BAR MATTER 1153
school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of
the Court En Banc dated March 9, 2010
"B.M. No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza
Proposing Reforms in the Bar Examinations Through
Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). - The Court
Resolved to APPROVE the proposed amendments to Sections
5 and 6 of Rule 138, to wit:
SEC. 5.Additional Requirement for Other Applicants. — All
applicants for admission other than those referred to in the
two preceding sections shall, before being admitted to the
examination, satisfactorily show that they have successfully
completed all the prescribed courses for the degree of
Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree, in a law school or
university officially recognized by the Philippine Government
or by the proper authority in the foreign jurisdiction where
the degree has been granted.
No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in
this jurisdiction shall be admitted to the bar examination
unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the following
course in a law school or university duly recognized by the
government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law,
criminal law, public and private international law, political
law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence,
taxation and legal ethics.
A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school
shall be admitted to the bar examination only upon
submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing:
(a) completion of all courses leading to the degree of
Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree; (b) recognition or
accreditation of the law school by the proper authority; and
(c) completion of all the fourth year subjects in the Bachelor
of Laws academic program in a law school duly recognized
by the Philippine Government.
SEC. 6.Pre-Law. — An applicant for admission to the bar
examination shall present a certificate issued by the proper
government agency that, before commencing the study of
law, he or she had pursued and satisfactorily completed in
an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring
for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high
bachelor's degree in arts or sciences.
A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her
Bachelor of Laws degree or its equivalent in a foreign law
school must present proof of having completed a separate
bachelor's degree course.
The Clerk of Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, is
hereby directed to CIRCULARIZE this resolution among all
law schools in the country.”
BAR MATTER 1154
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR
EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS
MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR, ATTY.
FROILAN R. MELENDREZ
Facts:
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez)
filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to
disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate
disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a
Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not
disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations
that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City,
namely:  Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for
Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No.  15687 for
Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which
occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered
defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of
media practitioners and other people.  Meling also
purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife
causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using
the title “Attorney” in his communications, as Secretary to
the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an
indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the
appellation and appears on its face to have been received by
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on
November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated December 3, 2002,
Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the
criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez because
retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised
him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez.  SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the
Believing in good faith that the case would be settled
because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he
being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling
considered the three cases that actually arose from a single
incident and involving the same parties as “closed and
terminated.”  Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds
that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that
some of his communications really contained the word
“Attorney” as they were, according to him, typed by the
office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8, 2003,
the OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against
Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases
filed against him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations
are ludicrous.  He should have known that only the court of
competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge
nor a law professor.  In fact, the cases filed against Meling
are still pending.  Furthermore, granting arguendo that these
cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose
the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral
character.  Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made
under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
Issue: WON the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon
Haron S. Meling is proper and shall subsequently barred him
from taking his lawyer’s oath and signing on the Roll of
Attorneys
Held: 
The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of
appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of
the Philippine Shari’a Bar.  Accordingly, the membership of
Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby
suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the
Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the
Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a
member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for
having become moot and academic.
Rationale:
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a
Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the
law but who are also known to possess good moral
character.  The requirement of good moral character is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of
law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining
in the practice of law.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to
determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good
moral character of the applicant. The nature of whatever
cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court
in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness
demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such
cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the
cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient
to impugn or affect the good moral character of the
applicant.
BAR MATTER 1678
B.M. No. 1678             December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
Facts:
 Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960.
He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December
1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of
Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was
approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
 On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003),
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day,
he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the
Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter,
he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his
law practice.
Issue:
 Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his
membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his
Philippine citizenship
Ruling:
 The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions
in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in
cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof
terminates membership in the Philippine bar and,
consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law.
In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure
terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.
 The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason
of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is
because “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].”
Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of
another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his
membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to
resume law practice accrues.
 Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal
profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he) shall apply with
the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice.

A.C. No. 244             March 29, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT
OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,
vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations
held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with
having falsely represented in his application for such Bar
examination, that he had the requisite academic
qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the
Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated;
and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's
name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary
to the allegations in his petition for examination in this
Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law
subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the
Department of Private Education, specially, in the following
particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training;
and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and
never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom — which
contradicts the credentials he had submitted in
support of his application for examination, and of his
allegation therein of successful completion of the
"required pre-legal education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A.
Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he claims that
although he had left high school in his third year, he entered
the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General
Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is
equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to
civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army
service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim,
what with respondent's failure to exhibit any certification to
that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials.
However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second
charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A.
from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-
1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his
A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says
he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate
of Quisumbing College, in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing
other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the
"error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had
his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from
Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got
it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law
studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before
obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would
not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our
Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination
must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law,
he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the
required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the
Department of Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take
the bar examinations; but due to his false representations,
he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was
thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been
obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby
revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the
prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is
equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of
attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is
required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So
ordered.
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, PETITIONER. (DIGEST)
B.M. No. 2540
September 24, 2013
TOPIC:
Admission to the Bar, Unauthorized Practice of Law, Canon
9, Signing of the Roll of Attorneys
FACTS:
Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979.
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the PICC. He
was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May
1980, but failed to do so allegedly because he had
misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several
years later, while rummaging through his things, he found
said Notice. He then realized that he had not signed in the
roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC
was probably just an attendance record.
He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing
of the Roll of Attorneys was not as important. The matter of
signing in the Roll of Attorneys was subsequently forgotten.
In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was
required to provide his roll number for his MCLE compliances
to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he
was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant
Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys. Medado justifies this lapse by characterizing his
acts as “neither willful nor intentional but based on a
mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the
instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence,
gross misconduct and utter lack of merit, saying that
petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence
in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of
Attorneys.
RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the
payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent
to suspension from the practice of law.
Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would
be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of
disbarment, a penalty reserved for the most serious ethical
transgressions. In this case, said action is not warranted.
The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith
in filing the petition himself, albeit after the passage of more
than 30 years; that he has shown that he possesses the
character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar; and
that he appears to have been a competent and able legal
practitioner, having held various positions at different firms
and companies.
However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of
inaction.
A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification,
because everyone is presumed to know the law and its
consequences.
Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake
of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC
entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of
Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he
had signed was just an attendance record, he could no
longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid
justification. At that point, he should have known that he
was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar, as it
was the act of signing therein that would have made him so.
When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue
practicing law, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise
transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. At the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty
to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty
likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As
aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to conduct
themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the
legal profession.
Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged
lawyer. However, the Court imposed upon him a penalty akin
to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
one (1) year after receipt of the Resolution. He was also
made to pay a fine of P32,000. Also, during the one-year
period, petitioner was not allowed to engage in the practice
of law.
In re:Lanuevo
A.C. No. 1162. August 29, 1975.
Makasiar, J.
FACTS:
Based on a confident letter of a bar flunked, the Supreme
Court checked the records of the 1991 bar examinations.
Upon investigation, Bar Confidant Victorino Lanuevo
admitted having brought back the five examination
notebooks for re-evaluation. Ramon Galang, bar candidate
and who owns the examination notebooks under
investigation, denied having any knowledge of the
actuations of the Bar Confidant.
ISSUE:
WON Lanuevo and Galang be disbarred.
RULING:
Yes. For Lanuevo, the Bar Confidant is simply the custodian
of the bar examination notebooks for and in behalf of the
court; hence, any suggestion or request by him for
reevaluation or reconsideration of the grades of the
examinee is not only presumptuous but also offensive in the
norms of delicacy. Thus, he is therefore guilty of serious
misconduct and should be disbarred.
In the case of Ramon Galang, he is disbarred on the grounds
that he (1) omitted to declare his case of slight physical
injury on his applications for bar examinations and (2)
cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased
grades given after the said re-evaluation.
IN RE: VICENTE CHING
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
FACTS:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat
Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino,
was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964.
Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. In 1998,
Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis
University in Baguio City. He eventually passed the bar but
he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a
Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his oath.
Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen but his
mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents were married
before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a
legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires
the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching
maintained that he has always considered himself as a
Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant – a
profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a
councilor in a municipality in La Union.
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that
as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching
should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority. Ching did elect Filipino citizenship, but he
only did so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14
years after reaching the age of majority. In conclusion, the
OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine
citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond
the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence.
However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding
Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the
standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable
period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking
his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyer’s
oath.
HELD:
No. In the present case, Ching was already thirty-five (35)
years old when he complied with the requirements of CA No.
625 or fourteen years after he had reached the age of
majority. The age of majority commenced upon reaching
twenty-one (21) years. The Supreme Court noted that the
period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It
seems it can’t be extended any further). Ching’s special
circumstances can’t be considered. It is not enough that he
considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a
professional and a public officer (was) serving this country.
The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didn’t
give any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino
citizenship (but I guess it’s simply because he never thought
he’s Chinese not until he applied to take the bar). The
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is
certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is
required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election
of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with
the nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and
unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply
glossed over.
DECISION:
The Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application
for admission to the Philippine Bar.
In re: Amparo 65 SCRA 120 (1974)
FACTS: Amparo is a bar examinee who was caught by the
head watcher reading a piece of paper during the bar
examination in Criminal Law. He refuses to surrender the
paper until the head watcher threatened to report him to the
authorities. The paper contains the list of duration of
penalties and formula computing them, which Amparo
justifies as just a piece of paper that fell out of his pocket as
he tried to get his handkerchief. A report was filed and an
investigation ensued.
ISSUE: WON Amparo is guilty for his actions.

RULING: Yes. He violated Rule 133, section 10 prohibiting
examinees from bringing papers, books, or notes into the
examination room. Amparo committed an overt act
indicative of an attempt to cheat by reading notes. The
report of the bar showed that he did not passed the bar thus
the court ordered he will not be allowed to re-take the bar
the following year.
Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991
201 SCRA 210
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by
President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of
the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-
C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required
qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs.
Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceeding, the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges
and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice
to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment
and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance
before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means
any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the
required qualification of having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s
past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich
and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The
respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition
is DISMISSED.
Yumol vs Atty. Ferrer, Sr. A.C. No. 6585 April 21, 2005
Facts: The petitioner, OIC of the Commission on Human
Rights, files a disbarment case against respondent, Attorney
IV said commission on ground for grave misconduct. The
respondent was found to have issued 2 orders awarding
custody of a child to a complainant in the Commission,
ordered a bank to reinstate the bank account of the said
complainant, engaging in private practice, notarizing public
documents, and attending court hearings while filling up his
DTR at the Commission as present at the same time. The
case was referred to the IBP and the investigating
commissioner recommended suspension for 2 years which
was modified by the IBP Board to 6 months.
ISSUE: WON respondent has committed gross misconduct
arising from the following alleged acts:
1. Engaging in the private practice of his profession while
being a government employee;
2. Falsifying his Daily Time Records;
3. Issuing unauthorized orders; and
4. Continuously engaging in private practice even after the
filing of case against him for engaging in private practice.
RULING: The court held on the following:
1. CHR Resolution No. (III) A2002-133 authorizes CHR
lawyers to engage in private practice (adopting the Civil
Service Commission Resolution) subject to some conditions
with indispensable requirement to secure approval from the
CHR. In the absence of such approval, the respondent is not
allowed in private practice and proved to have falsified his
attendance in the DTR while appearing in court at the same
time without approved leave of absence.
2. The respondent has been notarizing even before the CHR
authorized his practice as a notary public.
3. The authority granted with the CHR in their function is
merely to investigate all forms of human rights violation.
They cannot try and decide cases.
With the above constituting grounds for suspension of
lawyers stated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
the court ruled to modify the suspension of 1 year as
sufficient sanction.
Mauricio C. Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic, Inc.
B.M. No. 553. June 17, 1993
Facts:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from
issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as
that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to
perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law.” The
advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as
follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THEPlease call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam
Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday
to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration
Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to
Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
 US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call
Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC.  Tel. 521-7232521-7251
522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements
above reproduced are champertous, unethical, demeaning
of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of
the community in the integrity of the members of the bar
and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence
the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of
publication of said advertisements at its instance, but claims
that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the
rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with
the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services
advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the
case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of
Arizona,  reportedly decided by the United States Supreme
Court on June 7, 1977.
Issue:
            Whether or not the services offered by respondent,
The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice
of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be
the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Held:
            Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services
offered by the respondent constitute practice of law. The
definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of
Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge
and the application of legal principles and technique
to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments
of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law."
           
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal
support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been offering. While some
of the services being offered by respondent corporation
merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as
the installation of computer systems and programs for the
efficient management of law offices, or the computerization
of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to
justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably
clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal
information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such
function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more
apparent than real. In providing information, for example,
about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy
thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the
law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to
be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely
within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such
a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent
corporation does not represent clients in court since law
practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited
merely to court appearances but extends to legal research,
giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry
out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it
is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of
the services it renders which thereby brings it within the
ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the
advertisements which it has caused to be published and are
now assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the legal
profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The proscription
against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal
business rests on the fundamental postulate that the
practice of law is a profession. The canons of the profession
tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity
to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character
and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as
to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-
product of effective service which is right and proper. A good
and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate
it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference
between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda.
In Re: Argosino B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath
taking of a successful bar applicant. Petitioner Al Caparros
Argosino was previously involved with hazing which caused
the death of Raul Camaligan a neophyte during fraternity
initiation rites but he was convicted for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide. He was sentenced with 2 years and 4
months of imprisonment where he applied a probation
thereafter which was approved and granted by the court. He
took the bar exam and passed but was not allowed to take
the oath. He filed for a petition to allow him to take the
lawyer’s oath of office and to admit him to the practice of
law averring that his probation was already terminated. The
court note that he spent only 10 months of the probation
period before it was terminated.
ISSUE: Whether or not Al Argosino may take the lawyer’s
oath office and admit him to the practice of law.
HELD: The practice of law is a privilege granted only to
those who possess the STRICT, INTELLECTUAL and MORAL
QUALIFICATIONS required of lawyers who are instruments in
the effective and efficient administration of justice. The court
upheld the principle of maintaining the good moral character
of all Bar members, keeping in mind that such is of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper
administration of justice are concerned. Hence he was asked
by the court to produce evidence that would certify that he
has reformed and has become a responsible member of the
community through sworn statements of individuals who
have a good reputation for truth and who have actually
known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to certify
that he is morally fit to the admission of the law profession.
The petitioner is then allowed to take the lawyer’s oath, sign
the Roll of Attorney’s and thereafter to practice the legal
profession.
In Re: Albino Cunanan (1954)
In re: Albino Cunanan (Petitions for Admission to the Bar of
Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953) 94 Phil 534
Subject: Supreme Court has primary and inherent
prerogative on bar admissions; Only the Supreme Court can
revoke its earlier decisions regarding admissions of bar
candidates; Practice of Law is imbued with Public Interest;
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions; Admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a judicial function;
R.A. 972 (Bar Flunkers” Act of 1953) Unconstitutional for
being violative of Equal Protection (no valid classification
resting on substantial distinctions); R.A. 972 is not a curative
statute
Facts:
810 unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a
few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar
petitioned in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage
of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the
passing general average in bar examinations to 70%
effective since 1946.
The President requested the views of the Supreme Court on
the bill, thus seven members of the court submitted written
comments adverse thereto. Shortly thereafter, the President
vetoed it. The Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it
approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the
provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this
court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the
President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953
without his signature.
Republic Act Number 972, known as the “Bar Flunkers” Act
of 1953” admitted to the bar those candidates who had
obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75
percent. These candidates took the exams during the war
making reading material scarce. After its approval, around
810 unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for
admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others
with motions for the revision of their examination papers
were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an
additional ground for admission. There are also others who
have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades
without invoking the law in question.
Section 1 of the said law provided for the following passing
marks: 1946-1951; 70%, 1952; 71%, 1953; 72%, 1954; 73%,
1955; 74%. Section 2 on the other hand stated that “A bar
candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall
be deemed to have already passed that subject and the
grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the
general average in subsequent bar examinations.”
Held:
Supreme Court has primary and inherent prerogative
on bar admissions
1. Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal,
alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. The
rules laid down by Congress under this power are only
minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of
the court on who can practice law. It is the primary and
inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the
ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may
continue in the practice of law according to existing rules. In
depriving the court of the opportunity to determine if they
are already prepared to become members of the Bar, the
law is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional
responsibility of the Supreme Court.
Only the Supreme Court can revoke its earlier
decisions regarding admissions of bar candidates
2. In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar
examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per
cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be
admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is
not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking
those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year
affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this
Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for
justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court,
and not the legislative nor executive department, that may
be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments
would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case
with the law in question.
Practice of Law is imbued with Public Interest
3. Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its
author, to admit to the Bar,those candidates who suffered
from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparation. By its declared objective, the law is contrary to
public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who
confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of
the profession.
4. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate
preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal
problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An
adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for
the practice of law that should be developed constantly and
maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the
protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To
approve officially those inadequately prepared individuals to
dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a
serious social danger.
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions
5. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. One is admitted to the bar "for something more
than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and
,like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the
end of justice.
Admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the
attorneys at law is a judicial function
6. In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved,
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been disputably a judicial function and
responsibility.
7. Even considering the power granted to Congress by our
Constitution to repeal, alter, supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the
practice of law, to our judgment, the proposition that the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the
attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging
to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1)
previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete
facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are
governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial
function of the highest degree. And it becomes more
undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial
resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are
attempted to be revoked or modified.
8. It is quite likely true that the legislature may exercise the
power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative
functions. However, xxx the power to admit attorneys to the
practice of law is a judicial function. xxx the licensing of an
attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function,
no matter where the power to determine the qualifications
may reside. (State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441)
9. It is an inherent power of [the judicial] department of
government ultimately to determine the qualifications of
those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in
its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit,
those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing
good moral character. It rests exclusively with the court to
determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as
an attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to
be removed
R.A. 972 Unconstitutional for being violative of Equal
Protection (no valid classification resting on
substantial distinctions)
10. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of
candidates, which the law makes, ( insufficiency of reading
materials during the war) is contrary to facts which are of
general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the
Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended
classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class
legislation.
11. It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or
the years before, were not included because the Tribunal
has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those years.
This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of
unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952,
1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who
failed before said years under the same conditions justified.
R.A. 972 is not a curative statute
12. The power exercised was not to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was
done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not
included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress,
because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This
power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been
confided.
13. What the law attempts to amend and correct are not the
rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by
means of simply taking its place.What Congress lamented is
that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by
those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to
qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or
defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured.
Portions of R.A. 972 Invalidated
14. As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared
unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in
force and effect. As to the portion declared in force and
effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it
void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in
1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court
resolutions denying admission to the bar of any of the
petitioners.
 
PCGG vs Sandiganbayan, et al
G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005
 
Facts:
On February 1991, Former Solicitor General Estelito Mendoz,
who has currently resumed the private practice of law, was
sought to be disqualified from representing the Lucio Tan
group, in the 1987 case involving General Bank and Trust
Company (GENBANK) as one of those properties subject to a
writ of sequestration by PCGG being alleged to be ill –gotten
wealth acquired during the Marcos Regime. It was averred
by the PCGG that there exists an adverse interest on
Mendoza since he was the one who filed a petition praying
for assistance and supervision of the court in the liquidation
of GENBANK when he was still a Solicitor General, which
bank was subsequently owned by the Lucio Tan group when
it submitted the winning bid.
PCGG invokes Rule 6.03of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers
from accepting “engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.”
Sandiganbayan rejects PCGG’s motion by arguing that CGG
failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between
respondent Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor General
and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan
group and that Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited
period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he
ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986.
Issue: WON Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza
Ruling:
No, Rule 6.03 of the CPR is inapplicable in the case. Rule
6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service. The motion for disqualification should be dismissed
for the following reasons:
1) After discussing the history of the present Code of
Professional Responsibility which revealed that the
word “intervene” is applicable to both adverse
interest conflicts and congruent interest conflicts, it
has been found that neither of these conflicts
exists in the liquidation case and the sequestration
case.
2) The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an
issue in the sequestration cases.
The “matter” where he got himself involved was in
informing Central Bank on the procedure provided
by law to liquidate GENBANK through the courts and
in filing the necessary petition in the then Court of
First Instance. The subject “matter” of the special
proceeding, therefore, is not the same nor is related
to but is different from the subject “matter” in the
civil case.  The civil case involves the sequestration
of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in
Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-
gotten.  The case does not involve the liquidation of
GENBANK.  Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK
to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the
reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far
removed from the issue of the dissolution and
liquidation of GENBANK.  GENBANK was liquidated
by the Central Bank due, among others, to the
alleged banking malpractices of its owners and
officers.
3) Mendoza’s intervention in the liquidation of
Genbank is not substantial and significant to
warrant disqualification.
The petition in the special proceedings is
an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by
respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor
General.  For another, the record is arid as to
the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in
the subsequent proceedings.  Moreover, the
petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the
court in the liquidation of GENBANK.  The principal
role of the court in this type of proceedings is to
assist the Central Bank in determining claims of
creditors against the GENBANK.
It is worthy to note that in construing the words of such rule
in this case, the Court balanced the two policy
considerations of having a chilling effect on government
recruitment of able legal talent and the use of former
government employment as a litigation tactic to harass
opposing counsel.