Mendoza v. CA

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 201 24/05/2017, 7*52 PM
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 5, 1991 343

Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 81909. September 5, 1991.
LETICIA C. MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, HON, CONRADO VASQUEZ, JR., FROILAN E.
ISORENA AND LAURO E. ISORENA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motion to Dismiss; As a general

rule, an order denying a motion to quash or to dismiss is
interlocutory and cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari;
Exception is when the trial court clearly acted outside of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion
to dismiss.·As a general rule, an order denying a motion to quash
or to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of a petition
for certiorari. The remedy of the aggrieved party in a denied motion
to dismiss is to file an answer and interpose, as defense or defenses,
the objection or objections raised by him in said motion to dismiss,
then proceed to trial and, in case of adverse decision, to elevate the
entire case by appeal in due course
________________
30 PNOC·Exploration Corporation vs. National Labor Relations

Commission, G.R. No. 71711, 18 August 1988,164 SCRA 501.
* FIRST DIVISION.
344
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000015c3a5a0555fa99ade1003600fb002c009e/p/APW559/?username=Guest Page 1 of 16
(NIDC v. Aquino, 163 SCRA 153). The exception to this rule is when
the trial court clearly acted outside of its jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss.
Same; Same; Same; Court has four (4) options in deciding a
motion to dismiss.·ln deciding a motion to dismiss, Section 3, Rule
16 of the Rules of Court grants the court four (4) options: 1) to deny
the motion; 2) grant the motion; 3) to allow amendment of pleading;
and 4) to „defer‰ the hearing and determination of the motion until
the trial, if the ground alleged therein does not appear to be
indubitable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under the fourth option, court is
granted the discretion to defer the hearing and determination of the
motion until the trial if the ground alleged therein does not appear
to be indubitable.·Under the fourth option, the court is not obliged
to immediately hold a hearing on the motion to dismiss; it is
granted the discretion to defer the hearing and determination
thereof until the trial, if the ground alleged therein does not appear
to be indubitable.
Same; Same; Same; Essential requisites for the existence of res
judicata.·The essential requisites for the existence of res judicata
are: (1) that the former judgment must be final: (2) that it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject
matter and the parties: (3) that it must be a judgment on the
merits; and (4) that there must be, between the first and second
actions; (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of subject matter; and (c)
identity of cause of action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The judgment rendered in an action
for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the
possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership
of the land or building.·There is no question that the judgment in
Civil Case No. 11374, for unlawful detainer, had long became final
and executory as against private respondent Froilan Isorena.
However, the judgment in that case does not appear to be res
judicata in the complaint subject of this petition, which is for
annulment of documents. The petitioner alleged that in the case for
unlawful detainer, not only was the question of possession resolved
but the question of ownership as well. (T)he judgment rendered in
an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect
to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an
action between the same parties respecting title to the land or
building, nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in
a case between the same parties upon a different cause of
345
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 5, 1991 345
action not involving possession (Rule 70, Sec. 7, Rules of Court). The
main issue in forcible entry and unlawful is possession de facto,
independently of any claim of ownership or possession de jure that
either party may claim in his pleading.
Same; Same; Same; To determine identity of cause of action, it
must be ascertained whether the same evidence which is necessary to
sustain the second cause of action would have been sufficient to
authorize a recovery in the first.·To determine identity of cause of
action, it must be ascertained whether the same evidence which is
necessary to sustain the second cause of action would have been
sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first (Vda. de Cruz v.
Carriaga, Jr., G.R. Nos. 75109–10, June 28, 1989, 174 SCRA 330). It
is clear that the evidence presented to sustain the first action for
unlawful detainer is not the same set which could defeat the action
for annulment of the real estate mortgage, etc. in the complaint
subject of this petition.
Same; Same; Parties; Since private respondentsÊ parents are
already dead, as legitimate heirs, they have the personality to bring
the action to recover the property should the action for annulment
prosper.·Third, the petitioner alleged that the private respondents
have no personality to prosecute. The subject property was allegedly
the conjugal property of private respondentsÊ parents, Pedro Isorena
and Matilde Echavarria. Since the latter are already dead, private
respondents as their legitimate heirs have the personality to bring
the action to recover the property should the action for annulment
prosper.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court
of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court

Manuel T. De Guia for petitioner.
Trinidad, Reverente, Makalintal, Cabrera and Office
for private respondents,
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of

the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Sp. No.
12111, entitled „Leticia C. Mendoza v. Hon. Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr., et al,‰ promulgated on July 9, 1987, which
dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by
herein petitioner
346

Leticia C. Mendoza.
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
Spouses Pedro S. Isorena and Matilde Echavarria were
owners of a parcel of land located at 1825 Sandejas Street,
Pasay City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
3229. Sometime in 1967, said spouses borrowed money
from the Second Rizal Development Bank. To secure
payment of the indebtedness, the property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3229 was mortgaged to the
bank. The money borrowed was used for the construction of
the house of their son, Froilan Isorena.
To save the mortgaged property from being foreclosed,
Pedro Isorena gave his son the amount to pay off the
mortgage indebtedness to the Second Rizal Development
Bank. However, Froilan, his wife, Carmencita Marquez and
his mother (Pedro IsorenaÊs wife), Matilde Echavarria were
made to execute a promissory note and a deed of real estate
mortgage of the same property covered by TCT No. 3229, in
favor of Leticia C. Mendoza. Leticia C. Mendoza was then
the common-law wife of Pedro Isorena and was allegedly
kept in the conjugal home by Pedro Isorena.
Froilan, Carmencita and Matilde defaulted in the

payment of their mortgage obligation to Leticia Mendoza.
The mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed and the
property acquired at the auction sale by the mortgagee-
lender, Leticia C. Mendoza. After the lapse of the
redemption period without the mortgagors exercising their
right of redemption, ownership was consolidated in the
name of Leticia Mendoza and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 18617 was issued in her name.
After the foreclosure of the mortgage on June 16, 1973
up to March 31, 1974, Froilan Isorena paid two hundred
pesos (P200.00) monthly rentals to Leticia Mendoza. From
April 1, 1974, Froilan failed to pay the rentals prompting
Leticia Mendoza to file a complaint for unlawful detainer
against Froilan and his wife Carmencita with the City
Court of Pasay in Civil Case No. 11374. Leticia Mendoza
prevailed in this unlawful detainer case.
On September 23, 1986, Froilan Isorena, his sister
Vivian Isorena and another brother, Lauro Isorena filed a
complaint, subject of the instant petition, for the
annulment of real estate
347
VOL. 201, SETPEMBER 5, 1991 347

mortgage, the auction sale, the title of Leticia Mendoza in

the subject property and the decision of the trial court in
the unlawful detainer case. Named defendants were Leticia
Mendoza, the Regional Trial Court (Pasay City, Branch
CXIII), the Metropolitan Trial Court (Branch XLVI), the
Register of Deeds and the Sheriff, both of Pasay City. The
complaint (pp. 68–71, Rollo) prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order to enjoin the trial court in the
unlawful detainer case from executing the decision ousting
the plaintiffs from the premises of the questioned property.
It also alleged that the money allegedly borrowed from
Leticia Mendoza was owned by their father, Pedro Isorena
with whom the former had illicit relations. The complaint
alleged, inter alia, that:
„14. That for the reasons adduced in pars. 6, 7, 8, 9,12 and 13,
supra. (the circumstances leading to the execution of the questioned
documents), the Promissory Note (Annex „A"), Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage (Annex „B"), all proceedings in the auction sale of the
subject property including Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18617
(Annex „E"), Order (Annex „F") and Decision (Annex „G") are all
null and void and without force and effect whatsoever, x x x‰ (p. 71,
Rollo)
Instead of filing an Answer, the defendants filed a motion

to dismiss (pp. 92–103, Rollo) dated October 9,1986, on the
following grounds: 1) that the action has prescribed; 2) that
the action is barred by a prior judgment; 3) that the
plaintiffs have no judicial personality to prosecute; and, 4)
that the plaintiffs are guilty of estoppel. The plaintiffs
opposed the motion.
On October 21, 1986, the trial court granted the motion
of plaintiffs, for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. The order stated, inter alia, that:
„In the complaint for illegal detainer (Civil Case No. 11374) filed by
private defendant herein Leticia C. Mendoza against the spouses
Froilan Isorena and Carmencita Isorena, the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch XLVI, dated June 7,
1984, as to possession or ordering the ejectment of these spouses
from the premises of the said property was ordered maintained by
the Court of Appeals in a civil action, AC-G.R. No. SP-06904 of that
court. The complaint in the above-entitled case, however, seeks,
among others, to annul that decision on the ground that the
Metropolitan Trial Court of
348

Pasay City had no jurisdiction to squarely resolve, as it did, the

issue of ownership in that case. On this contention, with respect to
the issue of whether or not this Court may issue a writ of
preliminary injunction, plaintiffs rely on the cases of Dulap vs.
Court of Appeals, 42 SCRA 537, and Arabay, Inc. vs. Salvador, 82
SCRA 138, the former case holding, in brief, that a Court of First
Instance or a branch thereof has authority to annul a final and

executory judgment or order rendered by another court of first
instance or by another branch of the same court, i.e., that,
necessarily, this Court, which has jurisdiction on cases of the nature
presented by the complaint herein (where the subject is not capable
of pecuniary estimation)? can annul a final and executory judgment
of the inferior Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City for having
exceeded its jurisdiction (resolving squarely the issue of ownership
although it was not within its powers to do so).
„The said private defendant, in her opposition to the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction, incorporated therein her grounds
in her motion to dismiss, that is, prescription; bar by former
judgment; lack of judicial personality on the part of the plaintiffs to
prosecute the above-entitled case (allegedly, the estate of Matilde
Echavarria should be the one to do so); and estoppel on the part of
plaintiff Froilan Isorena (for being a signatory to the deed of
mortgage in favor of defendant Leticia C. Mendoza). To these
grounds, the plaintiffs, in their opposition to motion to dismiss and
reply to opposition to the motion for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, contended that prescription will not lie
inasmuch as the action to declare the inexistence of a contract (the
above-mentioned mortgage In favor of the private defendant herein)
does not prescribe pursuant to Art. 1410 of the Civil Code, it being a
void or inexistent contract. To the ground of res judicata, the
plaintiff Ês, aside from alleging that the requisites for res judicata
are not present with respect to the order of April 5, 1978, issued by
the former Court of First Instance, Branch XXX, Pasay City (since
that order is not a decision on the merits), contend that the said
order of dismissal can but be considered as having expressly
provided, that it was one without prejudice [that order was issued
due to the mistaken impression of that court that with the death of
Pedro Isorena and his conjugal partnership with Matilde
Echavarria Isorena therefor dissolved, the administrator of the
estate of said Pedro Isorena should be the one to file a proper case
against the private defendant herein Leticia C. Mendoza (co-
defendant of Pedro Isorena in that Civil Case No. 4165-P where
Matilde Echavarria was the plaintiff)].
„To the ground of improper parties, the plaintiffs rely on the fact
that as the legitimate children of the late spouses Pedro Isorena
and also now-deceased Matilde Echavarria Isorena, they
automatically stepped into the shoes of these spouses and therefore
have the neces
349
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 5, 1991 349

sary personality to prosecute the above-entitled case. And as for the

ground of estoppel, the plaintiffs contend that this ground does not
apply if the subject matter of the action (the aforesaid mortgage) is
void and inexistent from the beginning.
„As for the other arguments contained in the opposition to
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction, suffice it to say that
these arguments are highly contentious and constitute inferences to
be deduced from alleged facts. Therefore, there being yet no
conclusive proof of such facts and inferences from facts being a
subject of conjecture, this Court cannot give reliance thereto if only
for the reason that to do so will be a premature act on its part.
„To the mind of this Court, there is, at least on the surface, a
legitimate basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
since the allegations of the complaint in the above-entitled case
prima facie constitute a good and sufficient, though debatable,
cause of action. Therefore, to prevent the issues presented by that
complaint from being moot and academic, especially considering the
fact that, indeed, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch XLVI, should be construed as really not having any
jurisdiction to resolve the question of ownership between the
parties hereto and/or the predecessors in interest of the plaintiffs in
the case which it decided, and due to at least an apparently
questionable figure in the contents of the said affidavit of private
defendant Leticia C. Mendoza as previously narrated above, i.e., the
mortgage in favor of the Monte de Piedad on September 7, 1964,
was for P20,000.00; that mortgage was taken over by the Second
Rizal Development Bank on September 30, 1967 (after 3 years), for
P27,000.00, and yet as of October 13, 1971, or four (4) years
thereafter, private defendant herein Leticia C. Mendoza paid the
Second Rizal Development Bank the amount of only P26,000.00,
which is obviously not ordinary (why would the Second Rizal
Development Bank pay off the three (3) year mortgage in favor of
Monte de Piedad with the sum of P27,000.00 and then after four (4)
more years Leticia C. Mendoza paid the Second Rizal Development
Bank a lesser amount of P26,000.00), it behooves this Court to
arrive at an opinion that the matters in issue in the above-entitled
case be more minutely scrutinized and, hence, should not be

allowed to become moot and academic.
„Additionally, in view of the peculiar circumstances constituting
the facts forming the background of the above-entitled case, i.e., as
aforesaid, private defendant Leticia C. Mendoza was a mere
concubine of Pedro Isorena, and there is at least a possibility that
the mortgage in question of which the latter is the principal
mortgagor, might ultimately be considered as void due to the illicit
relationship between them, to the detriment of the legal spouse and
to the legiti
350

mate children of the spouses Pedro Isorena and Matilde Echavarria,

this Court is constrained to resolve the issue of whether or not to
issue a writ of preliminary injunction in the affirmative.‰ (pp. 159–
161, Rollo)
Also on October 21, 1986, the defendants filed a verified

urgent motion for inhibition of Judge Capistrano p. 105,
Rollo). On December 5, 1986, Judge Capistrano issued a
resolution denying the motion to dismiss and inhibiting
himself from hearing the case. The portion of the resolution
pertinent to the motion to dismiss reads:
„x x x.
„Regarding the motion to dismiss filed by the private defendant
and the opposition thereto filed by the plaintiff, this matter has
already been extensively discussed in the order of this Court of
October 21,1986, which discussion is reproduced herein, by
reference, for brevity. On this matter, suffice it to say that the
grounds of the said motion to dismiss are not indubitable. Moreover,
as regards the principal ground of res judicata of the said motion to
dismiss, suffice it to say that the principal requisite therefor, i.e.,
final judgment or order on the merits, (2 Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1979 Ed., pp. 348–349) is not present. Hence, the
said motion to dismiss should be considered as DENIED." (p. 109,
Rollo)
On December 19,1986, the defendants filed a motion for

reconsideration of the resolution denying the motion to
dismiss (pp. 112–116, Rollo). As a consequence of the
inhibition of Judge Capistrano from any participation in
the case, it was re-raffled to herein respondent Judge
Conrado Vasquez, Jr. On May 20, 1987, respondent Judge
issued an order (p. 117, Rollo) denying the motion for
reconsideration and ordering the defendants to file their
answer.
Only defendant Leticia C. Mendoza filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals
questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss the
complaint. On July 9, 1987, the Court of Appeals denied
the petition but modified the resolution dated December 5,
1986 denying the motion to dismiss and the order dated
May 20, 1987 denying the motion for reconsideration.
Instead of denying the motion to dismiss respondent
appellate court ordered the deferment of the resolu-
351
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 5, 1991 351

tion of the motion until the trial on the merits, The

pertinent portion of decision states:
„While there is no question that prescription is a proper ground for

a motion to dismiss. [Rule 16, Sec. 1 (f)], and that the allegations of
the complaint sufficiently indicate a basis for such claim, the point
raised in the opposition to the motion to dismiss, i.e., that the
contract is void and inexistent, and the action for the declaration of
the inexistence of a void contract does not prescribe, did raise a
doubt as to the validity of claim of prescription, The same is true
with the ground of res judicata, which has not been clearly
established, because the alleged prior judgment did not dispose of,
or settle, the question of annulment of the mortgage in question. In
view of this, the lower court cannot be said to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss so as to
warrant the issuance of the extxaordinary writ of certiorari. If there
was an error of judgment, this is not the whimsical or capricious
exercise of judgment so as to warrant intervention of this Court.
Not every error in the proceeding or erroneous conclusion of fact or

of law is an abuse of discretion, it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law
(Talavera vs. Nable, 67 Phil. 340; Alafriz vs. Nable, 72 Phil. 278; De
Gala vs. Cui, 26 Phil. 522). Where the motion to dismiss is denied.
the remedy of the defendant is to interpose as defense in the
answer, the objections raised by him in the motion. to dismiss, then
proceed to trial and in case of an adverse decision, bring the case by
appeal in due time. Unless the denial of a motion to dismiss
constitutes clearly a grave abuse of discretion or is issued without
or in excess of jurisdiction, the error, if any should be corrected by
appeal in due time after trial and judgment on the merits, and not
by the extraordinary legal remedy such as a writ of certiorari or
prohibition (Phil. International Fair Inc. vs. Ibañez, 94 Phil. 424;
Harrison Foundry Machinery vs. Harrison Foundry Workers
Association, G.R. No. L18432, June 29, 1963).
„In this case, the trial court apparently denied the motion to
dismiss on the ground that the grounds therefor do not appear to be
indubitable. The proper course of action should have been to defer
the hearing and determination of the motion until the trial (Sec. 3,
Rule 16, Rules of Court), However, the net result is the same, in
that the defendant will have to file his answer and the grounds
raised in his motion to dismiss may be interposed in his answer
(Sections 4 and 5, Rule 16). „xxx.
352

„WHEREFORE, with the modification that the Resolution dated

December 5, 1986 denying PetitionerÊs Motion to Dismiss and the
Resolution dated May 20, 1987 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration of said Resolution should be for deferment of action
on the motions instead of denial, the present petition for certiorari
and mandamus is DENIED due course and accordingly
DISMISSED." (pp. 123–124, Rollo)
The motion for reconsideration filed by Mendoza was

likewise denied on February 5, 1988 (p. 131, Rollo).
Mendoza is now before Us seeking the review of the
decision and resolution of respondent appellate court.

Petitioner argues that the decision of respondent
appellate court denying the defense of prescription on the
ground that said defense is not indubitable is belied by the
record and the documentary evidence; Likewise, the
defense of estoppel and res judicata which were raised in
the motion to dismiss were allegedly very clear from the
records.
The petition has no merit.
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to quash or
to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of a
petition for certiorari. The remedy of the aggrieved party in
a denied motion to dismiss is to file an answer and
interpose, as defense or defenses, the objection or objections
raised by him in said motion to dismiss, then proceed to
trial and, in case of adverse decision, to elevate the entire
case by appeal in due course (NIDC v. Aquino, 163 SCRA
153). The exception to this rule is when the trial court
clearly acted outside of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss,
In deciding a motion to dismiss, Section 3, Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court grants the court four (4) options: 1) to deny
the motion; 2) grant the motion; 3) to allow amendment of
pleading; and 4) to „defer‰ the hearing and determination
of the motion until the trial, if the ground alleged therein
does not appear to be indubitable. In the instant case, the
trial court correctly ruled that the grounds for the motion
to dismiss does not appear to be indubitable. It erred
however in denying the motion to dismiss instead of just
deferring Âthe resolution of the motion as corrected by
respondent appellate court because the grounds for the
motion to dismiss filed by petitioner do not
353
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 5, 1991 353

appear to be indubitable. Under the fourth option, the court

is not obliged to immediately hold a hearing on the motion
to dismiss; it is granted the discretion to defer the hearing
and determination thereof until the trial, if the ground
alleged therein does not appear to be indubitable. (Nico v.

Blanco, 81 Phil. 213; Ong Peng v; Custodio, G.R. No. L-
14911, March 25, 1961, 59 O.G. 3447, June 3, 1963 cited in
Vicente J. Francisco. The Revised Rules of Court of the
Philippines, Annotated and Commented,‰ Vol. I, Second
edition, p. 966).
Fourt (4) grounds were relied upon by petitioner in the
motion to dismiss, all of which do not appear to be
indubitable. First, that the action had prescribed, The
action is one for annulment of a real estate mortgage
executed some fifteen (15) years back, But, as pointed out
by respondent appellate court, the opposition of the
defendants raised a claim that the deed of mortgage, etc., is
void and inexistent. Hence, the action appears to be
imprescriptible pursuant to Article 1410 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.
Second, that the complaint is barred by res judicata. The
essential requisites for the existence of res judicata are: (1)
that the former judgment must be final: (2) that it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the
subject matter and the parties: (3) that it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (4) that there must be,
between the first and second actions; (a) identity of parties;
(b) identity of subject matter; and (c) identity of cause of
action (Asuncion v. Pineda, G.R. No. 47924, July 31, 1989,
175 SCRA 719; Magdangal v. City of Olongapo, G.R. No.
83828, November 16, 1989, 179 SCRA 506, Filipinas
Investment and Finance Corporation v. IAC, G.R. Nos.
66059–60, December 4, 1989, 179 SCRA 728). All the
requisites may be present in this case, except identity of
causes of action, which is likewise indispensable. To
determine identity of cause of action, it must be
ascertained whether the same evidence which is necessary
to sustain the second cause of action would have been
sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first (Vda. de Cruz
v. Carriaga, Jr., G.R. Nos. 75109–10, June 28, 1989, 174
SCRA 330). It is clear that the evidence presented to
sustain the first action for unlawful detainer is not the
same set which could defeat the action for annulment of the
real estate mortgage, etc. in the complaint subject of this
petition. There is no question
354

that the judgment in Civil Case No. 11374, for unlawful

detainer, had long became final and executory as against
private respondent Froilan Isorena. However, the judgment
in that case does not appear to be res judicata in the
complaint subject of this petition, which is for annulment of
documents. The petitioner alleged that in the case for
unlawful detainer, not only was the question of possession
resolved but the question of ownership as well. (T)he
judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or
detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only
and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the
land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action
between the same parties respecting title to the land or
building, nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein
found in a case between the same parties upon a different
cause of action not involving possession (Rule 70, Sec. 7,
Rules of Court). The main issue in forcible entry and
unlawful is possession de facto, independently of any claim
of ownership or possession de jure that either party may
claim in his pleading (Caparros v. C.A., G.R. No. 56803,
February 28,1989)
Third, the petitioner alleged that the private
respondents have no personality to prosecute. The subject
property was allegedly the conjugal property of private
respondentsÊ parents, Pedro Isorena and Matilde
Echavarria. Since the latter are already dead, private
respondents as their legitimate heirs have the personality
to bring the action to recover the property should the action
for annulment prosper.
Lastly, that the private respondents are stopped from
filing the complaint for annulment is disputable. Petitioner
alleged that as early as 1975, she filed an action for
unlawful detainer against private respondent Froilan
Isorena wherein she already asserted her ownership over
the property by virtue of the real estate mortgage. Yet, it
took the private respondents more than ten (10) years after
or sometime in 1986 only, to bring the instant complaint for
annulment of the real estate mortgage. For their part,
private respondents alleged in the complaint that the late
father of private respondents, Pedro Isorena ruled with an

iron hand and imprinted psychological fear not only on his
children but on his wife, as well. Those were the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the real estate
mortgage which private respondents seek to annul. The
determination of
355
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 5, 1991 355

Alba Patio de Makati vs: NLRC
the veracity of the allegations ations of both party need to

be threshed out in the trial proper.
The respondent appellate court acted within its
jurisdiction and did not abuse its jurisdiction when it
denied the petition and ordered the deferment of the
motion to dismiss for the reason that the grounds alleged in
the motion to dismiss are not indubitable.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and the
questioned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED,
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ.,

concur.
Petition denied. Decision and resolution affirmed.
Note.·When the ground for a motion to dismiss is that

the complaint states no cause of action, no evidence may be
allowed, and the issues shall only be determined in the
light of the allegations in the complaint. (Sustiguer vs.
Tamayo, 176 SCRA 579.)
··o0o··
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 201 24/05/2017, 7*52 PM

VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 5, 1991 343

LETICIA C. MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motion to Dismiss; As a general

30 PNOC·Exploration Corporation vs. National Labor Relations

344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals

VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 5, 1991 345

Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court

This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of

346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Froilan, Carmencita and Matilde defaulted in the

VOL. 201, SETPEMBER 5, 1991 347

mortgage, the auction sale, the title of Leticia Mendoza in

Instead of filing an Answer, the defendants filed a motion

348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pasay City had no jurisdiction to squarely resolve, as it did, the

Instance or a branch thereof has authority to annul a final and

VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 5, 1991 349

sary personality to prosecute the above-entitled case. And as for the

case be more minutely scrutinized and, hence, should not be

350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

mate children of the spouses Pedro Isorena and Matilde Echavarria,

Also on October 21, 1986, the defendants filed a verified

On December 19,1986, the defendants filed a motion for

VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 5, 1991 351

tion of the motion until the trial on the merits, The

„While there is no question that prescription is a proper ground for

Not every error in the proceeding or erroneous conclusion of fact or

352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

„WHEREFORE, with the modification that the Resolution dated

The motion for reconsideration filed by Mendoza was

decision and resolution of respondent appellate court.

VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 5, 1991 353

appear to be indubitable. Under the fourth option, the court

alleged therein does not appear to be indubitable. (Nico v.

354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

that the judgment in Civil Case No. 11374, for unlawful

father of private respondents, Pedro Isorena ruled with an

VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 5, 1991 355

the veracity of the allegations ations of both party need to

Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ.,

Petition denied. Decision and resolution affirmed.

Note.·When the ground for a motion to dismiss is that

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