POLICE POWER

1. White Light Corporation et. al. vs. City of Manila, January 20, 2009
Facts:
On December 3, 1992, then Manila City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Ordinance No. 7774 the title of which is
“An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels,
Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila” This ordinance
sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or
the renting of rooms more than twice a day. The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC),
and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro
Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention.

According to them, the ordinance will affect their business interests as operators. On the other hand, the respondents
asserted that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. In its ruling, the RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774
as null and void on the bases that it “strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded
by the Constitution.” The RTC cited provisions from the Constitution that encourage private enterprises and the right to
operate economic enterprises. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision of the RTC. According to the
respondents, the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government
Code which confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist
guides and transports. They also contended that under Art. III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power
to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city
and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.

Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.

Ruling:
Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such, it is unconstitutional. The
test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy;
and (6) must not be unreasonable.

The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and
renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on
local government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.

Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its
people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. The apparent goal of
the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use
and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the
State. Yet the desirability of these ends does not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must
align with the Constitution.

2. MMDA v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, December 16, 2009

Facts:
In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications, entered into a build-lease-
transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with Metro Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act No.
6957 (Build, Operate and Transfer Law). In the said BLT agreement, MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject to the
condition that MRTC would own MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which the ownership would transfer to the
Government. The BLT agreement also stipulated that, among others, MRTC could build and develop commercial
premises in the MRT3 structures and obtain advertising income from such.

In 1998, Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc. (Trackworks) entered into a contract for
advertising services with MRTC. Trackworks thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and other advertizing
media in the different parts of the MRT3. In 2001, however, MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle the billboards,
signages and other advertizing media pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009. In the said regulation, MMDA
prohibited the posting, installation and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any part
of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and open space. After Trackworks refused the request of MMDA,
the latter proceeded to dismantle the former’s billboards and similar forms of advertisement.

Issue: Whether MMDA has the police power to dismantle, remove or destroy the billboards, signages, etc. installed by
Trackworks

Ruling:
No, MMDA has no police power to dismantle, remove or destroy the billboards, signages, etc. that were installed by
Trackworks.

Since MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time material to this case, its entering into a contract
with Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership. In other words, Trackworks has the right to install the billboards,
signages, and other advertising media pursuant to the contract.

As for MMDA, it is futile for it to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of Trackworks billboards,
signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the
billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. Previously, the court
had the occasion to rule that MMDA powers were limited to the following: the formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and administration. In
other words, there is no law that grants police power to MMDA.

3. Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. vs. CA, 329 scra 314

Facts:
Petitioner Acebedo Optical Company applied for a business permit at the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan. After
consideration of petitioners application and the opposition raised by local optometrists, Respondent City Mayor issued
issued Business Permit No. 5342. Along with the issuance are the following conditions: (a) Acebedo cannot put up an
optical clinic but only a commercial store; (b) Acebedo cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical
glasses for patients, because these are functions of optical clinics; (c)Acebedo cannot sell reading and similar
eyeglasses without a prescription having first been made by a an independent optometrist or independent optical clinic;
(d) Acebedo cannot advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses but can advertise Ray-ban and similar eyeglasses; (e)
Acebedo is allowed to grind lenses but only upon the prescription of independent optometrist

On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI), Iligan Chapter, through its
Acting President, Dr. Frances B. Apostol, filed a complaint against the petitioner before the Office of the City Mayor.
SOPI alleged that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its business permit and requesting the cancellation
and/or revocation of such permit. In an investigation designated by Respondent City Mayor, the results showed that
petitioner was guilty of violating all the conditions of its business permit. It was also recommended that petitioner be
disqualified from operating its business in Iligan City. The report further advised that no new permit shall be granted to
petitioner for the year 1989 and should only be given time to wind up its affairs. Subsequently, on July 19, 1989, the
City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit effective as of said date and giving
petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs.

On October 17, 1989, petitioner brought a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for restraining
order/preliminary injunction against the respondents, City Mayor, City Legal Officer and Samahan ng Optometrists sa
Pilipinas-Iligan City Chapter (SOPI), docketed as Civil Case No. 1497 before the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City,
Branch I. Petitioner alleged, among others, that (3) the City Mayor had no authority to impose the special conditions
on its business permit; and (4) the City Legal Officer had no authority to conduct the investigation as the matter falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Professional Regulation Commission and the Board of Optometry.

Issue: Whether or not the imposition of said special conditions on petitioner’s business permit is well within the
authority of the City Mayor as a valid exercise of police power

Ruling:
NO, the imposition of said special conditions by the City Mayor is not a valid exercise of police power.

First, distinction should be made between the grant of a license or permit to do a business and the issuance of a license
to engage in a particular profession. The first is usually granted by the local governments and the second is issued the
Board or Commission tasked to regulate the particular profession. In the present case, Acebedo was applying for a
business permit to operate its business and not to practice optometry (the latter being within the jurisdiction PRC Board
of Optometry).

Second, although the mayor can definitely impose conditions in the granting of permits, he must base such conditions
on law or ordinances. Not doing such will render the conditions set as ultra vires. In the case at bar, the conditions set
by the mayor are ultra vires, hence cannot be given any legal application. As such, estoppels do not apply.

3.a. Manila Memorial Park Inc. vs. Sec. of the DSWD, etl al., Dec. 3, 2013

EMINENT DOMAIN

4. Association of Small Landowners In the Phils. vs. Sec. of the DAR, 175 scra 343
Facts:
In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for his life on his way to
Mycenae after performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his adversary to the ground
thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger to resume their struggle. This happened several times to Hercules'
increasing amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea
and could never die as long as any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned, Hercules then held
Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed him to death.
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus
weakened and died.

The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental forces of life and death,
of men and women who, like Antaeus need the sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay alive. "Land for the
Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource among our
people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the
increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun. Recognizing this
need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and economic security of
all the people," especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that
"the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably
diffuse property ownership and profits." Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and
implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil.”

The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and
separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for
the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian
reform program:

SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to
receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of
all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking
into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide
incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-
hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified
farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislature’s power. A petition by
landowners and sugarplanters in Victoria’s Mill Negros Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation
131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund withinitial fund of P50Billion. A petition by owners of land which was placed
by the DAR under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to
owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares.

Issue:Whether the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc exempted from agrarian reform program

Held:
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme
provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do
not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to
distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land.
In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.

5. Philippine Press Institute vs. COMELEC, 244 scra 272

Facts:
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No 2772 directing newspapers to provide free print space of not less than ½ page for use as “Comelec Space” from
06March1995 to 06May1995. COMELEC Commissioner sent letters to publishers informing them of the same. PPI seek to declare the resolution
unconstitutional and void on the ground of taking private property w/o just compensation. TRO was enforced. SocGen argues that even if the
questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the
police power of the State. COMELEC Chair stated that they will clarify the resolution that the letter was intended to solicit and not to compel.
Resolution No. 2772-A was promulgated.

Issue: Whether or not Resolution 2772 is void on the ground of deprivation of use w/o compensation of newspaper?

Ruling:
To compel print media companies to donate “Comelec-space” amounts to “taking” of private personal property for public use. The extent of the
taking or deprivation is not insubstantial measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-
urban areas.

The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under the rubric of expropriation of private personal property for public
use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the taking;
another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not
been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. It has not been
suggested that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable
relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown.

The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of “just compensation.”

6. Forform Development Corporation vs. PNR, December 10, 2008

Facts:
Forfom is the registered owner of several parcels of land in San Vicente, San Pedro,Laguna. Said parcels of land were originally registered in the name
of Felix Limcaoco, predecessor-in-interest of Forfom. In a cabinet meeting held on 1 November 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos approved
the Presidential Commuter Service Project, more commonly known as the Carmona Project of the President. Per Resolution No. 751 dated 2
November 1972 of the PNR Board of Directors, its General Manager was authorized to implement the project. The San Pedro-Carmona Commuter
Line Project was implemented with the installation of railroad facilities and appurtenances. During the construction of said commuter line, several
properties owned by private individuals/corporations were traversed as right-of-way. Among the properties through which the commuter line passed
was a 100,128 square-meter portion owned by Forfom

Issue:
Whether the petitioner Forfom can recover possession of its property because respondent PNR failed to file any expropriation case and to pay just
compensation.

Ruling:
The power of eminent domain is an inherent and indispensable power of the State. Being inherent, the power need not be specifically conferred on
the government by the Constitution. Section 9, Article III states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The
constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation The fundamental power of eminent domain is exercised by the Legislature. It may be
delegated by Congress to the local governments, other public entities and public utilities. In the case at bar, PNR, under its charter, has the power of
expropriation. A number of circumstances must be present in the taking of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter
a private property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be
under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public purpose or otherwise informally, appropriately or injuriously
affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
of the property.
It can be gathered from the records that Forfom accepted the fact of the taking of its land when it negotiated with PNR for just compensation,
knowing fully well that there was no expropriation case filed at all. Forfom's inaction for almost eighteen (18) years to question the absence of
expropriation proceedings and its discussions with PNR as to how much petitioner shall be paid for its land preclude it from questioning the PNR's
power to expropriate or the public purpose for which the power was exercised. In other words, it has waived its right and is estopped from assailing
the takeover of its land on the ground that there was no case for expropriation that was commenced by PNR.

7. Republic of the Philippines vs. Spouses Cancio, January 30, 2009

Facts:
On May 19, 2001, petitioner offered to purchase respondents’ lot at P52,294,000 for the whole property. The letter
containing the offer further instructed respondents to consider and accept however, instead of accepting, respondents
filed an unlawful detainer case against Maitland in the Municipal Trial Court of Lapu Lapu City.

Thereafter, petitioner commenced expropriation proceedings for respondents’ property with the Regional Trial Court.
Accordingly, it sought a writ of possession for the property for which it was willing to deposit 10% of the offered
amount.

Respondents, however, filed a motion to require petitioner to comply with RA 8974 which requires that, upon the filing
of the complaint for expropriation, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property an
amount equivalent to 100% of the current zonal valuation thereof for purposes of the issuance of a writ of possession.
Petitioner should make the required payment under the law because RA 8974, which took effect before the
commencement of the expropriation case, applied to all actions of such nature regardless of whether the government
agency was already in possession or not.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8974 is applicable in this case or not.

Held:
RA 8974 governs this case. RA 8974 readily reveals that it applies to instances when the national government
expropriates property for national government infrastructure projects. Undeniably, the economic zone is a national
government project – a matter undisputed by both parties. Also, the complaint for expropriation was filed only on
August 27, 2001 or almost one year after the law was approved on November 7, 2000. Thus, there is no doubt about
its applicability to this case.
There was also confusion regarding the nature of the amount to be paid for the issuance of a writ of possession. In
Capitol Steel Corporation v. PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority, we clarified that the payment of the provisional value as a
condition for the issuance of a writ of possession is different from the payment of just compensation for the
expropriated property. While the provisional value is based on the current relevant zonal valuation, just compensation
is based on the prevailing fair market value of the property.
There is no need yet to determine with reasonable certainty the final amount of just compensation in resolving the
issue of a writ of possession. In fact, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue the writ. No hearing is required
and the court cannot exercise its discretion in order to arrive at the amount of the provisional value of the property to
be expropriated as the legislature has already fixed the amount under the aforementioned provision of the law. It is
only after the trial court ascertains the provisional amount to be paid that just compensation will be determined.

8. LBP vs. Raymunda Martinez, July 31, 2008

Facts:
After compulsory acquisition by the Department of Agrarian Reform, on November 16, 1993, of respondent Martinez's
62.5369-hectare land in Barangay Agpudlos, San Andres, Romblon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines offered P1,955,485.60 as
just compensation, for which respondent rejected. Thus, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board,
through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator conducted summary administrative proceedings for the preliminary
determination of just compensation in accordance with Section 16 (d) of the CARL. On September 4, 2002, PARAD
Virgilio M. Sorita, rendered judgment ordering the LBP to pay landowner-protestant RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ for her
property covered with the total amount of TWELVE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED NINETY TWO and 50/100 Pesos (Php12,179,492.50). A petition for the fixing of just compensation was then
filed by LBP's counsel before the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) of the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan, Romblon.
Meanwhile, respondent, still asserting the finality of PARAD Sorita's decision, filed before the Office of the PARAD a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was eventually granted on November 11, 2003. The PARAD denied
LBP's motion for reconsideration and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution on February 23, 2004. LBP, on March
12, 2004, moved to quash the said February 23, 2004 PARAD resolution. On April 6, 2004, even as the motion to quash
was yet unresolved, LBP instituted a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA, on September 28, 2004 dismissed the
petition.

Issue: Whether or not the PARAD, gravely abused its discretion when it issued a writ of execution despite the
pendency of LBP's petition for fixing of just compensation with the SAC?

Ruling:
In this case, petitioner moved to quash the PARAD resolutions and at the same time petitioned for their annulment via
certiorari under Rule 65. In both proceedings, the parties are identical and the reliefs prayed for are the same. In the
two actions, petitioner also has a singular stance: the PARAD resolutions should not be executed in view of the
pendency of the petition for fixing of just compensation with the SAC. Thus a situation is created where the two fora
could come up with conflicting decisions. This is precisely the evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum-
shopping. We find petitioner not entitled to the grant of a writ of certiorari by the appellate court because the Office of
the PARAD did not gravely abuse its discretion when it undertook to execute the September 4, 2002 decision. Rule XIII,
Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure. · In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals and in Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, we explained the consequence of the said rule to the effect that the
adjudicator's decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period. Considering therefore that,
in this case, LBP's petition with the SAC for the fixing of just compensation was filed 26 days after its receipt of the
PARAD's decision, or eleven days beyond the reglementary period, the latter had already attained finality. The PARAD
could very well issue the writ of execution.
“An appeal may be taken from the decision of the Special Agrarian Courts by filing a petition for review with the Court
of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the decision; otherwise, the decision shall become final.
9. Hon. Vicente Eusebio vs. Jovito M. Luis et. al., October 13, 2009
Facts:
Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land taken by Pasig City to be used as a municipal road in 1980.
On 1993, a resolution authorizing payments for said land was passed. However, respondents were not agreeable with
the assessed value and went on to negotiate the same. On 1994, a letter was addressed to the mayor calling his
attention as a property in the same area had been paid for by petitioners at the price of P2,000.00 per square meter
when said property was expropriated in the year 1994 also for conversion into a public road.
Counsel for respondents sent a demand letter on 1996 to Mayor Eusebio, demanding the amount of P5,000.00 per
square meter, or a total of P7,930,000.00, as just compensation for respondents property.
Respondents filed a Complaint for Reconveyance and/or Damages praying that the property be returned to them with
payment of reasonable rental for sixteen years of use at P500.00 per square meter, or P793,000.00, with legal interest
of 12% per annum from date of filing of the complaint until full payment, or in the event that said property can no
longer be returned, that petitioners be ordered to pay just compensation in the amount of P7,930,000.00 and rental for
sixteen years of use at P500.00 per square meter, or P793,000.00, both with legal interest of 12% per annum from the
date of filing of the complaint until full payment. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondents which was
affirmed by the CA upon appeal.

Issue: Whether or not respondents are entitled to regain possession of their property taken by the city government in
the 1980s and, in the event that said property can no longer be returned, how should just compensation to respondents
be determined.

Ruling:
The Court ruled that failure to question the taking of the property for a long period of time, respondents are also
estopped from recovering possession of their land, but are entitled to just compensation as addressed in Forfom
Development Corporation v. Philippine National Railways. With regard to the time as to when just compensation should
be fixed, it is settled jurisprudence that where property was taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings, and
its owner files an action for recovery of possession thereof before the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is
the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling.

10. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macasangkit Sangkay, August 24, 2011
Facts:
On November 21, 1997, the respondents as the owners of land with an area of 221,573 square meters situated in Ditucalan, Iligan City, sued NPC in
the RTC for the recovery of damages and of the property, with the alternative prayer for the payment of just compensation. They alleged that they
had belatedly discovered that one of the underground tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of the Agus River for the operation of the
Hydroelectric Project in Agus V, Agus VI and Agus VII traversed their land; that their discovery had occurred in 1995 after Atty. Saidali C. Gandamra,
President of the Federation of Arabic Madaris School, had rejected their offer to sell the land because of the danger the underground tunnel might
pose to the proposed Arabic Language Training Center and Muslims Skills Development Center; that such rejection had been followed by the
withdrawal by Global Asia Management and Resource Corporation from developing the land into a housing project for the same reason; that Al-
Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines had also refused to accept their land as collateral because of the presence of the underground
tunnel; that the underground tunnel had been constructed without their knowledge and consent; that the presence of the tunnel deprived them of
the agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of their land; and that their land had also become an unsafe place for habitation because
of the loud sound of the water rushing through the tunnel and the constant shaking of the ground, forcing them and their workers to relocate to
safer grounds. In its answer with counterclaim, NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to compensation under section 3(f) of
Republic Act No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their land was established; that their cause of action, should they be entitled to
compensation, already prescribed due to the tunnel having been constructed in 1979; and that by reason of the tunnel being an apparent and
continuous easement, any action arising from such easement prescribed in five years.

Issue: Whether the Heirs of Macabangkits right to claim just compensation.

Ruling:
The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for damages. The former, also known as
inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal
exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owner's loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of
the word compensation in order to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and
ample. On the other hand, the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate,
liquidated, or exemplary.

11. Anunciacion Vda. De Quana et. al. vs. Republic of the Phils., February 9, 2011
Facts:
In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAAs predecessor agency, pursued a program to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Through
its team of negotiators, NAC met and negotiated with the owners of the properties situated around the airport, in the Banilad Estate. As the
landowners would later claim, the government negotiating team, as a sweetener, assured them that they could repurchase their respective lands
should the Lahug Airport expansion project do not push through or once the Lahug Airport closes or its operations transferred to Mactan-Cebu
Airport. Some of the landowners accepted the assurance and executed deeds of sale with a right of repurchase. Others, however, including the
owners of the aforementioned lots, refused to sell because the purchase price offered was viewed as way below market, forcing the hand of the
Republic, represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), as successor agency of the NAC, to file a complaint for the expropriation of
the lots entitled Republic v. Damian Ouano, et al.

Issue:
1. WHETHER ABANDONMENT OF THE PUBLIC USE FOR WHICH THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES WERE EXPROPRIATED
ENTITLES PETITIONERS OUANOS, ET AL. AND RESPONDENTS INOCIAN, ET AL. TO REACQUIRE THEM.
2. WHETHER PETITIONERS OUANOS, ET AL. AND RESPONDENTS INOCIAN, ET AL. ARE ENTITLED TO
RECONVEYANCE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES SIMPLY ON THE BASIS OF AN ALLEGED VERBAL PROMISE OR
ASSURANCE OF SOME NAC OFFICIALS THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES WILL BE RETUNRED IF THE AIRPORT
PROJECT WOULD BE ABANDONED.
Held:

1. The MCIAA and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots subject of the final decree of
expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were originally taken by the government, i.e., for
the expansion and development of Lahug Airport.

2. The Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned. A significant portion of it had, in fact, been purchased by a
private corporation for development as a commercial complex.[20]

3. It has been preponderantly established by evidence that the NAC, through its team of negotiators, had given
assurance to the affected landowners that they would be entitled to repurchase their respective lots in the
event they are no longer used for airport purposes.

11.a. Land Bank of the Phils. vs. Esther Anson Rivera, et. al., February 27, 2013
11.b. Land Bank of the Phils. vs. Spouses Placido and Clara Dy Orilla, Feb. 13, 2013
11.c. Republic of the Phils. (DPWH) vs. Ortigas and Company, March 3, 2014
11.d. Republic of the Philippines vs. Hon. Samson-Tatad and Sps. Genato, April 17, 2013

DUE PROCESS
12. Sen. Jinggoy Estrada vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et. al., January 21, 2015
13. Suyan vs. People of the Philippines, July 2, 2014

14. Govt. of the USA vs. Guillermo Purganan, September 24, 2002
FACTS:
Secretary Lantion was to give Mr. Jimenez copies of the request for extradition, its supporting papers, and to grant the
latter a reasonable period to file a comment and supporting evidence. But on motion for reconsideration by the
Secretary of Justice, the decision was reversed. It did however, hold that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to
notice and hearing. On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA filed the Petition for Extradition with the RTC,
praying that an order for his “immediate arrest” be issued right away in order to prevent Jimenez’s flight. Before the
RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before the same an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,” praying
that his application be set for hearing. After the hearing, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum therein stating that
he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000 should a warrant be issued. The court ordered the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and
posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty. The US Government filed a petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and
fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still no
local jurisprudence to guide lower court.

ISSUE: Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process.

RULING:
No. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. A subsequent
opportunity to be heard is enough. Thus, there can be no violation of due process. Mr. Jimenez would have the full
opportunity to be heard when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. He would also enjoy, during the
hearings, the full chance to be heard and fundamental fairness. Also worth of note is that, before the US government
requested the extradition of Mr. Jimenez, proceedings had already been conducted. Having had the opportunity in the
requesting state, instead of taking it, he ran away.

15. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood Inc. vs. COMELEC, April 29, 2010
FACTS:
The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) files a petition for review and a motion for reconsideration
to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI
and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009. These resolutions delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
According to Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941, known as Party-List System Act, COMELEC, upon verified
complaint of any interested party, may remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if: (1) it fails to participate in the last two preceding elections or
(2)fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered. For May 2010 Elections, the COMELEC en banc issued
Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions.
Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes
cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections. PGBI filed its opposition to Resolution No. 8679 and
likewise, sought for accreditation as a party-list organization. One of the arguments cited is that the Supreme Court's
ruling in G.R. No. 177548 – MINERO(Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association) vs COMELEC cannot apply in the
instant controversy. One of the reasons is because the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBI's.
Additionally, the requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 179271 – BANAT
(Barangay Association for Advancement and National Transparency) vs COMELEC.COMELEC denied the motion and in
response, pointed out that the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and
did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PGBI’s right to due process was violated.
RULING:
No. PGBIs right to due process was not violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a
reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to
administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. The
court finds it obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process. In any case, given the
result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint on due process grounds.

15.a. Emilio Ramon Ejercito vs. Commission on Elections et. al., November 25, 2014

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

16. TELEBAP vs. COMELEC, 289 scra 337
FACTS
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio
and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The other
petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under a
franchise granted by Congress. They challenge the validity of Section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and television
broadcast companies to provide free air time to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and other political
purposes. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time and they
raised the following issues (1) that it takes property with-out due process of law and without just compensation; (2)
that it denies radio and television broad-cast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of
the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information
during the period of election. Petitioners complain that the provision singles out radio and televi-sion stations to provide
free air time. They contend that there was a different treatment with news-papers and magazines for they are not
similarly required for the print space.

ISSUE:Whether or not there was a violation of equal protection clause in this case.

HELD:
The argument will not bear analysis. It rests on the fallacy that broadcast media are entitled to the same treatment
under the free speech guarantee of the Constitution as the print media. There are important differences in the
characteristics of the two media, however, which justify their dif-ferential treatment for free speech purposes. Because
of the physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the government must, of necessity, allocate broadcast
frequencies to those wishing to use them. There is no similar justification for government allocation and regulation of
the print media. The reason for this is that, as already noted, the government spends public funds for the allocation and
regulation of the broadcast industry, which it does not do in the case of the print media. To require the radio and
television broadcast industry to provide free air time for the COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for what the industry
gets. The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos. On the other
hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming universal. Their message may be
simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners including the indif-ferent or unwilling who
happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and
immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and
reject the utterance. Petitioners' assertion therefore that assailed provision denies them the equal protection of the law
has no basis.

17. People vs. Jalosjos, 324 scra 689

Fact:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for
statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the
duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance
of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented. Jalosjos further argues that on
several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or
medical reasons. Further, Jalosjos admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has been
receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been discharging his mandate as a member of the House
of Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under detention.

Issue:Whether or not being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment and a substantial differentiation
which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law.

HELD:
NO. The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws."

This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights .The organs of government may not show any undue
favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The
accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members
of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by
public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

18. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, December 7, 2010
Fact:
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under
the Office of the President tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration and submit their findings and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes
between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no
power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information
in our courts of law. Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.

It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation; The provisions
of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President
to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely
new office was inexistent like the Truth Commission; The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it
the power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ. It violates the equal protection clause

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.

Ruling:
Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating
Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the
President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality
of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or
that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.

19. COMELEC vs. Conrado Cruz, et. al., November 20, 2009
Facts:
The constitutional challenge, originally filed before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 128 (RTC), against the following highlighted
portion of Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 (entitled An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections,
amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991):

Sec. 2. Term of Office. The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years.

No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position: Provided, however, That the term of office
shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.

The RTC granted the petition and declared the challenged proviso constitutionally infirm. The present petition, filed by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), seeks a review of the RTC decision.

The COMELEC takes the position that the assailed law is valid and constitutional. RA No. 9164 is an amendatory law to RA No. 7160 (the Local
Government Code of 1991 or LGC) and is not a penal law; hence, it cannot be considered an ex post facto law. The three-term limit, according to the
COMELEC, has been specifically provided in RA No. 7160, and RA No. 9164 merely restated the three-term limitation. It further asserts that laws
which are not penal in character may be applied retroactively when expressly so provided and when it does not impair vested rights. As there is no
vested right to public office, much less to an elective post, there can be no valid objection to the alleged retroactive application of RA No. 9164.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9164 is unconstitutional?

Held:
Petition Granted. The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is found under its Section 2, Article III, which provides: Nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws. Essentially, the equality guaranteed under this clause is equality under the same conditions and among
persons similarly situated. It is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are different from one another on the basis of
substantial distinctions related to the objective of the law; when things or persons are different in facts or circumstances, they may be treated
differently in law. Appreciation of how the constitutional equality provision applies inevitably leads to the conclusion that no basis exists in the
present case for an equal protection challenge. The law can treat barangay officials differently from other local elective officials because the
Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between these elective officials with respect to length of term and term limitation. The clear
distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution provides for a three-year term and three-term limit for local elective
officials, it left the length of term and the application of the three-term limit or any form of term limitation for determination by Congress through
legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment recognize substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-
uniform treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under these conditions.

From another perspective, we see no reason to apply the equal protection clause as a standard because the challenged proviso did not result in any
differential treatment between barangay officials and all other elective officials. This conclusion proceeds from our ruling on the retroactivity issue
that the challenged proviso does not involve any retroactive application.

20.a. Jose Miguel Arroyo vs. Department of Justice et. al., September 18, 2012
Facts:
The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint committee with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct
preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections.

The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007
National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. In its initial report, the Fact-Finding
Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and
Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be
subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage.

After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be
filed against GMA, et al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protection clause?
Ruling:
Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not violate the equal protection clause. Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding
Team is in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because its sole purpose is the investigation and prosecution of certain persons
and incidents. They insist that the Joint Panel was created to target only the Arroyo Administration as well as public officials linked to the Arroyo
Administration.

While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there
were public officers who were investigated upon in connection with their acts in the performance of their official duties. Private individuals were also
subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee. The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to
eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, it does not demand absolute
equality. It merely requires that all persons under like circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. Petition Dismissed.

20.b. Republic vs. Daisy Yahon, June 16, 2014

Fact
Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the issuance of protection order under the provisions of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262,3 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," against her
husband, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt. Yahon), an enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army who retired in January
2006. Respondent and S/Sgt. Yahon were married on June 8, 2003. The couple did not have any child but respondent
has a daughter with her previous live-in partner.

The Local Police Officers and the Barangay Officials through the Chairman in the area where the petitioner and
respondent live at Poblacion, Claveria, Misamis Oriental and Bobuntogan, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental are directed to
respond to any request for assistance from the petitioner for the implementation of this order. They are also directed to
accompany the petitioner to their conjugal abode at Purok 2, Bobuntogan, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental to get her personal
belongings in order to insure the safety of the petitioner.

The Deputy Sheriff of this Court is ordered to immediately serve the Temporary Protection Order (TPO) upon the
respondent personally and to seek and obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents, if needed, for purposes of
effecting the smooth implementation of this order.

Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection

Ruling
Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term “employer,” which includes in its coverage the military institution, S/Sgt. Yahon’s employer.
Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers, whether private or government. It
bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child support, is a support enforcement legislation. In the United States, provisions of the
Child Support Enforcement Act allow garnishment of certain federal funds where the intended recipient has failed to satisfy a legal obligation of child
support.

As these provisions were designed “to avoid sovereign immunity problems” and provide that “moneys payable by the Government to any individual
are subject to child support enforcement proceedings,” the law is clearly intended to “create a limited waiver of sovereign immunity so that state
courts could issue valid orders directed against Government agencies attaching funds in their possession.”

This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and does not violate the equal protection clause. In Garcia v. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352
(2013), the issue of constitutionality was raised by a husband after the latter failed to obtain an injunction from the CA to enjoin the implementation
of a protection order issued against him by the RTC. We ruled that R.A. No. 9262 rests on real substantial distinctions which justify the classification
under the law: the unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence;
and the widespread bias and prejudice against women.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
20.b. Raul H. Sesbreno vs. Court of Appeals, March 26, 2014
Fact:
It all has to do with an incident that occurred at around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of May 11, 1989. On that day, the
Violation of Contracts (VOC) Team of defendants–appellees Constantino and Arcilla and their PC escort, Balicha,
conducted a routine inspection of the houses at La Paloma Village, Labangon, Cebu City, including that of plaintiff–
appellant Sesbreño, for illegal connections, meter tampering, seals, conduit pipes, jumpers, wiring connections, and
meter installations. After Bebe Baledio, plaintiff–appellant Sesbreño’s maid, unlocked the gate, they inspected the
electric meter and found that it had been turned upside down. Defendant–appellant Arcilla took photographs of the
upturned electric meter. With Chuchie Garcia, Peter Sesbreño and one of the maids present, they removed said meter
and replaced it with a new one. At that time, plaintiff–appellant Sesbreño was in his office and no one called to inform
him of the inspection. The VOC Team then asked for and received Chuchie Garcia’s permission to enter the house itself
to examine the kind and number of appliances and light fixtures in the household and determine its electrical load.
Afterwards, Chuchie Garcia signed the Inspection Division Report, which showed the condition of the electric meter on
May 11, 1989 when the VOC Team inspected it, with notice that it would be subjected to a laboratory test. She also
signed a Load Survey Sheet that showed the electrical load of plaintiff–appellant Sesbreño.

But according to plaintiff–appellant Sesbreño there was nothing routine or proper at all with what the VOC Team did on
May 11, 1989 in his house. Their entry to his house and the surrounding premises was effected without his permission
and over the objections of his maids. They threatened, forced or coerced their way into his house. They unscrewed the
electric meter, turned it upside down and took photographs thereof. They then replaced it with a new electric meter.
They searched the house and its rooms without his permission or a search warrant. They forced a visitor to sign two
documents, making her appear to be his representative or agent. Afterwards, he found that some of his personal
effects were missing, apparently stolen by the VOC Team when they searched the house

Issue:Whether or not there is a violation of the right of search and seizure

Ruling
The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is intended as a restraint against the Government
and its agents tasked with law enforcement. It is to be invoked only to ensure freedom from arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of State power. The Court has made this clear in its pronouncements, including that made in People v. Marti,
193 SCRA 57 (1991) viz.: If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the
intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act
of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.

20.c. Lim vs. Felix, 194 scra 292

Facts:
On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the
municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes,
Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr.
survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. An investigation of the incident then followed. Thereafter, and for
the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing
Vicente Lim, Sr. et al of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident.

After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order concluding that a probable cause has been
established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a
recommendation of no bail.

On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the Court a verified petition for change
of venue. The Court issued an en banc Resolution authorizing the change of venue from the Regional Trial Court of
Masbate to the Regional Trial Court of Makati to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The cases were raffled to Branch 56
presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix. Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent
court several motions and manifestations, among others was an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial
records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best
enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima facie
evidence as well as its determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution
that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable
cause. Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued warrants
of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein.

Issue: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation
that a probable cause exists.

Ruling:
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are
in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial
Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

The Court reiterated that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the
evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case
and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence
before him, he issues a warrant of arrest. Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied
solely on the Prosecutor's certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having before him
any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause.
The instant petitions were GRANTED. The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56,
Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. The Temporary
Restraining Orders and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued in the instant Petitions are made PERMANENT.

20.d. People vs. Edano, July 7, 2014

Fact:
The prosecution charged the appellant Edaño and Godofredo Siochi with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 under two separate
Informations. The appellant and Siochi pleaded not guilty to the charge on arraignment. Joint trial on the merits followed.

Prosecution Defense

Witnesses: Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Aylin Casignia and Police Officer Witnesses: Siochi and Ruben Forteza
(PO) 3 Elmer Corbe

On the evening of August 6, 2002, members of the Metro Manila Drugs
Enforcement Group, together with a female informant, went to the
parking area of McDonalds, West Avenue to conduct an entrapment
operation against a certain alias "Nato."
At around 7:00 p.m., the appellant arrived on board a space wagon
driven by Siochi. 5 The informant approached the appellant and talked to
him inside the vehicle. Afterwards, the informant waved at PO3 Corbe. 6
When PO3 Corbe was approaching the appellant, the latter went out of
the vehicle and ran away.
PO3 Corbe recovered a "knot-tied" transparent plastic bag from the
appellant's right hand, while PO3 Alcancia seized a gun tucked in the
appellant's waist. The other members of the police arrested Siochi.
Thereafter, the police brought the appellant, Siochi and the seized items
to the police station for investigation.
P/Insp. Casignia, the Forensic Chemical Officer examined the seized
items and found them positive for the presence of shabu.
At around 4:00 p.m. on August 6, 2002, he called Siochi on the phone,
and informed him that the motorbike starter the latter needed was already
available. On the same day, Vanessa Paduada called the appellant, and
asked for the directions to McDonalds, West Avenue. At around 6:00
p.m., Siochi and Ruben arrived at the gate of Philam Homes on board a
space wagon. The appellant met them at the subdivision gate, and
showed the starter to Siochi. Thereafter, Vanessa called on the
appellant's cellular phone. The appellant then boarded the vehicle, and
told Siochi that he would just talk to a person at McDonalds. Afterwards,
Vanessa called him from inside a parked car. The appellant approached
Vanessa who, for her part, alighted from the car. Vanessa told the
appellant to get inside the car's rear. The appellant did as instructed.
Immediately after, the male driver alighted from the vehicle and entered
the car's rear. The appellant went out of the car, but the male driver
followed him and grabbed his hand. The appellant resisted, and wrestled
with the driver along West Avenue. During this commotion, the
appellant heard a gunfire; four (4) persons approached him, and then tied
his hands with a masking tape. The police placed him on board a pick-up
truck, and then brought him to Bicutan. In Bicutan, the police brought
him to the interrogation room, where they punched him and placed a
plastic on his head.

Issue:Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid, and if so, whether or not the seized items were admissible

Ruling:
No, the shabu purportedly seized from the appellant is inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.

Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an o ffense. This is known as
arrest in flagrante delicto.
"For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer."

In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be properly attributed to the appellant to rouse suspicion in
the mind of PO3 Corbe that he (appellant) had just committed, was actually committing, or was attempting to commit a crime. In fact, PO3 Corbe
testified that the appellant and the informant were just talking with each other when he approached them.

As testified to by PO3 Corbe himself, the appellant and the informant were just talking to each other; there was no exchange of money and drugs
when he approached the car. Notably, while it is true that the informant waved at PO3 Corbe, the latter admitted that this was not the pre-arranged
signal to signify that the sale of drugs had been consummated. PO3 Corbe also admitted on cross-examination that he had no personal knowledge on
whether there was a prohibited drug and gun inside the space wagon when he approached it. That the appellant attempted to run away when PO3
Corbe approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the police officer with personal knowledge that the
appellant had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity

As the Court explained in People v. Villareal:

Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to one's consciousness of guilt. It is not a reliable indicator of
guilt without other circumstances, for even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for flight, including fear of retribution for
speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party.

In other words, trying to run away when no crime has been overtly committed, cannot be evidence of guilt. Considering that the appellant's
warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag containing white
crystalline substances seized from him is inadmissible in evidence, having come from an invalid search and seizure.

21. Manalili vs. Court of Appeals, 280 scra 400

Facts:
At about 2:10 o’clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a
surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City. They then chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The
male person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the
latter approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his hands.
The male person tried to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said male person had in his hands. The latter showed
the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed
marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents. Then the accused was arrested.

Issue: Whether a search and seizure could be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest.
Ruling:
Yes. In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise,
such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee. This right,
however, is not absolute. The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and
seizure, viz.: "(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the
accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure." In People vs. Encinada, the Court further explained that in these cases,
the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as the essential requirement. Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another
exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that there were many instances
where a search and seizure could be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk. To require the police
officers to search the bag only after they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the circumstances.
In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or to maintain the
status quo while obtaining more information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur. Herein, Patrolman Espiritu and his
companions observed during their surveillance that Manalili had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which
according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts

21.a. People of the Philippines vs. Nazareno Villareal, March 18, 2013
Facts:
In the morning of December 25, 2006, Police officer Renato de Leon was driving his motorcycle. From a distance of 8 to
10 meters he saw the appellant Villareal, holding a plastic sachet of shabu. When Villareal saw him, he immediately ran
away. When de Leon caught Villareal, he was brought to the police station where he was arrested and the alleged
shabu was turned over to be marked as evidence. The substance was tested and was proven to be a 0.03 gram of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The appellant was charged with the violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. 9165 for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

During the trial de Leon claimed that the appellant had previous criminal charges for the same offense and that he
arrested the appellant because when he saw that the appellant was holding a powdery white substance, it immediately
gave him suspicion as to the matter thereof.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest based on the police officers personal knowledge of the
criminal record of the appellant.

Ruling:
No, there was no valid warrantless arrest. A lawful warrantless arrest exists when either of the following circumstances
are present: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is
attempting to commit an offense, (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that he person to be arrested has committed it, and © when
the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is service final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

Based on the distance and the amount of the powdery substance it is insufficient to conclude, even with clear vision
that such substance constitutes as shabu. The act of the appellant of examining the substance is not tantamount to
arouse suspicion of a commission or possible commission of a crime even if he has previous criminal history on the
same offense.

Personal knowledge is not defined as knowledge of a person’s criminal record, but personal knowledge as to the actual
commission of the crime. The act of running away from authority also does not automatically imply guilt on the
accused. There are various reasons to run away from authority, and commission of a crime is just one of the possible
reasons. Because there is an absence of overt act there is no justification for the appellant’s warrantless arrest. Hence,
it cannot be presented as evidence in court as it is a fruit of the poisonous tree.

22. People of the Philippines vs. Edison Sucro, March 18, 1991
Facts
On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr to monitor the activities of
appellant Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana.

As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio Positioned himself under the house of a certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo Street.
Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something
which turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the
same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the activity going on. P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to
continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later Identified as Ronnie
Macabante, was transacting with appellant.

At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio
told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and appellant. P/Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and Maagma
Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of
marijuana. When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from appellant (Edison Sucro) in front of the chapel. The police
team then was able to overtake and arrest appellant at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of
marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante,

Issue Whether or not the arrest of the accused without warrant is lawful and whether or not the evidence of such arrest is admissible.

Ruling
As the Solicitor General has pointed out:

There are several instances when a warrantless search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest provided the
same is effected on the basis of probable cause (e.g. stop and search without warrant at checkpoints). Between warrantless searches and seizures at
checkpoints and in the case at bar the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of probable cause.
Under the circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for the arresting officers, to arrest appellant who was in fact
selling marijuana and to seize the contraband.

That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 [1986]).
Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant. (People v. Castiller, G.R. No. 87783, August 6, 1990)

23. People vs. Abe Valdes, September 5, 2000

Facts:
This is an automatic review for the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27 sentencing Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz
to death penalty for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

SPO3 Marcelo Tipay testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence of a
marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by appellant. The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. Police Inspector Alejandro
R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the report. Inspector Parungao
gave them specific instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same."

At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team, accompanied by their informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants
were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by
their informant. The police found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and
saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut.PO2 Balut asked appellant who
owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which
weighed 2.194 kilograms. The police took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants. Appellant was then arrested. One of the plants,
weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis. Inspector Prevy
Fabros Luwis, the Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic examination of said plant, she found cystolitic hairs containing
calcium carbonate, a positive indication for marijuana.

Issue: Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case lawful?

Ruling: The Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the
search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being
the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded. Such evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In
the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana plants before appellant was arrested without a warrant.

Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant's premises. Note further that the police team was dispatched to
appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of the
cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the
area" before they could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was
needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be
made to apply.

For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where
they are; and (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. Valdez is
ACQUITTED.

24. People vs. Chua Ho San, 308 scra 432

Fact:
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Chief of Police Jim Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police Station, La Union
began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio call at around
12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting for police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the
latter had spotted. According to Almoite, the vessel looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisher folk of the area and was poised to dock
at Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by SPO1 Reynoso Badua, proceeded immediately to Tammocalao beach and there conferred with
Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger, who was later identified as Chua Ho San. When the speedboat landed,
the male passenger alighted, carrying a multicolored strawbag, and walked towards the road. Upon seeing the police officers, the man changed
direction and broke into a run. Badua held Chua’s right arm to prevent him from fleeing. They then introduced themselves as police officers;
however, Chua did not understand what they’re saying. CID then resorted to "sign language;" he motioned with his hands for Chua to open the bag.
Chua apparently understood and acceded to the request. The said bag was found to contain several transparent plastics containing yellowish
crystalline substances, which was later identified to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Chua was then brought to Bacnotan Police
Station, where he was provided with an interpreter to inform him of his constitutional rights.

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted by the Police Officers constitute a valid exemption from the warrant
requirement.

Ruling:
The Court held in the negative. The Court explains that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or residence except
if conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in accordance with the Rules. However, warrantless searches may be permitted in the
following cases, to wit:(1)search of moving vehicles, (2)seizure in plain view, (3)customs searches, (4)waiver or consent searches, (5)stop and frisk
situations (Terry search), and (6)search incidental to a lawful arrest. It is required in cases of in flagrante delicto that the arresting officer must have
personal knowledge of such facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause.

Probable cause means a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's
belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. In the case at bar, there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive
or demonstrative of CHUA's participation in ongoing criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search.
CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent.

The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the
process of perpetrating an offense. With these, the Court held that there was no probable cause to justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The
Court likewise did not appreciate the contention of the Prosecution that there was a waiver or consented search. If CHUA could not understand what
was orally articulated to him, how could he understand the police's "sign language?" More importantly, it cannot logically be inferred from his
alleged cognizance of the "sign language" that he deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his right against such an intrusive search. Finally,
being a forbidden fruit, the subject regulated substance was held to be inadmissible in evidence. Hence, the accused was acquitted as the evidence
was not sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

25. People vs. Tangliben, 184 scra 220

Facts:
Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting surveillance at the San Fernando Victory Liner Terminal. At
around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a traveling bag who acted suspiciously. They
confronted him, inspected his bag, and there they found marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken to the Police
Headquarters for further investigations. The Trial Court found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425
or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Issue: Whether or not the search is unlawful

Ruling: The court ruled that the search was lawful.

One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus,
Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls
squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid.

In the case of People v. Claudia, 160 SCRA 646, Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat.
Daniel did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search
being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco V. Paño, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no
infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.

In People v. Amininudin, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from an informer that accused-appellant. was on
board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they waited for him one evening,
approached him as he descended from the gangplank, detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. Said bag
contained marijuana leaves. The Court held that the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence since it was seized
illegally. The records show, however, that there were certain facts, not sing in the case before us, which led the Court
to declare the seizure as invalid. As stated therein:

The present case presented no such urgency From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they
had at react two days within which they could have obtained a warrant of arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming
to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And
from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to
justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights
was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own
authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."

In contrast, the instant case presented urgency. Although the trial court's decision did not mention it, the transcript of
stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana.
(TSN, pp. 52-53) Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough
time to secure a search warrant. We cannot therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin to the case at bar. To require
search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors,
smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes
with which these persons are associated.

26. People vs. Leila Johnson, December 18, 2000

Facts:
Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker of the NAIA departure area. When Ramirez frisked Leila Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the
United States, she felt something hard on the latter’s abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as
she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her
superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile who directed her to take accused-appellant to the nearest women’s room for inspection accompanied by SPO1
Rizalina Bernal. Inside the womens room, Johnson brought out three plastic packs, later identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu with
a total weight of 580.2 grams. Johnson claimed that the shabu confiscated from her is inadmissible as evidence because she was forced to affix her
signature on the plastic bags while she was detained at the 1st RASO office, without the assistance of counsel and without having been informed of
her constitutional rights.

Issue: Whether or not the shabu confiscated is inadmissible as evidence.

Ruling:
No, the shabu is not inadmissible as evidence. What is involved in this case is an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid search made on her
person. The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was validly arrested
without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Travellers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if
any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. The packs of methamphetamine
hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against Johnson. Johnson’s subsequent
arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person in flagrante
delicto.
Anent Johnson’s allegation that her signature on the shabu packs had been obtained while she was in the custody of the airport authorities without
the assistance of counsel, the Solicitor General correctly points out that nowhere in the records is it indicated that Johnson was required to affix her
signature to the packs.

27. People vs. Malmstedt, 198 scra 401

Facts:
Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a tourist. At
about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, Captain Alen Vasco ordered his men to set up a temporary
checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the
Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles
coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by
the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession
prohibited drugs. At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. During the
inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist.

Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification
papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his
waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer
noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the
wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

Issue: Whether or not the search and arrest of the accused was illegal for it is made without a valid search warrant.

Held: A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person when in his presence the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The receipt of
information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the
suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to
reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances
arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused.

28. Valmonte vs. De Villa, 178 scra 211

Facts:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within
its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development
of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in
various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and
Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) aver that: (1) because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of
Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to
regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court
order; (2) the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without
search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution; and, (3) instances have occurred where a citizen, while
not killed, had been harassed.

Issue: Whether or not the conduct of military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures

Ruling:
No. Military and police checkpoints do not violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures. The
Court held that not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each
case. Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public
fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.

Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right
against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner
that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even
irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part
of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

29. People vs. De Gracia, 233 scra 716

Facts:
Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) staged coup d’état in December 1989
against the Government. Efren Soria of Intelligence Division, NCR Defense Command, together with his team,
conducted a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office in EDSA, QC on early morning of December 1, 1989, which
surveillance actually started November 30, 1989 at around 10:00 PM. Such surveillance was conducted pursuant to an
intelligence report that the said establishment was being occupied by the elements of the RAM-SFP as communication
command post.

Near the Eurocar office, there were crowd watching the on-going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo when a group of
5 men disengaged themselves and walked towards their surveillance car. Maj. Soria ordered the driver to start the car
and leave the area. However, as they passed the area, then 5 men drew their guns and fired at them, which resulted to
the wounding of the driver. Nobody in the surveillance team retaliated for they were afraid that civilians might be
caught in the crossfire.

Thereafter, on the morning of December 5, 1989, a search team raided the Eurocar Sales Office and confiscated 6
cartons of M-16 ammunition, 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and molotov. Obenia, who first
entered the establishment, found De Gracia in the office of a certain Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously
peeping though door. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, there was so
much disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was
simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently
closed.

Issue Whether there was a valid search and seizure in this case.

Ruling:
YES, there was a valid search and seizure in this case. It is admitted that the raiding team was not armed with a search
warrant at that time. It was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters
by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conductedon the premises wherein the surveillance team was
fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place,  the
occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break
into the office.

The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual
depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence
of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably explained.

In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that timebecause of simultaneous and intense firing within the
vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the
surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted.

Under circumstances, SC considered that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a
warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had
reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently  more than sufficient
probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, in the prevailing situation, the raiding team had no opportunity to
apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989
when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant
could lawfully be dispensed with.

30. Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board, et. al., November 3, 2008
Facts:
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to
prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing
paragraphs (c),(d) and (f) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 which provides that random drug testing will be conducted on
Students of secondary and tertiary schools and also to officers and employees of public and private offices persons,
while mandatory drug testing to All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm, for the persons constitutional right against unreasonable searches is breached by said
provisions.

Issue: Whether or not paragraph (c) and (d) and (f) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 violates the persons constitutional right
against unreasonable searches.

Ruling:
Sec. 36 (c) and (d) of RA 9165 is Constitutional but Sec. 36(f) is unconstitutional. Using US Jurisprudence, the Court
ruled in favor of the constitutionality of Sec 36(c) applying the following reasonable deduction: (1) schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights
than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools,
acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt such
measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions
on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory. It is within the prerogative of educational
institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and
policies. Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by
Sec. 36 (d) of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable. The Court notes in this
regard that petitioner Social Justice Society, other than saying that subjecting almost everybody to drug testing,
without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy.

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities. Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as
couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the
employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment
is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled
out in advance for drug testing.

The intrusion into the employees privacy is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing
leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal. Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and
employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on
public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of
reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by
constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost
responsibility and efficiency. In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutors office, a mandatory
drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to
their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutors office and peaceably submitting
themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right
to privacy.

31. Pollo vs. Constantino-David, et. al., October 18, 2011

Facts:
An unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson which read that an employee of your agency is lawyering to an accused
government employee who have a pending case in the CSC. Chairperson David immediately formed a team and issued a memo directing them to
conduct an investigation and specifically "to back up all the files in the computers. The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers was
witnessed by several employees. Chairperson David made an observation that most of the draft pleadings found in the computer of petitioner are for
and on behalves of parties gives rise to the inference that the one who prepared them was knowingly, deliberately and willfully aiding and advancing
interests adverse and inimical to the interest of the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government tasked to discipline misfeasance and
malfeasance in the government service. Petitioner denies allegation and accused CSC officials of conducting a "fishing expedition" when they
unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer and these would violate his constitutional right to privacy and protection against self-
incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. The CSC issued a resolution and petitioner guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, etc. CA
dismissed his appeal and his motion for reconsideration. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the search conducted on petitioner ‘s computer violates his right against unreasonable searches and seizure?

Ruling:
Public employers have an interest in ensuring that their agencies operate in an effective and efficient manner, and the work of these agencies
inevitably suffers from the inefficiency, incompetence, mismanagement, or other work-related misfeasance of its employees. Therefore, a probable
cause requirement for searches of the type at issue here would impose intolerable burdens on public employers.

The search conducted on petitioner's computer was justified at its inception and scope. Even conceding for a moment that there is no such
administrative policy, there is no doubt in the mind of the Commission that the search of Pollo's computer has successfully passed the test of
reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its capacity as a government
employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted
from the warrant requirement. At the inception of the search, a complaint was received recounting that a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV
was "lawyering" for parties having pending cases with the said regional office or in the Commission. The nature of the imputation was serious, as it
was grievously disturbing. Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any possible
adverse consequence or fall-out.

The warrantless search done on computer assigned to Pollo was not, in any way, vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of the
managerial prerogative of the Commission as an employer aimed at ensuring its operational effectiveness and efficiency by going after the work-
related misfeasance of its employees. Consequently, the evidence derived from the questioned search are deemed admissible.f dismissal with all its
accessory penalties, pursuant to existing rules and regulations.

WRIT OF AMPARO

32. Sec. of DND et. al. vs. Raymund Manalo, et. al., October 7, 2008
Facts:
On February 14, 2006 past afternoon, Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging
to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and
torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007. Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition,
Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right
to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on
October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition
as amparo petition. On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA
ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all
official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos’ custody, confirm the present places of official assignment
of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under
military custody. The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to
reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.

Issue: Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for the right to security of a person may be invoked.

Ruling:
In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the Manalos right to
security. The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security
has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by
private individuals or entities. Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and
protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents’
abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will
again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life,
actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court explained. The right to security of person is a guarantee
of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a
general rule, one’s body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the
context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may
constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury
increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against
persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.

33. Robert Reyes vs. Sec. Raul Gonzales, December 3, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner Robert Reyes together with forty-nine (49) others were arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege and brought to Camp Crame to await
inquest proceedings. The Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecution conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was
probable cause to hold petitioner the others for trial on charge of Rebellion and/or inciting to Rebellion. Then upon the request of the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued and Hold Departure Order (HDO) ordering respondent
Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure list of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of the petitioner
and 49 others. After finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for the crime of Rebellion, the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an
Information before the RTC, Makati. The petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable cause and release of the accused Reyes
upon recognizance asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce any evidence indicating his specific participation of the crime charged. The RTC
dismissed the charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. Then petitioners counsel Atty. Francisco Chavez wrote
the DOJ secretary requesting the lifting of HDO in view of the dismissal of the criminal case against him.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of the subject to HDO, which
would entitle him to the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.

Held:
No, In order for the him to be entitled to privilege of the Writ of Amparo, the Court must be preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of
the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the
rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.

The restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has
failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his rights.

33-A. In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data in favor of Noriel H. Rodriguez vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo,
et. al., November 15, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan ( Kagimugan). An organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged the KMP as enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when refused to confess to
his membership in the NPA. Later, Rodriguez was freed under certain conditions. Were Rodriguez was made to sign an affidavit stating that he was
neither abducted nor tortured. Then on December 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for Writ
of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders. And on January 6, 2012, respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration, Arguing that soldiers
belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military cannot be held accountable for authoring the abduction and torture of
the petitioner.

Issue: Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in Amparo and Habeas Data cases.

Held:
The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the
abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from
applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances. Command responsibility may be loosely applied to amparo cases in order to identify those accountable individuals that
have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute
criminal responsibility merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

34. Marynette Gamboa vs. Marlou C. Chan et. al., July 24, 2012
Fact:
Former PGMA issued Administrative Order No. 275 "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged
Existence of Private Armies in the Country. The body, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission, was
formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them and
dismantling them permanently in the future. Gamboa alleged that the PNP–Ilocos Norte conducted a series of
surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly without
the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa
Commission,  thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.  
The report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG was published and released in the
different form of media. Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified
information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zeñarosa Commission. As a result, she claimed
that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report
also made her, as well as her supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to harassment and police
surveillance operations.

Gamboa filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents. The trial court ruled that the
inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining PAGs constituted a violation of her right to privacy However, the
RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that the subject
information originated from respondents,.

Issue: Whether or not the forwarding of information or intelligence report by PNP tot he Commission was unlawful act
that violated petitioner’s right to privacy.

Ruling:
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not recognized by the
duly constituted authority.

Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim,
which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently. Pursuant to
the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and functions accorded to the Zeñarosa
Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored
them and counteracted their activities. One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.

This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the Report listing her as a
PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the
PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty
or security.

The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for
the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly
authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request
assistance from the latter.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion
on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was
pursuant to a lawful mandate.Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied. WHEREFORE, the
instant petition for review is denied. The assailed Decision insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of
habeas data, is affirmed.

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION

35. Felipe Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, August 26, 1999

Facts:
The evidence shows that, at around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique Ike Lingan,
who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment
City following reports that it was showing nude dancers. After the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered
beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act. As she removed her brassieres,
Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture. At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security
guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and demanded to know why he took a picture. Jalbuena replied: Wala kang
pakialam, because this is my job. Sioco pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he warned the latter that he would kill
him.

This angered Lingan. The two then had a heated exchange. Finally, Lingan said: Masyado kang abusado, alisin mo yang
baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo. petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow.
Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on
the forehead which floored him. Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: Kita mo yan ha, buhay kang testigo, si
Ike Lingan ang naghamon. He said to Sgt. Aonuevo: Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter, sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin,
na si Ike Lingan ang naghamon. He then poked his gun at the right temple of Jalbuena and made him sign his name on
the blotter. Jalbuena could not affix his signature. His right hand was trembling and he simply wrote his name in print.
Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro to his office, while a policeman took Lingan to the
Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station manager of DWTI, Boy Casaada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had been
taken to the hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died from his injuries.Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was
able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased.

Issue: Whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping

Ruling:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described: It shall also be unlawful for any
person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any
tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word
secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same
for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any
copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not
be covered by this prohibition.

SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the
same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the
preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.

Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since the exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a
witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded;
and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena
testified that he personally made the voice recording;that the tape played in court was the one he recorded;]and that
the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan.A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication
of the tape presented by the prosecution.

Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated exchange between petitioner
Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of
violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.

36. Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 248 scra 590

Facts:
A case was filed by Socorro Ramirez in the RTC of Quezon City against private respondent Esther Garcia alleging that the latter “vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy.” Ramirez produced a verbatim transcript to the event alleged. The transcript was taken from a tape recording during the confrontation.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the conversation was illegal, Respondent Garcia filed
a criminal case against Ramirez alleging that the recording of the event was illegal and thus, a violation of RA 4200, entitled “ An Act to prohibit and
penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes. Ramirez filed a motion to quash on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense. The trial court agreed with her and granted motion to quash, reasoning that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense under RA 4200; and that the violation punished by RA 4200 refers to the taping of a communication by a person other than a
participant to the communication. The CA reversed the decision of the lower court. Hence the petition.

Issue:Whether or not the Anti-Wire tapping Act applies in the recordings by one the parties in the conversation

Ruling:
Section 1 of RA 4200 provides “ It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken
word, to tap and wire or cable, or by using and other device or arrangement to secretly overhear, intercept or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a Dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.

Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “ private communication” in Section 1 of RA 4200 does not include “ private conversations” narrows the
ordinary meaning of the word communication to point of absurdity.

37. Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 scra 699

Facts:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the
clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's
secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation
and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence obtained can be held inadmissible as it violated his right of privacy of
communication.

Ruling:
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the
other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or
to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor
wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither
may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the
other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is
a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other.

38. Waterous Drugs Corporation vs. NLRC, October 16, 1997

Facts:
Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. YSP Inc., a supplier of medicine, sold to
Waterous, thru Catolico, 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc.
showed that the price per bottle is P320.00. Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was
found that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced.

YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents refund of jack-up price
of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice, which was paid to Ms. Catolico. Said check was sent in an envelope
addressed to Catolico. Catolico denied receiving the same. However, Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp.
confirmed that she saw an open envelope with a check amounting P640 payable to Catolico. Waterous Drug Corp.
ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.

NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the
constitutional right invoked by complainants. In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by
government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Issue: Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence

Ruling:
Yes. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private
individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On
the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this,
the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment Suspicion is
not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.

39. Marquez vs. Desierto, June 27, 2001

Facts:
Petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto to produce several bank documents for purposes of in camera
inspection relative to various accounts at Union Bank of the Philippines. The accounts to be inspected were involved in a case pending with the
Ombudsman. The basis of the Ombudsman for ordering an in camera inspection of the accounts is a trial of managers checks purchased by one
George Trivino, a respondent in the said pending case. The Ombudsman issued an order directing petitioner to produce the bank documents relative
to accounts in issue in line of her persistent refusal to comply with the order which they sais as an unjustified and is merely intended to delay the
investigation of the case; constitutes disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order issued by this office is punishable as Indirect under R.A 6770.
Petitioner together with Union Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for a declaratory relief, prohibition and injunctions with RTC. On August 21,
1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite her in contempt on the ground that compliance with Ombudsman by Agapito B. Rosales.
Petitioner filed with the Ombudsman an opposition to the motion to the motion to cite her in contempt on the ground that compliance with the
Ombudsman’s order would violate R.A. No 1405. But was denied.

Issue: Whether or not an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on bank secrecy of bank deposits.

Held:
An examination of the secrecy of bank deposits law (RA 1405) would reveal the following exceptions:
1. The depositor consents in writing;
2. 2. In impeachment case;
3. By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials;
4. Deposit is subject of litigation;
5. In cases of unexplained wealth.

In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is existing is an investigation by the office of the
Ombudsman. In shirt, what the Office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameao,
et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.

40. Ople vs. Torres, July 23, 1998

Facts:
President Fidel V. Ramos issued AO No. 308 entitled “ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM”. Petitioner assailed its constitutionality on the grounds that the administrative order issued by the
executive is deemed to be a law and not a mere administrative order thus it is a usurpation of legislative power of the
congress to make laws, and it impermissibly intrudes the citizen’s constitutional right of privacy.

Issue: Whether or not AO No. 308 violates a person’s right to privacy.

Ruling:
The essence of privacy is the right to be let alone. Administrative Order No. 308 violates the constitutional right to
privacy because its scope is too broad and vague that will put people’s right to privacy in clear and present danger if
implemented. The A.O. 308 also lacks of proper safeguards for protecting the information that will be gathered from
people through biometrics and other means. Thus, A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual’s liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access
confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for “fishing
expeditions” by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

41. TELEBAP vs. COMELEC, supra

Facts:
Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881. on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just
compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power
given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election.

Issue:  Whether is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information
during the period of election.

Held:
No. The petition is dismissed. With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space are
about the only means through which candidates can advertise their qualifications and programs of government. More than merely depriving
candidates of time for their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by the government would clearly deprive the people
of their right to know. Art. III, §7 of the Constitution provides that “the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized,” while Art. XII, §6 states that “the use of property bears a social function [and] the right to own, establish, and operate economic
enterprises [is] subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.”

To affirm the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on
issues in an election is maintained. For while broadcast media are not mere common carriers but entities with free speech rights, they are also public
trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the people have access to the diversity of views on political issues.

This right of the people is paramount to the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of §92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the people’s
right to information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the state’s duty to intervene for the
common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in connection with
the holding of elections is for that common good.

42. ABS-CBN Broadcasting vs. COMELEC, January 28, 2000

Fact:
COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS CBN or any other groups, its
agents or representatives from conducting exit surveys. The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon
"information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage
of the elections and to make an exit survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for
President and Vice President, results of which shall be broadcasted immediately.” The electoral body believed that such
project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for
Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
Two days before the elections on May 11, 1998, the Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by
petitioner ABS-CBN. The Comelec was directed to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed
Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and
reported by media without any difficulty or problem.

Issue: Whether or Not ABS-CBN, in holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results validly exercises
freedoms of speech and of the press.

Ruling:
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. It, cited the following: First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees
or participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the
general sentiment or view of the community or group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at
par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in
general has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here
are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and independent from the
exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the
former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.

Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress incidental
problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of our people.

43. Social Weather Station vs. COMELEC, may 5, 2001

Facts:
Petitioner Social Weather Station and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections and release to
the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey
results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.

Issue:
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and
constitutional?

Ruling:
No. The Court held that Section (5) 4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be
promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs
respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as
diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.

44. A.M. 10-4-03 SC Radio TV Coverage of the Trial in Sandiganbayan, June 21, 2001
Facts: 
On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mgaBrodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letterrequesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the
anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan.  The petitioners
invoked other than the freedom of the press, the constitutional right of the people to be informed of matters of public concern which could only be
recognized, served and satisfied by allowing live radio and television coverage of the court proceedings. Moreover, the live radio and television
coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of justice.
However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 1991, in a case for libel filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino read that the Court resolved to
prohibit live radio and television coverage of court proceedings in view of protecting the parties’ right to due process, to prevent distraction of the
participants in the proceedings and to avoid miscarriage of justice.

Issue: Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and right to information of public concern be given more weight   than the
fundamental rights of the accused.

Ruling : 
The petition is denied. The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information. It also approves
of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the
public with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused
to due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.  

Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings
nor made an object of public's attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influencebut only by evidence
and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded."Television can work profound changes in the behavior of
the people it focuses on."The conscious or unconscious effect that such coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges
cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it

Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held
critically in balance.  A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not
compromised. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit
in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.  In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough
facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to
distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.

45. Newsounds Broadcasting Networks, Inc. vs. Hon. Cesar Dy, April 2, 2009
Facts:
Petitioners Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc. (Newsounds) and Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS)
operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC) and Star FM DWIT Cauayan in Cauayan Citry, Isabela. Back in
1996, Newsounds commenced relocation in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela. The HLURB and OMPDC affirmed and
certified that the commercial structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as well that the
location is classified as a “commercial area”.

The radio station was able to fully operate smoothly thereafter. However in 2002, petitioners’ renewal of mayor’s
permit was denied on the ground that they have not submitted conversion papers showing that the agricultural land
was converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the court to compel the issuance of mayor’s permit but the same
was denied. In the meantime, DAR Region II office issued to petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the
property from agricultural to commercial.

In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayor’s permit, attaching the DAR Order. Respondent
Felicisimo Meer, denied the same, claiming that it was void on the grounds that they did not have record of the DAR
Order. The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia closed the radio
station. Due to the provision of Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio station during the pendency
of election period, COMELEC issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004, but was
barred again by respondent Mayor Cesar Dy on the grounds that the radio station had no permit. Nonetheless,
COMELEC allowed them to run again until June 10, 2004 after elections. Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for
the issuance of mayor’s permit but both courts denied the petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners’ constitutional right of freedom of expression was violated

Ruling:
In the case at bar, the absence of any evidence other than bare assertions that the 1996 to 2001 certifications were
incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion that respondents are estopped from asserting that the previous recognition
of the property as commercial was wrong.

It is thus evident that respondents had no valid cause at all to even require petitioners to secure “approved land
conversion papers from the DAR showing that the property was converted from prime agricultural land to commercial
land.” Respondents closure of petitioner’s radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motives. Petitioners have been
aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and
his political dynasty. Such statement manifests and confirms that respondent’s denial of the renewal applications on the
ground that property is commercial and merely a pretext, and their real agenda is to remove petitioners from Cauayan
City and suppress the latter’s voice. This is a blatant violation of constitutional right to press freedom. WHEREFORE, the
petitions are GRANTED

46. Hector C. Villanueva vs. PDI, March 15, 2009

Fact:
Petitioner was a mayoralty candidates in Bais, Negros Oriental during the 1992 elections. Two months prior the
elections, Ricardo Nolan, petitioned for the disqualification of petitioner before the COMELEC. Nolan’s petition however,
was denied. Two days prior the elections, respondent Manila Daily Bulletin Publishing Corporation published a story that
COMELEC had disqualified petitioner. A day prior the elections, respondent Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. also came out
with a similar story. Subsequent the articles, when the results of the elections came out, petitioner lost. Under the
belief that said articles led to his defeat, petitioner sued respondents PDI and Manila Bulletin, alleging that the articles
were maliciously timed to defeat him. He sued for actual damages worth P270,000, moral damages worth P10,000,000,
an unspecified amount of exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees of P300,000. Respondents disclaimed liability,
asserting that they acted without malice, stressing that the stories were privileged in nature.

Issue: Whether or not respondents, being members of the press, abused the freedom of the press.

Ruling:
The Court did not consider that the respondents had abused the freedom of the press. Newspapers should be given
such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our
democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and editors usually have to race with their deadlines; and
consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for
honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. For liability to arise without offending the freedom of the press,
the test to meet is whether or not the constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that prohibits a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct, unless it be proven that the
statement was made with ‘actual malice,’ or with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not. Absent proof that they were obtained from a press conference or release, respondents were not
impelled by malice. Still, the news items were derogatory and injurious to petitioner’s reputation and candidacy. The
Court simply faulted respondents for failing to verify the truth of the news tips they published and held them
respondents liable for negligence. Petitioner was awarded damages, as amended.

47. GSIS & Winston Garcia vs. Dinnah Villaviza et. al., July 27, 2010
Facts:
PGM Garcia, as President and General Manager of the GSIS, filed separate formal charges against respondents and
eventually found them guilty for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and
meting out the penalty of one (1) year suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto. The charges
contained that respondent, wearing red shirt together with some employees, marched to or appeared simultaneously at
or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for Messrs.
Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises.

On appeal, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office wearing red shirts to witness a public
hearing do not amount to a concerted activity or mass action prescribed above. CSC added that their actuations can be
deemed an exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. The CA found no cogent reason to deviate
therefrom.

Issue: Whether or not an unruly mass gathering of employees to protest the prohibition against the appearance of
their leader as counsel in the administrative case, falls within the constitutional purview of the constitutional guarantee
of freedom of expression.
Ruling:
Yes. As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate the political rights of those in the
government service, the concerted activity or mass action prescribed must be coupled with the intent of effecting work
stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession. Wearing similarly colored shirts,
attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing with them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even
badmouthing the guards and PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or service
disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force concession.

Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the land to voice out their protests
against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. Not all collective activity or mass undertaking of
government employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we would be totally depriving our brothers and sisters in the
government service of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. Civil Service does not deprive them of their
freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the members thereof have
renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.

Thus, respondents freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSCs Resolution No. 02-1316 defining what
a prohibited concerted activity or mass action has only tempered or regulated these rights. Measured against that
definition, respondents actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass action.

48. Soriano vs. MTRCB, March 15, 2010

Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, which then aired on
UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against Iglesia ni Cristo(INC). Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost
identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo, against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt
directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang
Daan.

Issue: Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” program a part of the religious
discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III of the 1987 Constitution?

Ruling:
No. The SC ruled that “Soriano’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child,” and
thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court, the High
Court said that the analysis should be “context based” and found the utterances to be obscene after considering the use
of television broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and the “G” rating of the show, which are all factors that
made the utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily
understood by a child literally rather than in the context that they were used.” The SC also said “that the suspension is
not a prior restraint, but rather a “form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment.” In affirming
the power of the MTRCB to issue an order of suspension, the majority said that “it is a sanction that the MTRCB may
validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause.” visit fellester.blogspot.com The Court
said that the suspension “is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating
Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB,” rather, it was a sanction for “the indecent contents of his
utterances in a “G” rated TV program.”

Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of petitioner’s utterances
on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB
properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly
asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or
as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above, a requirement that indecent language be avoided
has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts
that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.

49. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, October 5, 2010
Facts:
Six petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 9372 otherwise known as Human
Security Act of 2007. The petitioners raise that the law suffers vagueness and overbreadth. There is vagueness when
the law lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two aspects: (1) it violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcements unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle. There is overbreadth when the law is too sweeping that it restricts even those rights that are protected. The
petitioners assail that the definition of the crime of terrorism under the said law was vague and broad.

Issue: Whether or not the RA 9372 suffers vagueness or overbreadth that should be grounds for a facial invalidation or
challenge.

Ruling:
No penal laws should be subject to a facial challenge. A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech
cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly accepted. The petitioners invoked that the law
penalizes speech, contending the element of “unlawful demand” in the definition of terrorism must be necessarily be
transmitted through some form of expression protected by free speech clause. The court held that the notion of the
petitioners is entirely inaccurate, as it focused on just one element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime
entails consideration of every word in the elements and mincing of the words of the offender.

49.a. The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Comelec & Majarucon, January 21, 2015
Fact:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each
tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first
tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin
is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a
check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic
Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team
Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains
names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.

Ruling:
No. Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However,
the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any
political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-
candidate in this case.

FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

50. Bayan, Karapatan et. al. vs, Ermita et. al., April 25, 2006
Fact:
Petitioners, Bayan, et al, allege that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated was violently
dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880. On the other hand, petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., who allege that they
were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU),
et al., allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their individual members as citizens,
specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of "Calibrated Preemptive Response" (CPR) being
followed to implement it. They argue that B.P. No 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or
absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and
place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to
mass actions in support of the government.

Issue: Whether or not Batas Pambansa No. 880 is unconstitutional?

Ruling:
Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. These rights are fundamental personal rights of the
people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions. But the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated.

It is very clear that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the
assemblies. B.P. No. 880 refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it
content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither
are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject.
Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public
morals or public health. Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent
needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the
content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.

As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard – the clear and present danger test. The reference to
"imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil" in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. The law also
provides for an alternative forum through the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any
time.

The petitions are granted in part, and respondents, more particularly the DILG, are directed to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance
with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and
municipality of the country. The petitions are dismissed in all other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is sustained.

51. IBP vs. Hon. Lito Atienza, February 24, 2010

Facts:
In June 2006, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed an application for a rally permit with the office of Manila
Mayor Jose “Lito” Atienza. The IBP sought their rally to be staged at the Mendiola Bridge. Atienza granted the permit
but indicated thereon that IBP is only allowed to stage their rally at the Plaza Miranda, a freedom park.

IBP President Jose Anselmo Cadiz received the rally permit on the day before the scheduled rally. Cadiz immediately
went to the Court of Appeals to assail the permit because what Atienza did was only a partial grant which was alleged
to be a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression and a grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Atienza.

Meanwhile, IBP pushed through with the rally not at Plaza Miranda but at the Mendiola Bridge. Subsequently, the Manila
Police District (MPD) filed a criminal case against Cadiz for allegedly violating the Public Assembly Act or specifically, for
staging a rally in a place different from what was indicated in the rally permit.

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Atienza. The CA ruled that what Atienza did was within his power; that freedom
of expression is not absolute. Cadiz appealed before the Supreme Court. Cadiz also prayed for the suspension of the
criminal case against him on the ground that the certiorari case he filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question to the
criminal case.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the certiorari case Cadiz filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question to the criminal case filed
against him (Cadiz).
2. Whether or not it is within Mayor Jose Atienza’s power to modify the rally permit without consulting with the IBP.

Ruling:
1. No. It is improper for Cadiz to raise the issue of prejudicial question at this stage and in this certiorari case. Under
the Rules of Court, a prejudicial question is a ground to suspend the criminal proceeding. However, Cadiz must first file
a petition to suspend the criminal proceeding in the said criminal case. The determination of the pendency of a
prejudicial question should be made at the first instance in the criminal action, and not before the Supreme Court in an
appeal from the civil action.

2. No. In modifying a rally permit or in granting a rally permit which contains a time and place different from that
applied for, the mayor must first consult with the applicant at the earliest opportunity. This is in order to give the
applicant some time to determine if such change is favorable to him or adverse (and if adverse, he can seek judicial
remedies) – Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act.

It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard
for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicant must be heard on the matter. In this case, Atienza did not consult with the IBP. Atienza capriciously and
whimsically changed the venue without any reason therefor. Such is a grave abuse of discretion and a violation of the
freedom of expression.

52. Batas Pambansa Bilang 880

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

53. Estrada vs. Excritor, June 22, 2006

Fact:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than
twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally
married to another woman. Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent
should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace
Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when
legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Ruling:
The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as
one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in
enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at
bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the
State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.

Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends
only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises
as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not
offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the
state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of
the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

54. Soriano vs. Laguardia, April 29, 2009

Fact:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, which then aired on
UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against Iglesia ni Cristo(INC). Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost
identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo, against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt
directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang
Daan.

Issue:Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” program a part of the religious
discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III of the 1987 Constitution?

Ruling:
No. The SC ruled that “Soriano’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child,” and
thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court, the High
Court said that the analysis should be “context based” and found the utterances to be obscene after considering the use
of television broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and the “G” rating of the show, which are all factors that
made the utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily
understood by a child literally rather than in the context that they were used.” The SC also said “that the suspension is
not a prior restraint, but rather a “form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment.” In affirming
the power of the MTRCB to issue an order of suspension, the majority said that “it is a sanction that the MTRCB may
validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause.” visit fellester.blogspot.com The Court
said that the suspension “is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating
Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB,” rather, it was a sanction for “the indecent contents of his
utterances in a “G” rated TV program.”

Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of petitioner’s utterances
on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB
properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly
asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or
as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above, a requirement that indecent language be avoided
has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts
that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.

55. Pastor Austria vs. NLRC, August 16, 1999

Facts:
The Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law. The petitioner was a pastor of the
SDA for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when his services were terminated. On various occasions from August up to
October, 1991, petitioner received several communication from Mr. Eufronio Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros
Mission asking him to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife,
Mrs. Thelma Austria, in his district which amounted to P15,078.10, and to remit the same to the Negros Mission. The
petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since it was Pastor Buhat and Ibesate who
authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very ill to be able to do the collecting.

A fact-finding committee was created to investigate. The petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing:
Misappropriation of denominational funds;Willful breach of trust; Serious misconduct; Gross and habitual neglect of
duties; Commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized representative as grounds for the
termination of his services.

Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and sued the SDA for reinstatement and back
wages plus damages. Decision was rendered in favor of petitioner. SDA appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in
favor of respondent.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the termination of the services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involves the
separation of church and state.
2. Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed by petitioner against the
SDA.

Held:
1. No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what is involved here is the relationship
of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee, which is purely secular because it has no relationship
with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines. The grounds invoked for petitioner’s dismissal are all based on Art. 282
of Labor Code.

2. Yes. SDA was exercising its management prerogative (not religious prerogative) to fire an employee which it believes
is unfit for the job. It would have been a different case if Austria was expelled or excommunicated from the SDA.

56. Islamic Da’wah Council of the Phils. vs. Exec. Sec., 405 scra 497
Fact;
October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the Philippine Halal Certification
Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the
exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.

On May 8, 2002, a news article entitled "OMA Warns NGOs Issuing Illegal 'Halal' Certification" was published in the
Manila Bulletin, a newspaper of general circulation. In said article, OMA warned Muslim consumers to buy only products
with its official halal certification since those without said certification had not been subjected to careful analysis and
therefore could contain pork or its derivatives. Respondent OMA also sent letters to food manufacturers asking them to
secure the halal certification only from OMA lest they violate EO 46 and RA 4109.As a result, petitioner lost revenues
after food manufacturers stopped securing certifications from it. Hence, this petition for prohibition.

Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State. It is
unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said
scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.
According to petitioner, a food product becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic religious ritual and prayer.
Thus, only practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for food. A government agency like herein respondent
OMA cannot therefore perform a religious function like certifying qualified food products as halal.

Issue: Whether or not there was a violation in Section 10, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that no
law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

Ruling
We grant the petition. OMA was created in 1981 through Executive Order No. 697 (EO 697) "to ensure the integration
of Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino society with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions, and
institutions." OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim community as a"national
cultural community" and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church
and State, the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-
establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution.

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."

57. Velarde vs. Social Justice Society, 428 scra 283

Facts:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 12, 2003 Decision  and July 29, 2003
Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 49).
The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a Petition for Declaratory Relief  filed before the RTC-Manila by herein
Respondent Social Justice Society (SJS) against herein Petitioner Mariano Mike Z. Velarde, together with His Eminence,
Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as co-
respondents. The Petition prayed for the resolution of the question whether or not the act of a religious leader like any
of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring the
members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions.

Issue:May religious leaders like Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates for public office?

Ruling:
The basic question posed in the SJS Petition -- WHETHER ENDORSEMENTS OF CANDIDACIES BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL -- undoubtedly deserves serious consideration. As stated earlier, the Court deems this
constitutional issue to be of paramount interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it concerns the governance of our country
and its people. Thus, despite the obvious procedural transgressions by both SJS and the trial court, this Court still
called for Oral Argument, so as not to leave any doubt that there might be room to entertain and dispose of the SJS
Petition on the merits.

Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to convince the Court that there are enough factual and legal bases to
resolve the paramount issue. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General has sided with petitioner insofar as
there are no facts supporting the SJS Petition and the assailed Decision.

We reiterate that the said Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for its claim.  During the
Oral Argument, counsel for SJS candidly admitted that there were no factual allegations in its Petition for Declaratory
Relief. Neither were there factual findings in the assailed Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to answer a
hypothetical question. In effect, it merely sought an advisory opinion, the rendition of which was beyond the courts
constitutional mandate and jurisdiction.

Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made no findings of facts
and final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally inexistent. Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to
review, affirm, reverse or even just modify.

Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a
constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that the constitutionality of a statute [or act] will be passed upon only
if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the
protection of the rights of the parties concerned.

58. Taruc et. al. vs. Bishop De La Cruz, March 10, 2005
Fact:
The petitioners are lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro, Surigao City. Petitioners led by
Taruc clamored for the transfer of parish priest Rustom Florano for the reason that the family of Fr. Floranos wife
belonged to a political party opposed to petitioner Tarucs. However, Bishop De la Cruz found this reason too flimsy so
he denied their request. Things worsened when Taruc conducted an open mass for the town Fiesta celebrated by Fr.
Ambong who was not a member of the clergy of the diocese of Surigao. Petitioners were then
expelled/excommunicated from the PIC for the reason of (1) disobedience to duly constituted authority, (2) inciting
dissension resulting in division of the Parish of Our Mother of Perpetual Help and (3) threatening to forcible occupy the
Parish Church causing anxiety among the General Membership.

Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop De la Cruz and impleaded Fr.
Florano and a certain Delfin Bordas for conspiring with the Bishop. They said that their rights to due process were
violated because they were not heard before the order of expulsion was made

Issue: Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the expulsion/excommunication of members
of a religious institution.

Ruling:
Section 5, Article III or the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution specifically provides that:
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

The case at bar is purely ecclesiastical matters which is considered to be outside the providence of the court due to the
form of government where the complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon. Hence, the civil
courts must not allow themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical nature. Civil Courts will not interfere
in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be
the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title,
use, or possession of church property. Those who unite to an ecclesiastical body do so with implied consent to submit
to the Church government and they are bound to submit to it.

The power to exclude membership from the church of those considered unworthy lies solely to the Church thus it is
outside the province of the civil court. The expulsion of membership of the petitioners was legally made. They have not
violated the due process of law because they were given opportunity to be heard when they were also warned of the
consequences of their actions.
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
59. Executive Order NO. 464 (Executive Privilege)

59.a. Chavez vs. PCGG, 299 scra 744

Fact:
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the prosecution of the
Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of
the countrys economy, alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports bannered in a
number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions
of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a
compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its
transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and
agreements pertaining to PCGGs task of recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on
the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of paramount public interest, since it has a debilitating effect
on the countrys economy that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Respondents,
on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that
petitioners action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations
and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed
terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.

Issue: Whether or not recovery of the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with
public interest.

Ruling: The Court ruled in affirmative.

Executive Order No. 1, , created the PCGG which was primarily tasked to assist the President in the recovery of vast
government resources allegedly amassed by former President Marcos. Under Executive Order No. 2, all persons and
entities who had knowledge or possession of ill-gotten assets and properties were warned.On May 7, 1986, another
directive (EO No. 14) was issued giving additional powers to the PCGG which, taking into account the overriding
considerations of national interest and national survival. With such pronouncements of our government, whose
authority emanates from the people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth is a
matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. We may also add that ill-gotten wealth, by its very nature,
assumes a public character. Based on the aforementioned Executive Orders, ill-gotten wealth refers to assets and
properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and
close associates through or as a result of their improper or illegal use of government funds or properties; or their
having taken undue advantage of their public office; or their use of powers, influences or relationships, resulting in their
unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the government itself. To all intents and
purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. As such, upon reconveyance they will be returned to the public
treasury, subject only to the satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts.
Another declared overriding consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is that it may be used for
national economic recovery.

Also, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient
public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of
ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to
intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still
in the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same
restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier -- such as on matters involving national
security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.

60. Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002

Facts:
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim
land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all
kinds of lands.” PD No. 1085 transferred to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay"
under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP for brevity). On April 25, 1995, PEA entered
into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands.
PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On November 29, 1996, then Senate
President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all
scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. On April 27, 1998, Frank I. Chavez,
as a taxpayer, filed a petition and prayed that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking
Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the
right.

Issue: Whether or not the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations
before a final agreement.

Ruling:
Yes, the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final
agreement. Contrary to AMARI's contention, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right
to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is
consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects. The right to information covers three categories of
information which are "matters of public concern," namely: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3) government research data used in formulating policies. The
constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The
information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized
exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and
public order. Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to information in several legislations.

61. Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability, March 25, 2008

Facts:
On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified on matters concerning the
National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and
Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval
of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the
bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo
and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege." To
be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it. On November
20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the President invoking executive
privilege. Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory.

Issue: Whether or not the questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive privilege.

Ruling:
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.

The Court articulated in these cases that "there are certain types of information which the government may withhold
from the public," that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets
regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters"; and that "the right to information does not extend
to matters recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings."

In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific questions, did not in
any way curb the public’s right to information or diminish the importance of public accountability and transparency.
First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President. Second, the
communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test. Third, there
is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of
the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

62. Center for People Empowerment vs. COMELEC, September 21, 2010
Fact:
On May 26, 2009 petitioner Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG), a non-government organization,
wrote respondent COMELEC, requesting a copy of the source code of the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) programs,
the Board of Canvassers Consolidation/Canvassing System (BOC CCS) programs for the municipal, provincial, national,
and congressional canvass, the COMELEC server programs, and the source code of the in-house COMELEC programs
called the Data Capturing System (DCS) utilities.

On June 24, 2009 the COMELEC granted the request for the source code of the PCOS and the CCS, but denied that for
the DCS, since the DCS was a system used in processing the Lists of Voters which is not part of the voting, counting
and canvassing systems contemplated by R.A. 9369. According to COMELEC, if the source code for the DCS were to be
divulged, unscrupulous individuals might change the program and pass off an illicit one that could benefit certain
candidates or parties.

Rejecting COMELEC’s excuse, on October 5, 2009 CenPEG filed the present petition for mandamus, seeking to compel
COMELEC to immediately make its source codes available to CenPEG and other interested parties.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC violated the constitutional right to information

Ruling:
Yes. The pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in that once an AES technology is selected for
implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to any
interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof. The COMELEC has offered no reason
not to comply with this requirement of the law. Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the source code was that it
was not yet available when CenPEG asked for it and, subsequently, that the review had to be done, apparently for
security reason, under a controlled environment. The elections had passed and that reason is already stale.

The Court GRANTS the petition for mandamus and directs the COMELEC to make the source codes for the AES
technologies it selected for implementation pursuant to R.A. 9369 immediately available to CenPEG and all other
interested political parties or groups for independent review.

LIBERTY OF ABODE

62.a. Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap vs. Robredo, July 22, 2014

Facts:
Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. and Corazon de Jesus Homeowners’ Association as well as the individual
petitioners, Fernando Sevilla, Estrelieta Bagasbas, Jocy Lopez, Elvira Vidol and Delia Frayres, were/are occupying
parcels of land owned by and located in the cities of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon (collectively, the LGUs). These
LGUs sent the petitioners notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in order to
give way to the implementation and construction of infrastructure projects2 in the areas illegally occupied by the
petitioners.
Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 authorize evictions and demolitions without any court order when: (1) persons or
entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and
other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds; and (2) persons or entities occupy areas where
government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented.

On March 23, 2012, the petitioners directly filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before the Court, seeking to
compel the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, et al. (the public respondents) to first secure an eviction and/or
demolition order from the court prior to their implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279. The petitioners
justify their direct recourse before this Court by generally averring that they have no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Issue:  Whether or not there is a violation for liberty of abode

Ruling:
We note that Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution provides that urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be
evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. Paragraph 1,
Section 28 of RA 7279 allows summary evictions and demolition in cases where   persons or entities occupy danger
areas and when persons or entities occupy areas where government infrastructure projects with available funding are
about to be implemented.

To ensure that evictions and demolitions are conducted in a just and humane manner, paragraph 2, Section 28 of RA
7279 commands the public respondents to comply with the following prescribed procedure in executing eviction and/or
demolition orders:

In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, the following shall be
mandatory:
(1)Notice upon the effected persons or entities at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of eviction or demolition;

(2)Adequate consultations on the matter of settlement with the duly designated representatives of the families to be resettled and the affected
communities in the areas where they are to be relocated;
(3)Presence of local government officials or their representatives during eviction or demolition;

(4)Proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition;

(5)Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular office hours from Mondays to Fridays and during good weather, unless the affected
families consent otherwise;
(6)No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are permanent and of concrete materials;

(7)Proper uniforms for members of the Philippine National Police who shall occupy the first line of law enforcement and observe proper
disturbance control procedures; and
(8)Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent: Provided, however, That in cases of eviction and demolition pursuant to a court
order involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, relocation shall be undertaken by the local government unit concerned and the
National Housing Authority with the assistance of other government agencies within forty-five (45) days from service of notice of final
judgment by the court, after which period the said order shall be executed: Provided, further, That should relocation not be possible within
the said period, financial assistance in the amount equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily wage multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be
extended to the affected families by the local government unit concerned.

This Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
shall jointly promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the above provision.

Lastly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their allegations that the public respondents gravely abused their discretion
in implementing Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279. Instead, they merely imputed jurisdictional abuse to the public
respondents through general averments in their pleading, but without any basis to support their claim.

RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATION

63. In Re: Edillon, 84 scra 554

Facts:
This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to pay his IBP membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A
and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and
suspension for failure to pay the same. He contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights of being compelled
to be a member of the IBP in order to practice his profession and thus deprives his rights to liberty and property and thereby null and void.

Issue: Whether or not it assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property of the respondent?

Ruling:
The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar associations that are organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership of which is voluntary. The IBP however is an official national body of which all lawyers must be a member and are subjected
to the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which includes payment of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of carrying out its objectives
and implementation of regulations in the practice of law. The provisions assailed does not infringe the constitutional rights of the respondent as it is a
valid exercise of police power necessary to perpetuate its existence with regulatory measures to implement. The name of Edillon was stricken out
from the rolls of attorney for being a delinquent member of the bar.
64. Malabanan vs. Ramento 129 scra 359
Facts:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought and were granted by
the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such
permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science
basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the
second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the
proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same day, they marched
toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. They
continued their demonstration, giving utterance to language severely critical of the University authorities and using
megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non-academic
employees, within hearing distance, stopped their work because of the noise created.

The demonstration also went beyond the period allowed. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should
not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were
under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The validity thereof was
challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against private respondents and before the
Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal
assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral
defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Student’s Councils constitutional right to form association has been violated.

Ruling:
Yes, with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public
disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.”

The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their
exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint
or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state,
has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or
utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the
name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If
the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the
power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time
and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if,
however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.

65. United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union vs. Laguesma, March 25, 1998
Facts
Petitioner union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products
Philippines, Inc.  However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for union
membership pursuant to Art. 245 of the Labor Code.

Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.   Its petition
was dismissed by the Third Division for lack of showing that respondent committed grave abuse of discretion.  But
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, pressing for resolution its contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of
the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join unions, contravenes
the constitution.

Citing the Court’s ruling in Nasipit Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission, petitioner argues that previous
administrative determinations of the NLRC do not have the effect of  res judicata in this case, because “labor relations
proceedings” are “non-litigious and summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities.”

Issue Whether or not  res judicata applies to administrative proceedings?

Ruling:
YES. The doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative proceedings.  As early as 1956, in
Brillantes v. Castro, the Court sustained the dismissal of an action by a trial court on the basis of a prior administrative
determination of the same case by the Wage Administration Service, applying the principle of res judicata.   Recently,
in Abad v. NLRC the Court applied the related doctrine of stare decisis in holding that the prior determination that
certain jobs at the Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. were project employments was binding in another case involving
another group of employees of the same company.   Indeed, in Nasipit Lumber Co., this Court clarified toward the end
of its opinion that “the doctrine of res judicata applies . . . to judicial or quasi judicial proceedings and not to the
exercise of administrative powers.”  Proceedings for certification election are quasi judicial in nature and, therefore,
decisions rendered in such proceedings can attain finality.

At the very least, the principle of finality of administrative determination compels respect for the finding of the
Secretary of Labor that route managers are managerial employees as defined by law in the absence of anything to
show that such determination is without substantial evidence to support it. Nonetheless, the Court, concerned that
employees who are otherwise supervisors may wittingly or unwittingly be classified as managerial personnel and thus
denied the right of self- organization, has decided to review the record of this case.

66. Acosta vs. Court of Appeals, June 28, 2000

Facts:
Petitioners are teachers from different public school in Metro Manila. On various dates in September and October 1990,
petitioner did not report for work and instead, participated in mass actions by public school teachers at the Liwasang
Bonifacio for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of their grievances. Petitioners were
administratively charged with such offenses as grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of civil service
law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination,
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence without official leave. Petitioners failed to answer
these charges. Following the investigations conducted by the DECS Investigating committees, Secretary Cariño found
petitioners guilty as charged and ordered their immediate dismissal from the service. Petitioners appealed and the CSC
modified the said orders of Secretary Cariño to six months suspension without pay. Petitioners appealed the orders of
Secretary Cario to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and later to the CSC. Following the denial of their motion
for reconsideration, petitioners questioned the matter before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied their
petition.

Issue: Whether Petitioner’s participation in the mass actions was an exercise of their constitutional rights to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances

Ruling:
Petitioners' contentions are without merit. The character and legality of the mass actions which they participated in
have been passed upon by this Court as early as 1990 in Manila Public School Teachers' Association (MPSTA) v. Laguio,
Jr. wherein we ruled that "these 'mass actions' were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted
and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers' sworn duty to perform, undertaken for
essentially economic reasons." The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute,
public employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose. Further, herein
petitioners, are being penalized not because they exercised their right of peaceable assembly and petition for redress of
grievances but because of their successive unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon
their students for whose education they are responsible. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, “It is not the exercise
by the petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was punished, but the manner in which they
exercised such right which resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service and classes in various
public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there are efficient and non-disruptive avenues, other than the mass actions
in question, whereby petitioners could petition the government for redress of grievances.”

It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail services to the public,
which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government employees. It may be conceded that the
petitioners had valid grievances and noble intentions in staging the “mass actions,” but that will not justify their
absences to the prejudice of innocent school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an illegal work
stoppage.

In the case at bar, petitioners initially assailed the alleged non-observance of due process by the DECS Investigating
Committees only upon appeal to the MSPB. Significantly, however, it has been our consistent ruling that an appeal is
curative of any supposed denial of due process.[ Thus, after full ventilation of their case before the MSPB and CSC, and
later on before the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot now allege denial of due process to justify their claim for back
wages.

NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE

67. Pacific Wide Realty and Devt. Corp. vs. Puerto Azul Land, Inc., November 25, 2009
Facts:
Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI) is the owner and developer of the Puerto Azul Complex situated in Ternate, Cavite. In order to finance its operations, it
obtained loans from various banks, the principal amount of which amounted to (P640,225,324.00). PALI and its accommodation mortgagors, i.e.,
Ternate Development Corporation (TDC), Ternate Utilities, Inc. (TUI), and Mrs. Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez, secured the loans.

PALIs business did very well until when the Philippine Stock Exchange rejected the listing of its shares in its initial public offering which sent a bad
signal to the real estate market. Potential investors and real estate buyers were driven away by the situation. The decline in business growth was
further aggravated by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Consequently, PALI was unable to keep up with the payment of its obligations. One of its
creditors, the Export and Industry Bank 1[7] (EIB), later substituted by Pacific Wide Realty and Development Corporation (PWRDC), filed foreclosure
proceedings on PALIs mortgaged properties. Thrust to a corner, PALI filed a petition for suspension of payments and rehabilitation, accompanied by a
proposed rehabilitation plan and three (3) nominees for the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver. On December 13, 2005, the RTC rendered a
Decision2[16] approving PALIs petition for suspension of payments and rehabilitation

Issue: Whether the terms of the rehabilitation plan are unreasonable and in violation of the non-impairment clause;

Ruling:
In G.R. No. 180893, the rehabilitation plan is contested on the ground that the same is unreasonable and results in the impairment of the obligations
of contract.

The court, however, does not find nothing onerous in the terms of PALIs rehabilitation plan. The court also did not find any merit in PWRDCs
contention that there is a violation of the non- impairment clause. The non-impairment clause may not be invoked since the case does not involve a
law or an executive issuance declaring the modification of the contract among debtor PALI, its creditors and its accommodation mortgagors.
Assuming that the non-impairment clause may be applied in this case, it must yield to the police power of the State. Property rights and contractual
rights are not absolute thereby making it limited. Such constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State for the common good of the general public.

68. Hon. Heherson Alvarez vs. PICOP Resource, Inc., December 3, 2009
Fact:
Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources an application to have its
Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43converted into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA).

1
2
PICOP filed before the (RTC) a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR Sec Alvarez for  unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to sign and execute
the IFMA contract of PICOP even if the latter has already complied with all the legal requirements for the automatic conversion of its TLA No. 43 into
an IFMA.

The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trialcourt is clear: the government is bound by contract, a
1969 Document signed by then PresidentFerdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.

PICOP filed the MANDAMUS CASE against then DENR Secretary Alvarez on the ground that Secretary Alvarez’s refusal to issue an IFMA in its favor
allegedly violated its vested right over the area covered by its TLA No. 43 and presidential warranty, and impaired the obligation of contract under
said agreement and warranty.

PICOP, argues that the issue at hand is not on whether the timber license is a mere license or privilege rather the issue
is the unlawful refusal of then DENR Secretary Alvarez to convert the TLA No. 43 into IFMA.

Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the non-impairment clause

Ruling:
It has been consistently held that licenses concerning the harvesting of timber in the country’s forests cannot be considered contracts that would
bind the Government regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. Timber licenses are not contracts, therefore the
non-impairment clause does not apply to it.
PICOP alleged that the DENR Secretary violated its constitutional right against non-impairment of contracts when it did not issue an IFMA. However,
it has been consistently ruled, that the 1969 Document is not a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause, much less a contract
specifically enjoining the DENR Secretary to issue the IFMA. The conclusion that the 1969 Document is not a contract recognized under the non-
impairment clause has even been disposed of in another case decided by another division of this Court, PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Base Metals Mineral
Resources Corporation, the Decision in which case has become final and executory. The Petition for Mandamus filed by PICOP should, therefore, be
dismissed.

The 1969 Document expressly states that the warranty as to the tenure of PICOP is "subject to compliance with
constitutional and statutory requirements as well as with existing policy on timber concessions." Thus, compliance with
statutory and administrative requirements for the conversion of its TLA into an IFMA still remains to be proven.

69. Renato v. Diaz vs. Sec. Of Finance and the Comm. Of BIR, July 19, 2011
Fact:
Petitioners Renato V. Diaz and Aurora Ma. F. Timbol filed a petition for declaratory relief assailing the validity of the impending imposition of value-
added tax (VAT) by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on the collections of tollway operators. Petitioners claim that, since the VAT would result in
increased toll fees, they have an interest as regular users of tollways in stopping the BIR action. Petitioners meaning of sale of services that are
subject to VAT; that a toll fee is a users tax, not a sale of services; that to impose VAT on toll fees would amount to a tax on public service; and that,
since VAT was never factored into the formula for computing toll fees, its imposition would violate the non-impairment clause of the constitution.

The government avers that the NIRC imposes VAT on all kinds of services of franchise grantees, including tollway operations, except where the law
provides otherwise; that the Court should seek the meaning and intent of the law from the words used in the statute. Respondent argues that
petitioners have no right to invoke the non-impairment of contracts clause since they clearly have no personal interest in existing toll operating
agreements (TOAs) between the government and tollway operators. At any rate, the non-impairment clause cannot limit the States sovereign taxing
power which is generally read into contracts. It is government’s contention that the non-inclusion of VAT in the parametric formula for computing
toll rates cannot exempt tollway operators from VAT. Respondent further argues that it cannot be claimed that the rights of tollway operators to a
reasonable rate of return will be impaired by the VAT since this is imposed on top of the toll rate.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners Diaz and Timbol have legal standing to file the action.

Ruling:
Petitioners have no personality to invoke the non-impairment of contract clause on behalf of private investors in the tollway projects. Neither will be
prejudiced by nor be affected by the alleged diminution in return of investments that may result from the VAT imposition against the Tollway
operators. There are no interests at all in the profits to be earned under the TOAs. The interest in and right to recover investments solely belongs to
the private tollway investors

FREE ACCESS TO COURTS

70. RE: Request of the National Committee on Legal Aid to Exempt Clients from Paying Filing, Docket and other Fees, August 28, 2009
Fact:
The Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) promulgated Resolution No. 24, series of 2008. The resolution requested
the IBP’s National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) to ask for the exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other fees of clients of the legal
aid offices in the various IBP chapters. The Court noted Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 and required the IBP, through the NCLA, to comment
thereon.

In a comment dated December 18, 2008, the IBP, through the NCLA, made the following comments:
(a)Under Section 16-D of RA[7] 9406, clients of the Public Attorneys’ Office (PAO) are exempt from the payment of docket and other fees incidental
to the institution of action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies. On the other hand, clients of legal aid offices in the various IBP chapters do not
enjoy the same exemption. IBP’s indigent clients are advised to litigate as pauper litigants under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court;
(b)They are further advised to submit documentary evidence to prove compliance with the requirements under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, i.e., certifications from the barangay and the Department of Social Welfare and Development. However, not only does the process involve
some expense which indigent clients could ill-afford, clients also lack knowledge on how to go about the tedious process of obtaining these
documents;
(c)Although the IBP is given an annual legal aid subsidy, the amount it receives from the government is barely enough to cover various operating
expenses;
(d)While each IBP local chapter is given a quarterly allocation (from the legal aid subsidy),said allocation covers neither the incidental expenses
defrayed by legal aid lawyers in handling legal aid cases nor the payment of docket and other fees collected by the courts, quasi-judicial bodies
and the prosecutor’s office, as well as mediation fees and
(e)Considering the aforementioned factors, a directive may be issued by the Supreme Court granting IBP’s indigent clients an exemption from the
payment of docket and other fees similar to that given to PAO clients under Section 16-D of RA 9406. In this connection, the Supreme Court
previously issued a circular exempting IBP clients from the payment of transcript of stenographic notes.

At the outset, we laud the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP for its effort to help improve the administration of justice, particularly, the access to
justice by the poor. Its Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 in fact echoes one of the noteworthy recommendations during the Forum on Increasing
Access to Justice spearheaded by the Court last year. In promulgating Resolution No. 24, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP has effectively
performed its duty to “participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the administration of
justice.”

Issue: WON RESOLUTION NO. 24 SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE SC?

Ruling:
The Court recognizes the right of access to justice as the most important pillar of legal empowerment of the marginalized sectors of our
society.Among others, it has exercised its power to “promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights” to open
the doors of justice to the underprivileged and to allow them to step inside the courts to be heard of their plaints. In particular, indigent litigants are
permitted under Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19, Rule 141of the Rules of Court to bring suits in forma pauperis.

Under the IBP’s Guidelines Governing the Establishment and Operation of Legal Aid Offices in All Chapters of the IBP (Guidelines on Legal Aid), the
combined “means and merit tests” shall be used to determine the eligibility of an applicant for legal aid (see full text for the provisions quoted).

The “means and merit tests” appear to be reasonable determinants of eligibility for coverage under the legal aid program of the IBP. Nonetheless,
they may be improved to ensure that any exemption from the payment of legal fees that may be granted to clients of the NCLA and the legal aid
offices of the various IBP chapters will really further the right of access to justice by the poor. This will guarantee that the exemption will neither be
abused nor trivialized. Towards this end, A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC (IRR) (see full text) shall be observed by the NCLA and the legal aid offices in IBP
chapters nationwide in accepting clients and handling cases for the said clients.

The above rule, in conjunction with Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service and
the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, shall form a solid base of rules upon which the right of access to courts by the poor shall be
implemented. With these rules, we equip the poor with the tools to effectively, efficiently and easily enforce their rights in the judicial system.

Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there must be a remedy. The remedy must not
only be effective and efficient, but also readily accessible. For a remedy that is inaccessible is no remedy at all.

The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to the courts and to adequate legal assistance. The legal aid service rendered by the
NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters nationwide addresses only the right to adequate legal assistance. Recipients of the service of the NCLA and
legal aid offices of IBP chapters may enjoy free access to courts by exempting them from the payment of fees assessed in connection with the filing of
a complaint or action in court. With these twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section 11, Article III of Constitution is advanced and access to justice is
increased by bridging a significant gap and removing a major roadblock.

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
71. UN Convention Against Torture
72. Republic Act No. 9745, Anti-Torture Act of 2009
73. Republic Act No. 7438
74. New Rules on Inquest, Department of Justice Circular No. 61, September 21, 1993

75. People vs. Galit, March 20, 1985

Facts:
The Prisoner was arrested for filling the victim of the occasion of a robbery. He had been detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days,
to no avail. He consistently maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously, something drastic had to be done. A
confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his
innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat him. They covered his face with a rag
and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not take it anymore. His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted
on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been broken. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed
the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment.

This incident could have happened in a Russian gulag or in Hitler's Germany. But no it did not. It happened in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not the accused was informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make
could be used against him.

Ruling:
Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights
under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect
or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover , at the
time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not
know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed and “salaysay” that his relatives
were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by
one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. This gross violations of his rights.

76. People vs. Ordoo, June 29, 2000

Fact:
In August 5, 1994 a decomposing body of 15 years old name Shirley Victore was found among the bushes near a bridge in Barangay Poblacion,
Santol, La Union who 3 days before reported as missing. According to the examination by a medico-legal officer of NBI the victim was raped and
strangle to death. Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina are the suspects and they were brought to the police station for questioning. However, for the
lack of evidence linking them to the crime so they were allowed to go home. On August 10, 1994 both of the suspects returned to the police station
one after another and acknowledged that indeed committed the crime. Acting on their admission, the police immediately conducted an investigation
and put their confession in writing. The investigators however could not get at once get the services of a lawyer to assist the two accused because
there were no practicing lawyer in the municipality of Santol because it is a remote town of the province of La Union. The investigation was
conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police and officers in the attendance to listen to and witness the giving of the
voluntary statements of the two suspects who admitted their participation in the crime. Also they were interview by radio reporter and they
confessed freely. But in the arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty.

Issue: Whether or not their confession is inadmissible in evidence mainly the lack of counsel to assist them during custodial investigation.

Ruling:
A review of the contents of the tape as included in Roland Almoite's testimony reveals that the interview was conducted free from any influence or
intimidation from police officers and was done willingly by the accused. The interview of the reporter is not considered as part of the investigation as
response of the accused was made in answer to questions asked by the radio reporter, not by the police or any investigating officer. Hence the
accused confess to the radio announcer it will be considered as to talking to a private citizen although their confession was not with the consent of
their lawyers, all of it does not violate their constitutional rights. The evidence was admissible. The accused was sentenced guilty of the felony.

77. People vs. Lugod, February 21, 2001

Fact:
At around 12:30 a.m. on September 15, 1997 Helen Ramos the mother of the victim Nairube was awaken by her husband because he sense that
there is someone going down to the stairs of their house. She noticed that Nairube was no longer in her place she was sleeping so she assumed that
Nairube is just answering to the call of nature. Nairube’s blanket was also no longer at the place where she sleep but her slippers were still there.
After 3 minutes waiting Helen stood up and began calling Nairube but there was no answer. Thereafter, she went downstairs and she found out that
the backdoor of their house was open. She found a pair of slippers on the top of the wooden bench outside the backdoor and it does not belong to
any member of her family. In the morning of September 16, 1997, she went to the police station to report the loss of her child and also the slippers
that she found to SP02 Quirino Gallardo. She then went home while the police began their search for Nairube.

At around 12:30 p.m., Alma Diaz requested her to go with the searching, Helen found a panty and she recognized as that of her daughter. After
seeing the panty she cried. She was ordered to go home while others continued the search. Thereafter, they continued the search and found a black
collared T-shirt with buttons in front hanging on a guava twig. Loreto Veloria informed him that Clemente John Lugod wore the two items when he
went to the house of Violeta Cabuhat.

Issue: WON the Constitutional rights of the accused has been violated.

Ruling:
Yes, the rights of the accused-appellant has been violated. The act of confession of the accused that he raped and killed Nairube without the
assistance of the counsel cannot be used against him because it will tantamount for violation of his rights under Bill of Rights. This is a basic tenet of
our Constitution, which cannot be disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal the crime is. On the other hand the act of pointing out of the accused
the location of the body of Nairube was also elicited in violation of the accused right to remain silent. The same was an integral part of the
uncounselled confession and is considered a fruit of the poisonous tree. The accused was acquitted.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment dated October 8, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28 in
Criminal Case No. SC-6670 finding the accused, Clemente John Lugod alias HONASAN, guilty of the crime of rape with homicide is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED
from confinement unless held for some other legal cause. No pronouncement as to costs.

78. People vs. Edralin Taboga, Febraury 6, 2002

Facts:
That on or about the 1st day of April 1998, in the municipality of Magsingal, province of Ilocos Sur, Philippines, Francisca Tubon, a widowed,
septuagenarian, was robbed, stabbed and burned beyond recognition by EdralinTaboga. Accused was charged in Criminal Case no. 1818-k with
robbery with homicide and was indicted for arson in Criminal case no. 1819-k. Police officer rounded up the deceased former farm workers, while
being questioned the barangay captain notice a fresh blood stain in Taboga’s short. He confronted Taboga and the latter readily admitted that he
killed the victim. He was brought to the police station for further investigation. Police officers questioned Taboga and they prepared a written extra-
judicial confession for Taboga. During the inquest, however, Taboga refused to sign the confession upon the advice of his lawyer.Next day a radio
announcer went to the police station to interview the suspect. Again, Taboga admitted killing the deceased and setting her and her house on
fire.Accused-appellant EdralinTaboga raised the defense of denial and alibi. He alleged that he was in the house of the parents of his live-in partner,
Liza Almazan, seventy meters away from the house of the deceased.Accused-appellant further claimed that he was maltreated by the policemen and
forced to admit the crime. Regarding his admission to radio announcer Mario Contaoi, he narrated that the interview was held inside the
investigation room of the police station where policemen were present. Thus, he had to admit the crimes because he was afraid of the policemen.
Moreover, relatives of the deceased beat him up by kicking him, hitting him with a chair, slapping him and punching him on the head and
face.Accused-appellants live-in partner corroborated his testimony. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, Branch 24, rendered
judgment finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes.

Issue: Whether or not confession made by the accused to a radio report, a private person, can be admitted as evidence against him.

Ruling:
Yes. There is nothing in the record shows that the radio announcer collude with the police authorities to elicit inculpatory evidence against the
accuse. Neither is there anything in the record, which remotely suggests that the police to the extract information from him on the details of the
crime instructed the radio announcer. Indeed the reported even ask for permission from the officer-in-charged to interview the accused. Nor was the
information obtained under duress. In fact, the accused not only confessed to the radio reporter but to several others.

79. People vs. Baloloy, 381 scra 31

Facts:
At Barangay Inagasan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the evening of August 3 1996, the body of 11 years old Genelyn Camacho was found at the
waterfalls at the said barangay. Autopsy report found the Genelyn was raped before she was drowned. The one who caused its discovery was
accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy himself, Who claimed that he had caught sight of it while he was catching frogs in the nearby creek. While in the
wake of Genelyn, Juanito confessed to the barangay captain that he only wanted to frighten the girl but ended up raping and throwing her body in
the ravine. While in the custody of authorities, he was asked incriminating questions by Judge Dicon who justified his actions saying that Juanito was
not yet in custodial investigation. Based on his alleged extrajudicial confession, coupled with circumstantial evidence, the trail court violated Section
12 (1) of Article III of the barangay captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon. According to him, the two failed to inform him of his Constitutional rights before
they took it upon themselves to elicit from him the incriminatory information. It is of no moment that Ceniza and Dicon are not police investigators,
for as public officials it was incumbent upon them to observe the express mandate of the Constitution. While these rights may be waiver executed in
the presence of counsel. He concludes that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence.

Issue: Whether or not Juanitos extrajudicial confession before the barangay captain was amissible.

Ruling:
Yes, as to his confession with the barangay captain Ceniza, it has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply
to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits
having committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed
under investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. In the instant case, Juanito
voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he rapes Genelyn and thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This narration was spontaneous answer, freely
and voluntarily given in an ordinaty manner. It was given before he was arrested or place under custody for investigation in connection with the
commission of the offense. Moreover, Juanito did not offer any evidence of improper or ulterior motive on the party of Ceniza, which could have
compelled her testify falsely against him.

RIGHT TO BAIL

80. Govt. of the USA vs. Purganan, supra.

Facts:
The Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC on 18 May 2001, the
appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case 01192061. It was alleged in the said Petition for Extradition that Jimenez
was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on 15 April 1999.

Jimenez filed before the Regional Trial Court an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," which prayed that his application for an arrest warrant be
set for hearing. In an order dated May 23 2001, the RTC granted the said Ex-Parte Motion and set the case for hearing on the 5 th of June 2001. During
the hearing, Jimenez manifested his reservations on the procedure then adopted by the trial court allowing that the accused in a case of extradition
be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Subsequently, through his Memorandum, he sought for permission to be allowed to post bail in
the amount of P100,000.00 in case warrant would be issued against him. The issue on Jimenez’ manifestation to post bail was set to be heard on 15
June 2001.

In its 3 July 2001 Order, the court directed the issuance of warrant for Mark Jimenez’arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1 million in
cash. Jimenez was granted provisional liberty after he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond via the challenged Order
dated 4 July 2001. Hence, this petition.

Issues: Whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending

Ruling:
No. The constitutional provision on bail, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. Such
provision does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused whose guilt is yet to be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Therefore, itfollows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue.

The constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition
proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present
case. To emphasize, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which the respondent is charged. Jimenez
should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

81. Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz, March 17, 2000

Facts:
An information for parricide was filed against Joselito Narciso for the death of his wife Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso. After his review asked and
motion for reconsideration was both denied, he asked for reinvestigation of his warrant of arrest. Prosecutor found no reason to disturb and the case
was remand for arraignment and trial. Thereafter, he filed an Urgent Ex-Parte‘ to allow him to Post Bail‘. The Public

Prosecutor registered no objection and said motion was granted on the same day. It was opposed by respondents herein, then they moved for the
postponement of the hearings because no witness was available, Not obtaining any resolution on her Motion To Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post
Bail‘ private complainant (respondent herein) filed this petition before the CA. CA granted the petition. Hence this case. Petitioner averred that CA
erred when it reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which granted the petitioner his constitutional right to bail,
considering the absence of strong evidence or proof of his guilt, and more especially when the public prosecutors, who have direct control of the
proceedings and after assessment of the evidence, have themselves recommended the grant of bail.

Issue: Whether the bail granted was valid and CA should not have reversed RTC.

Ruling:
No. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides: "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution. The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such finding, since no hearing had been conducted on the
application for bail -- summary or otherwise. The appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion by the
accused and the Order granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence. We
agree with the CA. Stressing in Basco v. Rapatalo that the judge had the duty to determine whether the evidence of guilt was strong, the Court held: x
x x x x x x x x "Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.

Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the required hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged
with a capital offense. The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to
presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of familiarity with the case. "Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the
prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the
judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the
prosecutor."

Basco v. Rapatalo summarized several case that emphasized the mandatory character of a hearing in a petition for bail in a capital case. It enunciated
the following duties of the trial judge in such petition:
"(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court as amended;
"(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra);
"(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison,
supra);
"(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise,
petition should be denied."

The Court added: "The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail
applications. So basic and fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper cases that it would amount to
judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof."

Additionally, the court‘s grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be
formulated the judge's own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The summary thereof is
considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial of the
application for bail. Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago was laced with grave abuse of discretion and the Court of Appeals was
correct in reversing him.

82. Defensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez, January 27, 1993

Fact:
On May 13, 1991, an information docketed as Criminal Case No. 16698 was filed against petitioner with the
Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. An order of arrest was issued on May 14, 1991 against herein petitioner by Presiding Justice
Francis E. Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the accused fixed at P15,000.00.

On even date, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in Behalf of Dr.
Miriam Defensor-Santiago,".On the same day, a resolution was issued by the Sandiganbayan authorizing petitioner to
post a cash bond for her provisional liberty without need for her physical appearance until June 5, 1991 at the latest,
unless by that time her condition does not yet permit her physical appearance before said court. On May 15, 1991,
petitioner filed a cash bond in the amount of P15,000.00, aside from the other legal fees. Meanwhile, in a resolution
adopted on July 6, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against herein petitioner following her public
announcement that she would be leaving for the United States to accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the John F.
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Petitioner likewise disclosed that she would be addressing
Filipino communities in the United States in line with her crusade against election fraud and other aspects of graft and
corruption.

Issue: Whether or Not there was valid posting of bail bond

Ruling:
The court finds that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing of her
aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein she expressly
sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and
other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said
motion "she be considered as having placed herself under the custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her
own representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused
it to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.

Petitioner cannot deny the fact that she has posted a cash bail bond of P15,000.00 for her provisional release as
evidenced by Official Receipt No. 4292925 dated May 15, 1991 and which is even attached as Annex C-2 to her own
motion now under consideration. The filing a motion for the cancellation of said cash bond and for the court to allow her
provisional liberty upon the security of a recognizance is a supporting basis that petitioner indeed posted a bail bond.
The fact that such motions were filed by petitioner, petitioner should accordingly admit that she had posted a valid bail
bond instead of adopting a stance which ignores the injunction for candor and sincerity in dealing with the courts of
justice.

Petitioner argues that she did not personally appear before respondent court therefore making the bail invalid.
However, it was petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance of the cash bond, who requested respondent court
to dispense with the requirement of personal appearance until she shall have recovered sufficiently from her vehicular
accident. The court is disappointed that petitioner puts fault upon the respondent court for taking a compassionate
stand on the matter and accommodating her own request for acceptance of the cash bond posted in her absence.
Motion is denied for lack of merit.

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
83. Agullo vs. Sandiganbayan, July 20, 2001
Fact:
Charged with, tried and convicted in Criminal Case No. 13579 for malversation of public funds, herein petitioner Elvira Agullo, erstwhile Disbursing
Officer of the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH), Regional Office No. VIII, Candahug, Palo, Leyte, now comes before the High Court
to assail the Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on 16 March 1992, and its Resolution dated 11 March 1998, denying petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration.

On September 1988, petitioner was charged of malversation of public funds after an audit was conducted which revealed a 26, 404.26 cash shortage
on which she was required to produce immediately. In her written explanation she reasoned out that the funds might have been stolen or taken due
to a fortuitous event on the day she suffered stroke

On board MPWH vehicle Agullo together with Benjamin Veridiano, driver of Finance and Management Division she encashed checks at PNB and on
the way back to office (MPWH) felt dizziness, chest pain and nausea. She requested to be dropped off near her home and bought with her the bag
containing the money. Upon leaving house she collapsed and was brought to St Paul’s Hospital and was confined for about a week under attending
care of Dr. Juan Abando who issued a medical certificate. Sandiganbayan struck down such defense as incredible and convicted Elvira as they found
no evidence presenting the link of the loss of government funds with her sudden heart attack.

In the course of the pre-trial, Agullo conceded the fact of audit and admitted the findings in the Report of Cash Examination and the facts set forth in
the letter of demand. She admitted fact of shortage but vehemently denied accusation against her.Hence, Agullo filed this appeal with the High
Court.

Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan overlooked evidence to convict Agullo violating her constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven
otherwise.

Ruling:
The pieces of evidence presented against petitioner do not suffice the test of moral certainty to support conviction. Records reveal that evidence for
the prosecution consisted solely of the Report of Cash Examination along with a letter of demand signed by Auditing Examiner Ignacio Gerez. Not a
single witness was presented by the prosecutor rather merely relied on the prima facie evidence of conversion of malversation.

If the accused is able to present adequate evidence that can nullify any likelihood that he had put the funds to property or personal use, the prima
facie evidence is rebuttable. When the absence of funds is not due to the personal use of the accused, presumption is completely destroyed.
Sandiganbayan merely relied on the deficiencies in the evidence of the defense than on the strength and merit of the prosecution’s evidence—that
which is impermissible to the unprejudiced mind.

As stated in People v. De Guzman, the constitutional presumption of innocence is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be uneven contest
between the lone individual pitted against the People of the Philippines and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all
the authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free of his guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of
doubt. Sandiganbayan’s decision was reversed and set aside, acquitting Elvira Agullo on grounds of reasonable doubt.

84. People vs. Bato, January 16, 1998

Fact:
On May 9, 1988, at about three oclock in the afternoon, Ernesto Flores, Jr. together with his father Ernesto Flores, Sr., were on their way home when
invited by Sergio and Abraham Bato(Brothers) to join them in a drinking spree in the house of Paran Lescabo, which Ernesto, Sr. accepted. When his
father was already drunk, appellants tied the victim with his hands placed at the back. Later, Ernesto, Jr. saw appellants bring his father to
somewhere else. Seeing his father being held, he ran away, as he was afraid he would also be taken by appellants. It was only the following morning
Ernesto, Sr.’s body was found dead at the Binaha-an River. Ernesto Jr. immediately reported the incident to the Barangay Captain who informed the
police department about the incident.

The two accused raised the defense of denial during arraignment. They maintained that their identification as the alleged perpetrators of Ernestos
murder is merely an afterthought, necessitated by a death of strong evidence on the part of the prosecution. After trial, RTC rendered judgment that
both are guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court and further declared that the totality
of the prosecution evidence constituted more than sufficient incriminatory and inculpatory circumstances to reach the conclusion that the appellants
killed the victim. Since penalty is reclusion perpetua. CA refrained judgment and certified the case to the Supreme Court. Sergio Bato died during the
pendency of appeal from which decision will only pertain to Abraham Bato.

Issue: WON the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional right to presumption of innocence was acheived?

Ruling:
In the absence of an eyewitness, the guilt of an accused may be established by circumstantial evidence.Such evidence, however, must still pass the
test of moral certainty. When inadequate and uncorroborated, circumstantial evidence cannot sustain a conviction. Specifically, where the states
evidence does not constitute an unbroken chain leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the accused, the constitutional presumption of
innocence prevails and the accused is entitled to an acquittal.

“The circumstances proved must be concordant with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and, at the same time,
inconsistent with any hypothesis other than that of guilt.” As a corollary to the constitutional precept that the accused is presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with his innocence.

It is also noteworthy that Ernesto Jr. did not attempt to attract the attention of other people who were nearby at the time, or to seek their aid. His
testimony was grossly insufficient and sorely in need of corroboration. It has been held that circumstantial evidence which has not been adequately
established, much less corroborated, cannot by itself be the basis of conviction.

The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Where the State fails to
meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional presumption, the accused is entitled to an acquittal regardless of the weakness or
even the absence of his defense.

The Court stressed that acquittal of Abraham does not follow that he did not participate in the killing of Ernesto, Sr.; it is merely rling that the state
failed to present sufficient evidence to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.
85. People vs. Ronaldo De Guzman, March 26, 2010
Fact:
Ronaldo de Guzman was charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, punishable under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. This was after a confidential
informant reported to the Chief of Police that De Guzman was engaged in selling prohibited drugs. The COP immediately formed a team to conduct a
buy-bust operation, Senior Police Officer (SPO)1 Daniel Llanillo, was designated as poseur-buyer. The team recovered from De Guzman two packs of
empty transparent sachets, three disposable lighters, and P3,380.00 in cash, which included the marked money paid by SPO1 Llanillo. The team then
brought De Guzman to the police station in Alcala, Pangasinan.

De Guzman denied charges against him. Trial court found De Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and was later on affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. De Guzman now comes to this Court on a Petition for Review. He argues that the prosecution failed to show that the police
officers complied with the mandatory procedures under R.A. No. 9165. Appellant also claims that the unbroken chain of custody of the evidence was
not established. Further, the failure of the police officers to enter the buy-bust operation in the police blotter before the said operation, the lack of
coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency and the failure to observe the requirements of R.A. No. 9165 have effectively overturned
the presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers duties.

Issue: Whether or not the quantum of evidence was overcomed

Ruling:
When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, one of which is consistent with innocence and the other is compatible with guilt, the
presumption of innocence must prevail, and the court must acquit.

The Constitution mandates that an accused in a criminal case shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecution is laden with the burden to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required.

In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of the dangerous drug is a condition sine qua non for conviction. The
dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime.

The apprehending officers failed to comply with the guidelines, SPO1 Llanillo himself admitted that the marking of the seized items was done in the
police station and not immediately after the buy-bust operation. Failure to observe proper procedure negates presumption of regularity. The
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The failure to establish, through convincing proof, that the integrity of the seized items has been adequately preserved through an
unbroken chain of custody is enough to engender reasonable doubt on the guilt of an accused.

RIGHT TO BE HEARD

86. People vs. Magsi, 124 scra 64

Fact:
On 14 January 1968 in the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union, Philippines, Eloi Magsi, Juan Ponce, Perfecto Arce, along with Gerardo Flores,
Opring Olazo, Peter Doe, and "Doro Doe," subsequently identified as Teodoro del Rosario conspired in the killing of one Jesus Gallardo outside the
latter's house through the use of carbine, pistols and revolvers. They were charged for murder, with aggravating circumstances of (1) abuse of
superior strength; (2) use of a motor vehicle; (3) the offense was committed in the dwelling place of the offended party; and (4) that the offense was
committed by a band.

Altogether, the case was actually set and rescheduled for 6 times, where despite appointment by the court of Atty. Mario Rivera as de officio counsel
for the accused, but moved to withdraw as de officio counsel on accused desired to be represented by a de parte counsel. On 8 September 1970, for
failure of the de officio and de parte counsels to appear, despite a second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for the next day and the court
appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. On 9 September 1970, neither the de parte nor the de officio counsel was in
Court, so Atty. Rivera was reappointed that day as de officio counsel for arraignment purposes only.

Del Rosario entered a plea of guilty but qualified it with the allegation that he committed the crime out of fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the
other co-accused. De officio counsel Atty. Cariaso moved to be relieved as counsel by reason of his close ties with the deceased but was denied by
the court.

The Court motu proprio changed accused's plea of guilty to not guilty. Cariaso, who appeared in court only after a warrant for his arrest was issued,
informed the Court that those interested in the conviction of the accused opposed his appearance as de officio counsel. Again, his motion to be
withdrawn as counsel was denied and hearing was re-set. Atty. Cariaso outrightly informed the Court that the accused was ready to enter an
unqualified plea of guilty. Based on accused's plea of guilty without any evidence for the prosecution on any of the alleged aggravating circumstances
nor accused's evidence on duress, the Court rendered its decision the next day, 20 October 1970, finding del Rosario guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death. Hence, the mandatory review.

Issue: Whether the court had been remiss in its duties to the accused, who was convicted on an improvident plea of guilty.

Ruling:
The court should exercise solicitous care before sentencing the accused on a plea of guilt especially on offenses with capital punishments. In the
instant case, the accused was not given an opportunity to present evidence on the alleged duress. The court failed its bounden duty to apprise and
advise the accused of the seriousness of the charges, the meaning of the qualifying and modifying circumstances, and gravity of the penalty that may
be imposed on him despite the plea of guilty, as well as received prosecution's evidence on the alleged aggravating circumstances attendant to the
commission of the offense charged.

Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio counsel, who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused, resetting of hearing by the court for
alleged reception of evidence when in fact none was conducted, perfunctory queries addressed to the accused whether he understands the charges
and the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient compliance with the Court's injunctions. The conduct of the trial court clearly established the fact
that it had been remiss in its duties to the accused, who was convicted on an improvident plea of guilty.

87. People vs. Rivera, July 31, 2001

Fact:
Accused appellant Rolando Rivera was charged with rape sentencing him penalty of death and pay offended party Erlanie Rivera, his 13 year old
daughter. Complainant Erlanie Rivera testified that sometime in March 1997, her younger sister, was hospitalized which her mother had to take care
of. However his father, Rolando Rivera went back home and at around 11 oclock in the evening of the same day. Erlanie was awakened as his father
started kissing her and fondling her breasts. Complainant tried to resist by kicking and pushing him, but her efforts were to no avail. Accused-
appellant removed her shorts and panty, touched her private parts, and then had sexual intercourse with her. After he was through with her,
accused-appellant told complainant not to tell anyone what had happened or he would kill complainant’s mother and sister. Hence, when her
mother came home the following day, Erlanie did not tell her what had happened because she was afraid of accused-appellant.

After private complainant testified on direct-examination, counsel for accused attempted to cross-examine her on matters relevant to the complaint
for Acts of Lasciviousness which was objected to by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Arturo G. Santos on the ground that private complainant did not
testify on that matter but limited her testimony on the rape case only. Counsel for the accused argued that although that is correct nonetheless
because [of] the sworn statement executed by private complainant identified by said witness in her direct examination and marked as Exhibit C for
the prosecution, he is at liberty to cross-examine the witness on all matters stated in her sworn statement including that portion touching on the acts
of lasciviousness subject matter of another case before another court.

Rolando denied the accusation against him and invokes his right to due process of law. Accused-appellant insists that his counsel should have been
allowed to ask questions in relation to the sworn statement executed by complainant. He also contends that the trial court’s judgment was biased as
it was only a day after they passed a memorandum when the judge promulgated a decision.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court failed to observe the constitutional right of the accused-appellant to due process and right to court

Ruling:
Rivera was not denied of due process of law considering the speed the trial court rendered judgment against him, which was rendered one day after
he filed his memorandum. The decision rendered by the trial court gives a clear account of the facts and the law on which it is based. It discusses in
full the courts findings on the credibility of both the prosecution and defense witnesses and its evaluation of the evidence of both parties.

A review of the trial courts decision shows that its findings were based on the records of this case and the transcripts of stenographic notes during
the trial. The speed with which the trial court disposed of the case cannot thus be attributed to the injudicious performance of its function. Indeed, a
judge is not supposed to study a case only after all the pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a mark of diligence and devotion to duty that a judge
studies a case long before the deadline set for the promulgation of his decision has arrived. The one-day period between the filing of accused-
appellants memorandum and the promulgation of the decision was sufficient time to consider their arguments and to incorporate these in the
decision. As long as the trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly administration of justice in favor of a speedy but reckless disposition of a case, he
cannot be taken to task for rendering his decision with due dispatch. The decision by the trial court gives a clear account of the facts and the law on
which it is based.

88. People vs. Alcanzado, 428 scra 681

Fact:
Oscar Alcanzado was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, and the Court hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of the unidentified victim the sum of 50,000.00 as moral damages.

In brief, the evidence for the prosecution show that on the early morning of June 17, 1998, the Barangay Tanods of Bel-Air, while on duty, which is
adjacent to TGIF American Bar, heard two (2) shots; when they investigated they found a dead body of the victim with two (2) gunshot wounds inside
the storeroom of TGIF being guarded by the accused. The accused, who was the security guard of the TGIF, surrendered his service firearm (Exhibit
"D") to policeman Bagon which was found to have spent two (2) spent shells. The ballistic report states that the two (2) spent shells were fired from
the gun surrendered by the accused to policeman Bagon.

Alcanzado pleaded not guilty during his arraignment and trial ensued. The prosecution rested its case, upon motion of appellant, the RTC issued an
order allowing appellant to file a demurrer to evidence but that which was opposed by the prosecution. Subsequently, RTC promulgated herein
assailed decision convicting appellant.

Issue: Whether or not the constitutional right of the accused to be heard on his defense has been violated

Ruling:
The RTC committed a very serious error in promulgating a decision after denying the demurrer to evidence filed by appellant upon prior leave of
court, without first giving appellant the opportunity to present his evidence.

Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its
own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.

If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused filed such motion to dismiss without
express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
Contrary to the RTC’s assertion in its decision that the demurrer to evidence was denied, the records of the case do not reveal that there was any
prior order denying appellant’s demurrer to evidence before the rendition of the assailed judgment.

The assailed judgment was treated to be a mere resolution denying the demurrer to evidence and ascertain whether the RTC has committed grave
abuse of discretion in not granting the same. It was later found out that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion over the denial of demurrer to
evidence rather it was on convicting Alcanzado of the crime when he was not given opportunity to adduce evidence.

Due to the procedural unfairness and complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the proceedings in the RTC, a remand of the case for
reception of defense evidence is warranted. The constitutional right of the accused to be heard on his defense has been violated.

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
89. People vs. Rodrigo Bayya, March 10, 2000
Facts:
For automatic review here is a judgment handed down by Branch 16 of the Regional Trial Court in Ilagan, Isabela, finding appellant Lodrigo Bayya
guilty of incestuous rape and sentencing him to the ultimate penalty of DEATH. That on or about the year 1994 and for sometimes thereafter in the
municipality of Burgos, province of Isabela, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused armed with a knife, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge with his own
daughter ROSIE S. BAYYA for several times against the latters will and consent. At the outset, it bears stressing that having admitted authorship of the
offense charged, appellant does not dispute the trial courts finding of guilt. However, appellant questions the penalty imposed below, contending
that since the information made no reference to Republic Act No. 7659, it was a reversible error to convict thereunder. And because the only penal
provision relied upon by the prosecution is Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, he could only be sentenced to the maximum penalty of  reclusion
perpetua in accordance therewith.

Issue: Whether or not there was a transgression of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him, in view of the fact that the Information is silent about the applicability of R.A. No. 7659.

Ruling:
Yes. While departing from appellants strained reasoning, the Court nonetheless agrees with and adopts his submission
that the trial court erred in imposing the capital punishment on him. A careful perusal of the Information indicting
appellant reveals a crucial omission in its averments of the minority of the victim, Rosie S. Bayya. Instructive in this
regard is Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which reads: SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. When an offense
is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information. The purpose of the
above-quoted rule is to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, a right guaranteed
by no less than the fundamental law of the land.

The Court held recently that to sustain a conviction under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, the prosecution must allege and prove the basic elements of: 1) sexual congress; 2) with a
woman; 3) by force and without consent, and in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the additional
elements that 4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape; and 5) the offender is a parent (whether
legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim. In the case under scrutiny, the information  does not allege the
minority of the victim, Rosie S. Bayya, although the same was proven during the trial as borne by the records.

The omission is not merely formal in nature since doctrinally, an accused cannot be held liable for more than what he is
indicted for. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be
convicted of any offense, not charged in the Complaint or information on which he is tried or therein necessarily
included. He has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial.
To convict an accused of an offense higher than that charged in the Complaint or information on which he is tried would
constitute unauthorized denial of that right. The Information under consideration charges nothing more than simple
rape defined and penalized in the first and second paragraphs of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, that is - having
carnal knowledge of a woman by means of force and intimidation and against her will. The additional allegation that the
offender is a parent of the offended party can only be deemed a generic aggravating circumstance.

The failure of the prosecution to allege the age of the victim has effectively removed the crime from the ambit of
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 prescribing the death penalty "when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim". Since the appellant had been informed of the elements
of simple rape under the information indicting him and nothing more, he could only be convicted of simple rape and
sentenced to reclusion perpetuaas prescribed by law.

90. People vs. Malansing, 378 scra 685

Facts:
For automatic review is the joint decision dated May 2, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 27, in Criminal Cases No. 6150-
AF and No. 6151-AF, convicting appellants of two counts of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death for each count.   Appellants
are brothers. For four years they were tenants of the spouses Magin and Jorja Soriano. That on or about the 27th day of December, 1994, in the City
of Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and
mutually aiding one another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of night time and with the use of
bolo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of Jorga and Magin Soriano by
hacking the latter, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious injuries which directly caused their death.

Issue: Whether or not the right to be informed of the accuseds was violated when abuse of superior strength and dwelling were not alleged in the
informations.

Ruling:
Yes. A review of the informations filed against appellants, in relation to prevailing law and jurisprudence as well as the
newly adopted revisions of the Rules of Court favorable to the accused will show that the crimes of the brothers could
not be qualified as murder. Pursuant to Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which
took effect on December 1, 2000, the information should state not only the designation of the offense and the acts and
omissions constituting it but shall also specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. So is it with the present
case. None of the aggravating circumstances were alleged in the informations nor in the amended informations with
specificity as a qualifying circumstance elevating either killing to murder. The offenses committed by appellants only
constitute two counts of homicide and not murder. Since the penalty for homicide under 249 of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion temporal, it is incorrect to sentence both appellants to death.

In evaluating the circumstances that qualified the crimes to murder, the trial court considered, aside from evident
premeditation, treachery, nighttime, and use of a deadly weapon, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength and dwelling. We note that abuse of superior strength and dwelling were not alleged in the informations.  In
accordance then with Section 8 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, abuse of superior strength and
dwelling may not be appreciated to convict the brothers. Further, should there be a finding of treachery, then abuse of
superior strength is absorbed by the former. We are thus left to review only the allegation that the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery, and nocturnity were present in the commission of the crimes. The
court unable to agree now with the trial court that the offenses committed by appellants could be qualified as
murder. They are guilty only of double homicide. Hence, it is improper now to impose the death penalty on each of
them.
91. People vs. Alvarado, 379 scra 475
Facts:
At around 6:30 in the evening of May 26, 1991, Zosimo Estao was stabbed dead by one of five (5) men who arrived at
his house located at Andromeda, municipality of Angono, Rizal. An information for murder qualified by treachery and
evident premeditation was thereafter filed against herein appellant Rollie Alvarado and four (4) others whose true
names and whereabouts were unknown. As his co-accused all remained at large, only appellant underwent trial.

Issue: Whether or not the right to be informed of the accused was violated.

Ruling:
No. The court however, take exception to the trial courts pronouncement that what qualified the killing of Zosimo to murder is the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. As earlier mentioned, the information alleged treachery and evident premeditation, not abuse of
superior strength. It is the existence of treachery which qualifies the crime to murder since Zosimo was killed after already being in a helpless
condition, it appearing that Zosimos hands were being held by appellants companions before he was stabbed by appellant. Granting that abuse of
superior strength was also alleged, it is nonetheless absorbed in treachery.

92. Teves vs. Sandiganbayan, December 17, 2004

Facts:
Edgar Y. Teves, former Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, and his wife Teresita Z. Teves seeks to annul and set aside
the 16 July 2002 Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 2337 convicting them of violation of Section 3(h)
of the Anti-Graft Law for possessing direct pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in Valencia.
That on or about February 4, 1992, and sometime subsequent thereto, in Valencia, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Edgar Y. Teves, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor
of Valencia, Negros Oriental, committing the crime-herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking
advantage of his official functions, and conspiring and confederating with his wife, herein accused Teresita Teves, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause the issuance of the appropriate business permit/license to
operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of one Daniel Teves, said accused Edgar Y. Teves having a
direct financial or pecuniary interest therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned and operated
by him and accused Teresita Teves.

Issue: Whether or not the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against the
accuseds was transgressed because they were never apprised at any stage of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan
that they were being charged with, and arraigned and tried for, violation of the LGC of 1991.

Ruling:
No. In view of the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which both read: Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is a
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. Sec. 5.  When an
offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And
an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute
or form part of those constituting the latter.

The elements of the offense charged in this case, which is unlawful intervention in the issuance of a cockpit license in
violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are 1. The accused is a public officer; 2. He has a direct or indirect
financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction, whether or not prohibited by law; and 3. He
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest.

On the other hand, the essential ingredients of the offense proved, which is possession of prohibited interest in violation
of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are as follows: 1.The accused is a public officer; 2. He has a direct or indirect
financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; and 3. He is prohibited from having such
interest by the Constitution or any law.

It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute or form part of those constituting the offense
charged. Put differently, the first and second elements of the offense charged, as alleged in the information, constitute
the offense proved. Hence, the offense proved is necessarily included in the offense charged, or the offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved. The variance doctrine thus finds application to this case, thereby warranting
the conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense proved.

RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL

93. Republic Act No. 8493, Speedy Trial Act

94. Estrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001

Fact:
The cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely
eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governos, Luis Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the
petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Calls for the resignation of
the petitioner filled the air. However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign. The political temperature rose despite the
cold December. On December 7, the impeachment trial started. The battle royale was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal profession.

The day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. It’s high and low points were the constant
conversational piece of the chattering classes. Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the
opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the
name Jose Velarde. The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling and were met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit
the streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the
petitioner and the eleven (11) senators. A 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino
Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people’s solidarity in demanding petitioner’s resignation.  The news
broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is being deprived of his right to speedy, impartial and public trial.

Ruling:
No. We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and
broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we now rule that the
right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press.  To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused right to a fair trial for, as
well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field
x x x. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors,
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-
camera performances of parties to litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the
investigation and trial of the case.

In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that
to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they
might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a
consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the
trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change even by evidence presented during the trial.
Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.

94-A. Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of t he Multiple Murder Cases Against Maguindanao Gov. Zaldy Ampatuan, et. al., A.M. No.
10-11-5-SC, June 14, 2011
Facts:
Almost a year after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news reporters , the National Union of Journalists of the
Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various media entities,
and members of the academe filed a petition before this Court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be
allowed, recording devices be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern
the broadcast coverage and the use of devices. Petitioners assert the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair and
public trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of association,
subject to regulations to be issued by the Court. Hence, this petition docketed as AM No. 10-11-5-SC.

Issue: Can there be live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings?

Ruling:
Yes. The court ruled that there can be live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceeding but subject to some guidelines which
addressed also the concerns mentioned in Aquino and Estrada. Furthermore, the court held “that the impossibility of holding such judicial
proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties, whether private complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What
more if the right itself commands that a reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the
courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a
transparent, open and public trial.

RIGHT TO MEET THE WITNESSES FACE TO FACE

95. Cariaga vs. Court of Appeals, June 6, 2001

Facts:
Aboitiz received reports that some private electricians were engaged in the clandestine sale of DLPC materials and supplies.   He initiated a covert
operation with the following objectives:  (1) ascertain how DLPC materials were being stolen, the frequency of the thefts, who were perpetrating the
thefts; and (2) `catch’ at least one (1) DLPC employee that may be involved. ‘Canuto Duran’, Aboitiz’s undercover struck an acquaintance with Cariaga
and he told the latter that his boss ordered him to buy electrical materials to be brought to Diwalwal, a gold panning area in Monkayo, Davao.
Ricardo offered to supply ‘Canuto Duran’ with electrical materials, saying that he has a cousin from whom he can procure the same. Siton’s (Duran)
undercover work came to an abrupt end on February 1, 1989 when members of Sgt. Villasis’ team ‘apprehended’ ‘Canuto’ and turned him over,
including the electrical wires that he previously purchased from Jonathan through Ricardo, to the San Pedro Patrol Station. ‘Canuto Duran’
‘confessed’ in order to persuade Ricardo – and the others who were involved – to likewise come out with the truth. Ricardo revealed that he acted
as a fence for his cousin, Jonathan Cariaga and ‘Canuto Duran’ on November 27, 1988 and again on January 23, 1989; that the items that ‘Canuto
Duran’ bought from Jonathan, thru him, were DLPC properties. Jamero also confessed that Ricardo was his fence in disposing of DLPC electrical
materials that he pilfered but the items were not sold to ‘Canuto Duran’ but to someone else. The recitals of Ricardo and Jamero in their sworn
statements are substantially corroborated by entries in the blotter. The accused was also invited to the San Pedro Patrol Station but he refused to
give a statement.

The prosecution was unable to present Ricardo as its witness as the subpoena could not be personally served upon him. According to the trial court,
“the prosecution’s evidence considered as a whole is strong, clear and convincing. The statements in the extrajudicial confessions of Ricardo Cariaga
implicative of the accused as the source of the stolen articles, corroborated by Siton’s testimony and the police records are formidable compared to
the mere puny denial of the accused.”

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga without him taking the witness stand
since it violates the fundamental right of the accused to meet the witnesses against him face to face.

Ruling:
Yes. The records reveal that witness Ricardo Cariaga was subpoenaed only once and did not appear to testify in the criminal case against petitioner.
Concededly, this witness was not deceased or out of the Philippines. It must be emphasized that this rule is strictly complied with in criminal cases;
hence, “mere sending of subpoena and failure to appear is not sufficient to prove inability to testify. The Court must exercise its coercive power to
arrest.”
In the instant case, no efforts were exerted to have the witness arrested which is a remedy available to a party-litigant in instances where witnesses
who are duly subpoenaed fail to appear. On this score alone, the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga should not have been admitted as evidence for
the prosecution, and we shall no longer delve into the other aspects of this rule.

96. People vs. Ong, June 21, 2004

Facts:
July 24, 1998 , Quezon City, Philippines, accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other not having been
authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there willfully and unlawfully sell or offer for sale
980.50 grams of Methyl Amphetamine Hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug. Upon arraignment, the two (2) accused, who are Chinese nationals,
pled not guilty. The records do not show whether they had sufficient knowledge of the English language. Their trial proceeded. In the course of the
trial, the two (2) accused were given the services of a Chinese interpreter. Appellants denied the story of the prosecution. Accused Ong, a Chinese
citizen from the People’s Republic of China, claimed that he came to the Philippines in 1997 to look for a job. In June 1998, he stopped working at
the factory and hunted for another job. Accused De Ming testified that he is a legitimate businessman engaged in the RTW business. On July 23,
1998 at around 4:30 and 5:00 P.M he was approached by persons unknown to him. They blindfolded and brought him to a place. After a few hours,
at Camp Crame, Quezon City, they removed his blindfold. He denied knowing accused Ong and the charge of conspiring with him to deliver shabu in
New Manila, Quezon City. Avelina Cardoz corroborated his story. When they returned to the car, accused De Ming was nowhere to be found. They
saw him next at the Quezon City Jail.

Issue: Whether or not the right to meet witness face to face was violated.

Ruling:
Yes. In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation is incomplete. The confidential informant who had sole knowledge of
how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started and how it was perfected was not presented as a witness. His testimony was given instead by SPO1
Gonzales who had no personal knowledge of the same. On this score, SPO1 Gonzales’ testimony is hearsay and possesses no probative value unless it
can be shown that the same falls within the exception to the hearsay rule. To impart probative value to these hearsay statements and convict the
appellant solely on this basis would be to render nugatory his constitutional right to confront the witness against him, in this case the informant, and
to examine him for his truthfulness. As the prosecution failed to prove all the material details of the buy-bust operation, its claim that there was a
valid entrapment of the appellants must fail.

97. People vs. Ricardo Bohol, June 28, 2008

Facts:
On or about August 2, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the accused, without being authorized by law to sell, administer, deliver, transport or
distribute any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell or attempt to sell, or offer for sale for P100.00 and deliver
to PO2 Ferdinand Estrada, a poseur buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance commonly known as
"shabu" weighing zero point zero five four (0.054) gram, which substance, after a qualitative examination, gave positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a dangerous drug. Consequently, the police officers brought Bohol to the police station and the
confiscated four plastic sachets of white crystalline substance were subjected to laboratory examination. The specimens were confirmed to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu. Upon arraignment, Bohol entered a plea of "not guilty" to both charges.

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in convicting Bohol despite the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:
No. Bohol cannot insist on the presentation of the informant. During trial, the informant’s presence is not a requisite in the prosecution of drug
cases. The appellate court held that police authorities rarely, if ever, remove the cloak of confidentiality with which they surround their poseur-
buyers and informers since their usefulness will be over the moment they are presented in court. Further, what is material to the prosecution for the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti. Both requirements were sufficiently proven in this case. The police officers were able to testify positively and categorically that the
transaction or sale actually took place. The subject shabu was likewise positively identified by the prosecution when presented in court. Hence, we
agree that Bohol’s guilt has been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS

98. People vs. Chua, April 4, 2001

Fact:
In September 1992, accused Chua received a facsimile message from Harmony Electronics Company in Taiwan.The
message was written in Chinese characters except for the names of To-ong Zenon Tumenlaco and Tercenio Domingo
Fornaliza. Harmony asked her to call up To-ong and Tercenio and tell them that they were needed in Taiwan. Accused
Chua contacted To-ong and told him the message.

In October 1992, To-ong and Tercenio went to the office of accused Chua, and the latter told them that she could send
them to Taiwan upon payment of a placement fee of P15,000.00 each. She also asked them to secure NBI clearances
and medical certificates. On October 29, 1992, Tercenio, together with private complainant Lonito Baluis, went back to
the office of accused Chua and submitted the requirements. Tercenio and Lonito Baluis paid P15,000.00 each for which
they were issued a receipt bearing the name Man Tai Trading and General Services with accused Chuas signature.

Accused Chua assured Tercenio and Lonito Baluis that they would be able to leave for Taiwan soon. Three months
passed, but they were not deployed. Tercenio became apprehensive and told accused Chua that he would withdraw his
application and ask for refund of the placement fee. Accused Chua repeatedly promised that she would give back the
money to him, but she never did. After a few more months, Tercenio could not anymore locate accused Chua

Accused Chua used the same modus operandi on the other private complainants. After requiring each complainant to
pay a placement fee of P15,000.00 each, to secure NBI clearances and to undergo medical examinations, she would go
in hiding. In time, complainants inquired from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) about accused
Chuas activities. The POEA issued a certification that accused Chua was not licensed to recruit persons/workers for
overseas employment. Chua was convicted of illegal recruitment and estafa. On appeal, the accused said that she was
deprived of her right to compulsory process when the court denied her motion for the production of the records used as
basis for the POEA certification.
Issue: WON Chua was deprived of her right to compulsory process

Ruling:
No. The 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expanded the right to compulsory process which now includes the right to secure the production of evidence in
ones behalf. By analogy, U.S. vs. Ramirez which laid down the requisites for compelling the attendance of witnesses, may be applied to this expanded
concept. Thus, the movant must show: (a) that the evidence is really material; (b) that he is not guilty of neglect in previously obtaining the
production of such evidence; (c) that the evidence will be available at the time desired; and (d) that no similar evidence could be obtained.

In the case at bar, the trial court correctly denied appellants motion for the production of the records which were the basis in issuing the POEA
Certification dated February 3, 1994, as the same would not in any way alter the undisputed fact that appellant was not issued a license until then.

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

99. People vs. Malimit, 264 scra 167

Fact:
On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Batin stepped inside Malaki’s store, he was taken aback when he saw appellant coming out of
the store with a bolo while his boss, Malaki, bathed in his own blood, was sprawled on the floor "struggling for his life.”

Rondon, who was outside and barely five (5) meters away from the store, also saw appellant Jose Malimit rushing out through the front door of
Malaki's store with a blood-stained bolo. Aided by the illumination coming from a pressure lamp inside the store, Rondon clearly recognized Malimit.
Afterwards, they noticed together with Beloy, Malaki’s brother in law, that the store's drawer was opened and ransacked and the wallet of Malaki
was missing from his pocket.

Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with and convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, was meted by the trial
court. Appelant asked for acquittal for the following grounds:
1.The trial court erred in giving credence to the unreliable testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on their alleged identification of the
accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime despite the fact (sic) they revealed their alleged "knowledge" of the crime more than five
months after the incident.
2.The trial court erred in admitting as evidence the wallet and its contents although the circumstances which lead to its production was obtained
in violation of the constitutional rights of the accused.
3.The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue: WON the prosecution violated the appellant’s rights

Ruling:
The non-disclosure by the witness to the police officers of appellant's identity immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against
human experience.

The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in
Holt vs. United States, ". . . is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him . . ." It is simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. It does not apply to the instant case
where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence.

Time and again, we ruled that there can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved form an
unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the others, as the perpetrator of the
crime. In order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz., (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt

100. People vs. Rondero, 320 scra 383

Fact:
On the evening of March 25, 1994, Mardy Doria came home late from a barrio fiesta. When he noticed that his nine year old sister, Mylene, was not
around, he woke up his parents to inquire about his sisters whereabouts. Realizing that Mylene was missing, their father, Maximo Doria, sought the
help of a neighbor, Barangay Kagawad Andong Rondero to search for Mylene. Maximo and Andong went to the house of a Barangay Captain to ask
for assistance and also requested their other neighbors in Pugaro, Dagupan to look for Mylene.

The group began searching for Mylene at around 1:00 oclock in the morning of March 26, 1994. They scoured the campus of Pugaro Elementary
School and the seashore in vain. Tired and distraught, Maximo started on his way home. When he was about five (5) meters away from his house,
Maximo, who was then carrying a flashlight, saw herein accused-appellant Delfin Rondero pumping the artesian well about one (1) meter away.
Accused-appellant had an ice pick clenched in his mouth and was washing his bloodied hands. Maximo hastily returned to the school and told
Kagawad Andong what he saw without, however, revealing that the person he saw was the latters own son.

The group returned to Pugaro Elementary School where they found Mylenes lifeless body lying on a cemented pavement near the canteen. Her right
hand was raised above her head, which was severely bashed, and her fractured left hand was behind her back. She was naked from the waist down
and had several contusions and abrasions on different parts of her body. Tightly gripped in her right hand were some hair strands. A blue rubber
slipper with a tiny leaf painted in red was found beside her body while the other slipper was found behind her back.

Half an hour later, five (5) policemen arrived at the scene and conducted a spot investigation. They found a pair of shorts under Mylenes buttocks,
which Maximo identified as hers. Thereafter, Maximo led the policemen to the artesian well where he had seen accused-appellant earlier washing his
hands. The policemen found that the artesian well was spattered with blood. After the investigation, the policemen, together with Maximo, went
back to their headquarters in Dagupan City. There, Maximo disclosed that before they found Mylenes body, he saw accused-appellant washing his
bloodstained hands at the artesian well.

Issues: WON the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is strong enough to sustain his conviction
WON his right against self incrimination is violated
Held:
It is true that to warrant a conviction, direct evidence is not always necessary. The rules of evidence allow the courts to rely on circumstantial
evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue
may be established by inference

Accused-appellant alleges that while in the custody of police officers, some hair strands were taken from him without his consent and submitted to
the NBI for investigation, in violation of his right against self incrimination. Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were
forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is
proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.

101. Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan, January 26, 1999

Fact
On 17 February 1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin dispatched NBI agents to Legaspi Village following a report that the group of Arnold Pasicolan, an
emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in the Printed Matters Section, and Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office, would
stage a theft of mail matter on that day. Tumagan accompanied a team of NBI agents composed of Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other agents in a
private car. They arrived at Legaspi Village at about 1:00 p.m. At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was parked in front of
the Esguerra Building on Adelantado Street.

The passengers of the postal delivery jeep were Arnold Pasicolan, Jacinto Merete, and the driver, Henry Orindai. Pasicolan alighted from the jeep
bringing with him a mail bag. Merete stayed inside the jeep. Pasicolan then passed through an alley between Esguerra and Montepino Buildings
going towards Amorsolo St. Upon reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave the mail bag to two persons, who were later identified as Ronnie Romero
and Lito Marcelo. The latter transferred the contents of the mail bag (i.e., assorted mail matter) to a travelling bag. The two then secured the bag to
the back of their motorcycle. Meanwhile, the NBI team led by agent Vela, upon seeing Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo St., moved their car and
started towards Pasicolan just in time to see him handing over the mail bag to Marcelo and Romero.

At that point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela arrested Marcelo and Romero. Unaware of the arrest of Romero and Marcelo, Pasicolan went back to
the postal delivery jeep and proceeded toward Pasay Road. The NBI agents followed the postal delivery jeep, overtook it, and arrested Pasicolan.

The unsorted mail seized from Marcelo and Romero consisted of 622 letters. The names of the addressees were listed. They were subsequently
notified by the Bureau of Posts to claim their letters. Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes of the
letters. They did so in the presence of the members of the NBI Administrative and Investigative Staff and the people transacting business with the NBI
at that time. According to Director Ranin, they required the accused to do this in order to identify the letters as the very same letters confiscated
from them. Arnold Pasicolan y Mabazza, Ronnie Romero y Santos, and Lito Marcelo y Cruz were charged with infidelity in the custody of documents.
The case was later withdrawn and another information for qualified theft was filed before the Sandiganbayan.

Issue: Whether the exclusion of the admission, made through the signatures on the envelopes, extend to the exclusion from evidence of the letters
themselves.

Ruling:
The purpose for securing the signature of Marcelo, et. al. on the envelopes was to authenticate the envelopes as the ones seized from him and
Ronnie Romero. This purpose and their signatures on the envelope, when coupled with the testimony of prosecution witnesses that the envelopes
seized from Marcelo were those given to him and Romero, undoubtedly help establish the guilt of Marcelo. Since these signatures are actually
evidence of admission obtained from Marcelo and his co-accused under circumstances contemplated in Art. III. §§12(1) and 17 of the Constitution,
they should be excluded. For indeed, Marcelo and his co-accused signed following their arrest. Hence, they were at the time under custodial
investigation, where they have the right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice and if the person cannot afford
the services of counsel that he must be provided with one. However, the letters are themselves not inadmissible in evidence. The letters were validly
seized from Marcelo and Romero as an incident of a valid arrest.

102. Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 scra 767
Fact:
The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over personal privilege before the Senate on the
alleged "takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the First Manila Management of Companies or FMMC by Ricardo Lopa, then President Aquino's
cousin, and called upon the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case with regard to RA 3019.

The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public Officers [SBRC]) started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and
Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the SBRC to appear before it and testify on what they know regarding the sale of 36 corporations belonging to
Benjamin Romualdez. Lopa and Bengzon refused to testify, invoking their rights to due process, and that their testimony may unduly prejudice the
defendants and petitioners in another civil case before the Sandiganbayan. SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying and the
SBRC continued its investigation of the matter.

The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for TRO and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the SBRC in requiring their attendance and testimony,
acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose.
The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed by one of the defendants of the civil case.

Issue: WON the SBRC violated the appellant's right to self incrimination

Ruling:
NO. The Constitution provides the right of an accused of a crime to remain silent; this extends also to respondents in administrative investigation but
only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding. This is not so in this case. Hence, the petitioners may not be compelled by respondent
Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before it only because the inquiry is not in aid of legislation and if pursued would be violative of
the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of the government as ordained by the Constitution. 

103. People vs. Gallarde, February 17, 2000

Fact:
In the evening of 26 May 1997, Editha went missing but she was last seen talking with Gallarde. Then the searchers for Editha went back to the house
of Gallarde. The searchers found Gallarde squatting with his short pants at the toilet about 6 meters away from Gallarde's house; his hands and knees
covered with soil. Asked where Editha was, Gallarde replied: "I do not know, I did not do anything to her." To the question, "where did you come
from since a while ago you were not yet in this toilet?" Gallarde answered "I was with Kiko, I was asleep in their house. One of the searchers Mario
Bado, got angry and countered that Gallarde's statement was impossible because Kiko was with him drinking. After the confrontation at the toilet,
Exkagawad Fernandez brought Gallarde to Brgy. Captain Felicisimo Mendoza, informing the latter that Gallarde was the last person seen talking with
the missing child. Fernandez then rejoined the searchers. Back in the field, Virginia Fernandez tripped on a wet ground. The searchers, thereafter,
noticed disheveled grasses, and a wide hole among the disheveled grass. When Ex-kagawad Fernandez forthwith scratched some earth aside and
then Editha's hand pitted out. Mindful of Gallarde's safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring Gallarde to the municipal building. On their way
though, they met policemen on board a vehicle. He flagged them down and turned over the person of Gallarde, saying: "Here is the suspect in the
disappearance of the little girl. Since you are already here, I am giving him to you." The policemen together with Gallarde proceeded to where the
people found Editha. The lifeless Editha was completely naked when she was recovered. A picture of Gallarde was taken without any counsel
present.

Issue: Whether the taking of pictures of an accused violates of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

Ruling:
The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not
included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The
essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act.
Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and
an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to
whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot
traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to
move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.

104. COMELEC vs. Tagle, 397 scra 618

Facts:
Bautista ran for the position of mayor. He filed with the COMELEC a complaint against then incumbent mayor and ten
(10) others for violation of Section 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. The complaint was supported by the
separate affidavits of forty-four (44) witnesses attesting to the vote-buying activities. The Law Department of COMELEC
filed the corresponding information against the respondents before the RTC. Before the trial began, Rodelas and
Macapagal filed a complaint against the witnesses for violation of Section 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. The
witnesses appealed before the COMELEC the Resolution by the Provincial Prosecutor to file separate information for
vote selling against them. The COMELEC declared such resolution as null and void. It held that witnesses are exempt
from criminal prosecution. The Law Department filed a motion to dismiss the cases. The judge denied the motion
stating that it is necessary that the witnesses have already performed an overt act of voluntarily giving information or
testifying for one to be exempt from prosecution.

Issue: Whether the witnesses should be exempted from criminal prosecution

Ruling:
One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of vote-buying and of prosecuting those committing it is the
grant of immunity from criminal liability in favor of the party whose vote was bought. This grant of immunity will
encourage the recipient or acceptor to come into the open and denounce the culprit-candidate, and will ensure the
successful prosecution of the criminal case against the latter. Congress saw the wisdom of this proposition, and so
Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646 on Prosecution of Vote-Buying and Vote-Selling concludes with this paragraph: The giver,
offeror, the promisor as well as the solicitor, acceptor, recipient and conspirator referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of
Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as principals: Provided, That any person, otherwise guilty under
said paragraphs who voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies on any violation thereof in any official
investigation or proceeding shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for the offenses with reference to which
his information and testimony were given: Provided, further, That nothing herein shall exempt such person from
criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony. Petitioner COMELEC found that witnesses voluntarily admitted that
they were the acceptors or recipients in the vote-buying done by the accused in said case. It was precisely because of
such voluntary admission and willingness to testify that the COMELEC en banc held that the respondents therein are
exempt from criminal prosecution.

104.a. De La Cruz vs. People of the Philippines, July 23, 2014

Facts:
The petitioner here was Jaime De La Cruz, a police officer, who was charged of violation of Sec 15, Art 2 of RA 9165 or “Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002”. According to the prosecution, the NBI received a complaint from Corazon and Charito that Ariel, who was the live-in partner of
Corazon and the son of Charito was picked up by unknown persons whom were believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. After that, an
errand boy came and gave a phone number to the complainants. During the call, complainants were instructed to go to Gorordo Police Office
wherein they met James who demanded them money worth P100,000 which was lowered to P40,000 in exchange of the release of Ariel. After the
meeting, they went to the NBI to file a complaint.

Thus, the NBI conducted an entrapment operation. During the course of entrapment, the officers were able to nab Jaime Dela Cruz by using a pre-
marked 500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder which was made part of the amount demanded by James and handed by Corazon. After that,
petitioner Jaime was required to submit his urine for drug testing which produces a positive result for having presence of dangerous drug. However,
petitioner denied the charge against him. RTC and CA found the accused guilty.

Issue: Whether or not the drug test was a violation of  petitioner’s right to privacy and  right against self-
incrimination.  

Ruling:
It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer
prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still
compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those circumstances.

The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the
crime or offense for which the arrest is being made.

While we express our commendation of law enforcement agents as they vigorously track down offenders in their
laudable effort to curb the pervasive and deleterious effects of dangerous drugs on our society, they must, however, be
constantly mindful of the reasonable limits of their authority, because it is not unlikely that in their clear intent to purge
society of its lawless elements, they may be knowingly or unknowingly transgressing the protected rights of its citizens
including even members of its own police force.

RIGHT AGAINST CRUEL, DEGRADING AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT

105. Republic Act No. 9745, Anti-Torture Act of 2009

106. People v. Echegaray, February 7, 1997

Fact:
On June 25, 1996, we rendered our decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year
old daughter.  The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the
Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death. On July 9, 1996, the accused-
appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of
the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused.  We find no substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb our verdict.

On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task
Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines (FLAG). On August 23, 1996, we received the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant. In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed
factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3)
purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against
cruel and unusual punishments.

HELD:
No. The Court unchangingly answered this question in the negative in the cases of  Harden v. Director of Prison  People v. Limaco, People v.
Camano, People v. Puda  and People v. Marcos, In Harden, we ruled: "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive.  In Ex-
parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but
the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution.It implies there something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of life.'"

Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that our courts are not the fora for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the death
sentence where the law itself provides therefor in specific and well-defined criminal acts.  Thus we had ruled in the 1951 case of Limaco that: "x x x
there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective.   However, as
long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial
officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions, and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of People v. Veneracion. Under
the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence with the enemy during times of war, qualified piracy,
parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity,
robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in death.  The list of capital offenses lengthened as the legislature responded to the emergencies of the
times. 

 In 1941, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 616 added espionage to the list.  In the 1950s, at the height of the Huk rebellion, the government enacted
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, which carried the death penalty for leaders of the rebellion.   From 1971
to 1972, more capital offenses were created by more laws, among them, the Anti-Hijacking Law, the Dangerous Drugs Act, and the Anti-Carnapping
Law. During martial law, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 was enacted penalizing with death, among others, crimes involving homicide committed
with an unlicensed firearm.

107. People vs. Mercado, November 29, 2000

Facts:
The defendants were convicted by the trial court with the crime of kidnapping with murder and sentencing them the punishment of death.

The defendants raised the constitutionality of death penalty and the alleged haste of the trial court in deciding the case resulting in grave and serious
errors committed in convicting the accused.

Issues:
Whether or not death penalty is unconstitutional and "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment 
Whether or not the trial court’s haste in deciding the case resulted to grave and serious errors to the prejudice of the defendants.

Ruling:
No. The death penalty is not unconstitutional. As settled in People vs. Echagaray, death penalty is not a "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment." It is an exercise of the state's power to "secure society against the threatened and actual evil". Procedural and substantial safeguards
to insure its correct application are established

No. The contention of the defendants that the speed the trial court decided their case resulted in grave and serious errors to their prejudice. A
review of the trial court's decision shows that its findings were based on the records of this case and the transcripts of stenographic notes taken
during the trial. The speed with which the trial court disposed of the case cannot thus be attributed to the injudicious performance of its function.
Indeed, a judge is not supposed to study a case only after all the pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a mark of diligence and devotion to duty
that a judge studies a case long before the deadline set for the promulgation of his decision has arrived. The one-day period between the filing of
accused-appellants' memorandum and the promulgation of the decision was sufficient time to consider their arguments and to incorporate these in
the decision. As long as the trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly administration of justice in favor of a speedy but reckless disposition of a case, he
cannot be taken to task for rendering his decision with due dispatch. The trial court in this case committed no reversible errors and, consequently,
except for some modification, its decision should be affirmed.

RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY

108. Cuizon vs. Court of Appeals, 289 scra 159

Facts:
Eduardo Cuison was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of double homicide. Aside from imprisonment from six years and one day of
prision mayor as minimum to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum, accused was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of Rafael
Sapigao and Rulo Castro the amount of P30,000.00 each promulgated on February 7, 1989. On appeal, the Court of Appeals on July 30, 1991,
affirmed the decision with modification that civil indemnity was increased to P50,000.00.

On April 4, 1995, the case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan for promulgation of the decision. However, the respondent Judge
promulgated only with respect to the modified civil liability of the accused but did not commit the accused to jail to commence service of his
sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision as to the penalty of imprisonment. The accused filed a motion to set aside the
promulgation on the ground that there has already been a promulgation dated April 4, 1995, therefore there is nothing more to promulgate and to
pursue such promulgation will violate the accused’s constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s right against double jeopardy was violated.

Ruling:
No. The Court does not concede with the petitioner’s contentions that the promulgation by Judge Ramos on April 4, 1995 has effectively terminated
the criminal cases against the petitioner with the effect that the Court has lost jurisdiction over the case. The Court likewise does not agree with the
petitioner’s claim that the first jeopardy attached at that point. To substantiate the claim of double jeopardy, it must be proven that (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the
same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the
same or is a frustration thereof.

Legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered;
(e) the case was dismissed of otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.

As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action. Hence, a decision in such case disposes both criminal and civil liabilities. In the present case
however, the court promulgated only the civil aspect, but not the criminal. With this, such promulgation renders it not only incomplete, but also void.
Since the criminal case has not yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense.

109. Almario vs. Court of Appeals, 355 scra 1

Fact:
Petitioner is one of the accused in estafa thru falsification of public document, and in estafa, with respondent RCBC as the offended party in both
cases. The informations were filed on October 22, 1992. After petitioner’s arraignment on March 18, 1992, pre-trial was held, which was terminated
on October 21, 1994. Thereafter, the cases were scheduled for continuous trial in December 1994, and in January and February 1993, but the
hearings were cancelled because the Presiding Judge of the court was elevated to this Court and no trial judge was immediately appointed thereto.
The hearing set for June 21, 1995, was postponed for lack of proof of notice to all the accused and their counsel. The hearing on July 17, 1995, upon
request of private prosecutor, and without objection on the part of petitioner’s counsel, postponed to July 24, 1995. However, for lack of proof of
service of notice upon petitioner’s three co-accused, the hearing set for July 24, 1995, was likewise cancelled and the cases were reset for trial on
September 8 and 25, 1995.

On September 8, 1995, private complainant failed to appear despite due notice. Hence, upon motion of petitioner’s counsel, respondent court issued
the order to dismiss the case of the petitioner for failure to prosecute and considering that accused is entitled to a speedy trial. Upon motion of the
private prosecutor and despite the opposition of petitioner, respondent court in its Order dated October 25, 1995, reconsidered the Order of
September 8, 1995. Petitioner sought reconsideration for the said order in the Court of Appeal but denied the same. Petitioner maintains that the
appellate court erred in sustaining the trial court which, in turn, had gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, when it
reconsidered the order which dismissed the criminal cases against him. Petitioner asserts that this reversal was a violation of the doctrine of double
jeopardy, as the criminal cases were initially dismissed for an alleged violation of petitioner's constitutional right to a speedy trial.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s right against double jeopardy was violated.

Ruling:
No. The Court held that a jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid
plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused. In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to speedy trial was made upon motion by
counsel for petitioner before the trial court. It was made at the instance of the accused before the trial court, and with his express consent.
Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place
the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial.

Double jeopardy may attach when the proceedings have been prolonged unreasonably, in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial. There being
no oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no postponements unjustifiably sought, we concur with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals
that petitioner's right to speedy trial had not been infringed. Where the right of the accused to speedy trial had not been violated, there was no
reason to support the initial order of dismissal. It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional right against double jeopardy when that
order was reconsidered seasonably. For as petitioner's right to speedy trial was not transgressed, this exception to the fifth element of double
jeopardy - that the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused - was not met. The trial court's initial order of dismissal was upon motion of petitioner's counsel, hence made with the express consent of
petitioner. That being the case, despite the reconsideration of said order, double jeopardy did not attach.

110. Manantan vs. Court of Appeals, 350 scra 387

Facts:
On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information charging petitioner Manantan with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide,
allegedly committed on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of Santiago, Isabela. The said accused being then the driver and
person-in-charge of an automobile bearing Plate No. NGA-816 willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same while along the Daang Maharlika
of the said municipality, in a negligent manner causing the automobile to sideswipe a passenger jeepney, thereby causing the said automobile to turn
turtle twice resulting to the death Ruben Nicolas passenger of the said automobile. In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August 4,
1988, the trial court decided the criminal case in favor of Manantan. Subsequently, the private respondent spouses Nicolas filed their notice of
appeal on the civil aspect of the trial court’s judgment. The Nicolas spouses prayed that the decision appealed from be modified and that the
appellee be ordered to pay indemnity and damages. On its decision, the Court of Appeals decided in favor of the private respondents. In finding
petitioner civil liability, the court a quo noted that at the time the accident occurred, Manantan was in a state of intoxication, due to his having
consume all in all a total amount of at least twelve bottles of beer between 9 a.m. to 11 p.m. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but the
appellate court denied the motion.

Issue: Whether or not the acquittal of the accused also extinguished his civil liability.

Ruling:
No. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the
accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of as a felony. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been
found not to be the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which will be instituted must be based on ground other than the delict
complained of. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused
has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In the case at
bar, the accused’s acquittal is based on reasonable doubt. The decision of the trial court did not state in clear and equivocal terms that petitioner was
not recklessly imprudent or negligent.

Hence, impliedly, the trial court acquitted him on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases if the accused acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt, the decision of the Court of Appeals finding that the defendant is civilly liable for his negligent and reckless act of driving
his car which was the proximate cause of the vehicular accident, and sentenced him to indemnify plaintiff-appellants in the amount of P74,400.00 for
the death of Ruben Nicolas.

111. People vs. Feliciano, October 10, 2001

Facts:
Accused-appellant Feliciano, a security guard, went to the guard post of Rodel de la Cruz, the latter having the same occupation as the former, to ask
for assistance in going after a customer who did not pay the bill in the pub where he was working. Appellant rented a tricycle for the said purpose.
The appellant however decided to stop the chase because the person he was looking for was nowhere in sight. As they pass by Banga, New
Washington, they saw a woman walking. Appellant ordered de la Cruz to stop the vehicle and when he was close to the woman, he poked his gun at
the woman’s face.

De la Cruz didn’t want to get involved of what was happening but appellant told him that he already was so the former stayed until the intentions of
the latter were consummated. It ended up with appellant robbing the woman and putting into his chaleco the contents of the woman’s pocket. One
of the possessions robbed was a necklace which appellant inserted in the pocket of De La Cruz as he went home. In the morning of June 6, 1995, the
day after the woman, Teresita Fuentes was found dead, the police confiscated the wallet of De La Cruz which contained the necklace of the
deceased.

The prosecution sought the discharge of accused Rodel de la Cruz so that the latter could testify against his co-accused Carlos Feliciano. Such was
granted and de la Cruz, accused turned state witness, was stricken off from the information. Carlos Feliciano denied the asseverations of the state
witness de la Cruz claiming that the accusations were motivated out of pure spite and revenge borne of the hostility between them due to work-
related differences. The accused Feliciano was convicted of the crime Robbery with Homicide. On his appeal, he claimed that the trial court erred in
discharging de la Cruz to be state witness despite strong objections from the defense.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of de la Cruz be revoked and the same be tried for conviction.

Ruling:
No. Here, even while one might be convinced that state witness Rodel de la Cruz would, on the basis of evidence ultimately submitted, appear to be
equally as, and not less than, guilty in conspiracy with appellant Carlos Feliciano, the hands of the State are now stayed and the Court must assure
the exemption of the witness from punishment. It is widely accepted that the discharge of an accused to become a state witness has the same effect
as an acquittal. The impropriety of the discharge would not have any effect on the competency and quality of the testimony, nor would it have the
consequence of withdrawing his immunity from prosecution.[16] A discharge, if granted at the stage where jeopardy has already attached, is
equivalent to an acquittal, such that further prosecution would be tantamount to the state reneging on its part of the agreement and
unconstitutionally placing the state witness in double jeopardy. The rule, of course, is not always irreversible. In an instance where the discharged
accused fails to fulfill his part of the bargain and refuses to testify against his co-accused, the benefit of his discharge can be withdrawn and he can
again be prosecuted for the same offense.

112. Merciales vs. Court of Appeals, 379 scra 345

Fact:
On August 12, 1993, Criminal Case Nos. 6307, 6308, 6309, 6310, 6311, and 6312, for rape with homicide, in connection with the death of one
Maritess Ricafort Merciales, were filed and consolidated in Branch 8, presided over by the respondent judge. During the trial, after presenting seven
witnesses, the public prosecutor filed a motion for the discharge of accused Joselito Nuada, in order that he may be utilized as a state witness.
However, the prosecution contended that it was not required to present evidence to warrant the discharge of accused Nuada, since the latter had
already been admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the Department of Justice. Consequently, the respondent judge denied the motion for
discharge, for failure of the prosecution to present evidence as provided for by Section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

On December 22, 1993, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, questioning the respondent judge's denial of the
motion to discharge the accused Nuada. Despite the fact that the petition did not contain a prayer for a temporary restraining order, the trial judge
did not set the case for further hearing so as to give the prosecution time to secure such temporary restraining order from the Supreme Court.
Petitioner maintains that the reopening of the criminal case will not violate the accuseds right to double jeopardy. More particularly, she ascribes
prosecutorial and judicial misconduct in the undue haste which attended the prosecutions premature resting and the trial courts grant of the
demurrer to evidence when the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution has not been completed.

Private respondent Ramon Flores filed his Memorandum, arguing that petitioner, being the private complainant in the criminal case below, has no
legal standing to appeal the acquittal of private respondents; that there was no extrinsic fraud, abuse of discretion or jurisdictional defect to warrant
either a petition for annulment of judgment or certiorari; and that the reopening of the criminal case will violate the accused right against double
jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or not there is a violation on right against double jeopardy.

Ruling:
No. By contending that the challenged Decision is void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the petition does not violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. It is elementary that double jeopardy attaches only when
the following elements concur: (1) the accused are charged under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain their
conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused have been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are convicted or acquitted, or the case
is dismissed without their consent. Thus, even assuming that a writ of certiorari is granted, the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy
because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Precisely, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal
contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist.

113. Potot vs. People, 383 scra 449

Facts:
Petitioner Potot was charged with homicide. Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty to the charge. Thereupon, the trial court convicted Potot of
homicide. The petitioner filed a manifestation with motion that he is not appealing from the Decision. However, the wife of the victim, filed a motion
for reconsideration/retrial praying that the Decision be set aside and that the case be heard again because “there were irregularities committed
before and during the trial which caused miscarriage of justice.” The trial court granted private complainant's motion and set aside its Decision and
ordered that the records of the case be remanded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor “for re-evaluation of the evidence and to file the
corresponding charge”. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the trial court has no jurisdiction to issue the order as the
Decision had become final, and that the said order “would place the accused in double jeopardy.” This was denied for the reason that the State is not
bound by the error or negligence of its prosecuting officers, hence, jeopardy does not attach.”

Issue: Whether or not the judgment has become final that the accused right against double jeopardy will be violated upon re-trial of the same case.

Ruling:
Yes. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected.
Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence
has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. Only the
accused may ask for a modification or setting aside of a judgment of conviction. And this he must do before the said judgment becomes final or
before he perfects his appeal. Such judgment becomes final in any of the following ways: (a) when no appeal is seasonably filed by the accused,
except in case of automatic review of the decision imposing the capital penalty; (b) when he has partially or totally served his sentence; (c) when he
expressly waives his right to appeal the judgment, except when the death penalty is imposed; or (d) when he applies for probation. When one of
these circumstances is present, the trial court which rendered the judgment of conviction loses jurisdiction to alter, modify or revoke it. In this case,
petitioner filed a manifestation expressly waiving his right to appeal therefrom. Such waiver has the effect of causing the judgment to become final
and unalterable.

Thus, it was beyond the authority of the trial court to issue the order setting aside its Decision which had attained finality. A judgment which has
acquired the status of finality becomes immutable. Any error, assuming one was committed in the judgment, will not justify its amendment except
only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. The assailed orders would violate the constitutional right of the petitioner against double jeopardy. Such
right prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted.

The objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the peril
and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense. To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present:
(1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent

114. People vs. Astudillo, 401 scra 723

Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision which convicted Clarence, Crisanto and Hilario, all surnamed Astudillo, of the crime
of murder. The prosecution presented its witnesses who testified that the three accused were indeed the ones who
killed Silvestre Aquino, Clarence who stabbed the said victim, while the two others who held the victim by the wrists.
The version of the defense said it was Silvestre who did the attacking first. Also, the stabbing of said victim was did as
self-defense. The decision of the trial court convicted the three Astudillos of the crime murder qualified by abuse of
superior strength. Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the prosecution failed to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and, assuming that it did, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, not
having been alleged in the information, cannot be appreciated against them.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the appellants on the ground not given in the information and
rectifying the same violates their constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Ruling:
No. Anent the qualifying circumstance of treachery, we find no merit in appellants contention that the trial cannot
validly appreciate the same in its amended decision because the attendance of treachery was not one of the issues
raised in their motion for reconsideration. Otherwise stated, appellants posit that the reconsideration of the judgment of
conviction should be limited only to the issues raised in their motion for reconsideration, i.e., their guilt or innocence
and/or the propriety of appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength which was not alleged in
the information. Under Rule 121, Section 1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of
a judgment of conviction may be filed by the accused, or initiated by the court, with the consent of the accused.
Likewise, under Rule 120, Section 7,[25] a judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside only upon motion of
the accused. These provisions changed the previous rulings of the Court to the effect that such modification may be
made upon motion of the fiscal, provided the same is made before a judgment has become final or an appeal has been
perfected.

It must be stressed, however, that the protection against double jeopardy in the foregoing rules may be waived by the
accused. Thus, when the accused himself files or consents to the filing of a motion for reconsideration or modification,
double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the accused waived his right not to be placed therein by filing such motion.
His motion gives the court an opportunity to rectify its errors or to reevaluate its assessment of facts and conclusions of
law and make them conformable with the statute applicable to the case in the new judgment it has to render. The
raison detre is to afford the court a chance to correct its own mistakes and to avoid unnecessary appeals from being
taken. In effect, a motion for reconsideration or modification filed by or with consent of the accused renders the entire
evidence open for the review of the trial court without, however, conducting further proceedings, such as the taking of
additional proof

Having filed a timely motion for reconsideration asking the court to acquit, or in the alternative, convict them of the
lesser offense of homicide, appellants waived the defense of double jeopardy and effectively placed the evidence taken
at the trial open for the review of the trial court. At any rate, the issue of the attendant qualifying circumstance in the
case at bar was squarely raised by the appellants in their alternative prayer for conviction for the lesser offense of
homicide in view of the erroneous appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength which was
not alleged in the information.

Hence, the court a quo is not only empowered but also under obligation to rectify its mistake in appreciating the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength instead of treachery.

RIGHT AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAW AND BILL OF ATTAINDER

115. Bayot vs, Sandiganbayan, March 23, 1984

Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot is one of the several persons accused in more than one hundred (100) counts of Estafa
thru Falsification of Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges stemmed from his alleged
involvement, as a government auditor of the Commission on Audit assigned to the Ministry of Education and Culture,
together with some officers/employees of the said Ministry, the Bureau of Treasury and the Teacher’s Camp in Baguio
City, in the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for non-existent obligations of the Teacher’s Camp
resulting in damage to the government of several million pesos. The first thirty-two (32) cases were filed on July 25,
1978. In the meantime, petitioner ran for the post of municipal mayor of Amadeo, Cavite in the local elections held in
January 1980. He was elected. On May 30, 1980, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting herein
petitioner and some of his co-accused in all but one of the thirty-two (32) cases filed against them. Whereupon,
appeals were taken to this Court and the cases are now pending review in G.R. Nos. L-54645-76.

However, on March 16, 1982, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 was passed amending, among others, Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 3019. The said section, as amended, reads — "Sec. 13. Suspension of and Loss of Benefits. — Any incumbent
public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II
of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a
simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall
be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings had been filed against him."

Thereafter, in other cases pending before the respondent court in which herein petitioner is one of the accused, the
prosecution filed a motion to suspend all the accused-public officers pendente lite from their respective offices or any
other public office which they may be occupying pending trial of their cases.cOn July 22, 1982, respondent court issued
an order directing the suspension of all the accused including herein petitioner "from their public positions or from any
other public office that they may be holding . . ."

Issue: Whether or not to apply the provision of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 to the herein accused would be violative of
the constitutional guarantee of protection against an ex post facto law.

Ruling:
No. The petitioner’s contention that Section 13 of Republic Act 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which
includes the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document as among the crimes subjecting the public officer
charged therewith with suspension from office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the
constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law. Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Revised Penal
Code clearly states that suspension from the employment or public office during the trial or in order to institute
proceedings shall not be considered as penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial
proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. Those mentioned in paragraph Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of said Article 24
are merely preventive measures before final judgment. Not being a penal provision, therefore, the suspension from
office, pending trial, of the public officer charged with crimes mentioned in the amendatory provision committed before
its effectivity does not violate the constitutional provision on ex post facto law. Further, the claim of petitioner that he
cannot be suspended because he is presently occupying a position different from that under which he is charged is
untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud upon the government
or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode
of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.

116. People vs. Ferrer, December 27, 1972

Facts:
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the
respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a
preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file the
corresponding information. That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, feloniously became an
officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to
overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means
for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and
domination of an alien power, by being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of
the New People's Army, the military arm of the said Communist Party of the Philippines.
On May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five
others with subversion. Both accused moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.

Issue: Whether or not the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.

Ruling:
Yes. Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be
enacted." A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a
legislative for a judicial determination of guilt.   The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the
principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to  rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation
of the judicial function.  History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and
political minorities, and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite
class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder. 

In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a bill of attainder because it "tars and
feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country;
its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the trial court
said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the
CCP without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be
determined] is whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of attainder
because it has expressly created a presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to overthrow."

When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the
Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4,
against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" issued solely for
definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other
organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct. 

117. Republic of the Philippines vs. Katigbak, December 22, 1989

Facts:
These cases were certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals for resolution on appeal,  since the central issue
involved is the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1379, "An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State of Any
Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings
therefor.

Civil Case No. 30823, instituted by the Spouses Alejandro Katigbak and Mercedes Katigbak. In their complaint they
prayed that: (1) the Solicitor General be enjoined from filing a complaint against them for forfeiture of property under
the above mentioned R.A. No. 1379; (2) said statute be declared unconstitutional in so far as it authorizes forfeiture of
properties acquired before its approval, or, alternatively, a new preliminary investigation of the complaint filed against
Alejandro Katigbak by NBI officers be ordered; (3) properties acquired by Alejandro Katigbak when he was out of the
government service be excluded from forfeiture proceedings; and (4) the NBI officers and the Investigating Prosecutor
(Leonardo Lucena) be sentenced to pay damages.

Civil Case No. 31080, commenced by petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines against Alejandro Katigbak, his
wife, Mercedes, and his son, Benedicto, seeking the forfeiture in favor of the State of the properties of Alejandro
Katigbak allegedly gotten by him illegally, in accordance with R.A. No. 1379. Said properties were allegedly acquired
while Katigbak was holding various positions in the government, the last being that of an examiner of the Bureau of
Customs; and title to some of the properties were supposedly recorded in the names of his wife and/or son. The cases
were jointly tried. The judgment thereafter rendered (1) dismissed the complaint and the counterclaim in Civil Case No.
30823, the first action; and (2) as regards Civil Case No. 31080, ordered "that from the properties (of Katigbak)
enumerated in this decision as acquired in 1953, 1954 and 1955, shall be enforced a lien in favor of the Government in
the sum of P100,000.00. The judgment also declared that the "impatience of the Investigating Prosecutor" during the
preliminary inquiry into the charges filed against Katigbak for violation of R.A. No. 1379 did not amount to such
arbitrariness as would justify annulment of the proceedings since, after all, Katigbak was able to fully ventilate his side
of the case in the trial court; that R.A. No. 1379 is not penal in nature, its objective not being the enforcement of a
penal liability but the recovery of property held under an implied trust; that with respect to things acquired through
delicts, prescription does not run in favor of the offender.

No less than 18 errors have been attributed by the Katigbaks to the Court a quo.  They concern mainly the character of
R.A. No. 1379 as an ex-post facto law, principally because it imposes the penalty of forfeiture on a public officer or
employee acquiring properties allegedly in violation of said R.A. No. 1379 at a time when that law had not yet been
enacted.

Issue: Whether or not RA 1379 is an ex post facto law.

Ruling:
Yes. The forfeiture of property provided for in Republic Act No. 1379 being in the nature of a penalty; and it being
axiomatic that a law is ex-post facto which inter alia "makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and
which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act," or, "assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in
effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful," it follows that penalty of
forfeiture prescribed by R.A. No. 1379 cannot be applied to acquisitions made prior to its passage without running afoul
of the Constitutional provision condemning ex post facto laws or bills of attainder. But this is precisely what has been
done in the case of the Katigbaks. The Trial Court declared certain of their acquisitions in 1953, 1954 and 1955 to be
illegal under R.A. No. 1379 although made prior to the enactment of the law, and imposed a lien thereon "in favor of
the Government in the sum of P100,000.00." Such a disposition is, quite obviously, constitutionally impermissible.

118. Wright vs. Court of Appeals, August 15, 1994

Facts:
Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian authorities for indictable crimes in his country. Extradition
proceedings were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, which rendered a decision ordering the deportation of
petitioner. Said decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals; hence, petitioner came to this Court by way of review
on certiorari, to set aside the order of deportation. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving
retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution. He assails the trial court's decision ordering his extradition, arguing that the evidence adduced in the court
below failed to show that he is wanted for prosecution in his country. Capsulized, all the principal issues raised by the
petitioner before this Court strike at the validity of the extradition proceedings instituted by the government against
him.

Issue: Whether or not the retroactive force and effect to the extradition treaty between the republic of the Philippines
and Australia amounts to an ex post facto law.

Ruling:
No. The concept of ex post facto law was limited only to penal and criminal statutes. As conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto laws are 1)
statutes that make an act punishable as a crime when such act was not an offense when committed; 2) laws which, while not creating new offenses,
aggravate the seriousness of a crime; 3) statutes which prescribes greater punishment for a crime already committed; or, 4) laws which alter the
rules of evidence so as to make it substantially easier to convict a defendant. "Applying the constitutional principle, the (Court) has held that the
prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused." This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in
petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to
the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. "It merely provides
for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime

119. Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, January 20, 1999

Facts:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 — an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan — is being challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by
petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from
proceedings with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro
Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence
Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The
ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor
Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission — Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH)
headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief
Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief
Superintendent Romeo Acop.

Issue: Whether or not the retroactive application of RA 8249 which gives jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan on the
Kuratong Baleleng cases constitute an ex post facto law for the accuseds are deprived of their right to procedural due
process as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.

Ruling:
No. This contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull, an ex post facto law is
one: (a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when committed, and
punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or (c) which
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or different testimony that the law required at the time of
the commission of the offense on order to convict the defendant.  (e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its
consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage.    Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits
retrospectivity of penal laws.  R.A. 8249 is not penal law.

It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which
prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and
provide for their punishment. R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its
mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a
procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly
administer justice.  Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.

Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has
been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court
several times considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by
law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against  ex
post facto laws.  R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not
partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the
prohibition. Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial.   It has been ruled that adjective
statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.

In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of
law.  On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine
if the presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome.