Max Scheler's Phenomenology of Shame

International Phenomenological Society
Max Scheler's Phenomenology of Shame

Author(s): Parvis Emad
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Mar., 1972), pp. 361-370
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
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MAX SCHELER'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SHAME
Among the numerous works of Scheler, there are many essays which
present a phenomenological description of the witness of certain phe-
nomena. These essays, beyond doubt, are outstanding cases of applied
phenomenology. To such essays belong, for instance, those dealing with
phenomena humility, resentment, repentance,' the sphere 'of the abso-
lute in consciousness and freedom. The phenomenon of shame also be-
longs to the group of these essays. These shorter essays of Scheler are
highly revelatory of the foremost characteristics of his phenomenology,
namely, its desymbolizing quality and its interest in intuitively expe-
rienced life. What Scheler intuited and wrote regarding "Scham und
Schamgeftihl" uniquely reveals these two characteristics of his pheno
menology. Moreover, this essay immediately relates to Scheler's most
eminent metaphysical engagement, viz., the question of man. Thus it is
highly rewarding to see Scheler's achievements for what they really are,
i.e., phenomenological insights which he sharply distinguishes from psy-
chological description. Scheler draws our attention to this crucial dis-
tinction when he says:
The phenomenology of the psychic is totally and absolutely different from all
explicative (erkldrende) and descriptive psychology. There is no description
without observation of single processes (einzelner Vorgiinge). In the phenome-
nological attitude, however, what is-mneant (Gemeintes) is intuited. It is not
observed.2
It is precisely because of this intuitive source of phenomenology that

Scheler regards the discursive and argumentative attitude at its best as
insufficient, and at its worst as misleading and irrelevant. It takes little
reading in Scheler's work to see that his thoroughgoing dissatisfaction
with definitions and prefixed conceptions compels him to approach
nearly every phenomenon in a negative fashion. This is even true td the
extent that he sometimes goes so far as to compare the phenomenological
method with the method of so-called negative theology.3
1 For a thoroughgoing discussion of these phenomena, cf. M. S. Frings "Person

und Dasein." in Phaenomenologica, Vol. 32, p. 62, 1969, Nijhoff, The Hague.
2 Max Scheler. Schriften aus dem Nachlass (hereafter Nachlass), Vol. 10 of the
Collected Edition, p. 388.
3 Cf. Max Scheler: Vom Ewigen im Menschen, Vol. 5 of the Collected Edition,
1954, p. 167.
361
362 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
I. Shame and Related Feelings.
The above characterization of Schelerian phenomenology may be

helpful in understanding why he places a critical evaluation of related
feelings before his own definitive articulation of the intuited phenomenon
of shame. This may, in fact, give an argumentative tone to his treat-
ment of this question. Yet his objective is not to persuade but to help
prepare one to intuit.
First a close examination of the whole range of life is necessary in
order to trace the genesis of shame. Can shame be considered an evo-
lutionary necessity? Supported by the biological and anthropological
resources of his time, it seemed certain to Scheler that shame cannot be
encountered at every stage in the development of life. The organic con-
dition for the origination of the feeling of shame is, according to Scheler,
the increase in the degrees of individualization of living beings (Masse
der Individualisierung lebendiger Einheiten). Whenever a new biological
entity is merely the manifestation of an indifferent transmission (Durch-
gangspunkt) of life, the organic conditions for the appearance of shame
are not present at all. The gradual increase of the individualization is to
be seen in the slow but determinate preference of the quality of repro-
duction over its mere quantity. What at the lowest level of life seems
to be a totally nonselective process - almost similar to the combination
of two chemical elements - is replaced in higher levels of life by the
preference of quality of propagation to its mere quantity. It is in man
alone that the phenomenon of shame taking advantage of the hitherto
achieved preparatory organic phases -is clearly and distinctly mani-
fested as a feeling.4 But what kind Zf feeling is shame? It is obvious that
Scheler, in answering this question, aims at a careful and precise artic-
ulation of his central intuition. However, before making any statement
as to the positive sense of the feeling of shame, we are told that shame
is neither a sexual feeling nor a social feeling, because in the absence
of all social realities (sexual partner included) we can be ashamed of
ourselves (Scham vor sich selbst). Shame belongs to- the group of those
feelings through which we can feel our own selves.5 This point brings
Scheler a decisive step closer to a positive determination of the feeling
of shame inasmuch as he refers to the specific act which takes place in
this feeling:
4 Cf., Nachlass, p. 74.

5 For questions concerning German Geffihl and English feeling, as well as vita
feelings, feeling-states, etc., cf. M. S. Frings, Max Scheler, A Concise Introduct
in to the World of a Great Thinker, Duquesne University Press, 1965, pp. 50-51.
MAX SCHELER'S PHIENOMENOLOGY OF SHAME 363
In all the experiences of shame there takes place an act which I would like
to call (the act of) turning back to a self (-Rfickwendung auf ein selbst).6
This "turning back" seems to be accompanied by a sense of opposition

(Widerstreit) which results from a contact of higher levels of conscious-
ness with the lower biophysical centers. The significational and inten-
tional aspects of this act of turning back to a self are the occasion for
Scheler to delve deeper into the problem of shame. Whenever the
direction of intentionality oscillates (schwankt) towards something in
us generally shared by all and something purely individual (hence shared
by none), then the sense of shame is present. The fact that intentionality
may thus remain undecided and hesitant as to its choice can best be
observed in the insufficiency of concepts in expressing an entirely
unique lived experience (Erlebnis). The concepts are almost like the
"public" (rffentlichkeit) of our consciousness, where the unique expe-
rience of the individual is as out of place as our private life would be
in newspapers.7 This is why sexual life, its extreme sensibility toward
shame notwithstanding, is not the origin of the sense of shame but just
one occasion of its applicability. Sex then, far from being something
individual, is that which we have in common with all brutes and living
organisms as the most common generality of all (Alleraligemeinste).
Seen in its significational aspect, the sense of shame is revealed as an
individual feeling for protection (Schutzgefjihl des Individuums) wh
prevents the uniqueness of individual values from being absorbed by the
sphere of generality.
The consideration of phenomena associated with "to be ashamed of
oneself," brought into focus the sense of shame as a feeling of pro-
tection directed toward the owned self. Yet there is also a feeling of
shame for someone else, and this feeling is as original and authentic an
experience as to be ashamed of oneself. In this way shame may be taken
to be like a feeling of guilt directed toward a self, whether my own or
that of someone else. This leads to the insight that shame - unlike
sorrow (Trauer) and wistfulness (Wehmut) - is not a feeling adhesive
to the ego, i.e., it is not a quality of the ego (Ichqualitdt) at all. Shame
is an independent emotion which cannot be empathically felt the way
sorrow and sadness can. This is why a differentiation of shame from
related emotions is required. The sense of shame stands in a unique
relationship to pride (Stolz) and to humility (Demut). It seems as if
shame contains qualities from both of them. With pride it shares the
awareness of one's own value, and with humility, the tendency toward

7 Ibid., p. 80.
devotion and loyalty. Furthermore, shame is very close to repentance

(Reue) and to the feeling of honor (EhrgefUhl). In repenting, one is
also ashamed of oneself. A sense of shame is ordinarily paralleled by
a sense of honor, while shamelessness is accompanied by an absence
of the feeling of honor. Moreover, shame dynamically opposes and
restricts ambition (Ehrgeiz), vanity (Eitelkeit), and thirst for fame
(Ruhmbegierde).
Scheler declares that these psychic forces (seelische Mdchte) would
have driven man to the point where he would have lost his true self to
the world, were it not for the sense of shame to save and justify man's
most intimate self. The analogical relations of shame to nausea (Ekel)
and aversion are an opportunity for Scheler to uncover the essential
structure of these feelings. Nausea, aversion, and shame possess a vital
inhibitory effect (Hemrnungseffekt) on absorption of food and sexual
drive. In a sense, the feeling of shame may be taken to be the mental
protectivity of the totality of our sexual life, insofar as sexual maturity
is possible under the dominance of shame. Finally, fear, dread, and
shame are closely studied in their relationship and dependence. Shame
seems to have little to ado with dread; rather, it seems closer to fear
(Angst). Not only are the expressional forms (Ausdruckserscheinungen)
of trembling for fear and trembling for shame identical, but the whole
emotional position in "shame" and fear are also similar. The sense of
shame fulfills a protective function prior to sexual intercourse, and here
is how fear and shame seem to be blended together.
II. Basic Forms of Shame.
The essence of shame appeared throughout the foregoing analysis in

a twofold manner. It appeared as the sense of the act of turning-back-
to-a-self (Riickwendung) and then as a subjectively lived (erlebt) tension
(Spannung) of higher and lower levels of consciousness. Based on this
twofold mode of appearance of the essence of shame, Scheler now dis-
tinguishes between spiritual feeling of shame (geistiges Schamgefuihl)
and a bodily shame (Leibesscham).
These basic forms of shame are not reducible to each other. Both of
them represent the index of tension (Spannung) which exists between
love and drive. With body, love appears as vital love (vitale Liebe) whose
concentration is reached in sexual love. With spirit, love appears as
spiritual love (geistige Liebe) which is directed toward spiritual person-
ality. With body, drive appears as drive-impulse (Triebimpuls) which in
its sexual form is condensed in an erotic sensation of tingling desire (Kit-
zel der Wollust). With spirit, drive appears as vital drive (vitaler Grund-
MAX SCHELER'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SHAME 365
trieb), involved merely in increasing the power of life (Lebensmacht).

The connectedness of bodily shame and drive as well as the relatedness
of spiritual shame and vital drive (both lived as a tension) reveal the
phenomenon of shame as belonging to the constitution of consciousness.
Thus, shame is an individual essence (Wesenheit). Its whatness (essential
should not be confused with its thatness (existentia). The inexcusable
mistake of all theories of shame lies in this confusion. Supported by these
phenomenological insights Scheler is now prepared to examine these
erroneous theories. They represent in turn the educational and the
ecclesiastical interpretations of shame.
First, Scheler critically scrutinizes the theory (originating in the 18th
Century) which regards shame as the outcome of training and education
(Erziehung). Leaving the question untouched, as to how educators them-
selves might have acquired the notion of shame, Scheler points to the
three types of confusion (Verwechslungen) upon which this theory seems
to rest. First, this theory mistakes the expressional form (Form des Aus-
drucks) of shame for its factual expression. Next, it confuses the natural
expression of shame (e.g., blushing) with its artificial expression (e.g.,
bathing suit). Finally, this theory mistakes shame for its expressions in
general. Closely related to these misconceptions is also the one which
substitutes moral interpretations for shame.
Regarding the expressional forms of shame, Scheler denies education
any determinability of these forms. Instead, he credits tradition with
determining role by pointing to the existing differences in expressional
forms of shame among various ethnic groups. (What seems shameful to
us regarding bathing is not shameful to the Japanese and vice versa). It
is-from his critical treatment of the role of education and tradition that
Scheler examines prudery, cynicism, obscenity, flirtation, coquetry and
frivolity. The limited space of this paper does not allow for a thorough
discussion of the latter which, while associated with shame, are not
identical with the genuine feeling itself. Suffice it only to indicate that
prudery, for instance, seems to Scheler to be the outcome of the control
of education over the external expressions of shame. On the whole,
Scheler concedes that education has only a negative role which consists
in letting the feeling of shame develop and mature freely, by preventing
its violations (Verletzung) and deformations. Education does not appear
to Scheler as a positive generative force in the development of shame.8
In view of the intimate relatedness of the sense of shame to sexuality,
a special ecclesiastical interpretation (kirchliche Deutung) of shame now
comes under Scheler's scrutiny. This ecclesiastical interpretation has been
8 Ibid., p. 98.
expressed as a demand for chastity. This demand for chastity, under-

stood as a volitional repression of sexual impulse, is based on false
assumptions. The assumptions are false because the sense of shame
usually associated with sexuality is nourished by sexual impulse itself,
so that shame can never repress this impulse. At most, shame may divert
attention from the sexual impulse and prevent its conscious acknowledge-
ment. Once a repression (UnterdrUckung) of this kind has been intended;
it may result in a twofold disturbance. It can lead to an unusual increase
of sexual sensitivity (Ubersteigerung der geschlechtlichen Empfindlich-
keit) with regard to everything which is distantly and vaguely related to
sex.9 It may also distract the genuine sense of shame associated with
sexuality from fulfilling its positive function in sexual life.
Lastly, Scheler deals with those cases in which a reception
(Tduschung) in the feeling of shame is present. Self-deception regarding
shame is present primarily whenever it appears to the individual that he
feels shame, yet does not actually experience it. In these circumstances,
a certain socionoral code may be responsible for either exalting the
sense of shame, praising modesty (Schamhaftigkeit) or reproaching their
absence. It is Ressentiment which explains and clarifies the complexity
of deception regarding the authentic feeling of shame, for here as in all
cases of Ressentiment, the positive value of the imagined sense of shame
covers the negative value of deficiency (der negative Wert des Man-
gels) 10 like a layer.
III. Shame and Sex
The unreflective association of shame and sex necessitates Scheler's

return to the theme of bodily shame (Leibesscham) in order to seek the
essential structures involved in this association. The feeling of shame
associated with body, with sexual impulses and with vitality (leibliches
Schamgefiihl) belongs to the group of vital feelings (Lebensgefiihle). The
states of vital feelings like weakness, illness, health, etc., are not the
same as feel-sensations (Geffihlsempfindungen) like itching, pleasantne
(Annehmlichkeit) or unpleasantness (Unannehmlichkeit). The states of
vital feelings are also not the same as spiritual feelings like woe (Weh-
mut0, sorrow and joy. By belonging to the group of vital feelings, the
impulse toward shame also belongs to the group of vital impulses. Like
vital impulses, they are not localized in certain parts of the body. More-
9 In this connection Scheler notes: "It is told of Saint Alphons Liguori that he
would not give hand to greet any woman and it is told of Saint Aloysius that he
even refused to see his own mother." Cf., Ibid., p. 98.
10 Cf., Ibid., p. 100.
over, they are capable of checking and stopping the natural flow of drives
and urges. The mere presence of an impulse toward shame is enough to
check and stop the strongest drive of libido. The impulses toward shame,
like vital impulses, are altogether beyond our volition, choice and
selection.
What does man attain through the sense of shame associated with his
sexuality? Scheler's answer develops in three stages which distinguish a
threefold goal attainable by the sense of shame. Bodily shame is primarily
designed to divert attention from various forces of drive (Trieb) in order
to prevent their outright expression. In this respect, the sense of shame
felt in sexual matters prevents and excludes the chances of autoeroticism.
This could be also designated as the altruistic effect of the sense of
shame. Further, the sexually associated sense of shame fulfills a sym-
pathetic function towards the opposite sex insofar as it contributes to the
development and shaping of sexual drive. The second goal achievable by
the sense of shame (felt in sexuality) is the postponement (Verschiebung)
of the satisfaction of sexual drive. To postpone the appeasement of the
sexual drive until a time of adequate sexual maturity and simultaneously
to regulate the frequency of the coitus are works of the feeling of shame.
The third goal accessible to shame is its unique performance during
(innerhalb) sexual intercourse itself. Thus, the sense of shame associated
with intercourse is differentiated by Scheler according to its presence
before, during, and after coitus. Within sexual intercourse, the sense of
shame fulfills the following functions: 1. It prevents coitus from striving
after conscious intention or purpose; 2. It prevents attention being drawn
to the anatomy and mechanism of intercourse; 3. It prevents the apper-
ceptive isolation of sexually sensitive parts of the body from the entirety
of the person; 4. Under the influence of shame, the sexual parts of the
body are taken solely for expressional symbols of the initial affectation
of the psyche (seelische Bewegung).
Within the space given to the study of "shame" and "sex," Scheler's
critical discussion of Freud's views occupies considerable space. From
the foregoing account it is evident that Scheler stands diametrically
opposed to Freud's notion of libido. In the first place, Scheler maintains
that the actual sexual drive is not identical with libido. (It should be
noted that by libido he understands only those impulses which are
directed toward erotic sensation of tingling desire (Kitzelgefiihl der Wol-
lust). On the contrary the sexual drive is an edifice (Bauwerk) constructed
with the aid of three independently existing powers, namely, libido,
shame and sympathy." Thus, shame fulfills a constructive function in
l Cf., Ibid., p. 111.
the genesis of sexual drive and is not reducible to it. The priority of the
sense of shame over sexual drive appears to be the central phenomeno-
logical insight thus far. It is precisely from the vantage point of this
priority that Scheler deals with Freud's views on shame. Scheler declares
that "shame" - according to Freud - appears to be nothing but one
means toward the achievement of the ongoing process of repression
(Verdringung). The technique of psychoanalysis should attempt to
elucidate this repression by neutralising the effect of shame, i.e., by
revealing the masks with which "shame" disguises our factual life. This
interpretation of "shame," Scheler concludes, is the inevitable outcome
of Freud's assumption that libido comprises the actual and real sub-
stance of human life.12 But things stand differently for Scheler. The
sense of shame, remarks Scheler, might have a twofold function regarding
sensual images and sexual representations. It can prevent the initial
origination of these images and fantasies, or else it can try to repress
those which have already been originated. In the first instance
shame is no repressive force as Freud mistakenly assumes.... Shame thus

spares repression. It is not that the original and pure function of shame con-
sisits in a reacting with feeling versus something presently given. (vorhanden
Gegebenes). Rather it consists in the prefeeling (VorgefUhl) of something
oncoming ... What in the second case ... is used to lead to a repression ...
is not at all the genuine sense of shame (echte Scham), but only fear and
dread with regard to possible social consequences... 3
At the end of his study, Scheler briefly considers the intensity of

in man and in woman. Man, with respect to sexual or nonsexual matters,
seems to possess a more refined mental sense of shame (seelisches Scham-
gefuhl). However, Scheler emphasizes that women seem to possess a
refined sense of bodily shame. The reason for these differences may be
sought in Scheler's statement that
... woman is ... an actual genius of life (Genie des Lebens) while man (is)
a genius of spirit (Genie des Geistes)...14
12 Regarding libido and human life, Scheler, maintains: "What we ordinarily

our 'consciousness' and its content, is indeed a mere sign (Zeichen), symptom and
epiphenomenon, but not a sign of our subconscious life or drive. It is rather a
sign of a deep and ongoing fight (Kampf) which our higher spiritual self ... is
fighting with the life of sensations (Empfindungsleben). The deceptive ... force
(Kraft) stems from that changing multiplicity of sensuous affectations (sinnliche
Regungen). Insofar as shame obscures (verdunkelt) these affectations and keeps
them at a distance from consciousness, it decreases their deceptive force at the
same time as it elucidates our deeper Being and Life ... Shame is not a form
of self-deception but merely a faculty (Kraft) to eliminate it." Cf. Ibid., p. 114.
13 Ibid., pp. 115-116.
14 Ibid., p. 147.
IV. The Metaphysical Significance of Shame
To better appreciate what &heler has accomplished in his study of

the feeling of shame, we might note the metaphysical implications of his
phenomenological findings. It should be noted, for instance, that the
phenomenological insights into "shame" are quite in keeping with
Scheler's views on Spirit and Person. Far from introducing a new element
into his thought, his study of shame strengthens and confirms his central
notions of Spirit and Person.'
What does Spirit mean to Scheler? Spirit is that which
possesses anything which belongs to the essence of act-being, and intentionality

and manifestation of meaning.15
It is the quintessence (Inbegriff) of acts nonexistent in the realm of

animal life.16 One may ask what, then, is act? Act (and its performance)
is that which makes objectification possible. While everything can be-
come an object for an act, act itself can never become an object. In the
phenomenon of shame, objectification reaches such an intensity and clar-
ity, that it can be taken to be the criterion for the differentiation of man
not only from brutes but from the divine as well. It is an evident phe-
nomenological insight that the essence of animality is not compatible with
the essence of the feeling of shame. By the same token, it is nonsense to
ascribe shame to the divine. Thus, Scheler designates the locus of the
feeling of shame as the living contact which takes place between Spirit
and animality. That is to say, the climax of objectification of all process
of life is the awareness of the entanglement of Spirit in Nature and Life.
Scheler, like Nietzsche, uses the metaphors of "bridge" (die Briicke) and
"transition" (Ubergang) to portray 'his central intuition of man. Man is
a bridge so stretched between divinity and animality that he cannot give
up (preisgeben) either without simultaneously giving up his manhood.
Shame is alien to whatever exists "beyond" and "under" man. But it is
manifest by essential necessity in man himself, or it is he who:
has to feel shame. It is not because of this or that reason that he must do
so, and it is not that he feels shame because of his relations to an "other".
He feels shame as being this transition itself, conceived as an incessant
movement.17
Scheler's study of shame is an excellent example of applied phenom-

enology. It is instructive not only in the subtleties of phenomenological
'5 Max Scheler. Der Formalismus in der Ethik and die material Wertethik,
Vol. 2 of the Collected Edition, 1954, pp. 399-400.
17 Ibid., p. 69.
enterprise in general but also in Scheler's particular conception of phe-

nomenology. In addition to these merits, it also has special significance
for our understanding of Scheler's thought in its entirety, for here, as
elsewhere, the unity and inner consistency of Scheler's thought come
clearly to the fore. The conception of man, for instance, in the light of
the duality of Spirit and Life is as plainly presented here as it is, say, in
Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos. What is done in this study on
shame as a fundamental phenomenological insight, suffices in itself to
free us from the misleading and unphilosophical idea of a "break"
(Bruch) in Scheler's thought.
Here a few words may be said about the interest expressed in "shame"
by recent German philosophers. Scheler was not the first philosopher to
have taken "shame" seriously. Nietzsche, not to mention Schopenhauer,
has profound insight into "shame," especially in the period following his
Zarathustra. Yet the profundity of his insights is only representative of
mere glimpses into the phenomenon of shame and is by no means an
adequate and exhaustive account of this feeling. His outlook seems to be
conditioned by his psychology of unmasking: he sees in shame mainly an
inventive might.18 What attracts his attention is not shame qua shame,
but rather the modes of conscious equilibrium brought about by this
feeling. Thus, properly speaking, he cannot be accused of having a basic
misconception of shame, since he did not study shame as such but
elaborated on shame's relevance to man's central concern with self
esteem.
Scheler, on the contrary, is not concerned with shame for this or that
reason. His motive in studying shame is to disclose its essential structure
and hence to work out its phenomenological foundation.
PARVIS EMAD.
DE PAUL UNIVERSITY.
ACKN OWLEDGEMENT
I wish to thank Miss Carol Sikora for her stylistic suggestions.
18 Cf., F. Nietzsche, Werke in Drei Binden, K. Schlechta, Edition of 1960

2, p. 603.

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