Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Katrina - Memorial Medical Hospital and Dr. Pou
Katrina - Memorial Medical Hospital and Dr. Pou
Memorial Medical Center during Hurricane Katrina and the Legislative Response
By Kellyann Creelman
In many ways, Hurricane Katrina was an unprecedented natural disaster for the United
States. The hurricane underscored the gross inadequacy of the country's emergency response
preparedness for a natural disaster of such magnitude. It also highlighted the inadequacy of the
law to deal with the circumstances that any natural disaster can create. What happened in the
hospitals of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina has been the subject of intense speculation and
scrutiny – particularly the events at Memorial Medical Center. This article examines those
events, arrests of Dr. Anna Pou and two nurses, Cheri Landry and Lori Budo, , and the judicial
and legislative responses after Hurricane Katrina shook the core of New Orleans' Memorial
Medical Center.
This article presents an in-depth time-line of events that took place at the hospital and
throughout New Orleans as Katrina ravaged the city. Next, I discuss the effects the hurricane
had on the doctors at Memorial Medical Center, the attorney general's investigation, the coroner's
dilemma, the media frenzy, and the outcome of the grand jury hearings. Finally, I will discuss
The city of New Orleans was built primarily below sea level. The location of the city has
been described as sitting at the center of a large bowl with a slight decline decline from all edges.
Memorial Medical Center was built in 1926. The center is located in the bowl of New Orleans,
three miles southwest of the city's French Quarter and three feet below sea level. It served a
diverse client base as it was situated a few blocks from a housing project and a short walk to the
mansions of Uptown New Orleans. Memorial Medical Center was bought by Tenet Healthcare,
1
a Dallas-based commercial healthcare chain, in 1995. For almost 80 years the hospital's sturdy
Memorial's seventh floor housed The LifeCare Hospitals of New Orleans, which operated
a “hospital within a hospital” for injured or critically ill patients in need of 24-hour care and
intensive therapy over an extended period of time. LifeCare had its own administrators, doctors,
nurses, pharmacists and a supply chain separate from Memorial's. Most of LifeCare's 52 patients
Dr. Anna Pou is a New Orleans native whom colleagues described as a dedicated,
hardworking physician who, though physically small, “had a huge presence” in the hospital.3 At
the time, Dr. Pou was a 49-year-old head- and neck-cancer surgeon whose strong work ethic
earned respect from doctors and nurses at Memorial. She was described by her colleagues as
funny and sociable, and always put her patients at the center of her life.4 She was “on call” at
Memorial the weekend Katrina hit, but chose to volunteer her services because she felt she
would be needed.5
Hurricane Katrina approached land near New Orleans as a Category 5 storm, the most
severe of hurricanes.6 On Sunday, August 28, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco stated that
President Bush called her just before the press conference and said that he was “concerned about
the [storm’s] impact” and asked her “to please ensure that there would be a mandatory
evacuation of New Orleans.”7 Although Mayor Ray Nagin was hesitant to evacuate due to his
concerns about the city's liability for closing hotels and other businesses, he ordered a mandatory
evacuation of the city, the first for a United States city of this size since the American Civil War. 8
For those unable to leave New Orleans, shelters, including the Superdome, were set up as
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“refuges of last resort.” By evening the rains began pouring down.9
By Monday morning, approximately 2,000 people had taken shelter at Memorial Medical
Center, including 200 patients and 600 workers.10 Just before 5:00am, New Orleans' city power
supply to the hospital failed. Memorial's auxiliary generators immediately kicked on to power
only the necessary equipment – emergency lights, critical medical equipment, but no air-
conditioning.11 When the storm hit land at 6:10am, Memorial's windows shattered under a hail
of debris from nearby buildings, and its walls groaned and shook violently.12
By Monday afternoon, the hospital seemed to have weathered the storm. Search-and-
rescue operations began throughout the city, but the government's rescue efforts and
Storm surges lashed parts of New Orleans with several feet of water. By the end of the
storm, several flood-walls and levees, including the 17th Street Canal, the London Avenue Canal,
and the Industrial Canal, were over-topped with water and breached. According to reports, 80%
of the city was under water with some areas experiencing water levels as high as twenty feet.14
shelters in the city, on Tuesday, August 30th.15 By noon, Homeland Security Secretary Michael
Chertoff declared Katrina an “incident of national significance,” and became aware that the
levees breached could not be plugged. Chertoff launched a full federal response under the
By Tuesday morning, Memorial's interior had been transformed into a “fetid catacomb of
Third World despair: the power was out, there was no running water, temperatures soared to 110
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degrees” and, as Dr. Pou described, “the smell was so rancid it would burn the back of your
throat.”17 When Dr. Pou looked out a window, what she saw was hard to believe: water, rimmed
with garbage, began gushing from the sewer grates and crawled in the direction of Memorial, it
“probably rose about a foot an hour”.18 Employees quickly understood the danger posed by the
advancing water. Memorial's main emergency-power transfer switches were located only a few
feet above ground level, leaving their electrical system extremely vulnerable. Although facilities
personnel had warned, “it won't take much in height to disable the majority of the medical
center,” after Hurricane Ivan one year earlier, it was too costly to fix the problem and only a few
Administrators began contacting other hospitals, warning that Memorial would have to
evacuate over 180 patients. Although New Orleans hospitals had participated with the Federal
Emergency Management Agency and other state agencies in 2004 to prepare for a catastrophic
hurricane, there was no organized plan for evacuation of the hospitals. James Aiden, the medical
director for emergency preparedness at Louisiana State University said that government officials
assumed the facilities would be self-sufficient for five to seven days.20 Memorial did have a 246-
page emergency plan, however, the document offered no guidance for dealing with a complete
power failure nor how to evacuate the center if the city streets were flooded.21
chairman, organized roughly two dozen physicians and several nurses on the fourth floor (which
eventually became the hospital's “command center”) to discuss their plan of action in evacuating
the hospital.22 The group agreed to enter into standard triage by allocating aid on the basis of
need for medical treatment. Babies in the neonatal intensive-care unit, pregnant mothers and
critically ill adult I.C.U. Patients were at great risk from the intense heat and got first priority.
4
Doctors also agreed that Do-Not-Resuscitate (D.N.R.) patients would be evacuated last.i
Doctors believed the D.N.R. patients should go last because they would have the “least to lose”
compared with other patients if tragedy struck.23 At the time, the doctors did not believe this
decision would ever come into effect as they trusted rescuers would evacuate the hospital within
a few hours.
It is important to note that LifeCare administrators were absent from the meeting with Dr.
Deichmann. No one discussed evacuating LifeCare's patients specifically, despite the fact that
In the afternoon, Coast Guard and privately owned helicopters began landing on a long-
unused helipad on top an eight-story parking garage adjacent to Memorial.25 As the Coast Guard
had already rescued over 1,200 people stranded through the city, 26 the helicopter pilots were
impatient while doctors and nurses tried to get as many critical patients as possible to the
helipad.
In order to get to the helipad, each patient was placed on a stretcher and carried by staff
members down the dark stairwell to the second floor. They were then passed through a three-
foot-by-three-foot opening in the machine-room wall that served as a shortcut to the parking
facility. Most patients were placed on the bed of a pickup truck and driven to the top of the
garage. The patients were then carried up two flights of metal stairs to the helipad landing.27
Texas and was assured that her patients would be included in any FEMA evacuation of
i Under Louisiana law, a D.N.R. Patient with a “terminable and irreversible condition” could request in advance
that “life-sustaining procedures” be withheld or withdrawn. (Louisiana Living Will Law. Title 40 – Public
Health and Safety Code, Part XXIV – A. Declarations Concerning Life-Sustaining Procedures § 1299.58.3.)
5
Memorial. However, the communications grew frantic as the day wore on and it became clear
that the government's rescue efforts were in disarray. Robichaux requested that Memorial add
her 52 patients to the rescue plans being organized with the Coast Guard by helicopter and
national guard trucks. Memorial informed Robichaux that they had to obtain permission from
it's corporate owner, Tenet Healthcare, before any actions were taken.ii, 28
Memorial staff had spent close to three days on duty, under intense stress and with very
little sleep. It was dark when the last of the critical patients were finally evacuated from the
center. The Coast Guard offered to evacuate more patients throughout the night, but Memorial
declined because the helipad had very little light, no guard rail, and the staff needed rest. By
Tuesday night, Memorial had lowered its patient count from 187 to roughly 130. About 25 were
rescued by helicopter, the remainder by National Guard trucks before the water level rose too
high to access the emergency room ramp.29 However, on the seventh floor, all 52 LifeCare
Cutting his vacation short, President Bush flew back to Washington D.C. Although he
did not stop in Louisiana, Air Force One flew low over the Gulf Coast so the President could
view the devastation. Soon after, he declared a Public Health Emergency for the Gulf Coast and
On Wednesday, the first reports of widespread looting and violence were reported. “The
looting is out of control - the French Quarter has been attacked,” New Orleans councilwoman,
Jackie Clarkson remarked, “We're using exhausted, scarce police to control looting when they
ii LifeCare staff members refused several offers of evacuation assistance from Memorial on Tuesday afternoon.
(Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 5.)
6
By 2:00am, Memorial's auxiliary generators had shut off.33 On the seventh floor,
LifeCare's critically ill patients began suffering the consequences. Life-support monitors and
ventilators briefly switched to battery reserves and continued to support seven patients' lives.
Approximately 30 minutes later, the batteries failed and patients were rushed to the helipad
where, luckily, a Coast Guard helicopter arrived just in time. Three of the LifeCare's seven most
By this time, Memorial's morgue was full and employees began wheeling bodies into the
chapel on the second floor. As the sun rose, the temperature in the hospital climbed back above
100 degrees. Again Memorial suffered through the day with no running water, backed up toilets,
diminishing supplies, and a first floor flooded with a soupy ocean of sewage water.35
Early Wednesday morning, doctors and nurses discussed their plan with the 100
remaining Memorial and LifeCare patients. The group decided to initiate “reverse triage,” which
is common during any devastating event where there are far more severely injured victims than
ambulances or medics. The staff divided the remaining patients into three categories. Although
there was no single doctor officially in charge of categorizing patients, Dr. Pou was energetic and
Those in fairly good health and could sit up or walk were marked with a “1.” They were
prioritized first for evacuation and taken to the emergency-room ramp on the second floor where
a few of the hospital workers commandeered neighborhood boats for evacuation. The patients
who were sicker and needed assistance with evacuation were labeled “2” and taken to the second
floor corridor leading to the hole in the machine-room wall that served as a shortcut to the
helipad. The remaining patients were marked at a “3” and were moved to a corner of the second
floor lobby. These patients included those whom doctors judged to be very ill and those with
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D.N.R. orders. Doctors and nurses continued to care for all patients – diapers were changed, and
patients were fanned and given sips of water – but most medical interventions – including
Several helicopters came to rescue the “category 2” patients in the morning but after the
President flew over New Orleans that afternoon, very few helicopters returned. The Coast Guard
began to focus its efforts on saving people stranded on rooftops around the city. Administrators,
worried that intruders from the neighborhood might ransack the hospital for drugs and valuables,
distributed guns to employees in the parking garage.38 Several people floated up to the hospital
during the day, looking for shelter and medical aid. René Goux, the hospital's chief executive,
had decided, for safety reasons, that they would be told to “go away” and directed to dry ground
about a mile south. Memorial was no longer a treating hospital but a shelter that had run out of
Later in the afternoon, Dr. Ewing Cook, a Memorial administrator, made his way to the
eighth floor where only one D.N.R. patient remained - Jannie Burgess, a 350 pound, 79-year-old
woman with advanced uterine cancer and kidney failure. She was being treated for comfort only
and was sedated to unconsciousness with morphine. Dr. Cook believed he would be unable to
make it up to the eighth floor again (due to two prior heart attacks, the intense heat, and physical
and mental exhaustion). He also did not think it would be possible to get Burgess down six
flights of stairs. Dr. Cook estimated that the patient only had a few days to live, and the nurses
caring for her were desperately needed elsewhere. He realized the morphine that kept her
iii Dr. Bryant King, who will be mentioned later, strongly disagreed with René Goux's decision. Dr. Cook begged
with the chief to allow the people in need to medical assistance to be admitted into the center, Goux ignored his
request. (Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 8.)
8
Morphine, a schedule II narcotic,iv is frequently used to control severe pain or discomfort,
it can also slow breathing, and very high doses can lead to death. Dr. Cook had experience with
morphine as a pulmonologist (a medical specialist in the lungs and respiratory system). When a
patient, or their family, made the decision to disconnect a ventilator, Dr. Cook would prescribe
morphine to ensure the patient was not gasping for breath when the machine was withdrawn.
The intent was to provide alleviation, but it resulted in death. To Dr. Cook, the difference
Dr. Cook realized that Jannie Burgess' situation was different than any of his previous
pulmonology patients because the painkillers did not make her uncomfortable. However, he
imagined the worst-case scenario as Burgess waking-up finding herself and her surroundings in
the ravaged condition while being moved downstairs or to the helipad. Dr. Cook asked Burgess's
nurse to increase her morphine, “giving her enough until she goes.” 42 He then wrote on Burgess'
chart “pronounced dead at...” left the time blank and signed the bottom. Dr. Cook believed he
had done the right thing and headed back to the second floor. “To me it was a no-brainer... I don't
feel bad about what I did... I gave her medicine so I could get rid of her faster, get the nurses off
the floor... There is no question I hastened her demise.” 43 This was the first documented instance
of potential euthanasia at Memorial.v In this desperate situation, Dr. Cook only saw two choices:
to quicken patients' deaths or abandon them. Assistance was coming too slowly and there were
far too many people who needed to leave. “It was actually to the point where you were
considering that you couldn't just leave them; the humane thing would be to put 'em out,” said
Dr. Cook.44
space. In Richard Deitchmann's memoir, “Code Blue,” he was surprised that afternoon when
Susan Mulderick, the 54-year-old nursing director and Memorial's rotating “emergency-incident
commander,” asked him his thoughts regarding euthanizing the “category 3” D.N.R. patients.vi
Deitchmann told her, “Euthanasia's illegal... There's not any need to euthanize anyone. I don't
think we should be doing anything like that.”45 His plan was still to evacuate the D.N.R.
shooting at rescuers. For the third night in a row, doctors were working with scarcely any sleep.
Patients continued to fight through the night with no food and very little water.46
interview with Newsweek, Dr. Pou claimed employees were told by a hospital administrator that
no more help would arrive.47 This was supported by most of the interviews taken with Dr. Pou.
However, in an interview with the New York Times, Dr. Pou remembers Curtis Dosch,
Memorial's CFO, announced that Tenet was dispatching a fleet of privately owned helicopters to
Memorial. Within a couple hours military and private aircrafts and boats came to rescue more
people at the hospital. Soon after, local State Police officers ordered that everyone had to be out
of the hospital by 5:00 that night due to civil unrest throughout the city; they also stated that they
During the day Dr. Cook and Dr. Pou met to discuss the “category 3” patients,
specifically nine who had never been brought down from the LifeCare floor. Both doctors were
vi Through her lawyer, Mulderick denied that she had any euthanasia conversation with anyone at Memorial.
(Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 8.)
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worried that they would not be able to evacuate the patients before 5:00. Dr. Cook had never
been on the seventh floor since Katrina struck, but thought the patients were “chronically death-
Dr. Cook instructed Dr. Pou on how to administer a mixture of morphine and a
benzodiazepine sedative – the effect was that the drugs would gradually slow the patients'
respiration until they stopped breathing. He viewed it as an easy way to ease the patients out of a
terrible situation.50 When Pou was later asked who specifically appointed her to administer the
mixture to the nine patients on the LifeCare floor, Pou replied, “It was a group decision. I didn't
really volunteer for anything.”51 Her intention was only to “help the patients that were having
pain and sedate the patients who were anxious” because “we knew they were going to be there
another day, that they would go through at least another day of hell.”52
Therese Mendez, an executive LifeCare nurse, returned to the seventh floor and saw
several unconscious patients, frothing at the mouth and erratically breathing. She found Dr. Pou
who told her that the LifeCare patients probably were not going to survive. Dr. Pou told
Mendez, “the decision had been made to administer lethal doses” of morphine and other drugs.53
When Diane Robichaux, the incident commander in charge of LifeCare, proceeded to ask
Susan Mulderick, Memorial's executive nursing director, when the LifeCare patients on the
seventh floor would be evacuated, Mulderick replied, “The plan is not to leave any living
Dr. Pou told Robichaux and Mendez that she and the other Memorial staff members
would assume responsibility for the remaining LifeCare patients, “I want ya’ll to know I take full
responsibility and ya’ll did a great job taking care of the patients.”55 Dr. Pou also insisted that
the LifeCare nursing staff not be involved and they should ordered off the floor. Mendez left to
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dismiss her employees as they were forced downstairs by several Memorial workers.56
Robichaux told Dr. Pou that she was concerned about one patient, Emmett Everett, a 61-
year-old, 380-pound man who was “very aware” of his surroundings and on several occasions
appealed to his nurse not to leave him behind.57 He, along with three other LifeCare patients on
the seventh floor had no D.N.R. order. Dr. Pou, along with the two nurses, concluded that the
paralyzed patient was too heavy to be maneuvered down the stairs and through the machine-
room wall. Later, staff members who helped with boat and air evacuations said they would have
certainly found a way to evacuate Everett but were never made aware of his situation.58
According to statements made by Steven Harris, LifeCare's pharmacist, Dr. Pou brought
several vials of morphine and midazolam to the seventh floor.59 Like morphine, midazolam
depresses breathing. Dr. Pou drew fluid from vials into syringes, entered Everett's room and shut
the door. She continued down the hallway to Wilda McManus' room and told her “I am going to
give you something to make you feel better.”60 Two patients resided in the neighboring room,
Alice Hutzler and Rose Savoie, both women were alert and stable that morning. “That burns,”
Savoie spoke quietly as Dr. Pou injected them both with the lethal mixture.61
On the second floor, roughly a dozen “category 3” patients remained. Some of the
patients were being evacuated with help from volunteers and medical staff. Around noon, Dr.
Bryant King, a Memorial physician, saw Dr. Pou holding several syringes and telling patients
“I'm going to give you something to make you feel better.”62 Dr. King remembered the
conversation he had earlier with a colleague who asked him how he felt about the doctors
hastening patients' deaths. He did not agree with their actions. and did not think any of the
patients were in the kind of pain that called for sedation, let alone “mercy killing.”
Dr. King also noticed a significant change: “there were no more fanners, there were no
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more nurses checking blood sugars or blood pressures... It didn't make any sense that we were
stopping what we had been doing.”63 This was an eerie departure from protocol because
physicians did not normally give medication unless there was a critical need.64 When he saw Dr.
Pou with the syringes, he grabbed his belongings and stormed to the boat-loading area. Dr. King
sent out text messages asking family and friends to tell the media that doctors at Memorial were
Dr. Bill Armington, a Memorial neuroradiologist, was upset with the way Dr. King left.
After a conversation with Dr. Cook, Dr. Armington suspected euthanasia might occur and
immediately made his way up to the helipad to help get people off the roof and to safe grounds.66
By late Thursday afternoon only a few nurses and three doctors remained on the second
floor; Dr. Pou; Dr. Kathleen Fournier, a young internist; and Dr. John Thiele, a 53-year-old
pulmonologist. Dr. Thiele did not know Dr. Pou by name, but she appeared to be the physician
in charge. Dr. Pou told him that the “category 3” patients were close to death and would not
survive an evacuation. Dr. Thiele thought the looters and chaotic crowds of New Orleans - “the
animals” as he called them – might storm the hospital, looking for drugs after everyone had
gone. “I figured, What would they do, these crazy black people who think they've been
oppressed for all these years by white people? I mean if they're capable of shooting at somebody,
why are they not capable of raping them, or, or, you know, dismembering them? What's to
prevent them from doing things like that?”67 He asked Dr. Pou if she needed help. Dr. Thiele
previously practiced pallitative care medicine and was certified to teach it. He later told a New
York Times journalist that he knew what they were about to do, it seemed right even though it
vii Dr. King later told a New York Times journalist that he did not intervene because he didn't think his opinion,
which hadn't mattered when he argued against turning away the hospital's neighbors, would be heard by
administrators. (Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009,
at 13.)
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was technically “a crime,”... “the goal was death; our goal was to let these people die.”68
Dr. Thiele remembers turning to Karen Wynn, the highly respected I.C.U. nurse manager
at Memorial who led the hospital's ethics committee, and asked, “Can we do this?”69 Karen
Wynn thought it was necessary to medicate the patients and the aim was to make patients
comfortable by sedating them, she was motivated by how bad the patients appeared.70 Wynn,
later stated, “[All the staff could offer was] comfort, peace and dignity... We did the best we
Most patients died within minutes of being medicated, but Dr. Thiele remembers one
heavy-set African American patient struggled to stay alive through multiple doses of morphine.
Wynn claims that she and her colleagues took it as a sign from God and struggled to get him to
the helipad for evacuation.72 However, Dr. Thiele has a very different recollection of events, “We
covered his face with a towel” until his breathing stopped.73 Dr. Thiele says that he knew what
he did was right, “We were abandoned by the government, we were abandoned by Tenet, and
clearly nobody was going to take care of these people in their dying moments... I did what I
Thursday afternoon, Memorial's pathologist walked through each floor of the hospital to
record the locations of the dead and to make sure nobody alive was left behind. Throughout the
At 9:00pm, Rodney Scott, an overweight I.C.U. Patient recovering from surgery, was the
last living patient to leave the hospital grounds.76 Rodney Scott, Dr. Thiele, and Wynn were
flown in separate helicopters to Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport, where
hundreds of hospital and nursing-home patients were met by federal disaster-management teams
attempting to provide basic care though understaffed and under-supplied.77 Dr. Thiele, in an
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interview with the New York Times remembers, if the patients he injected with morphine had
made it to the airport, they would not have survived anyway. 78 By Friday, September 2, the
Foti's Investigations
The building remained empty until September 11th, when mortuary workers could finally
recover the bodies that covered the second floor. Disaster Mortuary Operations Team carried 45
corpses from Memorial, more than any comparable sized hospital in the drowned city.79 Eleven
patients died before the hurricane hit New Orleans and 24 of the dead had been LifeCare
patients.80
The same day the bodies were recovered, the Daily Mail, a British newspaper, ran a story
regarding an interview with an unidentified New Orleans doctor who admitted to killing
patients.81 The doctor (presumably Dr. Pou) reported saying, “I didn't know if I was doing the
right thing. But I did not have time. I had to make snap decisions, under the most appalling
circumstances, and I did what I thought was right... I injected morphine into those patients who
were dying and in agony. If the first dose was not enough, I gave a double dose.”82
attorney general, Charles Foti Jr., opened investigations into hospital and nursing home deaths
during Hurricane Katrina.83 The investigation focused on five hospitals and ten nursing homes,
Foti's office reviewed 215 patients' deaths.84 That day, an anonymous LifeCare attorney called
the Louisiana Justice Department to relay a report that nine patients at Memorial may have been
given lethal doses of medication.85 No other hospital in the New Orleans area had authorized
euthanasia of its patients as a response to the natural disaster.86 Soon after, federal and state
investigators interviewed witnesses and entered back into the hospital to search for evidence.
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The Coroner's Dilemma
Foti asked Orleans Parish coroner, Dr. Frank Minyard, to perform autopsies and drug
tests on over 100 bodies recovered from various hospitals and nursing homes around the city,87
Minyard performed autopsies on all 45 bodies from Memorial. 88 For Dr. Minyard, the burden
was great, he was struggling with the amount of autopsies already on his list as well as
identifying hundreds of Katrina victims. Dr. Minyard performed the autopsies in the following
two weeks, he also sent specimens to National Medical Services in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania
for drug toxicology reports.89 National Medical Services detected morphine in nine bodies – the
same patients the LifeCare lawyer identified over the phone with the Justice Department as
potential victims.viii,90 Investigators also found prescriptions for large amounts of morphine for
three of the nine patients. The prescriptions all were signed and dated by Dr. Pou on Thursday,
September 1.91 Establishing the cause of death for the nine patients posed a problem - the bodies
baked in the sweltering heat for ten days before they were recovered, and autopsies were not
In February of 2006, after consulting many experts, Dr. Minyard announced that he could
not determine whether the patients had died from natural causes or from homicide.93 He sought
the help of a former colleague, Dr. Michael Baden, who, after reading all medical documents,
concluded, “... the patients died as the result of the improper administration of morphine with
and without Versed... It is in my further opinion that each died of morphine poisoning... these
Medical records were also sent to Dr. James Young, the former chief coroner of the
viii The patients were later identified in Coroner Frank Minyard's reports as: Hollis Alford, Harold Dupas, Emmett
Everett, George J. Huard, Alice Hutzler, Wilda S. McManus, Elaine Nelson, Rose Savoie, and lretha B. Watson.
(William Bradley, Autopsy and Toxicology Reports, October 22, 2007. (letter) Accessed October 31, 3009 at
http://www.nola.com/katrina/files/102107_memorial_autopsy.pdf/ )
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Province of Ontario, Canada, who once served as president of the American Academy of
Forensic Sciences. Dr. Young commented, “All these nine patients survived the adverse affects
of the previous day and for every patient on a floor to have died in [a] three and a half hour
period with drug toxicity is beyond coincidence.”95 Dr. Young also noted that “the
administration of the drug was not documented... Accidental overdoses would need to have
occurred nine times between 12 noon and 3:30 p.m., all on one floor, to every patient who was
left on the floor... morphine was not ordered for seven of the patients and Versed was not ordered
for any.”96
Dr. Minyard also sent the files to Dr. Frank Brescia, an oncologist and palliative care
specialist in New Orleans. Dr. Bresia wrote to Dr. Minyard, “It is in my opinion that these
patients were terribly ill, with some very close to death. The external circumstances were
horrific, i.e., no water, toilets, electricity, air conditioning – which I expect contributed, to some
extent, to hastening their deaths. However, after studying the charts carefully, I feel that the
manner of death in these individuals, especially in four cases, obligates the legal process to
Foti's office hired Cyril Wecht, a forensic pathologist, to review the deaths of four
patients whose full medical records were recovered from the hospital (Emmett Everett - 61, Rose
Savoie - 90, Ireatha Watson - 89, and Hollis Alford – 66). 98 Wecht concluded, “The primary and
immediate cause of death for each of these patients was acute combined drug toxicity,
specifically morphine and Versed... the manner of death would be classified as homicide.”99
All four victims were expected to live through the hurricane, as none were in danger of
imminent death from natural causes.100 Rose Savoie was ill from bronchitis, but was otherwise
in good health.101 Jennie Crabtree, Savoie's daughter, said, “She didn't act like a 90 year-old; she
17
was all there. She knew where she was. She knew who she was.”102 Emmett Everett “could
have lived for years. All he wanted was to live to be with his grandkids.”103 Ireatha Watson was
ill from gangrene in both legs and dementia, but she was in stable condition when last visited by
her daughter, two days before Katrina hit.104 She was scheduled to have both legs amputated on
August 29, the day the hurricane arrived.105 Finally, Hollis Alford's chart shows that he was
“resting calmly” the previous afternoon with no other documentation of pain or distress to
None of the victims complained of any pain on Thursday, and thus did not require any
strong medication like morphine or Versed.107 There were no orders on any of the victims'
medical charts for the prescription of either drug.108 The drugs had not previously been given to
these patients in their routine care.109 Finally, no consent was sought or given for the lethal
doses.110
It seems as if the victims were lied to when given lethal doses. Dr. Pou told Everett she
was going to give him something for his dizziness, even though he was conscious and alert;111
and Rose murmured, “that burns,” when she was injected with the drugs.112 None of the victims
were under the care of Dr. Pou or either nurse. 113 A witness said that the doctor did not appear
After months of interviews and collecting documents, investigators came to believe that
as many as two dozen patients at Memorial were euthanized by doctors and nurses.
Unfortunately, medical records were needed to substantiate the findings and, according to Tenet
lawyers, most of the charts were unavailable.115 State prosecutors, armed with the testimony of
LifeCare workers and records of the four patients on the seventh floor, decided their best case
was against Dr. Pou and nurses Cheri Landry and Lori Budo.
18
Arrest warrants were issued on July 17, 2006 by an Orleans Parish Criminal Court judge
in New Orleans upon an affidavit from Special Agent Virginia B. Rider of the Louisiana
Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit in Baton Rouge.116
Despite the fact that Dr. Pou agreed to turn herself in weeks before if an arrest warrant was
issued,117 around 9:00pm Pou opened her door to find state and federal agents with a warrant for
her arrest.118 Dr. Pou was still dressed in scrubs when she was read her rights, handcuffed and
brought to the Orleans Parish jail on four counts of principal to second-degree murder. Cheri
Dr. Pou was booked and released by morning. The following day Foti held a news
conference with CNN. Foti was quoted saying, “This is not euthanasia... This is plain and simple
homicide... [Morphine and Versed,] either one of them can kill you – but when you use both of
them together it becomes a lethal cocktail that guarantees [the patients] are going to die.” ix, x, 120
As the investigation progressed, Carrie Everett, Emmett Everett's widow, along with two
other victims' families filed wrongful death suits against Dr. Pou, LifeCare, Tenet, Landry and
Budo (these cases are still pending and all documents have been kept confidential).121
Medical professionals immediately weighed in with various media outlets. Ethicists drew
ix Many doctors, including Dr. Ben deBoisblanc, a critical care expert who attended 50 critically ill patients
stranded for five days at the nearby Charity Hospital, did not agree with Foti's claim. “This is absurd. If it were
true, then thousands of people would be dying at the hands of doctors every day, because we use these drugs in
combination all the time to give comfort, either during hospital procedures or at the end of life.” He also notes,
“Versed and morphine are appropriate drugs to ease suffering at the end of life in such a situation... if you didn't
find sedatives and analgesics in these people, I would think that was inhumane. The very fact that you see these
drugs means nothing... Versed relieves anxiety and gives patients amnesia for events so they don't have horrible
recollections of frightening events. Morphine is used to relieve pain. The combination is not some witch's brew,
as was inferred during the press conference announcing the arrests.” (Dr. Ben deBoisblanc, It was Heroism, Not
Homicide, TIME MAGAZINE, July 25, 2007.)
x However, Rob Middleburg, who was the toxicology expert at National Medical Services in Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania, stated that “the presence of Versed is a red flag in post-mortem examination. Whenever you find
it out of the blue, we always raise our eyebrows a little bit. Versed is typically used with a surgery, it's used
almost exclusively in relation to general anesthesia, and you don't find it used very often day to day for
therapeutic circumstances. (James Varney, Doctor's Drug Mix Not Ideal Killer, August 6, 2006, available at
http://www.nola.com/printer.ssf?/base/news-6/1154844156102520.xml&coll=1/ last accessed on November 22,
2009.)
19
distinctions between euthanasia and assisted suicide on one hand and palliative care on the other.
Intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm is a requirement for a second-degree murder charge in
Louisiana,xi so Foti's general accusation meant that he believed Dr. Pou's actions were euthanasia
or assisted suicide, not palliative care. A patient may die as a result of receiving pain control
medication, but if the intent is to palliate, not harm or kill, that death is not legally considered
euthanasia.122
Dr. Pou contacted Richard Simmons, an attorney referred by the Louisiana State
University, “At that point in time, she was being terrorized by the media, CNN was pressing her:
'You'd better come tell your side of the story; we're going with it. And then she became a person
of interest.”123
At a news conference later that day, the attorney blamed the storm and the circumstances
for the patients' deaths. He claimed Dr. Pou was innocent and accused Foti of orchestrating a
media event with the arrests to gain support for his re-election.124 Simmons intended to bring his
own investigation to the Orleans Parish district attorney, who had jurisdiction over the case, in
hopes to present it to a grand jury.125 Simmons said he knew the government's case was a loser,
determining drug-dosage levels from the decomposing bodies was near impossible. “I was
interfacing with the district attorney saying, 'You don't have the forensics...' The bodies were
there for 10 or 11 days before they even retrieved them. And so they made a big forensic jump in
To reform Dr. Pou's reputation, Simmons worked with a CBS correspondent, Morley
Safer, to coordinate an appearance on 60 Minutes, “I think the world needed to know that this
girl is not a murderer.”127 The interview was a risky move, but Simmons felt justified in the way
xi In Louisiana, “second-degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to
kill or to inflict great bodily harm.” (La. R.S. 14:30.1)
20
Dr. Pou presented herself on camera – she appeared anxious, but confident in her innocence. “It
just came through. Anybody that listened to it would have said that this woman couldn't have
On 60 Minutes, when asked whether or not she murdered the patients, Dr. Pou responded,
“No, I did not murder those patients... I've spent my entire life taking care of patients. I have no
history of doing anything other than good for my patients. I do the best of my ability.”129 Dr.
Pou claimed that she was not capable of any sort of mercy killing, let alone murder, “I do not
believe in euthanasia. I don't think that it's anyone's decision to make when a patient dies...
However, what I do believe in is comfort care. And that means that we ensure that they do not
suffer pain.”130 Dr. Pou concluded the interview with, “I'm very committed and I love what I do.
I mean, I really love it. It is the best thing about my life. And the fact that I may not be able to
continue to do the thing that I love the most when I know I can do a lot of good is just
Three days after the CBS interview, the 6,116-member Louisiana State Medical Society
issued a press release stating that the LSMS was “confident that Dr. Pou performed courageously
under the most challenging and horrific conditions and made decisions in the best interests of her
patients... Her long and distinguished career as a talented surgeon and dedicated educator should
not be tarnished as a result of these accusations.”132 The Baton Rouge Ear, Nose & Throat
Society took out a full page ad in the July 27, 2006 edition of The Advocate, boldly addressing
“The People of Louisiana” and commending Dr. Pou's career-long dedication to her patients
suffering from head and neck cancer, “Dr. Pou is a true patient advocate, teacher, and friend.
Her compassion is unmatched. Her dedication is unequaled. Following her arrest, her first
concern was only for her patients. We hold Dr. Anna Pou in the highest regard both
21
professionally and ethically.”133
Foti turned the investigation over to the Orleans Parish District Attorney, Eddie Jordan,
who in turn impaneled a grand jury to consider Dr. Pou's charges. In March 2007, the grand
jurors who would decide Dr. Pou's case were sworn in. Through the summer the panel met once
Normally prosecutors advocate indictment, but the assistant district attorney, Michael
Morales told a New York Times journalist that he and Eddie Jordan “weren't gung-ho” about
prosecuting the case. “We were going to give some deference to the defendant” because Dr. Pou
wasn't the usual career criminal accused of murder. At the same time, “we weren't going to shirk
our duties and tank [the case].” He personally “didn't care one way or the other” about the
outcome.135
Rather than have all evidence presented as Foti strongly suggested, the jurors were
invited to act as investigators and decide what evidence they wanted to consider. Foti repeatedly
asked the district attorney's office to present all the evidence and the experts to the jury, but was
declined .136 The jury did hear from Dr. Minyard, but not any of his forensic experts; nor any
LifeCare employees on the floor during most of the ordeal; nor the main Justice Department
investigator.137 Dr. Minyard never publicly revealed his opinion about the case until 2009. In the
end he decided that four of the nine deaths were homicides.138 “I strongly do not believe she
planned to kill anybody, but it looks like she did,” said Dr. Minyard.139
The jury also heard from only two LifeCare nurses, Budo and Landry, who were
compelled to testify after the district attorney decided not to prosecute them. They publicly
22
On July 17, 2007, a support rally marked the one-year anniversary of Dr. Pou's arrest.
Hundreds of people gathered in New Orleans' City Park to support Dr. Pou. Speakers aimed
their comments directly at the grand jury, warning that the physicians across the country would
be discouraged from staying behind and caring for their patients in future similar situations if Dr.
The grand jurors stopped hearing evidence the week of the rally. The district attorney's
office prepared a ten-count bill of indictment against Pou for the grand jury to consider – one
count of second degree murder in Emmett Everett's case and nine counts of conspiracy to
commit second-degree murder, one for each of the LifeCare patients.142 The grand jurors were
asked to decide whether the evidence they hear persuaded them that Pou had “specific intent to
“Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that
the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to
act.”144 Thus, to convict Dr. Pou, the prosecution had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
On July 24, 2007, Judge Calvin Johnson read aloud the ten counts - the grand jury did not
Dr. Pou filed two lawsuits as a result of the ordeal. The first was against the Louisiana
Office of Risk Management and demanded the agency provide her with a legal defense against
the three pending civil lawsuits.146 “The State of Louisiana abandoned Dr. Pou and others
during Hurricane Katrina and now she is being abandoned again by the state's denial of a civil
xii In Louisiana, “second-degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to
kill or to inflict great bodily harm.” La. R.S. 14:30.1 (2007).
23
defense,” claimed Simmons.147 He believed that since Dr. Pou was a state employee, she was
entitled by law to be reimbursed her legal fees,148 amounting to more than $450,000.xiii, 149
Louisiana law allows state workers to be reimbursed for legal expenses incurred due to actions
they took as part of their official duties if they are ultimately exonerated. 150 Dr. Pou qualified as
a state employee because she, at the time of Katrina, worked for the Louisiana State University
The second of Dr. Pou's lawsuits was filed against Foti, essentially accusing him of
playing politics with her life in hopes to be re-elected. “It is in the interest of the State of
Louisiana, through its chief law enforcement official, to shift the blame to Dr. Pou and other
medical professionals thus limiting the state's exposure and raising an obvious conflict of interest
between the Attorney General's Office and Dr. Pou,” wrote Simmons on behalf of the doctor,
“The Attorney General himself has political interest in the indictment of Dr. Pou based upon the
controversy stirred by his own improper and unethical activities in arresting Dr. Pou.”152
After the grand jury failed to indict Dr. Pou, multiple media organizations filed public
records requests to access Foti's investigative materials and medical records of patients at
Memorial. Media outlets continued to pursue Dr. Pou, Richard Simmons, and other doctors and
nurses and Memorial Medical Center over access the private medical records.
In September 2007, Judge Donald Johnson, a state district judge in Baton Rouge, ordered
the release of all documents. Judge Johnson did not allow public access to all the records related
to the case, and delayed his ruling for 30 days, allowing for an inevitable appeal to the 1 st Circuit
xiii On July 1, 2009, the House Committee of Appropriations passed House Bill 341. As recommended by the
Attorney Fee Review Board, Louisiana paid $312,128 to the LSU Health Network, and $144,852 to the Dr. Anna
Pou Defense Fund. The fees covered legal costs incurred between the time of Dr. Pou's arrest through the grand
jury's investigation, not the $250,000 in legal fees incurred before her arrest and after grand jury declined
indictment. (H. Comm. Appropriations B. 341, Reg. Sess. (La. 2009).)
24
Court of Appeals and eventually the Louisiana Supreme Court.153
Attorneys for Memorial employees appealed the decision, saying it violated the privacy
of people who willingly gave Foti's investigators interviews that were expected to remain
confidential.154 State public records law shields records from view when criminal litigation is
The 1st Circuit Court of Appeals decision, which was signed by four of the seven judges
on the panel, said the files in the Memorial case would not become public. The court ruled that
the media organizations would not have access to the documents because there is no statute of
On October 13, 2008, the Louisiana Supreme Court heard oral arguments from CNN's
lawyers and representatives of the New Orleans Times Picayune regarding their right to access
the records.157 A ruling in their favor would open thousands of pages of highly personal
medical records and as yet unsubstantiated statements supposedly collected by investigators for
Foti as he sought, without success, to build his case against Dr. Pou and her colleagues. 158 The
Supreme Court found the current record to be “insufficient” to determine whether anyone is
likely to face charges for their actions at Memorial. The Court subsequently ordered Judge
Johnson to hold a hearing to determine whether future prosecution was “reasonably anticipated”
Pou's Advocacy
The debate among medical professionals regarding the best way to handle disasters is
intensifying, with Dr. Pou often at the center. She strongly advocated for changes in Louisiana
laws to shield health care workers from civil and criminal liability in disaster times. With her
help, three laws have passed to help aid future healthcare professionals during a declared natural
25
disaster.
This bill amends the Good Samaritan Statute and is applicable only during declared
natural disasters. The law protects healthcare professionals under the Good Samaritan Statute
regardless of whether or not they were compensated for their work. This is an important change
to the statute, as most healthcare professions are deemed as “employees” during a disaster.
Under the original statute, civil protection was offered only if the services were “gratuitous,” or
uncompensated / volunteered. In addition, the measure protects medical personnel from “simple
negligence” and only allows liability for “gross negligence” or “willful misconduct.”160
Senate Bill 330 is the first of its kind in the United States. The unamended Good
The statute recognizes the self-sacrifice by medical personnel in remaining “in harm's way”
The bill was approved by the Senate by a vote 38-0, and passed in the House of
During disasters, “reverse triage” protocols are often put into use. This plan allows for
those patients not expected to survive to be at the bottom of the “priority list” for evacuation.
Many doctors and nurses who stayed to serve during Hurricane Katrina have faced (or are
currently facing) civil lawsuits for patient deaths that occurred while waiting for evacuations.162
Senate Bill 301 gives immunity for simple and gross negligence by doctors and nurses,
thereby protecting them from civil damage to patients as a result of the evacuation or treatment
(as well as failed evacuation or treatment) at the direction of the military or government in
26
accordance with “disaster medicine” protocols.163
For the first time, a state statute defines disaster medicine as “patient care” under
circumstances when the number of patients exceeds normal medical capacities. The statute
recognizes that medical personnel should not bear civil liability for such disastrous situations
Senate Bill 301 passed in the Senate by a vote 38-0 and in the House of Representatives
by 97-0.
This bill sets up a unique “Disaster Medicine Review Panel” concept to examine
“medical judgment” during declared disaster times. The important features of this, which are
• An independent medical panel consisting of three members: the Coroner, a member of the
medical community, and a disaster medicine expert appointed by the Governor. The panel
will render an independent opinion regarding medical judgment. The panel must rest its
opinion on scientifically reliable evidence which may help all parties avoid a lengthy Grand
• The prosecuting authority will refrain from arresting medical personnel until the opinion is
• The panel review process is advisory and allows an opportunity for respondent personnel to
provide input.
• The standard of care of medical personnel is established as “good faith medical judgment”
given the disastrous circumstances under which the judgment was rendered.165
House Bill 1379 was passed by the House of Representative by a vote 102-0. It was
27
approved by the Senate at 38-0. xiv
By signing these three Acts of the Legislature, Louisiana is at the forefront of reform in
natural disaster medicine. Supporters of these bills believe they could become a model for other
states considering similar action across the country. “It is only fitting that Louisiana took the
unprecedented step of righting the wrongs that were done to medical professionals and their
patients during and after Hurricane Katrina, and to call national attention to the need for
sweeping reform and protections,” said Dr. Pou.166 “Throughout the whole ordeal, I talked about
wanting something good to come out of it... I think what happened to the three of us could really
hurt volunteering across the nation. People all across the country told me they would worry
about stepping in during a disaster, worry about what they might face.”167
Dr. Pou strongly urges states across the nation to enact similar statutes. The measures go
into effect with any declared disaster, “It's not just hurricanes, but floods, tornadoes, or terrorist
attacks... Most disaster planners agree it's not a case if something like that will happen, but
when.”xv, 168
xiv Originally the House Bill 1379 was proposed as House Bill 838. The early version mandated the panel's
evaluations, but was opposed by the District Attorney Association because they felt it infringed on their right to
bring charges. House Speaker Jim Tucker amended the bill to make the panel's opinion advisory. The new bill
relieved the District Attorneys' fear and was supported by the Association. (Ed Anderson, Medical Review Panel
in Disasters Backed, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 15, 2008, at 1.)
xv Emphasis added.
28
1 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 1.
2 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 4.
3 Anne Rochelle Konigsmark, Louisiana Affidavit Describes Alleged 'Mercy Killings': State Accuses 3 of Taking 'Law into
Their Own Hands,' USA Today, July 19, 2006, at 3A.
4 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 3.
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7 “Congressional Reports: S. Rpt. 109-322 – Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared.” Gpoaccess.gov. Retrieved
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30 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 5.
31 Bush Meets with Disaster Relief Task Force in D.C. (Fox News broadcast September 1, 2005).
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33 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 5.
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38 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 7.
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42 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 8.
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46 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 8.
47 Julie Scelfo, A Doctor Says She Didn't Murder Her Patients, NEWSWEEK, September 3, 2007, at 2.
48 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 10.
49 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 10.
50 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 10.
51 Julie Scelfo, A Doctor Says She Didn't Murder Her Patients, NEWSWEEK, September 3, 2007, at 2.
52 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 10.
53 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 11.
54 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 11.
55 Anne Rochelle Konigsmark, Louisiana Affidavit Describes Alleged 'Mercy Killings': State Accuses 3 of Taking 'Law into
Their Own Hands,' USA Today, July 19, 2006, at 3A
56 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 11.
57 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 11.
58 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 12.
59 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 13.
60 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 13.
61 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 13.
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65 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 13.
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68 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 14.
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70 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 15.
71 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 15.
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73 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 15.
74 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 15.
75 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 15.
76 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 16.
77 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 16.
78 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 16.
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80 Kathleen Johnston, Staff at New Orleans Hospital Debated Euthanizing Patients, CNN, October 12, 2005, at 2.
81 Caroline Graham, We Had to Kill Our Patients, Daily Mail (London), November 9, 2005, at 13.
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83 Bruce Weber, Storm and Crisis: Hospital Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, October 28, 2005, at A19.
84 Kevin Johnson, Grand Jury to Probe Hospitals, USA TODAY, January 15, 2006, at 1.
85 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 16.
86 Anne R. Konigsmark, Louisiana Affidavit Describes Alleged 'Mercy Killings,' NPR, February 16, 2006.
87 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 16.
88 Louisiana AG Orders Autopsies of 50 Memorial Medical Patients (Broadcast on CNN, October 14, 2005).
89 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 17.
90 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 17.
91 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 18.
92 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 18.
93 Susan Okie, Dr. Pou and the Hurricane – Implications for Patient Care During Disasters, 358 THE NEW ENGLAND
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94 Letter from Dr. Michael M. Baden, Forensic Pathologist, to Dr. Frank Minyard, Orleans Parish Coroner (October 2,
2006). (Accessed at http://i.a.cnn.net/cbb/2007/images/08/27/memorial.medical.center.pdf/ last accessed on November
20, 2009).
95 Letter from Dr. James Young, Chief Coroner of the Province of Ontario, Canada / Physician, to New Orleans Coroner's
Office (October 3, 2006). (Accessed at http://i.a.cnn.net/cbb/2007/images/08/27/memorial.medical.center.pdf/ last
accessed on November 20, 2009).
96 Letter from Dr. James Young, Chief Coroner of the Province of Ontario, Canada / Physician, to New Orleans Coroner's
Office (October 3, 2006). (Accessed at http://i.a.cnn.net/cbb/2007/images/08/27/memorial.medical.center.pdf/ last
accessed on November 20, 2009).
97 Letter from Dr. Frank Brescia, Oncologist and Palliative Care Specialist, to Dr. Frank Minyard, Orleans Parish Coroner
(Not Dated). (Accessed at http://i.a.cnn.net/cbb/2007/images/08/27/memorial.medical.center.pdf/ last accessed on
November 20, 2009).
98 Bob Meadows, Mercy – or Murder? A Doctor and Two Nurses in New Orleans Are Accused of Killing Four of Their
Elderly Patients in the Dark Days After Hurricane Katrina, PEOPLE, August 7, 2006.
99 Letter from Dr. Dyril Wecht, Forensic Pathologist, to Arthur Schafer, Esquire (October 3, 2006). (Accessed at
http://i.a.cnn.net/cbb/2007/images/08/27/memorial.medical.center.pdf/ last accessed on November 20, 2009).
100 Interview by Dr. Charles I. Lugosi with Dr. Cyril Wecht, Esquire, October 20, 2006.
101 Michelle Roberts, Doctor in Katrina Case Reassigned, SIGN ON SAN DIEGO, July 20, 2006.
102 Michelle Roberts, Doctor in Katrina Case Reassigned, SIGN ON SAN DIEGO, July 20, 2006.
103 Inteview by Dr. Charles I. Lugosi with Charles C. Foti, Jr., Attorney General, State of Louisiana, July 20, 2006.
104 Michelle Roberts, Doctor in Katrina Case Reassigned, SIGN ON SAN DIEGO, July 20, 2006.
105 Michelle Roberts, Louisiana Kin Suspicious About Hospital Deaths, Start-Telegram.com, available at
http://www.dfw.com/mld/dfw/news/nation/15068035.htm (last visited November 10, 2009).
106 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 18.
107 Interview by Dr. Charles I. Lugosi with Dr. Cyril Wecht, Esquire, October 20, 2006.
108 Interview by Dr. Charles I. Lugosi with Dr. Cyril Wecht, Esquire, October 20, 2006.
109 Interview by Dr. Charles I. Lugosi with Dr. Cyril Wecht, Esquire, October 20, 2006.
110 Interview by Dr. Charles I. Lugosi with Dr. Cyril Wecht, Esquire, October 20, 2006. No documentation appeared on the
patients' charts to indicate consent.
111 Affidavit, State of Louisiana v. Pou, Budo and Landry, available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/katrina/lapoui706wrnt.html/ (last visited November 22, 2009).
112 Interview by Dr. Charles I. Lugosi with Dr. Cyril Wecht, Esquire, October 20, 2006.
113 Adam Nossiter, Patient Deaths in New Orleans Bring Arrests, N.Y. TIMES,July 19, 2006, at B1.
114 Affidavit, State of Louisiana v. Pou, Budo and Landry, available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/katrina/lapoui706wrnt.html/ (last visited November 22, 2009).
115 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 17.
116 Frank W. Dawkins, J.D., LL.M. candidate, Good Samaritans or Mercy Killers: And Never the 'Twain Shall
Meet,November 2006, accessed at www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2006/(FD)MercyKillers.pdf/ last accessed
November 22, 2009.
117 KevinMD.com : http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2006/07/dr-anna-pou-hurricane-katrina-and.html/ last accessed on
November 22, 2009.
118 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 17.
119 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 17.
120 Interview with Charles F. Foti, Louisiana Attorney General, in New Orleans, Louisiana. (July 18, 2007). (Accessed at
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0607/18/pzn.01.html/ last accessed on November 21, 2009).
121 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 17.
122 Lee Black, LLM, An Accusation of Murder in New Orleans and the Media Response, American Medical Association
Journal of Ethics, Volume 9, Number 3, Page 202.
123 Kevin Featherly, The Fine Line Between Mercy and Murder, Louisiana Super Lawyers, January 2009, accessed at
http://www.superlawyers.com/louisiana/article/the-fine-line-between-mercy-and-murder/77970b3-fbc5-485b-9e78-
864512bb5f87.html/ last accessed on November 19, 2009.
124 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 17.
125 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 17.
126 Kevin Featherly, The Fine Line Between Mercy and Murder, Louisiana Super Lawyers, January 2009, accessed at
http://www.superlawyers.com/louisiana/article/the-fine-line-between-mercy-and-murder/77970b3-fbc5-485b-9e78-
864512bb5f87.html/ last accessed on November 19, 2009.
127 Kevin Featherly, The Fine Line Between Mercy and Murder, Louisiana Super Lawyers, January 2009, accessed at
http://www.superlawyers.com/louisiana/article/the-fine-line-between-mercy-and-murder/77970b3-fbc5-485b-9e78-
864512bb5f87.html/ last accessed on November 19, 2009.
128 Kevin Featherly, The Fine Line Between Mercy and Murder, Louisiana Super Lawyers, January 2009, accessed at
http://www.superlawyers.com/louisiana/article/the-fine-line-between-mercy-and-murder/77970b3-fbc5-485b-9e78-
864512bb5f87.html/ last accessed on November 19, 2009.
129 Interview by Morley Safer with Dr. Anna Pou, CBS Broadcast 60 Minutes, September 24, 2006. Transcript accessed at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/09/21/60minutes/main2030603.shtml/ last accessed on November 22, 2009.
130 Interview by Morley Safer with Dr. Anna Pou, CBS Broadcast 60 Minutes, September 24, 2006. Transcript accessed at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/09/21/60minutes/main2030603.shtml/ last accessed on November 22, 2009.
131 Interview by Morley Safer with Dr. Anna Pou, CBS Broadcast 60 Minutes, September 24, 2006. Transcript accessed at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/09/21/60minutes/main2030603.shtml/ last accessed on November 22, 2009.
132 Floyd A. Buras, Statement Regarding Dr. Anna Pou, accessed at http://www.lsms.org/LSMS%20stmt%on%20Anna
%20Pou.pdf/ last accessed on November 1, 2009.
133 Advertisement from Baton Rouge Eat, Nose & Throat Society, The Advocate, July 27, 2006, at A18. (emphasis is
original)
134 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 20.
135 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 20.
136 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 20.
137 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 20.
138 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 21.
139 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 21.
140 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 21.
141 Frank W. Dawkins, J.D., LL.M. candidate, Good Samaritans or Mercy Killers: And Never the 'Twain Shall
Meet,November 2006, accessed at www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2006/(FD)MercyKillers.pdf/ last accessed
November 22, 2009.
142 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 21.
143 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 21.
144 La. R.S. 14:30.1. This note relies on the Louisiana definition of intent.
145 Sheri Fink, Strained by Katrina, a Hospital Faced Deadly Choices, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 2009, at 21.
146 Gwen Filosa, Foti Sued by Doctor Accused in Memorial Hospital Deaths, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, July 16, 2007,
at 1.
147 Gwen Filosa, Foti Sued by Doctor Accused in Memorial Hospital Deaths, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, July 16, 2007,
at 1.
148 The Associated Press, Louisiana: Doctor Wants Legal Fees Paid, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, February 11, 2009.
149 Jan Moller, Panel Recommends Paying Dr. Anna Pou's Legal Fees, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, MARCH 18, 2009, at 1.
150 The Associated Press, Louisiana: Doctor Wants Legal Fees Paid, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, February 11, 2009.
151 Jan Moller, Panel Recommends Paying Dr. Anna Pou's Legal Fees, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, MARCH 18, 2009, at 1.
152 Gwen Filosa, Foti Sued by Doctor Accused in Memorial Hospital Deaths, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, July 16, 2007,
at 1.
153 Bill Barrow, Judge Says Memorial Records Should Be Public, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, September 20, 2007, at 1.
154 Laura Maggi, High Court Considers Making Public Records of Memorial Medical Center Deaths During Katrina, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, October 13, 2008.
155 Laura Maggi, High Court Considers Making Public Records of Memorial Medical Center Deaths During Katrina, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, October 13, 2008.
156 Laura Maggi, High Court Considers Making Public Records of Memorial Medical Center Deaths During Katrina, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, October 13, 2008.
157 Committee for Disaster Medicine Reform, CMDR.org, Media Outlets Continue to Hound Dr. Pou, other Docs, Nurses
and Their Patients, CMDR.org, October 10, 2008, accessed at cmdr.org, last accessed on November 11, 2009.
158 Committee for Disaster Medicine Reform, CMDR.org, Media Outlets Continue to Hound Dr. Pou, other Docs, Nurses
and Their Patients, CMDR.org, October 10, 2008, accessed at cmdr.org, last accessed on November 11, 2009.
159 Laura Maggi, High Court Considers Making Public Records of Memorial Medical Center Deaths During Katrina, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, October 13, 2008.
160 La. R.S. 37:1731.1 (2009).
161 La. R.S. 37:1731.1 (2009).
162 La. R.S. 29:735.3 (2009).
163 La. R.S. 29:735.3 (2009).
164 La. R.S. 29:735.3 (2009).
165 La. R.S. 29:735.3 (2009). La. R.S. 40:1299.39.3 (2009).
166 Mary Foster, New Legislation Pleases Doctor Accused of Murder, The Committee for Disaster Medicine Reform at
http://www.cmdr.org/
167 Mary Foster, New Legislation Pleases Doctor Accused of Murder, The Committee for Disaster Medicine Reform at
http://www.cmdr.org/
168 Mary Foster, New Legislation Pleases Doctor Accused of Murder, The Committee for Disaster Medicine Reform at
http://www.cmdr.org/