USE OF CONJUNCTIVE AND DISJUNCTIVE WORDS IN CRIMINAL LAW

The use of words “and” and “or” in criminal law is very intricate. The interpretation is used
in criminal procedure to Indian penal code and other criminal laws. At first sight it might
appear that understanding of the words "and" and "or" need not be viewed as fundamental,
and are mostly subsidiary rules of interpretation and does not need a lot of consideration.
Nonetheless, a few times, it is right through the translation of the words "and" and "or" that
the entire importance of the Statute has been changed and the Judicature has developed
another rule by and large which was rarely anticipated. "Or" is ordinarily disjunctive "and" is
regularly conjunctive yet now and again they are perused as the other way around to
effectuate the show plan of the assembly as uncovered from the specific situation.

In the case of State of AP vs Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao 1, Section 239 of the Criminal
Procedure Code came into question. In section 239, it does not seem that various clauses
maybe applied alternatively however clause(f) has a conjunction “and” at its end. Here, the
necessary intention of the legislature must be taken into account. The intention of the
legislature was that the provisions of the clauses must be available only alternatively it would
have used the word “or” and would not have used the conjunction “and”. In this case, “and”
has an opposite effect. Therefore, it appears that the provisions and clauses are cumulative in
nature. The introductory words are enabling and the court thus has an option to avail
conjunctively of two or more clauses. The court thus has a power to move away from normal
grammatical constructs if the court believes that this type of adherence could actually defeat
the main intention of the legislature.

In Jayendra Vishnu Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra 2, in section 299 and 82 the question is on
recording of evidence in absence of the absconding accused. Section 299(1) firstly provides
for jurisdictional fact in respect of absconding person who is accused and secondly that there
was no immediate prospect of arresting him. Both conditions of section 299 of the CrPC must
be read together or conjunctively and not disjunctively. Hence, satisfaction of one
prerequisite is not adequate, both of the conditions is required to be fulfilled. Section 299
gives power to the court to record the evidence. Section 299 is to be construed strictly and the
rules of interpretation must be interpreted together with the other words of the statutory

1
AIR 1963 SC 1850
2
(2009) 7 SCC 104
provisions where the same term are to be used. The term “proved” are exception to the
general rule and are required to be construed strictly.

This standard is an augmentation of the "Purposive Interpretation Rule." Purposive theory is a

hypothesis of statutory consideration that holds that Courts ought to decipher enactment
considering the reason behind the enactment. As indicated by this hypothesis Courts are not
have any desire to bound by the content. It is a down to earth approach or rather an utilitarian
part of deciphering law, wherein deviation from strict principle is allowed for the bigger
enthusiasm of the general public3. A Judge must be a legal adviser supplied with the official's
knowledge, student of history's quest for truth, prophet's vision, ability to react to the
necessities of the present, versatility to adapt to the requests of things to come and to choose
dispassionately withdrawing himself or herself from each close to home impact or
preferences. In this manner, the judges should receive purposive translation of the dynamic
ideas of the Constitution and the Act with its interpretative ordnance to explain the felt
necessities of the time4.

In the case of J. Jayalalitha Vs. Union Of India 5, the word “or” is normally used for the
purpose of joining in proper grammatical sense and also for rephrasing but at times it could
also be substituted for “or”. However, section 3(1) 0f the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988
came into question. In respect to this section the word “or” does not come in isolation and
therefore it will not be proper to attribute to it the comprehension which is not reliable with
section 3. At times “or” is used to join terms where either one or the other is indicated.
Section 3 is dependent on the necessity that government are to appoint Special Judges for an
area “or” areas “or” case. The use of word “or” is not to be restricted or else it would restrict
the power of the government. The government thus has power to do either or both the things.

In section 7 of the Official Secrets Act, 1920, which scrutinizes 'Any individual who
endeavors to submit any offense under the chief Act or this Act, or requests or affects or tries
to convince someone else to submit an offense, or helps or abets and does any demonstration
preliminary to the commission of an offense', "and" imprinted in Italics was perused as "or"
for by perusing "and" as "and" the outcome delivered was incomprehensible and ridiculous
and against the away from of the Legislature6. Accordingly even an individual who does a

3
Interpretation of Statutes, “legal services India” <
http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/1152/Interpretation-of-Statutes.html > (accessed 5 February 2020)
4
Ibid
5
AIR 1999 SC 1912
6
Supra note 3
demonstration preliminary to the commission of an offense is similarly at risk. Section 3(b)(i)
of the Drugs Act, 1940, (preceding its amendment in 1962 ) characterized narcotics as follow:
'All medications for inner or outer utilization of individuals or creatures and all substances
expected to be utilized for in the finding, treatment, relief or counteraction of illness in people
or creatures other than medication and substances solely utilized or arranged for use as per
the Ayurvedic or Unani frameworks of medication'. The Italicized, word "and" right now
read disjunctively as the setting demonstrated word "or" "and" uncovers the away from of the
Legislature7.

In the case of Paras Ram vs State of Haryana 8, Section 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 was to be interpreted. It was said that the word “and” was
to be read conjunctively and not only in the correct sense of grammar. According to Section 5
the accused must carry both “arms and ammunition” hence must be read conjunctively. The
accused held only a pistol and therefore section 5 was inapplicable. This subserves the act.
However, this was overruled in Sanjay Dutt vs. State through CBI 9, the offence under “arms
and ammunition” were to be read disjunctively. The court stated that “and” cannot be
interpreted as “or” this totally disrupts the purpose of the statute in itself.

“If, in a subsequent statute on the same subject as a former one, the legislature uses different
language in the same connection, the courts must presume that a change of the law was
intended. If a provision in one statute, which has received a judicial construction, is inserted
in another, the same construction will be given to it; but if the clause varies, it shows a
different intention in the legislature10”. It is to be assumed, in the primary case, that the
legislative comprehended the principles of grammar and the utilization of language, and that
they have communicated their will in well-suited phrases and words. However, this
assumption will be deserted at whatever point it becomes clear that the consequence of
holding fast to it is make the demonstration ludicrous, unrestrained, or then again offensive to
different arrangements of law. Henceforth, in such cases, linguistic standards and the
appropriateness of language must respect the aim of the law-making body, to be found out by
a balanced translation of the establishment.

7
Zander, Michael. The Law-Making Process. Cambridge University Press (United Kingdom), 2004.
8
AIR 1993 SC 1212
9
(1994) 5 SCC 410
10
Black, Henry Campbell. Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws.
St. Paul, West Pub. Co.
In the case of Rameshwar Dass Chhotey vs Union Of India 11 the utilization of the word 'Or'
plainly makes the sentence disjunctive in section 16 of the Food Adulteration Act 1955. If the
governing body proposed else it ought to have said a sentence of detainment for a term of
under a half year and of fine of short of what one thousand rupees. Again there was no need
of the last part of the stipulation, to be specific, "Or of both detainment for a term of under a
half year and fine of short of what one thousand rupees". The expectation of the governing
body was to hold the total idea of sentence and present circumspection on the court just to
decrease, the sentence of detainment and of fine it would have been abundant for the
assembly to give that "the court may for satisfactory and extraordinary motivations to be
referenced in the judgment force a sentence of detainment for a term of under a half year and
of fine of short of what one thousand rupees". On the development proposed for the benefit of
the applicants, the last sentence for example "or on the other hand of both detainment …and
fine of short of what one thousand rupees", will be decreased to quietness. I would state that
regardless of whether the council planned to hold aggregate sentence it has fizzled and the
plain language overlies such purpose. Perusing the resolution as recommended by Mr. Gsain
will involve clear violence to the plain language. We are deciphering a resolution which isn't
just correctional yet additionally speaks to high watermark or the intrusion on the freedom of
the subjects. It has broad measurements. It makes people vicariously subject. It would resolve
uncertainty assuming any, for lesser sentence the net impact, along these lines, is that under
the primary arrangement the court will undoubtedly grant sentence of detainment while in
cases falling under the stipulation the court may grant just a sentence of fine12.

11
1969 SCC OnLine Del 252
12
Supra Note 10