RULE 99-100
It is undisputed that, at
G.R. Nos. 168992-93               May 21, 2009
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P.
LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL
JUDE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS
Petitioner is an optometrist by profession, married
Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children,
whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them
by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to
have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered
the children to make it appear that they were the
children’s parents. The children were named Michelle
P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael).
Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to
the clinic of petitioner. And Michael was 11 days old
when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic.
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they
were their own. They sent the children to exclusive
schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their
school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28
November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000,
petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American
citizen.
Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of
the amnesty given under Republic Act No. 8552 (RA
8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a
child.
In 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the
adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court.
At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption,
Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the
adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.
Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown
in his Affidavit of Consent. Petitioner’s husband Olario
likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent for the
adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), Michelle was
considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts
of her natural parents were unknown. The DSWD
issued a similar Certification for Michael.
The trial court dismissed the petitions averring that
since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have
filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The
trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband
and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III
of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
decision but the motion was denied. Hence, the present
petition.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can
singly adopt.
Ruling
No. The Petition was denied.
the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner
had already remarried. She filed the petitions by
herself, without being joined by her husband Olario.
The SC has no other recourse but to affirm the trial
court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. The
law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession
of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good
moral character, has not been convicted of any
crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally
and psychologically capable of caring for
children, at least sixteen (16) years older than
the adoptee, and who is in a position to support
and care for his/her children in keeping with
the means of the family. The requirement of
sixteen (16) year difference between the age of
the adopter and adoptee may be waived when
the adopter is the biological parent of the
adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s
parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications
as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided,
That his/her country has diplomatic relations
with the Republic of the Philippines, that
he/she has been living in the Philippines for at
least three (3) continuous years prior to the
filing of the application for adoption and
maintains such residence until the adoption
decree is entered, that he/she has been certified
by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any
appropriate government agency that he/she has
the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country,
and that his/her government allows the adoptee
to enter his/her country as his/her adopted
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the
requirements on residency and certification of
the alien’s qualification to adopt in his/her
country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to
adopt a relative within the fourth (4th)
degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse;
or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino
citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his/her spouse a relative within the
fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after
the termination of the guardianship and
clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except
in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her
own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated
from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse
adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted
provision means that joint adoption by the husband
and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with
the concept of joint parental authority over the child
which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted
is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three
exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children
to be adopted are not the legitimate children of
petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the
children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner.
And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally
separated from each other.
The affidavit executed by Olario giving his consent to
the adoption does not suffice. There are certain
requirements that Olario must comply being an
American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set
forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must
prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been
living in the Philippines for at least three continuous
years prior to the filing of the application for adoption;
(3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption
decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in
his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter
the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child.
None of these qualifications were shown and proved
during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of
the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be
waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees
are not relatives within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario.
Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of
petitioner.
G.R. No. 164948             June 27, 2006
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
In 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen, of
Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a
petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos,
Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos, all are
the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s
brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, alleged in her petition that when Manuel
died, the children were left to their paternal
grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological
mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now
has two children by her second marriage and no longer
communicated with her children from the time she left
up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are
being financially supported by the petitioner and her
children, and relatives abroad.
Maria (paternal grandmother) passed away on 2000.
Petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors
have given their written consent to the adoption; she is
qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-
year-old widow, has children of her own who are
already married, gainfully employed and have their
respective families; she lives alone in her own home in
Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works
as a restaurant server. And her children gave their
written consent to the adoption of the minors.
Petitioner’s brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns
substantial income, signified his willingness and
commitment to support the minors while in petitioner’s
custody.
The court ordered the DSWD to conduct a case study
as mandated by Article 34 of Presidential Decree No.
603.
On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare
Officer II of the DSWD, Field Office III, Tarlac,
submitted a Child Study Report recommending that
minor Elaine, Elma & Eugene all surnamed Ramos are
eligible for adoption and that Amelia, the biological
mother of minors was consulted about the adoption
plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her
children, she voluntarily consented.
However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as
witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of
Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise,
failed to present any documentary evidence to prove
that Amelia assents to the adoption.
RTC granted the petition. The CA rendered a decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the
minors without the written consent of their
biological mother, Amelia Ramos.
RULING:
NO. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise
known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. -
After being properly counseled and informed of his/her
right to give or withhold his/her approval of the
adoption, the written consent of the following to the
adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or
over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the
child, if known, or the legal guardian,
or the proper government
instrumentality which has legal
custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted
sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or
over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if
any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten
(10) years of age or over, of the adopter,
if living with said adopter and the latter’s
souse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person
adopting or to be adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the
natural parents is intended to protect the natural
parental relationship from unwarranted interference by
interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard
the best interests of the child in the manner of the
proposed adoption.
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents
is indispensable for the validity of a decree of
adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his
child requires that his consent must be obtained before
his parental rights and duties may be terminated and
re-established in adoptive parents. In this case,
petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia
Ramos to the adoption.
Meanwhile, the petitioners argument that the written
consent of the biological mother is no longer necessary
is bereft of merit.
When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep.
Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof
provides that if the written consent of the biological
parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the
legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed
by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors
had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have
adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.
Ordinarily, abandonment means neglect and refusal to
perform the filial and legal obligations of love and
support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a
time undisturbed in the care of others is not such an
abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of
consent, the abandonment must be shown to have
existed at the time of adoption. In this case, petitioner
relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine Ramos
to prove her claim that Amelia Ramos had abandoned
her children.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE
NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, filed a
petition1 to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among
others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; 2
that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name
and surname; and that he is now a widower and
qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that
Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to
"Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her surname
"Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.
RTC granted the petition. Petitioner filed a motion for
clarification and/or reconsideration praying that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name for the
following reasons to wit;
(1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from
having a middle name in case there is only one
adopting parent;
(2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle
name the surname of the mother;
(3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a
person;
(4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the
adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name
should not be violated;
(5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name
"Garcia" (her mother’s surname) avoids the stigma of
her illegitimacy; and;
(6) her continued use of "Garcia" as her middle name is
not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law
or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie
should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the
surname of her natural mother for the following
reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain
Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother because
under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be
an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any
confusion and needless hardship in the future, her
relationship or proof of that relationship with her
natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie
to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle
name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle
name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother.
This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and
Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees
agreed that "the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father so that
the second name, if any, will be before the surname of
the mother."7
ISSUE:
Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of
her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
RULING:
YES.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it
follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to
bear the surname of her father and her mother.
Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname
(Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal
lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the
Family Code and Section 1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law
on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an
intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence,
Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights
from her natural mother in the future.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate
child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to
use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no
reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that
Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother’s
surname "GARCIA" as her middle name.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Cang v CA
FACTS: Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie
Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973, begot
three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973;
Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph
Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.
Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged
extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of
the Clavanos.
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation with
alimony pendente lite with the then Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Cebu which rendered a
decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang
spouses providing that they agreed to "live separately
and apart or from bed and board.
Petitioner then left for the United States where he
sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the Second
Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said
court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole
custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie,
reserving "rights of visitation at all reasonable times
and places" to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus
became a naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he
divorced his American wife and never remarried.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private
respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago
Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of
Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for
the adoption of the three minor Cang children before
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The petition bears the
signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent
to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of
consent alleging that her husband had "evaded his
legal obligation to support" his children; that her
brothers and sisters including Ronald V. Clavano, had
been helping her in taking care of the children; that
because she would be going to the United States to
attend to a family business, "leaving the children would
be a problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-
seeking venture abroad;" and that her husband had
"long forfeited his parental rights" over the children.
Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner
immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an
opposition thereto, alleging that, although private
respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were
financially capable of supporting the children while his
finances were "too meager" compared to theirs, he
could not "in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of
his parental authority over his beloved children.
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption,
petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his children
alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United
States thereby leaving custody of their children to
private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, issued an
order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect,
relinquished custody over the children and, therefore,
such custody should be transferred to the father. The
court then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over
the minors to petitioner.
The RTC then held that petitioner was unfit to be the
father of his children and granted the petition for
adoption.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: W/N the adoption of the three children is valid
(NO)
RULING: Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that
notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the
written consent of the natural parent to the adoption
has remained a requisite for its validity. Notably, such
requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court.
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law,
the written consent of the natural parent is
indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption.
Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be
dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child
or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly
intemperate." The court may acquire jurisdiction over
the case even, without the written consent of the
parents or one of the parents provided that the petition
for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant
exemption from compliance therewith. This is in
consonance with the liberality with which this Court
treats the procedural aspect of adoption.
In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the
natural mother was attached to the petition for
adoption. Petitioner's consent, as the natural father is
lacking. Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged
the fact of abandonment of the minors for adoption by
the natural father.
In cases where the father opposes the adoption
primarily because his consent thereto was not sought,
the matter of whether he had abandoned his child
becomes a proper issue for determination. The issue of
abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a
preliminary issue that an adoption court must first
confront. Only upon, failure of the oppositor natural
father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he
did not abandon his child may the petition for adoption
be considered on its merits.
This Court finds that both the lower court and the
Court of Appeals failed to appreciate facts and
circumstances that should have elicited a different
conclusion on the issue of whether petitioner has so
abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to
the adoption unnecessary.
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's
conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over
his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical
estrangement alone, without financial and moral
desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
The Court is thus dismayed that the courts below did
not look beyond petitioner's "meager" financial support
to ferret out other indications on whether petitioner
had in fact abandoned his family. The omission of said
courts has led us to examine why the children were
subjected to the process of adoption, notwithstanding
the proven ties that bound them to their father. To our
consternation, the record of the case bears out the fact
that the welfare of the children was not exactly the
"paramount consideration" that impelled Anna Marie to
consent to their adoption.
This couple, however, could not always be in Cebu to
care for the children. A businessman, private
respondent Ronald Clavano commutes between Cebu
and Manila while his wife, private respondent Maria
Clara, is an international flight stewardess.
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental
authority over the child only for a valid reason. No such
reason was established in the legal separation case. In
the instant case for adoption, the issue is whether or
not petitioner had abandoned his children as to
warrant dispensation of his consent to their adoption.
Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of
a decree of adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree
of adoption in this case precisely because, as this Court
has demonstrated earlier, the finding of the courts
below on the issue of petitioner's abandonment of his
family was based on a misappreciation that was
tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record.
Underlying the policies and precepts in international
conventions and the domestic statutes with respect to
children is the overriding principle that all actuations
should be in the best interests of the child. This is not,
however, to be implemented in derogation of the
primary right of the parent or parents to exercise
parental authority over him. The rights of parents vis-à-
vis that of their children are not antithetical to each
other, as in fact, they must be respected and
harmonized to the fullest extent possible.
Said petition must be denied as it was filed without the
required consent of their father who, by law and under
the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.
Lahom vs Sibulo
FACTS: Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom took
into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo
and brought him up as their own. At the tender age of
two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support
of the couple who treated the child like their own.
Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on
legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the
couple decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05
May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued
that made all the more intense than before the feeling
of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with
the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City
changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin
Lahom."
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually,
in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a
petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City.
Despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses,
respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo
to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly
her husband until the latter died, and even before his
death he had made known his desire to revoke
respondent's adoption, but was prevented by
petitioner's supplication, however with his further
request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever
properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the
future.
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22
March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known
as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new
statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to
rescind a decree of adoption.
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition,
contending principally (a) that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had
no cause of action in view of the aforequoted provisions
of R.A. No. 8552.
The RTC dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: W/N the adoption may still be revoked or
rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No.
8552 (NO)
RULING: The concept of "vested right" is a consequence
of the constitutional guaranty of due process that
expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason
and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state
action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from
new obligations created after the right has become
vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to
enjoyment is a present interest, absolute,
unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that
herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of
adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had
already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter
under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a
decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier
pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the
action for rescission of the adoption decree, having
been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had
come into force, no longer could be pursued.
Even before the passage of the statute, an action to set
aside the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule
under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the
adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption
decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the
right within a prescriptive period is a condition that
could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right
entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged
that a person has no vested right in statutory
privileges. While adoption has often been referred to in
the context of a "right," the privilege to adopt is itself
not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right
merely created by statute. It is a privilege that is
governed by the state's determination on what it may
deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child.
Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal
of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree,
are subject to regulation by the State.
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from
an adopter a consequential right to rescind the
adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might
clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains,
nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply
the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed
truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It
is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while
barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can
always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain
benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child.
For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an
adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and,
by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from
having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
Bartolome v SSS
FACTS: John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was
employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services,
Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since
February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the
government's Employees' Compensation Program
(ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident
occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell
on John, which led to his untimely death the following
day.
John was, at the time of his death, childless and
unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome,
John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining
beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD
626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San
Fernando City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union
office, in a letter dated June 10, 20095 addressed to
petitioner, denied the claim.
SSS stated that "We regret to inform you that we
cannot give due course to your claim because you are
no longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL
as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL
based on documents you submitted to us."
The denial was appealed to the Employees’
Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the
ruling of the SSS La Union Branch.
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch
and the ECC ruled against petitioner’s entitlement to
the death benefits sought after under PD 626 on the
ground she can no longer be considered John’s primary
beneficiary. As culled from the records, John and his
sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great
grandfather, petitioner’s grandfather, Cornelio Colcol
(Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision in Spec. Proc. No.
8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated
February 4, 1985, which decree of adoption attained
finality. Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is
Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary,
not petitioner.
In effect, the rights which previously belong to the
biological parent of the adopted child shall now be
upon the adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the legal
parent referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the
beneficiary, who has the right to file the claim, is the
adoptive father of the deceased and not herein
appellant.
ISSUE: W/N the biological parents of the covered, but
legally adopted, employee considered secondary
beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases,
to receive the benefits under the ECP (YES)
RULING: Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it
appears that John’s adoptive father died on October 26,
1987, or only less than three (3) years since the decree
of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained
finality. As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled
that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent,
Cornelio, has already passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate
parents is contrary to law.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner. In other words, the concept of equal
justice under the law requires the state to govern
impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective.
The concept of equal protection, however, does not
require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply
requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to
all members of the same class. "Superficial differences
do not make for a valid classification."
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable
basis to discriminate against illegitimate parents.
Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated by the
ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate
parents miserably failed the test of reasonableness
since the classification is not germane to the law being
implemented. We see no pressing government concern
or interest that requires protection so as to warrant
balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand
and the rationale behind the law on the other.
There being no justification for limiting secondary
parent beneficiaries to the legitimate ones, there can be
no other course of action to take other than to strike
down as unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as
appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended
Rules on Employees’ Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then
about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority
over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked,
one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s
death, was that when the adoptive parent died less
than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was
still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a
significant factor in the case at bar. Under such
circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to
have reverted in favor of the biological parents.
Otherwise, taking into account our consistent ruling
that adoption is a personal relationship and that there
are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who
was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the
adopter passed away?
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which
was prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code,
which provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child,
leaving no children or descendants, his parents and
relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall
be his legal heirs.
We hold that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s
minority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s
parental authority over the adopted child.
Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records reveal,
both petitioner and John repeatedly reported "Brgy.
Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In
fact, this very address was used in John’s Death
Certificate executed in Brazil, and in the Report of
Personal Injury or Loss of Life accomplished by the
master of the vessel boarded by John. Likewise, this is
John’s known address as per the ECC’s assailed
Decision. Similarly, this same address was used by
petitioner in filing her claim before the SSS La Union
branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC.
Hence, it can be assumed that aside from having been
restored parental authority over John, petitioner indeed
actually exercised the same, and that they lived
together under one roof.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application, named
petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits
under RA 8282, otherwise known as the "Social
Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover
compensation for work-related deaths or injury and
expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who
are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD
626, John’s deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his
beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way,
considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently,
the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death
during John’s minority, the restoration of petitioner’s
parental authority, the documents showing singularity
of address, and John’s clear intention to designate
petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively made petitioner,
to our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a
secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent
parent.
Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not
deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits
stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent
given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s
minority. Since the parent by adoption already died,
then the death benefits under the Employees'
Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein
petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXX
Castro vs Gregorio GR No 188801 15 October 2014
Facts: This is a petition for review on Certiorari
assailing the decision of the CA which denied the
petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners.
The petition before the appellate court sought to annul
the judgment of the trial court that granted Rs’ decree
of adoption.
Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro
(Petitioner). Unfortunately, they separated later on due
to their incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged homosexual
tendencies. Their marriage bore two daughters: Rose
Marie, who succumbed to death after nine days from
birth due to congenital heart disease, and Joanne
Benedicta Charissima Castro (Petitioner).
On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria
Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio
(Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty.
Castro alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosario’s housekeeper).
After a Home Study Report conducted by the Social
Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition was granted.
A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro
by Rosario. She alleged that Jose had been remiss in
providing support to his daughter Joanne for the past
36 year; that she single-handedly raised and provided
financial support to Joanne while Jose had been
showering gifts to his driver and allege lover, Larry, and
even went to the extent of adopting Larry’s two
children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne
knowledge and consent. Atty. Castro denied the
allegation that he had remiss his fatherly duties to
Joanne. He alleged that he always offered help but it
was often declined. He also alleged that Jed and Regina
were his illegitimate children that’s why he adopted
them.  Later on Atty. Castro died.
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of
judgment seeking to annul the decision of the TC
approving Jed and Regina’s adoption.
Petitioner allege that Rosario’s consent was not
obtained and the document purporting as Rosario’s
affidavit of consent was fraudulent. P also allege that
Jed and Regina’s birth certificates shows disparity. One
set shows that the father to is Jose, while another set of
NSO certificates shows the father to be Larry.  P further
alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose’s
illegitimate children but the legitimate children of
Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their
birth. CA denied the petition.
CA held that while no notice was given by the TC to
Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, it ruled that there
is “no explicit provision in the rules that spouses and
legitimate child of the adopter. . . should be personally
notified of the hearing.”
CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information
contained in the different sets of birth certificates
required the determination of the identities of the
persons stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the
scope of the action for annulment of judgment. The
alleged fraud could not be classified as extrinsic fraud,
which is required in an action for annulment of
judgment.
Issues:
1. Whether extrinsic fraud exist in the instant
case?
2. Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate
children 10 years or over of the adopter is required?
Decision:
1. The grant of adoption over R should be annulled
as the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction
over the proceedings, and the favorable decision
was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent
the participation of any other interested party, as in
this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of
whether the fraud was committed through the use of
forged documents or perjured testimony during the
trial.
Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from
having a reasonable opportunity to contest the
adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to
participate, the trial court would have hesitated to
grant Jose’s petition since he failed to fulfill the
necessary requirements under the law. There can be no
other conclusion than that because of Jose’s acts, the
trial court granted the decree of adoption under
fraudulent circumstances.
2. RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the
father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only
the consent of his wife but also the consent of his
legitimate children. (Art. III, Sec. 7, RA 8552)
 
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint
petition for adoption. The law, however, provides for
several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation
where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children
born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is
not necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt must
first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or
annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married
despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible
to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her
consent to the adoption. Since her consent was not
obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the
adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or older (ART.
III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was
required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of
summons should have been effected on the spouse and
all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive
rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on
constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of
procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over
substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on
Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly
acquired jurisdiction.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXHOSPITALIZATION OF INSANE
PERSONS
Shorter version:
People vs. Dungo 199 SCRA 860
Rosalino Dungo stabbed Mrs. Sigua, with a knife from
the envelope he was carrying, inside the field office of
the Department of Agrarian Reform. Mrs. Sigua died
and an information for murder was filed against Dungo.
The accused raised the defense of insanity. During the
trial, the prosecution presented the victim’s husband,
Atty. Sigua, to testify that the accused visited their
house to confront him on why his wife was making it
difficult for the accused to transfer the landholding his
father to him. The trial court convicted him because the
act of concealing a fatal weapon and the act of taking
flight in order to evade arrest indicates that accused
was sane during the time he committed the stabbing.
The case went up to the Supreme Court for automatic
review.
Issue: Whether it is permissible to receive evidence of
the accused’s mental condition for a reasonable period
both before and after the time of the act in question. 
RULING:
Yes. The Court held that “Evidence of insanity must
have reference to the mental condition of the person
whose sanity is in issue, at the very time of doing the
act which is the subject of inquiry. However, it is
permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition
for a reasonable period both before and after the time of
the act in question. Direct testimony is not required nor
the specific acts of derangement essential to establish
insanity as a defense.”
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Longer version recit:
G.R. No. 89420             July 31, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROSALINO DUNGO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
PARAS, J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision* of the
Regional Trial Court of the Third Judicial Region,
Branch 54, Macabebe, Pampanga, convicting the
accused of the crime of murder.
The pertinent facts of the case are:
On March 24, 1987, the prosecuting attorney of the
Province of Pampanga filed an information charging
Rosalino Dungo, the defendant-appellant herein, with
the felony of murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of March, 1987
in the Municipality of Apalit, Province of
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused ROSALINO DUNGO, armed with
a knife, with deliberate intent to kill, by means
of treachery and with evident premeditation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab Mrs. Belen
Macalino Sigua with a knife hitting her in the
chest, stomach, throat and other parts of the
body thereby inflicting upon her fatal wounds
which directly caused the death of said Belen
Macalino Sigua.
All contrary to law, and with the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia, evident premeditation
and the generic aggravating circumstance of
disrespect towards her sex, the crime was
committed inside the field office of the
Department of Agrarian Reform where public
authorities are engaged in the discharge of their
duties, taking advantage of superior strength
and cruelty. (Record, p. 2)
On arraignment, accused-appellant Rosalino Dungo
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the
merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution, through several witnesses, has
established that on March 16, 1987 between the hours
of 2:00 and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a male
person, identified as the accused, went to the place
where Mrs. Sigua was holding office at the Department
of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief
talk, the accused drew a knife from the envelope he was
carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times.
Accomplishing the morbid act, he went down the
staircase and out of the DAR's office with blood stained
clothes, carrying along a bloodied bladed weapon. (TSN,
pp. 4-19, 33-46, April 13, 1987; TSN, pp. 5-21, 28-38,
April 20, 1987).
The autopsy report (Exh. "A") submitted by Dra.
Melinda dela Cruz Cabugawan reveals that the victim
sustained fourteen (14) wounds, five (5) of which were
fatal.
Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased, testified
that, sometime in the latter part of February, 1987, the
accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him concerning
the actuations of his wife (the victim) in requiring so
many documents from the accused. Rodolfo Sigua
explained to the accused the procedure in the
Department of Agrarian Reform but the latter just said
"never mind, I could do it my own way." Rodolfo Sigua
further testified that his wife's annual salary is
P17,000.00, and he spent the amount of P75,000.00 for
the funeral and related expenses due to the untimely
death of his wife. (TSN, pp. 4-21, April 22, 1987).
The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that
he was insane at the time of the commission of the
offense.
The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea
Dungo, the wife of the accused. According to her, her
husband had been engaged in farming up to 1982
when he went to Lebanon for six (6) months. Later, in
December 1983, her husband again left for Saudi
Arabia and worked as welder. Her husband did not
finish his two-year contract because he got sick. Upon
his arrival, he underwent medical treatment. He was
confined for one week at the Macabali Clinic. Thereafter
he had his monthly check-up. Because of his sickness,
he was not able to resume his farming. The couple,
instead, operated a small store which her husband
used to tend. Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, she
noticed her husband to be in deep thought always;
maltreating their children when he was not used to it
before; demanding another payment from his
customers even if the latter had paid; chasing any child
when their children quarrelled with other children.
There were also times when her husband would inform
her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth
they were not. On the fateful day of March 16, 1987, at
around noon time, her husband complained to her of
stomach ache; however, they did not bother to buy
medicine as he was immediately relieved of the pain
therein. Thereafter, he went back to the store. When
Andrea followed him to the store, he was no longer
there. She got worried as he was not in his proper
mind. She looked for him. She returned home only
when she was informed that her husband had arrived.
While on her way home, she heard from people the
words "mesaksak" and "menaksak" (translated as
"stabbing" and "has stabbed"). She saw her husband in
her parents-in-law's house with people milling around,
including the barangay officials. She instinctively asked
her husband why he did such act, but he replied, "that
is the only cure for my ailment. I have a cancer in my
heart." Her husband further said that if he would not
be able to kill the victim in a number of days, he would
die, and that he chose to live longer even in jail. The
testimony on the statements of her husband was
corroborated by their neighbor Thelma Santos who
heard their conversation. (See TSN, pp. 12-16, July 10,
1987). Turning to the barangay official, her husband
exclaimed, "here is my wallet, you surrender me."
However, the barangay official did not bother to get the
wallet from him. That same day the accused went to
Manila. (TSN, pp. 6-39, June 10, 1981)
Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the
National Center for Mental Health testified that the
accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per
order of the trial court dated August 17, 1987, on
August 25, 1987. Based on the reports of their staff,
they concluded that Rosalino Dungo was psychotic or
insane long before, during and after the commission of
the alleged crime and that his insanity was classified
under organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-
vascular accident or stroke. (TSN, pp. 4-33, June 17,
1988; TSN, pp. 5-27, August 2, 1988).
Rosalino Dungo testified that he once worked in Saudi
Arabia as welder. However, he was not able to finish his
two-year contract when he got sick. He had undergone
medical treatment at Macabali Clinic. However, he
claimed that he was not aware of the stabbing incident
nor of the death of Mrs. Belen Sigua. He only came to
know that he was accused of the death of Mrs. Sigua
when he was already in jail. (TSN, pp. 5-14, July 15,
1988)
Rebuttal witnesses were presented by the prosecution.
Dr. Vicente Balatbat testified that the accused was his
patient. He treated the accused for ailments secondary
to a stroke. While Dr. Ricardo Lim testified that the
accused suffered from oclusive disease of the brain
resulting in the left side weakness. Both attending
physicians concluded that Rosalino Dungo was
somehow rehabilitated after a series of medical
treatment in their clinic. Dr. Leonardo Bascara further
testified that the accused is functioning at a low level of
intelligence. (TSN, pp. 620, September 1, 1988; TSN,
pp. 4-29, November 7, 1988).
On January 20, 1989, the trial court rendered
judgment the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the
crime of murder, the Court hereby renders
judgment sentencing the accused as follows:
1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and the accessories of the law;
2. To indemnify the family of the victim in the
amount of P75,000.00 as actual damage,
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and
P30,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was insane during
the commission of the crime charged?
The trial court was convinced that the accused was
sane during the perpetration of the criminal act. The
act of concealing a fatal weapon indicates a conscious
adoption of a pattern to kill the victim. He was
apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila which
indicates that he embarked on a flight in order to evade
arrest. This to the mind of the trial court is another
indication that the accused was sane when he
committed the crime.
It is an exercise in futility to inquire into the killing
itself as this is already admitted by the defendant-
appellant.
One who suffers from insanity at the time of the
commission of the offense charged cannot in a legal
sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held
criminally responsible for his acts. His unlawful act is
the product of a mental disease or a mental defect. In
order that insanity may relieve a person from criminal
responsibility, it is necessary that there be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that
is, that the accused be deprived of cognition; that he
acts without the least discernment; that there be
complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the
will. (People v. Puno, 105 SCRA 151)
It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There
is no definite defined border between sanity and
insanity. Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three
major criteria in determining the existence of insanity,
namely: delusion test, irresistible impulse test, and the
right and wrong test. Insane delusion is manifested by
a false belief for which there is no reasonable basis and
which would be incredible under the given
circumstances to the same person if he is of compos
mentis. Under the delusion test, an insane person
believes in a state of things, the existence of which no
rational person would believe. A person acts under an
irresistible impulse when, by reason of duress or
mental disease, he has lost the power to choose
between right and wrong, to avoid the act in question,
his free agency being at the time destroyed. Under the
right and wrong test, a person is insane when he
suffers from such perverted condition of the mental and
moral faculties as to render him incapable of
distinguishing between right and wrong. (See 44 C.J.S.
2)
So far, under our jurisdiction, there has been no case
that lays down a definite test or criterion for insanity.
However, We can apply as test or criterion the
definition of insanity under Section 1039 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which states that insanity is "a
manifestation in language or conduct, of disease or
defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently
diseased or disordered condition of the mentality,
functional or organic, and characterized by perversion,
inhibition, or by disordered function of the sensory or
of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered
volition." Insanity as defined above is evinced by a
deranged and perverted condition of the mental
faculties which is manifested in language or conduct.
An insane person has no full and clear understanding
of the nature and consequence of his act.
Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding
circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such
as evidence of the alleged deranged person's general
conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct
inconsistent with his previous character and habits, his
irrational acts and beliefs, and his improvident
bargains.
Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental
condition of the person whose sanity is in issue, at the
very time of doing the act which is the subject of
inquiry. However, it is permissible to receive evidence of
his mental condition for a reasonable period both
before and after the time of the act in question. Direct
testimony is not required nor the specific acts of
derangement essential to establish insanity as a
defense. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by
outward acts: thereby we read the thoughts, motives
and emotions of a person; and through which we
determine whether his acts conform to the practice of
people of sound mind. (People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87)
In the case at bar, defense's expert witnesses, who are
doctors of the National Center for Mental Health,
concluded that the accused was suffering from
psychosis or insanity classified under organic mental
disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or
stroke before, during and after the commission of the
crime charged. (Exhibit L, p. 4). Accordingly, the mental
illness of the accused was characterized by perceptual
disturbances manifested through impairment of
judgment and impulse control, impairment of memory
and disorientation, and hearing of strange voices. The
accused allegedly suffered from psychosis which was
organic. The defect of the brain, therefore, is
permanent.
The defense reposed their arguments on the findings of
the doctors of the National Center for Mental Health,
specifically on Dr. Echavez's assessment that the
accused has been insane since January of 1987 or
three (3) months before the commission of the crime
charged. The doctors arrived at this conclusion based
on the testimonies of the accused's wife and relatives,
and after a series of medical and psychological
examinations on the accused when he was confined
therein. However, We are still in quandary as to
whether the accused was really insane or not during
the commission of the offense.
The prosecution aptly rebutted the defense proposition,
that the accused, though he may be insane, has no
lucid intervals. It is an undisputed fact that a month or
few weeks prior to the commission of the crime charged
the accused confronted the husband of the victim
concerning the actuations of the latter. He complained
against the various requirements being asked by the
DAR office, particularly against the victim.
If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the
accused was supposed to be mentally ill during this
confrontation. However, it is not usual for an insane
person to confront a specified person who may have
wronged him. Be it noted that the accused was
supposed to be suffering from impairment of the
memory, We infer from this confrontation that the
accused was aware of his acts. This event proves that
the accused was not insane or if insane, his insanity
admitted of lucid intervals.
The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor Echavez
is to the effect that the appellant could have been aware
of the nature of his act at the time he committed it. 
Insanity in law exists when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence. The statement of one of the
expert witnesses presented by the defense, Dr. Echavez,
that the accused knew the nature of what he had done
makes it highly doubtful that accused was insane when
he committed the act charged. As stated by the trial
court:
The Court is convinced that the accused at the
time that he perpetrated the act was sane. The
evidence shows that the accused, at the time he
perpetrated the act was carrying an envelope
where the fatal weapon was hidden. This is an
evidence that the accused consciously adopted a
pattern to kill the victim. The suddenness of the
attack classified the killing as treacherous and
therefore murder. After the accused ran away
from the scene of the incident after he stabbed
the victim several times, he was apprehended
and arrested in Metro Manila, an indication that
he took flight in order to evade arrest. This to
the mind of the Court is another indicia that he
was conscious and knew the consequences of
his acts in stabbing the victim (Rollo, p. 63)
There is no ground to alter the trial court's findings and
appreciation of the evidence presented. (People v.
Claudio, 160 SCRA 646). The trial court had the
privilege of examining the deportment and demeanor of
the witnesses and therefore, it can discern if such
witnesses were telling the truth or not.
Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in
favor of the accused.1âwphi1 However, in the defense
of insanity, doubt as to the fact of insanity should be
resolved in fervor of sanity. The burden of proving the
affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense.
Thus:
In considering the plea of insanity as a defense
in a prosecution for crime, the starting premise
is that the law presumes all persons to be of
sound mind. (Art. 800, Civil Code: U.S. v.
Martinez, 34 Phil. 305) Otherwise stated, the
law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and that
it is improper to presume that acts were done
unconsciously (People v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288). . .
. Whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a
defense has the burden of proving its existence.
(U.S. v. Zamora, 52 Phil. 218) (People v.
Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451)
The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the
presumption of sanity is proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Insanity is a defense in a confession and
avoidance and as such must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Insanity must be clearly and
satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on
the ground of insanity. Appellant has not successfully
discharged the burden of overcoming the presumption
that he committed the crime as charged freely,
knowingly, and intelligently.
Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer
escaping punishment through a general plea of
insanity. (People v. Bonoan, supra) PREMISES
CONSIDERED, the questioned decision is hereby
AFFIRMED without costs.
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HABEAS CORPUS (Rule 102)
DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO V WARDEN
Facts:
Butukan S. Malang, one of the accused in the
Maguindanao massacre, had a pending warrant of
arrest issued by the trial court in People vs Ampatuan
Jr. et. al. When Datukan Malang Salibo learned that
the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in
Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang,
he presented himself to clear his name. Salibo
presented to the police pertinent portions of his
passport, boarding passes and other documents
tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo
was in Saudi Arabia when the massacre happened. The
authorities, however, apprehended and detained him.
He questioned the legality of his detention via Urgent
Petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA, maintaining
that he is not the accused Batukan S. Malang. The CA
issued the writ, making it returnable to the judge of
RTC Taguig. After hearing of the Return, the trial court
granted Salibo’s petition and ordered his immediate
release from detention.
On appeal by the Warden, the CA reversed the RTC
ruling. The CA held that even assuming Salibo was not
the Batukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of
Arrest, orderly course of trial must be pursued and the
usual remedies exhausted before the writ of habeas
corpus may be invoked. Salibo’s proper remedy,
according to the CA, should have been a motion to
quash information and/or warrant of arrest.
On the other hand, Salibo believes that the Warden
erred in appealing the RTC decision before the CA.
Salibo argued that although the CA delegated to the
RTC the authority to hear the Warden’s Return, the
RTC’s ruling should be deemed as the CA ruling, and
hence, it should have been appealed directly before the
SC.
Issue 1: W/N Salibo properly availed the remedy of a
petition for writ of habeas corpus
Yes. Habeas corpus is the remedy for a person deprived
of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such cases, the
person is not under any lawful process and is
continuously being illegally detained.
First, it was Butukan S. Malang, not Salibo, who was
charged and accused in the Information and Alias
Warrant of Arrest issued in the case of People vs
Ampatuan. Based on the evidences presented, Salibo
sufficiently established that he could not have been
Butukan S. Malang. Therefore, Salibo was not arrested
by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense, nor
restrained under a lawful process or an order of a
court. Second, Salibo was not validly arrested without a
warrant. When he was in the presence of authorities,
he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an
offense, and the police officers had no personal
knowledge of any offense that he might have
committed. Salibo was also not an escape prisoner.
The police officers have deprived him of his liberty
without due process of law. Therefore, Salibo correctly
availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Issue 2: W/N a motion to quash information and/or
warrant of arrest is the proper remedy in cases
where a person with a mistaken identity is detained
No, the CA’s contention is not correct. Salibo’s proper
remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or
Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a
Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if
petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he
alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment
of the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing
the name of the accused appearing in the Information
and/or Warrant of Arrest from “Butukan S. Malang” to
“Datukan Malang Salibo” will not cure the lack of
preliminary investigation in this case. Likewise, a
motion for reinvestigation will not cure the defect of
lack of preliminary investigation.
Issue 3: W/N the Warden correctly appealed the
RTC ruling on the Return before the CA
Yes. An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be
made through a petition filed before CA or any of its
members, the CA or any of its members in instances
authorized by law, or the RTC or any of its presiding
judges. The court or judge grants the writ and requires
the officer or person having custody of the person
allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ.
A hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted.
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart
from that which issued the writ. Should the court
issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the
writ is made returnable, the lower court shall proceed
to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of
the designation, the lower court acquires the power and
authority to determine the merits of the petition for
habeas corpus. Therefore, the decision on the petition
is a decision appealable to the court that has appellate
jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.
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G.R. No. 182497               June 29, 2010
NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 37, DIRECTOR GENERAL
AVELINO RAZON, JR., DIRECTOR GEARY BARIAS,
PSSUPT. CO YEE M. CO, JR. and POLICE CHIEF
INSPECTOR AGAPITO QUIMSON, Respondents
Facts:
Petitioner, Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan, is the wife of
Police Officer 1 Basser B. Ampatuan (PO1 Ampatuan),
who was alleged to be illegally detained, hence the
petition for the writ of habeas corpus.
According to his wife, on 14 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan
was asked by his Chief of Police to report to the
Provincial Director of Shariff Kabunsuan,
Superintendent Esmael Pua Ali (Supt. Ali). The latter
brought PO1 Ampatuan to Superintendent Piang Adam,
Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Maguindanao. PO1 Ampatuan was directed to
stay at the Police Provincial Office of Maguindanao
without being informed of the cause of his restraint.
The next day, 15 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was
brought to the General Santos City Airport and was
made to board a Philippine Airlines plane bound for
Manila. Upon landing at the Manila Domestic Airport,
PO1 Ampatuan was turned over to policemen of Manila
and brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim by Police
Director Geary Barias and General Roberto Rosales. A
press briefing was then conducted where it was
announced that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for the
killing of two Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Officials.
He was then detained at the Police Jail in UN Avenue,
Manila. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to
inquest Prosecutor Renato Gonzaga of the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Manila due to the alleged murder of
Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, head of the Law Department of
the COMELEC. On 20 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was
turned-over to the Regional Headquarters Support
Group in Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City.
Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva ordered the
release for further investigation of PO1 Ampatuan. The
Order was approved by the City Prosecutor of Manila.
But Police Senior Superintendent Co Yee Co, Jr., and
Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson refused to
release PO1 Ampatuan
Private respondents narrated that at around 7:08
o’clock in the evening of 10 November 2007, a sixty-
four-year-old man, later identified as Atty. Alioden D.
Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was
killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil
Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted by the
Manila Police District (MPD) Homicide Section yielded
the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan.
Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the
MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise,
inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila
Prosecutor’s Office.
On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Atty.
Clarence V. Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge
Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding
probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave
Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that said PO1
Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.
respondent Police Director Geary L. Barias requested
for the creation of the Summary Hearing Board to hear
the case of PO1 Ampatuan
Petitioner then file the petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the RTC of Manila, Branch 37. Respondent
Judge ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
commanding therein respondents to produce the body
of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents to
show cause why they are withholding or restraining the
liberty of PO1 Ampatuan.
Respondents maintain that while the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila had recommended that PO1
Ampatuan be released from custody, said
recommendation was made only insofar as the criminal
action for murder that was filed with the prosecution
office is concerned and is without prejudice to other
legal grounds for which he may be held under custody.
The RTC denied the petition based on Section 52, Par.
4 of R.A. 8551. The provision authorizes the
authorizing the Chief of PNP to place the PNP personnel
under restrictive custody during the pendency of
administrative case for grave misconduct . Thus, the
habeas corpus will not apply.
Petitioner contends that when PO1 Ampatuan was
placed under the custody of respondents on 20 April
2008, there was yet no administrative case filed against
him. When the release order of Chief Inquest
Prosecutor Nelson Salva was served upon respondents
on 21 April 2008, there was still no administrative case
filed against PO1 Ampatuan. She also argues that the
arrest on 14 April 2008 of PO1 Ampatuan in Shariff
Kabunsuan was illegal because there was no warrant of
arrest issued by any judicial authority against him.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC Manila is correct in denying
the petition for the petition for Habeas Corpus?
Held:
Yes. The denial is correct.
Essentially, a writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention by which any person
is deprived of his liberty.
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is
to determine whether or not a particular person is
legally held. A prime specification of an application for
a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and
effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal
restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best
and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of
habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for
those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned
without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not
be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue
of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ,
therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is
illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed
under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s
liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of
habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order
to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the
restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal
and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue
as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory
operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial
discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be
clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented
that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It
is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being
unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for
habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not
detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in
whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be
dismissed.
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under
restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument
for his continued detention. This Court has held that a
restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or
whereabouts of police officers under investigation by
their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or
restraint of liberty.
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which
is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither
actual nor effective restraint that would call for the
grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible
precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities
that the police officers concerned are always accounted
for.
The Court ruled that since the basis of PO1
Ampatuan’s restrictive custody is the administrative
case filed against him; his remedy is within such
administrative process. Thus, the petition for the writ of
habeas corpus is denied.
Note.—In order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas
corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of
an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action. (Veluz vs. Villanueva, 543 SCRA 63 [2008])
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
.M. NO. RTJ-06-2018             August 3, 2007
(Formerly Adm. Matter OCA-IPI No. 05-2360-RTJ)
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ANTONIO I. DE CASTRO Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Manila, respondent
Facts:
Gao Yuan is a national of the People's Republic of
China (PROC) and holder of a special non-immigrant
visa to the Philippines and an immigrant visa to
Canada. On 6 September 2005, Gao Yuan, her
husband James Mahshi, a U.S. national, and their two
young children were on their way to a vacation in
Canada when Philippine immigration officers arrested
Gao Yuan and prevented her from boarding her flight.
Gao Yuan's arrest was by virtue of an order issued by
Bureau of Immigration (BI) Commissioner Alipio
Fernandez, Jr., which, in turn, was a response to a
letter dated 9 August 2004 from the Consul General of
the PROC which alleged that Gao Yuan was a fugitive
from justice and charged with embezzlement by
Chinese police and requested her arrest and
deportation to China. Gao Yuan was detained at the BI
Detention Center.
James Mahshi filed on 8 September 2005 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila the Petition for the
writ of Habeas Corpus with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, contending that Gao Yuan was illegally
detained since she is not a fugitive from justice.
On the same day, Executive Judge Eugenio, Jr. of the
RTC of Manila issued a 72-hour TRO enjoining the
Commissioner from initiating any deportation
proceeding and/or directing the suspension of any
such proceedings against Gao Yuan. The case was then
raffled to Branch 3 of the Manila RTC presided by
respondent.
Commissioner Fernandez, through the OSG, filed a
Return of the Writ on 8 September 2005. The Return
informed the RTC that Gao Yuan's passport had been
cancelled on 18 November 2004 by the PROC and her
apprehension had been expressly requested by the
Embassy of the PROC. Gao Yuan's summary
deportation was already ordered upon prior filing of a
charge sheet for being an undocumented and
undesirable alien by the BI Board of Commissioners
A summary hearing on the issue of injunction was held
and the parties, upon the suggestion of respondent,
agreed to the extension of the 72-hour TRO by 17 days
or up to 28 September 2005. Thereafter, on 13
September 2005, respondent promulgated an Order of
Release, after filing her cash bond. However, the BI
refused to release Gao Yuan as there was no BI
clearance.
Respondent Judge insisted on releasing Gao Yuan from
custody. Through an interlocutory order, the RTC took
custody of Gao Yuan. The RTC clarified that it was only
a provisional release for the duration of the TRO or up
to 28 September 2005, subject to certain conditions:
the posting of an additional cash bond of P100,000.00;
(2) her movements were to be monitored by the court;
(3) the issuance of a warrant of arrest against her
should she try to hide; and (4) the signing by Gao Yuan
and her husband of an undertaking that she will come
to court at any given time she is called. Respondent
based the provisional release on humanitarian reasons,
considering that Gao Yuan was merely wanted as a
witness in a case in the PROC and she is a nursing
mother to a 17-month old child.
Complainant OSG contends that Gao Yuan's release on
bail is illegal since such falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Immigration and not in the
regular courts pursuant to Section 37(e) of C.A. No.
613. Citing Commissioner Rodriguez v. Judge
Bonifacio, complainant contends that the RTC has no
power to release the alien on bail even in habeas
corpus proceedings.
Moreover, OSG averred the following: (1) respondent
openly disregarded Sec. 4(a), Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure for the grant of the injunction
embodied in the 13 September 2005 Order is invalid,
for the release was only prayed for in an unverified
Supplement to Application for TRO and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction; (2) respondent declaration of
the notice of appeal as premature is also illegal since he
already decided the habeas corpus suit on the merits
and ordered the release of Gao Yuan; and (3)
respondent is guilty of dishonesty for making it appear
that Solicitor Danilo Leyva agreed to the extension of
the TRO and did not oppose the release of Gao Yuan
when the contrary is true.
The case against Judge Eugenio, Jr. was dismissed per
Resolution dated 30 August 2006, as it was found that
even though he erred in issuing the TRO, it was a mere
judgment error not meriting administrative sanction.
The case against respondent Judge was raffled to
Justice Romilla-Lontok, who summarized in the Report
and Recommendation that respondent averred in his
comments that: (a) the RTC had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the petition for habeas corpus; (b) he
acted in accordance with law in issuing the Orders
dated 9, 13 and 16 September 2005; and (c) the proper
remedy of a party aggrieved by the decision of a court is
to elevate the matter by appeal or certiorari and not to
file an administrative case against the judge.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge is correct?
Held:
As to the issue in Jurisdiction
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is
a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to
determine whether the confinement or detention is
valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What
is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as
of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the
writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its
inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening
events, such as the instances mentioned in Sec. 4 of
Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of
the application.
Under Sec. 21 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, RTCs have
original jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of habeas
corpus which may be enforced in any part of their
respective regions, and the material averments in
James Mahshi's petition for habeas corpus sufficiently
raised the issue of legality of Gao Yuan's detention.
The remedy of habeas corpus extends to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, and the prayer for
injunctive relief enjoining the deportation of Gao Yuan
is merely incidental to the question of legality of her
detention. Respondent also points out that the
Summary Deportation Order came after the filing of
the habeas corpus petition, so that the jurisdiction of
the RTC was already vested upon service of summons
on respondent, and the BI cannot remove such
jurisdiction by issuing a Summary Deportation Order.
Justice Romilla-Lontok agrees that the RTC, and in this
particular case, Branch 3 with respondent presiding,
had clearly been vested with jurisdiction over the
petition for habeas corpus, based on the allegations in
the petition that Gao Yuan had been detained even
without a judicial writ or order for her commitment.
As to the issue in validity of the Order Release
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he
may no longer question his detention through a petition
for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy
would be to quash the information and/or the warrant
of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should
not be allowed after the party sought to be released had
been charged before any court. The term “court”
includes quasi-judicial bodies or governmental agencies
authorized to order the person’s confinement, like the
Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.
The respondent’s acts also disregarded the rule on
burden of proof after the writ has been returned as laid
down in Sec. 13 of Rule 102. If the detention is by
reason of or in pursuance of law, the return is
considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the
restraint and the petitioner therein has the burden of
proof to show that the restraint is illegal. The reason for
this is the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed. The transcript of stenographic
notes of the hearing on 16 September 2005 shows that
the allegations in the return that Gao Yuan had a
pending deportation case with the BI Board of
Commissioners, as shown by the Charge Sheet, and
that a Summary Deportation Order was already issued
against her and that she used an expired Chinese
passport in her attempt to leave the Philippines, were
not controverted by James Mahshi. It seems that
respondent merely confirmed from Gao Yuan the
allegations in the petition for habeas corpus that she
was not a fugitive from justice but was merely wanted
as a witness in a case and that she was a nursing
mother to a 17-month old baby. Believing that Gao
Yuan’s detention was without due process of law,
respondent ordered that the court take custody of her
and that she be not returned to the BI Detention
Center.
However, the Court ruled that the provisional or
temporary release of Gao Yuan effectively granted the
petition for habeas corpus insofar as the discharge of
the detainee is concerned, since the main prayer in a
petition for habeas corpus relates to the release or
discharge of the detainee. The general rule is that the
release, whether permanent or temporary, of a
detained person renders the petition for habeas
corpus moot and academic. Such release must be
one which is free from involuntary restraints. Gao
Yuan’s release, while still subject to certain conditions,
did not unduly restrain her movements or deprive her
of her constitutional freedoms. The conditions were
deemed necessary by the court below to ensure her
attendance in the subsequent hearings on the case.
Said conditions did not at all restrict her freedom of
movement as she was able to elude the authorities who
tried to arrest her for her failure to appear before the
trial court on 23 September 2005.
It should be noted too that Section 37 (9) (e) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended,
provides that “[a]ny alien under arrest in a deportation
proceeding may be released under bond or under such
other conditions as may be imposed by the
Commissioner of Immigration.” This provision confers
upon the Commissioner the power and discretion to
grant bail in deportation proceedings, but does not
grant to aliens the right to be released on bail. The
exercise by the Commissioner of such power is
discretionary. So too, the determination of the
propriety of allowing the temporary release on bail
of the alien, subject to deportation under the
Immigration Act, as well as the conditions of such
release falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commissioner, not the courts of justice. The reason
for this is that the courts do not administer
immigration laws. The power of the Commissioner to
grant bail in deportation proceedings should be
exercised when the alien is still under investigation,
and not after the order of deportation has been issued
by the BI. When an alien is detained by the BI for
deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the
Deportation Board, the courts of first instance, now
RTCs, have no power to release such alien on bail, even
in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law
authorizing it.
As to the error in filing an administrative case
against respondent Judge
Ordinarily, to constitute gross ignorance of the law, the
subject decision, order, or actuation of the judge in the
performance of his official duties should be contrary to
existing law and jurisprudence, and most importantly,
he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption. In the present case, there is no finding of
bad faith or malice, but this does not excuse
respondent. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge
owes it to his office to simply apply it, and anything less
than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of
the law. In short, when the law is so elementary, not to
be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
While judges should not be held accountable for
every erroneous judgment rendered in good faith,
such good faith is no defense where the basic issues
are simple and the applicable legal principle evident
and basic as to be beyond permissible margins of
error.
The Court found that the respondent's failure to
observe the law and procedure on petitions for habeas
corpus inexcusable, albeit done in good faith for
humanitarian considerations and in the honest belief
that Gao Yuan's detention was in violation of due
process. Accordingly, respondent is administratively
liable for gross ignorance of the law.
Notes.—The act of a judge deciding against a settled
doctrine constitutes gross ignorance of the law, but to
be punishable as such, it must not only be
contradictory to existing law and jurisprudence, it must
also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption. (Rallos vs. Gako, Jr., 344 SCRA 178 [2000])
The writ of habeas corpus, although not designed to
interrupt the orderly administration of justice, can be
invoked by the attendance of a special circumstance
that requires immediate action, such as when resort
cannot be had to the remedy of a motion to quash since
the case is no longer with the judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation, and neither could there be a
reinvestigation since the preliminary investigation for
purposes of filing the information has already been
taken over by the Provincial Prosecutor. (Calvan vs.
Court of Appeals, 341 SCRA 806 [2000]) Office of the
Solicitor General vs. De Castro, 529 SCRA 157, A.M.
No. RTJ-06-2018 August 3, 2007
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G.R. No. 162734 August 29, 2006
MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES,
ORLANDO B. SALIENTES, and ROSARIO C.
SALIENTES, Petitioners,
vs.
LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO
SABUNDAYO, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 203, MUNTINLUPA CITY, Respondents
Facts:
Loran S.D. Abanilla and Marie Antonette Abigail C.
Salientes are the parents of the minor Lorenzo
Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie
Antonette’s parents, Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario
C. Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, Loran suggested
to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but
Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of
the Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing
his son.
Loran, in his personal capacity and as the
representative of his son, filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus and Custody, docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 03-004 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Muntinlupa City. The RTC granted the petition.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration filed thereafter
was denied. Their petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals was denied as well. The appellate court held
that the trial court was still about to conduct a full
inquiry, in a summary proceeding, on the cause of the
minor’s detention and the matter of his custody.
Hence, this present petition. Petitioners contend that
the order is contrary to Article 213  of the Family Code,
which provides that no child under seven years of age
shall be separated from the mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. They
maintain that herein respondent Loran had the burden
of showing any compelling reason but failed to present
even a prima facie proof thereof.
Petitioners posit that even assuming that there were
compelling reasons; the proper remedy for private
respondent was simply an action for custody, but
not habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas
corpus is unavailable against the mother who, under
the law, has the right of custody of the minor. They
insist there was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the
minor by his own mother. There was no need for the
mother to show cause and explain the custody of her
very own child.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it
dismissed the petition for certiorari against the RTC’s
orders?
Held:
No. The Court of Appeals properly dismissed the
petition for certiorari against the said orders of the
RTC.
Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where
rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled
thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code,
respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have
joint parental authority over their son and
consequently joint custody. Further, although the
couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has
yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a
judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents
are still entitled to the custody of their child.
In the present case, private respondents cause of action
is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged
in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is
available to him.
In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare
is the supreme consideration. The Child and Youth
Welfare Code unequivocally provide that in all
questions regarding the care and custody, among
others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount
consideration.

It bears stressing that the order did not grant custody

of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed
petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain
why private respondent is prevented from seeing his
child. This is in line with the directive in Section 9 of
A.M. 03-04-04-SC that within fifteen days after the
filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file
answer, the court shall issue an order requiring the
respondent (herein petitioners) to present the minor
before the court. This was exactly what the court did.

Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the

judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a
guideline for the proper award of custody by the court.
Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for
private respondents’ petition for custody. But it is not a
basis for preventing the father to see his own child.
Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from
seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.

Note.—As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal

restraint by the respondents rests on the petitioner who
attaches such restraints. (Jackson vs. Macalino, 416
SCRA 390 [2003]) Salientes vs. Abanilla, 500 SCRA
128, G.R. No. 162734 August 29, 2006)