and its secretariat was
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inaugurated in Thimpu. It will finance regional and sub-regional projects.

o India did put forward a proposal for developing a SAARC Market for Electricity trading assumes
importance as the region is reeling under power shortages.
• As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said, the challenge is “to translate institutions into activities,
conventions into programmes, official statements into popular sentiments. Declarations at summits and
official level meetings do not amount to regional cooperation or integration.”
• Instead of taking up new areas in its summit declarations, SAARC should focus on trade, connectivity and
security and the need to develop a regional identity.
• In this context increasing people to people ties is paramount.

• Only a regional identity will generate a regional approach and not the other way around.
o Time line for rail, sea connectivity-has to be determined an implemented seriously
o Need is to finalise a Regional Railways Agreement and complete the preparatory work on an Indian
Ocean Cargo and Passenger Ferry Service. Timely completion of demonstration run of a Bangladesh-
India-Nepal container train as envisaged in the Addu declaration needs to be taken up.
o On the trade front, the emphasis has to be on effective implementation of the free trade pact, paring
the sensitive lists, eliminating non-tariff barriers and harmonising standards and customs procedures.
7.8. INDIA’S CONTRIBUTIONS

India has made unilateral offers and contributions of:
• Offer of setting up a Special Purpose Facility to finance infrastructure projects in the region and of business
visa for 3-5 years for SAARC (At the 2014 Summit)
• upgradation of the SAARC Supra Reference Laboratory at Kathmandu,
• supplying vaccines for the children of South Asia,
• tele-medicine projects in Afghanistan, Bhutan and Nepal,
• launching of SAARC satellite in 2017,
• building of South Asian University, at new Delhi, at the cost of around USD 240 million and
• voluntary contribution of US $ 100 million to the SAARC Development Fund.
It is expected these initiative will increase mutual trust and confidence amongst citizens of SAARC.
7.9. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN SAARC

• At the 18th Summit of SAARC in 2014, at Kathmandu, a SAARC Framework Agreement on Energy
Cooperation (electricity) was signed. The rationale for signing the SAARC electricity trade agreement was
the impending domestic energy crisis faced by individual member countries. For instance, Pakistan is
struggling to meet its rising energy demands. Under this agreement:
o agreement is meant to be an overarching cooperative scheme that aims to address broad issues such
as the enabling of cross border trade in electricity, the development of a common regulatory
mechanism and the waiving of customs fees
• 18th summit decided to close down three regional centres, namely the SAARC Documentation Centre (SDC)
in New Delhi, SAARC Human Resource Development Centre (SHRDC) in Islamabad and SAARC Information
Centre (SIC) in Kathmandu and transfer their mandates to the secretariat and other mechanisms.
• it also decided to merge four regional centres, namely the SAARC Coastal Zone Management Centre
(SCZMC), SAARC Meteorological Research Centre (SMRC), SAARC Forestry Centre (SFC) and SAARC Disaster
Management Centre (SDMC), and create a new centre named ‘SAARC Environment and Disaster
Management Centre’ (SEDMC).
• Against the backdrop that only 18 summits could be held in the last 29 years - although the SAARC Charter
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mandates the regional body to meet every year - this time the regional leaders decided to hold the summit
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• Two other agreements, the SAARC Motor Vehicles Agreement for the Regulation of Passenger and Cargo
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Vehicular Traffic and the SAARC Regional Agreement on Railways could to be signed at the 18th Summit
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due to last minute objections to them by Pakistan.

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• The 19th summit scheduled to be hosted by Islamabad scheduled in November 2017 was postponed after
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request from four nations- Afghanistan, Bhutan, Bangladesh and. This was following escalation of tension
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between India and Pakistan owing to the issue of cross border terrorism.
7.10. DEADLOCK AT SAARC: OPTIONS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA
India’s decision to skip the South Asian summit in Islamabad in November 2016 was, in essence, about the
deteriorating relationship with Pakistan. However, it also underlined the growing irrelevance of the SAARC for
India’s regionalism. In this context search for alternatives to SAARC has acquired a new momentum. In this
context SAARC minus one formulation refers to moving ahead in regional cooperation without Pakistan.
examples are:

• The BBIN framework: A formulation involving sub-regional cooperation on connectivity, trade and energy,
people to people ties between Bhutan, Bangladesh, India and Nepal. The BBIN, however, was very much
part of the SAARC framework. The SAARC charter allows two or more countries of the forum to embark on
what is called ‘sub-regional cooperation’.
• The South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) program of Asian Development Bank: this
brings together Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, and Sri Lanka in a project-based
partnership that aims to promote regional prosperity, improve economic opportunities, and build a better
quality of life for the people of the subregion. In 2016, the SASEC countries approved the SASEC Operational
Plan 2016-2025, a 10-year strategic roadmap, which introduced Economic Corridor Development as a
sectoral area of focus. Since 2001, SASEC countries have implemented 49 regional projects worth over
$10.74 billion in the energy, economic corridor development, transport, trade facilitation, and information
and communications technology sectors.
• Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC): dates back to
1997, the forum that brings five South Asian countries (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka)
together with two south east Asian countries (Burma and Thailand). It had remined dormant for long,
however in recent times India has taken initiatve to revive cooperation at this forum. In this context India
had invited the BIMSTEC leaders to join the BRICS leaders at the Goa summit in 2016.
• However, these options do not resolve India’s Pakistan problem in promoting economic cooperation with
Afghanistan. With no physical access to Afghanistan, India needs to find creative ways to deepen bilateral
economic engagement with Kabul bilaterally and through trilateral cooperation with other partners like
Tehran.
• India can’t compel Pakistan to join the project of South Asian integration. SAARC for the time being seems
to be becoming redundant. However, success in other regional integration initiative might help Pakistan see
the benefit and then SAARC can revived. Thus instead of focusing on Pakistan India must devote itself to
bilateral, sub-regional and trans-regional cooperation with our neighbors, all of whom except Pakistan
want India to do more.
7.11. INDIA’S NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY: NEIGHBOURHOOD FIRST

• When PM Narendra Modi took oath as the 14th Indian Prime Minister in May 2014, he made a significant
diplomatic outreach to India’s neighbours by inviting their heads of government.
• The PM soon made his first foreign visit to Bhutan. Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj too, made
her first official foreign visit in the neighbourhood, to Bangladesh. The diplomatic priority that government
attached to the neighbourhood is evident from the PM’s visit to all of India’s neighbours, except Maldives,
and the numerous leaders hosted in New Delhi and meetings at other multilateral fora.
• These developments have gave rise to the term ‘nieghborhood first’ as India’s policy in its periphery.
• India’s neighbourhood first policy has four aspects.
o The willingness to give political and diplomatic priority to its immediate neighbours and Indian Ocean
island states,
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o providing them with support as needed

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o greater connectivity and integration

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o to promote a model of India-led regionalism with which its neighbours are comfortable.
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• India realises that development and rapid economic growth cannot be fulfilled without a stable and
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conducive neighbourhood. India shares borders, rivers, climatic zones, cultural and ethnic ties with its
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neighbors which can be a source of both conflict and cooperation.

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• The centrality of India’s neighborhood in its foreign policy has become ever more critical in the
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context of the changing geopolitical landscape. The rise of China, an important neighbor and
domestic changes in neighboring South Asian countries provide the backdrop of these developments
• Growing development need of India’s smaller neighbours and the increasing desire to fulfil them has made
Chinese access easier. In this context India’s needs to focus on the growing aspirations of its smaller
neighbours. The simple logic that drives smaller neighbours is how to maximise benefits from the two rising
Asian giants.
• India needs to create a narrative that reassures its smaller neighbours that it wants to contribute to their
rise as well. Development partnerships, trade, people to people ties can pave the way ahead.

VISION IAS
www.visionias.in
LECTURE-3
INDIA NEIGHBOURHOOD RELATIONS: PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN
CONTENTS
1. INDIA and PAKISTAN............................................................................................................................................... 2
1.1. The Background ............................................................................................................................................... 2
1.2. India-Pakistan Relations A Framework: Dialogue-Disruption-Dialogue .......................................................... 5
1.3. Key Issues ........................................................................................................................................................ 5
1.4. The Indus Water Treaty ................................................................................................................................... 6
1.4.1. Significance ............................................................................................................................................... 6
1.4.2. Important Provisions ................................................................................................................................ 6
1.4.3. Indus, Jhelum and Chenab: Western Rivers and India ............................................................................. 6
1.4.4. Recent Disagreements .............................................................................................................................. 7
1.4.5. What are Indian Concerns in Recent Times? ............................................................................................ 8
1.4.6. Increasing Questions on the Treaty.......................................................................................................... 8
1.4.7. Should the Treaty be Revoked? ................................................................................................................ 8
1.4.8. India’s Options .......................................................................................................................................... 9
1.5. Sir Creek Dispute ............................................................................................................................................. 9
1.5.1. India’s Claims v Pakistan’s Claims ............................................................................................................. 9
1.5.2. The Sir Creek Issue: Significance............................................................................................................... 9
1.6. Siachen .......................................................................................................................................................... 10
1.6.1. India v Pakistan Claims ........................................................................................................................... 11
1.6.2. India’s Position on the Way Forward ..................................................................................................... 11
1.7. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).............................................................................................. 11
1.8. The Kulbhushan Jadhav Issue ........................................................................................................................ 12
1.9. Trade .............................................................................................................................................................. 12
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1.10. Vision and Reality ........................................................................................................................................ 12

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2. INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN .................................................................................................................................... 13

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2.1. Background .................................................................................................................................................... 13

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2.2. Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) ........................................................................................................ 14

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2.3. Heart of Asia Process ..................................................................................................................................... 14

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2.4. India’s Contribution in Reconstruction Efforts .............................................................................................. 14

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2.4.1. Challenges of Connectivity ..................................................................................................................... 14

2.5 Multiple Aspects of Cooperation.................................................................................................................... 15

1. INDIA AND PAKISTAN
Map3.1 India-Pakistan and Afghanistan
Image Source: http://www.essential-humanities.net/img/history/his119.png
1.1. THE BACKGROUND

• Pakistan resolution passed in the annual session of the All India Muslim League held in Lahore on 22–24
March 1940.
• Partition of India 1947: Creation of Pakistan
• Kashmir issue was taken up at the UN 1948 and Ceasefire came into existence in 1949.
• Pakistan Joins the SEATO (1954) and Baghdad Pact or CENTO (1955)
• The Indus Water Treaty was signed in 1960 with the Mediation of the World Bank
• 6 rounds of talks in1962-64
• The India-Pakistan War 1965-
• Tashkent agreement 1966- Both sides giving up territorial claims, withdrawing their armies from the
disputed territory.
• The Bangladesh War 1971: Defeat and loss of territory marks a new phase in Pakistan’s politics and relations
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The Simla Agreement 1972: Signed between Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from
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o The Simla Agreement designates the ceasefire line of December 17, 1971, as being the new "Line-of-
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Control (LoC)" between the two countries, which neither side is to seek to alter unilaterally, and which
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"shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side".
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o It also contains a, mutual commitment to the peaceful resolution of all issues through direct bilateral
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approaches.
• Domestic turmoil in Pakistan- Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is removed by General Ziaul Haq who becomes the
president in 1978 and launches Islamic legal system. Bhutto is hanged in 1979.
• Operation Meghdoot in 1984 brought the Siachen Glacier under India’s control.
• 1988 Agreement - The two countries signed an agreement that neither side will attack the other's nuclear
installations or facilities. These include "nuclear power and research reactors, fuel fabrication, uranium
enrichment, isotopes separation and reprocessing facilities as well as any other installations with fresh or
irradiated nuclear fuel and materials in any form and establishments storing significant quantities of radio-
active materials". Since January 1992, India and Pakistan have exchanged lists of their respective civilian

nuclear-related facilities.
• 1989 - Armed insurgency the Kashmir valley begins. Muslim political actors, after accusing the state
government of rigging the 1987 state legislative elections, form militant wings.
• In 1991 - The two countries signed agreements on providing advance notification of military exercises,
manoeuvres and troop movements, as well as on preventing airspace violations and establishing overflight
rules.
• A joint declaration prohibiting the use of chemical weapons is signed in New Delhi in 1992.
• In 1998 India detonates five nuclear devices at Pokhran. Pakistan responds by detonating six nuclear
devices of its own in the Chaghai Hills. The tests result in international sanctions being placed on both
countries. In the same year, both countries carry out tests of long-range missiles.
• 1999 - Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee meets with Nawaz Sharif, his Pakistani counterpart, in
Lahore. The two sign the Lahore Declaration, the first major agreement between the two countries since the
1972 Simla Agreement. Both countries reaffirm their commitment to the Simla Accord, and agree to
undertake a number of 'Confidence Building Measures' (CBMs).
• Some of the diplomatic gains are eroded, however, after the Kargil conflict breaks out in May 1999.
Pakistani forces occupy strategic positions on the Indian side of the LoC, prompting an Indian counter
offensive in which they are pushed back to the other side of the original LoC. Kargil was the first armed
conflict between the two neighbours since they officially conducted nuclear weapons tests.
• In October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistani chief of army staff, leads a military coup,
deposing Nawaz Sharif, the then prime minister, and installing himself as the head of the government.
• Hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight-IC 814 in Indian airspace by members of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, a Pakistan-
based extremist group, highlighted Pakistan’s role in the supporting terrorism against India.
• 2001 - Tensions along the Line of Control remain high, with 38 people killed in an attack on the Kashmiri
assembly in Srinagar. In July, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pakistani President Pervez
Musharraf meet for a two-day summit at Agra. That summit collapses after two days, with both sides
unable to reach agreement on the issue of Kashmir. On December 13, an armed attack on the Indian
parliament in New Delhi leaves 14 people dead. India blames Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad for
the attacks. The attacks lead to a mobilization of India's (referred to as Operation Parakram) and Pakistan's
militaries along the LoC. The standoff only ends in October 2002, after international mediation.
• 2002 - President Musharraf pledges that Pakistan will combat extremism on its own soil, but affirms that
the country has a right to Kashmir.
• 2003 - After Musharraf calls for a ceasefire along the LoC during a UN General Assembly meeting in
September, the two countries reach an agreement to cool tensions and cease hostilities across the LoC.
• 2004 - Vajpayee and Musharraf hold direct talks at the 12th SAARC summit in Islamabad in January, and
the two countries' foreign secretaries meet later in the year. This year marks the beginning of the Composite
Dialogue Process, in which bilateral meetings are held between officials at various levels of government
(including foreign ministers, foreign secretaries, military officers, border security officials, anti-narcotics
officials and nuclear experts). In November, on the eve of a visit to Jammu and Kashmir, the new Indian
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prime minister, Manmohan Singh, announces that India will be reducing its deployment of troops there.
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• 2006 - India redeploys 5,000 troops from Jammu and Kashmir, citing an "improvement" in the situation
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there, but the two countries are unable to reach an agreement on withdrawing forces from the Siachen
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• In September, President Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh agree to put into place an India-Pakistan
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institutional anti-terrorism mechanism.

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2007 - On February 18, the train service between India and Pakistan, the Samjhauta Express, is bombed near
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Panipat, north of New Delhi. Sixty-eight people are killed, and dozens injured.
• The fifth round of talks regarding the review of nuclear and ballistic missile-related CBMs is held as part of
the Composite Dialogue Process. The second round of the Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism (JATM) is also
held.
• 2008 - India joins a framework agreement between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan on a $7.6bn gas
pipeline project (TAPI).
• A series of Kashmir-specific CBMs are also agreed to, including the approval of a triple-entry permit facility
with leniency for senior citizens.
• In July, India blames Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate for a bomb attack on the Indian
embassy in Kabul, which kills 58 and injures another 141.
• In September, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Indian Prime Minister Singh formally announce the
opening of several trade routes between the two countries.
• In October, cross-LoC trade commences, though it is limited to 21 items and can take place on only two days
a week.
• On November 26, armed gunmen open fire on civilians at several sites in Mumbai, India. The attacks
prompt an almost three-day siege of the Taj Hotel, where gunmen remain holed up until all but one of
them are killed in an Indian security forces operation. More than 160 people are killed in the attacks. Ajmal
Kasab, the only attacker captured alive, says the attackers were members of Lashkar-e-Taiba. In the wake of
the attacks, India breaks off talks with Pakistan
• 2009 - The Pakistani government admits that the Mumbai attacks may have been partly planned on
Pakistani soil, while vigorously denying allegations that the plotters were sanctioned or aided by Pakistan's
intelligence agencies. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza
Gilani meet on the sidelines of a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, issuing
a joint statement charting future talks. Singh rules out, however, the resumption of the Composite Dialogue
Process at the present time.The Indian government continues to take a stern line with Pakistan and
maintains that it is up to Pakistan to take the first step towards the resumption of substantive talks by
cracking down on terrorist groups on its soil. In August, India gives Pakistan a new dossier of evidence
regarding the Mumbai attacks, asking it to prosecute Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, the head of Jamaat-ud-Dawa,
an Islamic charity with ties to Lashkar-e-Taiba.
• 2010 - In January, Indian and Pakistani forces exchange fire across the LoC in Kashmir, the latest in a string of
such incidents that have led to rising tension in the area. In February, India and Pakistan's foreign secretaries
meet in New Delhi for talks. This meeting is followed by the two countries' foreign ministers meeting in
Islamabad in July. In May, Ajmal Kasab is found guilty of murder, conspiracy and of waging war against India
in the Mumbai attacks case. He is sentenced to death.
• 2011 - In January, Indian Home Secretary GK Pillai says India will share information with Pakistan regarding
the 2001 Samjhauta Express bombing. The two countries' foreign secretaries meet in Thimpu, in February,
and agree to resume peace talks "on all issues".
• 2013 - In January, India and Pakistan trade accusations of violating the cease-fire in Kashmir, with Islamabad
accusing Indian troops of a cross-border raid that killed a soldier and India charging that Pakistani shelling
destroyed a home on its side.
• 2013 - In September, the prime ministers of India and Pakistan meet in New York on the sidelines of the UN
General Assembly. Both the leaders agree to end tension between armies of both sides in the disputed
Kashmir.
• 2014 - On February 12, India and Pakistan agree to release trucks detained in their respective territories,
ending a three week impasse triggered by seizure of a truck in India-administered Kashmir coming from
across the de facto Line of Control for allegedly carrying brown sugar.
• 2014 - On May 1, Pakistan's Army chief General Raheel Sharif calls Kashmir the "jugular vein" of Pakistan,
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and that the dispute should be resolved in accordance with the wishes and aspirations of Kashmiris and in
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line with UNSC resolutions for lasting peace in the region.

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2014 - On May 25, Pakistan releases 151 Indian fishermen from its jails in a goodwill gesture ahead of
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swearing-in ceremony of Narendra Modi as prime minister.

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• 2014 - On May 27, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi holds talks with Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz
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Sharif in New Delhi. Both sides express willingness to begin new era of bilateral relations.
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In December 2015 PM Modi makes a surprise visit to Lahore on Nawaz Sharif's birthday and the wedding of
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his granddaughter.
• In January 2016 Six gunmen attack an Indian air force base in the northern town of Pathankot, killing seven
soldiers in a battle that lasted nearly four days.
• In July 2016, Indian soldiers kill Hizbul Mujahideen’s terrorist leader Burhan Wani, sparking months of anti-
India protests and deadly clashes.
• In September 2016 Suspected terrorists sneak into an Indian army base in Kashmir's Uri and kill 18 soldiers.
Four attackers are also killed.11 days later, Indian Army said it has carried out "surgical strikes" to destroy
terror launch pads across the Line of Control in Pakistan.

1.2. INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS A FRAMEWORK: DIALOGUE-DISRUPTION-DIALOGUE
• The relations between India and Pakistan are marked by divergent narratives starting with the very
beginning of these countries as independent nations in 1947 in the backdrop of the colonial rule, the two
nation theory and the partition of India. This had made it difficult to reconcile positions on issues ranging
from territory (J&K), boundaries (Sir Creek and Siachen) and Security (Terrorism).
• The foundational apprehensions of Pakistan against India and its quest for defining itself as the opposite
has led to its intransigence on many issues.
• The structure of this relation has been conflict prone and marked by asymmetry.
• The pattern in the decades since independence has shown a cycle of Disruption-Dialogue-Disruption. This
means cooperation and peace have often taken place parallel to the threats of war or have been disrupted
by violent episodes of terrorism.
• Though there had been sporadic agreements and treaties signed between India and Pakistan such as the
Indus Water Treaty of 1960, the Tashkent Agreement of 1966, and the Shimla Agreement of 1972, a
systematic peace-process between the two adversarial neighbours had never taken off till the Composite
Dialogue Process (CDP) in the late 1990s’
• Idea of a “composite dialogue process”(CDP) was articulated at the 1997 Male meeting between Indian
Prime Minister I.K. Gujral and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.
• However the composite dialogue process has also been disrupted by events such as the Kargil war of 1999,
the attack on India parliament in 2001 and the 26/11 attack in Mumbai in 2008.
• When the two countries again started engaging in 2010 it the name of CDP was changed to the ‘Resumed
Dialogue’, with some changes in the content, including progress on Mumbai trial.
• Two rounds of resumed dialogue took place and the foreign ministers analyzed the developments. But it
stopped in 2012 post the incident of firing on the border and beheading of India soldier Hemraj following
which then Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh said 'that there cannot be business as usual with Pakistan
• When Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Nawaz Sharif met in Ufa in 2015, on the sidelines of the SCO
summit, It was decided that the two sides will hold one discussion on terrorism and the other for peace on
the border.
• In 2015, during Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj’s recent visit to Islamabad on 8-9 December 2015 for the
‘Heart of Asia’ Conference, it was decided that India and Pakistan would hold discussions on wide-ranging
issues under the rubric of a ‘Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue’ as opposed to the nomenclature of
‘Composite Dialogue’ or ‘Resumed Dialogue’ used earlier.
• In the latest stage the dialogue between the two countries that resumed in 2015 was again disrupted by
the terrorist attack in Pathankot and Uri in 2016.
• India desires peaceful, friendly and cooperative relations with Pakistan, in an environment free from
terrorism and violence.
• According to the MEA Indian Policy on Pakistan is as follows:
o Issues can be resolved through dialogue;
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o There are only two parties to such dialogue-India and Pakistan;

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o However, terror and talks cannot go together.

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1.3. KEY ISSUES

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The India-Pakistan joint statement on 23 September 1998, following the meeting of the two Foreign Secretaries
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in New York, identified the issues to be included in the CDP between the two countries and the levels at which
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they were to be addressed.

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i. Peace and Security including Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) — Foreign Secretaries
ii. Jammu and Kashmir — Foreign Secretaries
iii. Siachen — Defence Secretaries
iv. Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project — Secretaries, Water & Power
v. Sir Creek — Additional Secretary (Defence)/Surveyors General
vi. Terrorism and Drug Trafficking — Home/Interior Secretaries
vii. Economic and Commercial Cooperation — Commerce Secretaries.
viii. Promotion of Friendly exchanges in various fields — Secretaries, Culture.

• Terrorism: India has been pressing its concern on the role of Pakistan based actors in terrorism in India.
This is backed by the US as well. Terrorism emanating from Pakistan and territory under its control has,
however, severely limited and disrupted initiatives to build a stable relationship.
• Kashmir: Following the Indo-Pakistan War of 1947 over the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir,
its territory has remained divided between India and Pakistan. A ceasefire line (1949), later known as the
Line of Control (LoC, since 1972), separates the Indian-administered and Pakistan-administered parts.
Pakistan has been trying to internationalise the issue at forums such as the United Nations. However this has
produced diminishing returns. CDP remains the only bilateral forum where Kashmir is formally brought to
the table by India and Pakistan
• Normalization: Normalization refers to the process of making progress on the contentious issues between
the country. It involves, trade, cultural exchanges and resolving the issues known as ‘low hanging fruits’
such as Siachen and Sirceek issues.
• In the context of the recent acrimony in relations issues related to the Indus Water Treaty have gained
salience.
1.4. THE INDUS WATER TREATY

• The Indus Waters Treaty was signed in 1960 after nine years of negotiations between India and Pakistan
with the help of the World Bank, which is also a signatory. Signed by India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru and the then President of Pakistan, Ayub Khan.
• The treaty pertains to most complete and satisfactory utilisation of the waters of the Indus system
comprising of the six rivers running across the Indus basin.
• The negotiations were the initiative of former World Bank President Eugene Black.
• Former U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower described it as "one bright spot ... in a very depressing world
picture that we see so often."
1.4.1. SIGNIFICANCE
• It is Seen as one of the most successful international treaties,
• It has survived frequent tensions, including conflict, and
• It has provided a framework for irrigation and hydropower development for more than half a century.
• It is a generous treaty in terms of both the sharing ratio (80.52 per cent of the aggregate water flows in the
Indus system reserved for Pakistan) and the total volume of basin waters for the downstream state.
• It is the first and only treaty that goes beyond water sharing to partitioning rivers.
1.4.2. IMPORTANT PROVISIONS
• The three western rivers (Jhelum, Chenab and Indus) were made available to Pakistan for unrestricted use.
• Three eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej), were made available to India for unrestricted use.
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1.4.3. INDUS, JHELUM AND CHENAB: WESTERN RIVERS AND INDIA

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• Under the treaty obligation India shall not permit any interference with these waters except for the
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following uses defined under the treaty:

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o Non-Consumptive Use;
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o Agricultural Use, as set out in Annexure C; and

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o Generation of hydro-electric power, as set out in Annexure D.

• Except as provided in Annexure D and E, India shall not store any water of, or construct any storage works
on, the Western Rivers.
• Thus, while India could use the western rivers, restrictions were placed on building of storage systems.
• The treaty states that except in certain cases, no storage and irrigation systems can be built by India on the
western rivers.
• India is permitted to construct hydroelectric power facilities on these rivers subject to constraints specified
in Annexures to the Treaty.

Working of the treaty:
• Treaty sets out a mechanism for cooperation and information exchange between the two countries
regarding their use of the rivers, known as the Permanent Indus Commission, which has a commissioner
from each country.
• The Treaty also sets forth distinct procedures to handle issues which may arise:
o “questions” are handled by the Commission;
o “differences” are to be resolved by a Neutral Expert; and
o “disputes” are to be referred to a seven-member arbitral tribunal called the “Court of Arbitration.”
o The World Bank’s role in relation to “differences” and “disputes” is limited to the designation of
people to fulfill certain roles when requested by either or both of the parties.
Map3.2-The Indus River System
Image Source: http://nriachievers.in/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/1.jpg

1.4.4. RECENT DISAGREEMENTS
• India and Pakistan disagree about the construction of the Kishenganga (330 megawatts) and Ratle (850
megawatts) hydroelectric power plants being built by India.
• The two countries disagree over whether the technical design features of the two hydroelectric plants
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The plants are on respectively a tributary of the Jhelum and the Chenab Rivers.
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• Among other uses, under the Treaty, India is permitted to construct hydroelectric power facilities on these
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Talks related to the Kishenganga and Ratle hydroelectric power plants are ongoing. However, different
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treaty mechanisms are sought by India and Pakistan.

• Pakistan asked the World Bank to facilitate the setting up of a Court of Arbitration to look into its concerns
about the designs of the two hydroelectric power projects. India asked for the appointment of a Neutral
Expert for the same purpose.
• The Treaty does not empower the World Bank to choose whether one procedure should take precedence
over the other.
• On December 12, 2016, World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim announced that the World Bank would
pause before taking further steps in each of the two processes requested by the parties

1.4.5. WHAT ARE INDIAN CONCERNS IN RECENT TIMES?
• From the Indian point of view, the basic dissatisfaction with the treaty arises from the fact that it prevents
the country from building any storage systems on the western rivers. Even though the treaty lays out that
under certain exceptional circumstances storage systems can be built, the complaint raised by India is that
Pakistan deliberately stops any such effort due to the political rivalry it shares with India.
• The Treaty has too many engineering provisions and gives Pakistan undue right to vet the designs of the
Indian projects. India has been attempting to construct run of the river projects on the western rivers. Run-
of-the-river projects are permitted by the Indus treaty within defined limits. But Pakistan wants no Indian
works on the three “western rivers” and seeks international intercession by invoking the treaty’s dispute-
settlement provisions. This has in effect to denied J&K the limited benefits permissible under the treaty,
Pakistan wishes to further its strategy to foment discontent and violence there.
• Since the treaty’s conception in 1960, the two countries have been embroiled in conflicts over a number of
projects including the Baglihar, the Kishenganga and Ratle (Chenab river) hydroelectric plants proposed by
India on the west flowing rivers.
• Given that water is J&K’s main natural resource and essential for economic development, the there. gifting
of its river waters to Pakistan by treaty has fostered popular grievance.
1.4.6. INCREASING QUESTIONS ON THE TREATY
• In the context of terrorism being used as an instrument of state policy by Pakistan questions have been
raised about the treat
• In 1960, India accepted the treaty as a goodwill gesture trading water for peace. Within five years of the
treaty’s entry into force, Pakistan launched a war to grab the Indian part of J&K in 1965.
• Pakistan insists on rights without responsibilities. Many argue, that use of state-reared terrorist groups can
be invoked by India, under Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as constituting
reasonable grounds for withdrawal from the Indus treaty. The International Court of Justice has upheld the
principle that a treaty may be dissolved by reason of a fundamental change of circumstances.
• As argued by David Lilienthal “No Armies with bombs and shellfire could devastate a land so thoroughly as
Pakistan could be devastated by simple expedient of India’s permanently shutting off the source of water
that keeps the fields and people of Pakistan green.”
• If Pakistan wishes to preserve the Indus treaty, despite its diminishing returns for India, it will have to strike a
balance between its right to keep utilising the bulk of the river system’s waters and a corresponding
obligation (enshrined in international law) not to cause “palpable harm” to its co-riparian state by exporting
terror
1.4.7. SHOULD THE TREATY BE REVOKED?
• Any calls for revoking the treaty needs to be tempered with multiple factors:
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• Revoking the treaty could be used by the Pakistani side to draw into another limited conflict or further
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boost its attempts to foment trouble in Kashmir.

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• Given the China-Pakistan axis, revoking the treaty maybe used to portray India as attempting to arm-twist
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the lower riparian in the region. Moreover, China can use this as a precedent for refusing to change their
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current stand of refusing to enter into a water sharing agreement on Brahmaputra river.
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• The treaty has prevented water conflicts and created incentive for Peace. For over five decades, both India
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and Pakistan are peacefully sharing the water of Indus and its tributaries, thanks to The Indus Water
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Treaty. It may be noted that both India and Pakistan are still at loggerheads over various issues since
Partition, but there has been no fight over water after the Treaty was ratified.
• The treaty has survived India-Pakistan wars of 1965, 1971 and the 1999 Kargil standoff besides Kashmir
insurgency since 1990 and is considered as the most successful water treaty in world. Upholding the treaty
even under adverse circumstances has added to the international image and India prides itself in being a
responsible country
• Short of abrogation, the Treaty may be modified under the existing provisions of article 12.

1.4.8. INDIA’S OPTIONS
• Utilizing the eastern river waters optimally.
• Ensure that the infrastructure which needs to be developed to fully exploit the capacity as provisioned as
part of the IWT with respect to both western and eastern rivers should be completed expeditiously in a time
bound manner.
• Utilizing the existing dispute resolution mechanism judiciously.
• India needs to continue its engagement with Afghanistan and assist in dam construction, not withstanding
protestations by Pakistan.
1.5. SIR CREEK DISPUTE

• The 96-km estuary between India and Pakistan, cutting through where Gujarat State and Sindh province
meet, has had a dramatic impact on Indian security, though it’s always been seen to be relatively simple to
resolve.
• It was one of the subjects in the India-Pakistan composite dialogue that resumed under Atal Bihari
Vajpayee’s government in 2004.
• Six rounds of talks have taken place, the two sides have conducted a joint survey of the creek and
exchanged maps showing their respective positions.
• The issue remains unresolved.
• Map3.3 Sir Creek
Image Source: http://media2.intoday.in/indiatoday/images/stories//2012december/sircreek02_small_121612120133.jpg

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1.5.1. INDIA’S CLAIMS V PAKISTAN’S CLAIMS

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• The Provisions of two contradictory paragraphs in the 1914 Verdict of the Bombay Government, make
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India and Pakistan contenders on the same issue.

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• Paragraph 9 of this verdict states that the boundary between Kutch and Sindh lies ‘to the east of the
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Creek,’ (Green Line) which effectively implied that the creek belonged to Sindh and, therefore, to Pakistan.
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• On the other hand, Paragraph 10 states that since Sir Creek is navigable most of the year. According to
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international law and the Thalweg principle, a boundary can only be fixed in the middle of the navigable
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channel, which meant that it has be divided between Sindh and Kutch, and thereby India and Pakistan. This
is the basis of India’s claim (red line) which is also bolstered by a map dating back to 1925.
1.5.2. THE SIR CREEK ISSUE: SIGNIFICANCE
• Over the years, the creek has also changed its course considerably. If one country agrees to the other’s
traditional position, then the former will end up losing a vast amount of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). A
vital reason for two countries locking horns over this creek is the possible presence of great oil and gas
concentration under the sea, which are currently unexploited thanks to the impending deadlock on the
issue.
• Because of various factors, the Sir Creek area is also a great fishing destination for hundreds of fishermen
from both India and Pakistan. Sir Creek is considered to be among the largest fishing grounds in Asia. In the
desperation for a great catch, many of their boats stray across the perceived boundaries, and they end up
being arrested by the other side.
• Maritime security concerns were heightened since November 2008, when 10 terrorists from the Lashkar-e-
Taiba left in a Pakistani boat for Mumbai. They captured an Indian fishing vessel, Kuber, off Sir Creek, and
used it to attack Mumbai.
• Drug trade: Officials monitoring the phone conversations in the disputed waters off Sir Creek say the
indications are that drug cartels are active in the region, and the quantity and frequency show that the area
could be among the world’s most active for trading centres.
Map3.4 Siachen Glacier
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Source: http://img01.ibnlive.in/ibnlive/uploads/875x584/jpg/2016/03/siachen-map.jpg
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1.6. SIACHEN
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• The Siachen dispute is a direct result of the ambiguity that exists in the Karachi ceasefire agreement of July
1949. The agreement, which established the ceasefire line, the positions of the two militaries at the end of
the 1947-1948 war, did not delineate beyond grid reference NJ 9842, which falls south of the Siachen
glacier,
• The 1972 Simla Agreement mentions the boundary after this point to extend “north to the glaciers”.
• India established its ground position in 1984, a response to Pakistan’s Oropolitics, through the Operation
Meghdoot in 1984 and remains in control of the glacier
• Divergent positions held by India and Pakistan on the dispute is one of the primary reasons why the
negotiations on demilitarising the Siachen glacier and the adjoining areas have not progressed much.
1.6.1. INDIA V PAKISTAN CLAIMS
• Indian and Pakistani sides have interpreted the phrase “North to the glaciers” very differently. Pakistan
argues that this means that the line should go from NJ 9842 straight to the Karakoram pass on the Sino-
Indian border. India, however, insists that the line should proceed north from NJ 9842 along the Saltoro
range to the border with China. Between these two interpretations lies a substantial amount of glaciated
territory that both sides want control of.
• These contrasting interpretations have made it difficult for a final resolution of the dispute even though it
is possible to mutually demilitarise the region given that both Indian and Pakistani soldiers regularly lose
their lives there due to harsh climatic conditions. However, demilitarization talks in the past have met with
major roadblocks owing to mutual distrust in the relationship
1.6.2. INDIA’S POSITION ON THE WAY FORWARD
• India has stated that the present ground positions on the Saltoro ridge should be demarcated and
authenticated on a map before any demilitarisation could be conducted, fearing that once India withdraws
from the region, the Pakistan Army could occupy the high ground, something the latter was weeks close to
doing when the Indian occupation took place in 1984 after operation Meghdoot.
• India has therefore insisted that joint demarcation of the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) on the
ground as well as the map should be the first step to be followed by a joint verification agreement and
redeployment of forces to mutually agreed positions.
1.7. THE CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR (CPEC)

Map 3.5: The CPEC
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Image Source: http://media2.intoday.in/indiatoday/images/stories//2017May/cpec-mos_051317113948.jpg

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The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is part of the larger OBOR or the Belt and Road(BRI) project
of China.
• It aims to connect Kasgar in the Xinxiang province of China to the warm water port of Gwadar in the
Baluchistan province of Pakistan. It involves multiple infrastructure projects including, highways, railroads,
waterways and pipelines. The Project investment estimates range from US$ 40 billion to 60 billion.
• Gwadar deep sea port, a culmination point of the ambitious China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),
which will be able to handle 13 million tonnes of cargo annually within five years — and an astounding 400
million tonnes annually by 2030 to be transported to landlocked Central Asia and to western China.
• The project through the development of Gwadar port also has strategic significance as it provides China a
presence in the Indian Ocean.
• India’s main concern is regarding the alignment of the Project that passes through the Gilgit-Baltistan
region of Jammu and Kashmir and thus violates India’s sovereign claims.
1.8. THE KULBHUSHAN JADHAV ISSUE

• Pakistan claimed to have arrested Jadhav from Balochistan on March 3, 2016. India maintains that Jadhav
was kidnapped from Iran where he was involved in business activities after retiring from the Indian Navy
in 2002.
• In April 2017 Pakistan's military establishment announced that Jadhav would be hanged.
• Shortly after India approached the International Court of Justice (ICJ. As India was denied Consular access
to Jadhav. India has accused Pakistan of violating the Vienna Convention.
• Pakistan contended that the Vienna Convention provisions on consular access were not intended for a "spy"
involved in subversive activities.
• India believes the ICJ can look into Jadhav’s case as both the countries are signatories to the optional
protocol of the Vienna convention on consular relations (VCCR). The protocol says any dispute arising out
of the interpretation or application of VCCR shall lie within the jurisdiction of the ICJ.
• On 18 May 2017 International Court of Justice stays death sentence given to Kulbhushan Jadhav by
Pakistani military court until further notice.
• This is the first time after 1971 that India has turned to the ICJ in a dispute with Pakistan.
• In September 1974, India spelt out the matters over which it would accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ,
replacing a similar declaration made in 1959.
• Among the matters over which India does not accept the ICJ jurisdiction are: “Disputes with the
government of any state which is or has been a member of the Commonwealth of Nations”.
• Moving the ICJ amounts to taking disputes with Pakistan to a multilateral forum, which New Delhi tends to
avoid.
1.9. TRADE
• Trade relations remained vibrant for an extended period after Partition. As noted by former Pakistan
commerce secretary Zafar Mahmood, in 1948-49, India accounted for around 56% of Pakistan’s total
exports and 32% of its total imports. Indeed, despite the hostilities of 1948, India remained Pakistan’s
largest trading partner until 1955-56.
• The trade relationship took a nosedive with the 1965 and 1971 wars, and only resumed, on a limited scale,
after the Shimla Agreement was signed in 1972.
• India unilaterally accorded Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to Pakistan in 1996. There is increased
question mark on this in recent years.
• Withdrawing MFN status to Islamabad could mark an important – even if symbolic – attempt by New
Delhi to demonstrate that it is taking tough action.
• But it won't have any real effect: volumes of trade between the two countries are too small for sanctions to
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While India’s exports to Pakistan have marginally grown from 0.78% of total exports in 2007-'08 to 0.88%
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in the year 2015-'16, India’s imports from Pakistan remain negligible at 0.12% of total exports, according to
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the data for the last financial year.

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• Pakistan’s total import from South Asia itself is less than 4 per cent.
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By not revoking the MFN status India can legitimately claim the moral high ground in fulfilling WTO
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obligations while Pakistan does not

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1.10. VISION AND REALITY

• As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said in January 2007, he dreamt of a day when “while retaining our
respective national identities, one can have breakfast in Amritsar, lunch in Lahore and dinner in Kabul.
That is how my forefathers lived. That is how I want my grandchildren to live.”
• According to TCA Raghavan: from 2008 till the present day “enough has changed to make sure older
solutions will not work.” Nonetheless, “the cyclical pattern” of reconciliatory moves and hawkish standoffs
will go on.

2. INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN
Map3.6-Afghanistan
2.1. BACKGROUND
• Relations between the people of Afghanistan and India traces to the Indus Valley Civilisation.
• The Durand Line is the 2,430-kilometre International border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Sir
Mortimer Durand had drawn this line in 1893 between Afghanistan and then British India, which later got
divided into two countries India and Pakistan in 1947.
• The Durand Line cuts through the Pashtun tribal areas and further south through the Balochistan region. It
politically divides ethnic Pashtuns, as well as the Baloch and other ethnic groups, who live on both sides of
the border in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan.
• During the Soviet intervention (1979-89), India was the only South Asian nation to recognise the Soviet-
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backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. India also provided humanitarian aid to then Afghan President
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Najibullah's government. Following the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, India continued to with
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humanitarian aid.
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In 1990s, India became one of the key supporters of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.
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• In 2005, India proposed Afghanistan's membership in the South Asian Association for Regional
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Cooperation (SAARC).
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Both nations also developed strategic and military cooperation against Islamist militants.
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• Indo-Afghan relations have been strengthened by the Strategic Partnership Agreement signed between the
two countries in 2011.
• As Afghanistan was undergoing three simultaneous political, security and economic transitions in 2015.
• India had allayed its fears about its future by making a long-term commitment to the security and
development of Afghanistan.
• Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani visited India for his first state visit in April 2015 and in October 2017
• Prime Minister Modi visited Afghanistan in December 2016.

2.2. STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (SPA)
The Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) between the two sides, inter alia, provides for
• assistance to help rebuild Afghanistan's infrastructure and institutions, education and technical assistance
to re-build indigenous Afghan capacity in different areas,
• encouraging investment in Afghanistan's natural resources, providing duty free access to the Indian
market for Afghanistan's exports
• support for an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, broad-based and inclusive process of peace and reconciliation,
• advocating the need for a sustained and long-term commitment to Afghanistan by the international
community.
2.3. HEART OF ASIA PROCESS

• Heart of Asia process or the Istanbul Process, started in 2011 to provide more assistance to Afghanistan.
The process has three main pillars:
o Political consultations
o Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)
o Cooperation with Regional Organizations
• This platform was established to address the shared challenges and interests of Afghanistan and its
neighbors and regional partners. The Heart of Asia is comprised of 14 participating countries, 17 supporting
countries, and 12 supporting regional and international organizations.
• The Heart of Asia provides a platform for results-oriented regional cooperation by placing Afghanistan at
its center, in recognition of the fact that a secure and stable Afghanistan is vital to the prosperity of the
Heart of Asia region.
• India is the lead country for Trade, Commerce and Investment CBM of Heart of Asia Process,
• India hosted Senior Officials Meeting of the Heart of Asia countries in New Delhi in January 2014 and with
the help of FICCI, India organized a 6th Regional Technical Group (RTG) in New Delhi on November 2015.
• India hosted the Sixth Ministerial conference of Heart of Asia in December 2016 at Amritsar. It was Jointly
Inaugurated by PM Modi and President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan
2.4. INDIA’S CONTRIBUTION IN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS

• India has committed over 2 billion US$ for development efforts in Afghanistan.
• It has financed and built significant projects such as:
o Delaram Zaranj Highway,
o Parliament Building,
o India Afghanistan Friendship Dam/Selma Dam, Hari River, Heart Province
o Transmission lines to Kabul.
• While it has avoided its own military presence, India views foreign military presence in Afghanistan as
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indispensable in promoting political stability and development in the country. The USA has also urged India
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to get involved more.

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• India believes in invest and endure strategy for Afghanistan.

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2.4.1. CHALLENGES OF CONNECTIVITY

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Pakistan, in particular, has been opposed to any growth in Indian influence and views Afghanistan as
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essential for achieving strategic depth.

• Despite India's requests for direct land access to Afghanistan, Pakistan has refused to provide such facility
over its strategic concerns.
• Alternate routes India could use to access Afghanistan: in the absence of direct land access, India is also
working with Afghanistan and Iran to develop trilateral transit. Participation in development of Chahbahar
port will augment our connectivity with Afghanistan and beyond.
• India in October 2017 began shipment of wheat to Afghanistan through the Iranian port of Chabahar.
• India and Afghanistan have also established two air corridors - one between Delhi and Kabul and the other
Kandahar to Delhi - to carry goods at subsidised rates.

Map 3.7 Connecting Afghanistan
Image Source: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article19945496.ece/alternates/FREE_660/Geo-strategiccol
2.5 MULTIPLE ASPECTS OF COOPERATION

• India delivered three Russia-made Mi-25 attack helicopters to Afghanistan in 2015 and 2016. Reports
suggest it is to deliver an additional helicopter soon.
• India remains wary of any efforts to reconcile with Taliban. In course of time India reconciled with the fact
that others including the US wanted to include Taliban in the talks, however the Indian position includes the
Taliban who renounce violence.
• For India any process of reconciliation should remain Afghan led, transparent and inclusive. Thus, India
stresses so much on the capacity building of the Afghan government.
• India is also considering a run of the river project on the Kabul river. This can put pressure on Pakistan in
the context of the Indus Water Treaty. Pakistan and Afghanistan have now river water treaty.
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VISION IAS
www.visionias.in
LECTURE-4
INDIA AND CHINA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INDIA AND CHINA ................................................................................................................................................... 2
1.1. Background ...................................................................................................................................................... 2
1.1.1. Evolution ................................................................................................................................................... 2
1.2. Boundary Question and Territorial Integrity ................................................................................................... 5
1.3. India-China Border: Specific Sectors................................................................................................................ 6
1.3.1. Western Sector ......................................................................................................................................... 6
1.3.2. The Eastern Sector.................................................................................................................................... 6
1.3.3. The Middle Sector .................................................................................................................................... 6
1.4. Current Negotiation Framework ..................................................................................................................... 6
1.4.1. Progress in Negotiations Since 2005 ........................................................................................................ 6
1.5. The Incident in Doklam Area-2017 .................................................................................................................. 7
1.5.1. Confrontation at the Borders: A Pattern .................................................................................................. 8
1.6. Rivers ............................................................................................................................................................... 8
1.7. Trade and Economy ......................................................................................................................................... 9
1.8. Geo-Strategic Competition ............................................................................................................................ 10
1.9. India’s Response Mechanism ........................................................................................................................ 10
1.10. Multilateral Engagement ............................................................................................................................. 10
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1.10.1 The BCIM Corridor ................................................................................................................................. 11

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1.11. OBOR/BRI .................................................................................................................................................... 12

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1.11.1. Early Assessment of OBOR/BRI ............................................................................................................ 12

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1.11.2. India and the OBOR .............................................................................................................................. 13

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1.12. The Pakistan Factor ..................................................................................................................................... 13

1.13. The USA Factor ............................................................................................................................................ 13
1.14. The Russia Factor ......................................................................................................................................... 13
1.15. The Japan Factor.......................................................................................................................................... 14
1.16. The Rise of China and India ......................................................................................................................... 14

1. INDIA AND CHINA
Map 4.1- China
1.1. BACKGROUND
• India shares total border of around 3,488 k.m with China (second largest after Bangladesh).
• The border is not fully demarcated and the process of clarifying and confirming the Line of Actual Control
is in progress. It is characterized by high altitude terrain and inadequate development of infrastructure in
these regions. The Sino-Indian border can be divided into three sectors namely: Western sector, Middle
sector, and Eastern sector
• 5 states viz. Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh share
border with China.
• Major rivers such as Indus, Brahmaputra originate in China. India is a lower riparian state.
• China is not an Indian Ocean littoral country, neither is India a Pacific littoral countries.
• In 2005- During Premier Hu Jintao’s visit to India, the two sides signed the strategic partnership agreement
1.1.1. EVOLUTION
• 30 December 1949: India became the second non-communist nation to recognize the Peoples’ Republic of
China after its proclamation on 1 October.
• 7 October 1950: The Peoples Liberation Army, Chinese troops, crossed the Sino-Tibetan boundary, and
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moved towards Lhasa, Tibet. This was for the first time since 1793 when a Chinese Tibetan army had
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marched till Kathmandu to punish Nepal’ rulers, India faced large Chinese army on its northern borders.
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The British policy had aimed at making Tibet a buffer to avoid such a scenario.
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• May 1951: China forced the Tibetan Governor of Chamdo to concede full suzerainty over Tibet.
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15 May 1954: China and India signed the Panchsheel document.

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• 2 March 1955: India objects to the inclusion of a portion of India’s northern frontier on the official map of
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China, saying it was a clear infringement of Panchsheel.

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• 1 April 1955: India signs a Protocol at Lhasa handing over to China the control of all communication
services in Tibet.
• November 1956: Zhou Enlai visits India for the second time on a goodwill mission.
• 18 December 1956: Chinese nationals who entered Ladakh were illegally detained and later sent back to
China.
• September 1957: Indian Vice-President S. Radhakrishnan’s visits China.
• 4 September 1958: India officially objects to the inclusion of a big chunk of Northern Assam and NEFA in
the China Pictorial - an official organ of the Chinese Peoples’ Republic.
• 23 January 1959: Zhou Enlai spells out for the first time China’s claims to over 40,000 square miles of

Indian territory both in Ladakh and NEFA.
• 3 April 1959: Dalai Lama escapes from Lhasa and crosses into Indian territory. India’s decision to grant
asylum to him sours relations with Beijing.
• 8 September 1959: China refuses to accept the Mc Mohan Line with Zhou Enlai stating that China was not a
signatory to the 1842 Peace Treaty between British India and England. Further, Beijing laid claims to almost
50,000 square miles of Indian territory in Sikkim and Bhutan.
• 19 April 1960: A meeting in New Delhi between Zhou Enlai and Nehru to address the boundary question
ends in deadlock.
• February 1961: China refuses to discuss the Sino-Bhutanese and Sino-Sikkimese boundary disputes and
further occupies 12,000 square miles in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border.
• 15-18 November 1962: A massive Chinese attack on the eastern front, Tawang, Walong in the western
sector over run, Rezang La and the Chushul airport shelled. Chinese troops capture Bomdila in the NEFA
region
• 21 November 1962: China declares a unilateral ceasefire along the entire border and announces
withdrawal of its troops to position 20km behind the LAC.
• 8 December 1962: China sends a note signed by Zhou Enlai to India reiterating the three-point ceasefire
formula.
o Both parties would respect the Line of Actual Control,
o the armed forces would withdraw 20km from this line and;
o talks between the prime-ministers of both countries to seek a friendly settlement.
• India accepts and later on 10 December endorses Colombo proposals.
• 2 March 1963: China and Pakistan sign a boundary settlement in Beijing between Kashmir and Xinjiang
where Pakistan ceded 5080 sq. km of Pakistan occupied Kashmir territory.
• 27 August 1965: China accuses India of crossing the Sikkim-China boundary.
• 30 November 1965: Chinese troops intrude into north Sikkim and NEFA once again.
• 1986: Differences surface over the precise limits of the McMahon Line in the Sumdorung Chu area of
Arunachal Pradesh.
• 8 December 1986: Beijing express strong condemnation over the establishment of Arunachal Pradesh as a
full fledged State of the Indian Union.
• December1988: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visits China. Agreement to set up a Joint Working Group on
Boundary question and a Joint Group on Economic Relations, Trade, Science and Technology signed.
• December 1991: Chinese premier Li Peng visits India after a gap of 31 years, pledges to resolve the boundary
question through friendly consultations.
• September 1993: Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao visits China, signs agreement on Border Peace and
Tranquility and the setting up of the India-China Expert Group of Diplomatic and Military Officers to assist
the work in Joint Working Group.
• 1994: Vice-President K R Narayanan visits China.
• August 1995: India and China agree to pull back their troops on the Sumdorong Chu Valley in the eastern
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• November 1996: Chinese President Jiang Zemin visits India, signs Agreement on Confidence Building
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Measures (CBM) in the military field along the LAC in the India-China Border Areas.
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• August 1997: The India-China Joint Working Group meets in New Delhi. Instruments of ratification in respect
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to Confidence Building Measures agreement exchanged.

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• May 1998: Defence minister George Fernandes reported claim that China was India’s threat number one
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• 14 May 1998: China strongly condemns India’s second peaceful nuclear tests.
• July 1998: China urges India and Pakistan to give up their nuclear ambitions and sign the NPT.
• August 1998: India officially announces talks with China on the reopening of the Ladakh-Kailash-Mansarovar
route.
• June 1999: China displays neutrality on the Kargil conflict and agrees to establish a security mechanism with
India.
• 28 September 1999: China asks New Delhi to stop the ‘splitting activities’ of Dalai Lama from Indian soil to
improve bilateral relations.
• 24 November 1999: India and China hold detailed discussions in New Delhi on ways to settle their border
row.
• 7 January 2000: Karmapa Lama flees China, reaches Dharamshala and joins the Dalai Lama.
• 11 January 2000: Beijing warns that giving political asylum to the Karmapa would violate the five principles
of peaceful coexistence.
• 4 January 2000: India officially declares to China that the 17th Karmapa has arrived in Dharamshala, but has
not been granted refugee status.
• 22 January 2000: The Dalai Lama writes to the Prime Minister urging him to accord protection to the 17th
Karmapa.
• 31 January 2000: The Chinese Peoples Liberation Army build a permanent road network and sets up bunkers
5km in the Indian side of the LAC in Ladakh’s Aksai Chin area.
• 22 February 2000: India and China sign a bilateral trade agreement in Beijing to facilitate China’s early entry
into the WTO and an MOU for setting up a Joint Working Group in the field of steel.
• 1 April 2000: India and China commemorate 50th anniversary of their diplomatic relations.
• 13 January 2002: Chinese premier Zhu Rongji visits India.
• 29 March 2002: India and China agree in Beijing to quicken the pace of LAC delineation in order to resolve
the vexatious border dispute within a reasonable time-frame.
• 23 June 2003: Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee makes a landmark visit to China. This marks the
Beginning of the Special Representatives framework on Border negotiations
• April 9, 2005: Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visits Bangalore to push for an increase in Sino-Indian
cooperation in high-tech industries. India and China also sign an agreement aimed at resolving disputes
over their Himalayan border.
• 6 July 2006: China and India re-open Nathu La Pass, which was closed since the Sino-Indian war in 1962.
• 25 May 2007: China denies a visa to Arunachal Pradesh chief minister, arguing that since the state is in fact a
part of China he would not require a visa to visit his own country.
• 13 October 2009: China objects to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh.
• 3 January 2009: Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visits China. Bilateral trade surpasses $50 billion and
China becomes India’s largest trading partner in goods.
• 27 August 2010: India cancels defense exchanges with China after Beijing refuses to permit Lt. Gen. B.S.
Jaswal, head of the northern command, a visa because he “controlled” the disputed area of Jammu and
Kashmir. India subsequently refuses to allow two Chinese defense officials to visit New Delhi.
• November 2010: China started the practice of issuing stapled visas to people from Jammu and Kashmir.
• April 2013: The Chinese troops intruded into Depsang Bulge in East Ladakh, approximately 19 km inside our
perception of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) claimed it to be a part of its Xinjiang province. They were,
however, pushed back.
• May 2014: China congratulates Modi’s election victory. Later in the month, Modi’s visit to Arunachal
Pradesh, which China considers disputed territory, invites remarks from the Chinese foreign ministry.
• June 2014: China’s foreign minister Wang Yi visits New Delhi to hold talks with his Indian counterpart
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Sushma Swaraj and Modi. Later in June, India’s vice president, Hamid Ansari, travels to Beijing on a five-day
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July 2014: India’s army chief Bikram Singh travels to Beijing for a three-day trip. Later that month, P.M. Modi
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meets Xi for the first time during the BRICS summit in Brazil. The two meet for almost 80 minutes.
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• August 2014: PM Modi visits Japan for five days and makes a speech describing the world as divided into two
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• September 2014: President Xi visits India, and P.M. Modi, breaking protocol, receives him in Ahmedabad.
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They spend an evening strolling on the banks of the Sabarmati river. China promises $20 billion worth of
investments in India over five years. Both countries, however, remain engaged in a face-off at the border in
Ladakh, after Chinese troops allegedly crossed over to the Indian side, through the entire visit.
• November 2014: President Xi invites P.M. Modi to attend the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation)
summit in Beijing. Modi declines the offer, but travels to Myanmar, Australia and Fiji. India also appoints its
national security advisor, Ajit Doval, as the country’s special representative for Sino-India boundary
negotiations.
• January 2015: During US president Barack Obama’s Republic Day visit, Obama and Modi reportedly spend
some 45 minutes talking about China, and both express concern about Beijing’s expansionist stance,
especially in the South China Sea.
• February 2015: Less than a week after Obama’s departure visit, foreign minister Swaraj leaves for Beijing and
meets president Xi.
• March 2015: India starts the 18th round of talks with China over the land boundary issue. National security
advisor Doval and China’s special representative Yang Jiechi meet in Delhi.
• May 2015: P.M. Modi visited China. His first stop is Xian, Xi’s home town, after which he’ll head to Beijing.
• October 2016: P.M. Modi meets Chinese president Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Goa BRICS Summit.
• May 2017: India declines Chinese invitation to attend the Belt and Road Initiative summit in Beijing and
issues a detailed statement listing its objections.
• 8-9 June 2017: India admitted to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as full-member along with
Pakistan. Modi meets Chinese president Xi Jinping and thanks for his country’s support for India’s full
membership in SCO.
1.2. BOUNDARY QUESTION AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

• despite over 30 years of regular dialogues, Sino-Indian border issues remain complicated and difficult.
• China continues to be in illegal occupation of approximately 38,000 sq. kms. in the Indian state of Jammu
and Kashmir. In addition, under the so-called `Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of 1963`, Pakistan
illegally ceded 5180 sq. kms. of Indian territory in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir to China.
• China honed its "salami tactics" in the Himalayas in the 1950s, when it grabbed the Aksai Chin plateau by
surreptitiously building a strategic highway through that unguarded region. Aksai Chin, part of the original
princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, provided China with the only passageway between its restive regions
of Tibet and Xinjiang.
• In 1993, the signing of an Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual
Control (LAC) on the India-China Border Areas.
• The LAC currently represents the de-facto border between India and China and is divided into three
sectors: the western, middle, and eastern
• As many as 15 rounds of negotiations were held under the JWG mechanism between 1988 and 2003.
• The talks were rebooted to the current Special Representative (SR) mechanism in 2003 after prime minister
AB Vajpayee’s China visit.
• Between 2003 and 2005, Beijing incrementally and implicitly but formally recognized Sikkim as a state of
the Indian Union, changing a 20 year long policy.
Map4.2India-China Border
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Image Source: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article19180924.ece/alternates/FREE_615/ChinaJPG

1.3. INDIA-CHINA BORDER: SPECIFIC SECTORS
1.3.1. WESTERN SECTOR
• Aksai Chin is the biggest disputed territory is 38,000 sq km in size. It is under the occupation of China but
claimed by India as part of the Ladakh district of Jammu and Kashmir
• Neither of the countries have sufficient documents to make strong historical claims in the area. However,
more than the legal claims, the region has huge strategic significance for China to gain access to Tibet region.
• Historically British always wanted to create outer Tibet as a buffer zone. Boundaries in the western sector
were hardly demarcated.
• In 1957, China built its Western Highway that connects Xinjiang with Tibet, cutting across Aksai Chin.
Eventually occupied it after 1962.
• In the Ladakh sector, the question of where exactly Chinese forces stood after the war remains contested.
• Demarcating boundary in Aksai Chin is more complicated because it has never been an inhabited area &
no markers really exist to demarcate their sovereignty.
1.3.2. THE EASTERN SECTOR
• At the 1914 China-Tibet-Britain Simla Convention, Sir Henry McMahon, foreign secretary of British India,
drew up the 890-km McMahon Line as the border between British India and Tibet.
• The line, drawn primarily on the highest watershed principle, marked out previously unclaimed/undefined
borders between Britain and Tibet.
• The line put Tawang and other Tibetan areas in the British empire. The line was forgotten until the British
government published the documents in the 1937 edition of Aitchison’s Collection of Treaties.
Subsequently, China refused to accept the line.
• In the Arunachal sector, China treats the McMahon Line as the LAC. But it challenges India’s claim that it
should follow the watershed. China lays its calim on Arunachal as “South Tibet” and is specifically keen on
the Tawang area.
1.3.3. THE MIDDLE SECTOR
• Disagreement between in certain areas such as the Barahoti plains in Uttarakhand
• Sikkim sector is considered to be settled by China. For a long time, China did not accept Sikkim’s accession to
be a legitimate territory of India. It was only after the joint statement of 2005, China formally accepted
Sikkim as a state of India.
• The basic problem is lack of any formal treaty defining the boundaries & varying interpretation of Indo-
China border. Both the countries went for a full fledged war in 1962 over the issue.
1.4. CURRENT NEGOTIATION FRAMEWORK

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In 2003 during PM Vajpayee’s visit to China the 1st comprehensive document for development of bilateral
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ties was signed at the highest level. During this visit both sides agreed to establish a special representative
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mechanism for settling the boundary dispute issue.

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For resolving the border dispute the talks are supposed to proceed through a three staged process-
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o Stage 1- agreement on the broad principles and political parameters that will be followed for resolving
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the border dispute.

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o Stage 2- negotiating the broad framework for resolving disputes in all sectors
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o Stage 3- delineating the border in maps and on ground

• In 2005, an agreement was reached on the “political parameters & guiding principles” (stage 1 of
negotiations was completed) that should be followed to resolve the boundary dispute.
1.4.1. PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS SINCE 2005
• Currently the talks are in the second stage. In December 2017 SR meeting was the 20th round of
negotiations to come to an agreement upon the broad framework, after which the talks can enter the last
stage.
• Some observers have voiced their opinion that the talks have been stuck in a deadlock in the 2nd stage of
the three staged process.
• In November 2013, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Beijing, both sides signed a Border
Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) aimed at expanding on the ground engagement and formalising
patrolling rules to prevent recurrence of stand-offs.
1.5. THE INCIDENT IN DOKLAM AREA-2017

Map4.3-Doklam Area
Source: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article12665125.ece/alternates/FREE_660/India%20Bhutan%20China
• The land in question spans 269 square kilometres on a sparsely populated plateau in western Bhutan,
which has no diplomatic ties with China and coordinates its relations with Beijing through New Delhi.
• In 1890, convention Between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet was signed which
delimited the boundary between the Tibet region of China and Sikkim. China claimed India violated this
convention.
Map4.4-China-Bhutan
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Image Source: https://i0.wp.com/thewire.in/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Chinese_incursion_Bhutan.jpg?resize=648%2C505&ssl=1

• In June 2017 the Indian troops thwarted Chinese attempts to build a road in this area which constitutes the
trijunction between the three countries and is close to India’s Siliguri corridor. This led to a 73-day-long
military standoff between the two countries which ended in August 2017 with the disengagement of the
Indiana and Chinese forces.
• Bhutan said the road China has been building would run from the town of Dokola to the Bhutanese army
camp at Zompelri.
• India argued that the two governments reached an agreement in 2012 that the status of the Doklam area
which falls between China and India on a Bhutanese plateau would be finalised only through joint
consultations involving all parties.
• Bhutan’s Foreign Ministry called it a “direct violation” of agreements reached in 1988 and 1998 to
maintain peace and refrain from unilateral action in the area pending a final border settlement.
• Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang argued that India had “illegally trespassed the boundary into
Chinese territory” when they confronted the Chinese army construction team.
• The Chinese have responded by suspending the Kailash-Mansoravar yatra through the Nathu La pass and
even warning India to not forget “historical lessons” from the 1962 war.
• For India, securing the Doklam Plateau is seen as essential to the Siliguri corridor, that connects to its
remote northeastern States.
• India has said the Chinese road project threatens its access to the corridor, while China has questioned why
India should even have a say in a matter that concerns only Beijing and Bhutan.
• Indian analysts said China appeared to be trying to pre-empt settlement negotiations by establishing its
presence in Doklam, As Beijing has been trying long to gain a tactical advantage in this sector.
• The dispute was discussed briefly without resolution by Chinese President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister
Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the G-20 summit.
• With the August 28, 2017 disengagement while the crisis has been defused for the time being, the
probability of a future flare up cannot be ruled out.
1.5.1. CONFRONTATION AT THE BORDERS: A PATTERN
• There Have been other such skirmishes in the past too:
• Military stand-off in Chumar-Demchok area in Ladakh region 2014.Chumar area, on the other hand, was
never contested till recently and was beyond the Chinese claim line of 1960.
• In the Depsang incident 2013, Area intruded was beyond the 1960 claim line of China and also beyond the
farthest line up to which Chinese army had reached during 1962 War, the LAC in this area has not been
mutually agreed upon.
1.6. RIVERS
Map4.5-Chinese Dams on the Brahmaputra
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Image Source: http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/multimedia/dynamic/01418/brahmaputra_new_1418338f.jpg

• India and China Share major River Systems such as the Indus and the Brahmaputra. The two countries do
not have any treaty arrangements on the river for water sharing. Under existing bilateral MoU, China
provides to India hydrological information of Brahmaputra River (Yarlong Zangbo) and Sutlej River
(Langqen Zangbo) during the flood seasons.
• Brahmaputra, originates in Tibet, known as the Yarlung Tsangpo there, and flows down to India and
further enters Bangladesh where it joins the Ganges and empties into the Bay of Bengal. About 18 percent
of Brahmaputra’s water is contributed by glacial melt in Tibet. Most of its water is contributed by rainfall in
the Indian territory
• India, China and Bangladesh don't have a joint treaty for the management of Brahmaputra.
• India and China, in 2006, set up an expert level mechanism to discuss interaction and cooperation on sharing
flood season hydrological data, emergency management, and other issues regarding trans-border rivers.
• Hydrological data of the river is shared by China, under a MoU signed in October 2013, during monsoon
season between 15 May and 15 October. The data is mainly of the water level of the river to alert
downstream countries in case of floods.
• Delhi has also asked for data for non-monsoonal flows of the river, because there are suspicions in India
that China could divert the waters of the Brahmaputra to its parched regions during dry seasons.
• In 2017 monsoon season India did not receive hydrological data - for the Brahmaputra river from upstream
China, despite the agreement.
• Beijing has constructed several hydropower dams on the river, which is known as Yarlung ZangboTsangpo)
in Tibet. The Zangmu dam was operationalised in 2015.
• China says the dams do not store or divert water and they will not be against the interest of downstream
countries. But in recent years, particularly in northeastern India, fears are also growing that China could
suddenly release a huge amount of water.
• The issue of the pollution of the Siang river which has contaminated the flow of the Brahmaputra in Assam.
Though India has raised the issue during December 2017 discussion with visiting foreign minister Wang Yi,
the Chinese foreign ministry’s spokesperson has dismissed the report.
• Experts argue that in view of China’s dam building- which causes concerns of diversion of river water, lack of
non-monsoonal data and interruption in data sharing, India should push for a comprehensive river water
treaty for Brahmaputra. However, the impending border dispute is a hurdle fro any such dispute.
• Pending such comprehensive treaty India must use available technological resources, satellite imagery etc.
to monitor the river flow.
• In this context involving Bangladesh, which is also a co-riparian can be considered to strengthen India’s
position.
1.7. TRADE AND ECONOMY

• Rapid Growth: Trade volume between the two countries in the beginning of the century, year 2000, stood at
US$ 3 billion. In 2008, bilateral trade reached US$ 51.8 billion with China replacing the United States as
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India’s largest “Goods trading partner.” In 2011 bilateral trade reached an all-time high of US$ 73.9 billion.
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According to recently released data by Chinese Customs, India-China trade in 2016 decreased by 0.67% year-
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on-year to US$ 71.18 billion. India’s exports to China decreased by 12.29% year-on-year to US$ 11.748 billion
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while India’s imports from China saw a year-on-year growth of 2.01% to US$ 59.428 billion.
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• The Indian trade deficit with China is a matter of concern. It stood at $51.08 billion in 2016-17 and $52.69
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In 2016, India was the 7th largest export destination for Chinese products, and the 27th largest exporter to
China.
• India-China trade in the first eight months of 2017 increased by 18.34% year-on-year to US$ 55.11 billion.
India’s exports to China increased by 40.69% year-on-year to US$ 10.60 billion while India’s imports from
China saw a year-on-year growth of 14.02 % to US$ 44.50 billion.
• The India-China Economic and Commercial Relations are shaped through various dialogue mechanism
such as:
o Joint Economic Group led by the Commerce Ministers of both sides,
o Strategic Economic Dialogues led by the Vice Chairman of NITI Ayog and the Chairman of National
Development and Reform Commission of China,
o the NITI Aayog and the Development Research Center Dialogue and
o the Financial Dialogue led by Secretary Department of Economic Affairs of India and Vice Minister,
Ministry of Finance of PRC.
• Some of the other institutionalized dialogue mechanisms between the two countries include the Joint
Working Group (JWG) on Trade, JWG on Collaboration in Skill Development and Vocational Education, Joint
Working Group on Information and Communication Technology & High-Technology, Joint Study Group and
Joint Task Force on Regional Trading Agreement (RTA), India-China Joint Working Group on Agriculture,
India-China Joint Working Group on Cooperation in Energy and the.
1.8. GEO-STRATEGIC COMPETITION

• The relation between India and China are shaped and influenced by perceived and real competition that can
turn into conflict and needs to be managed.
• The rise of China and India coincide, historically rise of powers has resulted in conflict. South Asia, South-
East Asia, Indo-Pacific and Africa are certain regions wher this pattern can be seen.
• Recent decades have seen the emergence of ideas, such as the String of Pearls, a term coined by US based
academics, which refers to the network of Chinese military and commercial facilities and relationships
along its sea lines of communication. The sea lines run through several major maritime choke points such as
the Strait of Mandeb (connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden), the Strait of Malacca ( stretch of water
between the peninsular Malaysia and the Indonesian island of Sumatra).
• The One Belt One Road initiative also involves building maritime infrastructure in the Indian Ocean; this has
strategic implications for India. Key countries in India’s nieghbourhood- Pakistan, , Sri Lanka, Maldives,
Myanmar, Bangladesh- are important locations for OBOR.
1.9. INDIA’S RESPONSE MECHANISM

• Malabar Exercise Since 1992: Multi lateral Naval exercise including Japan and the USA. Past non-
permanent participants are Australia and Singapore.
• India-Japan-Australia trilateral
• India-Japan-Australia-US Quadrilateral, Quad Met at the Sidelines of the ASEAN summit at Manila in
November 2017. It is perceived as a coming-together of likeminded Asia-Pacific democracies to balance
China.
• Metal Chain and Iron curtain: Naval analyst Zhang Ming recently proclaimed that the Islands of India’s
Andaman and Nicobar Archipelago could be used as a ‘metal chain’ to block Chinese access to the Straits of
Malacca. China has gone further to claim that India is building an ‘Iron Curtain’ in the Indian Ocean, which is
debatable.
• String of flowers: since 2015, agreements have been signed by India to develop infrastructure on Agalega
islands in Mauritius and Assumption Island of Seychelles. They add to an Indian listening post on
Madagascar, off the coast of Africa, commissioned in 2007 to monitor activities of foreign navies in the
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Indian Ocean Region (IOR). These are termed as the emergence of an Indian 'String of Flowers' to counter
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• However both countries have denied having either a string of pearls or a string of flowers strategy.
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1.10. MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT

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Being significant international actors in their own right, India and China interact at various multilateral
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forums on multiple issues. There are many instances of cooperation but also a few key issues of difference
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in this context.
• Anti-Piracy operations: in Gulf of Aden and horn of Africa naval coordination between India and China.
• BCIM corridor: Both countries have been engaging in dialogue on promoting regional connectivity
through the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor
• BRICS: Multilateral Cooperation on the issues of common concerns is promoted at this forum which also
includes Russia, Brazil and South Africa e.g. the NDB as alternative to the Brettonwoods institutions
• BASIC: bloc of four large newly industrialized countries – Brazil, South Africa, India and China – formed
by an agreement on 28 November 2009. The four committed to act jointly at the Copenhagen climate
summit.

• RIC: Russia-India-China Foreign Ministerial Forum is the platform of the three major countires is aimed
at facilitating common position on key global challenges -- radical ideas, terror threats, Afghanistan and
West Asia.
• SCO: The central Asia based organisation is a forum at which both India and China are members.
Countering terrorism is one of the prime objectives of this organisation.
• AIIB: It is a Chinese multilateral initiative which India has joined as the second largest capital
contributor and shareholder.
• G-20: Both the nations are member of this grouping of developed and emerging economies for
deliberating of global economic issues.
• United Nations: The China being a permanent member of UNSC is important for India achieving its aims
such as UNSC reforms and action agains terrorism. However, in recent times Chinese attitude towards
India’s candidature and UNSC reforms has been ambiguous. It has also been blocking India’s reqaues
at the 1267 committee to consider banning of Masood Azhar, the head of the Jaish-e-Mohammed,
• OBOR/BRI: The Chinese connectivity initiative was not joined by India which remains sceptical about
the aims and methods of the initiative.
• NSG: China has been blocking India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It has reiterated that
India’s inclusion in the Nuclear Suppliers Group is contingent upon the country signing the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty.
1.10.1 THE BCIM CORRIDOR
• One of the key policy initiatives among national governments in Asia in recent years is directed towards
developing sub-regional, regional and trans-regional corridors with the aim to further connect and integrate
their economies.
• One such corridor is the proposed Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar-Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC)
involving four nations and has generated much interests as well as concerns.
• Conceived as a sub-regional economic cooperation, BCIM initiative was launched in 1999 in Kunming, the
capital of Chinese Yunnan province.
• Two prominent objectives had driven the BCIM- one is economic integration of the sub-region that would
also enable integration of Asia and the other is development of the border regions. The BCIM priority
agenda has evolved over time. From the 3-T’s of Trade, Transport, and Tourism, the BCIM priority agenda
has moved to TTE (Trade, Transport, and Energy).
• The year 2013 was crucial in the development of BCIM initiative. In February that year a car rally from
Kunming to Kolkata (K2K) was organised with great success.The idea was first mooted in 2006 by Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh during Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to New Delhi.In October 2013, during
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to China, Kolkata and Kunming as sister-cities was unveiled.
• India and China have a Joint Study Group on BCIM Economic Corridor. The first meeting of the study was
held in December 2013 in Kunming officially set the mechanism to promote cooperation.
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• There are various political and security issues at the local, national, regional levels that need to be
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Trade architectures, transit facilities, infrastructure capabilities are all important but these operational
aspects of economic corridor need to be discussed within the larger societal context. Perhaps, the question
boils down to who gets what, and at what cost if the BCIM-EC is seen purely from the economic perspective.
• If one expands the scope of the BCIM framework to the society there is a lot that the BCIM initiative could
offer to all stakeholders. While top-down governmental initiatives are important, it is the society that
determines the success or failure of any national and transnational initiatives.

Map4.6-The BCIM Corridor
Image Source: http://www.thehindu.com/migration_catalog/article10441468.ece/alternates/FREE_660/HURDLES-TO-PROG+HURDLES-TO-PROGRESS.jpg
1.11. OBOR/BRI
• 6 September 2013, Astana, Xi Jinping’s Speech-Land based silk road economic belt
• In October 2013, his soeech at the Indonesian parliament spelled out the idea of Maritime silkroute.
• These two ideas combined to form the ambitious One Belt One Road (OBOR) also know as the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI)
• Considered as the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ambitious project, the One Belt One Road initiative focuses
on:
o On improving connectivity and cooperation among Asian countries, Africa, China and Europe.
o The emphasis is on enhancing land as well as maritime routes. The policy is significant for China since
it aims to boost domestic growth in the country.
• It will impact 4.4 billion people.
• China is said to be spending $1 trillion on it.
• It is not one project but six major routes which will include several railways line, roads, ports and other
infrastructure.
• Experts have noted that also a part of China’s strategy for economic diplomacy. Considering China’s
exclusion from G7, OBOR policy might just provide China an opportunity to continue its economic
development.
• China claims these economic corridors will not only build infrastructure in countries that cannot afford to
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among leaders, including 29 Heads of State, on OBOR. It also marked the official launch of the OBOR. India
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1.11.1. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF OBOR/BRI

• China’s strategy: China's strategy to grab land and assets in smaller, less-developed countries is simple: it
gives them loans on high rates for infrastructural projects, gets equity into projects, and when the country
is unable to repay the loan, it gets ownership of the project. Thus, it is also seen as a unilateral and
exploitative project that involves strategic footholds in important locations around the world
• China’s image: Many expect this scenario to unfold in dozens of small countries in Asia and Africa if OBOR
project becomes a reality. Touted as a global partnership by China, many including the United States,
believe that OBOR is actually an exploitative, colonial stratagem to gain vital vital assets in small
countries.
• The investment: the investment estimates for project of such a magnitude are touted to be in excess of
US$ 5 trillion, whereas current Chinese commitment stands at estimated US$ 1 trillion
• Early indicators: In November 2017, Pakistan turned down China's offer of assistance for the $14-billion
Diamer-Bhasha Dam. Pakistan has asked China to take the project out of the nearly $60 billion China
Pakistan Economic Corridor a part of OBOR—and allow it to build the dam on its own. The reason: it found
China's conditions exploitative. From its early reception, it is clear OBOR faces difficulties even in countries
that count China as a friend. Incidents in Sri Lanka, Nepal and Pakistan have cast serious doubts over
China's project to dominate the world through investments in infrastructure.
1.11.2. INDIA AND THE OBOR
• India is the only South-Asian country, apart from Bhutan, not to be involved in the Asian superpower’s
ambitious project.
• The main reason behind India’s opposition towards the policy is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC), which is a part of OBOR.
• Accordin to the MEA India is all for promoting connectivity, however the problem with the OBOR, is that
since the so-called CPEC forms a part of OBOR, and it passes through Indian territory.
• Citing sovereignty issues, India has raised objections over CPEC projects in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir
(PoK).
• China, however, initially did not try to attenuate India’s concerns. “The CPEC is a flagship project, but all
countries in South Asia have now confirmed participation in the Belt and Road Forum and are making use of
the initiative,” Wang Dehua, Director, Institute for South and Central Asia Studies in Shanghai.
• In November 2017, the Chinese Ambassador to India indicated that China“ can change the name of CPEC"
and "create an alternative corridor through Jammu & Kashmir, Nathu La pass or Nepal to deal with India's
concerns".
• Recognizing the significance of connectivity and infrastructure India is putting forward alternatives such as
the INSTC, Cahabahar corridor and the Asia-Africa growth corridor
1.12. THE PAKISTAN FACTOR

• With its strategic position, Pakistan offers China an opportunity to expand its influence against India in
South Asia.
• Beijing has been showering Islamabad with military and economic aid, such as the multibillion dollar China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor, which concerns India as it traverses through PoK.
• Pakistan’s support to China over the South China Sea issue and its willingness to provide China a foothold in
the Indian Ocean throught the Gwadar port also add to the concerns of India.
1.13. THE USA FACTOR

• The USA and China are strategic rivals. As china rises and asserts itself the US would be trying to contain it.
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• The indication of rising tensions can be found in the recently released (December 2017) Nations Security
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Strategy document of the USA as well as tariff escalation in 2018.

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1.14. THE RUSSIA FACTOR

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• Russia and China had frosty relations for much of the Soviet era (Sino Soviet rift of the 1960s). The two
countries faced off in 1969 border skirmishes. This led China to open up to the USA in 1971.
• However, in the recent years there has been a greater convergence between the two countries on the
issues of western interventionism, SCO, Syria, Crimea and South China Sea. In 2014 the two sides inked a
30-year, $400bn (£237bn) deal for Gazprom to deliver Russian gas to China in a deal that underscores
Russia's shift towards Asia amid strained relations with the west.
• Thus, there seems to be a short term convergence, however this sits on deep seated geographical realities
that can change the scenario.
• The RIC forum is a key to this triangular interaction for India.
1.15. THE JAPAN FACTOR
• Japan and China have a complex relationship. The era of Japanese imperialism between the two world wars
is a source of bitter memory.
• The dispute over the Senkaku (japan)/Diaoyu (China) islands is a sign of increasing tension.
• In such a scenario Japan has started courting India. This scenario has both opportunities and challenges for
India.
• Japan had strongly supported India during the Doklam Standoff.
1.16. THE RISE OF CHINA AND INDIA

• President Xi- Jinping, is considered to be the strongest leader since Den Xiaoping and by some after Mao.
OBOR is his brainchild.
• At the recent 19th Party Congress in October 2017-Xi Jinping thought was included in the constitution
along with the OBOR.Xi further consolidated his power at the weeklong leadership reshuffle event, held
every five years.
• Xi underlined the theme of this year’s congress as never forgetting the party’s founding purpose, including
realization of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”—also known as the “Chinese Dream”.
• Under Xi China’s rise has acquired assertive tone and this is expected to continue. e.g. the South China sea
issue.
• China under Xi has caused alarm, interest and caution in the international community.
• India needs to continue cooperation wherever possible, augment is own strength and resolve border and
river disputes amicably. A framework is available for such a strategy.
• For India, the first step is to understand China better, the recent move by the Ministry of External affairs to
establish a think tank dedicated to China with experts fluent in Chinese is perhaps a good start.
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VISION IAS
www.visionias.in
LECTURE-5
INDIA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INDIA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA ................................................................................................................................. 3
1.1. Myanmar: The Gateway to South East Asia .................................................................................................... 3
1.2. India-Myanmar Relations ................................................................................................................................ 3
1.2.1. Key Visits ................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.2.2. Trade ......................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.2.3. Development Assistance .......................................................................................................................... 4
1.2.4. Security ..................................................................................................................................................... 5
1.2.5. Bilateral Cooperation in Regional/Sub-Regional Context ........................................................................ 5
1.2.6. Chinese Involvement in Myanmar............................................................................................................ 6
1.2.7. Significance of Myanmar .......................................................................................................................... 6
1.2.8. What Should India Do? ............................................................................................................................. 6
1.3. BIMSTEC........................................................................................................................................................... 6
1.4. Mekong-Ganga Cooperation ........................................................................................................................... 7
2. ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH EAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) ...................................................................................... 8
2.1. What is ASEAN? ............................................................................................................................................... 8
2.2. India and South East Asia ................................................................................................................................ 9
2.2.1. Background ............................................................................................................................................... 9
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2.2.2. From Look East to Act East: Evolving Policy Framework ........................................................................ 10
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2.2.3. The Look East Policy ............................................................................................................................... 10

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2.2.4. Taking the Look East Forward: Look East 2.0 or the New Look East ...................................................... 11
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2.2.5. The Act East: Action and Implementation Oriented Approach to a Wider East .................................... 11
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2.3. India-Asean .................................................................................................................................................... 12

2.3.1. India-ASEAN: Recent Developments ...................................................................................................... 12
2.3.2. Trade ....................................................................................................................................................... 12
2.3.3. Investment.............................................................................................................................................. 13
2.4. RCEP Negotiations: From Trade to Economic Partnership ............................................................................ 13
2.4.1. Significance of RCEP ............................................................................................................................... 13
2.4.2. RCEP and India’s Current Concerns ........................................................................................................ 14
2.5. Connectivity ................................................................................................................................................... 14
2.6. Security Factor in the region ......................................................................................................................... 15
2.6.1. The South China Sea Disputes ................................................................................................................ 16
2.6.2. India’s Position ....................................................................................................................................... 17
2.6.3. Need for Further Action: ........................................................................................................................ 17
2.7. Cultural Ties Between India and South East Asia .......................................................................................... 17
2.8. India and Singapore ....................................................................................................................................... 17
2.8.1. Background ............................................................................................................................................. 17
2.8.2. Trade & Investment ................................................................................................................................ 18
2.8.3. Smart Cities............................................................................................................................................. 18
2.8.4. Defence Cooperation.............................................................................................................................. 18
2.9. India and Vietnam ......................................................................................................................................... 19
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1. INDIA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA
1.1. MYANMAR: THE GATEWAY TO SOUTH EAST ASIA
Map5.1 Myanmar
Image Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/graphics/maps/bm-map.gif
1.2. INDIA-MYANMAR RELATIONS

• India shares a long land border of over 1600 Km with Myanmar (previously known as Burma) as well as a
maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal. Four north-eastern states (Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland,
Manipur and Mizoram) share boundary with Myanmar.
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India and Myanmar share close cultural ties and a sense of deep kinship given India's Buddhist heritage.
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Over a period of 62 years (1824-1886), Britain conquered Burma and incorporated the country into its
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Indian Empire. Burma was administered as a province of India until 1937

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There are varying estimates of 1.5-2.5 million people of Indian origin living and working in various parts of
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Myanmar
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• Myanmar is the only ASEAN country adjoining India and, therefore, India’s gateway to South East Asia with
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which we are seeking greater economic integration through India's 'Look East' and now 'Act East' Policy.
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The landslide victory by Aung San Suu Kyi-led National League for Democracy (NLD) in November 2015
general elections and the formation of NLD government has provided opportunities to strengthen the
engagement building on previous efforts.
• Various institutional mechanisms: The first meeting of the India-Myanmar Joint Consultative Commission
(JCC) was held on 16 July 2015 at New Delhi.
• Secretary-level meetings include Foreign Office Consultations at the level of Foreign Secretary/Dy Foreign
Minister.
• Myanmar side has provided assurances at the highest levels that it will cooperate with India in taking
necessary action in preventing the use of Myanmar territory for anti-India activity.

1.2.1. KEY VISITS
• Then PM Dr. Manmohan Singh’s State Visit to Myanmar took place (May 2012) after 25 years.
• Prime Minister Narendra Modi attended the 12thASEAN-India Summit and 9 th East Asia Summit (Nov 11-13,
2014, Nay Pyi Taw).
• Myanmar President U Htin Kyaw undertook a State Visit to India from August 27-30, 2016.
• State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi undertook a State Visit to India on 17- 19 October 2016 after
participating in the BRICS-BIMSTEC Outreach Summit in October, at Goa.
1.2.2. TRADE
• A bilateral Trade Agreement was signed in 1970. Bilateral trade has been growing steadily to reach
US$2178.44 million (2016-17), of which Indian exports amounted to US$1111.19 million and Indian's imports
to US$1067.25 million.
• India is the fifth largest trading partner of Myanmar but trade remains below potential. Agriculture sector
dominates trade, particularly supply of beans & pulses to India ($ 809million, 2016-17) and timber ($ 156
million).
• India's exports to Myanmar include sugar ($ 424 million), pharmaceuticals ($ 184 million), etc.
• Border trade via Moreh and Zawkhatar reached to $ 87.89 million; Indian exports being $ 24.44 million and
Indian imports being $ 63.46 million.
• India is presently the tenth largest investor with an approved investment of US$ 740.64 million by 25 Indian
companies (as of 30Jun 2017). Most India's investments have been in oil & gas sector. 100% FDI is allowed in
select sectors. Indian companies have evinced interest in investing in Myanmar and major contracts have
been won by Indian companies.
1.2.3. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
• Currently, according to the MEA, India's commitment to Myanmar's development stands at over US$
1.726 billion, which is more than the assistance offered by other countries.
• India has committed to provide grant-in-aid assistance amounting to almost Rs 4000 crore. These include
support for:
o the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project;
o the Trilateral Highway Project, which is an East-West corridor connecting our Northeast with Myanmar
and Thailand;
o the Rhi-Tiddim road;
o supply of Bailey bridges;
o assistance for border area development in the Naga Self Administered Zone by financing bridges, roads,
schools and small health centers;
o assistance in setting up institutions for higher learning and research, namely Myanmar Institute of
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Information Technology, Advance Centre for Agricultural Research and Education, Myanmar-India
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Entrepreneurship Development Centre, Myanmar-India Centre for English Language Training, India-
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Myanmar Industrial Training Centres, assistance in public health by supporting upgradation of Yangon
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Children's Hospital, Sittwe General Hospital etc.

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• Disaster Relief: India has responded promptly and effectively to assist Myanmar in humanitarian relief
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operations following natural calamities like Cyclone Mora (2017), Komen (2015), Cyclone Nargis in 2008,
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and earthquake in Shan Statein 2010.

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• On 20 December 2017, India and Myanmar an MoU, as a government-to-government (G2G) agreement

on long-term socio-economic development of Rakhine, with US$ 25 million commitment from India.

Map5.2 Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project
Image Source: http://www.myanmarmatters.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Vol6_014.jpg
1.2.3.1. Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport Project

• The project includes a waterways component of 158 km on Kaladan river from Sittwe to Paletwa in
Myanmar and a road component of 109 km from Paletwa to Zorinpui on the India-Myanmar border in
Mizoram State. The waterways component comprises Sittwe Port, Inland Water Transport (IWT) terminals,
backup facilities and navigational channel.
• Mooted in 2003, India entered a framework agreement with Myanmar for Kaladan project in 2008.
Construction began in 2010 with a deadline in June 2015. However, the project faced delays especially on
the road project. Inadequate fund allocation and planning failure were seen as major reasons for the delay.
• The project is being implemented with GoI’s grant assistance under the head of ‘Aid to Myanmar
• By Early 2017, Under waterways component, Port and Inland Water Transport (IWT) terminal at Sittwe and
related infrastructure/back up facilities; IWT/trans-shipment terminal and related facilities at Paletwa;
navigational channel along Kaladan river from Sittwe to Paletwa and six self-propelled IWT vessels have
been completed.
• The construction of the road component is behind schedule. The work on road construction has already
been awarded on 17 March 2017 and the construction period is 36 months.
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According to sources, as per the framework agreement, India should also set up an SEZ at Sittwe, which is
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located closer to the Chinese port and SEZ at Kyaukphyu.

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1.2.4. SECURITY
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The Indian Armed Forces have traditionally had friendly relations with their Myanmar counterparts.
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• Both countries face problems of armed separatist groups using each other’s soil.
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• The KIA, an insurgent group in Myanmar, has backed India’s north-eastern separatist groups such as ULFA
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and the NSCN (Khaplang), in consultation with government officials in China’s neighbouring Yunnan
province.
1.2.5. BILATERAL COOPERATION IN REGIONAL/SUB-REGIONAL CONTEXT
• Myanmar's membership of ASEAN, BIMSTEC and Mekong Ganga Cooperation has introduced a
regional/sub-regional dimension to bilateral relations and imparted added significance in the context of our
"Act East" policy.
• Myanmar has generally been supportive of India's stand to various international organisations.
• India supported the inclusion of Myanmar as an observer in SAARC in 2008
1.2.6. CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN MYANMAR
• Large Chinese infrastructure and mining projects in Myanmar have come up since the early 1990s, with
scant regard for environmental degradation and displacement.
• China has increased its economic profile in the country in recent times pushing for a special economic zone
at Kyauk Phyu among other projects. The special economic zone, expected to cover more than 4,200 acres
(17 sq. km), includes the $7.3 billion deep sea port and a $2.3 billion industrial park, with plans to attract
industries such as textiles and oil refining, a Reuters report said.
• It also used short-sighted western aid policies to acquire considerable leverage within Myanmar.
• China now has an ability to significantly influence Myanmar insurgent groups such as the United WA State
Army (UWSA) and Kachin Independence Army (KIA).
• Its navy recently held joint exercises along Myanmar’s shores.
1.2.7. SIGNIFICANCE OF MYANMAR
• Myanmar is seen as a crucial partner in the fight to end insurgency in India’s north-east,
• as a gateway to South-East Asia and
• a key component of new vision for South and South-East Asian regional cooperation and India’s Act East
Policy.
• It has significant hydrocarbon resources
• It is also a neighbor that is increasingly being wooed by China.
1.2.8. WHAT SHOULD INDIA DO?
• India needs to review and restructure its economic cooperation with Myanmar, with an increasing focus on
assisting the populations living close to our borders through imaginative schemes for education, health,
communications and small/village industries.
• India has already extended nearly $2 billion in soft loans. It has offered to help Myanmar developmental
assistance in the areas it wants rather than be prescriptive.
• Here the need is to address delays in project implementation.
• India is keen to signing an agreement with Myanmar to streamline the free movement of people within 16
km along the border. A MoU was signed between the countires in this context in September 2017. In
January 2018 the Union Cabinet had approved proposed agreement between India and Myanmar on land
border crossing to enhance economic interaction between people of the two countries. However, This
agreement is yet to be signed between the two countries.
India has shown understanding of Myanmar’s internal problems of insurgency and the Rohingya issue.
Cooperation can be furthered in accordance with the Key Points of Joint Statement Issued in 2017 during P.M.
Modi’s visit to Myanmar
• “India condemned the recent terrorist attacks in northern Rakhine State, wherein several members of the
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Myanmar security forces lost their lives. Both sides agreed that terrorism violates human rights and there
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should, therefore, be no glorification of terrorists as martyrs,”.

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• On its part, Myanmar “reaffirmed its respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India and
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steadfastly upheld the policy of not allowing any insurgent group to utilise Myanmar’s soil to undertake
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hostile acts against the Indian Government.

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1.3. BIMSTEC
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• India’s strategy is to bridge south and South-East Asia. In this context groupings such as the BIMSTEC and
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Mekong Ganaga Cooperation are significant.

• The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) formed in
1997.
• It comprises Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand, and brings together 1.5
billion people or 21% of the world population and a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of over $2.5
trillion.
• For India, making BIMSTEC work is important as for years it has blamed Pakistan for holding back the SAARC.
• India’s leadership in activating the BIMSTEC was evident in the BRICS-BIMSTEC outreach hosted in Goa in
2016.
1.4. MEKONG-GANGA COOPERATION
• The Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) is an initiative by six countries – India and five ASEAN countries,
namely, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam for cooperation in tourism, culture,
education, as well as transport and communications.
• It was launched in 2000 at Vientiane, Lao PDR. Both the Ganga and the Mekong are civilizational rivers, and
the MGC initiative aims to facilitate closer contacts among the people inhabiting these two major river
basins. The MGC is also indicative of the cultural and commercial linkages among the member countries of
the MGC down the centuries.
• Indian drafted a Plan of Action (POA) 2016-18 which was endorsed to become the core guideline for future
action. On the future direction of MGC, it was recommended that POA 2016-18 may be continued.
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2. ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH EAST ASIAN NATIONS
(ASEAN)
2.1. WHAT IS ASEAN?
• The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand to promote political and economic cooperation and regional stability.
It based on the vision of an ASEAN Community comprised of three pillars, the Political-Security Community,
Economic Community and Socio-Cultural Community.
Map 5.3 ASEAN Memebers
Image Source: https://assets.weforum.org/editor/i4SuKiQBoWo0xuL_rK4bt5ymoHAc14VZxI_r976m-P4.PNG

• In 1976, the members signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, emphasizing ASEAN’s promotion of
peace, friendship, and cooperation to build solidarity.
• The members signed a deal in 1995 to create a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia
• It has evolved into a regional grouping that promotes economic, political, and security cooperation among
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its members.
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• 10 States are part of the ASEAN (Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore,
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Indonesia, Brunei, Philipines). East Timor is an observer state.

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• It’s secretariat is based in Jakarta.

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• ASEAN is chaired by an annually rotating presidency. Decisions are reached through consultation and
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consensus guided by the principles of noninterference in internal affairs and the peaceful resolution of
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conflicts.
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• In 2007, the ten members adopted the ASEAN Charter

• ASEAN countries have a population of nearly 640 million people and a combined GDP of $2.57 trillion. Since
the start of the ASEAN free trade area in 1993, intra-ASEAN trade has grown from 19.2 percent to 25.9
percent in 2016.
• The group has spurred economic integration, signing six free-trade agreements with other regional
economies (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea)
• Critics argue that ASEAN’s impact is limited by a lack of strategic vision, diverging national priorities, and
weak leadership. The bloc’s biggest challenge is negotiating a unified approach to China, particularly in
response to its widespread maritime claims in the South China Sea.
Map 5.4-ASEAN and Affiliated groups
Image Source: https://www.cfr.org/content/publications/ASEAN-Affiliated-Groups-Final.jpg

• ASEAN security challenges include border disputes, human trafficking, natural and manmade disasters, food
security, and cross-border terrorism and insurgencies.
• Regional security issues are dealt with through ASEAN or the following ASEAN-led forums
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)-
• the twenty-seven-member multilateral grouping was developed to facilitate cooperation on political and
security issues to contribute to regional confidence-building and preventive diplomacy.
• First meeting Held at Bangkok, Thailand, in 1994.
• It includes ASEAN and 10 dialogue partners i.e Australia, Canada, China, the European
Union, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, New Zealand, and the United States. Also included are the Papua
New Guinea, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, Timor-Leste, Bangladesh and Sri
Lanka.
• Unique among international organizations of its type, the ARF is characterized by minimal
institutionalization, decision making by consensus, and the use of both “first track” (official) and “second
track” (nonofficial) diplomacy.
East Asia Summit (EAS)
• Established in 2005, EAS is a unique Leaders-led forum of 18 (10+8). It seeks to promote security and
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prosperity in the region and is usually attended by the heads of state from ASEAN, Australia, China, India,
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Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the United States.
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It has evolved as a forum for strategic dialogue and cooperation on political, security and economic issues
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of common regional concern and plays an important role in the regional architecture.
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ASEAN+3
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The ASEAN Plus Three (APT) cooperation process began in December 1997 with the convening of an
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Informal Summit among the Leaders of ASEAN and China, Japan and the South Korea. The APT Summit was
institutionalised in 1999 when the Leaders issued a Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation at the Third
APT Summit in Manila.
2.2. INDIA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA

2.2.1. BACKGROUND
• India and South East Asia have age old cultural and civilisation ties. Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam spread
from India to the region and the imprint of this shared cultural heritage is also seen in art forms and
architecture.
• Geography played an important role in the maritime connectivity through the Monsoon.
• British colonial period saw many from India to migrate to the region and the Indian National Army received
support from this region.
• Cold war period saw estrangement as the region came under the American influence and India charted its
own path. Nonetheless Indonesia was an important part of the NAM.
• The End of Cold war brought new orientation and India moved ahead with the “ Look East Policy” to cement
ties with the region
• In recent times the Act East policy of India accords greater significance to the region.
• Apart from ASEAN, India has taken other policy initiatives in the region that involve some members of
ASEAN like BIMSTEC, MGC etc. India is also an active participant in several regional forums like the Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM), East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers'
Meeting + (ADMM+) and Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF).
• In the present geopolitical situation, Southeast Asia is the most important focal point of India's foreign
policy.
• By focusing on connectivity, the government wants to make the point that it considers the region a part of
its immediate, not extended, neighbourhood, given that it shares maritime boundaries with some countries
and also land boundary in the case of Myanmar.
• India and ASEAN have just completed 25 years of dialogue partnership, 15 years of summit-level
interaction and five years of strategic partnership.
• The P.M participated in the15th ASEAN-India Summit and 12th East Asia Summit in Manila, Philippines
(November 14, 2017)
• India hosted the leaders of all 10 ASEAN nations for the 2018 Republic Day. As part of a commemorative
summit.
2.2.2. FROM LOOK EAST TO ACT EAST: EVOLVING POLICY FRAMEWORK
In the context of South East Asia, India’s Look East Policy (LEP) has been a major pillar of our foreign policy since
the early 1990s. In the second half of 2014, LEP was upgraded to Act East Policy which focuses on the
extended neighbourhood in the Asia-Pacific region. The policy which was originally conceived as an economic
initiative, has gained political, strategic and cultural dimensions including establishment of institutional
mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation.
The key principles and objectives of ''Act East Policy” is to promote economic cooperation, cultural ties and
develop strategic relationship with countries in the Asia-Pacific region through continuous engagement at
bilateral, regional and multilateral levels thereby providing enhanced connectivity to the States of North
Eastern Region with other countries in our neighbourhood.
2.2.3. THE LOOK EAST POLICY

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Under PM Narasimha Rao & finance minister Manmohan Singh, India initiated upon the “look east policy”-
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The principal aim of the policy was to pursue a policy of active engagement with countries of South East
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Asia. Primary focus of this policy was the fast growing economies of Association of Southeast Asian
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Nations (ASEAN) and its member-countries, particularly Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and
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Burma/Myanmar.
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Factors responsible for India’s Look East Policy:

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o Collapse of Soviet Union- the collapse of India’s long term ally left India isolated on the International
arena. Moreover, the gulf crisis, the spike in oil prices, the collapse of rupee-rubal agreement, all left
India on its own, without an ally on the international scene. This made search for new partners
imperative.
o Balance of Payment crisis- The BoP crisis & the conditions imposed upon it for obtaining loans from
IMF resulted in India opening up its market by reducing tariffs to the world. Thus providing a ready
market for goods.
• During this initial phase the focus was on establishing trade & economic linkages with East Asian countries
& for achieving this aim, it went ahead to foster greater trade & economic linkages with ASEAN group of
countries.
• In this period India became a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1992 and then becoming a Summit
level partner in 2002.
• Trade between India and ASEAN multiplied fourfold — from $ 3.1 billion in 1991 to about $ 12 billion in
2002.
2.2.4. TAKING THE LOOK EAST FORWARD: LOOK EAST 2.0 OR THE NEW LOOK EAST
While the focus of First phase of Look East policy was primarily on economic engagement, in the second phase
along with deepening of the economic ties, strategic & domestic dimensions gained salience.
• Thus the three guiding parameters for Look East 2.0 were-
o Deeper & wider economic engagements- Deeper economic engagements would involve establishing
institutional linkages between India & ASEAN group of countries.2010- India signed a Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) with ASEAN in goods. (This is the first trade bloc with which India finalized a FTA). In
2012, trade between India and ASEAN stood at $80 billion. Following the implementation of FTA in
goods, trade grew by 41 per cent in 2011-12. Two-way flows in investments have also grown rapidly to
reach $43 billion over the past decade.
o Strategic & Security Component- The phenomenal rise of China has been a cause of concern for many
ASEAN countries & also for other East Asian one’s including Japan, South Korea etc. The rise of China has
been accompanied by its growing assertiveness in its backyard is seen in the frequency with which it
has asserted claims in south china sea & east china sea. These countries view India as a possible partner
in their effort to maintain balance of power & peace in the region. India tacitly seems to share this
concern as was reflected in PM’s speech in 2012- “India looks at ASEAN not simply as an institution of
economic development but also as an integral part of India’s vision of stable, secure & prosperous
Asia”. However, India does not see itself as adopting a confrontationist attitude with China, even as it
steps up engagement with both ASEAN & countries like Japan.
o Domestic dimension- Looking East through the North East. India has lagged behind in economic growth,
trade, industrialization & connectivity. Apart from this, the long porous borders have been a security
issue. These factors coupled with ethnic issues have fuelled insurgency in the region. Establishing trade
& connectivity links with South East Asian countries via North East has been one of the focus areas
under the Look East policy 2.0. This aimed at economically strengthening the region. For this purpose,
the following initiatives came up in this period suggested-
(a) Trilateral Highway- India-Myanmar-Thailand
(b) Kaladan Multi Modal Transport
(c) Mekong Ganga Corridor
(d) Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor
2.2.5. THE ACT EAST: ACTION AND IMPLEMENTATION ORIENTED APPROACH TO A WIDER EAST
• The Look East Policy has today matured into a dynamic and action oriented ‘Act East Policy. PM at the 12th
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ASEAN India Summit and the 9th East Asia Summit held in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, in November, 2014,
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formally enunciated the Act East Policy.

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India's Act East Policy focusses on the extended neighbourhood in the Asia-Pacific region.
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• The policy which was originally conceived as an economic initiative, has gained political, strategic and
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cultural dimensions including establishment of institutional mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation.
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• India has upgraded its relations to strategic partnership with Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Japan,
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Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, Singapore and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and
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forged close ties with all countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

• Further, apart from ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and East Asia Summit (EAS), India has also been
actively engaged in regional fora such as Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic
Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) and Indian
Ocean Rim Association (IORA).
• Act East Policy has placed emphasis on India-ASEAN cooperation in our domestic agenda on infrastructure,
manufacturing, trade, skills, urban renewal, smart cities, Make in India and other initiatives.
• Connectivity projects, cooperation in space, S&T and people-to-people exchanges could become a
springboard for regional integration and prosperity.

• The North East of India has been a priority in our Act East Policy (AEP). AEP provides an interface between
North East India including the state of Arunachal Pradesh and the ASEAN region. Various plans at bilateral
and regional levels include steady efforts to develop and strengthen connectivity of Northeast with the
ASEAN region through trade, culture, people-to-people contacts and physical infrastructure (road, airport,
telecommunication, power, etc.). Some of the major projects include Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport
Project, the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway Project, Rhi-Tiddim Road Project, Border Haats, etc.
2.3. INDIA-ASEAN
• India's relationship with ASEAN is a key pillar of our foreign policy and the foundation of our Act East
Policy.
• The up-gradation of the relationship into a Strategic Partnership in 2012 was a natural progression to the
ground covered.
• India became a Sectoral Partner of the ASEAN in 1992, Dialogue Partner in 1996 and Summit Level Partner
in 2002.
• There are, in total, 30 Dialogue Mechanisms between India and ASEAN, cutting across various sectors.
• Mission to ASEAN: India has set up a separate Mission to ASEAN and the EAS in Jakarta in April 2015 with a
dedicated Ambassador to strengthen engagement with ASEAN and ASEAN-centric processes.
• Delhi Dialogue: India has an annual Track 1.5 event Delhi Dialogue, for discussing politico-security and
economic issues between ASEAN and India. Since 2009, India has had nine editions of this event. The 9th
edition of Delhi Dialogue was hosted by the MEA on 4-5 July 2017 in New Delhi.
2.3.1. INDIA-ASEAN: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
• India hosted leaders of the 10 ASEAN nations ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit to mark the 25th
Anniversary of ASEAN-India Dialogue Relations in January 2018. This occasion marked the release of Delhi
declaration.
• In November 2017 PM participated in the 15th ASEAN-India Summit on the sideline of the 31st ASEAN
Summit in Manila.
• The ASEAN-India connectivity summit in Delhi from December 11-12 2017 saw participation from all the 10
ASEAN countries along with Japan.
• The summit also focused on ensuring better digital connectivity as the government looks to align its
initiative with ASEAN's Master Plan on Connectivity, 2025, which centres on five strategic areas:
o sustainable infrastructure,
o digital innovation,
o seamless logistics,
o regulatory excellence and
o people’s mobility.
• The summit looked at regulatory frameworks to support digital technologies, financing of digital
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infrastructure and use of technology by MSMEs

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• India had, in 2015, proposed a $ 1 billion line of credit to promote projects with ASEAN. In addition.
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• India has also set up a project development fund of $77 million for developing manufacturing hubs in
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CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) countries.

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• Japan had inaugurated an Act East forum with India on 5 December 2017. The forum is also meant to
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• India and Japan seek to counter balance China’s OBOR that is often accused of following exploitative debt
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financing practice.
• Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy converges with India’s Act East Policy, and this is specifically
beneficial for India’s Northeast where these initiatives geographically converge.
2.3.2. TRADE
• India-ASEAN trade and investment relations have been growing steadily.
• ASEAN is India's fourth largest trading partner.
• India's trade with ASEAN has increased to US$ 70 billion in 2016-17 from US$ 65 billion in 2015-16.
• India's export to ASEAN has increased to US$ 31.07 billion in 2016-17 from US$ 25 billion in 2015-16.
• India’s import to ASEAN increased by 1.8% in 2016-17 vis-à-vis 2015-16 and stood at US$ 40.63 billion.
• The trade represents 10.85% of India’s total trade with the world.
2.3.3. INVESTMENT
• Investment flows are also substantial both ways:
• With ASEAN accounts for approximately 12.5% of investment flows into India since 2000.
• FDI inflows into India from ASEAN between April 2000 to August 2017 was about US$ 514.73 billion,
• FDI outflows from India to ASEAN countries, the from April 2007 to March 2015, as per data maintained by
DEA, was about US$38.672 billion.
• The final agreement on ASEAN-India Free Trade Area signed on was on 13 August 2009. The free trade area
came into effect on 1 January 2010. ASEAN-India Free Trade Area has been completed with the entering into
force of the ASEAN-India Agreements on Trade in Service and Investments on 1 July 2015.
• India has setup Project Development Fund with a corpus of INR 500 crores to develop manufacturing hubs
in CLMV countries at the 13th ASEAN India Summit held in Malaysia in November 2015.
2.4. RCEP NEGOTIATIONS: FROM TRADE TO ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP

• While the India-ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement was inked and enforced from January 1, 2010, India’s
goods trade deficit with ASEAN widened from $4.98 billion in 2010-11 to $14.75 billion in 2015-16, and then
narrowed to $9.56 billion in 2016-17.
• The huge goods trade deficit has led to questions on whether the pact is only helping ASEAN nations and
not benefiting India.
• In this context the Proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is significant. The 19th
round of the Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) meetings and other related meetings were held from 17 to
28 July 2017 in Hyderabad, India. 20th round of negotiations for RCEP were held in Incheon, Korea, from
October 17 to 28, 2017.
• RCEP is a proposed comprehensive regional economic integration agreement or a mega Free Trade
Agreement amongst the 10-ASEAN countries (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and its six Free Trade Agreements.
• The RCEP involves negotiations in goods, services, investment, economic and technical cooperation,
intellectual property rights, competition, dispute settlement and other issues like Rules of Origin, customs
procedures and trade facilitation measures.
• The RCEP involves 16 countries:
o China, Japan and South Korea in North-east Asia;
o the ten ASEAN members in South-east Asia; and
o three non-East Asian countries -- India, Australia and New Zealand.
2.4.1. SIGNIFICANCE OF RCEP

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The economies of countries involved in RCEP negotiations account for about half of the world's
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After the USA pulled out of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) under President Trump, the RCEP is the most
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significant integration platform for the whole of the Asia-Pacific, including most of the countries that were
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• Why should India Join RCEP:

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• India should join it because it will mean

o Access to the Asia Pacific region which will be important for its future economic and strategic status in
the region.
o It will deepen its ties with the ASEAN further.
o RCEP is also an important opportunity for India to meet the higher standards promoted by a mega
Regional Trading Agreement (RTA) while it continues to support its domestic industries and promotes
the development dimensions of trade.
o India has indicated its interest especially in expanding trade in services, removing trade barriers as well
as specific interest in trade in goods like pharmaceuticals and textiles.

2.4.2. RCEP AND INDIA’S CURRENT CONCERNS
• India currently faces a demand to eliminate duties on 92% of its products and perhaps keep very low
duties on another 7%, covering a total of 99% of all its agricultural and industrial products.
• What is troubling the government is the fact that other RCEP countries have so far been lukewarm to
India’s demands for greater market access in services, particularly on easing norms on the movement of
professionals and skilled workers across borders for short-term work.
• India has said no to e-commerce negotiations at the WTO and any difference in its stance at the RCEP is
likely to have repercussions.
• RCEP has been criticized by global and Indian health activists for potentially forcing India to end its cheap
supply of drugs, specially related to HIV/AIDS to developing countries, especially Africa. India has to be wary
of measures that may lead to its losing the right to produce cheap generic drugs due to the enforcement
of a strict IPR regime related to patent term extension and data exclusivity.
• In 2017 the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has taken a strong stand that the country should restrain
itself from concluding any such pact from which it would not gain in the medium term.
• Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar’s comments before Department Related Parliamentary Standing Committee
on Commerce in June 2017, called for observance of due restraint and not conclude trade arrangements
which are not to our medium term advantage.” The panel’s report is on ‘trade with Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN)’ was released on December 18 2017. According to the report, the senior official
“submitted that a lot of our [India’s free trade] agreements have not served as well as they could have.”
• Referring to the RCEP before the standing committee, Mr. Jaishankar had said that “though larger FTAs are
important for getting preferential access to the markets, it is important to be cautious about the manner
in which such arrangements work out in respect of our imports as well as on our efforts to increase the
share of manufacturing sector in our economy.”
• Mr. Jaishankar stressed that India’s external trade arrangements must be supportive of the Make in India
initiative. As per the committee’s report, he pointed out that “emphasis in these trade arrangements is
mostly on trade in goods and the same enthusiasm is not shared for trade in services. The reluctance in
giving market access for trade in services is a big challenge.”
• The official added that such a strong stand would also be adopted in other negotiations including those on
the proposed India-European Union Broad Based Trade and Investment Agreement.
• At the ASEAN-India commemorative summit held on January 25 2018, the issue of the long-delayed
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was taken up and India has maintained commitment
to take the process forward.
2.5. CONNECTIVITY
ASEAN-India connectivity is a priority for India as also the ASEAN countries.
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• In 2013, India became the third dialogue partner of ASEAN to initiate an ASEAN Connectivity Coordinating
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Committee-India Meeting.
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• India has made considerable progress in implementing the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and
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the Kaladan Multimodal Project,

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issues related to increasing the maritime and air connectivity between ASEAN and India and transforming
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the corridors of connectivity into economic corridors are under discussion.

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A possible extension to India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway to Cambodia, Lao PDR and Viet Nam is
also under consideration.
• A consensus on finalising the proposed protocol of the India-Myanmar-Thailand Motor Vehicle Agreement
(IMT MVA) has been reached. This agreement will have a critical role in realizing seamless movement of
passenger, personal and cargo vehicles along roads linking India, Myanmar and Thailand.
• In 2015 PM announced a Line of Credit of US$ 1 billion to promote projects that support physical and
digital connectivity between India and ASEAN and
• India has also organized a Connectivity Summit in December 2017.

2.6. SECURITY FACTOR IN THE REGION
Faced with growing traditional and non-traditional challenges, politico-security cooperation is a key and an
emerging pillar of this relationship:
• Maritime security-Safeguarding Sea lanes of communication and combating piracy
• Radicalisation and terrorism
• Drug trafficking and Human trafficking
• South China Sea disputes
• In this context India has following attributes that can enhance cooperation:
o Tri services command in Andaman and NIcobar
o Participation in forum for ASEAN security dialogue such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). India has
been attending annual meetings of this forum since 1996 and has actively participated in its various
activities.
o The ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) Plus is the highest defence consultative and
cooperative mechanism in ASEAN. The ADMM+ brings together Defence Ministers from the 10 ASEAN
nations plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Russia, and the United States
on a biannual basis.
o Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) is an avenue for track 1.5 diplomacy focusing on cross cutting
maritime issues of common concern.
o CSCAP: Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, is a Track-2 organ of the security
related bodies, such as ARF, EAS and the ADMM. India was given a membership of the CSCAP in 2000
and participates in periodic conference that acts as forum for regional scholars and experts to exchange
views and often provide useful policy option for Track-1.
• In the Delhi declaration 2018 the two sides reaffirmed the:
o commitment to work closely together on common regional and international security issues of mutual
concern and ensure an open, transparent, inclusive and rules-based regional architecture through
existing ASEAN-led frameworks and mechanisms
o importance of maintaining and promoting peace, stability, maritime safety and security, freedom of
navigation and overflight in the region and other lawful uses of the seas and unimpeded lawful
maritime commerce and to promote peaceful resolutions of disputes, in accordance United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the relevant standards and recommended practices
by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization
(IMO).
o Strengthen maritime cooperation through existing relevant mechanisms and work together to prevent
and manage accidents and incidents at sea and promote effective coordination between ASEAN and
India in maritime search and rescue.
o Deepen cooperation in combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, violent extremism and
radicalisation through information sharing, law enforcement cooperation and capacity building under
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the existing ASEAN-led mechanisms.

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o Support the implementation of the Langkawi Declaration on the Global Movement of Moderates to
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promote peace, security, upholding rule of law,

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o Commitment and promote comprehensive approach to combat terrorism through close cooperation by
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disrupting and countering terrorists, terrorist groups and networks, including by countering cross
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border movement of terrorists and foreign terrorist fighters and misuse of Internet including social
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media by terror entities; strengthen cooperation to stop terrorism financing efforts, and prevent
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recruitment of members of terrorist groups; support efforts in targeting terrorist groups and
sanctuaries; and take further urgent measures to counter and prevent the spread of terrorism, while
stressing that there can be no justification for acts of terror on any grounds whatsoever.
o Work together with the international community to ensure compliance with the relevant United
Nations Security Council resolutions regarding counter-terrorism, and to note efforts on the
negotiations of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) at the United
Nations.
o Strengthen cooperation between ASEAN and India on cyber-security capacity building and policy
coordination, including through supporting the implementation of the ASEAN Cybersecurity Cooperation
Strategy. The declaration also proposed First ASEAN-India Cyber Dialogue in 2018.
2.6.1. THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES
• Since the 1970s, the South China Sea has been a nest of competing sovereignty claims over the island
features and ocean spaces by a number of adjacent countries.
• The South China dispute is over territory, sovereignty and maritime rights and entitlement, particularly
along the Paracel and the Spratly island chains.
• These island chains are claimed by a number of countries in the region including China, Vietnam, the
Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei.
• China through its unilateral 9 dash lines, declared in 1947, claims nearly the entire south China Sea.
• The islands lie among the world's busiest shipping lanes and have vast mineral resources around them,
making them highly strategic assets.
• In addition, China has recently engaged in, amongst other things, the physical enhancement of many of the
small features of the Spratly Islands and enforcement of a moratorium on fishing in the South China Sea.
Map 5.5 South China Sea
Image Source: https://cdn.staticeconomist.com/sites/default/files/images/2017/05/blogs/economistexplains/20170527 _sm909.png
2.6.1.1 Recent Dispute and International Ruling

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• In 2013, the Philippines commenced a case against China under the provisions of UNCLOS, to the
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Permanent court of Arbitration in the Hague. Although a long-standing party to the Convention, China
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declined to participate in the establishment of the Tribunal or to appear before it.

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An Arbitral tribunal was constituted under annex vii to the 1982 UNCLOS.
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• Issues concerned: legal basis of maritime rights and entitlements in the South China Sea, the status of
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certain geographic features in the South China Sea, and the lawfulness of certain actions taken by China in
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the South China Sea.

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• China viewed the principal subject matters in dispute as political and beyond the jurisdiction and
competence of the Tribunal.
• The tribunal, issued in 2015 an Award on Jurisdiction, stating that it had jurisdiction to consider the merits
of almost all the Submissions made by the Philippines.
• In 2016 a final Award ruled that many of China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea were contrary to
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and had thereby violated Philippine
sovereign rights and freedoms.
• China states that the both awards are “null and void” and have “no binding force”.

2.6.2. INDIA’S POSITION
• More the 55 % of India’s trade passes through the region.
• India has significant investments in the hydrocarbon sector along the Vietnam coast, in South China Sea.
• Thus, India has advocated a peaceful resolution of differences in the framework of international law
• At the same time India has expressed its resolute position supporting the freedom of navigations and open
Sea lanes of Communication. India’s reaction to the PCA verdict emphasized on freedom of navigation,
over-flight and the rule of law.
• Chinese maritime power in South East Asia has a direct bearing on the it navies’ power projection plans in
the Indian Ocean. From an Indian perspective, China’s growing military presence in the South China Sea has
a destabilizing effect on the wider Asian littorals, as it exacerbates existing power asymmetries.
• By taking a principled stand on the territorial disputes, India must contribute to the restoration of
strategic equilibrium in the Indo-Pacific.
• In the Delhi declaration 2018 India supported the full and effective implementation of the Declaration on
the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and look forward to an early conclusion of the
Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).
2.6.3. NEED FOR FURTHER ACTION:
• It is essential to recognize that India’s domain of maritime interest- now stretching across the Indo-Pacific
provides multiple opportunities
• India needs to expand the vision of SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) from its Indian
Ocean underpinnings to an all-round maritime outreach.
• Promote collaborative multilateral action for sustaining “good order at sea”. This can be done by fostering
cooperation among regional actors on safety of shipping, anti-piracy operations, search-and-rescue and
disaster relief are responsibilities.
• Without relying too much on US endorsement India should initiate an “Indo-Pacific Maritime partnership”
that seeks mutually-beneficial maritime security cooperation with ASEAN nations.
• The Delhi Declaration 2018 flags much of these ideas. However ideas need to converted into action and fro
that India needs to craft a National Maritime Strategy.
2.7. CULTURAL TIES BETWEEN INDIA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA

• 3 Cs – commerce, connectivity and culture – are at the core of India’s Act East policy.
• India’s soft power is reflected in
o Buddhism, yoga,
o Revival of Nalanda University,
o Chairs of Indian studies in universities (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia)
o Indian cultural centres (Jakarta, Bali, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Suva, Lautoka), and
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o joint restoration of monuments (Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos).

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• India has been organizing a large number of programmes to boost People-to-People Interaction with ASEAN,
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o such as inviting ASEAN students to India each year for the Students Exchange Programme,
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o Special Training Course for ASEAN diplomats,

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o Exchange of Parliamentarians, Participation of ASEAN students in the National Children’s Science

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Congress, ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks,

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o ASEAN-India Eminent Persons Lecture Series, etc.

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o In 2017 As part of commomerative events India organised Youth centric Programs such as youth summit,
artists camp and music band festival.
2.8. INDIA AND SINGAPORE

2.8.1. BACKGROUND
• Singapore was established as a trading post in 1819. It became a colony under British India, governed from
Calcutta (1830-1867). It becam an independent state in 1965.
• Even though small, 700 Sq Kilometre area, Singapore is strategically located.

• It has become a melting pot of multiracial and multi cultural identities including people of Indian origi.
• Subhash Chandra Bose had resided in Singapore. Jawahar Lal Nehru visited in 1937 and 1946
• Founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew is credited with transforming Singapore into the modern city state
with economic might.
• Singapore has been a staunch supporter of India in ASEAN. Singapore believes in pivotal role for India in
Asia. Singapore a hub of India’s political, economic, security engagement in South East Asia. Singapore
views India as a stabilising force. “India is Neither dominantly western nor eastern oriented, India is India”
• 2015 marked 50th anniversary of the bilateral relations and bilateral ties were elevated to a Strategic
Partnership.
• Relations are underpinned by the Defence cooperation agreement 2003 and Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation Agreement (CECA) of 2005.
• The 5-S Plank - Five areas of cooperation to enhance bilateral relations – referred to as
• 5-S Plank- were agreed during the visit of EAM to Singapore in August 2014. 5S Plank directs the
relationship towards– (i) Scale up Trade & Investment; (ii) Speed up Connectivity; (iii) Smart Cities and Urban
Rejuvenation; (iv)Skill development; and (v) State focus.
2.8.2. TRADE & INVESTMENT
• Bilateral trade expanded after the conclusion of CECA from US$ 6.7 billion in 2004-05 to reachUS$ 16.7
billion in 2016-17.
• Singapore is India’s 10th largest bilateral trade partner (2016-17) and the 2nd largest among ASEAN
countries with a share of 2.5 % and 2.6 % of overall trade of India and Singapore respectively
• Total foreign direct investments from Singapore into India was USD 57.6 billion (till June 2017) which was
16.8% of total FDI inflow. The outward Indian FDI to Singapore was USD 49.45 billion (till June 2017),
making Singapore one of the top destinations for Indian investments.
• 6000, Indian companies are registered in Singapore
2.8.3. SMART CITIES
• Singapore has expressed interest in working with India on the Smart Cities initiative. A consortium of
Singapore companies is working to develop Amaravati, new capital city of Andhra Pradesh. Singapore is
also working with Government of Rajasthan in preparing Concept Plans for townships in Udaipur and
Jodhpur and with the Government of Himachal Pradesh for developing an integrated township of Greater
Shimla.
2.8.4. DEFENCE COOPERATION
• Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA), signed in October 2003, and the enhanced DCA signed in
November 2015 provides an overarching framework for bilateral defence including includes conduct of
policy dialogues, working group and staff talks, exercises, training activities, exhibitions and conferences.
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• Pursuant to the enhanced DCA, the inaugural Defence Minister Dialogue was held on 3 June 2016.
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• Exchange of visits and exercises are regularly held between armed forces of two countries.
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• Singapore Armed forces have unique relation.

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• Navies have mutual logistical support. Indian Navy can base its Naval vessels at the Changi Naval base
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permanently. The agreement was strengthened in 2017.

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• Singapore India Maritime Bilateral Exercises (SIMBEX) Naval exercise was conducted in 2017 in South China
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Sea. Air force Agreement.

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• In November 2017 the two countries signed an agreement to deepen cooperation in the maritime security
domain and called for ensuring freedom of navigation in critical sea lanes against the backdrop of China's.
• Agreement provides for naval cooperation through increased engagement in the maritime security sphere,
join exercises, temporary deployments from each other’s naval facilities and logistics support. Increasing
military manoeuvres in the India-Pacific region.

2.9. INDIA AND VIETNAM
• Vietnam declared independence in 1945. Resistance of the French Rule continued after that which ended in
the defeat of the French in 1954
• Jawahar Lal Nehru became first foreign leader to visit Vietnam in 1954
• Doi-Moi reforms: economic reforms initiated in Vietnam in 1986 with the goal of creating a "socialist-
oriented market economy".
• Vietnam much deeper and historical hostility towards China exacerbated by a 1979 war
• A Strategic Parternship agreement was signed between India and Vietnam in 2007.
• A pivot to India’s role in South East Asia. Export of technology. Possibility of Export of Brahmos missile
• The two countries had signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement in 2016, pursuant to which a MoU on
Cooperation between the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) and the Vietnam Atomic
Energy Institute (VINATOM) was signed in 2018.
• Petroleum Exploration: In 2006, OVL won a contract to jointly explore, along with PetroVietnam, Blocks 127
and 128 in the Phu Khanh basin, Vietnam. It then signed a three-year deal with Petrovietnam in September
2011 to jointly explore for oil and gas in these blocks. OVL later relinquished Block 127 after it encountered
dry wells.
• India signed an agreement with Vietnam in October 2011 to expand and promote oil exploration in South
China Sea and stood by its decision despite China’s challenge to the legality of Indian presence.
• P.M. Narendra Modi visited Vietnam September 2016, on his way to China for the G-20 summit.
• PM Modi announced a new line of credit of $500 million for Vietnam to facilitate deeper defence
cooperation.
• India already provides Vietnam a $100 million concessional line of credit, some of which has been used for
procuring Offshore Patrol Vehicles (OPVs),
• Talks continue on Akash Surface to Air Missile systems (SR-SAMS) and Dhruv advanced light helicopters.
• India’s outreach to Hanoi comes at a time when the United States has lifted its long-standing ban on the sale
of lethal military equipment to Vietnam.
• While India may want to downplay the Brahmos sale at this point in its engagement with Vietnam, a final
decision will have to be made soon.
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VISION IAS
www.visionias.in
LECTURE-6
INDIA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INDIA AND JAPAN ................................................................................................................................................... 2
1.1. Background ...................................................................................................................................................... 2
1.1.1. New Era of Relationships .......................................................................................................................... 3
1.2. Economy .......................................................................................................................................................... 3
1.2.1. Bilateral Assistance and Investment ........................................................................................................ 3
1.3. Technology Cooperation ................................................................................................................................. 4
1.4. The Geo-Strategic Dimension .......................................................................................................................... 4
1.4.1. The Island Dispute with China .................................................................................................................. 4
1.5. Expanding Scope.............................................................................................................................................. 5
1.6. Issues to Address ............................................................................................................................................. 5
2. INDIA AND South Korea .......................................................................................................................................... 5
2.1. Background ...................................................................................................................................................... 6
2.1.1. New Era of Relationships .......................................................................................................................... 6
2.2. Economy .......................................................................................................................................................... 6
2.3. Cultural Ties ..................................................................................................................................................... 7
3. India-Australia ........................................................................................................................................................ 8
3.1. Background ...................................................................................................................................................... 8
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3.2 India-Australia: Institutional Mechanisms........................................................................................................ 8

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3.3 India-Australia: Recent Ties .............................................................................................................................. 8

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3.4 India-Australia: Political Cooperation ............................................................................................................... 9

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3.5 Economic and Trade Relations ......................................................................................................................... 9

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3.6 Civil Nuclear Cooperation ................................................................................................................................. 9

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4. India and the Pacific Island Countries .................................................................................................................. 10

4.1. Pacific Ocean and Island Countries ............................................................................................................... 10
4.2. India and the Pacific Island Countries ........................................................................................................... 10
4.2.1. India and Pacific Island Countries: FIPIC ................................................................................................. 10
4.3 The Concept of Indo-Pacific ............................................................................................................................ 11

1. INDIA AND JAPAN
Map 6.1-Japan
1.1. BACKGROUND
• The friendship between India and Japan has a long history rooted in spiritual affinity and strong cultural
and civilizational ties. India’s earliest documented direct contact with Japan was with the Todaiji Temple in
Nara, where the consecration or eye-opening of the towering statue of Lord Buddha was performed by an
Indian monk, Bodhisena, in 752 AD.
• In contemporary times, among prominent Indians associated with Japan were Swami Vivekananda, Gurudev
Rabindranath Tagore, JRD Tata, Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose and Judge Radha Binod Pal.
• The Japan-India Association was set up in 1903, and is today the oldest international friendship body in
Japan.
• Japan’s victory in its war against Russia in 1905 served as an inspiration to many Asian’s including in India.
• The two countries have never been adversaries. Bilateral ties have been singularly free of any kind of dispute
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– ideological, cultural or territorial.

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• Post the Second World War, India did not attend the San Francisco Conference, but decided to conclude a
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separate peace treaty with Japan in 1952 after its sovereignty was fully restored.
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The sole dissenting voice of Judge Radha Binod Pal at the War Crimes Tribunal struck a deep chord among
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the Japanese public that continues to reverberate to this day.

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Today, India is the largest democracy in Asia and Japan the most prosperous.
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In the first decade after diplomatic ties were established, several high level exchanges took place, including
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Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi’s visit to India in 1957, Prime Minister Nehru’s return visit to Tokyo
the same year (with a gift of two elephants) and President Rajendra Prasad’s visit in 1958.
• A transformational development in the economic history of India was Suzuki Motor Corporation’s path
breaking investment in India in the early 1980s that revolutionized the automobile sector, bringing in
advanced technology and management ethics to India.
• A test of the reliability of Japan as a friend was witnessed in 1991, when Japan was among the few
countries that unconditionally bailed India out of the balance of payment crisis.

1.1.1. NEW ERA OF RELATIONSHIPS
• The beginning of the 21st century witnessed a transformation in bilateral ties. During Prime Minister
Mori’s path-breaking visit to India in 2000, the Japan-India Global Partnership in the 21st century was
launched.
• The Joint Statement signed by Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Shinzo Abe in 2006 factored in the
new challenges, and the relationship was upgraded to a Global and Strategic Partnership with the
provision of annual Prime Ministerial Summits.
• A Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between Japan and India was concluded in
2011.
• PM Shinzo Abe paid an official visit to India for the 8th Annual Summit with Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan
Singh from 25-27 January 2014 and was the Chief Guest at the Republic Day parade in New Delhi.
• Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Japan from 30 August – September 3, 2014 for the 9th Annual
Summit Meeting with Prime Minster Shinzo Abe.
• During the visit in 2014, the two sides upgraded the relationship to a ‘Special Strategic and Global
Partnership’. Both sides also agreed to establish the ‘India-Japan Investment Promotion Partnership’. PM
Abe pledged to realize public and private investments worth JPY 3.5 trillion and doubling of the number of
Japanese companies in India over the next five years.
• Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Visited India in September 2017
1.2. ECONOMY
• Economic relations between India and Japan have vast potential for growth, given the complementarities
that exist between the two Asian economies.
• Japan's interest in India is increasing due to a variety of reasons including India's large and growing market
and its resources, especially the human resources.
• The India-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) that came into force in August
2011 is the most comprehensive of all such agreements concluded by India.
• CEPA covers not only trade in goods but also Services, Movement of Natural Persons, Investments,
Intellectual Property Rights, Custom Procedures and other trade related issues.
• The CEPA envisages abolition of tariffs over 94% of items traded between India and Japan over a period of
10 years.
• In the Financial Year (FY) 2015-16, India-Japan trade reached US$ 14.51 billion, showing a decrease of 6.47%
over FR 2014-15, when the total bilateral trade was US$ 15.51 billion. The bilateral trade in the period April-
September 2016 was US$ 6.48 billion. India’s export to Japan for 2015-16 was US$ 4.66 billion; whereas
India’s Import from Japan for 2015-16 was US$ 9.85 billion.
1.2.1. BILATERAL ASSISTANCE AND INVESTMENT
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Japan has been extending bilateral loan and grant assistance to India since 1958, and is the largest
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Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) supports India’s efforts for accelerated economic
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development particularly in priority areas like power, transportation, environmental projects and projects
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related to basic human needs. Multiple mega projects are on the anvil which will transform India in the
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o The Ahmedabad-Mumbai High Speed Rail,

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o the Western Dedicated Freight Corridor (DFC),

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o the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor with twelve new industrial townships,

o the Chennai-Bengaluru Industrial Corridor (CBIC)
o Delhi Metro Project has also been realized with Japanese assistance.
• Last year has seen the highest ever disbursement of official development assistance from Japan in a financial
year 2016-17
• The amount of Japan's cumulative investment in India since April 2000 to September 2016 is US$ 23.76
billion, which is nearly 8 per cent of India's overall FDI during this period. Japanese FDI into India has mainly
been in automobile, electrical equipment, telecommunications, chemical and pharmaceutical sectors.
• FDI flows from Japan have almost tripled in last three years (2014-2017).
1.3. TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION
• The bilateral Science & Technology Cooperation Agreement signed in 1985 underpins the bilateral S&T
cooperation. The India-Japan Science Council (IJSC) was established in the year 1993.
• In 2006, Department of Science and Technology (DST) initiated a value based partnership working on the
principles of 'reciprocity and co-funding with the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) and Japan
Science and Technology Agency (JST) through MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology).
• Since May 2015, about 250 students have visited Japan under the annual “Japan-Asia Youth Exchange
Program in Science” also known as the “SAKURA Exchange Program" implemented by DST and JST.
• During the September 2017 visit of Abe to India marked the commencement of the Mumbai-Ahmedabad
high speed rail project (bullet train) with financial and technological support of Japan.
1.4. THE GEO-STRATEGIC DIMENSION

• The strategic logic underpinning the cooperation between India and Japan is based on:
• China: The recent joint statement, 2017, calls for “a free, open and prosperous Indo-Pacific region where
sovereignty and international law are respected, and differences are resolved through dialogue, and
where all countries, large or small, enjoy freedom of navigation and overflight, sustainable development,
and a free, fair, and open trade and investment system.” This is an obvious reference to Chinese assertion in
recent times. The joint statement also endorses the principles on which India decided to sit out the Chinese
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• The joint statement is also much more direct in condemning North Korea and Pakistan. The statement also
hints at the role of China in creating the international problems that North Korea and Pakistan are today.
In a way, India and Japan show themselves to be an open and democratic bulwark against the conduct of
the Rawalpindi-Beijing-Pyongyang axis.
• Japan has been unsure of the US commitment to its allies ever since Donald Trump started his presidential
campaign. The ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) capability of North Korea has aggravated Tokyo’s
worries about the decoupling of the US-Japan alliance.
• India-Japan Act East Forum was launched in 2017 to build synergy between India’s Act East and Japan’s Free
and Open Indo-Pacific policies.
1.4.1. THE ISLAND DISPUTE WITH CHINA
Map 6.2: Japan-China Island dispute
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Image Source: https://cdn.static-economist.com/sites/default/files/images/print edition/20131130 _ ASM111.png

• Ties between Japan and China have been strained by a territorial row over a group of islands, known as the
Senkaku islands in Japan and the Diaoyu islands in China.
• At the heart of the dispute are eight uninhabited islands and rocks in the East China Sea. They have a total
area of about 7 sq km and lie north-east of Taiwan, east of the Chinese mainland and south-west of Japan's
southern-most prefecture, Okinawa. The islands are controlled by Japan.
• They matter because they are close to important shipping lanes, offer rich fishing grounds and lie near
potential oil and gas reserves.
• They are also in a strategically significant position, amid rising competition between the US and China for
military primacy in the Asia-Pacific region.
• In 2013, China declared a formal Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) covering airspace over the islands
and overlapping with airspace claimed by Japan. The ADIZ declaration required airlines flying over the waters
to first notify China.
• The two countries are often at loggerheads with violation of each other’s line and scrambling of fighter jets
1.5. EXPANDING SCOPE

• In the few years the momentum in relationship is marked by the following developments:
o Since 2015 Japan has been made a permanent participant in the Malabar naval exercises which also
involves the US;
o the two countries have inked a civil nuclear deal in 2016—Japan’s first with a non-signatory to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
o the India-Japan-US trilateral has been upgraded to ministerial level; and
o a new trilateral at the foreign secretary level has been initiated with Australia as the third country.
o two countries are exploring cooperation on infrastructure and human development projects beyond
India. The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), if pursued with an unwavering focus, has the potential
to become a serious counterweight to China’s BRI. Unlike BRI, the AAGC promises to evolve a
consultative mechanism towards identification and implementation of projects.
1.6. ISSUES TO ADDRESS

• The burgeoning relationship needs to address a few issues to develop optimally:
o Bilateral trade —below $15 billion annually in the last two years—do not reflect the economic ties
between the third and the fourth largest (on purchasing power parity terms) economies in the world. In
this context it must be noted that China is Japan's biggest trading partner; the two have a bilateral trade
of above $300 billion.
o Long pending defence deals—especially the sale of US-2 amphibious aircraft to India—too hasn’t moved
forward.
o UNSC reforms: The cooperation of two countries as part of G-4 needs further momentum.
• However, these areas of slow growth cannot take away from the tremendous distance that has been
covered elsewhere.
2. INDIA AND SOUTH KOREA

Map 6.3-South Korea
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2.1. BACKGROUND
• According to "SamgukYusa" or "The Heritage History of the Three Kingdoms" written in the 13th century, a
Princess from Ayodhya (Suriratna) came to Korea, married King Kim-Suro, and became Queen Hur Hwang-
ok in the year 48 AD.
• Korean Buddhist Monk Hyecho (704–787 CE) or Hong Jiao visited India from 723 to 729 AD and wrote
travelogue "Pilgrimage to the five kingdoms of India" which gives a vivid account of Indian culture, politics &
society.
• Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore also composed a short but evocative poem – 'Lamp of the East' - in
1929 about Korea's glorious past and its promising bright future.
• India played an important and positive role in Korean affairs after Korea's independence in 1945. Mr K P S
Menon of India was the Chairman of the 9-member UN Commission set up in 1947 to hold elections in
Korea. During the Korean War (1950- 53), both the warring sides accepted a resolution sponsored by India,
and the ceasefire was declared on 27 July 1953. Lt. General K.S. Thimayya of India, served as the chairman of
the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission [NNRC], after the armistice and contributed to resolving the
humanitarian issues arising out of the War, which won appreciation from all quarters.
• Consistent Indian support for peaceful reunification of the two Koreas has been well received in this
country.
• Bilateral consular relations were established in 1962 which was upgraded to Ambassador-level in 1973.
2.1.1. NEW ERA OF RELATIONSHIPS
• RoK's open market policies found resonance with India's economic liberalization and 'Look East Policy'
• The visit of President APJ Abdul Kalam in 2006, led to the launch of a Joint Task Force to conclude a bilateral
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) operationalized on 1st January 2010.
• In 2010, the bilateral ties were raised to the level of Strategic Partnership.
• 2011 two sides signed a Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement was signed.
• Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid a state visit to Korea during 18-19 May 2015, taking place within the
first year of his government. During the visit the bilateral relationship was upgraded to ‘special strategic
partnership’. In the ‘Joint Statement for Special Strategic Partnership’ PM and President Park Geun-hye
agreed to establish a 2+2 consultation mechanism at Secretary/Vice Minister of Foreign Office and Defence
Ministry.
2.2. ECONOMY
• Trade and economic relations have started to gather momentum again following the implementation of
CEPA in 2010
• A revised trade target of USD 40 billion by 2015 was set by PM Singh and President Lee on 25 March 2012.
However, bilateral trade has since declined to USD 18.13 billion in 2014-15, USD 16.56 billion in 2015-16,
USD 16.82 billion in 2016-17, which finally recovered and posted a positive growth of 30% in the first seven
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months of 2017.
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• Shipbuilding, automobile, electronics, textiles, food processing and manufacture being sectors of
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particular interest.
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• Separately, an updated India ROK Bilateral Air Services Agreement was revised in October 2015 in New Delhi,
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• An Indian Chamber of Commerce in Korea was established in January 2010 to help Korean companies
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interested in doing business with India.

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• India and South Korea launched an initiative ‘Korea Plus’, in June 2016 in India to promote and facilitate
Korean Investments in India.
• Major Korean conglomerates such as Samsung, Hyundai Motors and LG have made significant investments
into India, estimated at over $3 billion. Indian investments in ROK have already exceeded $2 billion.
• Mahindra & Mahindra acquired a majority stake in SsangYong Motors, the country's 4thlargest auto
manufacturer, in March 2011, with an investment of about $360 million. Tata Motors acquired Daewoo
Commercial Vehicle Company for $102 million in March 2004.
• In 2017 the two countries also signed agreements to establish $9 billion in concessional credit and $1
billion in Official Development Assistance (ODA) funding for infrastructure development projects in India.
2.3. CULTURAL TIES
• To further enhance cultural exchanges between Indian and Korea, an Indian Cultural Centre (ICC) was
established in Seoul in April 2011.
• Another Culture Centre was established in Busan in December 2013 on Public Private Partnership mode.
• A bust of Rabindranath Tagore was unveiled in Seoul by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha Smt. Meira Kumar in
May 2011.
• A bust of Mahatma Gandhi, presented by ICCR, was unveiled at the Hongbeop-sa temple in Busan on 21 July
2014.
• ICC in Seoul and Busan offers regular classes on yoga and dance, both contemporary and classical for
promotion of Indian culture.
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3. INDIA-AUSTRALIA
Map 6.4: Australia
3.1. BACKGROUND
• The India-Australia bilateral relationship has undergone evolution in recent years, developing along a
positive track, into a friendly partnership.
• The two nations have much in common, underpinned by shared values of a pluralistic, Westminster-style
democracies, Commonwealth traditions, expanding economic engagement and increasing high level
interaction.
• Their several commonalities including strong, vibrant, secular and multicultural democracies, free press,
independent judicial system and English language, serve as a foundation for a closer co-operation and
multifaceted interaction.
• The long-standing people-to-people ties, ever increasing Indian students going to Australia for higher
education, growing tourism and sporting links, especially Cricket and Hockey, have played a significant role
in further strengthening bilateral relations between the two countries.
• With the changing global scenario, Australia has come to look at India as a potential partner in promoting
regional security and stability.
• This led to upgradation of bilateral relationship between the two nations to a ‘Strategic Partnership’,
including a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2009.
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3.2 INDIA-AUSTRALIA: INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS

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• Over the years an array of institutional mechanism has been put in place to promote bilateral co-operation
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such as exchange of high level visits, Foreign Ministers’ Framework Dialogue, Joint Trade & Commerce
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Ministerial Commission, Defence Policy Talks including Policy talks at the level of Senior Officials, Staff Talks,
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Energy Security Dialogue and Australia-India Education Council, Track-2 Dialogues like Australia-India
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Leadership Dialogue, Youth Dialogue.

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• Foreign Ministers’ Framework Dialogue (FMFD), the central mechanism for advancing the bilateral agenda,
is held annually, alternatively in India and Australia.
• The India-Australia Dialogue on East Asia is also held at senior official level.
3.3 INDIA-AUSTRALIA: RECENT TIES

• The two way Prime Ministerial visits in 2014 built significant momentum in the bilateral relationship.
• Prime Minister Mr. Tony Abbott visited India from 04-05 September 2014, During the visit, four Agreements/
MoUs on Civil Nuclear Cooperation, Sports, Water resources and Skills were signed along with a number of
significant initiative were launched.
• Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Australia for G20 Leaders' Summit at Brisbane in November 2014,
followed by bilateral visit from 16-18 November 2014. During the visit, he held wide-ranging talks with then
PM Abbott and addressed a joint sitting of both houses of Parliament, the first by an Indian PM. Five
Agreements/MoUs on Social security, Tourism, Arts & Culture, Sentenced persons and combating Narcotics
were signed on this occasion.
• On his State Visit to India during 09-12 April 2017, Prime Minister Malcom Turnbull held bilateral
discussion with Prime Minister Modi and both leaders committed to deepening bilateral defence and
strategic partnership, broader economic relationship with greater emphasis on energy, education, science
and innovation, sports and health cooperation and strengthening international rule based systems.
• Inaugural Secretary-level Trilateral talks between India, Australia and Japan held in New Delhi in June
2015. The second Foreign Secretary level trilateral talks were held in Tokyo on 26 February 2016 and the
third took place in Canberra on 29 April 2017.
3.4 INDIA-AUSTRALIA: POLITICAL COOPERATION

• Australia supports India’s candidature in an expanded UN Security Council.
• Both India and Australia are members of the Commonwealth, IORA, ASEAN Regional Forum, Asia Pacific
Partnership on Climate and Clean Development, and have participated in the East Asia Summits.
• Both countries have also been cooperating as members of the Five Interested Parties (FIP) in the WTO
context.
• Australia is an important player in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and supports India's
membership of the organisation.
• In 2008, Australia became an Observer in SAARC.
3.5 ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONS

• Bilateral Trade: India’s trade in goods and services with Australia was approximately US$ 15.6 billion
(A$20.7 bn) in 2016. India's exports to Australia stood approximately at US$4.6 billion (A$6.1 bn) in 2016
while India's import from Australia 3 during the same period stood at US$11 billion (A$14.6 bn).
• The two countries are currently discussing a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA)
which will provide greater market access to exporters of goods and services.
• The two sides have exchanged their goods and services offer lists. It is expected that the conclusion of the
CECA will expand the base of merchandise trade, remove non-tariff barriers, encourage investment and
address the border restrictions to trade.
• India is also seeking to address its adverse balance of trade in Goods and Services through specialized
market access for its products. During his recent visit to India, Prime Minister Turnbull confirmed that CECA
was still “on the agenda” and both countries remained committed to it.
3.6 CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

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• A Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement between the two countries was signed in September 2014 during
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the visit of then PM Tony Abbott to India.

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• The agreement came into force from 13 November 2015

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• provides the framework for substantial new trade in energy between Australia and India. The Australian
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Parliament passed the “Civil Nuclear Transfer to India Bill 2016” on 01 December, 2016 which ensures that
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Uranium mining companies in Australia may fulfil contracts to supply Australian uranium to India for civil
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use with confidence that exports would not be hindered by domestic legal action challenging the
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consistency of the safeguards applied by the IAEA in India and Australia’s international non-proliferation
obligations.
• It also ensures that any future bilateral trade in other nuclear-related material or items for civil use will also
be protected.

4. INDIA AND THE PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES
4.1. PACIFIC OCEAN AND ISLAND COUNTRIES
• The Pacific Ocean is the earth's largest ocean covering 46 per cent of water surface and 33 per cent of the
earth's total surface, making it larger than the entire earth's land area.
• It is bounded by 41 sovereign states plus Taiwan, and 22 non-independent territories.
• It is rich in marine resources and accounts for 71 per cent of the world's ocean fishery catch.
• The Pacific has for long been an area of geostrategic interest for countries such as the US, Japan, China,
Russia, Australia, and Indonesia – large economies which lie on its boundary. The 14 PIF members are being
wooed by these powers.
• The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) is a political grouping with 18 Members: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated
States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Nauru, New Caledonia New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua
New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
• The Pacific Islands Forum was founded in 1971 as the South Pacific Forum. In 2000, the name was changed
to the Pacific Islands Forum to better reflect the geographic location of its members in the north and south
Pacific. Its secretariat is based in Suva, Fiji
• Two developed Pacific Island countries – Australia and New Zealand – have tended to dominate regional
cooperation forums such as the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).
4.2. INDIA AND THE PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES

• India's focus has largely been on the Indian Ocean where it has sought to play a major role and protect its
strategic and commercial interests.
• In recent times India’s interest in the region to its east has expanded to include the Pacific Ocean as well.
• India has had a long history of cooperation and close engagement with Fiji, which has a large population of
Indian origin.
• In 2016, the state visit by President Pranab Mukherjee to Papua New Guinea (PNG) and New Zealand
marked an important milestone in India’s extended ‘Act East’ policy.
• India has participated in Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), meetings as one of the 17 dialogue partners (including
US, EU and China).
• The Forum for India Pacific Cooperation (FIPIC) initiative marks a serious effort to expand India’s
engagement in the Pacific region.
4.2.1. INDIA AND PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES: FIPIC
• Forum for India Pacific Cooperation (FIPIC) includes 14 of the island countries – Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati,
Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga,
Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. It was launched during the visit of Prime Minister Modi to Fiji in November 2014.
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The second summit of the Forum for India Pacific Cooperation (FIPIC-2) was organised in Jaipur on 21-22
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August 2015.
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The Ministry of External Affairs, hosted the ‘India-Pacific Islands Sustainable Development Conference’ in
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economic zones (EEZs), and offer promising possibilities for fruitful cooperation.
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Transport, communications, renewable energy, health services, fisheries (“blue” economy), and agro-
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based industries are areas where India can make an impact.

• In this context India has envisaged following steps:
o Setting up of a 'special fund of $1 million' for adapting climate change vis-a-vis clean energy,
o establishing a 'trade office' in India,
o 'Pan Pacific Islands e-network' to close the physical distance between the islands by improving digital
connectivity,
o extending visa on arrival at Indian airports for all the fourteen Pacific Island countries,
o 'space cooperation' in space technology applications for improving the quality of life of the islands,
o 'training to diplomats' from Pacific Island countries to increase mutual understanding.

• These countries range in land area from the largest Papua New Guinea (461,700 sq km) to the smallest
Nauru (21 sq km). The size of their population ranges from Papua New Guinea (7.7 million) to Niue (1,500).
• Development indicators also vary widely with per capita income ranging from USD 27,340 (Cook Islands) to
USD 1020 (Papua New Guinea). These figures highlight the wide disparities among these countries.
4.3 THE CONCEPT OF INDO-PACIFIC

• The emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a new geopolitical frame of reference is embedded in the growing
strategic importance of the maritime domain and the rise of states that have demonstrated the ability to
‘transcend’ their respective sub-regions.
• The term “Indo-Pacific” has long been in vogue among marine biologists and ichthyologists to define the
stretch of water from the tropical Indian Ocean, through the equatorial seas around the Indonesian
archipelago, the South China Sea, and to the western and central Pacific Ocean.
• In geopolitical terms it has come in vogue in the early 21st century and, predictably, has proved to be far
more contentious than its scientific definition.
• It was first brought up by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2007 in a speech to the Indian Parliament
to represent the vast swathe of water that connects the Pacific and the Indian Oceans.
• It has recently got some traction after Rex Tillerson, the US Secretary of State, used it in a major policy
speech in Washington. Trump in his visit to China also referred to the Indo-Pacific.
• The first ever use of the term in the National Security Strategy Document of the USA, released in 2017, has
provided the term new salience.
• Against this backdrop, efforts to rejuvenate the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or the “Quad”) between
Australia, India, Japan and the US on the sidelines of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
and the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Manila in 2017 is of notable significance.
• The rise and increasing assertion of China has provided the current context for the salince the term has
acquired in geo-strategic circles.
• In this context apart from the Quad, the ASEAN and institutions centred around it can play a key role in
evolving an economic, security and political architecture in the Indo-Pacific.
• India is already a part of Quadrilateral, and engages with ASEA and institutions such as the EAS as well as
ARF.
• Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): is a regional economic forum established in 1989 to leverage
the growing interdependence of the Asia-Pacific among 21 members. The APEC process is supported by a
permanent secretariat based in Singapore.
• India is not a member of the APEC. Given its significance in the emerging architecture of the Indo-Pacific
India’s membership in the forum dominated by China can be a positive step.
• Over the years ideas such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor has been put forward by the USA.
• In recent times the USA has also underlined India’s significance in this region.
• The idea of Indo-Pacific thus is gaining momentum, the need is to
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VISION IAS
www.visionias.in
LECTURE-7
INDIA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INDIA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN .............................................................................................................................. 2
1.1. The Indian Ocean ............................................................................................................................................. 2
1.1.1. Significance of the Indian Ocean .............................................................................................................. 2
1.1.2. India Ocean: People and Regions ............................................................................................................. 3
1.1.3. India and the Indian Ocean ...................................................................................................................... 3
1.1.4. Push for A Comprehensive Maritime Policy ............................................................................................. 4
1.1.5. The Geo-Strategic Dimensions ................................................................................................................. 4
1.1.6. India’s Vision for Maritime Security ......................................................................................................... 4
1.1.7. India as Net-Security Provider .................................................................................................................. 4
1.1.8. Key Developments .................................................................................................................................... 5
1.2. Prime Ministers Visit to the Indian Ocean Countries 2015 ............................................................................. 5
1.2.1. India-Mauritius ......................................................................................................................................... 5
1.2.2. India-Seychelles ........................................................................................................................................ 5
1.2.3. Project Mausam........................................................................................................................................ 6
1.3. Blue Economy .................................................................................................................................................. 7
1.4. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) ....................................................................................................... 7
1.5. Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)........................................................................................................... 7
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1. INDIA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN
Map7.1-The Indian Ocean
1.1. THE INDIAN OCEAN

• Indian Ocean, covers approximately one-fifth of the total ocean area of the world.
• It is the smallest, geologically youngest, and physically most complex of the world’s three major oceans.
• It stretches for more than 6,200 miles (10,000 km) between the southern tips of Africa and Australia and,
without its marginal seas, has an area of about 28,360,000 square miles (73,440,000 square km).
• The decision by the International Hydrographic Organization in 2000 to delimit a fifth ocean, the Southern
Ocean, removed the portion of the Indian Ocean south of 60 degrees south latitude.
• The Indian Ocean’s average depth is 12,990 feet (3,960 metres), and its deepest point, in the Sunda Deep of
the Java Trench off the southern coast of the island of Java (Indonesia), is 24,442 feet (7,450 metres).
1.1.1. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INDIAN OCEAN
• Four critically important access waterways are the Suez Canal (Egypt), Bab el Mandeb (Djibouti-Yemen),
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• The Indian Ocean provides major sea routes connecting the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia with Europe
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and the Americas. It carries a particularly heavy traffic of petroleum and petroleum products from the
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Fishing fleets from Russia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan also exploit the Indian Ocean, mainly for shrimp
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• Large reserves of hydrocarbons are being tapped in the offshore areas of Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, and
western Australia. An estimated 40% of the world's offshore oil production comes from the Indian Ocean.
• Beach sands rich in heavy minerals and offshore placer deposits are actively exploited by bordering
countries, particularly India, South Africa, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.
• Major Seaports: Chennai (India); Colombo (Sri Lanka); Durban (South Africa); Jakarta (Indonesia); Kolkata
(India); Melbourne (Australia); Mumbai (India); Richards Bay (South Africa)
• International Trade: Indian Ocean and its various channels are responsible for two-thirds of world’s oil
shipment, one third of world’s cargo movement and nearly half of its container traffic movement.

1.1.2. INDIA OCEAN: PEOPLE AND REGIONS
• Home to nearly 2.7 billion people, states whose shores are washed by the ocean are rich in cultural
diversity and richness in languages, religions, traditions, arts and cuisines.
• They vary considerably in terms of their areas, populations and levels of economic development.
• They may also be divided into a number of sub-regions (Australasia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, West Asia
and Eastern & Southern Africa), each with their own regional groupings (such as ASEAN, SAARC, GCC and
SADC, to name a few). Despite such diversity and differences, these countries are bound together by the
Indian Ocean.
1.1.2.1. Piracy in the Indian Ocean
• More than eighty countries, organizations, and industry groups participate in operations in the IOR under
the auspices of the ad hoc, voluntary Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), created in
January 2009 in response to UN Security Council Resolution 1851 on Somali piracy and armed robbery at
sea.
• The International Maritime Bureau continues to report the territorial waters of littoral states and offshore
waters as high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships, particularly in the Gulf of Aden, along the
east coast of Africa, the Bay of Bengal, and the Strait of Malacca;
• the presence of several naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden and additional anti-piracy measures on the part
of ship operators, including the use of on-board armed security teams, have reduced incidents of piracy; in
response, Somali-based pirates, using hijacked fishing trawlers as "mother ships" to extend their range,
shifted operations as far south as the Mozambique Channel, eastward to the vicinity of the Maldives, and
northeastward to the Strait of Hormuz;
• Operation Ocean Shield, the NATO naval task force established in 2009 to combat Somali piracy, concluded
its operations in December 2016 as a result of the drop in reported incidents over the last few years; the EU
naval mission continues its operations in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean;
• the first half of 2017 has seen an increase in attacks with two incidents in the Gulf of Aden, one in the Red
Sea, and four off the coast of Somalia
1.1.3. INDIA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN
• India has a coastline of 7,500 km and is surrounded by Oceans and Seas in three sides of its international
boundaries.
• Independent India was a typical continental power, mostly due to its difficult land border disputes with
China and Pakistan.
• During the Cold War days, India wanted that the major world powers should withdraw themselves from
the Indian Ocean, presence of whom was actually a threat to India’s ideological inclination to the non-
aligned movement.
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enhanced supply of oil through Oceans and Seas in an order that increasing domestic demand for energy is
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Approximately 80 percent of India’s energy imports traverse through the Indian Ocean and its different
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• In the 1990s, India became enthused about regional maritime cooperation as well, thanks to the increasing
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number of regional trading blocs across the world that played a stimulator for India’s integration with
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various regional groupings. Given this context, India’s interests in the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for
Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC, now Indian Ocean Rim Association- IORA) and Indian Ocean Naval
Symposium are well founded.
• As Expressed by Prime Minister Modi “For us, it also serves as a strategic bridge with the nations in our
immediate and extended maritime neighbourhood ...”
• The Indian Ocean Region is one of India’s foremost policy priorities.
• India’s approach is evident in the vision of ‘sagar’, which means ocean and stands for Security and Growth
for all in the region.

1.1.4. PUSH FOR A COMPREHENSIVE MARITIME POLICY
• There are several factors that are pushing India towards a more comprehensive maritime policy.
o India’s own desire to play a significant role in the Indo-Pacific region, which is supported by regional
powers like United States, Australia and Japan.
o China’s special emphasis towards Indian Ocean (through its Silk Road project and growing cooperation
with the littoral nations) as well as its formation of the blue water navy was perhaps a reminder to New
Delhi that stirred the latter to strengthen its maritime capability in the Indian Ocean, considered to be its
‘strategic backyard’.
1.1.5. THE GEO-STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS
• During his 2015 visit to Mauritius and Seychelles, Prime Minister Mr. Modi underlined that India is now
ready to mark its presence in the wider geographic region of the Indo-Pacific and India may even consider
building military bases outside its own national territory.
• This changed perception should be understood in the context of Mumbai 2008 attack, perpetrators of
which came through the Seas and revealed that India still has to overcome few challenges in terms of
safeguarding its coastlines and national interests.
• India’s Goal is to:
o seek a climate of trust and transparency
o respect for international maritime rules and norms by all countries;
o sensitivity to each other’s interests;
o peaceful resolution of maritime security issues;
o increase in maritime cooperation
1.1.6. INDIA’S VISION FOR MARITIME SECURITY
• India’s new vision for maritime security is comprehensively articulated in Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian
Maritime Security Strategy, a 2015 document by the Indian Navy.
• The document clarifies that the Indian Navy’s interest areas now cover
o The Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, IOR Island nations, Southwest Indian Ocean and East Coast
of Africa littoral countries among many other nations and areas.
o The South China Sea, East China Sea and Western Pacific Ocean and their littoral nations are included
in the Indian Navy’s secondary priority areas.
By these, one expert has argued that India is trying to satisfy ASEAN which advocates for a larger Indian role in
South China Sea on the one hand and on the other, content US-Australia-Japan, countries that want to see
India as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean.
1.1.7. INDIA AS NET-SECURITY PROVIDER

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• The 2015 IMSS Document explains that the term Net Security Provider Includes
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o “…the state of actual security available in an area, upon balancing prevailing threats, inherent
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risks and rising challenges in the maritime environment, against the ability to monitor, contain
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and counter all of these.”

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• In the process, India’s role in this context also stands clarified. India seeks a role as a ‘net security provider’
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in the region, rather than being a ‘net provider of security’ as a regional ‘policeman.’
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• The Joint Strategic Vision with the US (2015), Japan’s inclusion into the Malabar Exercise, bilateral exercises
with countries like Japan, Australia and Indonesia and re-engaging with the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and
South Pacific island nations – all signal India’s preparedness for a critical role in the Indo-Pacific region.
1.1.7.1. Issues to Address
• To prepare for a larger role India is :
o considering indigenisation of defence capabilities,
o diversifying sources for its naval hardware,
o Increasing number of joint exercises with IOR partner countries,

o Promote blue economy and sustainable use of marine resources in a cooperative manner.
• There are Certain challenges:
o One of the challenges is the ambitions and activities of China. China’s ambition to control the Sea Lanes
of Communications (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean and its creation of a chain of friendly island countries
only escalates the existing bilateral tensions between India and China.
o Another challenge emanates from Pakistan. Pakistan considers India as a constant threat which has to
be deterred.
o India’s poor record in forming multilateral mechanisms (example, SAARC, BIMSTEC etc.) is another
concern as due to its failure in the aforementioned institutions India is mostly viewed as a country of
bilateral choice. Holistic maritime cooperation, on the other hand, is based on multilateralism.
• However, India is constantly learning, for instance the International Fleet Review in February 2016 in
Vishakhapatnam, India exhibited firm commitment towards intensified maritime cooperation with the IOR
partner nations.
1.1.8. KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region released in January 2015.
• In March 2015 Prime Minister Modi Visited the Indian Ocean Neighbours: Mauritius, Seychelles and
Srilanka
• In May 2015, it was reported that China was going to establish a naval base in the East African nation of
Djibouti.
1.2. PRIME MINISTERS VISIT TO THE INDIAN OCEAN COUNTRIES 2015

India’s role as the "net security provider" in the Indian Ocean region received a major boost when Prime Minister
Narendra Modi visited three India Ocean nations of Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka from March 10-14 2015.
1.2.1. INDIA-MAURITIUS
• The national day of Mauritius is celebrated every year on March 12. This day was selected as a tribute to
Gandhiji as he had launched the famous Dandi March.
• 68 per cent of the inhabitants are of Indian origin.
• Mauritius has a vast 2.3 million sq km of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Mauritius by virtue of its strategic
location is recognised as a hub of maritime activities in Indian Ocean.
• Two Countries in 2015, signed five agreements, one on opening up the “ocean economy”, or “blue
economy”.
• Another is a key memorandum of understanding that will see India taking over responsibility to build
transport infrastructure (sea and air links) for the Agalega Islands.
• The induction of an India-built naval patrol vessel 1,300-tonne vessel ‘Barracuda’ for the Mauritian
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National Coast Guard marked the first of such sales to this strategic island nation, which include fast attack
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1.2.2. INDIA-SEYCHELLES
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• P.M Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Seychelles in 34 years.
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• Modi announced that India will give a second Dornier aircraft to the Island nation for coastal surveillance
• The two nations signed four agreements for cooperation in hydrography, renewable energy, infrastructure
development and hydro-graphic survey.
• Another important agreement is for infrastructure development in the Assumption Island.
• P.M. also inaugurated the first of the eight Coastal Surveillance Radar Systems (CSRS) being set up by India.
India is helping Indian Ocean littorals as part of capacity and capability enhancement in strengthening their
maritime domain awareness capabilities.In addition to Seychelles, an agreement for setting up similar
systems in Maldives is pending and six Automatic Identification System (AIS) stations have been set up in Sri
Lanka.

Map7.2Various Strategic Posts in The Indian Ocean
Image Source: http://static.indianexpress.com/m-images/M_Id_8720.jpg
Map 7.3: Strategic Geography of the Indian Ocean

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Image Source: http://navalinstitute.com.au/wp-content/uploads/Strategic-Geography-of-the-Indian-Ocean-2010.jpeg

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1.2.3. PROJECT MAUSAM

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• Project ‘Mausam’ is the initiative of Ministry of Culture to be implemented by the Archaeological Survey of
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India (ASI) as the nodal agency with research support of the Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts
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(IGNCA) and National Museum as associate bodies.

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• Project ‘Mausam’ was launched in the 38th Session of World Heritage Committee meeting which was held
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at Doha in June, 2014.

• This project aims to explore the multi-faceted Indian Ocean ‘world’ – collating archaeological and historical
research in order to document the diversity of cultural, commercial and religious interactions in the Indian
Ocean – extending from East Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, the Indian Subcontinent and Sri Lanka to the
Southeast Asian archipelago.
• It also aims to promote research on themes related to the study of Maritime Routes through international
scientific seminars and meetings and by adopting a multidisciplinary approach.
• 39 Indian Ocean countries identified under Project Mausam.

1.3. BLUE ECONOMY
• The Blue Economy is sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods and
jobs, while preserving the health of marine and coastal ecosystem. The Blue Economy encompasses many
activities that impact every one. (World Bank)
• The objective of the Blue Economy is to promote smart, sustainable and inclusive growth and employment
opportunities within the Indian Ocean region maritime economic activities. The Blue Economy is
determined to initiate appropriate programs for sustainable harnessing of ocean resources, research and
develop relevant sectors of oceanography, assess stock marine resources, introduce marine aquaculture
deep sea/long line fishing and biotechnology and develop human resources. (IORA)
• This special area of focus was recognised at the 14th IORA Ministerial Meeting in Perth, Australia, on 9
October 2014.
1.4. THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM ASSOCIATION (IORA)

• The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) is an inter-governmental organisation which was established on
7 March 1997.
• The vision for IORA originated during a visit by late President Nelson Mandela of South Africa to India in
1995, where he said:
“The natural urge of the facts of history and geography should broaden itself to include the concept of an
Indian Ocean Rim for socio-economic co-operation”
• his sentiment and rationale underpinned the Indian Ocean Rim Initiative in March 1995, and the creation of
the Indian Ocean Rim Association (then known as the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-
operation), in March 1997.
• The IORA has 21 Member States and 7 Dialogue Partners
• IORA’s apex body is the Council of Foreign Ministers (COM) which meets annually. The Republic of South
Africa will assume the role for 2017-2019, followed by the United Arab Emirates.
• A committee of Senior Officials (CSO) meets twice a year to progress IORA’s agenda and consider
recommendations by Working Groups and forums of officials, business and academics to implement policies
and projects to improve the lives of people within the Indian Ocean Member States.
• The year 2017 is a landmark for IORA, celebrating the 20th Anniversary of the Association as a proactive
inter-governmental organisation
• The Vice-President of India led the Indian delegation to the first Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)
Leaders' Summit held on 7 March 2017 in Jakarta to commemorate the 20th Anniversary of the Association.
1.5. INDIAN OCEAN NAVAL SYMPOSIUM (IONS)

• The ‘Indian Ocean Naval Symposium’ (IONS) is a voluntary initiative that seeks to increase maritime co-
operation among navies of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region by providing an open and
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In the process, it endeavors to generate a flow of information between naval professionals that would lead
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The inaugural IONS-2008 was held in New Delhi, India on 14 Feb 08. CNS, Indian Navy was designated the
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Chairman IONS for the period 2008-10. A ‘Charter of Business’ was mutually agreed to by the Chiefs of the
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member-navies, which has been forwarded to all the member navies for ratification. The theme of the IONS-
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2008 was “Contemporary Trans-national Challenges – International Maritime Connectivities”.

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• That the launch of so important a regional initiative was able to meet with such wide acceptance across the
length and breadth of the Indian Ocean was in itself a unique phenomenon. There are 35 members -
navies of the IONS which have been geographically grouped into the following four sub-regions:
o South Asian Littorals- Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Pakistan, Seychelles and Sri Lanka
o West Asian Littorals- Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Yemen
o East African Littorals- Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eriteria, France, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan and Tanzania
o South East Asian and Australian Littorals- Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore,
Thailand and Timor Leste.

VISION IAS
www.visionias.in
LECTURE-8
INDIA AND WEST ASIA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INDIA AND WEST ASIA ............................................................................................................................................ 3
1.1. West Asia ......................................................................................................................................................... 3
1.2. India’s Focus In West Asia ............................................................................................................................... 3
1.3. India And West Asia: A Background ................................................................................................................ 3
1.4. The GCC ........................................................................................................................................................... 5
1.5. India-GCC Relations: Key Aspects .................................................................................................................... 5
1.6. Basis of Expanding Cooperation ...................................................................................................................... 5
1.6.1. Energy Security ......................................................................................................................................... 6
1.6.2. People to People Ties ............................................................................................................................... 6
1.6.3. Economic Ties ........................................................................................................................................... 6
1.6.4. Security Ties .............................................................................................................................................. 6
2. INDIA-SAUDI ARABIA .............................................................................................................................................. 8
2.1. Background ...................................................................................................................................................... 8
2.2. Economy .......................................................................................................................................................... 8
2.3. The People ....................................................................................................................................................... 8
2.4. Security ............................................................................................................................................................ 9
3. INDIA-UAE............................................................................................................................................................. 10
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3.1. Background .................................................................................................................................................... 10

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3.2. Recent Momentum ....................................................................................................................................... 10

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3.3. Economy: Trade and Investment................................................................................................................... 10

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3.4. The People ..................................................................................................................................................... 10

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3.5. Energy ............................................................................................................................................................ 11

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3.6. Strategic Partnership ..................................................................................................................................... 11

3.7. Key areas to Work on .................................................................................................................................... 11
4. INDIA-IRAN ........................................................................................................................................................... 12
4.1. Background .................................................................................................................................................... 12
4.1. Recent Momentum ....................................................................................................................................... 12
4.2. The Chabahar Port ......................................................................................................................................... 12

4.3. Economy: Energy Trade ................................................................................................................................. 13
4.4. Iran: New Opportunities? .............................................................................................................................. 13
4.5. Challenges...................................................................................................................................................... 14
4.6. Potential: Way Forward ................................................................................................................................. 14
5. INDIA-ISRAEL......................................................................................................................................................... 15
5.1. Background .................................................................................................................................................... 15
5.2. Defence and Security ..................................................................................................................................... 15
5.3. People ............................................................................................................................................................ 15
5.4. Trade .............................................................................................................................................................. 16
5.5. Agriculture ..................................................................................................................................................... 16
5.6. Recent Momentum: The Visits of Prime Minsters ........................................................................................ 16
5.7. Way Forward ................................................................................................................................................. 17
6. INDIA-PALESTINE .................................................................................................................................................. 18
6.1. The Palestinian Issue ..................................................................................................................................... 18
6.2. India’s Position .............................................................................................................................................. 18
6.3. Financial Assistance ....................................................................................................................................... 19
6.4. Recent developments and the Future: De-Hyphenation .............................................................................. 19
6.4.1. Two-State Solution ................................................................................................................................. 19
7. INDIA’S LOOK WEST POLICY: AN EVOLVING FRAMEWORK .................................................................................. 21
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1. INDIA AND WEST ASIA
1.1. WEST ASIA
• Western Asia, West Asia, Southwestern Asia or Southwest Asia is the westernmost sub region of Asia. The
concept significantly overlaps with the Middle East (or the Near East), the main difference usually being the
exclusion of the majority of Egypt (which would be counted as part of North Africa) and the inclusion of
the Caucasus.
• The term is sometimes used for the purposes of grouping countries in statistics. The total population of
Western Asia is an estimated 300 million as of 2015.
• The World Economy: Historical Statistics (2003) by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) only includes Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar,
Palestinian territories (called West Bank and Gaza in the latter), Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, UAE, and Yemen
as West Asian countries.
• The WANA [West Asia & North Africa] Division of MEA deals with all matters relating to Algeria, Djibouti,
Egypt, Israel, Libya, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Palestine, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Jordan and Tunisia
• The Gulf Division of MEA includes all matters relating to Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Yemen, UAE, GCC and OIC].
1.2. INDIA’S FOCUS IN WEST ASIA

• The region is significant for India’s energy security, people to people ties, trade and investment and
security relations.
• Key actors from India’s perspective in this region are the regional organizations such as the Gulf
Cooperation Council, States such as: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, and Israel.
• India has a historic and abiding interest in the Palestinian issue.
• In this diverse region India’s policy is to seek regional stability which is threatened by regional rivalries
(Iran-Saudi Arabia; Israel-Iran etc) and emergence of non state extremist groups such as the ISIS.
1.3. INDIA AND WEST ASIA: A BACKGROUND1

• Until the end of the Cold War India’s relations with West Asia were primarily shaped by India’s policy
responses to evolving geopolitical ground realities internationally and in the region.
• When India became independent, the West exercised almost unchallengeable influence and control over
West Asia. All independent West Asian countries then had strongly anti-Communist, pro-West regimes and
had become a part of the American-led bloc in the context of the newly emerged Cold War. However, to the
West’s great disappointment, even anger, India adopted a unique approach - not being aligned with either
camp.
• India’s consistent support for the Palestinian cause and pan-Arab nationalism with strong denunciations of
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Israeli and Western policies further angered Western powers.

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India had consistently provided a welcoming haven to Jewish people going back 2000 years. But having
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strongly denounced the Balfour Declaration (1917) during India’s freedom struggle, it was inevitable for India
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to oppose the creation of Israel and its admission to the United Nations as a matter of principle.
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• Britain had deliberately created Pakistan as an independent Muslim State. Pakistan’s belligerent hostility to
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India from day one was also manifested in its malevolent use of the Islamic card against India. There was
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automatic Western and Arab/Iranian/Turkish support for the emergence of Pakistan and in the many
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disputes that Pakistan created with India and in the wars that it initiated against India starting from its
brazen invasion of Kashmir on October 22, 1947.
• Britain sponsored the Baghdad Pact (1955), a military alliance with the region’s heavyweights — the
Shah’s Iran and Iraq (until 1958 a pro-Western monarchy) as well as Pakistan and Turkey — in order to
ensure its continued strategic control over the region and particularly to prevent the ingress of any Soviet
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This section is based on Ambassador Ranjit Gupta’s article available at:
http://www.mei.edu/content/map/india-s-relations-west-asia India and West Asia

influence. However, Pakistan’s sole motivation to join the alliance was the “India factor.” Unsurprisingly,
India strongly denounced the formation of this military alliance.
• In the context of non alignment India had viewed the advent of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt very
positively and had great empathy with the Nasserite ideology of pan-Arab nationalism, socialism, secular
and republican governance. India supported Egypt strongly during the Suez crisis (1956) and against the
consequent Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt and later in the 1967 war with Israel.
• In 1969 after the Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco invited India to the summit of Muslim countries in
Rabat, which led to the formation of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (O.I.C.), India was not allowed
to participate after the inaugural session due to Pakistan’s threat to walk out.
• To India’s great annoyance, the O.I.C. and its Contact Group (established at the O.I.C. summit in Tehran in
1994) adopted, at Pakistani instigation, strongly worded anti-India recommendations, resolutions and
statements regularly on Kashmir and on the supposed plight of Indian Muslims. Iran, Saudi Arabia and
Turkey have been proactively involved throughout.
• India's relationship with Iraq under Saddam Hussein was close, multidimensional and fruitful. Indeed, it
was probably India’s most valuable and productive bilateral relationship in West Asia during the Cold War
period. India implemented dozens of projects in Iraq and provided military training, particularly for the Iraqi
air force. Iraq was India’s leading oil supplier. And Saddam Hussein extended explicit political support in the
context of India’s problems with Pakistan. Both countries were close to the Soviet Union. However, this was
viewed negatively by almost all West Asian countries.
• The 1979 Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and the consequent mounting of the
modern jihad by the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to evict Soviet forces became a particularly
strong cementing factor between them while becoming yet another source of severe dissonance between
India on the one hand, and West Asian countries and the West on the other.
• As the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan intensified, the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) also became a
particularly strong Pakistan supporter. These same two Arab countries became the staunchest supporters of
the Taliban regime.
• Iran was also conspicuously pro-Pakistan during both the Shah and Khomenei eras — in the former as part
of the alliance with the West, and in the latter due to Iran’s ambition to become the leader of the Islamic
world and hence its strong support to all ‘Muslim’ causes.
• When the Cold War ended, India’s only friends in West Asia were Palestine Liberation Organization
(P.L.O.) Chairman Yasir ‘Arafat, who was gravely compromised due to his support for Saddam’s invasion of
Kuwait; a greatly weakened and strategically besieged Saddam; and Oman and Syria.
• India’s lone pillar of strategic support in the world, the Soviet Union, disintegrated. So dire was the state
of the economy that India’s gold reserves were physically airlifted to Europe in 1990 in order to enable an
International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) loan.
• Post Cold War India ceased viewing West Asia through the prism of its issues with Pakistan, discontinued
the use of strong rhetoric denouncing other countries’ policies, and abandoned defensive, reactive policy
approaches.
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India also started consciously courting the United States, now the lone global superpower. Importantly,
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India began to reach out to all West Asian countries without picking and choosing between them, and on
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In particularly audacious moves in December 1991, India reversed its earlier vote in the United Nations
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that had equated Zionism with racism. After personally obtaining P.L.O. Chairman Arafat’s full concurrence,
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Narasimha Rao established full diplomatic relations with Israel in January 1992, disregarding extremely
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strong domestic criticism. The relationship has flourished since then.

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• In December 1992, Rao, courageously risking a potential rebuff, reached out to Iran; his visit the next year
turned out to be exceedingly satisfying. A great rapport was established between him and President Ali
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.
• The Indian economy began to grow impressively, even as Pakistan became increasingly enmeshed in
Afghanistan and mired in internal political instability. The spreading Islamist extremist militancy and
terrorism in Pakistan and West Asia — while the world’s third largest Muslim community in India remained
immune to this danger — presented a particularly strong and impressive contrast internationally.
• Taken together, these developments constituted public recognition that the world welcomed India’s rise, in
contrast with growing anxieties about China’s rise. These same circumstances also persuaded Saudi Arabia

and its Gulf allies to look at India very differently.
• In response to Pakistan’s adventurism in Kargil in 1999, West Asian countries and the West declined to
support Pakistan — the first time such response in the long history of the India-Pakistan conflict.
• With the advent of the new millennium, there has been an extraordinary turnaround in the relationship
between the Gulf Cooperation Council (G.C.C.) countries and India.
• The Indo-Iranian economic relationship is also poised for a dramatic upsurge. On May 24, 2016, Prime
Minister Modi and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani signed a historic deal to develop the strategic port of
Chabahar and thereby open transport-and-trade corridor to and through Afghanistan to Central Asia and
Europe.
• First ever visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Israel in 2017 and reciprocal visit of Israel’s prime minister in
2018 have moved relations with Israel in to the fore.
• Prime Minster Modi’s stand alone visit to Palestine in 2018 again reiterated India’s support for a Palestinian
state and completed what is known as de-hyphenation of relations between India on the one hand and
Israel and Palestine on the other.
• Wars in Syria and Yemen, emergence of ISIS, difference between Iran and Arab States as well as political
transition, mark different aspects of current conflicts in West Asia. However, by a large India and
leadership in these countries have consciously not allowed this to adversely affect their bilateral relations.
1.4. THE GCC

• Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), is political and economic alliance of six West Asian countries:
o Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman.
• The GCC was established in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in May 1981. officially it is known as Cooperation Council
for the Arab States of the Gulf
• The purpose of the GCC is to achieve unity among its members based on their common objectives and
their similar political and cultural identities, which are rooted in Islamic beliefs.
• Presidency of the council rotates annually.
• The GCC also has a defense planning council that coordinates military cooperation between member
countries.
• The highest decision-making entity of the GCC is the Supreme Council, which meets on an annual basis and
consists of GCC heads of state. Decisions of the Supreme Council are adopted by unanimous approval.
• Some of the most important achievements of the GCC include the creation of the Peninsula Shield Force, a
joint military venture based in Saudi Arabia, and the signing of an intelligence-sharing pact in 2004.
• At a GCC summit in December 2009, an agreement was reached to launch a single regional currency
similar to the euro. This agreement remains unimplemented yet.
1.5. INDIA-GCC RELATIONS: KEY ASPECTS

• Collectively, the G.C.C. countries have become India’s preeminent oil and gas supplier and leading trade
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Indians are the largest expatriate group in each of the six G.C.C. countries.
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3,050,000 Indians live and work in Saudi Arabia constituting the largest number of Indian passport holders
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• The processes propelling this movement took place because of the high comfort level with Indians due to
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• Significantly, the number of Indians in G.C.C. countries has continued to rise notwithstanding the tightening
of domestic policies to curtail the influx of expatriate manpower and despite the ongoing wars in West Asia
from early 2011 onwards.
1.6. BASIS OF EXPANDING COOPERATION

• No major power has the kind of people-to-people socio-cultural compatibility and socio-economic
interdependence with countries of the Gulf region, in particular with G.C.C. countries that India has.
• Except for continuing O.I.C. activism relating to Kashmir in particular, there are no bilaterally contentious
political issues between India and the G.C.C. countries.
• India is very proud of being the world's largest democracy but India believes strongly that it is not the
business of foreign countries to impose forms of government on other countries; in fact,
• India believes that monarchies in G.C.C. countries are a factor of stability, fully in keeping with the
customs, ethos and traditions of the Arabian Peninsula.
• The deadly terrorist attacks in November 2008 in Mumbai was a watershed — the G.C.C. countries finally
recognized the potential dangers to the region of Pakistani-sponsored terrorism against India.
• Since then in particular Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. have provided excellent and expanding anti-terrorism
cooperation by repatriating those India wanted for terrorist activity .
• P.M.s historic visits to the U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Qatar between August 2015 and June 2016 have
marked renewed cooperation.
1.6.1. ENERGY SECURITY
• The IEA defines Energy Security as uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.
• India is a net importer of energy resources.
• Much of this import is sourced from West Asia, specifically the Gulf countries.
• In 2001, the region accounted for 66 percent of oil imports and in 2016 it accounted for 64 percent. Saudi
Arabia has been the largest oil supplier to India over the years.
• The Gulf Arab states 85 percent of its natural gas requirements
• India is the third largest export destination for gas from Qatar (behind Japan and South Korea). Qatar is the
largest supplier of LNG to India, accounting for over 65 per cent of India’s global import and 15 per cent of
Qatar’s export of LNG.
1.6.2. PEOPLE TO PEOPLE TIES
• GCC countries are host to the over 8 million strong and growing Indian expatriate community
• This is also refelcted in about US$ 35 billion annual remittances.
• Hajj- In 2017 India's Haj quota increased from 1,36,020 to 1,70,520.
• The Indian workers in Gulf countries face various issues:
o Delayed or non payment of Wages;
o Exit Visa issues;
o non-fulfilment of contracts;
o filing of false police cases etc
• India has signed Labour Agreements with multiple GCC countries including Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
1.6.3. ECONOMIC TIES
• The GCC region remains a top priority region for India, being one of the our largest trading partners with
bilateral trade over US$ 97 billion in 2015-16. In 2013-14 It was India’s largest trading partner group with
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a trade of US$ 171 billion (MEA).

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1.6.4. SECURITY TIES

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• Security Challenges: Radicalisation and terrorism, regional wars and maritime security remain key security
challenges in the region.
• Wars in Syria and Yemen, emergence of ISIS, difference between Iran and Arab States as well as political
transition, marks different aspects of current conflicts in West Asia.
• India’s maritime doctrine of 2009 and 2015 state that the Gulf and Arabian Sea are vital to India’s
interests, including securing choke points.
• In recent years, India has signed security and defense agreements with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, and
Qatar.
• The naval engagement with Oman has been most notable. While India and Oman entered into a “strategic

partnership” in 2008, naval cooperation has been on since 1993 in the form of a biennial exercise, Naseem
Al-Bahr.
• More significantly, Oman has played a key role in sustaining India’s security efforts in the Gulf of Aden by
offering berthing and replenishment facilities to naval ships, and hosting a crucial listening post in the
Western Indian Ocean. In 2018 India and Oman signed an agreement allowing Indian Naval vessels to use
the Duqm Port.
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2. INDIA-SAUDI ARABIA
2.1. BACKGROUND
• Visit of King Abdullah to India in 2006 resulted in signing of ‘Delhi Declaration’ imparting a fresh
momentum to the bilateral relationship. The visit provided the framework for cooperation in all fields of
mutual interest.
• The reciprocal visit by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh to Saudi Arabia in 2010 raised the level of
bilateral engagement to ‘Strategic Partnership’ and the ‘Riyadh Declaration’ signed during the visit captured
the spirit of enhanced cooperation in political, economic, security and defence realms.
• The visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Riyadh from April 2-3, 2016 could be seen as a taking forward
the momentum.
2.2. ECONOMY
• Saudi Arabia today is India’s 4th largest trade partner (after China, USA and UAE) and
• The value of India Saudi Arabia bilateral trade during 2016-17 decreased to USD 25.079 billion, a slight
decrease from USD 26.71 billion in 2015-16, as per figures provided by the Directorate General of Foreign
Trade.
• During this period, our imports from Saudi Arabia reached USD 19.94 billion, registering a decline of 1.85%
over previous year (USD 20.32 billion) whereas our exports to Saudi Arabia reached USD 5.13 billion
registering a decline of 19.70% over previous year (USD 6.39 billion). The current bilateral trade (April-May
2017) is valued USD 4.063 billion.
• Saudi Arabia is the 8th largest market in the world for Indian exports and is destination to more than
1.86% (2016-17) of India’s global exports. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia is the source of 5.19% (2016-17)
of India’s global imports.
• For Saudi Arabia, as per 2016 data, India is the 4th largest market for its exports, accounting for 9.3 % of its
global exports. In terms of imports by Saudi Arabia, India ranks 7th and is source of around 3.7 % of Saudi
Arabia’s total imports.
2.3. THE PEOPLE

• The 3.2 million strong Indian community in Saudi Arabia is the largest expatriate community in the
Kingdom and is the ‘most preferred community’ due to their expertise, sense of discipline, law abiding and
peace loving nature.
• Saudi Arabia continues to be among the most preferred destinations for Indians seeking jobs abroad,
resulting in the Gulf kingdom becoming among the highest sources of remittances to India, according to
official data. According to figures provided by the Embassy of India in Riyadh, the number of expatriate
Indians in Saudi Arabia increased from 3,039,193 in March 2017 to 3,253,901 in October 2017, a rise of
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• However, there are issues pertaining to employment and living conditions, that the two countries engage
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• Agreement on Labour Cooperation for Domestic Service Workers Recruitment, was signed in 2014.
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• In 2016 external affairs ministry and the Saudi labour ministry also signed an agreement on labour
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• In April 2013, King Abdullah announced a grace period allowing overstaying expatriates to correct the status,
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get new jobs or leave the country without facing penal action till the end of the grace period i.e. November
3, 2013. More than 1.4 lakh Indians availed the amnesty and returned back to home without facing penalty.
• Saudization, officially known as Saudi nationalization scheme, or Nitaqat system in Arabic, is the newest
policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia implemented by its Ministry of Labor .
• The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been following the policy of Nitaqat (Saudization), since
2011. This broadly aims at increasing the employment opportunities of the Saudi citizens both in the
public and private sectors by reducing dependence on the expatriate workers.
• These efforts of the Saudi side have of late gained momentum after the ongoing slowdown of the economy
due to continued low crude oil prices. From September 2017, only a handful of organisations with high

grades - based on number of Saudi nationals employed by them and other criteria - will be able to apply for
new block visas for migrant employees.
• The policy is not specifically directed at Indian nationals and the Saudi Government is exercising its
prerogative and sovereign right by following this policy uniformly in respect of all foreign nationalities.
• However, full implementation of the policy has implications for Indians in Saudi Arabia. Thus:
o The Government has been in regular contact with the Saudi Government towards safeguarding the
interests and welfare of the resident Indian community.
o There is a need for a comprehensive policy response at the level of the Union government
o Since the welfare of any of the Indian’s returning from Saudi Arabi lies with their respective state, there
is a need to prepare the states for such eventuality and enhance Union State cooperation.
2.4. SECURITY
• The 2010 Riyadh Declaration has been termed as ‘a new era of strategic partnership’ between the two
countries. The visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Riyadh from April 2-3, 2016 could be seen as a taking
forward the momentum in India’s growing engagement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which has taken
an upward strategic direction.
• Terrorism is an important issue on which cooperation between India and Saudi Arabia is crucial.
Collaborating with each other in combating terrorism has become necessary keeping in view the
transnational nature of terrorist funding, operation and ideology.
• In 2015 the Saudis deported Abu Jundal, who was wanted in the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, making counter
terrorism a key area of cooperation between the two countries.
• The visit of A. K. Antony to Saudi Arabia on February 13-14, 2012 was the first ever visit by an Indian Defence
Minister to the Kingdom.
• Only in recent years that the two countries have begun to conduct joint naval exercises. Indian ships have
visited Saudi Arabia on port calls and India has been providing training to some Saudi defence personnel.
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3. INDIA-UAE
3.1. BACKGROUND
• India and United Arab Emirates (UAE) enjoy strong bonds of friendship based on age-old cultural, religious
and economic ties between the two nations.
• The relationship flourished after the accession of H.H. Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan as the Ruler of Abu
Dhabi in 1966 and subsequently with the creation of the UAE Federation in 1971.
• Both countries soon established diplomatic relations in 1972 with UAE Embassy in India opening in 1972
and Indian Embassy in UAE opening in 1973. Since then, both sides have made sincere efforts to improve
relations in all fields.
3.2. RECENT MOMENTUM

• The visit Prime Minister of India to UAE on 16-17 August 2015 marked the beginning of a new
comprehensive and strategic partnership.
• Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, crown prince of Abu Dhabi and deputy supreme commander of
the UAE armed forces, visited India twice — once in February 2016 and then as chief guest at the Republic
Day celebrations in 2017.
• P.M. Modi visited UAE in February 2018. This was his second visit to the UAE, which has emerged as a key
strategic partner of India. After their talks, the two sides signed five agreements related to energy sector,
railways, manpower and financial services.
3.3. ECONOMY: TRADE AND INVESTMENT

• India-UAE bilateral relationship has evolved into a significant partnership in the economic and commercial
sphere. India-UAE trade is around US$ 52 billion (2016-17) making India the largest trading partner of UAE,
while UAE is India’s third largest trading partner (after China and US).
• UAE is the second largest export destination of India of over US$ 30 billion for the year 2016-17.
• Investment: There is an estimated US$ 8 billion UAE investment in India of which around US$ 4.03 billion
(Mar. 2016) is in the form of foreign direct investment, while the remaining is portfolio investment.
• UAE is the tenth biggest investor in India in terms of FDI. UAE’s investments in India are concentrated
mainly in five sectors: Services (10.33%), Construction Development (9.97%), Power (9.54%), Air Transport
(8.44%) and Hotel & Tourism (7.82%).
3.4. THE PEOPLE

• UAE is home to 2.8 million Indian expatriates, the largest expatriate community in the UAE.
• Professionally qualified personnel constitute about 15 & 20 percent of the community, followed by 20
percent white-collar non-professionals (clerical staff, shop assistants, sales men, accountants, etc.) and the
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remainder 65% comprises blue-collar workers.

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• There is a significant business community from India. The Indian community has played a major role in the
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• The annual remittances made by the large Indian community in UAE amount to over US$ 13.75 billion
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• The contribution of Indian community in development and prosperity of UAE was also acknowledged by
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UAE Government during the discussions in recently concluded 2nd India-UAE Strategic Dialogue.
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• In 2018 India and the UAE signed an MoU that aims to institutionalize the collaborative administration of
contractual employment of Indian workers in the Gulf country.
• IN 2015 government of Abu Dhabi announced plans for building the first Hindu temple in Abu Dhabi and
allocated land for it. The Ground breaking took place in 2018.
• There are 1,076 flights a week between India and the UAE, which is the largest operation of its kind. More
than 50 percent of Indians, who travel outside India to different destinations, such as Europe or America, use
Dubai and Abu Dhabi as their transit hub.

3.5. ENERGY
• The UAE contributes significantly to India’s energy security and was the fifth-largest supplier of crude oil to
India in 2016-17.
• The UAE accounts for 8 percent of India’s oil imports.
• India is the second-biggest buyer of U.A.E. crude behind Japan.
• Significantly, the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), in a first of its kind deal, has agreed to store
crude oil in India’s strategic storage facility at Manglore.
• In 2018 consortium of Indian oil companies led by ONGC videsh ltd. signed an agreement for 10% stake in
one of Abu Dhabi’s offshore Lower Zakum Concession.
• This is the first Indian Investment in upstream oil sector of UAE, transforming the traditional buyer-seller
relationship to a long-term investor relationship.
3.6. STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

• India and UAE signed an agreement to upgrade the relations to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, apart
from 13 other MoUs, in 2017.
• the first Strategic Dialogue meeting between the two Foreign Offices was held in New Delhi on January 20,
2017. The second Meeting took Place in October 2017 in Abu Dhabi
• India and UAE see each other as important players in maintaining peace and stability in their respective
regions and have reinforced their partnership in countering terrorism, combating radicalization and
preventing terror finance through intelligence sharing and close contacts between their National Security
Councils.
• The most significant support from the UAE came to India after the Uri attack when Abu Dhabi sent out a
very clear public statement suggesting India to take decisive action against perpetrators of the attack.
Even on Pathankot attack, the UAE supported India.
3.7. KEY AREAS TO WORK ON

• UAE also has the large sovereign wealth fund that India IS looking for investments. There is an agreement
that UAE will invest nearly $75 billion in India over the next few years
• In 2017, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority became the first institutional investor in the National
Investment and Infrastructure Fund’s Master Fund, with an investment of $1 billion.
• In January 2018 Dubai Ports (DP) World, the top port operator in the United Arab Emirates (UAE),
announced that has partnered with NIIF to invest in India's infrastructure projects.
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4. INDIA-IRAN
4.1. BACKGROUND
• India-Iran relations span millennia marked by meaningful interactions. The two countries shared a border
till 1947 and share several common features in their language, culture and traditions.
• Independent India and Iran established diplomatic links on March 15, 1950. In addition to the Embassy in
Tehran, India has two Consulates in Iran, one in Bandar Abbas and other in Zahedan.
• In recent times Iran has emerged as a key location for India’s connectivity initiatives for Afghanistan and
Central Asia.
• Thus, connectivity, commerce, culture, and energy are key pillars of India Iran relation in the current
context.
4.1. RECENT MOMENTUM

• The trend was enhanced at the turn of the millennium with the visit of Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari
Vajpayee to Tehran in April 2001 wherein the two countries signed the “Tehran Declaration” which set
forth the areas of possible cooperation between the two countries.
• President Mohammad Khatami visited India from January 24-28, 2003 as the Chief Guest at the Republic
Day parade. Both sides signed “The New Delhi Declaration” which set forth the vision of strategic
partnership between India and Iran.
• Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh visited Iran to attend the 16th NonAligned Movement (NAM) Summit
held in Tehran from August 28-31, 2012.
• Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi paid a bilateral visit to Iran from May 22- 23, 2016. 12
MoUs/Agreements were signed between India and Iran.
• External Affairs Minister Smt. Sushma Swaraj visited Iran on December 2, 2017 on her return journey from
SCO Summit at Sochi.
• Chabahar Port was inaugurated by the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran H.E. Mr Hassan Rouhani on
December 3 in the presence of Ministers from India, Afghanistan and the region.
• President Hassan Rouhani, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, paid his first State Visit to India from
15-17 February 2018.
4.2. THE CHABAHAR PORT

• Trilateral Transit and Trade Agreement signed in May 2016 between India, Iran and Afghanistan.
• Under the agreement signed between India and Iran in May 2016 , India is to equip and operate two berths
in Chabahar Port Phase-I with capital investment of USD 85.21 million and annual revenue expenditure of
USD 22.95 million on a 10-year lease.
• Chabahar port's location on the south-eastern coast of Iran is expected to open up greater opportunities
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for promotion of trade and commerce, especially from the ports along India’s western coast, with Iran,
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Afghanistan, Central Asia and beyond.

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India's participation in the development of Chabahar Port will provide India an alternative and reliable
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access route into Afghanistan utilizing India’s earlier investment in Zaranj-Delaram road built in Afghanistan,
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The first shipment of wheat assistance to Afghanistan was realised though Chabahar port in November
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2017. This has demonstrated that Chabahar port is a viable and secure alternative for promoting regional
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connectivity among India, Iran and Afghanistan and possibly to Central Asia.
• The port in the Sistan-Balochistan province on the energy-rich nation’s southern coast is easily accessible
from India’s western coast and is increasingly seen as a counter to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, which is being
developed with Chinese investment and is located at distance of around 80 kms from Chabahar.

Image Source: http://www.livemint.com/r/LiveMint/Period2/2016/05/24/Photos/G-iraqmap(modi)web.jpg
4.3. ECONOMY: ENERGY TRADE

• India-Iran commercial ties have traditionally been dominated by Indian import of Iranian crude oil.
• India is the second largest buyer of Iranian crude after China and Iran was the third largest supplier of
crude to India (April-Sep 2016).
• The India-Iran bilateral trade during the fiscal year 2015-16 was USD 9.054 billion. India imported USD 6.2
billion worth of goods mainly crude oil and exported commodities worth USD 2.7 billion.
• Major Indian exports to Iran include rice, tea, iron and steel, organic chemicals, metals, electrical machinery,
drugs/pharmaceuticals, etc.
• Major Indian imports from Iran include petroleum and its products, inorganic/organic chemicals, fertilizers,
plastic and articles, edible fruit and nuts, glass and glassware etc.
• Indian exports to Iran have steadily declined from $4.9 billion in 2013-14 to $2.379 billion in 2016-17,
increasing the trade deficit. There is need to address the problem of declining Indian exports to Iran by
putting in place a robust payment mechanism.
• A provision for investments in rupees has already been made between the two countries to take care of
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contingency if dollar payments are stopped because of sanctions.

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4.4. IRAN: NEW OPPORTUNITIES?

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• Iran, with the world’s second largest gas reserves and fourth largest oil reserves.
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manufacturing, transportation, finance, etc., that has started attracting many major global players. Its other
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major advantage is its demographics: 60% of its population is below 30 years of age.
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• Much of this potential was subdued by the international sanctions trgeted at Iran’s nuclear programme.
India voted against Iran in 2005, 2006, 2009, and 2011 for failing to comply with its NPT obligations. India
reduced oil imports in this period- importing21.20 million tonnes of crude oil from Iran in 2009-10, which
was reduced to 18.50 million tones in 2010-11, 18.11 million tones in 2011-12 and 13.14 million tonnes in
2012-13.
• Nuclear sanctions imposed against Iran were finally lifted on January 16, 2016 after it was certified by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran had met its obligations under the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached in July 2015 among six world powers.
• The deal has not only allowed Iran access to the billions of dollars of assets in international bank accounts
that were frozen during the sanctions period, but will also possibly see thousands of barrels of Iranian
crude added to its current exports of 2.9 million barrels per day (mb/d), with the possibility of 1 million
barrels extra per day (mb/d) by the end of 2016.
• The economic situation in Iran has been improving from early 2016 after the lifting of international sanctions
following the implementation of the nuclear deal by this oil exporting nation.
• The Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline project: In 1993, Pakistan and Iran announced a plan to build a
gas pipeline, which Iran later proposed extending into India. Dubbed the "peace pipeline“.
• New Delhi has not been participating in talks on the 1,036-km Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline since 2007
citing security and commercial concerns but has never officially pulled out of the $7.6 billion project.
• It had succumbed to the sanctions regime as well as fierce opposition from the US, with Washington
pushing for the rival Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) project. Lifting of sanctions provide an
opportunity to consider this project afresh.
• The Farzad-B gasfield, according to India holds reserves of almost 19 trillion cubic feet. The consortium,
which includes Indian Oil Corp. and Oil India Ltd., has been trying to secure development rights to the
Farzad-B gas field since at least 2009. OVL also leads a group that discovered Farzad B natural gas field off
Iran under an exploration services contract. ONGC Videsh and Indian Oil each own 40 percent interest in the
Farsi block that holds Farzad-B field, while Oil India has 20 percent.
• The joint statement in 2018 makes a reference to the Farzad B gas field, there is need to do more to bring
the negotiations to a conclusion.
• Recently, Iran has signed an initial pact with Russia's Gazprom for developing Farzad B, discovered
by ONGC. France’s oil major Total and the China National Petroleum Corporation have already signed
agreement for South Pars, Phase 11
4.5. CHALLENGES
• European sanctions linked to human rights and US sanctions linked to terrorism are still in place.
• Embargoes on the sales and exports of conventional weapons and ballistic missile technology also remain.
• US administration under president Trump has been dissatisfied with the nuclear agreement or JCPOA,
lifting sanctions on Iran.
• Iran’s rivalry with its Arab neighbours i.e Saudi Arabia, UAE etc. and its confrontation with Israel remain a
key issue for regional stability.
• The Chinese are building a refinery in Chabahar Free Trade Zone, and Iran has also joined China’s OBOR.
4.6. POTENTIAL: WAY FORWARD

• Iran is poised to become India’s “gateway” to Central Asia, Europe and Russia as a result of the future
construction of the ports at Chabahar and Bandar Abbas and the International North-South Transport
Corridor (INSTC).
• Iran is a valuable ally in the fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Finally, Iran is an emerging regional
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power with wide-ranging influence in West Asia that could contribute to regional stability.
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It is for these reasons that India worked assiduously to sustain its relationship with Iran in the face of
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5. INDIA-ISRAEL
5.1. BACKGROUND
• India formally recognised Israel on September 17, 1950. Soon thereafter, the Jewish Agency established an
immigration office in Bombay. This was later converted into a Trade Office and subsequently into a
Consulate. Embassies were opened in 1992 when full diplomatic relations were established.
• Since the upgradation of relations in 1992, defence and agriculture have been the main pillars of bilateral
engagement. In recent years, ties have expanded to areas such as S&T, education and security.
• Two Israeli Presidents have visited India - Ezer Weizmann in 1996 and Reuven Rivlin in 2016. Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon visited India in 2003.
• From India, President Pranab Mukherjee visited Israel in October 2015.
• Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit in 2017, marked the first such visit from India at the head of
government level.
• Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu Visited India in January 2018.
• These visits provided much public visibility to this relationship.
5.2. DEFENCE AND SECURITY

• India imports important defence technologies from Israel.
• India is the number one export target of the Israel defence industry. Nearly 41 % of Israel defence exports
are to India hence, India’s defence import sustains Israel,defence industry.
• However, between 2005 and 2014, it accounted for 7 percent of military equipment deliveries, the third
highest after Russia and the United States.
• There are regular exchanges between the armed forces and defence personnel. Air Chief Marshal, Arup
Raha, visited Israel in March, 2016 while Israeli Naval and Air Force Chiefs visited India in 2015. INS Trikand
made a port call at the Haifa port in August, 2015.
• In February 2014, India and Israel signed three important agreements on:
o Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters,
o Cooperation in Homeland and Public Security, and
o Protection of Classified Material.
• Under Cooperation in Homeland Security, four working groups in the areas of border management,
internal security and public safety, police modernization and capacity building for combating crime, crime
prevention and cyber crime were established.
• IPS officer trainees visited Israel in 2015 and 2016 for foreign exposure visit.
• There is ongoing cooperation on counter-terrorism issues, including through a Joint Working Group on
Counter-Terrorism which held its last meeting in July, 2015.
5.3. PEOPLE
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Major waves of immigration of Jews from India to Israel took place in the 1950s and 1960s. There are
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approximately 85,000 Jews of Indian-origin in Israel. The majority is from Maharashtra (Bene Israelis) with
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immigrating to Israel. While the older generation still maintains an Indian lifestyle and storng cultural links
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with India, the younger generation is more fully integrated into Israeli society. However, the Know India
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Programme, which provide Indian origin persons opportunities to visit India, have been received well by the
younger generation of Indian jews.
• There are about 12,500 Indian citizens in Israel, of whom around 11,500 are care-givers. Others are
diamond traders, some IT professionals, and students.
• For Israelis India has emerged as a key tourist destination.
• The launch of direct flight between Delhi and Tel Aviv on 22 March 2018 is expected to give major push to
people to people ties.

5.4. TRADE
• From US$ 200 million in 1992 (comprising primarily trade in diamonds), bilateral merchandise reached US$
5.19 billion in 2011. Since then, it has, however, stagnated around US$ 4 - 4.5 billion with bilateral trade
(excluding defence) for 2015 being US$ 4.14 billion.
• Though trade in diamonds constitutes more than half of bilateral trade, trade has diversified in recent years
to include sectors such as pharmaceuticals, agriculture, IT etc.
• Major exports from India to Israel include diamonds and metals, chemical products and textiles. Major
imports by India from Israel also include diamonds and metals, chemicals (mainly potash) and machinery and
transport equipment. Though reliable figures of services are unavailable, it is estimated that almost 75% of
bilateral trade in services flow from India to Israel.
5.5. AGRICULTURE
• India and Israel have a bilateral agreement for cooperation in agriculture. The bilateral action plan for
2015-18 is currently operational.
• India and Israel agreed to establish a "Strategic Partnership in Water and Agriculture” in 2017. This will
focus on water conservation, waste-water treatment and its reuse for agriculture, desalination, water
utility reforms, and the cleaning of the Ganges and other rivers using advanced water technologies.
• 10 out of the proposed 26 Centers of Excellence in agriculture being developed in India with Israeli help
have already been commissioned across different states such as Haryana, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Gujarat
etc.
• India has benefited from Israeli expertise and technologies in horticulture mechanization, protected
cultivation, orchard and canopy management, nursery management, micro-irrigation and post-harvest
management.
• Israeli drip irrigation technologies and products are now widely used in India.
5.6. RECENT MOMENTUM: THE VISITS OF PRIME MINSTERS

• P.M. visited Israel in July 2017, marking 25 years of exchange of emabssies.
• A Memorandum of Understanding was signed for establishing the India-Israel Industrial R&D and
Innovation Fund (I4F) by the Department of Science and Technology, India and the National Authority for
Technological Innovation, Israel with a contribution of US$ 20 million from each side.
• Both the countries also agreed for India-Israel Development Cooperation, a three-year work programme in
the agriculture sector. They also launched a five-year technology fund.
• MoUs were signed in 2017 on Plan of Cooperation Between the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO)
and the Israel Space Agency (ISA) regarding cooperation in Atomic, Clocks, GEO-LEO Optical Link and
Electric Propulsion for Small Satellites.
• India-Israel CEO Forum, was established in July 2017 during Prime Minister Modi's visit to Israel
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• However, certain developments such as on the vote at the UN on Jerusalem issue in December 2017 and
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the news of India cancelling a $ 500 million deal to buy 1,600 Spike anti-tank guided missiles from Israel,
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• The two Prime Ministers discussed the developments pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process.
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arrangements.
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• However, these issues did not cause much concern as seen during the January 2018 visit of Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu to India.
• During this visit, The two prime ministers noted with satisfaction the commencement and implementation
of India-Israel development cooperation - three-year work programme in Agriculture (2018-2020)
• MoU on Cooperation in the Oil and Gas sector was signed.
• Security cooperation was taken further by signing of the MoU on Cooperation in Cyber Security between
India and Israel.
• The two sides affirmed commitment to enhanced people-to-people contacts, through signing of a Protocol
Amending Air Transport Agreement to expand the scope of cooperation in the civil aviation sector.

• Both sides have signed an MoU in Film Co-Production in recognition of the role that films play in promoting
people-to-people contact.
• A decision was made on holding Festivals of India and Israel in their respective countries in the Year 2019.
5.7. WAY FORWARD

• India’s flourishing relationship with Israel has not damaged its relations with other West Asian countries;
on the contrary, the scale and scope of these relationships have been expanding
• Stand alone visit of the Prime Minister to Israel in 2017 marked the de-hyphenation of relation with Israel
from that with Palestinians and other Arab countries. This needs to be taken forward in a balanced way.
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6. INDIA-PALESTINE
6.1. THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE
• Mandate of Palestine was to be partitioned into Jewish and Arab states under United Nations Resolution
181, approved in November 1947. Jerusalem is put under international control.
• The state of Israel was finally created on May 14, 1948, provoking an eight-month war with Arab states.
• The war resulted in the West Bank including east Jerusalem going to Jordan and the Gaza Strip to Egypt.
Israel ended up occupying more territory than the resolution 181 had visualized.
• Thus, the First Arab-Israeli war resulted in statelessness for Palestinian people with many becoming
refugees in the neighboring Arab states.
• The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) is created in 1964 with the aim of liberating the whole of
historical Palestine.
• In the June war of 1967 between Israel and its Arab neighbors, Israel defeated Egypt, Jordan and Syria and
occupied east Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights. This war brought the
Palestinians under Israeli occupation.
• The first intifada, or Palestinian uprising against Israeli rule, rages from 1987 to 1993.
• In 1993, Israel and the PLO sign a declaration on principles for Palestinian autonomy after six months of
secret negotiations in Oslo, launching an abortive peace process.
• PLO leader Yasser Arafat returns to Gaza in July 1994 to create the Palestinian National Authority (PNA or
PA). Self-rule is established for the first time in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho.
• The Oslo Peace process broke down in 1999-2000. This was followed by a violent second intifada and
Israeli response to it
• Mahmud Abbas took over the leadership of the Palestinian Authority in January 2005, after the death of
Arafat.
• The last Israeli forces left Gaza after a 38-year occupation in September 2005.
• In June 2007, Islamist movement Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip after ferocious fighting with its
rivals in the Fatah faction led by Abbas, who remains in power in the West Bank. Hamas is a Palestinian
Islamist political organization and militant group that has waged war on Israel since the group's 1987
founding, most notably through suicide bombings and rocket attacks. It seeks to replace Israel with a
Palestinian state. It also governs Gaza independently of the Palestinian Authority.
• In 2014, Israel launched a new operation against Gaza in an attempt to stop rocket fire and to destroy
tunnels from the Palestinian territory.
• Hamas and Fatah sign a reconciliation accord in October 2017 aimed at ending a decade of discord.
• Thus, the Palestinians remain stateless and the territory which is expected to become a future state of
Palestine, i.e. West Bank and Gaze Strip remain separated and under Israeli occupation (West Bank) or
blockaded (Gaza strip).
•
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The Palestinian
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• International community including India supports a peaceful negotiated resolution of the issue with the
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Palestinian state, security and recognition for Israel remaining the end goal.
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6.2. INDIA’S POSITION

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• India’s solidarity with the Palestinian people and its attitude to the Palestinian question was given voice
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during our freedom struggle by Mahatma Gandhi. Since then, empathy with the Palestinian cause and
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friendship with the people of Palestine have become an integral part of India’s foreign policy.
• India was the first Non-Arab State to recognize PLO as sole and legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people in 1974. India was one of the first countries to recognize the State of Palestine in 1988.
• In 1996, India opened its Representative Office to the Palestine Authority in Gaza, which later was shifted
to Ramallah in 2003.
• India has always played a proactive role in garnering support for the Palestinian cause in multilateral fora.
India co-sponsored the draft resolution on “the right of Palestinians to self determination” during the 53rd
session of the UN General Assembly and voted in favour of it.
• India also voted in favour of UN General Assembly Resolution in October 2003 against construction of the

separation wall by Israel and supported subsequent resolutions of the UNGA in this regard. India voted in
favour of accepting Palestine as a full member of UNESCO in 2011.
• At the United Nations General Assembly on November 29, 2012 the status of Palestine was upgraded to a
‘non-member state’. India co-sponsored this resolution and voted in favour of it. India supported the
Bandung Declaration on Palestine at Asian African Commemorative Conference in April 2015. India
supported installation of Palestinian flag at UN premises along with other observer states, like the flags of
member states, in September 2015.
6.3. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

• India has so far extended budgetary and project support of US$ 60 million to Palestine. During the visit of
President Abbas to India in the year 2008, India announced a grant of US$ 10 million as budgetary support
and this was transferred to Palestine in March 2009. During the visit of President Abbas to India in February
2010, India announced a budgetary support of US$ 10 million and this was transferred in the month of
March 2010.
• Again in 2012, during the visit of President Abbas India announced a grant of US$ 10 million as budgetary
support to Palestine.
• During the year 2015, India provided a total of US$ 9 million as financial assistance to Palestine; US$ 4
million was provided as project assistance towards the reconstruction of Gaza (on 12 January 2015), and
US$ 5million was provided as budgetary assistance (on 12 October 2015).
• In 2018, during the PMs visit a total of 50 million US$ was committed by India as assistance to Palestine.
• A MoU was signed between India and Palestine for setting up of India-Palestine Super-specialty hospital at
Beit Sahour in Bethelhem Governorate at a cost of US$ 30 million.
• Construction of India Palestine Centre for Empowring women, "Turathi” at a cost of US$ 5 million.
• India also earmarked funds for Palestine for setting up of new National Printing Press at Ramallah at a cost of
US$ 5 million.
6.4. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THE FUTURE: DE-HYPHENATION

• The prime Minister during his 2018 visit observed that: “India hopes that Palestine soon becomes a
sovereign and independent country in a peaceful atmosphere... permanent solution to the issue of
Palestine is ultimately contained in negotiations and understanding through which a path to a peaceful
coexistence can be obtained.”
• According to recent MEA Statement "India’s position on Palestine is independent and consistent. It is
shaped by our views and interests and not determined by any third country," said the Official Spokesperson
in a statement to the media. India has traditionally supported an independent Palestine as part of a two-
state solution.
• The recent vote in the UN on the issue of Jerusalem is also consistent with India’s longstanding view on
the matter.
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PM Modi’s trip to Palestinian 2018 was a standalone visits just like his visit to Israel in2017. This was seen
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6.4.1. TWO-STATE SOLUTION

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The "two-state solution" would create an independent Israel and Palestine, and is the internationally
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accepted approach to resolving the conflict. The idea is that Israelis and Palestinians want to run their
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countries differently; Israelis want a Jewish state, and Palestinians want a Palestinian one. Because neither
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side can get what it wants in a joined state, the only possible solution that satisfies everyone involves
separating Palestinians and Israelis.
• Most polling suggests that both Israelis and Palestinians prefer a two-state solution. However, the inability
of Israelis and Palestinians to come to two-state terms has led to a recent surge in interest in a one-state
solution, partly out of a sense of hopelessness and partly out of fear that if the sides cannot negotiate a two-
state solution, a de facto one-state outcome will be inevitable.
• The "one-state solution" would merge Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip into one big country. It
comes in two versions. One, favored by some leftists and Palestinians, would create a single democratic
country. Arab Muslims would outnumber Jews, thus ending Israel as a Jewish state. The other version,
favored by some rightists and Israelis, would involve Israel annexing the West Bank and either forcing out
Palestinians or denying them the right to vote. Virtually the entire world, including most Zionists, rejects
this option as an unacceptable human rights violation.
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7. INDIA’S LOOK WEST POLICY: AN EVOLVING
FRAMEWORK
• Despite long historical ties, India’s links to the Gulf countries in the last few decades had come to be
defined by the twin factors of energy imports and labour exports.
• In 2005 P.M. Manmohan Singh officially argued that
"the Gulf region, like South-East and South Asia, is part of our natural economic hinterland. We must
pursue closer economic relations with all our neighbours in our wider Asian neighbourhood. India has
successfully pursued a Look East policy to come closer to the countries of South-East Asia. We must,
similarly, come closer to our western neighbours in the Gulf."
• This statement had the elements of the “Look West Policy” which further received momentum and shape
through Prime Minister Modi’ trips to Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran and Israel since 2014.
• PM Modi had used the phrase “Link West” in earlier speeches as well, In May 2017, the Indian foreign
ministry spokesperson promoted the policy further by referring to a “Go West” connectivity and outreach
policy with West Asia
• The phrase Think West was used for the first time in the inaugural Raisina Dialogue (March 2016) by
foreign secretary S. Jaishankar.
• The key factor here is not just a “shared” past but of shared challenges in the present and a shared future.
Proximity, history, cultural affinity, strong links between people, natural synergies, shared aspirations and
common challenges create boundless potential for a natural partnership between India the region.
• This view is defined not just by India’s “Look West” policy, based on its energy and financial needs, but that it
is equally defined by the GCC’s “Look East” policy, soliciting greater Indian engagement with West Asia.
Several factors have contributed to this fundamental shift in West Asian strategic thinking:
o the desire of the US to cut down its global security role is timed with India’s aspiration to play a
greater role in the Indian Ocean.
o The fall in commodity prices, has driven down the logic of diversification among the oil-rich nations in
West Asia.
o the rise of religious radicalism globally and India’s ability to largely escape that ominous trend has
underlined the success of India’s multicultural social fabric.
o in a world reeling under the long-term negative effects of the financial crisis, India is a remarkable
anchor of stability as it continues to be a fast growing economy
• Thus, West Asia, especially the gulf states, is ‘looking east’ concerned about the emerging strategic
instability in its own neighbourhood and the structural shift in the global energy market.
• In this context the need there has been increased engagement with the region with that also needs to be
taken further through:
o Closer government-to-government (G2G) relations,
o attention to the vibrant business-to-business (B2B) and
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o people-to-people (P2P) relationships.

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o India is building infrastructure in Iran while also sharing intelligence with Saudi Arabia.
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o And while the UAE is cooperating with India on maritime security, Israel is selling arms to New Delhi.
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• The next logical step may be for India to assume a catalytic role in promoting an inclusive Gulf security
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arrangement…in concert with principal Asian countries—China, Japan, and Republic of Korea.
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• Thus the making of a look west or think west is based on the need to harness common objectives and
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potentials and complementarities and it involves:

o Energy Security
o Investment opportunities
o Security Cooperation
o Connectivity
o Cultural contacts

21without prior permission of Vision IAS. www.visionias.in ©Vision IAS
VISION IAS
www.visionias.in
LECTURE-9
INDIA AND CENTRAL ASIA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INDIA AND CENTRAL ASIA ...................................................................................................................................... 2
1.1. Background ...................................................................................................................................................... 2
1.2. India and Central Asia ...................................................................................................................................... 3
1.2.1. India-Tajikistan ......................................................................................................................................... 3
1.2.2. India-Turkmenistan .................................................................................................................................. 3
1.2.3. India-Kazakhstan....................................................................................................................................... 4
1.2.4. India-Uzbekistan ....................................................................................................................................... 4
1.2.5. Ashgabat Agreement ................................................................................................................................ 5
1.2.6. India-Kyrgyzstan ....................................................................................................................................... 5
1.3. The Connect Central Asia Policy ...................................................................................................................... 5
1.3.1. Some Limitations ...................................................................................................................................... 6
1.4. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation................................................................................................................ 6
1.4.1. India at the SCO ........................................................................................................................................ 6
1.4.2. Limitations of India at SCO ....................................................................................................................... 6
1.5. What Should India Do? .................................................................................................................................... 7
1.6. The International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) ............................................................................ 7
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1. INDIA AND CENTRAL ASIA
Map 9.1-Central Asia
Image Source: http://open.lib.umn.edu/worldgeography/wp-content/uploads/sites/181/2016/04/9752c66d3ef6a53cee2f78a606aff33c.jpg
1.1. BACKGROUND
• Central Asia stretches from the Caspian Sea in the west to China in the east and from Afghanistan in the
south to Russia in the north.
• Central Asia was located on what was known as the Silk Road between Europe and the Far East and has
long been a crossroads for people, ideas, and trade
• The region is rich in diverse energy resources.
• It is a landlocked region. The region consists of the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.
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• The Central Asian Republics (CARs) emerged as independent states in 1991, after the disintegration of
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Soviet Union
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• Central Asia has a population of about 70 million, consisting of five republics:

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o Kazakhstan (18 million),

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o Tajikistan (9 million),
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o Turkmenistan (6 million), and

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o Uzbekistan (31 million).

• Afghanistan (pop. 35 million) is also sometimes included
• In the post cold war period, the Central Asian countries have engaged themselves in nation building and
consolidation of their statehoods.
• The pessimistic scenarios feared in the early nineties of Central Asia disintegrating have not fortunately been
realized. No state has become a failing state. On the contrary, countries like Kazakhstan have made great
strides.
• At the same time, the Central Asian countries continue to face daunting socio-economic and security
problems.
• The relations among themselves are far from smooth. Issues like water security, borders, environmental
degradation and migration have become acute and pose serious challenge to regional stability. Religious
extremism & fundamentalism.
1.2. INDIA AND CENTRAL ASIA

• Energy-rich Central Asia, with which India shares historical linkages, holds great strategic importance.
• The flow of Buddhism from India to Central Asia and Sufi ideas from Central Asia to India are examples of
age old relations. These deep rooted linkages are evident even today in similarities in food, language, dress
and culture.
• India’s disconnect with Central Asia came with Partition and the loss of direct geographical links.
• Although Central Asia is highly endowed with natural resources, the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and
Pakistan’s denial of transit prevent India from directly accessing these resources and deepening economic
ties with the countries of the region. This is an important factor that led India to seek membership in SCO.
• India hopes to
o build closer political, security, economic and cultural relations.
o based on ancient civilisational linkages.
• Three countries, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have enhanced relations to strategic partnership
level.
• The ‘Connect Central Asia’ policy was first unveiled in 2012. The policy is often seen by many as an
alternative to China’s earlier New Silk Road and current One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiatives.
• Though India no longer shares physical boundaries with the region. This challenge is sought to be overcome
enhancing connectivity i.e. land based, maritime, air, digital.
• Prime Minister Modi’s Visit to all the 5 Central Asian Republics in 2015 was a significant moment in these
relations.
1.2.1. INDIA-TAJIKISTAN
• Tajikistan, which borders Pakistan, Afghanistan and China (and Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan), has been a
close ally of India and is a “valued friend and strategic partner in Asia,”. It declared its independence on 9
September 1991.
• The country served as an important link for India in the 1990s when India recognised and supported the
Northern Alliance government in Afghanistan and practically had no ties with Taliban government.
• Tajikistan has set up a field hospital in Farkor at the border with Afghanistan to treat Northern Alliance
fighters. India, it also has a “quietly functional” small base to aid the Afghan government, and helped
service and repair Mi fighter planes.
• In 1995, India extended a $5 million credit line to Tajikistan to set up a joint venture with a private Indian
company for the production of pharmaceuticals.
• Despite these links, bilateral trade is not too high at a little over $58 million of which $53.7 million are export
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India and Tajikistan elevated their bilateral relations to the level of a “Strategic Partnership” during the visit
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of President Rahmon to India in 2012.

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Till date, 993slots for ITEC and 339 ICCR scholarships have been utilized by Tajik candidates to study in
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India. Tajikistan is one of the largest beneficiaries of the ITEC programme (ITEC training slots were increased
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from 100 to150 during the visit of President Rahmon to India in September 2012).
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1.2.2. INDIA-TURKMENISTAN
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• Turkmenistan, one of the Republics of the former USSR, was proclaimed as an independent State on 27
October 1991.
• It shares borders with Kazakhstan in the north, Uzbekistan in the north and North-east, Iran in the South and
Afghanistan in the Southeast. It has an area of 488,100 square kms and stretches 650 kms from north to
south and 1,100 km from east to west. The main river of Turkmenistan is Amu Darya, which enters the
country from Afghanistan and flows along the north-eastern borders before it enters Uzbekistan.
o TAPI- Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI countries) signed two basic documents on 11
December 2010, making a beginning to the TAPI project.

o The TAPI Gas Sales & Purchase Agreement (GSPA) was signed in May 2012. At the 22nd Steering
Committee Meeting of TAPI held in Ashgabat on 06 August, 2015, Turkmenistan offered to lead the
Consortium. In 2015 groundbreaking for the Turkmenistan leg was held. Transit fee payable by India to
Pakistan and Afghanistan has also been agreed.
o The groundbreaking ceremony for the Afghan section of an ambitious, multi-billion dollar gas pipeline
was conducted in the presence of Minister of State for External Affairs M.J. Akbar for the ceremony at
gas-rich on 23 February 2018.
o 1,840-km pipeline aims to transport natural gas from Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh gas fields by the
beginning of 2020. It is expected to help ease energy deficits in South Asia. The bulk of the 33 billion
cubic metres of gas to be pumped annually through the conduit will be purchased by South Asian rivals
Pakistan and India.
o For Turkmenistan it provides an avenue for diversification of gas deliveries.
o The pipeline will traverse Afghanistan, raising security concerns, and specifically for India the passage
through Pakistan is of key concern.
o The overall funding picture for the mammoth gas pipeline, with an estimated requirement of 15 billion
US$ remains unclear, with commercial energy giants such as France’s Total failing to follow up on
reported interest in the project.
• India provides ITEC training for Turkmen nationals in India. In the year 2016-17, 30 ITEC slots were offered
to them. In all, since the inception of the programme for Turkmenistan in 1994, over 380 Turkmen nationals
have been trained in various courses.
• Agreement for the Lapis Lazuli Corridor was signed in Novemebr 2017. It seeks to foster transit and trade
cooperation between Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey by reducing barriers
facing transit trade. Providing for a major international trade and transport corridor stretching from Turkey
to Afghanistan via Central Asian republics
• India is not a part of the Lapis Lazuli corridor.
1.2.3. INDIA-KAZAKHSTAN
• Kazakhstan became independent on 16 December 1991. Diplomatic relations were established in February
1992.
• President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan to be the Chief Guest at our 60th Republic Day celebrations in 2009. A
Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership was adopted during the visit.
• Issues of mutual concerns are :regional peace, connectivity and integration; reforms in the United Nations;
and, combating terrorism
• An Agreement between ONGC Videsh Limited and KazMunaiGaz on the purchase of 25% stake in the
Satpayev Oil Block in the Caspian Sea marked a new beginning in cooperation in the hydrocarbon sector.
• In 2015 India and Kazakhstan inked five key agreements including a defence pact to enhance military
cooperation and a contract for supply of uranium.
• Kazaksthan was one of the first countries with which India launched civil nuclear cooperation through a
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• A 14-day joint training exercise between Indian and Kazakhstan armies, Prabal Dostyk, was conducted at
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Bakloh in HP in November 2017. This was the second joint exercise between the two countries.
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• Kazakhstan is India’s largest trade and investment partner in Central Asia. Bilateral trade amounted to US$
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461 mln in 2015 and US$ 618 mln in 2016.

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• India provides capacity building assistance to Kazakhstan in various specialized fields under ITEC program.
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Since 1992, more than 1000 specialists have undergone training under ITEC programme. A total of 31 ITEC
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slots were utilized in 2016-17.

1.2.4. INDIA-UZBEKISTAN
• Uzbekistan is bordered by five landlocked countries: Kazakhstan to the north; Kyrgyzstan to the
northeast; Tajikistan to the southeast; Afghanistan to the south; and Turkmenistan to the southwest.
Uzbekistan is a major producer and exporter of cotton. The country also operates the largest open-pit gold
mine in the world.
• Uzbekistan became independent on 1st September 1991. Consulate General of India in Tashkent was
formally inaugurated on 7th April 1987. Indian leaders often visited Tashkent and other places. Prime
Minister, Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri passed away in Tashkent on 11 January 1966 after signing the Tashkent
declaration with Pakistan.
• Mirza Ghalib and Amir Khusro are notable Indians of Uzbek parentage.
• In August 1991, as the events leading to the disintegration of the USSR unfolded, President Islam Karimov, in
his then capacity as Chairman of Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan, was visiting India.
• Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh on April, 2006. First, Central Asian country that Prime Minister
Narendra Modi Visited in July 2015.
• Uzbekistan, the seventh biggest uranium exporter in the world, will be a key player in India’s plan to
procure nuclear fuel to create a strategic uranium reserve.
• Trade relations between India and Uzbekistan are governed by the Agreement on Trade and Economic
Cooperation signed in May 1993.
• Uzbekistan is a partner of India’s ITEC Programme since 1993-1994. Currently 150 slots are being allotted
annually.
1.2.5. ASHGABAT AGREEMENT
• It is a transit pact established in 2011 between Uzbekistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, and Oman. Kazhakstan
joined subsequently and Pakistan joined in 2016. Indian joined the agreement in 2017.
o Ashgabat Agreement is a transit pact signed in 2011 between Uzbekistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, and Oman
and Qatar. While Qatar subsequently withdrew from the agreement in 2013, Kazakhstan and Pakistan
joined the grouping in 2016.
o The Ashgabat Agreement came into force in April 2016.
o Its objective is to enhance connectivity within the Eurasian region and synchronize it with other regional
transport corridors, including the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC).
o India joined the Agreement in 2018.
o Accession to the Agreement would diversify India’s connectivity options with Central Asia and have a
positive influence on India’s trade and commercial ties with the region.
1.2.6. INDIA-KYRGYZSTAN
• Since the independence of Kyrgyz Republic on 31st August, 1991, India was among the first to establish
diplomatic relations on 18 March 1992; the resident Mission of India was set up on 23 May 1994.
• Several framework agreements, including on Culture, Trade and Economic Cooperation, Civil Aviation,
Investment Promotion and Protection, Avoidance of Double Taxation, Consular Convention etc.
• In 1995, India had extended a US$ 5 million line of credit to Kyrgyzstan; out of this, US$ 2.78 million were
disbursed for four project.
• India announced its Connect Central Asia Policy during the visit Minister of State for External Affairs, Shri E.
Ahamed to Kyrgyzstan in 2012.
• India-Kyrgyz trade was US$ 24.98 million in 2016-17. India’s exports to Kyrgyzstan was US$ 22.66 million
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whereas Kyrgyz exports to India was US$2.32 million. Apparel and clothing, leather goods, drugs &
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pharmaceuticals, fine chemicals, and tea are some of the important items in our export basket to Kyrgyzstan.
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Kyrgyz exports to India consist of raw hides, metalifers ores & metal scrap etc.
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• The "Khanjar” series of India-Kyrgyzstan military exercises has become an annual event. "Khanjar-II”
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exercises were held in March 2015 in Kyrgyzstan, "Khanjar III” in March-April 2016 in Gwalior, India. The
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• Technical assistance under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Program, particularly in
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terms of human resources development, is the cornerstone of India’s economic involvement in

Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan has utilized 58 slots for 2016-17. More than 1040 professionals from Kyrgyzstan have
received training in India since 1992. 80 ITEC slots have been sanctioned for 2017-18.
1.3. THE CONNECT CENTRAL ASIA POLICY

• The ‘Connect Central Asia’ policy (CCAP) was first in June 2012 in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan to fast-track India’s
relations with the Central Asian Republics (CAR) – Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan.
• The policy calls for:

o Human resource cooperation through setting up universities, hospitals, information technology (IT)
centers, an e-network in telemedicine connecting India to the CARs,
o joint commercial ventures,
o improving air connectivity to boost trade and tourism,
o joint scientific research and strategic partnerships in defense and security affairs.
1.3.1. SOME LIMITATIONS
• In 2015 the five Central Asian republics account for trade of only about $1.6 billion with India, compared to
about $50 billion with China that has made them a key to its Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) initiative.
• Despite bonhomie and much celebration, India has lacked presence on the ground in terms of G2G, B2B
and P2P linkages.
• Connectivity is the key weakness in India’s quest for increasing cooperation with Central Asia.
1.4. SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION

• SCO was formulated in 1996 with five countries- Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, China, Tajikistan.
• Uzbekistan joined in the group in 2001. Its headquarters is in Beijing.
• India and Pakistan, became permanent members of the body in 2017.
• The primary motive behind the formation was to ensure stability along the borders.
• SCO now represents over 40 per cent of humanity and nearly 20 per cent of global GDP.
• Tashkent-based Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) is the security apparatus of the SCO.
1.4.1. INDIA AT THE SCO
• The Astana summit in June 2017 fulfilled India’s long-time desire to attain full membership of Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
• India had been an observer of SCO meeting since 2005 and participated in ministerial-level meetings, which
focused on security and economic co-operation in the Eurasian region.
• With India gaining a full membership, the country aims to achieve regional and global stability and
prosperity. But, Pakistan’s inclusion in the body poses potential difficulties in India’s plan.
• It is expected that becoming a full member of the body will strengthen India’s position and reach in Central
Asia.
• it will help India engage the Central Asian Republics (CARs) on a regular basis every year, something which
has proved rather difficult in a bilateral format
• Membership in SCO is likely to help India fulfil its aspiration of playing an active role in its extended
neighborhood as well as checking the ever growing influence of China in Eurasia by intensifying regional
integration, promote connectivity and stability across borders.
• SCO countries have a significant role in stabilising Afghanistan, membership would provide India another
avenue to remain engaged in this process.
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• SCO also provides a platform for India to simultaneously engage with its traditional friend Russia as well as
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• India could gain from SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) – manned by 30 professionals
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analysing key intelligence inputs on the movements of terror outfits, drug-trafficking, cyber security threats
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• Likewise, participation in SCO’s counter-terror exercises and military drills could be beneficial to the Indian
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• SCO membership could help advance talks on the construction of stalled pipelines like TAPI (and possibly
IPI later) which is of considerable importance to India’s natural gas needs.
1.4.2. LIMITATIONS OF INDIA AT SCO
• Since China and Russia are co-founders of SCO and its dominant powers, India’s ability to assert itself would
be limited and it may have to content itself to playing the second fiddle.
• In addition, India may also have to either dilute its growing partnership with the West or engage in a
delicate balancing act.

• Except India, all the other members of SCO have endorsed China’s BRI initiative. India’s primary concern is
related to the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Infact, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan had long crossed
India’s sovereignty red lines when they signed the Quadrilateral Traffic in Transit Agreement (QTTA) with
Pakistan in 1995 to use the Karakoram Highway (KKH) passing through Gilgit-Baltistan as a transit corridor.
• Given the state of relations between India and Pakistan, many assume that the spotlight would shift away
from Central Asia towards tensions in South Asia, thus making regional cooperation hard to foster.
• With regards to RATS, India might face difficulties as the Indian understanding of terrorism is different
from the other members of SCO. Whereas for India it is related to state sponsored cross border terrorism.
SCO’s targets are groups like East-Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Al-Qaeda, whereas groups like
Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaiesh-e-Mohammad, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network do not
come under the ambit of the SCO anti-terror structure
1.5. WHAT SHOULD INDIA DO?

• Profiting in terms of energy security would be critical, but the idea of a SCO “Energy Club” will gain full
meaning only if Iran joins the grouping eventually.
• It is imperative to look at central Asia through the Eurasian prism. India would do well to enter into the
Eurasia integration path by seeking an early conclusion of a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian
Economic Union (EEU) in order to enable unhindered flow of goods, raw-materials, capital and technology.
• The commissioning of the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) along with the proposed
Chabahar project would enable Indian goods to gain better access to the untapped markets of the entire
Eurasian region including Russia’s Far East.
• India should rope in one or more SCO countries, preferably Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, in its effort to
project Chabahar as India’s gateway to Eurasia.
• In the meantime, it should seek to benefit from maintaining a regional presence, tracking regional trends in
security, energy, trade, connectivity and cultural interests.
• India should use the SCO atmosphere for building better convergences with China and Russia as well as to
minimise the intensity of China-Pakistan alignment which actually undercuts India’s direct access to
Eurasia.
1.6. THE INTERNATIONAL NORTH SOUTH TRANSPORT CORRIDOR (INSTC)

Map9.2-The INSTC
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Image Source: https://cdn.rbth.com/web/in-rbth/images/2016-11/top/north-south-transport-corridor.jpg

• The 7,200 km International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is a multimodal transport network
linking Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea via Iran, and onward to northern Europe via St.
Petersburg, Russia.
• The INSTC is a joint initiative launched by India, Iran, and Russia in September, 2000 to facilitate shipments
and logistics. The agreement came into effect in May, 2002 after being ratified by all three signatory states.
• This corridor connects India Ocean and Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea via Iran, further connected to St.
Petersburg and North European via Russian Federation. From St Petersburg, North Europe is within easy
reach via the Russian Federation. The estimated capacity of the corridor is 20-30 million tonnes of goods
per year.
• The INSTC was expanded to include 10 new members, namely: Republic of Azerbaijan, Republic of Armenia,
Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Republic of Tajikistan, Republic of Turkey, Republic of Ukraine,
Republic of Belarus, Oman, Syria. Bulgaria joined the initiative as an observer as.
• The International North South Transportation Corridor (INSTC) connecting Mumbai with St Petersburg and
beyond – which has been 17 years in the making – is set to be operationalised in 2018 with the first
consignment from India to Russia.
• INSTC will not only help cut down on costs and time taken for transfer of goods from India to Russia and
Europe via Iran but also provide an alternative connectivity initiative to countries in the Eurasian region.
• It could help India and Russia boost up their bilateral trade and help to reach their target of USD 30
billion over the next 10 years from the current trade of less than USD 7 billion in 2016.
• It will be India’s second corridor after the Chabahar Port to access resource rich Central Asia and its
market.
• INSTC is widely argued as best possible response to China's 'One Belt' initiative.
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VISION IAS
www.visionias.in
LECTURE-10
INDIA AND RUSSIA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INDIA AND RUSSIA .................................................................................................................................................. 2
1.1. Russia: Background.......................................................................................................................................... 2
1.1.1. Russia: Borders and Resources ................................................................................................................. 2
1.1.2. Russia: Politics .......................................................................................................................................... 3
1.2. India and Russia ............................................................................................................................................... 3
1.2.1. Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership ............................................................................................ 3
1.2.2. Political Relations: Mechanisms ............................................................................................................... 3
1.2.3. Defence and Security Cooperation........................................................................................................... 4
1.2.4. Economic Relations .................................................................................................................................. 4
1.2.5. Energy Cooperation .................................................................................................................................. 5
1.2.6. Science and Technology ........................................................................................................................... 6
1.2.7. Cultural Relations ..................................................................................................................................... 7
1.3. 70 Years: An Assessment of Prospects and Challenges ................................................................................... 7
1.3.1. Way Forward ............................................................................................................................................ 8
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1. INDIA AND RUSSIA
Russia an Introduction: “Russia is never as strong as she appears, and never as weak as she appears.”- Klemens,
Fürst (prince) von Metternich.
Map10.1-Russia
1.1. RUSSIA: BACKGROUND

• Russia stretches over a vast expanse of eastern Europe and northern Asia. Once the preeminent republic of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R. commonly known as the Soviet Union), Russia became an
independent country after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991.
• It is world’s largest country, it covers nearly twice the territory of Canada, the second largest. It extends
across the whole of northern Asia and the eastern third of Europe, spanning 11 time zones and incorporating
a great range of environments and landforms, from deserts to semiarid steppes to deep forests and Arctic
tundra. Russia contains Europe’s longest river, the Volga, and its largest lake, Ladoga. Russia also is home to
the world’s deepest lake, Baikal, and the country recorded the world’s lowest temperature outside the North
and South poles.
• The inhabitants of Russia are quite diverse. Most are ethnic Russians, but there also are more than 120
other ethnic groups present, speaking many languages and following disparate religious and cultural
traditions.
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Most of the Russian population is concentrated in the European portion of the country, especially in the
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Moscow and St. Petersburg (formerly Leningrad) are the two most important cultural and financial centres
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in Russia. Russians are also populous in Asia, however; beginning in the 17th century, and particularly
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pronounced throughout much of the 20th century, a steady flow of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking
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people moved eastward into Siberia, where cities such as Vladivostok and Irkutsk now flourish.
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1.1.1. RUSSIA: BORDERS AND RESOURCES

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• Russia is bounded to the north and east by the Arctic and Pacific oceans, and it has small frontages in the
northwest on the Baltic Sea at St. Petersburg and at the detached Russian oblast (region) of Kaliningrad (a
part of what was once East Prussia annexed in 1945), which also abuts Poland and Lithuania. To the south
Russia borders North Korea, China, Mongolia, and Kazhakstan, Azerbaijan and Georgia. To the south west
and west it borders Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, and Estonia, as well as Finland and Norway.
• Although the climate adds a layer of difficulty to daily life, the land is a generous source of crops and
materials, including vast reserves of oil, gas, and precious metals.
• Russia is among the world’s leading producers of oil, extracting about one-fifth of the global total. It also is
responsible for more than one-fourth of the world’s total natural gas output.
1.1.2. RUSSIA: POLITICS
• The Russian republic was established immediately after the Russian Revolution of 1917 and became a
union republic of USSSR in 1922.
• In 1991, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia joined with several other former Soviet
republics to form a loose coalition, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
• The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) formed when the former Soviet Union dissolved in 1991.
At its conception it consisted of ten former Soviet Republics: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan
• Under the new constitution (1993), the Federal Assembly became the country’s legislature. It consists of
the Federation Council (an upper house comprising appointed representatives from each of Russia’s
administrative divisions) and the State Duma (a 450-member popularly elected lower house).
• The president, who is elected in a national vote and cannot serve more than two terms consecutively, is
vested with significant powers. As Russia’s head of state, the president is empowered to appoint the head
of the government (prime minister), key judges, and cabinet members. In 2008 an amendment to the
constitution, to take effect with the 2012 election, extended the presidential term from four to six years.
• In international politics, Russia is a key power with the permanent membership of the UN Security Council
and a large nuclear arsenal.
1.2. INDIA AND RUSSIA

• In 2017 India and Russia Completed 70 years of diplomatic relations.
• Since the signing of “Declaration on the India-Russia Strategic Partnership” in October 2000 (during the
visit of Russian President H.E. Mr. Vladimir Putin to India), India-Russia ties have acquired a qualitatively new
character with enhanced levels of cooperation in almost all areas of the bilateral relationship including
political, security, trade and economy, defence, science and technology, and culture.
1.2.1. SPECIAL AND PRIVILEGED STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
• Under the Strategic Partnership, several institutionalized dialogue mechanisms operate at both political
and official levels to ensure regular interaction and follow up on cooperation activities.
• During the visit of the Russian President to India in December 2010, the Strategic Partnership was elevated
to the level of a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.”
• Over the years India and Russia have evolved mechanisms of engagement at multilateral level at forums
such as the UN, G-20, BRICS and SCO.
1.2.2. POLITICAL RELATIONS: MECHANISMS
• Annual Summit: The Annual Summit meeting between the Prime Minister of India and the President of the
Russian Federation is the highest institutionalized dialogue mechanism in the strategic partnership between
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• Annual Summit meetings take place alternatively in India and Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin
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visited Goa from 15-16 October 2016 for the 17th Annual Summit, which resulted in 19 documents related
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to cooperation in defence, space, information security, foreign policy, trade & investment, hydrocarbons,
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shipbuilding, railways, and science and technology. Prime Minister Modi and President Putin also adopted a
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Joint Statement "Partnership for Global Peace and Stability” and a “Roadmap of Events” to celebrate the
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70th anniversary of the establishment of the diplomatic relations between India and Russia in the year 2017.
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• Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited St. Petersburg, Russia from 31st May to 2nd June for the 18th India-
Russia Annual Summit, this resulted in the conclusion of 12 documents related to cooperation over a very
wide range of activities.
• The 18th Summit also witnessed the adoption of the “St. Petersburg Declaration” which not only highlights
the multi-faceted cooperation between the two countries but also provides a comprehensive matrix for
future cooperation. During this visit, PM had a separate meeting with governors of sixteen Russian regions
where they discussed various aspects related to the enhancement of cooperation between Indian and
Russian regions. PM also participated in the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum as the Guest of
Honour.

• Intergovernmental Commissions: There is regular high-level interaction between the two countries.
• Two Inter-Governmental Commissions- one on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural
Cooperation (IRIGC-TEC), Co-chaired by the External Affairs Minister (EAM) and the Russian Deputy Prime
Minister (DPM), and
• another on Military Technical Cooperation (IRIGC- MTC) Co-chaired by Russian and Indian Defence Ministers,
meet annually.
• The Inter Governmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation (IRIGC-MTC) Co-chaired by the two
Defence Ministers and its Working Groups and Sub-Groups review defence cooperation between the two
countries.
• Consultations: During the 17th Annual Summit, the sides concluded a Protocol for Consultations between
the foreign ministries for the period 2017-18.
• Pursuant to the signing of the Protocol for Consultations between the foreign ministries, Secretary (West),
Secretary (ER) and Secretary (East) visited Russia for bilateral consultations in 2016.
1.2.3. DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION
• India has longstanding and wide-ranging cooperation with Russia in the field of defence.
• Since 1960, the overall value of contracts within the framework of military and technical cooperation has
amounted to over USD 65 billion, while the portfolio of orders in 2012-2016 exceeded USD 46 billion.
• India-Russia military technical cooperation is evolving from a buyer - seller framework to one involving
joint research, development and production of advanced defence technologies and systems.
• BrahMos Missile System as well as the licensed production in India of SU-30 aircraft and T-90 tanks, are
examples of such flagship cooperation.
• During the 17th Annual Summit, the sides concluded agreements on supply of S-400 air defence systems,
construction of frigates under Project 1135.6 and shareholders agreement on the formation of joint
venture to manufacture Ka-226T helicopters in India.
• The two countries also hold exchanges and training exercises between their armed forces annually.
• The annual bilateral naval exercise ‘Indra - Navy’ took place off the coast of Vishakhapatnam on 14-21
December 2016.
• Both sides conducted the first ever tri-services exercise INDRA-2017 was successfully conducted from 19 to
29 Oct 2017 at Vladivostok in Russia.
• A roadmap for the development of bilateral defence cooperation was signed during the 17th Meeting of the
IRIGC-MTC.
• Air Chief, Arup Raha visited Russia from 24-29 October 2016. Russian Naval Chief visited India in March 2017.
• The first ever India-Russia Military Conference took place in Delhi in March 2017. Nearly 45 Russian entities
participated in this conference. FSB Director, Alexander Bortnikov led a nine-member delegation to India in
March 2017 and called on the Minister of Home Affairs.
1.2.4. ECONOMIC RELATIONS
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Making the economic partnership a strong pillar of the bilateral partnership like other areas of cooperation
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between India and Russia is a key priority for both governments

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The Inter- Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural
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Cooperation (IRIGC-TEC) is the apex G2G forum to review economic cooperation.

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Mechanisms such as India-Russia Business Council (partnership between FICCI of India and CCI of Russia),
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India-Russia Trade, Investment and Technology Promotion Council (partnership between CII of India and
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RUIE of Russia), India- Russia Business Dialogue (partnership between CII of India and Russia’s Business
Council for Cooperation with India) and India-Russia Chamber of Commerce (with focus on SMEs)
supplement the efforts to build direct B2B-business - to - business ties.
• In December 2014, the leaders of the two countries set a target of US $ 30 billion bilateral trade by 2025.
• According to Russian Federal Customs Service data, bilateral trade during in 2016 amounted to US$ 7.71
billion (decline of 1.5 % over 2015), with Indian exports amounting to US$ 2.39 billion and imports from
Russia amounting to US$ 5.32 billion.
• Major items of export from India include pharmaceuticals, tea, coffee and tobacco, machinery and
mechanical appliances, organic chemicals, and electrical machinery and equipment.

• Major items of import from Russia include pearls, precious and semi-precious stones & metals, nuclear
power equipment, electrical machinery and equipment, mineral oil & products, iron & steels, and optical,
precision and surgical equipment.
1.2.4.1. Enhancing Economic Ties: Trade
• India and Russia are exploring various ways for enhancing bilateral trade. A few important steps/projects
that could provide a major boost to bilateral trade are:
o operationalization of the ‘Green Corridor’ project between the two countries which has already
reached an advanced stage;
o implementation of the International North- South Transport Corridor (INSTC),
o and the signing of an FTA between Indian and the Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU).
• In December 2016, Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU) approved the decision to start negotiations between
India and the EaEU for signing an FTA.
• The Eurasian Economic Union (officially EAEU, but sometimes called EEU) is an economic union of states
located primarily in northern Eurasia. The Treaty aiming for the establishment of the EAEU was signed on 29
May 2014 by the leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, and came into force on 1 January 2015.
• There are four types of corridors introduced in the customs border: green corridor (goods through this
corridor does not undergo customs inspection), blue corridor (goods undergo examination in the customs
border), yellow corridor (goods which need a special licence for the importation) and red corridor (goods are
subjected to mandatory inspection).
• The green corridor concept was launched by the European Union in 2007 to enable trade traffic more
smoothly and efficiently.
• Russia is already implementing the Green corridor project with Finland and Turkey. Moscow has also signed
such agreements with China, Italy, Lebanon and Iran.
1.2.4.2. Economic Relations: Investments
• Both sides had expressed their desire to raise the level of investments in each other’s countries to US $ 15
billion (each way) by 2025. Based upon current figures it appears that the target will be achieved almost
eight years earlier than planned.
• Indian investments in Russia are estimated to be about US$ 13 billion which include Vankorneft and Taas-
Yuryakh Tass fields; Imperial Energy Tomsk; Sakhalin I; Volzhsky Abrasive Works Volgograd; and Commercial
Indo bank.
• Russian investments in India total about US$ 16 billion, including the acquisition of the ESSAR Group,
Kamaz Vectra in Hosur; Shyam Sistema Telecom Ltd, Sberbank and VTB.
1.2.5. ENERGY COOPERATION
• Hydrocarbons is an active area for exploring cooperation between the two countries.
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• In the second and third quarter of 2016, Indian companies invested close to US$ 5.5 billion in Russia’s Oil
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and Gas sector, which included acquisition of 23.9% stake in Vankorneft and 29.9% in Taas-Yuryakh by an
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Indian Consortium of Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL), Indian Oil Corporation Limited (OIL) and Bharat
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Petro Resources Limited (BPRL); and acquisition of 15% and 11% stake by ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) in
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• During the 17th Annual Summit, the sides concluded documents between Engineers India Ltd and Gazprom
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on the Joint Study of a gas pipeline to India and other possible areas of cooperation;
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Agreement in the area of Education and Training between ONGC Videsh Ltd and Rosneft Oil Company; and
Programme of Cooperation (PoC) in the Field of Oil and Gas for the period 2017-18;
• and the Sale and Purchase Agreement between a Rosneft-led consortium and Essar for acquisition of 98%
stake in Essar Oil Limited. The Rosneft led Consortium has invested close to US $ 13 billion in this deal.
• The sides are working towards realization of an ‘Energy Bridge’ between the two countries, which is based
on:
o robust civil nuclear cooperation,
o LNG sourcing, partnership in the Oil and Gas sector,
o and engagement in renewable energy sources.
• The idea to setup SCO Energy Club, proposed by Vladimir Putin in 2006, should contribute to deepening
interaction between energy producers (Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Iran) and energy consumers
(China, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, India, Pakistan and Mongolia)
1.2.5.1. Nuclear Energy
• Russia is an important partner for India in the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy. It recognizes India as
a country with advanced nuclear technology with an impeccable non-proliferation record.
• In 2009, India and Russia have sealed a breakthrough long-term pact for expanding civil nuclear
cooperation that is free from any restrictions on India and guarantees it against any curbs in the future.
• In December 2014, Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and Russia’s Rosatom signed the Strategic Vision for
strengthening cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy between India and Russia.
• Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP) is being built in India with Russian cooperation. KKNPP Units 1
and 2 have already become operational. PM Modi and President Putin jointly dedicated Units 1 & 2 to the
nation on separate occasions through videoconferencing.
• They also initiated the concrete pouring for Units 3 &4 through videoconference on October 15, 2016.
• An agreement on localization of manufacturing of nuclear equipment in India was also concluded during the
Annual Summit on 24 December 2015. The agreement for KKNPP Units 5 & 6 was concluded during the 18th
Annual Bilateral Summit in St. Petersburg in June 2017.
1.2.6. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
• With Russia’s technical and financial assistance, the pioneers of Indian industrialization came into
existence: metallurgical complexes in Bhilai, Visakhapatnam and Bokaro, the mining equipment plant in
Durgapur, the thermal power station in Neyveli, the electromechanical enterprise in Korba, antibiotics
plants in Rishikesh and the pharmaceutical plant in Hyderabad.
• Russian scientists and academics participated in the establishment of research and education centers in
India. These include the Indian Institute of Technology in Bombay, research institutes of petroleum
industry in Dehradun and Ahmedabad.
1.2.6.1. Space
• India-Russia cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of outer space dates back to about four decades.
• 2015 marked the 40th anniversary of the launch of India’s first satellite “Aryabhatt” on a Russian (then
USSR) launch vehicle ‘Soyuz.’
• In 2007, India and Russia signed a framework agreement on cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer
space, including satellite launches, GLONASS navigation system, remote sensing and other societal
applications of outer space.
• In June 2015, the space agencies signed an MoU on expansion of cooperation in the field of the exploration
and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.
• An agreement was signed between C-DAC and GLONASS for cooperation in technologies based on satellite
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• On 15 October 2016, ISRO and Roscosmos signed an MoU to establish ground measurement gathering
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• Both sides are also exploring the possibility of cooperation in manned space flight.
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1.2.6.2. Science and Technology: Other Areas

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• The Working Group on Science and Technology functioning under IRIGC- TEC, the Integrated Long Term
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Programme (ILTP) and the Basic Science Cooperation Programme are the three main institutional
mechanisms for bilateral Science and Technology cooperation, while the Science Academies of the two
countries promote inter-academy exchanges.
• ILTP during its 25-year long implementation period, supported over 500 joint R&D projects and setting up of
9 thematic centers in India and Russia that resulted in generation of over 1500 joint publications and many
new products, processes, facilities, and research centers besides developing over 10,000 scientific contacts.
• India-Russia Science and Technology Centre with a branch each in Delhi-NCR and Moscow was set up in
2011-12 in order to promote two-way transfer of technologies and their commercialization.
• On 8 May 2015, Department of Science & Technology (DST) and Russian Science Foundation signed an

agreement to support basic and exploratory research.
• During the 17th Summit, DST and FASO (Federal Agency for Scientific Organization) signed an agreement for
cooperation in the field of science and technology. A Basic Science Cooperation Programme between DST
and the Russian Foundation for Basic Research has been working quite successfully from 2016-17.
• A number of new initiatives such as the IndiRussia Bridge to Innovation, cooperation in telemedicine,
creation of a Traditional Knowledge Digital Library, GIAN, and the Russia-India Network (RIN) of Universities
are being promoted to encourage the growth of bilateral interaction in the field of S &T.
1.2.7. CULTURAL RELATIONS
• There are regular cultural initiatives to promote people-to-people contacts between India and Russia,
including reciprocal Years of Culture.
• There is a strong tradition of Indian studies in Russia. Jawaharlal Nehru Cultural Centre at the Embassy of
India, Moscow (JNCC) maintains close cooperation with leading Russian institutions, including the Institute of
Philosophy (Moscow); Russian State University for Humanities (Moscow); Institute of Oriental Studies
(Moscow); Institute of Asian and African Studies of the Moscow State University; School of International
Relations of the St. Petersburg University; Institute of Oriental Manuscripts (St Petersburg); Peter the Great
Museum of Anthropoalogy & Ethnography (Kunstkamera) in St Petersburg; Far Eastern Federal University
(Vladivostok);and Russian Institute for Cultural Research (Krasnodar).
• There is a Mahatma Gandhi Chair on Indian Philosophy in the Institute of Philosophy, Moscow.
• About 20 Russian Institutions, including leading universities and schools, regularly teach Hindi to about 1500
Russian students.
• The President of India inaugurated the Year of Indian Culture ‘Namaste Russia’ in Moscow on 10 May 2015.
About 15 performances in 8 cities were held as part of ‘Namaste Russia’ across various parts of Russia over
2015.
• The Embassy with support from regional governments organized week-long celebrations marking the third
International Day of Yoga (IDY) covering 68 regions spanning 87 locations and involving over 37685 Yoga
enthusiasts.
• During the previous Summit in October, the leaders adopted a ‘Roadmap of Events’ to celebrate the 70th
anniversary of the establishment of the diplomatic relations between India and Russia with year-long
celebrations in 2017 under which numerous events have already been held in both countries.
1.3. 70 YEARS: AN ASSESSMENT OF PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

• A report on the state of ties between the two nations brought out by two think tanks (VIF and Russian
International Affairs Council) calls for a major revamp of the engagement between the once-close partners.
• Once seen as closer to the former Soviet Union, India’s ties with the US have undergone a dramatic
change in recent years, with Washington emerging as a key source of military hardware for India. New
Delhi also has close to three dozen dialogues with Washington—unthinkable during the Cold War years
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• Meanwhile, the once close India-Russia ties have developed signs of strain with Moscow’s growing ties
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with Islamabad. Once seen as being on the same page over the threat posed by the Pakistan-backed Taliban
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in Afghanistan, India and Russia now have differences on the subject with Moscow seemingly more worried
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about the threat posed by the Islamic State than Taliban.

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• India’s concerns of Russia’s ties with New Delhi’s strategic rival China casting a shadow over Moscow-New
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Delhi relations. New Delhi also views Moscow’s recent reaching out to India’s arch rival Pakistan as a subset
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of Russia-China ties.
• In the case of Russia, Moscow has been worried about the growing warmth in India-US ties.
• Aprt from geopolitical factors, “an imperfect legal framework, tariff and non-tariff trade limitations, the
lack of up-to-date information on political processes in both countries; the low level of business contacts;
and the outdated images of both Russia and India their citizens have” are some of the impediments
standing in the way of a new partnership between the two nations.

1.3.1. WAY FORWARD
• Report calls for increased interaction at the ministerial and bureaucratic levels throughout the year, rather
than confining dialogue to an annual summit between the Russian and Indian leaderships. India and Russia
have been having regular bilateral summits between the Russian president and the Indian prime minister
since 2000.
• It also calls for a three-way talks between Russia, India and the US besides Russia, India and Israel to
increase the ambit of cooperation. India and Russia already have a trilateral arrangement with China.
• On terrorism and religious extremism, the paper calls for the two countries to support each other more
closely and visibly.
• It also calls for the two countries to collaborate in third countries—such as those in India’s neighbourhood
like Nepal and on Russia’s periphery like the Central Asian Republics. In this context development of
Vietnam’s hydrocarbon sector also provides opportunity for cooperation in third country.
• Giving a new impetus to Moscow-New Delhi relations would allow Russia to diversify its efforts in Asia.
• It is important to further expand Russia-India engagement on the international arena, Russia should
continue to actively support India’s claim for greater participation in international affairs.
• Connectivity needs a geopolitical interest in actively promoting the North-South Corridor through Iran so
that connectivity projects in the region get diversified and single-country domination is avoided.
• To strengthen economic linkages between the two countries, “it is necessary to set out mutually acceptable
business conditions, stimulate investment flows and greenlight mutual investments,” the report said.
• On defence collaboration, the report said “it is important to secure and consolidate new trends in the
development of military-technical cooperation and, first and foremost, to transition from the “seller–
buyer” model to large-scale joint breakthrough projects.”
• Russian should actively participate in India’s Make in India programme in defence manufacturing, with
more technology transfers, as that would consolidate Russia’s dominant position as India’s defence partner.
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VISION IAS
www.visionias.in
LECTURE-11
INDIA AND EUROPE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INDIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ........................................................................................................................ 3
1.1. The European Union (EU) ................................................................................................................................ 3
1.1.1. Institutional Setup .................................................................................................................................... 4
1.2. The European Union: Evolution....................................................................................................................... 4
1.3. The European Union: A Unique Identity ......................................................................................................... 5
1.4. Recent Developments and Issues for Europe.................................................................................................. 5
2. INDIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ........................................................................................................................ 6
2.1. Background ...................................................................................................................................................... 6
2.2. Political and Security Cooperation .................................................................................................................. 6
2.3. Economic Cooperation and Trade ................................................................................................................... 6
2.4. Science, Technology, Energy and Environment .............................................................................................. 7
2.5. Education and Culture ..................................................................................................................................... 7
2.6. India-EU FTA or the BTIA ................................................................................................................................. 7
2.6.1. The India-Meeting on BTIA Talks: Recent Developments ........................................................................ 8
2.6.2. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ...................................................................................................... 8
3. INDIA AND FRANCE............................................................................................................................................... 10
3.1. Background .................................................................................................................................................... 10
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3.2. Convergence .................................................................................................................................................. 10

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3.3. Recent Visits .................................................................................................................................................. 10

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3.4. Dialogue Mechanism ..................................................................................................................................... 10

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3.5. Security and Defence..................................................................................................................................... 11

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3.6. Technology: Space ......................................................................................................................................... 11

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3.6.1. Civil Nuclear Cooperation ....................................................................................................................... 11

3.7. Economic and Trade Cooperation ................................................................................................................. 12
4. INDIA-GERMANY................................................................................................................................................... 13
4.1.Background..................................................................................................................................................... 13
4.2. Dialogue Mechanism ..................................................................................................................................... 13
4.3. Defence Cooperation..................................................................................................................................... 13

4.4. Economic Cooperation .................................................................................................................................. 13
4.5. Science and Technology ................................................................................................................................ 14
5. INDIA AND UNITED KINGDOM.............................................................................................................................. 15
5.1. United Kingdom: Background........................................................................................................................ 15
5.2. India and UK Bilateral Ties ............................................................................................................................. 15
5.2.1. Dialogue Mechanism .............................................................................................................................. 15
5.2.2. Economic Ties ......................................................................................................................................... 16
5.2.3. Defence Ties ........................................................................................................................................... 16
5.2.4. Education, Science and Technology ....................................................................................................... 16
5.2.5. Diaspora .................................................................................................................................................. 16
5.3. Brexit ............................................................................................................................................................. 16
5.3.1. 2nd Phase of Negotiations ..................................................................................................................... 17
5.3.2. India and Brexit....................................................................................................................................... 17
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1. INDIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
Image Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/graphics/maps/ee-map.gif
1.1. THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU)

• The European Union has evolved into a hybrid intergovernmental and supranational organization of 28
countries across the European continent
• With a population of 516,195,432, it constitutes an important market.
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• With just 6,9% of the world’s population, the EU's trade with the rest of the world accounts for around 20%
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of global exports and imports.

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• Over 62% of EU countries’ total trade is done with other EU countries.

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• A common currency – The Euro as a common currency circulates among 19 of the member states known
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as the Eurozone, under the auspices of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
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o Eleven members states introduced the euro as their common currency on 1 January 1999. Greece in
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2001.
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o Slovenia (2007), Cyprus and Malta (2008), Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014), and Lithuania
(2015) have adopted the euro;
o 7 other member states - not including the UK nor Denmark, which have formal opt-outs - are required by
EU treaties to adopt the common currency upon meeting fiscal and monetary convergence criteria.
• The total GDP of EU countries stood at GDP PPP: $19.97 trillion (2016 est.) or GDP Official Exchange rate:
$16.52 trillion (2016 est.)
• With a GDP Per Capita: of $39,200 (2016 est.) EU ranks amongs the most prosperous regions in the world
• The Schengen Area is one of the greatest achievements of the EU. It is an area without internal borders, an
area within which citizens, many non-EU nationals, business people and tourists can freely circulate without
being subjected to border checks.Since 1985, it has gradually grown and encompasses today almost all EU
States and a few associated non-EU countries.
• Joining the EU: Any country that satisfies the conditions for membership can apply. These conditions are
known as the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ and include a free-market economy, a stable democracy and the rule of
law, and the acceptance of all EU legislation, including of the euro.
1.1.1. INSTITUTIONAL SETUP
EU's unique institutional set-up includes:
• European Council: the EU's broad priorities are set by the European Council, which brings together national
and EU-level leaders i.e Heads of states and governments as well as President of the European Commission.
Donald Tusk is the current president of the European Council.
• European Parliament: directly elected Members of European Parliament (MEPs) represent European
citizens in the European Parliament (751 seats)
• Council of the EU: governments defend their own country's national interests in the Council of the
European Union. It is a ministerial-level body. It conducts policymaking and coordinating functions as well
as legislative functions.
• European Commission: the interests of the EU as a whole are promoted by the European Commission,
whose members are appointed by national governments. At its head is a College of Commissioners
comprised of 28 members (one from each member country) including the president; each commissioner is
responsible for one or more policy areas. Its current president is Jean-Claude JUNCKER.
In principle, the Commission proposes new laws, and the Parliament and Council adopt them. The Commission
and the member countries then implement them, and the Commission ensures that the laws are properly
applied and implemented.
• Other important institutions such as Court of Justice of the EU, located in Luxembourg; upholds the rule of
European law.
• the Court of Auditors, located in, Luxembourg checks the financing of the EU's activities.
• European Central Bank, located in Frankfurt, Germany, responsible for European monetary policy.
1.2. THE EUROPEAN UNION: EVOLUTION

• European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was set up when in 1951 six members - Belgium, France, West
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands - signed the Treaty of Paris
• In 1957, envisioning an "ever closer union," the Treaties of Rome created the European Economic
Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and the six member states
undertook to eliminate trade barriers among themselves by forming a common market.
• In 1967, the institutions of all three communities were formally merged into the European Community
(EC), creating a single Commission, a single Council of Ministers, and the body known today as the European
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Parliament.
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• Members of the European Parliament were initially selected by national parliaments, but in 1979 the first
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direct elections were undertaken and have been held every five years since.
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• In 1993 the Single Market is completed with the 'four freedoms' of: movement of goods, services, people
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and money.
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• The 1993 Treaty of Maastricht on European Union laid the basis for further forms of cooperation in foreign
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and defense policy, in judicial and internal affairs, and in the creation of an economic and monetary union -
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including a common currency. This further integration created the European Union (EU), at the time
standing alongside the EC. In 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU/EC, raising the membership
total to 15.
• A new currency, the euro, was launched in world money markets on 1 January 1999; it became the unit of
exchange for all EU member states except Denmark, Sweden, and the UK.
• In 2002, citizens of those 12 countries began using euro banknotes and coins. Ten new countries joined the
EU in 2004 - Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and
Slovenia.
• Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007 and Croatia in 2013, bringing the current membership to 28. (Seven of

these new countries - Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia - have now adopted
the euro, bringing total euro-zone membership to 19.)
• In an effort to ensure that the EU could function efficiently with an expanded membership, the Treaty of
Nice (concluded in 2000; entered into force in 2003) set forth rules to streamline the size and procedures of
EU institutions. An effort to establish a "Constitution for Europe," growing out of a Convention held in 2002-
2003, foundered when it was rejected in referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005.
• The Treaty of Lisbon is ratified by all EU countries before entering into force in 2009. It provides the EU
with modern institutions and more efficient working methods.
• The Treaty's provisions are part of the basic consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) now governing what remains a very specific
integration project.
1.3. THE EUROPEAN UNION: A UNIQUE IDENTITY

• The evolution of what is today the European Union (EU) from a regional economic agreement among six
neighboring states in 1951 to today's hybrid intergovernmental and supranational organization of 28
countries across the European continent stands as an unprecedented phenomenon in history.
• Although the EU is not a federation in the strict sense, it is far more than a free-trade association such as
ASEAN, NAFTA, or Mercosur,
• It has certain attributes associated with independent nations: its own flag, currency (for some members),
and law-making abilities, as well as diplomatic representation and a common foreign and security policy in
its dealings with external partners.
• In view of its achievements, the European Union is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize In 2012.
1.4. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES FOR EUROPE

• Brexit: In the European elections are held in 2014 and more Eurosceptics, those doubting the efficacy of EU,
were elected into the European Parliament. Questions on the EUs efficacy are also raised by the Brexit,
wherein frustration with EU bureaucracy combined with immigration issues led the UK to vote for an exit
from the European Union in 2016. The exit negotiations will be difficult and potentially divisive, but are far
less important than the negotiations on establishing a new formal relationship between the UK and the EU.
• Russia: A new security policy was established in the wake of the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014.
However, Europe depends on Russia's gas exports, which rose in recent years, despite rising competition and
concerns about the country’s dominance of supply. State-run Gazprom, the world’s largest gas producer, has
a monopoly over Russia’s network of pipelines to Europe and supplies close to 40 per cent of Europe’s gas.
But it has been forced to lower its prices in recent years to protect its market share in the face of moves by
EU member states to buy more gas from the US, Qatar and other producers.
• Refugees: Regional instability in the Middle East and various countries and regions around the world,
leading to unrest and wars has resultedt in many people fleeing their homes and seeking refuge in Europe.
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The 2015 refugee crisis abated after the EU-Turkey migration deal and the closure of the Balkan route in
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the spring of 2016. The total number of migrants reaching Europe by two main sea routes in 2016 fell by
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nearly two-thirds, to 364,000 in comparison with 2015. However, the EU needs to work on a comprehensive
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response to the refugee crisis that can ensure internal cohesion, in view of strong views within the members
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and the rise of anti immigration sentiments, as well as protect its claims of being a normative power.
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• Climate change is still high on the agenda and leaders agree to reduce harmful emissions. However, it has to
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manage allies such as the US which has pulled out of the Paris agreement as well as developing countries
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that have demanded better performance on technology and funding.

• Terrorism: In recent time various European countries such as France and Germany have been target of
several terrorist attacks. It is an issue that needs a EU response in view of the open borders within Europe.
• Trade and Protectionism: Much of EUs success has based on its open economy and free trade. The recent
move by the United States to rase tariffs gives rise to the spectre of protectionism. EU would need to play a
key role in upholding a rules based order fro global trade.

2. INDIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
2.1. BACKGROUND
• In 2017, the European Union and India celebrated 55 years of diplomatic relations. The 14th EU-India
Summit, took place in New Delhi on 6 October 2017. It was an opportunity to review progress in many
aspects of the bilateral relationship and to discuss international and regional challenges.
• The EU is also the largest destination for Indian exports and a key source of the investment and cutting
edge technologies.
• India-EU relations date to the early 1960s, with India being amongst the first countries to establish
diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community. A cooperation agreement signed in 1994 took
the bilateral relationship beyond trade and economic cooperation.
• The first India-EU Summit took place in Lisbon on 28 June 2000 and marked a watershed in the evolution
of the relationship. Since then, thirteen annual Summits have been held.
• At the 5th India-EU Summit held at The Hague in 2004, the relationship was upgraded to a ‘Strategic
Partnership’. The two sides adopted a Joint Action Plan in 2005 (which was reviewed in 2008) that provided
for strengthening dialogue and consultation mechanisms in the political and economic spheres, enhancing
trade and investment, and bringing peoples and cultures together.
• India-EU relations received another boost with the 13th India-EU Summit at Brussels, held after a gap of
four years, in March 2016 adopting the India-EU Agenda 2020, which lays down a road map for cooperation
on a wide range of issues including nuclear cooperation, investments, Internet Governance, climate
change, 5G communications.
• In 2017 the two sides expressed their intent on cooperation through Joint Statements on Urban
Partnership, Counter Terrorism, Clean Energy and Climate Change.
2.2. POLITICAL AND SECURITY COOPERATION

• The 14th annual Summit between India and the European Union (EU) was held in New Delhi on 6 October
2017.
• India and EU also interact at the ASIA Europe Meeting (ASEM). The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) is an
intergovernmental process established in 1996 to foster dialogue and cooperation between Asia and
Europe. Presently it comprises 53 partners: 30 European and 21 Asian countries, the European Union and
the ASEAN Secretariat. ASEM addresses political, economic, social, cultural, and educational issues of
common interest, in a spirit of mutual respect and equal partnership.
• India and the EU interact regularly at the Foreign Minister level.
• A Security Dialogue envisaged under the Joint Action Plan has been held annually since May 2006.
• The Security Dialogue was merged with the Foreign Policy Consultations in 2016.
• The 2016 EU-India Summit adopted a Joint Declaration on the fight against Terrorism.
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• Both sides have also instituted Foreign Policy Consultations at the level of Secretaries. The first meeting
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took place in New Delhi on 15 November 2011, followed by a second round in Brussels on 20 July 2012. The
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last round of the Foreign Policy Consultations (4th) was held in Brussels on 29 February 2016.
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A bilateral Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism reports to the Security Dialogue, as do dialogues on
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Cyber-Security and Counter-Piracy.

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• An annual India-EU Ad-hoc Dialogue on Human Rights is also held in New Delhi, the eighth meeting of which
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took place on 27 November 2013.

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• In addition, a High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Mobility has been instituted at Secretary Level.
• India has participated in the EU-hosted Brussels Conference on Afghanistan in October 2016; and
the Brussels Conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region of April 2017
• A Delegation for Relations with India (D-IN) was formally constituted in the European Parliament (EP) in 2007
to follow relations with India.

• The EU as a bloc of 28 countries is India’s largest regional trading partner while India was the EU’s 9th
largest trading partner in 2016.

• Bilateral trade in goods standing at US$ 88 bn in 2016. The EU is also the largest destination for Indian
exports.
• In goods, India’s export to the EU in 2015 stood at € 39.41 billion ($43.73 billion) while India’s imports from
the EU were valued at € 38.1 billion ($42.3 billion).
• In 2015, the trade balance in goods was in India’s favour by €1.3 billion ($1.44 billion).
• India’s bilateral trade with the EU28 during the first eight months of 2016 (Jan-Aug 2016) stood at €51.2bn
with India’s exports valued at €26.6bn and India’s imports from the EU at €24.6bn.
• EU bilateral trade in services was €27.7billion ($30.75 billion) in 2015 comprising Indian exports of services to
the EU worth € 13.67billion ($15.17 billion) and Indian imports from the EU worth €14.03billion ($15.58
billion).
• India received around US$ 83 bn FDI flows from Europe during 2000-17 constituting approximately 24% of
the total FDI inflows into the country during the period makeing it one of the largest source of FDI.
• India and the EU are in the process of negotiating a bilateral Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement
(BTIA) since 2007.
• As of late, both sides are discussing the modalities of resumption of BTIA talks on a fast track.
• The India-EU Joint Commission dealing with economic and commercial issues meets annually, as do its
three Sub-Commissions on Trade, Economic Cooperation and Development Cooperation.
• In addition to enhance sector-specific cooperation, there are regular meetings of Joint Workings Groups
o Textiles and Clothing,
o Agriculture and Marine Products,
o Technical Barriers to Trade and Sanitary and
o Phyto-sanitary Issues, Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology (SPS/TBT) as well as Food Processing
Industries.
• A Macroeconomic Dialogue at Secretary Level along with a Dialogue on Financial Services Regulations have
also been instituted and take place annually.
2.4. SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

• The India-EU Science and Technology Steering Committee meets annually to discuss cooperation in this
field.
• India and the EU set up an Energy Panel in 2005 to enhance cooperation in the critical sector of energy and
energy security.
• Separate sub-groups have been constituted under the panel dealing with coal and clean coal conversion
technologies, energy efficiency and renewable energy, etc.
• As envisaged in the Joint Action Plan, a Joint Working Group on Environment dealing with prevention of
pollution, waste minimization, protection of biological diversity, sustainable forest management,
environmental education, etc. has been created.
• An Environmental Forum which brings together academia, business and civil society of both sides to
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exchange views on specific environmental issues also meets annually.

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An “Indo European Water Forum” meeting jointly organised by EU delegation to India, DG Environment and
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India’s National Water Mission took place on 23-24 Nov 2015.

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2.5. EDUCATION AND CULTURE

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• The framework of India-EU cooperation in the fields of education and culture is provided by three Joint
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Declarations covering cooperation in the fields of Education and Training, Multilingualism and Culture.
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• 50,000 Indian students are in EU in higher education, with 5,000 having been provided ERASMUS
scholarships.
2.6. INDIA-EU FTA OR THE BTIA

• With its combination of rapid growth, complementary trade baskets and relatively high degree of market
protection, India is an obvious partner for a free trade agreement (FTA) for the EU.
• The parameters for an ambitious FTA were set out in the report of the EU-India High Level Trade Group in
October 2006.
• Other studies have reinforced the economic potential of an FTA between the EU and India, notably
a sustainability impact assessment concluded in 2009.
• Negotiations on the India-EU free trade agreement started back in 2007 and 16 rounds of talks have been
held since then. The last round was held in 2013, after which negotiations were suspended.
• These negotiations, covering trade, investment protection and intellectual property, have remained
deadlocked since 2013.
• In recent times the uncertainties over Brexit and inflexibility on both sides have prevented resumption of
formal talks.
• EU wants stringent measures on investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) and Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary
measures
• The recent unilateral termination of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) by India with many EU member
countries including Germany has complicated things further, leaving many European businesses worried
about investment protection in India.
o India had unilaterally terminated BITs with most EU members in 2017, asking them to renegotiate the
treaty based on a new model BIT passed by the Cabinet in December 2015.
o The Indian Model BIT requires a foreign investor to litigate in national courts for at least five years
before approaching an international tribunal.
o On the other hand, the ISDS provision in EU-Singapore FTA (2013), the gives investors a choice
between bringing a dispute against a host state before the national court of the country where the
investment has been made and submitting the dispute to international arbitration.
o Rejecting a proposal by EU to suspend such termination, India proposed a toned-down version of the
BTIA, which would include an investment chapter and avoid contentious issues for the time being.
o However, the EU didn’t agree. The issue came up for discussion again during the meeting of the two
chief trade negotiators.
• At the 14th India-EU Summit in Delhi in October 2017, both sides resolved to restart negotiations for BTIA.
• After months of deadlock, India and the European Union (EU) chief trade negotiators met in New Delhi in
November 2017 to hammer out a way forward for the long-pending free trade agreement negotiations
between the two sides. It is not the resumption of BTIA negotiations, but to find a way forward to resume
negotiations.
2.6.1. THE INDIA-MEETING ON BTIA TALKS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
• On 15 November 2017, senior officials of India and European Union (EU) held discussions on the long-
stalled free trade pact and expressed willingness to address issues in a time-bound manner.
• The negotiations for the pact have been held up since May 2013 as both the sides are yet to bridge
substantial gaps on crucial issues such as:
o intellectual property rights,
o duty cut in automobile and spirits, and
o liberal visa regime.
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• The two sides have to iron out differences related to movement of professionals. A liberal visa regime is
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key for India in this context.

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• The EU, besides demanding significant duty cuts in automobiles, wants tax reduction in wines, spirits and
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dairy products, and a strong intellectual property regime.

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India is asking for 'data secure nation' status to be granted by the EU. The country is among the nations not
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considered data secure by the EU. The matter is crucial as it will have a bearing on Indian IT companies
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wanting market access.

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2.6.2. SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES

• Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures are measures to protect humans, animals, and plants from
diseases, pests, or contaminants.
• All countries maintain measures to ensure that food is safe for consumers, and to prevent the spread of
pests or diseases among animals and plants.
• Sanitary (human and animal health) and phytosanitary (plant health) measures apply to domestically
produced food or local animal and plant diseases, as well as to products coming from other countries.

• These sanitary and phytosanitary measures can take many forms, such as:
o requiring products to come from a disease-free area,
o inspection of products, specific treatment or processing of products,
o setting of allowable maximum levels of pesticide residues or permitted use of only certain additives in
food.
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3. INDIA AND FRANCE
3.1. BACKGROUND
• India and France have traditionally close and friendly relations. In 1998, the two countries entered into
Strategic Partnership which is emblematic of their convergence of views on a range of international issues
apart from a close and growing bilateral relationship.
• The areas of defence cooperation, space cooperation and civil nuclear cooperation constitute the three
principal pillars of our Strategic Partnership.
• Apart from these traditional fields of cooperation, India and France are increasingly engaged in new areas
of cooperation like climate change, sustainable growth and development, the International Solar Alliance
etc.
• France is the only western country with large territory in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) including the
Reunion Islands, that spans about two million square kilometres of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and
it has a population of one million French Citizens in the region, including about 30% of Indian origin.
• The French navy maintains bases in the UAE, Djibouti as well as in Reunion, with a total of 20,000 forces
permanently based in the IOR.
3.2. CONVERGENCE
• India and France support a multi-polar world order. France has continued to support India’s claim for
permanent membership of the Security Council and the reforms of the United Nations.
• France has provided consistent support to India’s candidature for the membership of Multilateral Export
Control regimes, viz. NSG and MTCR. France’s support was vital in India’s accession to MTCR in June 2016.
• India and France have consistently condemned terrorism and have resolved to work together for adoption
of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) in the UN.
• During the visit of then President Hollande in January 2016, India and France also issued a Joint Statement
on Counter Terrorism in which the two countries resolved to step up their bilateral cooperation in this field.
3.3. RECENT VISITS

• Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi visited France on 2-3 June 2017. The Paris Climate Accord and the
climate issue was prominently discussed.
• Earlier Prime Minister Modi had paid an official visit to France in April 2015 in what was his first visit to a
European country.
• Prime Minister Modi visited Paris on 29-30 November 2015 to attend the inaugural Leaders’ Event at the
COP-21 Climate Change Summit. He launched the International Solar Alliance jointly with President
Francois Hollande in the presence of UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon. Along with President Hollande, US
President Obama and Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates.
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President Hollande, during his Presidency twice visited India. During his visit in February 2013 and in January
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2016 as the chief guest of the Republic Day celebration. In a historic first, a French military contingent also
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marched on Rajpath on the Republic Day and thus France became the first ever foreign country to have
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• President Emanuel Macron of France visited India in March 2018.

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3.4. DIALOGUE MECHANISM

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• India and France have a range of regular institutional dialogues:

• India-France Strategic Dialogue takes place between NSAs from both sides.
• Annual Foreign Office Consultations
• The bilateral dialogue on Maritime Cooperation
• Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism
• Track 1.5 Dialogue (led by Joint Secretary (PP&R), MEA) with the participation of the Observer Research
Foundation from our side and the Strategy and Policy Planning Division of the French MFA called CAPS and
the Centre for International Studies and Research (CERI as the French acronym stands) are the other active
mechanisms.
3.5. SECURITY AND DEFENCE
• Regular exchange of visits at the level of Services Chiefs takes place.
• The three services also have regular defence exercises; viz. Exercise Shakti (Army); Exercise Varuna (Navy);
Exercise Garuda (Air Force.
• The Varuna exercise has been taking place since 1983.
• Apart from service-level staff talks, the two sides have a High Committee on Defence Cooperation (HCDC)
which meets annually at the level of Defence Secretary and the French Director General of the Directorate
of International Relations and Strategy (DGRIS).
• Apart from this, various staff courses, training programmes etc. also regularly take place.
• Major on-going defence-related projects are the following:
o Rafale Deal: The Inter-governmental agreement for purchase of 36 Rafale jets by India in flyaway
condition was signed in New Delhi on 23 September 2016 by RM Manohar Parrikar and French Defence
Minister Le Drian.
o P-75 Scorpene Project: The contract for six Scorpene submarines from M/s DCNS was signed in October
2006. All six vessels will be built under technology transfer at the Mazagaon Docks Ltd. The first two
submarine Kalvari and Khanderi have been built.
• During the 2018 Visit of the President Emmanuel Macron the two countries issued Joint Strategic Vision of
India-France Cooperation in the Indian Ocean region.
• In 2018, the two sides also signed agreement on reciprocal logistics support for armed forces; agreement
will facilitate the reciprocal provision of logistic support, supplies and services between the armed forces
of the two countries during authorised port visits, joint exercises and joint training among others.
• Two countries also signed an agreement on exchange and reciprocal protection of classified or protected
information.
3.6. TECHNOLOGY: SPACE

• India and France have a rich history of cooperation in the field of space going back to fifty years with ISRO
and the French Space Agency, CNES carrying on various joint research programmes and launch of
satellites. A joint stamp was released to commemorate fifty years of bilateral space cooperation during the
visit of PM Modi to France in April 2015.
• M/s Antrix and M/s Airbus Defence and Space also have signed an MoA for commercial cooperation in
June 2016.
• GSAT-18 was launched from Arianespace, Kourou on 5 October 2016 which was the twentieth ISRO satellite
launched by Arianespace. GSAT-17 was launched from Kourou on 28 June 2017.
• France continues to be a major supplier of components and equipment for the Indian space programme.
• During the visit of President Hollande to India in January 2016, ISRO and CNES signed an Implementing
Arrangement (IA) for the joint development of a thermal infrared satellite mission; payload of French
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Argos-IV instrument on India’s Oceansat-3 satellite and a Letter of Intent for cooperation in planetary
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The jointly developed MeghaTropiques satellite Mission was launched in 2011. It is an Indo-French Joint
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Satellite Mission for studying the water cycle and energy exchanges in the tropics. The main objective of
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this mission is to understand the life cycle of convective systems that influence the tropical weather and
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climate and their role in associated energy and moisture budget of the atmosphere in tropical regions.
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• A joint Ka-band propagation experiment is also under implementation.

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During the Asia Pacific Remote Sensing Symposium held in New Delhi, CNES and ISRO jointly organized a
reception of heads of space agencies on 3 April 2016. The meeting attended by 60 countries came up with a
“New Delhi Declaration” which identifies various international satellites contributing as space segment for
monitoring climate change.
3.6.1. CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION
• A landmark agreement on civil nuclear cooperation was signed between India and France on 30 September
2008 during the visit of Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh to France.
• Subsequently, during the visit of President Nicolas Sarkozy to India in December 2010, the General

Framework Agreement and the Early Works Agreement between NPCIL and M/s AREVA for the
implementation of EPR for the Jaitapur Nuclear Power Project (JNPP) were signed. The power plant will
have six reactors with a capacity of 1,650 MW each.
• During Prime Minister Modi’s visit to France in April 2015, M/s L&T and M/s AREVA signed an MoU to
maximize localisation for manufacturing of critical and large forgings involved in EPR technology for JNPP
(including Reactor Pressure Vessel) and M/s AREVA and NPCIL signed a pre-engineering agreement.
• Following M/s AREVA’s restructuring, French utility EDF has now been designated as the lead agency from
the French side for negotiations and implementation of the JNPP.
• During the 2018 visit of the French president India and France signed an agreement to expedite the Jaitapur
nuclear power. NPCIL (Nuclear Power Corporation) and EDF France have signed an industrial way forward
agreement. This indicates that negotiations between entities of France and the Indian government would
conclude by 2018-end and construction can begin.
• Once installed, the Jaitapur project will be the largest nuclear power plant in the world, with a collective
capacity of 9,900 MW.
3.7. ECONOMIC AND TRADE COOPERATION

• Both India and France have important bilateral investments and trade and commercial cooperation.
• In 2016, the total trade in goods between India and France stood at Euro 8.58 billion, registering an
increase of 0.49% from 2015.
• The trade surplus remains in India’s favour for the past ten years with Indian exports to France in 2016
standing at Euro 4.67 billion and French exports to India at Euro 3.90 billion. However, the overall volume of
bilateral trade remains low with Indian exports to France being a meagre 1.06% of France’s total imports.
Bilateral trade in services stood at Euro 3.41 billion in 2015 which remains in India’s favour with India’s share
of Euro 1.72 billion of exports.
• Almost 1000 French companies are present in India with a total turnover of US$ 20billion and employing
300,000 people in India. French companies have more than 25 R&D centres in India.
• France is the ninth largest foreign investor in India with cumulative investment of US$ 5.15 billion from
April 2000 to May 2016 which represents 1.5% of the total FDI inflows in India.
• In France, about 120 Indian companies are present with an estimated investment stock of Euro one billion
and employing 7000 people.
• A Joint Economic Committee exists at the level of Ministers of Commerce and Foreign Trade from both
sides.
• Seven bilateral joint working groups in various fields exist which are: (i) IT & Telecommunications;(ii) Roads;
(iii) Sustainable Urban Development; (iv) Agriculture and Food Processing; (v) Mineral Exploration and
Development; (vi) Energy; and (vii) Post.
• An India-France CEOs’ Forum exists at the level of top CEOs from both sides meeting annually and
presenting their reports to the Prime Minister of India and President of France.
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The Bilateral Investment and Protection Agreement between India and France expired in 2010, ten years
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agreement was proposed by the Indian side in 2015. French response has been pending.
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Almost all the major French companies are present in India including Renault, Saint Gobain, Veolia, Michelin,
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Capgemini, Sanofi, EDF, Airbus, Lactalis, Sodexho, Total and others. Alstom has won a major project worth
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Euro 3.2 billion of manufacturing 800 locomotives in Madhepura, Bihar.

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India’s Reliance, Tata, Mahindra and other big companies have tied up joint cooperation with major French
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companies like Dassault, SAFRAN, Thales and others in the defence sector. French infrastructure companies
are looking forward to major opportunities in Indian projects including in smart cities and renewable energy.

4. INDIA-GERMANY
4.1.BACKGROUND
• India was amongst the first countries to establish diplomatic ties with the Federal Republic of Germany
after the Second World War. Relations grew significantly following the end of the Cold War and the
reunification of Germany.
• In the last decade, both economic and political interaction between India and Germany has enhanced.
Today, Germany is amongst India's most important partners both bilaterally and in the global context.
• India and Germany have a 'Strategic Partnership' since 2000, which has been further strengthened with
the Intergovernmental Consultations (IGC) between the two Governments which allows for a
comprehensive review of cooperation and a platform to identify fresh areas of engagement.
• India is among a select group of countries with whom Germany has such a dialogue mechanism.
• Germany and India cooperate closely on the issue of UNSC expansion within the framework of G-4. Both
countries consult each other in G-20 on global issues such climate change, sustainable development.
• India's current priorities in most areas match with German expertise, such as renewable energy, skills
development, smart city, water and waste management
• German President Joachim Gauck had visite India was in February 2014.
• German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier visited India from March 22 to 25, 2018
4.2. DIALOGUE MECHANISM

• The two countries have several institutionalized arrangements to discuss bilateral and global issues of
interest viz.
o Joint Commission on Industrial and Economic Cooperation,
o Foreign Office Consultations (FOC),
o High Technology Partnership Group (HTPG),
o High Defence Committee,
o Indo-German Energy Forum, Indo-German Environment Forum, India-Germany Committee on S&T and
o Joint Working Groups (JWG) on various fields, including skills development, automotive, agriculture,
coal, tourism, water, waste management, etc.
o JWG on Quality Infrastructure for Cooperation on Standardisation, Conformity Assessment and Product
Safety took place in Berlin from 5-8 March 2017.
4.3. DEFENCE COOPERATION

• India-Germany Defence Cooperation Agreement (2006) provides a framework for bilateral defence
cooperation. The High Defence Committee (HDC) meetings at the Defence Secretary level take place
annually, alternately in New Delhi and Berlin.
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• Chief of German Navy Admiral Andreas Krause participated in the International Fleet Review held in
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4.4. ECONOMIC COOPERATION

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• Germany is India's largest trading partner in Europe. Germany has consistently been among India's top ten
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global trade partners.

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• India was ranked 24th in Germany's global trade during 2016.

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• Bilateral trade in 2016 was valued at 17.42 billion Euros. Apart from traditional sectors, knowledge-driven
sectors hold good potential for collaboration.
• There is considerable scope for co-operation in the fields of IT, biotechnology, renewable energy, green
technology, urban mobility & development and the entertainment industry.
• Germany is the 7th largest foreign direct investor in India since January 2000. German FDI in India in 2016
was to the tune of US$ 1.1 billion. April 2000 to December 2017 is USD 10.71 billion or 2.91 per cent of total
FDI, according to official figures.
• At present, German investments in India is mainly in the sectors of transportation, electrical equipment,
metallurgical industries, services sector (particularly insurance), chemicals, construction activity, trading
and automobiles.
• Most of the major German companies have already entered the Indian market. German automobile giants
such as Daimler, Volkswagen, BMW, and Audi have established manufacturing facilities/assembly plants in
India. Other major German companies that have significant operations in India include Siemens,
ThyssenKrupp, Bosch, Bayer, BASF, SAP, Deutsche Bank, Metro, Lufthansa, Merck, Munich Re etc. Besides
large companies, German Medium Sized Enterprises are also showing greater interest in India.
• Indian investments in Germany have also shown a remarkable increase in the last few years. Indian
corporate entities have invested over US$ 7 billion in Germany.
• There are more than 200 Indian companies operating in Germany. IT, automotive, pharma and biotech
have received a chunk of Indian Investments. The penetration of Indian software companies in German
market is growing and major Indian software providers like Infosys, WIPRO and TCS have operations in
Germany.
• Companies like Bharat Forge Limited, Ranbaxy, Piramal, Samtel, Hexaware Technologies, NIIT, Graphite
India Limited, Hinduja Group, Dr. Reddy's Laboratories, Biocon, Hindustan National Glass, Mahindra and
others have either acquired German companies or started their own subsidiaries.
4.5. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

• Science & Technology: Indo-German Science & Technology cooperation started with the signing of the
Intergovernmental S&T Cooperation Agreement in 1971 and 1974.
• In terms of scientific output across all subjects, Germany is India's second largest collaborator worldwide.
• For Indian scientists working abroad, Germany is among the top three destinations in the world.
• So far, more than 2000 joint projects have been successfully completed, resulting in more than 7000
exchanges of scientists, more than 2000 joint scientific publications and more than 400 Indo-German
workshops and seminars. At present, more than 170 projects are being implemented.
• India's scientific establishments have close partnerships with premier German R&D institutions, including the
Max Planck Society, Fraunhofer Laboratories and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.
• The jointly funded Indo-German Science & Technology Centre was set up in 2008 in Gurgaon with an
annual contribution of 1 million from each side. The mandate of the Centre has been extended till 2022 with
a contribution of 4 million per year by each side.
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5. INDIA AND UNITED KINGDOM
5.1. UNITED KINGDOM: BACKGROUND
• United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The island of Great Britain includes England,
Scotland, and Wales.
• The designation "Great Britain," in the sense of "Larger Britain," dates back to medieval times and was used
to distinguish the island from "Little Britain," or Brittany in modern France
• 12 April 1927 (Royal and Parliamentary Titles Act established current name of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland).
• The United Kingdom has historically played a leading role in developing parliamentary democracy and in
advancing literature and science. At its zenith in the 19th century, the British Empire stretched over one-
fourth of the earth's surface
• The Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales, and the Northern Ireland Assembly were
established in 1998
• As one of five permanent members of the UN Security Council and a founding member of NATO and the
Commonwealth, the UK pursues a global approach to foreign policy.
• The UK has been an active member of the EU since its accession in 1973, although it chose to remain outside
the Economic and Monetary Union.
• However, motivated in part by frustration at a remote bureaucracy in Brussels and massive migration into
the country, UK citizens on 23 June 2016 narrowly voted to leave the EU.
• The UK and the EU are currently negotiating the terms of the UK's withdrawal and will discuss a framework
for their future relationship ahead of the UK's scheduled departure from the bloc on 29 March 2019.
5.2. INDIA AND UK BILATERAL TIES

• Bilateral relationship was upgraded to a strategic partnership in 2004.
• During his tenure of British Prime Minister David Cameron visited India thrice in his first term (July 2010,
February 2013 and November 2013).
• The successful visit of Prime Minister Modi to the UK in November 2015 gave further impetus to the bilateral
relationship.
• Both Prime Ministers resolved to hold biennial PM-level Summits to advance the partnership and agreed
on a new Defence and International Security Partnership aimed to intensify cooperation on defence and
security, including cyber security, counter-terrorism and maritime security
• UK Prime Minister Theresa May’s visit to India in November 2016, which was her first overseas bilateral
visit after assuming office in July 2016, reflects the continuity of interactions at the highest political level.
• In the context of Brexit, the Commonwealth Summit scheduled in London in April 2018 presents another
opportunity for both countries to infuse fresh momentum to the bilateral engagement through a meeting
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5.2.1. DIALOGUE MECHANISM

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India and UK have a number of bilateral dialogue mechanisms in place, covering a wide spectrum of areas
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o Economic and Financial Dialogue at Finance Minister-level Joint Economic & Trade Committee at
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Commerce Minister-level
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o Strategic Dialogue at NSA-level

o Foreign Office Consultations at Foreign Secretary-level
o Home Secretary-level Dialogue
o Defence Consultative Group at Defence Secretary-level
o Cyber Dialogue and
o Counter Terrorism Dialogue.

5.2.2. ECONOMIC TIES
• Trade: UK is among India’s major trading partners and during the year 2016-17, UK ranked 16th in the list
of India’s top 25 trading partners.
• As per trade statistics of MoC&I, India’s trade with UK in 2016-2017 was US $12.21 billion.
• Investment: UK is the 4 th largest inward investor in India, after Mauritius, Singapore and Japan with a
cumulative equity investment of US $24.37 billion (April 2000- December 2016),
• 7% of all foreign direct investment into India.
• India continued to be the third largest investor in the UK and emerged as the second largest international
job creator with Indian companies having created over 110,000 jobs in the UK. About 10% of these 800
Indian and India-focused companies based in the UK are listed on the London Stock Exchange.
• According to the UK Trade and Investment (UKTI) in their ‘2015/16 Inward Investment Annual Report’,
Indian companies created 127 FDI projects in the UK in 2016-17, and created 3,999 new jobs and
safeguarded 7,645 jobs.
5.2.3. DEFENCE TIES
• Cooperation in defence sector is another important pillar of bilateral cooperation. At all the three services
level, joint exercises and wide ranging exchanges between the three services are conducted regularly.
• The last Army Joint Exercise ‘Ajeya Warrior’ was held in Bikaner from 1-14 December, 2017.
• The Indian Air force participated in the Exercise ‘Indradhanush-IV’ in the UK from 21 July – 1 August, 2015.
• The Joint Navy Exercise ‘Konkan 2017’ was held in May 2017 at Plymouth in the UK that witnessed
participation by INS Tarkash.
• During Prime Minister’s visit to UK in November 2015, the two countries agreed to elevate their Defence
relationship by establishing capability partnerships in strategic areas.
• The institutionalised dialogue to discuss defence cooperation viz. Defence Consultative Group Meeting, is
held annually at Defence Secretary level. The 18th DCG meeting was held on 9-10 October 2017 in London.
• Cooperation in defence intelligence commenced with the visit of Director General, Defence Intelligence
Agency and interactions with his counterpart in London on 3-5 December 2017.
5.2.4. EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
• Education is an important plank of the India-UK bilateral relationship.
• Relationship has grown substantially with the introduction of bilateral mechanisms such as the India-UK
Education Forum, UK-India Education and Research Initiative (UKIERI), Joint Working Group on Education,
Newton-Bhabha Fund and Scholarship schemes.
• 35 British faculty members have visited India under the Global Initiative for Academic Network (GIAN)
programme.
• UK also supports the Skills India Mission and announced a fresh commitment of up to £12 million.
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During UKPM Theresa May’s visit to India, a India-UK Clean Energy R&D Centre with a focus on solar energy
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storage and a collaborative R&D programme in energy efficient building materials were announced.
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Resistance (AMR) with a joint investment of up to £13 million have also been established.
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5.2.5. DIASPORA
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• The Indian Diaspora in UK is one of the largest ethnic minority communities in the country.
• With the 2011 census recording approximately 1.5 million people of Indian origin in the UK.
• Almost 1.8 percent of the population and contributing 6% of the country’s GDP.
5.3. BREXIT
• Brexit is a word that has become used as a shorthand way of saying the UK leaving the EU - merging the
words Britain and exit to get Brexit.

• On 23 June 2016 citizens of the United Kingdom (UK) voted in a referendum to leave the European Union
(EU). On 29 March 2017 the UK formally notified the European Council of its intention to leave the EU by
triggering of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. It is scheduled to depart at 11pm UK time on Friday 29 March,
2019
• For the time being, the United Kingdom remains a full member of the EU and rights and obligations continue
to fully apply in and to the UK .
• The UK and EU are negotiating on the "divorce" issues of:The first phase of negotiations focussed on:
o issues related to citizens' rights
o the financial settlement
o the Northern Irish border
o other separation issues
5.3.1. 2ND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS
On 29 January 2018, EU27 ministers adopted a new set of negotiating directives giving details on the EU27
position on the transition period. The main points are:
• the proposed end date for the transition period in the negotiating directives is 31 December 2020
• during the transition period the whole of the EU acquis will continue to apply to the UK as if it were a member state,
and any changes to it would also apply in the UK
• the UK will remain bound by the obligations stemming from the agreements concluded by the EU, while it will no longer
participate in any bodies set up by those agreements
• the UK, as already a third country, will no longer participate in the institutions and the decision-making of the EU
• all existing EU regulatory, budgetary, supervisory, judiciary and enforcement instruments and structures will also apply,
including the competence of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
• Predictions of immediate doom were wrong, with the UK economy estimated to have grown 1.8% in 2016, second only
to Germany's 1.9% among the world's G7 leading industrialised nations. The UK economy has continued to grow at
almost the same rate in 2017.
5.3.2. INDIA AND BREXIT

• Many Brexit supporters argued that the EU was the biggest obstacle to U.K.-India trade.
• India remains deeply vested in the outcome of the referendum for two reasons:
o The first concerns the welfare of a nearly three-million strong diaspora of Indian-origin U.K. citizens,
o second concerns the interests of a large moving population of Indians who come to Britain ever year as
tourists, business people, professionals, students, spouses, parents and relatives.
• Indian industry in the U.K. is thriving. There are 800 Indian companies in the country -- more than the
combined number in the rest of Europe. According to the India Tracker 2016 commissioned by the
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), Indian companies generate 110,000 jobs. The number of Indian
companies growing at more than 10 per cent — the key benchmark for inclusion on the list — has nearly
doubled this year over the last.
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• Work-related visa restrictions have already resulted in a fall in the number of Indian students studying in
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British universities from 22,385 in 2012-13 to 18,320 in 2014-15, according to the U.K. Council for
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• Indian businesses and financial institutions are however hedging their bets. According to a report by the
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significance of Commonwealth has increased in this context.

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VISION IAS
www.visionias.in
LECTURE-12
INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .......................................................................................................................... 3
1.1. India and the United States: Current Status.................................................................................................... 3
1.2. Background ...................................................................................................................................................... 3
1.3. The Civil Nuclear Deal: A New Era ................................................................................................................... 4
1.3.1. The Civil Nuclear Deal: Opertaionalisation ............................................................................................... 5
1.3.2. India-US Cooperation on Nuclear Energy: Historic Background .............................................................. 5
1.4. The Mechanism of Cooperation ...................................................................................................................... 5
1.5. Political Ties ..................................................................................................................................................... 6
1.6. Defence Cooperation....................................................................................................................................... 6
1.6.1. Expanding Scope of Defence Cooperation ............................................................................................... 6
1.6.2. Way Forward: The Foundational Agreements ......................................................................................... 7
1.7. Counter-terrorism and Internal Security ......................................................................................................... 7
1.8. The Economy ................................................................................................................................................... 8
1.8.1. Trade ......................................................................................................................................................... 8
1.8.2. Investment and Development .................................................................................................................. 8
1.8.3. Major issues of Contention in Economy ................................................................................................... 8
1.8.4. Major Issues: IPR ...................................................................................................................................... 9
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1.9. Energy .............................................................................................................................................................. 9

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1.10. Climate Change............................................................................................................................................ 10

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1.11. Education and Culture ................................................................................................................................. 10

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1.12. Space ........................................................................................................................................................... 10

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1.13. Science and Technology .............................................................................................................................. 11

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1.14. P2P: Diaspora............................................................................................................................................... 11

1.15. Global Public Health .................................................................................................................................... 11
1.16. Strategic Components of the Relationship.................................................................................................. 12
1.17. The Pakistan Factor ..................................................................................................................................... 12
1.17.1. Recent Trends ....................................................................................................................................... 12
1.17.2. Pakistan Factor: What’s New? .............................................................................................................. 13

1.18. The China Factor .......................................................................................................................................... 13
1.19. The Indo-Pacific ........................................................................................................................................... 14
1.20. The Russia Factor ......................................................................................................................................... 14
1.21. The Joint Declaration 2017 .......................................................................................................................... 14
1.22. Way Forward ............................................................................................................................................... 14
1.23. Policy Options .............................................................................................................................................. 15
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1. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
United States of America, U.S.A., is a federal republic of 50 states. It is bounded on the north by Canada, on the
east by the Atlantic Ocean, on the south by the Gulf of Mexico and Mexico, and on the west by the Pacific Ocean.
The United States is the fourth largest country in the world in area (after Russia, Canada, and China). Its
military capabilities, economic size, science and technology base and active involvement in international
affairs provide it a unique status. The term ‘superpower’, as applied to the USA, is reflective of the role played by
the US around the world in the last century.
1.1. INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT STATUS

• India-U.S. bilateral relations have developed into a "global strategic partnership", based on shared
democratic values and increasing convergence of interests on bilateral, regional and global issues.
• President Obama's visit to India in 2015 as the Chief Guest at Republic Day was a significant marker of
these relations. During the visit, the two sides issued a Delhi Declaration of Friendship and adopted a Joint
Strategic Vision for Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region.
• The summit level joint statement issued in June 2016 termed India and the U.S.A as “Enduring Global
Partners in the 21st Century”.
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The June 2017 Joint statement called for Prosperity through Partnership.
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Today, the India-U.S. bilateral cooperation is broad-based and multi-sectoral, covering:

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o defence and security,

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o cyber security, high-technology, civil nuclear energy, space technology and applications,
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o clean energy, environment, agriculture and health.

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o Vibrant people-to-people interaction

• These relations have acquired sustained support across the political spectrum in both countries
1.2. BACKGROUND
• For most of the period after India achieved independence in 1947, the U.S. viewed South Asia as a region
largely peripheral to its strategic needs.
• In two decades of independence, India depended on the supply of wheat under the PL 480 programme of
the US, which was suspended in the mid 1960s over political differences. Washington also provided India
some economic assistance, particularly as the latter’s ties with China deteriorated.
• During the 1962 Sino-Indian war, the U.S. publicly supported India’s interpretation of its border with China
in the eastern Himalayas.
• However, despite its potential and occasional periods of Indo-U.S. cooperation, it was clear from early on
that India would not serve as an active U.S. ally in the battle against global communism.
• For its part, India refused to join either the American or the Soviet side in the Cold War conflict and
instead charted its own “non-aligned” course largely independent of either superpower.
• From the U.S. perspective, the main problem with Indian policy was that “non-alignment,” Which the US
took for neutrality at a time when it was locked in a battle of ideas.
• India attached much significance to autonomy in international matters.
• Circumstance in the late 1960’s, As Sino-Soviet rift deepened, the US gravitated towards China and the
USSR towards India. This was perceived to be the beginning of India’s tilt towards the USSR, a process the
gained momentum in the early 1970s.
• At the strategic level, the Soviet Union afforded India crucial protection against regional adversaries. In
1971 New Delhi and Moscow signed a treaty of “peace, friendship, and cooperation” under which the two
parties promised to aid one another in the event of a perceived military threat.
• India’s “non-aligned” foreign policy thus became a source of considerable irritation to the U.S. Not only did
the Indians refuse to assist the U.S. in containing Soviet power, but they also actively cooperated with the
Soviet Union in significant ways
• Beyond these strategic problems, India was economically unattractive during the Cold War.
• In essence, during the Cold War India refused to promote U.S. grand strategic goals and offered few
economic benefits, while posing little direct military threat to American interests. India therefore was
largely ignored.
• The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War had profound consequences for India’s
foreign and security policies.
• The collapse of the Soviet Union required India’s policy makers to recalculate their strategic options. No
longer could they rely on their superpower ally’s military and diplomatic protection. Nor, the Russians
made clear, would the Indians be able to continue purchasing arms under exceptionally favorable Cold War
terms
• New Delhi realized that a closer relationship with Washington could help them fill the vacuum left by the
Soviet Union’s fall and also balance against rising power of Beijing.
• U.S., for its part, was no longer forced to view India in light of the latter’s friendship with the Soviets and
could re-evaluate Indo-U.S. relations on their own merits.
• In 2004 these countries converted the bilateral ties into strategic partnership.
• Since the end of Cold War and increasingly in the last decade common strategic interests such as managing
the rise of China, ensuring maritime security and confronting international terrorism combined with
shared values such as democracy have driven these relations.
1.3. THE CIVIL NUCLEAR DEAL: A NEW ERA

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In 2005 India-USA announced their intention to conclude a bilateral civil nuclear agreement. The bilateral
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civil nuclear cooperation agreement was finalized in July 2007 and signed in October 2008 after the US
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congress passed the 123 agreement bill in September of that year and the NSG agreed to exempt India
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from its rule requiring full scope safeguards for nuclear trade with non-weapon states. The process also
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The agreement:
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o Provided for separation of India’s military and civilian facilities,

o allows India to reserve all its indigenous uranium for its weapons programme, and
o Gave India the sole authority for determining which future facilities will be safeguarded.
• The U.S. law and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines forbid the sharing of nuclear fuel and technology
with countries classified as “non-nuclear weapons states” under the NPT, unless those states accept full-
scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is
key in interntional cooperation in the arena of civilian nuclear programs. Thus, this civil nuclear agreement
provided India a re-entry into international nuclear cooperation with exceptional arrangements with USA,
NSG and IAEA.
• The civil nuclear agreement has played an important role in:
o Facilitating the recent Indo-U.S. rapprochement.
o helped India make progress in developing clean energy options
o Ending isolation at the technology regimes such as the MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement.
o Made nuclear commerce possible with other countries
1.3.1. THE CIVIL NUCLEAR DEAL: OPERTAIONALISATION
• However the operationalistaion of the agreement hinged on resolving:
o issues related to some of the provisions of the Indian Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA),
o a successful negotiation of the administrative arrangements for the implementation of the India-US
123 nuclear agreement.
• The issues in respect of CLNDA related to:
o the conformity of CLNDA with the provisions of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation(CSC),
signed in 2010– but ratified in 2016 - by India;
o Sec. 17(b) of CLNDA, which allowed for Right of Recourse against the supplier; and
o Sec. 46, which allowed for legal cases against the operator under Acts other than the CLNDA.
• The administrative arrangements under discussion were with respect to the accounting and tracking of US-
supplied nuclear materials and materials produced with the use of US-supplied.
• During Prime Minister Modi's visit to the U.S. in September 2014, the two sides set up a Contact Group for
advancing the full and timely implementation of the India-U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, and
to resolve pending issues.
• During President Obama’s visit to India in 2015, it was the announced that India and the United States had
come to an understanding on the two major issues that stood in the way of the successful full
implementation of the Indo-US nuclear deal.
• The two sides started the preparatory work on site in India for six AP 1000 reactors to be built by
Westinghouse. Once completed, the project would be among the largest of its kind.
• The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd, and Westinghouse are in talks toward finalizing the contractual
arrangements, and addressing related issues.
• The Westinghouse however, on 29 March 2017, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in New York. This perhaps is
a bottleneck in the progress of its projects in India that both countries would have to overcome. The deal is
being reworked now.
1.3.2. INDIA-US COOPERATION ON NUCLEAR ENERGY: HISTORIC BACKGROUND
• More than a thousand Indian scientists between 1955 and 1974 participated in the US nuclear energy
research projects;
• The sale of US heavy water to India in the 1960s that was used in the unsafeguarded CIRUS reactor that
produced plutonium for India’s first nuclear explosion;
• Design work for the Trombay reprocessing facility provided by Vitro International, a US company; and
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• The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (now usually referred to as the NNPA), was signed by President
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Jimmy Carter in March 1978, this put a legal break to nuclear cooperation with India.
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1.4. THE MECHANISM OF COOPERATION

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• There are more than 50 bilateral dialogue mechanisms between the two governments.
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• The Strategic and Commercial Dialogue at the level of EAM and MoS (Commerce & Industry) were held in
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Washington DC in September 2015 and New Delhi in August 2016.

• This apex-level dialogue has added a commercial component to the five traditional pillars of bilateral
relations on which the erstwhile Strategic Dialogue of Foreign Ministers had focused, namely:
o Strategic Cooperation;
o Energy and Climate Change,
o Education and Development;
o Economy, Trade and Agriculture;
o Science and Technology;
o and Health and Innovation.

• A Policy Planning Dialogue has also been started between the two sides in September 2015.
• In addition, there are Ministerial-level dialogues involving home (Homeland Security Dialogue), finance
(Financial and Economic Partnership), commerce (Trade Policy Forum), HRD (Higher Education Dialogue),
Science & Technology (Joint Commission Meeting on S&T) and energy (Energy Dialogue).
• There have been regular contacts at political and official levels on bilateral, regional and global issues.
1.5. POLITICAL TIES

• The frequency of high-level visits and exchanges between India and the U.S. has gone up significantly in
recent years.
• Prime Minister Modi visited the U.S. on 26-30 September 2014;
• President Obama's visited India on 25-27 January 2015 as the Chief Guest at India's Republic Day.
• Prime Minister Modi again visited the U.S. on 23-28 September 2015.
• In 2016, Prime Minister visited the U.S. for the multilateral Nuclear Security Summit hosted by President
Obama in Washington D.C. on 31 March-1 April. This was soon followed by an official working visit by Prime
Minister on 6-8 June, during. The PM addressed a Joint Session of the U.S. Congress, he was the sixth
Indian Prime Minister to address the U.S. Congress.
• A hotline was established in 2015 between the Prime Minister's Office and the U.S. White House. It was
the only new hotline that was established during the eight years of Obama Administration. India is only the
fourth country after Russia, Britain and China with which the US has a hotline. In 2004, India and Pakistan
agreed to establish hotlines at the level of foreign secretaries, and in 2010 New Delhi and Beijing announced
to establish a hotline at the foreign ministry level.
• The PM visited the United States to meet President Donald Trump in June 2017.
1.6. DEFENCE COOPERATION

• Bilateral dialogue mechanisms in the field of defence include
o Defence Policy Group (DPG),
o Defence Joint Working Group (DJWG),
o Defence Procurement and Production Group (DPPG),
o Senior Technology Security Group (STSG),
o Joint Technical Group (JTG), Military Cooperation Group (MCG), and
o Service-to-Service Executive Steering Groups (ESGs).
• Defence relationship has emerged as a major pillar of India-U.S. strategic partnership with the signing of
‘New Framework for India-U.S. Defense Relations’ in 2005. The Defence Framework Agreement was
updated and renewed for another 10 years in June 2015.
• This has resulted in intensification in defence trade, joint exercises, personnel exchanges, collaboration
and cooperation in maritime security and counter-piracy, and exchanges between each of the three
services.
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• Joint strategic vision statement for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian ocean region-2015: which called for
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“safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over-flight” throughout the Asia-
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• RIMAPC: The two countries now conduct more bilateral exercises with each other than they do with any
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other country. India participated in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in July-August 2016 for the second
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time with an Indian Naval Frigate. The two countries now conduct more bilateral exercises with each other
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• Malabar Exercise-India-USA-Japan trilateral naval exercises. The annual Malabar exercise started in 1992 as
a bilateral event between the navies of India and the United States. In 2015 Japan became a permanent
participant in the Malabar exercises.
1.6.1. EXPANDING SCOPE OF DEFENCE COOPERATION
• The agreements signed during the past two year include:
o Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Association (LEMOA) signed in August 2016,
o Fuel Exchange Agreement signed in November 2015,
o Technical Agreement (TA) on information sharing on White (merchant) Shipping signed in May 2016 and
o Information Exchange Annexe (IEA) on Aircraft Carrier Technologies signed in June 2016.
• Aggregate worth of defence acquisition from U.S. has crossed over US$ 13 billion (MEA 2016).
• Defence Technology Trade Initiative (DTTI): India and the United States launched a Defence Technology and
Trade Initiative (DTTI) in 2012, aimed at simplifying technology transfer policies and exploring possibilities
of co-development and co-production to invest the defence relationship with strategic value.
• The DTTI Working Group and its Task Force will expeditiously evaluate and decide on unique projects and
technologies which would have a transformative impact on bilateral defence relations and enhance India's
defence industry and military capabilities.
• During President Obama's visit in January 2015, the two sides agreed to start cooperation on 4 DTTI
pathfinder projects and 2 pathfinder initiatives, which are currently at various stages of execution.
• During RM's visit in December 2015, the two sides also identified opportunities for bilateral cooperation in
production and design of jet engine components. During Secretary Ashton Carter's visit in April 2014, two
more G-2-G DTTI projects were added to the list.
• The DTTI meeting in Delhi in July 2016 decided to broaden its agenda by setting up five new Joint Working
Groups on: Naval Systems; Air Systems, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance; Chemical and
Biological Protection; and Other Systems.
• During the visit of Prime Minister to the U.S. in June 2016, the U.S. recognised India as a "Major Defence
Partner", which commits the U.S. to facilitate technology sharing with India to a level commensurate with
that of its closest allies and partners, and industry collaboration for defence co-production and co-
development.
• In December 2016, US Congress passed an amendment, Section 1292 titled “Enhancing Defense and
Security Cooperation with India”, to the National Defense Authorization Act of 2017 (NDAA) — an annual
bill that allocates funding to the US military.
• Section 1258 of the NDAA 2018 moves the ball forward by institutionalising the relationship. The bill, titled
“Advancements in defence cooperation between the United States and India”, directs the departments of
state, defence and commerce to “jointly produce a common definition that recognises India’s status as a
‘Major Defence Partner’ for joint use” by the three departments.
1.6.2. WAY FORWARD: THE FOUNDATIONAL AGREEMENTS
• The three agreements are referred to as the foundational agreements which the U.S. signs with countries
with which it has close military ties:
o Logistics Support Agreement (LSA),
o Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and
o Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA).
• India and USA signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016, is a tweaked
India-Specific Version of the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA).
• India had signed- the General Security Of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in 2002.
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Since 2005, the US has urged India to sign an agreement called the Communications Interoperability and
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Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), which lays down stringent safeguards for sensitive radio
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• Washington has agreed to rename the agreement COMCASA, or Communications Compatibility and Security
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Agreement, to allow India a country-specific agreement.

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1.7. COUNTER-TERRORISM AND INTERNAL SECURITY

• Cooperation in counter-terrorism has seen considerable progress with intelligence sharing, information
exchange, operational cooperation, counter-terrorism technology and equipment.
• India-U.S. Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Initiative was signed in 2010 to expand collaboration on counter-
terrorism, information sharing and capacity building.
• A Homeland Security Dialogue was announced during President Obama's visit to India in November 2010 to
further deepen operational cooperation, counter-terrorism technology transfers and capacity building.

1.8. THE ECONOMY
1.8.1. TRADE
• India-US bilateral trade in goods and services increased from $104 billion in 2014 to $114 billion in 2016.
• Two-way merchandise trade stood at $66.7 billion. Of this, India’s exports of goods to the US were valued
at $46 billion and India’s imports of goods from US were valued at $21.7 billion. India-US trade in services
stood at $47.2 billion. Of this, India’s exports of services to the US were valued at $26.8 billion and India’s
imports of services from US were valued at $20.3 billion.
• During Prime Minister's visit to the U.S. in September 2014, the two sides set a target to increase bilateral
trade in goods & services to $500 billion.
1.8.2. INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
• According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, US direct investments in India stood at $ 28.33 billion in
2015. As per Indian official statistics, the cumulative FDI inflows from the US from April 2000 to December
2015 amounted to about $ 17.94 billion constituting nearly 6% of the total FDI into India, making the U.S. the
fifth largest source of FDI into India.
• In recent years, growing Indian investments into the US, has been a novel feature of bilateral ties.
According to CII and Grant Thornton survey released in August 2015, 100 Indian companies have made $ 15
billion worth of tangible investments across 35 states, creating more than 91,000 American jobs.
• Among large Indian corporations having investments in the U.S. include Reliance Industries Limited, Tata
Consultancy Services, Wipro, Essar America, Piramal, Mahindra, Lupin, SunPharma, etc.
• There are several dialogue mechanisms to strengthen bilateral engagement on economic and trade issues,
including a Ministerial level Economic and Financial Partnership.
• For greater involvement of private sector in discussion on issues involving trade and investment, there is a
bilateral India-U.S. CEO's Forum.
• India and the US have set up a bilateral Investment Initiative in 2014. Special focus on facilitating FDI,
portfolio investment, capital market development and financing of infrastructure.
• U.S.-India Infrastructure Collaboration Platform has also been set up to deploy cutting edge U.S
technologies to meet India’s infrastructure needs. U.S. firms will be lead partners in developing Allahabad,
Ajmer and Vishakhapatnam as Smart Cities.
1.8.3. MAJOR ISSUES OF CONTENTION IN ECONOMY
• Major issues between the two countries that need attention-
o Barriers to the movement of goods and services, and deeper integration into global supply chains,
thereby creating jobs and generating prosperity in both economies
o The doubling of H-1B & L1 visa fees by USA which is expected to adversely impact Indian IT companies
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in USA.
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o The recent decision by the Trump Administration in US to make the extension of H-1B and L1 Visas
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stringent as part of immigration reforms. If the proposal passes, 500,000 to 750,000 Indian H-1B visa
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holders could be forced to leave the U.S., according to IndiaToday. Recently, on 10 January 2018, media
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reports suggested that the US has assured India that there would be no changes in the H-1B Visa
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o Annual cap of 85,000 H-1B visas: India wants this to be raised, event the the US multinational
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corporations have urged the same.

o India-USA solar dispute: The US trade complaint at WTO Dispute Resolution Body (DSB) in 2013 made
the case that the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission subsidies were available only if developers
used equipment produced in India, violating a key global trade rule. The US considers the program as
discriminatory points out that the U.S. solar exports to India had fallen by 90 percent from 2011.
o The United States won the case in 2016, when WTO appeals judges ruled India had broken the trade
rules by requiring solar power developers to use Indian-made cells and modules. India had until
Decemeber 14, 2017 to comply with the ruling and it told the DSB last week that it had done so.
o However, the US has complained that that India has failed to comply with the ruling, triggering a fresh
round of litigation.
o Public Food Stockholding Issue at the WTO: The talks at the WTO’s 11th ministerial conference, at
Buenos Aires in Argentina in December 2017 collapsed after the US went back on its commitment to
find a permanent solution to the public food stockholding issue, a key matter for India.
o Export Subsidies: In March 2018, USA filed a complaint at the WTO about India’s export subsidy
programmes claiming them to harm American workers.
1.8.4. MAJOR ISSUES: IPR
• India-US Intellectual property Rights tussle: Intellectual Property protection is a key issue for India-US
relationship. International Intellectual Property for the US Chambers of Commerce has been putting
pressure on the US administrations to push India to tighten its IPR regime. IPR has been flagged as the
biggest concern that the US has with India during the trade policy review.
• The main difference between the two sides stems from the fact that while the US sees IPR purely from the
commercial point of view, India sees it as a development measure.
• In its Special 301 report, 2017, the United States Trade Representative’s office said: Despite positive
statements and initiatives upon which the Modi Administration has embarked, the pace of reform has not
matched high-level calls to foster innovation and promote creativity. India has yet to take steps to address
longstanding patent issues that are affecting innovative industries. The report retained the India under the
priority watch list.
• In 2016 the US raised the issue at the WTO. What the US and the EU have against India’s intellectual
property legislation is a particular provision (Section 3(d) of Indian Patents act ) which allows the Indian
Patents Controller to deny patents on items that are not significantly different from their older versions. This
prevents pharmaceutical majors from getting fresh patents on medicines with expired patents by making
just cosmetic changes in its formulation.
• The US and Switzerland are also pushing the WTO for allowing ‘non-violation’ complaints on TRIPS-related
issues which would mean that complaints could be lodged on IPR matters even if the multilateral pact is not
violated.
• Many developing countries, on the other hand, want a Ministerial decision of excluding such disputes
permanently.
• New Delhi has teamed up with Brazil, China and South Africa to initiate a discussion on a recent report by
a high level UN panel on access to medicines that stresses on the importance of using flexibilities in the
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) pact to achieve the objective.
• New Delhi is also holding on to its right-to-issue compulsory licences for manufacture of copies of patented
drugs to address situations of national emergency, another flexibility that the TRIPS pact allows.
• There is a clear divide between developed and developing countries on their reaction to the UN report on
the issue with Egypt, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Bolivia, supporting the panel’s recommendations and the
EU, Switzerland, Japan and South Korea criticising it for being “narrow in scope’’.
1.9. ENERGY
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• The U.S.-India Energy Dialogue was launched in May 2005 to promote trade and investment in the energy
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• There are six working groups in oil & gas, coal, power and energy efficiency, new technologies& renewable
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energy, civil nuclear co-operation and sustainable development under the Energy Dialogue.
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• The 40-year-old ban on export of American oil was lifted by the then US President Barack Obama in
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December 2015. During the meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Donald
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Trump on June 26 2017 when the two leaders agreed to deepen the engagement in the energy sector.
• India received its first crude oil cargo of 1.6 million barrels from the US at the Paradip Port, Odisha on 2
October 2017.
• Investment by Indian companies like Reliance, Essar and GAIL in the U.S. natural gas market is ushering in a
new era of India-U.S. energy partnership. Four Indian public and private sector companies have invested
approximately USD 5 billion in shale assets in the US.
• The U.S. Department of Energy has so far given its approval for export of LNG from seven liquefaction
terminals in the U.S., to countries with which the U.S. does not have a free trade agreement (FTA).
• Two of these terminals, the Indian public sector entity, Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL) has off take
agreements, totaling nearly 6 million metric tonnes per annum (MTPA).
1.10. CLIMATE CHANGE
• India and the U.S. are advancing cooperation and dialogue on climate change through a high level Climate
Change Working Group and a Joint Working Group on Hydroflurocarbon.
• As a priority initiative under the PACE (Partnership to Advance Clean Energy), the U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE) and the Government of India have established the Joint Clean Energy Research and
Development Center (JCERDC) designed to promote clean energy innovations by teams of scientists from
India and the United States, with a total joint committed funding from both Governments of US$ 50 million.
• In November 2014, an MoU between U.S. EXIM Bank and Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency
(IREDA) was concluded to provide US$ 1 billion in financing for India’s transition to a low-carbon economy.
• A new U.S.-India Partnership for Climate Resilience has been agreed to, in order to advance capacity for
climate adaptation planning, as also a new U.S.- India Climate Fellowship Program to build long-term
capacity to address climate change-related issues.
• To further collaboration in the area of clean energy and climate change, in June 2016, the two sides
announced finalization of a package to provide concessional finance to support clean energy projects on
track, to coordinate U.S. Government efforts on clean energy investment in India jointly with leading Indian
financial institutions, and to provide liquidity to small scale renewable energy investors.
Challenges in Climate Change Cooperation
• Under President Trump the USA has embarked on a different path on the issue of Climate change.
• President Trump, on 1 June 2017, announced the US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Change Accord.
While doing so he accused India of demanding billions of dollars to comply with its commitments under
the Paris Pact. This was resolutely refuted by External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj. This divergence
poses challenge to future climate change cooperation.
1.11. EDUCATION AND CULTURE

• Cooperation in education sector has been made an integral part of the strategic partnership between the
two countries.
• Since 2008, India became an equal partner in the financial support of the Fulbright Program in India. All
awards in India are now titled Fulbright-Nehru fellowships, with enhanced mandate and joint funding, to
provide more student and scholar exchange grants. India now has the largest U.S. Fulbright Scholar Program
in the world with nearly 200 awards annually.
• About 130,000 Indian students are pursuing advanced degrees in the U.S.
• The Higher Education Dialogue, which has had four meetings since 2011 , laid out the road map for
promoting strategic institutional partnerships, deepening collaboration in research and development,
fostering partnerships in vocational education and focusing on junior faculty development.
• India is learning from the U.S. experience in community colleges in order to meet our demands for skill-
development.
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• It has been agreed to collaborate with U.S. institutions in the area of Technology Enabled Learning and
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Massive Open On-line Courses (MOOCs) to extend the reach of education in India.
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• Under the Global Initiative of Academic Networks (GIAN) launched by India, upto 1000 American
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academics will be invited and hosted each year to teach in Indian universities at their convenience.
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1.12. SPACE
• A bilateral Joint Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation provides a forum for discussion on joint
activities in space, including:
o (i) exchange of scientists; (ii) OCM2, INSAT3D collaboration; (iii) Cooperation on Mars mission; (iv) nano-
satellites; (v) carbon /ecosystem monitoring and modeling; (vi) feasibility of collaboration in radio
occultation: (vii) Earth Science Cooperation: (viii) international space station; (ix) global navigation
satellite systems; (x) L&S band SAR; (xi) space exploration cooperation; (xii) space debris mediation.
• India and USA are collaborating on India's Mars Orbiter Mission and for a dual-band NASA-ISRO Synthetic
Aperture Radar (NISAR). The second mission to Mars is tentatively slated for a 2021-2022
• In June 2016, ISRO successfully launched record 20 satellites onboard PSLV rocket, which included 13
satellites from the United States.
• Many U.S. companies continue to provide ISRO with satellite technology and components, and Raytheon is
playing an important role in India’s GAGAN navigation system.
Space Cooperation: A historical Background
• In 1963 when India first launched a U.S.-manufactured sounding rocket – sometimes called a “research
rocket” – from Thumba to study the atmosphere above Earth’s magnetic equator.
• In the 1970s, ISRO and NASA conducted the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE). SITE used
NASA’s first direct broadcasting satellite to beam television programs to more than 2,400 villages across
India.
• The first four INSAT satellites were built by U.S. industry, and three of them were put into orbit by U.S.
launch vehicles.
• Chandrayaan-1, India’s first mission to the moon, was launched successfully in October 2008. The
spacecraft carried several scientific instruments built by international partners, including two by NASA.
• In September 2014, both nations had spacecraft arrive in Martian orbit. NASA’s Mars Atmosphere and
Volatile EvolutioN spacecraft – popularly known as MAVEN – arrived at Mars on September 21 and is the
first spacecraft dedicated to exploring the upper atmosphere of Mars. ISRO’s Mars Orbiter Mission – or
MOM – arrived only two days later and made India the first Asian nation to “go to Mars.”
1.13. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

• The India-U.S. S&T cooperation has been steadily growing under the framework of U.S.-India Science and
Technology Cooperation Agreement signed in October 2005.
• There is an Indo-U.S. Science & Technology Joint Commission, co-chaired by the Science Advisor to U.S.
President and Indian Minister of S&T. The U.S. attended as the partner country at the Technology Summit
2014 at New Delhi.
• In 2000, both the governments endowed the India-U.S. Science & Technology Forum (IUSSTF) to facilitate
mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation in science, engineering, and health
• India's contribution of $250 million towards Thirty-Meter Telescope Project in Hawaii and Indian Initiative
in Gravitational Observations (IndiGO) with U.S. LIGO Laboratory are examples of joint collaboration to
create world-class research facilities.
1.14. P2P: DIASPORA

• The 3.5-million-plus strong Indian American community is an important ethnic group in the U.S., accounting
for about 1% of the total population in the country.
• Indian American community includes a large number of professionals, business entrepreneurs and
educationalists with increasing influence in the society.
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• With two Indian Americans occupying high level posts of Governor and several representatives of the
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people, the Indian Diaspora has assimilated into their adopted country and is acting as a catalyst to forge
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• The two countries have been working together to facilitate travel of their respective citizens, and to this end
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an MOU has been signed in June 2016 to facilitate India's joining of the Global Entry Programme for
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• During the visit of Prime Minister to the U.S. in June 2016, the two countries also announced their decision
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to celebrate 2017 as Travel and Tourism Partner Countries.
1.15. GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH

• Under the 2010 U.S.-India Health Initiative, four working groups have been organized in the areas of Non-
Communicable Diseases, Infectious Diseases, Strengthening Health Systems and Services, and Maternal
and Child Health.
• In order to build up the disease surveillance and epidemiological capacity in India, Global Disease
Detection-India Centre was established in 2010 and an Epidemic Intelligence Service program launched in
Oct 2012.

• U.S. National Institutes of Health, the Indian Council of Medical Research, and India's Department of
Biotechnology have developed a robust relationship in the biomedical and behavioral health sciences,
research related to HIV/AIDS, infectious diseases, diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, eye disease, hearing
disorders, mental health, and low-cost medical technologies.
• In the first meeting of the Health Dialogue in September 2015 in Washington DC, both sides agreed to
collaborate institutionally in the new areas of mental health and regulatory and capacity-building.
1.16. STRATEGIC COMPONENTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP

• As reflected in the PM’s visit to the United Sates in June 2017 the Strategic contents of the relationship
revolve around the following:
o Situation in Afghanistan, North Korea, Middle East, Pakistan, Indo-Pacific Region,
o India's membership in export control agreements and UN Security Council,
o Cyber space,
o Malabar naval exercises,
o Reaffirmation of India's designation as a Major Defence Partner,
o United States to join as an Observer in the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
• These are key for the future of the global relationship. The South Asia Strategy, issued in August 2017, and
the National Security Strategy, released in November 2017, both bring the US and India into a closer
alignment on multiple issues.
1.17. THE PAKISTAN FACTOR

• Traditionally, any strategic interest that the U.S. perceived in South Asia lay primarily with India’s arch-
rival, Pakistan. Pakistan, at least notionally, supported American grand strategic goals, including
participating in anti-communist military alliances such as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).
• Pakistan has allowed Washington to use its territory as a base for overflights to eavesdrop on the Soviet
Union, in addition to serving as a vital conduit for American arms shipments to anti- Soviet forces in
Afghanistan during the 1980s.
• In return, the Pakistan received substantial American economic and military assistance. U.S. ties with
Pakistan exacerbated Indo-U.S. estrangement.
• America’s support for Pakistan was apparent during the 1971 Bangladesh war, when President Nixon “tilted”
toward the Pakistan and dispatched the aircraft carrier USS-Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal.
• India viewed this move as an attempt to deter it from taking further action against Pakistan. The close
relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan thus had an exceedingly negative impact on Indo-U.S. relations.
• US provided multi-billion dollar military aid to Pakistan and Islamabad is a Major Non-NATO Ally.
1.17.1. RECENT TRENDS
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During the PM’s visit to the US in June 2017, the biggest takeaway in substantive terms was the stern
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language against Pakistan and the designation of Syed Salahuddin, the ‘supreme commander’ of the
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Kashmiri militant outfit Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist because of his
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pronouncements about wreaking havoc in Kashmir and making it a graveyard for Indian forces.
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• In August 2017, while unveiling his new South Asia strategy, Mr. Trump had accused Pakistan of giving
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“safe haven to agents of chaos, violence, and terror,” and said the time had come “for Pakistan to
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• The United States is keeping “all options” on the table to deal with Pakistan if it does not take decisive
action against the Taliban and the Haqqani network and dismantle their safe havens, the White House
warned on 6 January 2018.
• In the First week of January 2018, the US suspended about $2 billion in security aid to Pakistan for failing
to clamp down on terror groups. This includes Foreign Military Funding (FMF) and the Coalition Support
Fund (CSF)
• The freezing of all security assistance to Pakistan comes after President Donald Trump in a New Year’s Day
tweet (2018) accused the country of giving nothing to the US but “lies and deceit” and providing “safe
haven” to terrorists in return for $33 billion aid over the last 15 years.

• Some policy-makers have been asking the White House to revoke the non-NATO ally status of Pakistan
and put pressure on the country through multilateral institutions like the International Monetary Fund and
the United Nations, Pentagon generals have indicated unilateral actions.
• Mr. Trump’s new policy, according to the official, is driven by the desire to have a successful strategy in
Afghanistan. However, India’s primary concern has been regarding cross border state sponsored terrorism
emanating from Pakistan.
• Meanwhile, Defence Secretary Jim Mattis said the US would restore the suspended security assistance to
Pakistan if it takes action against terrorist groups. Mr. Mattis had travelled to Pakistan in December 2017for
talks with the top Pakistani leadership. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson also travelled to Pakistan in recent
months to deliver tough message.
1.17.2. PAKISTAN FACTOR: WHAT’S NEW?
• China now appears set for an even tighter embrace of its already “iron brother” Pakistan, following a New
Year slide in ties between Islamabad and Washington.- Atul Aneja- The Hindu, 8 January 2018.
• In the First Week of 2018 Pakistan’s central bank swiftly announced that it would use the Chinese Yuan (CNY)
to settle bilateral trade and investment with China.
• Critics argue that, Mr. Trump’s tweet also played into the hands of the religious right, now harbouring
political ambitions in Pakistan's elections next year. The Hafiz Saeed-led Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) demanded
the expulsion of the U.S. Ambassador during street protests in Lahore.
• In January 2018, according to media reports, it emerged that China plans to build its second military base
overseas — after Djibouti at the mouth of the Red Sea — in Jiwani. Only 90 km to the east is the Gwadar
deep sea port.
• The Global Times, A Chinese news paper, signaled that Pakistan would be justified in defining a new
geopolitical calculus that covers China and Russia.
1.18. THE CHINA FACTOR

• A distinctive pattern of triangular interaction has emerged in relations among China, India, and the United
States during the post–Cold War period. China was one significant factor in the emergence of the new Indo–
U.S. relationship.
• Each actor apprehends alignment of the other two against itself. This fear exists for all three actors but is
especially strong for the two weaker state actors, China and India.
• China is an emerging challenger to the global influence of the United States. It is also a key neighbour of
India. Thus the triangle acquires new salience in the changing geopolitics. All three a member of G-20. India
and China cooperate in BRICS and AIIB but diverge on OBOR. India and USA converge on the OBOR.
• Pivot to Asia: President Barack Obama’s “pivot to Asia”, announced in 2011, involved an attempt to
rebalance U.S. foreign policy away from the Middle East and toward East Asia. The Obama administration
spent eight years formulating a foreign policy vision, Known as the “rebalance to Asia”. The policy involved
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coordinated efforts to boost U.S. defense, diplomatic, and economic ties with the Asia-Pacific.
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• American strategic partnerships have generally expanded in the Asian region, as they did from 2001 to
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2008. There is more continuity and bipartisan consensus around Asia policy in the United States.
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• Flip Flops: In 2009, president Obama emphasized his intention to respect China’s “core interests” in Asia, to
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the alarm of American allies. Then, in 2011, after an emboldened China began throwing its weight around,
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the administration announced its “rebalance” to Asia with new military deployments to Australia, to the
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alarm of China.
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• Then, in 2013, the Obama administration shook American allies again by walking away from the “red line” on
Syria and announcing support for Xi Jinping’s “New Model of Great Power Relations” — a proposed
condominium of the United States and China in Asia that looked very much like the earlier pledge to respect
China’s core interests.
• With President Trump there are both elements of continuity and change e.g. His visit to China in November
2017 and his praise of China in light of his previous criticism of Beijing.

1.19. THE INDO-PACIFIC
• It was first brought up by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2007 in a speech to the Indian Parliament
to represent the vast swathe of water that connects the Pacific and the Indian Oceans.
• It has recently got some traction after Rex Tillerson, the US Secretary of State, used it in a major policy
speech in Washington. Trump in his visit to China also referred to the Indo-Pacific.
• The first ever use of the term in the recently released National Security Strategy Document of the USA, in
2017, has provided the term new salience.
• Against this backdrop, efforts to rejuvenate the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or the “Quad”) between
Australia, India, Japan and the US on the sidelines of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
and the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Manila, in 2017, are of notable significance.
1.20. THE RUSSIA FACTOR

• Russia is largest military competitor of the USA. It has been getting closer to China. Russia has been is
largest military supplier to India.
• USA is the largest military supplier in the World. India one of the largest military buyers in the world.
• Now Moscow seems to be pivoting towards Islamabad as New Delhi becomes closer to Washington.
• In June 2015 Russia had lifted its embargo on arms supply to Pakistan and negotiated supply of combat
Helicopters
• Russia signed gas pipeline pact with Pakistan in 2015, an estimated investment of 2 billion US$.
• Russia and China are collaborating closely. In 2014 both signed a 30 year Gas deal estimated to be over 400
billion US$.
• The US NSS identifies both Russia and China as national security challenges. President Trump remains
ambivalent about Russia and President Putin.
1.21. THE JOINT DECLARATION 2017

• Actions identified by the Joint Statement include increased intelligence sharing, operational-level
counterterrorism cooperation, exchange of information on known and suspected terrorists for travel
screening, strengthening information exchange on plans, movements and linkages of terrorist groups and
their leaders, terror financing, etc.
• On the subjects of regional connectivity and South China Sea (although the latter is not mentioned by
name), India's position has been fully reflected. The Joint Statement declares the necessity of transparent
development of infrastructure, use of responsible debt financing practices, respect for sovereignty and
territorial integrity, rule of law, and environmental protection.
• Principles of freedom of navigation, unhindered over flights, and commerce throughout the region as well
as the need to resolve territorial and maritime disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law
have been reiterated.
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• This reaffirms that India and USA are on the same page with respect to dealing with the rapidly growing
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influence and presence of China in the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific region.
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• The real test of the commitments assumed by the two countries will lie in action taken by them in the
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1.22. WAY FORWARD

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Defence has emerged as a major area of cooperation with USA emerging as the second largest supplier,
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after Russia, of sophisticated equipment to India. The sale of 22 Guardian surveillance drones is on the cards
and is likely to be announced shortly. Also, reports have emerged about a possible tie-up between Lockheed
Martin and the Tata group to locally manufacture F16 aircraft in India. This could provide a significant
impetus to the Make in India initiative.
• In his op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, referring to his statement about having overcome the “hesitations of
history” during his address to the US Congress a year ago, PM Modi affirmed it once again and expressed his
confidence with regard to the growing convergence between the two nations.
• However, the concerns regarding implications of close cooperation with USA in defence, especially the
signal it gives to Russia or China is a factor that needs consideration and adequate policy preparedness.
• Similarly, the impact on foundational agreements on India’s strategic autonomy requires careful and skilled
diplomatic and political engagement.
• On issues at WTO and climate change differences would persist as India needs to safeguard its national
interests. These issues require careful management.
1.23. POLICY OPTIONS

• Cooperate wherever possible, compete wherever necessary, avoid Conflict and defend strategic Autonomy.
• Engage multiple partners through, bilateral and multilateral instruments.
• Act as a bridge wherever possible. E.g. Iran, Russia.
• Remain strategic and avoid the temptations of tactical gains e.g. destabilising Pakistan or antagonising China
is not a strategic goal for India.
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VISION IAS
www.visionias.in
LECTURE-13
LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INDIA AND LATINAMERICA .................................................................................................................................... 2
1.1. History and Geography .................................................................................................................................... 2
1.2. India and South America: Current Imperatives and Historical Dynamics ....................................................... 3
1.2.1. History of Relations .................................................................................................................................. 4
1.2.2. Trade and Investment .............................................................................................................................. 4
1.2.3. Some interesting Facts ............................................................................................................................. 5
1.2.4. Food and Energy Security ......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2.5. Defence..................................................................................................................................................... 5
1.2.6. China Factor .............................................................................................................................................. 6
1.2.7. What Can Drive Cooperation? .................................................................................................................. 6
1.2.8. Regional Institutions ................................................................................................................................. 7
2. INDIA AND AFRICA .................................................................................................................................................. 8
2.1. Background and Evolution............................................................................................................................... 8
2.1.1. Understanding India-Africa Synergy ......................................................................................................... 9
2.1.2. Recent Dynamic ...................................................................................................................................... 10
2.2. Economy ........................................................................................................................................................ 10
2.2.1. Investments in Africa .............................................................................................................................. 11
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2.3. Development Partnership ............................................................................................................................. 12

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2.4. Security .......................................................................................................................................................... 12

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2.5. Challenges and Opportunities ....................................................................................................................... 13

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2.5.1. What Should India Do? ........................................................................................................................... 13

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2.5.2. The Asia Africa Growth Corridor............................................................................................................. 13

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1. INDIA AND LATINAMERICA
Map12.1Latin America
Image Source: https://media1.britannica.com/eb-media/30/108730-004-C0FE33B5.jpg
1.1. HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY

• Latin America is generally understood to consist of the entire continent of South America in addition
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to Mexico, Central America, and the islands of the Caribbean whose inhabitants speak a Romance
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language.
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• The peoples of this large area shared the experience of conquest and colonization by the Spaniards and
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Portuguese from the late 15th through the 18th Century as well as movements of independence from Spain
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and Portugal in the early 19th century.

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• Since the Spanish and Portuguese element looms so large in the history of the region, it is sometimes
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proposed that Iberoamerica would be a better term than Latin America.

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• Lesser Antilles, long arc of small islands in the Caribbean Sea extending in a north-south direction from
the Virgin Islands to Grenada. A number of other islands—Trinidad and Tobago, off the northeastern coast
of Venezuela, and the east-west island chain from Margarita Island to Aruba, off the northern coast of
Venezuela—are physiographically part of the South American continental shelf but are usually included in
definitions of the Lesser Antilles.
• The Greater Antilles is a grouping of the larger islands in the Caribbean Sea: Cuba, Hispaniola (containing
Haiti and the Dominican Republic), Puerto Rico, Jamaica, and the Cayman Islands.

Map12.2 The Caribbean
Image Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook//graphics/ref_maps/political/jpg/central_america.jpg
• The Spaniards from the first had concentrated on the Greater Antilles, leaving the smaller islands virtually
unoccupied. As developments passed the Spanish Caribbean by, even portions of the larger islands were left
under-occupied. Thus, in the course of the 17th century, the French and English, aided by buccaneers of
their respective nationalities, were able to take over the small islands, Jamaica, and the western end of
Hispaniola to grow tropical crops, above all sugar, for themselves.
• After three centuries of colonial rule, independence came rather suddenly to most of Spanish and
Portuguese America. Between 1808 and 1826 all of Latin America except the Spanish colonies of Cuba and
Puerto Rico slipped out of the hands of the Iberian powers who had ruled the region since the conquest
• On 2 December 1823, the USA issued the Monroe Doctrine. This was a policy of opposing European
colonialism in the Americas. It stated that further efforts by European nations to take control of any
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independent state in North or South America would be viewed as "the manifestation of an unfriendly
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disposition toward the United States.” President James Monroe first stated the doctrine during his seventh
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annual State of the Union Address to Congress. The term "Monroe Doctrine" itself was coined in 1850.
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1.2. INDIA AND SOUTH AMERICA: CURRENT IMPERATIVES AND HISTORICAL DYNAMICS
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It is essential to raise India’s global profile and expand the country’s footprints with the region which
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boasts a combined GDP of $4.9 trillion and is home to 600 million inhabitants, nearly half the population of
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India, but with a landmass five times that of India.

• Latin America, according to a report by Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean of the United
Nations, netted 179 billion dollars of FDI in 2013, the highest record for any region in the world.
• The relations have been influenced in the past seven decades by Cold War Era, Global Politics, Physical
distance, Mutually divergent priorities. India and South America have barely managed to maintain minimal
bilateral ties for the last several decades. India’s eminence is rising on the global stage but this has not yet
found an expression in Latin America.
• Absent strong ties in geography, what India and South America have instead is a shared post-colonial
history.

• Today, it is not only economics that creates the rationale for strong bilateral ties between India and South
America; there is also India's desire to diversify energy sources, and a growing Chinese influence in the
region. It is in India’s strategic interest to reduce its dependency on West Asia for its energy security.
• India is looking to further diversify its trade to relatively newer markers in Latin America and Caribbean
Islands.
• Many believe that trading with Latin America is expensive and therefore should not be a priority.
• However, Ministry of External Affairs has highlighted the potential of higher volumes of trade: “India’s
exports to Latin America are growing at a robust rate. Indian pharmaceuticals, automobiles, textiles,
chemicals, machinery and other value added products have found dedicated customers all over the region.
Indian companies – UPL, Godrej, Hero and others – have bought local companies or invested in greenfield
projects. Over a dozen Indian software companies employ from a few dozen to several thousand software
professionals in development and delivery centres all over Latin America. Latin America offers an essential
alternative source for our raw material needs, and new markets for value-added exports of our goods and
services, in an increasingly insecure and volatile international environment.”
1.2.1. HISTORY OF RELATIONS
• Perhaps the high point of Indian diplomacy with Latin America remains then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s
visits to eight countries in the region in 1968.
• Prime Minster Narendra Modi during his visit to Brazil for the BRICS Summit in 2014 , hinted at a promise
of greater engagement.
• Prime Minister Modi has not visited any Latin American nation after the BRICS Summit of 2014, and in 2016
he became the first Indian PM to have missed the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit, that year hosted
by Venezuela.
• Political engagement, has been minimal both ways: only five visits have been made by Latin American
leaders to India since 2014.
1.2.2. TRADE AND INVESTMENT
• India’s trade with Latin America reached US$46 billion in 2013-2014. Since then it has not shown
significant improvement.
• India’s trade with Latin America in 2016-17 was $30 billion, of which export was $10.4 billion and imports
$19.6 billion.
• Mercosur, a sub-regional bloc consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, remains India’s
largest trading partner in the region with US$15.9 billion in trade in 2016.
• The trade has gone up slightly from $29.7 billion in 2015-16 but is down from $43 billion in 2014-15.
• The main reasons for the decrease in trade are the fall in commodity prices imported by India from Latin
America and the recession of the region in 2015 and 2016.
• India’s import of crude oil from the region fell to $9.5 billion in 2016-17 from $20 billion in 2014-15, thanks
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to the decrease in oil prices from over $100 dollars to less $50. The volume of crude imports had, in fact,
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• Brazil has overtaken Venezuela to become the leading trade partner of India with US$6.69 billion. Trade
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with Venezuela was US$5.8 billion, with Argentina US$3 billion, Chile US$2.6 billion, Colombia US$1.69
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billion, and Peru US$1.52 billion.

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• Venezuela has remained the largest source of imports in the region, with US$5.7 billion, followed by Brazil,
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Argentina, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Bolivia and Paraguay.
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• India’s bilateral trade with Cuba is minuscule at just $43.18 million in 2016-17. Of this, India’s exports to
Cuba were worth $41.87 million, and imports from that country were only $1.31 million.
• The Indian government has provided Line of Credit to Cuba the tune of $173 million for projects including
milk powder processing plant, bulk blending fertiliser plant, power co-generation project and wind farm.
• In May 2017, Ecuador expressed its interest in signing a preferential trade agreement (PTA) with India to
enhance trade linkages. Colombia has also shown interest towards collaborating in industries like food
processing and agriculture.
• Negotiations over a PTA have started between India and Peru.
• In 2016, PTA between India and Chile was broadened, with Chile offering concessions on some 1,798 tariff

lines and India offering concessions on 1,031 tariff lines
• India’s inroads have been significant to the extent that in 2016, its exports of pharmaceuticals to Latin
America beat China’s volumes. India’s exports were $651 million in comparison to China’s $404 million in
2016.
1.2.3. SOME INTERESTING FACTS1
• In 2016-17, India exported more to Mexico ($3.5 billion) than to neighbours such as Thailand ($3.1 billion),
Myanmar ($1.7 billion) and Iran ($2.4 billion) or traditional trade partners Russia ($1.9 billion) and Canada
($2 billion).
• India’s exports to Colombia ($787 million) were more than the exports to some West European countries
such as Austria, Ireland and Scandinavian countries.
• Guatemala imported more from India ($243 million) than some Central Asian and East European countries.
• India’s trade with the Dominican Republic ($900 million) was more than the trade with Portugal, Greece and
some other European countries.
• Latin America was the leading destination of India’s vehicle exports with a share of 23% of India’s global
exports. Mexico continued to be the main buyer of Indian cars with $1.6 billion accounting for 25% of
India’s global exports. Vehicle exports to Mexico have been steadily increasing in the last three years and
the increase from last year was an impressive 39%. Colombia, which was the number one buyer of Indian
motorcycles came down to the third rank in 2016-17 with imports of $185 million, after Bangladesh and Sri
Lanka. In 2016-17 Latin America imported motorcycles worth $354 million from India in 2016-17, which was
25% of India’s exports to the world.
1.2.4. FOOD AND ENERGY SECURITY
• Food security is another powerful factor that’s driving India to deepen its engagement with the Latin
America region, which has vast swathes of fertile land.
• Brazil, for example, is an agriculture superpower with not just rolling acres of arable land, but is also
equipped with cutting edge food storage technologies. Argentina, too, is a leader in agricultural research.
The two sides are poised to set up more joint ventures and research collaborations in this area in days to
come.
• Latin America has also emerged as an important source of hydrocarbons for India in the last few years,
with the region contributing around 10 per cent of India’s energy imports. India is set to step up
collaboration with Brazil in the area of eco-friendly ethanol. Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico and Cuba are
some of important suppliers of oil to India in the region.
1.2.5. DEFENCE
South America is also a lucrative defence market for India. Among the more prominent sales of Indian defence
products in the region have been:
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• The sale of two Mahindra Rakshak armoured vehicles and one Mahindra Rapid Intervention Vehicle to
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Guyana Police Force.

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• 139 Ashok Leyland 4x4 trucks to the Honduran Army.

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• Mahindra 4x4 vehicles to Argentina, Uruguay and Belize.

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29 Mahindra Marksman vehicle to the Chilean Carabineros Special Forces

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• Two civil model Dhruv helicopters to Peru.

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Seven Dhruv helicopters to Ecuador (now withdrawn from use following accidents), and
• Three Chetak helicopters to Suriname.
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R. Vishwanathan, the Wire, 21 July 2017, https://thewire.in/159810/trade-india-latin-america/

1.2.6. CHINA FACTOR
• At a time when the world is witnessing the rise of China as a major global player, its steadily growing
presence and influence should be enough of an incentive to drive the Indian government to take the
necessary measures to bolster the country’s ties with South America.
• In 2016, China’s exports to Latin American & Caribbean countries was US$ 113 billion, while imports stood
at US$ 103 billion as compared to US exports of US$ 135,963.5 million and imports of US$ 107,651.7 million.
India, on the other hand, exported US$ 7,258.30 million and imported US$ 17,290.63 million worth of goods
from Latin America and Caribbean.
• China overtook the US to become the largest export destination for Latin American countries like Brazil,
Chile and Peru, and replaced the European Union (EU) as the second largest trade partner of the region in
2017.
• With a target of US$500 billion in trade and US$250 billion investment in the region by 2025, China is
working to establish itself as the dominant economic power in the region.
• Massive infrastructure projects in the region have been announced by China, such as the Bi-Oceanic
Railway between the ports of Santos in Brazil and Callao in Peru, and the Canal project in Nicaragua.
Indeed, China is setting the bar high for other powers to measure up to.
• As a manufacturing giant, China has huge requirements for raw materials of which Latin America has
reserves: among them, copper, iron, sliver and tin. Further, in order to meet the demands of its growing
population, China aims to import large quantities of agricultural produce from Latin American countries,
such as crops including soybean.
• On the symbolic front, greater engagement with the Latin bloc serves to challenge the hegemony long
exercised by the United States in the region. Economically, Latin America has a lot to offer: for one, Beijing
looks to the region to meet its oil needs, with Venezuela and Brazil becoming important elements in China’s
oil strategy.
• The challenge for India is how to engage in a region that China has similarly set its eyes on.
• There are certain instances from which lessons can be drawn. In April 2010, when Argentina put restrictions
on Chinese imports, China stopped buying Argentine soybean oil. By promptly tripling their imports of this
oil, India helped Argentina avert a serious blow to its oil industry in monetary terms.
• Brazil, which is part of the BRICS grouping, is also confronting the realities of a much more powerful China
trying to make BRICS an extension of its own economic heft. India can carve out a much more equitable
partnership with Brazil that underscores its credentials as a responsible global stakeholder.
• Further, if India could obtain membership to the Alianza del Pacífico (Pacific Alliance), it could help
enhance its economic ties with the bloc and assist in balancing China’s aggressive Belt and Road Initiative.
• The Pacific Alliance, a Latin American trade bloc, currently has four member states—Chile, Colombia,
Mexico and Peru—that all border the Pacific Ocean. India was granted ‘observer’ status in the bloc in
2014.
• India may find in Latin America a willing partner as nationalist and anti-immigration sentiments sweep
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1.2.7. WHAT CAN DRIVE COOPERATION?

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• With culture as tool— language, food, and art, among them—people from India and Latin America can
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strengthen their understanding of each other. Cultural exchanges between the two regions have increased
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over the years, with several educational institutions offering scholarships, for example, in dance and music.
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• The India-Latin America relations are increasingly acquiring strategic orientation. Building upon New
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Delhi’s dialogue with a troika of foreign ministers of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
(CELAC) in July 2012.
• the two sides should explore the possibilities of forging an India-Latin America and Caribbean Dialogue
Mechanism similar to that of the India-Africa Forum Summit that started in 2008.
• The region is also critical to multilateral diplomacy and the quest for reforming the global governance
architecture, including the reform and expansion of the UN Security Council.
• Defence Manufacturing and Export is an area that India has some links to the region. This arena has great
potential for cooperation.
• NAM can be a good mechanism and platform to cooperate.
1.2.8. REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS
• Mercosur: Mercosur is a South American trade bloc established by the Treaty of Asunción in 1991 and
Protocol of Ouro Preto in 1994. Its full members are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. It is the
largest trading partner of India in Latin America. Current preferential trade agreement (PTA) between
India and Mercosur was signed in 2009 and since 2017 there are attempts to expand it. A PTA is a limited
free trade agreement where partner countries reduce import duties on a few identified products for the
other. While the PTA between India and Mercosur is presently limited to just 450 products, the two sides
have raised their ambitions manifold and are now aiming at providing preferential access to about 3,000
items.
• CARICOM: CARICOM came into being on 4 July 1973 with the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas. The
Treaty was later revised in 2002 to allow for the eventual establishment of a single market and a single
economy. The CARICOM is a grouping of twenty countries: fifteen Member States and five Associate
Members. The Community is multi-lingual; with English as the major language complemented by French and
Dutch and variations of these, as well as African and Indian expressions. CARICOM rests on four main
pillars: economic integration; foreign policy coordination;human and social development; and security.
• The First Meeting of the India-CARICOM Joint Commission was held in Georgetown, Guyana on 2nd June
2015.
• CELAC: The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) is a regional bloc of 33 Latin
American and Caribbean states. It was formed at the Unity Summit, which consisted of the 21st Summit of
the Rio Group and the 2nd Latin American and Caribbean Summit on Integration and Development (CALC), in
the Mayan Riviera, Mexico on 23 February 2010. The organization aims to unite all of the Latin American and
Caribbean states in order to strengthen the political, social and cultural integration of the region, improve its
quality of life, stimulate its economic growth, and advance the well-being of all of its people. CELAC is a
successor of the Rio Group and CALC. The First Meeting of the India-CELAC Troika Foreign Ministers was
held in New Delhi on August 7, 2012.
• Andean community: The Andean Community is a customs union comprising the South American countries
of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. The trade bloc was called the Andean Pact until 1996 and came
into existence when the Cartagena Agreement was signed in 1969.
• On June 2003, the Andean Community and India established a Political Dialogue and Cooperation
Mechanism
• Pacific Alliance: The Pacific Alliance is a Latin American trade bloc, formed by — Chile, Colombia, Mexico
and Peru, which all border the Pacific Ocean. These countries have come together to form an area of
integration with the purpose of ensure a complete freedom in the movement of goods, services, capital, and
people. Together, these four countries have a combined population of 200 million people and about 35% of
the region's GDP.
• SICA: The Central American Integration System (Spanish: Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana,
or SICA) has been the economic and political organization of Central American states since February 1,
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1993.
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• Two ministerial meetings have been held till now in 2004 and 2008 both in India.
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• Nuclear Free Zone: Opened for Signature: 14 February 1967, Entered into Force: 25 April 1969. On 23
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October 2002, the Tlatelolco Treaty came into full force throughout the region when Cuba, the only state
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which had not ratified the treaty, deposited its instrument of ratification. Currently, all 33 states in the
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region of Latin America and the Caribbean have signed and ratified the treaty. The Tlatelolco Treaty has
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served as a model for all future nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) agreements. On 14 February 2017, the
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Treaty of Tlatelolco celebrated its 50th anniversary.

2. INDIA AND AFRICA
Map 12.3 AFRICA
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Image Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/refmaps.html

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2.1. BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION

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Geologically, peninsular India was once part of Africa, the fused ‘Super-Continent’ called ‘Gondwanaland’.
Some 200 million years ago when the continental drift started, the region broke away from the African
continent and pushed in a north-easterly direction till it joined South Asia.
• Trade and contacts through the Indian Ocean route and Arabian Peninsula have connected East coast of
Africa and India for centuries.
• Trade relations between India and Africa can be traced back to the first century CE, when the Aksum empire
had been established in what is modern day Ethiopia and Eritrea.
• The Advent of European Colonialism brought a shared experience for both.
• The British took thousands of Indian workers to construct the Kenyan Railway and to countries such as
South Africa.
• India has a large diaspora presence in African continent.
• Mahatma Gandhi , stayed and worked in South Africa and inspired the later African National Congress and
also led the freedom Movement in India.
• After Independence Prime Minister Nehru stressed on the Afro-Asian solidarity, this was markedly visible
in the Asian-African conference, Bandung, 1955.
• This led to large African participation in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
• Thus, the countries of Africa share solidarity in anti-colonial and anti-imperial sentiments.
• 1960 is referred to as the Year of Africa because of a series of events that took place during the year—
namely the independence of seventeen African nations—that highlighted the growing Pan-
African sentiments in the continent.
• India played a key role at the UN on behalf of the African colonies, also it played a significant role through
the Peacekeeping missions of the UN in Africa e.g in Belgian Congo (ONUC 1960-64). And MONUSCO (since
2005)
• India also maintained a principled anti-apartheid stand through the years.
• The commonality in economic concerns and complementarities in resources and capacity provide India
and Africa unique opportunity to cooperate for mutual benefit
• Nonetheless, as India became mired in its own issues, relations with Africa lacked momentum
• In the last two decades it is argued that China has stolen a march over India in Africa.
• The India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS), since 2008 and the latest edition in2015, show India and Africa
relations have acquired momentum.
• In May 2017, India hosted the 52nd annual general meeting of the African Development Bank (AfDB) at
Gandhinagar.
• Founded in 2001, African Union is a continental Union comprising 55 African countries. It is headquartered in
Adis Ababa (Ethiopia).
• Africa's current integration landscape contains an array of regional economic communities, including eight
recognized as the building blocks of the African Union. These eight are namely: AMU, CEN-
SAD, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC.
2.1.1. UNDERSTANDING INDIA-AFRICA SYNERGY
• 54 countries, Second largest and Second most populous continent in the world. Total GDP in 2015 2.8
trillion US$.
• Africa is called the only remaining El-dorado with
o Fast growing population
o Increasing prosperity
o Untapped mineral and agricultural wealth
• Relations between world’s fastest growing continent and World’s fastest growing major economy are key for
the future of humanity
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• In recent years growth in India's trade and investment has been partially affected by global slowdown, yet
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• African countries can provide a major support for UN security council membership.
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• Similarities: India and Africa have common colonial history, similar developmental profile and challenges.
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• Complementarities: India’s growing need for Africa’s Commodities, Africa’s need for development.
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• Multilateral partnership: BRICS, IBSA, BASIC

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• Development Partnershi/Capacity building:

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o Suitability of Indian technology and spirit of Jugaad for Africa

o India’s credentials as a uniquely suitable development partner for Africa have been widely
acknowledged.
o Pan Africa E-Network
o ITEC scholarships
o India’s contribution towards Ebola, Public Health.
• Socio-economic similarities: Urbanisation, industrialisation, young population, poverty
• Relations largely driven by private operators: market forces, middlemen, has resulted in steady but slow
growth of the relations

• Solutions for the problems of India can provide a way forward to Africa in its developmental trajectory
• India’s crude oil imports from Africa: the share of African crude fell to about 10.5 percent October 2017, the
lowest since November, 2012,
2.1.2. RECENT DYNAMIC
• In October 2017, President Ram Nath Kovind’s first foreign was to the African nations of Djibouti and
Ethiopia.
• PM Modi Visited 4 African countries in 2016- Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and Kenya
• The India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) that began in 2008 (New Delhi) is a much needed intergovernmental
attempt to give a direction an thrust to the bilateral synergy.
• 2011 Summit took place in Adis Ababa, Ethiopia
• 2015 summit in New Delhi, Invitation to all 54 heads of states
• India has committed unprecedented levels of resources in Africa:
o At IAFS-2 India promised soft loans of worth 5 billion US$,
o 500 million in grants
o Institution building and training fellowship to Africa
o At the IAFS-1 India had offered duty free market access to Africa’s least developed countries
• Before 2015, the participation of African leaders in the summit process was done on the basis of the Banjul
formula, which entailed the participation of the leaders of around 12-14 African countries, who were
represented at the summit in their capacity as the chiefs of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs).
• There is a surge in p2p contacts: Experts, students, patients and Entrepreneurs
• Fillip to cultural and informational contacts
2.2. ECONOMY
• The growth in India’s trade and investment in Africa has been partially affected by the global slowdown
• In 2014-15
o Bilateral trade India-Africa 70 billion
o China 200 billion
o US 100 billion
• Total trade between India and Africa increased almost five-fold between 2005-06 and 2015-16, and stood
at US$ 52 billion in March 2016-17. India’s exports to Africa increased from US$ 14 billion in 2007-08 to US$
23 billion in 2016-17, registering an impressive compound annual growth rate of 5.6 per cent. Indian exports
to Africa were at a peak in 2014-15 at US$ 32 billion.
• Indian imports from Africa, on the other hand, increased from US$ 20 billion in 2007-08 to US$ 28 billion in
2016-17 accounting for 7.5 percent of total Indian imports. Indian imports from Africa grew at a compound
annual growth rate of around 4 per cent, reaching a high in 2011-12 at US$ 44 billion.
• Statistics cited in the African Economic Outlook 2017 show that India is ranked second (after China) in terms
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of trade share with Africa.

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Africa exports Raw materials, India exports- Pharmaceutical, Mid and high-tech manufactured products,
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Automobiles.
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34 African countries enjoy duty-free access to the Indian market.

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Figure 12.1: India’s trade with Africa
Image Source: https://ciiblog.in/new/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/image2.png

2.2.1. INVESTMENTS IN AFRICA
• Latest UNCTAD figures show China to be a much bigger player in FDI in Africa as compared to India.
• However, India’s sustained effort is making an impact on Africa… India’s share of announced greenfield
projects grew from 3.3% in 2003-08 to 6.1% in 2009-15. In the same period, the investment from China
decreased from 4.9% to 3.3%.
• The 2017 African Economic Outlook, at the AfDB summit showed that China led greenfield investment in
Africa for 2015-16 (USD 38.4 billion), while during the same year India invested USD 2.2 billion across 64
projects in Africa.
• India was the fourth largest investor with 45 projects in 2015, after the United States, United Kingdom and
United Arab Emirates.
• Chinese FDI has been accused of bringing in a lot of Chinese labour, which means that a large amount of
earnings are repatriated, India’s relatively small presence does not show this pattern as yet.
Figure12.2 India and Chinese Investments in Africa
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Image Source: http://www.livemint.com/r/LiveMint/Period2/2017/05/29/Photos/Processed/w_plainfacts_chart_1.jpg

2.3. DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP
• Many countries may have higher bilateral trade with Africa, but what sets apart India’s engagement with
Africa is its focus on innovative capacity building programmes and the deployment of ICT, the country’s
forte, to help build a knowledge economy in the African continent.
• India launched Pan African e-Network Project (PAENP), in 2009, Conceived by former President of India,
A.P.J Abdul Kalam the project, with a budget of approximately US$ 125 million, is entirely funded by India
and aims to provide satellite connectivity, tele-education and tele-medicine services to the African
countries. It also supports e-commerce, e-governance, infotainment, resource mapping and various other
services. The project has presently been commissioned in 47 countries.
• During the IAFS- 3 in 2015, India offered Africa a concessional credit of $10 billion over five years and a
grant assistance of $600 million.
• Grant assistance includes an India-Africa Development Fund of $100 million and an India-Africa Health
Fund of $10 million. It will also include 50,000 scholarships in India over the next five years.
• India had committed $7.4 billion in concessional credit and $1.2 billion in grant since the first India-Africa
Summit in 2008, and creating:
o 100 capacity-building institutions, and developing infrastructure,
o public transport
o clean energy,
o irrigation, agriculture and
o manufacturing capacity across Africa.
• These are significant as resources available from traditional donors belonging to the OECD and from
multilateral financial institutions are diminishing precisely at a time when the current United Nations
session has adopted ambitious Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) .
• Whether or not SDGs are successfully achieved will critically depend upon what path countries like India and
those in Africa take as they grow their economies.
• African countries and India are extraordinarily rich in bio-diversity, with species of rare flora and fauna
which are threatened both by over-exploitation as well as by Climate Change.
• The economic interests of India and African countries are best served by a universal, multilaterally
negotiated, rules based global trade regime under the WTO.
• India can contribute its capital, skills and technological capabilities to sustain Africa’s growth.
Figure 12.3 Pan-African e-network
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Image Source: http://www.mea.gov.in/images/Power3.jpg

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2.4. SECURITY
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• Terrorism has affected a large swath of the continent.

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• The proliferation of terrorist and extremist groups in the continent like Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, Nigeria-
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based Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab in Somalia, and their suspected links with militants in other parts of the
world entails a more proactive collaboration between India and Africa on the issue of terrorism.
• Looking ahead to the next stage in the India-Africa partnership, one can, therefore, expect a deepening of
security cooperation across a spectrum of areas, including terrorism, piracy, and maritime security.
• Security has to be seen in its wider context: Thus it include issues such as
o Climate Change but also global public health challenges,
o drug-trafficking,
o trafficking of humans,
o proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism.
2.5. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
• India is not the only one with Africa Strategy
o EU, China, Japan, US, all also have IAFS-type processes, often commit more resources.
o There is an emerging synergy between India and Japan, Competition between India and China
o France uniquely suited for partnership in Francophone Africa
• Second, in recent years, new drivers of the putative African century have emerged; these include which
are both sources of opportunity and challenges
o lower commodity prices,
o greater democracy,
o rise in militancy,
o population growth,
o preponderance of youth and
o urbanization.
• Last but not the least, although Africa has lost some of its economic attractiveness, the long-term
importance of the continent is undimmed.
• China has already established its first overseas military base in this Djibouti.
• India has a natural advantage over China in Africa in the form of a large Indian diaspora in Anglophone
African nations.
2.5.1. WHAT SHOULD INDIA DO?
Though the actual delivery of projects and institutions has improved, it is still not commensurate with the
resources expended.
• We need to inject greater bilateralism for project implementation.
• Should not abrogate midstream and downstream delivery to the AU bureaucracy.
• Improve last mile delivery chain.
• Advertise our contribution adequately. E.g incredible India campaign or China’s can do Chengdu campaign
• Leverage two strong assets private sector and Diaspora
• With increasing economic engagement, the fate of India-Africa ties would depend on not just quantitative
factors such as trade and investment, but also a strategy that convinces the African people that economically
engaging with India would be mutually beneficial.
2.5.2. THE ASIA AFRICA GROWTH CORRIDOR
• 2017 summit meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Indian PM Narendra Modi in
Gujarat renewed impetus for an Indo-Japanese cooperation in line with their calls for an Asia Africa
Growth Corridor (AAGC) during their summit in November 2016.
• The vision, however, comes on the back of decades of cooperation amongst two of Asia’s largest
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democracies, both seeking an alignment of interests be it under democratic security cooperation or under
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Abe’s 2006 notion of an Asian ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.

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• Starting with India and Japan and then expanding to ASEAN and Africa, the AAGC is commonly portrayed
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as a response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

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• The AAGC aims to pool together Indian and Japanese technology and skills to build high-quality
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infrastructure in Africa, which is to be complemented by digital connectivity.

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• Asia Africa Growth Corridor aims for people-centric growth strategy. It also takes a multi-
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stakeholder/participatory approach. The various entities including government, business and academia will
contribute to AAGC.
• A Vision Document was relaesed during the African Development Bank Meeting at Ahmedabad in May
2017
o According to the Vision documents AAGC may be based on four pillars:
o Enhancing Capacity and Skills.
o Quality Infrastructure and Institutional Connectivity.
o Development and Cooperation Projects.
o People-to-People Partnership.
o people-to-people partnerships
o The AAGC offers a benevolent alternative to the BRI that holds significant potential for regional
connectivity on a state-to-state level. Given Japan’s experience with mass projects and expertise in
developing cutting edge train networks, such as the Shinkansen, there is room for cooperation. Despite
prioritising less costly Chinese bids for rail development, a lowering of costs would benefit Japan as it
enjoys greater trust within the region. Investing in strategic infrastructure projects such as ports, rails,
and telecommunications would find receptive customers in countries seeking to minimise their
dependence on individual trading partners.
o With infrastructure projects providing local employment, both India and Japan’s investments in
foreign economies can garner greater regional support for their vision. Japan’s own experience with
setting up hospitals shows how this form of cooperation can ensure a more permanent Japanese
presence without fostering local perceptions of foreign control. Matching Japan’s high skills and capital,
India’s own size and experience with economic development has challenged it to pursue key
technologies - be they in pharmacology or solar energy - on a mass scale.
o AAGC-led growth in Africa and Asia will be responsive to the collective commitment to Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs).
2.5.2.1. Challenges to be overcome by the AAGC
o Firstly, the African countries are in different stages of development. Adding to this is the fact that
Africa was colonised by different European powers in the past. This means that there are huge
differences in governance structures, languages and societal norms within Africa. It would, therefore,
not be possible for India and Japan to treat all of them with the same stroke
o There are issues of infrastructure bottlenecks and coordination between New Delhi and Tokyo. Unlike
in Japan, decision-making process in India is far more complex and, at times, painstakingly slow.
o China already has an advantage when it comes to trade with Africa – it has been Africa’s biggest
trading partner since 2009.Although there is some unhappiness among African states on the manner in
which China is reaching out to the continent, these states require funding and development support,
which China is happy to provide. India and Japan will have to compete with China in the African market.
o Lastly, there is civil strife in a number of the African countries poses security challenges. This could
create hurdles for India and Japan in their infrastructure development plans in the continent. The two
countries will need to tread carefully. Despite increased military and technological cooperation between
Japan and India, both countries are at a disadvantage with regards to power projection across Asia and
Africa. While it does not feature in the program of the AAGC, security plays a key role in foreign policy
establishments across the Indo-Pacific.
o Thus given its scope and ambition, the AAGC would require active cooperation from, and joint work
among international community for its success
In this context the vision of India was aptly expressed by the PM in 2017:
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“India’s partnership with Africa is based on a model of cooperation which is responsive to the needs of
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African countries. It is demand-driven and free of conditions.”

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VISION IAS
www.visionias.in
LECTURE-14
ORGANISATIONS, GROUPINGS AND INSTITUTIONS IN
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. ORGANISATIONS, GROUPINGS AND INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ............................................ 3
1.1 International Organisations .............................................................................................................................. 3
1.2. United Nations Organisation ........................................................................................................................... 3
1.2.1. Charter and Mandate ............................................................................................................................... 3
1.2.2. The Principle Organs ................................................................................................................................. 3
1.3. The General Assembly ..................................................................................................................................... 3
1.4. The Security Council ........................................................................................................................................ 4
1.4.1. Security Council: Step by Step Actions ..................................................................................................... 5
1.5. Economic and Social Council ........................................................................................................................... 6
1.6. Trusteeship Council ......................................................................................................................................... 6
1.7. Secretariat ....................................................................................................................................................... 6
1.8. The International Court of Justice ................................................................................................................... 6
1.9. Specialized Agencies, Programmes and Funds ................................................................................................ 7
1.9.1. Important Programmes and Funds .......................................................................................................... 7
1.9.2. Specialized Agencies ................................................................................................................................. 8
1.10. Other Bodies with UN Partnership ................................................................................................................ 9
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1.11. A Case for UN Reforms ................................................................................................................................ 10

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1.12. India and the United Nations ...................................................................................................................... 10

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1.12.1. UN Reforms and India .......................................................................................................................... 11

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1.12.2. India’s Case of Permanent Membership of the Security Council ......................................................... 11

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1.13. The Permanent Court of Arbitration ........................................................................................................... 11

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1.14. The International Criminal Court ................................................................................................................. 12

1.15. The Bretton Woods Institutions: IMF and the World Bank ......................................................................... 12
1.15.1 International Monitory Fund ................................................................................................................. 13
1.15.2. The World Bank .................................................................................................................................... 13
1.16. Washington Consensus ............................................................................................................................... 14
1.17. The WTO ...................................................................................................................................................... 14
1.17.1. The WTO Mandate ............................................................................................................................... 15
1.17.2. Dispute Resolution ............................................................................................................................... 15
1.17.3. The Doha Round ................................................................................................................................... 16
1.17.4. Key Issues and Challenges: Developed Versus Developing Countries ................................................. 16
1.17.5. TRIPS ..................................................................................................................................................... 16
1.18. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) ........................................................ 17
1.19. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB) ............................................................................................................. 18
1.20. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD) ........................................ 18
2. BRICS: BRAZIL, RUSSIA, INDIA, CHINA AND SOUTH AFRICA ................................................................................. 19
2.1. BRIC to BRICS ................................................................................................................................................. 19
2.2. The New Development Bank ......................................................................................................................... 19
2.3. Contingency Relief Arrangement (CRA) ........................................................................................................ 20
2.4. India’s Approach ............................................................................................................................................ 20
2.5. Significance and Challenges........................................................................................................................... 20
2.6. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) .......................................................................................... 21
3. IBSA FORUM ......................................................................................................................................................... 22
3.1. Organisational Structure ............................................................................................................................... 22
3.1.1. Joint Working Groups ............................................................................................................................. 22
3.1.2. People-to-People Forums ....................................................................................................................... 22
3.1.3. Focal Points............................................................................................................................................. 22
3.1.4. Trilateral Commission ............................................................................................................................. 22
3.1.5. Summits .................................................................................................................................................. 22
3.1.6. IBSA Fund ................................................................................................................................................ 22
3.1.7. IBSA Business Forum .............................................................................................................................. 23
4. ORGANISATION OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OPEC) ............................................................... 24
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5. THE ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (OIC) ........................................................................................ 24

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6. THE COMMONWEALTH ........................................................................................................................................ 24

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7. IMPORTANT GROUPINGS ..................................................................................................................................... 25

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7.1. G-20 ............................................................................................................................................................... 25

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7.2. G-7 ................................................................................................................................................................. 25

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7.3. G-77 ............................................................................................................................................................... 26

8. QUESTIONS FROM PREVIOUS YEARS.................................................................................................................... 27

1. ORGANISATIONS, GROUPINGS AND INSTITUTIONS IN
1.1 INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
International Organisations were created by common consent to enable and promote cooperation among states
in a number of domains (Saran 2017; 260). Thus, international organisations transcend the boundaries of states.
These bodies generally have founding documents defining their goals, rules of procedure, secretariats etc.
Generally, a distinction is made between intergovernmental organisations e.g. the UN, NATO etc and
international non-governmental organisations e.g Amnesty international. There is a third kind as well i.e.
hybrid international organisations in which governments work with NGOs e.g the International Red Cross. This
kind of organisation admits as full member both NGOs, companies and government or governmental bodies.
1.2. UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION

• United Nations came into Existence on 24 October 1945. With 51 founding members including India.
• Today the United Nations has 193 members, With South Sudan being the latest to join in 2011.
• The UN has six official languages i.e Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish.
• The mission and work of the United Nations are guided by the purposes and principles contained in
its founding Charter.
• The UN System involves the six Principle Organs along with Special Programmes and Funds.
• Antonio Guterres from Portugal is the current Secretary General of the UN
• Four of the five principal organs are located at the main UN Headquarters in New York City. The
International Court of Justice is located in The Hague, while other major agencies are based in the UN
offices at Geneva, Vienna, and Nairobi. Other UN institutions are located throughout the world.
• United Nation is funded by its member states through compulsory and voluntary contributions.
• Any amendment in the charter requires 2/3rd vote of the General Assembly
1.2.1. CHARTER AND MANDATE
• According to the Charter, the United Nations has four purposes:

o to maintain international peace and security;
o to develop friendly relations among nations;
o to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights;
o and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations.
1.2.2. THE PRINCIPLE ORGANS
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General Assembly.
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Security Council.
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Economic and Social Council.

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Secretariat.
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• International Court of Justice.

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• Trusteeship Council.
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1.3. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

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• The General Assembly is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the UN.
• All 193 Member States of the UN are represented in the General Assembly, making it the only UN body with
universal representation.
• It elects the Non-Permanent members in Security Council and also members for Social and Economic
Council.
• It elects Judges to International Court of Justice along with the Security Council.
• Each year, in September, the full UN membership meets in the General Assembly Hall in New York for the
annual General Assembly session, and general debate, which many heads of state attend and address.

• Decisions on important questions, such as those on peace and security, admission of new members and
budgetary matters, require a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly.
• Decisions on other questions are by simple majority.
• The General Assembly, each year, elects a GA President to serve a one-year term of office.
• Pursuant to its “Uniting for Peace” resolution of November 1950 (resolution 377 (V), the General Assembly
may also take action if the Security Council fails to act, owing to the negative vote of a Permanent Member,
in a case where there appears to be a threat to or breach of the peace, or act of aggression.
• The Assembly can consider the matter immediately with a view to making recommendations to members for
collective measures to maintain or restore international peace and security.
• In October 2015 the UN general assembly (UNGA) agreed to adopt a negotiating text for Security Council
reforms.
1.4. THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Under article 24 of the UN Charter, the members of the UN conferred on the Security Council primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.
The functions of the Council fall mainly under two headings:
o Pacific settlement of disputes
o Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.
• It has 15 Members (5 permanent and 10 non-permanent members). The non permanent members are
elected to serve a two year term. The membership was last expanded in 1965.
• 10 non-permanent members should be elected according to the following pattern: five from African and
Asia–Pacific states, one from Eastern European states, two from Latin American and Caribbean states, and
two from Western European and Other states.
• Five of the non-permanent members are elected each year by the General Assembly for a term of two
years.
• Decisions on procedural matters are made by an affirmative vote of any nine members. Decisions on other
matters are made by an affirmative vote of nine members, including the concurring votes of the five
permanent members of the Council.
• Each Member has one vote. Under the Charter, all Member States are obligated to comply with Council
decisions.
• The Security Council has a Presidency, which rotates alphabetically, changes every month.
• The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of
aggression. It calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of
adjustment or terms of settlement.
• In some cases, the Security Council can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorize the use of force to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
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The Security Council has three standing committees:

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o Committee of Experts on Rules of Procedure

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o Committee on Council Meetings away from Headquarters

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o Committee on the Admission of New Members.

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• Apart from these there are other committees and working groups.
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All existing committees and working groups are comprised of the fifteen members of the Council.
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• While standing committees are chaired by the President of the Council, rotating on a monthly basis, other
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committees and working groups are chaired or co-chaired by designated members of the Council who are
announced on an annual basis by a Note of the President of the Security Council.
• Counter-Terrorism Committee: Guided by Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), the CTC
works to bolster the ability of United Nations Member States to prevent terrorist acts both within their
borders and across regions.
• Non Proliferation Committee: It is a Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540
(2004) which imposes binding obligations on all States to adopt legislation to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of delivery, and establish appropriate domestic
controls over related materials to prevent their illicit trafficking.

• Military Staff Committee: The Military Staff Committee helps plan UN military measures and regulate
armaments.
• Ad hoc committees are established for a limited time and to address a specific issue.
o Sanctions Committees (ad hoc): The use of mandatory sanctions is intended to apply pressure on a State
or entity to comply with the objectives set by the Security Council without resorting to the use of forc
e.g. Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015)
concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities
oversees the sanctions measures imposed by the Security Council.
• Peacekeeping Operations and Political Missions
o A peacekeeping operation consists of military, police and civilian personnel, who work to deliver
security, political and early peacebuilding support.
o Political missions are part of a continuum of UN peace operations working in different stages of the
conflict cycle.
• Advisory Subsidiary Bodies: The Peacebuilding Commission is an advisory subsidiary body of both the
Security Council and the General Assembly.The Peacebuilding Commission plays a unique role in:
o bringing together all of the relevant actors, including international donors, the international financial
institutions, national governments, troop contributing countries;
o marshalling resources and
o advising on and proposing integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery and where
appropriate, highlighting any gaps that threaten to undermine peace.
• The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) established in 1993 and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) established in 1994 are subsidiary organs of the Security
Council within the terms of article 29 of the Charter
• The Security Council held its first session on 17 January 1946 at Church House, Westminster, London. Since
its first meeting, the Security Council has taken permanent residence at the United Nations Headquarters in
New York City. It also travelled to many cities, holding sessions in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1972, in Panama
City, Panama, and in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1990.
• A representative of each of its members must be present at all times at UN Headquarters so that the
Security Council can meet at any time as the need arises.
1.4.1. SECURITY COUNCIL: STEP BY STEP ACTIONS
• When a complaint concerning a threat to peace is brought before it, the Council’s first action is usually to
recommend that the parties try to reach agreement by peaceful means. The Council may:
o set forth principles for such an agreement;
o undertake investigation and mediation, in some cases;
o dispatch a mission;
o appoint special envoys; or
o request the Secretary-General to use his good offices to achieve a pacific settlement of the dispute.
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• When a dispute leads to hostilities, the Council’s primary concern is to bring them to an end as soon as
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possible. In that case, the Council may:

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o issue ceasefire directives that can help prevent an escalation of the conflict;
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o dispatch military observers or a peacekeeping force to help reduce tensions, separate opposing forces
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• Beyond this, the Council may opt for enforcement measures, including:
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o economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, and travel bans;
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o severance of diplomatic relations;

o blockade;
o or even collective military action.
• A chief concern is to focus action on those responsible for the policies or practices condemned by the
international community, while minimizing the impact of the measures taken on other parts of the
population and economy.

1.5. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
• The Economic and Social Council is the principal body for coordination, policy review, policy dialogue and
recommendations on economic, social and environmental issues, as well as implementation of
internationally agreed development goals.
• It has 54 Members, elected by the General Assembly for overlapping three-year terms.
• Eighteen members of ECOSOC are elected each year. Members generally serve three-year terms, ending on
31 December
• The president of ECOSOC is elected for a one-year term.
• Voting is by simple majority and every member has one vote.
• It is the United Nations’ central platform for reflection, debate, and innovative thinking on sustainable
development.
• It serves as the central mechanism for activities of the UN system and its specialized agencies in the
economic, social and environmental fields, supervising subsidiary and expert bodies.
• Subsidiary Bodies of ECOSOC: Functional Commissions; Regional Commissions; Standing Committees; Expert
Bodies; Other Subsidiary Bodies.
1.6. TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

• The Trusteeship Council was established in 1945 by the UN Charter, under Chapter XIII, to provide
international supervision for 11 Trust Territories that had been placed under the administration of seven
Member States, and ensure that adequate steps were taken to prepare the Territories for self-government
and independence.
• By 1994, all Trust Territories had attained self-government or independence.
• The Trusteeship Council suspended operation on 1 November 1994.
• By a resolution adopted on 25 May 1994, the Council amended its rules of procedure to drop the obligation
to meet annually and agreed to meet as occasion required -- by its decision or the decision of its President,
or at the request of a majority of its members or the General Assembly or the Security Council.
1.7. SECRETARIAT
• The Secretariat comprises the Secretary-General and tens of thousands of international UN staff members
who carry out the day-to-day work of the UN as mandated by the General Assembly and the Organisation's
other principal organs.
• The Secretary-General is chief administrative officer of the Organisation, appointed by the General
Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council for a five-year, renewable term.
• UN staff members are recruited internationally and locally, and work in duty stations and on peacekeeping
missions all around the world.
1.8. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

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• The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It was established in
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June 1945 by the Charter of the United Nations and began work in April 1946.
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• The Court is composed of 15 judges, who are elected for terms of office of nine years by the United Nations
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• Its seat is at the Peace Palace in The Hague (Netherlands). It is the only one of the six principal organs of
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the United Nations not located in New York (United States of America).
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• The Court’s functions are twofold.

o First, it decides, in accordance with international law, cases that are submitted to it by states.
o Secondly, the Court gives advisory opinions to the General Assembly and Security Council on legal
questions, and advisory opinions to other organs of the UN and specialised agencies that are
authorised by the General Assembly to request them.
• States entitled to appear before the Court fall into three categories:
o States members of the UN
o States not members of the UN that are parties to the Statute of the ICJ; Conditions are to be
determined in each case by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council
o States not parties to the Statute to which the Court is open. The conditions upon which the Court is
open to such states are to be laid down by the Security Council, but they must not place the parties in a
position of inequality before the Court.
1.9. SPECIALIZED AGENCIES, PROGRAMMES AND FUNDS

The UN system, also known unofficially as the "UN family", is made up of the UN itself and many affiliated
programmes, funds, and specialized agencies, all with their own membership, leadership, and budget.
• The programmes and funds are established by and report to the United Nations General Assembly. They
are financed through voluntary rather than assessed contributions
1.9.1. IMPORTANT PROGRAMMES AND FUNDS
• The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) works in nearly 170 countries and territories, helping
to eradicate poverty, reduce inequalities and build resilience so countries can sustain progress. As the
UN’s development agency, UNDP plays a critical role in helping countries achieve the Sustainable
Development Goals.
• The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) works in 190 countries and territories to save children’s lives,
to defend their rights, and to help them fulfil their potential. UNICEF provides long-term humanitarian and
development assistance to children and mothers.
• United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF): The UN Capital Development Fund makes public and
private finance work for the poor in the world’s 47 least developed countries (LDCs).
• United Nations Volunteers (UNV): UNV is based in Bonn, Germany. The UNV programme contributes to
peace and development through volunteerism worldwide. UNV is administered by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) and reports to the UNDP Executive Board
• United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP): UNEP is the leading global environmental authority that
sets the global environmental agenda, promotes the coherent implementation of the environmental
dimension of sustainable development within the United Nations system, and serves as an authoritative
advocate for the global environment. It is based In Nairobi, Kenya,
• United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA): UNFPA is the United Nations reproductive health and rights
agency. The organisation was created in 1969,
• United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT): is the United Nations programme working
towards a better urban future. Its mission is to promote socially and environmentally sustainable human
settlements development and the achievement of adequate shelter for all. The headquarters of the UN-
Habitat Secretariat are located in Nairobi, Kenya.
• United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): UNCTAD is a permanent
intergovernmental body established by the United Nations General Assembly in 1964. Its headquarters are
located in Geneva, Switzerland, and has offices in New York and Addis Ababa. UNCTAD is part of the UN
Secretariat. It reports to the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council but has its own
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membership, leadership, and budget. It supports developing countries to access the benefits of a
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globalized economy more fairly and effectively. Together with other UN departments and agencies, it
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measure progress by the Sustainable Development Goals, as set out in Agenda 2030.
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• Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): established on December 14, 1950
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by the United Nations General Assembly. The agency is mandated to lead and co-ordinate international
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action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide. Over the years it has provided vital
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assistance to refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced and stateless people. UNHCR is governed by
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the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).
• United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS): UNOPS helps the UN and its partners provide peace and
security, humanitarian and development solutions. UNOPS headquarters are located in Copenhagen,
Denmark.
• United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA): UNRWA was
established by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 to carry out direct
relief and works programmes for Palestine refugees. The Agency began operations on 1 May 1950. It is
headquartered in Amman, Jordan.
• UN-Women- Formed in 2010 UN women is an organisation dedicated to gender equality and the
empowerment of women.
1.9.2. SPECIALIZED AGENCIES
• UN specialized agencies are international organisations that coordinate their work with the United Nations
through negotiated agreements.
• Unlike UN funds and programmes, which are established by and report to the United Nations General
Assembly, specialized agencies are legally independent of the United Nations and have separate budgets,
members, rules, and personnel.
• The bulk of their funding comes from voluntary contributions from governments, institutions, and
individuals. Some specialized agencies, such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO), have been in
existence longer than the United Nations.
• There are currently 15 specialized agencies:
o Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO): The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) is specialized
agency of the United Nations that leads international efforts to defeat hunger. It was formed in 1945
and has headquarter in Rome, Italy. It is linked to the ECOSCO in the UN. Its goal is to achieve food
security for all and make sure that people have regular access to enough high-quality food to lead active,
healthy lives. With over 194 member states, FAO works in over 130 countries worldwide.
o International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO): established by States in 1944 to manage the
administration and governance of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention).
Its headquarters is in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. In October 1947, ICAO became an agency of the
United Nations linked to the ECOSOC. ICAO works with the Convention’s 192 Member States and
industry groups to reach consensus on international civil aviation Standards and Recommended
Practices (SARPs) and policies in support of a safe, efficient, secure, economically sustainable and
environmentally responsible civil aviation sector.
o International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD): IFAD is an international financial institution
and specialized United Nations agency based in Rome, the UN’s food and agriculture hub. It invests in
rural people, empowering them to increase their food security, improve the nutrition of their families
and increase their incomes. It help them build resilience, expand their businesses and take charge of
their own development. Since 1978, it has provided US$18.5 billion in grants and low-interest loans to
projects that have reached about 464 million people.
o International Labour Organisation (ILO): The only tripartite U.N. agency, since 1919 the ILO brings
together governments, employers and workers of 187 member States , to set labour standards,
develop policies and devise programmes promoting decent work for all women and men. In 1946, the
ILO became a specialized agency of the newly formed United Nations. Its headquarters is in Geneva
Switzerland. In 1969, the organisation received the Nobel Peace Prize for improving peace among
classes, pursuing decent work and justice for workers, and providing technical assistance to other
developing nations
o International Maritime Organisation (IMO): It is the United Nations specialized agency with
responsibility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships.
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In 1948 an international conference in Geneva adopted a convention formally establishing IMO (the
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original name was the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation, or IMCO, but the name
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was changed in 1982 to IMO). The IMO Convention entered into force in 1958 and the new
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Organisation met for the first time the following year, 1959. IMO currently has 173 Member States and
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three Associate Members. Its secretariat is base in London, U.K.

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o International Monetary Fund (IMF): see the entry on Bretton Woods institutions below.
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o International Telecommunications Union (ITU): ITU is the United Nations specialized agency for
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information and communication technologies – ICTs. It allocates global radio spectrum and satellite
orbits, develop the technical standards that ensure networks and technologies seamlessly
interconnect, and strive to improve access to ICTs to underserved communities worldwide. An
organisation based on public-private partnership since its inception, ITU currently has a membership of
193 countries and almost 800 private-sector entities and academic institutions. ITU is headquartered in
Geneva, Switzerland, and has twelve regional and area offices around the world. ITU was formed in
1865, in Paris, at the International Telegraph Convention; this makes it one of the oldest
intergovernmental organisations in the world. ITU became a United Nations specialized agency in 1947
o United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO): It is responsible for
coordinating international cooperation in education, science, culture and communication. The UNESCO
was founded on 16 November 1945. UNESCO has 195 Members and eight Associate Members. It is
governed by the General Conference and the Executive Board. The Secretariat, headed by the Director-
General, implements the decisions of these two bodies. Its headquarters are located at Place de
Fontenoy in Paris, France. Through the Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage , adopted by UNESCO in 1972, it encourages the identification, protection and
preservation of cultural and natural heritage around the world considered to be of outstanding value
to humanity. “Many Voices One World”, also known as the MacBride report, was a 1980 UNESCO
publication written by the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems.
o United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO): Established by a General Assembly
resolution in 1966 as an autonomous body within the UN, it became a sepcialiesd agency in 1985. It is
headquartered in Vienna, Austria. As of January 2018, 167 States are Members of UNIDO. The mission
of the UNIDO, as described in the Lima Declaration adopted at the fifteenth session of the UNIDO
General Conference in 2013, is to promote and accelerate inclusive and sustainable industrial
development (ISID) in Member States.
o Universal Postal Union (UPU): Established in 1874, the Universal Postal Union (UPU), with its
headquarters in the Berne, Switzerland, is the second oldest international organisation worldwide.
With its 192 member countries, it is the primary forum for cooperation between postal sector players.
It helps to ensure a truly universal network of up-to-date products and services.
o World Bank: see the entry on Bretton Woods institutions below
o World Health Organisation (WHO): WHO began functioning with its Constitution coming into force on 7
April 1948 – now celebrated every year as World Health Day. Its headquarters is in Geneva,
Switzerland. Working through offices in more than 150 countries, WHO Secretariat staff work side by
side with governments and other partners to ensure the highest attainable level of health for all
people. WHO defines health as Health as state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and
not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. Its Publications include the World Health Report, World
Health Statisitics etc.
o World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO): WIPO is the global forum for intellectual property
services, policy, information and cooperation. It is a self-funding agency of the United Nations, with
191 member states. Its mission is to lead the development of a balanced and effective international
intellectual property (IP) system that enables innovation and creativity for the benefit of all. Its mandate,
governing bodies and procedures are set out in the WIPO Convention, which established WIPO in 1967.
Its headquarters is in Geneva, Switzerland
o World Meteorological Organisation (WMO): It is an intergovernmental organisation with a
membership of 191 Member States and Territories. It originated from the International Meteorological
Organisation (IMO), which was founded in 1873. Established by the ratification of the WMO Convention
on 23 March 1950, WMO became the specialised agency of the United Nations for meteorology
(weather and climate), operational hydrology and related geophysical sciences a year later in 1951.
The Secretariat, headquartered in Geneva, is headed by the Secretary-General. Its supreme body is the
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World Meteorological Congress.

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o World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO): It is an agency responsible for the promotion of responsible,
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sustainable and universally accessible tourism. UNWTO encourages the implementation of the Global
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Code of Ethics for Tourism to maximize tourism’s socio-economic contribution while minimizing its
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possible negative impacts. UNWTO’s membership includes 158 countries, 6 Associate Members and
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over 500 Affiliate Members representing the private sector, educational institutions, tourism
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associations and local tourism authorities. On 27 September 1970, the International Union of Official
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Travel Organisations (IUOTO) Special General Assembly meeting in Mexico City adopts the Statutes of
the World Tourism Organisation (WTO). From 1980 onwards, this day is celebrated as “World Tourism
Day”. It began functioning s the in 1975. In 2003, the WTO general council and the UN agreed to
establish the WTO as a specialized agency of the UN. Its headquarters is in Madrid.
1.10. OTHER BODIES WITH UN PARTNERSHIP

• World Food Programme (WFP) (UN/FAO): Based in Rome it is the leading humanitarian organisation
fighting hunger worldwide, delivering food assistance in emergencies and working with communities to
improve nutrition and build resilience. It works closely with its two Rome-based sister organisations, the
Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations and the International Fund for Agricultural
Development.
• International Trade Centre (ITC) (UN/WTO): Established in 1964, the International Trade Centre (ITC) is the
joint agency of the World Trade Organisation and the United Nations. The ITC is involved in projects
providing trade technical assistance in countries all over the world. It is the only development agency that
is fully dedicated to supporting the internationalization of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). It is
headquartered in Geneva Switzerland.
1.11. A CASE FOR UN REFORMS

• Since the end of the Cold War, India has been spearheading a move for reforms at the UN to make the
world body more representative of the changing global realities while enhancing its credibility and
effectiveness.
• In 1992, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution. The resolution reflected three main complaints:
o The Security Council no longer represents contemporary political realities.
o Its decisions reflect only Western values and interests and are dominated by a few powers.
o It lacks equitable representation
• In view of these growing demands for the restructuring of the UN, on 1 January 1997, the UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan initiated an inquiry into how the UN should be reformed. For instance how the
members of the Security Council should be elected.
• The following are just some of the criteria that have been proposed for new permanent and non-
permanent members of the Security Council. A new member should be::
o A major economic power
o A major military power
o A substantial contributor to the UN budget
o A big nation in terms of its population
o A nation that respects democracy and human rights
o Country that would make the Council more representative of the world’s diversity in terms of
geography, economic systems, and culture.
• A related issue was to change the nature of membership altogether. Some insisted, for instance, that the
veto power of the five permanent members be abolished. Many perceived the veto to be in conflict with the
concept of democracy and sovereign equality in the UN and thought that the veto was no longer right or
relevant.
• As the UN completed 60 years of its existence, the heads of all the member-states met in September 2005 to
celebrate the anniversary and review the situation.
• Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has made proposals to reform the United Nations since beginning his
term in January 2017. In A speech in September 2017 he said “Our shared objective is a 21st century UN
focused more on people and less on process…more on delivery and less on bureaucracy.”
1.12. INDIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

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Founding Member: Since 1945

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Peacekeeping: Historically largest troop contributor. 43 mission participations. Currently third largest
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• Decolonisation: India was the co-sponsor of the landmark 1960 Declaration on UN on Granting of
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Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. India was also elected the first chair of the
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Decolonization Committee (Committee of 24) where its ceaseless efforts to put an end to colonialism are
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well on record.
• Apartheid: Key role against the regime In South Africa: In fact, India was the first country to raise the issue
in the UN (in 1946) and played a leading role in the formation of a Sub-Committee against Apartheid set up
by the General Assembly. When the Convention on Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination was
adopted in 1965, India was among the earliest signatories.
• Terrorism: With the objective of providing a comprehensible legal framework to counter terrorism India
took the initiative to pilot a draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) in 1996 and
continues to work for its early adoption
• Financial Contribution: With 0.7 percent of UN budge, India’s contribution is 24th largest.

• India’s status as a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 cemented its
position within the UN system as a leading advocate of the concerns and aspirations of developing countries
and the creation of a more equitable international economic and political order.
• India strongly believes that the United Nations and the norms of international relations that it has
fostered remain the most efficacious means for tackling today's global challenges.
1.12.1. UN REFORMS AND INDIA
• India is today at the forefront of efforts on UN reform, including expansion of the Security Council in both
the permanent and nonpermanent categories to reflect contemporary realities.
• India supports an increase in the number of both permanent and non-permanent members. Its
representatives have argued that the activities of the Security Council have greatly expanded in the past few
years. The success of the Security Council’s actions depends upon the political support of the international
community.
• India has suggested that the UN reforms need to be “broad-based and all-encompassing” and the changes
should not be restricted to its secretariat only.
• India has been a member of the Security Council during 1950-51, 1967-68, 1972-73, 1977-78, l984-85, 1991-
92, and lastly, 2011-12
• The 193 member-United Nations adopted a consensus resolution in its 69 th General Assembly on
September 14, 2015 to move from Inter-Governmental Negotiations (IGN) to a Text-Based Negotiations
(TBN) process for reforming the United Nations Security Council.
1.12.2. INDIA’S CASE OF PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
• India itself also wishes to be a permanent member in a restructured UN. Following arguments can be put
forth in Support of India’s claim;
o India is the second most populous country in the world comprising almost one-fifth of the world
population.
o Moreover, India is also the world’s largest democracy.
o India has participated in virtually all of the initiatives of the UN.
o Its role in the UN’s peacekeeping efforts is a long and substantial one.
o The country’s economic emergence on the world stage is another factor that perhaps justifies India’s
claim to a permanent seat in the Security Council.
o India has also made regular financial contributions to the UN and never faltered on its payments.
o Its military strength and responsible behaviour in terms of nuclear proliferation also bolster its claims
• India is aware that permanent membership of the Security Council also has symbolic importance. It
signifies a country’s growing importance in world affairs. This greater status is an advantage to a country in
the conduct of its foreign policy: the reputation for being powerful makes one more influential.
• India coordinates its position on the expansion of Security Council along with other claimants for a
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permanent membership such as Brazil, Germany and Japan in group called G-4.
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• Despite India’s wish to be a permanent veto-wielding member of the UN, some countries question its
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inclusion. Neighboring Pakistan, with which India has troubled relations, is not the only country that is
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reluctant to see India become a permanent veto member of the Security Council. Some countries, for
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instance, are concerned about India’s nuclear weapons capabilities. These views find common cause in the
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coalition known as Uniting for Consensus or the Coffee club, which apart from Italy and Pakistan also
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includes Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Malta, Mexico, San Marino, Spain, South Korea, and Turkey.
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1.13. THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION

• The Permanent Court of Arbitration, established convention of 1899, is an intergovernmental organisation
providing a variety of dispute resolution services to the international community. The 1899 convention was
revised in 1907.
• The PCA has 121 Contracting Parties (States) which have acceded to one or both of the PCA's founding
conventions.
• The PCA has a three-part organisational structure consisting of an Administrative Council that oversees its
policies and budgets, a panel of independent potential arbitrators known as the Members of the Court, and

its Secretariat, known as the International Bureau, headed by the Secretary-General.
• The PCA provides administrative support in international arbitrations involving various combinations of
states, state entities, international organisations and private parties.
• The PCA’s functions are not limited to arbitration and also include providing support in other forms of
peaceful resolution of international disputes, including mediation, conciliation, and other forms of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR).
• The PCA is available to provide administrative support in fact-finding commissions of inquiry involving
various combinations of states, state entities, international organisations and private parties.
• The Secretary-General of the PCA may be called upon to act as the appointing authority, or to designate
another appointing authority, for the appointment of arbitrators under the PCA’s Rules of Procedure, the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, or other rules of procedure.
1.14. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

The International Criminal Court (ICC) investigates and, where warranted, tries individuals charged with the
gravest crimes of concern to the international community: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and
the crime of aggression.
• The treaty known as Rome Statute signed in 1998, effective since 2002, officially established the ICC.
• The court is unique as it was created by a treaty and not by the UN. The ICC tries individuals and not
countries or organisations, for four crimes:
o Genocide,
o war crimes,
o crime against humanity and
o crime of aggression (once the 2010 amendment to Rome statute comes into effect).
• It does not have retrospective powers.
• It has jurisdiction:
o on the territory State parties and countries that have accepted the jurisdiction
o in other countries if crime are committed by the national’s of the state parties or the countries that have
accepted the jurisdiction,
o in other countries if crimes were referred to by the UNSC, pursuant to a resolution adopted under
chapter VII of the UN charter.
• ICC does not replace national courts but complements them. As a court of last resort it only prosecutes
cases only when the country is either unwilling or unable to prosecute
• The Rome Statute created Court, trust fund for victims, and Assembly of State Parties
• It has four organs- Presidency, Judicial divisions with 18 Judges divided in three division- pre trial, trial and
appeals, Office of Prosecutor, Registry.
• The Court has a cooperation agreement with the United Nations
• Countries such as India and the United States, are not members of the ICC.
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1.15. THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS: IMF AND THE WORLD BANK
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• The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were both created at an international
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conference convened in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, United States in July 1944. These are also
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• They share the same goal of raising living standards in their member countries.
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• Their approaches to this goal are complementary,

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o with the IMF focusing on macroeconomic issues and

o the World Bank concentrating on long-term economic development and poverty reduction
• Both Institutions are based in Washington D.C., United States
• Both institutions include 189 members countries and have vast operations around the world.
• Both have attracted criticism for being run by just a small number of economically powerful countries (USA
and Europe). These countries choose the leadership and senior management, and so their interests
dominate, despite the fact that the main borrowers from the World Bank and IMF are developing countries.
• The long-standing arrangement, under which the IMF is usually led by a European, while the World Bank is
led by an American, has also been called into question.
1.15.1 INTERNATIONAL MONITORY FUND
• The IMF’s mandate. The IMF promotes international monetary cooperation and provides policy
advice and capacity development support to help countries build and maintain strong economies.
• The IMF also makes loans and helps countries design policy programs to solve balance of payments
problems when sufficient financing on affordable terms cannot be obtained to meet net international
payments.
• IMF loans are short and medium term and funded mainly by the pool of quota contributions that its
members provide.
• IMF staff primarily constitutes of economists with wide experience in macroeconomic and financial policies.
• The SDR is an international reserve asset, created by the IMF in 1969 to supplement its member countries’
official reserves. SDRs can be exchanged for freely usable currencies. The value of the SDR is based on a
basket of five major currencies—the US dollar, the euro, the Chinese renminbi (RMB), the Japanese yen,
and the British pound sterling.
• Quotas: A member country's quota determines its maximum financial commitment to the IMF, its voting
power, and has a bearing on its access to IMF financing. When a country joins the IMF, it is assigned an
initial quota in the same range as the quotas of existing members of broadly comparable economic size and
characteristics. Quotas are denominated in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), the IMF’s unit of account.
• The largest member of the IMF is the United States, with a current quota (as of March 2017) of SDR82.99
billion (about US$118 billion) and 17.46 % of vote, and the smallest member is Tuvalu, with a quota of
SDR2.5 million (about US$3.5 million).
• India has a quota of 3,114.4 million SDRs, 2.76% of vote.
• The IMF is accountable to its member country governments. At the top of its organizational structure is the
Board of Governors , consisting of one governor and one alternate governor from each member country,
usually the top officials from the central bank or finance ministry.
• For India, Minister of Finance acts as the Governor and the RBI governor acts as alternate governor
• Since July 2011 IMF managing director is Christine Lagarde of France. She is the first woman to head the IMF
in organisation's history.
1.15.1.1. Reforms
• Though developing countries hold less than half the overall quota at the moment, with their rapidly
increasing economic heft they have demanded a greater share — with limited success.
• The 15th General Review of Quotas (GRQ), the most recent attempt to revise the size and composition of
the system, was to be completed by October 2017, but the deadline has now been extended to 2019.
• This follows the poor precedent set by the long delay in adoption in 2016 of the previous GRQ (originally
approved in 2010). That had doubled the overall size of the quotas to $659 billion (from $329 billion) while
allotting an additional 6% of quotas to the developing world. In this round voting powers at the IMF had
been revised to increase the voice of developing countries, notably China, Brazil, India, South Korea and
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• The developing world is looking beyond the short-term crisis management tools that the IMF, as the sole
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international lender of last resort, has traditionally offered them for decades now — albeit in an
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• With the rise of competing global institutions ready to meet the capital needs of the developing world, the
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patience of countries such as India may be tested more easily.

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1.15.2. THE WORLD BANK

• Together, IBRD and IDA make up the World Bank.
• The World Bank’s mandate: The World Bank promotes long-term economic development and poverty
reduction by providing technical and financial support to help countries reform certain sectors or
implement specific projects—such as building schools and health centers, providing water and electricity,
fighting disease, and protecting the environment.
• World Bank assistance is generally long term and is funded both by member country contributions and
through bond issuance.
• World Bank staff are often specialists on particular issues, sectors, or techniques.
• In 2010 voting powers at the World Bank were revised to increase the voice of developing countries, notably
China. The countries with most voting power are now the United States (15.85%), Japan (6.84%), China
(4.42%), Germany (4.00%), the United Kingdom (3.75%), France (3.75%), India (2.91%), Russia (2.77%), Saudi
Arabia (2.77%) and Italy (2.64%).
• Jim Yong Kim from the United States was chosen as the new president of the World Bank in April 2012.
1.15.2.1. Five Institutions, One Group
The World Bank Group consists of five organisations:
• The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
o The IBRD lends to governments of middle-income and creditworthy low-income countries.
• The International Development Association (IDA)
o The IDA provides interest-free loans — called credits — and grants to governments of the poorest
countries.
• The International Finance Corporation (IFC)
o IFC is the largest global development institution focused exclusively on the private sector. It helps
developing countries achieve sustainable growth by financing investment, mobilizing capital in
international financial markets, and providing advisory services to businesses and governments.
• The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
o MIGA was created in 1988 to promote foreign direct investment into developing countries to support
economic growth, reduce poverty, and improve people’s lives. MIGA fulfills this mandate by offering
political risk insurance (guarantees) to investors and lenders.
• The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
o The ICSID provides international facilities for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes.
1.16. WASHINGTON CONSENSUS

• This is a set of neoliberal economic prescriptions made by the International Monetary Fund, the World
Bank, and the U.S. Treasury to developing countries that faced economic crises.
• It recommended structural reforms that increased the role of market forces in exchange for immediate
financial help.
• The term was coined by British economist John Williamson in 1989.
• Philosophy: the operation of the free market and the reduction of state involvement are crucial to
development in the global South.
• While some said that the Washington Consensus was used to impose harsh conditions that were
unhelpful for economic recovery, others have argued that although not perfect, it was favourable to long-
term economic growth in developing economies.
• By the late 1990s it was becoming clear that the results of the Washington Consensus were far from
optimal.
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Increasing criticism led to a change in approach that shifted the focus away from a view of development
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as simply economic growth and toward poverty reduction and the need for participation by both
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developing-country governments and civil society. That change of direction came to be known as the post-
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Washington Consensus.
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1.17. THE WTO

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• Formed in 1995 after the Uruguay Round to replace the replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs and
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Trade (GATT), which commenced in 1948.

• Its secretariat is in Geneva. WTO Director General is Roberto Azevedo
• The WTO has over 160 members representing 98 per cent of world trade. Over 20 countries are seeking to
join the WTO.
• The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is the only global international organisation dealing with the rules of
trade between nations.
• At the heart of the system — known as the multilateral trading system — are the WTO’s agreements,
negotiated and signed by a large majority of the world’s trading nations, and ratified in their parliaments.
The goal is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible.
• The WTO's top decision-making body is the Ministerial Conference (MC).
• The latest ministerial conference, MC-11, was held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, from 10 to 13 December
2017.The Conference ended with a number of ministerial decisions, including on fisheries subsidies and e-
commerce duties, and a commitment to continue negotiations in all areas.
• Below this is the General Council (normally ambassadors and heads of delegation in Geneva, but sometimes
officials sent from members’ capitals) which meets several times a year in the Geneva headquarters. The
General Council also meets as the Trade Policy Review Body and the Dispute Settlement Body.
1.17.1. THE WTO MANDATE
• There are a number of ways of looking at the WTO:
o It’s an organisation for liberalizing trade.
o It’s a forum for governments to negotiate trade agreements.
o It’s a place for them to settle trade disputes.
o It operates a system of trade rules.
• Above all, it’s a negotiating forum. Essentially, the WTO is a place where member governments go, to try to
sort out the trade problems they face with each other. The first step is to talk.
• The bulk of the WTO's current work comes from the 1986-94 negotiations called the Uruguay Round and
earlier negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
• The WTO is currently hosting negotiations, under the “Doha Development Agenda” launched in 2001.
1.17.2. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
• Resolving trade disputes is one of the core activities of the WTO.
• A dispute arises when a member government believes another member government is violating an
agreement or a commitment that it has made in the WTO. The WTO has one of the most active
international dispute settlement mechanisms in the world.
• Since 1995, over 500 disputes have been brought to the WTO and over 350 rulings have been issued.
1.17.2.1 The Mechanism
• Settling disputes is the responsibility of the Dispute Settlement Body (the General Council in another guise),
which consists of all WTO members. The Dispute Settlement Body has the sole authority to establish
“panels” of experts to consider the case, and to accept or reject the panels’ findings or the results of an
appeal. It monitors the implementation of the rulings and recommendations, and has the power to
authorize retaliation when a country does not comply with a ruling.
• First stage: consultation (up to 60 days). Before taking any other actions the countries in dispute have to talk
to each other to see if they can settle their differences by themselves. If that fails, they can also ask the WTO
director-general to mediate or try to help in any other way.
• Second stage: the panel (up to 45 days for a panel to be appointed, plus 6 months for the panel to
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conclude). If consultations fail, the complaining country can ask for a panel to be appointed. The country
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“in the dock” can block the creation of a panel once, but when the Dispute Settlement Body meets for a
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second time, the appointment can no longer be blocked (unless there is a consensus against appointing the
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• Third Stage: Appeal-Either side can appeal a panel’s ruling. Sometimes both sides do so. Appeals have to be
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new issues.
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• Each appeal is heard by three members of a permanent seven-member Appellate Body set up by the
Dispute Settlement Body and broadly representing the range of WTO membership. Members of the
Appellate Body have four-year terms. They have to be individuals with recognized standing in the field of
law and international trade, not affiliated with any government.

1.17.3. THE DOHA ROUND
• The Doha Round is the latest round of trade negotiations among the WTO membership.
• Its aim is to achieve major reform of the international trading system through the introduction of lower
trade barriers and revised trade rules.
• The work programme covers about 20 areas of trade. The Round is also known semi-officially as the Doha
Development Agenda as a fundamental objective is to improve the trading prospects of developing
countries.
• The Round was officially launched at the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in
November 2001. The Doha Ministerial Declaration provided the mandate for the negotiations, including on
agriculture, services and an intellectual property topic, which began earlier.
• In Doha, ministers also approved a decision on how to address the problems developing countries face
in implementing the current WTO agreements.
1.17.4. KEY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES: DEVELOPED VERSUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
• The WTO's efforts have increased global trade expansion, but a side effect has been a negative impact on
local communities and human rights.
• Advocates of the WTO consider the stimulation of free trade and a decline in trade disputes as beneficial to
the global economy. Critics of the WTO point to the decline in domestic industries and increasing foreign
influence in some cases as negative impacts on the world economy.
• The Doha Development round remains incomplete and multiple issues are pending.
• The mini-ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) New Delhi (March 19-20, 2018) was
an attempt to rejuvenate the spirit of negotiations that have been pending for long between the developed
and the developing countries. It indicated that there remains key difference s between the developed and
developing countries on prioritising issues for negotiations at WTO
• The issue that was central to this mini-ministerial is the debate on agricultural trade. India has made it
amply clear through various rounds of Doha Development Agenda that agriculture being the mainstay of the
food security and livelihood for developing countries, settlement on agricultural trade is important for
multilateralism to succeed.
• It is key to understand the intricacies of agricultural trade and how this trade is currently highly
asymmetrical in nature and needs to be settled in a manner that provides a level-playing field to the
developing countries. Agricultural trade needs to be understood in the perspective of market access,
domestic subsidy and export competition, which are the main planks of this contentious issue.
• From the perspective developing of countries, the key issues that need to be settled are the designation of
Special Products (SP) and the agreement over the coverage of Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM). The
developing countries want to designate a set of SPs, which are critical from the viewpoint of their food
security, livelihood and rural development. In addition, the SSM may be available to them as a defence
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against a sudden surge in imports or the fall in international commodity prices. At the Hong Kong ministerial
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in 2005, WTO members in principle agreed to these demands.

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The developing countries argue that the slow implementation of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) has
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resulted in a negative impact on food security, livelihood and rural development in poor countries, as it has
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enhanced exports from the developed countries rather than promoting imports by them.
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The motive of the developed countries is to bring in new issues such as e-commerce, micro, small and
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medium enterprises, investment facilitation, etc, to the fold of the WTO negotiations. The developed
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countries are interested to ignore the so-called Doha Development Agenda and include other trade issues
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that are of primary importance to them and will provide better trade gains to the developed economies.
1.17.5. TRIPS
• "Intellectual property" refers to creations of the mind. These creations can take many different forms,
such as artistic expressions, signs, symbols and names used in commerce, designs and inventions.
Governments grant creators the right to prevent others from using their inventions, designs or other
creations — and to use that right to negotiate payment in return for others using them. These are
“intellectual property rights”.

• The WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), negotiated during
the 1986-94 Uruguay Round, It is adhered by all member of the WTO and is effective since 1995.
• Introduced intellectual property rules into the multilateral trading system for the first time. The TRIPS
Agreement covers five broad areas:
o how general provisions and basic principles of the multilateral trading system apply to international
intellectual property
o what the minimum standards of protection are for intellectual property rights that members should
provide
o which procedures members should provide for the enforcement of those rights in their own territories
o how to settle disputes on intellectual property between members of the WTO special transitional
arrangements for the implementation of TRIPS provisions.
1.18. UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL)

• Established in 1966, it is a subsidiary body of the General Assembly of the United Nations with the general
mandate to further the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of international trade.
• It is the core legal body of the United Nations system in the field of international trade law. The issues
dealt with by the WTO and UNCITRAL are different.
• The WTO deals with trade policy issues, such as trade liberalization, abolition of trade barriers, unfair
trade practices or other similar issues usually related to public law, whereas UNCITRAL deals with the laws
applicable to private parties in international transactions. As a consequence, UNCITRAL is not involved with
"state-to-state" issues such as anti-dumping, countervailing duties, or import quotas.
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1.19. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB)
• Based in Manila, Philippines it opened on 19 December 1966
• ADB assists its members, and partners, by providing loans, technical assistance, grants, and equity
investments to promote social and economic development.
• From 31 members at its establishment in 1966, ADB has grown to encompass 67 members—of which 48 are
from within Asia and the Pacific and 19 outside.
• India has been a member of ADB since its inception in 1966.
1.20. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD)

• Established in 1961 the OECD is based in Paris and has 35 members
• The OECD's origins date back to 1960, when 18 European countries plus the United States and Canada joined
forces to create an organisation dedicated to economic development. Today its membership spans North
and South America to Europe and Asia-Pacific. They include many of the world’s most advanced countries
but also emerging countries like Mexico, Chile and Turkey.
• The mission of the OECD is to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of
people around the world.
• In May 2007, the Council, meeting at ministerial level, invited the Secretariat to strengthen OECD
cooperation with Brazil, India, Indonesia, the People's Republic of China and South Africa through
"Enhanced Engagement" programmes.
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2. BRICS: BRAZIL, RUSSIA, INDIA, CHINA AND SOUTH
AFRICA
• BRICS brings together five major emerging economies, comprising 43% of the world population, having 37%
of the world GDP and 17% share in the world trade.
• The acronym BRIC was first used in 2001 by Goldman Sachs in their Global Economics Paper, "The World
Needs Better Economic BRICs" on the basis of econometric analyses projecting that the four economies
would individually and collectively occupy far greater economic space and would be amongst the world's
largest economies in the next 50 years or so.
• As a formal grouping, BRIC started after the meeting of the Leaders of Russia, India and China in St.
Petersburg on the margins of G8-Outreach Summit in July 2006. The grouping was formalized during the 1st
meeting of BRIC Foreign Ministers on the margins of UNGA in New York in September 2006.
2.1. BRIC TO BRICS

• The 1st BRIC Summit was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, on 16 June 2009. The Yekaterinburg summit’s final
resolution outlined the group’s preference for multilateralism and multipolar world, with UN playing a
central role in dealing with global challenges and threats”.
• It was agreed to expand BRIC into BRICS with the inclusion of South Africa at the BRIC Foreign Minister’s
meeting in New York in September 2010.
• South Africa attended the 3rd BRICS Summit in Sanya on 14 April 2011.
• The inclusion of South Africa affirmed its political ambitions & its desire for gaining greater political
legitimacy by roping in the largest economy of Africa. South Africa’s inclusion cannot be explained on the
basis of economic consideration given the relatively small size of its economy as compared to other
members.
• Nine BRICS Summits have taken place so far. The 8th BRICS Summit was hosted by India during its
Chairmanship in 2016. the 9th Summit took Place in Xiamen, China and the 10th Summit is slated to take
place in Johannesburg, South Africa.
• This desire for a multipolar world and reforming multilateral institutions took the concrete form for
reforming international financial institutions to “reflect changes in the global economy” & that “emerging
and developing economies must have a greater voice and representation in international financial
institutions whose heads should be appointed through an open, transparent & merit based process”.
2.2. THE NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK

• At the fourth BRICS Summit in New Delhi (2012), the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
considered the possibility of setting up a new Development Bank to mobilize resources for infrastructure
and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging economies, as well as in developing
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• At the fifth BRICS summit in Durban (2013), the leaders agreed on the feasibility of establishing the New
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Development Bank and made the decision to do so. It was also agreed that the initial contribution to the
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Bank should be substantial and sufficient for it to be effective in financing infrastructure.

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• During the sixth BRICS Summit in Fortaleza (2014), the leaders signed the Agreement establishing the New
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Development Bank (NDB).

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• In the Fortaleza Declaration, the leaders stressed that the NDB will strengthen cooperation among BRICS
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and will supplement the efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global development,
thus contributing to collective commitments for achieving the goal of strong, sustainable and balanced
growth.
• Fortaleza Declaration provided that:
o The Bank shall have an initial authorized capital of US$ 100 billion.
o The initial subscribed capital shall be US$ 50 billion, equally shared among founding members.
o The first chair of the Board of Governors shall be from Russia.
o The first chair of the Board of Directors shall be from Brazil.
o The first President of the Bank shall be from India.
o The headquarters of the Bank shall be located in Shanghai.
o The New Development Bank Africa Regional Center shall be established in South Africa concurrently with
the headquarters.
• More than the establishment of the NDB, the Fortaleza Declaration is remarkable for adoption of ‘one-
nation one-vote’ prescription for the proposed bank.
• In comparison the Bretton-Woods institutions — the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund —
have structures that aren’t equitable, to say the least.
• The inaugural meeting of the Board of Governors of the NDB was chaired by Russia and held on the eve of
the Ufa Summit on 7 July 2015, when the Bank formally came into existence as a legal entity. During the
meeting, the appointment of the President, Mr. K.V. Kamath, as well as four Vice Presidents and the Board
of Directors took place.
• With the Headquarters being setup in Shanghai China, on 27 February 2016, the NDB became fully
operational.
• The Bank has committed USD$1.5 billion in loans to member countries so far, with a strong emphasis on
renewable energy. Furthermore, plans are on track to reach the target $2.5 billion of loan commitments by
end of 2017. This will pave the way to reach between $10 billion and 15 billion of loans by 2021.
• The creation of the NDB happened in the context of a real and continuing power shift in the international
system from the developed industrialized world towards emerging market economies.
2.3. CONTINGENCY RELIEF ARRANGEMENT (CRA)

o The Durban summit (2013) announced the setting up of a US$100 billion contingency relief arrangement
(CRA).
o China would is the largest contributor, contributing US$ 41billion, while Brazil, India & Russia contribute
US$ 18 billion each and South Africa contribute the remaining US$ 5 billion.
o The aim of CRA would be to “forestall short term liquidity pressures, provide mutual support & further
strengthen financial stability” of these countries.
2.4. INDIA’S APPROACH

• India hosted the 8th BRICS Summit during its Chairmanship from 15-16 October 2016 in Goa. The theme of
India’s BRICS Chairmanship is Building Responsive, Inclusive and Collective Solutions.
• During India’s BRICS Chairmanship, five-pronged approach:
o Institution building to further deepen, sustain and institutionalise BRICS cooperation;
o Implementation of the decisions from previous Summits;
o Integrating the existing cooperation mechanisms;
o Innovation, i.e., new cooperation mechanisms; and
o Continuity, i.e., continuation of mutually agreed existing BRICS cooperation mechanisms.
• In short, the Indian approach towards its BRICS Chairmanship could be captured by ‘IIIIC or I4C’.
2.5. SIGNIFICANCE AND CHALLENGES

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While some are skeptical about the BRICS formation, there is no doubt that this group of countries along
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global economy. The contribution of BRICS countries to global GDP has increased from 8% in 2000 to 24% in
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2017. Being home to 43% of the world’s population, three of the BRICS economies are ranked in the top 10
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by GDP size, namely China (2nd), India (7th) and Brazil (9th).
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• Each of these emerging economies are presently on divergent growth paths, which in turn translate into
differing priorities and the lack of a unified agenda.
• Nevertheless, since these five countries cumulatively hold considerable weight in global economics and
politics, their continuing engagement serves well for stable growth prospects in the regions they encompass.
• This is why overcoming individual ambitions is a prerequisite if the trends toward deepening through
institutionalization (via the year-old New Development Bank and the proposed ratings agency) are to
actually materialize.
• In that sense, it makes more sense for the BRICS quintet to subscribe to a well-defined economic scope to
avoid getting caught in the quagmire of geopolitical rhetoric.

• Though such a mandate would be necessarily limited, seeking exclusively to promote investments and
commercial collaboration, they would also invariably reflect the dynamism of these five powerful
economies.
2.6. THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK (AIIB)

• A Chinese initiative, the AIIB is a multilateral development bank with a mission to improve social and
economic outcomes in Asia and beyond.
• Headquartered in Beijing, it commenced operations in January 2016 and has now grown to 84 approved
members from around the world.
• The Bank has an authorised capital of USD 100 billion.
• China is the largest shareholder with 26.06 per cent voting shares in the bank. India is the second largest
shareholder with 7.5 per cent followed by Russia 5.93 per cent and Germany with 4.5 per cent.
• It lent $1.7 billion in 2016, which increased to $2.5 billion in 2017.
• India is the first country where the Bank has committed more than $1 billion of financing.
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3. IBSA FORUM
• IBSA is a unique tripartite forum which brings together India, Brazil and South Africa, three large
democracies and major economies from three different continents, facing similar challenges. All three
countries are developing, pluralistic, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious nations.
• The idea of establishing IBSA was discussed at a meeting between the then Prime Minister of India and
the then Presidents of Brazil and South Africa in Evian on 2 June 2003 on the margins of the G-8 Summit.
• The grouping was formalized and named the IBSA Dialogue Forum when the Foreign Ministers of the three
countries met in Brasilia on 6 June 2003 and issued the Brasilia Declaration.
• Cooperation in IBSA is on three fronts:
o first, as a forum for consultation and coordination on global and regional political issues, such as, the
reform of the global institutions of political and economic governance, WTO/Doha Development
Agenda, climate change, terrorism etc.;
o second, trilateral collaboration on concrete areas/projects, through fourteen working groups and six
People-to-People Forums, for the common benefit of three countries; and
o third, assisting other developing countries by taking up projects in the latter through IBSA Fund.
3.1. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

3.1.1. JOINT WORKING GROUPS
• Joint Working Groups to promote sectoral cooperation have been established. There are 14 Joint Working
Groups in areas, Transport; Health; Education; Defence; Science & Technology; Trade & Investment; Culture;
Agriculture; Energy; Public Administration and Governance, Revenue Administration, Human Settlement,
Environment and Social Development.
3.1.2. PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE FORUMS
• There are six People-to-People Forums under IBSA. These are, Parliamentary Forum, Women's Forum,
Academic Forum, Local Governance Forum, Business Forum, and Editors' Forum. There is also a Tri-nation
Forum on MSME.
3.1.3. FOCAL POINTS
• Senior Officials from the Foreign Offices of the three countries dealing with IBSA are the designated Focal
Points; Secretary (West), assisted by Joint Secretary (MER), Ministry of External Affairs, is the IBSA Focal
Point for India. Focal Points meet once a year for a standalone meeting and also meet prior to the Trilateral
Commission.
3.1.4. TRILATERAL COMMISSION
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The Brasilia Declaration established a Trilateral Commission at the level of Foreign Ministers. The
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Commission meets regularly; the first meeting of the Trilateral Commission was held in New Delhi on 4 - 5
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March 2004. In addition, Foreign Ministers meet regularly before every IBSA Summit as well as on the
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3.1.5. SUMMITS
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• Five IBSA Summit have been held so far: 1st IBSA Summit in Brasilia on 13 September 2006; the 2nd in
South Africa on 17 October 2007, the 3rd in New Delhi on 15 October 2008, 4th in Brasilia on 15 April 2010
and the 5th in Pretoria on 18 October 2011.
3.1.6. IBSA FUND
• An innovative work of IBSA is the establishment of IBSA Facility Fund for Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger
through which development projects are executed with IBSA funding in fellow developing countries. An
annual amount of US $ 1 million is contributed by each IBSA member country. IBSA Fund received the 2010
MDG Award for South-South cooperation on 17 September 2010 in New York recognizing the work of the

three countries in using innovative approaches to share development experiences in other parts of the
world.
3.1.7. IBSA BUSINESS FORUM
• An IBSA Business Forum was launched in Cape Town in March 2005. From India, CII, FICCI and ASSOCHAM
are represented on the Council; CII coordinates India's participation.
• IBSA has also nitiated a trilateral Naval Exercise since 2008
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4. ORGANISATION OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING
COUNTRIES (OPEC)
• OPEC is a permanent intergovernmental organization of 14 oil-exporting developing nations that
coordinates and unifies the petroleum policies of its Member Countries.
• It was established at the Baghdad Conference on September 10–14, 1960
• OPEC Secretariat located in Vienna, Austria, it also functions as the Headquarters of the Organization. The
Secretariat was originally established in 1961 in Geneva, Switzerland. In April 1965 it was shifted to Vienna.
5. THE ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION

(OIC)
• OIC is inter-governmental organization with a membership of 57 states spread over four continents. It was
established in 1969.
• Its headquarters is in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
• The Organization is the collective voice of the Muslim world. It endeavors to safeguard and protect the
interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony among various
people of the world.
6. THE COMMONWEALTH
• Formed through the 'London Declaration‘adopted in 1949 which agreed that all member countries would
be "freely and equally associated". It also meant the adjective 'British' was junked. The declaration stated
the Commonwealth members were "free and equal members of the Commonwealth of Nations, freely co-
operating in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress”.
• It has 53 members, prominent ones inculde India, Canada, Australia, The UK etc.
• Commonwealth Secretariat in London was set up in 1965. The Commonwealth is represented by the
secretariat at the UN General Assembly as an observer.
• The Secretary-General is elected by Commonwealth heads of government for a maximum of two four year
terms.
• In 1971, the Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting ( CHOGM) process was set up and the
meetings of the Commonwealth heads of governments, which until then only took place in the UK, travelled
out of London. The first CHOGM was held in Singapore in 1971.
• A CHOGM has a two tier format - a) Executive Sessions, where the the heads of government interact in a
more formal manner and they make statements, and are accompanied by ministers or officials, and (b) a
Retreat, where the heads of government interact informally with their counterparts without the presence of
any aides.
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The Commonwealth has no written constitution, members reach decisions through consultations.
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• The 14 points Singapore Declaration dedicated the members to the principles of world peace, liberty,
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India, the Commonwealth's largest member state, has once hosted CHOGM. New Delhi was the venue for
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India is the fourth largest contributor to the Commonwealth budget but has played an important role in
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• Next Summit CHOGM, is Scheduled to be held in London in April 2018.

7. IMPORTANT GROUPINGS
7.1. G-20
• G-20 the Group of Twenty was established in 1999 as a forum in which major advanced and emerging
economies discuss discuss global financial and economic matters
• The G20 membership comprises a mix of the world’s largest advanced and emerging economies,
representing about two-thirds of the world’s population, 85 per cent of global gross domestic product and
over 75 per cent of global trade.
• The objectives of the G20 are:
o Policy coordination between its members in order to achieve global economic stability, sustainable
growth;
o To promote financial regulations that reduce risks and prevent future financial crises; and
o To create a new international financial architecture.
• The members of the G20 are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia,
Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the
United States and the European Union.
• Since its inception, it has held annual Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meetings and more
recently Summits of Heads of State.
• G20 was raised to the Summit level in 2008 to address the global financial and economic crisis of 2008.
• G-20 leaders Summits have been held in Washington in 2008 and in London and Pittsburgh in 2009. 2017 it
was held in Hamburg Germany.
• The G20 Presidency rotates annually according to a system that ensures a regional balance over time.
Reflecting its nature as an informal political forum, the G20 does not have a permanent secretariat.
Instead, the G20 president is responsible for bringing together the G20 agenda in consultation with other
members and in response to developments in the global economy.
• To ensure continuity, the presidency is supported by a “troika” made up of the current, immediate past and
next host countries. The Current Troika is China, Germany and Argentina.
• India hosted a meeting of G20 finance ministers and central bank governors in 2002.
• The preparatory process for the G20 Summit is conducted through the established Sherpa and Finance
tracks that prepare and follow up on the issues and commitments adopted at the Summits.
• The Sherpas’ Track or development track focuses on non-economic and financial issues, such as
development, anti-corruption and food security, while addressing internal aspects such as procedural rules
of the G20 process. The Sherpas carry out important planning, negotiation and implementation tasks
continuously.
• The Finance Track focuses on economic and financial issues. The Sherpa and Finance tracks both rely on the
technical and substantive work of a series of expert working groups.
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• Established in 1975 as G-5 (France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the USA).
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Subsequently expanded as the G-7 to include Canada (1976) and Italy (1978) and the G-8 to include Russian
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• However Russia was ejected from the G8 political forum in March 2014 following the Russian annexation of
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Crimea, thus again becoming G-7.

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• TheG-7 conducts semi-formal collaboration on world economic problems.

• Government leaders meet in annual G-7 Summits, while Finance ministers and/or their leading officials
periodically hold other consultations.

7.3. G-77
• Established in 1964 by a group of 77 developing countries in the United Nations.
• It is the largest intergovernmental grouping of developing countries in the UN. Established on 15 June
1964, the group today has 134 members including India.
• Still in existence the G-77 aims to promote collective economic interests, mutual cooperation for
development and negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues within the United
Nations system.
• Since January 2018, Egypt is the new Chair for the group.
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8. QUESTIONS FROM PREVIOUS YEARS
• The World Bank and the IMF, collectively known as the Bretton Woods Institutions, are the two inter-
governmental pillars supporting the structure of the world’s economic and financial order. Superficially, the
World Bank and the IMF exhibit many common characteristics, yet their role, functions and mandate are
distinctly different. Elucidate. (2013/ 200 words/10/ GS2)
• India has recently signed to become a founding member of New Development Bank (NDB) and also the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). How will the role of the two Banks be different? Discuss the strategic
significance of these two Banks for India. (2014/ 200 words/ 12.5/ GS2)
• WTO is an important international institution where decisions taken affect countries in a profound manner.
What is the mandate of WTO and how binding are their decisions? Critically analyse India’s stand on the
latest round of talks on food security. (2014/200 words/ 12.5/GS2).
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VISION IAS
www.visionias.in
LECTURE-15
KEY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. TREATIES/ CONVENTIONS/ PROTOCOLS/ AGREEMENTS ....................................................................................... 3
2. GLOBAL COMMONS................................................................................................................................................ 4
2.1. United Nations Convention on The Laws of The Sea (UNCLOS) ...................................................................... 4
2.2. UNCLOS Maritime Zones ................................................................................................................................. 4
2.2.1. Territorial Sea ........................................................................................................................................... 4
2.2.2. Contiguous Zone ....................................................................................................................................... 5
2.2.3. Exclusive Economic Zone .......................................................................................................................... 5
2.2.4. Continental Shelf ...................................................................................................................................... 5
2.2.5. High Seas .................................................................................................................................................. 5
2.2.6. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) ....................................................................... 6
2.2.7. Ocean Garbage Patches: A Case for Multilateral Action .......................................................................... 6
2.3. The Outer Space Treaty ................................................................................................................................... 7
2.4. The Antarctica Treaty ...................................................................................................................................... 7
2.5. The Arctic Council ............................................................................................................................................ 8
2.6. Atmosphere ..................................................................................................................................................... 9
2.6.1. UNFCCC ..................................................................................................................................................... 9
2.6.2. COP21 ..................................................................................................................................................... 10
2.7. The International Solar Alliance .................................................................................................................... 11
2.8. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) .................................................................................. 11
2.9. Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP)..................................................................... 11
2.10. International Energy Agency (IEA) ............................................................................................................... 12
2.11. Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21) .............................................................. 12
3. SECURITY............................................................................................................................................................... 13
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3.1. India’s Nuclear Policy..................................................................................................................................... 13

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3.2. MECR ............................................................................................................................................................. 13

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3.2.1. Wassenaar Arrangement ........................................................................................................................ 13

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3.2.2. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) ....................................................................................................... 14

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3.2.3. The Australia Group (AG)........................................................................................................................ 14

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3.2.4. MTCR ...................................................................................................................................................... 14

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3.3. The NPT.......................................................................................................................................................... 14

3.3.1. NPT Review Conferences ........................................................................................................................ 15
3.4. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) .......................................................................................... 15
3.5. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons ............................................................................................ 15
3.6. Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty....................................................................................................................... 15
3.7. Disarmament miscelleneous ......................................................................................................................... 16
3.7.1. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) .................................................... 16
3.8. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ........................................................................................... 16
3.9. Nuclear Security Summit ............................................................................................................................... 17
3.10. Terrorism ..................................................................................................................................................... 17
3.10.1. International Efforts ............................................................................................................................. 17
3.10.2. Four Pillars of Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy ............................................................................... 18
3.10.3. Key UN Steps ........................................................................................................................................ 18
3.10.4. Security Council Counter Terrorism Committee .................................................................................. 18
3.10.5. Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism ........................................................................................... 18
3.10.6. Key Conventions ................................................................................................................................... 18
3.10.7. Financial Action Task Force (FATF) ....................................................................................................... 19
4. HUMANITARIAN ISSUES: HUMAN RIGHTS/ MIGRATION/ REFUGEES .................................................................. 20
4.1. Human Rights ................................................................................................................................................ 20
4.1.1. Human Rights Council............................................................................................................................. 20
4.2. Migration/Refugees....................................................................................................................................... 20
4.2.1. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) .............................................. 22
4.2.2. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) ......................................... 22
4.2.3. The Rohingya Issue ................................................................................................................................. 23
4.2.4. International Organisation for Migration (IOM) .................................................................................... 24
5. KEY ISSUES/CONFLICTS ......................................................................................................................................... 25
5.1. The North Korean Issue ................................................................................................................................. 25
5.1.1. Why is North Korean Nuclear Capability a Concern ............................................................................... 25
5.1.2. India and North Korea ............................................................................................................................ 26
5.2. The Syrian Issue ............................................................................................................................................. 26
5.2.1. India and Syria ........................................................................................................................................ 27
5.3. Yemen Conflict............................................................................................................................................... 27
5.3.1. Implications ............................................................................................................................................ 28
5.3.2. India ........................................................................................................................................................ 28
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1. TREATIES/ CONVENTIONS/ PROTOCOLS/
AGREEMENTS
• The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 1969, defines a treaty as:
o ‘an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international
law’ (VCLT article 2(a) )
• Treaties can be referred to by many terms, including ‘agreements’, ‘conventions’, ‘protocols’, ‘charters’,
‘accords’, and ‘amendments’.
• According to the VCLT, whether an agreement constitutes a treaty does not depend on its title, but on
whether the parties intended the instrument to be governed by international law.
• Treaties can usually be distinguished from non-legally binding instruments by the inclusion of ‘final
clauses’, addressing issues such as how states express their consent to be bound (for example, through
ratification or accession) and the requirements for entry into force – provisions that would not make sense
in an instrument not intended to be legal in character.
• Under the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties, a treaty must be:
o a binding instrument, which means that the contracting parties intended to create legal rights and
duties;
o concluded by states or international organizations with treaty-making power;
o governed by international law and
o in writing.
• A framework convention or agreement describes a type of legally binding treaty which establishes broader
commitments for its parties and leaves the setting of specific targets either to subsequent more detailed
agreements (usually called protocols) or to national legislation. In essence, a framework agreement serves
as an umbrella document which lays down the principles, objectives and the rules of governance of the
treaty regime. e.g. the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol
• Treaties often contain a mix of mandatory and non-mandatory elements. For example, Article 4.1 of the
UNFCCC establishes legal obligations, because it specifies what parties ‘shall’ do to address climate change.
By contrast, Article 4.2 formulates the target for Annex I parties to return emissions to 1990 levels by the
year 2000 as a nonbinding ‘aim’, rather than as a legal commitment.
• The Convention took effect in 1994. The text of the Kyoto Protocol was adopted unanimously in 1997; it
entered into force on 16 February 2005.
• A ‘convention’ is a formal agreement between States. The generic term ‘convention’ is thus synonymous
with the generic term ‘treaty’. Conventions are normally open for participation by the international
community as a whole, or by a large number of States.
• Usually the instruments negotiated under the auspices of an international organization are entitled
conventions (e.g. the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations in 1989).
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2. GLOBAL COMMONS
• The ‘Global Commons’ refers to resource domains or areas that lie outside of the political reach of any one
nation State. Thus international law identifies four global commons namely:
o the High Seas;
o the Atmosphere;
o Antarctica; and,
o Outer Space.
• These areas have historically been guided by the principle of the common heritage of humankind - the
open access doctrine or the mare liberum (free sea for everyone) in the case of the High Seas. Despite
efforts by governments or individuals to establish property rights or other forms of control over most natural
resources, the Global Commons have remained an exception. These are governed by multiple treaty
arrangements and conventions
2.1. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAWS OF THE SEA (UNCLOS)

• UNCLOS is an international agreement that resulted from the third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which took place between 1973 and 1982.
• The Convention, concluded in 1982, replaced four 1958 treaties. UNCLOS came into force in 1994.
• It has been ratified by 168 parties (167 states+ EU).
• The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea lays down a comprehensive regime of law and order
in the world's oceans and seas establishing rules governing all uses of the oceans and their resources.
• It enshrines the notion that all problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be addressed
as a whole.
• It also established three institutions: the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the
International Seabed Authority (ISA) and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).
2.2. UNCLOS MARITIME ZONES

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2.2.1. TERRITORIAL SEA
• Under the Convention, a coastal State is entitled to a territorial sea not exceeding 12 nautical miles
measured from its baselines. Within its territorial sea, the coastal State exercises sovereignty, including
over its resources.
• Subject to the provisions of the Convention, ships of all States enjoy the right of innocent passage through
the territorial sea.
2.2.2. CONTIGUOUS ZONE
• The Convention also grants a coastal State the right to establish a contiguous zone not extending beyond 24
nautical miles from the baselines.
• Within its contiguous zone, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to prevent and punish
infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations that have occurred within its
territory or territorial waters and to control, in specified circumstances, the trafficking of archaeological and
historical objects.
2.2.3. EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
• In addition, a coastal State may establish an exclusive economic zone not extending beyond 200 nautical
miles from its baselines.
• Here, the coastal State has sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing natural living or non-living resources of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed
and its subsoil, and
• With regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the
production of energy from the water, currents and winds.
• In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has jurisdiction with regard to the establishment and use
of artificial islands, installations and structures, marine scientific research and protection and preservation
of the marine environment.
2.2.4. CONTINENTAL SHELF
• Pursuant to the Convention, the continental shelf comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
that extend beyond the territorial sea of coastal States up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines.
• In the cases in which the continental shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines, coastal
States are required by the Convention to submit information on the outer limits of the continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for its consideration.
2.2.4.1. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CCLS)
• CLCS is one of the three institutions created by the UNCLOS.
• The purpose of the CLCS is to facilitate the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (the Convention) in respect of the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles (M) from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
• It has 21 Members with a term of five years.
• It is based in Geneva, Switzerland.
2.2.5. HIGH SEAS
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All parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, the territorial sea or the internal
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or archipelagic waters of a State, are known as the high seas.

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On the high seas all States have the freedom of navigation, of overflight, to lay submarine cables and
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pipelines, to construct artificial islands and other installations, of fishing, and of scientific research.
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• These freedoms must be exercised with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the
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freedom of the high seas.

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The seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction constitute the
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“Area”. The Convention provides that the Area and its resources are the “common heritage of mankind”.
• In this context, the Convention defines “resources” as “all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in
the Area at or beneath the seabed, including polymetallic nodules.”
• No State can claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the Area or its resources,
nor can any State or natural or juridical person appropriate any part thereof. On the contrary, all rights in the
resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole.

2.2.5.1. International Seabed Authority
• An organization established by the UNCLOS, the International Seabed Authority, organizes and controls
activities in the Area, particularly with a view to administering resources in the Area.
• It is based in Kingston, Jamaica,
• The Convention provides that activities in the Area shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind.
• Both the high-seas and the Area can only be used for peaceful purposes.
2.2.6. THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA (ITLOS)
• ITLOS is an independent judicial body established by the UNCLOS to adjudicate disputes arising out of the
interpretation and application of the Convention.
• It is based in Hamburg Germany.
• The Tribunal is composed of 21 independent members, elected from among persons enjoying the highest
reputation for fairness and integrity and of recognized competence in the field of the law of the sea.
• The Tribunal has jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the
Convention, and over all matters specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction
on the Tribunal (Statute, article 21).
• The Tribunal is open to States Parties to the Convention (i.e. States and international organisations which
are parties to the Convention).
• It is also open to entities other than States Parties, i.e., States or intergovernmental organizations which
are not parties to the Convention, and to state enterprises and private entities "in any case expressly
provided for in Part XI or in any case submitted pursuant to any other agreement conferring jurisdiction on
the Tribunal which is accepted by all the parties to that case" (Statute, article 20).
2.2.7. OCEAN GARBAGE PATCHES: A CASE FOR MULTILATERAL ACTION
• Ocean cover more than 70 percent of earth’s surface, they act as major resource for humanity and support
great biodiversity.
• The world's oceans are full of trash, causing "tremendous" negative impacts on coastal life and ecology.
Plastic makes up about 80 percent of the ocean trash collected in some areas of the world
• Most of the garbage accumulates in five little-explored "patches" found in the doldrums of the Atlantic,
Pacific, and Indian Oceans.
• The largest is the Great Pacific Garbage Patch, which starts a few hundred miles off the coast of North
America and stretches to a few hundred miles off the coast of Japan; a more concentrated area lies between
California and Hawaii.
• In these cases the harm to fish and other sea creatures is increasing.
• Only about 20 percent of ocean plastic comes from marine sources, such as discarded fishing equipment or
cargo ship mishaps. About 80 percent of it washes out to sea from beach litter or was carried downstream
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Ocean Garbage Patches

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• There is an increasingly urgent need to approach the issue of marine litter through better enforcement of
laws and regulations, expanded outreach and educational campaigns, and the employment of strong
economic instruments and incentives
• Creating incentives to help reduce littering can be a political challenge.
2.2.7.1. Solutions
• There are several solutions offered by UN Environment Programme in a report titled "Marine Litter: A
Global Challenge.":
o Countries and regions should adopt long-term plans to prevent litter from ending up in the oceans.
o Countries should monitor marine litter using international standards and methodologies.
o Ports should encourage fishing boats not to discard nets at sea.
o Efforts to reduce marine litter should get more funding.
• Thus, the issue requires international attention and cooperation to be resolved.
2.3. THE OUTER SPACE TREATY

• Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.
• The Treaty was opened for signature by the three depository Governments (the Russian Federation, the
United Kingdom and the United States of America) in January 1967, and it entered into force in October
1967.
• 107 countries are parties to the treaty, while another 23 have signed the treaty but have not completed
ratification.
• The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) oversees these treaties
and other questions of space jurisdiction.
• The Outer Space Treaty provides the basic framework on international space law, including the following
principles:
o the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries and shall be the province of all mankind;
o outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all States;
o outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or
occupation, or by any other means;
o States shall not place nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial
bodies or station them in outer space in any other manner;
o the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes;
o astronauts shall be regarded as the envoys of mankind;
o States shall be responsible for national space activities whether carried out by governmental or non-
governmental entities;
o States shall be liable for damage caused by their space objects; and
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o States shall avoid harmful contamination of space and celestial bodies.

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• However, the treaty fails to define what exactly constitutes outer space and its limits. Also, there is
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ambiguity on what constitutes peaceful use. There has been tremendous changes in the use of space and
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States with Space capability. Thus, there have been calls for a new space treaty for contemporary times.
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2.4. THE ANTARCTICA TREATY

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The Antarctic Treaty was signed in Washington on 1 December 1959 by the twelve countries whose
scientists had been active in and around Antarctica during the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957-
58.
• It entered into force in 1961 and has since been acceded to by many other nations. The total number of
Parties to the Treaty is now 53.
• Some important provisions of the Treaty:
o Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only (Art. I)
o Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that end … shall
continue (Art. II).

o Scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be exchanged and made freely available (Art.
III).
• No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting,
supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in
Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be
asserted while the present Treaty is in force.
• Among the signatories of the Treaty were seven countries - Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand,
Norway and the United Kingdom - with territorial claims, sometimes overlapping. Other countries do not
recognize any claims. The US and Russia maintain a “basis of claim”.
2.5. THE ARCTIC COUNCIL
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• The Arctic Council is the leading intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation, coordination and
interaction among the Arctic States, Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on
common Arctic issues, in particular on issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in
the Arctic.
• The Ottawa Declaration (1996) lists the following countries as Members of the Arctic Council: Canada, the
Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States.
• In addition, six organizations representing Arctic indigenous peoples have status as Permanent
Participants. The category of Permanent Participant was created to provide for active participation and full
consultation with the Arctic indigenous peoples within the Council. They include: the Aleut International
Association, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar
Council, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North and the Saami Council.
• Observer status in the Arctic Council is open to non-Arctic states, along with inter-governmental, inter-
parliamentary, global, regional and non-governmental organizations that the Council determines can
contribute to its work. Arctic Council Observers primarily contribute through their engagement in the
Council at the level of Working Groups.
• The standing Arctic Council Secretariat formally became operational in 2013 in Tromsø, Norway. It was
established to provide administrative capacity, institutional memory, enhanced communication and
outreach and general support to the activities of the Arctic Council.
• In 2013 India achieved the observer Status in the Arctic Council, along with China, Italy, Japan, Republic of
Korea and Singapore
• India would contribute its scientific expertise, particularly its polar research capabilities, to the work of the
Arctic Council to support its objectives.
• India also looking for partnership in hydrocarbon exploration by by joining hands with one of the five
countries gearing up for the purpose — the U.S., Canada, Norway, Russia and Denmark. Russia can be the
most suitable partner geographically in this endeavour.
2.6. ATMOSPHERE
• First Sustainable Development Summit in Stockholm 1972, marked the emergence of environment as a key
issue in IR.
• UNFCCC is one of the three Rio-Conventions, adopted at the “Rio Earth Summit” in 1992. Its sister Rio
Conventions are the UN Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention to Combat Desertification.
• UNFCCC came into existence in 1992 and has 197 parties. It took effect in 1994.
• Conference of Parties (CoP) is in place since 1995, it is the supreme decision-making body of the
Convention. All States that are Parties to the Convention are represented at the COP, at which they review
the implementation of the Convention and any other legal instruments that the COP adopts and take
decisions necessary to promote the effective implementation of the Convention, including institutional and
administrative arrangements.
• Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCC came into existence in 1997.
• UNFCC borrows from the Montreal Protocol, in 1987 on CFCs i.e. it bound member states to act in the
interests of human safety even in the face of scientific uncertainty.
2.6.1. UNFCCC
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• The ultimate objective of the Convention is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations "at a level that
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would prevent dangerous anthropogenic (human induced) interference with the climate system.
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• The idea is that, as they are the source of most past and current greenhouse gas emissions, industrialized
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countries are expected to do the most to cut emissions on home ground.

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• They are called Annex I countries and belong to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
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Development (OECD). They also include 12 countries with "economies in transition" from Central and
Eastern Europe. Annex I countries were expected by the year 2000 to reduce emissions to 1990 levels.
2.6.1.1. Kyoto Protocol
• The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997. Due to a complex ratification
process, it entered into force on 16 February 2005.
• The Kyoto Protocol is what “operationalizes” the Convention. It commits industrialized countries to
stabilize greenhouse gas emissions based on the principles of the Convention. The Convention itself
only encourages countries to do so.

• Sets binding emission reduction targets for 37 industrialized countries and the European community in its
first commitment period. Overall, these targets add up to an average five per cent emissions
reduction compared to 1990 levels over the five-year period 2008 to 2012 (the first commitment period).
• It only binds developed countries because it recognizes that they are largely responsible for the current high
levels of GHG emissions in the atmosphere, which are the result of more than 150 years of industrial activity.
• It places a heavier burden on developed nations under its central principle: that of “common but
differentiated responsibility”.
• Its architecture involved:
o Reporting and verification procedures;
o Flexible market-based mechanisms, which in turn have their own governance procedures; and
o A compliance system.
• Market based mechanisms are: International Emission trading, Clean Development Mechanism, Joint
implementation. These created what is now known as the “carbon market.”
• In Doha, Qatar, on 8 December 2012, the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol was adopted. This
launched a second commitment period, starting on 1 January 2013 until 2020.
2.6.2. COP21
• CoP21 was held in Paris from 30 November to 12 December 2015.
• The Paris Climate Agreement is a pact within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
dealing with greenhouse gas emissions mitigation, adaptation and finance starting in the year 2020.
• According to the agreement, each country determines, plans and regularly reports its own contribution it
should make in order to mitigate global warming.
• The Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016, thirty days after the date on which at least 55
Parties to the Convention accounting in total for at least an estimated 55 % of the total global greenhouse
gas emissions deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the
Depositary.
• India is the world’s third largest emitter of greenhouse gases after the China and the United States.
2.6.2.1. Paris Agreement
• The Paris Agreement’s aim is to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change by keeping
a global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and to
pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius.
• Additionally, the agreement aims to strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate
change. To reach these ambitious goals, appropriate financial flows, a new technology framework and an
enhanced capacity building framework will be put in place, thus supporting action by developing countries
and the most vulnerable countries, in line with their own national objectives.
• The Agreement also provides for enhanced transparency of action and support through a more robust
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transparency framework. There will be a global stocktaking every 5 years to assess the collective progress
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towards achieving the purpose of the Agreement and to inform further individual actions by Parties.
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2.6.2.2. Nationally determined contributions

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• The Paris Agreement requires all Parties to put forward their best efforts through “nationally determined
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contributions” (NDCs) and to strengthen these efforts in the years ahead. This includes requirements that
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all Parties report regularly on their emissions and on their implementation efforts.
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2.6.2.3. Key terms

• Mitigation: Mitigation refers to efforts to reduce or prevent emission of greenhouse gases. Mitigation can
mean using new technologies and renewable energies, making older equipment more energy efficient, or
changing management practices or consumer behavior.
• Adaptation: Adaptation means anticipating the adverse effects of climate change and taking appropriate
action to prevent or minimise the damage they can cause, or taking advantage of opportunities that may
arise.
• Finance: The operation of the Financial Mechanism was initially entrusted to the Global Environment
Facility (GEF). Established in 1992. The World Bank serves as the GEF Trustee, administering the GEF Trust
Fund (contributions by donors).
• At COP 17, Durban 2011, Parties decided to designate the Green Climate Fund (GCF) as an operating entity
of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, in accordance with Article 11 of the Convention. The Green
Climate Fund (GCF) is a fund established within the framework of the UNFCCC to assist developing
countries in adaptation and mitigation practices to counter climate change. The GCF is based in the
new Songdo district of Incheon, South Korea. It is governed by a Board of 24 members and initially
supported by a Secretariat.
• The Financial Mechanism is accountable to the CoP, which decides on its climate change policies,
programme priorities and eligibility criteria for funding.
• In addition to providing guidance to the GEF, Parties have established four special funds: the Special
Climate Change Fund (SCCF), the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), both managed by the GEF, and
the GCF under the Convention; and the Adaptation Fund (AF) under the Kyoto Protocol.
2.7. THE INTERNATIONAL SOLAR ALLIANCE

• The International Solar Alliance is a treaty based international inter-governmental alliance of 121 solar
resource rich countries lying fully or partially between the Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn.
• It aims to execute innovative and concerted efforts to reduce the cost of finance and technology for the
immediate deployment of assets for solar power generation. In other words, to tap solar energy at more
affordable prices through aggregating both demand and risks bringing down costs and securing investments
of solar developers.
• The International Solar Alliance (ISA) initiative was launched at the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris
on 30 November 2015 by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the then French President Francois Hollande.
• The finalized ISA framework agreement, which seeks to establish ISA as a treaty based organization, was
opened for signature at the 22nd CoP of the UNFCCC at Marakech, Morrocco in 2016. And it entered into
force in on 6 December 2017 following ratification by Guinea as the 15th country.
• India hosted the first international Solar Alliance Summit on 11 March 2018 in New Delhi. The aim was to
mobilise $1 trillion of investments needed by 2030 for massive deployment of solar energy to achieve the
target of over 1,000 GW of solar generation capacity.
• ISA’s headquarters and Secretariat is in Gurugram, Haryana.
• The Alliance contributes towards the mutual goal of increasing utilization of solar energy and solar
applications to help the world transition to a low carbon and greener society.
• It aims not duplicate or replicate the efforts that others (like International Renewable Energy Agency
(IRENA), Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership(REEEP), International Energy Agency (IEA),
Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21), United Nations bodies, bilateral
organizations etc.) are currently engaged in, but will establish networks and develop synergies with them
and supplement their efforts in a sustainable and focused manner.
2.8. THE INTERNATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY (IRENA)

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energy future, and serves as the principal platform for international cooperation, a centre of excellence,
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and a repository of policy, technology, resource and financial knowledge on renewable energy.
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The proposal for an international agency dedicated to renewable energy was made in 1981 at the United
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Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy, held in Nairobi, Kenya. IRENA was officially
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founded in Bonn, Germany, on 26 January 2009.

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• The Agency is Headquartered in Abu Dhabi, UAE.

• As of 2018 it has 156 members.
2.9. RENEWABLE ENERGY AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY PARTNERSHIP (REEEP)

• REEEP is an international multilateral partnership that works to accelerate market-based deployment of
renewable energy and energy efficient systems in low- and middle-income countries.
• It invests in clean energy markets in developing countries to reduce CO2 emissions and build prosperity.
• It was originally launched by the government of the United Kingdom, along with other partners, at the
Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in August 2002.
• In June 2004, REEEP obtained formal, legal non-profit status as an international NGO and has since been
located at the UN complex in Vienna, Austria.
2.10. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA)

• The IEA is an autonomous body within the OECD framework.
• The IEA works to ensure reliable, affordable and clean energy for its 30 member countries and beyond.
• Its mission is guided by four main areas of focus: energy security, economic development, environmental
awareness and engagement worldwide.
• The IEA was founded in 1974 to help countries collectively respond to oil supply disruptions.
• It is based in Paris.
• Chile is currently a candidate country for IEA membership and seven countries – Brazil, China, India,
Indonesia, Morocco, Singapore, and Thailand are Association countries.
2.11. RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY NETWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (REN21)
• REN21 is the global renewable energy policy multi-stakeholder network that connects a wide range of key
actors. The network was launched in June 2004 as an outcome of the International Conference for
Renewable Energies in Bonn.
• REN21 brings together governments, nongovernmental organisations, research and academic institutions,
international organisations and industry to learn from one another and build on successes that advance
renewable energy.
• REN21’s goal is to facilitate knowledge exchange, policy development and joint action towards a rapid
global transition to renewable energy.
• It is based at the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in Paris.
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3. SECURITY
3.1. INDIA’S NUCLEAR POLICY
• India is a de facto nuclear power as well as a long term user of nuclear energy.
• In terms of nuclear weapons India’s policy is spelt out by the May 1998 speech of the PM in Parliament, the
1999 Draft of the National Security Council and the January 2003 Press release of the Cabinet Committee
on Security.
• These spell out what is sometimes known as India’s nuclear doctrine. Perhaps it would be better to consider
them as the outlines of India’ nuclear policy
• Following are the key elements of India’s nuclear policy:
o Maintaining Credible Minimum Deterrence
o No first use
o No use against non nuclear states
o Not engaging in nuclear armed race
o Deter nuclear blackmail and aggression
o Civilian command and control of nuclear weapons
o Universal global nuclear disarmament under international verification
• India reserves the right to nuclear retaliation “in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces
anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons”
• These elements have developed through the various phases of India’s engagement with nuclear
technology.
• India is against discriminatory nature of current regimes such as the NPT and CTBT.
• India also seeks to become member of technology export control regimes such as the NSG.
3.2. MECR
• A Multilateral Export Control Regime (MECR) is an international body that states use to organize their
national export control systems.
• It includes:
o The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and
Technologies
o The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), for the control of nuclear related technology
o The Australia Group (AG) for control of chemical and biological technology that could be weaponized
o The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) for the control of rockets and other aerial vehicles
capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction
3.2.1. WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT
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• It is the successor to the Cold War-era Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, and was
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established on 12 July 1996, in Wassenaar, the Netherlands, which is near The Hague.
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• A Secretariat for administering the agreement is located in Vienna, Austria

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• 42 participating states including many former Comecon (Warsaw Pact) countries.

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• Participating States apply export controls to all items set forth in the List of Dual-Use Goods and
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Technologies and the Munitions List, with the objective of preventing unauthorized transfers or re-transfers
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of those items.
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• Every six months member countries exchange information on deliveries of conventional arms to non-
Wassenaar members that fall under eight broad weapons categories: battle tanks, armoured fighting
vehicles (AFVs), large-caliber artillery, military aircraft, military helicopters, warships, missiles or missile
systems, and small arms and light weapons.
• It is not a treaty not legally binding.
• India’s membership approved in December, 2017.

3.2.2. THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP (NSG)
• NSG is a group of nuclear supplier countries that seek to prevent nuclear proliferation by controlling the
export of materials, equipment and technology that can be used to manufacture nuclear weapons.
• The NSG was founded in response to the Indian nuclear test in May 1974. As of 2017 the NSG has 48
participating governments.
• Overall responsibility for activities lies within NSG Plenary meetings that are held once a year.
• A rotating Chair has the overall responsibility for coordination of work and outreach activities.
• The Zangger Committee, also known as the Nuclear Exporters Committee, sprang from Article III.2 of
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which entered into force on March 5, 1970.
Under the terms of Article III.2 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards must be applied to
nuclear exports.
3.2.3. THE AUSTRALIA GROUP (AG)
• The Australia Group is an informal group of countries (now joined by the European Commission)
established in 1985 (after the use of chemical weapons by Iraq in 1984) to help member countries to
identify those exports which need to be controlled so as not to contribute to the spread
of chemical and biological weapons.
• With the incorporation of India in January 2018, it now has 43 members.
• Delegations representing the members meet every year in Paris, France.
• Members of the group maintain export controls on a uniform list of 54 compounds, including several that
are not prohibited for export under the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993), but can be used in the
manufacture of chemical weapons.
• In 2002, the group took two important steps to strengthen export control.
• The first was the "no-undercut" requirement, which stated that any member of the group considering
making an export to another state that had already been denied an export by any other member of the
group must first consult with that member state before approving the export.
• The second was the "catch-all" provision, which requires member states to halt all exports that could be
used by importers in chemical or biological weapons programs, regardless of whether the export is on the
group's control lists
• China is not a member.
3.2.4. MTCR
• MTCR is a multilateral export control regime. It was established in April 1987 by the G7 countries:
• It is an informal and voluntary partnership among 35 countries. India joined on 27th of June 2016. Prior to
this India was adhering to the MTCR Guidelines unilaterally.
• Aims to prevent the proliferation of missile and unmanned aerial vehicle technology capable of carrying
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Prohibited materials are divided into two Categories, which are outlined in the MTCR Equipment, Software,
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• The People's Republic of China is not a member of the MTCR but has agreed to abide by the original 1987
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Guidelines and Annex, but not the subsequent revisions.

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3.3. THE NPT

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• Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was
extended indefinitely. A total of 191 States have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon
States.
• More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a
testament to the Treaty’s significance.
• India along with Israel and Pakistan are the only non signatories, nuclear weapons states. North Korea had
originally signed the treaty but later withdrew from it.
• The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and
weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal
of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.
• The NPT's rests on three pillars:
o nonproliferation,
o the peaceful use of nuclear energy,
o and disarmament.
• The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by
the nuclear-weapon States.
• To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building measure between States parties, the
Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA).
• Conferences to review the operation of the Treaty have been held at five-year intervals since the Treaty
went into effect in 1970.
• Each conference has sought to find agreement on a final declaration that would assess the implementation
of the Treaty’s provisions and make recommendations on measures to further strengthen it.
• Prominent conference were in 1995, 2005, 2010 and 2015. The Conference is a once every five year
opportunity to stabilize and strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The Review Conference is
tasked with evaluating how well the terms of the NPT have been implemented and to chart a path forward
to tackle unfinished business.
3.3.1. NPT REVIEW CONFERENCES
• The 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held
in New York from 27 April to 22 May, ended without the adoption of a consensus substantive outcome.
• At the 2010 Review Conference the States parties agreed to a final document which included conclusions
and recommendations for follow-on actions, including the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the
Middle East.
• The 2015 outcome constitutes a setback for the strengthened review process instituted to ensure
accountability with respect to activities under the three pillars of the Treaty as part of the package in support
of the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995.
3.4. COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT)

• The CTBT is the Treaty banning all nuclear explosions - everywhere, by everyone.
• The Treaty was negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly. It opened for signature on 24 September 1996.
• Since then, the Treaty has reached near-universality. 183 countries have signed the Treaty.
• 164 countries have ratified the Treaty.
• The Treaty’s entry into force depends on 44 specific States, mentioned in Annex 2, that must have signed
and ratified the Treaty. These States had nuclear facilities at the time the Treaty was negotiated and
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adopted. 36 of these States have ratified the Treaty.

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• India, North Korea and Pakistan have not yet signed the Treaty.
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3.5. TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

• Draft adopted at a UN conference in July 2017 by a vote of 122 in favor with one country voting against.
• Opened for signature in September 2017 and would come into force once 50 countries ratify it.
• None of the nine countries that possess nuclear weapons — the United States, Russia, Britain, China,
France, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel — took part in the negotiations or the vote.
3.6. FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY

• A fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) is a proposed international agreement that would prohibit the
production of the two main components of nuclear weapons:
o highly-enriched uranium (HEU), and
o plutonium.
• An FMCT would provide new restrictions for the five recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS—United
States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and China), and for the four nations that are not NPT members
(Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea).
• Discussions on this subject are being held within the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD), a body of 65
member nations established as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. The CD requires
consensus for action to take place. Consequently,
o Negotiations for an FMCT have not taken place, though preliminary discussions are ongoing.
o Those nations that joined the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-weapon states are already
prohibited from producing or acquiring fissile material for weapons.
o In order for negotiations to begin on an FMCT, Pakistan will have to remove its opposition vote, and a
consensus to move forward with negotiations must be reached. Pakistan has been primarily concerned
that an FMCT would lock them into a disadvantageous position relative to India’s superior nuclear
stockpile.
o Consequently, Islamabad would like an FMCT to include current fissile material stockpiles, instead of just
capping future production, a position shared by several other countries.
3.7. DISARMAMENT MISCELLENEOUS

• Conference on Disarmament, Highest platform of the UN on disarmament issues. It has 65 members and it
works through consensus
• January United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA): UNODA was established in 1998 as the
Department for Disarmament Affairs which was part of the SG’s programme for reform in accordance with
his report to the General Assembly (A/51/950). It was originally established in 1982 upon the
recommendation of the General Assembly’s second special session on disarmament (SSOD II).
• In 1992, its name was changed to Centre for Disarmament Affairs, under the Department of Political Affairs.
At the end of 1997, it was renamed Department for Disarmament Affairs and in 2007, it became the United
Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.
3.7.1. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
• Formed in 1997, the OPCW is an independent, autonomous international organisation with a working
relationship with the United Nations.
• OPCW is the implementing body of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered into force in
1997. Its headquarters in The Hague, Netherlands
• It has 192 Member States, who are working together to achieve a world free of chemical weapons.
• To this end, the Convention contains four key provisions:
o destroying all existing chemical weapons under international verification by the OPCW;
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o monitoring chemical industry to prevent new weapons from re-emerging;

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o fostering international cooperation to strengthen implementation of the Convention and promote the
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• for their "extensive work to eliminate chemical weapons", the OPCW was awarded the Noble Peace Prize in
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3.8. THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)

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• IAEA is an international organization that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and to
inhibit its use for any military purpose, including nuclear weapons.
• The IAEA was established as an autonomous organisation on 29 July 1957.
• Though established independently of the United Nations through its own international treaty, the IAEA
Statute, the IAEA reports to both the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council.
• The IAEA has its headquarters in Vienna. The IAEA has two "Regional Safeguards Offices" which are located
in Toronto, Canada, and in Tokyo, Japan.
• It has 169 member states

• The IAEA serves as an intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical co-operation in the peaceful
use of nuclear technology and nuclear power worldwide.
• Three main pillars – or areas of work – underpin the IAEA's mission:
o Safety and Security;
o Science and Technology; and
o Safeguards and Verification.
• The IAEA has three main bodies: the Board of Governors, the General Conference, and the Secretariat.
3.9. NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT

• The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) is a world summit, aimed at preventing nuclear terrorism around the
globe.
• The first Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, DC in 2010, and was followed by additional
Summits in Seoul in 2012 and The Hague in 2014. The fourth summit was held in Washington, D.C. on March
31–April 1, 2016.
• In 2009, U.S. President Obama delivered a speech in Prague in which he called nuclear terrorism one of the
greatest threats to international security.
• Under the NSS process, countries work to improve their nuclear security on the basis of the Washington
Work Plan, which contains numerous measures and action points.
• The NSS process is ongoing, and since 2009 has required world leaders and diplomats to devote extra
attention to the issue of nuclear security.
• The negotiators for the various countries, known as sherpas and sous sherpas, discuss the progress made
and confer on key themes, work plans and measures.
• Gift basket diplomacy is an approach to multilateral negotiation aimed at pushing forward progress on a
particular issue without the requirement of consensus.
• The United States first implemented a policy of Gift Basket Diplomacy between the 2010 and 2012 Summits.
• These Summits have achieved tangible improvements in the security of nuclear materials and stronger
international institutions that support nuclear security.
3.10. TERRORISM
• The Global Terrorism Index 2017 released by the Australia-based Institute for Economics and Peace provides
a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last 17 years in
covering the period from the beginning of 2000 to the end of 2016.
• India, which ranks eighth on the list.
• India displaced Pakistan on a list of countries facing terror attacks in 2016, with higher fatalities and injuries
than its restive neighbour, according to data compiled by the US state department.
• Out of 11,072 terror attacks in 2016 worldwide, India bore the brunt of 927, 16% more than 2015 (798).
• The number of deaths in India also rose 17% from 289 in 2015 to 337 in 2016while the number of injured
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increased from 500 in 2015 to 636 last year. On the other hand, the number of terror attacks in Pakistan
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3.10.1. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS

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• The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy on 8 September
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2006.
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• Through its adoption that all Member States have agreed the first time to a common strategic and
operational approach to fight terrorism, not only sending a clear message that terrorism is unacceptable in
all its forms and manifestation but also resolving to take practical steps individually and collectively to
prevent and combat it.
• Those practical steps include a wide array of measures ranging from strengthening state capacity to counter
terrorist threats to better coordinating United Nations system’s counter-terrorism activities.
• 2016 marked the 10th anniversary of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

3.10.2. FOUR PILLARS OF GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY
• The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in the form of a resolution and an annexed Plan of
Action (A/RES/60/288) composed of 4 pillars:
o Addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism
o Measures to prevent and combat terrorism
o Measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the
United Nations system in that regard;
o Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the
fight against terrorism.
3.10.3. KEY UN STEPS
• Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, contained in the annex to General Assembly
resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994,
• the Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism,
contained in the annex to General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, and
• the 2005 World Summit Outcome, in particular its section on terrorism.
3.10.4. SECURITY COUNCIL COUNTER TERRORISM COMMITTEE
• Guided by Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), the CTC works to bolster the ability of
United Nations Member States to prevent terrorist acts both within their borders and across regions.
• It was established in the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks in the United States.
• In addition to the Counter-Terrorism Committee and CTED, the Council has established:
o the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) and 2253
(2015) and its Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and
the Taliban and associated individuals and entities; and
o the Non-proliferation Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and its
Expert Group.
o The Council also established a Working Group on the victims of terrorism, pursuant to its resolution
1566 (2004).
3.10.5. COMPREHENSIVE CONVENTION ON TERRORISM
• Proposed first by India in 1996. There are at least 14 conventions on terrorism.
• CCIT provides a legal framework which makes it binding on all signatories to deny funds and safe havens to
terrorist groups. Its Objectives are
o To have a universal definition of terrorism that all 193-members of the UNGA will adopt into their own
criminal law
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o To ban all terror groups and shut down terror camps

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o To prosecute all terrorists under special laws

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All three have objections over the “definition of terrorism” (the most divisive of the issues) and seek
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exclusions to safeguard their strategic interests. For example, the OIC wants exclusion of national liberation
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movements, especially in the context of Israel-Palestinian conflict. The US wanted the draft to exclude acts
committed by military forces of states during peacetime.
• The CCIT is currently being discussed at the Sixth Ad Hoc Committee of the United Nations. The committee is
the primary forum for the consideration of legal questions in the UNGA.
• India, on its part, has lobbied overtime, especially with the OIC countries and GCC.
3.10.6. KEY CONVENTIONS
• Although consensus eludes towards adoption of the terrorism convention, but discussions have yielded
three separate protocols that aim to tackle terrorism:
• International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted on 15 December 1997;
• International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted on 9 December 1999;
• and International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, adopted on 13 April 2005.
3.10.7. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF)
• The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was established in July 1989 by a Group of Seven (G-7) Summit in
Paris, initially to examine and develop measures to combat money laundering. It is an intergovernmental
body with 37 members including India. Israel and Saudi Arabia are its observer members.
• Its objectives are to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and
operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to
the integrity of the international financial system.
• The FATF is therefore a “policy-making body” which works to generate the necessary political will to bring
about national legislative and regulatory reforms in these areas.
• The FATF has developed a series of Recommendations that are recognised as the international standard for
combating of money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. They form the basis for a co-ordinated response to these threats to the integrity of the financial
system and help ensure a level playing field. First issued in 1990, the FATF Recommendations were revised
in 1996, 2001, 2003 and most recently in 2012 to ensure that they remain up to date and relevant, and they
are intended to be of universal application.
• The FATF monitors the progress of its members in implementing necessary measures, reviews money
laundering and terrorist financing techniques and counter-measures and promotes the adoption and
implementation of appropriate measures globally.
• In collaboration with other international stakeholders, the FATF works to identify national-level
vulnerabilities with the aim of protecting the international financial system from misuse.
• The FATF's decision making body, the FATF Plenary, meets three times per year.
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4. HUMANITARIAN ISSUES: HUMAN RIGHTS/
MIGRATION/ REFUGEES
4.1. HUMAN RIGHTS
Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, regardless of race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language,
religion, or any other status. Human rights include the right to life and liberty, freedom from slavery and
torture, freedom of opinion and expression, the right to work and education, and many more. Everyone is
entitled to these rights, without discrimination.
• International human rights law lays down the obligations of Governments to act in certain ways or to
refrain from certain acts, in order to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of
individuals or groups.
• The foundations of this body of law are the Charter of the United Nations (1945) and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948).
• The UDHR, together with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional
Protocols (on the complaints procedure and on the death penalty) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its Optional Protocol, form the so-called International Bill of
Human Rights.
• A series of international human rights treaties and other instruments adopted since 1945 have expanded
the body of international human rights law.
o They include the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948),
o the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965),
o the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979),
o the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and
o the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006), among others.
4.1.1. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
• The Human Rights Council, established on 15 March 2006 by the General Assembly and reporting directly
to it, replaced the 60-year-old UN Commission on Human Rights as the key UN intergovernmental body
responsible for human rights.
• The Council is made up of 47 State representatives and is tasked with strengthening the promotion and
protection of human rights around the globe by addressing situations of human rights violations and
making recommendations on them, including responding to human rights emergencies.
• The most innovative feature of the Human Rights Council is the Universal Periodic Review. This unique
mechanism involves a review of the human rights records of all 192 UN member states once every four
years. The Review is a cooperative, state-driven process, under the auspices of the Council, which provides
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rights situation in their country and to meet their international obligations. The Review is designed to
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UN High Commissioner for Human Rights principal responsibility for UN human rights activities. The High
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Commissioner is mandated to respond to serious violations of human rights and to undertake preventive
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The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is the focal point for United Nations
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human rights activities. It serves as the secretariat for the Human Rights Council, the treaty bodies (expert
committees that monitor treaty compliance) and other UN human rights organs. It also undertakes human
rights field activities.
4.2. MIGRATION/REFUGEES
• The term migrant applies to anyone moving from one country to another with the intention to stay in that
place for some period of time.
• A refugee is someone who is outside of their home country who cannot return to their home country
because there is a real chance that they will be seriously harmed for reason of their race, religion,

nationality, political opinion or because they belong to a particular social group.
• An asylum seeker is someone who says he or she is a refugee, but whose claim has not yet been
definitively evaluated, has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution, serious
human rights violations and other serious harm.
• All asylum seekers are potential refugees until their case has been determined by UNHCR or government.
• Internally displaced persons (IDP), While they may have fled for similar reasons, IDPs stay within their own
country and remain under the protection of its government, even if that government is the reason for their
displacement. As a result, these people are among the most vulnerable in the world.
• A “stateless person” is someone who is not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its
law.
• The 1951 Refugee Convention is the key legal document in this context. Ratified by 145 State parties,
o it defines the term ‘refugee’ and
o outlines the rights of the displaced,
o as well as the legal obligations of States to protect them.
• UN’s 1951 convention relating to the status of refugees, in response to mass persecutions and displacements
of the Second World War. It defines a refugee as someone outside the country of their nationality and is
unable to return to their home country because of well founded fears of being persecuted.
• UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) serves as the ‘guardian’ of the 1951 Convention and its 1967
Protocol.
• International law recognises only those fleeing conflict and violence as refugees.
• While more than 50 percent of refugees are in cities, often the first stop for a person fleeing his conflict is
a refugee camp, these are temporary structures usually run by the United Nations Refugee Agency or local
governments, until inhabitants can safely return back to their homes or rehabilitated in the host country or
resettle in another country.
• Resettlement and long term integration options are limited so many refugees are left with no choice but to
stay in the refugee camps for years or decades.
• Once in a new country the first legal step for a displaced person is to apply for asylum.
• At this time they are asylum seekers and not officially recognised as refugees until their application is
processed.
• While countries by and large agree on one definition of a refugee, every host country is responsible for
examining all requests for asylum and deciding whether applicants can be granted the status of refugee.
• Guidelines of different countries can vary substantially. India is not a signatory of either the Convention of
1951 or its 1967 protocol. Host countries have certain duties towards people they have recognized as
refugees, e.g. guarantee of a minimum standard of treatment and non-discrimination.
• The most basic obligation towards refugees is non-refoulement, a principle preventing a state from
sending an individual back to a country where their life and freedom are threatened. In realty refugees are
often victim of inconsistent and discriminatory treatment. They are often not permitted to enter the
workforce and are fully dependent on humanitarian aid.
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• Roughly half the world's refugee are children.

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• Many refugee children are out of school due to lack of funding for education programme
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UNHCR Key Figures
Image Source: http://www.unhcr.org/images/infographics/(English)_FiguresAtAGlance_Infographic(4JULY2017)_StaffNumberUpdate.png
4.2.1. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR)
• UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, established on December 14, 1950 by the United Nations General
Assembly, is a global organization dedicated to saving lives, protecting rights and building a better future
for refugees, forcibly displaced communities and stateless people.
• UNHCR is governed by the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).
• The High Commissioner is responsible for the direction and control of UNHCR. Elected by the UN General
Assembly for a five year term.
• The UNHCR Executive Committee approves the agency's biennial programmes and the corresponding
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budget. These are presented by the High Commissioner, who is appointed by the UN General Assembly.
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• Its mandate is defined by the 1950 UNHCR Statute. In 2003, the General Assembly extended the
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organization's mandate "until the refugee problem is solved." The High Commissioner reports annually to
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ECOSOC and the General Assembly on the work of UNHCR.

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• It has10,966 national and international staff working in 130 countries.

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• Its headquarters is in Geneva, Switzerland.

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4.2.2. UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES (UNRWA)
• Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict, UNRWA was established by United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 to carry out direct relief and works programmes for Palestine
refugees. The Agency began operations on 1 May 1950.
• UNRWA is funded almost entirely by voluntary contributions from UN Member States.
• UNRWA also receives some funding from the Regular Budget of the United Nations, which is used mostly
for international staffing costs.
• The Agency’s services encompass education, health care, relief and social services, camp infrastructure
and improvement, microfinance and emergency assistance, including in times of armed conflict.
• UNRWA is one of the largest United Nations programmes, with over 30,000 personnel working across five
areas of operations and is unique in that it delivers services directly to beneficiaries.
• UNRWA Headquarters are located in Amman and in Gaza.
4.2.3. THE ROHINGYA ISSUE
• The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), places the Rohingya’s among the “the most vulnerable
groups of the forcibly displaced”.
• Rohingya are an ethnic group, largely comprising Muslims, who predominantly live in the Western
Myanmar province of Rakhine. They speak a dialect of Bengali, as opposed to the commonly spoken
Burmese language.
• Myanmar considers them as persons who migrated to their land during the Colonial rule.
• So, it has not granted Rohingyas full citizenship. According the 1982 Burmese citizenship law, a Rohingya (or
any ethnic minority) is eligible for citizenship only if he/she provides proof that his/her ancestors have lived
in the country prior to 1823.
• Else, they are classified as “resident foreigners” or as “associate citizens” (even if one of the parent is a
Myanmar citizen).
• Myanmar state, which was ruled by the military junta until 2011, has been accused of ethnic cleansing in
Rakhine by the United Nations.
• It deported thousands of Rohingya to Bangladesh in the seventies and the citizenship law was also enacted
by the junta.
• Things changed little for the Rohingya even after the political reforms in 2011 that eventually led to the
first general elections in 2015, as the democratically-elected government-headed by President Htin Kyaw has
been unwilling to grant citizenship.
• Sectarian violence between Rohingyas and Rakhine’s Buddhist natives began flaring up in June 2012,
following the rape and murder of a Rakhine woman in a Rohingya-dominated locality
• Another round of riots broke out in October, due to which the government moved around a million
Rohingyas to refugee camps. Thousands of Rohingyas fled their homes and sought refugee in neighbouring
Bangladesh, a Muslim-majority nation. Some of them sought asylum in South East Asian nations of Thailand,
The Phillipines, Indonesia and Malaysia
• This ethnic conflict flared up as religious violence spreading to the other provinces of Myanmar. It was
finally contained in 2013 after military intervention.
4.2.3.1. Current Status: 2017
• Muslim militants in Myanmar staged a coordinated attack on 30 police posts and an army base in Rakhine
state on August 25.
• The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), a group previously known as Harakah al-Yaqin, which
instigated the October attacks, claimed responsibility for the attacks. In the counter attacks launched by
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Army at least 59 of the insurgents and 12 security personnel were killed.

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• The ARSA is an armed guerilla outfit, which is active since 2016, claiming to fight for a “democratic Muslim
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state for the Rohingya.” The group has been targeting Myanmar armed forces. Bangladesh and India have
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also claimed ARSA is creating trouble in their soil too.

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The “clearance operations” to root out ARSA launched by the Myanmar military has once again affected the
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lives of Rohingya, many of whom have been living in relief camps since 2012.
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An estimated 87,000 Rohingya have fled Myanmar to Bangladesh since late 2016.
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• About five lakh Rohingyas have already taken shelter in Bangladesh over the last two decades and Prime
Minister Sheikh Hasina is clearly unwilling to take in more.
• She has even urged the United States to put pressure on Myanmar to stop the exodus of Rohingyas.
• The country has opened its border for Rohingyas upon UNHCR’s request and continues to shelter Rohingya
in over-crowded refugee camps at Cox Bazar.
4.2.3.2. India and the Rohingya Issue
• According to the Ministry of Home Affairs there are approximately 40,000 Rohingyas living in India. They
have reportedly reached India from Bangladesh through the land route over the years.

• Home Ministry in an advisory to states said “infiltration from Rakhine State of Myanmar into Indian
territory…besides being burden on the limited resources of the country also aggravates the security
challenges posed to the country.”
• December 2017, socio-economic MoU, woth US$ 25 milllion, with Myanmar to help in the Rakhine
province.
• India is not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol and does not have a national
refugee protection framework.
• However, it continues to grant asylum to a large number of refugees from neighbouring States and
respects UNHCR’s mandate for other nationals, mainly from Afghanistan and Myanmar.
• While the Government of India deals differently with various refugee groups, in general it respects the
principle of for holders of UNHCR documentation.
4.2.4. INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM)
• Established in 1951, IOM is the leading inter-governmental organization in the field of migration and works
closely with governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental partners.
• It was initially established in 1951, as the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM). In
2016, it became a related organization of the United Nations
• With 169 member states, a further 8 states holding observer status and offices in over 100 countries, IOM is
dedicated to promoting humane and orderly migration for the benefit of all. It does so by providing
services and advice to governments and migrants.
• Its headquarters is in Geneva, Switzerland. Among its publications is the WORLD MIGRATION REPORT-
2018.
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5. KEY ISSUES/CONFLICTS
5.1. THE NORTH KOREAN ISSUE
• Over the past year, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has accelerated his country’s rush toward nuclear
weapons and intercontinental missiles.
• Kim Jong-un is the third supreme leader in the Kim dynasty, founded by his grandfather Kim il-Sung, the
country's leader at the time of its establishment. Kim Jong-un took over from his father Kim Jong-il when he
died from a heart attack in December 2011.
• North Korea’s isolated dictators have long believed that nuclear weapons will ensure regime survival
against U.S. military power, enabling it to unite the Korean Peninsula on its terms. Successive U.S.
Administrations have tried various strategies to thwart the dangerous trajectory of the regime.
• North Korea has made development, deployment and the capability to deliver nuclear weapons a national
aspiration. With its accelerating intercontinental ballistic missile program, it has made clear that it seeks a
capacity to strike targets far from the Korean Peninsula, namely the continental U.S.
• In the region South Korea and Japan are wary of growing belligerence of North Korea, both these countries
are allies of the United States.
• In October 1994 North Korea and the US sign an Agreed Framework under which Pyongyang commited to
freezing its nuclear programme in return for heavy fuel oil and two light-water nuclear reactors.
• In January 2002 - US President George W Bush labels North Korea, Iraq and Iran an "axis of evil" for
continuing to build "weapons of mass destruction".
• In 2003 North Korea exited the NPT which it has joined in 1985.
• 2003 also marked the beginning of six-party talks involving China, the Koreas, the US, Japan and Russia to
try to resolve the nuclear issue.
• In October 2006 North Korea conducted its first nuclear weapons test at an underground facility. The UN
imposed economic and commercial sanctions on North Korea.
• In July 2007 North Korea shut down its main Yongbyon reactor after receiving 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil
as part of an aid package.
• In May 2009 North Korea carried out its second underground nuclear test. UN Security Council condemns
move in June.
• In February 2013 UN approved fresh sanctions after North Korea stages its third nuclear test, said to be
more powerful than the 2009 test.
• 2014 March - North Korea test-fired two medium-range Rodong ballistic missiles for the first time since
2009,
• In December 2015 - US imposed new sanctions on North Korea over weapons proliferation, targeting the
army's Strategic Rocket Force, banks and shipping companies.
• In November 2016 UN Security Council further tightend sanctions by aiming to cut one of North Korea's
main exports, coal, by 60 per cent.
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• China announced its plan to implement the UN sanctions against North Korea agreed earlier this month,
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banning imports of coal, minerals and sea food.

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• In January 2018 First talks in two years between North and South Koreas show signs of a thaw after
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heightened tension. The North said it will send a team to the Winter Olympics in the South.
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In March 2018, it was announced by the South Korea’s national security director Chung Eui-yong that Kim
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Jong Un wished to meet US President Donald Trump. The Invitation was accepted by President Trump.
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If the meeting takes place it would be the first ever between leaders of the two countries. Pyongyang has
long sought a summit with the US to reflect what the regime sees as its status as a regional military power.
Bill Clinton came close to agreeing to a meeting with Kim’s father, Kim Jong-il, in 2000, but arrangements
had not been made by the time he left office in January 2001.
5.1.1. WHY IS NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY A CONCERN
• India, Israel and Pakistan developed and tested nuclear weapons with little international reaction. Why can’t
North Korea do the same?
• The answer lies in the essence of the North Korean state:
o North Korea has little interest in being a member of the international community,
o It does not belive in having allies or in collective security.
o Its trade linkages are limited to a series of bargaining transactions, and
o It does not pay heed to international standards of behavior.
• Some argue that North Korea wants nuclear weapons for regime security, an analysis that would suggest
that North Korea is simply warning predatory states to stay away or else.
• However, North Korea’s contempt for its neighbors suggests that it would hold them hostage with its
nuclear weapons. North Korea notoriously threatened to reduce South Korea’s capital city to a “sea of fire.”
Such a threat takes on new meaning when a country holds nuclear weapons.
5.1.2. INDIA AND NORTH KOREA
• North Korea is on relatively friendly terms with India, with both states maintaining embassies in their
respective capital cities.
• While India is a critic of North Korea’s aim of becoming a nuclear power, the country still exports millions of
dollars worth of goods to the hermit state every year.
• A BBC survey in 2014 revealed almost one-quarter of all Indians believe North Korea is having a positive
impact on the world.
• In recent months the US has been pushing for India to cut ties with North Korea.
• Minister for External Affairs Sushma Swaraj has argued India only conducted “minimal” trade with North
Korea and its embassy staff had already been pared down in recent years.
• And in April 2017, in line with UN sanctions due to North Korea’s nuclear tests, India banned almost all
trade with the North Korea.
• But in 2017 India refused to shut down its embassy, which is located in Pyongyang, a move which angered
the US.
• As per the Directorate General of Foreign Trade, India’s export to North Korea was $76.52 million and import
stood at $132.53 million in 2014-15. While India largely exported oilmeals, cotton yarn and machinery,
Pyongyang exported iron and steel.
• From $209.05 million, the bilateral came down $130.38 million in 2016-17.
• In April, India banned all trade with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), except for food and
medicine – in line with United Nations Security Council sanctions.
• In September 2017, India endorsed the BRICS Xiamen declaration which called for a “direct dialogue”
involved in the Korean Peninsula crisis.
5.2. THE SYRIAN ISSUE

• Syria has been engaged in civil war since 2011, with different groups trying to seize control of the country.
• The trouble began in 2011 in the Syrian city of Deraa.
• In July 2012, the International Red Cross said the violence in Syria had become so widespread that it was
in a state of civil war.
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The fighting is between:

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o Soldiers who support the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, supported by Russia and Iran
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o fighters known as rebels, who don't want Assad to be in power anymore, and
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o the group that call themselves the Islamic State.

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• The group, called the opposition, who want the president to step down is made up of several kinds of
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people. These include groups of rebel fighters, political parties who disagree with Assad, and those living in
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exile who cannot return to the country.

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• According to the United Nations (UN), almost five million Syrians have had to leave the country. Many have
gone to neighbouring countries, like Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey or Iraq. Six million more people have tried to
find safety elsewhere in Syria as internally displaced people.
• Many refugees made the decision to try to reach Europe. This is because some countries in Europe said
they would accept refugees who wanted to start a new life here.
• More than 400,000 people have been killed in this civil war.
• In August 2013, it was reported that chemical weapons were used in the war in Syria, which caused anger
around the world. Both the rebels and the Syrian government denied that they were responsible.
• In September 2013, Russia and the US reached an agreement which said the Syrian government should

give up its chemical weapons and destroy them so they can never again be used. This was important as
Russia and the US support different sides in the Syrian war.
• The process of destroying the weapons began in October 2013 and the people working on this project,
monitors from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) were awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize later that month.
• But in April 2017, there was reportedly another chemical weapons attack on a town in north-west Syria,
which killed and injured many people. This was denied by the Syrian government as well as Russia.
• The US has responded with military action by carrying out missile attacks on Syria, which the UK has said it
supports.
• IS had taken over large parts of Iraq and then moved into eastern Syria. In the chaos of the war they were
able to gain land and power there too.
• Raqqa was the first big city captured by IS in Syria in early 2014. The group went on take over large parts of
the country towards Aleppo in the north, and along the Turkish border.
• In 2017 an alliance of Syrian Kurdish and Arab fighters, backed by America, took back the city of Raqqa in
the north-west from IS.
• In December 2017, President Vladimir Putin of Russia declared victory in Syria and announced partial
withdrawal from Syria.
5.2.1. INDIA AND SYRIA
• India has a number of interests and values which underpin its position on Syria.
• Opposition to foreign intervention and support for state sovereignty (regardless of regime type) are long-
held principles that by default make India’s position favorable to the Assad government.
• These principles are underpinned by anti-colonialism, Third World solidarity, interest in preventing foreign
intervention in Kashmir, and cultural values such as pluralism, non-violence (at the interstate level) and
tolerance. India can justify not criticizing Russia’s involvement as this was at the invitation of the Assad
regime.
• Delhi also has major interests in stability in the Middle East given its increased dependency on oil and gas
imports.
• A clean victory for the rebels in Syria will give a morale boost to certain other regional insurgents, potentially
causing further instability.
• India had to, along with its consortium partners, abandon oil investments due to security concerns in
2013.
• Instability also threatens India’s migrant workers.
• The risk of radicalisation through actors such as the ISIS is also a key concern.
• India has abstained from most UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions on Syria—and having supported one
Arab League sponsored resolution.
• India—along with other BRICS states—resolutely opposes the regime change narrative
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• India believes that societies cannot be re-ordered from outside and that people in all countries have the
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right to choose their own destiny and decide their own future. In line with this, India supports an all-
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inclusive Syrian-led process to chart out the future of Syria, its political structures and leadership.
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5.3. YEMEN CONFLICT

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Yemen’s history is marked by foreign interventions that have failed to reckon with the complexity of the
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country’s politics. In the nineteen-seventies, the country was divided into South Yemen and North Yemen.
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• In 1978, Ali Abdullah Saleh, took power in the North, when the two Yemens unified, in 1990, it was under
Saleh’s leadership.
• The conflict has its roots in the failure of a political transition supposed to bring stability to Yemen
following an Arab Spring uprising that forced its longtime authoritarian president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to
hand over power to his deputy Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, in 2011.
• Disillusioned with the transition, many ordinary Yemenis - including Sunnis - supported the Houthis and in
late 2014 and early 2015, the rebels took over Sanaa.
• Yemen’s most recent conflict began in early 2015, when Houthi rebels, from the country’s northern
highlands, overran Sana’a and a Saudi-led coalition began bombing them.

• Coalition ground troops landed in Aden in August 2015 and helped drive the Houthis and their allies out of
much of the south over the next few months.
• The Houthi movement takes its name from the Houthi family, whose home province, Saada, in the north of
Yemen, has always enjoyed a degree of autonomy. They are Zaydi Shias.
• The Houthis allied with a former President Saleh and co-opted tribal networks in an effort to solidify and
expand their power. They have received the Support of Iran.
• The Saudi coalition is made up of nine Middle Eastern and African countries, and is supported by the
United States.
• Yet the U.S. and Great Britain have continued to support the coalition, mainly with weapons sales and
logistical help.
• The launch of a ballistic missile towards Riyadh in November 2017 prompted the Saudi-led coalition to
tighten its blockade of Yemen.
• The coalition said it wanted to halt the smuggling of weapons to the rebels by Iran - an accusation Tehran
denied - but the UN said the restrictions could trigger "the largest famine the world has seen for many
decades".
• Although the coalition eased its restrictions on rebel-held ports after several weeks, the extended closures
resulted in a sharp increase in prices of basic commodities, accelerating food insecurity and the collapse of
already basic services.
• In Novemebr 2017, Mr Saleh offered to "turn a new page" with the Saudi-led coalition if it stopped
attacking Yemen and ended its blockade. The Houthis responded by accusing him of a "coup" against "an
alliance he never believed in".
• In December 2017 it was announced that Mr Saleh had been killed in an attack on his convoy as he
attempted to flee the capital.
5.3.1. IMPLICATIONS
• Almost three years of fighting appears to have entrenched both sides, while three UN-organised efforts to
negotiate a peace deal have failed.
• The situation in Yemen is, the UN says, the world's worst man-made humanitarian disaster.
• More than 9,245 people have been killed and 52,800 injured since March 2015, the UN says.
• At least 5,558 of those killed, and 9,065 of those injured up to 14 December 2017 were civilians. Saudi-
led coalition air strikes were the leading cause of overall civilian casualties.
• According to the UN Human Rights Council, civilians have repeatedly been the victims of "unrelenting
violations of international humanitarian law".
• What happens in Yemen can greatly exacerbate regional tensions. It also worries the West because of the
threat of attacks emanating from the country as it becomes more unstable.
• The conflict between the Houthis and the government is also seen as part of a regional power struggle
between Shia-ruled Iran and Sunni-ruled Saudi Arabia.
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• Jihadist militants from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and rival affiliates of the Islamic State
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group (IS) have taken advantage of the chaos by seizing territory in the south and carrying out deadly
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Yemen is strategically important because it sits on the Bab al-Mandab strait, a narrow waterway linking the
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Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden, through which much of the world's oil shipments pass.
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5.3.2. INDIA
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• Delhi’s immediate focus is naturally on evacuating its citizens in the region. It completed Operation Rahat
In 2015. In a matter of days, the Navy, the Air Force, and Air India were able to rescue thousands of Indians
from the heart of Yemen’s war-zone, in an effort coordinated by the Ministry of External Affairs.
• The government showed magnanimity by rescuing non-Indians of about 17 nationalities, including Pakistan,
a gesture reciprocated by Pakistani forces.
• Until there is a UN mandate for the external intervention in Yemen, it will serve India’s citizens better if
the government retains its impartiality on events in the region, which is ridden with fault-lines. Stability
and regional security remains a chief concern for India in a region that is significant for it.

VISION IAS
www.visionias.in
LECTURE-16
THE DIASPORA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. THE DIASPORA: INDIAN’S AROUND THE WORLD ................................................................................................... 2
1.1. Defining the Diaspora ...................................................................................................................................... 2
1.1.1. Pattern ...................................................................................................................................................... 2
1.2. Indian Diaspora: Charecteristics ...................................................................................................................... 2
1.3. Waves of Migrations: The Old and New Diaspora .......................................................................................... 3
1.3.1. The Old Diaspora ...................................................................................................................................... 3
1.3.2. The New Diaspora .................................................................................................................................... 4
1.3.4. The Gulf Diaspora: The Persian Gulf Countries ........................................................................................ 5
1.4. Status, Success and Future .............................................................................................................................. 5
1.5. Issues and Challenges ...................................................................................................................................... 6
1.5.1. Rights and Changing Policies in Gulf......................................................................................................... 6
1.5.2. Protectionism and Nationalist Sentiments in USA ................................................................................... 7
1.5.3. Xenophobia and Violence ......................................................................................................................... 7
1.5.4. Ethnic Ties in the Old Diaspora Countries ................................................................................................ 7
1.6. The Future ....................................................................................................................................................... 8
1.7. Government Policy and Steps ......................................................................................................................... 8
1.8. What Needs to Be Done? ................................................................................................................................ 8
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1.9. The Overseas Citizen of India .......................................................................................................................... 8

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All rights are reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior
permission of Vision IAS.

1. THE DIASPORA: INDIAN’S AROUND THE WORLD
There are 31.2 million people of Indian origin around the world out of this about 13 million are Persons of Indian
Origin (PIOs) and about 17 million are NRIs. This Diaspora is a diverse group both economically, historically and in
terms of qualifications. Nonetheless, this group is a strategic asset for India and is often considered to be the
unofficial ambassadors of India in their host countries. They contribute resources, advocate India’s cause and
contribute to the development of their own country thus generating goodwill for India. Remittances sent by the
Indian Diaspora accounts for 3 percent of the GDP.
1.1. DEFINING THE DIASPORA

Migration, a fundamentally essential ingredient of global social change, is a phenomenon that has been taking
place for thousands of years and continues to take place all over the world.
In earlier periods, people migrated from one place to another in search of food, shelter, and safety from
persecution. Today, people tend to migrate in search of better career opportunities and better quality of life.
1.1.1. PATTERN
a) Ancient and Medieval migration to colonial powers.
b) Migration to the industrial nations immediately after World War II.
c) Recent migration to developed countries for better career opportunities and better living condition, where
the Internet, affordable airfare, and cheap communications help to maintain close ties with one’s homeland
for people migrating to these countries.
Diaspora is a word of Greek origin that means scattering or sowing of seeds. It is used to refer to people who
leave their native lands to live in other parts of the world for employment, business or any other purpose.
The term originally referred to the dispersion of Jews after their exile from Babylon in the 6th Century BC, and
later to describe all the Jewish people scattered in exile outside Palestine. Today, the word has evolved to
classify any group of people who are dispersed or scattered away from their home country with a distinct
collective memory and a myth of return.
1.2. INDIAN DIASPORA: CHARECTERISTICS

Indian Diaspora is a generic term used for addressing people who have migrated from the territories that are
currently within the borders of the Republic of India. It constitutes NRIs (Non-resident Indians) and PIOs
(Persons of Indian origins). The Indian Diaspora is estimated to be over 31 million. The Government of India
recognizes the importance of Indian Diaspora as it has brought economic, financial, and strategic benefits to
India. The Indian Diaspora today constitutes an important, and in some respects unique, force in world culture.
A Diaspora is also characterized by the role played collective memory in preserving history and culture.
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Thus one can find the Indian Diaspora is characterized by the following:
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1. It maintains family traditions of origin, but also is gradually subject to social, cultural, and political
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2. It is acutely aware of Indian (and regional) origins, but do not go much further than a sympathetic curiosity
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about them. However, our personal identity is significantly affected by that awareness.
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3. It takes an active interest in the general fate of India, and in important events in India.
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4. It perpetuates significant aspects of Indian culture like language, tradition, and religion. For example:
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• Most speak Hindi, as well as our mother tongues like Telugu, Gujarati, etc.
• Maintains tradition for weddings, birth and cremations etc.
• Maintain religions like Hinduism, Sikhism, Islam, and other India based religions.
5. It maintains regular communications with family and friends in India.
6. It sends remittances back home on a regular basis. India is number one in the world with over $69 billion in
annual remittances constituting 3 percent of the GDP.
7. It attempts to influence our host country’s government to pursue policies favorable to India. For example,
the intense lobbying by the Indian diaspora in the US that persuaded a recalcitrant US Senate to approve the
Nuclear Treaty a few years ago.

From the 1920s onward, the Indian nationalist movement had acknowledged and lauded the contribution of
overseas Indians to the struggle for freedom. After all, the “Father of the Nation,” Mohandas K. Gandhi, had
been prominent in the Diaspora and had begun his experiments with civil disobedience movements while in
South Africa.
1.3. WAVES OF MIGRATIONS: THE OLD AND NEW DIASPORA

The history of migration from India dates back at least two thousand years. The first migration from modern-
day India took place at around the time of the reign of Emperor Kanishka (around the 1st century AD). This
group was the Romani people, now known all around the world as “gypsies”, from what today is the Indian
state of Rajasthan. They emigrated from India towards the northwest and eventually settled in Eastern Europe.
Another major migration from the Indian subcontinent started in around 500 AD, when a group emigrated to
Southeast Asia. The Cholas, a great naval power, conquered what is today Indonesia and Malaysia as well as
the so-called ‘Indianized’ kingdoms of Southeast Asia. The influence of Indian culture is still felt strongly in
Southeast Asia. This is particularly evident amongst the royal Brahmins kings of Thailand, the archeological
wonders of the Angkor Kingdoms of Cambodia, and in Indonesia, especially in Central Sumatra and Bali.
However, in all these early migrations, the label of “Indian Diaspora” is not applied to the descendants of
those emigrants who left India many centuries ago. The intermixing of these groups with the local population
over the centuries has been so great that they eliminated all traces of such “Indian” identity. Therefore, these
people are no longer considered PIOs (“People of Indian Origin”).
However, over the past two centuries, India has achieved arguably the most diverse and complex migration
histories, forming the Modern Indian Diaspora. Spread across all six continents and 125 countries, it is
estimated that about 31 million people now comprise the Indian Diaspora.
The characteristics of this diversified group vary to an astonishing degree – yet all are part of the same Indian
Diaspora. It varies to such an extent that it is defined in three subsets of our Diaspora:
• the Old Diaspora,
• the New Diaspora, and
• the Gulf Diaspora.
However, there is one consistent theme to all three categories. They were, and continue to be, created by a
labor migration – unskilled labor starting two centuries ago, and highly skilled labor after the mid-1960s.
1.3.1. THE OLD DIASPORA
The first wave of the Indian Diaspora is what we call the “Old Diaspora.” It began during the early 19th
century and continued until the end of the British Raj.
Britain abolished slavery in 1833 and other colonial powers such as France, the Netherlands, and Portugal
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followed suit. Without the labor of African slaves, their colonies then desperately needed manpower to work the
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sugar and rubber plantations. To meet this demand, the British established the system of “Indentured Labor
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Migration” from the Indian subcontinent.

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In 1834, Britain began exporting bonded Indian labor to Mauritius. The Dutch and French replicated the British
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system and also exported Indian workers to their colonies.

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Conditions of absolute poverty in many parts of India, in addition to the prospect of gaining wealth overseas,
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motivated Indians to sell themselves and become bonded laborers. The conditions on these journeys were
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extremely difficult. Mortality was high on British, Dutch and French boats from the sub-continent to these
colonies.
1.3.1.2. The Plantations in Islands
Workers for plantations in Mauritius, Suriname, Trinidad and Fiji arrived mainly from the present-day states of
Bihar and UP. In Guyana and East Africa, laborers originated primarily from Punjab and Gujarat. Given the
proximity of Tamil Nadu to French possessions in India like Pondicherry, the workers in most French colonies,
such as Guadeloupe, Martinique, and La Reunion, were Tamils. The majority of these migrants were males. This

brutal indenture system lasted until World War I, abolished in 1916-1917. By that time, more than 1.5 million
Indians had been shipped to colonies in the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia.
1.3.1.3. Labour in South East Asia
However, during roughly the same period, another form of labor migration developed. Tapping into the labor
surplus of South India, mostly in the modern-day Indian state of Tamil Nadu, the Colonial bosses of tea, coffee,
and rubber plantations in Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Burma authorized Indian headmen to recruit entire families
and ship them to plantations. About five million Indians, mostly poor Tamils, migrated to these three countries
until the system was abolished just prior to World War II. Today, Malaysia and Singapore have local Indians
who comprise 7 and 9.1 % of the total population respectively, and are seen as a minority in both.
Around that same time, merchants and traders from Gujarat and Sindh settled in British colonies in the
Middle East, and South and East African. For example, Gujarati and Sindhi merchants became shop owners in
East Africa, and traders from Kerala and Tamil Nadu were involved in retail trade and money lending to poor
Indian peasants in Burma, Ceylon and Malaya. By the time of Second World War, the Indian Diaspora included
approximately six million migrants. Out of this total, over one million Indians were in Burma. At that time,
there were only 6,000 Indians in United States.
Today this “Old Diaspora” constitutes 60% of Indian Diaspora, or approximately 18 million PIOs. The Old
Diaspora is primarily a pre-WWII phenomenon.
1.3.2. THE NEW DIASPORA

The New Diaspora, consists of migrants who left India in large numbers from the mid-1960s onwards –
primarily to developed countries like the UK, US, Canada, Australia, and Western Europe.
Around 1900, there were less than a thousand Indians in both the UK and the United States. By World War II,
the number had grown to about 6,000 in each country.
• In Britain, this population consisted mostly of unskilled workers for low wages.
• In the US, this population consisted mostly of Sikhs who worked in agriculture in California.
Many factors contributed to this small number of migrants from India to these developed countries. Draconian
legislation in the United States had banned immigration to the US from all but a handful of Western European
countries. The Johnson–Reed Act of 1924, probably the most overtly racist immigration law in the world at the
time, served to limit the annual number of immigrants to the US from any country to 2% of the number of
people from that country who were already living in the US dating back to 1890.
The year ‘1890’ is not a completely arbitrary benchmark. The US established the law in order to stop Eastern
Europeans Jews who had migrated in large numbers to the US after 1890 to escape persecution in Europe.
Though aimed at Eastern Europeans, this law had the collateral effect of prohibiting the entry of Middle
Easterners, East Asians, and Indians to the US. According to the U.S. Department of State at the time, the
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purpose of the act was “to preserve the ideal of American homogeneity.”
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Similarly, at the turn of the century in Canada, also part of the British Empire at that time, there were about
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100 Indians. This number rose to 5,000 by 1907, before a restrictive new law, the Continuous Passage
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regulation, stopped any further immigration. This law required that all migrants who intended to immigrate to
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Canada make a continuous journey from the countries of their citizenship. This law stopped Indian immigration
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in its tracks, since no steamships traveled directly from India to Canada. This became most evident in the
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“Komagatamaru” incident of 1914, when more than 350 immigrants from India sent back from Vancouver, as
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the ship carrying them, the Komagatamaru, had not travelled continuously form India to Canada.
1.3.2.1. After Independence
The landscape began to change after Indian independence. A group of unskilled (and some skilled) workers,
mostly male Punjabi Sikhs, migrated from India to the United Kingdom. After the war, Britain had a demand
for low-skilled labor. Given India’s postcolonial ties and the UK’s Commonwealth immigration policy, which
allowed any citizen of a Commonwealth country to live, work, vote, and hold public office in the United
Kingdom, Indians came to the UK. Many settled in London as well as industrial cities like Leicester and

Birmingham. At the time (from 1947 till 1962), Indian nationals, as Commonwealth citizens, had an
unrestricted right to enter the United Kingdom.
In 1962 and again in 1968, the British Commonwealth Immigration Acts rescinded these rights for Indians.
However, 20 years later, when the UK was faced with a shortage of highly skilled labor, the UK reversed itself,
and Indian migration to the UK picked up considerably. Additionally, during the mid-1960s, anti-Indian
discrimination developed in African countries like Kenya and Uganda. This also resulted in a large-scale
“Secondary Migration” of PIOs to the UK. Of the current Indian diaspora in the UK, one-fifth is as a result of
this secondary migration from East African countries and South Africa.
The dividing line for Indian immigration to the United States, and the significant Diaspora formation that
resulted, is the year 1965. It was in 1965 that President Lyndon Johnson and the US Congress passed the
historic Hart-Celler Act. This legislation:
• terminated the racist 1924 Johnson-Reed Act,
• abolished national-origins quotas, and
• Made it possible for high-skilled immigrants, including Indians, to gain legal, permanent residence in the
United States.
• The migrants were able to bring their family members as well.
As in the United States, new immigration legislation that opened the doors to highly-skilled immigrants triggered
significant immigration of Indians to Canada. In 1968, Canada introduced its points system, which assigns value
to qualifications rather than a person’s ethnic or national background. As a result, Indian immigration to
Canada boomed.
The 1990s software boom and rising economy in the US attracted Indians by the boatload. The US Immigration
Act of 1990, effective from 1995, facilitated this process further by introducing the H-1B temporary worker
program, allowing US businesses to hire foreigners with a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in “specialty
occupations” including doctors, scientists, engineers, and IT specialists.
Indian citizens are far and away the top recipients of H-1B visas each year. As a result the Indian diaspora in
the US is highly-skilled. The US Census Bureau estimates that 75% percent of all ethnic Indians working in the
US hold at least a bachelor’s degree, and 69% percent work in management and professional occupations.
US, UK and Canadian census data from 2010 estimates that the Indian Diaspora grew to three million in the
US, 1.5 million in the UK, and one million in Canada – a twentyfold increase in half a century. Today, Indians are
the fourth largest immigrant group in the United States after the Mexicans, Filipinos, and Chinese.
Also, since the 1990s, Australia and New Zealand have become important destination countries for Indians.
Both countries look to attract English-speaking, highly-qualified professionals, often to supply their IT
industries. The Indian diaspora in Australia numbers more than 400,000, almost two percent of Australia’s total
population.
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1.3.4. THE GULF DIASPORA: THE PERSIAN GULF COUNTRIES

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The most recent development of the Indian Diaspora is the “Gulf Diaspora”. The 1970s oil boom in the West
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Asia/Middle East ended up triggering significant migration from India to the Persian Gulf. An increasing number
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of semi-skilled and unskilled workers, primarily from South India, have worked in the gulf countries on
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temporary schemes in the oil industry and in services and construction.

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With modern air transportation, this was on a contractual basis rather than the permanent basis that was the
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case in the 19th century. More than 8 million Indians reside in Gulf today; an estimated 70% of them are blue
collar workers. These workers are responsible for running oilfields, businesses, transport and household work.
1.4. STATUS, SUCCESS AND FUTURE

• Ethnic Indians are a small but wealthy minority in the US, UK, and the countries of the New Diaspora.
• In terms of number they constitute 40 percent of the populations in Fiji, Trinidad, Guyana, Reunion and
Suriname, and 70 percent of Mauritius – all Old Diaspora countries.
• In Gulf they are more than 50 percent of all the immigrant workers.

The New Indian Diaspora, especially in the United States, is highly organized with many regional and pan-Indian
cultural, professional, religious, and charity organizations. In recent years, Indians have demonstrated their
increasing political influence examples being- Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal, South Carolina Governor and
US representative to the United States Nikki Haley, NY Attorney General Preet Bharara, California Senator
Kamla Harris and the formation of the India Caucus in both the Congress and the Senate.
In Canada, 19 Indian-origin MPs were elected to the Canadian parliament in 2015 and four were appointed in
the cabinet of PM Justin Trudeau. In the UK, a record number of 12 Indian Mps, were elected to the British
Parliament in 2017, and eight members of the House of Lords are People of Indian Origin. With the Appointment
of Rishi Sunak and Suella Fernandes in January 2018 the UK has three Indian-origin Ministers in the
government.
If Indians appear to have done well for themselves within the economic domain of these Old Diaspora countries,
their affluence in new Diaspora countries like the United States is even more pronounced, as is our presence
within top professions. Though our share of the population in the US is less than 1%, Indians account for well
over 5% of the scientists, engineers, and software specialists, and almost 10% of all the doctors. No group, not
whites, not the Chinese, nor the Jewish people, has a higher median household income than Indians, which is
almost double that of the overall average of the United States.
Diaspora has contributed to India’s ascendency in the world. In all of the countries to which Indians have
migrated, Indians have achieved in the fields of entrepreneurship, business, academia, science, arts, and culture.
The success of Indian entrepreneurs, CEOs, scientists, academics, media personalities, filmmakers and IT
professionals in the US has created trust in India’s intellectual abilities abroad. This success has been a major
factor in branding India as a source of well-educated and hard-working professionals. This new “Brand India”
explains the increased interest in recruiting Indian graduates and professionals in several countries.It also
contributes to the willingness of US and other companies to collaborate with, and outsource to, Indian
companies. Ethnic Indians, particularly in New Diaspora countries, have become known for their economic,
professional, academic, scientific, and artistic successes, as well as for their generally peaceful integration.
In the Old Diaspora, Indians have become integral part of their countries. In countries such as Mauritius names
such as Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, Anerood Jugnauth, Navin Chandra Ramgoolam and Pravind Jugnauth are
prominent in politics serving as the heads of state and governement. Similalry, Trinidad and Tobago has seen
two Indian origin prime ministers- Basdeo Panday and Kamala Persad Bissessar. Another Indo-Trinidadian VS
Naipaul is much celebrated author and Nobel Laureate.
In Malay Peninsula the Indian Community played a key part in the decolonization process and Malaysian Indian
Congress had been a key part of the ruling alliance coalition of the Alliance Party (BN- Barisan Nasional). In
Singapore Tamil is an official language along with English, Mandarin and Malay. Indians have served as two out
of eight Presidents of Singapore, most recently Mr. S.R. Nathan (1999-2011).
The Gulf Diaspora has increased to more than 8 million. It’s is source of more than 50 percent of remittances
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received by India. In the economy of countries like the UAE, Indians have achieved a notable presence as
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entrepreneurs and managers. The Indian community in gulf is more than fifty percent of the total immigrant
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workers in the Gulf countries and this number has doubled since 2000.
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1.5. ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

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1.5.1. RIGHTS AND CHANGING POLICIES IN GULF

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More than 70 percent of Indian workers in the gulf are blue collar workers and are on temporary contracts.
Certainly, many of them face discrimination, have limited rights, and face future challenges in the
indigenization or Arabisation policy of these states that seeks to include more Arabs in the workforce. The
Nitaqat policy of Saudi Arabia is a specific example of government policy aiming at changing the composition of
the work force. These Gulf countries have a common policy of refusing to naturalize non-Arabs, even if they are
born in the Gulf Countries. Thus, members of the Diaspora in these countries are relegated to a kind of “second
class” status.
On the other hand threats emanating from regional instability have resulted in large scale evacuation from the
Gulf countries in 1990 and more recently from Yemen in 2015 (operation Raahat).
Indian Missions in Gulf countries receive various types of complaints from Indian workers:
• including non-payment/delayed payment of wages,
• sudden closure of companies,
• ill treatment, excessive working hours,
• filing false charges with police authorities,
• withholding of passports, dishonouring terms of the contract,
• exit visa issues
The economies of Gulf countries have been facing an economic downturn due to fall in crude oil prices. In
particular, those employed in oil & gas and construction sectors are among the most vulnerable where
downsizing and lay-offs have been reported. There are some reports of Indian workers being asked to leave
before completion of their existing contracts. Instances of unpaid salaries for last few months and non-
availability of food in some labour camps of two big companies in Saudi Arabia have also been reported by
Indian workers.
Indian Missions and Posts have been pro-active in liaising with the host countries in resolving difficulties faced by
Indian workers. In addition, the institutional framework for supporting the welfare of Indian community abroad
has been considerably strengthened during the last few years. The Indian Community Welfare Fund has been
extended to all our Missions and Posts abroad to meet contingency expenditure for welfare activities for
overseas Indian citizens who are in distress on a means tested basis. Multilingual helplines have been set up in
India and in Gulf countries. Indian Worker Resource Centre (IWRC) has also been set up in Dubai, UAE that
provides toll-free helpline and walk-in counseling facilities. Four more IWRCs have been approved in Sharjah,
UAE, Riyadh and Jeddah in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia.
1.5.2. PROTECTIONISM AND NATIONALIST SENTIMENTS IN USA
The protectionist measures as a result of rise of nationalist, protectionist and anti-immigration politics in the west
poses a major future challenge in this context. The proposed restrictions on the renewal of H-1b visas in the USA
are case in point to be watched closely.
1.5.3. XENOPHOBIA AND VIOLENCE
The attacks on Indian students in Australia from 2008 to 2010 and the recent murder of Indian engineer in the
USA are examples of the threat from xenophobia and racism that the Indian community faces abroad.
1.5.4. ETHNIC TIES IN THE OLD DIASPORA COUNTRIES
The removal of Mahendra P. Chaudhary in Fiji in the coup of 2000, and the ensuing ethnic strife are symbolic of
the issues of domestic politics in the Old Diaspora countries. Similarly the issue of rights of the people Indian
origin in Malaysia has been a recurrent domestic issue in that country. In November 2007, the Hindu Rights
Action Force, a coalition of NGOs, gathered more than 50,000 minority Indians in the streets of Kuala Lumpur to
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announce a symbolic lawsuit against the British government, the former colonial ruler, for bringing them to the
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region as indentured labourers.

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Incidents of ethnic tensions exist all across our diaspora; for instance, in Old Diaspora countries such as,
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Malaysia, where despite some political representation, Indians faces discrimination exacerbated by religious
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tensions between the Malays (Bhumiputras) and the Indians.

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Fiji, where ethnic Indians comprise over 40% of the population, anti-Indian resentment resulted in an ethnic
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Fijian coup d’état in 2000, which removed from office the democratically-elected Prime Minister Mahendra
Chaudhry. Trinidad, where the Speaker of the House, Occah Seapual, an Indian woman, was unseated by the
People’s National Movement (PNM), the black party which had held power for most of the recent history of
Trinidad. The PNM did it by promulgating a state of emergency in the dead of night, placed Seapual under house
arrest, and eventually removed her as Speaker of the House.
This discrimination persists not just in countries like Malaysia, Fiji and Trinidad, but also in the New Diaspora
countries like the UK and Germany, where skinhead Brits and Germans have violently clashed with people from
South Asia. In Australia, attacks on Indian students have occurred at an alarming rate. Even in the US, a country
where Indians have made immense strides in all fields, Indians are not immune from hate crimes, such as those

committed by the Dot-buster gangs of New Jersey or the massacre of worshipers at the Sikh Gurdwara in
Wisconsin.
Success of the Indian community as entrepreneurs, educators, innovators and doctors has also attracted certain
threat perception. For instance, the portrayal of Indian’s having achieved their success at the cost of the local
population. Thus, such threats need to be taken into consideration for making any Diaspora policy.
Indian migrants have lived in conditions of appalling poverty in many places around the world, where they were
first taken as indentured labor many years ago. Still, a number of remarkable transformations have taken place
over the past generations. Through thrift, dogged perseverance, hard work, and most importantly by a
withdrawal into their own culture, these Indians successfully labored to give their children and grand-children
better economic futures. In time, these descendants came to capture the trade, commerce and business
leadership of their new homelands.
This was equally true in South Africa, Kenya, and Uganda as it was in Trinidad, Mauritius, Suriname and Burma, in
spite of the resentment and discrimination of the local populace and political establishments.
1.6. THE FUTURE

According to prediction in the near future India will overtake China as the most populous country. The young
population would be highly mobile. Given the conundrum of an expanding middle class in India, juxtaposed
against the continuing abject poverty of over half a billion Indians, migration patterns will accelerate. In spite of
discrimination, xenophobia, and exclusion in many countries, our Diaspora grew by over 10 million people during
the last decade alone. The migration of highly-skilled professionals, the continuing export of labor, and illegal
immigration to New Diaspora countries are likely to add to those numbers.
1.7. GOVERNMENT POLICY AND STEPS

• Pravasi Bhartiya Divas Conventions
• OCI card
• Know India Programme
• VAJRA scheme for returning Indian scientists
• India has signed labour agreements with Jordan, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait and Oman.
• Social Security agreements with countries of Europe
• Indian Community Welfare Fund at all Missions and Posts abroad.
• Indian Worker Resource Centre (IWRC) has also been set up in Dubai, UAE that provides toll-free helpline
and walk-in counselling facilities. Four more IWRCs have been approved in Sharjah, UAE, Riyadh and Jeddah
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia.
• Special provision for NRIs to invest in the National Pension Scheme.
• Prime Minister’s Global Advisory Council (PMGAC) was set up as a high level platform, to draw upon the
experience and knowledge of eminent people of Indian origin in diverse fields from across the world in
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January, 2009. So far five meetings have taken place.

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1.8. WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE?

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• Proactive response to unfolding policies such as Nitaqat

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Involving states in managing the immigrants

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• Strategic evacuation Policy

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Curbing red-tapism and easing investment environment.

• Training to the immigrant workers in line with the example of countries such as Philippines.
1.9. THE OVERSEAS CITIZEN OF INDIA

An Overseas Citizen of India is a lifetime visa status with some added benefits.
Who can be an OCI?
• A person who used to be an Indian citizen
• A person with at least one parent, grandparent, or great-grandparent who is/was an Indian citizen

• A person married to an Indian citizen or an existing OCI for at least two continuous years
The following groups of people cannot have OCI status:
• Anyone who was ever a citizen of Pakistan or Bangladesh
• Anyone whose parents or grandparents were citizens of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, or Sri
Lanka
• Anyone who served in a foreign military or worked in a foreign defense department
What are the benefits of being an OCI?
• Lifelong multiple entry visa to India
• No need to report to the FRRO regardless of the length of your stay
• One can eventually become a citizen of India if you remain an OCI for 5 years and live in India for at least 1
year.
• special counters during immigration
• No requirement of a student visa to study in India
• No requirement of an employment visa to get a job
• One can open a special bank account in India, just like an NRI
• make investments in India
• One can buy non-farm property and exercise property ownership rights
• OCI card can be used to apply for a driver’s license, open a bank account, or get a PAN card
• same economic, financial, and education benefits as NRIs (e.g. reserved admission quotas), and you can
adopt children like an NRI
• Fee equivalent to Indian resident when visiting a national parks, monuments, museums or wildlife sanctuary
(of course it is ultimately up to the discretion of the man issuing tickets)
What are the limitations?
• Cannot purchase agricultural land or farm houses
• Cannot vote
• Cannot hold a government job
• Cannot be elected to a political position
• Cannot travel to restricted areas without permission
How do you become an OCI?
• One can apply through the Indian embassy in your country of residence or within India at the local FRRO.
• The entire process can take several months in some cases. Fees vary from nationality to nationality.
Sources:
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Ministry of External Affairs

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World Migration report 2018

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Report of the High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora,

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http://indiandiaspora.nic.in/contents.htm
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• Ashok Rao, 6 February 2013,

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https://www.fairobserver.com/region/central_south_asia/indian-diaspora-past-present-and-future-part-iii/
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3.1. Non-Alignment: Relevance of the Idea and the movement.......................................................................... 12

3.2. Arguments in the context of Irrelevance of NAM ......................................................................................... 12

3.2.1. Arguments in Defence of NAM and Non-Alignment .............................................................................. 12

3.2.2. A Contemporary Assessment ................................................................................................................. 13

4. SUPPLEMENTARY READING .................................................................................................................................. 15

1 www.visionias.in ©Vision IAS

The lectures would broadly cover the following themes:

• Feel Free to add your Own Notes in blank Spaces

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1.2. DETERMINANTS: ACTORS AND FACTORS SHAPING INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

foreign policy over the years.

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most visible in:

Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea (1952-54)

• United Nations Peacekeeping forces in the Belgian Congo (1960-1964)

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negotiations. Eventually the initiative withered away.

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2.2. 1962-1991: PERIOD OF SELF HELP APPROACH

increasingly acquired a more realist orientation in multiple senses.

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between India and Pakistan, and a key to durable peace.

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against the coup in Maldives in 1988.

2.3. 1991 AND AFTER: ERA OF “PRAGMATIC” FOREIGN POLICY

On the basis of the discussion above we can

1. Identify certain Achievements of this phase:

• Recognised Nuclear capability

• Key relations: US, Japan, Russia, South East Asia

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3.2. ARGUMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF IRRELEVANCE OF NAM

3.2.1. ARGUMENTS IN DEFENCE OF NAM AND NON-ALIGNMENT

cooperation cannot be written off in the contemporary world.

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analysts derisively claim.

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exercising freedom of taking foreign policy decisions.

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4.2. REASONS FOR NON-ALIGNMENT

4.3. THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

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NAM: Role after the Cold War:

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18 www.visionias.in ©Vision IAS

Cultural diversity and human rights

Feel Free to add your Own Notes in blank Spaces

Copyright © by Vision IAS

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2. INDIA AND BHUTAN.............................................................................................................................................. 11

2.1. Background and Evolution............................................................................................................................. 11

2.2. Recent Dynamics ........................................................................................................................................... 11

2.3. Hydropower ................................................................................................................................................... 12

2.4. Economic Development ................................................................................................................................ 12

6.1. Background .................................................................................................................................................... 24

6.2. Security .......................................................................................................................................................... 25

6.3. Economic and Development Cooperation .................................................................................................... 25