DEFENSE AGAINST THE CHARGE OF NEGLIGENCE
The above findings clearly show that the negligence of
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's
lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.  occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors,
The court f ound upon the evidence that both the
plaintiff and the defendant were negligent in handling their
automobiles and that said negligence was of such a character
and extent on the part of both as to prevent either from
recovering.
BERNARDO VS Where the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his
LEGASPI own carelessness contributes to the principal
occurrence, that is, to the accident, as one of the
determining causes thereof, he cannot recover. This is
equally true of the defendant; and as both of them, by
their negligent acts, contributed to the determining
cause of the accident, neither can recover.
PLDT VS CA We find no error in the findings of the respondent court in its
original decision that the accident which befell private
respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent
Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent
omission on the part of petitioner PLDT.
“First. Plaintiff’s jeep was running along the inside lane of
Lacson Street. If it had remained on that inside lane, it would
not have hit the ACCIDENT MOUND.
Second. That plaintiff’s jeep was on the inside lane before it
swerved to hit the ACCIDENT MOUND could have been
corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street to the south
of the ACCIDENT MOUND.
Third. Plaintiff’s jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an
hour as plaintiff-husband claimed. At that speed, he could
have braked the vehicle the moment it struck the ACCIDENT
MOUND.
Fourth. If the accident did not happen because the jeep was
running quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or
other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb
over the ACCIDENT MOUND, then plaintiff-husband had not
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid
the accident.
respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his
injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of
the
and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. 30 The
perils of the road were known to, hence appreciated and
assumed by, private respondents. By exercising reasonable
care and prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could have
avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even
assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence
on the part of petitioner.
The presence of warning signs could not have completely
prevented the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to
inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on
the site. The private respondents already knew of the
presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of
knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of
respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplained
sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the
accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the
omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of
warning signs on the site of the excavation,
constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing
of the said omitted act would have prevented the
injury.31 It is basic that private respondents cannot charge
PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due
and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a
societal norm and necessity that one should exercise a
reasonable degree of caution for his own protection.
Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last
clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident,
notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner
PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that
street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence
and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence
that exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely
responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.
MANILA ELECTRIC Where it is shown that the death of the deceased was
VS REMOQUILLO primarily caused by his own negligence, the company could
not be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due
diligence. To hold the latter liable in damages for the death
of the deceased, such supposed negligence of the company
Torts and Damages Midterm|1
 must have been the proximate and principal cause of the
accident. But in the case at bar, the act of the deceased in
turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet with
his hands was the proximate and principal cause of the
electrocution, therefore his heirs cannot recover.
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an
action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish
the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury
was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such condition or occasion.
If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the circumstances which result
in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."  ground posing danger to the life and limb of everyone in said
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF
Art. 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the
damages that he may recover.
NPC VS HEIRS OF Moreover, We find no contributory negligence on Noble’s
CASIONAN part.
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the
interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution,
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.11 On the other
hand, contributory negligence is conduct on the part
of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to
the harm he has suffered, which falls below the
standard which he is required to conform for his own
protection.12 There is contributory negligence when the
party’s act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that
such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. 13 It is
an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the
part of the person injured which, concurring with the
defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the
injury.14
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that
a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should
not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the
consequences of his own negligence.15 If indeed there was
contributory negligence on the part of the victim, then it is
proper to reduce the award for damages. This is in
consonance with the Civil Code provision that liability will be
mitigated in consideration of the contributory negligence of
the injured party
In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was
regularly used by members of the community. There were no
warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger
to their lives should they accidentally touch the high tension
wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to
Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing
what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area.
The pocket miners, although they have no permit to do
pocket mining in the area, are also human beings who have
to eke out a living in the only way they know how. The fact
that they were not issued a permit by the DENR to do pocket
mining is no justification for NPC to simply leave their
transmission lines dangling or hanging 8 to 10 feet above the
community. x x x”19 (Italics added)
In sum, the victim was not guilty of contributory
negligence. Hence, petitioner is not entitled to a mitigation of
its liability.
Same; Same; This Court ruled that the violation
of a statute is not sufficient to hold that the violation
was the proximate cause of the injury, unless the
very injury that happened was precisely what was
intended to be prevented by the statute.—In Añonuevo
v. Court of Appeals, 441 SCRA 24 (2004), this Court ruled
that the violation of a statute is not sufficient to hold that the
violation was the proximate cause of the injury, unless the
very injury that happened was precisely what was intended
to be prevented by the statute. In said case, the allegation of
contributory negligence on the part of the injured party who
violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his
bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon was struck down.
Quasi-Delicts; Damages; In quasi delicts,
exemplary damages are awarded where the offender
was guilty of gross negligence.—In quasi delicts,
exemplary damages are awarded where the offender was
guilty of gross negligence. Gross negligence has been
defined to be the want or absence of even slight care or
diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety
of person or property. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.
Torts and Damages Midterm|2

The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any,
does not exonerate the accused. “The defense of
contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases
GENOBIAGON VS
committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot
CA
allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his
own negligence .
The negligence of the injured person contributing to his
injury but not being one of the determining causes of the
MH RAKES VS THE principal accident, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but
ATLANTIC & CO only in reduction of his damages. Each party is chargeable
with damages in proportion to his fault.
LAMBERT VS Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without
HEIRS OF first establishing his right of way, was the proximate cause of
CASTILLON the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio.
Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. The cause of the collision is
traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo for, as the trial
court correctly held, without that left turn executed with no
precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have
happened.
In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of
the mishap: (1) was driving the motorcycle at a high speed;
(2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one
or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective
helmet.21 These circumstances, although not constituting the
proximate cause of his demise and injury to Sergio,
contributed to the same result. The contribution of these
circumstances are all considered and determined in terms of
percentages of the total cause. Hence, pursuant to Rakes v.
AG & P, the heirs of Ray Castillon shall recover damages only
up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the damage
shall be borne by the private respondents; the remaining
50% shall be paid by the petitioner.
COMPUTATION OF NET EARNINGS
In considering the earning capacity of the victim as an
element of damages, the following factors are considered in
determining the compensable amount of lost earnings:
1. the number of years for which the victim would
otherwise have lived; and
2. the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the
deceased.
Jurisprudence provides that the first factor, i.e., life
expectancy, is computed by applying the formula (2/3 x [80
-age at death]) adopted in the American Expectancy Table of
Mortality or the Actuarial Combined Experience Table of
Mortality. As to the second factor, it is computed by
multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of the
deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in
the creation of such earnings or income and less living and
other incidental expenses. 
The net earning is ordinarily computed at fifty
percent (50%) of the gross earnings . Thus, the
formula used by this Court in computing loss of
earning capacity is: 
Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 – age at
time of death) x (gross annual income –
reasonable and necessary living expenses)] .22
ART. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a
crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos,
even though there may have been mitigating circumstances.
In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the
earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be
paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every
case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the
deceased on account of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the
time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to
the provisions of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir
called to the decedent’s inheritance by the law of testate or
intestate succession, may demand support from the person
causing the death, for a period of not exceeding five years,
the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
However, the amount has been gradually increased through
the years. At present, prevailing jurisprudence fixes the
amount at P50,000.00.26
Torts and Damages Midterm|3
 Paragraph 3 of the same provision also serves as the
basis for the award of moral damages in quasi-delict. The
reason for the grant of moral damages has been explained,
thus:
. . . the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration,
within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante;
and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted. The intensity of the pain experienced by the
relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of
affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the
wealth or means of the offender. 2
Note.—The rule is that the antecedent negligence of a
person does not preclude the recovery of damages caused by
the supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last
fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of
due diligence. (Canlas vs. Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA
415 [2000])
PNR VS BRUNTY Torts and Damages; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; Words
and Phrases; Negligence is want of the care required by the
circumstances—it is a relative or comparative, not an
absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation
of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably require.— Negligence is the
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided
by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct
of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which
a prudent and reasonable man would not do. In Corliss v.
Manila Railroad Company, 27 SCRA 674 (1969), this Court
held that negligence is want of the care required by the
circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an
absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation
of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably require. In determining whether or
not there is negligence on the part of the parties in a given
situation, jurisprudence has laid down the following test: Did
defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, the
person is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct
of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites to Sustain a Claim
Based on Quasi-Delict.—In a long line of cases, the Court
held that in order to sustain a claim based on quasi-delict,
the following requisites must concur: (1) damage to plaintiff;
(2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or
some person for whose acts he must respond was guilty; and
(3) connection of cause and effect between such negligence
and damage.
DAMAGES
Actual or compensatory damages are those
awarded in order to compensate a party for an injury or loss
he suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice,
aimed at repairing the wrong done. To be recoverable, they
must be duly proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. A
court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork as
to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon
competent proof that they have suffered, and on evidence of
the actual amount thereof. Respondents, however, failed to
present evidence for such damages; hence, the award of
actual damages cannot be sustained. However, as the heirs
of Rhonda Brunty undeniably incurred expenses for the wake
and burial of the latter, we deem it proper to award
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence. This is in lieu of actual damages as
it would be unfair for the victim’sheirs to get nothing, despite
the death of their kin, for the reason alone that they cannot
produce receipts.
Same; Same; Same; The relatives of the victim
who incurred physical injuries in a quasi-delict are
not proscribed from recovering moral damages in
meritorious cases.— We, therefore, sustain the award of
moral damages in favor of the heirs of Rhonda Brunty. Moral
damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to
compensate and alleviate in some way the physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly
caused a person. Although incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages must nevertheless be somehow
proportional to and in approximation of the suffering
inflicted. In the instant case, the moral suffering of the heirs
of Rhonda Brunty was sufficiently established by Ethel Brunty
in her deposition.
FORTUITOUS EVENT
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption
Torts and Damages Midterm|4
of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen,
or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
ELEMENTS (Lasam v. Smith):
(1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the
debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will;
(2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which cons- titutes the caso fortuito,
or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid.
(3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner;
(4) The debtor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor.
Note: The elements, while lacking in statutory basis, are applied by the court anyway.
EXCEPTIONS:
(1) specified by law;
(2) when it is declared by stipulation; or
(3) required by the nature of the obligation.
LASAM VS SMITH What is meant by "events which cannot be foreseen and
which, having been foreseen, are inevitable?" The Spanish
authorities regard the language employed as an effort to
define the term caso fortuito and hold that the two
expressions are synonymous. (Manresa, Comentarios al
Código Civil Español, vol. 8, pp. 88 et seq.; Scævola, Código
Civil, vol. 19, pp. 526 et seq.)
The antecedent to article 1105 is found in Law 11, Title
33, Partida 7, which defines caso fortuito as (An event that
takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen.
Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire,
shipwreck, violence of robbers. * * *)"
Escriche defines caso fortuito as "an unexpected event or
act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted, such
as floods, torrents, shipwrecks, conflagrations, lightning,
compulsion, insurrections, destruction of buildings by
unforeseen accidents and other occurrences of a similar
nature."
In discussing and analyzing the term caso
fortuito the Enciclopedia Jurídico, Española says: "In a legal
sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso
fortuito presents the following essential characteristics:
(1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply
with his obligation, must be independent of the
human will.
(2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which
constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid.
(3) The occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner. And
(4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor." (5 Enciclopedia Jurídica
Española, 309.)
As will be seen, these authorities agree that some
extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the
obligor, or of his employees, is an essential element of
a caso fortuito. Turning to the present case, it is at once
apparent that this element is lacking. It is not
suggested that the accident in question was due to an
act of God or to adverse road conditions which could
not have been foreseen. As far as the record shows,
the accident was caused either by defects in the
automobile or else through the negligence of its
driver. That is not a caso fortuito,
In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurrence was not independent of the human
will. The accident was caused either through the negligence
of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire.
JUNTILLA VS
Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload
FONTANAR
their vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed limits, and
to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up
thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times.
SOUTHEASTERN In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from
COLLEGE VS CA liability, it is necessary that he be free from any previous
negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may
Torts and Damages Midterm|5
 have been occasioned. When the effect is found to be partly
the result of the participation of man – whether it be from
active intervention, or neglect, or failure to act – the whole
occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed from the rules
applicable to fortuitous events.
Robbery; Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a
fortuitous event; Merely presenting the police report on the
robbery committed based on the report of the employees of
the pawnshop owner is not sufficient to establish robbery.
An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has
failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse
SICAM VS JORGE consequences of such a loss. One's negligence may have
concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury
to another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or
proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous
event would not exempt one from liability.
PLAINTIFF’S ASSUMPTION OF RISK/VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA
AFIALDA VS HISOLE Article 1905 names the possessor or user of the animal as
the person liable for "any damages it may cause," since he
has the custody and is in a position to prevent it from
causing damage.
In the present case, the animal was in custody and under
the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as
such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to
prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to
anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal
under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the
occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which
he must take the consequences.
ILOCOS NORTE The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner
ELECTRIC VS CA finds no application in the case at bar. It is imperative to
note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the
deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the
subsiding typhoon. As testified by Linda Alonzo Estavillo
and Aida Bulong, the deceased, accompanied by the former
two, were on their way to the latter's grocery store "to see
to it that the goods were not flooded." As such, shall We
punish her for exercising her right to protect her property
from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable
presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury?
Definitely not. For it has been held that a person is excused
from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents
to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if
an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of
another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his
endangered property (Harper and James, "The Law of
Torts." Little, Brown and Co., 1956, v. 2, p. 1167).
Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's
property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an
impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the
fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a
right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she
was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private
respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering
damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's
negligence.
A person is excused from the force of the rule when (1) an
emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of
another is in peril, or (2) when he seeks to rescue his
endangered property.
CALALAS VS CA The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat"
(extension seat in a placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other
jeepney) passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was
petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of
negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by
Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually
negligent in transporting passengers.
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's
contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat"
amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to
arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the
tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely
because those passengers assumed a greater risk of
drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. 
NIKKO HOTEL V The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person
REYES assents is not esteemed in law as injury" 47 ) refers to self-
(The Gate Crasher) inflicted injury48 or to the consent to injury49 which
precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even
if he is not negligent in doing so.
Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in
a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a
Torts and Damages Midterm|6
 legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be responsible." 60 The object of this article, therefore,
is to set certain standards which must be observed not only
in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance
of one’s duties.61 These standards are the following: act
with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty
and good faith.62 Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act
evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the
following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing
or injuring another.63 When Article 19 is violated, an action
for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil
Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a
violation of law64 which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim
was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave.
Article 21, on the other hand, states:
PANTALEON V In Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes , 452 SCRA 532
AMERICAN EXPRESS (2005), we ruled that a person who knowingly and
voluntarily exposes himself to danger cannot claim
damages for the resulting injury: “The doctrine of volenti
non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is not esteemed
in law as injury”) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the
consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages
by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself
to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.” This
doctrine, in our view, is wholly applicable to this case.
Pantaleon himself testified that the most basic rule when
travelling in a tour group is that you must never be a cause
of any delay because the schedule is very strict . When
Pantaleon made up his mind to push through with his
purchase, he must have known that the group would
become annoyed and irritated with him. This was the
natural, foreseeable consequence of his decision to make
them all wait.
PRESCRIPTION
Article 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict.
KRAMER CS CA he petition is devoid of merit. Under Article 1146 of the
Civil Code, an action based upon a quasidelict must be
instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period
begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. In
Paulan vs. Sarabia, this Court ruled that in an action for
damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks, the
action being based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year
prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the
collision.
The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of
action, which consists of 3 elements, namely:
a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created;
b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such
right; and
c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant
violative of the right of the plaintiff x x x. It is only when
the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in
law that a cause of action has arisen x x x.”
CAUSES
A. PROXIMATE CAUSE
BATACLAN VS Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and
MEDINA continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. More comprehensively, it is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or
by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event
in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment
of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.
When a vehicle turned not only on its side but completely
on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was
not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men
Torts and Damages Midterm|7

with lighted torch was in response to the call for help,
made not only by the passenger, but most probably by the
driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it
was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers
had to carry a light with them; and coming as they did
from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not
available, they had to use a torch the most handy and
available; and what was more natural, than that said
rescuers should innocently approach the overturned vehicle
to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from
them, Held: That the proximate cause of the death of B
was the overturning of the vehicle thru the negligence of
defendant and his agent.
MERCURY DRUG VS Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces
BAKING injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would
not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is
determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined
consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and
precedent.
C. INTERVENING CAUSE
Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had
PHEONIX
petitioner’s employee been careful in reading Dr. Sy’s
CONSTRUCTION VS
prescription. Without the potent effects of Dormicum, a
IAC
sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall
asleep while driving his car, resulting in a collision.
Notes: There is a possibility that there was contributory
negligence, since a considerable amount of time has lapsed
since the sale of the medicine. In any case, proximate
cause is usually confused with the standard of care.
Proximate causation should emphasize the connection
between negligence and the injury. The case, however,
only focused on the degree of care required.
B. CONCURRENT CAUSE
FAR EASTERN It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in
SHIPPING VS CA order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause
of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring
with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff’s, is
the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where
several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not
relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one
of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the
person charged with injury is an efficient cause without
which the injury would not have resulted to as great an
extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the
person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent
tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his
negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts
of the other concurrent tortfeasor. Where several causes
producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not have happened,
the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and
recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible
persons although under the circumstances of the case, it
may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that
the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the
same. No actor’s negligence ceases to be a proximate
cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of
other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire
result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause
of the injury.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and
the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and
proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries
was the wrongful — or negligent manner in which the
dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of
petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable
relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on
the one hand and the accident and respondent's injuries on
the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different
manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck
was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck
driver's negligence.
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far
from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an
indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the
dump truck and the private respondent's car would in an
probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been
parked askew without any warning lights or reflector
devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created
an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down
General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk,
Torts and Damages Midterm|8

the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view,
Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than
the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the
accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent
cause. What the Petitioners describe as an "intervening
cause" was no more than a foreseeable consequent
manner which the truck driver had parked the dump truck.
In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to
private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated
not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had
created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent
and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of
causation in fact between the improper parking of the
dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris
vinculum of liability. It is helpful to quote once more from
Professor and Keeton:
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening
cause is one which in ordinary human experience is
reasonably to be anticipated or one which the
defendant has reason to anticipate under the
particular circumstances, the defendant may be
negligence among other reasons, because of failure
to guard against it; or the defendant may be
negligent only for that reason.  Thus one who sets a
fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary,
usual and customary wind arising later wig spread it
beyond the defendant's own property, and
therefore to take precautions to prevent that event.
The person who leaves the combustible or explosive
material exposed in a public place may foresee the
risk of fire from some independent source. ... In all
of these cases there is an intervening cause
combining with the defendant's conduct to produce
the result and in each case the defendant's
negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff
against that very risk.
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was
"only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate
cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due
care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may
recover damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the
Philippines)
3. DETERMINING PROXIMATE CAUSATION
There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause. It is based
upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Plaintiff
must, however, establish a sufficient link between the act or omission and the
damage or injury. That link must not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability
will attach. The damage or injury must be a natural and probable result of the act or
omission. [Dy Teban v. Ching, 2008]
DY TEBAN VS CHING There is no exact mathematical formula to determine
proximate cause. It is based upon mixed considerations of
logic, common sense, policy and precedent. [28] Plaintiff
must, however, establish a sufficient link between the act
or omission and the damage or injury. That link must not
be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will
attach. The damage or injury must be a natural and
probable result of the act or omission. In the precedent-
setting Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina,[29] this Court discussed
the necessary link that must be established between the
act or omission and the damage or injury, viz.:
 
 
It may be that ordinarily, when a
passenger bus overturns, and pins down
a passenger, merely causing him physical
injuries, if through some event,
unexpected and extraordinary, the
overturned bus is set on fire, say, by
lightning, or if some highwaymen after
looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the
passenger is burned to death, one might
still contend that the proximate cause of
his death was the fire and not the
overturning of the vehicle. But in the
present case and under the
circumstances obtaining in the same, we
do not hesitate to hold that the
proximate cause of the death of Bataclan
was the overturning of the bus, this for
the reason that when the vehicle turned
not only on its side but completely on its
back, the leaking of the gasoline from the
tank was not unnatural or unexpected;
that the coming of the men with a lighted
torch was in response to the call for help,
made not only by the passengers, but
most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because
Torts and Damages Midterm|9
 it was very dark (about 2:30 in the
morning), the rescuers had to carry a
light with them; and coming as they did
from a rural area where lanterns and
flashlights were not available, they had to
use a torch, the most handy and
available; and what was more natural
than that said rescuers should innocently
approach the overturned vehicle to
extend the aid and effect the rescue
requested from them. In other words,
the coming of the men with the torch
was to be expected and was natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus,
the trapping of some of its passengers
bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers and the call for outside help.
 
The ruling in Bataclan has been repeatedly cited in
subsequent cases as authority for the proposition that the
damage or injury must be a natural or probable result of
the act or omission. Here, We agree with the RTC that the
damage caused to the Nissan van was a natural and
probable result of the improper parking of the prime mover
with trailer. As discussed, the skewed parking of the prime
mover posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Limbaga
failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The skewed parking
of the prime mover triggered the series of events that led
to the collision, particularly the swerving of the passenger
bus and the Nissan van.
PHOENIX Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to
CONSTRUCTION VS distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm
IAC and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause
operated. If the defendant has created only a
passive static condition which made the damage
possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But
so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the
sense of necessary antecedents which have played
an important part in producing the result it is quite
impossible to distinguish between active forces and
passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably
the case, the latter are the result of other active
forces which have gone before.  The defendant who
spills gasoline about the premises creates a
"condition," but the act may be culpable because of
the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the
gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to
bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is
the very risk which the defendant has created, the
defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the
lapse of a considerable time during which the
"condition" remains static will not necessarily affect
liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may
still be liable to another who fans into it a month
afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find
occasional mention in the decisions; but the
distinction is now almost entirely discredited.  So far
as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type
of case where the forces set in operation by the
defendant have come to rest in a position of
apparent safety, and some new force
intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the
distinction between "cause" and "condition" which
is important but the nature of the risk and the
character of the intervening cause. 9
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far
from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an
indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the
dump truck and the private respondent's car would in an
probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been
parked askew without any warning lights or reflector
devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created
an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down
General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk,
the truck driver must be held responsible.
4. LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE
CONSOLIDATED The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both
BANK VS CA parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused
the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to
avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the
loss. Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the
plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages
caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant,
who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending
harm by the exercise of due diligence.
We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the
Torts and Damages Midterm|10
 present case. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due
to negligence in the performance of its contractual
obligation to L.C. Diaz. This is a case of culpa contractual,
where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff
nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate
the defendant from liability. 31 Such contributory
negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely
serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff
but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of
contract.
PHIL BANK OF Furthermore, under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also
COMMERCE VS CA referred to, at times as "supervening negligence" or as
"discovered peril"), petitioner bank was indeed the culpable
party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where both
parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it
is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should
be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do
so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. 19 Stated
differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of
damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a
defense against liability sought by another, if the latter,
who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. 20 Here,
assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in
entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing
the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, as
advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the
petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear
opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply
by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation
procedure.
PICART VS SMITH The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge, Seeing an
automobile ahead he improperly pulled his horse over to
the railing on the right. The driver of the automobile,
however, guided his car toward the plaintiff without
diminution of speed until he was only a few feet away. He
then turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse
that the latter being frightened, jumped around and was
killed by the passing car. Held: That although the plaintiff
was guilty of negligence in being on the wrong side of the
bridge, the defendant was nevertheless civilly liable for the
legal damages resulting from the collision, as he had a fair
opportunity to avoid the accident af ter he realized the
situation created by the negligence of the plaintiff and
failed to avail himself of that opportunity; while the plaintiff
could by no means then place himself in a position of
greater safety.
BUSTAMANTE VS CA The doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint
tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be
held liable to the injured person by reason of his discovery
of the latter's peril, and it cannot be invoked as between
defendants concurrently negligent. As against third
persons, a negligent actor cannot defend by pleading that
another had negligently failed to take action which could
have avoided the injury.
Notes: The case defined the doctrine both in terms of its
effect on recovery and as a test to establish liability, that is,
to determine proximate cause. However, part of the
definition provided does not help at all in determining
proximate cause since it even includes cases where it is
impossible to determine whose negligence caused the
occurrence. In other words, it seems to include those cases
where proximate cause cannot be determined at all.
5. PERSONS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE
Article 2180. The obligations imposed in Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damages.
PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITYArticle 2180. xxx
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who
are under their authority and live in their company. xxx
Article 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees
may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
Article 216, Family Code. In default of parents or a judicial- ly appointed guardian,
the following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the
order indicated:
Torts and Damages Midterm|11
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified.
Whenever the appointment of a judicial guardian over the property of the child
becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed.
Article 217, Family Code. In case of foundlings, abandoned, neglected or abused
children and other children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in
summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's homes, orphanages and similar
institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency.
Article 221, Family Code.
Parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused
by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in
their company and under their parental authority subject to
appropriate defenses provided by law.
LIBI VS IAC In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious
liability of petitioners, respondent court cites Fuellas vs.
Cadano, et al. which supposedly holds that “(t)he
subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their
minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and
criminal offenses,” followed by an extended quotation
ostensibly from the same case explaining why under Article
2180 of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal
Code parents should assume subsidiary liability for
damages caused by their minor children. The quoted
passages are set out two paragraphs back, with pertinent
underscoring for purposes of the discussion hereunder.
Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule
holding the parents liable, but the categorization of their
liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature
requires a hard second look considering previous decisions
of this court on the matter which warrant comparative
analyses. Our concern stems from our readings that if the
liability of the parents for crimes or quasidelicts of their
minor children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither
invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that
they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability
imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary,
that diligence would constitute a valid and substantial
defense. We believe that the civil liability of parents for
quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary.
In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides
for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons
responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor
and the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental
liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last
paragraph of Article 2180 provides that “(t)he responsibility
treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
TAMARGO VS CA We do not believe that parental authority is properly
regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and
vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at
the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not
consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree
of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting
parents accruing at a time when the adopting parents had
no actual or physical custody over the adopted
child. Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the
granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential
to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor
of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold
that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the
Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a
tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which
they could not have prevented (since they were at the time
in the United States and had no physical custody over the
child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such
a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the
philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of
vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of
parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was
not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was
committed.
TEACHERS AND SCHOOLS
Article 2180. xxx Lastly, teachers or head of establish-ments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages cause by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody. xxx
Torts and Damages Midterm|12
Article 218, Family Code. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental
authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
Article 219, Family Code. Those given the authority and responsibility under the
preceding Article shall be princip- ally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the
acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the
persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily
liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not
apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the
particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by
the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
PALISOC VS The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers
BRILLANTES for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as
they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain
extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis  and
are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over
the conduct of the child."11 This is expressly provided for in
Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code. 12 In the law of
torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody
of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted
for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their
obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide
proper supervision of the students' activities during the
whole time that they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time, as well as to take the necessary
precautions to protect the students in their custody from
dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated,
including injuries that some student themselves may inflict
willfully or through negligence on their fellow students. .
The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving
defendants-school officials on the ground that they could
be held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the
student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate
and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other
defendants officials of the school." As stated above, the
phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the
students) remain in their custody" means the protective
and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long
as they are at attendance in the school, including recess
time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such
liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the
tortious act must live and board in the school, as
erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta
in Mercado  (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must
now be deemed to have been set aside by the present
decision. 
AMADORA VS CA After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court
has come to the conclusion that the provision in question
should apply to all  schools, academic as well as non-
academic. Where the school is academic rather than
technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the teacher in
charge of such student, following the first part of the
provision. This is the general rule. In the case of
establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof,
and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the
general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be
liable for the acts of their students except where the school
is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof
who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo
singula singulis "teachers" should apply to the words
"pupils and students" and "heads of establishments of arts
and trades" to the word "apprentices."
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is
clear that while the custody requirement, to repeat Palisoc
vs. Brillantes, does not mean that the student must be
boarding with the school authorities, it does signify that the
student should be within the control and under the
influence of the school authorities at the time of the
occurrence of the injury. This does not necessarily mean
that such custody be co-terminous with the semester,
beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the
close thereof, and excluding the time before or after such
period, such as the period of registration, and in the case
of graduating students, the period before the
commencement exercises. In the view of the Court, the
student is in the custody of the school authorities as long
as he is under the control and influence of the school and
within its premises, whether the semester has not yet
Torts and Damages Midterm|13
 begun or has already ended.
SALVOSA VS IAC In line with the case of Palisoc, a student not “at
attendance in the school” cannot be in “recess” thereat. A
“recess,” as the concept is embraced in the phrase “at
attendance in the school” contemplates a situation of
temporary adjournment of school activities where the
student still remains within call of his mentor and is not
permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within
which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature
does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being
enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more
does not constitute “attending school” or being in the
“protective and supervisory custody” of the school, as
contemplated in the law.
Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that
Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been “at
attendance in the school,” or in the custody of BCF, when
he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners
cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarily
liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his
acts.
ST. MARY’S ACADEM Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall
VS CARPITANOS have special parental authority over a minor child while
under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the
school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This
special parental authority and responsibility applies to all
authorized activities, whether inside or outside the
premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such
authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions
and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the
school premises whenever authorized by the school or its
teachers. Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the
person under custody is a minor, those exercising special
parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor under their supervision, instruction,
or custody.
CASTILEX Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of
VS the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer
VASQUEZ is not engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the
business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not
covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should
apply. Petitioner’s interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not
accurate. The phrase “even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry” found in the fifth paragraph should be
interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be
engaged in any business or industry to be liable forthe negligence of
his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task.
The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of
the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner
with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it
appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope
of his employment.
JAYME VS Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only
APOSTOL liable for one’s own quasi-delictual
acts, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible for. This
liability is popularly known as vicarious or imputed liability. To sustain
claims against employers for the acts of their employees, the
following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was
chosen by the employer personally or through another; (2) That the
service to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer
has the authority to give at all times; and (3) That the illicit act of the
employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions
entrusted to him. Significantly, to make the employee liable under
paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180, it must be established that the
injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee
was performing his functions.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only
liable for one’s own quasi-delictualacts, but also for those persons for
whom one is responsible for. This liability is popularly known as
vicarious or imputed liability. To sustain claims against employers for
the acts of their employees, the following requisites must be
established: (1) That the employee was chosen by the employer
personally or through another; (2) That the service to be rendered in
accordance with orders which the employer has the authority to give
at all times; and (3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the
occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him. Significantly,
to make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article
2180, it must be established that the injurious or tortuous act was
committed at the time the employee was performing his functions.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only
liable for one’s own quasi-delictual
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
42
Torts and Damages Midterm|14
 4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
2 negligence. In the context of the present case, “a hospital cannot be
Jayme vs. Apostol
acts, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible for. This
liability is popularly known as vicarious or imputed liability. To sustain
claims against employers for the acts of their employees, the
following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was
chosen by the employer personally or through another; (2) That the
service to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer
has the authority to give at all times; and (3) That the illicit act of the
employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions
entrusted to him. Significantly, to make the employee liable under
paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180, it must be established that the
injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee
was performing his functions.
FILAMER Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an
VS IAC official appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner
may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being
sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for
the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not
the school driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial
duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the
presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either
in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over
him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised
the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees
Funtecha and Allan.
NPC VS CA
VALENZUEL In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to our
A VS CA satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were
made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to
determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to
whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. 31 Not having
been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be
absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said
company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be
jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained
by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.
POFESSION A prominent civilist commented that professionals engaged by an
AL employer, such as physicians, dentists, and pharmacists, are not
SERVICES “employees” under this article because the manner in which they
VS AGANA perform their work is not within the control of the latter
(employer). In other words, professionals are considered personally
liable for the fault or negligence they commit in the discharge of their
duties, and their employer cannot be held liable for such fault or
held liable for the fault or negligence of a physician or surgeon in the
treatment or operation of patients.
LAMPESA Once negligence on the part of the employee is established, a
VS DE VERA presumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent in the
selection and/or supervision of said employee. 18 To rebut this
presumption, the employer must present adequate and convincing
proof that he exercised care and diligence in the selection and
supervision of his employees.
MERCURY The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is direct
DRUG V or immediate. It is not conditioned on a prior recourse against the
HUANG negligent employee, or a prior showing of insolvency of such
employee. It is also joint and solidary with the employee. 11
To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug should show that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, both in the
selection of the employee and in the supervision of the performance
of his duties. Thus, in the selection of its prospective employees, the
employer is required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience, and service records.12 With respect to the supervision of
its employees, the employer should formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary
measures for their breach. To establish compliance with these
requirements, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.
STATE
Article 2180.
xxx The State is responsible in like manner when it acts
through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused
by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which
case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. xxx
JAYME VS It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are
APOSTOL suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue
and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts
committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions
and can only be held answerable only if it can be shown that they
were acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to
be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that
the defendant was not acting in governmental capacity when the
injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions
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 recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover. of the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section
3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule
SAN Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is that the State that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks
FERNANDO may not be sued except when it gives consent to be sued. Consent pertaining to his office.
VS LA UNION takes the form of express or implied consent.
Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a
special law. The standing consent of the State to be sued in case MERITT VS The Government of the Philippine Islands its only liable for the
of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in GOVERNMENT negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees when they are
Act No. 3083. A special law may be passed to enable a person to acting as special agents within. the meaning of paragraph 5 of
sue the government for an alleged quasi-delict, as in Merritt v. article 1903 of the Civil Code, and a chauffeur of the General
Government of the Philippine Islands (34 Phil 311). (see United Hospital is not such a special agent.
States of America v. Guinto, G.R. No. 76607, February 26,
1990, 182 SCRA 644, 654.)
Consent is implied when the government enters into business
contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contracting
party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening
itself to a counterclaim. (Ibid)
Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities,
are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental
functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from
suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the
performance of such functions because their charter provided that
they can sue and be sued.

Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable

for the torts committed by its employee, the test of
liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the
driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing
governmental or proprietary functions. 

It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are

suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue
and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts
committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions
and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were
acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be
sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that
the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when
the injury was committed or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot
recover. (Cruz, supra, p. 44.)

In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the

municipality insists that “he was on his way to the Naguilian river
to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando’s
municipal streets.” (Rollo, p. 29.)

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity

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