Aranas vs. Mercado

G.R. No.
156407 January 15, 2014
THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND,
RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L.
MERCADO, Respondents.
Facts:
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second
wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children; and his two children by his first
marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas
(Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate
shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation
Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate
stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.
On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the
appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio’s estate (Special Proceedings No.
3094-CEB).1 The RTC granted the petition considering that there was no opposition. The
letters of administration in favor of Teresita were issued on September 7, 1992.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio on December

14, 1992 for the consideration and approval by the RTC.
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory,
Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined
regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma’s motion through the order of January 8, 1993.
On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8,
1993,3 supporting her inventory.
On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on
the inventory.
The RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted
by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included, and accordingly ruled adverse
to respondents.
On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the
reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real properties
affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and
that the parcels of land covered by the deed of assignment had already come into the
possession of and registered in the name of Mervir Realty.10 On May 18, 2001, the RTC
denied the motion for reconsideration,
On appeal, the CA partially granted respondent’s appeal. The assailed Orders dated March
14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 are hereby reversed and set aside
Issue:
Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the
inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale or
exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?
Held:
In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
for including properties in the inventory notwithstanding their having been transferred to
Mervir Realty by Emigdio during his lifetime, and for disregarding the registration of the
properties in the name of Mervir Realty, a third party, by applying the doctrine of piercing
the veil of corporate fiction.
It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in reaching its conclusion, ignored the law and the facts
that had fully warranted the assailed orders of the RTC.
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be
granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing
to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the
surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the preparation and submission of
the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator,
has the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the
issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. – Within three
(3) months after his appointment every executor or administrator shall return to the
court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the
deceased which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of
such estate, the court may order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to
give his or their assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and
personal properties of the decedent in the inventory.22 However, the word ‘all’ is qualified by
the phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the
properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her
possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase ‘true
inventory’ implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded
from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of
the decedent is "to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of
the executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition)
of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate." 23 Hence, the RTC
that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the
question of what properties should be included in the inventory.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and
limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the
estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can
do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the
inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. Such determination is
provisional and may be still revised.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an
intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and

convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding
the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without
prejudice to final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested
parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership..
It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its directive for the
inclusion of the properties in question in its assailed order of March 14, 2001, viz:
In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that Emigdio Mercado was one of
the heirs of Severina Mercado who, upon her death, left several properties as listed in the
inventory of properties submitted in Court in Special Proceedings No. 306-R which are
supposed to be divided among her heirs. The administratrix admitted, while being examined
in Court by the counsel for the petitioner, that she did not include in the inventory submitted
by her in this case the shares of Emigdio Mercado in the said estate of Severina Mercado.
Certainly, said properties constituting Emigdio Mercado’s share in the estate of Severina
Mercado should be included in the inventory of properties required to be submitted to the
Court in this particular case.
In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado also admitted in
Court that she did not include in the inventory shares of stock of Mervir Realty Corporation
which are in her name and which were paid by her from money derived from the taxicab
business which she and her husband had since 1955 as a conjugal undertaking. As these
shares of stock partake of being conjugal in character, one-half thereof or of the value
thereof should be included in the inventory of the estate of her husband.
In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado admitted, too, in
Court that she had a bank account in her name at Union Bank which she opened when her
husband was still alive. Again, the money in said bank account partakes of being conjugal in
character, and so, one-half thereof should be included in the inventory of the properties
constituting as estate of her husband.
In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this case that Lot No. 3353
of Pls-657-D located in Badian, Cebu containing an area of 53,301 square meters as
described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 of the Registry of Deeds
for the Province of Cebu is still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado until now.
When it was the subject of Civil Case No. CEB-12690 which was decided on October 19,
1995, it was the estate of the late Emigdio Mercado which claimed to be the owner thereof.
Mervir Realty Corporation never intervened in the said case in order to be the owner thereof.
This fact was admitted by Richard Mercado himself when he testified in Court. x x x So the
said property located in Badian, Cebu should be included in the inventory in this case.
Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of land by the late
Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir Realty Corporation on January 10, 1991 by virtue of the Deed
of Assignment signed by him on the said day (Exhibit N for the petitioner and Exhibit 5 for
the administratrix) was a transfer in contemplation of death. It was made two days before he
died on January 12, 1991. A transfer made in contemplation of death is one prompted by the
thought that the transferor has not long to live and made in place of a testamentary
disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909). Section 78 of the National Internal Revenue Code
of 1977 provides that the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the
value at the time of his death of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which
the decedent has at any time made a transfer in contemplation of death. So, the inventory
to be approved in this case should still include the said properties of Emigdio Mercado which
were transferred by him in contemplation of death. Besides, the said properties actually
appeared to be still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado at least ten (10) months
after his death, as shown by the certification issued by the Cebu City Assessor’s Office on
October 31, 1991 (Exhibit O).28
Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence
relevant to the procedure for preparing the inventory by the administrator. The aforequoted
explanations indicated that the directive to include the properties in question in the
inventory rested on good and valid reasons, and thus was far from whimsical, or arbitrary, or
capricious.
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory
of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate
court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under
the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the possession of the
administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to
exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as
the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part
of the regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means either that
the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board
evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction.39
In light of the foregoing, the CA's conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC was unwarranted and erroneous.
G.R. No. 114217 October 13, 2009
HEIRS OF JOSE SY BANG, HEIRS OF JULIAN SY and OSCAR SY,1 Petitioners,

vs.
ROLANDO SY, ROSALINO SY, LUCIO SY, ENRIQUE SY, ROSAURO SY, BARTOLOME
SY, FLORECITA SY, LOURDES SY, JULIETA SY, and ROSITA FERRERA-
SY, Respondents.
Facts:
On May 28, 1980, respondent Rolando Sy filed a Complaint for Partition before the then
Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch 2, docketed as Civil Case No. 8578.
Sy Bang died intestate in 1971, leaving behind real and personal properties, including
several businesses.6
During an out-of-court conference between petitioners and respondents, it was agreed that
the management, supervision or administration of the common properties and/or the entire
estate of the deceased Sy Bang shall be placed temporarily in the hands of petitioner Jose
Sy Bang, as trustee, with authority to delegate some of his functions to any of petitioners or
private respondents. Thus, the function or duty of bookkeeper was delegated by Jose Sy
Bang to his co-petitioner Julian Sy, and the duty or function of management and operation of
the business of cinema of the common ownership was delegated by petitioner Jose Sy Bang
to respondent Rosauro Sy.7
Herein petitioners and respondents also agreed that the income of the three cinema houses,
namely, Long Life, SBS and Sy-Co Theaters, shall exclusively pertain to respondents for their
support and sustenance, pending the termination of Civil Case No. 8578, for Judicial
Partition, and the income from the vast parts of the entire estate and other businesses of
their common father, to pertain exclusively to petitioners. Hence, since the year 1980,
private respondents, through respondent Rosauro Sy, had taken charge of the operation and
management of the three cinema houses, with the income derived therefrom evenly divided
among themselves for their support and maintenance.
On March 30, 1981, the Judge rendered a First Partial Decision based on the Compromise
Agreement dated November 10, 1980, submitted in Civil Case No. 8578 by plaintiff Rolando
Sy and defendants Jose Sy Bang and Julian Sy. On April 2, 1981, the Judge rendered a
Second Partial Decision based on the pretrial order of the court, dated March 25, 1981,
entered into by and between respondent Renato Sy and petitioner spouses. Said First Partial
Decision and Second Partial Decision had long become final, without an appeal having been
interposed by any of the parties
On June 8, 1982, the Judge rendered a Third Partial Decision:
(a) Declaring that all the properties, businesses or assets, their income, produce and
improvements, as well as all the rights, interests or participations (sic) in the names
of defendants Jose Sy Bang and his wife Iluminada Tan and their children, defendants
Zenaida and Ma. Emma; both surnamed Sy, and defendants Julian Sy and his wife
Rosa Tan, as belonging to the estate of Sy Bang, including the properties in the
names of said defendants which are enumerated in the Complaints in this case and
all those properties, rights and interests which said defendants may have concealed
or fraudulently transferred in the names of other persons, their agents or
representatives;
(b) Declaring the following as the heirs of Sy Bang, namely: his surviving widow,
Maria Rosita Ferrera-Sy and her children, Enrique, Bartolome, Rosalino, Rolando,
Rosauro, Maria Lourdes, Florecita and Julieta, all surnamed Sy, and his children by his
first wife, namely: Jose Sy Bang, Julian Sy, Lucio Sy, Oscar Sy and Renato Sy;
(c) Ordering the partition of the Estate of Sy Bang among his heirs entitled thereto
after the extent thereof shall have been determined at the conclusion of the proper
accounting which the parties in this case, their agents and representatives, shall
render and after segregating and delivering to Maria Rosita Ferrera-Sy her one-half
(1/2) share in the conjugal partnership between her and her deceased husband Sy
Bang;
(d) Deferring resolution on the question concerning the inclusion for partition of
properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando and Enrique, all surnamed
Sy.
On August 17, 1982, the Judge issued two Orders: (1) in the first Order, 13 Mrs. Lucita L.
Sarmiento was appointed as Receiver, and petitioners’ Motion for New Trial and/or
Reconsideration, dated July 9, 1982 and their Supplemental Motion, dated July 12, 1982,
were denied for lack of merit; and (2) in the second Order, 14 the Judge ordered the
immediate cancellation of the lis pendens annotated at the back of the certificates of title in
the names of Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy and Rolando Sy.
On August 18, 1982, the trial court approved the bond posted by the receiver, Mrs. Lucita L.
Sarmiento, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy and Rosalino Sy
On September 11, 1982, an Urgent Manifestation and Motion was filed by Mrs. Lucita L.
Sarmiento, the appointed receiver, which was opposed by petitioners on September 24,
1982. 16
After several incidents in the case, the Court, on May 8, 1989, referred the petition to the CA
for proper determination and disposition.
The CA rendered the assailed Decision17 on May 6, 1993, denying due course to and
dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It held that Judge Puno acted correctly in issuing the
assailed Third Partial Decision.
The CA also upheld the judge’s appointment of a receiver, saying that the judge did so after
both parties had presented their evidence and upon verified petition filed by respondents,
and in order to preserve the properties under litigation. Further, the CA found proper the
order to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of title in the names of
Rosalino, Rolando and Bartolome.
On April 22, 1994, petitioners filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC ruling regarding the Third Partial
Decision?
(2) Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC’s appointment of a receiver?
(3) Whether or not the CA erred in cancelling the lis pendens?
Held:
Finding no reversible error therein, we affirm the CA Decision.
Section 4, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 4. Several judgments. – In an action against several defendants, the court may,
when a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of them,
leaving the action to proceed against the others.
The trial court’s Third Partial Decision is in the nature of a several judgment as contemplated
by the rule quoted above. The trial court ruled on the status of the properties in the names
of petitioners (defendants below) while deferring the ruling on the properties in the names of
respondents pending the presentation of evidence.
A several judgment is proper when the liability of each party is clearly separable and distinct
from that of his co-parties, such that the claims against each of them could have been the
subject of separate suits, and judgment for or against one of them will not necessarily affect
the other.84
Petitioners, although sued collectively, each held a separate and separable interest in the
properties of the Sy Bang estate.
The pronouncement as to the obligation of one or some petitioners did not affect the
determination of the obligations of the others. That the properties in the names of
petitioners were found to be part of the Sy Bang estate did not preclude any further findings
or judgment on the status or nature of the properties in the names of the other heirs.
The trial court painstakingly examined the evidence on record and narrated the details, then
carefully laid out the particulars in the assailed Decision. The evidence that formed the basis
for the trial court’s conclusion is embodied in the Decision itself – evidence presented by the
parties themselves, including petitioners.
However, notwithstanding the trial court’s pronouncement, the Sy Bang estate cannot be
partitioned or distributed until the final determination of the extent of the estate and only
until it is shown that the obligations under Rule 90, Section 1, 88 have been settled.89
In the settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be
made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the
widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the
distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made
to meet those obligations.90
Settling the issue of ownership is the first stage in an action for partition. 91
The issue of ownership or co-ownership, to be more precise, must first be resolved in order
to effect a partition of properties. This should be done in the action for partition itself.
Moreover, the Third Partial Decision does not have the effect of terminating the proceedings
for partition. By its very nature, the Third Partial Decision is but a determination based on
the evidence presented thus far. There remained issues to be resolved by the court. There
would be no final determination of the extent of the Sy Bang estate until the court’s
examination of the properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique.
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court will have to make a pronouncement
whether the properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique indeed
belong to the Sy Bang estate. Only after the full extent of the Sy Bang estate has been
determined can the trial court finally order the partition of each of the heirs’ share.
(2) As to the issue of the judge’s appointment of a receiver, suffice it to say that the CA
conclusively found thus:
The records show that the petitioners were never deprived of their day in court. Upon Order
of the respondent Judge, counsel for the petitioners submitted their opposition to [the]
petition for appointment of a receiver filed by private respondents. x x x.
Moreover, evidence on record shows that respondent Judge appointed the receiver after
both parties have presented their evidence and after the Third Partial Decision has been
promulgated. Such appointment was made upon verified petition of herein private
respondents, alleging that petitioners are mismanaging the properties in litigation by either
mortgaging or disposing the same, hence, the said properties are in danger of being lost,
wasted, dissipated, misused, or disposed of. The respondent Judge acted correctly in
granting the appointment of a receiver in Civil Case No. 8578, in order to preserve the
properties in litis pendentia and neither did he abuse his discretion nor acted arbitrarily in
doing s. On the contrary, We find that it was the petitioners who violated the status quo
sought to be maintained by the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 61519, by their intrusion and
unwarranted seizures of the 3 theaters, subject matter of the litigation, and which are
admittedly under the exclusive management and operation of private respondent, Rosauro
Sy.
(3) While the trial court has an inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, such power
is to be exercised within the express confines of the law. As provided in Section 14, Rule 13
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled on two
grounds: (1) when the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse
party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who
caused it to be recorded.96
This Court has interpreted the notice as:
The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect
the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who
deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they
may acquire in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the
action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined
and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a
mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any
given time. And its continuance or removal-like the continuance or removal of a preliminary
attachment of injunction-is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action,
and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.
G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
Facts:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibañez
entered into a loan agreement3 in the amount of ₱128,000.00. In view thereof, Efraim and
his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum
payable in five equal annual amortizations of ₱43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and every
May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement, 4 this
time in the amount of ₱123,156.00. Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory
note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also
signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement5 for the loan dated December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. 6 Subsequently in March
1981, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 2706. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed
as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent.7 During the pendency of the
testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañez Ariola,
executed a Joint Agreement8 dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between
themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund
and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late
father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities 9 was executed by
and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the
assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank.
Demand letters10 for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the
Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay.
Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint 11 for sum of money against the
heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch
150, docketed as Civil Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued against both, but the one
intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no
information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines. 12 Accordingly, the
complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer 13 and alleged that the
loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the
joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate
court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint
agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch
63.14 Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered by
the court dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
On appeal, CA ruled adverse to petitioner.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
1) Whether or not the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid?
2) Whether or not the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid?
3) Whether or not the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the deceased?
Held:
1) At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine
all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. 20 The said court is primarily
concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. 21
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after
the will has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has
been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because
unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to
dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will
decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity
of a will.
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties
embraced in the will.23 In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibañez, left a
holographic will24 which contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later
after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately
preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision
embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that
time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included
therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said
tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement 25 executed by Edmund and
Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the
time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late
father’s holographic will covering the said tractors.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision
embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that
time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included
therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said
tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement 25 executed by Edmund and
Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the
time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late
father’s holographic will covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all
the properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any
way without the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which
the Court cannot allow.26 Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. 27 Thus, in executing any joint agreement
which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court
approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that
part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine
the identity of the heirs of the decedent.28 In the instant case, there is no showing that the
signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was
executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the court and the latter had yet to
determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence
S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and
prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the
estate of the deceased.
2,3) The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’ assumption of the
indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint
agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto "have agreed to divide between
themselves and take possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them to
assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is
in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp."29 The assumption of liability was conditioned upon
the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of their
respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the
partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that
they were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect
did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be
given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a
creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the
probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is
mandatory.30 As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:31
… This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing
the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each
claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and
obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the
early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires
the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order
to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the
residue.32
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S.
Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence
presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were
executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the
petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after
Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing
guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As
the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to
delve into the matter further.
G.R. No. 156403. March 31, 2005
JOSEPHINE PAHAMOTANG and ELEANOR PAHAMOTANG-BASA, Petitioners,

vs.
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (PNB) and the HEIRS OF ARTURO
ARGUNA, Respondents.
Facts:
On July 1, 1972, Melitona Pahamotang died. She was survived by her husband Agustin
Pahamotang, and their eight (8) children, namely: Ana, Genoveva, Isabelita, Corazon,
Susana, Concepcion and herein petitioners Josephine and Eleonor, all
surnamed Pahamotang.
On September 15, 1972, Agustin filed with the then Court of First Instance of Davao City a
petition for issuance of letters administration over the estate of his deceased wife. The
petition, docketed as Special Case No. 1792, was raffled to Branch VI of said court,
hereinafter referred to as the intestate court.
In his petition, Agustin identified petitioners Josephine and Eleonor as among the heirs of his
deceased spouse. It appears that Agustin was appointed petitioners' judicial guardian in an
earlier case - Special Civil Case No. 1785 – also of the CFI of Davao City, Branch VI.
On December 7, 1972, the intestate court issued an order granting Agustin’s petition.
On July 6, 1973, respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Agustin executed
an Amendment of Real and Chattel Mortgages with Assumption of Obligation. It
appears that earlier, or on December 14, 1972, the intestate court approved the mortgage
to PNB of certain assets of the estate to secure an obligation in the amount of ₱570,000.00.
On July 16, 1973, Agustin filed with the intestate court a Petition for Authority To
Increase Mortgage on the above mentioned properties of the estate.
In an Order dated July 18, 1973, the intestate court granted said petition.
On October 5, 1974, Agustin again filed with the intestate court another petition, Petition
for Declaration of Heirs And For Authority To Increase Indebtedness, whereunder he
alleged the necessity for an additional loan from PNB
In an Order of October 19, 1974, the intestate court granted Agustin authority to seek
additional loan from PNB in an amount not exceeding ₱5,000,000.00 to be secured by the
land covered by OCT No. P-7131 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao Oriental, but denied
Agustin’s prayer for declaration of heirs for being premature.
On October 22, 1974, a real estate mortgage contract for ₱4,500,000.00 was executed by
PNB and Agustin in his several capacities
On February 19, 1980, Agustin filed with the intestate court a Petition (Request for
Judicial Authority To Sell Certain Properties of the Estate), therein praying for
authority to sell to Arturo Arguna
On February 27, 1980, Agustin yet filed with the intestate court another petition, this time
a Petition To Sell the Properties of the Estate, more specifically referring to the
property covered by OCT No. P-7131, in favor of PLEI.
In separate Orders both dated February 25, 1980, the intestate court granted Agustin
authority to sell estate properties
In a motion for reconsideration, Agustin prayed the intestate court for the amendment of
one of its February 25, 1980 Orders by canceling the requirement of express conformity of
the heirs as a condition for the disposal of the aforesaid properties.
In its Order of January 7, 1981, the intestate court granted Agustin’s prayer.
Hence, on March 4, 1981, estate properties covered by TCTs No. 7443,11465, 24326, 31226,
8035, (T-2947) 662 and (T-3918) T-1081, were sold to respondent Arturo Arguna, while the
property covered by OCT No. P-7131 was sold to PLEI. Consequent to such sales, vendees
Arguna and PLEI filed witt the intestate court a motion for the approval of the corresponding
deeds of sale in their favor. And, in an Order dated March 9, 1981, the intestate court
granted the motion.
Thereafter, three (3) daughters of Agustin, namely, Ana, Isabelita and Corazon petitioned
the intestate court for the payment of their respective shares from the sales of estate
properties, which was granted by the intestate court.
Meanwhile, the obligation secured by mortgages on the subject properties of the estate was
never satisfied. Hence, on the basis of the real estate mortgage contracts dated July 6,
1973 and October 22, 1974, mortgagor PNB filed a petition for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage.
Petitioner Josephine filed a motion with the intestate court for the issuance of an order
restraining PNB from extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgage. In its Order dated August 19,
1983, the intestate court denied Josephine’s motion. Hence, PNB was able to foreclose the
mortgage in its favor.
Petitioners Josephine and Eleanor, together with their sister Susana Pahamatong-Zamora,
filed motions with the intestate court to set aside its Orders of December 14, 1972 [Note:
the order dated July 18, 1973 contained reference to an order dated December 14, 1972
approving the mortgage to PNB of certain properties of the estate], July 18, 1973, October
19, 1974 and February 25, 1980.
In an Order dated September 5, 1983, the intestate court denied the motions
Such was the state of things when, on March 20, 1984, in the Regional Trial Court at Davao
City, petitioners Josephine and Eleanor, together with their sister Susana, filed their
complaint for Nullification of Mortgage Contracts and Foreclosure Proceedings and
Damages against Agustin, PNB, Arturo Arguna, PLEI, the Provincial Sheriff of Mati, Davao
Oriental, the Provincial Sheriff of Tagum, Davao del Norte and the City Sheriff of Davao City.
In their complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 16,802 which was raffled to Branch 12 of
the court,
PNB moved to dismiss the complaint, which the trial court granted in its Order of January 11,
1985.
However, upon motion of the plaintiffs, the trial court reversed itself and ordered defendant
PNB to file its answer.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners

From the aforementioned decision of the trial court, PNB, PLEI and the Heirs of Arturo
Arguna went on appeal to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65290. While the appeal
was pending, the CA granted the motion of Susana Pahamatong-Zamora to withdraw from
the case
As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated March 20,
2002,7 reversed the appealed decision of the trial court and dismissed the petitioners’
complaint in Civil Case No. 16,802
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners can obtain relief from the effects of contracts of sale and
mortgage entered into by Agustin without first initiating a direct action against the orders of
the intestate court authorizing the challenged contracts?
Held:
It bears emphasizing that the action filed by the petitioners before the trial court in Civil
Case No. 16,802 is for the annulment of several contracts entered into by Agustin for and
in behalf of the estate of Melitona, namely: (a) contract of mortgage in favor of respondent
PNB, (b) contract of sale in favor of Arguna involving seven (7) parcels of land; and (c)
contract of sale of a parcel of land in favor of PLEI.
The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case upon the allegations
in the complaint that said contracts were entered into despite lack of notices to the heirs of
the petition for the approval of those contracts by the intestate court.
Contrary to the view of the Court of Appeals, the action which petitioners lodged with the
trial court in Civil Case No. 16,802 is not an action to annul the orders of the intestate court,
which, according to CA, cannot be done collaterally. It is the validity of the contracts of
mortgage and sale which is directly attacked in the action.
And, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the trial court made a factual finding in its decision of
August 7, 1998 that petitioners were, in fact, not notified by their father Agustin of the filing
of his petitions for permission to mortgage/sell the estate properties. The trial court made
the correct conclusion of law that the challenged orders of the intestate court granting
Agustin’s petitions were null and void for lack of compliance with the mandatory
requirements of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, particularly Sections 2, 4, 7
Settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that when an order authorizing the sale or
encumbrance of real property was issued by the testate or intestate court without previous
notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees as required by the Rules, it is not only the contract
itself which is null and void but also the order of the court authorizing the same.
Thus, in Maneclang vs. Baun,12 the previous administrator of the estate filed a petition
with the intestate court seeking authority to sell portion of the estate, which the court
granted despite lack of notice of hearing to the heirs of the decedent. The new administrator
of the estate filed with the Regional Trial Court an action for the annulment of the sales
made by the previous administrator. After trial, the trial court held that the order of the
intestate court granting authority to sell, as well as the deed of sale, were void. On appeal
directly to this Court, We held that without compliance with Sections 2, 4 and 7 of Rule 89 of
the Rules of Court, "the authority to sell, the sale itself and the order approving it would be
null and void ab initio".
Clearly, the requirements of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court are mandatory and failure to give
notice to the heirs would invalidate the authority granted by the intestate/probate court to
mortgage or sell estate assets.
Here, it appears that petitioners were never notified of the several petitions filed by Agustin
with the intestate court to mortgage and sell the estate properties of his wife.
Aside from merely quoting the orders of July 18, 1973 and October 19, 1974 of the
intestate court, the Court of Appeals leaves us in the dark on its reason for disbelieving the
trial court. The appellate court did not publicize its appraisal of the evidence presented by
the parties before the trial court in the matter regarding the knowledge, or absence thereof,
by the petitioners of Agustin’s petitions. The appellate court cannot casually set aside the
findings of the trial court without stating clearly the reasons therefor. Findings of the trial
court are entitled to great weight, and absent any indication to believe otherwise, we simply
cannot adopt the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals.
Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined the
right.16 The essential elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of
one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for
which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having been
afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4)
injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the
suit is not held barred.17
In the present case, the appellate court erred in appreciating laches against petitioners. The
element of delay in questioning the subject orders of the intestate court is sorely lacking.
Petitioners were totally unaware of the plan of Agustin to mortgage and sell the estate
properties.
G.R. No. 178933 September 16, 2009
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and NELIA S. SILVERIO-DEE, Respondents.
Facts:
The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz
Silverio. After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate
proceeding for the settlement of her estate. The case was docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-
2629 entitled In Re: Estate of the Late Beatriz D. Silverio, Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. v. Ricardo S.
Silverio Jr., et al. pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 57
(RTC).
On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition
to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On November
22, 2004, Edmundo S. Silverio also filed a comment/opposition for the removal of Ricardo C.
Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate and for the appointment of a new administrator.
On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo
Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new
administrator.
On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated January 3, 2005, as well as all other related orders.
On February 4, 2005, Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any
Person to Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the Late
Beatriz Silverio, Without Authority from this Honorable Court. 3
Then, on May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order4 affirming its Order dated January
3, 2005 and denying private respondent’s motion for reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order,
the RTC also authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the order, immediately
exercise his duties as administrator of the subject estate. The Omnibus Order also directed
Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to vacate the property at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order.
Nelia Silverio-Dee received a copy of the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 on June 8,
2005.
On June 16, 2005, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 15,
20055 of the Omnibus Order. This was later denied by the RTC
Notably, the RTC in its Order dated December 12, 2005 6 also recalled its previous order
granting Ricardo Silverio, Jr. with letters of administration over the intestate estate of Beatriz
Silverio and reinstating Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as the administrator.
From the Order dated December 12, 2005, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the RTC in an Order dated October 31, 2006. In the
same order, the RTC also allowed the sale of various properties of the intestate estate of the
late Beatriz Silverio to partially settle estate taxes, penalties, interests and other charges
due thereon
Meanwhile, on January 6, 2006, Nelia Silverio-Dee filed a Notice of Appeal dated January 5,
20068 from the Order dated December 12, 2005 while the Record on Appeal dated January
20, 20069 was filed on January 23, 2006.
Thereafter, on October 23, 2006, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for
Issuance of a Writ of Execution10 against the appeal of Nelia Silverio-Dee
Thus, on April 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order11 denying the appeal on the ground that it
was not perfected within the reglementary period. The RTC further issued a writ of execution
for the enforcement of the Order dated May 31, 2005 against private respondent to vacate
the premises of the property located at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City. The writ of
execution was later issued on April 17, 200712 and a Notice to Vacate13 was issued on April
19, 2007 ordering private respondent to leave the premises of the subject property within
ten (10) days.
Consequently, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Prayer
for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) dated May 2, 200714 with the CA.
On May 4, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the prayer for the issuance
of a TRO.
Afterwards, on July 6, 2007, the CA issued the assailed decision granting the petition of
private respondent.
Hence, this petion.
Issue:
Whether or not the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 (Annex G of Annex C) and the Order
dated December 12, 2005 are Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to appeal under
Sec. 1 of Rule 41?
Held:
To recapitulate, the relevant facts to the instant issue are as follows:
On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate
the premises of the property located at No. 3, Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. She
received a copy of the said Order on June 8, 2005. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and
Record on Appeal, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order. This
motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated December 12, 2005. This Order
was received by private respondent on December 22, 2005. On January 6, 2006, private
respondent filed her Notice of Appeal while she filed her Record on Appeal on January 23,
2006.1avvphi1
The question posed is whether the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 is an interlocutory
order.
An interlocutory order, as opposed to a final order, was defined in Tan v. Republic: 20
A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution
what has been determined by the court, while an interlocutory order is one which does not
dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Additionally, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for
the appeal of the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
The interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is
only when such interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to.
In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the
ground that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia
Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect the order is not a final determination of the
case or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights
therein. It must be borne in mind that until the estate is partitioned, each heir only has an
inchoate right to the properties of the estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a particular
property. In Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, we succinctly ruled:
Art. 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the
whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs,
subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. Under a co-ownership, the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Each co-owner
of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and
may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the
interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is
made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-
owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership over the
pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the
estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise
rights of ownership over such inchoate right. Thus, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alie
nate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership
Additionally, the above provision must be viewed in the context that the subject property is
part of an estate and subject to intestate proceedings before the courts. It is, thus, relevant
to note that in Rule 84, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, the administrator may only deliver
properties of the estate to the heirs upon order of the Court. Similarly, under Rule 90, Sec. 1
of the Rules of Court, the properties of the estate shall only be distributed after the payment
of the debts, funeral charges, and other expenses against the estate, except when
authorized by the Court.
Verily, once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court, the properties
included therein are under the control of the intestate court. And not even the administrator
may take possession of any property that is part of the estate without the prior authority of
the Court.
In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly
secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore,
never had any real interest in the specific property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park,
Makati City. As such, the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory
and, therefore, not subject to an appeal.1avvphi1
Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal
with the RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode of appeal, the case should have
been dismissed.23
G.R. No. 185226 February 11, 2010
CORAZON M. GREGORIO, as administratrix of the estate litigated in the case

below, RAMIRO T. MADARANG, and the heirs of CASIMIRO R. MADARANG, JR.,
namely: Estrelita L. Madarang, Consuelo P. Madarang, Casimiro Madarang IV, and
Jane Margaret Madarang-Crabtree, Petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. MADARANG and VICENTE R. MADARANG, Respondents.
Facts:
Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr. (Casimiro, Sr. or the decedent) died intestate on June 3, 1995,
leaving real and personal properties with an estimated value of ₱200,000.00. 1 He was
survived by his wife Dolores and their five children, namely Casimiro, Jr., Jose, Ramiro,
Vicente and Corazon.
In the intestate proceedings filed by the couple’s son Jose which was lodged before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57, Dolores was appointed as administratrix
of the intestate estate of Casimiro, Sr.2
Dolores submitted an Inventory Report listing the properties of the decedent’s estate. Jose
filed his Comment on the Report, alleging that it omitted six lots including Lot 829-B-4-
B located in Cebu City which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 125429.
A hearing was thus conducted to determine whether the six lots formed part of the estate of
the decedent
By Order of April 5, 2002, the RTC instructed Dolores to revise her Inventory Report to
include the six lots.
Dolores and her children, except Jose who suggested that the former be referred to as
"oppositors,"5 questioned the RTC order of inclusion of the six lots via motion for
reconsideration during the pendency of which motion the court appointed herein petitioner
Corazon as co-administratrix of her mother Dolores.
As Dolores and her co-oppositors alleged that the six lots had been transferred during the
lifetime of the decedent, they were ordered to submit their affidavits, in lieu of oral
testimony, to support the allegation. Only herein respondent Vicente complied. In his
Affidavit, Vicente declared that one of the six lots, Lot 829-B-4-B, was conveyed to him by a
Deed of Donation executed in August 1992 by his parents Dolores and Casimiro, Sr. 6
It appears that petitioners later manifested that they no longer oppose the provisional
inclusion of the six lots, except Lot 829-B-4-B.
The RTC, by Order of January 20, 2003,7 thus modified its April 5, 2002 Order to exclude Lot
829 B-4-B and the administratrix is directed within sixty (60) days: (1) to submit a revised
inventory in accordance with the Order dated April 5, 2002, as here modified; and (2) to
render an accounting of her administration of the estate of Casimiro V. Madarang.
(underscoring supplied),
Jose moved to reconsider the RTC January 20, 2003 Order, arguing that since the title to Lot
829-B-4-B remained registered in the name of his parents, it should not be excluded from
the Inventory; and that the Deed of Donation in Vicente’s favor was not notarized nor
registered with the Register of Deeds. Jose’s motion for reconsideration having been denied
by Order of February 5, 2003, he filed a Notice of Appeal.
Jose later filed before the appellate court a "Motion to Withdraw Petition” granted on
Resolution of January 18, 2008
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s grant of Jose’s Motion to
Withdraw Petition was, by Resolution of November 6, 2008,9 denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred when it passed upon the merits of respondent’s appeal from
the RTC order to exclude Lot 829-B-4-B from the Inventory?
Held:
More specifically, petitioners question the appellate court’s finding that as the parties
"interposed no objection to the non-inclusion of Lot No. 829-B-4-B in the inventory of the
estate of Casimiro V. Madarang, in effect, they have consented thereto.
A review of the voluminous records of the case shows that, indeed, there was no accord
among the parties respecting the exclusion of Lot 829-B-4-B.
While a probate court, being of special and limited jurisdiction, cannot act on questions of
title and ownership, it can, for purposes of inclusion or exclusion in the inventory of
properties of a decedent, make a provisional determination of ownership, without prejudice
to a final determination through a separate action in a court of general jurisdiction.1avvphil
Article 1061 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs,
must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may
have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir and in the account of partition.
(underscoring supplied)
in relation to which, Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. – Questions as

to advancement made, or alleged to have been made, by the deceased to any
heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person
raising the questions and on the heir. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By express provision of law then, Lot 829-B-4-B, which was alleged to have been donated by
the decedent and his wife to their son-respondent Vicente, should not be excluded from the
inventory of the properties of the decedent.
G.R. No. 240199
SPOUSES ISIDRO R. SALITICO AND CONRADA C. SALITICO, Petitioners

vs.
HEIRS OF RESURRECCION* MARTINEZ FELIX, NAMELY: LUCIANO, CORAZON AND
CONCEPCION, ALL SURNAMED FELIX, RECAREDO P. HERNANDEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF AMANDA H. BURGOS, AND THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS, Respondents
Facts:
Amanda is the registered owner of a 1,413-square-meter parcel of land registered in

her name under Original Certificate of Title No. (OCT) P-1908, located in Bambang,
Bulacan (subject property).
By virtue of a document entitled Huling Habilin ni Amanda H. Burgos5 dated May 7,

1986 (Huling Habilin), the subject property was inherited by the niece of Amanda,
Resurreccion, as a devisee.
Thereafter, Resurreccion, as the new owner of the subject property, executed a document
entitled Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa7 dated November 10, 1998, which transferred ownership
over the parcel of land in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico. The latter then took physical
possession of the subject property.
Subsequently, a proceeding for the probate of the Huling Habilin was undertaken

before the RTC. The latter then filed and presented the Huling Habilin before the
Probate Court, which approved it on February 6, 2008. The Probate Court likewise
issued a Certificate of Allowance on January 12, 2009.
On March 9, 2010, the petitioners Sps. Salitico received a demand letter requiring
them to vacate the subject property and surrender possession over it to the
respondents heirs. To protect their interest over the subject property, the petitioners
Sps. Salitico executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim dated March 17, 2009, which was
however denied registration by the respondent RD on November 3, 2009.
In their Complaint before the RTC, the petitioners Sps. Salitico sought the delivery
and return in their favor of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908 and the
execution of the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale by way of confirming
the Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa. They likewise prayed that OCT P-1908 be cancelled
and a new one be issued in their names. Lastly, they also demanded payment of
attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages, and reimbursement for litigation
expenses.
On February 11, 2013, the petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Motion for Summary
Judgment,8 which was, however, denied by the RTC in its Order9 dated June 5, 2013.
The RTC issued a partial summary judgment in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico,
ordering the respondent RD to register the petitioners' Affidavit of Adverse Claim
dated March 17, 2009
On June 6, 2014, the RTC rendered its Decision11 dismissing the Complaint for lack of
cause of action.
The petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied
in the RTC's Order dated May 26, 2015
On appeal, the CA dismissed the appeal due to the pendency of the probate
proceedings before the Probate Court
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC's Decision dated June 6, 2014 and Order
dated May 26, 2015, which dismissed the petitioners Sps. Salitico's Complaint for
Specific Performance due to lack of cause of action?
Held:
Article 777 of the Civil Code, which is substantive law, states that the rights of the
inheritance are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Article
777 operates at the very moment of the decedent's death meaning that the
transmission by succession occurs at the precise moment of death and, therefore, at
that precise time, the heir is already legally deemed to have acquired ownership of
his/her share in the inheritance, "and not at the time of declaration of heirs, or
partition, or distribution."[19] Thus, there is no legal bar to an heir disposing of his/her
hereditary share immediately after such death. [
As applied to the instant case, upon the death of Amanda, Resurreccion became the
absolute owner of the devised subject property, subject to a resolutory condition that
upon settlement of Amanda's Estate, the devise is not declared inofficious or
excessive. Hence, there was no legal bar preventing Resurreccion from entering into
a contract of sale with the petitioners Sps. Salitico with respect to the former's share
or interest over the subject property.
According to Section 92 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, with respect to the transfer of properties subject of
testate or intestate proceedings, a new certificate of title in the name of the
transferee shall be issued by the Register of Deeds only upon the submission of a
certified copy of the partition and distribution, together with the final judgment or
order of the court approving the same or otherwise making final distribution,
supported by evidence of payment of estate tax or exemption therefrom, as the case
may be.
Further, under Section 91 of PD 1529, even without an order of final distribution from
the testate/intestate court and in anticipation of a final distribution of a portion or the
whole of the property, the Register of Deeds may be compelled to issue the
corresponding certificate of title to the transferee only when the
executor/administrator of the estate submits a certified copy of an order from the
court having jurisdiction of the testate or intestate proceedings directing the
executor/administrator to transfer the property to the transferees.
Hence, under the applicable provisions of PD 1529 and the Rules of Court, it is only upon the
issuance by the testate or intestate court of the final order of distribution of the estate or the
order in anticipation of the final distribution that the certificate of title covering the subject
property may be issued in the name of the distributees.
In the instant case, there is no showing that, in the pendency of the settlement of the Estate
of Amanda, the Probate Court had issued an order of final distribution or an order in
anticipation of a final distribution, both of which the law deems as requirements before the
Register of Deeds can issue a new certificate of title in the name of the petitioners Sps.
Salitico.
Hence, reading Article 777 of the Civil Code together with the pertinent provisions of PD
1529 and the Rules of Court, while an heir may dispose and transfer his/her hereditary share
to another person, before the transferee may compel the issuance of a new certificate of
title covering specific property in his/her name, a final order of distribution of the estate or
the order in anticipation of the final distribution issued by the testate or intestate court must
first be had.
Therefore, despite the existence of a valid contract of sale between Resurreccion and
the petitioners Sps. Salitico, which ordinarily would warrant the delivery of the
owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908 in favor of the latter, pending the final
settlement of the Estate of Amanda, and absent any order of final distribution or an
order in anticipation of a final distribution from the Probate Court, the RD cannot be
compelled at this time to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a new certificate of title in
favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
G.R. No. 174835 March 22, 2010
ANITA REYES-MESUGAS, Petitioner,
vs.
ALEJANDRO AQUINO REYES, Respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner Anita Reyes-Mesugas and respondent Alejandro A. Reyes are the children of
Lourdes Aquino Reyes and Pedro N. Reyes. Lourdes died intestate, leaving to her heirs,
among others, three parcels of land, including a lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 24475.
On February 3, 2000, respondent filed a petition for settlement of the estate of

Lourdes,3 praying for his appointment as administrator due to alleged irregularities and
fraudulent transactions by the other heirs. Petitioner, her father Pedro and Arturo, a sibling
of the petitioner, opposed the petition.
On August 30, 2000, a compromise agreement4 was entered into by the parties whereby the
estate of Lourdes was partitioned. A decision5 dated September 13, 2000 was rendered by
the RTC pursuant to the said compromise agreement.
Respondent opposed the motion and claimed that the parties, in addition to the compromise
agreement, executed "side agreements" which had yet to be fulfilled. However, petitioner
refused to give the right of way and threatened to build a concrete structure to prevent
access. He argued that, unless petitioner permitted the inscription of the right of way on the
certificate of title pursuant to their agreement, the notice of lis pendens in TCT No. 24475
must remain.
In its order8 dated January 26, 2006, the RTC denied the motion to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotation for lack of sufficient merit.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal.10 Because the denial of a motion to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotation was an interlocutory order, the RTC denied the notice of appeal as it
could not be appealed until the judgment on the main case was rendered. 11 A motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioner but the same was also denied. 12
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in not cancelling the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 24475?
Held:
We find for petitioner.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid

litigation or put an end to one already commenced.13 Once submitted to the court and
stamped with judicial approval, it becomes more than a mere private contract binding upon
the parties; having the sanction of the court and entered as its determination of the
controversy, it has the force and effect of any judgment. 14
Consequently, a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement is

immediately executory as there is no appeal from such judgment. 15 When both parties enter
into an agreement to end a pending litigation and request that a decision be rendered
approving said agreement, such action constitutes an implied waiver of the right to appeal
against the said decision
In this instance, the case filed with the RTC was a special proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of Lourdes. The RTC therefore took cognizance of the case as a probate court.
Settled is the rule that a probate court is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction. It acts on matters
pertaining to the estate but never on the rights to property arising from the contract. 17 It
approves contracts entered into for and on behalf of the estate or the heirs to it but this is
by fiat of the Rules of Court.18 It is apparent therefore that when the RTC approved the
compromise agreement on September 13, 2000, the settlement of the estate proceeding
came to an end.
Moreover, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled when the annotation is not necessary to
protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded. 19 The compromise agreement did
not mention the grant of a right of way to respondent. Any agreement other than the
judicially approved compromise agreement between the parties was outside the limited
jurisdiction of the probate court. Thus, any other agreement entered into by the petitioner
and respondent with regard to a grant of a right of way was not within the jurisdiction of the
RTC acting as a probate court. Therefore, there was no reason for the RTC not to cancel the
notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 24475 as respondent had no right which needed to be
protected. Any alleged right arising from the "side agreement" on the right of way can be
fully protected by filing an ordinary action for specific performance in a court of general
jurisdiction.
In line with the recording of the order for the partition of the estate, paragraph 2, Section 77
of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 152921 provides:
Section 77. Cancellation of Lis Pendens –
At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant, or other disposition
of the action such as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to
the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a memorandum or notice
of lis pendens has been registered as provided in the preceding section, the notice
of lis pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon the registration of a certificate of
the clerk of court in which the action or proceeding was pending stating the manner
of disposal thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, when the September 13, 2000 decision was recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
pursuant to Section 4, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, the notice of lis pendens inscribed on
TCT No. 24475 was deemed cancelled by virtue of Section 77 of PD No. 1529.
G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005.*

EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR AND HEIR OF THE
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA CHING-PACIOLES, petitioner, vs. MIGUELA
CHUATOCO-CHING, respondent.
Facts:
On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value
of ₱10.5 million, stock investments worth ₱518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to ₱6.54
million, and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her husband, petitioner
herein, and their two minor children.
Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition4 for the
settlement of Miguelita’s estate. He prayed that (a) letters of administration be issued in his
name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate be divided among the compulsory heirs.
Miguelita’s mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an opposition,
specifically to petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of letters of administration on the grounds
that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator;
and (b) the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of "paraphernal properties." Respondent
prayed that the letters of administration be issued to her instead.5 Afterwards, she also filed
a motion for her appointment as special administratrix.6
Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct
and material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory heir, and that he, being the
surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be appointed as administrator under the law.7
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she
gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them "would
undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business
partners."8
In her omnibus motion9 dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her son Emmanuel

Ching to act as special administrator.
On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel
as joint regular administrators of the estate.10 Both were issued letters of administration
after taking their oath and posting the requisite bond.
Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila Standard on
September 12, 19, and 26, 1994. However, no claims were filed against the estate within the
period set by the Revised Rules of Court.
Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s

estate.11 Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.
On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the
only compulsory heirs of Miguelita.12
On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion13 praying,
among others, that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition
and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorney’s fees.
Respondent opposed petitioner’s motion on the ground that the partition and distribution of
the estate is "premature and precipitate," considering that there is yet no determination
"whether the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a
joint venture."14 Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelita’s estate as an
"heir and co-owner." Thus, she prayed that a hearing be scheduled.
On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and
attorney’s fees but denied petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the estate,
holding that it is indeed "premature."
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution dated May 7,
1996.
Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking to annul
and set aside the intestate court’s Order dated January 17, 1996 and Resolution dated May
7, 1996 which denied petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the estate for being
premature, indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve respondent’s claim of
ownership.
The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing the
challenged Order and Resolution, the intestate court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied.
Hence, this petition for review
Issue:
Whether or not a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of
ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate?
Held:
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate
court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of
will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership
that arise during the proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this rule is that such court
exercises special and limited jurisdiction.16
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court
may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether
or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such situations the adjudication is
merely incidental and provisional.
Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,17 we held:
"x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate
court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate
properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination
is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
to resolve title."
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of
the intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondent’s claim. Such reliance is misplaced.
Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or
probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine
whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. The facts of this case show
that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.
First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and Opposition18 dated
September 18, 1995, respondent expressly adopted the inventory prepared by petitioner,
thus:
"6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his Amended Compliance
dated October 6, 1994,[…]
And second, Emmanuel, respondent’s son and representative in the settlement of
Miguelita’s estate, did not submit his own inventory. His mandate, as co-administrator, is "to
submit within three (3) months after his appointment a true inventory and appraisal of all
the real and personal estate of the deceased which have come into his possession or
knowledge."19 He could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those properties
which respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to submit one
shows that he acquiesced with petitioner’s inventory.
Obviously, respondent’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of
what properties should or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted something
else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court a final determination of her claim of ownership
over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate.
It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by the
intestate court was actually to "determine the propriety of oppositor’s (respondent’s) claim."
According to the intestate court, "if it is true that the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk
of (Miguelita’s) properties," then it means that she has a "material and direct interest in the
estate" and, hence, "she should be given her day in court." The intended "day in court" or
hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of respondent’s contention that she is the
true owner of the bulk of Miguelita’s estate.
Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondent’s ingenious attempt to secure a proceeding for

the purpose of resolving her blanket claim against Miguelita’s estate. Although, she made it
appear that her only intent was to determine the accuracy of petitioner’s inventory,
however, a close review of the facts and the pleadings reveals her real intention.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper
course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It is well-settled in
this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question
arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person,
but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate,
such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate
proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such
contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction
as a regional trial court
Jurisprudence teaches us that:
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate

cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties,
the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a
final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot
do so."22
Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction.
The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of
ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.
At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish or deprive
respondent of whatever rights or properties she believes or considers to be rightfully hers.
We reiterate that the question of ownership of properties alleged to be part of the estate
must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. 29
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
G.R. No. 172931 June 18, 2009
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), Petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 18, ROXAS CITY, CAPIZ, RIZAL RECIO, TERESITA
RECIO, PACIENCIA RECIO, and HEIR OF OSCAR RECIO, HARRIET VILLANUEVA vda.
DE RECIO, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS, ROXAS CITY, CAPIZ, Respondents.
Facts:
On September 14, 1984, said RTC rendered a decision in Land Registration Case (LRC) No.
N-785 granting the Application for Registration of Title4 dated June 20, 1977 filed by Rizal
Recio for himself and in behalf of his brother Oscar Recio and sisters Teresita Recio and
Paciencia Recio.
The abovementioned decision became final, and pursuant thereto, Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 0-21076 covering the 11,189-square meter piece of land, was issued in the
Recios’ names on April 17, 1985.
In 1997, a number of occupants of Lot No. 900 filed a protest before the DENR, Roxas City
against the issuance of OCT No. 0-2107 on the ground that the land covered therein is within
forest lands or timberlands, hence it cannot be the subject of private appropriation.
Acting on the protest, Lorna L. Jomento, Special Investigator II of the Lands Management
Department (LMD), DENR, Region VI, Iloilo City conducted an ocular inspection and
investigation on the status of Lot No. 900.
On January 19, 1998, Jomento rendered a written report 7 that Lot No. 900 falls within the
forest lands of Project No. 20-A, established on January 17, 1986 under Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4-1777, per Land Classification (LC) Map No. 3132. 8 Jomento
recommended that an action be instituted in the proper court for the cancellation of OCT No.
0-2107.
On September 9, 2002, RP, represented by the DENR, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals
seeking to annul the Decision dated September 14, 1984 on the ground that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to adjudicate title over the subject parcel of land which forms part of the public
forest.
In their Answer to the Petition for Annulment of Judgment, 13 the Recios argued that the RTC
of Roxas City, Branch 18 has jurisdiction over the case.
On September 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution 15 directing the Executive
Judge of the RTC in Roxas City to conduct a pre-trial conference and reception of evidence.
However, since the Executive Judge presides in the same branch where the decision in LRC
No. N-785 was rendered, the incident was assigned by raffle to another judge in the RTC of
Roxas City.16 In a Report and Recommendation17 dated December 13, 2005, Judge Juliana C.
Azarraga, RTC of Roxas City, Branch 15, recommended that the petition for annulment of
judgment be dismissed.1avvphi1
Subsequently, on May 25, 2006, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of
sufficient evidence.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the RTC act without jurisdiction in allowing the registration of the subject
land?
(2) Whether or not petitioner fail to discharge the burden of establishing the inalienable
character of the land?
Held:
1) As to the first issue, did the RTC act without jurisdiction in allowing the registration of
inalienable land?
Petitioner contends that the RTC acted without jurisdiction in allowing the registration of the
subject land because the land is forest land and thus, inalienable. Verily, jurisprudence is
replete with cases which iterate that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of
private appropriation, and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into
private property.28
If indeed the subject land is forest land, then the decision of the RTC is void. A void
judgment may be assailed or impugned at any time either directly or collaterally, by means
of a petition filed in the same case or by means of a separate action, or by resisting such
judgment in any action or proceeding wherein it is invoked. 29
Moreover, an action for reversion filed by the State to recover property registered in favor of
any party which is part of the public forest or of a forest reservation never prescribes. Verily,
non-disposable public lands registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by
the State at any time and the defense of res judicata would not apply as courts have no
jurisdiction to dispose of such lands of the public domain. 30
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, however, we disagree with petitioner that
the subject land is inalienable.
It is clear that at the time the Recios filed their application for registration of title in 1977
and at the time the RTC rendered its decision in 1984, the land was not inalienable forest
land but was alienable land. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction to adjudicate title to the land.
2) As to the second issue, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to
discharge the burden of establishing the inalienable character of the land.
In an action to annul a judgment, the burden of proving the judgment’s nullity rests upon
the petitioner. The petitioner has to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
judgment being challenged is fatally defective.
The ruling of the Court of Appeals, based on the abovementioned findings of fact, is upheld
by this Court. The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of
Appeals is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law. The findings of facts of the latter are
conclusive for it is not the function of this Court to analyze and weigh such evidence all over
again.34 Our jurisdiction is in principle limited to reviewing errors of law that might have
been committed by the Court of Appeals. Factual findings of courts, when adopted and
confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive on this Court unless these
findings are not supported by the evidence on record.35
Finding no reason to deviate from the ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to
adduce sufficient evidence to prove its allegation that Lot No. 900 falls within forest lands,
we affirm such ruling.
G.R. No. 143483 January 31, 2002
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASAY

CITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER 3RD DIVISION) AND AMADA H. SOLANO,
assisted by her husband ROMEO SOLANO, respondents.
Facts:
For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985) private respondent Amada Solano
served as the all-around personal domestic helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow
and a French national. During Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most especially during the waning
years of her life, respondent Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant companion
since no close relative was available to tend to her needs.
In recognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms. Hankins executed in her favor
two (2) deeds of donation involving two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 7807 and
7808 of the Registry of Deeds. Private respondent alleged that she misplaced the deeds of
donation and were nowhere to be found.
While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a petition for the escheat of the
estate of Elizabeth Hankins before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. 1
Since it was established that there were no known heirs and persons entitled to the
properties of decedent Hankins, the lower court escheated the estate of the decedent in
favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
By virtue of the decision of the trial court, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled TCT
Nos. 7807 and 7808 and issued new ones, TCT Nos. 129551 and 129552, both in the name
of Pasay City.
In the meantime, private respondent claimed that she accidentally found the deeds of
donation she had been looking for a long time. In view of this development, respondent
Amada Solano filed on 28 January 1997 a petition before the Court of Appeals for the
annulment of the lower court's decision
On 17 March 1997 the Office of the Solicitor General representing public respondents RTC
and the Register of Deeds (herein petitioner) filed an answer setting forth their affirmative
defenses,
Finding no cogent reason to justify the dismissal of the petition for annulment, the Court of
Appeals issued on 12 November 1998 the first of its assailed Resolutions giving due course
to the petition for annulment of judgment and setting the date for trial on the merits
In its Resolution of 4 May 2000 the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by public respondents Register of Deeds of Pasay City and the Presiding judge of the
lower court and set the trial on the merits for June 15 and 16, 2000.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction to declare the subject parcels of land
escheated in favor of the state.
Held:
We rule for the petitioner.
Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by

virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person who
dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the
state to forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers." 5 Since escheat is
one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does, prescribe the
conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such property may be made. The
procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered is generally prescribed by
statue, and a time limit is imposed within which such action must be brought.
In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim "within five (5)
years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to the
same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the proceeds, after
deducting the estate; but a claim not made shall be barred forever." 6 The 5-year period is
not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it is
decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in asserting their
claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final judgment.
In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early
as 27 June 1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997, more or less seven (7) years after,
when private respondent decided to contest the escheat judgment in the guise of a petition
for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals. Obviously, private respondent's
belated assertion of her right over the escheated properties militates against recovery.
A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is

conclusive against all persons with actual or constructive notice, but not against those who
are not parties or privies thereto. As held in Hamilton v. Brown,8 "a judgment of escheat was
held conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. Absolute
lack on the part of petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, or
in any way injure him, constitutes due process of law, proper notice having been observed."
With the lapse of the 5-year period therefore, private respondent has irretrievably lost her
right to claim and the supposed "discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough
justification to nullify the escheat judgment which has long attained finality.

Aranas vs. Mercado

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G.R. No.

156407 January 15, 2014

As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio on December

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and

G.R. No. 114217 October 13, 2009

HEIRS OF JOSE SY BANG, HEIRS OF JULIAN SY and OSCAR SY,1 Petitioners,

On June 8, 1982, the Judge rendered a Third Partial Decision:

Finding no reversible error therein, we affirm the CA Decision.

Section 4, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure states:

This Court has interpreted the notice as:

G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

On appeal, CA ruled adverse to petitioner.

Hence, this petition.

G.R. No. 156403. March 31, 2005

JOSEPHINE PAHAMOTANG and ELEANOR PAHAMOTANG-BASA, Petitioners,

In its Order of January 7, 1981, the intestate court granted Agustin’s prayer.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioners

G.R. No. 178933 September 16, 2009

RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. Petitioner,

Hence, this petion.

To recapitulate, the relevant facts to the instant issue are as follows:

An interlocutory order, as opposed to a final order, was defined in Tan v. Republic: 20

CORAZON M. GREGORIO, as administratrix of the estate litigated in the case

Hence, this petition.

Article 1061 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

in relation to which, Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. – Questions as

G.R. No. 240199

SPOUSES ISIDRO R. SALITICO AND CONRADA C. SALITICO, Petitioners

Amanda is the registered owner of a 1,413-square-meter parcel of land registered in

By virtue of a document entitled Huling Habilin ni Amanda H. Burgos5 dated May 7,

Subsequently, a proceeding for the probate of the Huling Habilin was undertaken

G.R. No. 174835 March 22, 2010

On February 3, 2000, respondent filed a petition for settlement of the estate of

Hence, this petition.

We find for petitioner.

A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid

Consequently, a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement is

Section 77. Cancellation of Lis Pendens –

G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005.*

In her omnibus motion9 dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her son Emmanuel

Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied.

Hence, this petition for review

Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,17 we held:

Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondent’s ingenious attempt to secure a proceeding for

Jurisprudence teaches us that:

"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.

G.R. No. 172931 June 18, 2009

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF

G.R. No. 143483 January 31, 2002

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASAY

We rule for the petitioner.

Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by

A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is

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