(The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage 6) Darling, Linda T.-Revenue Raising and Legitimacy - Tax Collection and Finance Administration in The Ottoman Empire 1560-1660-Brill (1996) PDF

REVENUE-RAISING AND LEGITIMACY
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

AND ITS HERITAGE
Politics, Socie~ and Economy
EDITED BY
SURAIYA FAROQ,HI AND HALIL INALCIK
Advisory Board
Fikret Adanir · Idris Bostan · Arnnon Cohen · Cornell Fleischer

Barbara Flemming · Alexander de Groot · Klaus Kreiser
Hans Georg Majer · Irene Melikoff · Ahmet Ya§ar Ocak
Abdeljelil Temimi · Gilles Veinstein · Elizabeth Zachariadou
VOLUME6
REVENUE-RAISING AND
LEGITIMACY
Tax Collection and Finance Administration
in the Ottoman Empire
1560-1660
BY
LINDA T. DARLING
EJ.BRILL
LEIDEN · NEW YORK · KOLN
1996
The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the
Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library
Resources.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Darling, Linda T., 1945 -
Revenue-raising and legitimacy: tax collection and finance
administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660 I by Linda T.
Darling.
p. cm. - (The Ottoman Empire and its heritage. ISSN
1380-6076 ; v. 6)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 9004102892 (cloth : alk. paper)
1. Taxation-Turkey-History. 2. Tax collection -Turkey-History.
3. Tax administration and procedure-Turkey-History. 4. Turkey-
-Economic conditions-History. I. Title. II. Series.
Iij2906.5.D37 1995
336.2'00956 l-dc20 95-24727
CIP
Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Darling, Linda T.:
Revenue-raising and legitimacy: tax collection and finance
administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660 I by Linda
T. Darling. - Leiden; New York; Koln: Brill, 1996
(The Ottoman empire and its heritage ; Vol. 6)
ISBN 90-04-10289-2
NE:GT
ISSN 1380-6076
ISBN 90 04 10289 2
C Copyright 1996 by EJ. Brill, Uiden, The Nether/,ands

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PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS
To my mother
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CONTENTS
List of Tables ............................................................................... ix

Preface ........................................................................................... xi
List of Abbreviations ..... .. ...... .................. .. .... ............ ............ .. .... xiii
Transliteration and the Turkish Alphabet ............................... ... xiv
Identification of Archival Sources ..................................... ......... xv
Introduction: The Myth of Decline ............................................. 1

The Myth of Ottoman Decline ................................ ~.......... 2
Crisis and the Ottoman State ..... .............. .................... .... .. 8
Sources for the Study of the Post-Classical Age ............. 16
I. Classical Ottoman Finance .................................................. 22

Ottoman Taxation ................................................................. 22
Revenue Assessment by Survey (Tahrir) ........................... 29
The Monetary System and the Price Revolution ............. .. 35
Population and Economic Change ....................................... 41
II. The Ottoman Central Finance Department ........................ 49

Early Finance Department Organization ............................. 51
Reorganizations in the Finance Structure ........................... 57
The Seventeenth Century and Beyond ......... .......... .. .. ......... 67
III. Revenue Assessment by the Central

Finance Department: Cizye and Avarzz .............................. 81
Revenue Surveying by the Finance Bureaus ....... .. .......... .. 82
Registration of Taxpayers and Population Estimation ...... 100
Amounts of Money Taken in Tax ...................................... 108
IV. Taxation Without Assessment?

Tax Farming (iltizam) .......................................................... 119
Mukataa Revenues and Records .......................................... 123
Bidding and Revenue Amounts ........................................... 136
Bidders' Conditions and Personnel Recruitment ................ 146
iltizam Supervision ................................................................ 152
viii CONTENTS
V. Tax Collection Personnel .................................................. 161

Appointment of Revenue Collectors ... ........ .. .. ........ .. ....... 161
The Military in Cizye and A varzz Collection .................. 169
The Military in Tax Farming ........................................... 178
VI. Tax Collection, Remittance, and Reporting ..................... 186

Collection Procedures: Cizye and ~varzz ......................... 187
iltizam Collection ... .. ...... .. .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ........ .. .... .. .. ...... .. .. 194
Remittance and Reporting ................................................. 203
VII. Arrears, Accounting, and Balance-Sheets ........................ 213

Collectors' Accounts (Muhasebe) ..... .. .. ........ ........ .. .. .. .. .... 213
Arrears and their Collection ............................................. 222
Central Accounting Procedures ......................................... 231
Balance-Sheets and Budgets ............................................. 237
VIII. Complaints and Corruption ............................................... 246

The Petition Process ............. ............................................. 248
Changing the Assessment .................................................. 260
Corruption in Tax Collection ....... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ........ ... .. 267
IX. Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy ....... ..... ... ........ .. .... .. ....... 281
Revenue and Legitimacy: The Circle of Justice ............. 283
Revenue-Raising and Decline ........................................... 299
Glossary ... ...... ............. ... .. .... ...... .. .... ...•...... .. .... ...... .. .. .......... .... .. ... 307
Bibliography ............. .. .. .... ... ... .. .......... .. .. .. .. .. ... ....... ...... .. .. .... .. .. .. .. 325
Index ............................................................................................. 35 3
TABLES
1. Price Inflation in the Ottoman Empire, 1555-1655 ....................... 36

2. Total Numbers of Salaried Scribes .................................................. 59
3. The Structure of the Maliye in the Mid-Sixteenth Century .......... 63
4. Number of Scribes in Finance Bureaus .......................................... 68
5. Cizye Rates in Text, 1560-1660 ...................................................... 110
6. Seventeenth-Century Cizye .............. ......... ... .. ......... .......... .......... ....... 112
7. Avarzz Rates in Text, 1500-1660 .................................................... 114
8. Avarzz Assessed around 1640 ........................................................... 116
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PREFACE
When I first began to study the Ottoman Empire, its history was
explained in terms of rise and decline. After reaching a peak of greatness
in the reign of Siileyman the Magnificent (1520-1566), the empire
entered an era of decline which was thought to have lasted until its
end in 1923. The pivotal century from 1560 to 1660, between the
regime of Siileyman and that of the Kopriilii grand viziers, who
controlled the empire in its final moment of strength, was portrayed
as an era of social and economic disorder and governmental corrup-
tion leading to military defeat and imperial disintegration. Although
trends similar to the internal difficulties of the Ottoman Empire also
appeared in seventeenth-century Europe, they were heralded there not
as signs of decline but as forces of growth and progress, precursors
of a coming "European miracle;" or at worst they were dismissed as
negligible stumbles on the road to greatness, a "crisis" from which
at least some European states emerged with renewed health and
strength. In focusing my research on this century, I thought I would
find the turning point in Ottoman fortunes, would discover what it
was that set the Ottomans off on an opposite course from western
Europe. Like others who have researched this period, however, I found
no such thing. Perhaps I was looking in the wrong place, but I thought,
and still think, that such a turning point would be reflected in the fiscal
system even if it did not originate there. What my research uncovered
contradicts the stereotype of decline and negates the idea of a defini-
tive downturn in Ottoman history. The century after Siileyman is
revealed as a period of continuity in changing times, exhibiting strength
in unexpected places to balance weakness in others. With other scholars
of the post-Siileymanic era, I have had to abandon decline as an
explanatory paradigm and work toward concepts that better accord
with the Ottoman experience. I trust that this book will lay a f oun-
dation for others to continue investigation of the many unanswered
questions that remain.
The account in these chapters is by no means a complete exposi-
tion of the Ottoman fiscal system. Expenditures, government procure-
ment, provincial finance, and many other issues remain to be studied;
this book provides only an introduction. In view of its primary purpose,
xii PREFACE
the encouragement of further research, Ottoman terms have generally

been employed for Ottoman institutions and documents. For non-
specialist readers and comparative historians, a glossary is provided
in the back of the book, and Ottoman terms are alternated with English
equivalents. Transliteration and document numbering are explained
below.
I would like to thank the individuals and organizations who have
contributed in various ways to the completion of this work. In defi-
ance of convention, I will list first my parents, Dorothy M. and Richard
J. Darling, to whom I owe my interest in history and in the Middle
East (and even, indirectly, in Ottoman taxation) and from whom I
received unfailing moral and financial support. My advisor, Halil
Inalcik, formed my approach and gave me tools with which to pursue
it; I have drawn extensively on his knowledge. Influential among my
teachers have been Richard L. Chambers, R. Stephen Humphreys,
Donald Lach, Abdul-Kerim Rafeq, and John E. Woods, and among
my critics Rifa<at <Ali Abou-El-Haj. Editorial help has been provided
by Peri Bearman and Suraiya Faroqhi, copy editing by Christina Jarvis,
and computer assistance by Patricia Foreman. Financial support for
research and writing was provided at various stages by grants from
the American Council of Learned Societies, the University of Arizona's
Social and Behavioral Sciences Research Institute, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research
Abroad Program, the Ameri~an Research Institute in Turkey, the
Institute of Turkish Studies, and the Center for Middle Eastern Studies
of The University of Chicago. I am grateful to the Government of
Turkey for granting research permission and to the staffs of the
Ba§bakanhk Ar§ivi, Topkap1 Saray1 Ar§ivi, and Siileymaniye Kiitii-
phanesi in Istanbul, the Joseph Regenstein Library at The University
of Chicago and the University of Arizona Library for their patient
help. The Department of History at the University of Arizona has
supported this work in a number of ways, both intellectual and practical.
Finally, I would like to thank friends and colleagues who have given
generously of their criticism and support for the book at various stages:
Peter Alter, Richard Beal, Cornell H. Fleischer, Elizabeth J. Gottschalk,
Sally A. Hastings, Kate Lang, Leslie Peet, Hermann Rebel, JoAnn
Scurlock, Laura Tabili, and the students in my Ottoman history course
over the years. Needless to say, the remaining errors and infelicities
are my own.
ABBREVIATIONS
AE Ali Emiri Tasnifi, Ba§bakanhk Ar§ivi.

A0DTCFD Ankara Oniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Cografya Fakiiltesi Dergisi.
BSOAS Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.
EI Encyclopaedia of Islam.
EI2 Encyclopaedia of Islam. New Edition.
IJMES International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies.
jA islam Ansiklopedisi.
tOWM istanbul Oniversitesi iktisat Fakultesi Mecmuasz.
JESHO Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient.
IRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
KK Kamil Kepeci Tasnifi, Ba§bakanhk Ar§ivi.
MM Maliyeden Mtidevver Tasnifi, Ba§bakanhk Ar§ivi.
MTM Milli Tetebbu'lar Mecmuasz.
POF Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiyu i Istorija Jugoslovenskih Naroda pod
Turskom Vladavinom.
THjTM Turk Hukuk ve iktisat Tarihi Mecmuasz.
TKSA Topkapt Saray1 Miizesi Ar§ivi.
TOEM Tarih-i Osmani Encumeni Mecmuasz.
WZKM Wiener Zeitschrift fiir die Kunde des Morgenlandes.
ZDMG Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft.
TRANSLITERATION AND THE TURKISH ALPHABET
For ease of reading, Ottoman words in the text have been transcribed
into their modem Turkish equivalents, spelled as they appear in
Redhouse Yeni Turk~e-ingilizce Soz/Ukl New Redhouse Turkish-Eng-
lish Dictionary (Istanbul: Redhouse Press, 1968), where the spelling
in Ottoman script is given for each entry. If there is a choice of
modem spellings, the more traditional one has usually been preferred.
Turkish words are underlined only the first time they appear (with
the exception of the word has, to distinguish it from the English verb
has). They are explained in the text and also in the glossary, where
they have been transliterated, for more accurate reference, according
to the system used by the Encyclopaedia of Islam. Place names have
been spelled as in modern Turkish, with the exception of major
cities and provinces and the empire itself, for which the English terms
are used.
The modem Turkish alphabet is pronounced approximately like that
of English, with the following exceptions:
Vowels:
a= far
e = bend
i ~ keep
1 = again, women
o = coke
o = fur, oeuvre
u = boot or book
ii = French u (chute)
Consonants:
c =J
~ = ch
g = gh, or simply lengthens previous vowel
h = never silent
j = zh
r = flipped
§ = sh
ARCHIVAL SOURCES
Archival documents are identified by the abbreviation for the archive

(except for the Ba§bakanhk Ar§ivi; see List of Abbreviations), the
name of the collection (tasnif) to which they belong, their number,
and their date. Most documents only have one number, but documents
from the Maliyeden Mi.idevver Tasnifi (MM) have two-the catalogue
number and the shelf number of the document. It is traditional to·
identify documents from this collection by shelf number alone, but
unless the researcher knows the date of the document, it may be
impossible to find it in the catalogue, which is organized in chrono-
logical order rather than by shelf number. I hope to inaugurate a new
tradition in which the catalogue number as well as the shelf number
will be used. In my references, the catalogue number is given first,
followed by the shelf number in parentheses or brackets, and fre-
quently by the date as well: first the hicri date of the Islamic calendar,
taken from the document itself or from the catalogue entry, and then
the translation into the Gregorian calendar. For example, the reference
MM 122 (559) 942/1535-36 is to a register dated 942 hicri (running
from 2 July 1535 to 19 June 1536) whose number in the Maliyeden
Mi.idevver catalogue is 122 and whose shelf number is 559.
In most registers, page numbers had been added; in one or two
cases the pagination was incorrect, and this is noted in the footnotes
to those registers. Some registers were not paginated; references to
unpaginated registers are made by folio number.
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INTRODUCTION
THE MYTH OF DECLINE
"The sick man of Europe"-everyone has heard of him. The Ottoman

Empire, once invincible, was no longer able to fend off the armies
of Europe. Weak sultans allowed power to pass into the hands of
slaves, eunuchs, and women. Corruption rotted the bureaucracy, with
devastating effects on administration, tax collection, and military ef-
fectiveness. Inflation and chaos in the monetary system created suffer-
ing throughout society and havoc in the government budget. Banditry,
rebellion, and Celali revolts disrupted revenue collection and provin-
cial governance, causing whole villages to disappear. European explo-
rations reduced the empire to an economic backwater, while European
military might chipped off ever larger pieces of Ottoman territory.
Through all this, the Ottomans' smug sense of superiority and the
heavy hand of religion prevented them from imitating European
technological and scientific achievements until it was ·too late. Mod-
ernizing reforms were unable to strengthen the "sick man" sufficiently
to resist the "impact of the west." The Ottomans stagnated and declined,
falling in the end to western imperialism.
The "sick man," however, is a straw man. In view of the fact that
Europe long derived its self-definition by contrasting itself with empires
to the east, the concept of Ottoman decline reflects the self-image of
western Europe more than actual conditions in the Ottoman Empire. 1
It interprets the nineteenth-century west's overwhelming growth in
economic power as normal and the Ottomans' continuing to change
at the old rate as stagnation and decay. 2 For western historians, the
idea of Ottoman decline both describes and justifies the military and
political domination of west over east: if the Ottomans lost the ability
to innovate and to organize and were unable to keep up with the west
1
Norman Daniel, Islam and the West: The Making of an Image (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1960; rpt. ed. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, Ltd., 1993); Edward
W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1978); M.E. Yapp,
"Europe in the Turkish Mirror," Past & Present 137 (1992): 134-55.
2
Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World
Civilization, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 1: 38-39.
2 INTRODUCTION
militarily, economically, or intellectually, then colonization by an

expanding Europe was not only inevitable but beneficial. For histo-
rians in the post-Ottoman states of Turkey, the Balkans, and the Arab
world, countries whose national identities depend on no longer being
Ottoman, a declining Ottoman Empire can safely be blamed for present-
day political and socioeconomic difficulties. 3 The search for meaning
in the wake of fragmentation in the Soviet Union and social decay
in America and Britain has generated renewed interest in the concept
of decline and in the Ottoman Empire as a state in decline. 4 But
decline is an explanation that does not explain; the most prominent
writer on Ottoman decline confessed himself unable to "disentangle
the web of cause, symptom, and effect."5 Indeed, decline is less an
explanation than a myth, a "story of ostensibly historical events that
serves to unfold the world view of a people," as the dictionary defini-
tion has it.
The Myth of Ottoman Decline
The image of the rise and decline of empires has a long history in
both east and west, and books on this theme achieve wide popularity. 6
3
Suraiya Faroqhi summed up recent Turkish historiography of the Ottoman Empire
in her introduction to Halil Berktay and Suraiya Faroqhi, eds., New Approaches to State
and Peasant in Ottoman History (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 3-17; idem, "Crisis and
Change, 1590-1699," in An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-
1914, ed. Halil Inalcik with Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994), 469.
4
See, for instance, Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth,
Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Paul Kennedy,
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984);
Michael Mann, ed., The Rise and Decline of the Nation State (Oxford: Basil Black-
well, 1990).
5
Bernard Lewis, "Some Reflections on the Decline of the Ottoman Empire," Studia
Islamica 1 (1958): 111.
6
Probably the most famous European embodiments of the concept of decline are Edward
Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 2 vols. (London: J.S. Virtue, n.d.),
and Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, 2 vols. (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1926-
29). The decline of Spain was once as proverbial as that of the Ottoman Empire has
become; for controversy over this concept see J.H. Elliott, "The Decline of Spain," Past
& Present 20 (1961): 52-75; Henry Kamen, "The Decline of Spain: A Historical Myth?"
Past & Present 81 (1978): 24-50; Jonathan I. Israel, "Debate: The Decline of Spain: A
Historical Myth?" Past & Present 91 (1981): 170-80; and Henry Kamen, "The Decline
of Spain: A Historical Myth? A Rejoinder," Past & Present 91 (1981): 181-85. For the
Islamic world the best-known work on decline is lbn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An
Introduction to History, trans. Franz Rosenthal, ed. and abridged by N.J. Dawood, Bollinger
THE MYTH OF DECLINE 3
This literature, however, employs "decline" in two distinct senses, one

internal to the Ottomans and one external. In western historiography
on the Ottoman Empire, decline was originally used in the external
sense, referring not to Ottoman institutional and moral decay but to
a decrease in the empire's military threat to the Christian states of
Europe. 7 Formerly considered invincible, the Ottomans in 1699 were
forced to relinquish territory inhabited by Muslims as a result of
European victories, and in subsequent decades their military potential
began to be seen as declining. The word "decline" was not applied
to the internal workings of the empire until the early nineteenth century
in the histories of Mouradgea d'Ohsson and Joseph von Hammer-
Purgstall. 8 As translators, these men had access to Turkish sources,
where the theme of decline was already under consideration. Ottoman
writers of the seventeenth century, authors of a genre of advice lit-
erature (nasihatnameler), believed themselves to be living in an era
of decline from former greatness, a decline that had set in during the
later sixteenth century. 9 This understanding of decline had little or
nothing to do with defeats by the west; rather, it was these thinkers'
judgment on administrative, economic, and social turmoil within the
empire during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The
Ottoman concept of decline dovetailed so neatly with the need of
European historiography to find a reason for the Ottomans' reversal
Series (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul and Martin Secker & Woodbury Ltd., 1967;
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969). For the Ottoman Empire, see Leopold von
Ranke, The Ottoman and the Spanish Empires in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,
trans. Walter K. Kelly (Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard, 1845); and more recently Alan
Palmer, The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire (London: John Murray, 1992).
7
See, for instance, Paul Rycaut, The Present State of the Ottoman Empire (London:
John Starkey and Henry Brome, 1668; rpt. Westmead, Eng.: Gregg International Publish-
ers, 1972). Likewise, the decline of Spain, which has been called "the most significant
international phenomenon of the seventeenth century," is defined as "the struggle and
failure of Spain to maintain a position of hegemony" (R.A. Stradling, Europe and the
Decline of Spain: A Study of the Spanish System, 1580-1720, Early Modem Europe Today
[Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1981], 2-3).
8
Ignatius Mouradgea d'Ohsson, Tableau general de /'empire ottoman, 7 vols. (Paris:
F. Didot, 1788-1824), 7: 261-73; on d'Ohsson himself see Kemal Beydilli, "Ignatius
Mouradgea d'Ohsson (Muradcan Tosunyan)," Tarih Dergisi 34 (1983-84): 247-314; Joseph
von Hammer-Purgstall, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, 10 vols. (Budapest: Ca.
H. Hartleben, 1827-35).
9
Pal Fodor, "State and Society, Crisis and Reform, in 15th-17th Century Ottoman
Mirrors for Princes," Acta Orientalia Hungarica 60 ( 1986): 217-40; Douglas A. Howard,
"Ottoman Historiography and the Literature of 'Decline' of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Centuries," Journal of Asian History 22 (1988): 74--77. The advice literature began to
be translated into western languages in the eighteenth century.
4 INTRODUCTION
of military. fortunes that it was unhesitatingly accepted and incorpo-

rated into the western historical narrative. 10 The observed change in
the strength of the Ottoman Empire thus appeared to be corroborated
and explained by the Ottomans themselves: the Ottomans declined
externally because they had first declined internally.
In this version of Ottoman history the importance of the internal
decay of institutions still lay in its effect on Ottoman military capa-
bility; the institutions themselves, their basis of operation, and their
underlying rationale were not investigated for their own sake. When
twentieth-century historians initiated the study of Ottoman internal
institutions, however, they employed the same chronology as the
Ottoman advice writers, enhancing the persuasiveness of the decline
paradigm. In this view, the "ciassical age" of the Ottoman Empire
came to an end in the late sixteenth century with the transformation
of the timar system (a military-administrative system in which a cavalry
army was supported by temporary grants of rights over revenues
awarded by the sultan according to surveys performed by a central-
ized bureaucracy). 11 The turning point in Ottoman history is set around
1600, the time of the empire's greatest chaos and distress: population
explosion, price revolution, treasury deficits, military upheaval, inter-
nal rebellion, external defeat, sultanic incompetence, rule by women,
popular disaffection, all crowned by the inability of the Ottomans to
deal with these problems in any effective way. Decline is construed
as the decay of central power and sultanic authority, and its conse-
quences as disorder, chaos, and corruption.
Specialists have become skeptical of this decline paradigm, feeling
that it fails to explain Ottoman tranformation and change. It is tele-
ological: because we know that eventually the Ottomans became a
10
See, for example, Sir Hamilton A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and
the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near
East, Vol. 1: Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century, 2 pts. (London: Oxford University
Press, 1957), hereafter Gibb & Bowen; Bernard Lewis, "Ottoman Observers of Ottoman
Decline," Islamic Studies 1 (1962): 71-87; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, The
History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1976); Erik J. Zilrcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris,
1993).
11
The most influential expressions of this view are Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire:
The Classical Age, 1300-1600, trans. Norman Itzkowitz (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1973; rpt. New Rochelle, NY: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1989); idem, "The Heyday and Decline
of the Ottoman Empire," in The Cambridge History of Islam, ed. P.M. Holt, Ann K.S.
Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, vol. IA: The Central Islamic Lands (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970), 324-53.
weaker power and finally disappeared, every earlier difficulty they

experienced becomes a "seed of decline," and Ottoman successes and
sources of strength vanish from the record. Furthermore, during the
time when Ottoman relations with the west were in a process of reversal,
the west was undergoing its own transformation: the scientific and
industrial revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
dramatically altered the pace of change. The Ottomans' lack of military
success in this period may be attributable to European advance rather
than Ottoman decline. This "relative decline," as it is called, decline
by virtue of slower progress, may even conceal improvements in
Ottoman internal organization and strength that simply did not go far
enough and remain invisible in this model. Moreover, the writers of
advice literature, who furnish our analysis of internal decay, were
scarcely disinterested observers; their tales of domestic woe were
intended to stimulate governmental responses from which they as
individuals and as a group often expected to benefit. 12 Their attention
was focused on what they thought was wrong with their society, and
they wasted no words on what ran well. Only now are scholars
attempting to evaluate the accuracy of the picture they painted, either
of their own time or of the preceding "golden age." One approach
being taken is a detailed analysis of the genre of advice memoranda
and their conventions, in order to understand the Ottomans' use of
the image of fall from a golden age. 13 Another method is to work
from different sources to uncover the historical realities of the period. 14
Was the age of Siileyman really as orderly and smooth-running as
the advice writers believed? Were there actually more revolts in the
12
Cornell H. Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian
Mustafa Ali (1541-1600), Princeton Studies on the Near East (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1986); Rifa<at cAli Abou-El-Haj, "Fitnah, Huruc ala al-Sultan, and Nasihat: Po-
litical Struggle and Social Conflict in Ottoman Society, 1560's-1700's," Actes du Vie
symposium du Comite international d'etudes pre-ottomanes et ottomanes, ed. Jean-Louis
Bacque-Grammont and Emeri van Donzel, Varia Turcica, 4 (Istanbul: Divit Yaymc1hk,
1987), 185-91.
13 Rhoads Murphey, "The Veliyuddin Telhis: Notes on the Sources and Interrelations
Between Ko~i Bey and Contemporary Writers of Advice to Kings," Belleten 43 (1979):
547-61; Rifa<at cAli Abou-El-Haj, "The Ottoman Nasihatname as a Discourse over
'Morality'," Revue d'histoire maghrebine 14 (1987): 15-30; Howard, "Ottoman Histori-
ography and the Literature of 'Decline'."
14
See, for example, Haim Gerber, State, Society, and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in
Comparative Perspective (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994). On the
slowness of paradigm shift in Ottoman studies see Suraiya Faroqhi, "Recent Work in the
Social and Economic History of the Ottoman Empire (1450--1800)," Trends in History
2, No. 3 (1982): 15-34.
6 INTRODUCTION
early seventeenth century than in the early sixteenth--or the early

fifteenth, for that matter? If some seventeenth-century rulers were
incompetent, could leadership and control be provided in other ways?
Was the military weakness of the eighteenth century indeed connected
to the loss of the spice trade? Was there more corruption and extortion
in the later period of the empire than before? If so, how much more?
How impoverished were the peasants and how heavy were the taxes?
How many people actually left the land, and how many remained?
Does the fact that the Ottomans did not imitate western ways mean
their empire was in decline? The Ottomans lost battles in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, but they lost some in earlier periods
as well-around 1400, they lost their whole empire. Was that decline?
The empire, after all, survived for 350 years after the death of Silleyman
the Magnificent. If it was declining all that time, why didn't it fall? 15
This book takes an initial step toward answering some of these
questions, particularly those on socioeconomic conditions, by exam-
ining the empire's financial records. Extensive research has been done
on fifteenth- and sixteenth-century conditions since the opening of the
Ottoman archives earlier in this century: research on population
increase, landholding and agriculture, urban settlement and growth,
trade and trade routes, government and taxation. This work has revised
our view of the earlier empire from an inexorable military machine
enslaving all in its path to a complex civilization that successfully
managed a polyglot empire and made it secure, wealthy, and pow-
erful, allowing us to call this period the empire's "classical age."
Revising the myth of decline demands the same kind of detailed
research into the events and trends of the post-classical age. Until
recently, however, the dominance of the decline paradigm discour-
aged scholarship on what was defined in advance as a period of failure
and loss. Removing Ottoman history from the ghetto of dead empires
requires a new paradigm that will remove the stigma of decline and
introduce some dynamism into the analysis.
In the last few decades, Ottomanists have experimented with a
number of models, derived mainly from European history, for ana-
lyzing the empire in terms that would permit comparison with other
15
Palmer (Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire, 2) tries to explain decline by the
qualities of the sultans themselves and by "the way in which an astonishingly narrow
ruling class imposed government on lands extending from the Danubian plains to the
mountains of the Caucasus," but he is still left with the question, "How did it survive
so long?"
early modem states. Modernization, decentralization, world systems

theory, and Marxist notions of class conflict and the Asiatic Mode
of Production have all been applied to the Ottoman case. 16 None,
however, has caught on outside specialist circles, perhaps because
none has escaped the decline paradigm's greatest flaw, its limitation
to a single question: What went wrong with the Ottoman Empire?
Economic crisis and Celali unrest, transformations in the nature of
the sultanate and in the political power of those close to the throne,
military defeats against the European powers, and the eventual reduc-
tion of the Middle East to third-world status are considered manifes-
tations of a single underlying process. A corollary assumption is that
weakness is the norm during the whole post-classical period and signs
of strength are an aberration. In the end, these alternative paradigms
tum out to be euphemisms for decline, at best disguising its more
unwelcome implications in the neutrality of scientific terminology.
Replacing the decline paradigm demands more than a revision of
terminology; it also requires revision of the underlying conceptions.
Escape from the trap of teleology begins with separating the events
of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries from what hap-
pened afterward and examining them in their own right, not just as
precursors. If it is wrong to believe, as the west once did, that the
Ottoman Empire was purely a military machine and that ceasing to
16
For modernization see William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, eds., Beginnings
of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century, Publications of the Center
for Middle Eastern Studies, 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); for decen-
tralization see Thomas Naff and Robert Owen, eds., Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic
History, Papers on Islamic History (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977);
for world systems theory see Huri islamoglu-inan, ed., The Ottoman Empire and the
World-Economy, Studies in Modern Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1987); Re§at Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: The Nineteenth Century,
SUNY Series in Middle Eastern Studies (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1988). For a Marxist class analysis see Vera P. Mutafcieva, Agrarian Relations in the
Ottoman Empire in the 15th and 16th Centuries, East European Monographs, 251 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1988); and Rifa<at <Ali Abou-El-Haj, "Power and Social
Order: The Uses of the Kanun," in The Ottoman City and Its Parts: Urban Structure and
Social Order, ed. Irene A. Bierman, Rifa<at <Ali. Abou-El-Haj, and Donald Preziosi, Subsidia
Balcanica, Islamica et Turcica, 3 (New Rochelle, NY: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1991), 77-
99; idem, Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth
Centuries, SUNY Series in the Social and Economic History of the Middle East (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1991); and for the Asiatic Mode of Production see
<;aglar Keyder, "The Ottoman Social Formation," in The Asiatic Mode of Production:
Science and Politics, ed. Anne M. Bailey and Josep R. Llobera (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1981), 301-24; and Halil Berktay, "The Feudalism Debate: The Turkish
End-Is 'Tax-vs.-Rent' Necessarily the Product and Sign of a Modal Difference?" Journal
of Peasant Studies 14, no. 3 (1986/87): 291-333.
8 INTRODUCTION
expand was a perversion of its raison d'etre, 17 then seventeenth-cen-

tury changes in the Ottomans' military and fiscal organizations cannot
be equated with the decline of the empire but must be considered as
part of a process of imperial consolidation. As the age of the empire's
expansion gave way to an era of consolidation, the forms of estab-
lished institutions perforce had to be altered and old patterns of
organization gave way to new arrangements. Stabilization of the
frontiers in the sixteenth century and the consequent inability of the
timar system to expand necessitated a more selective military force
and thus an expansion of the janissary corps. Fixed borders also meant
that state revenues were no longer expanded by conquest, and the
empire needed to develop new methods of revenue extraction to tap
the surplus within society; thus, revenue farming and the regulariza-
tion of extraordinary taxation were natural consequences. These new
methods of financing the state did not keep up with military expenses,
and price inflation resulting from devaluation exacerbated the fiscal
problem. Financial instability coincided with population growth,
urbanization, two draining wars, and a possible climatic reversal to
create conditions of economic crisis in the Ottoman Empire in the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.
Crisis and the Ottoman State
The "general crisis of the seventeenth century," a widely-used model

in European history, sought to draw connections among a revolution
in prices and the value of money caused by the influx of gold and
silver from the New World, an economic downturn after the pros-
perity of the sixteenth century, the financial demands of an expanding
bureaucracy and military force, a large number of mostly unsuccessful
revolts occurring almost simultaneously in the 1640s and 1650s, and
a significant intellectual or ideological shift. 18 This paradigm placed
17
For the concept of the Ottoman Empire as a giant war machine dependent on expansion
see von Ranke, The Ottoman and the Spanish Empires, 5-21.
18
/ The originators of the "general crisis" debate were Eric J. Hobsbawm, "The Crisis
of the Seventeenth Century," Past & Present 5-6 (1954): 33-53, 44--65; and Hugh Trevor-
Roper, "The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century," Past & Present 16 (1959): 31-
64, both articles rpt. in Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660, ed. Trevor Aston (New York: Anchor
Books, 1967) 5-62, 63-102. On the intellectual repercussions of the crisis see J.H. Elliott,
"Self-Perception and Decline in Early Seventeenth-Century Spain," Past & Present 14
the economic and political trends of the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries in their international context and allowed distinctions be-
tween what was universal and what was unique to particular situations
without reference to later outcomes. Economic distress and political
upheavals were seen to have occurred simultaneously all over Europe,
in countries that declined and in those that did not, in countries that
became part of the west European core and in countries that were
later peripheralized. 19 Spain, France, England, Milan, Venice, and many
other areas saw population growth, urbanization, influx of precious
metals, rapid inflation of prices and lagging wages, followed by
worsening climate conditions (the "Little Ice Age"), subsistence cri-
ses, population decrease, social unrest, and destructive war. Another
kind of climate change, one of intellectual unease, resulted from rapid
economic and social change, the Reformation's challenge to authority
and established world views, and the breakdown of boundaries and
identities by discoveries and explorations in new worlds. The French
wars of religion, the Thirty Years' War, the English Civil War, and
other conflicts broadened the scale of warfare, and changes in weap-
onry, tactics, and organization great enough to be called a military
revolution took place with the adoption of firearms, the development
of infantry tactics, and the social and economic dislocations that
followed. To finance expansion of their military forces, kings struggled
to control the economic resources of their countries, to expand and
improve their administrative apparatus, and to eliminate obstacles to
the centralization of finances and manpower recruitment. 20 Increased
taxation weighed heavily on people undergoing economic distress,
setting off peasant rebellion and popular unrest. The need to control
( 1977): 41-61. The best recent summary of the debate is Sheilagh C. Ogilvie, "Germany
and the Seventeenth-Century Crisis," Historical Journal 35 (1992): 417-41.
19
P.J. Coveney, "An Early Modern European Crisis?" Renaissance and Modern Studies
20 ( 1982): 1-26. Comprehensive discussions of the period using the general crisis as a
framework include Henry Kamen, The Iron Century: Social Change in Europe, 1550-
1660, History of Civilisation (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971 ); Charles Henry
Wilson, The Transformation of Europe, 1558-1648 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1976); Raymond Birn, Crisis, Absolutism, Revolution: Europe, 1648-1789191
(Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press, 1977); Geoffrey Parker, Europe in Crisis, 1598-164-8, Fontana
History of Europe, 9 (Brighton, England: The Harvester Press, 1980).
20
Niels Steensgaard, "The Seventeenth Century Crisis," in The General Crisis of the
Seventeenth Century, ed. Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1978), 26-56. Ogilvie makes the point that centralization permitted new and
strongly contested encroachments by the state into the economic, social, and (in Europe)
religious life of its subjects ("Germany and the Seventeenth-Century Crisis," 434).
10 INTRODUCTION
the flow of resources encouraged rulers to violate traditions and lib-

erties, sometimes motivating members of the upper classes to join
forces with or coopt the rebellious peasantry and engage in revolts
against the centralizing state.
For the Ottoman Empire, the upheavals of the late sixteenth century
were first analyzed in terms of population growth and price inflation.
Barkan's researches in these areas showed how the Ottomans were
affected by European global exploration and the changes in Europe's
economic base. 21 The military revolution, the widespread employment
of infantry with handguns, was brought into the analysis by Inalcik,
who also investigated the impact of change in patterns of commerce
with the west as well as the silver influx and the resulting problems
of counterfeiting and coinage devaluation. 22 Faroqhi, for whom "the
Ottoman state of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries belongs in
the same category as the centralised, late feudal states of contemporary
Europe," used the seventeenth-century crisis model to generate research
questions about Ottoman population, land use, agricultural produc-
tion, urbanization, manufacturing, trade, markets, prices and wages. 23
21
Omer Liitfi Barkan, "XV. Asnn Sonunda Baz1 Biiyiik ~ehirlerde E§ya ve Yiyecek
Fiyatlanmn Tesbit ve Tefti§i Hususlanm Tanzim Eden Kanunlar," Tarih Vesikalarz 1,
no. 5 (1942): 323-40, 2, no. 7 (1942): 15-40, and 2, no. 9 (1942): 168-77; idem, "The
Price Revolution in the Ottoman Empire," IJMES 6 (1975): 3-28. The main influence on
Barkan was that of Fernand Braudel (The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World
in the Age of Philip II, trans. Sian Reynolds, 2 vols. [New York: Harper and Row, 1971]).
22
Halil Inalcik, "The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-Arms in the Middle
East," in War, Technology and Society in the Middle East, ed. V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp
(London: Oxford University Press, 1975; rpt. in The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organ-
ization and Economy, XIV), 195-217; idem, "Osman11 imparatorlugunun Kurulu§ ve inki§af
Devrinde Tiirkiyenin iktisadi Vaziyeti iizerinde bir Tetkik Miinasebetiyle," Belleten 15
(1951): 629-84; trans. as "Notes on a Study of the Turkish Economy during the Estab-
lishment and Rise of the Ottoman Empire," in The Middle East and the Balkans under
the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society, Indiana University Turkish Studies
and Turkish Ministry of Culture Joint Series, 9 (Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish
Studies, 1993), 205-63; idem, "Impact of the Annales School on Ottoman Studies and
New Findings," Review 1 (1978): 69-96; rpt. in Studies in Ottoman Social and Economic
History, Collected Studies Series, 214 (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985), Selection IV;
idem, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700," Archivum
Ottomanicum 6 (1980): 283-337 rpt. in Studies in Ottoman Social and Economic History,
Collected Studies Series, 214 (London: V ariorum Reprints, 1985), Selection V.
23
Suraiya Faroqhi, Introduction to New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman
History, 13. The subjects of many of her articles correlate with the themes of the crisis
paradigm: on population, see Suraiya Faroqhi and Leila Erder, "Population Rise and Fall
in Anatolia, 1550-1620," Middle Eastern Studies 15 (1979): 322-45; idem, "The De-
velopment of the Anatolian Urban Network during the Sixteenth Century," JESHO 23
(1980): 265-303; on agriculture, Suraiya Faroqhi and Huri islamoglu-inan, "Crop Patterns
and Agricultural Production Trends in Sixteenth Century Anatolia," Review 1 (1978n9):
The most influential summary of these trends was made by Bernard

Lewis, who added seventeenth-century crisis to the framework of
Ottoman decline. Lewis did not explore the implications of this move
for the decline paradigm; for him, the manifestations of the crisis were
self-evidently related to decline. 24 In his analysis, the monetary up-
heaval consequent on the influx of New World silver functions simul-
taneously as an aspect of financial and economic decline, a symptom
of the Ottomans' inability to comprehend and control the modem
world, and a cause of further decline having dire effects on Ottoman
military capability in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Celali rebellions resulting from military transformation are both
symptoms of the Ottoman state's declining control and causes of decline
in military efficacy and social order. Thus, in his work the concept
of seventeenth-century crisis does not alter the existing paradigm but
becomes one more cause of decline. In western European historiog-
raphy, however, historians' introduction of the crisis model had enabled
them to abandon the concept of decline in view of the recovery and
growth experienced by most of Europe. If the phenomena described
by the "general crisis" model were not necessarily linked to decline
in western Europe, then monetary devaluation and Celali unrest may
401-36; Suraiya Faroqhi, "The Peasants of Saideli in the Late Sixteenth Century," Archivum
Ottomanicum 8 (1983): 215-50; on urbanization, idem, "Taxation and Urban Activities
in Sixteenth-Century Anatolia," International Journal of Turkish Studies 1 (1979-80): 19-
53; idem, "Towns, Agriculture and the State in Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Anatolia,"
JESHO 33 (1990): 125-56; on manufacturing and trade, idem, "Notes on the Production
of Cotton and Cotton Cloth in 16th and 17th Century Anatolia," Journal of European
Economic History 8 (1979): 405-17; idem, "Alum Production and Alum Trade in the
Ottoman Empire (about 1560--1830)," WZKM 16 (1979): 153-75; idem, "Textile Produc-
tion in Rumeli and the Arab Provinces: Geographical Distribution and Internal Trade,"
Osmanlz Ara§tzrmalari 1 (1980): 61-83; idem, "The Early History of the Balkan Fairs,"
Sudost-Forschungen 31 ( 1978): 50--69; idem, "Sixteenth-Century Periodic Markets in
Various Anatolian Sancaks: i~el, Hamid, Karahisar-i Sahib, Kiitahya, Aydm, and Mente§e,"
JESHO 22 (1979): 32-80; and on prices and wages, idem, "Long-Term Change and the
Ottoman Construction Site: A Study of Builders' Wages and Iron Prices," Journal of
Turkish Studies 10 (1986): 111-26.
24
Lewis, "Some Reflections on the Decline of the Ottoman Empire." As Sanjay Subrah-
manyam has noted, most historians of the "price revolution" in Asia have taken the price
revolution to signal the beginning of decline ("Precious Metal Hows and Prices in Western
and Southern Asia, 1500--1750: Some Comparative and Conjunctural Aspects," Studies
in History n.s. 7, no. 1 [1991]: 104). Rifa<at <Ali Abou-El-Haj, however, raised the issue
of the seventeenth-century crisis for the Ottoman Empire only to dismiss it ("The Nature
of the Ottoman State in the Latter Part of the XVIIth Century," Habsburgisch-osmanische
Beziehungen, ed. Andreas Tietze, Beihefte zur Wiener Zeitschrift fiir die Kunde des
Morgenlandes, 13 [Vienna: Verlag des Verbandes der Wisseschaftlichen Gesellschaften
Osterreichs, 1985], 172).
12 INTRODUCTION
not be equivalent to decline in the Ottoman case either. The general

crisis model offers a means of seeing them as parts of a global process
rather than simply the product of Ottoman weakness.
The crisis model functions primarily as a description of circum-
stances; a deeper analysis of the way states responded to crisis has
been made by theorists of state formation. The state formation para-
digm examines the processes by which states attempted to gain control
over rebellious and resource-controlling elements in the society; it
acknowledges the state's agency as it seeks to learn its goals and the
means by which it pursued them. 25 Important issues in state formation
are the relationship between resources-money, goods, and man-
power-and needs, the means by which government income is ob-
tained, and through whose hands that income passes. Ideologies of
cooperation and resistance become central to the mobilization of society.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, according to this model,
the demands of Europe-wide war heightened the desire of early modem
states to expand their control of resources. The form and degree of
opposition to the state's demands was affected by the relationship of
upper classes to other strata of society and to the state, the ideas
of merchants and bankers about resource investment, and the capa-
city of peasants to organize and rebel. The eventual domination of
nationally-organized states over more loosely organized empires was
related to their superior ability to harness the resources of warmak-
ing through control of capital and of local administration, recruitment,
and taxation. 26
Ottoman history gained a prominent place in the seventeenth-cen-
tury crisis and state formation paradigms in the work of Goldstone. 27
25
Research on this model has concentrated on countries where the state's efforts at
control failed most spectacularly, producing the major revolutions of modern times: Theda
Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and
China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rue-
schemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985); Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol. 1: A History
of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1986).
26
Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge:
Basil Blackwell, 1990).
27
Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1991). An earlier sum~ary of his argument was presented
in "East and West in the Seventeenth Century: Political Crises in Stuart England, Otto-
man Turkey, and Ming China," Comparative Studies in Society and History 30 (1988):
103-42. See also V.G. Kiernan, State and Society in Europe, 1550-1650 (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1980), 255.
He linked events in the Ottoman Empire and the Far East to those
in early modern Europe, relating differing outcomes to variations in
internal state structures and ideologies. Revolution and rebellion, in
the Ottoman Empire and China as well as in Europe, resulted from
the demographic and economic crises of the period and generated
widespread state breakdown. Goldstone' s analysis of the crisis re-
volved around the impact of population growth on three levels of
Ottoman society: the central government, where budget deficits re-
sulting from taxation and monetary policies adopted to meet the fiscal
needs of warfare in the late sixteenth century led to inability to pay
its soldiers, causing them to rebel; the Ottoman elite, which experi-
enced a loss of cohesion and loyalty due to competition to enter
government service and tax farming, both of which offered more
security and greater financial rewards than the traditional military
career; and the popular level, where urban artisans engaged in wage
protests and demonstrations and landless peasants committed vagrancy,
banditry, and rebellion or joined the military forces of officials and
provincial magnates, contributing to factionalism and provincial
autonomy. The coinciding of unrest on all three levels threatened the
empire with a collapse that was only averted by the action of the
strong dynasty of Koprillil grand viziers, who took control in 1656,
restored order, and presided over a hardening of conservatism.
Goldstone's explanation makes it possible to investigate the causes
and effects of these events without having to assume ubiquitous
corruption or inevitable decline. Unfortunately, it does not break free
from the orientalism associated with the decline paradigm: in this
analysis, the same trends that generated a successful transition in Europe
somehow led to ossification in the Ottoman Empire and China, al-
though the only discernible difference in the eastern empires was the
lack of an ideology of dynamism. Criticism of Goldstone's work has
also come from theorists of state formation who see no state break-
down in the Ottoman case. 28
For these theorists, the Ottoman seventeenth century was a period
not of state formation or breakdown but of consolidation; peasant
rebellion and provincial autonomy were nonexistent and the state's
28
Rhoads Murphey, "Continuity and Discontinuity in Ottoman Administrative Theory
and Practice during the Late Seventeenth Century," Poetics Today 14 (1993): 424; Karen
Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Peculiar Route of Ottoman State Centralization
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994). I am grateful to Karen Barkey for the
opportunity to see parts of her manuscript prior to publication.
14 INTRODUCTION
main problem was banditry (not genuine rebellion) on the part of ex-
soldiers. Branded as Celalis (rebels), discharged soldiers with gun-
powder weapons preyed on the countryside, disrupting cultivation and
revenue collection. The process by which the Ottoman state success-
fully managed these disruptive elements through bargaining and
cooptation to its service has been analyzed by Barkey. 29 The absence
of local ties on the part of the military elite prevented elites and
peasants from combining effectively to resist imperial demands. The
strategies of incorporation by which the state consolidated its control
made rebellion by elites unprofitable even under unfavorable demo-
graphic and economic conditions, and the bargaining tactics employed
by the state became the standard means of harnessing peripheral
energies to the purposes of the center. The turmoil of the period
contributed to state consolidation by increasing the demand for control
and multiplying the loci where control could be exercised. A similar
concept of control through negotiation of privileges was applied by
Salzmann to the distribution of revenue farming rights among central
and local elites. 30 This approach problematizes the relationship be-
tween seventeenth-century crisis and decline, disconnecting phenom-
ena formerly written off as "signs of decline" from subsequent mili-
tary defeats in order to look for sources of strength as well as weakness.
This book takes a similar approach to the study of the Ottoman
finance department and its taxation policies and procedures. 31 Ex-
tortionate taxation has always played a role in theories of Ottoman
decline as a primary cause of misery among the peasantry, flight from
the land, decline of cultivation, loss of prosperity, lowered resistance
to European encroachment, elite demands for autonomy, and finally
the rise of nationalism by oppressed minorities. Seen as parts of a
29
Karen Barkey, "Rebellious Alliances: The State and Peasant Unrest in Early Seven-
teenth-Centmy France and the Ottoman Empire," American Sociological Review 56 (1991):
699-715. On state bargaining in general see Margaret Levi, "The Predatory Theory of
Rule," Politics and Society 10 (1980/81): 431-65. Faroqhi interprets the entire Celali
movement as motivated by the desire of Anatolian Muslim peasants to join the elite
("Crisis and Change," 437).
30
Ariel Salzmann, "An Ancien Regime Revisited: 'Privatization' and Political Economy
in the Eighteenth-Centmy Ottoman Empire," Politics & Society 21 (1993): 393-423. A
European example of rule by negotiation is provided by the Habsburg monarchy of sixteenth-
century Spain and its relationship with the towns: Helen Nader, Liberty in Absolutist
Spain: The Habsburg Sale of Towns, 1516-1700, The Johns Hopkins University Studies
in Historical and Political Science, 109th Series (1990), 1 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1990), 4-5.
31
Gerber also sees the traditional "signs of decline" as perennial features of imperial
administration rather than indications of breakdown (State, Society, and Law, 132-36).
single process, the causes, symptoms, and effects of these phenomena

cannot be disentangled, and the fiscal history of this period is incom-
prehensible: the finance department appears bent on its own destruc-
tion. The incredible tenacity of the decline myth may well rest on
its dependence on and reinforcement of another myth, an orientalist
one of eastern mysteriousness and irrationality which ostensibly
explains such inexplicable behavior. In contrast, here taxation is
considered not as a cause of decline but as a tool in the hands of
government, one whose impact is not yet well known. Clarifying the
finance department's contribution to the fate of the empire involves
placing it in its seventeenth-century context, seeking to understand its
purposes and how it carried them out. As Faroqhi has said, "We are
at present concerned not so much with the fact that the Ottoman
Empire ultimately lost its cohesion and disappeared from the political
arena, as with the mechanisms which allowed Ottoman state and society
to survive the first major crisis by over three hundred years."32
The economic and demographic conditions of the empire were
fundamental to its post-classical history and basic to the problems that
confronted the Ottoman leadership. If we are to understand the seven-
teenth-century Ottoman Empire in the same terms as other countries
undergoing similar crises and transformations, we need better infor-
mation on its economy and population, production and trade, the
conditions of the peasantry and ruling class, and the government's
efforts to deal with the situation it faced. Although survey registers
for the timar system, the documents from which our statistics are
derived for the period before 1600, are not found after that date, that
does not mean there is no evidence on later conditions; it means we
must find other kinds of evidence. From the advice writers we have
only alarmist generalizations designed to rouse the government to
action. Fortunately for researchers, just at the time when survey registers
ceased to be made regularly, there was a vast increase in other types
of documents. Two major groups of documents are especially impor-
tant for research on Ottoman state and society in the seventeenth
century: court records and finance documents. Court records (includ-
ing inheritance records), particularly useful for social history, are now
beginning to be more widely exploited. 33 Finance documents, of which
32 Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change," 414; in this chapter Faroqhi summarizes and reinter-
prets a quarter-century of research on the seventeenth century.
33 For a description of court records and a bibliography of recent work see Yvonne
J. Seng, "The ~er'iye Sicilleri of the Istanbul Mtiftiiliigii as a Source for the Study of
Everyday Life," Turkish Studies Association Bulletin 15 (1991): 307-25.
16 INTRODUCTION
new kinds were developed in the seventeenth century, form our principle
source of economic data for this period, from which our detailed
knowledge of Ottoman society and economy will be extended beyond
the classical age. Through these documents we can also obtain a sense
of the purposes of Ottoman administration and the ideological context
in which it took place, as they record interactions between the gov-
ernment and its people.
Sources for the Study of the Post-Classical Age
One of the most sophisticated bureaucracies of its time, the Ottoman

finance administration left abundant records from which better data
on the post-classical era can be obtained. As an initial study, this book
cannot attempt to solve the many complex problems raised above; its
aim is more modest. It introduces sources which can improve our
picture of seventeenth-century conditions, opens up avenues of in-
quiry, draws comparisons with fiscal administration in contemporary
states, and suggests revisions in the way we conceptualize the Otto-
man experience. A necessary preliminary to further research is an
understanding of the nature of the sources. These sources consist of
a mass of finance department registers and documents stored mainly
in the Ba§bakanhk Ar§ivi (the Prime Minister's Archive) in Istanbul;
some are also located in the Topkap1 Palace Archive. 34 They exist
in enormous number and baffling variety, some in good condition and
some tom and wormeaten. No catalogue has yet been published, and
only a few of the many kinds of documents have been described so
as to be useful to scholars. As a step toward wider us.e of these
documents, certain questions need to be addressed. How did these
documents come into existence? Who compiled them and for what
purposes? How are they organized and what are the sources of the
information they contain? What is the nature of the administrative
structure within which they were employed? Does a particular register
34
Most of the finance registers are in the Maliyeden Miidevver Tasnifi, for which no
detailed catalogue is published; see Akta~, Necati, and ismet Binark, Arshif al-'Uthmani:
Fihris Shami/ li-Watha)iq al-Daw/ah al-'Uthmaniyah al-Tabi'ah li-Ri'asat al-Wuzara) bi-
Istanbul, trans. Salih Sa'dawi (Istanbul: Markaz al-Abhath lil-Ta'rikh wa-al-Funiin wa-
al-Thaqafah al-Islamiyah, 1986); Atilla <;etin, Ba§bakanlzkAr§ivi Kzlavuzu (Istanbul: Enderun
Kitabevi, 1979), 28-35; Midhat Sertoglu, Muhteva Bakzmmdan Ba§vekalet Ar§ivi, Ankara
Universitesi Dil ve Tarih-Cografya Fakiiltesi Yaymlan, 103 (Ankara: Tiirk Tarih Kurumu
Bas1mevi, 1955).
show taxes as assessed or revenue actually collected? Was the ac-

curacy of tax collectors' accounts ever checked? Did the composition
of the revenue-collecting group alter over time? What were the prob-
lems inherent in the fiscal system and how were they solved? How
did people participate in the documentation process and what did they
think they were accomplishing by doing so? 35
This study attempts to answer such questions for documents con-
nected with the three largest sources of Ottoman central government
revenue in the seventeenth century: the cizye, a poll tax on non-Muslims,
the avarzz-z divaniye ve tekalif-i orfiye, a large group of extraordinary
levies and dues, and the iltizam system, or tax farming. The records
of these revenues, besides containing information on the income of
the central government, shed light on tax collection practices and
personnel, population and population movements, local societies and
economies, and the organization and activities of governmental offi-
cials. The most important sources for this study are the registers and
papers of the finance department itself. Ottoman finance officials did
not write treatises on their procedures, nor did they compile collec-
tions of sample documents (miin§eat), like those compiled by scribes
of the divan. 36 The model they used for the format of a register was
the previous register, and procedural instructions were published not
in handbooks but as imperial orders to those required to carry them
out. Hence, the conclusions in the following chapters are based on
registers actually created by the finance scribes and orders written on
fiscal matters.
Certain of these documents, mainly survey (tahrir) and accounting
(muhasebe) registers, have previously been published as isolated
35
For a study with similar aims focusing on legal documents and the legal system in
twentieth-century Yemen see Brinkley Messick, The Calligraphic State: Textual Domi-
nation and History in a Muslim Society, Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies, 16
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). Closer to our period, though pursuing
somewhat different goals, is a study by Joel Shinder, "Ottoman Bureaucracy in the Second
Half of the Seventeenth Century: The Central and Naval Administrations" (PhD disser-
tation, Princeton University, 1971), which analyzes the documentation of the naval ad-
ministrative bureaus and the flow of paperwork between them and the central finance
bureaus in the second half of the seventeenth century.
36
For a general discussion of in§a see H.R. Roemer, "lnsha'," E/2 3: 1241-44; for
the Ottoman Empire see Josef Matuz, "Uber die Epistolographie und Insa'-Literatur der
Osmanen," Deutscher Orientalistentag, 1968, ZDMG, Supplementa I, 2 (1970): 574-94,
which includes a bibliography of Ottoman in§a works. The best-known example is Ahmed
Feridun Bey, Mecmu'a-i Miin§e'at'us-Se/atfn, 2 vols. (Istanbul: Dar et-Tiba'a el-'Amire,
1848--49; Istanbul, n.p., 1274-75/1858).
18 INTRODUCTION
examples. 37 Here, the documents are treated instead as parts of a

procedural whole, artifacts of a process of governance. This method
shifts the focus of study from the specific information contained in
a single document to relationships among groups of documents, making
it possible to draw conclusions about their compilation and use and
about the procedural and administrative context in which they were
drawn up. Of course, the examination could not include every register,
of which there are many thousands, but the various types of registers
are examined and placed within the process. The aim was to obtain
representative coverage broad enough in space (with examples from
all parts of the Ottoman Empire) and in time (with examples from
the beginning, middle, and end of the period under investigation) to
permit generalizations about common features and about changes and
differences. Unfortunately for a full understanding of scribal proce-
dures, all but a few of the individual accounts, notes, and papers from
which the registers must have been compiled are either uncatalogued
or destroyed; a small number, however, is examined here. A final and
most valuable type of record is registers of outgoing orders of the
finance department (maliye ahkam defterleri). These registers contain
copies of instructions to tax assessors and collectors and responses
to complaints regarding errors or injustices in the assessment and
collection processes, all of which prove extremely helpful in under-
standing both normal procedure and deviations from it. Once again,
complete coverage is impossible, but examples of orders addressed
to many parts of the empire and dating from the beginning, middle,
and end of the period are used. One of these registers, chosen at
random, is examined in its entirety to understand the overall scope
of a single bureau's activities.
After describing the Ottoman revenue and monetary systems in the
period examined, this book examines the finance department and its
bureaus, the administrative organs by which taxes were assessed and
collected and in which the finance records forming our sources were
37
A detailed cizye tahriri register for istolni Belgrad: Josef Matuz, ed., with the
cooperation of Istvan Hunyadi Die Steuerkonskription des Sandschaks Stuhlweissenburg
aus den Jahren 1563 bis 1565, Islamwissenschaftliche Quellen und Texte aus deutschen
Bibliotheken, 3 (Bamberg: Verlag Aku, 1986); an avanz tahriri register: Munir Aktepe,
"XVII. Asra ait istanbul Kazas1 Avanz Defteri," istanbul Enstitiisii Dergisi 3 (1957): 109-
39; and a cizye accounting register: Omer Liitfi Barkan, "894 ( 1488/1489) Y1h Cizyesinin
Tahsilatma ait Muhasebe Bilan~olan," Beige/er I (1964): 1-117; customs and provincial
account registers: Lajos Fekete and Gyula Kaldy-Nagy, Rechnungsbucher Turkischer
Finanzstellen in Buda (Ofen), 1550-1580 (Budapest: Akademiai Kiad6, 1962).
produced. Salary registers of finance department personnel permit

reconstruction of the department's organizational structure and its
changes over time. Besides assisting in the critical use of finance
documents, this information corrects misconceptions about the depart-
ment's inefficiency and corruption arising from the decline stereotype.
Neither a static monolith nor an overblown warren, the finance
department of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries emerges as a
developing organism, altering over time to conform to change in the
empire's structure and needs.
The succeeding chapters have a dual purpose: they describe in detail
the documents by which taxes were assessed and collected, and
conversely, they piece together the processes of tax assessment and
collection as they appear in the documents. One goal of this detailed
examination is to make tax documents more accessible to researchers.
Another is to show how change in procedure reflected changing needs
and conditions rather than mere bureaucratic corruption. Although the
prevalence of any particular procedure or problem cannot yet be
determined, by examining the range of possibilities we can construct
a picture of normal fiscal procedure to replace the lurid tales of
oppression that now comprise our image of Ottoman tax collection.
Chapter Three examines the process of tax assessment by survey (tahrir,
used for the cizye and avanz taxes) and attempts to evaluate the
figures found in survey registers. Chapter Four describes tax farming,
tax farming personnel, and how tax farming revenues were deter-
mined. Chapter Five analyzes the holders of tax assessment, collec-
tion, and farming positions in the first half of the seventeenth century
and discusses the employment of military personnel in these positions.
Chapter Six deals with the collection process itself, while Chapter
Seven describes how tax revenues were delivered to the central treas-
ury and accounted for, and how revenue totals were compiled at the
central level. This chapter also relates the income figures for the period
1560--1660 to the economic crisis of the early seventeenth century.
Chapter Eight examines petitions submitted by taxpayers and offi-
cials, not only to catalogue problems that arose in the course of revenue
assessment and collection, but also to understand the petition process
as an instrument of governance. Finally, Chapter Nine relates taxpay-
ers' complaint petitions to other forms of protest taking place con-
currently that challenged the ruler's decisions and disturbed the order
of the state. The finance department's policy in crisis is linked to a
search for governmental legitimacy in the face of new and ominous
20 INTRODUCTION
challenges that arose in this period of turmoil. Orders issued in response

to petitions illuminate the political relationship between the ruler and
the ruled in the Ottoman system. The Ottoman sultanate has given
its name to the most extreme form of despotism, 38 but taxation proce-
dures and responses to petitions display the Ottoman sultans of the
seventeenth century in quite a different light. Although revenue-rais-
ing was of critical importance, their continued legitimacy rested in
part on the provision of economic as well as legal justice to their
subjects.
This study takes on only one segment of the larger task of rethink-
ing the Ottoman seventeenth century. In its focus on exploring finance
department documents and their interconnections, it bears the mark
of the dissertation from which it evolved. Even within the field of
finance administration, numerous questions remain about the preva-
lence of various practices, the total amounts of money involved, and
the relationship between revenue collection and spending. I hope this
work will serve as a stepping-stone for researchers who will use finance
department records in conjunction with other sources to examine
specific problems in Ottoman history and to make detailed compari-
sons between periods and between provinces of the empire. European
state-making theory offers a vehicle for questioning, rather than
assuming, the connection between seventeenth-century fiscal admin-
istration and later military reversal, bt(t comparison between the
Ottoman Empire and the contemporary states of Europe is still at a
preliminary stage. I have limited myself here to pointing out some
intriguing similarities and differences on the level of specific insti-
tutions and to raising questions already asked in the European context
but not in the Ottoman. Even with those limitations, however, it has
been possible to explore ways in which our framework might be revised
and our understanding of the post-classical era in Ottoman history
38
Weber's designation for the ultimate form of patrimonialism was "sultanism"; for
Weberian analyses of the Ottoman Empire as a patrimonial state, see ~erif Mardin, "Power,
Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire," Comparative Studies in Society and
History 11 (1969): 258-81; Metin Heper, "Patrimonialism in the Ottoman Turkish Public
Bureaucracy," Asian and African Studies 13 (1979): 3-21. Conversely, the Ottoman Empire
was designated as one of the historic bureaucratic empires by S.N. Eisenstadt, The Political
Systems of Empires (New York: Macmillan Co., Free Press of Glencoe, 1963). Halil
Inalcik discusses the tension between patrimonial and bureaucratic tendencies in the Ottoman
state in "Comments on 'Sultanism~: Max Weber's Typification of the Ottoman Polity,"
Princeton Papers on Near Eastern Studies 1 (1992): 49-72; and "Decision Making in
the Ottoman State," in Decision Making in the Ottoma.n Empire, ed. Caesar Farah (Kirksville,
MO: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993), 9-18.
improved. Critics will undoubtedly detect a bias toward the Ottoman

state, a bias which it is currently fashionable to decry. Such an
orientation results naturally from the focus on the state's own records
and procedures, but it is also the product of reluctance to reach a
premature judgment on a system whose functioning we do not un-
derstand well. Thus, there has been no attempt to cast the Ottoman
state as the villain in a morality play or a scapegoat for modem
problems; the state appears here as problem-solver, as an agent faced
with difficulties it is required to address. If the study permits later
scholars to use these records to uncover the lives of Ottoman peasants
and workingmen in the early modern period, it will also have
made a contribution to the history of the voiceless majority, the ordi-
nary people.
CHAPTER ONE
CLASSICAL OTTOMAN FINANCE
Through its vast and detailed records, the Ottoman fiscal system
provides an entree into the economic and social life of the empire.
One need only look at studies of the classical age, the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries, to see how many kinds of informatioa can be
obtained from Ottoman tax records. 1 Population figures and distribu-
tion, land use, agriculture, urban history, commercial trends, building
construction and financing, religious movements and their economic
basis, local disturbances, changes in the composition of the ruling
class-all have been investigated through the study of revenue sur-
veys. Records for the post-classical age can likewise be used to address
questions about population and population movements, production,
trade, taxation, monetary history, and the efforts of the central gov-
ernment to control economic resources. These later records, produced
in a context of political and economic crisis, grew out of systems
already established for the recording of fiscal data. An overview of
the revenue and monetary systems of the Ottoman Empire will pro-
vide an introduction to the logic and vocabulary of tax documents
and will introduce the fiscal difficulties faced by the Ottoman state
in the late sixteenth century.
Ottoman Taxation
By the time the finance department (maliye) came into being during
the fourteenth century, the classical revenue system was essentially
in place. Ottoman history is generally considered to have begun with
1
The work of Halil Inalcik illustrates the variety of documentary sources available:
survey registers, Hicri 835 Tarihli Suret-i Defter-i Sancak-i Arvanid (Ankara: Tiirk Tarih
Kurumu, 1954); estate records, "15. Asrr Tiirkiye iktisadi ve ictimai Tarihi Kaynaklar,"
iUiFM 15 (1953-54): 51-75; military court records, "The Ruznam~e Registers of the
Kadzasker of Rumeli as Preserved in the Istanbul Milftiiliik Archives," Turcica 20 ( 1988):
251-75; civilian court records, "Osmanh Tarihi Hakkmda Miihim bir Kaynak," AUDTCFD
1 (1943): 89-96; petitions, "Osmanh Bilrokrasisinde Aklam ve Muamelat," Osmanlz
Ara§tzrmalarz 1 (1980): 1-14 and "~ikayet Hakk1: 'Arz-i Halve 'Arz-i Mahzar'lar," Osmanlz
Ara§tzrmalarz 7/8 (1988): 33-54; and a number of sources for economic history, "XV.
CLASSICAL OTIOMAN FINANCE 23
Osman I (1280-1324), the eponymous founder of the Ottoman dy-

nasty, followed by Orban (1324-1362) and Murad I (1362-1389).
Those early Ottoman conquerors cannot be seen as primitive warriors
unfamiliar with the sophisticated governmental practices of their more
civilized Anatolian neighbors. Elements of the classical revenue system
are visible in documents dated as early as the reign of Orban.
Documents surviving from the fourteenth century in apparently un-
altered form reveal that the first Ottoman rulers utilized a well-
developed chancery style whose closest resemblances were to con-
temporary Ilkhanid practice. 2 Early Ottoman financial administration
was also influenced by the Seljuks and Byzantines, whose taxation
practices were modified in accordance with Islamic norms and adopted
into law by Ottoman rulers. 3 However, evidence for the existence of
a separate bureaucratic organization for the scribal and administrative
tasks associated with revenue collection is lacking for this early period.4
Asrr Osmanh Maliyesine Dair Kaynaklar," Tarih Vesikalarz n.s. 1 (1955): 128-34. For
a detailed examination of Ottoman economic and social history to the mid-sixteenth cen-
tury see Mustafa Akdag, Tiirkiye' nin iktisadf ve htimaf Tarihi, 2 vols. (Istanbul: Cem
Yaymlan, 1959).
2
Irene Beldiceanu-Steinherr, Recherches sur Les actes des regnes des sultans Osman,
Orkhan et Murad I, Acta Historica, 7 (n.p.: Societas Academica Dacoromana, 1967). Some
of the documents collected here are apparently not authentically early and have been
considered forgeries. According to Inalcik, these are probably not forgeries but copies of
early documents which were altered by later scribes to conform to sixteenth and seven-
teenth century scribal practices. However, sufficient evidence for our purpose is provided
by documents 5, 7, and 40, which are accepted as early. For early Ottoman scribal practice
see Inalcik, "Reis-iil-kiitrab," iA 9: 671-83. For the Ilkhanid revenue system see Paul
Wittek, "Zu einigen friihosmanischen Urkunden, I," WZKM 53 (1957): 300-313; Walther
Hinz, "Das Rechnungswesen orientalischer Reichsfinanzamter im Mittelalter," Der Islam
29 (1949/50): 1-29, 113-41; Philip Remler, "New Light on Economic History from Ilkhanid
Accounting Manuals," Iranian Studies 13 (1980): 157-77.
3
For Seljukid scribal and taxation practices see the numerous works of Adnan Sadik
Erzi, Claude Cahen, and Osman Turan; for the Byzantine system of revenue allocation
see George Ostrogorsky, Pour l' histoire de la f eodalite byzantine, trans. Henri Gregoire,
Corpus Bruxellense Historiae Byzantinae, Subsidia 1 (Brussels: Institut de philologie et
d'histoire orientales et slaves, 1954). Contrasting views on the nature of Byzantine influ-
ence have been offered by Mehmed Fuad Kopriilii, "Bizans Miiesseselerinin Osmanh
Miiesseselerine Te'siri Hakkmda Baz1 Miilahazalar," THiTM 1 (1931): 165-313; Speros
Vryonis, Jr., "The Byzantine Legacy and Ottoman Forms," Dumbarton Oaks Papers 23-
24 (1969-70): 251-308; and Bistra A. Cvetkova, "Influence exercee par certaines insti-
tutions de Byzance et des Balkans du moyen age sur le systeme feodal ottoman," Byzantino-
Bulgarica 1 (1962): 237-57. On early Ottoman taxation see Halil Inalcik, "The Problem
of the Relationship between Byzantine and Ottoman Taxation," Akten des X. Internationalen
Byzantinisten-Kongresses 1958, rpt. in The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization and
Economy (London: Variorum Reprints, 1980), II; idem, "Orf," iA 9: 480.
4
Some authorities assert that the development of the first elements of bureaucratic
financial administration should be placed as early as the latter part of the reign of Murad
24 CHAPTER ONE
The reign of Bayezid I (1389-1402) is thought to have seen the

inception of a system of land registration and the introduction of
centralized bureaucratic administration. Evidence from records of the
early fifteenth century indicates that major land registrations or fiscal
surveys called tahrirs were made in the 1390s in the newly conquered
territories of southern Albania and the area around Ankara. 5 Land had
formerly been granted in private ownership (miUk), but from this point
on, private ownership grants were seldom made. The implementation
of land registration facilitated the reestablishment of Ottoman domi-
nation after the invasion of Timur in 1402, despite the frequency with
which territories in the region changed hands during the warfare of
the early fifteenth century. Ottoman chroniclers such as A§tkpa§azade,
however, censured the land registration policy as evidence of oppres-
sion and a step in the direction of increased central control of the
perquisites of conquest, as it was based on a theory of state ownership
of land and implied demands of service from those to whom the state
allotted revenue. 6
The revenues surveyed and registered by the tahrir were either
awarded as a living (dirlik) to members of the Ottoman military class
in lieu of salary or other recompense, or retained in the central treas-
ury to pay for the expenses of government, mainly the palace,
bureaucracy, and standing army of slave soldiers. The Ottoman social
system, an artifact of a conquest state, divided the population into
two main groups: the askeri ("military"), which included military
personnel, administrators and judges, and members of the Ottoman
ruling house and was recompensed in untaxed wages or revenue grants;
and the reaya ("flock"), the producers-peasant cultivators, pastoral
no,mads, urban artisans and traders-who paid taxes in return for
protection and justice provided by the askeri. There was limited mobility
between these two groups. 7 Reaya who cultivated agricultural lands
I; Mehmed Zeki Pakahn, Osmanlz Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri SozlUgu, 3 vols. (Istanbul:
Milli Egitim Bas1mevi, 1946), 1: 413-14; Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 1: 25.
5
Halil Inalcik, "Amavutluk>ta Osmanh Hakimiyetinin ve iskender Beg isyammn Men§ei,"
Fatih ve istanbul 1, no. 2 (1953): 154; idem, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest," Studia
lslamica 2 (1954), rpt. in The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization and Economy,
Selection I, Collected Studies Series, CS87 (London: Variorum Reprints, 1978), 104-6;
Paul Wittek, "Zu einigen frilhosmanischen Urkunden, Il," WZKM 54 (1957): 240-55.
6
Halil Inalcik, "The Rise of Ottoman Historiography," in Historians of the Middle East,
ed. Bernard Lewis and P .M. Holt, Historical writing on the Peoples of Asia (London:
Oxford University Press, 1962), 155-65; Joel Shinder, "Early Ottoman Administration in
the Wilderness," IJMES 9 (1978): 504-5.
7
For political and social structures of conquest states, see John Kautsky, The Politics
of Aristocratic Empires (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962).
CLASSICAL OTTOMAN FINANCE 25
held hereditary tenure (tapu) on those lands; their taxes, fines, and
fees constituted the revenue to be granted as dirliks. Revenue grants
or dirliks, according to their size, were called timar (valued at 1-
19,999 ak~e), zeamet (20,000-99,999 ak~e), or has (pl. havas, over
100,000 ak~e), and the whole complex of military, fiscal, adminis-
trative, and personal relationships engendered by these grants is now
referred to by scholars as the timar system. 8 At the beginning of the
sixteenth century, about half the revenue of the empire was allocated
under the timar system; the rest was retained by the central treasury
as havass-z humayun, "royal domains" or "crown lands." A complex
recording system composed of several types of documents and defters
(registers, record books) enabled the government to assess revenue
and distribute grants. 9 Through a diploma of privilege called a berat,
the sultan or his delegate bestowed on a particular person the right
to collect the revenues of a particular area. A single cavalryman (sipahi)
could be supported on a small timar, while holders of larger dirliks
had to pay a retinue of men-at-arms out of their income. A promotion
was accompanied by an addition (terakki) to the dirlik; increased income
meant responsibility for more men. The reaya on timar lands paid
their taxes, often in kind, to the holder of the dirlik. In the case of
the havass-1 hiimayun, the royal domains, taxes were paid to agents
of the central treasury. Tax rates were specified by regulatory codes
8
Information on the timar system provided here is oriented around the tax system. For
more detail see the general works on the classical timar system: Omer Liitfi Barkan,
Tiirkiye'de Toprak Meselesi: Toplu Eserler, I (Istanbul: Gozlem Yaymlan, 1980), a collection
of many of his important articles; idem, "Timar," iA 12: 186-333; lnalcik, The Ottoman
Empire: The Classical Age; Nicoara Beldiceanu, Le Timar dans l'etat ottoman (debut
XWe-debut XV/e siecle) (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1980). For a succinct explanation
of the Ottoman land system see Halil Inalcik, "Koy, Koylii ve imparatorluk," in V.
Milletlerarasi Turkiye Sosyal ve iktisat Tarihi Kongresi, Tebligler (Ankara: Tiirk Tarih
Kurumu, 1990), 1-11; rpt. with notes in Osmanli imparatorlugu Top/um ve Ekonomi
uzerinde Ar§iv <;all§malari, incelemeler (Istanbul: Eren, 1993), 1-14; trans. as "Village,
Peasant and Empire," in The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire:
Essays on Economy and Society, Indiana University Turkish Studies and Turkish Ministry
of Culture Joint Series, 9 (Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies, 1993), 137-
60; and for a detailed description see Halil Inalcik, "The Ottoman State: Economy and
Society, 1300-1600," in An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-
1914, ed. Halil Inalcik with Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994), 103-78. Was the timar system feudal? After much debate, the answer seems to
be juridically no, economically yes.
9 For the documentary steps involved in the grant of a timar see lnalcik, "Osmanh
Biirokrasisinde Aklam ve Muamelat," 1-14. For a history and description of defters see
Bernard Lewis, "Daftar," E/2 2: 77-81. For the timar bestowal process see Douglas A.
Howard, "The Ottoman Timar System and Its Transformation, 1563-1656" (PhD disser-
tation, Indiana University, 1987).
26 CHAPTER ONE
(kanun) promulgated by the rulers and adhered to in the making of

the tahrirs; the kanuns were often copied into the front of the registers.
The revenue of the Ottoman Empire consisted of a multitude of
separate taxes, dues, fees, and levies on production, trade, and the
activities of daily life. These taxes varied from place to place and
sometimes from group to group within the empire; some were pre-
scribed by Islamic law (§er'f), while others were customary or pre-
conquest practices given the force of law by sultanic edict (orfi).
Scholars have usually categorized Ottoman revenues according to their
source: tithes on agricultural and pastoral production, customs dues,
sales and market taxes, fines, commutation of feudal services, bride
taxes, revenues from mines, salt pans, fisheries, and so on. Numerous
studies have described in detail these varied taxes, their levels and
amounts, and the laws applied to them. 10 For a study of finance
procedures, however, it is more useful to classify Ottoman revenues
according to the recipient of the income. This approach divides taxes
into two groups cutting across the many sources of revenue: revenues
alienated from the central treasury and collected directly by their final
recipients, and those entering the central government's coffers (and
its books) before being spent. 11 Alienated revenues included revenues
allocated to members of the military and governing class through the
timar system, revenues held by provincial governors to pay local
expenses, and revenues tied up in pious foundations (evkaf, sing. vakif,
revenue devoted in perpetuity to charitable purposes). Although alien-
ated revenues came from the same sources as central treasury rev-
enues-agriculture, stockraising, production and trade-the structures
and personnel by which they were collected differed considerably.
Under the timar system, the timar holder lived on his timar and was
responsible for maintenance of security and general oversight of peasant
life as well as for revenue collection during his tenure, and the holders
of the larger dirliks and of pious foundations had agents or retainers
to collect their revenues. On the other hand, the havass-i humayun,
10
Ne§et ~agatay, "Osmanh imparatorlugunda Reayadan Alman Vergi ve Resimler,"
AUDTCFD 5 (1947): 483-511; Halil Inalcik, "Osmanhlarda Raiyyet Riisumu," Belleten
23 (1959): 575-610.
11
For a Marxist version of this classification, see Mutafcieva, Agrarian Relations in
the Ottoman Empire, 169-89. Revenue sources can also be classified according to the
type of possession rights by which they were held: tapulu yer were lands held by hereditary
right of usufruct, maintained by the payment of a fee called tapu resmi, while mukataalu
yer were lands that could be rented by anyone (Inalcik, "The Ottoman State: Economy
and Society," 108-10).
the "crown" revenues, comprising unallocated land revenues and most

of the income from urban and commercial taxes and monopolies, were
either farmed or collected by government employees.
Revenue also came directly to the central treasury from a variety
of other sources. Throughout the sixteenth century, the largest of these
sources was the cizye, the traditional Islamic poll tax on non-Muslims,
usually paid as a fl.at fee per household. In the seventeenth century
the largest single source of central government income became the
avanz-1 divaniye ve tekalif-i orfiye (extraordinary impositions and
customary levies, also called simply avarzz). This was a blanket term
for a large number of di:fferent types of levies in cash, in kind, or
in service: providing chickens or onions for the imperial kitchens;
supporting post horses; maintaining roads, bridges, and watercourses;
guarding mountain passes; providing grain for the horses of the army
on the march; sending oarsmen to the naval galleys; or giving cash
for paying soldiers or purchasing provisions in time of war. Also
coming into the central treasury were revenues for the evkaf assigned
to the support of imperial and vezirial foundations and of the Two
Holy Places, Mecca and Medina. These funds were administered by
the treasury but were earmarked for religious and charitable purposes
and did not add to the government's disposable income. A number
of smaller revenue sources included confiscated funds, the estates
of people dying without heirs (beytiUmal), and various kinds of fees
and fines. Finally, the central treasury received annual remittances
from provincial treasuries, balances remaining after the deduction of
local expenses.
Three main systems of tax assessment and collection were applied
to the income of the central treasury. In vassal states or tribes and
in provinces where the timar system was not applied (salyane prov-
inces), revenues were collected by local officials and fmwarded in a
lump sum to the capital. 12 Tax farming (iltizam) was employed from
an early period for revenues which were occasional or whose amount
varied according to circumstance, such as the revenues from mines,
mints, salt works, mills, dyeing establishments, customs dues and
market taxes. Other taxes, such as agricultural has revenues, or cizye
12 Salih Ozbaran, "The Salyane System in the Ottoman Empire as Organized in Arabia
in the Sixteenth Century," Osmanlz Ara§tzrmalarz 6 (1986): 39-45; Stanford J. Shaw, The
Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517-
1798, Princeton Oriental Studies, 19 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).
28 CHAPfER ONE
and avanz, could also be farmed; over time tax fanning was used
more and more for such revenues. 13 The finance department's role in
tax fanning was an indirect one and involved awarding bids, keeping
records, receiving money, and adjudicating conflicts. The final method
of tax assessment was the tahrir or revenue survey, performed by
government officials to estimate most agricultural and urban revenues.
The tahrir was employed both for revenues alienated by the timar
system (or by other means) and for central treasury revenues collected
by salaried imperial agents.
Survey registers produced by the tahrir are our main source of
information on Ottoman society and economy in the classical age.
They tell us the number of taxpayers, their settlement patterns, ethnic
and religious origins, ages, family structures, agricultural and artisanal
production, animal ownership, and movement across the landscape.
They also supply information on land-holding and land use, the
composition and distribution of the ruling class, and policies of reward
and recompense for government servants. 14 Studies of the registers
and of codes regulating taxation practices, however, show that behind
their apparent uniformity lay a bewildering variety of tax rates,
assessment and collection arrangements, exceptions to the rules, and
so forth; the same is true with respect to registers for other kinds of
taxes, such as the cizye or avanz. Register-making can thus be in-
terpreted as spreading a gloss of conformity over a base of extreme
13
For early records of tax fanning, see M. Tayyib Gokbilgin, XV.-XVI. Aszrlarda Edirne
ve Pa§a Livasz: Vakzflar-MiUkler-Mukataalar, istanbul Universitesi Edebiyat Fakilltesi
Yaymlan, 508 (Istanbul: U~ler Bas1mevi, 1952); for mines see Robert Anhegger, Beitriige
zur Geschichte des Bergbaus im Osmanischen Reich, Istanbuler Schriften, 2 (Istanbul:
Maannara Bas1mevi, 1943). In France, revenues such as commercial and production taxes
and state monopolies were also fanned during the sixteenth century; in the latter part of
the century these tended to be consolidated into large "general farms." In the seventeenth
century these farms were granted for long periods of time to groups of people formed
into companies (Julian Dent, Crisis in Finance: Crown, Financiers and Society in Seven-
teenth-Century France [Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1973], 38, 45). The English
also fanned their customs revenues (the main source of central government income) as
well as production monopolies, partly in order to ensure the predictability of the revenue
(Frederick Charles Dietz, English Public Finance, 1485-164-1, 2 vols. [New York: Barnes
and Noble, 1964], 2: 90--91).
14
For the use of the tahrir registers in determining population and production and the
pitfalls encountered therein see M.A. Cook, Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia, 1450-
1600 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972); Amnon Cohen and Bernard Lewis, Popu-
lation and Revenue in the Towns of Palestine in the Sixteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1978); Inalcik, "Impact of the Anna/es School"; Faroqhi and islamoglu,
"Crop Patterns and Agricultural Production Trends."
diversity, the only practical way for a small bureaucracy to administer

a multinational empire. 15
Revenue Assessment by Survey (Tahrir)
The history of fiscal surveys in the Middle East dates at least to the
Assyrian Empire of the seventh century BC, when the Harran census
or survey of northern Mesopotamia was made. It recorded agricultural
lands, buildings, crops, and animals, and enumerated the residents by
family, including their names, occupations, personal status, and
obligations to the state. 16 Similar information was customarily recorded
in bills of sale, and a letter of Hammurabi I (c. 2200 BC) indicates
that in his time land and land use were recorded, although no surveys
survive from that early period. 17 Another revenue survey that found
its way into the pages of history was performed in the sixth century
by the Sasanian king Khusrau Anushirvan. 18 He set the level of taxation
by measuring the extent and kind of land rather than the amount of
the harvest, as delay in measuring the yield until after harvest ap-
parently caused hardship and injustice. 19 He also established a sepa-
rate tax administration independent of provincial governors and
15
The Ottoman situation was not unique; at this period Spain, France, and Britain were
likewise not homogeneous nations but accumulations of provinces under a single crown.
Each province was virtually autonomous with respect to law, custom, and taxation. The
provinces of France had separate tax systems, customs dues, and languages until the
nineteenth century (Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural
France, 1870-1914 [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976]).
16 Claude Hermann Walter Johns, An Assyrian Doomsday Book: or, Liber Censualis
of the District Round Harran, in the Seventh Century BC, Assyriologische Bibliothek, 17
(Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1901); Frederick Mario Fales, Censimenti e catasti di epoca neo-
assira, Studia Economici e Tecnolgici, 2 (Rome: Centro per le Antichita e la Storia dell' Arte
del Vicino Oriente, 1973).
17 Leonard William King, The Letters and Inscriptions of Hammurabi, King of Babylon,
about B.C. 2200, 3 vols., Luzac's Semitic Texts and Translation Series, 2, 3, 8 (London:
Luzac and Co., 1898-1900), 3: 23-25.
18 Mario Grignaschi, "Quelques specimens de la litterature sassanide conserves dans
les bibliotbeques d'Istanbul," Journal asiatique 254 (1966): 17-18, 20-23. These reforms
were begun by Khusrau's father Kobad (Kavad I, 488-531) before he died.
19 Richard N. Frye, The Heritage of Persia (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962),
218. In addition to land tax, the Sasanian tax system also included personal taxes,
extraordinary levies, and "gifts." The three upper classes (priests, nobles and soldiers, and
bureaucrats) were exempt from taxation, but not from "gifts" (Arthur Emmanuel Christensen,
L' Iran sous /es Sassanides, 2nd ed. [Osnabriick: 0. Zeller, 1971], 367). On harvest
measurement and taxation in Sasanian and Ottoman times see Halil lnalcik, "Islamization
of Ottoman Laws on Land and Land Taxation," Festgabe an Josef Matuz: Osmanistik-
30 CHAPTER ONE
commissioned judges to supervise assessment and collection in their

districts. To handle unforeseen problems, he instituted a complaint
procedure staffed by scribes, judges, and personnel from the palace.
For later empires, Anushirvan became the model of the just ruler.
In the early Islamic period revenue surveys were performed under
the Umayyads and Abbasids; the latter returned to a system of
measuring the harvest for assessment purposes. 20 Egypt had a long
tradition by which land covered by the Nile flood was surveyed and
redistributed and the revenue assessed. 21 Surveys performed by the
Mongols in the thirteenth century combined Middle Eastern and Chinese
methods, and information on the procedures they used was available
to the Ottomans through the Ilkhanid scribal manuals. 22 The Mongol
example was followed by the Romanovs, who conducted a land survey
immediately after consolidating their control over Russia in the 1620s.23
The Byzantine Empire also made records, called praktika, which
inventoried the domains of military men, government officials, mon-
asteries, and the like, enumerating land and buildings, cultivators and
their families, animals, and possessions, and the revenues due from
various kinds of taxes and rents. 24
Turkologie-Diplomatie, ed. Christa Fragner and Klaus Schwarz (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz
Verlag, 1992), 100-116.
20
Frede L~kkegaard, Islamic Taxation in the Classical Period (Copenhagen: Branner
& Korch, 1950), 113-16. For the Ottoman interpretation of early Islamic land and taxation
systems see Inalcik, "Islamization of Ottoman Laws on Land and Land Taxation."
21
Gladys Frantz-Murphy, The Agrarian.Administration of Egypt from the Arabs to the
Ottomans, Supplement aux annales islamologiques, 9 (Cairo: Institut fran~ais d 'arcbeologie
orientale, 1986).
22
Thomas T. Allsen, Mongol Imperialism: The Policies of the Grand Qan Mongke in
China, Russia, and the Islamic Lands, 1251-1259 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1987).
23
Parker, Europe in Crisis, 113. Western Europe was unable to attain this standard
of administration until a later period. In sixteenth-century Spain, census information was
simply not available, although it was recognized that good planning depended on accurate
information obtained through such devices (I.A.A. Thompson, War and Government in
Habsburg Spain, 1560-1620 [London: University of London, The Athlone Press, 1976],
76-77). In France of the ancien regime there was no general register even of the royal
domain, despite an attempt to compile one in the seventeenth century (Roland E. Mousnier,
The Institutions of France under the Absolute Monarchy, trans. Brian Pearce and Arthur
Goldhammer, 2 vols. [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979-84], 2: 437). Little
Denmark made a census of agricultural land for taxation purposes in 1681 that was used
until 1844 (Thomas Munck, Seventeenth Century Europe: State, Conflict and the Social
Order in Europe, 1598-1700, Macmillan History of Europe [London: Macmillan Edu-
cation Ltd., 1990], 346).
24
Ostrogorsky, Pour I' histoire de la feodalite byzantine, 259-368.
The Ottomans employed regular tahrirs, or surveys, to determine

and record (in the imperial register, the defter-i hakanf) the value of
the empire's revenues. 25 These revenues could then be distributed as
timars, retained by the central treasury, or assigned as vak1f and millk.
A tahrir or registration could be occasioned by the conquest of new
territory, by the accession of a new sultan, by change in the consti-
tution of a region sufficient to render the previous defter out of date,
or by the institution of certain reforms. It permitted taxation of those
who had recently come of age or moved into an area, as well as the
correction of errors and the deletion of exempted and deceased persons.
A tahrir might involve the registration of the whole empire at once,
or one might be made for a single region or province. It could be
initiated centrally, by an order from the sultan, or locally, by a petition
requesting the issuance of such an order.
A superintendent or director was appointed to take charge of the
survey; he held the title of agent (emin or emin-i defter, often trans-
lated "intendant") or registrar (yazzcz or muharrir). He was usually
a former governor or finance official or a member of the ulema (religious
scholars), someone with authority and knowledgeable about the
Ottoman revenue system, often someone acquainted with the area to
be surveyed. For example, several sixteenth-century tahrirs of Hun-
gary were made by Dervi§ Bey, the cizye collector of Budin. 26 A
scribe, or katib, accompanied the emin to keep the actual records and
supervise their copying. He was usually a scribe in central government
employ or a sipahi's son with scribal training; he had to be an expert
on the timar system and scribal practice. In the early years of conquest,
25
Omer Lfitfi Barkan, "Tiirkiye'de imparatorluk Devirlerinin Biiyiik Niifus ve Araz1
Tahrirleri ve Hakana Mahsus istatistik Defterleri," iOiFM 2 (1940-41): 39-44; Inalcik,
Hicri 835 Tarihli Suret-i Defter-i Sancak-z Arvanid, xix-xx; idem, "Ottoman Methods of
Conquest," 110-11. The descriptions of the Ottoman survey process offered by these two
scholars have been repeated and amplified numerous times, most extensively by Gyula
Kaldy-Nagy, "The Administration of the Sanjaq Registrations in Hungary," Acta Orientalia
Hungarica 21 (1968): 181-223; Irene Beldiceanu-Steinherr and Nicoara Beldiceanu,
"Reglement ottoman concernant le recensement (premiere moitie du xv1e siecle)," Sudost-
Forschungen 39 ( 1978): 1-40; Bistra A. Cvetkova, "Early Ottoman Tahrir Defters as a
Source for Studies on the History of Bulgaria and the Balkans," Archivum Ottomanicum
8 (1983): 133-214; Inalcik, "Ottoman State: Economy and Society," 132-42; and Feridun
M. Emecen, whose XVI. Aszrda Manisa Kazasz, Atatiirk Kiiltiir, Kil ve Tarih Yiiksek
Kurumu, Tiirk Tarih Kurumu Yaymlar1, ser. 14, no. 6 (Ankara: Tiirk Tarih Kurumu
Bas1mevi, 1989) successfully integrates data from a large number of survey registers of
various kinds into a detailed economic and social history of the kaza of Manisa.
26
Gustav Bayerle, Ottoman Tributes in Hungary, According to Sixteenth Century Tapu
Registers of Novigrad (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), 18.
32 CHAPTER ONE
the Ottomans also employed scribes from the conquered population,

people who knew the area to be surveyed, the language of the in-
habitants, and the potential sources of revenue. Residents of the
area, both taxpayers and those with rights to collect tax revenues,
appeared before the emin and katib armed with whatever documents
they possessed establishing their status, possessions, and privileges.
Fields, villages, towns, and cities were examined to determine their
probable revenue yield. The local kadi (judge) remained in attendance
on the emin to provide whatever assistance was necessary for the
success of the survey, and special information on local conditions was
obtained from governmental personnel and local notables. If a survey
was conducted in a dangerous frontier area, or if the population offered
resistance to the assessment, military force could be called upon to
ensure the security of the process.
The task of the emin and katib was to register the taxpaying
population and their obligations and to discover and record all sources
of tax revenue in the area surveyed. As authorization, they carried
an imperial order (ni§an) appointing them to the task and command-
ing compliance by the population and local authorities. If a previous
survey register existed, they carried a copy as a basis for the new
one. They estimated expected revenue from agricultural, productive,
and commercial activities by taking an average of the previous three
years' production, and they counted taxpayers by household (hane,
the basic unit of agricultural production) to reach a projected figure
for personal taxes. 27 Particular note was taken of any changes in
population or production since the previous survey, if any, and of
special local practices and tax rates, which were recorded. in a
kanunname, a list of regulations, at the front of the register. Docu-
ments in the claimants' possession verified the claims of those wholly
or partially exempt from taxation and of timar holders and others
entitled to collect the revenues assessed, as well as the status of lands
held as miilk, valaf, or sultanic has. The possibility of corruption in
the survey process was lessened by the confrontation in person of
peasant, timar holder, local kad1, and imperial emin. It was to each
27
On Ottoman tax households see Inalcik, "Ottoman Empire: Economy and Society,"
143-54. Spanish censuses of the sixteenth century were likewise made for tax purposes
and enumerated not individuals but households (vecinos) (A.W. Lovett, Early Habsburg
Spain, 1517-1598 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986], 245). The French, too, counted
their taxpayers in hearths (sing. feu), equivalent to households (P.J. Coveney, ed., France
in Crisis, 1620-1675 [Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1977], 250).
party's interest to expose misrepresentation or cheating by the others,

and the survey order imposed severe penalties for tax evasion and
substantial rewards for its exposure. 28
Information gained by the survey was recorded in several different.
types of registers, known collectively as tahrir defters. 29 The mufassal
defter, or detailed register, listed the taxpayers by name and status
according to their place of residence (for that reason it was also called
a register of names, defter-i esami or esami defteri). It also recorded
the taxes assessed on them and on their agricultural production and
livestock, on marketing activities in the towns, and on certain manu-
facturing activities such as milling or cloth dyeing. This type of register
often contained a kanunname, or regulatory code, detailing local
taxation practices. 30 Miilk and vaklf revenues might be included in
such a register, or they might appear in separate registers of their own.
The icmal defteri, or summary register, recorded assignments of revenue
as timar, zeamet, or has; it identified the revenues assigned and the
names of the holders, but not the names of the taxpayers. The kad1s
made up additional defters listing the names of those obligated to pay
cizye and avanz. Another separate count was made of all zeamet and
timar holders and their armed retainers (cebe/Us). Scribes made two
copies of each defter, which were sent to the capital for approval;
one was then retained in the treasury's archives and the other, vali-
dated by the sultan's tugra or monogram, was returned to the locality
surveyed. Upon sultanic approval of the defters, documents confirm-
ing tax amounts, exemptions, and collection rights could be issued
and timars could be reassigned. These registers became the law of
the land on revenue; the Ottomans were even able to prove claims
to villages in disputed Hungarian territory through the use of tahrir
28
In 987/1579-80, timar holders were able to petition against an incorrect tahrir made
by a governmental official who had misrepresented the amounts of revenue produced
by the various timars (ismail Hakk1 Uzunc;ar§ll1, Osmanlz Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye
Te§kil/itz, Ttirk Tarih Kurumu Yaymlan, ser. 8, no. 16a [Ankara: Ttirk Tarih Kurumu
Bas1mevi, 1948], 107, n. 2).
29
Many studies of local areas have been done using the tahrir defters as a basis, but
as yet there is no complete bibliography of these studies nor of published tahrir defters.
A study showing the advantages of using the tahrir registers in conjunction with court
records to gain a fuller insight into regional life is Amy Singer's "Tapu Tahrir Defterleri
and Kadi Sicilleri: A Happy Marriage of Sources," Tarih 1 (1990): 95-125.
3
° Collections of these kanunnames include Omer Liitfi Barkan, XV. ve XV/mcz Aszrlarda
Osmanlz imparatorlugunda Zirai Ekonominin Hukuku ve Mali Esaslarz, vol. 1: Kanunlar,
istanbul Universitesi Edebiyat Fakilltesi Yaymlar1, 256 (Istanbul: Tiirkiyat Enstitiisii
Ne§riyat1, Burhaneddin Matbaas1, 1943); Ahmet Akgiindiiz, Osmanlz Kanunnameleri ve
Hukukf Tahlilleri, 7 vols. to date (Istanbul: isis Ltd., 1990-).
34 CHAPTER ONE
defters. 31 If necessary, the defters were updated by means of marginal

notes (der kenar) until the time of the next survey. Between general
surveys, tahrir registers were produced by copying the registers of a
previous survey, incorporating any corrections that had been trans-
mitted to the center. 32 Control and updating of the tahrir registers was
in the hands of scribes responsible to the ni§ancz, the official in charge
of inspecting outgoing orders for adherence to kanun and validating
them with the sultan's tugra; he himself was responsible to the grand
vizier and the imperial divan rather than to the finance department. 33
In the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries numerous general
and regional tahrirs were made. By the mid-sixteenth century, after
over a century and a half of experience, the practice of holding a
general tahrir every 30 years, or once a generation, had become a
standard, prescribed by the grand vizier Liitfi Pa§a in his Asa/name
of 1543.34 The patchiness of document survival, however, means that
we cannot be sure if the whole empire was ever surveyed at one time.
Moreover, the period of the grand tahrirs was short. In 1592 the grand
vizier Ferhad Pa§a confirmed Liitfi Pa§a's recommendation, but this
confirmation proved without lasting effect. 35 The 1590s saw the last
of the great general tahrirs of the empire. While the compilation of
tahrir defters never entirely ceased, the last defter made of an area
subsequently served for many decades as the basis for revenue as-
sigmnent, being updated on an ad hoc basis. 36
31
Elod Vass, "Two Tahrir Defiers of the Sanjaq of Mohacs from the Time of Sultan
Murad ID, 1580--1591," in Between the Danube and the Caucasus: A Collection of Papers
concerning Oriental Sources on the History of the Peoples of Central and South-Eastern
Europe, ed. Gyorgy Kara, Oriental Sources on the History of the Peoples of South-Eastern
and Central Europe, Academy of Sciences of the USSR Institute for Oriental Studies/
Hungarian Academy of Sciences Research Group for Altaistic Studies (Budapest: Aka-
demiai Kiad6, 1987), 342-44.
32
Some peculiarities of the tahrir process have been examined by Rhoads Murphey,
"Ottoman Census Methods in the Mid-Sixteenth Century: Three Case Histories," Studia
Islamica 71 (1990): 115-26.
33
Douglas A. Howard, "The Historical Development of the Ottoman Imperial Registry
(Defter-i Hakanf): Mid-Fifteenth to Mid-Seventeenth Centuries," Archivum Ottomanicum
11 (1986): 213-30.
34
Liitfi Pa§a, Das Asa/name des Lutfi Pascha, ed. and trans. Rudolf Tschudi (Leipzig:
W. Drugulin, 1910), 33, 44; see also Barkan, "Biiyiik Niifus ve Arazi Tahrirleri," 31; and
Kaldy-Nagy, "Administration of the Sanjaq Registrations," 185, n. 15.
35
The recommendation was repeated by the grand vizier Kemanke§ Kara Mustafa Pa§a
in 1639, and it seems he did attempt to implement it (Paik Re§it Unat, "Sadrazam Kemanke§
Kara Mustafa Pa§a Layihas1," Tarih Vesikalari 1 [1941-42]: 462).
36
For the updating of timar registers in the late seventeenth century, see Gerber, State,
Society, and Law, 167. In western Europe new tax assessments were infrequent. In France,
As long as the empire was relatively small and compact, the survey
process worked well to control the flow of revenues. It is noteworthy,
however, that much of the enormous expanse of the Arab lands was
never surveyed after its conquest in 1516-17. After the sixteenth
century, surveys were made only in extraordinary circumstances, such
as after new conquests, or for a limited area, such as a single prov-
ince. 37 This has sometimes been construed to mean that all regular
tax assessment ceased after 1600 and the administration became
incapable of or uninterested in keeping up with changes in the coun-
tryside. 38 In fact, however, the documents in the Ottoman archives
show that the opposite was the case. In the face of new demands on
its fiscal resources and a military restructuring that threatened to shake
the social system of the empire, the finance department worked out
new approaches to revenue-raising and control. New priorities led to
shifts in the importance of various revenues and collection methods,
alterations in fiscal organization, and changes in the groups from which
finance personnel were recruited. These changes were designed to
cope with an economy in which rising prices caused the government's
budget to swell and made it harder for people to pay their taxes.
The Monetary System and the Price Revolution
The sixteenth century was a period of rapid price increases all over
the world, changes in the value of money and commodities severe
enough to be called a price revolution. Study of the sixteenth-century
price revolution in the Ottoman Empire began with Barkan's work
on prices in the 1940s. 39 Barkan computed the rate of inflation in the
cost of a single large quantity of goods, both in the official Ottoman
taxes were paid throughout the seventeenth century on the basis of assessments last made
in 1530 (William Beik, Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power
and ·Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc, Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985], 141).
37
Sertoglu, Muhteva Bakmznda Ba§vekalet Ar§ivi, 43-44.
38
Lewis, "Some Reflections on the Decline," 119; Bistra A. Cvetkova, Les institutions
ottomanes en Europe, Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Veroffentlichungen
der Orientalischen Kommission, 32 (Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1978), 101.
39 Omer Liitfi Barkan, "Essai sur les donnees statistiques des registres de recensement
dans l'empire ottoman aux xve et XVIe siecles," JESHO 1 (1958): 9-36; idem, "Price
Revolution in the Ottoman Empire"; idem, "Baz1 Biiyiik ~ehirlerde E~ya ve Yiyecek
Fiyatlannm Tesbit ve Tefti~i Hususlarm1 Tanzim Eden Kanunlar," Tarih Vesikalarz 1
(1941/42): 326-40; 2 (1942/43): 15-40, 168-77; idem, "Les mouvements des prix en
36 CHAPTER ONE
coin and in its silver equivalent. The Ottoman coinage system was
initiated in the reign of Orban with a silver coin called the ak~e, about
30 of which equalled a Venetian gold ducat. 40 Gold and copper coins
began to be minted later; the Ottoman gold coin was modelled on
the ducat. Over the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the average weight
of the ak~e decreased until by the mid-sixteenth century the ducat was
worth 60 ak~e. Prices followed suit: after a period of stability in the
first half of the sixteenth century, they began to rise around mid-
century. In the 1580s the value of the ak~e was halved again, 120
being equivalent to a gold piece, and in the following decades there
were occasions when the gold piece equalled 240 ak~e. Again, prices
rose accordingly; the steepest price rises occurred in the years 1585-
1595 and 1600-1605 and the highest prices in the period 1605-1625.
Prices subsequently decreased and leveled off, though they remained
more than twice as high as before.
Table 1. Price Inflation in the Ottoman Empire, 1555-1655
NOMINAL VALUE
YEAR VALUE IN INDEX IN SILVER INDEX
AK~E
1555-56 875,184 100.00 639,759 100.00

1573 1,107,173 126.51 755,092 118.03
1585-86 1,122,965 128.31 765,862 119.71
1586-87 1,649,975 188.53 633,590 99.04
1587-88 1,959,381 223.88 752,402 117.61
1588-89 2,248,665 256.94 863,487 134.94
1605 3,788,575 432.89 1,223,709 191.28
1623-25 3,650,751 417.14 1,179,132 184.31
1655-56 2,841,328 324.65 869,446 135.90
Source: Omer Lutfi Barkan, "The Price Revolution in the Ottoman Empire," /IMES 6
(1975): Table 2, page 11, with index numbers adjusted to use 1555 as the base year rather
than 1489.
Turquie entre 1490 et 1655," in Histoire economique du monde mediterranean, 145-1650:

Melanges en I' honneur de Fernand Braudel (Toulouse: Privat, 1973), 65-79.
40
The most recent analysis of the Ottoman monetary system is ~evket Pamuk, "Money
in the Ottoman Empire, 1326-1914," in The Ottoman Empire: Its Economy and Society,
1300-1914, ed. Halil Inalcik with Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1994), 947-80; I am grateful to ~evket Pamuk for letting me see the manuscript
of this article prior to publication. On monetary history see also Halil Sahillioglu, "The
Role of International Monetary and Metal Movements in Ottoman Monetary History 1300-
1750," in Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, ed. J.F.
Richards (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1983), 269-304.
Major discrepancies can be noted between the rise in prices expressed

in akc;e coin and the extent of inflation measured in silver. The highest
prices of 1605 were well over four times those of 1555 in terms of
the akc;e but less than double in terms of silver. Over the century from
1555 to 1655, the inflation rate of the akc;e was 225% (approximately
2% per year), but the inflation rate of silver was only 36% (averaging
1/3 of 1% per year), not much different from the rate for the previou~
century. Inflation rates were higher for the peak period 1573-1605,
242% in akc;e and 62% in silver (7.5% and 1.9% per year, respec-
tively). This higher inflation, though relatively short-lived, disrupted
the monetary system in ways that dramatically altered the post-clas-
sical fiscal system. The inflation and monetary chaos have been
explained in two ways: by a massive influx of silver from the New
World via Spain and Italy, or by a sixteenth-century population increase
that caused demand to outstrip production of food and other goods.
In fact, both of these forces were in operation, and their coincidence
in time created havoc in the Ottoman economy.
In explaining the price revolution, Inalcik has focused on the influx
of silver from the Americas to Spain as a result of its conquests in
Mexico and Peru. 41 The value of silver in Europe fell rapidly against
gold and other commodities. Merchants, particularly Italian middle-
men, took advantage of the relative cheapness of European silver to
purchase Ottoman gold and goods for re-export throughout Europe,
making immense profits. As silver poured into the Ottoman Empire
from Europe in the 1550s, the value of silver there began to fall as
well. The official exchange rate between the ak~e and the gold piece
was not altered, however, and the akc;e continued to be minted at the
old rate. Overvaluation of the akc;e gave rise to widespread counter-
feiting and clipping of coin as akc;e coins were remade into something
closer to the market value of the silver they contained. 42 "Good,"
unaltered akc;e disappeared from the marketplace, people lost confi-
dence in the official coinage, and prices fluctuated wildly as merchants
disregarded official fixed-price lists. 43 At the same time, price increases
41
Inalcik, "Tiirkiyenin iktisadi Vaziyeti iizerinde bir Tetkik Miinasebetiyle."
42 On counterfeiting see, in addition to Inalcik's work, Ltitfi Gii~er, XVI.-XVII. Aszrlarda
Osmanlz imparatorlugunda Hububat Meselesi ve Hububattan Alman Vergiler, istanbul
Oniversitesi ikitsat Fakiiltesi Yaymlan, 152 (Istanbul: istanbul Oniversitesi iktisat Fakiiltesi,
1964), 36-37; Skender Rizaj, "Counterfeit of Money on the Balkan Peninsula from the
XV to the XVII Century," Balkanica 1 (1970): 71-97; Suraiya Faroqhi, "Counterfeiting
in Ankara," Turkish Studies Association Bulletin 15 (1991): 281-92.
43 For lists of fixed prices (narh defterleri) see Barkan, "E~ya ve Yiyecek Fiyatlan";
38 CHAPTER ONE
affected the government's budget by raising the cost of supplies for

the military, the palace, and pious foundations, creating huge defi-
cits.44 In the 1580s, the government yielded, devaluing the ak~e
overnight to its approximate market rate. Several decades of monetary
fluctuation ensued until a new equilibrium was reached in the second
quarter of the seventeenth century.
The difference between the lower rate of silver inflation and the
much higher price rise in ak~e shows, however, that the influx of
cheap American silver from Europe was only one of the problems
facing the Ottoman monetary system in this period. 45 The first sign
of the silver influx appeared in 1554. Between that date and the first
official devaluation in 1586, a number of factors combined to increase
I
the demand for coinage and especially for the ak~e coin: growth in
population, urbanization, and the volume of commercial exchange;
accelerating monetarization of the economy and the tax system; a rise
in wages; a decrease in gold imports from Europe; a drain of silver
toward Iran and the east, where its relative value was greater; and
a growth in the salaried military forces and in war expenditures.
Halil Sahillioglu, "Osmanhlarda Narh Mtiessesesi ve 1525 Y1h Sonunda istanbuPda

Fiyatlar," Belgelerle Turk Tarihi Dergisi 1, no. 1 (1967/68): 36--40; Mtibahat S. Ktittikoglu,
"1009 (1600) Tarihli Narh Defterine gore istanbuPda <;e§idli E§ya ve Hizment Fiatlar1,"
Tarih Enstitusu Dergisi 9 (1978): 1-85; idem, "1624 Sikke Tashihinin Ardmdan Hazrrlanan
Narh Defterleri," Tarih Dergisi 34 (1983/84): 123-82; idem, Osmanlzlarda Narh Muessesesi
ve 1640 Tarihli Narh Defteri (Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1983); Ya§ar Yticel, 1640 Tarihli
Es'ar Defteri, Osmanh Devlet Dtizenine ait Metinler, 5 (Ankara Universitesi Dil ve Tarih-
Cografya Faktiltesi Bas1mevi, 1982).
44
For the effect of the crisis on a pious foundation see Suraiya Faroqhi, "A Great
Foundation in Difficulties: or Some Evidence on Economic Contraction in the Otto-
man Empire of the Mid-Seventeenth Century," Revue d' histoire maghrebine 14 (1987):
109-21.
45
The precise causal sequence is a matter of scholarly debate. For the details of the
1586 devaluation see Cemal Kafadar, "When Coins Turned into Drops of Dew and Bankers
Became Robbers of Shadows: The Boundaries of Ottoman Economic Imagination at the
End of the Sixteenth Century" (PhD dissertation, McGill University, 1986). This first
devaluation is thought to be related to a devaluation in the Persian coinage (Haim Gerber,
"The Monetary System of the Ottoman Empire," JESHO 25 [1982]: 309-24). See also
Inalcik, "Impact of the Anna/es School"; Ozer Ergen~, "XVI. Ytizydm Sonlarmda Osman11
Paras1 tizerinde Yapdan i§lemlere ili§kin Baz1 Bilgiler," Turkiye iktisat Tarihi Uzerine
Ara§tzrmalar: Geli§me Dergisi, Ozel Sayzsz (1978): 86-97; Holm Sundhaussen, "Die
'Preisrevolution' im Osmanischen Reich wahrend der zweiten Halfte des 16. Jahrhundert:
'Importierte' oder intern verursachte Inflation? (Zu einer These O.L. Barkans)," Sudost-
Forschungen 42 (1983): 169-81; Jack A. Goldstone, "The Ecological Dynamics of Empires:
Seventeenth-Century Crises in Ottoman Turkey and Ming China," in Comparative Social
Dynamics: Essays in Honor of S.N. Eisenstadt, ed. Erik Cohen, Moshe Lissak, and Uri
Almagor (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 31--47; Nezihi Aykut, "Osmanl1 impara-
torlugunda Sikke Tecdidleri," Tarih Enstitusu Dergisi 13 (1983-87): 257-97.
Theoretically, demand for coinage should have increased its value and
deflated prices but, in the Ottoman case, shortage of coin seems to
have played a more important role. The government in particular
experienced a shortage of silver ak~e for paying its personnel. A general
lack of ready cash was aggravated by periodic but extreme cash flow
difficulties brought about by a discrepancy between the solar and lunar
calendars; every 33 years there was a lunar year for which expenses
had to be paid but no solar-year revenues were collected.46 The govern-
ment appears to have used devaluation to solve this problem, peri-
odically decreasing the amount of silver in the ak~e to make a limited
supply of precious metal stretch further. Frustration at this "solution"
sparked a number of money-related disturbances in this period.47
Barkan's figures for nominal prices in ak~e show that these prices
doubled over the three years from 1585-86 to 1588-89. Over the same
period, though, silver inflation amounted only to 13%. Silver inflation
did not follow a steady curve but exhibited sharp ups and downs; real
prices fell even below mid-century levels in the second year of the
period. In the year 1000/1591-92 it was necessary to spell out a tax
farm bid both in ak~e and in silver to ensure proper payment. 48 The
high inflation figures in Table 1 and in official price lists refer to prices
expressed in ak~e and do not necessarily reflect an equivalent inflation
in other coins, even other silver coins. 49 The importance of this
discrepancy lies in the fact that the ak~e was not the only coin avail-
able for making payments; if it had been, only the nominal inflation
figure would be relevant. Ak~e of various issues (whole, clipped, and
46
Halil Sahillioglu, "Osmanh imparatorlugunda S1v1§ Y1h Buhranlar1, iOiFM 27, no.
1/2 (1967-8), 75-111; idem, "Szvz§ Year Crises in the Ottoman Empire" in Studies in
the Economic History of the Middle East: From the Rise of Islam to the Present Day,
ed. M.A. Cook (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 230-54; idem, "The Role of
International Monetary and Metal Movements in Ottoman Monetary History 1300-1750,"
in Precious Metals in the Uiter Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, ed. J.F. Richards
(Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1983), 283 and n. 36.
47
Rhoads Murphey, "The Functioning of the Ottoman Army under Murad IV ( 1623-
39/1032-1049): Key to the Understanding of the Relationship between Center and Pe-
riphery in Seventeenth-Century Turkey," (PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1979),
213. Eventually these factors combined to produce a total disintegration of the Ottoman
monetary system (~evket Pamuk, "The Disintegration of the Ottoman Monetary System
During the Seventeenth Century," Princeton Papers in Near Eastern Studies, no. 2 [1993]:
67-81).
48
MM 687 (9820), p. 64.
49
Gibb & Bowen state that the silver para of Egypt was devalued at the same time
as the ak~e (Islamic Society and the West, pt. 2: 51 and n. 7); but Pamuk questions that
conclusion ("Money in the Ottoman Empire," Table A.4, n. 3, p. 954).
40 CHAPTER ONE
counterfeit) continued to circulate for some time beside newly-minted

coins, despite government efforts to recall the old ones. Other types
of coin, of gold and copper as well as silver, were in circulation, and
outlying regions of the empire had their own coinages. Foreign coins,
such as the various types of kuru§ (the name given to large silver
coins from several European countries), also circulated freely in the
empire. 5° Foreign silver coins had their own rates of change, and gold
coinage remained fairly stable. Evidence from Moldavia indicates that
foreign coins could be used instead of the ak~e for all payments,
including revenues sent to the central treasury. 51 The government set
a special fee, called tefaviit-i hasene ve kuru§, for taxes paid in coins
other than the ak~e, charging two ak~e or more per coin. 52
Change in the value of the ak~e had its greatest impact in provinces
close to the capital. Exchange rates decreed in Istanbul took several
years to spread throughout the provinces. 53 By judicious currency
manipulation, a properly-situated person could experience in daily life
a rate of itrllation quite a bit lower than the nominal rate. The people
hit hardest by nominal inflation were those on government payroll,
paid wholly in new ak~e and at the official exchange rate (usually
considerably above the market rate). Among them, of course, were
the bureaucrats, and it was they who authored the histories and advice
memoranda which have shaped our understanding of this period. It
is perhaps understandable if they painted their time in hues of black,
but their accounts must be treated with caution.
The effect of inflation depends in part on what happens to wages.
Research on salaries shows that between 1560 and 1635, the wages
of construction laborers doubled in nominal terms. Scribal wages also
doubled, on average, but the lowest salaries showed no rise at all.
Military salary registers have not yet been exploited, but from gross
5
° For the interaction among these factors see Inalcik, "Tiirkiyenin iktisadi Vaziyeti
iizerinde bir Tetkik Miinasebetiyle"; and Cemal Kafadar, "Les troubles monetaires de la
fin du XVIe siecle et la prise de conscience ottomane du declin," Anna/es E.S.C. 46 (1991):
381-400.
51
Mihai Maxim, "Considerations sur la circulation monetaire dans les pays roumains
et !'empire ottoman dans la seconde moitie du XVIe siecle," Revue des hudes sud-est
europeennes 13 (1975): 409-10.
52
This fee compensated for the treasury's loss due to devaluation (Murphey, "Func-
tioning of the Ottoman Army," 218).
53
Ergen~, "Osmanlannda Osmanh Paras1 iizerinde Y apdan i§lemlere ili§kin Baz1
Bilgiler"; Suraiya Faroqhi, "Town Officials~ Timar-Holders, and Taxation: The Late
Sixteenth-Centmy Crisis as Seen from ~orum," Turcica 18 (1986): 59.
figures in the expenditure summaries it would appear that per-capita

military wages rose no more than about 25%. Other research indicates
that garrison soldiers received no increase at all and that salaries of
the most highly-paid branches of the palace military corps were
repeatedly cut. 54 These figures go some way toward explaining the
military unrest of the period. The two decades after 1605 saw both
the highest prices and the most dramatic rise in salaries, but the growth
of wages lagged behind that of prices, and even if some salaries doubled
in those years, prices more than tripled. The little we know about
Ottoman agriculture and economy around the turn of the century
suggests increased pressure on the food supply and on cultivation, a
decrease in purchasing power for imported goods, and an inability
on the part of resource controllers such as timar holders and dervish
convents to meet their financial commitments.
Population and Economic Change
Change in the Ottoman economy had a significant impact on the

resources available to the state and the effectiveness with which the
government could execute its will. Population and agricultural pro-
ductivity largely determined the empire's tax intake. Our knowledge
of seventeenth-century economic trends is slight and, except for
international trade, confined to the first decades of the century. His-
torians' dependence on tahrir registers has created an imbalance in
the data between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Research
on population has shown that in the sixteenth century, with a certain
amount of local variation, the general trend was upward, just as it
was in Europe. Barkan calculated that urban population increased by
an average of 90% and rural population by 40%; he found that regional
population increases averaged 71 % in the Balkans, 60% in Anatolia,
and 55% in the Syrian provinces. 55 Other research results parallel his
54
On builders' wages see Faroqhi, "Long-Term Change and the Ottoman Construction
Site"; on scribal salaries see Linda T. Darling, "Ottoman Salary Registers as a Source
for Economic and Social History," Turkish Studies Association Bulletin 14 (1990): 13-
33; on military wages see Barkan, "Price Revolution in the Ottoman Empire," 2~21;
Murphey, "Functioning of the Ottoman Army," 221, 246; information on military wages
also comes from personal communication with Mark Stein. For the military, however,
prices of the most common foodstuffs were fixed by the government.
55 Barkan, "Essai sur les donnees statistiques," 9-36; idem, "Research on the Ottoman
Fiscal Surveys," in Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, ed. M.A. Cook
42 CHAPTER ONE
conclusions. Almost all studies show the population of the sixteenth-

century Balkans as increasing; according to some, it more than
doubled. 56 In the Anatolian towns studied by Jennings, population
grew at rates ranging from 147% to 278%, and other studies also
show population growth. 57 The Syrian provinces form the only ex-
ception to this trend; there, population increased during the first half
of the century, but toward the end of the century it showed a decrease
which has not yet been explained. 58 Much of the urban growth was
doubtless due to immigration from the countryside, and there was
considerable migration and population movement. 59
Because tahrir registers were not produced on an empire-wide scale
after the 1590s, and no other sources have been exploited on a large
scale, there are no reliable estimates of population or population
(London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 163-71; Inalcik, "Impact of theAnnales School,"
73-78.
56
Metodiya Sokolovsky, "Le developpement de quelques villes dans le sud des Balkans
au xve et XVIC siecles," Balcanica 1 (1970): 81-106; Spyros Asdrachas, "Societes rurales
balkaniques aux xve-xv1e siecles: mouvements de la population et des revenus," Etudes
Balkaniques 13 (1977): 49-66; Gilles Veinstein, "La population du sud de la Crimee au
debut de la domination ottomane," in Memorial Omer Lutfi Barkan, Bibliotheque de l'Institut
fran~ais d'etudes anatoliennes d'Istanbul, 28 (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1980), 227-49; Yusuf
Hala~oglu, "XVI. Yiizydda Sosyal, Ekonomik ve Demografik Bak1mdan Balkanlar'da
Baz1 Osmanh Sehirleri," Belleten 53 (1989): 637-78.
57
Ronald C. Jennings, "Urban Population in Anatolia in the Sixteenth Century: A Study
of Kayseri, Karaman, Amasya, Trabzon and Erzurum," IJMES 7 (1976): 21-57; idem,
"The Population, Society, and Economy of the Region of Erciye~ Dag1 in the Sixteenth
Century," in Contributions a I' histoire economique et sociale de I' empire ottoman, ed.
Jean-Louis Becque-Grammont and Paul Dumont (Paris: L'Institut fram;ais d'etudes
anatoliennes d'Istanbul, 1984), 149-250; Cook, Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia;
Erder and Faroqhi, "Population Rise and Fall in Anatolia."
58
Bernard Lewis, "Nazareth in the Sixteenth Century, According to the Ottoman Tapu
Registers," in Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A.R. Gibb, ed. George
Makdisi (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1965), 416-25; idem, "Notes and Documents from the Turkish
Archives: A Contribution to the History of the Jews in the Ottoman Empire," Oriental
Notes and Studies 3 (1952): 1-52; idem, "Studies in the Ottoman Archives - I," BSOAS
16 (1954): 469-501; Cohen and Lewis, Population and Revenue in the Towns of Palestine;
E. Toledano, "The Sanjaq of Jerusalem in the Sixteenth Century: Aspects of Topography
and Population," Archivum Ottomanicum 9 (1984): 279-319; Amy Singer, "The Coun-
tryside of Ramie in the Sixteenth Century: A Study of Villages with Computer Assistance,"
JESHO 33 (1990): 51-79. Tripoli is an exception; there the population seems to have
decreased throughout the century (Ralph S. Hattox, "Some Ottoman Tapu Defters for
Tripoli in the Sixteenth Century," al-Abhath 29 [1981]: 65-90).
59
On Ottoman migration see Gii~er, Osmanlz imparatorlugunda Hububat Meselesi,
21. The urban population of Spain may have decreased as much as 50% in the last
decade of the sixteenth century and the first decade of the seventeenth (Parker, Europe
in Crisis, 146); there, also, the figures may reflect out-migration rather than an absolute
decline in numbers (J.H. Elliott, Imperial Spain: 1469-1716 [New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1964], 288).
movements in the seventeenth century. The idea that Ottoman popu-

lation, like Europe's, declined soon after the end of the sixteenth century
is based largely on impressionistic evidence: reports of peasant flight,
famines and epidemics, deserted villages and the incursion of nomads
onto formerly settled areas. When censuses began to be taken in the
nineteenth century, the population level was found to be well below
its sixteenth-century height, and it is assumed that the drop occurred
during the early seventeenth-century period of turmoil. A widely-cited
study of the Konya region in southwest Anatolia, the area most af-
fected by Celali disturbances, does indicate that population there
declined dramatically in the early sevepteenth century. 60 Studies made
for other locations, however, reveal growing populations during the
same period. Aleppo saw an increase of population in the seventeenth
century, particularly in the suburbs outside the walls; Bursa's popu-
lation doubled between 1631 and 1670 and then decreased again, as
the city received refugees from areas farther south where Celali disturb-
ances were taking place; and although the Christian population of
seventeenth-century Tozluk decreased, an increase in the Muslim popu-
lation more than compensated for the loss. 61 McGowan located a
considerable drop in population at the end of the seventeenth century;
Todorova, however, disputing his method, found only a relatively small
decrease in the Christian population, much of which may be accounted
for by islamization. 62 Many sources document the migration (tempo-
rary or permanent?) of Anatolian peasants to cities, to places with
lower tax rates, or to Rumeli where things were quieter, while Murad
IV ( 1623-1640) implemented a policy of returning urban refugees to
the countryside. Other sources suggest a certain amount of re-nomad-
ization, but this has not yet been quantified. In cases like these, a
60
Wolf-Dieter Hiitteroth, Liindliche Siedlungen in sUdlichen Inneranatolien in der letzten
vierhunder J ahren, Gottingen Geographische Abhandlungen, 46 (Gottingen: Geographischen
lnstitut der Universitiit Gottingen, 1968).
61
Andre Raymond, "The Population of Aleppo in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries
According to Ottoman Census Documents," IJMES 16 (1984): 447--60; Haim Gerber,
Economy and Society in an Ottoman City: Bursa 1600-1700, Max Schoessinger Memorial
Series, 3 (Jerusalem: Hebrew University Press, 1988); Machiel Kiel, "Anatolia Trans-
planted? Patterns of Demographic, Religious and Ethnic Changes in the District of Tozluk
(N.E. Bulgaria) 1479-1873," Anatolica 17 (1991): 1-27.
62
Bruce McGowan, "The Study of Land and Agriculture in the Ottoman Provinces
within the Context of an Expanding World Economy," International Journal of Turkish
Studies 2, no. 1 (1981): 59; Maria N. Todorova, "Was There a Demographic Crisis in
the Ottoman Empire in the Seventeenth Century?" Etudes balkaniques 24, no. 2 (1988):
55--63.
44 CHAPTER ONE
decline in population registration does not necessarily mean a decline

in population.
The lack of seventeenth-century tahrir registers has increased the
difficulty of tracing agrarian history in this period, and other sources
have not been sufficiently exploited. Ideas about climate change and
its impact on Ottoman agriculture are extrapolated from evidence on
Europe. We do not yet understand the effects of the "Little Ice Age"
in the Ottoman Empire; a hard year in Belgrade might have produced
a bumper crop in Damascus. 63 Dendrochronological evidence does
indicate a period of lowered growth of Anatolian trees between the
mid-sixteenth and the mid-seventeenth centuries, especially severe from
1570 to 1600, but these dates do not coincide with the "Little Ice Age"
in Europe, and the impact on agriculture empire-wide is as yet
undetermined. The records of Anatolian dervish foundations suggest
a possible agricultural crisis, but for a somewhat later period, around
1620 to 1690.64 Frequent droughts in the period 1578-1637 are thought
to have forced pastoralists to feed their flocks on agricultural land
for want of grass in traditional pasturelands. A study of late sixteenth-
century Aleppo, however, uncovered an extension of cultivation onto
unworked or marginal land as population in that area rose. 65 Asser-
tions about an increase in pastoralism in the seventeenth century have
gone largely undocumented, and although there is abundant evidence
of abandoned villages and peasant flight, where these peasants went
and how they made their living remains unknown.
There is a similar dearth of evidence on other aspects of the economy.
Important elements of an analysis, such as the amount of financial
support for the military or the growth of tax farming, have not been
subjected to quantitative research. On coinage and monetary move-
ments the evidence is more extensive than that on the economy as
a whole, but the official coinage was actually used less and less. We
63
On Ottoman grain production see Maurice Aymard, Venise, Raguse et le commerce
du ble pendant la seconde moitie du XV/e siecle (Paris: Ecole pratique des hautes etudes,
1966); Gii~er, Osmanli imparatorlugunda Hububat Meselesi. For harvest failures and fam-
ines in Spain see Elliott, Imperial Spain, 292; for plague and famine in France see Coveney,
France in Crisis, 27.
64
P.I. Kuniholm, "Archaeological Evidence and Non-Evidence for Climatic Change,"
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London A 330 (1990): 645-55; Gii~er,
Osmanli imparatorlugunda Hububat Meselesi; Suraiya Faroqhi, "Agricultural Crisis and
the Art of Flute-Playing: The Worldly Affairs of the Mevlevi Dervishes (1592-1652),"
Turcica 20 (1988): 43-70.
65
Margaret L Venzke, "The Question of Declining Cereals' Production in the Sixteenth
Century: A Sounding on the Problem-Solving Capacity of the Ottoman Cadastres," Journal
of Turkish Studies 8 (1984 ): 251-64.
have no overall figures for internal or foreign trade, trade balances,

or customs revenue in the seventeenth century. Revenue from the
spice trade undoubtedly declined after 1600, but revenue from the new
coffee trade all but made up for it, so the impact on the Ottoman
budget is questionable. 66 Income and expense summaries of the Ottoman
treasury showed deficits throughout the century, but summary totals
do not include all government funds. 67 We know very little about
urban or village politics, provincial governance, or relations between
province and center during this period. Studies of Ottoman politics
and ideology in most of the seventeenth century are lacking, as are
biographies of the major players. The timar system declined but did
not disappear; that raised the problems of class conflict and main-
tenance of internal order, but the military and financial impact might
well have been positive. Tax farming undoubtedly increased, but the
extent and effects of such an increase are not known. There may have
been more complaints of oppression, but whether there actually was
more oppression we cannot tell.
As the fiscal base of the Ottoman treasury became more insecure,
the demands made upon it became more onerous. In the Ottoman
Empire, as in the west, the early seventeenth century was a period
of expansion for the bureaucracy and palace staff. The finance de-
partment grew from 35 to 188 salaried scribes, and other departments
of government service increased even more. For instance, salaried
members of the corps of heralds or imperial messengers (~avu§lar)
went from 20 in 1535 to a high of 840 in 1645. 68 Even the sultan's
tasters (~a§negirler) increased in number from 24 to 101 and court
architects (mimaran) from 7 to 42. Some of this growth may be ascribed
to duplication of staff, as sultanic sedentarization entailed separate
palace and campaign administrations, 69 and some to the greater
workload caused by imperial expansion and bureaucratization. An-
other reason for growth in staff, however, may be that during the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the palace staff became the
66
Suraiya Faroqhi, "Coffee and Spices: Official Ottoman Reactions to Egyptian Trade
in the Later Sixteenth Century," WZKM 16 (1986): 87-93; Shaw, Financial and Admin-
istrative Organization and Development, 104-7.
67
Halil Sahillioglu, "XVII. Asnn ilk Yansmda istanbul'da Tedaviildeki Sikkelerin Raici,"
Beige/er 1 (1964): 227-34; idem, "The Income and Expenditures of the Ottoman Treasury
between 1683 and 1740," Revue d'histoire maghrebine 25-26 (1982): 65-84.
68
Employment figures come from salary registers produced by the kil<;ilk ruznam<;e
kalemi and found in the MM and KK collections of the Ba~bakanhk Ar~ivi.
69
Murphey, "Functioning of the Ottoman Army," 18.
46 CHAPfER ONE
most important route of promotion to high office. 70 It is not surprising

to find that people pushed to get their sons and proteges enrolled in
the palace service, shouldering aside the true slaves, products of the
child levy (dev§irme), whose province this service used to be. 71 The
ruling class's desire for entry into the palace service is indicated by
the continued growth of the mute/errika corps, a palace cavalry corps
composed of sons of the elite, numbering 64 in the mid-sixteenth
century; in 1660, although other departments' rolls had begun to shrink,
the miiteferrika corps was at 693 and still rising. After the middle
of the seventeenth century, the number of salaried staff was decreased
in order to ease the burden on the treasury: finance scribes in the
salary registers went down from 188 to 86 and tasters from 101 to
22. In the case of the finance staff, as we shall see, this did not mean
a decrease in personnel but the use of other revenue sources to pay
them. The cost of pensions for retirees and people temporarily out
of office further burdened the Ottoman treasury.
These costs paled, though, in comparison with military expendi-
tures. The empire's expenditure records show that between 1567 and
1669 the number of men in the standing infantry and garrison forces
more than quadrupled, more than doubling in the years 1570 to 1600
alone. 72 Large numbers of infantry with firearms were also recruited
from the peasantry on a seasonal basis. Their employment was made
possible by the military revolution, the widespread use of infantry
with handguns, which affected the Ottoman Empire as well as western
Europe. The Ottomans had long employed cannon, but in the late
sixteenth century individual gunpowder weapons became militarily
effective, and the former backbone of the army, the timariot cavalry
armed with bows and arrows, was outmoded. Infantry with handguns
were relatively easy to recruit and train; they were not recompensed
70
The one study of Ottoman career paths in the early seventeenth century indicates
that in those decades the main avenue of advancement to the post of provincial governor
was service as a retainer in the sultan's palace (i. Metin Kunt, The Sultan's Servants:
The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650, The Modem Middle
East Series, 14 [New York: Columbia University Press, 1983]).
71
Cornell H. Fleischer has suggested that, contrary to the stereotype, the hold on the
palace service of men of servile origin was never absolute and may have been only a
temporary phenomenon ("Between the Lines: Realities of Scribal Life in the Sixteenth
Century," in Studies in Ottoman History in Honour of Professor V.L. Menage, ed. Colin
Heywood and Colin Imber [Istanbul: isis Press, 1994], 45-61).
12
Omer Liitfi Barkan, "H. 974-975 (M. 1567-1568) Mali Ytlma ait bir Osmanh Biit~esi,"
iOiFM 19 (1957-58): 305-6; idem, "1079-1080 (1669-1670) Mfili Yilma ait Bir Osmanh
Biit~esi ve Ek>leri," iOiFM 17 (1955-56): 227-28; Inalcik, "Military and Fiscal Trans-
formation."
by timars but by cash salaries from the treasury. Although these salaries
did not keep pace with inflation, they combined with the rise in the
price of foodstuffs, manufactured goods, and military weapons and
supplies to inflate the cash needs of the government. The wars of the
period did not result in lucrative and easy conquests, and the Otto-
mans had no American treasure house to replenish their silver supply
at regular intervals. As a result, the finance department was obliged
to adopt numerous expedients for rounding up the cash to pay military
and other expenditures.
Some tactics used by the Ottomans to increase revenue were strik-
ingly similar to those employed in the west. As in France or England,
tax farming was widely used to obtain cash revenues and increase
their amount, as well as to reward government servants. Ottoman
customs dues and urban taxes had long been farmed, but the seven-
teenth century saw an extension of tax farming into new areas such
as hass-i hiimayun revenues, extraordinary levies, and the poll tax.
In the Ottoman Empire, as elsewhere, extraordinary taxes were regu-
larized and levied annually as a means of tapping urban and non-
traditional wealth. Like many European countries, the Ottoman Empire
also resorted to contributions and forced loans from officials and the
wealthy; the extent to which they were repaid is not known, as the
records of these loans have not been investigated. 73 Advance payment
of taxes and late disbursal of salaries also constituted forms of short-
term loans. In other respects, however, the Ottomans' financial ex-
pedients differed sharply from those employed in some western
European countries. No security was offered for loans, so the Ottoman
Empire, unlike Spain or France, did not lose control of its future tax
receipts by borrowing. The Ottoman government, in contrast to most
European governments, did not engage in long-term borrowing from
international moneylenders or banking houses, nor in the sale of bonds.
And unlike Spain or England, the Ottoman treasury was never able
to tax the equivalent of ecclesiastical property, the evkaf, though it
borrowed from their surplus funds. Nor, unlike many Spanish and
French taxes, could Ottoman taxes generally be altered by the ruler's
decision (with or without the subjects' consent). 74 It was also difficult
73 That loans were sometimes repaid is shown by amounts designated as debt payments
in expense summaries (Murphey, "Functioning of the Ottoman Army," 247-51).
74
For example, the revenues of Trablus-~am showed almost no increase between 979/
1571-72 and 1002/1594 (Hattox, "Some Ottoman Tapu Defters for Tripoli," 82). For an
example of an order in 1037/1627-28 forbidding the collection of any more than the
traditional amount for the tax called bedel-i lagzm see MM 2728 (3457), p. 52, and for
48 CHAPTER ONE
for the Ottomans to find a legitimate and regular way to tax the
wealthiest class, the askeri, though a number of expedients were tried.
The timar bedeli (a tax on timar-holders who did not go on campaign,
amounting to 20% of the income of the timar), was levied as early
as 1038/1628-29, but it did not become an important source of reve-
nue until the mid-seventeenth century. 75 The kassabiye was a levy on
the wealthy to subsidize meat sales to janissaries. Finally, employing
the justification that all government servants were technically slaves
whose property was forfeit on their death, the Ottomans recouped
large sums from the estates of high office-holders; musadere, confis-
cation, from the office-holders themselves also increased in frequency. 76
Quantification of these trends and a more precise evaluation of the
Ottoman economy can only come through intensive study of the records
produced by the finance department in the seventeenth century. These
documents cannot be dismissed as the product of a decayed and
incompetent bureaucracy out of touch with its surroundings. Scruti-
nizing the finance department through the lens of decline severely
limits our perception of its underlying dynamics, as growth in number
of officials is ascribed to nepotism, change in the function of bureaus
to the irrationality of an oriental bureaucracy, and exaction of new
taxes to greed and corruption. Finance department structure and
functioning must be understood as facets of the government's response
to critical conditions in the economy and the fiscal system.
the motivation for this policy, fear of upheaval if such traditions were violated, see Inalcik,
"Military and Fiscal Transformation," 313.
75
MM 2728 (3457), p. 86; other contributions by the ruling class also became important
in the second half of the seventeenth centucy (lnalcik, "Military and Fiscal Transformation").
76
Klaus Rohrbom, "Osmanh imparatorlugunda Miisadere ve Mutavass1t Gii~ler," in/.
Milletlerarasz Turkoloji Kongresi, Tebligler, vol. 1: Turk Tarihi (Istanbul: Terciiman Gazetesi
ve istanbul Universitesi Edebiyat Fakiiltesi, Tiirkiyat Enstitiisii, 1979), 254-60; Murphey,
"Functioning of the Ottoman Army," 226.
CHAPTER TWO
THE OTTOMAN CENTRAL FINANCE DEPARTMENT
The Ottoman finance department has generally been described in the

context of imperial decline: through its inefficiency, rapacity, nepo-
tism, and corruption, it is thought to have contributed to the weakness
of the Ottoman state and the ruin and despoliation of the peasantry.
According to Bernard Lewis, "the breakdown in the apparatus of
government affected not only the supreme instruments of sovereignty
but also the whole of the bureaucratic and religious institutions all
over the empire. These suffered a catastrophic fall in efficiency and
integrity. . . . This deterioration is clearly discernible in the Ottoman
archives, which reflect vividly and precisely the change from the me-
ticulous, conscientious, and strikingly efficient bureaucratic govern-
ment of the 16th century to the neglect of the 17th and the collapse
of the 18th centuries." 1 The idea of a causal link between finance
department operations, however corrupt, and imperial decline has been
questioned by Lewis himself. 2 More importantly, this characterization
ignores the real contribution made by the finance department to the
survival and stability of the empire. Not only was it responsible for
uncovering and bringing together needed financial resources, but its
uniformity of procedure lent consistency and legitimacy to Ottoman
governance amid the turmoil and transformation of the early seven-
teenth century.
Studies of Ottoman administrative personnel have tended to con-
centrate on people in the highest positions, such as the grand vizier,
who headed the administration, the ba§ defterdar, who headed the
finance department, and the reisiilkiittab, whose office eventually
became the ministry for foreign affairs. 3 The route of advancement
to the top of the hierarchy has also been examined, but little research
1
"Some Reflections on the Decline," 112.
2
"Ottoman Observers of Ottoman Decline," 83.
3
ibntilemin Mahmud Kemal inal, Osmanlz Devrinde Son Sadrazemlar, 4 vols. (Istan-
bul: Maarif Bas1mevi, 1940-53); Mehmed Zeki Pakalm, Maliye Te§kilatz Tarihi (1442-
1930), Maliye Bakanhg1 Tetkik Kurulu Yay1m, 1977/180/1 (Ankara: Ba§bakanhk Bas1mevi,
1978); Inalcik, "Reis-til-ktittub"; Norman Itzkowitz, "Mehmed Raghib Pasha: The Making
50 CHAPTER TWO
has been done on the organization and work of lower-level members

of the scribal service. 4 The idea that the finance department was
inefficient and corrupt seems to be based on a multiplication of bureaus
and growth in number of finance officials beginning in the mid-six-
teenth century. The finance department of the stereotype is static and
unchanging, organized according to stages in the documentation process
rather than by a rational separation of functions. Part of the reason
for that impression, however, is that the lists of bureaus in most
descriptions of the finance department are derived from eighteenth-
and nineteenth-century catalogues published by d'Ohsson and Hammer.
Lybyer's influential study of sixteenth-century Ottoman govern-
ment employed these later sources to describe the Ottoman finance
department of 250 years earlier, and many historians have followed
his lead. 5 The uncritical use of comparatively recent sources to de-
scribe the institutions of prior centuries is both a product and a
confirmation of stereotypes about "the unchanging east." Uzun~ar~1h's
publication of two earlier lists of finance department bureaus, one
taken from a mid-eighteenth century document, the other from a mid-
sixteenth century kanunname, could have helped to rectify the situ-
ation, but it attracted little notice. 6 From salary registers and other
of an Ottoman Grand Vezir," (PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 1959); idem,

"Eighteenth Century Ottoman Realities," Studia Islamica 16 (1962): 73-94. One excep-
tion, focusing on the lower-level scribes of the divan, is Christine Woodhead, "Research
on the Ottoman Scribal Service, c. 1574-1630," in Festgabe an Josef Matuz: Osmanistik-
Turkologie-Diplomatik, ed. Christa Fragner and Klaus Schwarz, Islamkundliche Unter-
suchungen, 150 (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1992), 311-28.
4
The late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries have been treated by Itzkowitz, "Eight-
eenth-Century Ottoman Realities"; Carter V. Findley, "The Legacy of Tradition to Reform:
Origins of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry," /IMES 1 (1970): 334-57; Joel Shinder, "Career
Line Formation in the Ottoman Bureaucracy, 1648-1750: A New Perspective," JESHO
16 (1973): 217-37. The earlier period was examined by Klaus Rohrborn in his study of
the defterdars, "Die Emanzipation der Finanzbiirokratie im Osmanischen Reich (Ende 16.
Jahrhundert)," ZDMG 122 (1972): 118-39. Christine Woodhead traced the career of a
single chancery scribe in "From Scribe to Litterateur: The Career of a Sixteenth-Century
Ottoman Katib," Bulletin of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies 9 (1982): 55-
74. Finally, Fleischer investigated the sixteenth-century scribal career in general and Mustafa
Ali's career in the provincial finance service in particular in Bureaucrat and Intellectual.
5
D'Ohsson, Tableau general de I' empire ottoman, 7: 261-73; Joseph von Hammer-
Purgstall, Des Osmanischen Reichs Staatsverfassung und Staatsverwaltung, 2 vols. (Vienna,
1815; photocopy reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1977), 2: 145-
67; Albert Howe Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman
the Magnificent, Harvard Historical Studies, 18 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1913; rpt. New York: AMS Press, 1978), 167-75.
6
Uzun~ar§th, Osmanlz Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Te§kilat1, 338-61.
THE OTTOMAN FINANCE DEPARTMENT 51
archival sources it is now possible to obtain a fuller picture of the

development of the finance department over time.
The conclusion that finance department standards dropped in the
seventeenth century has been inferred from the fact that records once
produced in great numbers were produced no longer and others were
less legibly written than in earlier centuries. Complaints about tax-
ation have also been used to support charges of administrative cor-
ruption. A major problem here is bias-who has ever had anything
good to say about paying taxes? In order to evaluate charges of decline
and corruption we must be able to separate the normal operation of
the system from its abuse. Critics, both contemporary and modem,
have made much of what was wrong with the post-classical fiscal
system, but they have paid little or no attention to its actual develop-
ment and functioning, confining themselves to horrified exclamations
at how far it had come from the system of the classical age. It can
be argued, however, that changes to the procedures and records used
in the finance department reflect structural changes in Ottoman financial
administration occurring in response to the exigencies of governance.
Early Finance Department Organization
The creation of a governmental finance bureaucracy (maliye) distinct

from the sultan's personal household is generally dated to the reign
of Bayezid I. Scribes (katibs)7 employed in the maliye were organized
into cadres assigned to particular tasks connected with the government's
financial affairs. These scribes were recruited from the sultan's ser-
vants and secretaries, from trained and literate members of the con-
quered Byzantine population, and from the ranks of the Muslim learned
class, the ulema, particularly the ulema of the Anatolian hinterland
who had access to techniques of imperial administration practiced by
the Seljuks and Ilkhanids. While the chronicles note the inauguration
of the maliye, its development between the 1390s and the 1480s cannot
be traced for lack of documentation. The only fourteenth-century
officials attested by title in the chronicles are the defterdars, the heads
7 The word "katib" was used by the Ottomans both in the general meaning of "scribe"
and in the more specific meaning of a particular rank of scribe within the bureaucratic
hierarchy. In this book the term "katib" will be used only in the specific senses of a higher-
ranking scribe or a scribal assistant to a tax collector, while "scribe" will refer to a scribe
of any rank or position.
52 CHAPTER TWO
of the finance administration. 8 No facts are available on the organi-

zation of their subordinates, and little of their work has survived. We
can assume that, following the example of Ilkhanid scribal practice,
the early Ottoman scribes organized themselves around the various
types of registers they produced. 9 These clusters of scribes around
particular defters formed the nucleus of the structure of bureaus, or
kalems (lit. "pen"), which was the Ottoman maliye's characteristic
mode of organization.
During the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the fiscal ad-
ministration's role in assimilating and exploiting the empire's resources
forced the maliye to expand and reorganize several times. 10 A com-
pilation of ceremonial regulations, or te§rifat kanunnamesi, dating from
the end of the reign of Mehmed II (1451-1481), furnishes a glimpse
of maliye organizatlon in the late fifteenth century. 11 This kanunname
regulated the duties, relative ranks, promotion paths, and privileges
of high administrative officials in the Ottoman government. The finance
administration it describes was headed by an official called the ba§,
or head, defterdar. Ranking immediately below the ba§ defterdar were
an unspecified number of mal defterdars, who headed the finance
administration in the provinces. They were responsible for non-timar
revenues and were called mal (money) defterdars to distinguish them
from timar defterdars, also members of the provincial bureaucracy,
who kept records of timar allocations.
The central finance staff, as described in the kanunname, consisted
of an unspecified number of ordinary scribes called katibs, among
whom seniority granted a certain precedence. They were supervised
by senior scribes functioning as bureau heads, hacegan (masters, sing.
hace). According to the kanunname, the finance department hacegan
8
"Defterdar," iA 3: 506.
9
Nejat Goyiln~, ''Ta>rih Ba§hkh Muhasebe Defterleri," Osmanli Ara§tzrmalarz 10 (1990):
1-37. Many early copies and Turkish translations of Ilkhanid scribal manuals can be found
in Turkish manuscript collections. For each section of Ilkhanid government finances,
organized geographically by province, there was a separate defter and a particular scribe
or group of scribes responsible for it (Hinz, "Rechnungswesen," 114-37).
10
An overview of early finance department structure is provided by Josef Matuz,
Das Kanzleiwesen Sultan Siileymans des Priichtigen (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag,
1974), 57-63.
11
The kanunname was published by Mehmed Arif, "Kanunname-i AI-1 Osman," TOEM,
suppl. 3 (1330/1912). Its authenticity was questioned by Konrad Dilger, Untersuchungen
zur Geschichte des osmanischen Hofzeremoniells im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert, Beitrage
zur Kenntnis Siidosteuropas und des Nahen Orients, 4 (Munich: Rudolf Trofenik, 1967).
Dilger's position was in tum challenged by Hans Georg Majer in a review in Sudost-
Forschungen 28 (1969): 464-67.
of the late fifteenth century were the ruznameci, the mukabeleci, the
mukataacz, and the tezkireci. A muhasebeci, a member of the hacegan
in later times, was mentioned in the kanunname but not in the rank
list of hacegan. 12 The titles of the bureau heads reflected their func-
tions: the ruznameci supervised the journal or daybook (ruzname),
where receipts and payments were recorded in chronological order;
the mukabeleci compared (mukabele) military wage tickets with salary
registers and authorized their payment; the mukataac1 kept the books
on revenues outside the tapu system (mukataas); and the tezkireci
wrote memoranda and notes (tezkires); while the muhasebeci drew
up and audited the state's accounts (muhasebe). Working under each
bureau head were a number of ordinary scribes, katibs. Under these,
surely, were apprentices, §agirds, not mentioned in the kanunname
presumably because they were without ceremonial rank. The number
of scribes employed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was not
large. A document from the year 900/1494-95 shows a total of only
20 salaried finance scribes, and one from 909/1503-4 lists 35; by the
1530s, after the finance department had been reorganized and en-
larged, the number of salaried employees was still only 65. 13
During the period between Mehmed II's kanunname and the next
extant description of Ottoman finance administration, dated in the
mid-sixteenth century, the organization of the maliye was significantly
transformed. By that time the unitary central finance staff of the earlier
period had been divided into several branches with responsibilities
organized more or less on provincial lines; the number and organization
12
Arif, "Kanunname-i Al-1 Osman," 18. A sixteenth-century list of hacegan published
by Uzun~ar§1h is much longer (Merkez ve Bahriye Te§kilati, 19). Its 29 officials comprised
all or almost all of the bureau heads of the time, and the muhasebeci was included in
this list. In the eighteenth century the muhasebecis ranked above the other hacegan and
immediately below the defterdars (d'Ohsson, Tableau general de I' empire ottoman, 7:
191-96).
13
For 900/1494-95 see Omer Liitfi Barkan, "H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Mali Y1hna
ait bir Biit~e Ornegi," iOiFM 15 (1953-54): 309; the same document is discussed in
Matuz, Kanzleiwesen Sultan SUleymans des Prachtigen, 57-63. For 909/1503-4 see
Omer Liitfi Barkan, "istanbul Saraylan,nm ait Muhasebe Defterleri," Beige/er 9 (1979):
307-8 and 351-52; while this list omits the defterdar, it includes the emin-i defter, the
scribe in charge of timar records. Further information on the growth of the scribal service
in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries is given by Cornell H. Fleischer, "Prelim-
inaries to the Study of the Ottoman Bureaucracy," Journal of Turkish Studies 10 (1986):
135-42. The number of salaried finance scribes in 942/1535-36 was determined from
a salary register from the Maliyeden Miidevver Tasnifi in the Ba§bakanhk Ar§ivi,
MM 122 (559). On the internal organization of finance bureaus see Shinder, "Ottoman
Bureaucracy."
54 CHAPTER TWO
of these units altered more than once in the course of the sixteenth
century. In the first stage of the process, the maliye was divided into
two sections (defterdarlzks, areas of jurisdiction of a defterdar) and
a second upper-level defterdar was appointed to head the second sec-
tion.14 The first defterdar, now called the defterdar of Rumeli ("Rome-
land") as well as ba§ defterdar, was responsible for the revenues and
expenses of the European part of the empire; the second, called the
defterdar of Anadolu ("Anatolia"), was responsible for those in Asia.
The ba§ defterdar retained oversight of the maliye as a whole. The
vast increase in finance department business resulting from expansion
of the empire on two continents in the late fifteenth century was
undoubtedly the reason for this change. Dividing the central finance
department entailed duplicating certain of the kalems, probably dou-
bling the number of scribes employed. We have already noted an
increase in salaried finance staff from 20 to 35 between the years 900/
1494-95 and 909/1503-4, which supports the suggestion that the second
defterdarhk was founded during those years, that is, during the reign
of Bayezid II.
The next stage in the reorganization of fiscal administration was
the establishment of provincial treasuries in the outlying provinces of
the empire. After the conquest of Safavid and Mamluk territory in
1514-17, a high-ranking defterdar, called the Arab ve Acem defterdan,
was appointed for the Arab and Persian lands; he was headquartered
in Damascus from 1516 to 1521 and in Aleppo from then on. 15 The
14
The whole question of the establishment and jurisdiction of the various defterdarhks,
formerly argued from the very inconclusive evidence presented by the Ottoman chroni-
clers, must be settled by archival research. The date of the establishment of the second
central defterdarhk has been placed during the reign of Bayezid II (1481-1512) by d'Ohsson
(Tableau general de /'empire ottoman, 7: 261) and by Uzun~ar§Ih (Merkez ve Bahriye
Te§kilati, 327 and notes 5 and 6). Rohrbom asserts, however, ("Die Emanzipation der
Finanzbilrokratie," 118) that it was not founded until the reign of Silleyman I, sometime
after 930/1523-24, while Aeischer has presented evidence that would date its foundation
to the reign of Mehmed II (Bureaucrat and Intellectual, 312 n. 2).
15
The date of the creation of the Arabve Acem defterdan is also disputed. According
to Uzun~ar§Ih (Merkez ve Bahriye Te§kilati, 327 n. 7), this office was created by Yavuz
Sultan Selim (1512-1520); d'Ohsson (Tableau general de I' empire ottoman, 7: 261) says
the same. Rohrbom states that while a third defterdarhk was probably created as early
as 1516, it may have been as late as 940/1534 ("Die Emanzipation der Finanzbilrokratie,"
119). He also cites contradictory evidence mentioning only two defterdars as late as 932/
1526, despite an earlier reference to a defterdar in Aleppo in 930/1523-24. The defterdar
of the Arab lands, however, must not be identified with the third defterdar in the capital;
the third central defterdarhk was a separate office. Muhammad Adnan Bakhit has now
established that there was a defterdar in the Arab lands from the time of the conquest
(The Ottoman Province of Damascus in the Sixteenth Century [Beirut: Librarie du Liban,
1982], 143-44).
rema1rung provincial treasuries were probably founded during the

middle decades of the sixteenth century. 16 Provincial defterdars func-
tioned as intermediaries between the central finance department and
the sources and destinations of funds within their provinces: they
gathered the reports and remittances of local tax collectors and sent
annual reports and summaries of provincial financial affairs to the
capital, receiving in return orders from the ba§ defterdar which they
transmitted to local agents and tax collectors. In connection with this
reorganization, mal defterdars in the older provinces became provin-
cial defterdars, and a supervisory mechanism for non-timar revenues
was instituted, entrusted to a kad1 called the nazir-1 emval (inspector
of finances); in the seventeenth century some of the provincial
defterdar's functions were performed by a still another official called
the muhassil-i emval (fiscal supervisor). 17 The functioning of provin-
cial treasuries has not yet been studied, but their organization was
probably modelled on that of the central finance department and their
staffs drawn from a variety of sources, both central and local.
At some time in the first half of the sixteenth century, a third defterdar
was appointed at the center, but his responsibilities are difficult to
determine; he did not have charge of revenue from the Arab lands. 18
In a balance-sheet (summary of income and expenses, often miscalled
a "budget") dated 931/1524-25, the revenues of Rumeli were divided
16
Dates cited for the creation of provincial defterdarhks again vary; Rohrborn notes
that they must have been established before the composition of Ayn-1 Ali's Kavanin-i
Al-z Osman in 1610-11 ("Die Emanzipation der Finanzbtirokratie," 119), while the
unattributed article in iA specifies without evidence a date of 1574 ("Defterdar," 507).
Cornell H. Fleischer suggests that the provincial treasuries were organized in the 1540s
and 1550s ("The Lawgiver as Messiah: The Making of the Imperial Image in the Reign
of Stileyman," in SUleyman the Magnificent and His Time, ed. Gilles Veinstein, Ecole des
Hautes Etudes des Sciences Sociales [Paris: La documentation fran~aise, 1992], 167, 171).
According to d'Ohsson (Tableau general de I' empire ottoman, 7: 261), the provincial
defterdarhks were suppressed sometime after the reign of Murad III.
17
An entry in Mtihimme Defteri 1, p. 288, records the appointment berat of the timar
defterdar1 and nazrr-1 emval of Teme§var in 962/1554-55. For the muhassil-i emval see
Halil Inalcik, "Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration," in Studies
in Eighteenth Century Islamic History, ed. Thomas Naff and Roger Owen, Papers on
Islamic History (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), 28-29; Murphey,
"Functioning of the Ottoman Army," 272-77.
18
The date of the establishment of the third central defterdarhk has also been a matter
of contention. Dilger, relying on European sources, cites a date for this reorganization
of 1526 (Untersuchungen, 22); Fleischer also prefers that date (Bureaucrat and Intellec-
tual, 312 and n. 2). Rohrborn, basing himself on an interpretation of MS Esad Efendi
3363, which describes the seating order of high dignitaries at a feast, favors an indefinite
date before 946/1539 ("Die Emanzipation der Finanzbtirokratie," 118 and notes 4 and 5).
Uzun~ar§Ih, however, reads the same manuscript to say that the change must have come
after 946/1539 (Merkez ve Bahriye Te§kilatz, 328 and n. 1).
56 CHAPTER TWO
into two separate sections, one under the defterdar of Rumeli, iskender
<;elebi, and the other under Mahmud <;elebi, not labeled a defterdar
in that document. The second section was called the §lkk-z sani (sec-
ond division) and consisted mainly of mukataa revenues. The balance-
sheet gives no information about the reason for dividing the revenues
nor about the way specific mukataas were allocated between the two
divisions. The revenues of Rumeli were reunited in a balance-sheet
dated 933-34/1527-28 but divided again in a balance-sheet from 954-
55/1547--48. In an accounting register for 974-75/1567-68 the rev-
enues of Anatolia were also divided into two sections, §lkk-z evvel
and §tkk-1 sani. 19 This document lists four revenue heads, two for
Rumeli and two for Anadolu, all four designated as defterdars.
A fourth central defterdar with responsibility for the Danube region
was appointed around 992/1584; it is not clear whether still another
division was created at that time or whether one of the four existing
divisions was simply renamed. 20 The fourth defterdar was called
defterdar of the Danube (Tuna defterdan) and head of the third division
(§zkk-z salis), while the third defterdar's titles were defterdar of Istanbul
and head of the second division, the §tkk-1 sani. The ba§ defterdar,
still known as the defterdar of Rumeli, acquired the additional title
of defterdar of the §tkk-1 evvel, the first division. The defterdarhk of
Anadolu did not have a number at this time. The new position, the
Tuna defterdarhg1, was eliminated in the seventeenth century, leaving
only three defterdarhks in the eighteenth century. 21 The divisions were
19
Halil Sahillioglu, "1524-1525 Osmanh Bilt~esi," Ord. Prof Omer Lutfi Barkan'a
Armagan: iOiFM 41 (1985): 434-35; Omer Liitfi Barkan, "H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528)
Mali Yiima ait bir Bilt~e Omegi," 280--87; idem, "954-955 (1547-1548) Mali Yiima ait
bir Osmanh Bilt~esi," iOiFM 19 (1957/58): 237-50; idem, "H. 974-975 (M. 1567-1568)
Mali Y tlma ait bir Osmanb Btit~esi," 298-303.
20
D'Ohsson (Tableau general de l' empire ottoman, 7: 261) dates the appointment of
"the" fourth defterdar to the reign of Siileyman I (1520--1566), but while it appears that
there were indeed four defterdars during at least part of Siileyman's reign, the fourth was
not the defterdar of the Danube but the second defterdar for Anadolu. Uzun~ar§ih (Merkez
ve Bahriye Te§kilatz, 329 n. 2), on the authority of the historian Selaniki, cites a date
of 992/1584-85 for the creation of the defterdarhk of the Danube (see Mustafa Selaniki,
Tarih-i Selaniki, ed. Mehmet ip§irli, istanbul Oniversitesi Edebiyat Fakiiltesi Yaymlar1,
3371 [Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakiiltesi Bas1mevi, 1989], 1: 156). Rohrborn, also on the author-
ity of Selaniki (see Tarih, 1: 183), asserts that the correct date was 995/1586-87 ("Die
Emanzipation der Finanzbilrokratie," 118). Selaniki actually recorded this event under both
dates, but the man appointed to the post in 992/1584-85 was promoted soon afterward,
and the position may have lapsed until 995/1586-87.
21
According to Rohrborn, the office was eliminated in 1035/1625-26 ("Die Emanzipa-
tion der Finanzbilrokratie," 119 and n. 6; Uzun~ar§th, Merkez ve Bahriye Te§kilatz, 329
n. 3), but Victor Ostapchuk finds that in 1627-28 the Tuna defterdarhg1 still existed and
renumbered sometime after the fourth defterdar's position was elimi-

nated, possibly at the beginning of the eighteenth century; the third
defterdar became the defterdar of the §lkk-1 salis and the defterdar
of Anadolu the defterdar of the §lkk-1 sani. 22
Reorganizations in the Finance Structure
The bureau structure supervised by the defterdars underwent signifi-

cant change during the first half of the sixteenth century. It was
reorganized again later in the century, and the seventeenth century
saw ongoing change. These developments, occurring below the top-
most level of authority, are not mentioned in chronicles and are
generally invisible in summary documents, but they can be traced in
detail through archival records. The most important kind of record
for this purpose is the monthly salary registers (mii§aherehoran
mevacibi defterleri). 23 These registers list the names of salaried fi-
nance department staff, together with their bureau assignments and
their daily and monthly wages. Scribes were recorded in the registers
either as katib (full scribe) or §agird (apprentice). While registers from
the 1530s include approximately equal numbers of katibs and §agirds,
in seventeenth-century registers the rank of katib seems to have been
reserved for heads of bureaus, hacegan, as even ha/ifes, second in
command of bureaus, were listed as §agirds. Although bureau heads
were subject to rotation, replaced at least every two years in the early
seventeenth century, the registers show that the bureau staffs did not
rotate but served continuously until promotion, transfer, or death.
Numerous salary registers for the seventeenth century are catalogued
in the Ottoman archives, but for the sixteenth century very few have
been preserved, all dating to the first half of the century. As far as
can be determined from position descriptions, the registers from the
1530s included the whole staff of the finance bureaus except perhaps
for a few young boys who were there to get an education and to fetch
was being reorganized ("The Ottoman Black Sea Frontier and the Relations of the Porte
with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy, 1622-1628," [PhD dissertation,
Harvard University, 1989]). D'Ohsson (Tableau general de l' empire ottoman, 7: 261)
connects the appearance and disappearance of this defterdarhk with the capture and loss
of Budin, the dates of which were 1541 and 1686.
22
Uzun~ar§th, Merkez ve Bahriye Te§kilatz, 332-33 and n. 4.
23 For a full description of the salary registers and examples of their possible uses, see
my "Ottoman Salary Registers as a Source for Economic and Social History."

58 CHAPTER TWO
tea. As time went by, the registers included fewer scribes, since they
did not record wages paid from sources other than treasury revenues.
Scribes on the highest level, bureau heads and defterdars, gradually
disappeared from the salary registers, as they were increasingly
compensated by income from zeamets and timars. 24 Those on the very
lowest level, apprentices and learners, did not receive salaries but
were compensated, if at all, out of their masters' income; they too
are unrecorded. 25 Fees paid by those for whom services were per-
formed and documents written became an additional source of rev-
enue for members of the finance department, and gifts and bribes were
still another. 26 The salary registers provide no evidence on scribal
support from these income sources. For the purpose of this study, it
has been assumed that the proportion of recorded to unrecorded
employees was consistent, yielding, if not an absolute, at least a relative
notion of the size of bureaus.
24
This development was in line with the advice of the nasihat writers of the 1630s
and 1640s recommending the compensation of government employees by timars as a way
of cutting back the demand for scarce cash resources. Shinder was mistaken in his assumption
that the upper-level staff, katibs and above, were "enrolled in the pay registers of the
ruzname-i kur;uk ka,lemi," at least after the mid-sixteenth century ("Ottoman Bureaucracy,"
56, and "Career Line Formation," 229); it was the upper-level staff who were the first
to drop out of the registers. It is impossible to determine whether any of the scribes listed
in the registers simultaneously received income from both salaries and timars. It might
be expected that Ottoman officials would have kept a record of timars granted to finance
scribes, but although special registers of scribal timars and zeamets began to be produced
around the middle of the seventeenth century, these registers list only the zeamets and
timars of high-level chancery scribes of the divan, not those belonging to scribes of the
maliye (an example is MM 4091 [3275], dated 1059/1649-50, a list of zeamets and timars
belonging to scribes of the imperial divan). Even though in a few registers a specific area
was designated for the zeamets of finance scribes, that area was invariably left blank.
25
The system by which these very low-ranking scribes were remunerated and promoted
has been variously described for a later period; see Findley, "Legacy of Tradition," 339-
40, 345--47; Shinder, "Ottoman Bureaucracy," 57-58; idem, "Career Line Formation,"
229-36.
26
Payment from fee income was normal for the sixteenth century; see John Horace
Parry, The Sale of Public Office in the Spanish Indies under the Hapsburgs, Ibero-Americana,
37 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), 2; Koenraad Wolter Swart, The Sale
of Offices in the Seventeenth Century, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1949), 49-50; Richard
J. Bonney, The King's Debts: Finance and Politics in France, 1589-1661, (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1980), 10. If high-level Ottoman officials received part of their remuneration
in cash, it was not in the form of a salary granted from tax revenues but probably came
out of the document fees collected in the finance bureaus. According to d'Ohsson (Tableau
general de I' empire ottoman, 7: 263), in the eighteenth century even the ba~ defterdars
were paid solely from fees. The revenue from fees was recorded in separate registers (see
MM 1480 [651] dated 1012/1603--4, which records deposits of document fees in the
treasury), but salaries paid out of fee income were not recorded in the salary registers.
THE OTIOMAN FINANCE DEPARTMENT 59
Table 2. Total Numbers of Salaried Scribes
YEAR NUMBER OF SCRIBES SOURCE
900/1494-95 20 TKSA D. 9587

920/1514-15 36 TKSA E. 5475
Prior to 942 53 TKSA D. 7843 27
942/1535-36 65 MM 122 (559)
955/1548--49 38 MM 174 (7118)
961/1553-54 37 KK 6593
982/1574-75 68 Ko'i Bey Risalesi
1000/1592-93 183 Mustafa Nuri, Netayic
1013/1604-5 160 MM 1495 (3365) and KK 3398
1033/1623-24 212 MM 2587 (5586)
1035/1625-26 205 MM 2732 (5510)
1036/1626-27 182 KK 3399
1038/1628-29 182 MM 2919 (5965)
1041/1631-32 163 Ko,i Bey Risalesi
1042/1632-33 120 KK 3400
1050/1640--41 92 MM 3556 (6248)
1060/1650-51 102 MM 4195 (6261)
1069/1658-59 86 MM 4691 (6008)
1070-71/1660-61 70 Hezarfen, "Telhis)til-Beyan"
1071/1661-62 78 KK 3406
1079-80/1669-70 70 MM 5594 (2950)
post-1768 714 TKSA D. 3208B 28
1780s 700 d'Ohsson28
Sources: Barkan, "H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Mali Y1hna ait Biit~e Ornegi," 309, 313,
324; Uzun~ar§1h, Merkez ve Bahriye Te§kilatz, 336; Barkan, "H. 974-975 (M. 1567-1568)
Mali Y dma ait Bir Osmanh Biit~esi," 294; Ko~i Bey, Ko,i Bey Risalesi, ed. Ali Kemal
Aksiit (Istanbul: Vak1t Gazetesi Matbaa Kiitiiphane, 1939), 29, 41; Mustafa Nuri, Netayic
ul-Vukuat, ed. Ne§et <;agatay, Tiirk Tarih Kurumu Yaymlar1, ser. 22, no. 1-2 (Ankara:
Tiirk Tarih Kurumu Bas1mevi, 1979), 1: 152; Omer Liitfi Barkan, "1070-1071 (1660-
1661) Tarihli Osmanh Biit~esi ve Bir Mukayese," iViFM 17 (1955-56): 317; idem, "1079-
1080 (1669-1670) Mah Yilma ait Bir Osmanh Biit~esi ve Ek)leri," 230; Shinder, "Career
Line Formation," 236 n. 1; Gibb & Bowen 1: 136.
The numbers of salaried scribes at various points in time are shown

in Table 2. According to the figures in this table, the number of salaried
finance department personnel, after doubling in the early sixteenth
century, inexplicably dropped again, subsequently rose to a peak in
the 1620s, and then diminished almost to its previous level. Figures
for the seventeenth century are all a little low due to the omission
27
Barkan dated this document to the ba§ defterdarhk of Nazh Mahmud ~elebi (944-
949/1537-1542), but it must have been written before the defter of 942/1535-36, since
scribes in the 942/1535-36 register who are also listed here usually appear at lower salaries,
and those promoted in 942/1535-36 are still shown at their old positions in this document.
28
May include nonsalaried as well as salaried staff.
60 CHAPTER TWO
of bureau heads from the salary registers. The large numbers of finance
scribes reported for the late eighteenth century, however, suggest that
that their actual number increased constantly, and that the totals for
the second half of the seventeenth century may be a great deal too
low. Still, even in the early seventeenth century, their number was
quite small considering the volume of work, and their growth in
numbers seems proportionate to the expansion of their task. 29
The first half of the sixteenth century in the finance department
was a period of organizational changes and structural experiments,
some of which can be traced in the salary registers. The first change,
visible in registers from the 1530s, was the creation of a bureau struc-
ture for the Arab lands and eastern Anatolia (together called the vila-
yet-i Arab), parallel to those for Rumeli and Anadolu. 30 According
to register MM 122 (559) for the years 942/1535-36 and 943/1536-
37, the finance department consisted of three nearly parallel structures
of bureaus. Two of these structures, labeled, like their defterdars,
"Rumeli" and "Anadolu," were responsible for the European and Asian
parts of the empire respectively. The bureaus in each of these groups
were the muhasebe, mukataa, mevkufat, and tezkire bureaus. The third
bureau structure, consisting of ruznam~e, muhasebe, mukataa, and
ahkam bureaus, was labeled "Arab" or "vilayet-i Arab"; its function
was doubtless to supervise the revenues controlled by the Arab ve
Acem defterdan. There were no bureaus for the §tkk-1 sani, despite
the subdivision of the revenues of Rumeli under that heading in the
balance-sheet of 931/1524-25; this suggests that the amalgamation
of Rumeli's revenues seen in 933-34/1527-28 was still in force ten
years later.
The bureau structure of 942/1535-36 resembles the organization of
revenues in the balance-sheet of 933/1526-27 more closely than that
of 931/1524--25. An organizational shift between these two dates can
be explained by the 1525 revolt of the newly conquered Arab prov-
inces and the subsequent revision of political and fiscal arrangements
29
In the sixteenth century the English finance staff numbered about 80, but the Ottoman
Empire was a much larger and more diverse country (John Craig, A History of Red Tape:
An Account of the Origin and Development of the Civil Service [London: Macdonald &
Evans, 1955], 61). The sale of offices in France and Spain increased the number of office-
holders into the tens of thousands in those countries during the seventeenth century.
30
See register TKS D. 7843, published by Barkan, "H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Mali
Yilma ait Bii~e Omegi," 324-25; and register MM 122 (559) for 942-43/1535-37. The
organization of finance responsibilities by geographical area is reminiscent of the Ilkhanid
style of organization. Bureau assignments of finance scribes are listed in Table 4.
THE OITOMAN FINANCE DEPARTMENT 61
made at their conquest in 1516. The original plan allowing manage-

ment of finances to remain on the provincial level was altered in favor
of central control, and the salary registers display the administrative
structure by which the new arrangement was carried out. Separation
of the revenues of Rumeli into two divisions was temporarily sus-
pended, and a separate bureau structure for central control of revenues
from the Arab lands was put into place. It seems probable that this
rearrangement provoked the appointment of the third central defterdar.
Outside these three bureau structures, the ruznam~e or daybook
function was separated into first (evvel) and second (sani) sections,
but their work was divided not by province but by a difference in
their tasks. The ruznam~e-i evvel maintained the finance department's
daily income and expense journals, while the ruznam~e-i sani kept
salary records for palace personnel who were paid monthly (mti§ahe-
rehoran) rather than quarterly or half-yearly like the military. The
remaining finance bureaus (mukabele, varidat, mevcudat, te§rifat, and
teslimat) show no indication of division at this time.
This organizational structure, however, was relatively short-lived.
Beginning around 1540, multiple provincial treasuries were organ-
ized and the finances of the Arab lands were no longer handled as
a single unit. By the late 1540s, the bureaus for the "vilayet-i Arab"
had disappeared, replaced by elements of a new bureau structure for
the §tkk-1 sani. This organization of finance duties proved more long-
lasting, enduring with minor changes through the end of the period
studied. The distribution of scribal assignments in salary register MM
174 (7118) from 955/~548-49 reflects this readjustment of central
finance responsibilities. The bureaus designated as "Arab" in the register
of 942/1535-36 were gone; the concept of a third bureau structure
parallel to the first two and responsible for the revenues and expen-
ditures of a separate geographical region of the empire was aban-
doned. Instead, the salary register for 955/1548--49 includes a separate
varidat~z (receiver of income) for the §lkk-1 sani apart from those
of Rumeli and Anadolu, reflecting the separate~ income total for the
§lkk-1 sani in the balance-sheet of 954-55/1547-48. No other bureaus
handling revenues of the §lkk-1 sani are indicated in that register.
Salary registers cannot be used to reconstruct the finance depart-
ment's structure during the second half of the sixteenth century, because
no registers covering those years are extant, and only one exists from
the first quarter of the seventeenth century. The others presumably
perished in the many fires that swept the defterdar's archives during
62 CHAPTER TWO
that time. 31 A look at the next surviving salary register, dating from
1013/1604-5, shows a great proliferation in the number of depart-
ments between 955/1547-48 and 1013/1604-5. Some of this growth
undoubtedly resulted from the organization of the third central
defterdarhk and the resulting creation of new bureaus and reallocation
of functions. In the absence of salary registers for the intervening
period, we must tum to other records for informaffon on what hap-
pened. An important source of information for the period without
salary registers is a kanunname prescribing the organization of the
maliye in the mid-sixteenth century. 32 Preserved in the Atif Efendi
collection of the Siileymaniye Kiitiiphanesi (and therefore known as
the Atif Efendi Kanunnamesi), the kanunname has been dated around
1560, near the end of Siileyman's reign. 33 Another useful source from
around the same time is a register showing allocations in kind dis-
tributed to palace personnel and members of the finance department.
The register is dated 977/1569-70, but the section on finance scribes
bears the date 961/1553-54. 34
Table 3 summarizes information from the Atif Efendi Kanunnamesi
on the overall structure of the maliye around 1560. When this regu-
latory code was composed, the finance bureaus were organized in
three sections under the direction of the ba§ defterdar, the Anadolu
defterdan, and the third (ii~iincii) defterdar respectively; the third
defterdar was in charge of the §lkk-1 sani. There is no provision for
the fourth division of revenues appearing in the balance-sheet of 974-
75/1567--68, so the kanunname must have been written prior to that
time. It not only provides information on the finance department's
personnel but also describes their responsibilities in some detail.
Subsequent to the balance-sheet of 931/1524-25, when the §lkk-1 sani
was a subdivision of Rumeli, the distribution of provinces among the
bureaus had undergone considerable change. The provincial designa-
31
Robert Mantran, Istanbul dans le second moitie du XVIr siecle, Bibliotheque
archeologique et historique de l'Institut fran~ais d' archeologie d 'Istanbul, 12 (Paris: Librairie
Adrien Maisonneuve, 1962), 30--36; Mustafa Cezar, "Osmanh Devrinde istanbul Yapdannda
Tahribat Yapan Yangmlar ve Tabii Afetler," Turk Tarih Ara§tzrma ve incelemeler 1 (1963):
327-414.
32
The regulatory code is in Ms. Abf Efendi 1734, fols. 124b-3 la; parts of this kanunname
were published by Uzun~ar~1b (Merkez ve Bahriye Te§kilatz, 338-46) and by Barkan ("H.
974-975 [M. 1567-1568] Mali Yilma ait bir Osmanh Biit~esi," 315-22).
33
Halil Inalcik, "Suleiman the Lawgiver and Ottoman Law," Archivum Ottomanicum
1 (1969): 174.
34
KK 6593, published in part by Uzun~ar§Ih in Merkez ve Bahriye Te§kilatz, p. 336.
Table 3. The Structure of the Maliye in the Mid-Sixteenth Century
Ba§ Defterdar
Ruznam~ei-i Evvel
Ruznam~ei-i Sani
Muhasebei-i Rumeli Muhasebei-i Anadolu
Ba§ Defterdar Anadolu Defterdari (J,ancu Defterdar

Mukataac1-1 Evvel Mukataac1-1 Evvel Mukataac1-1 Evvel
Mukataac1-1 Sani Mukataac1-1 Sani Mukataac1-1 Sani
Mevkufat~1 Mukataac1-1 Salis Mukataac1-1 Salis
Varidat~1 Mevkufat~1 Mevkufat~1
Tezkireci-i Ahkam-1 Varidat~1 Varidat~1
Rumeli Tezkireci-i Ahkam-1 Tezkireci-i Ahkam-1
Tezkireci-i Ktla Anadolu Defterdar-1 Salis
Tezkireci-i Ktla
Mevcudat~1
Te§rifat~1
Teslimat~1
Source: At1f Efendi MS 1734
tions of "Rumeli" and "Anadolu" in the titles of the defterdars no

longer accurately reflected their jurisdictions; their responsibilities were
not so neatly geographical.
The ba§ defterdar, in addition to his general responsibility for the
financial affairs of the whole empire, now ·had specific responsibility
only for the mukataa revenues of northern Rumeli as far south as
Ohri, Uskiip, and Filibe, and for those of the Danubian provinces of
Bosna, Budin, and Teme§var. 35 These revenues were divided between
two mukataa bureaus not by location, but by the nature of the revenue
source: one bureau handled revenue from the customs dues of Danubian
ports and the salt works, the other the revenue from mines. In addition
to these revenues, the ba§ defterdar was also responsible for issuing
berats (diplomas of appointment) and salary and payment orders for
fortress garrisons in the oytlined area, as well as for those in Erzurum
and the Arab lands, the former "vilayet-i Arab," the income of which
was accounted for elsewhere. For these orders and payments he
employed an official called the tezkireci-i kzla, who wrote documents
for the garrisons.
35
For maps showing the locations of Ottoman provinces see Donald Edgar Pitcher,
A Historial Geography of the Ottoman Empire: From Earliest Times to the End of the
Sixteenth Century (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972).
64 CHAPTER TWO
The defterdar of Anadolu was responsible not only for the mukataa
revenue of the province of Anadolu (western Anatolia) itself, but
also for revenue from the provinces of S1vas, Erzurum, Trabzon, and
Kefe in the Crimea. His responsibilities were apportioned among three
bureaus by rough geographical criteria which are simpler to describe
in reverse order. His third bureau received mukataa revenue from the
following sancaks and provinces: Saruhan, Karesi and Bolu in Anadolu,
then Karaman, S1vas, Erzurum, Trabzon, and Kefe. With the excep-
tion of Karesi and Bolu, these provinces are all adjacent and run
neatly in a straight line eastward across central Anatolia and north
up to and across the Black Sea. The second bureau administered revenue
from the sancaks of southwest Anadolu, plus Bergama and Midilli
in the northwest. To the first bureau was allotted the remainder of
Anadolu, comprising the northern and northwestern sancaks minus
Karesi, Bolu, Midilli and Bergama.
The jurisdiction of the third defterdar was, from a geographical
point of view, even less coherent. His first bureau recorded mukataa
revenue from Istanbul, Edirne, and two Greek provinces, Selanik and
Mora; it is possible that these revenues were among those allocated
in the balance-sheet of 931/1524-25 to the §lkk-1 sani of Rumeli. His
second bureau oversaw other mukataa revenues of the §lkk-1 sani, but
no source enumerates these revenues; they may have been the same
as those later categorized separately in the balance-sheet of 974-25/
1567-69, and they may have been on the Anatolian side of the empire.
In addition, the second bureau handled revenue from the extensive
has properties of the late grand vizier ibrahim Pa§a and certain other
revenues from the §lkk-1 evvel of Rumeli. 36 His third bureau handled
mukataa revenue from the remaining areas of southern Rumeli: the
rest of Greece (T1rhala, Siroz, and inebaht1), Albania (iskenderiye,
Arnavut, and Belgrad/Berat), and Thrace (Gelibolu and <;irmen). These
may have been included in the §lkk-1 sani revenue of the balance-
sheet of 931/1524-25. The odd configuration of the third defterdar's
jurisdiction may be related to the formation of the province of the
Cezayir beylerbeyi, who was also the Grand Admiral of the empire;
his province, containing parts of Greece and Gelibolu as well as the
Aegean islands and a portion of western Anatolia, was considered part
36
For· a description of the has of ibrahim Pa§a in Rumeli, see Gokbilgin, Edirne ve
Pa§a Livasz, 15.
of the §lkk-1 sani. 37 The third defterdar was also responsible for
payments to the fortress garrisons of Mora, inebahtI, Modon, Coron,
"and other fortresses" (according to the kanunname), while the for-
tresses in the remainder of his region were overseen by the ba§ def-
terdar; the defterdar of Anadolu is not described as having had any
responsibility for fortress garrisons.
The kanunname describes three parallel structures of finance bu-
reaus, one under each of the three defterdars; these structures involved
a number of officials in addition to the various mukataac1s and the
kda tezkirecis whose jobs have been described above. A varidat~z in
each division was responsible for recording incoming payments to the
treasury from the areas for which his defterdar was responsible. A
mevkufat~z recorded income from properties which were temporarily
in the possession of the treasury, such as unallocated timars, strays,
or the legacies of deceased persons (beytiUmal). 38 A tezkireci-i ahkam
prepared tezkires, memoranda, requesting the production of orders
(hukm, pl. ahkam) on matters unrelated to fortress garrisons.
In addition to the above officials, there were certain functionaries
who served the entire treasury department. Besides the ruznamecis,
there were the muhasebecis, who oversaw the accounts of the cizye
and of the imperial emins; we have seen these officials earlier under
Mehmed II. In addition, there was a mevcudat~z who counted cash
as it came in and kept records of the contents of the treasury; a tesrifat~z
who noted the pi§ke§ or presents; and a teslimat~z who recorded fabrics
and robes and kept track of those removed from the treasury to be
worked or embroidered by the palace craftsmen.
Two functions were disregarded by the kanunname. The maliye
kalemi, the main order-writing bureau of the finance department, was
omitted from the kanunname's list, although it was certainly in existence
at that time, since it appeared in the salary registers, where it was
often listed separately from bureaus dealing directly with money.
Secondly, although salaried mukabele scribes were referred to earlier
in the ceremonial kanunname of Mehmed II and appear in later
registers, the At1f Efendi Kanunnamesi omitted any mention of them.
37 For the province of Cezayir see A. Galotta, "Khayr al-Din," E/2 4: 1157; Uzun~ar§th,
Merkez ve Bahriye Te§kilati, 420; idris Bostan, Osmanli Bahriye Te§kilati: XVII. Yilzyilda
Tersane-i Amire, Atatilrk Kiiltiir, Oil ve Tarih Yiiksek Kurumu, Tiirk Tarih Kurumu
Yaymlar1, ser. 7, no. 101 (Ankara: Tiirk Tarih Kurumu Bas1mevi, 1992), 233.
38 For procedures related to unallocated timars see Howard, "Ottoman Timar System
and Its Transformation," 95-97, 104.

66 CHAPTER TWO
Nor does the kanunname describe bureaus whose function was to

spend the revenues that other bureaus took in; expenditures were
handled by the same bureaus as income. Although we modems assume
that the primary division of finance operations ought to be between
income and expenditures, the Ottoman division of labor was predi-
cated on the nature of the revenue source and the records and types
of problems associated with it. 39
Our second source from this period, the register detailing alloca-
tions in kind to central government personnel, confirms that the full
bureau structure for the §lkk-1 sani already existed in 961/1553-54,
predating the kanunname by several years. This register has been used
as evidence for a massive increase in finance staff at this time, but
what it actually shows is a decline in numbers. 40 The register contains
a list of 37 finance scribes who received allotments of fodder for the
year 961/1553-54. The total of 37 scribes is similar to the 955/1547-
48 total, but the list of offices agrees more closely with the later
kanunname than with the earlier salary register. For instance, the salary
register shows only a varidat scribe for the §Ikk-1 sani, while the
register of allotments includes §Ikk-1 sani scribes for varidat, mukataa
and tezkire functions, corresponding to the responsibilities of the third
defterdar as detailed in the Atif Efendi Kanunnamesi. It would appear
that a structural transformation to the §Ikk-1 sani began in the late
1540s and was completed during the 1550s. The growth of the finance
department to over 100 salaried scribes must have taken place during
the second half of the sixteenth century, after the composition of these
sources. On the basis of an order in register MM 1513 (7316) dated
1011/1602-3, however, we can hypothesize that the increase took
place not long before the tum of the century. The order was issued
39
The English finance administration divided its work into income and expenditures
(Craig, History of Red Tape, 27, 32). In sixteenth-century Spain, however, it was rec-
ognized that the safest way to ensure that bills were paid was to assign expenditures to
specific revenue sources; these could be switched or "borrowed" from if more urgent needs
~ose (Thompson, War and Government in Habsburg Spain, 87). The Ottoman expenditure
system has not yet been studied.
40
KK 6593, dated 977/1569-70, and cited in Uzun~ar§1h, Merkez ve Bahriye Te§kilatz,
336 and n. 2. Uzun~ar§1h believed this register to prove that the number of scribes in
the finance department at that date was 192, but the figures in the section dealing with
the finance department do not record the number of scribes in each bureau in 976/1568-
69 but the number of units of fodder or hay (giyah-z hu§k) allocated to each scribe in
961/1553-54. The finance scribes do not appear in any list of later date. That each unit
of fodder did not represent one member of a bureau is shown by the fact that the fodder
for the §agirds, who numbered 6, was listed in a separate section below that for the 31
katibs; the katibs' fodder was not shared with the apprentices.
in response to a complaint from the scribes of the maliye that as their

number had grown (because of an increase in their workload), the
amount of food issued to them from the imperial kitchens no longer
sufficed. The previous ba§ defterdar had obtained additional food for
them, but the present one had taken it away; they requested that it
be restored, which it was.
To summarize, although originally organized by province, the three
defterdarhks as finally constituted were not geographically based. The
creation of an organization, the §lkk-1 sani, in which finances from
both regions of the empire were combined into a third jurisdiction
that overlapped the other two geographically, was a clear break from
the Ilkhanid fiscal system organized by province, appropriate to an
appanage state where the provinces had had considerable autonomy.
The great geographical divisions of the Ottoman Empire lost their
significance as demarcators, although they were retained as titles.
Nothing could more vividly illustrate the centralized character of Otto-
man administration in the sixteenth century. Contrary to the myth of
immobility, the finance department was a structure that developed
gradually over time, expanding with the empire's growth and alter-
ing its basis of organization to suit the changing character of impe-
rial administration.
The Seventeenth Century and Beyond
After a gap of about fifty years for which no salary records are avail-
able, the scribal salary registers for the first half of the seventeenth
century once again provide detailed information on scribal identities
and bureau assignments. By the middle of the century, however, due
to the treasury's cash flow problems, many scribes were remunerated
by timars and fee revenues rather than by salaries from the treasury.
They therefore disappear from the salary registers, rendering the
registers less valuable as sources. Detailed information on the finance
department after that point must be obtained from literary descriptions
or from new sources.
Table 4 contains information from a number of scribal salary registers
whose dates span the period 1535-1660. The table shows the finance
bureaus in which the scribes worked and the number of salaried scribes
employed in each bureau, as well as the number of scribes whose
bureau assignment was not identified in the register. Judging by the
Table 4. Number of Scribes in Finance Bureaus °'
00
942/ 955/ 961/ 1013/ 1033/ 1035/ 1036/ 1038/ 1042/ 1050/ 1060/ 1069/ 1071/
KALEM (BUREAU) 1535 1548 1553 1604 1613 1615 1616 1628 1632 1640 1650 1658 1660
Ruznam~e-i evvel 2 1 1 5 17 31 30 27 18 12 12 15 15
Ruznam~e-i sani 2 1 1 6 12 11 10 9 8 11 11 9 7
Ruznam~e-i Arab 1
Unidentified ruznam~e 1 3 1 3
Total ruznam~e 6 5 3 14 29 42 40 36 26 23 23 24 22
Muhasebe-i Rumeli 3 1 1 2 - - 1 2 1 2 4 3 3
Muhasebe-i Anadolu 2 - 1 4 4 3 4 4 3 1 2 2 1
Muhasebe-i Arab 2
Unidentified muhasebe 1 3 - - - - - - 1 3 - 1
Muhasebe-i cizye - - - 3 16 19 19 19 19 12 12 12 11
Muhasebe-i evkaf - - - 2 3 2 2 2 1
Muhasebe-i haremeyn - - - - 3 5 5 4 6 8 10 5 6
Total muhasebe 8 4 2 11 26 29 31 31 30 25 28 23 21
Tezkire-i Rumeli 2 3 3 13 9 9 8 8 5 3 3 2 1
Tezkire-i Anadolu 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tezkire-i Arab 1
Unidentified tezkire 1 0 - 2k 3k 2k 2k 2k 2k 2k lk
Tezkire-i §lkk-1 sani - - 2 7 3 2 2 1
Total tezkire 6 4 6 27 17 14 13 12 9 6 5 3 2
Ahkam-1 maliye 3 8 19 14 13 12 10 7 2 2 3 1
Ahkam-1 vil.-i Arab 1
942/ 955/ 961/ 1013/ 1033/ 1035/ 1036/ 1038/ 1042/ 1050/ 1060/ 1069/ 1071/
KALEM (BUREAU) 1535 1548 1553 1604 1613 1615 1616 1628 1632 1640 1650 1658 1660
Mukataa-i Rumeli 8 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 5 4 3 1 1
Mukataa-i Anadolu 3 2 2
Mukataa-i Arab 2
Mukataa-i sikk-i sani
Unidentified mukataa 10 - 1 3 5 6 5 5 3 1
Mukataa-i Agnboz - - - 1 2 1 1 1
Mukataa-i Avlonya - - - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mukataa-i Brusa - - 1 2 6 6 5 5 3 2 1 1 1
Mukataa-i haremeyn - - - 4 3 1 1 2 - 1 3 4 3
Mukataa-i hasha - - - 6 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 1 1
Mukataa-i hasha-1 cedide - - - 3 3 3 3 3 2 1 1
Mukataa-i istanbul (memlaha) - - - 3 5 5 5 ~ 2 2 3 1 1
Mukataa-i Kefe - - 1 2 3 3 2 2 I 2 4 4 5
Mukataa-i maadin - - 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
Mukataa-i mensiihe - - - 5 7 7 6 6 6 5 6 3 2
Mukataa-i hasha-1 cedide-i sani - - - 1 1 1 1 1
Mukataa-i agnam - - - - 3 2
Total mukataa 23 6 11 36 49 46 39 39 28 23 25 17 16
Varidat 3 - - - 3 - - - 1 2 - 1
Varidat-i evvel - 1 1 1 3 3 - 3 - - 1
V aridat-i Anadolu - 1 1 1
Varidat-i §lkk-1 sani - 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1
Total varidat 3 3 3 5 7 4 4 4 2 2 1 1
0\
\0
Table 4. cont. -......)
0
942/ 955/ 961/ 1013/ 1033/ 1035/ 1036/ 1038/ 1042/ 1050/ 1060/ 1069/ 1071/
KALEM (BUREAU) 1535 1548 1553 1604 1613 1615 1616 1628 1632 1640 1650 1658 1660
Mevkufat-i Rumeli 2 - - 4 3 3 3 1 1 1
Mevkufat-i Anadolu 1 - - 1 1 1 1
Unidentified mevkufat - 3 3 - 3 3 4 3 4 3 5 9 7
Mevkufat-i §tkk-1 sani - - - 1
Total mevkufat 3 3 3 5 8 7 8 4 5 4 5 9 7
Mukabele-i piyadegan - - - 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1
Mukabele-i sipahiyan - - - 1 - - - - - 3 2
Unidentified mukabele 2 - 1
Total mukabele 2 0 1 3 2 2 2 2 1 5 4 1 1
Mevcudat 1 1 1 - 1 1 - 1
Te§rifat 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - - 1
Teslimat 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
Other unidentified 6* 2 3 18 24 19 21 16 9 4 6 5 6
Total scribes 65 38 36 144 188 181 158 157 120 92 102 86 78
* Three of these served in Egypt

k Tezkire-i kda scribes
Sources: MMD 122 (559) 942-43/1535-37; MMD 174 (7118) 955/1548-49; KKT 6593 (961/1553-54); MMD 1495 (3665) 1013/1604-5 (with
corrections and additions from KKT 3398, which covers the same year); MMD 2587 (5586) 1033/1623-24, the first of the surviving series; MMD
2732 (5510) 1035/1625-26; KKT 3399 (1036/1626-27); MMD 2919 (5965) 1038/1628-29; KKT 3400 (1042/1632-33); MMD 3556 (6248) 1050/
1640-41; MMD 4195 (6261) 1060/1650-51; MMD 4691 (6008) 1069/1658-59; and KKT 3406 (1071/1659-60).
distribution of scribes among the bureaus, significant change in the

finance department's organizational structure as well as considerable
growth in numbers took place between the mid-sixteenth century
sources and the first of the seventeenth-century salary registers. A
large increase in the number of scribes and of bureaus directly re-
sponsible for accounting tasks reflects a growth in finance department
business that accompanied the subdivision of fiscal responsibilities in
the second half of the sixteenth century. 41 Instead of three parallel
groups of bureaus, seventeenth-century registers reveal a multiplica-
tion and complication of bureaus in certain areas of administration
and a gradual attrition and disappearance in others. The description
of the finance department's structure in the sixteenth-century kanun-
name was clearly not a prescription for permanence but a snapshot
of a changing reality at a particular moment in time. Indeed, the fact
that ~ikk-1 sani bureaus of various types appeared and disappeared
at different dates implies that the neatness and symmetry of the
kanunname's depiction may have been an idealization rather than a
reality even at the time it was written.
If the number of scribes employed in a bureau is a valid indication
of the size or significance of that bureau's job, it appears that certain
of the finance department's functions, once central to the department's
operation, became less important with time. This decrease in impor-
tance can be seen in the case of the varidat bureaus. During the sixteenth
century, as shown by the mid-century kanunname and the 955/1548-
49 register, the single varidat bureau of the early decades had become
three separate bureaus, one under each of the defterdars. Several varidat
bureaus were likewise listed in the early registers of the seventeenth
century, but after the 1620s they began to disappear and the number
of varidat scribes diminished. There were no varidat scribes at all in
the register of 1071/1660-61, and according to d'Ohsson the varidat
bureaus no longer existed in the eighteenth century.
In some bureaus the number of salaried scribes decreased even
though the bureau's function continued to be performed. Decreases
in the bureau staffs of muhasebe-i evvel (from 4 scribes in the six-
teenth century to 1 in the 1620s), mukataa-i evvel (from 9 to 3 in
the same period), and mukataa-i Anadolu (from 6 to none) may have
41 Growth in the Ottoman finance staff was negligible compared to that of France, where
in 1643 financial and judicial employees together numbered 45 ,000 (Parker, Europe in
Crisis, 271-73.
72 CHAPTER TWO
been related to the transfer of some of their responsibilities to newly

created bureaus. The teslimati and the mukabelei-i sipahiyan disap-
peared from the lists and the mevcudati appeared only intermittently.
These decreases and disappearances were probably due to the com-
pensation of these officials by timars or fees instead of by cash salaries.
On the other hand, despite the absence of the mukabele function from
the kanunname, mukabele scribes were included in the list of finance
scribes receiving allotments of fodder in 961/1553-54, and throughout
the seventeenth century registers mukabele scribes continued to re-
ceive salaries.
A disproportionately large increase can be noted in other areas.
There were three areas where the rate of scribal growth was more
than double the 225% average increase from 942/1535-36 to 1013/
1604-5: ruznam~e, mevkufat, and order-writing. The number of scribes
in the ruznam~e bureaus nearly tripled before 1013/1604-5, from 5
to 14, and tripled again over the next three decades to a peak of 42.
By 1660, however, the total dropped again to 22; this may have been
a real cut due to overstaffing earlier in the century, or it may only
be apparent, reflecting a shift in compensation from salaries to timars
or fee income. Even with this reduction, however, the ruznam~e staff
was still the largest in the finance department in 1660, demonstrating
the continued importance of the ruznam~e bureaus, especially the ruz-
nam~e-i evvel, in accounting for receipts and expenditures and sum-
marizing the accounts of other bureaus.
The mevkufat kalemi also tripled in size, but in contrast to the
ruznam~e bureaus, it experienced a more consistent pattern of growth
through the middle years of the century, its staff slowly increasing
from 3 to 6 to 7 to 9. A separate mevkufat bureau for the §lkk-1 sani
had been described in the Attf Efendi Kanunnamesi, and the mevkufat
income of the §tkk-1 sani had its own heading in the balance-sheets,
but only one scribe was ever listed (in the register for 1033/1623-
24) as belonging to such a bureau. In the registers from 1630 on, the
mevkufat bureaus for Anadolu and the §Ikk-1 sani no longer appeared.
By the second quarter of the seventeenth century the mevkufat func-
tion had been consolidated under a single head, and a source from
the second half of the seventeenth century confirms that at that time
there was only one mevkufat bureau.42
42
Hiiseyin Hezarfen, "Telhis iil-Beyan fi Kavanin-i Al-1 Osman," cited by Shinder,
"Ottoman Bureaucracy," 43. The mevkufat continued as a single bureau throughout the
eighteenth century (d 'Ohsson, Tableau general de I' empire ottoman, 7: 267).
The two fastest-growing bureaus of the period were the tezkire-i

Rumeli kalemi, whose staff increased by 550% from 2 to 13, and the
ahkam-1 maliye kalemi (elsewhere called the maliye kalemi), whose
staff increased by 630% from 3 to 19. The fact that these two bureaus
were responsible for communication rather than accounting tasks is
suggestive. Their expansion reflects the bureaucratization of the empire
in this period and a consequent rise in the amount of paperwork. It
also indicates the enormous importance of the office of ba§ defterdar
between the mid-sixteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries, owing to
his ability to mobilize the empire's financial resources at a time of
fiscal crisis. The tezkire and ahkam bureaus, as communications tools,
played an important role in the ba§ defterdar's exercise of empire-
wide power. Toward the middle of the seventeenth century, however,
salaried scribes in these bureaus decreased to 2 or 3; although there
were undoubtedly non-salaried employees, it· is possible that overall
numbers did decrease with the ba§ defterdar's loss of power at that
time. The maliye kalemi still existed in d'Ohsson's day, whereas the
three tezkire bureaus had been replaced by a single bureau called the
mektup~u kalemi, or oda.
The Atif Efendi Kanunnamesi and the allotments register of 961/
1553-54 had listed a tezkire bureau under each defterdar, along with
tezkire bureaus for fortress garrisons under the first and third defter-
dars. In the register of 1013/1604-5, the tezkire bureaus of Rumeli
(tezkire-i evvel kalemi, 13 scribes) and the §Ikk-i sani (7 scribes) were
considerably larger than the tezkire bureau of Anadolu (2 scribes),
and the disproportionate size of the tezkire-i evvel kalemi continued
in later registers despite the overall decrease in numbers. This differ-
ence doubtless reflected the wider responsibilities of the Rumeli and
§lkk-1 sani defterdars as described in the Atif Efendi Kanunnamesi.
In the salary registers, none of the scribes in the Anadolu tezkire
bureau were identified as tezkire-i kila scribes, confirming the impres-
sion obtained from the kanunname that the defterdar of Anadolu did
not have responsibility for any fortress garrisons, even those within
his own area of jurisdiction. In d'Ohsson's time the two bureaus for
fortress garrisons were called "Biiyiik Kale" and "Kii~iik Kale," greater
and lesser garrison bureaus.
In two areas of function, muhasebe and mukataa, still more exten-
sive alterations in bureau structure are apparent. Within the area of
muhasebe (accounting), which throughout the first half of the six-
teenth century had been divided into bureaus along provincial lines
(Rumeli, Anadolu, and vilayet-i Arab), tasks were reassigned later in
74 CHAPTER TWO
the century in a way that cannot simply be ascribed to the establish-

ment of another defterdarhk. Separate bureaus appear in the 1013/
1604-5 register for examining the accounts of collectors of the cizye,
or poll tax on non-Muslims (muhasebe-i cizye kalemi), and those of
imperial evkaf, or pious foundations (muhasebe-i evkaf kalemi). The
expansion of the muhasebe-i cizye kalemi from 3 scribes in 1013/
1604-5 to 16 in 1033/1623-24 and 19 two years later reflects a growth
in this department's functions. During these two decades, as we shall
see, independent cizye surveys began to be made, and the muha-
sebe-i cizye kalemi was responsible for the records of those surveys.
By 1033/1623-24, an additional accounting bureau called the muha-
sebe-i ha.remeyn kaJemi had been established for examining the accounts
of evkaf dedicated to the Two Holy Cities, Mecca and Medina, the
haremeyn-i §erifeyn. The responsibility of the muhasebe-i evkaf kalemi
was then limited to examining the accounts of evkaf not dedicated
to the haremeyn; in the eighteenth century this bureau was known
as the ku~uk evkaf muhasebesi kalemi. 43 The old muhasebe bureaus
of Rumeli and Anadolu were now responsible for examining the
accounts of imperial emins, 44 emins of the hass-1 hiimayun, and
provincial finance departments. The muhasebe bureaus retained this
overall structure i~to the eighteenth century, but as time went by the
bureaus of muhasebe-i Rumeli and muhasebe-i Anadolu were given
new responsibilities for malikane (life-term tax farms), pensions, and
troop salaries. 45 Although the muhasebe staff numbered only 11 scribes
at the beginning of the century, by mid-century it rivaled that of the
ruznam~e bureaus.
The mukataa bureaus in the late sixteenth century underwent an
expansion and diversification even greater than that of the muhasebe
bureaus. This expansion resulted primarily from reorganization around
the third defterdarhk. The number of scribes employed in the mukataa
bureaus increased from 23 to 36 between 942/1535-36 and 1013/
1604--5 and to 49 over the next two decades, making it for a time
the largest group of scribes in the finance department. The bureau
structure also became more complex. The register of 942/1535-36 had
identified three mukataa bureaus, one under each defterdar. According
43
D'Ohsson, Tableau general de l' empire ottoman, 7: 268.
44
Agents for expenditures: among the major emins were those of Istanbul (§ehir), the
dockyards (tersane), the mint (darphane), the imperial kitchens (matbah), and barley (arpa).
45
D'Ohsson, Tableau general de l' empire ottoman, 7: 265-66.
to the mid-sixteenth century kanunname, there were then eight mukataa

bureaus, two or three responsible to each defterdar, and the register
of allotments in kind listed nine mukataa bureaus. Over the next few
decades, mukataa responsibilities were further subdivided; the number
of bureaus increased to eleven by 1013/1604-5, and twenty years later
there were two additional bureaus. After the 1620s several bureaus
disappeared, leaving eight in the final register examined (from 1071/
1660-61), but one new bureau, governing the ziyade-i cizye tax, was
added before the end of the century. The muhasebe-i evvel kalemi
also handled some mukataa revenues, notably those for the Arab
lands; it apparently took over the responsibilities of the old muka-
taa-1 Arab kalemi.
Information in the sixteenth-century Atif Efendi Kanunnamesi en-
ables us to allocate responsibility for mukataa bureaus mentioned in
salary registers among the defterdars and to understand their tasks as
of that date. Conversely, the salary registers reveal the names of bureaus
described in the kanunname. The responsibilities of the mukataa bureaus
at the end of the seventeenth century have also been studied, using
registers dating between 1090 and 1110 (1679-1699) issued by the
bureaus to record the award or accounting of the mukataas in their
charge. 46 The lists of taxes administered by each bureau are not
comprehensive, in part because not every tax was offered in iltizam
every year, and many smaller taxes were subsumed under larger
categories. In some cases income sources were apparently shifted
around among bureaus to meet payment obligations, so these lists
must be considered suggestive rather than definitive. They do indicate,
however, that the system had undergone radical change by the late
seventeenth century.
According to the kanunname, as we have seen, the ba§ defterdar
was responsible for two mukataa bureaus. The bureau governing
mukataas of mines, labeled in the registers the mukataa-1 maadin
kalemi, first appeared in the allotment list of 961/1553-54. In the late
seventeenth century, this bureau farmed the mines of Sidrekaps1,
Previ§te, Uskiip, and Bekof~a in southern Rumeli, and also handled
taxes on coffee, wine, and tobacco as well as the cizye of the Walla-
chians, the Moldavians, and the gypsies (kzbtzyan) of Rumeli. The
46Omer Liitfi Barkan, "Osmanh imparatorlugu But~elerine dair Notlar," iOiFM 17

(1955-56): 198-213. No comparable examination has yet been made for the late sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries.
76 CHAPTER TWO
bureau responsible for the remaining mukataas of Rumeli, in parti-

cular the customs dues of the Danubian ports, was called the muka-
taa-1 Rumeli or mukataa-1 evvel kalemi. In later times it also admin-
istered tax farms of rice fields and salt works, mines in Oskiip and
Kratova, and the yava (non-resident) cizye of Selanik, of Armenians
in Rumeli and Anadolu, and of Jews in Istanbul. In 1013/1604-5 there
was a short-lived bureau called the mukataa-1 memlaha-1 istanbul
kalemi, also responsible for salt works; it is not yet known in whose
jurisdiction it lay, but it might have belonged to the third defterdar.
The defterdar of Anadolu supervised three mukataa bureaus in the
sixteenth century. By the seventeenth century, the mukataa-i Anadolu
kalemi, which had originally handled the mukataas of southwest
Anatolia, had ceased to exist. The mukataa-1 Kefe kalemi controlled
the mukataas of Kefe and of the sancaks in Anadolu associated with
Kefe in the kanunname's list, and by the late seventeenth century it
also administered the revenues of southwest Anatolia. 47 The muka-
taa-1 Brusa kalemi held jurisdiction over the mukataas of Bursa and
the sancaks of northwestern Anadolu, and in the late seventeenth
century the silk market taxes (mizan-i harir) of Istanbul. In the eight-
eenth century these taxes were administered by the Istanbul mukataas1
kalemi. The mukataa-1 haremeyn kalemi (bureau of mukataas of the
Two Holy Cities) was responsible for the mukataas of the Two Holy
Cities, but by the late eighteenth century its responsibility was limited
to Anadolu, while the muhasebe-i haremeyn kalemi had charge of
similar mukataas in Rumeli. The mukataa-1 haremeyn bureau, there-
fore, may have been under the defterdar of Anadolu.
Certain bureaus probably came under the jurisdiction of the third
defterdar, who was responsible for Istanbul, southern Rumeli, west-
ern Anadolu, and the province of Cezayir. These were the bureaus
called mukataa-1 Avlonya (Albania), mukataa-1 istanbul, mukataa-1
Agnboz (eastern Greece), and mukataa-1 hasha (royal domain). The
mukataa-1 Avlonya kalemi administered the mukataas of Albania and
47
The reorganization of provincial administration lying behind these bureaucratic changes
is mentioned by Rhoads Murphey, Regional Structure in the Ottoman Economy: A Sultanic
Memorandum of 1636 A.D. Concerning the Sources and Uses of the Tax-Farm Revenues
of Anatolia and the Coastal and Northern Portions of Syria, Near and Middle East
Monographs, n.s., vol. 1 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1987), xxv-xxvii. In the sum-
mary mukataa register analyzed by Murphey, the Anatolian sancaks were divided into
yet different groups, indicating that Ottoman officials did not hesitate to alter their ad-
ministrative organization if necessary.
western Rumeli, while the mukataa-1 istanbul kalemi was responsible

for Istanbul, Thrace, and parts of Greece. The mukataa-1 Agnboz
kalemi disappeared from the salary registers after the 1630s and did
not exist in d'Ohsson's time, though it was still in operation in the
late seventeenth century with responsibility for a variety of locations
in Rumeli. The mukataa-1 hasha kalemi originally administered the
has of ibrahim Pa~a; in the late seventeenth century it had responsi-
bility for the has lands of Aydm in western Anadolu and by the
eighteenth century for all has lands.
The mukataa-1 hasha-1 cedide kalemi (bureau of new has mukataas)
was also called the mukataa-1 cedide-i ula kalemi (first bureau of new
mukataas). For the early seventeenth century we do not know which
defterdar had charge of it or what taxes it administered, but later in
the century it managed a curious mixture of taxes in various sancaks
of Anadolu. The mukataa-1 hasha-1 cedide-i sani kalemi (second bureau
of new has mukataas) is yet more elusive: never described in detail,
it disappeared from the salary registers after the 1630s, and although
it appeared in a list of bureaus from 1670, it was absent from d'Ohsson's
list. In the late eighteenth century the cedide-i evvel and cedide-i sani
bureaus apparently managed new taxes levied to support Selim III' s
New Model Army. 48 The mukataa-1 agnam kalemi (bureau of sheep
[tax] mukataas), a short-lived bureau of the 1620s, was later subor-
dinated to the mevkufat kalemi. Another short-lived bureau was the
mukataa-1 mensuhe kalemi (bureau of abrogated or unassigned muka-
taas). By d'Ohsson's time, a salyane mukataas1 bureau (mukataas of
annual revenues) had replaced the ziyade-i cizye mukataas1, and an
esham (shares) mukataas1 bureau had been founded. A dating bureau
is mentioned by Hezarfen in the second half of the seventeenth
century ,49 but its absence from any of the lists suggests a late date
for its establishment as a separate bureau.
Changes in the number of defterdars and their responsibilities, made
for reasons of fiscal control of an expanding empire, brought corre-
sponding changes in the subordinate bureaucratic structure and its
scribal staff. It must be remembered that in 1013/1604-5 there was
also a fourth defterdar, the Defterdar of the Danube (Tuna). No fourth
bureau structure parallel to the other three was created for him. The
48
Shinder, "Ottoman Bureaucracy," 45.
49 Hezarfen, "Telhis iil-Beyan," cited by Shinder, "Ottoman Bureaucracy," 35. The dating
bureau still existed in d' Ohs son's time.
78 CHAPTER TWO
ba§ defterdar, burdened with responsibility for the finances of the

empire as a whole, may simply have given the fourth defterdar charge
over the existing bureaus controlling northern Rumeli, together with
the financial affairs of Hungary and the Danubian provinces.
D'Ohsson states (and others repeat) that in the second half of the
seventeenth century, the second and third defterdarhks became sine-
cures and all responsibility was borne by the ba§ defterdar. 50 The
creation of the fourth defterdarhk casts doubt on this generalization
for the period before 1650, although the consolidated bureau structure
of the eighteenth century might support such a judgment for a later
time. For the seventeenth century, however, Tevkii Abdilrrahman Pa§a,
often cited as the source of d'Ohsson's statement, says only that the
second and third defterdars did not generally involve themselves in
the business of the divan, although they attended its sessions; when
the ba§ defterdar was on campaign they were able to stand in for
him. 51 The holders of these positions, then, had to be ready to carry
the full weight of responsibility when needed, and they doubtless had
other duties inside the finance department. An interpretation closer to
Tevkii Abdilrrahman Pa§a's text is that the positions of the second
and third defterdars were depoliticized or professionalized in the
seventeenth century. 52 From the beginning the ba§ defterdar had been
charged with general oversight of the empire's financial welfare. The
duties of the other defterdars must always have been oriented more
narrowly toward departmental affairs.
Sometime in the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century, the
maliye outgrew its allotted space in the Topkap1 Palace and moved
to separate quarters outside the palace, called the defterdar kapzsz, the
Porte of the Defterdar. Proliferation of finance department responsi-
bilities and growth in staff were probably not the only reasons for
this move. It also coincided with a period of increased political power
for the ba§ defterdar stemming from his critical ability to mobilize
50
D'Ohsson_, Tableau general de l' empire ottoman, 7: 261-62; Gibb & Bowen, 1: 130.
51
Tevkici Abdurrahman Pa§a, "Osmanh Kanunnameleri," MTM 1 (1331/1912-3): 517.
52
Likewise, the Spanish Council of War was professionalized after 1586; both its members
and its secretaries all had previous field experience in either the army or the navy (Thompson,
War and Government, 39-40). The duties of the French Controleur General des Finances
in the seventeenth century seem not dissimilar to those of an Ottoman defterdar, lying
mainly in the area of verifying, checking, comparing and signing accounts of receipts and
expenditures, keeping track of the movement of cash in and out of the treasury, and
preparing statements (Mousnier, Institutions of France under the Absolute Monarchy, 2:
185-86).
·THE OTTOMAN FINANCE DEPARTMENT 79
resources to meet the financial straits of the empire. 53 The move

underlines the extent to which the finance department had become
independent of the sultan's household by this time. Government fi-
nances were administered outside the palace by a hierarchy of salaried
scribes working in functionally differentiated groups according to
regularized procedures. The sultan's private expenses were separate
from the costs of government; receipts from sales by the palace gardens
furnished the sultan's pocket money, and separate registers for "the
imperial pocket" (ceyb-i humayun) existed from at least the early
seventeenth century. 54 If the Ottoman Empire had once fit the descrip-
tion of a patrimonial state, it was now approaching a bureaucratic
model, at least in the case of the finance department. 55
Ottoman bureaucracy has often been depicted as unchanging, its
rigidity a cause of the empire's decline. Comparing the description
of the sixteenth-century finance department in the Attf Efendi Kanun-
namesi, the seventeenth-century lists of bureaus in the salary registers,
and the eighteenth-century description of d'Ohsson shows that, while
the number of bureaus and their names remained nearly the same for
250 years, the finance department was reorganized several times during
that period. 56 Although a few of the maliye's functions retained the
labels "Rumeli" and "Anadolu," the sixteenth century's three parallel
53
Rohrborn, "Die Emanzipation der Finanzbiirokratie," 121; even the ba§ defterdar's
office, however, became depoliticized and professionalized in the late seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries (Shinder, "Ottoman Bureaucracy," 47-50).
54
Giilrii Necipoglu, Architecture, Ceremonial and Power: The Topkapz Palace in the
Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 135; examples of seven-
teenth-century ceyb-i humayun defterleri exist in the Maliyeden Mtidevver collection in
the Prime Minister's Archives, Istanbul.
55
For the tension between household and bureaucratic government in the Ottoman state,
see Inalcik, "Comments on Sultanism;" Gerber, State, Society, and Law, 127-73. In the
seventeenth century, subjects' loyalty to the Ottoman house seems to have become more
abstract, and loyalty to the dynasty and its administration was separated from loyalty to
any individual member of it (Peirce, Imperial Harem, 263). At this time, the complex
relationships between royal household, court, and bureaucracy in western Europe were
also in the process of changing (Ronald G. Asch and Adolf M. Birke, eds., Princes,
Patronage, and the Nobility: The Court at the Beginning of the Modern Age, c. 1450-
1650, Studies of the German Historical Institute, London [Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1991]). Rosenberg posits for Prussia the development of a "new" bureaucracy of dynastic
(not quite "public") servants, separate from the princely household and loyal to the monarchy
rather than to the monarch (Hans Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy:
The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815 [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958], 14).
56 In contrast, the French fiscal structure could not be altered and during the seventeenth
century had to be completely bypassed by a new illegal structure (Dent, Crisis in Finance,
28-29). The English in the sixteenth century created a new finance administration dis-
pensing with the Latin, parchment, wooden tally sticks, and Roman numerals of the old,
80 CHAPTER TWO
divisions disappeared completely in the later period. Allocation of

work among the mukataa bureaus by geographical area was replaced
by division of labor according to function. The number of muhasebe
bureaus increased, also along functional lines. Later the department
was consolidated again and its tasks redistributed once more.
The finance department emerges from this examination as a flexible
structure, constantly adapting to changing circumstances, in contrast
to the static and dateless picture derived from the use of eighteenth-
century accounts to represent its entire history. 57 It responded to the
growth of the empire not only by developing a provincial finance
bureaucracy but also by dividing central administrative functions to
permit a greater degree of efficiency and control. The subdivision and
reconsolidation of the varidat and mevkufat bureaus contradicts the
stereotype of governmental structures that, once created, remained in
existence whether or not their functions were still necessary. The
mukataa and muhasebe-i Anadolu bureaus illustrate another pattern
of flexibility found in the finance department, assignment of new
functions to a bureau which had become unnecessary or of reduced
importance, without changing its name. The lack of correspondence
between old names and new purposes highlights the need to go beyond
prescriptive sources to administrative documents in order to under-
stand how Ottoman government actually functioned.
only to have the old structure absorb the new one by the end of the century (Craig, History
of Red Tape, 35-38).
57
A similar conclusion has been reached by Murphey, "Ottoman Census Methods."
CHAPTER THREE
REVENUE ASSESSMENT BY THE CENTRAL FINANCE

DEPARTMENT: CIZYE AND AVARIZ
Revenue assessment methods used by the central finance administra-

tion in the seventeenth century were based on or derived from the
major Ottoman tax assessment procedure, the tahrir or fiscal survey.
The tahrir has been perceived as a barometer of the empire's adminis-
trative cohesiveness and strength, the regular surveys of the sixteenth
century indicating firm central control over land, revenues, and military
personnel, and their absence in the seventeenth century signaling dis-
integration and decay. It is true that the Ottoman tahrir represents a
level of administrative ability achieved by very few states before the
modem period. Its abandonment, however, was related less to a sudden
onset of bureaucratic incapacity than to a change in the relationship
between the military forces and the land. After about 1600, alterations
were made in the Ottoman fiscal system in response to conditions of
political and economic upheaval and social change, alterations that
diminished the role of the defter-i hakani in Ottoman fiscal practice. 1
At the same time, other types of records gained prominence or were
invented to record changes in population and revenue.
The price revolution of the last quarter of the sixteenth century,
combined with military requirements, increased enormously the cen-
tral government's need for cash, while advances in military technol-
ogy and organization simultaneously rendered the timar-holding cav-
alry army less effective. In consequence, granting ti mars for the
!Ilaintenance of the sipahi army lost its importance as a goal of Ottoman
fiscal administration in favor of rounding up sufficient cash to meet
government expenditures in other areas. As an instrument in the search
for increased cash resources, the general tahrir could not have been
very useful; a large part of timar revenues was collected in kind and
it was impossible to raise their rates. Furthermore, around the turn
of the century tahrir officials found it increasingly difficult to conduct
accurate and thorough surveys of land revenues due to unrest in the
1
See McGowan, "The Study of Land and Agriculture," 57-58.
82 CHAPfER THREE
countryside and Celali activity. As a result of these conditions, three

categories of state revenue gained new importance during the first half
of the seventeenth century: the cizye (poll tax on non-Muslims), the
avanz-1 divaniye ve tekalif-i orfiye (extraordinary taxes and imperial
and customary levies), and the taxes farmed to private bidders through
the iltizam system. Reasons for their increased importance were that
their returns were made in cash, they were easier to assess than typical
agricultural taxes, and their rates could to some extent be manipulated
to meet current needs. Tax farming, which permitted the government
to abandon direct revenue assessment, will be treated in the next chapter.
Cizye and avanz were more easily assessed than agricultural taxes-
basically by counting heads. Cizye was always paid in cash, while
avanz included levies in cash, in kind, and in service, the latter two
commutable to cash if necessary. Although the rate of the cizye was
set by Islamic law and could be altered only to keep pace with inflation,
the rate of the avanz was variable and could be changed to meet
budgetary needs. Until the end of the sixteenth century, the potential
returns of the cizye and avanz-1 divaniye were calculated by kadis
in the course of the tahrir. With the near cessation of land revenue
surveys, a new system of surveys was developed for these taxes which
replaced the traditional tahrirs as the basic method of assessment during
the seventeenth century.
Revenue Surveying by the Finance Bureaus
Cizye (often called harac by the Ottomans, especially in the sixteenth

century) was the traditional poll tax paid by non-Muslims living in
Islamic lands in return for the protection of the Muslim community. 2
It could be assessed either on a whole community as a lump sum
(maktu) or on military-age males (usually 15-60) as individuals (ala'l-
riius), but in the Ottoman Empire before the end of the seventeenth
century it was usually assessed on a non-Muslim household (hane)
regardless of the number of adult male inhabitants as long as their
finances were shared in common. The cizye was usually assessed at
a flat rate, although according to Islamic tradi,tion people of low income
2
An introduction to the pre-Ottoman and Ottoman history of the cizye may be found
in Claude Cahen and Halil Inalcik, "Djizya," E/2 2: 559--66; Barkan, "894 (1488/1489)
Y1h Cizyesinin Tahsilatma ait Muhasebe Bilan~olan," 1-16; Yavuz Ercan, "Osmanh im-
paratorlugu'nda Gayrimiislimlerin Odedikleri Vergiler ve Bu Vergilerin Dogurdugu Sosyal
Sonu~lar," Belleten 55 (1991): 371-91.
REVENUE ASSESSMENT 83
(edna) paid half as much as those of middling income (evsat), who

paid half as much as the richest (a'la). The indigent (people whose
property was valued at less than 300 ak~e) and the unemployed were
exempt, as were women (except widows farming their deceased
husbands' property), children, the blind and disabled, and sometimes
clerics and monks. Non-Muslim groups providing military service,
such as Vlachs (Eflak), martolos, and voynuks, were also exempt.
Relatives of voynuks paid a substitute for the cizye (bedel-i cizye,
much lower than the regular cizye) but were otherwise tax-exempt. 3
Reaya living on lands belonging to a vaklf often paid their cizye to
the vaklf rather than to the central treasury. Even when assessed
individually, the cizye (like other taxes) might be paid communally;
the entire community was responsible for the taxes of all people listed
in the assessment register and so in reality could apportion them as
it pleased. Cizye was payable in cash, and the rates in ak~e or other
silver coins were repeatedly adjusted to keep the lowest rate equiva-
lent to the traditional assessment of one gold coin.
Cizye payers (harar;guzar) were normally counted in the course of
the timar tahrir, when the list of villagers or urban residents was
made. The number of cizye payers was sometimes recorded in the
tahrir register itself, and local kad1s were also required to prepare sep-
arate cizye registers. 4 The number of taxpayers liable for avanz-1
divaniye was determined at the same time and was usually written
into the cizye registers. A separate register recorded payers of yava
cizye, non-Muslims who had left their original place of residence and
were surveyed and taxed separately. The cizye count was updated by
means of triennial inspections made by a kad1 or by a cizyedar (also
called haraccz, agent in charge of the cizye) accompanied by a kad1.
The purpose of these frequent updates was to delete from the rolls
the deceased (murde), converts (nev-muslim), and those who paid cizye
3 For martoloses see Robert Anhegger, "Martoloslar Hakkmda," Tiirkiyat Mecmuasz

7-8 (1940-42): 282-328; Milan Vasic, "Die Martolosen im Osmanischen Reich," Zeit-
schriftfiir Balkanologie 2 (1964): 172-89; idem, "Osmanh imparatorlugunda Martoloslar,"
Tarih Dergisi 31(1977):47--64; idem, "The Martoloses in Macedonia," Macedonian Review
7, no. 1 (1977): 31--41; for voynuks see Yavuz Ercan, Osmanlz imparatorlugunda Bulgarlar
ve Voynuklar, Atatiirk Kiiltiir, Oil ve Tarih Yiiksek Kurumu, Tiirk Tarih Kurumu Yaymlan,
ser. 7, no. 88 (Ankara: Tiirk Tarih Kurumu Bas1mevi, 1986); idem, "The Taxes Imposed
on the Voynuks and Those from Which They Were Exempted," Revue des etudes sud-
est europeenes 21 (1983): 341--48.
4
Recording of cizye payers in a tahrir register can be seen in the registers published
by Bayerle, Ottoman Tributes in Hungary, 20; and Lewis, "Nazareth in the Sixteenth
Century," 416--25.
84 CHAPfER THREE
separately for any reason (e.g., transfer into a vaktf), and to add new
residents and the nev-yaftegan, the newly uncovered, those not previ-
ously recorded or recently come of age. Hanes newly entered in the
register might be required to pay an increase (ziyade) of 5 ak~e over
the normal cizye; that was probably why some banes in a cizye register
for Dukakin were assessed at 70 ak~e, while others were assessed at
75. 5 Like tahrir defters, cizye defters were produced in two copies,
one kept in the capital and the other maintained locally.
Sixteenth century cizye registers in the archives contain the names
of cizye payers, listed according to their place of residence, together
with a total figure for each location. 6 Most also include totals of
avanzhanes. At the end of each register appear the seal and imza
(stylized signature or monogram) of the kad1 who compiled it. Very
few cizye registers produced before the 990s/1580s can be found in
the Maliyeden Mildevver collection of the Ba§bakanhk Ar§ivi; several
exist in other collections, and some provincial copies have been pre-
served in the archives of former provincial capitals. A portion of a
cizye tahrir for Szolnok from the year 979/1571-72, from the Con-
sular Academy Library in Vienna, has been published by Lajos Fekete. 7
This register contains no figure for the number of avanzhanes but is
otherwise identical in format to those in the archives, listing the cizye-
paying inhabitants of each town and village by name and including
the total number of households (banes). Summarized survey results
can also be found in the records of kad1s and in the ahkam records
of the central government. Provincial accounting records note cizye
payments to provincial treasuries. 8
The Ottoman archives contain a series of cizye registers beginning
in 992/1584--85 and including registers for all but four of the years
between 1585 and 1660. Most of these registers cover only one sancak;
in some years the number of sancaks represented is greater than in
others, but in none are there registers from all the sancaks of the
5
MM 256 (14783) 971/1563-64; see Barkan, "894 (1488/1489) Y1h Cizyesinin
Tahsilatma filt Muhasebe Bilan~olan," 9.
6
See also the description in Machiel Kiel, "Remarks on the Administration of the Poll
Tax (Cizye) in the Ottoman Balkans and Value of Poll Tax Registers (Cizye Defterleri)
for Demographic Research," Etudes balkaniques 26, no. 4 (1990): 70-104.
7
Lajos Fekete, Die Siyaqat-Schrift in der Turkischen Finanzverwaltung, 2 vols., Bib-
liotheca Orientalis Hungarica, 7 (Budapest: Akademiai Kiad6, 1955), 1: 350-55 and 2:
plate 36.
8
See Gyula Kaldy-Nagy, "The Cash Book of the Ottoman Treasury in Buda in the
Years 1558-1560," Acta Orientalia Hungarica 15 (1962): 174-75.
empire. The number of registers increases from 2 per year in 992/

1584-85 to 5-9 per year around 1002/1593-94 and to 10-14 per year
around 1010/1601-2, and although the total drops to only two per
year in 1017/1608-9 it rises again to 5-9 or more per year by 1031/
1621-22, trailing off again only after the middle of the century. The
many registers dating from the 1590s and early 1600s must be based
on the general tahrir conducted during the reign of Murad III (1574-
1595). The registers for succeeding years, however, appear to reflect
new counts of cizye payers taken in areas where no regular tahrir had
recently been made. A number of them record periodic registrations
of nev-yaftegan made by kad1s to keep the registers up to date between
major tahrirs. 9 Register MM 863 (1460) 999/1590-91 for Malakas,
for example, lists the names of cizye payers and the number of hanes
in each village or urban mahalle (quarter or neighborhood), 10 followed
by the names of nev-yaftegan added since the tahrir. Another defter
of nev-yaftegan is MM 2315m (14732) 1027/1617-18 for Vul~itrin.
Register MM 2485 (1057) 1031/1621-22 for Midilli includes "cor-
rections made after the tahrir"; it is not clear whether this refers to
the last general tahrir or a more recent count of cizye payers only,
but given the rather late date it might well be the latter.
Some defters dated after the 1030s/l 620s refer explicitly to the
making of new tahrirs which are unlikely to have been traditional
surveys of land revenues. The process by which these new tahrirs
were made will be examined in more detail below. Some registers
definitely produced by new tahrirs are MM 3205 (14638) 1043/1633-
34 for Salaz (Chios), a tahrir made by one Mehmed from the cavalry
of the Porte with assistance from the community heads (kethudas) of
the non-Muslims; MM 3535 (1539) 1050/1640-41 for Tikve§, which
refers to the reorganization of the cizye after a new tahrir; MM 3701
(17716) 1052/1642--43 for Kibns (Cyprus), which mentions a new
tahrir made in that year listing the names of non-Muslims; and MM
3720 (1209) 1052/1642--43 for Sidrekaps1, including problems con-
cerning the cizye related to a recent tahrir of Sidrekapsi. The twelve
9
See the notation "this is a nev-yafte year" in cizye accounting registers: Barkan, "894
(1488/1489) y1h Cizyesinin Tahsilatma ait Muhasebe Bilan~olar1," 9, n. 6; and MM 895
(14725) 1002-3/1593-95 for Karaferye. Selaniki records the award of a medrese post to
a kad1 as a reward for having completed a nev-yafte tahriri of Rumeli in 1004/1595-
96 (Tarih-i Selaniki, ed. ip§irli, 2: 600.
10
See Ozer Ergen~. "Osmanh Sehrindeki <Mahalle'nin i§lev ve Nitelikleri Dzerine,"
Osmanlz Ara§tzrmalarz 4 (1984): 69-78.
86 CHAPTER THREE
cizye defters surviving from the year 1060/1650-51 all refer explicitly
to the subtraction of runaways from the cizyehanes; there may have
been an order for a general recount in that year.11
Another kind of cizye defter found in the finance records is a
summary register (icmal), covering a wider area than the detailed
registers described above. The summary registers list not individuals
but the total number of households owing cizye in each village or
urban mahalle; registers covering a whole province or region show
only the number in each kaza (judicial district). 12 An example of a
summary register is MM 589 (15151) dated 993/1585-86 for Bosna
and other areas in Rumeli, which shows the total number of cizye
payers in each village but does not list names. A broader kind of
summary, called erkam-i cizye (cizye figures), is represented by reg-
ister MM 2161 (5696) dated 1024/1615-16, which contains totals of
cizye payers for every kaza in Rumeli and Anadolu. Summary reg-
isters were assembled, either in a provincial capital or at the central
government, from the detailed registers submitted by individual kad1s.
In addition to the number of taxpayers liable for dzye, they also list
amounts of money expected, enabling finance officials to estimate
the empire's income and to determine the accountability of collec-
tion agents.
Scribes of the cizye muhasebesi kalemi (accounting bureau for the
poll tax) were responsible for receiving and storing cizye registers
from all over the empire, compiling summary registers, making annually
updated copies of survey registers for each cizye collector, auditing
collectors' annual accounts, keeping registers up to date, and research-
ing answers to questions or complaints regarding the cizye. We saw
earlier that this bureau was founded between 977/1569-70 and 1013/
1604-5, and it is tempting to hypothesize that its establishment
coincided with the proliferation of cizye registers produced by Murad
Ill's tahrir in the 1590s. Between 1013/1604--5 and 1033/1623-24,
as cizye assessment was separated from the timar tahrir, the bureau
11
Subtraction of missing people can be seen in a published defter of 1597 for an area
in Hungary: Joseph Perenyi, "Trois villes hongroises sous la domination ottomane au
XVIIe siecle," in Actes du /er congres international des etudes balkaniques et sud-est
europeennes, vol. 3: Histoire (Sofia: Editions de l' Academie Bulgare des Sciences, 1969),
585; see also the fifteenth-century registers in Barkan, "894 (1488/1489) Y1h Cizyesinin
Tahsilatma Muhasebe Bilan~olan."
12
A published cizye defter of Budin from 954/1548-49 is of this type: Fekete, Siyaqat-
Schrift, 1: 176--99; 2: plates 9-14.
increased from 3 salaried scribes to 16, remaining around that level

through the middle of the seventeenth century.
Avanz (levies), avanz-1 divaniye (state levies), and tekalif-i orfiye
(civil and customary dues) were blanket terms for a large number of
dues in cash, kind, or services. 13 Some of these were extraordinary
revenues or levies of supplies assessed, usually for military purposes,
by order of the sultan in times of need. 14 Others were routine levies
for the maintenance of institutions such as the post system, the imperial
kitchens or the navy, or longterm services such as guarding mountain
passes or maintaining bridges, roads, and waterworks. 15 The term
"avanz," which often refers to an assessment in cash (also called
avarzz ak~esi), can be used as a general term for all these levies. 16
Levies in kind could be transmuted to cash; they were then called
bedel (equivalent, price, substitute). Some levies were empire-wide,
13
For the origin and nature of avanz taxes see Omer Ltitfi Barkan, "Avanz," iA 2:
13-19. Documents cited by Wittek show the imposition of this tax as early as the four-
teenth and fifteenth centuries ("Zu einigen friihosmanischen Urkunden, II," 248-55). Others
who have discussed the origins and the basis of avar1z taxation include Gii~er, Osmanlz
imparatorlugunda Hububat Meselesi; Avdo Suceska, "Die Entwicklung der Besteuerung
durch die 'Avfuiz-i divaniye und die Tekalif-i «>rfiye' im Osmanischen Reich wahrend
des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts," Sudost-Forschungen 27 (1968): 89-130; Bruce McGowan,
"Osmanh Avanz-Ntiztil Te§ekktilti, 1600-1830," VIII. Tiirk Tarih Kongresi, 3 vols. (Ankara:
Ttirk Tarih Kurumu Bas1mevi, 1981), 2: 1327-31; Inalcik, "Military and Fiscal Trans-
formation," 311-17; idem, "Rice Cultivation and the <;eltukci-Reaya System in the Ottoman
Empire," Turcica 14 (1982): 69-141; rpt. in Studies in Ottoman Social and Economic
History, Collected Studies Series, 214 (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985), Selection VI.
14
The avanz was defined in a fifteenth-century sultanic order as a tax paid in time
of war (Aryeh Shmuelevitz, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire in the Late 15th and 16th
Centuries: Administrative, Economic, Legal, and Social Relations as Reflected in the
Responsa [Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984], 94 and n. 41). In England, until the 1530s, extraor-
dinary taxation was sanctioned only for the purpose of war-making (Charles Tilly, "War
Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Bringing the State Back Jn, ed. Peter
B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol [Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985], 180).
15
On the post system see C.J. Heywood, "Some Turkish Archival Sources for the
History of the Menzilhane Network in Rumeli during the Eighteenth Century (Notes and
Documents on the Ottoman Ulak, I)," Bogazif;i Oniversitesi Dergisi, Be§eri Bilimler
4-5 (1976--77): 39-55; see also Yusuf Hala~oglu, "Osman11 imparatorlugu'nda Menzil
Te§kilatI Hakkmda Baz1 Mtilahazalar," Osmanlz Ara§tzrmalarz 2 (1981): 123-32; Murphey,
"Functioning of the Ottoman Army," 97-104. For studies of workers on roads, bridges,
and water works see Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlz imparatorlugunda $ehircilik ve Ula§zm
Ozerine Ara§tzrmalar, ed. Salih Ozbaran, Ege Universitesi Edebiyat Faktiltesi Yaymlar1,
31 (Izmir: Ticaret Matbaac1hk, 1984); Abdullah Martal, "XVI. Ytizydda Osmanl1 impa-
ratorlugunda Su Yolculuk," Belleten 52 (1988): 1585-1654 and plates.
16 In the
early eighteenth century, the avar1z ak~esi made up nearly half of all avanz
income (Ahmet Tabakoglu, Gerileme Donemine Girerken Osmanlz Maliyesi, Dergah
Yay1nlan, 117; Tarih Dizisi, 10 [Istanbul: Dergah Yay1nlan, 1985], 153-57).
88 CHAPTER THREE
while others were assessed only on the population of a given area.

Both Muslims and non-Muslims contributed to these levies. Exemp-
tions were granted for a variety of reasons (most commonly for service
to the state), and have been estimated at 20% to 40% of the total
number of households. 17 Reaya who paid taxes to a vakif were often,
though not always, exempt from avanz levies destined for the state;
such reaya might have to supply wood or foodstuffs to the valof
instead. 18 Certain localities received blanket exemptions for reasons
such as proximity to a war zone or frontier area or possession of tax-
exempt status under a previous ruler. 19 People who supplied one type
of levy generally did not have to contribute for another. 20 Individuals
and villages providing long-term services or deliveries of goods were
exempt from emergency levies, as were such groups as sharecroppers
(ortakczs) and rice growers (~eltii,k~is). 21 In the records examined for
this study, by far the largest number of exemptions from avanz was
given to guardians of mountain passes (derbendcis); bridge keepers
(koprucus); miners (madencis); supporters of post stations and post
17
Elena Grozdanova, "Bevolkerungskategorien mit Sonderpftichten und Sonderstatus-
nach unveroffentlichten osmanisch-ttirkischen Dokumenten der Orient-Abteilung der
Nationalbibliothek 'Kyrill und Method' in Sofia," in Osmanistische Studien zur Wirtschafts-
und Sozialgeschichte: In Memoriam Vanco Boskov, ed. Hans Georg Majer (Wiesbaden:
Otto Harrassowitz, 1986), 46-67. For a list of tax-exempt categories see M. <;etin Varhk,
"XVI. Yiizydda Kiitahya Sancag1'nda Yerle§me ve Vergi Niifusu," Belleten 52 (1988):
115-67.
18
In register KK 2576, p. 107, it is explicitly stated that the reaya owe certain dues
to the vak1f in place of the avanz. Exemptions from avanz for vak1f reaya also occur
in KK 2576, pp. 46, 47, 61, 77, 78, 81, 94, 104, 108. In MM 2256 (5712), p. 47, banes
previously part of the beylerbey's has and subsequently transferred to a vakifwere exempted
from avanz. KK 2576, p. 130, notes the exemption from the avanz of reaya on the grand
vizier's has.
19
Muhamed Hacliijahic, "Die privilegierten Stiidte zur Zeit des Osmanischen Feudalismus:
Mit besonderer Berticksichtigung der Privilegien der Stadt Sarajevo," Sudost-Forschungen
20 (1961): 130-58; Avdo Suceska, "Uber 'Mu<afiyet' im Bosnischen Eyalet," in Osma-
nistische Studien zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte: In Memoriam Vanco Boskov, ed.
Hans Georg Majer (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1986), 156-63.
2
° KK 2576, pp. 9, 30, 59, 81, 110, 129. Bruce McGowan asserts (Economic Life in
Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600-1800, Studies in Modem
Capitalism/Etudes sur le capitalisme modeme [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;
Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l 'Homme, 1981], 107) that after the late
sixteenth century the avanz and ntiztil began to be assessed simultaneously on the same
people; but in KK 2576, p. 10, there is a long letter to kad1s dated 22 Ramazan 1044/
12 March 1635 calling for the collection of nilztil instead of, not in addition to, avanz.
21
For sharecroppers see Omer Liitfi Barkan, "XV ve XVImc1 As1rlarda Osmah
imparatorlugunda Toprak i§~iliginin Organizasyonu ~ekilleri: Kulluklar ve Ortak~1 Kullar,"
iOiFM 1 (1939): 29-74, 198-245, 397-447; for rice growers see lnalcik, "Rice Cultivation
and the <;eltukci-Reaya System."
horses (menzilci)s; and saltmakers (tuzcus or memlaha personnel).

Exemptions were also granted to oarsmen in the imperial fleet (kurek~is)
and suppliers of war materiel such as oars (kurek), saltpeter (guher-
~ile ), carts (araba), horses, oxen, mules, and camels. Other groups
exempted from regular avanz were those who provided supplies for
the imperial kitchen (matbah)-onions, chickens, melons, oil, butter,
honey, grain, wood; the stables (istabl)-straw, grain, leather; the grain
storage system (anbar); the imperial armory (cebehane); or the dock-
yards (tersane). 22 Provision of repairs to fortresses, walls, fountains,
aquaducts, roads, mosques, and other public buildings was often
considered grounds for tax exemption. Twenty-eight non-Muslim reaya
who cultivated the gardens of <;atalca were exempt from avanz,
probably in return for supplying vegetables or flowers for the palace.
One individual, Girgis oglu Hiisne, from the city of Damascus, ren-
dered such exceptional service in the suppression of the Macnoglu
rebellion that he was granted exemption from avanz for his whole
neighborhood (mahalle). The inhabitants of another area evaded
payment of avanz on the grounds that they were all monks (ke§i§);
clerics, then, must ordinarily have been exempt. Dispersed (perakende)
reaya newly settled in Koca iii were exempted from all extraordinary
levies except avanz (here probably avanz ak~esi). Exemptions were
valid only as long as services were provided; people formerly exempt
but no longer performing service had to be registered in avanzhanes. 23
Exemptions from cizye, on the other hand, were rarely granted in
exchange for service; in the documents examined, this study found
only three cases of exemption from cizye in return for supplying honey,
olive oil, and chicken fat for the state. All tax exemptions were recorded
in the finance department's records and supported by verification do-
cuments (temessuks) which could be produced to substantiate a claim.
22
For derbendcis see Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlz imparatorlugu)nda Derbend Te§kil/iti,
istanbul Universitesi Edebiyat Faktiltesi Yaymlan, 1209 (Istanbul: istanbul Universitesi
Edebiyat Faktiltesi, 1967; rpt. Eren Yaymcilik ve Kita~1hk, 1990); for kiirek~is see Mehmet
ip~irli, "XVI. Asrm ikinci Yansmda Kurek Cezas1 ile ilgili Hiikiimler," Tarih Enstitusu
Dergisi 12 ( 1981/82): 203-48. Exemption from avanz taxation was the reason why such
groups began to think of themselves as askeri: biz askeri, "we are askeri," was the excuse
given in 1066/1656-57 by doganc1s, kopriiciis, etc., in Uskiidar for not contributing to
a levy of wood (MM 4646 [7455], p. 21); see also Gibb & Bowen, 2: 4, 19.
23
KK 2576, pp. 93, 32, 84, 65; MM 3881 (2765), pp. 13, 186; KK 2576, p. 56. For
the exemption of clerics from avar1z see Halil Inalcik, "Notes on N. Beldiceanu's Trans-
lation of the Kanunname, fonds turc ancien 39, Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris," Der Islam
43 (1967): 151.
90 CHAPTER THREE
For example, an entry in the register of outgoing orders of the finance

department records an exemption from cizye granted in 1036/1646
in return for supplying chicken fat to the imperial barges (kayzks);
it states that the exemption was recorded in the defters of the ba~
muhasebe kalemi and that a temessiik was produced verifying deliv-
ery of the fat. 24
In the early sixteenth century, extraordinary taxes were levied once
every few years; the general policy was not to impose avanz on any
area two years in a row .25 It has been disputed whether the avanz
was in essence a levy in kind occasionally commuted into cash, or
a cash tax for which services could be substituted. 26 If, however, the
avanz was a levy exacted in time of need, the basis of assessment
must have taken into account both the nature of the government's
immediate need and what could realistically be expected from the
population at that moment. The actual rate of levies comprising the
avanz was determined by apportioning the government's estimated
total need among the areas to be taxed according to the number of
avanzhanes in each. The amount assessed was divided evenly among
the avanzhanes which, like the cizyehanes, were organized by a process
that took into account each taxpayer's ability to pay. The traditional
Ottoman revenue system drew mainly on agriculture, urban revenues
representing only a small part of the total, but the avanz, paid by
all, tapped the new commercial prosperity resulting from sixteenth-
century urbanization. 27
The bureau in charge of the avanz, along with other occasional
taxes and revenues in kind, was the mevkufat kalemi. In the early
sixteenth century it was divided into two sections, Rumeli and Anadolu,
and employed a total of three salaried scribes. 28 By about 1560 a
24
KK 2576, p. 58; MM 2728 (3457), p. 13. For a fuller description of temessiiks see
below, chapter 6.
25
The levies were every 4-5 years, according to the grand vizier Liitfi Pa§a (cited by
Barkan, "Avanz," 16). Thus, Mutafcieva overestimated the tax burden of the reaya at
35% of total production when she figured the taxes of a reaya household as if the avanz
of one particular area at one date had been assessed on the entire population of the empire
every year (Vera P. Mutafcieva, "De l'exploitation feodale dans les terres de population
bulgare sous Ia domination torque au xve et xv1e s.," Etudes historiques [19601: 166).
26
See Barkan, "Avanz," 16; Gibb & Bowen 2: 4; McGowan, Economic Life, 107.
27
Mustafa Akdag, "Osmanh imparatorlugunun Kurulu§ ve inki§afi Devrinde Tiirkiye' -
nin iktisadi Vaziyeti," Belleten 13 (1949): 54; Haim Gerber, "Jewish Tax-Farmers in
the Ottoman Empire in the 16th and 17th Centuries," Journal of Turkish Studies 10
(1986): 143.
28
A register of revenues submitted to the mevkufat kalemi in 964/1566-67, before the
mevkufat bureau for the §lkk-1 sani had come into existence. The
mevkufat-1 Rumeli kalemi was always the largest, suggesting that the
imposition of these taxes was heaviest there. 29 As noted earlier, by
the mid-seventeenth century the mevkufat scribes lost any specific
responsibility for separate regions of the empire and merged into a
single bureau. Mevkufat register KK 2576, for example, whose entries
date from around 1050/1640-41, covers the whole empire. The duties
of mevkufat scribes paralleled those of cizye scribes with respect to
keeping records up to date, providing survey register copies, checking
on problems, and answering questions. Salaried mevkufat scribes num-
bered 6 at the beginning of the seventeenth century and 9 at mid-
century. Given that avanz records were far more complicated to
maintain than cizye records, it is surprising that the mevkufat kalemi
was no larger. As the avanz increased in importance, however, other
duties of the mevkufat scribes seem to have faded into insignificance;
some may have been reassigned to other bureaus.
A survey for the avanz was made during the reign of Siileyman,
but its records do not seem to have survived. 30 Throughout the rest
of the sixteenth century, cizye and avanz payers were usually counted
simultaneously and recorded in a single defter. Separate avanz reg-
isters had to be made for Muslim avanz payers or those previously
tax-exempt. The earliest such register found in the archives, dated
1009/1600-1601, enumerates members of the piyade and miisellem,
two groups which until the mid-sixteenth century rendered auxiliary
military service; exempt from taxation, they were not counted in the
regular tahrir. By the end of the century both groups had ceased to
provide military service and were required instead to make an annual
payment to the treasury under the heading of avanz; they thus had
avanz became an annual tax, is found in the Ali Emiri collection of the Ba§bakanhk
Ar§ivi, Kanuni 50.
29
McGowan's research showed that the number of avar1z taxpayers was always higher
in Rumeli than in Anadolu or the eastern provinces (Economic Life, 113-14). This may
reflect a difference in population or wealth among the empire's regions. In the early
eighteenth century the difference in avanz revenue between the two regions was slight,
whereas with respect to the cizye, the remittances from Rumeli were by far the largest,
followed by the Syrian provinces, with Anadolu a distant third (Tabakoglu, Gerileme
Donemine Girerken Osmanlz Maliyesi, 171-73).
30 Akdag, "Tiirkiye>nin iktisai Vaziyeti," 550; cf. Mutafcieva, Agrarian Relations in
the Ottoman Empire, 188. During the rest of the century avanz surveys were apparently
done sporadically; there is an order dating from 981/1573-74 in which the kad1 of Karadag
was commanded to make an avanz tahrir of villages from which the inhabitants had fled
(MM 357 [20115], p. 118).
92 CHAPTER THREE
to be surveyed. 31 The register of 1009/1600--1601, compiled for Tokat,

lists members of the piyade and miisellem groups required to pay
avanz and, in addition, those too poor to pay and those who had run
away for fear of the Celalis. 32 Several other defters recording piyade
and miisellem avanz survive from the first two decades of the seven-
teenth century.
After about 1620, avanz registers became more comprehensive,
reflecting efforts to extend the payment of avanz to all the taxpayers
of an area. A detailed avanz register of Harput for 1056/1646-47
represents an attempt to be still more inclusive, listing by name not
only taxpayers but also tax-exempt members of the ulema and the
military class, both salaried and timar-holding. 33 Summary or icmal
defters, similar to those for the cizye, were also compiled for the
avanz. Most surviving avanz registers are summaries, listing only the
number of banes in a village or kaza and not individual taxpayers.
These summaries usually cover a whole province; the earliest ex-
amples in the archives are for Mente~e and Hamid. A published avanz
defter of Istanbul for 1044/1634--35, also of this type, lists not the
names of the individual taxpayers but the total numbers of avanzhanes
for each mahalle in the city. 34
The descriptive titles of summary registers indicate that avanz defters,
like those for the cizye, were often produced by kad1s. Two examples
are a summary defter of piyade and milsellem avanzhanes of Hamid
compiled, according to the heading, from defters submitted by the
31
Inalcik has noted in the sixteenth century a general policy of standardizing the status
and tax obligations of Ottoman subjects ("Rice Cultivation and the <;eltukci-Reaya System,"
92). On the piyade and miisellem groups, see Gibb & Bowen, 1: 53-55, 99, 252; 2: 16;
Gyula Katdy-Nagy, "The Conscription of Musellem and Yaya Corps in 1540," in Hungaro-
Turcica, Studies in Honour of Julius Nemeth (Budapest: Lorand EOtvos University, 1976),
27 5-81; idem, "The First Centuries of the Ottoman Military Organization," Acta Orientalia
Hungarica 31 (1977): 169-73.
32
MM 1294 (15615); for Tokat's central role in the Celali uprisings see M. Tayyib
Gokbilgin, "Tokat," iA 12: 407.
33
Early seventeenth-century avanz defters include MM 1509 (14802) 1013/1604-5 for
Saruhan, 1511 (14683) 1013/1604-5 for Alaiye, and 2100 (14804) 1023/1614-15, again
for Saruhan. Harput's inclusive register was published by Mehmet Ali Onal, "1056/
1646 Tarihli Avanz Defterine gore 17. Yiizyd Ortalannda Harput," Belleten 51 (1987):
119-29.
34
KK 2556 is an icmal defter of the piyade avanzhanes of Mente§e in 1013/
1604-5; Ali Emiri, I. Ahmed 281 covers piyade and miisellem avanzhanes of Hamid in
1022/1613-14. Another summary register was published by Aktepe, "XVII. Asra filt istanbul
Kazas1 Avanz Defteri," 109-39. For a list of summary avariz registers in the Ba§bakanhk
Ar~ivi covering all of Rumeli and Anadolu for the years 1641-1834, see McGowan,
Economic Life, 115-17.
kad1s and naibs (assistants) of the kazas, and a summary register for
the whole of Anadolu containing registrations from various kad1s'
tahrir defters. 35 The use of kad1s to record avanzhanes continued
throughout the first half of the seventeenth century; a slightly later
example is register KK 2581 (1047/1637-38), an avanz tahrir of
Krr§ehir, Kayseri, S1gla, and Koca ili compiled by the kad1 of Kayseri,
Mehmed b. Mustafa. From mid-century comes a summary defter for
Kayacik compiled and sent to the capital by the kad1 of Kayacik,
Osman b. Mustafa, in 1056/1646-47. 36 As the century progressed,
however, avanz surveys were more often undertaken by government
finance scribes or by military officials. Of 24 people identified in
various documents as conducting avanz tahrirs during the second
quarter of the seventeenth century, only 2 were kad1s; of the others,
6 were beys or pa§as, 3 agas, 3 ~avu§es, 7 scribes, and 3 of unidentifi-
able status.
Precisely when the emergency levy became an annual exaction is
not known, but it probably occurred during the Long War with the
Hapsburgs (1593-1606). 37 The historian Selaniki reports that in 973/
1565-66 and 979/1571-72 avanz was levied for the imperial fleet.
He states further that Murad III never levied the avanz, but that in
the first five years of the reign of Mehmed III (1595-1603) it was
levied every year. This is an exaggeration, however; Selaniki himself
records the submission of avanz moneys to the treasury in 999/1590-
91, during Murad Ill's reign. 38 Surviving avanz defters show that the
transformation to a regular tax was essentially complete by 1030/
1620-21. Almost all surviving avanz registers dating from before that
year list only piyade and miisellem avanz payers, with the exception
of defters for Haleb in 1025/1616-17 and for §am in 1026/1617-18,
areas where no piyade or milsellem groups resided. After about 1030/
35
These registers are MM 2385 (594) 1029-31/1619-22 and MM 1950 (43) 1020/
1611-12.
36
Feridun M. Emecen, "Kayac1k Kazasmm Avanz Defteri," Tarih Enstitiisii Dergisi
12 (1981): 159-70. At the same period, when the muhassil-i emval appointed to make
a tahrir of Egribucak failed to do so, the kad1 was entrusted with the job (KK 2576,
p. 120).
37 Inalcik, "Military and Fiscal Transformation," 314-15; Harold Bowen, "'Awari9,"
E/2, 1: 760-61. The Spanish extraordinary tax (servicio) became an annual tax as early
as 1525 (Elliott, Imperial Spain, 194-95); in 1575 it made up over 15% of Spain's annual
revenue (Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain). The French began collecting extraordinary taxes
during peacetime in 1560 (Robert R. Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite: The Provincial
Governors of Early Modern France [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978], 100).
38
Selaniki, Tarih-i Seltlnikf, ed. ip~irli, 1: 11, 85, 249; 2: 828.
94 CHAPfER THREE
1620-21, however, separate avanz defters become more numerous

and cover more of the empire, including all-Muslim areas where no
cizye defters were made. Also, cizye defters after that date record
avanzhanes less frequently, suggesting that separate records were being
kept for the avanz.
This evidence indicates that avanz was levied more widely as well
as more often, and was assessed on people who were not liable for
cizye. Indeed, at this time an intensive effort was made to broaden
the base of population from which avanz could be collected. 39 The
extension and rectification of the avanz is not usually mentioned among
the reforms of the 1640s, but the documents indicate that such a reform
was in progress, probably attributable to the grand vizier Kemanke§
Kara Mustafa Pa§a (1638-44). Regularization of the avanz increased
the importance of a precise assessment. Special avanz tahrirs were
made in areas where neither a recent tahrir nor a count of cizye payers
was available. Eventually this process was carried out over most of
the empire. The procedure employed in avanz tahrirs was an extension
of methods long used by kad1s to draw up and update cizye registers.
The elements of the tahrir process are illustrated in a detailed order,
a firman, instructing a surveyor of avanzhanes how to carry out the
survey. 40 The order, dated 1 Safar 1050/23 December 1640, relates
that a tahrir was required in the sancaks of Mente§e and S1gla in
southwestern Anatolia because reaya registered in the avanzhanes of
those sancaks, both Muslims and non-Muslims, had deserted their
homes to avoid renewed fiscal impositions. 41 They had settled on
39
French taxes as well were regularized in the 1620s and 1630s (Parker, Europe in
Crisis, 274). Faroqhi alludes to an effort during Murad IV's reign (1623-1640) to resettle
migrants and those who had fled the land ("Political Activity among Ottoman Taxpayers,"
28); intensified avanz registration was a means of keeping track of resettled reaya, and
the resettlement may have been motivated in part by a desire to increase avanz revenues.
40
The order was recorded in a register of outgoing orders of the finance department
(maliye ahktlm defteri) number KK 2576, pp. 48-49 (this register, though dated 1043-
49/1633-40, actually contains entries dating from 1043/1633-34 to 1053/1643-44).
41
The problem of deserted villages is well known (Villages desertes et histoire
economique, xve-XVIW siecle, Les hommes et la terre, 11 [Paris: Ecole pratique des
hautes etudes, Vie section, 1966]). For seventeenth-century Anatolia see Suraiya Faroqhi,
"Anadolu iskaru ile Terkedilmi§ Koyler Sorunu (The Settlement of Anatolia and the Problem
of Deserted Villages)," in Turkiye Toplumsal Bilim Ara§llrmalarznda Yakla§imlar ve
Yonetimler Semineri, ed. Seyfi Karaba§ and Ya§ar Ye§il\ay (Ankara: Orta Dogu Teknik
Universitesi, 1977), 289-302; Wolf-Dieter Hiitteroth, "The Demographic and Economic
Organization of the Southern Syrian Sancaks in the Late 16th Century," in Turkiye>nin
Sosyal ve Economik Tarihi (1071-1920), ed. Osman Okyar and Halil Inalcik (Ankara:
Meteksan, 1980), 35-42; and Halil Inalcik, "Mazra<a," E/2, 6: 959-61. Avanz defters,
sultanic and vizierial evkaf properties and evkaf of the Two Holy
Cities, on imperial has lands, and in serbest (free) and muaf (exempt)
areas. 42 Those remaining behind were required to pay the taxes of
those who had left, and their complaints had reached the ears of the
sultan. In consequence, a new tahrir was mandated for the area and
one of the higher ulema was appointed to carry it out. This man,
Mevlana Pir Mehmed, had formerly been a teacher in one of the high-
ranking religious colleges of the Ottoman Empire and was now, as
another order reveals, fiscal supervisor (muhassil-i emval) for several
sancaks in southwestern Anatolia. 43
The appointed surveyor was instructed to inspect and register the
following categories of population: those already recorded in the cizye
and avanz defters; the former military groups of piyade and miisellem;
retired pensioners (mutekaidin) who customarily paid bedel-i guher~ile,
a cash payment in lieu of supplying saltpeter to gunpowder factories
(a levy normally imposed on the sons of sipahis and retired janis-
saries44); persons not previously recorded in the defters who performed
no service that would entitle them to an exemption; and boys attaining
maturity whose families were not tax-exempt. Those who had for-
merly enjoyed exemptions for services rendered, such as koprilciis or
derbendcis, were also to be registered at this time if their service was
no longer performed or was unnecessary to the welfare of the em-
pire, as were dervishes in convents (tekkes and zaviyes) formerly
providing shelter to travelers, and sons of janissaries and state ser-
vants (evlad-1 kul taifesi), formerly exempt because of the askeri status
indicating the destinations of fleeing villagers, may provide a useful approach to this
problem.
42
All these places were normally exempt from avanz levies. In the sixteenth century,
most vak1f lands seem to have been exempt from avanz, but during the seventeenth, while
formerly exempt lands usually retained their exemptions, other (perhaps newly created)
vak1f areas were apparently no longer exempted. Register KK 2576, p. 54, for example,
shows that reaya of the evkaf of Selanik were exempt from avar1z, but those on the evkaf
of the sancak of Pa~a paid avar1z as a lump sum. This is in line with a general tendency
during the seventeenth century to extend the imposition of avanz over as much of the
empire's population as possible.
43 KK 2576, p. 42; by now the muhassil-i emval seems to have replaced the mal defterdan
as the chief fiscal official in the provinces; he also had supervisory authority over tax
farming (Inalcik, "Centralization and Decentralization," 28-29).
44
Ahmet Refik, ed., Osmanli Devrinde TUrkiye Madenleri (967-1200): TUrkiye>de <;zkan
Madenlerle Bu Madenlerin i§!erilmesi Hakkmda Divam Hiimayun Miihimme Defterlerinde
Mukayyet Hiikiimleri Havi (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaas1, 1931), pp. 12, 15. In Bursa in 1052/
1642 the bedel-i gtiher~ile amounted to 100 ak~e (Bursa Kadi Sicil 259, p. 147, published
in Uludag: Bursa Halkevi Dergisi 7 [1936]: 106-7).
96 CHAPTER THREE
of their families. All of the above were to be registered by name and

categorized according to their degree of wealth as high-, middle-, or
low-income.
The registrar was specifically instructed not to follow the long-
standing policy of always seeking to increase the tax figures. In villages
where avanzhanes had been broken up, he was to take careful account
of what the current population could afford to pay and not record any
higher figure. On the other hand, he was not to hold back where the
assessment could be increased (presumably because of population
immigration). He was also to ignore the old rule that people who had
moved should be registered in their former homes for at least ten
years. Instead, he was to record them in their current places of resi-
dence regardless of the length of time they had lived there. He was
particularly ordered to register those not personally exempt who had
moved to places where avanz was not normally collected, the evkaf,
serbest, and muaf areas. Rather than forcing them back to the villages
from which they had come, he was to register them in avanzhanes
and cizyehanes in their present locations. This was a new policy; in
1610 the government had enforced the old rule, granting three-year
exemptions from avanz to people who voluntarily returned to their
former residence. In the 1630s enforcement became more shrill, and
orders went out to return to their original homes even reaya who had
lived elsewhere for as much as 40 years. Evidently, by 1640 Ottoman
officials recognized that this rule had become unenforceable, and
conditions for return became a subject for bargaining between fugitive
reaya and the state. 45
In the last part of the order, the registrar was commanded to make
avanz and cizye registers, sign and seal them, and send them to the
capital. After imperial approval of the registers, he could present
documents verifying their tax status to the towns and villages sur-
veyed. Finally, the registrar himself was enjoined to make unlimited
efforts, in return for which his personal petitions would be answered.
45
Gii~er, Osmanlz imparatorlugunda Hububat Meselesi, 21; Aleksandar Matkovski,
"La resistance des paysans macedoniens contre l'attachement a la glebe pendant la
domination ottomane," Actes du fer Congres International des Etudes Balkaniques et Sud-
Est Europeennes, Vol. 3: Histoire (Sofia: Editions de l' Academie Bulgare des Sciences,
1969), 706; Hrand D. Andreasyan, "Celalilerden Ka~an Anadolu Halkmm Geri
Gonderilmesi," in Ord. Prof ismail Hakkz Uzun,ar§zlz'ya Armagan, Ttirk Tarih Kurumu
Yaymlan, ser. 7, no. 70 (Ankara: Ttirk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1976), 45-54; Amy
Singer, "Peasant Migration: Law and Practice in Early Ottoman Palestine," New Perspectives
on Turkey 8 (1992): 49-65.
Those who helped him in his work would also gain favor, while those
who hindered him would lose it.
The first half of the seventeenth century was a period of great
turmoil and population movement. Predictably, the result was a hodge-
podge of exempt individuals, those paying revenues to a vak1f, and
those paying taxes to the central government all living side by side
in the same village. The resulting confusion of responsibilities may
have contributed in some degree to timar holders' inability to maintain
order in the countryside. In these circumstances, the injunction to
register people where they actually lived made practical sense with
respect to easing the survey process. It was a boon to taxpayers,
eliminating problems such as the one arising when the Jews of Lepanto
were relocated to Patros; they were registered in two places and owed
double taxes for several years until they managed to have themselves
erased from the Lepanto registers. 46 The new policy also made sense
with respect to cultivation: the old system, binding cultivators to the
land, was a solution for labor shortage, the prevailing condition during
the first three centuries of the empire. Population growth and a trans-
fer to stockraising would have made labor more abundant, reducing
the necessity of tying peasants to the land except in conditions of
peasant flight.
A series of documents relating to Erzurum in 1055/1645--46 offers
another context in which a new tahrir might be made. The order for
the tahrir was initiated by a petition from the governor of Erzurum,
who was worried about his revenue account with the central govern-
ment.47 According to the petition, a tahrir of cizye and avanzhanes
in the province of Erzurum had been completed as recently as 1053/
1643--44 by the mukataa accountant, Cafer Efendi. In the ensuing two
years, however, a plague had visited Erzurum, many had died, and
the count of taxpayers was invalidated. 48 Those still alive could not
46
Shmuelevitz, Jews of the Ottoman Empire, 90 and n. 27.
47
Maliye ahkam defteri MM 3881 (2765), p. 127. In addition to the avanz register
compiled in response to this order, MM 3891 (14839) for 1055/1645--46, the archives
contain the original general tahrir register compiled by Cafer Efendi in 1052/1642--43,
register MM 3727 (5152), the cizye register made from it, MM 3765 (4277) dated 1053/
1643--44, and the earlier avar1z register for the same year, MM 3801 (6422). Similar
comprehensive tahrirs were made in the same year in Amasya and Samsun; for Amasya
see Jennings, "Urban Population in Anatolia in the Sixteenth Century," 21-57; for Samsun
see Suraiya Faroqhi, Towns and Townsmen in Ottoman Anatolia: Trade, Crafts, and Food
Production in an Urban Setting, 1520-1650, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 106-7.
48
Contemporaneous registers for Kayseri show a population decrease in the same year
98 CHAPTER THREE
afford to pay the taxes of the deceased as well as their own, and a
serious shortfall in Erzurum's tax revenue would result. Consequently,
the governor was ordered to conduct a new tahrir, drawing on the
expertise of Cafer Efendi and the services of the kad1s of the area.
A record was to be made of what the remaining population could
afford to pay and the resulting defter was to be sent to the capital.
Once again, contrary to the typical practice of recording higher reve-
nues in a new survey than in the old, the surveyor was ordered to
lower the total figure in the interest of the long-term health of the
imperial revenue. The avanz register indicates that these instructions
were duly carried out.
The case of Erzurum shows that in the seventeenth century the
avanz, though assessed individually, was paid communally, avanz
owed by absent taxpayers being distributed among those who remained.
An order dated 1693-94 explicitly commanded such a procedure.49
Communal payment was in accord with the nature of the avanz as
an extraordinary levy; it was assessed on an area or community as
a whole and adjusted according to what the people of the area were
able to contribute, rather than by any sort of strict accounting by head.
The way the number of households per bane was computed reflects
this understanding. An order commanding the voyvoda Be~lii Mehmed
to make a tahrir of the village of Abu Bali instructed him to report
to the central government not how many taxpayers there were but how
many banes the village could bear. 50
An order to a kad1 illustrates how information obtained through the
survey process was used in making new assessments. 51 The order,
issued to ~erhi Mehmed, the kad1 of Kayseri, commissioned him to
make a cizye and avanz tahrir of the province of Karaman because
areas in the province dedicated to evkaf and formerly exempt from
avanz taxation were seeing an influx of non-exempt immigrants. The
consistent with epidemic conditions; the decrease, however, could also be interpreted as
a reaction to conditions of unrest (Suraiya Faroqhi, Men of Modest Substance: House
Owners and House Property in Seventeenth-Century Ankara and Kayseri, Cambridge Studies
in Islamic Civilization [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987], 54; idem, "Crisis
and Change,'-' 439).
49
Bistra A. Cvetkova, "Contribution al'etude des impots extraordinaires (avanz-1 divaniye
ve tekalif-i orfiye) en Bulgarie sous la domination turque: L'impot 'nuzul' ," Rocznik
Orientalistyczny 23 (1959): 62.
50
Ne mikdar haneye tahammulleri oldugun i'/am eylemek emrim o/mu§tur; KK 2576,
p. 93.
51
KK 2576, p. 78; the use of survey registers in tax collection will be examined below.
old survey register was to be used as a basis for the new, and the
finance department was ordered to furnish a copy for the kad1. From
it reaya traditionally connected to evkaf and thus legitimately exempt
from the avanz could be identified; the rest were to be registered in
new avanz defters. The figures from the previous survey were copied
into the mevkufat order register directly beneath the notice of ~erhi
Mehmed's appointment to record his commission and to facilitate
comparison with the new survey when it was completed. 52 The mevkufat
scribes also copied figures from newly-made surveys into the order
register, as in the case of a tahrir of Bey§ehir in S1gla performed by
Mevlana Pir Mehmed el-Miiderris. 53 Almost half of the 631 taxpayers
surveyed by Pir Mehmed had to be subtracted from the avanz register
because of their connection with a vaktf. The mevkufat scribes may
have recorded the figures in the ahkam register in order to verify them
against the vak1f survey registers before allowing them to stand.
These cases are more detailed than most in the registers, but other
orders issued for similar purposes contain the same procedures in
outline. For example, an order commanding Elhac Ali to make a tahrir
of Vidin required him to base his survey on the defter provided by
the mevkufat bureau and to register in a new defter villages not included
in the old one and reaya not performing services or those exempted
for services no longer necessary. 54 While there may have been in-
stances in which these procedures were not employed, they were
followed by most seventeenth-century Ottoman tax assessors. Local
kad1s and other persons appointed to make surveys of the population
liable for cizye or avanz taxation listed their findings_ in registers or
defters, copies of which were dispatched to the central administration
in Istanbul. In conformity with orders commanding surveys, registers
created by the tahrir process bore the surveyor's signature and seal
as a guarantee to central officials of their authenticity and correctness.
Registers sent from the provinces were kept in the central finance
department's archive, and from them summary registers were compiled.
These records served as the government's official tax assessments
until the next survey, which might take place within the following
year or two or might not occur for several decades. People moving
52
KK 2576, p. 79; other instances of this record-keeping procedure in the same register
appear on pages 51, 68, 72, 89, 90, 99, 100, 101. A number of the registers to which
these figures refer still survive in the archives.
53
KK 2576, p. 113.
54
KK 2576, p. 108.
100 CHAPTER THREE
into the area in the interval would owe taxes in their old homes until
the registers could be changed.
Thus, in the first half of the seventeenth century, enumeration of
the taxpaying population was still being carried out by the govern-
ment, even though examination of land allocation and agricultural
production was not. In the absence of timar tahrirs, the finance depart-
ment developed alternative procedures for determining the amount of
anticipated income, for maintaining the government's record-keeping
system, and for governing the people with justice. Conscientious and
detailed records were still kept, although their format and locus had
changed. The image of the finance department's "catastrophic fall in
efficiency and integrity" between the sixteenth and the seventeenth
centuries has no basis in reality. While a certain degree of "break-
down in the apparatus of government" may have taken place, it seems
to have affected provincial administration rather than the central scribal
service. 55 Combined with the problems of price revolution, mone-
tarization of the economy, and "seventeenth century crisis," provincial
disorder forced the finance department to find new ways to organize
and assess its revenues. The "carefully kept" tahrir registers of the
sixteenth century gave way in the seventeenth not to "neglect" and
"collapse" but to cizye registers beginning in the 1590s and to avanz
registers from about 1620. The cessation of regular surveys did not
mean the disintegration of the fiscal administration's hold over the
countryside, but its transformation into different forms.
Registration of Taxpayers and Population Estimation
The usefulness of the cizye and avar1z defters for the study of Otto-
man population, like that of the traditional tahrir defters, depends on
our understanding of how the figures in the registers were compiled.
The defters reveal a bewildering variation in the way people were
counted for inclusion and in the amounts assessed for different taxes.
Such wide variation makes it a complex matter to derive generali-
zations about population change or the incidence of taxation from
55
On disorder in the provinces, see Mustafa Akdag, Turk Halkmm Dirlik ve Duzenlik
Kavgasi (= Cel/ili lsyanlari) (Ankara: Bilgi Yaymevi, 1975); William J. Griswold, The
Great Anatolian Rebellion, 1000-102011591-1611, Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, 83
(Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983); Inalcik, "Military and Fiscal Transformation"; and
Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats.
these registers. Data from any one register may or may not be valid
beyond the location and date to which it refers. An empire-wide picture
of population changes and fiscal conditions must be founded on a
broad base of detailed local studies.
The question of the relationship between the number of names in
the defters and the actual size of the population seems to have no
single answer. In general, cizye defters based on timar tahrirs can be
presumed to be as accurate as the latter, subject to the difficulties
involved in determining the family multiplier used to convert from
hanes or households to individuals: the multiplier formerly used was
5, but recent studies suggest that average household size was probably
closer to 3.5. 56 Cizye tahrirs made independently, however, present
further difficulties, as they offered a greater opportunity for idiosyn-
cratic local arrangements. Exemptions must also be considered, in-
cluding the traditional exemption from cizye of those owning less than
300 ak~e worth of goods. 57 In studying this problem, Kaldy-Nagy
found that in some areas of Hungary, non-Muslims exempt from
payment of cizye in the mid-sixteenth century and thus absent from
the cizye defters of that period amounted to 20-30% of those in the
tahrir defters. As the nominal poverty level did not rise with inflation,
later cizye defters recorded a greater percentage of the population.
Toward the end of the sixteenth century, totals of taxpayers recorded
in the cizye defters of some localities agreed within less than 1% with
totals in the tahrir defters. Compared with contemporaneous non-
Ottoman records, the dica (church tithe) registers, cizye defters showed
almost no variation, suggesting that the basis of compilation of the
56
The problem of household size has been discussed by Barkan, "Essai sur les donnees
statistiques"; Bruce McGowan, "Food Supply and Taxation on the Middle Danube ( 1568-
1579)," Archivum Ottomanicum 1 (1969): 139-96; Leila Erder, "Measurement of Pre-
industrial Population Changes: The Ottoman Empire from the 15th to the 17th Century,"
Middle Eastern Studies 11 (1975): 284-301; Jennings, "Urban Population in Anatolia in
the Sixteenth Century"; Geza David, "The Age of Unmarried Children in the Tahrir-
Defters (Notes on the Coefficient)," Acta Orientalia Hungarica 31 (1977): 347-57; Inalcik,
"Impact of the Anna/es School"; Nejat Goyiin~, "'Hane' Deyimi Hakkmda," Tarih Dergisi
32 (1979): 331-48; Eugenie Biettry-Elifoglu, "Ottoman Defiers Containing Ages of Children:
A New Source for Demographic Research," Archivum Ottomanicum 9 (1984): 321-28;
Kemal H. Karpat, "The Ottoman Family: Documents Pertaining to Its Size," International
Journal of Turkish Studies 4, no. 1 (1987): 137-45; Todorova, "Was There a Demographic
Crisis in the Ottoman Empire in the Seventeenth Century?" 59--62; Bekir Kemal Ataman,
"Ottoman Demographic History (14th-17th Centuries): Some Considerations," JESHO 35
(1992): 187-98.
57 Cahen and Inalcik,
"Qjizya," 564; Barkan, "Avanz," 15.
102 CHAPTER THREE
two sorts of records might have been the same. However, detailed
comparison between the late sixteenth-century tahrir defter of a single
sancak and a contemporaneous list of tithe payers in the same area
revealed that while the number of taxpayers was similar in the two
lists, the overlap of names was only 70--80%; quite a few people
were not included in each list. The average overlap for the whole of
Hungary proved to be about 90%. On the basis of these figures Kaldy-
Nagy was able to determine a correction factor to apply to figures
in the registers which would yield a fairly accurate estimate of the
actual population. 58
Other scholars have reached varying conclusions about the accu-
racy of population figures in cizye registers they have studied. Ac-
cording to Amnon Cohen, the list of Jews liable for cizye in Jerusalem
was far from accurate. Discovering in the lawcourt registers numerous
individuals of some financial standing whose names were not in the
cizye tahrirs, he concluded that despite strenuous efforts on the part
of the government to correct the tahrir by close inspection of the
Jewish communities of that city, the cizye registers of Jerusalem did
not contain all members of the community, although they might give
an indication of population trends. In Safed, as well, people new to
the community were not added to the cizye rolls. Jewish authorities
in Vidin in the mid-sixteenth century, rather than swear on the Torah
that the cizye registers were correct, were prepared to pay up to four
times the assessed sum, which suggests the size of the underpayment
a true assessment might have uncovered. Rabbis' responsa included
instructions about how to bribe survey officials to erase taxpayers'
names from the registers. A contemporary observer in Salonica, on
the other hand, believed that register totals for most communities
exceeded the taxable population. Machiel Kiel showed that the dis-
appearance of large numbers of people from some cizye registers in
the early seventeenth century was related to the creation of evkaf and
the transfer of large groups of taxpayers to their support. Finally,
Perenyi states that in the Hungarian towns he studied, cizye administra-
58
Gyula Kaldy-Nagy, "BevOlkerungsstatistischer Quellenwert der Gizye-Defter und der
Tahrir defter," Acta Orientalia Hungarica 11 (1960): 259-69; idem, "Der Quellenwert
der Tahrir Defterleri ftir die osmanische Wirtschaftsgeschichte," in Osmanistische Studien
zur Wirtscha.fts- und Sozialgeschichte: In Memoriam Vanco Boskov, ed. Hans Georg Majer
(Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1986), 76--83. Kaldy-Nagy's procedure has been em-
ployed by Istvan Hunyadi, "Etude comparee des sources fiscales turques et hongroises
du XVIe siecle comme base de calcul de la population," Turcica 12 (1980): 125-55.
tion was in the hands of local town leaders who kept the total number
of defter entries constant, even though the number of inhabitants rose
markedly after the first quarter of the seventeenth century. 59 It seems
that the question of reliability can only be answered on a case-by-
case basis by comparison of register totals with other sources and by
familiarity with practices regularly employed in the area under study.
Variations in procedure from survey to survey and from place to place
necessitate checking the tahrir defters for a particular locality against
other sources before the accuracy of their figures can be ascertained.
Scholars have employed cizye and avanz tahrir registers in a variety
of ways. Grozdanova employed cizye defters to determine population
figures for tax-exempt groups in Bulgaria not appearing in tahrir
registers and not liable for avanz, finding these registers adequate to
establish the overall ratio between taxpaying and exempt groups at
various dates. Unal used a detailed avanz tahrir register for Harput
in conjunction with other registers to chart the rise and fall of popu-
lation in that town and the relative size and wealth of the Muslim
and Christian populations. Heyd found the cizye registers of the Jews
of Istanbul useful as a source not only for population figures but also
for the location, history, and makeup of the various Jewish congre-
gations of the city. As Shmuelevitz observed, however, data for a
small group might be recorded in a register for another having the
same tax collector, making it complicated to arrive at complete to-
tals.60 The difficulty of guessing what percentage of the population
remained unregistered at any particular time is suggested by an order
mandating a tahrir to enroll new taxpayers because the old ones were
few in number and could not pay the assessed amount; it sounds as
if there was a pool of unregistered people from which new taxpayers
could be drawn. 61
A further barrier to the use of cizye defters to determine population
59
Amnon Cohen, Jewish Life under Islam: Jerusalem in the Sixteenth Century (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 7, 20-35; Uriel Heyd, "Turkish Documents
concerning the Jews of Safed in the Sixteenth Century," in Studies of Palestine during
the Ottoman Period, ed. Moshe Maoz (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1975), 117; Shmuelevitz,
Jews of the Ottoman Empire, 89-90 and notes 24 and 25; Kiel, "Remarks on the Ad-
ministration of the Poll Tax," 77; Perenyi, "Trois villes hongroises."
60 Grozdanova, "Bevolkerungskategorien mit Sonderpftichten und Sonderstatus," 46-
67; Unal, "1056/1646 Tarihli Avanz Defterine Gore," 119-29; Uriel Heyd, "The Jewish
Communities of Istanbul in the Seventeenth Century," Oriens (Leiden) 6 (1953): 299-
314; Shmuelevitz, Jews of the Ottoman Empire, 87 and n. 15.
61
KK 2576, p. 53.
104 CHAPTER THREE
is the practice whereby the cizye of some communities was not assessed
on individuals or on separate households but on the community as
a whole in a fixed lump sum (maktu). Communal leaders divided the
total sum among the individuals in the community. 62 It has sometimes
been assumed that the taxes of all non-Muslim communities were
handled in this way, but in fact the cizye was usually assessed by
means of an actual count. In some cases only part of a village was
assessed under the maktu system, while the remaining households
were assessed individually. Many of the villages of the e§kinciyan
of Yanya, for example, exhibit this dual assessment. Under each vil-
lage appear the names of several individuals and the amount of cizye
to be paid by each (not always the same amount, as some villagers
paid 70 ak~e and others 75, reflecting their more recent addition to
the register). Then appears the phrase ber vech-i maktu, "paying in
a lump sum," followed by a number of hanes paying communally and
a total amount. Finally, the word yekun, "total," introduces the com-
bined total of hanes paying separately and hanes paying communally,
and the cizye total owed by the entire village. 63
The advantages to a community of paying in common were several:
the abiJity to apportion taxes as it saw fit, exempting its clergy from
taxation, for example, or easing the burden on its poorer members;
freedom from harrassment and from the imposition of extra fees by
tax collectors from outside the community; and reduction of the per
capita imposition during a time of population growth. Conversely, the
increase of the per capita tax burden in a period of population decline
would give groups a powerful incentive to switch to an individually-
assessed cizye at such a time. Payment of taxes in a lump sum became
a subject for bargaining between the population and the government.
For example, a summary register of those paying ziyade-i cizye on
various evkaf properties shows numbers of banes and payments by
maktu; in each case it appears that the villagers paid an amount
62
For a general discussion of maktu see Inalcik, "Military and Fiscal Transformation,"
333-34. For the assessment of cizye in Safed by maktu see Lewis, "Notes and Documents
from the Turkish Archives"; Daniel S. Goffman, "The Maktu' System and the Jewish
Community of Sixteenth-Century Safed: A Study of Two Documents from the Ottoman
Archives," Osmanlz Ara§tlrmalarz 3 (1982): 81-90. Collective liability for taxes is the most
efficient mode of collection for small bureaucracies, as can be seen in the case of seven-
teenth-century France (Hilton L. Root, Peasants and King in Burgundy: Agrarian Foun-
dations of French Absolutism, California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy,
9 [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987], 13-16; 207-8).
63
MM 836 (14713) 1001/1592-93, p. 43.
equal to half of what they would have paid had they been assessed
by household. 64
The benefits to the government of the maktu system included ease
of collection, voluntary cooperation by the taxpaying community,
stability and predictability of the assessment through population
fluctuation, and elimination of a range of middlemen who took a share
of the state's revenues; the disadvantages involved a loss of central
control, lowered revenue when the population rose, and the possibility
of incomplete payments in a period of population decline. The six-
teenth century, a time of general population growth, saw efforts by
the Ottoman government to do away with the maktu system in areas
where it was applied. During the seventeenth century, however, al-
though declining population made fixed assessments more onerous for
some taxpayers, the degree of rural upheaval gave the system a practical
advantage for the government in terms of ease of tax collection.
Attempts to do away with it then began to come from the populace. 65
Both taxpayers and government took advantage of the maktu system
to reduce the incidence of abuse by tax collectors and officials.
One difficulty affecting avanz defters in particular is the problem
of determining the number of households in an avanzhane. The usually
accepted generalization holds that one avanzhane was made up of
anywhere from 3 to 15 households, the precise number being deter-
mined by the wealth of the taxpayers. Information in the defters makes
it possible to qualify this statement. It will be remembered, first of
all, that cizye defters for the sixteenth century contain, along with the
number of cizye payers, the total of avanzhanes. In many instances
these two figures are identical. It is highly improbable that in so many
cases the number of Muslim reaya in an area precisely equalled the
number of non-Muslims who were exempt or combined with others
to make up avanzhanes. It is far more likely that the reaya population
of the area was wholly non-Muslim and that their avanzhanes were
64
KK 2559, dated 1023/1614-15.
65 For governmental attempts to eliminate the maktu system see Goffman, "The Maktu'
System" (for the year 959/1544-45); and Uriel Heyd, Ottoman Documents on Palestine,
1525-1615: A Study of the Firman According to the Miihimme Defteri (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1960), 121-22 (for the year 1577). For attempts by taxpayers to do away with it
see KK 2576 (1050/1640-41), pp. 3, 14; and Gyula Kaldy-Nagy, "The Effect of the Timar-
System on Agricultural Production in Hungary," in Studia Turcica, ed. L. Ligeti (Budapest:
Akademiai Kiad6, 1971), 241-48. A similar logic applied to the making of new surveys
(Shmuelevitz, Jews of the Ottoman Empire, 87).
106 CHAPTER THREE
counted as one per household in that period. 66 In accord with this

conclusion is the frequent assessment of the avanz during the first
three quarters of the sixteenth century on the basis of a specified
number of avanzhanes. For example, an imposition made in 913/
1507-8 called for one fortress repairer from every 20 hanes and 20
ak~e from each bane, while in 980/1572-73 the rural areas of Diyarbekir
and the east were assessed one fortress repairer from every 7 hanes
and one mud of grain from every 8 hanes. Combined with the record
of avanzhanes in the defters, these instances confirm the interpretation
that the avanzhanes of the early sixteenth century must have been
individual households.
From the late sixteenth century, however, avanzhanes were clearly
composed of multiple households. The total number of avanzhanes
in the empire dropped nearly 50% between the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries. While this reduction might be attributed to demo-
graphic or economic change, a more likely reason was a change in
the manner of assessment. 67 A record of the avanz of Bahkesir in
1603 provides one indication of the number of individuals or house-
holds in a hane, prescribing that three married men and six bachelors
would constitute one hane. 68 Barkan relates that Muslims settling in
Cyprus in 1015/1606 were counted as 5 taxpayers (nefer, individuals,
referring to heads of households as well as to single men) per
avanzhane. The avanz tahrir of the kaza of Timurci, made in 1032/
1622-23, shows an average of 3.59 individuals per hane. 69 Interest-
66
The generalization of 3-15 households per avanzhane appears in Barkan, "Avar1z,"
15. In his documents on sixteenth-century Palestine, however, Bernard Lewis found the
word avarzzhane to be equivalent to "taxpaying household" ("Notes and Documents from
the Turkish Archives," 10-11; "Studies in the Ottoman Archives - I," BSOAS 16 [1954]:
485), and it is similarly defined by Gokbilgin (Edirne ve Pa§a Livasz, 69). Nejat Goyiin~
also uses avarzzhane as an equivalent for hane, household, meaning a taxable unit (" 'Hane'
Deyimi Hakkmda," 331). As late as 1677, levies of hemp were assessed from avar1zhanes
on the Black Sea coast which were equivalent to single households (Faroqhi, "Crisis and
Change," 465).
67
McGowan, "Osmanh Avar1z-Niiziil Te~ekkiilii," 1329-30. During the seventeenth
century population in Spain declined 17 .6% (John Lynch, Spain under the Habsburgs,
2 vols. [New York: Oxford University Press, 1964], 2: 135). Rifat Ozdemir, "Avanz ve
Ger~ek-hane Saytlar1mn Demografik Tahminlerde Kullamlmas1 iizerine Baz1 Bilgiler," in
X. Turk Tarih Kongresi (1986), Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler, vol. 4, Atatiirk Kiiltiir, Oil
ve Tarih Ytiksek Kurumu, Tiirk Tarih Kurumu Yay1nlan, ser. 9, no. lOe (Ankara: Tiirk
Tarih Kurumu Bas1mevi, 1993), 1581-1613.
68
Akdag, "Tiirkiye>nin iktisai Vaziyeti," 554, ii~ bennak ve altz mucerred bir hane
hesabznca (in view of the disproportionate number of unmarried men to married, this
passage might be better translated "three married men or six bachelors").
69
Barkan, "Avanz," 15; MM 2517 (14730).
ingly, the order for the tahrir, copied into the front of the register,
specifies that taxpayers should be counted as 3 per hane, and while
very few figures for single villages in this kaza come out to round
numbers of persons per hane, most do fall between 3 and 4.
A defter of notes and orders regarding avanz for the year 1051/
1641-42 contains scattered information on the subject of the number
of taxpaying individuals per hane in that year: one village (Bostanh,
p. 7) had 8 individuals (nefer) comprising 1.5 hanes, or 5.3 individuals
per hane; another (Mi.isellem, p. 8) had 20 reaya in 3 hanes, or 6.3
individuals per hane; and a third (Koyun, p. 129), formerly with 71
nefer forming 7 hanes, or 10.1 individuals per bane, had been re-
corded in a new tahrir as holding 59 reaya, 3 descendants of members
of the ruling class (kul oglu), and 2 not present, for a total of 64
individuals forming 9 banes, or 6.6 individuals per bane (reaya only;
7.1 if all inhabitants are counted). The kaza of Manastir in 1640
averaged 3.8 taxpayers per hane. 70 In a register for the early 1050s/
1640s (KK 2576), assessments for most areas in both Rumeli and
Anadolu were figured at an even 5 individuals per bane except for
Dimetoka at 7 individuals per bane and Bey~ehir at 3 individuals per
hane. In 1055/1645-46 Malazgirt was assessed at 97 nefer and 15.5
banes, or 6.25 individuals per hane. 71 Finally, the defter of Kayac1k
dating from 1056/1646--47 published by Emecen shows a total of 455
reaya forming 167.5 banes, or an average of 2.7 individuals per bane.
Only rarely in that register did the number of individuals per hane
in a single village equal a round number, though it usually fell between
2 and 3. The groups of piyade (footsoldiers) and mi.itekaid (retirees)
in this kaza numbered 82 and were counted at an even 4 per hane,
for an additional 20.5 hanes. It should be noted that half and quarter
hanes were registered as such in surveys and are not simply a function
of averaging. The existence of fractional hanes per village or kaza
is evidence that hanes were not actually considered clusters of real
people but were essentially an accounting device used to calculate the
total avariz liability of a village, mahalle, or kaza. If there is a trend
in these figures, it seems to involve an increase in the number of
individuals per bane between the beginning of the century and the
1640s, which would be equivalent to a decrease in tax burden if the
° KK
7
2590; McGowan, Economic Life, 106.
71
MM 3881 (2765), p. 134.
108 CHAPTER THREE
amount demanded remained the same; further research, however, could

reverse that conclusion.
Amounts of Money Taken in Tax
According to the stereotype, the decline period was characterized by

the oppression of Ottoman subjects through high and ever-increasing
taxation. While assessments did increase in this period, the defters,
petitions, orders, and kanunnames showing the amounts of money at
which both cizye and avanz were assessed indicate that the Ottoman
tax system had no pretension to uniformity. Canonical prescriptions
and sultanic decrees notwithstanding, the wide range of variation seen
in agricultural taxes was also characteristic of both cizye and avanz. 72
For all our study, we have only begun to understand Ottoman taxa-
tion; scholars' conclusions have been marred by assumptions about
the uniformity of tax rates, of accession increases, and of the value
of the currency. Synthesizing the available statements, while indicat-
ing overall trends, reveals the true level of diversity within the system
and suggests that more comprehensive research must be done before
we can generalize accurately.
The cizye was usually assessed at the silver equivalent of one gold
piece (50 ak~e in the early sixteenth century), the lowest canonical
rate. Along with the assessed cizye, additional sums were paid to
defray collection costs, usually one ak~e to the collector and one ak~e
to the scribe as salary (gulamiye), and sometimes an additional due
of one ak~e as resm-i kitabet (recording fee), resm-i hane ("bane
fee"), or tefavut-u hasene (money-changing fee). 73 For the mid-six-
teenth century, secondary sources report cizye figures ranging between
50 and 80 ak~e. These reports are not always carefully dated nor the
locations specified, and it is not always clear how long it took a rate
72
This point has also been made by Barkan ("894 [1488/1489] Yih Cizyesinin Tahsilatma
ait Muhasebe Bilan~olari," 1); his research showed that the cizye paid in Rumeli in 894/
1488-89 varied from a low of 6 ak~e for certain widows to a high of over 100 ak~e
for the inhabitants of Drama (pp. 17-28).
73
Cahen and lnalcik, "Djizya," 564; Barkan, Kanunlar, see index. Collection fees were
lower in the late fifteenth century; Barkan, "894 ( 1488/1489) Yih Cizyesinin Tahsilatma
ait Muhasebe Bilan~olari," 9. For cizye amounts from earlier in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, see Akdag, "Tiirkiye'nin iktisadi Vaziyeti," 557-58; Hamid Hadzibegic, Glava-
rina u Osmanskoj Dri.avni, Posebna Izdanja, 4 (Sarajevo: Orientalni Institut u Sarajevu,
1966), 52--62.
change, once ordered, to penetrate to the provinces-or whether the

value of silver was the same throughout the empire. 74 There may also
have been variations in the original tax rates at the time of an area's
conquest. It does appear that the ak~e figure for the cizye was regu-
larly raised as the value of silver dropped during the second half of
the sixteenth century. Rumeli's cizye of 50 ak~e was raised to 60 in
the reign of Selim II. 75 The cizye of the Arab lands seems to have
followed the same pattern at an earlier date: according to a tahrir
register, the cizye of Sis near Adana was raised from 50 ak~e, the
Mamluk rate, to 60 ak~e between 930/1523-24 and 943/1536-37.
Other sources report the Mamluk rate as 60 ak~e per household, which
the Ottomans raised to 80. 76 Rates in eastern Anatolia were lower,
varying from 25 to 35 to 55 ak~e, usually explained by the poverty
of certain areas of the East, though it may be that the ak~e's value
was higher there. Lower rates or total exemptions were occasionally
granted for military or other service or in cases of hardship, such as
residence in a war zone, although in general exempting people from
cizye was considered to be against the interests of the state. Table
5 contains an overview of cizye rates for the period 1560-1660.
In 974/1566-67, on the accession (cillus) of Selim II, a general
increase of the cizye was ordered, reported as 10 ak~e for most parts
of the empire and 5 akc;e for Christians in ~am and Trablus and non-
Muslims in eastern Anatolia. Another increase on the accession of
Murad III (984/1576-77) amounted in most places to 6 akc;e, but in
a few areas only to 5. 77 Accession increases appear to have been the
means by which the cizye's rate was adjusted for inflation. 78 Akdag
74
Numismatic research shows that when the ak~e in Istanbul and Rumeli weighed
.5-.75 grams, the ak~e was still minted in the east at the old weight of .9-1.3 grams
(Ciineyt Ol~er, Y1ldmm Bayezid'in Ogullarma air Ak<;e ve Mangirlar [Istanbul: Yenilik
Bas1mevi, 1968]; ibrahim Artuk, Kanunf Sultan Suleyman Adma Bas1lan Sikkeler, Tiirk
Tarih Kurumu Yaymlar1, ser. 7, no. 58 [Ankara: Tiirk Tarih Kurumu Bas1mevi, 1972]).
75
Cvetkova, Les institutions ottomanes en Europe, 56.
76
For the 50-ak~e rate see Yusuf Hala~oglu, "Tapu-Tahrir Defterlerine gore XVI. Yiizydm
ilk Yarismda Sis (= Kozan) Sancag1," Tarih Dergisi 32 ( 1979): 888-91; for the 60-ak~e
rate see Cohen, Jewish Life, 21, 33. Both Shmuelevitz and Lewis state that the rate for
Damascus and Hungary in the sixteenth century was 75 ak~e but provide neither a specific
date nor documentary support (Shmuelevitz, Jews of the Ottoman Empire, 85 and n. 12,
citing Lewis, Notes and Documents from the Turkish Archives, 10-11).
77
For the 974 increase see Barkan, Kanunlar, 83, 193, 216, 226; Lewis, "Nazareth,"
419. For the 984 increase see Barkan, Kanunlar, 83, 316; two increases of 5 ak~e each
would have brought the cizye of Jerusalem up to the 90 ak~e cited by Cohen for 1590
(Jewish Life, 33).
78
For discussion of the relationship between increases in the cizye and changes in the
110 CHAPTER THREE
Table 5. Cizye Rates in Text, 1560-1660
DATE AMOUNT IN AK~E PLACE
1560s 50-80 Rumeli, Syria

1560s 25-55 Eastern Anatolia
1566 5-10 increase (55-90) Syria
1576 5-6 increase (60-96)
1592 100
1595 5-22 increase ( 105-122)
1604 200
1614 220 Bosna
1626 225 Trabzon
1640 95-333 + 40 maa§ Bosna
1645 290 Ankara
1646 325 Trabzon, Haleb
believed that accession increases were always 5 ak~e, but in both

prescriptive literature (kanun) and cizye defters, the amounts of such
increases vary. 79 After these increases, the cizye was actually lower
in value than in the mid-sixteenth century, as the ak~e had been debased
to approximately half its former value in the mid-1580s.
According to a ferman of the year 1000/1591-92, the nominal amount
of the cizye was increased in that year specifically in order to keep
its value canonically correct with respect to gold. In the fallowing
year, taxes on wine and sheep (bedel-i hamr and adet-i agnam) were
added. It seems that because of abuses in the collection of these taxes,
their assessment according to rates of production and their separate
collection were abolished; they were commuted to flat fees of 30 and
15 ak~e respectively, to be collected with the cizye. Together with
collection costs, these increases resulted, by Akdag' s calculations, in
a cizye of 100 ak~e. 80 Another increase on the accession of Mehmed
exchange rate between silver and gold, see Hadzibegic, Glavarina, 62-64; Cohen and
Lewis, Population and Revenue in the Towns of Palestine, 71-72.
79
Akdag, "Ttirkiye>nin iktisadi Vaziyeti," 558-60.
80
Akdag, "Ttirkiye>nin iktisadi Vaziyeti," 558-59, from a ferman recorded in Ankara
~erci Sicil number 4, pp. 250-51; also in Selaniki, Tarih-i Selanikf, ed. ip~irli, 1: 293,
and Hadzibegic, Glavarina, 65-66. A register of 1014/1605-6, MM 1630 (15674), also
cites the hamr bedeli (wine tax) and ziyade-i cizye (increase of the cizye) as amounting
to 45 ak~e together. Cohen says that this increase took several years to take effect, but
his figures for its amount vary; he lists the total increase as 82 ak~e for Christians and
107 for Jews (Jewish Life, 33), but on another occasion he states that the increase was
60 ak~e for Christians and 88 for Jews (ibid., 232, n. 38). Hadzibegic saw the decree
relating to the sheep tax as beneficial for the reaya, as it permitted them to expand production
with no fiscal penalty. According to Cvetkova, the ordinance dated to 1604, and its purpose
was to encourage sheep-raising (Les institutions ottomanes en Europe, 53).
III (1003/1594-95) is reported by Akdag as 5 ak~e and by Cohen as

12 ak~e for Christians and 22 for Jews in Syria. Evidence from the
~erci sicills shows that during the reign of Mehmed III (1595-1603),
the cizye and additional dues went up from 100 ak~e to 140, and then
in 1013/1604-5, shortly after the accession of Ahmed I (1603-1617),
to 200. 81 After these leaps the rate of increase in the cizye slowed
markedly.
Table 6 summarizes information from a number of seventeenth
century cizye registers on the rates of the cizye assessed at different
locations during the first half of the seventeenth century. These data
show that by the end of Ahmed I's reign, the amount collected had
risen to 220-225 ak~e, where it stabilized for the next two decades. 82
Twice during those two decades, in 1623-24 and again in 1635-40,
the unofficial or market rate of exchange of the akce rose to 240 ak~e
or more, double the official rate of 120 ak~e to the gold piece. These
rises were followed by official government coinage revaluations, the
exchange rate in each instance returning to the official rate for a short
time before creeping upward again. 83 The rate of the cizye did not
follow these ups and downs. By the 1050s/1640s the cizye's ordinary
base rate had increased slightly to 240-250 ak~e, which included the
gulamiye paid to the collector as well as the sheep and wine taxes.
About that time Ko~i Bey cited the normal cizye as 285 ak~e. 84 Cizye
amounts for some of the Balkan sancaks in 1639-40 were found to
range from 95 to 333 ak~e, in addition to which a 40-ak~e salary
called maa§ was collected. 85 The gulamiye was now 40 ak~e as well,
81
Selaniki, however, states that already in 1006/1597-98 the cizye with its increases
amounted to 300 ak~e (Tarih-i Selanikf, ed. ip~irli, 2: 717). For the increase of 1003/
1594-95 see Akdag, "Tiirkiye'nin iktisadi Vaziyeti," 558; Cohen, "New Evidence," 63,
n. 3; Jewish Life, 232, n. 38. For later increases see Akdag, "Tiirkiye'nin iktisadi Vaziyeti,"
559; Hadzibegic, Glavarina, 65-66. The doubling of the sheep tax in 1596 may have con-
tributed to part of the increase; see Akdag, Turk Halkzmn Dirlik ve Duzenlik Kavgasz, 53.
82
Hadzibegic found a rate of 222 ak~e in Bitola in 1031/1621-22 and 232 in 1043/
1633-34 (Glavarina, 67). Documents 96 and 185 in Metodiya Sokolovsky, ed., Turski
dokumenti za istorijata na Makedonskiot narod, Serija Prva: 1607-1699, Tom III: Jan.
1636-end 1639 (Skopje: Arhiv na Makedonija, Komisija za Publikuvatse Arhivski Materijali,
1969) also specify 232 ak~e, and in addition, an "exemption substitute fee" (bedel-i muafi-
yet) of 30 ak~e was charged. According to doc. 153 in the same collection, the Gypsies
of Rumeli paid 200 ak~e. Doc. 174 specifies that the ziyade-i cizye in two vak1f villages
in the area would be 130 ak~e, plus the bedel-i muafiyet of 30, but the document does
not tell what payers of the bedel-i muafiyet were exempted from.
83 Sahillioglu, "XVII. Asnn ilk Yansmda istanbul'da Tedaviildeki Sikkelerin Raici,"
239--41; Pamuk, "Money in the Ottoman Empire," 962.

84
Kofi Bey Risalesi, ed. Aksiit, 112.
85 Hadzibegic, Glavarina, chart, 73-75. The charts in this book are misleading and must
112 CHAPTER THREE
Table 6. Seventeenth-Century Cizye
DATE PLACE AMOUNTS TOTAL
1023/1614 Bosna 200 + 20 sheep tax 220

1023/1614 Drgiip 220 220
1026/1617 Bosna 230, 236 230
1026/1617 Bosna 284, 290 290
1026/1617 Kibns 337 337
1030/1620 Rumeli 126, 210, 214, 223, 233, 240, etc.
1033/1622 Selanik 250 + 120 bedel-i kiirek~iyan 370
1036/1626 Trabzon 220 + 5 accession 225
1038/1629 Trabzon 225 225
1055/1645 Bosna 240 + maa§ 280
1055/1645 Ankara 250 + 40 maa§ 290
1055/1645 Arabkir 250 (cizye + gulamiye) + 40 maa§ 290
1055/1645 Yeni§ehir 339 (cizye + gulamiye + maa§ +
new increase) 339
1056/1646 Diyarbekir 240 + 5 accession 245
1056/1646 Cunke§ 251 + maa§ 291
1056/1646 Trabzon 240 + 5 accession + 40 maa§ 285
1056/1646 Trabzon 240 + 5 accession + 40 maa§ +
40 gulamiye 325
1056/1646 Haleb 285 (cizye + gulamiye) + 40 maa§ 325
Sources: MM 2256 (5712) 1026/1617, MM 2428 (5331) 1030/1620, MM 2728 (3457)

1037/1627-28, KK 2576 (1050/1640--41), MM 3881 (2765) 1052-55/1642-46.
and it sometimes looks as if it were being charged twice (see Trabzon

and Haleb in the table). The maa~ was paid to the individual doing
the actual house-to-house or village-to-village collecting, while the
gulamiye was assigned to the central government appointee respon-
sible for assembling and accounting for the cizye of a larger area,
such as a sancak. 86
It is obvious that the variations in cizye totals shown in Table 6
did not originate in a distinction among taxpayers of high, middle,
and low income. 87 Descriptions in the documents suggest that since
be used carefully; filling blank spaces in them with data from the text creates quite a
different impression from the one presented by the charts as they stand.
86
For further discussion of the increase in the collectors' salaries see Chapter 5. In
comparison, French diocesan tax collectors of the period took as their fee 2 112% of what
they collected, while local collectors took 5% (Beik, Absolutism and Society, 248 and n. 5).
87
An accounting register of the cizye of Rumeli and Anadolu for the year 1013/
1604-5, MM 1520 (5334), shows the cizye of only two places as being assessed at differing
rates for people of high, medium, and low income: the displaced (yava) Jews of Istanbul
paid 445 ak~e, 325 ak~e, and 265 ak~e respectively, while the non-Muslims of the evkaf
of Ali Pa§a-1 Atik paid 330, 315, and 300 ak~e respectively. All others paid a cizye of
27 4 ak~e plus a sheep tax of 26, for a total of 300 ak~e.
the original amount of the cizye varied from place to place, the basic
amount of a locality's cizye was derived from older records and
supplemented by accession increases and collection costs decreed since
the last collection, yielding a new total to be paid. Occasionally it
would appear that the inclusion of these added amounts was forgotten
or ignored, and that the previous total rather than the original cizye
was used as the base figure for the next installment. Or a local increase
may have been decreed by an order of which no copy has yet come
to light; the continued exploitation of the ~erci sicills will doubtless
clarify the way in which cizye amounts were determined. Some of
the lower figures may be explained by the exemption from increments
to the cizye of non-Muslims whose cizye was paid to a vaktf. A vaktf
account register for Edime in 1042/1632-33, for example, shows the
cizye at 70 ak~e per bane even at that late date. 88 To bring their tax
closer to that of everyone else, vak1f reaya were assessed a supple-
mental cizye (ziyade-i cizye) around the tum of the century. Lower
inflationary increases in taxes paid to evkaf may explain some of
the financial difficulties experienced by dervish orders in the seven-
teenth century.
With respect to the avanz, it is impossible to calculate the total
rates of its various levies without knowing the cash value of the goods
and services involved. 89 This discussion will therefore focus on the
avanz in cash, which varied even more wildly than the cizye. Table
7 provides an overview of avanz figures over the century. An avanz
levied in 890/1485 demanded 15 ak~e per bane, while levies in 903/
1497-98 and 913/1507-8 were 20 ak~e per bane. A levy in 922/1516-
17 exacted 15-30 ak~e per bane in Rumeli and 10-20 ak~e per bane
in Anadolu. In 944/1537-38 the residents of Bahkesir paid 60 ak~e
per hane. 90 In 977/1569-70 and 978/1570-71 the Ttirkmens of Haleb
88
Omer Liitfi Barkan, "Edirne ve Civanndaki Baz1 imaret Tesislerinin Y tlhk Muhasebe
Bilan~olan (2 fotokopi ile birlikte)," Beige/er 1 (1964): 368. The increases in the cizye
were apparently not universal; a kanunname for Hatvan from the mid-seventeenth century
still prescribes a cizye of only 66 ak~e (Barkan, Kanunlar, 316).
89
For the complexities involved in only one of these levies, see Barkan' s discussion
of the levy of oarsmen (kiirek~i) in his article "Avar1z." Except where otherwise indicated,
the data cited here on the rates of the cash avanz in the sixteenth century come from
that article. Mutafcieva in her discussion of "feudal rent" does not attempt to quantify
the portions paid in labOr or goods (Agrarian Relations in the Ottoman Empire, 182-86).
90 For
the levy of 890/1485 see Halil Inalcik, "Osmanh idare, Sosyal ve Ekonomik
Tarihiyle ilgili Belgeler: Bursa Kadi Sicillerinden Se~meler," I: Beige/er IO, no. 14 (1980-
81): 56-57; for Bahkesir see Akdag, "Tiirkiye'nin iktisadi Vaziyeti," 554.
114 CHAPfER THREE
Table 7. Avarzz Rates in Text, 1500-1660
DATE AMOUNT IN AK~E PLACE
1507 20
1516 15-30 Rumeli
10--20 Anadolu
1537 60 Bahkesir
1569-70 80 Haleb, Diyarbekir
1577 50 Mara§
1592 160 Bahkesir
1606 300 Kibns
1621 360 Manastir
1622 100 Anadolu
1626-30 300 Bitola
1636 400 Pa§ a
1642 325 Vidin
1643 100 Rodos, istankoy
1645 435 Yeni§ehir
1645 501 Bosna
1655 325 Rumeli
1656 125 Rumeli, Anadolu
paid one gold piece (sikke-i filori, equal to 80 ak~e) per hane, the
same rate charged in 980/1572-73 in Diyarbekir and Mardin. In 981/
1573-74 Debri and Kalkandelen were assessed 1 oarsman and 1000
ak~e for every 15 hanes, or 67 ak~e per hane in addition to the man,
while the payment demanded in Mara~ in 985/1577-78 amounted to
only 50 ak~e per hane. Thus, although the avanz base rate for the
mid-sixteenth century has been cited as 30--40 ak~e, as early as 944/
1537-38 the actual rate was almost double that. 91 Over the sixteenth
century, however, the per capita weight of timar taxation decreased
considerably, so the total tax burden increased at a slower rate than
the avanz itself. 92
After the coinage devaluation in the mid-1580s, avanz rates were
immediately raised. 93 The kiirekr;i bedeli (oarsmen substitute cash levy)
in Trabzon was 80 ak~e in 972/1564--65, but in 1001/1592-93 the
91
McGowan, Economic Life, 109; the increases of later years, therefore, were pro-
portionally only half as large as McGowan thought. Cf. Mutafcieva, Agrarian Relations
in the Ottoman Empire, 189.
92
Faroqhi, "Taxation and Urban Activities," 35.
93
The Ottoman experience was not unique in this respect; Spain's customs dues tripled
or quadrupled in 1566 (von Ranke, The Ottoman and the Spanish Empires, 115), while
the inauguration of the millones in 1590 nearly tripled again the existing tax burden per
household (Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 234 ). Denmark's extraordinary taxes doubled
between 1629 and 1643 (Parker, Europe in Crisis, 286).
same levy in Bahkesir amounted to 160 ak~e, and Ankara paid 250
ak~e the following year. In 1010/1601-2 Lapseki's kiirek~i bedeli was
240 ak~e per bane. Reaya settling in Kibns (Cyprus) in 1015/1606-
7 paid 300 ak~e per bane as bedel-i avanz, and the same tax in 1031/
1621-22 cost the reaya of Manastir 360 ak~e per bane. An avanz
raised in 1032/1622-23 to pay a levy of soldiers with firearms was
originally set at 240 ak~e; this proved to be more than was needed,
however, and the rate was lowered to 207 ak~e in Akhisar, 177 ak~e
in Marmara, and 221 ak~e in Gordiik. That same year, however, the
avanz for Anadolu was only 100 ak~e per bane. The cash avanz in
1037/1627-28 in the area of izvornik displayed a variegated assess-
ment pattern: the urban banes of izvornik itself were assessed at 370
ak~e per bane; the banes of the kz§lak, the wintering area of the nomads,
were assessed at 400 ak~e; and ~iftliks were assessed at 100, 150,
200, or 250' ak~e each. In 1038/1628-29 and 1039/1629-30, the avanz
of Bitola was 300 ak~e. A few years later, in 1046/1636-37, the
residents of Bitola again paid 300 ak~e per bane, but the sancak of
Pa§a paid a bedel-i nuziU (cash substitute for grain for horses) of 5
kamil kuru§, or 400 ak~e. 94 Thus, the avanz rose steadily until the
1620s, when it began to fluctuate between 100 and about 400 ak~e.
Ko~i Bey's treatise, however, ignored this variation, citing the normal
level (which he called the kanun, regulation) as 300 ak~e. 95
Table 8 displays amounts of cash avanz assessed from 1049/1639-
40 to 1052/1642-43, as recorded in register KK 2576. The figures
hover around 325 ak~e per bane. For about the same period, however,
Barkan reported the assessment of considerably higher figures: 1000
ak~e per bane in 1048/1638-39, 950 ak~e per bane in 1049/1639-
40, and 1100 ak~e per bane in 1050/164~1. 96 Barkan did not specify
his sources for these figures nor the locations where they were as-
sessed; but since amounts charged in one location usually differed
from those charged in another, and rates rose and fell depending on
94
Akdag, "Tiirkiye'nin iktisadi Vaziyeti," 555; MM 1720 (15562); M. ~agatay Ulu~ay,
XVII. Aszrda Saruhan'da E§kiyalzk ve Halk Hareketleri, Manisa Halkevi Yaymlanndan
(Istanbul: Resimli Ay Matbaas1, 1944), 187-88; MM 2550 (5855), p. 85; Barkan, "Avanz,"
15; McGowan, Economic Life, pp. 204-5 n. 17; KK 2571; Metodija Sokolovski, ed., Turski
dokumenti za istorijata na Makedonskiot narod, docs. 8, 41, 182, and 219.
95
Ko~i Bey Risalesi, ed. Aksiit, 112.
96
Barkan, "Avar1z," 15; MM 2770 (16163) 1041/1631-32. The bedel-i niizill was
stabilized at 600 ak~e in the eighteenth century (McGowan, Economic Life, 109-10;
Cvetkova, "Contribution a l 'etude des imp0ts extraordinaires," 60). Abou-El-Haj translates
a petition dated 1108/1696 prescribing this amount ("Power and Social Order," 98).
116 CHAPTER THREE
Table 8. Avarzz Assessed around 1640
YEAR PLACE AMOUNT TOTAL
1049/1639 Mezistre 300 + 25 gulamiye 325

1049/1639-40 Avlonya 325 + 40 maa§ 365
1050/1640 Mora & Mezistre 325 325
Rodos & Istankoy 325 325
Trrhala 325 325
Dsktip 325 325
Haslar 360 360
~am 390 390
Zagora 408 408
Bolu 700 700
1051/1641 Vize & Saray 325 325
1052/1642 Vidin 325 325
Vize 325 325
Trrhala 325 + 30 maa§ 355
Sidrekaps1, Selanik 325 + 40 maa§ 365
Source: KK 2576
the government's needs, specification of time and place is essential.

Avanz figures gleaned from registers of similar date reveal only one
instance of such a large assessment: the bedel-i niiziil for the year
1042/1632-33, totalling 20 kamil kuru§ (1560 ak~e) in Aksaray and
14 kamil kuru§ (1092 ak~e) in Haleb, amounts reduced by 25% on
petition of the inhabitants. The bedel-i niiziil appears always to have
been higher than the regular avanz, varying from 380 to over 1000
ak~e, and Barkan's figures probably refer to this levy.
Avanz amounts in subsequent years show little evidence of a pattern,
let alone of a continuous rise. The avanz of Rodos and istankoy, after
being raised from 140 ak~e to 325 in 1050/1640--41, was lowered
again to 160 ak~e in 1053/1643-44. In 1055/1645-46 Yeni§ehir paid
an avanz of 435 ak~e per bane, which was the avanz base amount
plus gulamiye, plus a bedel-i tabhane (cookery fee, for the manufac-
ture of either ship's biscuit or gunpowder), plus a new increase called
simply zam-z cedid (new increase). In the same year, most of Bosna
was assessed an avanz of 400 ak~e per bane plus an 81-ak~e increase
(zam) and a sheep due (celebke§an) of 20 ak~e, while Bosnian Muslim
ba§tina cultivators paid only 146 ak~e and Christian ba§tina cultiva-
tors 200 ak~e. The following year all of Rumeli paid a bedel-i niiziil
of 400 ak~e per bane. In 1064/1653-54, the taxpayers of §am paid
400 ak~e per bane; but the avanzhanes of Rumeli paid 225, 250, 300,
325, 350, or 358 ak~e depending on location; the "exempt" (muafen)
paid a bedel or substitution price of 30 ak~e, and the out-of-office

(mazulen) paid 120 ak~e. In 1066/1655-56 the avanz rate for most
of Rumeli was a flat 325 ak~e per bane, for Rhodes 160 ak~e, and
for Trrhala 80 ak~e; Anadolu in that year paid 300 ak~e and Istanbul
429 ak~e per hane. In 1067/1656-57, however, the amount assessed
empire-wide was only 125 ak~e per hane. 97
It is possible, by using the highest and the lowest figures commonly
applied for cizye and avanz, to calculate very roughly the nominal
percentage of increase in these taxes, although this calculation ignores
rate variations from place to place. With this considerable caveat, it
can be said that in the period 1555-1625, the period of greatest inflation,
the annual rate of the cizye rose 212-350%, depending on location,
and that of the avanz 425-500%. It will be recalled that the nominal
inflation rate of the ak~e, according to Barkan's figures, was 317%
over that period. Thus, at this time the increase of the cizye ordinarily
did not keep pace with the rate of inflation, while growth in the rate
of the avanz outstripped the inflation rate but not to the extent of
doubling it. Over the century as a whole the picture is somewhat
different, as taxes continued to rise while inflation slackened. Between
1555 and 1655, the inflation rate of the ak~e was 225%. Cizye rates
increased 306-480% in that period, while avanz rates increased 108-
436%. Thus, at its highest the growth in the cizye rate was double
the inflation rate for the whole century, and at its lowest it was still
somewhat above inflation. Most of the increase, however, can be ac-
counted for by the rise in the gulamiye and the institution of the
second salary, the maa§. These figures actually exhibit not an increase
in the cizye itself but a salary raise for its collectors. Excluding the
gulamiye and maa§, neither of which enriched the treasury, the average
increase in cizye was only 263%, 17% over the rate of inflation, and
the lowest rates barely kept up. Making a similar calculation for the
avanz is more complex, as its rates vacillated wildly according to the
government's needs. Its percentage of increase ranged from half to
twice the rate of inflation, depending on the year, but the average rate
increase for the century was 272%, only 21 % above the rate of inflation.
In the seventeenth century the avanz was also assessed more frequent-
ly, every year as opposed to every 4-5 years in the early sixteenth
century. The number of avanzhanes in the empire, however, was halved
97 MM 3881 (2765), p. 202; MM 2256 (5712), p. 59; Barkan, "Avar1z," 15; MM 4410
(2989), p. 39; MM 4410 (2989); MM 4511 (3847); MM 4576 (18206).

118 CHAPTER THREE
at the beginning of the seventeenth century, effectively cancelling out

much of that increase. The actual rise in the cash avanz was only
moderately greater than the rate of inflation.
Thus, at a time when government expenditures should have been
expanding to pay for a larger standing army and modem weaponry,
increases in the rates of the cizye and avanz taxes, the two largest
sources of central government income, were not much higher than the
rate of inflation. This conclusion must be taken into account when
evaluating claims about tax increases. If per capita production were
decreasing in the seventeenth century, even a modest increase in the
tax rate would have placed a proportionately greater burden on tax-
payers, but that research remains to be done. As far as the government's
budget is concerned, the increase was minimal. This analysis does not
take into account other sources of government income, but if the figures
for cizye and avanz are at all typical, it is not surprising that the
Ottoman Empire began to fall behind in the seventeenth-century arms
race and to decline militarily vis-a-vis the European states.
CHAPTER FOUR
TAXATION WITHOUT ASSESSMENT?

TAX FARMING (iLTiZAM)
More than any other form of taxation, tax farming carries a symbolic
freight of decline ideology. As a "sign of decline," tax farming connotes
weakness in the central government; it is assumed to give license to
unprincipled individuals to exploit the peasantry unchecked. Its mere
existence is treated as presumptive evidence for loss of central control
and diversion of government revenues into private pockets. Its use
supposedly raised tax rates beyond legitimate levels and encouraged
corruption and abuse by tax farmers. The effect of tax farming in the
Ottoman Empire, however, has been assumed without investigation;
narration of individual examples of extortionate practice has generally
substituted for an understanding of its principles and procedures. Before
an accurate assessment of its impact can be made, tax farming docu-
ments must be investigated more systematically to determine how the
system functioned under normal circumstances. Although a full ex-
ploration of tax farming must include its operation at the provincial
level, this examination of the central finance department's role in tax
farming between 1560 and 1660 finds evidence for greater central
control and less corruption than previously suspected.
Revenue farming means contracting out the collection of state
income, taxes or revenue from state-owned monopolies and enter-
prises, to private bidders. It attempts to maximize revenue through
competitive bidding, in which bidders undertake to supply an agreed-
upon sum regardless of the actual yield of the revenue source. It
transfers risk and effort from the government to the tax farmer, who
is not only burdened with the labor of collection but is responsible
(often in advance) for the full sum contracted for, even if the revenue
source fails to yield it. 1 On the other hand, if the revenue yield is
higher than the contracted amount, the tax farmer benefits from the
1 There
is a suggestive analogy between the government's farming its taxes and the
risk-avoidance behavior characteristic of peasants in an agrarian economy (see James C.
Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance [New Haven: Yale
120 CHAPTER FOUR
discrepancy, which in certain circumstances can be considerable. Tax

farming is a high-risk, high-yield investment.
As a means of revenue collection, tax farming affords a greater
degree of central control than is possible under a system in which
rights over state revenue sources are held as a form of private prop-
erty, such as a feudal system. In such a system, the government does
not receive the revenues and has no control over how they are spent.
Its only recourse is the threat to remove a designee disobedient to
central authority or so corrupt as to cause public outcry. Farmed
revenues, on the other hand, are either remitted to the government
or disbursed according to government orders. In addition, tax farmers,
sent by the state, embody a greater degree of central authority than
vassal rulers or feudatories. At the same time, the farming of taxes
allows for less central control than a fully bureaucratized system
of revenue collection by salaried members of a state apparatus, in
which both collection and disbursement come under direct govern-
ment supervision.
Revenue farming was known to the ancient world and was widely
employed in both east and west down to the development of modern
bureaucracy. 2 Its use was on the rise in early modern Europe as
monarchs expanded their standing armies, gained tighter control over
their kingdoms, and sought to increase their revenues. 3 By contracting
University Press, 1985]). See also Murat <;1zak~a, "Tax-Farming and Financial De-
centralization in the Ottoman Economy, 1520--1697," Journal of European Economic History
22 (1993): 221-22; his major study on tax farming was inaccessible to me at the time
of writing.
2
Eisenstadt, Political Systems of Empires; Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A
Comparative Study of Total Power (rpt. ed. New York: Vintage Books, 1981), 168, 317-
18. For tax farming in the ancient Near East see Matthew W. Stolper, Entrepreneurs and
Empire: The Murasu Archive, the Murasu Firm, and Persian Rule in Babylonia Uitgaven,
Nederlands Historisch-Archeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 14 (Istanbul: Nederlands
Historisch-Archeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 1985). For classical Europe see A.H.M.
Jones, "Taxation in Antiquity," in The Roman Economy: Studies in Ancient Economic and
Administrative History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), 151-85; E. Badian, Publicans and
Sinners: Private Enterprise in the Service of the Roman Republic (Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1983).
3
For early modern England, see A.P. Newton, "The Establishment of the Great Farm
of the English Customs," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society ser. 4, vol. 1 ( 1918):
129-55; W. Percy Harper, "The Significance of the Farmers of the Customs in Public
Finance in the Middle of the Seventeenth Century," Economica 9 (1929): 61-70; Frederick
C. Dietz, "Elizabethan Customs Administration," English Historical Review 45 (1930):
35-57; idem, English Public Finance, 2: 311-58; Robert Ashton, "Revenue Farming under
the Early Stuarts," Economic History Review ser. 2, vol. 8 (1956): 310--22. For France,
see F. Bayard, "Fermes et traites en France dans la premiere moitie du XVIIe siecle,"
TAX FARMING (iLTiZAM) 121
revenue collection to private persons, ambitious rulers employing small

numbers of officials could exploit wide territories for their own benefit
rather than delegating control to others. 4 In addition, granting tax farms
became a means of bestowing privilege and rewarding loyalty and
service in a fashion that did not deplete crown lands or royal treasure. 5
Besides monetarizing and potentially increasing the yield, tax farm-
ing also made delivery of money to the treasury more predictable and
more secure. 6
In the Islamic world, revenue farming was employed from an early
period, and it was widespread in medieval Egypt. 7 Among the Ottomans
Bulletin du Centre d' Histoire Economique et Sociale de la Region Lyonnaise 4 (1975):

45-80; Richard J. Bonney, "The Failure of the French Revenue Farms, 1600-60," Eco-
nomic History Review ser. 2, vol. 32 (1979): 11-32; Mousnier, Institutions of France under
the Absolute Monarchy, 2: 67-72, 423-39. In comparison, tax farming was somewhat less
important in Spain; see Elliott, Imperial Spain, 104; Pierre Vilar, A History of Gold and
Money, 1450-1920, trans. Judith White (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1976),
146-48. However, the revolt of the Comuneros was related to a proposal to farm the
a/cabala of the towns; after the revolt these taxes were farmed and by 1534 were being
purchased by a consortium of towns (Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 311-33). Moreover,
the taxes of Spain's dependencies such as Naples were farmed and the income dedicated
to the support of Spanish armies (Parker, Europe in Crisis, 266).
4
European "governments in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were in-
capable of mobilizing funds, armies or navies without considerable private assistance";
Spain in the late sixteenth century did institute a policy of direct tax administration but
was forced to abandon it by the 1630s under the pressure of war. Administrative ideol-
ogy, nevertheless, always called for complete central control (Thompson, War and Gov-
ernment, 2-7).
5
A noted instance of tax farms granted as rewards was the English revenue farms of
the Elizabethan and Stuart periods, bestowed on favorites and close advisors of the monarchs
(Lawrence Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558-1641 [Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1965], 428-39). In Spain, tax farming was a preserve of the lesser nobility from which
common people were barred (Elliott, Imperial Spain, 104). In the Ottoman Empire in the
1570s, Michael Cantacuzenus, the buyer for the palace, who built a number of new galleys
for the sultan after Lepanto, received in return the farm of the customs, salt works, and
fisheries of the empire and died fabulously wealthy; his contemporaries knew him as
~eytanoglu, son of Satan (Nicolae Iorga, Byzance apres Byzance [Bucharest: Association
international d'etudes du sud-est europeen, Comite national roumain, 1971], 121). In Russia,
by contrast, profits from tax farming do not seem to have been sufficient to attract great
merchants and top officials (Paul Bushkovitch, "Taxation, Tax Farming, and Merchants
in Sixteenth-Century Russia," Slavic Review 38 [1978]: 398).
6 The farming of English import dues, besides increasing the yield and making receipt
of the revenues more predictable, enabled these taxes to escape the treasury's extremely
old-fashioned and inefficient administrative system (Dietz, English Public Finance, 2: 321-
30); nevertheless, the amounts received by the crown were much less than the total collected
(idem, "Elizabethan Customs Administration," 52). Tax farming was widely used in France
for customs dues (traites), the salt monopoly (gabelle), internal tolls, sales taxes (aides),
and taxes on the royal domain land (Mousnier, Institutions of France under the Absolute
Monarchy, 2: 423-39).
7 Tax farming appeared in the early Islamic period under the names qabala and daman;
122 CHAPTER FOUR
its employment probably antedates its earliest record in the fifteenth

century. Over the next two centuries its use increased, as it did in
western Europe, and probably for the same reasons: to centralize and
maximize revenue, to monetarize the tax system, to transfer collection
risks, and to seek societal support by granting privileges to a wider
range of people than was possible with other revenue collection
systems. 8 Most of the revenues of the Arab provinces were farmed
after the conquest of that region. Revenues formerly collected by central
government employees were farmed with increasing frequency during
the sixteenth century, as were timar lands after the mid-seventeenth
century. 9 Although Ottoman tax farming is often condemned as a sign
of governmental corruption, this criticism seems to be related to a
rising level of abuse in the later period, when tax farming itself became
more common. Changes in the operation of the system over time,
therefore, need to be investigated. Here we will examine the central
treasury's role in the processes of assessment and collection of farmed
revenues, the types of records produced by these processes, the ways
in which the finance department attempted to control the behavior of
see C.H. Becker, "Steuerpacht und Lehnswesen," Der Islam 5 (1914): 81-92; Lfc?Skkegaard,
Islamic Taxation, 92-108. In the Abbasid era, tax farmers had the authority, not granted
to fiscal employees of the state, to remit taxes in cases of need (Abu Yusuf, Kitab al-
Kharaj, trans. A. Ben Shemesh, Taxation in Islam, 3 [Leiden: E.J. Brill; London: Luzac
& Co., 1969], 49). For taxation in Egypt see Kosei Morimoto, The Fiscal Administration
of Egypt in the Early Islamic Period, Asian Historical Monographs, 1 (Kyoto: Dohosha
Publisher, Inc., 1981); Hasanain Rabie, The Financial System of Egypt, A.H. 564-7411
A.D. 1169-1341, London Oriental Series, 25 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972).
8
Lewis, "Some Reflections on the Decline," 122; Omer Liitfi Barkan, "The Social
Consequences of Economic Crisis in Later Sixteenth Century Turkey," in Social Aspects
of Economic Development: Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Social
Aspects of Economic Development, Istanbul, 1963 (Istanbul: Economic and Social Studies
Conference Board, 1964), 26; Ioana Constantinescu, "L 'Affermage des domaines aux pay sans
corveables dans les principautes danubiennes sous le regime phanariote," Revue roumaine
d'histoire 20 (1981): 517-34; Huri Islamoglu and <;aglar Keyder, "The Ottoman Social
Formation," in The Asiatic Mode of Production: Science and Politics, ed. Anne M. Bailey
and Josep R. Llobera (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981 ), 312. For evidence of
the marketing of mukataa produce by miiltezims, see KK 2576, p. 114.
9
Salih Ozbaran, "Some Notes on the Ottoman Practice of Iltizam in the Arab Lands
in the Sixteenth Century," Arab Historical Review for Ottoman Studies, no. 5/6 (1992):
89-95; Bakhit, Ottoman Province of Damascus, 205-1; Gibb & Bowen 2: 21. In the first
half of the century vacant timar lands were ordinarily reassigned to members of the salaried
military forces who had demonstrated ability in warfare (Howard, "Ottoman Timar System
and Its Transformation," 214; Geza David, "Financial Policy in a Hungarian Sanjaq [The
Case of Simontornya]," in Between the Danube and the Caucasus: A Collection of Papers
concerning Oriental Sources on the History of the Peoples of Central and South-Eastern
Europe, ed. Gyorgy Kara, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Research Group for Altaistic
Studies [Budapest: Akademiai Kiad6, 1987], 23-29).
tax farmers, and how the system responded to the pressures of the
early seventeenth century.
Mukataa Revenues and Records
Ottoman tax farming is often referred to as "the mukataa system,"

but the word "mukataa" had a broader meaning than tax farming.
Mukataa (lit. "something divided") referred to the division of state
revenue sources into portions to be distributed in return for a mutually
agreed-upon price. 10 Mukataa revenues could come from land (land
not subject to tapu, not held in hereditary peasant proprietorship, such
as rice fields) or from other taxes (such as customs dues) or govern-
mental monopolies (such as mints or salt production). Each portion
of the revenue, each mukataa, could be farmed out, collected by a
salaried agent (emin) of the government in a process called emanet,
or awarded as part of a timar, zeamet, or has. Farming the revenue,
that is, contracting for its collection, was called iltizam (undertaking),
the contractor was a mUltezim (undertaker), and the revenue was said
to be collected by means of an undertaking (ber vech-i iltizam). In
keeping with this usage, the word mukataa will refer here to a section
of revenue, while iltizam will refer to the tax farm contract, the un-
dertaking itself. Revenue farming procedures included a bidding pro-
cess, by which the revenue level was set and collection rights awarded,
a collection process (sometimes related to a production process, as
in state-run enterprises), and a recording and reporting process, in
which farmed revenues were either disbursed or submitted to the
treasury. Revenue could also be offered in farm by property-holders
other than the government, especially by evkaf or by officials and
palace personnel granted lands as has or zeamet.
10
For definitions see Haim Gerber, "Muqata'a," E/2 7: 508; Pakahn, Osmanlz Tarih
Deyimleri ve Terimleri Soz/Ugii, 2: 578; Uzun~ar~1h, Merkez ve Bahriye Te§kilatz, 332
n. 2; Inalcik, "Village, Peasant and Empire," 4-5. Generalized discussions tend to obscure
the wide variety of tax farming practices. For detailed studies on the fifteenth century
see Gobilgin, Edirne ve Pa§a Livasz, 87-160; Akdag, Tiirkiye'nin iktisadf ve i~timaf Tarihi,
2: 334-69; Halil Sahillioglu, "Bir Miiltezim Zimem Defterine gore XV. Yiizyd Sonunda
Osmanh Darphane Mukataalan," iOiFM 23 (1962-3): 145-218. For the seventeenth century,
Bistra A. Cvetkova's "Recherches sur le systeme d'affermage (iltizam) dans l'Empire
Ottoman au cours du XVIe-xvme s. par rapport aux contrees bulgares," Rocznik Orienta-
listyczny 21 (1964): 111-32, though founded on Gokbilgin, stresses the contribution of
tax farming to Ottoman decline and oppression in the Balkans; for a more analytical
124 CHAPTER FOUR
Although tax farming put the collection of taxes into private hands,
in the Ottoman Empire it was not, as is often claimed, a private
enterprise. 11 In the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth
centuries, the finance department exercised strict control over who
could touch its revenues and under what circumstances. 12 Although
technically those undertaking iltizams were not state employees, they,
like other types of tax collectors, were registered in the finance
department's records as government servants. In order to do their
work and be remunerated, iltizam officials needed imperial orders in
their hands.13 Awards of iltizams, appointments of officials, issuance
of collection orders, deposit of revenues in the treasury, and submis-
sion of proper accounts were all meticulously recorded, and the records
were checked whenever a problem arose. Tax collection proceeded
in accordance with survey registers (tahrir defters), revenue laws
(kanun), and local custom (adet), and taxpayers were free to complain
to the government if tax farmers exceeded those limits. Every
miiltezim's accounting registers were inspected at the end of his term.
Miiltezims and officials could be dismissed for oppression or extor-
tion, for not adhering to proper procedure, or for not fulfilling their
contracted obligations. Any idea that mukataa revenues were up for
grabs was strongly discouraged.
All these processes generated documentary records, the oldest extant
dating from the mid-fifteenth century. These documents can be used
examination of its role in the upheavals of the period see Inalcik, "Military and Fiscal
Transformation," 327-33.
11
Despite reiterated assertions of the absence of state intervention in or supervision
of tax farmers, which appear with regularity in the secondary literature (for example, see
Mantran, Istanbul, 217), the Ottomans did exercise quite a lot of control over tax farmers.
This contrasts with the situation in Spain, for example, where the asiento fell under the
civil law of contracts (Thompson, War and Government, 257), or in England, where tax
farmers' accounts were not subject to audit (Newton, "Establishment of the Great Farm
of the English Customs," 137; Dietz, "Elizabethan Customs Administration," 46).
12
Cvetkova stresses a lapse of central control in the later seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries which is not visible in the period under study ("Recherches sur la systeme
d'affermage," 121). The work of Ariel Salzmann on tax farming in the 18th century
suggests that if there was a lapse of control, it was by no means universal, since involve-
ment in tax farming generated an interest among participating social groups and individu-
als in the reproduction and extension of state power ("An Ancien Regime Revisited").
In Egypt, tax farmers were not only considered government appointees, they wore special
uniforms (Israel M. Goldman, the Life and Times of Rabbi David lbn Abi Zimra: A Social,
Economic and Cultural Study of Jewish Life in the Ottoman Empire in the 15th and 16th
Centuries as Reflected in the Responsa of RDBZ [New York: Jewish Theological Seminary
of America, 1970], 152).
13
A record from 899/1493 indicates that salaries and fees ate up about 10% of the
receipts of a mukataa: Akdag, Turkiye)nin iktisadf ve i~timaf Tarihi, 347 n. 1.
to reconstruct the taxation system itself and to investigate fiscal and

economic conditions on the local and regional level. 14 The sources
of mukataa revenue were extremely diverse; any kind of revenue might
be included, and in practice different sorts of revenue were often
combined within a single iltizam. The destinations of the funds were
equally diverse, and many types of payments could be made from
a single revenue source. Tax farming records thus form valuable sources
for the history of trade, agriculture and commodity production, and
military funding and organization. 15 The existing mukataa and iltizam
records are voluminous; this study cannot attempt to cover them all,
nor can it furnish a complete exposition of how these systems worked
in the Ottoman Empire between 1560 and 1660. Summary records
offer the most comprehensive coverage of mukataa income and
expenditures. For example, a published summary of the farmed rev-
enues of Anatolia and northern Syria gives an overview of the sources
of a large part of central government income and indicates how it
was spent. 16 Precisely because they are summaries, however, the
information such records contain cannot provide a detailed explana-
tion of the workings of the system. Study of mukataa records for a
single location over time may be the most fruitful approach for this
purpose. An excellent example is Vass' s treatment of the finance
administration of the province of Budin in Hungary, which relates
records of bidding and payment on the tax farm of Vac to those of
the provincial administration and its finances. 17 Nevertheless, it is
14
See, for example, Inalcik, "Notes on N. Beldiceanu's Translation of the Kanunname."
A general comparison of mukataa registers with tahrir registers was made by Dtindar
Giinday, "Tahrir Defterleriyle Mukataa Defterleri Arasmda Mukayese," POF 21 (1977):
277-82.
15 Detailed provincial mukataa records for customs revenues have been used to track
changes in the economic life of Szegedin over a three-year period (Gyula Kaldy-Nagy,
"Turckiye Reestrovye Knigi Mukata 'a kak Istorceskie Istocniki [Les livres de compte turcs
'Muqata'a'-Source de documentation historique]," in Vostocnye Istcniki po Istorii Narodov
Jugo-Vostocnoj i Central' no} Evropy, ed. A.S. Tveritinova [Moscow: Izdatel' stvo "Nauka,"
Glavnaja Redakcija Vostocnoj Literatumy, 1964], 76-90. Tax farming records other than
customs registers have rarely been employed in this way; however, for the use of iltizam
records in the kad1 sicills of Ankara as a source for information on mohair production
and trade see Ozer Ergen~, "1600--1615 Ydlar1 arasmda Ankara iktisadi Tarihine ait
Ara~tirmalar," in TUrkiye iktisat Tarihi Semineri, Metinler/Tartl§malar, ed. Osman Okyar
and H. Dnal Nalbentoglu, Hacettepe Universitesi Yaymlan, C13 (Ankara: Hacettepe
Universitesi, 1975), 145--68.
16
Murphey~ Regional Structure in the Ottoman Economy; this is not, however, a typical
summary register compiled for accounting purposes but a regional overview.
17 Elod Vass, "Elements pour completer l'histoire de !'administration des finances du
vilayet de Buda au XVIe siecle," in Studia Turcica, ed. Lajos Ligeti, Bibliotheca Orientalia
Hungarica, 17 (Budapest: Akademiai Kiad6, 1971 ), 483-90.
126 CHAPTER FOUR
unwise to generalize from the experience of a single area, nor can

we estimate the impact of events in a single place on the financial
state of the whole empire. Numerous local and regional studies will
be required to produce a satisfactory account of the operation of the
mukataa system as a whole and of the struggles over revenue and
control of revenue sources that formed an integral part of the complex
state-society relationships entailed by tax farming. 18
The term iltizam refers to a method of collection and not a kind
of revenue, but in the early centuries urban revenues tended to be
retained as part of the imperial has, collected by emanet or iltizam,
while revenues of agricultural lands worked by peasant households
were usually distributed as timars. Out of 177 Balkan cities in the
sixteenth century, for instance, the revenues of 159 were designated
as has and zeamet, 9 belonged to evkaf, and only 9 were awarded
as timars; just under half of the sultanic has was farmed, while the
remainder was collected by emanet. 19 Tax farmers were usually less
effective in managing agricultural revenues than long-term holders of
land because of the difficulties of collecting agricultural tithes in kind-
the need for a large number of short-term employees, a vast storage
system, and a system of marketing the crops. 20 The revenues of imperial
has lands were sometimes farmed, however, especially when the lands
in question were outside the tapu system, like rice paddies or mezraas;
over time, even tapu lands were subjected to iltizam. More typically
farmed were the revenues of state-owned monopolies like salt or metals,
revenues generated by enterprises and industries such as mills, mints,
or dyehouses, and revenues which were irregular in nature or whose
total yield was difficult to estimate accurately or to collect, such as
fines or marriage taxes, customs dues or market taxes. 21 Tax farming
could also be used to collect revenues other than those of the mukataa
system per se, such as cizye and avanz taxes or document fees.
18
Halil Berktay, "Three Empires and the Societies They Governed: Iran, India and the
Ottoman Empire," in New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History, ed. Halil
Berktay and Suraiya Faroqhi (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 247.
19
Nicolai Todorov, The Balkan City, 1400-1900, Publications on Russia and East Europe
of the School of International Studies, University of Washington, 12 (Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 1983), 80-83.
20
Haim Gerber, Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem, 1890-1914, Islamkundliche Untersuchungen,
101 (Freiburg: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1985), 160-61.
21
An order enforcing an imperial monopoly for the sake of ensuring the flow of iltizam
revenues is KK 5019 ( 1038/1628-29), p. 169. A description of sixteenth-century Sidon
illustrates the variety of urban revenues collected by farming: revenues of the port, slaugh-
A single revenue source could pass from the status of timar to

emanet to iltizam and back. It was possible for mukataa revenues,
even from a source formerly given in iltizam, to be included as part
of a timar; for instance, the timar of is mail, katib of the defterhane
in 977/1569-70, included mukataa revenue from the bridge market
in Karahisar-1 Teke. 22 The has of the beylerbey and sancak bey and
the zeamets of suba§iS (urban commanders) routinely included, in
addition to village agricultural taxes, revenues from market taxes,
mills and other enterprises that were normally farmed or collected ber
vech-i emanet. 23 Around 1540 many timars and zeamets included
income from mills, fishing stations, and the like, possibly because of
a shortage of suitable land revenues for the growing number of military
personnel awarded timars. This practice was not new even then; timar
records from a century earlier also record the inclusion of mukataa
revenues in timars. 24 Vacant timar lands, whose revenues were normally
collected by emanet, could be farmed out as iltizam. The relationship
was reciprocal: in the early eighteenth century, farmed revenues in
the conquered territory of Tabriz were granted as timars to garrison
troops because the miiltezims had not kept up with their treasury
payments. 25
Emanet and iltizam were used interchangeably as collection meth-
ods for certain revenues. After a tahrir of Hamid and Teke sancaks
in 976/1568-69, imperial has revenues which had until then been
terhouse, dyeing house, salt tax, horse market tax, oxen tax, road tolls, revenues from
strayed persons and runaway slaves, market inspection fees, weighing fees, beyttilmal,
poll tax on Jews, charge for night watchmen, taxes on Christian pilgrims, wineshops and
wine, soap shops, winter pasture, olive presses, silk wheels, buffaloes, bees, and goats
(Muhammad Adnan Bakhit, "Sidon in Mamluk and Early Ottoman Times," Osmanlz
Ara§tirmalarz 3 [ 1982]: 64-66). For a list of farmed revenues of Edirne in the fifteenth
century see Gokbilgin, Edirne ve Pa§a Livasz, 89-124; for those farmed in Aleppo in 1583
see Jean Sauvaget, Alep: Essai sur le developpement d'une grande ville syrienne, des
origines au milieu du X/Xe siecle (Paris, Librairie orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1941), 254-
56; and for tax farming in Egypt see Shaw, Financial and Administrative Organization
and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 31--40; 98-133.
22 Timar
Ruznam~e Defteri 31, p. 353 (I owe this reference to Douglas A. Howard).
23 An iltizam
on farmed taxes in southern Rumeli was cancelled (fesh olunmak) when
they were removed from the havass-1 hiimayun and made part of a vizierial has: MM
564 (15405) 992/1584-85.
24 Robert
Lee Staab, "The Timar System in the Eyalet of Rumeli and the Nahiye of
Dimetoka in the Late Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries," (PhD dissertation, University
of Utah, 1980), 58, and examples on 51, 52, 69, 85, 86, 291, 292; Inalcik, Hicrf 835
Tarihli Suret-i Defter-i Sancak-z Arvanid, xxxiv-xxxv, and examples on 9, 39, 43.
25 Fariba Zarinebaf-Shahr, "Tabriz under Ottoman
Rule (1725-1730)" (PhD disserta-
tion, University of Chicago, 1991), 112-14.
128 CHAPTER FOUR
collected in emanet were bid for as an iltizam, and tithes (a)§ar) in

the province of Aydm which were collected by emanet in 980/1572-
73 were later farmed. By the same token, revenues normally farmed
out as iltizam could be collected by emanet if necessary, such as when
bidders on the taxes of Sak1z offered less than the amount in the
survey register, or when no bidders appeared for the iltizam of the
salt works of Mora in 983/1575-76. Brigandage by deserting soldiers
made farming the revenues of Filibe excessively dangerous, so it was
ordered that they be collected ber vech-i emanet. In another case, the
has of the provincial governor of Aydin aml"S~gla was added to the
imperial has, where it was offered as an iltizam. The emin resigned
and no new bidders came forward due to the difficulty of collecting
taxes over the entire area of the has, which was scattered through
several kazas. Numerous people declined even to accept it in emanet,
and the position of emin lay vacant (and the revenue uncollected) for
some .time. Finally·in 973/1565-66 it was awarded to a certain Mustafa
in his absence; he was to be given a berat for it if he returned
"fortunately" (saadet ile) from campaign. 26
Some revenue sources experienced repeated change in status, such
as the beyti.ilmal (unclaimed inheritances) of the Jews of Istanbul, held
in iltizam for a sum of 50,000 ak~e for three years from 972/1564-
65 to 974/1566-68. The end of the iltizam saw a deficit in collection
of 10,000 ak~e, and no one was willing to submit a bid for the next
three-year period (and risk facing a similar deficit). Consequently, that
revenue source was designated as emanet. However, the emin and
katib quit their job (the source does not say why) and nothing was
collected for several years. Finally in 983/1575-76 two other indi-
viduals undertook a bid of 40,000 ak~e, and the revenue source reverted
to the status of iltizam. In another example, when the Danubian ports
of Vidin and Nigbolu were closed on account of the rebellion of the
voyvoda of Wallachia, their iltizam was annulled (fesh olunmak) and
the existing revenues were collected ber vech-i emanet for three years.
After conditions settled down, a new bid for the iltizam was proposed.
A similar fate befell the mukataa of the port (iskele) of ~e§me in
26
For the tahrir of Teke and Hamid see Murphey, "Ottoman Census Methods," 125-
26. The first three examples here come from register MM 241 (115) 969/1561-62, fols.
97b, 25b, and 58a; the case of Mora is from KK 4994 (983/1575-76), fol. 20b; that of
Filibe is from MM 687 (9820), p. 196, and that of the provincial governor's has is from
MM 241 (115) 969/1561-2, fol. 58a. It was possible for a tax farmer to be compelled
to accept another term even against his will if necessary (Goldman, lbn Abi Zimra, 152).
Aydin in the years 973-976/1565-68 as a result of the temporary loss

of that island by the Ottomans. 27
The organization of a mukataa was complex, involving a number
of officials with different functions. One group of officials was charged
with managing and operating the revenue source, whether a mine or
a candle works, a customs house or a piece of agricultural land. The
man in charge was the emin, or agent, who functioned as head of
the enterprise, collector of the revenues, or manager of the lands. In
the case of has lands or other types of landed property, the chief
official might be a voyvoda (financial supervisor in a kaza), mutesellim
or musellim (financial agent of a sancak), or mutevelli (supervisor of
a vak1f). The official in charge, whatever his title, functioned as
supervisor and decision-maker for the mukataa, as is clear from an
order instructing a kad1 on how to manage mukataas without emins.
He was to allocate the waters of a rice field (~eltiik), hire and fire
workers, ensure that accurate records were kept, and oversee revenue
submission. 28 A katib, or scribe, was responsible for record-keeping.
Depending on the nature of the revenue source, there might be numerous
other agents, employees, and assistants. The operation of a mint, for
instance, involved a different set of workers from a customs post or
a rice field belonging to the sultan's has. The word muba§ir, agent,
often seen in connection with mukataa records, did not refer to a
specific office but was a general term for a subordinate, as was the
word adam (man, in the sense of employee).
A second set of officials collected revenues for the treasury and
delivered them to the capital or to their intended recipient. In the case
of mukataa revenues collected by emanet, the responsible official was
also called an emin. He was assisted by a katib, also a government
appointee. When revenues were collected by iltizam rather than emanet,
this emin and katib were replaced by the miiltezim and his officials.
The miiltezim, the successful bidder for the revenue farm, could be
27 KK 4994 (983/1575-6), p. 57; MM 687 (9820), p. 173 dated 1006/1597-98; MM

241 (115) 969/1561-62, fol. 94a.
28 KK 5019 (1038/1628-29), p. 184. The people operating the revenue source seem
to have stayed on the job even when the revenues were farmed, in contrast to England,
where the tax farmer appointed all the officials (Dietz, "Elizabethan Customs Adminis-
tration," 38-39). The statement made by both Cohen (Jewish Life, 142) and Todorov (The
Balkan City, 84), that despite the farming of revenues to private individuals the taxes were
collected by employees of the state, must refer to the work of this group of officials. For
the various types of financial supervisors and their responsibilities see lnalcik, "Central-
ization and Decentralization."
130 CHAPTER FOUR
either a single individual or a partnership or consortium. In the fifteenth

century the milltezim was commonly known as the amil (pl. ummal,
agent or tax farmer). This term, however, almost never appears in
seventeenth-century documents; even in documents from the late
sixteenth century it is used primarily when revenues formerly farmed
were transferred to emanet. 29 The tax farmer was required to work
closely with the emin or agent in charge of the revenue source; fifteenth-
century kanuns mandated, and orders in court registers reiterated, that
the amil must not do anything without the know ledge and cooperation
of the emin. 30 The milltezim was directly responsible to the govern-
ment for collecting and submitting the revenues of the iltizam and
for selecting subordinate officials.
A number of other officials were responsible to the government for
aspects of iltizam operation. An emin and katib, subordinates of the
milltezim, were primarily responsible for revenue collection, just as
in an emanet. In the seventeenth century, revenues were often col-
lected by someone designated as the kabzz-z mal (receiver of the money);
this official, often the nazrr, seems to have assembled funds collected
by a number of more lowly functionaries. The office of kab1z-1 mal
may be a product of the employment of absentee military emins, or
it may have resulted from the practice of sub-farming, assembling
large groups of revenue farms under a single head. Another position
that gained prominence during the seventeenth century was the havale
(pl. havalegan), the person or persons receiving collected funds or
conveying them to their destination. 31 This function seems originally
29
MM 267 (2775) 973/1565-66, p. 32, contains an order concerning unsold mukataas
of Usktip whose revenues were collected by amils in emanet; MM 241 (115) 969/1561-
62, fol. 21b: bundan akdem ummal uhdesinde 260,540 akr;e iken, "formerly, when it [the
iltizam] was in the hands of amils for 260,540 ak~e ... ". Sahillioglu describes other
terminology used for cases where revenues formerly collected in emanet were bid on by
their emins ("Bir Mtiltezim Zimem Defterine Gore," 147); in the seventeenth-century
documents examined here these distinctions seem to have been less important.
30
Inalcik, "Notes on N. Beldiceanu's Translation of the Kanunname," 144; idem,
"Osmanh idare, Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihiyle ilgili Belgeler," no. 14: 3; 13, no. 17: 11-
12; Kaldy-Nagy, "The Cash-Book of the Ottoman Treasury in Buda," 179. In England,
too, the customs collector and the controller were required to act in concert with one
another (Dietz, "Elizabethan Customs Administration," 42).
31
A havale can be defined as an assignation, that is, the assignment on a particular
revenue source of the payment of a particular item of expenditure; the same word is also
used for the document of assignment and for the person to whom it was awarded (see
Halil Inalcik, "J:lawala," E/2 3: 283-85). The difficulty of transferring large amounts of
coinage over the muddy and bandit-infested roads of England __ in the sixteenth century
has been described by Stone, Crisis of the Aristocracy, 511.
to have been performed on an ad hoc basis, but in the seventeenth

century it became a regular appointment. The yasak~z, on the other
hand, prominent in fifteenth-century records as an enforcer of iltizam
regulations, did not appear in the seventeenth-century documents
examined and was seldom seen in those of the late sixteenth century.
The nazzr, or inspector, was responsible for ascertaining the correct-
ness and completeness of the iltizam's accounts. Traditionally the
kad1 of the area, he was expected to apply his knowledge of law and
of local conditions to solve problems arising from the undertaking.
Occasional mention is made of a nazzr-z nuzzar, suggesting a hierarchy
of nazrrs. From the mid-sixteenth century, the office of nazrr was
increasingly awarded not to the local kad1 but to a nominee of the
miiltezim who was often a ~avu§, less frequently a member of the
standing army or a timariot. The function of inspection and oversight,
however, was not abandoned to the miiltezim's designee but was
performed by another official called the mufetti§, again a kad1, who
served as financial inspector for a whole province or region. 32 One
of the most important tasks of the miifetti§ and nazrr was to ensure
that iltizams were awarded only to suitable and capable people, people
able to do the work of collecting and bear the financial responsibility
involved. Finally, the kefil (guarantor) was responsible for guarantee-
ing payment of all or part of the sum contracted for, in the event that
the revenue source proved insufficient or the contractor defaulted.
An iltizam might involve sub-farming portions of the revenue to
yet another layer of officials. 33 In urban areas, for example, there was
32 For a discussion of the kad1' s role in tax farming as recorder, intermediary, and
guarantor see M. Tayyib Gokbilgin, "XVI. Asrrda Mukataa ve iltizam i§lerinde Kad1hk
Miiessesesinin Rolii," Tebligler, Tiirk Tarih Kongresi, 4th (Ankara: Tiirk Tarih Kurumu,
1952): 433-44. Sometimes he also had to act as enforcer of the government's decisions
(idem, "Hatvan Kad1hgmm iki Sicilli," in Hungaro-Turcica: Studies in Honour of Julius
Nemeth, ed. Gyula Kaldy-Nagy [Budapest: Lorand Eotvos University, 1976], 315-19).
Every miifetti§ encountered in this research was a kad1, like Mevlana Mehmed, the kad1
of Selanik and Sidrekaps1, miifetti§ for the mukataas of Selanik (KK 4994, p. 2). Cvetkova
has given examples of nominations of non-kad1s to the position of miifetti§ but she did
not reveal the date or say whether these nominations were ratified by the central gov-
ernment ("Recherches sur le systeme d'affermage," 123). Gokbilgin found one example
of a non-kad1 acting as miifetti§ in the mid-sixteenth century ("Kad1hk Miiessesesinin
Rolii," 441). European tax farmers do not seem to have had any supervision of this kind.
33 Cvetkova, "Recherches sur le systeme d'affermage," 126-29. In England, the large
"general farm" with subdivisions was found to be more profitable than many smaller ones,
as enforcement of government decisions was more effective and less money was spent
on administration and bribery (Newton, "Establishment of the Great Farm of the English
Customs," 149).
132 CHAPTER FOUR
a tendency for various mukataas to be consolidated under one or a

few major miiltezims, who then assigned or farmed out mukataas
within their iltizam to others. In rural areas the same process might
take in large expanses of territory. Thus there came into existence
a pyramidal hierarchy of tax farmers, only the upper levels of which
dealt directly with the state. At the head of such pyramids of revenue
collection could be found important military-administrative officials
such as leaders of palace cavalry and janissary forces or provincial
governors and sancak beys. 34 The obvious problems of control in such
a system have not yet been studied in detail, but the finance depart-
ment's registers formed the means by which the state kept track of
these layers of officials. With the exception of the miifetti§, the nazir,
and the kefil or kefils, all officials could be recompensed from the
revenues of the emanet or iltizam, and as recipients of state funds,
they had to be recorded in the finance department's registers.
The recording of mukataa matters was complex and produced several
different kinds of mukataa records. The simplest are those pertaining
to revenue collected ber vech-i emanet, by emins who were salaried
employees of the central government. These records are of four types:
registers listing assignments of emins, detailed accounts kept by emins
themselves, registers showing deposits of money into the central
treasury, and summary accounting registers of funds submitted. An
example of an assignment (tevzi) register is KK 2282, which listed
the names of those appointed to collect beytiilmal funds in Rumeli
and Anadolu for the year 984/1576-77. The names of emins appointed
to collect various taxes in emanet can also be found in tahvilat or
tevcihat registers, containing entries for revenue amounts submitted
to the treasury along with the names of those responsible for their
collection. Emins' detailed daily account registers, often called def-
ter-i mufreda{ or ruznam~e, are rarely found in the central treasury;
their summarized accounting registers (muhasebe defterleri) appear
more frequently. The importance to the government of the emins'
muhasebes is indicated by an imperial order firing the emin of certain
34
lnalcik, "Military and Fiscal Transformation," 291, 329; idem, "Centralization and
Decentralization," 29-30. The English customs regime in the sixteenth century attempted
through tax farming to install such a hierarchical system rather than having every customs
collector independent of the others, because controlling and altering the system would be
much easier (Dietz, "Elizabethan Customs Administration," 38); in addition, tax farming
was less expensive for the state than direct collection (Newton, "Establishment of the Great
Farm of the English Customs," 146). In France, as well, tax farms showed a tendency
toward consolidation (Bonney, "Failure of the French Revenue Farms," 22).
taxes in the sancaks of Teke, Aiaiye, and Hamid for not submitting
his muhasebe, which caused anxiety over possible non-collection of
revenue. 35 The third type of register, a record of deposits of funds
into the treasury, is exemplified by register MM 303 (16020) dated
977-78/1569-71, recording deposits from has lands held in emanet,
and by register MM 619 (7376) dated 994-95/1585-87, detailing
receipts from zeamets held in emanet in the area of Filibe. These
records are organized according to the nature of the revenue source
and its geographical location. Treasury deposits of emanet revenues
also appear in tahvilat registers, listed by bureau and month, and in
income daybooks (ruznamr;e-i varidat), listed in order of receipt. 36
Finally, the finance department compiled summary accounting registers
from the income ruznam~es and from individual muhasebe registers
submitted by emins. Register KK 2281 is an accounting summary
(muhasebe) for receipts and expenditures of the mukataas and mevkufat
(vacant timars) of Mente~e. These revenues were not farmed but were
collected ber vech-i emanet, and the register lists them emanet by
emanet with their totals. A published example of an accounting
summary is a muhasebe of the customs dues of Tul~a, collected ber
vech-i emanet and remitted to Akkerman every three months. 37
Documentary records for mukataas held in iltizam were more
complicated than those for emanets, as records were required of the
various bids and the award of the iltizam. The bidding process was
initiated by a petition, or arz; some original petitions still survive. A
successful bid was rewritten in the form of a report (called telhis or
tezkire) summarizing the circumstances of the iltizam and the details
of the bid, which was sent to the central government for confirma-
tion.38 These reports were copied or simply bound together into reg-
isters called in the catalogues mukataa/mukataaya ait arz tezkireleri,
reports on petitions for mukataas, or talebnameleri, documents of
35 MM 241 (115) 973/1565-66, fol. 53b. For an emin's muhasebe in published form
see Gyula Kaldy-Nagy, "Two Sultanic Hass Estates in Hungary during the XVlth and
XVIIth Centuries," Acta Orientalia Hungarica 13 (1961): 31-62.
36 MM 1488 (651) 1012/1603-4 lists the tahvilat of the muhasebe-i Rumeli bureau,
and KK 5172 ( 1026/1616-17) the tahvilat of the maadin bureau. Registers numbered 1696
to 1956 in the Kamil Kepeci collection of the Ba§bakanlik Ar§ivi are income and expense
ruznam~e registers.
37 Janos H6van, "Customs Register of Tul~a (Tulcea), 1515-1517 ," Acta Orientalia
Hungarica 38 (1984): 115-42.

38 Original petitions include AE Kanuni 269, 271, 274, and III. Murad 275; iltizam
tezkires include AE I. Ahmed 336, 479; KK 4994, p. 2; and MM 404 (17950), p. 1.

134 CHAPTER FOUR
request. Registers detailing iltizam awards are also called registers

of undertaking (mukataa iltizam defterleri), registers of sale (furuht-
the award of an iltizam was often called a sale), or registers of bestowal
(tevcih) of mukataas. 39 The holders of iltizam, the miiltezims, are also
listed in detailed ruznam~e registers, tevzi (distribution) registers used
in the collection process, and tahvilat/teslimat/hasilat registers record-
ing the submissions of funds to the treasury. 40 In addition, miiltezims
were required to keep individual muhasebe registers showing moneys
collected, expended, and remitted, and to submit these accounts to the
treasury at the end of the period of iltizam.41 Summary mukataa account
registers exist which cover a whole area or province.42 Finally, orders
describing tax farms can be found in maliye ahkam registers and in
specialized mukataa ahkam registers, as well as in muhimme defterleri,
"registers of important affairs. "43
The term of an iltizam, especially one for agricultural revenue, was
usually figured according to the solar calendar and then translated into
the hicri calendar. 44 The solar calendar was made up of the twelve
39
Mukataa ait arz tezkireleri registers include KK 4990-4997, 4999, 5003, 5005-5010,
5014, 5016, and 5024, MM 526 (5359) and 314 (7189); talebname registers are MM 1665
(5383), 1835 (3360), and 2027 (4684). MM 304 (7319) is called a mukataa iltizam defteri
showing 3-year revenue averages; MM 241 (115) is labelled mukataa iltizamzm gosterir
defteri (register showing iltizams of mukataas); MM 453 (4972) is entitledfiiruht-i muka-
taat-z Haleb (sale of the mukataas of Haleb); MM 708 (6218) is a mukataa furuht defteri
(register of mukataa sales).
40
Register MM 595 (312) includes a mukataa ruznam~esi; MM 851 (18118) is an
income and expense daybook for various mukataas. MM 331 (17862) and 4843 (5804)
are mukataa tevzi or tevziat registers, and MM 1142 (5294) is a mukataat tevcih register.
MM 522 (5640) is a mukataa teslimat register, as are MM 646 (14382) and 812 (3229),
while mukataa tahvilat registers include MM 877 (1830), 1288 (501), 1308 (693), and
1786 (5688).
41
One emin's detailed account register can be found in AE Kanuni 26, dated 975/1567-
68. Examples of miiltezim's muhasebes are KK 2283, 3061, 5015; MM 1393 (16038).
A published example is in Fekete, Siyaqat-Schrift, #15, 1: 304-17; 2: plates 29-30.
42
MM 533 (22420) shows Belgrad's mukataa income and expenditures, MM 828 (7449)
those ofNigbolu. MM 411 (1838) shows all of Rumeli and MM 1322 (4116) the mukataas
of Egypt, while MM 2233 (18129) summarizes the mukataas of Anadolu in 16 pages.
43
MM 22603 (9824) dated 1021/1612 is a mukataa ahkfun register whose heading
reads: Siiver-i ahkdm-z §erife der zaman-z Nesuh mukataa-f el-fakir an 19 Zulhicce sene
1021 ila 12 Saban sene 1022, copies of noble orders in the time of your humble servant
the mukataac1 Nesuh from 19 Ziilhicce 1021 to 12 ~aban 1022/10 January-27 Septem-
ber 1613.
44
KK 4994 (983/1575-76), p. 12, petitions the ruler to grant a bidder's request for
the mukataa of the kapan galle of Selanik to be calculated according to the solar rather
than the lunar year; the reason given was that selling this mukataa by the lunar year was
difficult and there had been no other bidders that year. Knowledgeable people testified
that following the solar calendar would be more profitable. Sahillioglu published an order
Roman months: Yanar, Febrar or Felvar, Mart, Abril, May1s, Yunyus,

Yulyus, Agustos, Septuris, Uhturis, Nuvurus, and Dekuris. An iltizam
frequently began either on 1 Mart or on Nevruz (the solar New Year,
25 Mart); the first installment payment was usually due on 1 Agustos
or on H1zrr ilyas's day (Ruz-1 H1zrr, April 23), while the second pay-
ment was due on Ruz-1 Kas1m (October 26). It was quite possible,
however, for an iltizam to begin on another date, as in some of the
examples below, which show iltizams beginning on 1 Abril, 1 Yulyus,
or 1 Septuris. Most iltizams in register MM 15259 began on 1 Mayis.
The months of Yunus and Nuvurus were not often used, possibly
because they could easily be misread as Nevruz. Iltizams of revenues
not dependent on the agricultural cycle were often computed by the
lunar calendar.
The total amount of the iltizam, divided by the number of days
in its term, yielded an amount due per day, called the kzst el-yevm.
This daily portion, multiplied by the number of days in a payment
period, equalled the amount due in each installment. It was also used
to prorate a miiltezim's liability: if his iltizam was so much for one
year, then the daily portion was so much, but if the iltizam ran for
more or less than an exact year, the amount to be added or subtracted
could be determined by multiplying the daily portion by the number
of days in question. Three years was the normal term or tahvil for
a single iltizam, after which the mukataa was again offered for bid-
ding. A six-year tahvil could result from the award of two three-year
tahvils together. 45 Contracts of other lengths could also be made, and
it was possible for a bid to be submitted in mid-term. If it was accepted,
the old miiltezim's term would end as of that date and his liability
would be prorated for the shorter time period. 46 The examples below
illustrate these and a number of other features of the iltizam system
as practiced in the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.
They reveal that the system was not static and that generalizations
to the provincial officials of Basra in 1105/1694 making the same switch, on the ground
that revenues of that province were tied to the agricultural calendar and the monsoon cycle
("S1v1~ Y1h Buhranlar1," 78). These discrepancies occurred perennially in the tax systems
of Muslim states; for the Mamluks see D.S. Richards, "A Mamluk Petition and a Report
from the Diwan al-Jaysh," BSOAS 40 (1977): 1-14.
45
KK 4990 (971/1563-64 ), p. 21, 2 tahvils; p. 22, 3 tahvils. For a fuller definition
of the term "tahvil" see chapter 6.
46 An example is the iltizam of the mint in Diyarbekir, farmed to Bagdes(?) and his
partners for three years in 1021, but bid on by Nikofor and partners after only two years
had passed (AE I. Ahmed 336).
136 CHAPTER FOUR
based on a single place or period must not be taken to represent the

functioning of the system as a whole.
Bidding and Revenue Amounts
A description of central finance department procedures and documents

for iltizams must begin at the beginning, with the initiation of a bid.
The initiative for making a bid came from the bidder or talib in the
form of a petition (arz). Any financially responsible person could bid
on a tax farm, and bidders and other iltizam employees came from
all branches of society: bureaucrats, religious personnel, military men,
local elites, merchants, well-to-do farmers, widows, tribal sheikhs,
members of the non-Muslim communities, even slaves. Tax farming
was one institution that brought the empire's diverse populations
together and gave them a reason to cooperate with the state and with
each other. 47 Bidders presented petitions either at the court of the kad1
serving as nazir or milfetti§ of the mukataa or at the imperial divan
in Istanbul. Information on the bid and on guarantors for the sum
offered was recorded in the kad1 sicills and a copy (suret) in the form
of a tezkire or telhis was sent to Istanbul for recording in the mukataa
iltizam registers. For a bid presented in Istanbul, the telhis was produced
by the divan scribes and communicated to the local kad1, who re-
corded it in his sicil. The kad1 was also required to find kefils for
the amount bid and was sometimes called upon to testify to the bidder's
financial capability or find witnesses to do so. 48
Accounts from later periods show that during the nineteenth cen-
tury, iltizams were offered to bidders only at particular times and in
public gatherings or auctions regulated by kanun and carefully over-
47
Mark Alan Epstein, The Ottoman Jewish Communities and Their Role in the Fifteenth
and Sixteenth Centuries, Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, 56 (Freiburg: Klaus Schwarz
Verlag, 1980), 107-11; Gerber, "Jewish Tax-Farmers in the Ottoman Empire," 143;
Eisenstadt, Political Systems of Empires, 129. For a slave holding a tax farm (with his
master as a guarantor) see Halil Inalcik, "Bursa I: XV. Asrr Sanayi ve Ticaret Tarihine
Dair Vesikalar," Belleten 24 [1960]: 45--66, 244-58; rpt. in Osmanlz imparatorlugu Top/um
ve Ekonomi uzerinde Ar§iv r;ali§malarz, incelemeler [Istanbul: Eren Yaymlan, 1993], 238).
In England tax farming and its rewards in contacts and privileges were reserved for the
upper nobility and in France for the great financiers, though both groups drew on less
important people as investors (Newton, "Establishment of the Great Farm of the English
Customs;" Bonney, "Failure of the French Revenue Farms," 21-22).
48
A tezkire from the finance department to the kad1 of Istanbul making these requests
is AE Kanuni 221.
seen to preserve order and prevent fraud. 49 While similarly regulated

public auctions may have been held in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, the records hold little trace of such a practice; most of the
time it appears that the presentation of an arz was sufficient to constitute
a bid. 50 As part of his bid, the talib agreed to follow certain proce-
dures, such as submitting all or part of the total sum in advance or
in regular installments, rendering accounts at the end of each year
of his term, or presenting kefils for all or part of the amount pledged-
so that, one group of bidders was told, the money would not be
embezzled nor the reaya oppressed. 51 In tum, the talib could pose
certain conditions of his own.
Individual petitions from persons bidding on tax farms can be found
in the archives primarily in the Ali Emiri collection of documents;
a typical example is AE Kanuni 274 dated 969/1561--62. 52 This petition,
addressed to the sultan, did not name the sender (intimating that he
presented the petition in person), but an appended note (der kenar)
identified him as Mustafa, a member of the silahdar corps, presenting
his petition in the imperial divan. Mustafa requested the iltizam of
all mukataas in Edirne and offered to pay a 100,000-ak~e increase
(ziyade) over the current price (al-asl) for each one, with the condition
(§art) that he be granted the positions of nazrr (financial inspector)
and §ehremini (city administrator) of Edime and emin of the beytiilmal
(controller of the estates of those dying without heirs). Another
appended note indicated that the current nazrr, Seyyid Mehmed, had
held these three offices for the preceding 17 years. Above the petition,
in the wide margin left for further notes, were copies of register entries
verifying the date of appointment of Seyyid Mehmed to his offices.
Finally, the uppermost line of the document was an order (buyuruldu)
containing the decision to appoint Silahdar Mustafa to replace Seyyid
49
Haim Gerber, Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem, 161-64; Eli Eshkenazi, "Za Nachina na
Subiraneto na Niakoi Danutsi v Zapadna Bulgariia prez XIX V. do Osvobozhdenieto,"
Izvestiia na I nstituta za I storiia 16-17 ( 1966): 344-45.
50
The seventeenth-century writer Ko~i Bey used the word auction (bey men yezid) for
iltizam sales but did not describe the procedure employed; Ko~i Bey Risalesi, ed. Akstit,
56; Zuhuri Dam§man translates the same term as a~ik artirma, open bidding (Ko~i Bey
Risalesi, Ttirk Ktilttirti Kaynak Eserleri Dizisi [Istanbul: Milli Egitim Bas1mevi, 1972],
57). For a description of the bidding process used in Egypt see Shaw, Financial and
Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 31--41.
51 Halil Sahillioglu, "Osmanh idaresinde Kibns>m ilk Y1h Btit~esi," Beige/er 4, no. 7/8
(1967): 30.
52
AE Kanuni 269 and 271 are similar in format.
138 CHAPTER FOUR
Mehmed, with the effective date and a notation setting his salary (no
raise was granted, possibly in view of the opportunity for enrichment
offered by the iltizam).
Some petitions were written by kad1s on behalf of bidders who
presented their bids orally in court. One example is a petition written
by the kad1 of Selanik on behalf of a resident of that city named
ibrahim b. Omer, who appeared before him to bid for the mukataa
of the ~eftali Haslan for a 3-year period beginning 1 Mart or 18
Zilkade 982/1 March 1575.53 Omer undertook (kabil ve iltizam) a
3000-ak~e ziyade, for a total of 33,000 ak~e over three years, to be
guaranteed by Ali b. Abdullah, a resident of the same quarter. The
kad1 ascertained. that both of these men were capable and diligent
(yarar ve maslahatguzar), recorded the bid in his register (sicil), and
composed and transmitted the petition.
More common in the archives than actual petitions are documents
called telhis or tezkire which repeat and record the information in the
petitions. They appear either as individual documents or bound or
copied into registers called mukataa ait arz tezkireleri (reports on
petitions concerning mukataas). In archival catalogues, tezkires can
be found under the terms talebname (document of request), fiiruht
(sale), and tevcih (bestowal). The tezkires themselves do not indicate
how they were produced, but a catalog description for one states that
it was written by the Aydm katibi, a provincial scribe. 54 It seems
likely, however, that most were written by the nazlf or miifetti~ of
the mukataa at the time the bids were made. They were then sent
to the central finance department for compilation in registers, accom-
panied by the bidder's petition. Clearly, then, the tezkires record bids
which were (at least temporarily) successful. The central government's
record of tezkires was authoritative, as can be seen by a register entry
concerning a group of four mukataas in Selanik. A janissary named
Omer Cafer was awarded the position of emin of these mukataas by
the central government, but when he arrived in Selanik he found that
three of them, traditionally awarded separately from the fourth, had
53
KK 4994 (983/1575-76), p. 3. Records of petitions written by kad1s for bids on
iltizams (called arzname) can be found in the kad1 sicills; see Inalcik, "Bursa Kadi
Sicillerinden Se~meler: I," 40. See also Halit Ongan, Ankara'mn iki Numaralz Ser'iye
Sicili, Tiirk Tarih Kurumu Yaymlan, ser. 14, no. 4 (Ankara: Tiirk Tarih Kurumu Bas1mevi,
1974), nos. 416, 471, 476, 486, 489, concerning a single case; another case, nos. 153,
713, 714, 766, 1685.
54
ibniilemin 42, dated 984/1576-77.
been granted locally to a Selanik resident. On the basis of his entry

in the central government's record of awards, Omer Cafer sought and
obtained an order overriding the local grant and giving him full
collection rights over the four mukataas. 55
Whether individual documents or copied into registers, all tezkires/
telhisler in the archives have the same basic format: identification of
the mukataa, identification of the bidder, details of both the old iltizam
and the new bid with its conditions, and finally the decision and the
effective date. The following example is typical. 56 First, the mukataa
in question is defined: the emanet of the salt works of Selanik, cur-
rently held by Hiiseyin in iltizam (ber vech-i iltizam) at a salary of
140 ak~e per day. Then the talib, or bidder, is identified, in this case
the same Hiiseyin and his partner Hac1 Mehmed ~aVU§. Then appear
the current amount of the iltizam (fi al-asl), 8,600,000 for three years;
the amount bid (the iltizam, or undertaking), 9,100,000 for three years
beginning on the first of Yulyus/22nd of Rebiiilevvel 983/1575-76;
and the increase (ziyade) of the new bid over the old, 500,000 ak~e
for the three-year period. Next, the entry explains that Hac1 Mehmed
~avu§ had come before the divan and undertaken the above bid (kabil
ve iltizam eder) with the following conditions: that his current salary
of 23 ak~e per day (8,142 per year) should remain in the treasury
and that instead he should be given a zeamet (his first) of 25,000 ak~e;
that he should not have to wait for a zeamet but should receive the
first one to fall vacant; that his partner Hiiseyin should receive a raise
of 5000 ak~e; that a person named Muzaffar should receive an order
for an initial timar of 2000 ak~e; and that the conditions of Hiiseyin's
previous bid should remain in force. A marginal note informs us that
these conditions were accepted and the iltizam awarded to Hiiseyin
and Hac1 Mehmed ~avu§ on 29 Muharram 983/10 May 1576.
The intricate bidding process resulting in the above bid is detailed
in another register entry concerning the same mukataa. 57 This entry,
a petition from the kad1 of Selanik, mentions the old iltizam of
8,600,000 held by Hiiseyin b. Hasan and partners Mehmed b. Ali and
55
KK 5019 (1038/1628-29), p. 3.
56
KK 4994 (983/1575-76), p. 1. Bids by partnerships or consortia of bidders were not
unusual in either the Ottoman Empire or western Europe, particularly after the consoli-
dation of the tax farms. For some Ottoman consortia, see Epstein, Ottoman Jewish
Communities, 128-30; for France see Mousnier, Institutions of France under the Absolute
Monarchy, 2: 67.
57
KK 4994 (983/1575-76), p. 5.
140 CHAPTER FOUR
Ali b. Tursun for the three-year period from 980/1572-73 to 983/

1575-76. A new bid had been made in 983/1575-76 by Zaim
Sidrekaps1h Dervi§ Mehmed, including a ziyade of 250,000 ak~e and
a condition that he receive a 5000-ak~e increase in his zeamet. After
that, Hac1 Mehmed bid 200,000 ak~e higher, bringing the total bid
to 9,050,000 ak~e, with the condition that he receive a salary raise
of 4 ak~e per day. Subsequently, the milltezim Hilseyin b. Hasan (here
identified as a member of the garrison of Selanik possessing an order
for a 6000-ak~e timar) combined forces with Hac1 Mehmed c;avu§
and appeared at the kad1's court. They offered to match the 450,000
increase already bid (for a total bid of 9,050,000) on the following
conditions: Hac1 Mehmed c;avu§ would receive a 7-ak~e raise, Hilseyin
would receive a 10,000-ak~e increase in his timar, Muzaffar b. Abdullah
would receive a 2000-ak~e timar (presumably as recompense for
assisting in the collection), and the conditions of Hilseyin's current
iltizam would continue. Then one of the petitioners altered his condi-
tion: Hac1 Mehmed c;avu§ requested a zeamet of 30,000 ak~e instead
of the 7-ak~e salary increase. The kad1' s decision, recorded in his sicil
on 25 Muharram 983/6 May 1575 and presented in the form of a
petition, amended these conditions slightly: Hac1 Mehmed should be
awarded a smaller zeamet of 25,000 ak~e, Hilseyin a lesser increase
of only 5000 ak~e, and Muzaffar the requested timar of 2000 ak~e.
In the final offer presented in the divan, recorded in the tezkire analyzed
above, the ziyade was raised from 450,000 to 500,000, although the
conditions remained the same. The discrepancy between the last bid
made before the kad1 and the offer Hac1 Mehmed c;avu§ made four
days later in the divan may result from the process of bargaining or
from another unrecorded bid received during those four days.
It is interesting to note the identities of the bidders in this case:
Hilseyin b. Hasan, a member of the garrison of Selanik awaiting a
timar; Hac1 Mehmed, a ~avu§ of the Porte; and Dervi§ Mehmed, a
zeamet-holder born in nearby Sidrekaps1, all members of the Ottoman
askeri class, at least two with local ties. The identity of Muzaffar b.
Abdullah is obscure, but his patronymic, ibn Abdullah, and the fact
that he was awarded a small initial timar suggest that he was a
rather lowly kaplkulu in the local garrison who assisted the bidders
as scribe or agent. A methodical study of bidders' identities might
well illuminate state-society relations over time. The kad1's role in
the negotiation seems at first glance to be merely that of recorder
and transmitter, but on closer inspection he emerges as a negotiator
for the government and a mediator among the bidders.

While arz and tezkire made up the usual format in which bids for
iltizams were communicated to the central finance department, infor-
mation on bids can also be found in other register entries. For ex-
ample, a register of orders on mukataas (mukataa ahkam defteri),
addressed mainly to kad1s, contains an entry recording a petition by
the nazir of Belgrad about a bid on mukataas in the area of Hersek
and Dubrovnik, as well as one recording a bid made in the imperial
divan for mukataas in Alaca Hisar and Semendire. Copied into a
similar register is a long order to the milfetti~ of Yanya including the
details of a bidding war between Ali Gureba-i Yemin and isaak Yehudi
and explaining the complex result. 58 Mukataa iltizam defters, record-
ing the award of mukataas, also include data on the nature of the
mukataa, the bidder's identity, dates and amounts of the iltizam, names
of kefils, and sometimes additional information. Registers labelled
fiiruht, "sales," on the other hand, usually record not only details of
the grant of iltizam but also payments submitted to the treasury, as
do mukataa defters, also called mukataa tahvilat or "transfer" reg-
isters. Tevzi, or assignment, registers list what a havale should collect
from miiltezims. All of these sources will be useful in putting together
a picture of the mukataas of a particular area and tracking economic
and personnel changes over time.
The potential value of an iltizam could be determined in a number
of ways, depending on the type of revenue source. Kadis, as part of
their fiscal responsibility, were often asked to investigate the revenue
potential of mukataas being offered in iltizam. For example, a kad1' s
report including figures from three previous iltizams was requested
in 976/1568-69 for an iltizam in Edirne on which a bidder promised
to pay a 120,000-ak~e increase. Previous registers were often used
to set totals, as in a bid on the zeamet and ihtisab of Filibe based
on an accounting register made when these revenues were collected
in emanet. Sometimes the amount of an iltizam or a change in its
total appears to have been the product of an estimate by the bidder.
Local kanunnames set the rates for customs dues, production taxes,
market tolls, fees, and fines, and although totals collected varied with
levels of production and trade, years of experience by responsible
individuals made it possible to project what they would be. One bid-
der's estimate appears in a petition sent by a person offering to open
58 MM 687 (9820) 997-1012/1588-1603, pp. 20, 24; KK 4994 (983/1575-76), p. 54.

142 CHAPTER FOUR
up a new iltizam consisting of two mines, the potential revenue of

which he forecast as 100,000 ak~e per year. Another estimate appears
in a request from a miiltezim in Silistre: unable to collect the full
amount he had contracted for because one of his revenue sources, a
customs station (iskele) on the Danube, had been taken from the
Ottomans, he sent a petition estimating that the iltizam should be
reduced by half. 59
Another vehicle for deciding an iltizam total was negotiation or
power plays among interested parties. In one example, Hamza, a
member of the ebna-1 sipahiyan, undertook an iltizam of 60,000 ak~e
for the stamp tax (damga resmi) and other taxes in Kayseri. The
people of Kayseri, however, insisted that they were not accustomed
to pay this tax and would abandon their homes unless it were lifted.
In the face of their threat, the government agreed to fore go this revenue
and lowered the amount of the iltizam. The process worked the other
way when proceeds of the Damascus stamp tax on cloth (damga-z
akmi§e), which paid the wages of the city's garrison, proved insuffi-
cient to meet the salary total and the treasury lacked the funds to make
up the deficit. On that occasion, the government took the initiative,
ordering an increase of 100 kuru§ per month in the mukataa of the
stamp tax.6()
In the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as the revenues of
has lands and other areas subject to tahrir came to be more extensively
farmed, survey registers were frequently used to govern tax collection
by iltizam, setting the amounts and rates of taxes and the conditions
under which they could be collected. For instance, a bid on various
taxes in the havass-1 hiimayun of the sancaks of Hamid and Teke
listed as the original amount (al-asl, the basis) the sum recorded in
the new tahrir defter. The same source, a tahrir register, was used
to determine the amount of an iltizam for taxes on newly founded
villages near Karahisar-1 Teke not yet awarded as timars. A tahrir of
Antalya in 974/1566--67 disclosed that merchants weighed their goods
themselves at the scales (kapan) of that city and did not pay a weighing
59
For the kad1's report see AE Kanuni 275; for the accounting register see MM 687
(9820), p. 229 dated 1011/1602-3. For an example of a local kanunname, together with
an extensive discussion of the various taxes and their origins, see Mihnea Berindei and
Gilles Veinstein, "Les possessions ottomanes entre Bas-Danube et Bas-Dniepr: Reglements
fiscaux et fiscalite de Bender-Aqkerman," Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique 22 (1981):
251-328. For bidders' estimates see MM 687 (9820) 998/1589-90, pp. 27, 275.
60
MM 2728 (3457) 1037/1627-28, pp. 62, 58.
fee (kapan resmi); when it was estimated that in a three-year period

the weighing fee could bring in 90,000 ak~e, the kapan was imme-
diately put up for bid. The close tie betwen the amount of an iltizam
and the survey total is illustrated by a complaint from two collectors
named Hasan and Mustafa regarding their iltizam of reaya taxes in
1055/1645-46. The reaya had left the land, and collecting the sur-
veyed amount of tax was now impossible, but no new tahrir had been
made reflecting the lowered revenue level. Because the iltizam was
pegged to the survey, the tax farmers were forced to petition for a
reduction in their iltizam. 61
The original amount of an iltizam, however it was determined, would
naturally be raised in the course of bidding. Part of this increase was
purely nominal: in a period of inflation, certain revenues rose automati-
cally with the general rise in prices. This was especially true of revenues
collected in kind. In fact, tax farming can be regarded as a method
of compensating for inflation on taxes whose amounts might be fixed
in monetary terms. As tithes of grain and other products from has,
mevkuf, or vak1f lands increased in price with inflation, the amount
offered for the iltizam could rise without any increase in the percent-
age of crops levied. If nominal rates of taxes or fees were raised to
compensate for the falling value of the ak~e, the bid on an iltizam
could also rise without representing a real increase in taxes. An increase
in iltizam prices might be based on a growth in volume of business,
as in the case of customs or market dues, milling or dyehouse fees,
and the like. In this way tax farming could tap commercial revenues
generated by urbanization. Revenues of mines, salt works, and other
productive enterprises could also increase considerably through price
rises and increased production without putting any additional burden
on the taxpayer. It is possible that the growth of iltizam bids, like
the increase in cizye rates, did no more than keep pace with inflation. 62
The greatest real increase, as with the cizye and avanz, may have
stemmed from raises in official salaries.
61
For iltizams in Hamid and Teke see MM 241 (115) 969/1561-62, fols. 97b, 54a.
The tahrir defteri for Hamid could not be located, but an icmal register for Teke (TT
471) contains entries referring to these mukataas. The mtihimme registers examined by
Murphey regarding this tahrir apparently do not address the issue of tax farming (see
Murphey, "Ottoman Census Methods," 125-26). For the kapan of Antalya see MM 241
(115), fol. 64a; for Hasan and Mustafa's complaint see MM 3881 (2765) 1055/1645-46,
p. 18.
62
By the eighteenth century, the profit on tax farming in Egypt exceeded the amount
paid to the government (Abdul Rahim Abdul Rahman, "Financial Burdens on the Peasants
144 CHAPTER FOUR
When aspiring talibs bid against each other for an iltizam, the price
could rise more rapidly. For example, a group of three zimmis in
partnership (ber vech-i i§tirak) held the iltizam of the has of Kalonya
on the island of Midilli for the amount of 350,000 ak~e for three years
from 974/1566--67. The following year Silahdar Mahmud submitted
a bid of 355,000 ak~e. To prevent him from obtaining the iltizam,
the zimmis countered with a bid of 370,000 ak~e, increasing the total
by 5.7%. In a case from 969/1561-62, a bidding war between Abdiil-
cebbar and ilyas for the mukataas of Aydm, Saruhan, and Mente§e
raised the amount bid by 1,100,000 ak~e (6.1 % of the total); at that
point the two bidders, probably recognizing that the upper limit had
been reached, agreed to divide the mukataas between them, ending
the price rise. 63 In register KK 4994 dated 983/1575-76, iltizams of
the Selanik mukataas increased by an average of 7.2% over their
original prices of three years earlier. The revenue increase, averaging
about 2% per year, was a little more than double the period's inflation
rate of slightly less than 1% per year. A register dated 1003/1594-
95 shows much greater increases after the rapid inflation of the 1580s,
ranging from a minimal 5% to 148% of the original price; the average
increase was 48%, or nearly half again the original price. 64 In other
registers of the same period, however, increases were only 4% to 8%,
well below the inflation rate. On the other hand, the 8.5% increase
offered by a bidder in 1067/1656-57, a period of price stability, must
have exceeded inflation. 65 More detailed study of these increases is
needed to clarify the pricing of iltizams, the degree of real growth
in amounts demanded, and the actual incidence of oppression in
Ottoman tax farming.
under the Aegis of the Iltizam System in Egypt," Journal of Asian and African Studies
12 [1976]: 122-38). Whether this was universally true has yet to be determined, but it
does not seem to have been the case in the first half of the seventeenth century. In
seventeenth-century England, despite the inflation of the period, customs rates were
infrequently updated and thus were usually well below the actual value of goods taxed,
allowing bids to rise by what look like astounding amounts (Newton, "Establishment of
the Great Farm of the English Customs," 144).
63
For the Kalonya iltizam see MM 241 (115), fol. 44b; for the Aydm area see MM
241 (115) 969/1561-62, fol. 36b. ~izak~a has used data on the bidding prices and rate
of turnover of iltizams to determine the competitiveness of a number of tax farms ("Tax-
Farming and Financial Decentralization," 222); unfortunately, his data do not begin until
1593, so they cannot be compared with figures from the 1570s.
64
MM 949 (7597) 1003/1594-95; but compare MM 989 (2768) 1004/1595-96, MM
1176 (624) 1007/1598-99, and KK 5008 (1012/1603-4).
65
MM 4550 (7455), p. 11.
Another justification for an increase might lie in prior undervalu-

ation of the revenue source. A case in point involved the grain tithe
of the kaza of Ala~ehir in Aydm, held in iltizam by Sinan and Piri
for the amount of 27 ,000 ak~e, which was raised by a bidding war
in 970/1562-63 (well before the period of high inflation) by an
astounding 181 %. 66 If the new iltizam total of 73,000 ak~e was really
payable from normal mukataa revenue, then the old amount must
have been considerably less than the value of grain taken in tax. It
was recognized that a village's taxes could be arbitrarily raised through
the bidding process, and some care was taken to ensure that the resulting
sum was not extortionate. When the tax of a village in Karaman, a
maktu of 2500 ak~e, became the object of a bid of 3000 ak~e, a 20%
increase, the order from the capital explicitly noted that awarding the
iltizam at that level constituted a rise in taxes for the village, but it
pointed out that the village was comfortably off and quite capable of
paying the increased sum. 67
Iltizam amounts could not be increased indefinitely. A natural ceiling
on the extent to which a bid could be raised was formed by the
capacity of the revenue source to generate new income. A bidder
could always increase his bid based on potential extortion or illegal
increases in the tax rate, but that course was risky. Later chapters will
explore what happened to milltezims who attempted to increase their
revenue through extortion or fraud. Here we will examine the normal
course of events when a mukataa's revenue failed to reach the
milltezim's contracted amount. In general terms, when this happened
the iltizam was re-awarded at a loss (noksan uzere or kesr uzere) or
else assigned as emanet (ber vech-i emanet). The first method lowered
the total demand to an amount within the capacity of the revenue
source, while the second also absolved the emin from personal re-
sponsibility for the final sum.
For example, when the term of Turak, milltezim of rice farms (~eltiik)
and villages in Elmah, ended in 971/1563-64, no bidders were found
for the next term because the irrigation system was in disrepair and
the revenues were in deficit (kulli kesirleri olmagm). Pir Fakih was
appointed to collect the revenues ber vech-i emanet, on condition that
66
MM 241 (115) 969/1561-62, fol. 40a.
67
MM 4550 (7455) 1067/165fr57, p. 18. The same care was taken with respect to
other taxes: when a sancak bey doubled the levy of oil due from a village in Trrhala
and villagers complained they were unable to deliver that much, the amount was lowered,
though not to the original level (MM 2728 [3457], p. 67).
146 CHAPTER FOUR
he repair the irrigation works. In another instance, several mukataas

in Aydm (a rice farm, an oil press, and several mezraas) had been
combined in a single iltizam of 500,000 ak~e which showed a deficit
(killli kesir gosterip ). A new miiltezim was found who undertook the
iltizam at the reduced amount of 300,000 ak~e, but he was required
to provide kefils who were not in debt or involved in other mukataas,
in case he had difficulty meeting even that lowered amount. The naztr
who nominated him also pointed out the need to reexamine the merging
of these disparate income sources, presumably to determine exactly
where and why the deficit occurred. Another example involves the
mukataas of Athens, awarded in iltizam for three years in 969/1561-
62 for 141,000 ak~e. In 972/1564-65, the next award date, there were
no bidders except Cafer b. Abdullah, who offered 21,000 ak~e less
than the previous iltizam (kesr iizere), a total of only 120,000 ak~e.
He must have perceived that the treasury was desperate to sell this
mukataa, because he put numerous conditions on his undertaking, all
of which were accepted. In Kastamonu, the year 1020/1611-12 was
particularly bad because of Celali disturbances. No miiltezim could
collect anywhere near what he had contracted for, and the miifetti§
received permission to sell every iltizam for 100,000 ak~e less than
its previous price. 68 In all these cases the treasury can be seen to prefer
the assured receipt of a lower income to the greater risk involved in
obtaining a higher sum. Fluctuations in bids for iltizams should be
a sensitive indicator of local economic conditions and ought therefore
to be studied carefully by local historians.
Bidders' Conditions and Personnel Recruitment
A feature of the iltizam system that i~creased the power of successful

bidders was the conditions (§artlar or §Urut, sing. §art) under which
an iltizam was awarded. At first the term "§art" seems to have referred
merely to the circumstances of the iltizam, but it came to connote
demands made by the bidder, whose bid was conditioned on govern-
mental acceptance of these demands. The finance department, in return,
imposed conditions on the bidder, generally having to do with proper
collection and recording procedures. This section will investigate bid-
68
MM 241 (115) 969/1561-62, fols. 26a; 77b; 44a (see also fols. 38a, 94a, and KK
4990 [971/1563-64], p. 21); AE I. Ahmed 479.
ders' conditions; conditions imposed by the government will be dis-

cussed later. These conditions reflect aspirations of participants in the
system and problems commonly encountered. According to register
MM 241 (115), in the period from 970/1562-63 to 974/1566--67 fewer
than half the bidders put conditions on their bids, but by 976/1568-
69, after the accession of Selim II, the frequency with which con-
ditions were included in bids increased greatly and the conditions
themselves became more elaborate. By the tum of the century, these
conditions had become standard procedure, and their execution was
recorded in shorthand form. 69
Certain bidders sought to ensure that during their tahvil, conditions
prevailing in the previous term would continue to apply. In a typical
example, ilyas, the successful bidder on the mukataas of Aydm, made
his bid "on condition that the conditions formerly in effect would
continue." "Conditions," referred to in this way, generally meant the
salaries of the emin and katib. Some bidders made this more explicit,
as in a bid made "on condition that the old salaries be continued from
the starting date." Others made their requests in more detail: "on
condition that the former salaries of 10 ak~e per day be continued."
One petition on behalf of a new miiltezim named Mehmed, taking
over a mukataa from the former emin, Mirza, requested specifically
"that the aforementioned Mirza's salary of 12 ak~e per day be [given]
to him." From here it was an easy step to specifying a new salary
unconnected to the old; Mahmud b. Hae, for instance, made his bid
"on condition that he be emin with 15 ak~e per day."70
Another common set of conditions had to do with specifying
who should occupy the iltizam's administrative offices (and collect
the attached salaries). The most important office was that of emin,
the person in charge of collecting the tax or revenue. Ordinarily the
successful bidder, the miiltezim, served as emin, but not invariably;
he could appoint someone else to that office. Cafer b. Abdullah's bid
on the mukataas of Athens, mentioned above, proposed Mustafa b.
Bali as his kefil "on this condition, that the aforementioned Mustafa
69
See MM 687 (9820), p. 279, entries dated 1010/1601-2.
70 MM 241 (115) 969/1563-64, fol. 36b: §Ol §art/a ki ... sabzka eyledikleri §Urut dahi
mukarrer olmak uzere; KK 4994 (983/1575-76), p. 58: §Ol §artzyla ki mevacib-i kadime
ibtida-z tarihten mukarrer olup; MM 241 (115) 969/1561-62, fol. 87a: §Ol §art/a ki
mukaddema olan yevmi on akfe ulufeleri mukarrer olup; MM 241 (115) 969/1561-62,
fol. 53b: mezkur Mirzamn yevmi on iki akfe ulufesi kendiye olup; MM 241 (115) 969/
1561-62, fol. 25b: §Ol §art/a ki kendisi yevmi on be§ akfe ile emin olup.
148 CHAPTER FOUR
be emin of the aforementioned mukataa at 4 ak~e per day and that

he himself be katib at 2 ak~e per day." The position of katib could
also be made the subject of a condition. Mahmud b. Hae, who took
the job of emin, made the additional condition "that a person named
Hayrrca b. Salih ... be katib." Ahmed b. Mehmed bid on three muka-
taas with three kefils, under the condition that each kefil should serve
as katib for one mukataa. In many 'cases the bidder did not name a
specific candidate, but demanded that the job be filled by "the person
he wanted." In some cases, bidders shared a position and the attached
salary in partnership (ber vech-i i§tirak), like Mehmed <;avu§ and
Sinan <;avu§, dual nazrrs of the mukataas of Selanik. 71 It is not yet
known how many of these requests were granted or whether any
were refused.
The appointment of functionaries as a condition of a bid rapidly
extended to positions beyond emin and katib. For instance, Zaim ~lyas
bid on the mukataas of Aydm and Saruhan on condition that he be
appointed nazrr. It is doubtless through such conditions that the office
of nazrr came to be occupied by non-kad1s, causing the interposition
of the mi.ifetti§ to maintain legal oversight of mukataas. By the seven-
teenth century most nazrrs came from the ranks of ~avu§es, some as
successful bidders themselves but many nominated to their positions
by miiltezims. It also became increasingly popular in the seventeenth
century to request a ~avu~luk for someone as a condition of an iltizam,
though in the mid-sixteenth century the popular request had been for
a yayaba§zlzk (command of foot troops, possibly even then a nominal
position). 72 In the mid-seventeenth century, when the number of salaried
mii§aherehoran of all types was decreasing, the corps of ~avu§es still
numbered 709; the attraction of the job and the new responsibilities
and opportunities it represented are not well understood. 73
71
MM 241 (115) 969/1561-62, fol. 44a: §Ol §art/a ki mezkur Mustafa yevmi dort ak~e
ile mukataa-i mezbureye emin olup ve kendisi yevmi iki ak~e ile katib olup; see also KK
4994, p. 34, where the miiltezim Yunus Ser-Oda nominated Dervi§ Mehmed b. Pervane
as the emin of the mukataa of Modon. MM 241 (115) 969/1561-62, fol. 25b: ve Hayirca
b. Salih nam kimesne ... kdtib olup; KK 4994 (983/1575-76), p. 2; MM 241 (115) 969/
1561-62, fols. 53b, 69a, 76b: kendi istedigi kimesne/kimesneler olup; KK 4990 (971/1563-
64), p. 21.
72
Nazrr: MM 241 (115) 969/1561-62, fol. 36b. Nazrr-1 nuzzar: MM 687 (9820) 997-
1012/1588-1603, p. 216. ~avu§es as nazrrs: MM 241 (115), fol. 93a; MM 687 (9820),
pp. 11, 166, 167; KK 4994, p. 21; yayaba§thk: MM 241 (115), passim. Other positions
made the object of conditions in bidding include yasakfi (enforcer or guard) and dideban
(watchman), for which see MM 241 (115), fol. 69a; MM 687 (9820), pp. 13, 30.
73
KK 3406 ( 1071/1660). In the seventeenth century there were ~avu§es stationed in
all the major cities of the empire (lnalcik, "Military and Fiscal Transformation," 291).
Some bidders had several nominations to make. For example, Reis

Mehmed b. Hilseyin specified as a condition of his iltizam that he
be appointed nazir, that the current katib be retained, that other
employees of the mukataa (huddam) be whoever he wanted, and finally,
that the milfetti§ be the kad1 of his choice. Reis Mehmed may have
been seeking to surround himself with allies, or perhaps to reward
previous favors. The latter motive seems to have animated Daud, a
bidder for the mukataas of Sak1z, who requested a 30-ak~e increase
in the salary allotment, to be distributed among the employees as he
saw fit. More people paid out of iltizam revenues, of course, meant
that less money was remitted to the treasury. Miiltezims even pre-
sumed to nominate kad1s. One bidder made the condition that a
dismissed milfetti§ and kad1 of Halomi~, ~emseddin, be restored to
his position, another that the kad1 of Yanya be made kad1 of Tirhala
and milfetti§ of all his mukataas. 74 A study of kad1s' relationships with
local officials and notables might be quite helpful in understanding
tax farming as well as other problems in local administration.
Bidders soon demanded not just salaries or positions on the iltizam,
but jobs in governmental cadres which could provide salary and status
on an ongoing basis. Bidders made such demands not only on their
own behalf or on behalf of those who worked with them on the iltizam,
but increasingly on behalf of people apparently unrelated to the iltizam,
possibly relatives or proteges. By so doing, they could surround
themselves with people they knew and trusted while providing em-
ployment for members of their entourage. Looking back at some
previous examples, Mahmud b. Hae requested that Hayirca b. Salih,
his chosen katib, be recompensed not with a salary but with a
yayaba§thk. Zaim ilyas, bidding on the mukataas of Aydm and Saruhan,
specified that he receive a 10,000-ak~e increase (terakki) to his timar
and that Abdillcebbar, his former competitor and now collaborator,
be enrolled in the military corps as a silahdar. One bidder had himself
enrolled as a ~avu§ with a zeamet. Another requested a 10,000-ak~e
increase in the timar of a muteferrika named Osman. 75 A miiltezim
in Sofya made the condition that Hasan b. Abdullah, an azeb, or
locally recruited fortress guard, receive a position in the mehter, the
military band. Cafer b. Abdullah, who wrote himself in as katib to
the mukataas of Athens, demanded that Dervi§ Mehmed, one of the
MM 241 (115) 969/1561-62, fols. 39a, 80a; KK 4994 (983/1575-76), pp. 63, 4.
74
MM 241 (115) 969/1561-62, fols. 25b, 36b, 79a; KK 4994 (983/1575-76), p. 65;
75
MM 687 (9820) 997-1012/1588-1603, p. 153.

150 CHAPTER FOUR
garrison troops, be confirmed in his gedik for the duration of the

iltizam, and that Cafer b. Mehmed's timar be given to Ahmed b.
Mustafa, another member of the garrison. H1zrr, the former miiltezim
of the same iltizam, had held the command of the fortress (dizdarlzk)
as a condition of his iltizam. 76 The Ali Emiri collection contains a
portion of a register recording appointments of military men in tax
collection positions through conditions made by successful bidders on
iltizams. 77 The nature of the links between those who received po-
sitions and the miiltezims who nominated them is not explained; its
exploration may be a task for local history. -If well understood, the
employment conditions made by miiltezims in a particular area would
throw a fascinating light not only on patronage patterns but also on
the process by which the empire's ruling class became involved in
the local economy.
Still other types of conditions could be imposed. It was typical for
bidders on iltizams made up of more than one revenue source to
request that any surplus in one be used to make up a deficit in the
other. 78 The bidders would be spared having to dig into their own
resources to make up a deficit, while the government could pair
unprofitable mukataas with profitable ones to make them more attrac-
tive to bidders. Another popular condition was that, after providing
kefils for the amount bid, the miiltezim should be allowed to proceed
directly with tax collection. This might have been an attempt to
circumvent the long wait for an official berat or to forestall compe-
tition for the iltizam. 79
It was common to request that if a campaign (sefer) took place
during the term of an iltizam, the employees, even if military, would
remain at home in the service of the treasury. Not at all unusual was
the condition of a bidder named (ironically) Sefer that if a campaign
occurred during his tahvil he be allowed to send a substitute. 80 The
miifetti§ and nazrr of the Bozdogan mukataas petitioned on behalf of
76
MM (115) 969/1561-62, fol. 43a.
77
III. Mehmed 170, dated 1010/1602-3.
78
Birinin fazlasz birinin kesrine mahsub olup; e.g., KK 4990, p. 22. The linking of
mukataas in this way over a long period was one means by which larger and more complex
iltizams were created (Sahillioglu, "Bir Miiltezim Zimem Defterine Gore," 148.
79
MM 241 (115) 969/1561-62, fol. 54a.
80
Ve tahvili i~inde sefer-i humayun vaki olursa varmayzp mal-1 miri hizmetinde ola:
e.g., MM 687 (9820) 997-1012/1588-1603, pp. 44, 64. For Sefer see MM 241 (115),
fol. 97b: ve tahvili i'inde sefer-i humayun vaki oldukta yerine yarar cebe/Usun gonderip
kendisi mukataa zabtzna kalzp.
the emin of the ~eltiik (rice farms), a member of the cavalry corps
of ulufeciyan-z yemin who was ordered on service in Egypt just as
the rice harvest drew near; since the imperial revenue would be harmed
if the rice were not collected properly, the emin was allowed not to
go to Egypt with his troop. 81 The frequency of this demand suggests
the extent to which the military had become involved in tax farming.
Employees holding timars then had to request permission to retain
possession of their timars even though they had not gone on cam-
paign. Bidders had an influential bargaining point if recipients of
treasury salaries for military or other services left that money in the
treasury (hazine mande) and were recompensed from iltizam revenues
not yet collected; this practice amounted to a short-term loan as well
as a transfer of risk. As the number of absentees and substitutes rose,
however, a military corps could be thrown into disorder. Extended
involvement of military men in tax farming could clearly be detri-
mental to military efficiency, whatever its effect on taxpayers or the
revenue system.
Bidders often worried that someone installed as miiltezim but later
outbid by a rival would lose not only his position but also the per-
quisites attached to it. To prevent this, talibs often negotiated to retain
the benefits for which they had bargained even if they lost the iltizam.
For example, the timariot Sefer, mentioned above, stipulated that he
should retain the 15,000-ak~e increase to his timar if a higher bidder
came along before the end of his tahvil. Another common condition
was that a successful bidder not be replaced in mid-term. Mehmed,
bidding on the iltizam of certain evkaf lands, specified that his position
of miltevelli not be taken away for three years, no matter what befell
the iltizam. Mehmed ~aVU§ and Sinan ~avu§ were among the many
to demand that they be allowed to match any higher bid made during
their tahvil so they could retain their iltizam. 82 The popularity of this
condition suggests that the government was attempting to maximize
its income by accepting higher bids for mukataas at any time during
81
MM 687 (9820), p. 64 dated 1000/1592-93; MM 241 (115) 969/1561-62, fol. 88b.
Several registers of such people, iltizam employees excused from campaign in order to
collect revenues, are bound together in register Divan-1 Hiimayun Muhtelif ve Mutenevvi
Defterler 47, dated in the 980s. One entry on p. 55 even added up the total amount of
money involved in order to demonstrate the benefit to the state of having these people
stay home and collect taxes.
82
MM 241 (115) 969/1561-62, fol. 76b: ve mezkur tevliyetler ii{ yzlz degin elinden
alznmayzp; ibid., fol. 97b: ve tahvili tamam olmadzn emanet-i mezbureyi gayri kimesne
gelip ziyade edip elinde alzrsa sadaka olunan terakki uzerine mukarrer olup.
152 CHAPTER FOUR
the term rather than waiting for the end of a tahvil. While this practice
was not outside the treasury's rights, its too-frequent application could
induce disorder in the revenue system.
Bidders' demands could become quite extravagant, but the govern-
ment retained the right to modify or reject them if necessary. For
example, the timariot Sefer, who had requested a 15,000-ak~e increase
to his timar, was actually granted one of 4,000 ak~e. A bidder on
the salt works of Aydm, where the previous emin had been paid 30
ak~e per day, requested an increase to 50 but was awarded 41, while
the emin of customs at the port of Antalya, who requested 45 ak~e
per day when the previous emin received 35, was allowed 40. The
grant of a ~avu§luk to Mahdi b. Murad, who demanded it as a condition
of undertaking an iltizam on the Danubian ports of Vidin and Nigbolu,
was made conditional on the successful completion of his three-year
tahvil. 83 In general, the government .seems to have sought a compro-
mise position rather than reject a request outright.
Once made, an agreement had the force ~fa contract to which both
sides were expected to adhere. The seriousness with which the agree-
ment was taken is shown in the case of the bidder Yunus Ser-Oda,
who had requested as one of his conditions that the agahk of the azebs
of Modon be assigned to a man named ibrahim. When the agahk was
granted to someone else, Yunus considered his contract with the
government broken and abandoned revenue collection, leaving his
tahvil vacant. Another miiltezim, Mustafa b. Dizdar Hiisrev, awarded
the iltizam of Yanya, Karh iii, and inebaht1 in 983/1575-76, stated
in a petition that as the conditions he had requested were not accepted,
it would be impossible to fulfill the undertaking and he would aban-
don it, leaving the revenues uncollected. 84
iltizam Supervision
A relatively decentralized tax collection system like the iltizam system

needed built-in supervision mechanisms to avoid degenerating into a
free-for-all of self-aggrandizement. The primary supervisor of an iltizam
83
MM 241 (115) 969/1561-62, fols. 97b, 69a; MM 687 (9820) 997-1012/1588-1603,
p. 173.
84
Yunus: Mezbur ibrahimin agalzgz ahara verilmekle §artzm bozuldu deyu iltizamdan
ve kefilleri kefaletten riicu edip miiba§eret eylemeyip mukataanzn tahvili hali kalmagm (KK
4994 [983/1575-76], p. 35; Mustafa: Zikr olunan §artlar makbul olmadzgi takdirce
was the nazir, who provided security for the revenue, as recorded in
a register entry appointing Hilseyin <;avu§ as nazir-1 milltezim of the
mukataas of Sofya in 997/1589-90. 85 He was ordered to work in
conjunction with the milfetti§ to locate sufficient kefils for all the
mukataas in his charge, men who were capable and wealthy; have
them properly recorded, with their address and reputation, in the kad1
sicills; and send a signed and sealed copy of the list to the capital.
He was not to allow collection of money by anyone without a berat.
He was to inspect the accounts of every mukataa and demand detailed
registers from the katibs, go over the accounts in the presence of the
milfetti§, sign and seal them as proof of accuracy, and send them on
to the capital. The traditional duties of the ~avu§ were communication
and transportation, which may explain the large number of ~avu§es
acting as nazirs, and it is not surprising to find ~avu§es particularly
involved in the transfer of mukataa revenues around the empire. The
same duties detailed in the order above were listed in an arz and telhis
(petition and report) regarding the appointment of Mahmud b. Sah
Kulu as nazir of the Ede Haslan in Edirne in 979/1571-72, and we
can observe them being carried out in a telhis for the mukataa of the
weighing scales of Antalya in 974/156fr67. 86 The latter document,
written by the nazir Yahya, kad1 of Lazkiye, verified the appointment
of an emin and katib, the examination of their detailed (milfredat) and
summarized muhasebe registers, and the dispatch of the revenues under
the nazir's supervision. In the seventeenth century nazirs also func-
tioned as milltezims for a number of mukataas, which may have been
those designated as ocakhk for garrison troops; in this case the nazir
was granted wide jurisdictional powers in the area of the mukataa. 87
Two register entries show that the nazir of the mukataas of Mente§e
had a katib and describe the appointment and duties of this function-
ary. Like the nazir, he was employed to ensure that tax farmers
submitted what they were supposed to. He was ordered to collect the
detailed registers of the emins, katibs, and amils of the mukataas for
which the nazir was responsible, to inspect their muhasebes one by
one, to compile a muhasebe for the whole iltizam and obtain the
iltizam1m1za cevaba imk/in ofmamagm miiba§eret olunmay1p f eragat mukarrer oldugu (KK
4994, p. 4).
85
MM 687 (9820) 997-1012/1588-1603, p. 11.
86
KK 4994, pp. 36, 37; MM 241 (115), fol. 64a; see also KK 4994 p. 47 (kefils) and
MM 241 -(115) fol. 34b (duties).
87
Murphey, "Functioning of the Ottoman Army," 271-73.
154 CHAPTER FOUR
signatures of the naztr and miifetti§, and finally to submit it, together
with any proceeds, to the treasury. 88
The miifetti§, in our sources, was always a kad1, usually the kad1
of the area where the mukataa was located, though sometimes bidders
requested the right to select another kad1 as miifetti§. Qualified by
piety, probity, and good management, the miifetti§ exercised general
oversight over mukataas in his charge, making sure that personnel
performed their jobs correctly, that any who died or departed were
replaced with suitable persons, and that accounts were properly
submitted. He was ultimately responsible for seeing that miiltezims
obtained kefils attested in court as capable of guaranteeing their bids,
and that collectors delivered the amounts due. He also adjudicated
disputes and handled complaints or sent them to the capital. 89 The
miifetti§ rarely appeared as a central character in iltizam records; he
was the person from whom petitions came and to whom orders were
sent, the intermediary and inspector, overseeing work performed by
others. Neither he nor the naztr ordinarily took part in the operation
of the mukataa, but both were important in ensuring that the system
functioned smoothly and correctly.
As iltizam supervisor the miifetti§ was rarely involved in crooked
dealings, but it did occasionally happen. However, the checks and
balances of the system, giving immediate attention to complaints of
illicit behavior by officials, operated to restrain the miifetti§ and limit
the damage. One example in the records is the case of Mevlana
Abdullah, miifetti§ of the mukataas of Kili, Akkerman, Tul~a, and
isaak~1 prior to 1005/1597-98: after ordering large amounts of money
transferred from various mukataas to pay for repairs to the fortifica-
tions of Kili, he paid out only a fraction of the amount and embezzled
the rest. The governor of Silistre blew the whistle, and a new man,
Musliheddin, was appointed miifetti§, while a sealed order was pro-
duced to prevent Abdullah from acting further and to command a
proper inspection of the matter. 90 In another case, two miiltezims
working in partnership reported that the four forme~ emins of their
mukataas had been working for Mevlana Ahmed, a resident of izdin
who exercised undue power in that region. 91 Even though the four
88
MM 241 (115) fols. 36a, 42b.
89
MM 687 (9820) 997-1012/1SS8-1603, p. 10; AE III. Mehmed 170, pp. 3, 13.
90
MM 687 (9820) 997-1012/1588-1603, p. 162.
91
Mezburun ol diyarda kuvvet-i kahiresi olmagm; AE III. Mehmed 170, p. 13.
miiltezims had committed irregularities in collection which had con-

siderably harmed imperial income during their term, Mevlana Ahmed,
as milfetti~, had approved and signed their registers. An inspection
was ordered and an imperial kap1c1 named Mustafa was appointed
as milba§ir, executor, to perform it.
Kefils appeared in the documents frequently as names but rarely
as actors. If the mukataa functioned well, producing enough revenue
to meet the miiltzim's bid, kefils were not called upon to do anything
more than stand waiting in the wings for a call that never came. Only
if the miiltezim defaulted were they required to act. Nevertheless, they
were carefully sought out, recorded, and screened for financial capa-
bility in the court of the kad1 serving as nazir or milfetti~. The kad1
heard witnesses who testified to the general probity of the kefils and
their ability to pay the amounts pledged. Some reports labeled the
kefils muzekka, legally competent as witnesses; their honesty could
not be doubted. 92 They were also described as maldar (wealthy), ma/
edasma kadir (able to pay the money), yarar (capable), makbul (well-
esteemed), or yerli yurtlu (local residents, known to all and unlikely
to disappear before the end of the iltizam). Kefils were usually re-
corded in the kad1's sicil at the time a bid was accepted and a telhis
or tezkire written. Often they were listed in the tezkire itself, but
sometimes their names appear in a separate document. 93 This docu-
ment is called kefil defteri, kufela defteri, or kefilname, and it is usually
vouched for as a signed and sealed copy of the list in the kad1' s
records (imzalz ve muhurlU suret-i sicil). As such, it often includes
the names of §Uhud, official witnesses to court proceedings and to the
identities and reputations of local people involved in cases, who testified
to the kefils' ability to meet their commitments. The number of kefils
92
MM 241 ( 115), fol. 87 a. In contrast, the guarantees on French tax farms were nearly
worthless: tax farmers were usually guaranteed by their own business associates, who
would often go bankrupt if the tax farmers themselves failed, while the advances re-
quired amounted to only three months' revenue (Bonney, "Failure of the French Revenue
Farms," 14).
93
Tezkires listing kefils include MM 241 ( 115) fol. 21 b, 28a, 48b, 51 a; AE III. Mehmed
170, p. 9. In MM 687 (9820) 997-1012/1588-1603, p. 34, kefils were described as kufela
bi)l-mal her muceb-i defter-i Mevlana Seyfullah kadi-i Yenipazar el-mufetti§, "guarantors
of the money, according to the register of Mevlana Seyfullah, kad1 of Yenipazar, the
milfetti~." KK 4994, p. 45, is a copy of a sebeb-i tahrir from the kad1 of Edirne listing
the kefils of Dervi~ Bey b. Yagma, milltezim of the Ede Has in 982/1574-75, while a
separate kefil register is AE III. Murad 286: suret-i kefilname-i mukataa-i iskele-i Ahyolu
deruhde-i Andonaki ve Manul el-mUlteziman, "copy of the kefilname for the mukataa of
the port of Ahyolu, which is in the possession of the milltezims Andonaki and Manul."
156 CHAPTER FOUR
listed depended on their wealth and the size of the sum to be covered;
in the documents examined the number of kefils ranged from 1 to
over 100.
In the sixteenth century, iltizams could be awarded without kefils.
The need for kefils was sometimes obviated by payment of all or part
of the iltizam in advance (her vech-i pi§in); such advances were called
bedel-i kefalet, substitute for kefils. 94 In time, however, provision of
kefils was required for obtaining an iltizam. A bid covered by guar-
antors was favored over one that was not, and bidders without kefils
were ordered to provide them. 95 When a man named Receb offered
no kefils for a 500,000-ak~e bid, the iltizam went for the same price
to another bidder, Muharrem b. Abdiirrahman, who was able to supply
them. In another case, the iltizam of the Mesih Pa§a Has in Silistre,
which had been in deficit under its three miiltezims, Osman of Silistre,
Selman "the bankrupt Jew," and his young son Mustafa, was awarded
to Katib Mehmed for a year. Mehmed had only been collecting for
eight months when Osman, concealing the fact that he had been ousted
from his position, offered a higher bid and obtained the iltizam in the
name of young Mustafa. Besides what he still owed on his old iltizam,
Osman was found to be embezzling from the new one. So Katib
Mehmed made a new bid for six years, scarcely higher than the old
one, but offering 133 kefils. Encouraged by the far greater chance that
the treasury would receive its revenue, the finance department ac-
cepted this new bid with alacrity .96
In a period of fiscal deficits like the late sixteenth century, the
government did all it could to ensure receipt of its revenues in full;
thus, a bidding war for the Istanbul dellaliye mukataa also became
a "war of kefils." Kemal Yehudi, the original miiltezim, had bid
1,650,000 ak~e for the iltizam. After two years he had only paid
94
KK 4994, p." 21: ve bedel-i kefalet ber vech-i pi§in mufetti§ marifetiyle sene ahda ve
semanin ve tisama'ya Nevruzf irsaliyesinin zumre-i sipahiyandan havale Mustafa yedi ile
hazane-i amireye iysal ettigim yiiz bin akfe bedel-i kefalet olsun, "and let the bedel-i
kefalet of 100,000 ak~e be the Nevruz remittance for the year 981, which I deposited
in the imperial treasury in advance with the knowledge of the miifetti§, by the hand of
havale Mustafa of the sipahi corps" (see also ibid., p. 23; KK 4990, p. 2).
95
MM 687 (9820) 997-1012/1588-1603, p. 32: kefil vermege aczleri olup mukataa hali
kalmagm, "since they were unable to give kefils and the mukataa remained vacant"; KK
4994, p. 26: yedi kere yuz bin akfe zarar-z ma/a yarar ve maldar kefilleri almmak f erman
olunduktan sonra, "after being ordered to obtain kefils capable and wealthy [enough] for
a loss of 700,000 ak~e," the bidder was granted the iltizam.
96
For Receb see KK 4990, p. 22; for the Mesih Pa~a Has see MM 687 (9820) 997-
1012/1588-1603, p. 34.
216,325 ak~e, and a new bid of 1,850,000 was offered by isaak, who
furnished kefils for 515,000 ak~e. A counter-bid by Diakomi of
1,900,000 ak~e included kefils for 600,000. isaak then matched
Diakomi's bid and offered kefils for 615,000 ak~e. How to decide?
The finance department sent a ~avu§ to the kad1's court with an order
to bring together both bidders and their kefils, gather knowledgeable
local people (ehl-i vukuf) to testify to their business acumen and ability
to meet their obligations, and award the iltizam to whichever bidder
was better at the task and had more suitable and capable kefils. When
the kad1 decided on isaak, his report described the kefils in full, showing
not just their names but their backgrounds and occupations (most were
merchants, a few, doctors). The provision of kefils was also at issue
in a case from Akkerman. Officials there wrote several petitions
protesting the re-granting of an iltizam to a derelict former official
who was unable to produce kefils for his bid. The officials were worried
because the iltizam revenues supported the fortress garrison, and this
miiltezim had shown a deficit (noksan tizere) in a previous iltizam.
Without kefils, the deficit might be repeated. Besides, a good officer
had been displaced from his position as one of this miiltezim's latest
conditions, and adequate defense of the fortress had become a matter
of concern. The disposition of the case was not recorded in this entry,
but it is likely that the kad1 was ordered to demand that the miiltezim
provide kefils or be replaced. 97
The state also tried to ensure receipt of its money by institution-
alizing the position of havale, assignee. A havale was someone
authorized by possession of a havale, or letter of transfer, to take
direct possession of state revenues on his own behalf or for transfer
. to the central treasury or to another recipient. 98 On an iltizam, a havale
was a person other than the emin or miiltezim authorized to receive
the revenues or to transfer them to the treasury or to the location
\
where they would be spent. References to havales in _sixteenth-century

iltizam records are sporadic; it is possible that it was ordinarily the
miiltezim's reponsibility to dispose of collected funds, and a havale
97
For the "war of kefils" see KK 4994, p. 42; for Akkerman see MM 687 (9820) 997-
1012/1588-1603, p. 271.
~ 8 Inalcik, "l:lawala," 283. The French had a similar system whereby disbursements
could be authorized, either centrally or locally, against the presentation of appropriate
documentation (Mousnier, Institutions of France under the Absolute Monarchy, 2: 187-
90; Dent, Crisis in Finance, 82). In England, on the other hand, only specially favored
courtiers were able to obtain payments directly from tax farmers rather than from the
treasury (Dietz, English Public Finance, 2: 343).
158 CHAPTER FOUR
was appointed only when the iltizam's revenues were assigned to a

particular person, institution, or sultanic expenditure; when the central
treasury needed revenues in a hurry; or when the reliability of the
emin was in question. One fifteenth-century order commanded that
a havale appointed to transport revenues of the port of Mudanye to
the treasury be sent on his way together with the amil (miiltezim) or
his man; the two could serve as checks on each other. 99
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the term havale gained
an additional usage when miiltezims began nominating candidates to
a post called mukim havale, resident assignee. 100 Having a local havale
might be particularly appropriate when iltizam proceeds were depos-
ited in a provincial treasury or spent locally rather than sent to Istanbul.
For instance, Ruhullah Sefer was appointed as mukim havale in 1038/
1628-29 for a mukataa in the province of Diyarbekir; the revenues
were destined for the Diyarbekir treasury, so it made sense to appoint
someone residing there to make the transfer. 101 It is also possible that
at this point miiltezims were able to demand that their own men be
used to convey funds they had collected, which would permit them
to draw the salary attached to the office of havale. An order from
the tum of the century appointed as havale a man named Hasan
Teberdar, a sipahi's son sent from the provinces to the capital with
petition in hand, who may well have been the protege of the miiltezim. 102
This state of affairs lasted only about three decades, however, after
which the reins were tightened again. Appointments of havales are
numerous in register KK 5019 dating from 1038/1628-29, but the new
havales were the government's men, mulazims or candidates for office
because of campaign service, who held a suret-i rilus, a copy of an
entry in the ruus defters, registers of appointment kept by the
reisiilkiittab, the chief scribe. One of these entries described in detail
the task of a havale: Ahmed Nev Muslim Tuba, a member of the Six
99
Inalcik, "Osmanh idare, Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihiyle ilgili Belgeler: Bursa I," 4;
these documents also record the sending of havales to collect revenues destined for a
campaign and for garrison salaries (ibid., 19, 51). In England, assignments on the revenues
of customs farms could be transferred by purchase and seem to have circulated on the
open market in the manner of bills of exchange, their value depending on estimates of
the revenue yield (Harper, "Significance of the Farmers of the Customs," 68).
100
MM 687 (9820), pp. 15, 28, 64, all dated 999-1000/1591-92; p. 28 reads: Daud
bu sene mukim havalemiz olup kapzdan havale gelmeye, "Daud this year should be our
resident assignee-an assignee should not come from the Porte."
101
The tezkire appointing him and authorizing him to draw his salary from the revenues
of the mukataa on a quarterly basis can be found in register MM 2728 (3457), p. 75.
102
AE III. Mehmed 170, p. 8.
Boliiks and a miilazim with a suret-i riius, was appointed havale for
the Nevruz payments of the mukataas of Mora and Mezistre for the
year 1038/1628-29. He was given a tevzi defteri, in this case a register
detailing the names of the miiltezims, emins, and katibs, and the
amounts of all the mukataas entrusted to him. He was ordered to go
out and collect one-fourth of the total amount due in accordance with
this register, kad1s were to prevent interference with the collection,
and emins were to record what had been collected from them for the
end-of-term accounting. 103 By regularizing the appointment of such
havales, the finance department could exercise control over who
obtained access to salaries from state funds, as well as over the transport
and submission of the funds themselves. Appointing soldiers who had
proved themselves on campaign rewarded meritorious service at low
cost while the timar system was in abeyance, gave the military forces
a peacetime outlet and the state an additional enforcement arm, and
attached to the government's service people who otherwise might
become (and had become in Celali days) a force for rebellion.
Clearly, then, to call tax farming "collection without assessment"
is an overstatement. While the system of tax farming was, as is often
reiterated, subject to abuses, abuse was not inherent in the system but
was a product of the specific ways it was administered and the changing
conditions in which it operated. Initially the system was heavily
regulated, but as the demand for revenue increased and the value of
money fell, the government became more dependent on tax farmers,
who were able to set their own conditions on their service. Tax farmers'
need for money increased in parallel with that of the treasury, and
they began to exploit every opportunity for enrichment offered by the
system in which they operated. In the Ottoman institutional frame-
work, tax farmers were surrounded by checks and safeguards to prevent
overcollection, unauthorized profits, embezzlement, or oppression. The
government regularly demanded and checked account registers, bal-
anced officials concerned with revenue production against officials
concerned with revenue extraction, and provided supervision by kad1s.
When tax farmers succeeded in suborning or coopting those safe-
guards, additional layers of control were instituted, as can be seen
103
KK 5019 ( 1038/1628-29), p. 86; see also pp. 7, 10, 171, 186, 187. A copy of a
tevzi register indicating to havales what was owed on various mukataas for Agustos of
976/1568-69 is in register MM 241 (115), beginning at fol. 104b. A case of havale
harassment of miiltezims who had been turning in their receipts faithfully for 5 years is
reported in MM 22603 (9824), p. 69.
160 CHAPTER FOUR
in the increasingly common provision of government-appointed havales

and the addition of supervision by the milfetti§ when nazrrs became
the milltezims' nominees. Far from abandoning control of taxation to
private parties, the government in this period strove to maintain its
hold over the tax farming system and to keep it operating within the
bounds of law, justice, and good accounting.
The biggest obstacle to its success seems to have been personal
relationships among officials, who could infiltrate nominees into
connected positions and then falsify or bypass the checking proce-
dures required by the system. When we examine collection problems
we will encounter additional examples of this practice. Any valid
assessment of the impact of tax farming on Ottoman society in this
period must therefore be made in the context of the personal rela-
tionships, patronage (intisab), and personal politics of the post-clas-
sical age, on both central and provincial/local levels. The changing
power relationships and political mechanisms of this period, though
largely uninvestigated, have been interpreted negatively, as deviations
from a pristine pattern of sultanic headship which was responsible for
the empire's power and growth. Although this ideal may always have
existed more in imagination than in reality, there were significant
alterations in Ottoman politics in the early seventeenth century that
led to a broader sharing of power among the great men of state, a
strengthened role for the sultan as arbiter and legitimizer rather than
as warrior and decision-maker, and a greater development of the lower
echelons of government. 104 This was not a "rational-legal" bureau-
cracy, however, but a bureaucracy operated by a ruling class still
relatively small and tightly bound by personal links. Some of these
personal links ran through the finances of the empire, and it is the
interaction between the personal and the official that demands our
attention. Tax farming offers a unique window into these relation-
ships, especially on the local level where detailed knowledge of
personalities and economic conditions becomes feasible.
104
In this respect the seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire resembled Stuart England,
the France of Louis XIII, or Olivares' Spain, in all of which the governing role of ministers,
royal favorites, and bureaucrats was expanding; for a more extended look at some of these
similarities and their significance see my "The Ottoman Empire through British Eyes: Paul
Rycaut's The Present State of the Ottoman Empire," Journal of World History 5 (1993):
71-98. For an example of personal politics at work see Evliya <;elebi, The Intimate Life
of an Ottoman Statesman: Melek Ahmed Pasha (1588-1662) as Portrayed in Evliya <;elebi' s
Book of Travels, trans. Robert Dankoff, SUNY Series in Medieval Middle East History
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991).
CHAPTER FIVE
TAX COLLECTION PERSONNEL
The infiltration of the military into the taxation apparatus, formerly

dominated by civilians, has traditionally been seen as an indication
of Ottoman decline. Of course, the portion of government revenues
allocated under the timar system had always been collected by sol-
diers. As the timar system diminished in importance, soldiers prolif-
erated in other tax collection posts. We have seen that in the early
seventeenth century the military became a significant presence in the
iltizam system and that, among those who conducted cizye and avanz
tahrirs, an increasing number of military personnel could be found.
Assessing the growing role of the military in this area of government
finance requires a closer look at the collectors of these taxes and the
procedures for their appointment. Although a systematic study has not
yet been made, an overview is sufficient to reveal a succession of
changes in patterns of employment of civilian and military personnel
in tax collection. An examination of these changes is all the more
necessary in view of the decline theory's accusations of finance
department complicity in the corruption of government. Control was
a paramount issue for the governance of a far-flung empire in an era
without modem means of communication and transportation. The
finance department's efforts to secure that control led to a variety of
experiments with military and civilian collectors and changes in
methods of tax collection and the kinds of records kept.
Appointment of Revenue Collectors
The Ottoman finance department worked toward legality and fairness

in tax collection by insisting that its collection personnel be properly
appointed and adhere to standard procedures. Tax collection procedures
were based on registers of assessment and other official documents,
while rates were set by custom, kanun, and tahrir. Collectors were
obliged to collect according to registers in the case of agricultural
taxes, cizye, or avanz, and to maintain canonical rates of customs
162 CHAPTER FIVE
tolls, market dues, fees and fines. Efforts were made to ensure that
every tax collector knew the relevant laws and practices and could
be held responsible if they were violated. One kad1 who petitioned
the capital about the oppression of a tax farmer received strict in-
structions not to allow emins and amils to oppress the reaya contrary
to custom and law and the registers and imperial orders, nor to act
against the conditions of the iltizams and the berats in their hands. 1
Cizye collection by agents of the sultan on timar lands and on
imperial has properties provided an opportunity for central govern-
ment inspection and control in areas whose administration was other-
wise delegated to timar holders or imperial emins. Government agents
were not permitted to enter serbest, "free," timars, has lands of
provincial and district governors, or most lands belonging to evkaf,
and in those areas the cizye was collected from the taxpayers by
agents of the landholder. If the cizye formed part of the revenue
assignment (an exception to the rule, made only when specified by
the original grant), it was added to the landholder's income; if not,
it was turned over in a lump sum to a collector sent by the state.
Finance department records do not indicate how individuals as-
signed to collect the cizye were selected, but their appointments were
recorded in registers called tevzi-i cizye defterleri (registers of the
distribution of the cizye, also called in the catalogues tevziat-1 cizye,
cizye tevzi, or cizye tevziatt defterleri). These are similar to tevzi
registers of iltizams but focus on tax collectors rather than amounts
to be collected. 2 Tevzi-i cizye registers in the archives generally cover
only Rumeli and Anadolu; cizye collected in provinces with separate
provincial treasuries was submitted to the central treasury by provin-
cial treasurers as a lump sum, together with a summarized account.
Cizye collection assignments in those provinces were probably made
by officials of the provincial treasuries and similar assignment reg-
isters were no doubt kept there. The names of cizye collectors can
also be found in registers called tahvilat (assignments), teslimat (sub-
missions or deliveries), and irsaliye (transmissions), all of which are
1
Emin ve ummal taifesi vech-i me§ruh uzere rencide ve remide eyledikler vaki ise men
u def edip min ba'd hilaf-z adet ve kanun ve mugayir-i defter ve emr-i humayun mii§arun
ileyhin zeameti reayasz ol vechile §art-z iltizamlarzna ve ellerinde olan beratlarzna muhalif
umena ve ummala ve sairden bir fer de dahil ve taarruz rencide ve re mide ettirmeyip: AE
III. Mehmed 170, p. 6, dated 1008/1599-1600. Ko~i Bey cited collection strictly according
to the registers as one of the things regarding which the sultan should. instruct the grand
vizier in person (Ko~i Bey Risalesi, ed. Aksilt, 112-13).
2
For a published tevzi-i cizye defteri see Gokbilgin, Edirne ve Pa§a Livasz, 155-59.
TAX COLLECTION PERSONNEL 163
arranged by the date of submission of the collected funds, and also

in some muhasebe (accounting) registers, where the entries are ar-
ranged by location. One tevzi-i cizye register dated 958/1551-52, found
in the Kamil Kepeci Tasnifi, is described as belonging to the cizye
muhasebesi kalemi, although the register probably predates the for-
mation of that bureau. 3 The other cizye tevzi registers in the archives
are catalogued in the Maliyeden Miidevver Tasnifi and show no
indication of their bureau of origin. The headings of several of these
registers, however, indicate that they were copied from a ruznam~e
or daily record of appointments called a tahvil ruznam~esi. Tahvil
ruznam~es were compiled by the ba§ muhasebe kalemi, which kept
track of a variety of tax collection assignments. 4 Lists of appointees
for each type of tax were copied from the chronological appointment
register and distributed to the appropriate bureaus, where they were
kept for future reference.
In the tevzi-i cizye registers, collection of the cizye of each liva
(sancak, subprovince) was ordinarily assigned to a team of two men,
an emin and a katib. A typical tevzi-i cizye register examined in detail
bears the title, "Register of the distribution of the poll tax of the non-
Muslims in the provinces of Rumeli and Anadolu for the year 979,
made on 15 Cemaziiilevvel 979" (5 October 1571).5 It proceeds liva
by liva, listing the number of banes, the persons assigned to serve
as emin and katib for the collection of the cizye, and their term of
office (see sample entry below). It will be recalled that cizye tahrirs
were organized by liva or sancak. A liva too large for efficient collec-
tion by a single team might be divided. For example, separate col-
lectors were listed in a tevzi register for Sofya and for tetimme-i Sofya
(the rest of Sofya), and also for Oskiip and for maadin-i Uskiip (the
mines of Uskiip). Such divisions were often made along kaza lines,
though these too might be disregarded if necessary. 6 Cizye on evkaf
3
KK 3523 (958/1551-52).
4
For example, register MM 657 (5240) for 996-1006/1587-97, a tahvil defteri of the
ba§ muhasebe bureau, includes appointments for the collection of ispen~e and bedel-i hamr
(a personal tax and a wine tax, both collected from non-Muslims), while register KK 2282
for 984/1576-77, also compiled by the ba§ muhasebe bureau, is a tahvil defteri containing
the names of men appointed as emins of the beytiilmal.
5 MM 323
(6874) for the year 979/1571-72: Defter-i tevzi-i cizye-i gebran-z vilayet-i
Rumeli ve Anadolu vacib-i sene 979 el-vaki' fl 15 cemaziUlevvel sene 979.
6 The
borders of these administrative units do not seem to have been identical to those
of the sancaks of the timar tahrirs, nor were they constant from one period of time to
another; villages were apparently moved from one liva to another at need (Kiel, "Remarks
on the Administration of the Poll Tax," 72).
164 CHAPTER FIVE
Amed [ ]
Der liva-1 Minniran
tabi-i hazret-i vezir-i a'zam
Cizye-i gebran-1 vilayet-i Edirne deruhde-i
hane 4746
39 35
Ramazan Abdullah Destan Voyvoda c;erkes
an ebna-1 sipahiyan an cemaat-1 mezbure
fi yevm 20 fi yevm 20
emin katib
Kii~iik Aya Sofya kurbunda Daud Pa§a Iskelesinde
sakindir sakindir
An vacib
an 8 receb sene 979
ila selase e§hiir
tahriren fi el-tarih el-mezbur
Done on [date]
Province of the Beylerbey
belongs to the grand vizier
Cizye of the unbelievers of the district of Edime, in the responsibility of:
hanes: 4746
39[th company] 35[th company]
Ramazan Abdullah Destan Voyvoda <;erkes
of the ebna-1 sipahiyan of the same regiment
20 [ak~e] per day 20 [ak~e] per day
emin katib
lives near Kii~iik Aya Sofya lives at Daud Pa§a iskelesi
Due for [the period]:

from 8 Recep 979/26 November 1571
for three months
written on the above date
lands was organized by vakif, and if the vakif was large, by the
location of the properties, or several small evkaf might be assigned
to a single emin for collection. Within a single area, the cizye was
often organized by confessional group, especially if the group collected
its own cizye and submitted it to the official collector as a lump sum. 7
7
For Sofya and Uskilp see MM 1520 (5334) dated 1013/1604---5. The cizye of the evkaf
of Sultan Selim in Edirne was collected separately from the cizye of his other evkaf, while
Avanz documents from around the turn of the century show that
the avanz was collected by kad1s and therefore was organized and
divided by kaza. No appointment registers like those for cizye col-
lectors exist for avanz collectors before the 1630s, but several temessiiks
for avanz payments found in the Ali Emiri collection in the archives
list kad1s as the persons responsible for payment. 8 One of these receipts,
dated 1007/1598-99, indicates that the kad1 of Ankara remitted the
bedel-i ntiziil paid by the Ytiriiks of Ankara; one dated 1009/1600--
1601 shows that two kad1s from Hamid sent in the bedel-i kiirek~iyan
of several kazas in the sancak of Hamid; and one dated 1010/1601-2
states that the kad1 of Midilli, Mevlana Hiisrev, remitted the bedel-
i ktirek~iyan of a kaza in Midilli. Certain levies were picked up from
kad1s by specialized officials; for instance, agents of the supervisors
of the shipyard (tersane emini) and the imperial kitchens (matbah
emini) were often involved in the collection and transportation of
naval stores and provisions. These were cases in which the revenues
of designated mukataas were assigned on a long-term basis to the
support of these institutions in a system called ocaklzk (discussed
below). Members of the standing cavalry were occasionally involved
in avanz collection at this time. A record from the year 1010/1601-2,
for example, lists Bekir Bey of the ebna-1 sipahiyan as collector for
the kiirek~i bedeli of Sivas. 9
By the mid-1030s/l 620s, avanz collectors were listed in tevzi or
tevziat registers resembling those produced for cizye collectors, and
over the next two decades the term tevzi (distribution) became the
one regularly used to describe avanz collection assignments. 10 At the
same time, procedures for avanz collection, like those for assessment,
were gradually assimilated to those used for the cizye; by the 1050s/
1640s they had become standard avanz procedure. The central gov-
ernment would send an appointee, usually a member of the standing
the cizye of the evkaf of Muslih Pa§a, Saruca Pa§a, and Mehmed Pa§a in Dimetoka was
all collected by a single emin (MM 224 [236] 1028/1618-19, p. 7). Other subdivisions
included the cizye of the Jews of Istanbul, or the cizye of the dispersed (perakende)
Armenians of Anadolu living in the kaza of Dervi§~ik as reaya of the evkaf of Sultan
Ahmed (ibid., p. 2).
8
For an overview of the kad1s' role in local government and taxation see ilber Ortayh,
"On the Role of the Ottoman Kadi in Provincial Administration," Turkish Public Admin-
istration Annual 3 (1976): 1-21.
9 For avanz
collection by kad1s see Ali Emiri Tasnifi, III. Mehmed, docs. 75, 76, 212;
for collection by emins, see MM 2728 (3457), p. 66; for collection by cavalrymen see
MM 1491 (16596), p. 2.
10
See tevziat registers MM 2845 (16215) for 1037-38/1627-29, KK 2614 for 1057/
1647-48, or MM 4576 (18205) for 1067/1656-57.
166 CHAPTER FIVE
cavalry forces, with an order and a copy of the assessment register

(emr u defter) to perform the collection. The appointment procedure
for collectors is described in an order regarding an unnamed military
man who had been appointed to collect the avanz for the previous
year from several kazas and submit it to the treasury. He was sent
out with an order and a register (emr ti defter), and local kad1s were
enjoined to cooperate with him to perform the collection in accord-
ance with the register. The kad1s were ordered to compile a new
register of amounts collected and to transmit the money and the
collection register to the capital. The tevziat registers were the final
authority on appointments, as illustrated by an order prohibiting Kas1m
Arnavut, a cavalryman listed in the military' s registers as an avanz
collector, from carrying out that task. Because his name did not appear
in the mevkufat bureau's tevziat registers, his claim to the assignment
was disallowed and his registration was cancelled. 11
Even in mid-century, however, the avanz was still sometimes
collected by kad1s. An order to the kad1s of Vidin anq Saray dated
1051/1641-42 commanded them to collect the avanz of those kazas
for the year 1051. The kad1s were told to perform the collection in
accordance with a register sent from the mevkufat kalemi, submitting
the money itself to the agent of the imperial kitchens (matbah emini)
and an accounting register (irad ve masraf, income and outgo) to the
treasury. In another case from the same period, the kad1 of Dskiidar
was ordered to collect firewood in lieu of avanz payments from certain
reaya in accordance with a new tahrir register bearing a tugra. The
kad1 of Bogaz Hisar was responsible for collecting camels in a certain
area and delivering them to the arpa emini, an official responsible for
collection and transport of barley for the state, who had petitioned
for additional pack animals. The kad1 of the imperial has estates was
ordered to collect straw from the avanzhanes in his jurisdiction in
accordance with the copy of the register sent to him. 12 It is possible
that while central government appointees were increasingly respon-
sible for avanz collections in cash, local kad1s continued to oversee
collections in kind. 13
11
For the appointment procedure see KK 2576, p. 59; the man is described as
istihdamlardan (blank) zide kadruhu. For the disallowing of an unregistered collector see
ibid.' p. 77.
12
KK 2576, pp. 91, 181, 123, 90.
13
In the seventeenth century, as the kad1s' role in tax collection seems to have de-
creased, their role in the enforcement of justice increased, probably because provincial
governors became less reliable in this regard (Gerber, State, Society, and Law, 68-70).
Among the many people associated with an iltizam, it is not always

easy to determine who actually took the money from the taxpayers.
Anyone drawing a salary from mukataa revenues, however, had to
be listed in the central registers. The tezkire recording a successful
bid on an iltizam also recorded, of course, the name of the miiltezim.
Most miiltezims chose to act as emins of their iltizams and their salaries
were part of the iltizam's records. If a miiltezim did not do so, but
apppointed someone else as emin, a separate entry recorded his name
and the amount and source of his salary .14 More frequently, the regis-
ters record appointments of katibs and other officials designated by
miiltezims.
The register entry for such an appointment contains the name, date,
location, reason for appointment, amount of salary, and source from
which the funds were drawn.
lbtida-i mevacib-i Hasan ki katib-i mukataa-i ~eltiik anhar-1 Talmani(?)
ve tevabicha §iid der liva-1 Mente§e becay-i Nesuh ki mazul §iid ez an
sebeb ki Mustafa emin-i mi.iltezim-i mukataa-1 mezbure taleb kerde ber
muceb-i mektub-1 Mevlana Pir Ahmed nazu-1 sab1k-1 liva-1 mezbure el-
vak1 fi 25 ~aban el-mu<azzam sene 970 fi yevm 5 fi mahsul-1 havas
el-mezbur
Beginning of the salary of Hasan who is scribe of the mukataa of the
rice fields of the river Talmani(?) and related [mukataas] in the liva
of Mente§e in place of Nesuh who is out of office, for the reason that
Mustafa, the emin-i mi.iltezim of the aforesaid mukataa, requested [it],
according to the letter of Mevlana Pir Ahmed, the former nazu of the
aforesaid liva, on 25 ~aban 970/1 May 1562, [salary] 5 [ak~e] per day
from the revenues of the aforesaid has. 15
Entries of this type, starting salary or ibtida entries, often record the
appointment of new scribes upon the retirement or death of the old.
Appointments could be recorded in other ways as well. A petition or
register record of a petition of appointment might be found with
an attached buyuruldu, an order commanding that the request be
enacted. For example, a petition from the timariot ibrahim, who became
nazrr-1 miiltezim of the mukataas of Edime on condition that he be
allowed to appoint a scribe for each mukataa, requested the appoint-
ment of Hasan b. Hilseyin as scribe for one of the mukataas at a salary
of 15 ak~e per day. Above the record of the petition is a marginal
14 For example, KK 4994, p. 23; MM 687 (9820) pp. 12, 14.

15 The example comes from MM 241 (115) 969/1561-62, fol. 22a.
168 CHAPTER FIVE
note (der kenar) stating that it had been so ordered (buyuruldu). 16

The amount of money per bane that tax collectors were allowed
to take as their salary increased gradually over the period 1560-1660.
The traditional amount of the gulamiye, one ak~e per bane for the
emin and one ak~e per bane for the katib, was repeated in an order
dated 1004/1595-96 stating that 3 ak~e had formerly been taken as
resm-i bane, one ak~e for the treasury and one each for the two
officials. 17 This order, however, mandated a change in the gulamiye
to 10 ak~e, or 5 ak~e each for the emin and the katib. The same
amount, 10 ak~e per taxpayer, or 5 ak~e each for emin and katib,
was described as the normal amount of the gulamiye at the tum of
the century by To~ular Katibi Abdiilkadir Efendi. 18 When each emin
and katib was earning one ak~e per bane, the sums earned by indi-
vidual tax collectors ranged from about 100 to 5,000 ak~e per year,
or from less than one-half ak~e to about 15 ak~e per day. The larger
amount might double the salary of an emin or katib, as although many
men assigned to these duties already earned more than 20 ak~e per
day, a substantial minority earned salaries of only 8 to 13 ak~e daily.
After the increase in the rate, the same jobs paid from 495 ak~e, or
under two ak~e per day, to 25,995 ak~e, nearly 75 ak~e per day. 19
In the 1050s/1640s, the rate of the gulamiye rose to 40 ak~e, and an
additional 40-ak~e salary called maa§ was also charged, yielding annual
salaries of 4,000 to 208,000 ak~e, or 11 to 585 ak~e per day. These
higher wages more than paid collectors' living expenses and made
it possible for the government to postpone increasing salaries out of
tax revenues for a considerable period. At the same time, it was not
unknown for a tax collector in the military or scribal forces to waive
either his own salary or the salary attached to the post of tax collector;
this gesture might have made a candidate for the post more attractive
to those in charge of appointments. 20
16
lbtida entries include KK 5012, p. 6, dated 1017, and KK 5019, pp. 3, 10, dated
1038/1628-29. Appointment petitions are KK 4994, pp. 28, 19, 15, 18, 31.
17
Ulu~ay, XVII. Aszrda Saruhan'da E§kiyalik, 172-73.
18
Cited in Caroline Finkel, The Administration of Warfare: The Ottoman Military
Campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606, Beihefte zur Wiener Zeitschrift fiir die Kunde des
Morgenlandes, Band 14 (Vienna: VWGO, 1988), 81.
19
MM 2224 (236) dated 1028/1618-19.
20
MM 3881 (2765) 1055/1645-46, pp. 158, 159, 205, and 206; for the waiving of
salaries see MM 3881 (2765), p. 153. Already in 1570 the salaries of garrison soldiers
in Simontomya were held in the treasury, replaced by timars (David, "Financial Policy
in a Hungarian Sanjaq," 28).
There were also exceptionally lucrative jobs, usually awarded to

high government personnel, such as one for collection of the cash
equivalent for the cooking of biscuit (bedel-i tabhane) from the avanz-
hanes of Ttrhala in the year 1052/1642-43. The name of the person
assigned to this collection job was not recorded, but the register entry
states that he was to collect the tax from 8579.5 banes at a salary
of six ak~e each, totalling 51,477 ak~e for the year, or over 145 ak~e
per day. Likewise, although the avanz of Sam was disbursed locally
for military campaign expenses, the gulamiye, a traditional perquisite
of the kapzczlar kethudasz, was nevertheless collected; for the year
1047/1637-38 it came to the tidy sum of 383,200 ak~e, equivalent
to 1,082 ak~e per day. 21
The Military in Cizye and Avanz Collection
The vast majority of those appointed to the offices of emin and katib
for cizye collection came from the standing military regiments of the
Porte: the mute/errika guards and the cavalry regiments known as the
"Six Boliiks" (altz boliik), comprising the sipahiyan or ebna-z sipahiyan
("sons of sipahis"), the silahdaran, the ulufeciyan-1 yasar and ulu-
f eciyan-1 yemin, and the gureba-1 yasar and gureba-z yemin, with an
occasional appointee from the janissary corps or the armorers
(cebeciyan). By the late sixteenth century it had become customary
in time of war for the oldest members of the Six Bolilks to be registered
as miilazims (candidates) and, after a year of campaign service, to
receive positions as tax collectors. These assignments became known
as their hizmet, service or duty. 22 A register entry dated 103 7/1627-
28 records a complaint from taxpayers accustomed to paying their
own cizye who suddenly found its collection assigned to a sipahi. 23
In a register dated 979/1571-72, 169 emins and katibs out of 217
(78%) came from the standing cavalry, while 16 were scribes or treasury
officials, 10 were from the corps of saddlers (sarw;), 7 were ~avu§es,
21
KK 2576, pp. 101, 32.
22 The hizmet began as a reward for service on the part of Siileyman's elite bodyguard
of 300 cavalrymen, but despite efforts to limit its use, it spread to encompass the whole
palace cavalry (M. Belin, Essais sur l' histoire economique de la Turquie, d' apres les
ecrivains originaux [Paris: Imprimerie Imperiale, 1865], 124, citing Seyhizade; Gibb &
Bowen, 1: 328; Murphey, "Functioning of the Ottoman Army," 44; Howard, "Ottoman
Timar System and Its Transformation," 203-4).
23
MM 2728 (3457), p. 21.
170 CHAPTER FIVE
8 were other palace officials, 3 were sancak beys, and 4 were retainers
of prominent men. A generation later, a register dated 1013/1604-
5 lists all of the nearly 400 emins and katibs of the cizye of Rumeli
and Anadolu as members of standing cavalry regiments, except for
miiltezims of the mines of Vul~itrin and Sidrekaps1, who collected
the cizye in those areas, and miitevellis of certain evkaf properties
(usually serbest, "free" from central government intervention), who
collected the cizye on their own evkaf. These exceptions continued
throughout the ensuing decades. In 1024/1615-16, the percentage of
cizye collectors from the standing cavalry was 90%: 199 out of 221
cizye collectors in a register for the month of Muharrem were from
the Six Boliiks. In a register of the 1620s the proportion was about
the same: over five years from 1028/1618-19 to 1032/1622-23, the
standing cavalry held on average 91 % of the positions of emin and
katib, while the remaining collectors were either miitevellis of evkaf
or other central government functionaries such as ~avu§es, boliik ba§IS
in the palace, or scribal personnel. Two registers from about 1630
show all cizye emins and katibs as men from the standing cavalry
forces. 24 The preponderance of men from the standing cavalry in the
position of tax collector was also characteristic of revenues other than
the cizye; for example, 75% of the collectors of the sheep tax (adet-i
agnam) around 1620 were from this group. 25
Using cavalrymen as tax collectors had numerous advantages for
the Ottoman government. It tapped the wealth of the military elite
and kept them busy during the off-season for campaigning. Armed
men were well-equipped to enforce imperial edicts regarding taxation
and to represent the sultan's might in all comers of the empire. Such
assignments made up a system of rewards serving as motivators for
state employees. As slaves or dependents, these men might be ex-
pected to be relatively loyal and obedient, likely to return collected
funds to the capital. Finally, the salaries they received for tax col-
lection increased their income without drawing on treasury funds. The
military forces rapidly grew to depend on these assignments and their
24
MM 323 (6874) dated 979/1571-72; MM 1520 (5334) dated 1013/1604-5; MM 2134
(15824), a tahvilat-1 cizye register dated 1024/1615-16; MM 2224 (2363), a register of
ziyade-i cizye collected on evkaf properties over several years around 1620; cizye tev-
ziat registers MM 2930 (14588) for 1039-40/1629-30 and MM 3200 (14583) for 1044/
1634-35.
25
MM 2224 (236): 20 of 24 in 1025/1616-17; 15 of 17 in 1026/1617-18; 14 of 21
in 1027/1617-18; 9 of 13 in 1028/1618-19; and 6 of 10 in 1029/1619-20.
accompanying salaries. When the cavalrymen, on returning from

campaign in 1008/1599-1600, learned not only that their salaries were
to be paid in debased coinage apparently brought in by the miiltezim
of the Istanbul customs, the Jewish kira or harem vendor, but also
that, possibly at her instigation, the best and most lucrative tax collection
assignments were sold to the highest bidders among wealthy civilians
rather than being reserved for campaign veterans, they rioted and
killed the kira. As early as 1001/1593-94 there were not enough tax
collection assignments to go around among the palace cavalry; the
historian Selaniki reported that it was necessary to fill each assign-
ment not just with two men but with five or ten to ensure that all
had a chance at the resulting revenues. In the seventeenth century,
these positions were often distributed by auctioning the cizye registers
among the cavalrymen. Further disturbances over this issue took place
in 1036/1627 and 1041/1631, by which time the cavalry's extra services
had expanded to include a variety of positions in military procurement
as well as revenue collection. 26
The increasing access of the Six Boliiks and milteferrika guardsmen
to positions in cizye collection caused disquiet among those who lost
these opportunities in the late sixteenth century, but it was not a sudden
or drastic change. By the middle of the sixteenth century, men from
the standing cavalry regiments already held nearly 80% of these lucra-
tive assignments. The increase of this figure to 90% by 1620 and to
100% by 1630 meant the loss of that small percentage of opportunities
in tax collection previously open to palace and financial officials; men
from those groups naturally felt disgruntled. The cause of their dis-
may, however, was short-lived. Soon after 1630, registers indicate that
the organization of cizye collection was altered, reducing the use of
emin/katib teams to collect the cizye. 27 Cizye collection by agents
26
Selaniki, Tarih-i Selllnikf, ed. ip§irli, 2: 854-55; on the kira see also Abraham Galante,
Esther Kyra, d' apres de nouveaux documents (Istanbul: Societe Anonyme de Papeterie
et d'Imprimerie (Fr. Halm), 1926); J.H. Mordtmann, "Die jildischen Kira im Serai der
Sultane," Mitteilungen der Seminar far Orientalistische Sprachen 32 (1929): 1-38; on
cavalry hizmets see further Selaniki, Tarih-i Selanikf, ed. ip§irli, 1: 319 (he called the
appointees zaleme-i afarft, "devils of oppressors"); William S. Peachy, "A Year in Selaniki's
History: 1593-4," (PhD dissertation, Indiana University, 1984), 226, 549; Murphey,
"Functioning of the Ottoman Army," 43--45, 224.
27
This alteration coincided in time with a proposal for reform of the Six BOlilks in
the 1630s under Murad IV; see Rhoads Murphey, ed., Kanun-Name-i Sultanf Ii 'Azfz
Efendi, Aziz Efendi' s Book of Sultanic Laws and Regulations: An Agenda for Reform by
a Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Statesman, Sources of Oriental Languages and Literatures,
9; Turkish Sources, 8 (n.p.: 1984), 6. ,
172 CHAPTER FNE
other than emins and katibs lessened considerably the impact of the
standing cavalry's recently established monopoly over these positions.
It was only after a shift to non-military collectors that the higher
gulamiye and maa§ of 40 ak~e each were instituted.
Although the appointment of emins and katibs had long been the
normal method of collecting the cizye, it was never the only method
used. In register MM 323 (6874) of 979/1571-72, there were instances
in which the cizye collector was called an emin purely as a formality,
such as the sancak bey of iskenderiye who was appointed "emin and
katib" for the cizye of iskenderiye, or the nazrr (inspector) of the
mukataas of Vidin who was also "emin and katib" for the cizye of
Vidin. In practical terms, this designation meant only that the person
so appointed was entitled to collect the gulamiye allotted to collection
officials. Shortly thereafter, in tahvilat register MM 657 (1520) dated
996-1006/1587-97, cases can be found in which cizye collection was
not assigned to an emin. For example, the cizye of the village of
Ortakoy in Siizebolu, belonging to the evkaf of Fatma Hatun, was
delivered to the treasury by the villagers themselves, while the cizye
of certain sultanic vak1f properties in Bursa was collected by a former
tezkireci of the §tkk-1 evvel who did not receive the title of emin.
The number of cizye collectors not labeled emins gradually increased
and their origins diversified. By the first decade of the seventeenth
century, cizye accounting register MM 1520 (5334) dated 1013/1604-5
shows that cizye was assigned to an emin and katib only 85% of the
time; in the remaining 15%, cizye was collected by someone not labeled
an emin. The cizye of Sidrekaps1 was collected by Mustafa Aga, the
nazrr of the mukataa on the mines of Sidrekaps1; he was not called
an emin in this register, though in 979/1571-72 he probably would
have been. Mehmed Bey, the sancak bey of Vul~itrin and nazrr of
the mukataa of the mines of Vul~itrin, collected the cizye of Vul~itrin,
Pri§tine, and Novobrdo, again without being labeled an emin, as his
counterparts for iskenderiye and Vidin in the earlier register had been.
The cizye of a number of locations was collected by Osman Pa§a,
the former beylerbey of Egri, as financial supervisor (muhassil-i emval)
rather than as emin. 28 The cizye of the evkaf of Mustafa Pa§a in
Kalkan was collected by the administrator (miitevelli) of the evkaf.
28
The involvement of sancak beys and even beylerbeys in provincial tax collection
as emins or miiltezims was to become much more significant later in the seventeenth
century (lnalcik, "Centralization and Decentralization").
Finally, two men named Si.ileyman and Halil collected the cizye of
Kalavuma, but not as emin and katib; they were designated instead
as havalegan, people who had a havale.
While most of the collectors of the ziyade-i cizye in register MM
2224 (236) dated 1028/1618-19 were called emins and katibs, a fair
number were described as havalegan, assignees. A typical entry in
register KK 2576 records an order (emr-i §erif) making To~u Ba§t
(Head Cannoneer) Osman the havale for funds destined for expenses
of the cannons of the fortress of Erzurum, this expenditure having
been assigned on the bedel-i niizi.il of Amasra for 1044/1634--35. Other
orders record havales (assignments of revenue) for repairs to a mosque
from the cizye receipts of Argiri Kasn and for fortress repairs from
the avanz of several kazas in Mora. 29 In such cases, holders of havales
demanded funds from the official collectors and transferred them to
their proper destinations. In situations where havales were granted for
individuals' salaries, those individuals might be sent to collect the tax
directly. All cases in register MM 2224 (236) were of this type: the
havalegan were imperial soldiers or officials whose salaries had been
assigned on the cizye or other taxes of a particular place for a particular
period of time. Rather than having the money collected by others,
transmitted to Istanbul, and paid out again as salaries, the men to
whom these revenues were assigned were given havales and permitted
to make the collection themselves. In a few cases it appeared that
someone other than the havalegan would do the actual collecting; for
example, two men were assigned to Timaklia(?) as havalegan, but in
addition Mehmet Piri, sipahi, was assigned as cami (collector) with
the following marginal note: "and the above Mehmet lives in Timak-
lia and he himself will collect [it]."30
By the time of cizye tevziat register MM 2932 (14588) in 1039-
40/1629-30, there were many occasions when emins and katibs were
not appointed, and even if an emin was listed in the register, someone
else performed the actual collection. This person was designated by
the·words cami, collector, or cem eder, will collect. According to an
order dated 1055/1645-46, the second salary or maa§ collected with
the cizye was for the cami, while the government-appointed officials
29
KK 2576, pp. 1, 119, 76.
30
Ve mezkur Mehmet Timaklia'da sakin olup kendisi cem eder: MM 2224 (236),
p. 8. The term cami for this type of collector must not be confused with cabi, the revenue
collector for a vaklf.
174 CHAPTER FIVE
responsible for gathering tax receipts over a wider area received the
guiamiye. 31 The cami often seems to have been a retainer of the emin,
sometimes a person connected with valof management, and occasion-
ally someone with no obvious connection to the appointed emin. In
registers from the 1640s and 1650s, no emins at all were recorded;
the spaces for their names were left blank (in the responsibility of
"blank," deruhde-i ), and only cfuni collectors were listed, usually
with the phrase, "so-and-so will record and collect". By mid-century
the cizye was often farmed. 32
Avanz collection, like cizye collection, gradually became a perqui-
site of the standing cavalry forces. In the years 1031/1621-22 and
1032/1622-23 the majority of assignments for collection of the piyade
and miisellem avanz of Anadolu went to men from the standing cavalry:
9 out of 14 in 1031/1621-22, and 14 out of 15 in 1032/1622-23. 33
Like cizye collectors, appointees listed in the registers as collectors
of avanz in the 1030s/1620s and 1040s/1630s were usually members
of standing cavalry regiments. As with the cizye, however, these
assignments were gradually given to others. For the cizye, standing
cavalry appointments began to decrease around 1630, precisely when
the number of military collectors for the avanz began to grow. This
suggests that cavalrymen might simply have been transferred from
cizye to avanz collection around this time, a move that would have
acknowledged their dependence on tax collection salaries to augment
their wages. For the avanz, a decrease in assignments to standing
cavalrymen began around 1650; by the mid-1060s/1650s the majority
of avanz collectors were from the palace and imperial enterprises or
the retinues of great men of state, while a few were authorities on
the local scene, such as sancak beys and provincial emins.
Tevziat registers show that other individuals could be assigned to
collect avanz. An order for a collection of clarified butter (revgan-
z sade) was addressed to the beylerbey and nazlf of Kefe; the order
stated that an employee of the imperial larder (hassa kilarflerden) had
been appointed as agent (miiba~ir) for transport of the butter to Istanbul,
31
MM 3881 (2765), p. 50.
32
Filan kayd edip cem eder; MM 3742 (14790) from 1052/1642-43 and MM 4187
(14581) from 1060/1650--51; MM 4569 (14797), a cizye tevzi register dated 1067/1656-
57, also records a large number of cases in which no emin was appointed for cizye
collection. For farming of the cizye see KK 5271 dated 1068/1657-58, pp. 6, 7.
33
Assignments (made three years in advance) listed in a tevziat register dated 1028/
1618-19, MM 2224 (236).
and the beylerbey and nazrr should make haste to prepare a suitable
ship for him. In an order dated 1051/1641-42, several kad1s were
alerted to the fact that the cabi and katib of the vak1f of Orta Cami
would collect the avanz from villages in the area of Tikve~ possessed
by the valaf and would tum the money over to the miitevelli of the
vaklf. A temessiik accounting for the money was, however, to be
submitted to the mevkufat bureau. A final entry appointed Saban,
formerly koyun emini (overseer of the provision of sheep for the state),
as avanz collector of the entire province of Sam for the year 1050/
1640--41. The order did not mention Saban' s current employment, so
it is possible that- he was out of office (mazul) at that time and had
been assigned this large and lucrative collection post as a form of
pension. 34 Tevziat registers in the last decades of the seventeenth century
reflect a redistribution of the avanz among taxpayers and a readjust-
ment of its incidence which are absent from earlier registers; in that
period, the amount to be collected was decided by a process of
negotiation between kad1s and other provincial and local authorities
and the taxpayers. 35 Although this makes later tevziat registers less
reliable than earlier ones for determining population, they do indicate
the distribution of provincial wealth.
By the 1060s/1650s, the avanz of certain areas was assigned on
a more or less permanent basis to support the dockyards, stables,
kitchen, or other imperial enterprises, and the emins of those enter-
prises were made responsible for the collection of funds. This system
of long-term revenue assignments, known as ocaklzk, was frequently
applied to farmed revenues, especially those supporting provincial
garrisons. 36 Revenues assigned as ocakhk and corresponding expen-
ditures were often accounted for outside the treasury's income and
expenditure totals and so must be added in to determine the empire's
34
MM 3881 (2765), p. 99; KK 2576, pp. 93, 46.
35
Inalcik, "Military and Fiscal Transformation," 335-37; for evidence to this effect
from kad1 sicills, see Michael Ursinus, '"Avariz Hanesi' und 'Tevzi' Hanesi' in der
Lokalveiwaltung des Kaza Manastir (Bitola) im 17 Jh.," POF 30 (1980): 481-93. McGowan
sees the tevzi adjustment process as the product of a decrease of population in the late
seventeenth century ("Study of Land a~d Agriculture," 59-60). According to Ulu~ay, this
process first appeared in the kad1 sicills of Manisa in 1671 (M. <;agatay Ulu~ay, 18 ve
19. Yiizyzllarda Saruhan'da E§kiyalzk ve Halk Hareketleri [Istanbul: Berksoy Bas1mevi,
1955], 52).
36 For definitions and a closer examination of the destinations of these revenues see
Murphey, "Functioning of the Ottoman Army," 187-203; Ostapchuk, "Ottoman Black

Sea Frontier," 194-257. On ocakhk for the arsenal see Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change,"
461-65.
176 CHAPTER FIVE
total revenue. Ocakhks were recorded in separate registers of their

own, which contain data on these revenues and their collection as well
as on military groups and enterprises supported by them. Orders
regarding ocakhks, however, appear in regular ahkam registers. There
is evidence that a good deal of bargaining went on between taxpayers
and representatives of the institutions supported regarding the amounts
to be paid and therefore the numbers of avanzhanes to be listed in
the registers. This may be the origin of the adjustments noted in the
later tevziat registers. Taxation by negotiation seems to have become
a general characteristic of revenue collection in the second half of
the seventeenth century.
An order dated 1040/1630-31 regarding the collection of the avanz
of Menlik contains a surprising note: it appears that the appointed
collector, Ahmed, gave or sold the right of collection ·to a resident
of Menlik named Siileyman. 37 Selling rights to tax collection would
have been reasonable behavior, as the award of tax collection respon-
sibilities with the attached salaries was intended in part to compensate
for the effects of inflation on military wages, often nominally un-
changed throughout the inflation period. 38 By selling his collection
rights, the official appointee could receive his money in a lump sum
without the inconvenience and risk of collection, while the new collector
could behave like a tax farmer, profiting from anything he might
collect over and above the assigned sum. This practice may also be
related to the fact that many of the appointed collectors had other
responsibilities: during wartime, military men would be less available
to collect taxes in the countryside.
The available documents do not indicate how collection appointees
were selected, but the process doubtless involved recommendations
from superiors, approval from above, and the operation of patronage
networks. A document showing the recommendation process at work
can be seen in a register dated 1038/1628-29, where an order man-
dated the appointment of a certain Ali on the recommendation of his
superior (also named Ali, an aga of the gureba-i yemin) to the collection
37
Mezbur Ahmed zide kadruhu da,hi Menlik kazasz sakinlerinden Siileyman nam kimesneye
deruhde ve sipari§ edip memhur temessiik alznmz§: KK 2576, p. 86.
38
Personal communication from Mark Stein, whose doctoral dissertation in progress
on the seventeenth-century Ottoman forts and garrisons along the Hapsburg border will
shed light on the condition of the standing army during this period. For timar-holders
selling their tax collection rights see Faroqhi, "Town Officials, Timar-Holders, and Taxa-
tion," 68-69.
of taxes from the rice paddies (~eltiik) of Mara§, on the grounds that
he had submitted the previous year's collection in full and without
arrears ("not one ak~e nor one grain remained outstanding"). 39 One
exceptional appointment register, MM 2224 (236), carefully explains
to whose retinue each of the appointees belonged or on whose
recommendation they obtained their jobs. This information sheds an
interesting light on the process of intisab (connections, usually trans-
lated "patronage") within the ruling elite. 40 At the time of this register,
1028-32/1619-23, although most appointees came from the ranks of
the standing cavalry forces, their patrons or superiors were well
distributed across the elite. Eleven recommendations were made by
various viziers, nine by defterdars, sixteen by members of the finance
department below the level of defterdar, another sixteen by me.mbers
of the palace staff (excluding the harem), eight by harem servants,
thirteen by the outer service (bostanc1s, stables, and arsenal), seven
by religious personnel (including kad1s, kazaskers, the §eyhiUislam,
and the sultan's hoca), thirteen by the emir of the gypsies (kzbtzyan
emiri) in Edime, eight by miitevellis of evkaf (all for collection on
evkaf lands), and nine by people of unidentifiable status (including
"a person known as <;ama§irzade" and a Jew). The source provides
39
Bir akr;e ve bir habbe baki kalmayzp; MM 2728 (3457), p. 76.
40
Factionalism apparently became prevalent under Sultan Stileyman, when the whole
royal household, including the women, moved into the new palace of Topkap1 (Halil
Inalcik, "Sultan Stileyman: The Man and the Statesman," in Siileyman the Magnificent
and His Time, ed. Gilles Veinstein, Ecole des Hautes Etudes des Sciences Sociales [Paris:
La documentation fran~aise, 1992], 94-95; Leslie P. Peirce, The Imperial Harem: Women
and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire, Studies in Middle Eastern History [New York:
Oxford University Press, 1993], 143-49). A vivid picture of the workings of intisab in
the seventeenth century can be obtained from Evliya ~elebi, The Intimate Life of an
Ottoman Statesman, which depicts life in the grand vizier's household. In sixteenth-century
Europe, provincial governors commonly received appointment because, as heads of large
households where up to several hundred other nobles were trained, they could command
large entourages and patronage networks, mobilizing the assistance required for their work
(Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite, 37, 44; Elliott, Imperial Spain, 310). The sale of
office as practiced in western Europe was an alternative to patronage that allowed people
from outside the noble households to obtain government positions (Parry, Sale of Office,
2-3; Coveney, Introduction to France in Crisis, 9, 26). It resulted in competition for office
between the old nobility and those newly qualified (Coveney, Introduction to France in
Crisis, 15-16; Stone, Crisis of the Aristocracy, 481-82; Wilson, Transformation of Europe,
54-55). Abuse of patronage in the Ottoman Empire, resulting in the recruitment of
untrustworthy riffraff, is often held to be at the root of military decay (Fodor, "State and
Society, Crisis and Reform," 229). Gerber argues, however, that intisab actually played
a rather small role in promotion (State, Society, and Law, 146-48). In the finance depart-
ment, although birth seems to have counted more heavily in initial hirings, promotion was
governed by a combination of merit and intisab (Darling, "Ottoman Salary Registers").
178 CHAPTER FIVE
no information about the factions or alliances to which these patrons

might have belonged. Comparison with similar registers, if any exist,
or with information from chronicles, might illuminate political rela-
tionships within the Ottoman ruling class, and in particular how the
sixteenth-century competition for office between timar-holding sipahis
and products of the dev§irme was transformed during the seventeenth
century into a competition between the standing cavalry of the sultan's
household and the households of other great men of state.41
The Military in Tax Farming
During the seventeenth century, gradual alterations were made in the

tax farming system resulting in the transfer of its benefits from one
group to another in Ottoman society, while the central government
struggled to maintain control over the process. 42 The length of time
for which iltizams were normally held was one of the first things to
change. The government had the right to abrogate an iltizam at any
time if a higher bid were offered, but in the mid-sixteenth century
such abrogation was relatively uncommon. Around the tum of the
century, however, the completion of a full three-year term was much
more unusual. Although most iltizams were still awarded for three
years, three-year tahvils were almost never completed, as the accep-
tance of new bids and the award of iltizams in mid-term became
prevalent. This turnover was understandable when prices were on the
increase and the government was strapped for cash. Available evi-
dence suggests that the price of iltizams rose by some 2% per year
before about 1586 and by larger amounts after that. The high inflation
and widespread unrest of the late sixteenth century caused the real
value of mukataas to fluctuate wildly, and three-year bids became less
41
On seventeenth-century officeholders see Kunt, The Sultan's Servants; the critique
of Rifa<at cAli Abou-El-Haj ("Review Article: I. Metin Kunt, The Sultan's Servants: The
Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650," Osmanlz Ara§tzrmalarz
6 [ 1986]: 221-46) seems to be contradicted by some of his own evidence (The 1703
Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics, Uitgaven van bet Nederlands Historisch-
Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 52 [n.p.: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut
te Istanbul, 1984]).
42
Cvetkova also notes that the iltizam system was transformed considerably in this
period ("Recherches sur le systeme d'affermage," 123-24). Detailed study would doubtless
modify the prevalent image of tax farming and uncover mechanisms by which the prob-
lems of the later seventeenth century developed.
and less realistic. In the end, the term for many iltizams was altered
to one year, though some mukataas, probably those with more stable
revenues, still formed the object of three-year tahvils. 43 It was rec-
ognized that a high turnover of miiltezims created problems, espe-
cially with one-year iltizams, and by the 1050s/1640s iltizams were
usually granted for a full year even if a higher bid was made in the
middle of the term. Granting an iltizam to a new bidder in mid-term
began to be seen as improper as long as the current miiltezim was
doing a good job.44
With rising prices, shortened terms, and a rapid changeover of
personnel, it has often appeared that the government was losing control
of the iltizam process. During these same decades, however, the finance
department tightened its hold on tax farms by changing the personnel
to whom iltizams were awarded and the procedure by which awards
were made. Military men had always been employed in iltizam
collection, but a tally of miiltezims in 983/1575-76 shows that only
36% came from the askeri class: members of the standing military
forces, palace servants, or local timar-holding sipahis; 26% were local
people not of the military class, while 38% were of unidentifiable
origin. 45 A generation later these percentages were reversed: in reg-
ister MM 1488 (651) dated 1012/1603-4, 64% of miiltezims were
from the askeri, mainly standing cavalry forces and palace servants,
while only 36% were non-askeri or unidentifiable. By the 1620s, most
iltizams were granted to military men who had proven themselves on
campaign, and in registers from the 1630s and 1640s, over 85% of
emins came from the standing military forces. The remaining few
were people with local ties, both Muslims and non-Muslims. Like the
cizye and avanz, iltizam-collected taxes gradually fell under the control
of military and palace personnel. The timing of this change paralleled
that of the cizye: an increase in the decades before 1620 and a near
domination afterward. After 1620, iltizam havale assignments were
43
For example, see MM 2765 (1055/1645-46), pp. 8, 74.
44
See, for example, MM 3881 (2765) 1055/1645-46 p. 64: an iltizam of 197 112 kuru§
was upheld even though a bid of 200 kuru§ was offered. For two examples of refusal
to replace a worthy miiltezim see MM 2728 (3457), p. 44. For outstanding performance,
collectors could be retained for an additional term; see MM 2728 (3457), p. 60. Finance
department policies on tax farms must be added to the list of factors qualifying ~izak~a' s
estimate of their competitiveness ("Tax-Farming and Financial Decentralization," 221).
45
KK 4994. For kuls in tax collection positions in the sixteenth century see the kad1
records on Bursa published by Inalcik, and for members of the Six BOliiks involved in
mukataas in 964/1556--57 see Akdag, Turkiye'nin iktisadf ve iftimaf Tarihi, 339, n. 1.
180 CHAPTER FIVE
also awarded to campaign veterans. Again, the involvement of these

groups was not an innovation, but an intensification of a presence
already strongly felt.
At the same time, the nature of the iltizam award undeIWent a
change. After about 1620, the appointment of campaign veterans,
mtilazims, to tax farming positions was called tevzi, connoting an
assignment rather than a competition.46 Ko~i Bey reports in this period
that iltizams on the imperial has villages were routinely parcelled out
to the standing cavalry as their service or duty (hizmet, the same term
used for cizye collection assignments). 47 Troops obtaining these iltizams
did not receive them because of high bids. These assignments were
documented like iltizams, but in almost all cases the new bid was
for the same amount as the old, indicating that a true bidding process
was not in operation. The motive for these appointments lay not in
increasing the treasury's income but in securing that income through
employing the state's own personnel, and decreasing its expenses by
remunerating service to the empire by means other than salary in-
creases. Most miiltezims appointed in this way did not provide kefils;
instead, they usually submitted a rather large sum in advance. 48 Their
assignments were for one year rather than the traditional three, and
during the year no new bids were accepted. ~1zak~a has hypothesized
that the proceeds of tax farms whose price remained level (which he
labeled "frozen") were earmarked for military salaries. 49 These may
46
A register of such appointments, called tevziat-i muldzim, dated 1042/1632-33, forms
part of MM 3207 (4888). In register KK 5019 (1038--44/1629-35), 86% of appointments
were of this type; in MM 1257 (1768) 1047-55/1637--46, 86% again; in MM 4091 (3275)
1059/1649-50, 87%. An earlier tevziat defteri for iltizams, MM 331 (17862) dated 979/
1571-72, lists only the iltizams and their value, not the persons to whom they were
awarded.
47
Ko~i Bey Risalesi, ed. Aksilt, 55.
48
Advance payments by military tax farmers reveal the ability of soldiers to accumulate
capital and, as has been pointed out, represent a form of domestic short-term borrowing
by the state. It should be noted that not all milltezims paid in advance, and that Ottoman
tax farming as an institution did not necessarily serve as a loan device. The Spanish
government repaid loans by granting creditors tax collection rights. In England, as well,
the Crown borrowed from customs farmers, who repaid themselves from tax receipts; their
profits were considered a fair price for their services in making cash available on demand
(Newton, "Establishment of the Great Farm of the English Customs," 155; Ashton, "Revenue
Farming under the Early Stuarts," 311 ). Service as royal creditors involved English customs
farmers in "Court intrigue and wire-pulling," and they became focal points for chains of
wealthy lenders, lending money borrowed from others as well as their own (Harper, "Signi-
ficance of the Farmers of the Customs," 65-69). In France, tax farming was specifically
used to anticipate future revenues by setting the selling price of the farm higher than the
anticipated annual revenue (Bonney, "Failure of the French Revenue Farms," 20).
49
~1zalc~a, "Tax-Farming and Financial Decentralization," 232.
have been the very mukataas assigned to provincial military groups

as ocakhk. It is reasonable to assume that, in support of military
salaries, the state would prefer the lesser risk posed by assigned
collectors to the higher chance of loss inherent in open bidding.
However, to conclude that "frozen" iltizams represent fiscal decentral-
ization is to ignore the identity of the tax farmers. If ~izak~a' s "frozen"
iltizams were indeed the same as those awarded to military veterans
from the standing cavalry, then profits generated by the revenue sources
over and above iltizam amounts would benefit the central military
forces rather than provincial representatives of a decentralization
process. Such profits would represent interest on advance payments,
which constituted short-term loans to the treasury. The "frozen" iltizams,
therefore, should probably be regarded as an instrument of central-
ization rather than decentralization, one by which the state could secure
support for its troops, make use of wealth (in the form of ready cash)
accumulated by upper echelons of the military, and ensure an on-
going interest in its own health and strength by some of its most
powerful servants.
Procedural routinization is clearly visible in the wording of register
entries for these iltizams. Assignments were made "at the time of the
distribution [of assignments]", for the reason that "the period of the
year of his iltizam was completed" or "because his year of iltizam
is over". 50 There was no competitive bidding for an assignment as
emin; competition in these decades resulted from duplicate assign-
ments. For example, although a local resident, Seyyid Osman ~avu§,
held the iltizam of a number of mukataas in Selanik, a silahdar named
Mehmed Ahmed, who by virtue of his campaign service had obtained
an imperial riius (certificate of the reisiilkiittab), was awarded the
same iltizam and submitted 50,000 ak~e in advance as a guarantee.
When he petitioned regarding this conflict, the collection post was
duly granted to him. Another campaign veteran, Mehmed Mahmud
<;avu§, was simultaneously awarded the position of hassa hare emini
also held by Seyyid Osman ~avu§; the latter had to resign that position
as well. In another case, a mukataa awarded to Bekir Hasan of the
ulufeciyan-i yesar was also assigned to Hasan, a campaign miilaz1m.
50
Hin-i tevzide, ez an sebeb [ki] mUddet-i sene-i iltizame§ temam §Ud, or ez an sebeb
[ki] murur-z iltizam-z sene-i hod temam §i.id; KK 5019, p. 4; also pp. 1, 5, 7, 11, 12, 13,
15. The same wording, presumably indicating the same process, occurred in sixteenth-
century entries, but much less frequently: see MM 241 (115) fol. 34b, dated 971/1563-
04; and KK 4994, p. 23 from 983/1575-76. Belin, citing a firman regulating miilazemet,
stated that the term could be as short a~ six months (Essais, 131-32).
182 CHAPTER FIVE
Hasan resigned his assignment in favor of Bekir, who then requested

an order confirming him in the position. Resignation (/eragat) of an
iltizam in favor of another was a fairly common occurrence in this
register. 51 Usually no reason was given for the action; we can only
assume that the person resigning obtained other employment.
In addition to providing a degree of central control over the ilitzam
process, orders of appointment permitting iltizam employees to draw
salaries from state revenues had another purpose, to avert clashes
between old and new appointees. An order installing the katib of the
candle works (§emhane) of Edirne, addressed to the kad1 of Edirne,
explained that Ali, an Edime resident, had petitioned stating his ap-
\pointment to the post at a salary of 4 ak~e per day. The order permitting
him to collect the mukataa' s revenue and draw his salary also charged
the former katib, Arslan, not to interfere with Ali's performance of
his duties, and instructed the kad1 to copy the order into his sicil and
return the original to Ali. 52 This order, like many others in the reg-
isters, hints at conflicts over collection rights arising from turnover
in mukataa personnel, especially when iltizam awards were made for
only one year or simultaneously on the central and provincial levels,
and explains the care taken to record and date every change. Con-
sidering the number of tax-collecting positions available throughout
the empire and the fact that collection and recording of taxes took
place well after position assignments, the frequency of this sort of
trouble seems relatively low.
Appointment entries from the 1030s/1620s granting iltizams to
soldiers all mention a tezkire or suret from the reisiilkiittab in the
hands of the potential appointee ("in accordance with the copy of the
imperial rilus," [her muceb-i suret-i ruus-i humayun]). The suret-i rilus,
or copy of an entry in the reisiilkiittab's register, verified the applicant's
military service and his status as a candidate (miilazim) for further
government employment. In the year 1000/1591-92, one iltizam
appointee had had a suret-i riius from the reisiilkiittab but had also
presented a tezkire from the ba§ defterdar, a document sometimes
offered in 1013/1604-5 by finance scribes desiring appointments.
Although in the sixteenth century such documentation had not been
necessary, by the 1620s a tezkire from the reisiilkiittab was required
51
KK 5019, pp. 4, 12, 10, 8, 9, 14.
52
KK 5019, p. 165, dated 1043/1633; for other examples see Murphey, "Functioning
of the Ottoman Army," 201, 224; Ostapchuk, "Ottoman Black Sea Frontier," 206-13.
for appointment as a finance scribe, and a rilus was the mandatory

document for scribes of the divan as well as prospective miiltezims.
Appointments to the office of nazir also became subject to the
reisillkilttab at this time. 53 The heightened power wielded by the
reisillkilttab in the 1620s is suggested by the fact that a suret-i rilus
enabled a young soldier from the ulufeci-yan-1 yesar, Salih Ahmed,
to oust the old katib ibrahim Halife from the mukataa of the weighing
scales (kapan) of Edime, a post he occupied as a form of pension
(her vech-i tekaud). 54
In the first half of the seventeenth century, therefore, tax farming
and other government tax collection assignments filled a gap caused
by the decline of the timar system, serving as rewards for military
service and as devices for securing the cooperation and loyalty of the
military class, particularly the standing cavalry forces. Assigning tax
farming and cizye or avanz collection to military personnel permitted
greater government control over disbursal of revenues than the timar
system had done, as the money collected was spent under treasury
auspices rather than private ones. There were other benefits as well:
the government could tap the wealth of the askeri class,55 as military
miiltezims usually paid in advance of collection, and could exert a
measure of control over soldiers unemployed between campaigns.
Registers often noted that tax collection assignments were made to
otherwise unoccupied veterans (mUlazzm-z feragmdan); the govern-
ment evidently recognized the need to provide soldiers with employ-
ment in order to forestall the kind of military unrest seen in connection
with the Austrian War at the tum of the century. The practice of
granting tax collection assignments to military candidates rather than
local civilians may have increased the reliability of return. It also
reduced the number and extravagance of conditions placed by bidders
on iltizams. In 1039/1629-30 and 1040/1630-31, collection assign-
ments to soldiers were allowed to override appointments made in
53
, For the riius see Nejat Goyiin~, "XVI. Yiizyilda Ruus ve Onemi," Tarih Dergisi 22
(1969): 17-34; Inalcik, "Reis-iil-kiittab." For scribal appointments in the finance depart-
ment see Linda T. Darling, "The Ottoman Finance Department and the Assessment and
Collection of the Cizye and Avanz Taxes, 156~1660" (PhD dissertation, University of
Chicago, 1990), 61-63. For appointments of nazrrs see KK 5019 (1038/1628-29), pp. 9, 10.
54 KK 5019 (1038/1628-29), p. 5; when the campaign came around, however, Salih
was called up for service and ibrahim received his former job back.
55 For the wealth of the askeri, see Halil Inalcik, "Capital Formation in the Ottoman
Empire," Journal of Economic History 29 (1969): 97-140.

184 CHAPTER FIVE
other ways. 56 At the same time, some iltizams were still awarded
through open bidding, and some, possibly the same ones, still had
three-year terms. Toward the middle of the seventeenth century,
awarding one-year iltizam grants to military men seems to have
diminished in frequency, and competitive bidding reasserted itself,
along with longer terms. Provincial governors in this period often
served as miiltezims, undertaking to submit a set amount of provincial
revenue to the treasury. 57
The increasing involvement of the standing cavalry forces in tax
collection parallels the increasing involvement of janissaries in im-
perial politics. The growing importance of the standing army as a
whole, stemming from the military revolution of the late sixteenth
century, resulted in a greater political and administrative role for its
members, like that of timar holders in times past. Although it has long
been acknowledged that the advice writers' demands for restoration
of the timar army were unrealistic in the face of advances in military
technology, the converse has gone unrecognized: that is, the need for
studies that analyze more carefully the standing army's activities in
the post-classical era, their interests and loyalties, and the effect of
their participation on Ottoman governance. The non-timar-holding
military forces have been treated unidimensionally, their involvement
in the empire's political and financial activities analyzed as evidence
of decline. The advice writers saw them as an element of disruption
that had to be controlled and eliminated from the centers of power.
The standing military forces, however, constituted a potential admin-
istrative tool, and employing them in tax collection was a means of
incorporating them into the governing structure and giving them a
stake in the absence of disruption. The little we know about patronage
ties suggests that they had links to a broad range of officials and
powerful people who probably belonged to different factions of the
56
See KK 5019, pp. 16, 89, 153. Again in 1691 it was found necessary to insist on
tax farmers' being allowed to remain in their positions for a full year (Faroqhi, "Crisis
and Change," 538).
57
Around the turn of the century, positions as sancak bey began to be awarded as
sinecures to high officials (usually of palace rather than military origin) who were on
rotation out of office and who exercised their governing functions through agents. At the
same time, the government began to transfer provincial has revenues to the central treasury's
accounts, causing these officials to seek additional income from tax collection. It is not
coincidental that the governmental powers of these provincial officials also diminished,
or that control in the countryside became an issue (lnalcik, "Centralization and De-
centralization," 29-30; Kunt, The Sultan's Servants; Murphey, "Functioning of the Otto-
man Army," 202-3).
ruling elite. Thus, we cannot presume that they all had the same interests
or worked for the same goals. The expansion and diminution of their
role in tax collection, and possibly in other areas as well, affected
Ottoman governance during this period in ways we have not yet begun
to examine. Comparing their impact on the system with those of the
timar holders of the past and the ayan (local notables), who later
acquired the role in tax collection that the military had lost, might
pncover issues fundamental to maintaining imperial cohesion as well
as to day-to-day administration in the empire.
CHAPTER SIX
TAX COLLECTION, REMITTANCE, AND REPORTING
Corruption in tax collection is one of the things it seems "everyone

knows" about the Ottoman Empire. Oppressive bureaucratization,
bribery, and extortion have become standard elements of the decline
myth, subscribed to by scholars and ordinary people alike, even in
an era when governmental control is far more intrusive and probably
no more equitable than in the seventeenth century. The negative as-
sessment of Ottoman fiscal administration originates in the diatribes
of advice writers and the complaints of taxpayers living in a non-
bureaucratic age. To set Ottoman administration in a comparative
context, and to evaluate fairly these charges of corruption, we must
start from normal fiscal procedure rather than the exceptions and abuses,
committed without official warrant, that have until now made up the
text of the tax collection story for the seventeenth century. Tax
collection problems had a number of causes, only one of which was
corruption. Certain kinds of problems were more closely related to
the international fiscal crisis of the period than to administrative decline
in any one state. Maintaining or increasing the tax yield in a declining
economy generally entails hardship for taxpayers and generates re-
sentment and refusal to pay: the tax collectors of Spain in those years
"had a very uncertain expectation of life," and those of France were
regularly murdered at the beginning of major revolts. 1 Another set of
problems, shared with all large bureaucratic states of the early modem
period, was related to the low level of technology in which the
administrative system operated, and involved difficulties in transport-
ing money, obtaining information on distant events and circumstances,
and making accurate counts of taxpayers. This chapter details the
normal processes by which taxes assessed according to the methods
already described were collected and remitted to the treasury and
examines normal problems encountered in collection. Corruption and
malfeasance will be investigated later.
1
Kamen, Iron Century, 378.
TAX COLLECTION, REMITIANCE, AND REPORTING 187
Collection Procedures: Cizye and Avanz
Revenue collection procedures were not described in any finance

department handbook but can be pieced together from orders addressed
to tax collectors and local administrators. These orders (ahkam) contain
the finance department's instructions to tax collectors and details on
normal procedure and problems encountered in the collection process.
A copy of a tezkire issued in 1036-37/1626-28 requesting an order
for cizye collection will serve to show the contents of a typical tax
collection order. 2 Blank spaces left for the year and the collector's
name indicate that this particular tezkire was intended either as a
model for several orders or as a request for an order for a person
not yet appointed. 3 The order requested by the tezkire was a ni§an,
a type of berat to be shown as authorization for performing a function.
This ni§an was supposed to relate that now that the tevzi, distribution,
of cizye and other tax collection responsibilities had been made for
this year in the capital, "blank" was ordered to collect the cizye of
the city of Trabzon due for the year 103-/162-.4 After detailing the
number of banes (1575, from which 533 were to be subtracted, as
the cizye from those banes was devoted to support of the garrison
of Giresun), the ni§an was to state that at the appointed collection
time, "blank" was authorized to collect 220 ak~e from each taxpayer
plus an accession increase of 5 ak~e, totaling 225, and no one was
to interfere with the collection in any way. It specified the current
exchange rates at which gold coins and silver kuru§ were to be accepted
(1 altun = 118 ak~e; 1 kamil kuru§ = 78 ak~e; 1 esedi kuru§ =worm-
hole: elsewhere in this register the exchange rate for the esedi kuru§
is listed as 68 ak~e) and warned the collector that if he were forced
to take actual ak~e coins, he should accept only those that were new
and genuine and of full weight (at that time, 11 to a dirhem). He was
to send the money collected to Istanbul and submit it to the treasury.
Another tezkire for a ni§an for the year 1055/1645-46 was issued
to Osman, the defterdar and cizye collector of Erzurum, who had
2
MM 2728 (3457), p. 3. A copy of an order like that requested in the tezkire is in
MM 241 (115), fol. 55a.
3 Dent
has suggested that the blank spaces instead of names found in documents
for French tax farmers may have indicated secret participants in the system (Crisis in
Finance, 56).
4 The wording used,
"the collection of the cizye of the city of Trabzon due for the
year x" (x senesine mahsub olmak uzere nefs-i Trabzon cizyesi), is the standard phrase-
ology employed in almost every such order.
188 CHAPTER SIX
petitioned requesting authorization to collect the tax. 5 The muhasebe

defterleri (i.e., the tevzi-i cizye registers kept in the cizye muhasebesi
kalemi) were checked and this Osman's appointment as cizye collec-
tor for Erzurum for that year was verified. Collection having been
ordered, he was authorized to collect the cizye of Erzurum in accord-
ance with the cizye assessment (tahrir) register bearing a tugra (the
Sultan's) and a seal (the muharrir's) which was given to him, and
he was ordered to send neither more nor less than the amount assessed
and recorded in the register. Earlier we examined the production
of tahrir registers; here we see them in use in the tax collection pro-
cess to specify amounts to be collected and individuals responsible
for payment.
The two orders above illustrate the procedures followed after the
appointment of a cizye collector. First, the appointee was given an
appointment berat (ni§an), a diploma addressed to all and sundry
empowering him as collector of the cizye of a certain place for a
certain year, providing specific instructions as to how he was to proceed
and commanding people's compliance. Dates of appointment in the
registers show that appointments were made anywhere from a few
months to several years in advance. Shortly before the actual time
for collection, the beginning of the year,6 the collector petitioned to
request another order (emr or hilkm) mandating collection at this
specific time. Upon receiving this petition, finance department scribes
checked the tevzi-i cizye registers in the cizye muhasebesi kalemi to
make sure that this person had truly been appointed as claimed. Only
then was the second order sent. Addressed to the kad1, the milfetti§,
and/or the local defterdar rather than to the tax collector himself, this
second order commanded their cooperation with his collection and
contained detailed instructions on collection and reporting procedures
which they would have to supervise. 7 The tax collector was sent a
copy of the area's current cizye tahrir register, according to which
the collection was to proceed. The complexity of the appointment
procedure and the long delays between stages explain the need to
5
MM 3881 (2765), p. 157.
6
An order in register MM 4646 (7455) 1069/1658-59, p. 20, specified that the cizye
of Mara§ was due "from Muharrem to Muharrem," the lunar year, but it was collected
in March, the beginning of the solar year and the harvest season in that part of the Mid-
dle East.
7
For a copy of such an order recorded in the kad1's sicil see Ongan, Ankara'mn iki
Numarali Ser'iye Sicili, no. 671.
TAX COLLECTION, REMITTANCE, AND REPORTING 189
issue dual orders and keep appointment registers. Another reason for
dual orders appears in a response to a tax collector's petition; he
requested a second collection order specifically to fores tall opposition
to his collection. 8
In cases where the actual collection was made from taxpayers by
provincial officials, the finance department directed orders to these
officials to warn them that collection time had come, to identify the
person sent to pick up the revenue from them, and to ensure the
officials' cooperation with the collector when he arrived in their ter-
ritory. An example of such an order is one addressed to the beylerbey
and defterdar of K1bns (Cyprus) about the cizye of that province. It
informed the provincial officials that Hiiseyin Aga, a former miiteferrika
of the Porte now employed by the grand vizier Halil Pa§a as kap1c1
ba§I, had been appointed to collect the cizye of K1bns, and it com-
manded them, upon Hiiseyin Aga's arrival, to pack up in purses (der
kise) and hand over all money from the cizye, as well as imperial
funds (revenues of crown lands and imperial enterprises) and other
cash revenues in the provincial treasury. 9 Hiiseyin Aga would trans-
port these revenues to Istanbul and place them in the imperial treas-
ury. Shortly afteiward, a second order was issued to these same two
officials informing them that Hiiseyin Aga had now been commanded
to receive the cizye collected in accordance with the detailed register
for the year 1026/1617-18 and transmit it to the campaign treasury
of the army in the east rather than to Istanbul. This was an unusual
circumstance; ordinarily money would be submitted to the central
treasury and recorded there before being sent on to its ultimate
destination. A final tezkire on this matter recorded information to be
included in Hiiseyin Aga' s berat, specifying the amount of the 1026/
1617-18 payment to be levied from each of the 26,842 taxpayers
listed in the defter (with tugra) as the following: cizye plus gulamiye
(here called resm-i kalem), plus a 40-ak~e exemption fee (bedel-i
muafiyet; exemption not explained), plus a 10-ak~e substitution price
for linen (bedel-i kirpas), totalling 387 ak~e. It gave the current
exchange rates, 118 ak~e to the gold piece and 78 ak~e to the kamil
kuru§, and the weight of the ak~e, 9.5 to the dirhem. It also required
that collection take place in the kad1's court, the mahkeme, and in
8 Min ba'd muhalefet ettirilmemek uzere; KK 2576, p. 47.

9 The value of a standard purse (kise or kese) varied over time between 20,000 and
50,000 ak~e; see Pakalm, Osmanlz Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sozlugu, 2: 247-49.
190 CHAPTER SIX
no other location; that collection not take place until the proper cizye
collection time had come (a provision designed to prevent double
collection and to avoid burdening the peasants at a season when they
were unlikely to have ready cash), and that a register of the cizye
collected should be made, signed, sealed, and submitted to the treas-
ury. These final stipulations were undoubtedly added to ensure that,
as the money would not pass through the treasury, irregularities in
collection could not slip through unnoticed. 10 By such detailed instruc-
tions, the finance department hoped to maintain its control of tax
collection and fore stall problems that were likely to arise, including
disputes over the destination of the revenues, excessive collection,
interference by unauthorized personnel, the disappearance of collected
funds, and currency alterations.
Occasionally, taxes were not collected because a collection order
never arrived at its destination, an important reason for notifying local
officials of tax collection appointments. When a kad1 or appointed
collector became aware that a collection order had gone astray, proper
procedure was to petition for a new order, which was immediately
forthcoming, usually accompanied by injunctions to make the collec-
tion as quickly as possible. The kad1 of Ankara petitioned in this way
when he became aware that neither an order to draft oarsmen for the
fleet nor an agent to muster the draft had reached his town; the order
was reissued with a command to send men, not money. Likewise,
when it was reported that an order for payment of a timar bedeli in
the province of ~am had not been seen there, a new order had to be
issued to the beylerbey and defterdar. 11
Payment of taxes in advance frequently gave rise to problems. The
normal procedure in such a situation is illustrated by a case in Trabzon
in 1039/1629-30 in which the cizye was paid in advance by its collector,
Hasan Osman Yeni~eri. He was given a register signed, sealed, and
marked with a tugra showing 1572 banes and an order permitting him
to take 225 ak~e from each hane. The order listed the advance payments
made by Hasan Osman with the dates on which they were made,
10
MM 2256 (5712) 1026/1617-18, pp. 65-66. Another order of this sort (MM 2256
(5712) 1026/1617-18, p. 40) was written to the kad1s of the cizye-paying areas in Urgiip,
instructing them to oversee cizye collection in that area, since again the money would
not pass through the central treasury. While seeing that the agents took no more than
was specified, the kadts were at the same time to avoid any shortfall in garrison salaries;
whether that was possible we do not know.
11
MM 357 (20115), p. 130; MM 2728 (3475), p. 77.
showing that by that time he had already paid the full amount to the
treasury. The payments had been submitted over a period of about
three weeks immediately prior to the issuance of the order, from 26
Ramazan to 18 ~evval 1038. 12 The order did not explain the reasons
behind this arrangement. One consideration may have been the risk
involved in transporting large amounts of cash through areas possibly
infested with bandits; payment in advance transferred the risk from
the treasury to Hasan Osman. Another may have been the government's
need for immediate cash to make, for example, a salary payment due
at the first of the year.
Since appointments of cizye collectors were made in advance, it
sometimes happened that appointees died or retired or were dismissed
before collection could take place. Tevzi-i cizye register MM 323
(6874) dated 979/1571-72 contains a number of such instances, as
well as marginal notations showing the names of those newly ap-
pointed to take their places. Both emin and katib were replaced, even
if only one had retired or died; this might indicate that the two worked
together as partners or belonged to the same group. The most unusual
case comes from a register dated 1067/1656-57: when the cizye
collector Hasan Aga died, his assignment was given to Elhac Hiiseyin
Aga on payment of 3,000 kuru~ in advance, and the "berat and defter"
of collection were assigned to him. 13 Elhac Hiiseyin Aga, however,
never came to pick them up, resigning (farig olmagla) his appoint-
ment, so it was reassigned to Yahya Aga, and the "berat and defter"
were awarded to him. He in tum resigned his assignment to Kara
Hasan Zade Mustafa Aga, to whom the "berat and defter" were finally
presented. One can only wonder whether there were special circumstan-
ces making this particular assignment so unattractive.
Appointments of cizye collectors in advance were sometimes con-
nected to their paying in advance, as Hasan Osman above did. Register
MM 3742 (14790) dated 1052/1642-43 is a record of cizye collectors
who had paid the tax before actually collecting the revenue. A number
of entries in the tevziat register MM 4569 (14797) dated 1067/1656-
57 also indicate that payment had been made in advance of collection.
The decline paradigm makes much of the hardship to the peasantry
12
The date on the order itself is 18 ~evval 1036/2 July 1626. That was a slip of the
pen; as indicated by adjacent orders, the correct date was 18 ~evval 1038/21 June 1628,
this date being a little over two months before the beginning of 1039 (MM 2728 [3457],
p. 89). Thus, the collection order was written upon submission of the final installment.
13
MM 4569 (14797), p. 13.
192 CHAPTER SIX
caused by collection of taxes in advance, but in these cases, although

the treasury received its money in advance, collection from taxpayers
was made at the normal time. Iltizam payments in advance, frequent
in the 1630s and 1640s, likewise did not necessarily involve collection
from taxpayers in advance. The government apparently resorted to
this practice only in years when the need was particularly acute, or
in preparation for military campaigns, because registers from other
years contain no indication of advance payment. 14
Another difficulty facing a tax collector was the possibility of arriving
in his territory to find that taxes he had been assigned to collect had
already been collected by someone else. This was sometimes due to
a conflict of jurisdiction over appointments, as in the case of the evkaf
of Haseki Sultan, where cizye collection was assigned by the central
bureaus to the team of Ali b. Mustafa and Mahmud b. Mustafa when
the cizye had already been collected by Yusuf, an agent of the defterdar
of the Danube. A petition sent by the local kad1 described the mix-
up and requested a solution. 15 In another instance, the grand vizier
Mehmed Pa§a's kethuda, Yusuf, reported that a village valued at 18,000
ak~e had been granted to him as zeamet and he held an imperial be-
rat and a copy of the tahrir defteri for it, but that the emin of the
hass-1 hilmayun in that region, claiming that the village belonged to
the imperial has, had started collecting its revenues. When Yusuf
requested an order prohibiting the emin's collection, the miifetti~ was
ordered to inspect his berat and defter to discover whether or not the
village really belonged to the has. If the emin had begun collection
illegally, he was to be stopped, and it was to be recorded in Yusuf's
berat that miiltezims were prohibited from interfering in collection.
In a similar vein, an attempt was made to collect the revenue of a
village in the sultan's has in Tirhala on behalf of the valide sultan's
fully-owned millk properties. In this case, the village did not appear
in the valide sultan's miilkname, or deed of ownership, so the attempt
was disallowed. 16
A problem similar to conflicts in jurisdiction was that of multiple
allocations of the same revenue. Although any discussion about
expenditure of tax revenues is outside the scope of this study, it may
14
Registers showing no payments made in advance include MM 2930 (14588) dated
1040/1630-31 and MM 4187 (14581) dated 1060--62/1650-52. On taxes demanded in
advance in preparation for a military campaign, see Finkel, Administration of Warfare,
231 n. 43.
15
AE I. Ahmed, 205.
16
AE III. Mehmed 170, pp. 16, 6.
be mentioned that the inadvertent assignment of a single revenue source

to two different expense items (for example, two people's salaries)
formed a significant source of conflict between tax collectors. 17 Agents
representing both areas of expenditure, sent to collect the same funds,
were forced to petition the central bureaus for clarification of the
status of the revenue source. Tahrir registers and collectors' appoint-
ment registers were used to determine where the revenue should be
allocated and who should be permitted to collect it. A good example
can be seen in an order regarding the collection of the cizye of Egin
and Arapkir. The non-Muslim inhabitants of the area, having paid the
cizye for the previous year in full, purchased the collection of cizye
for 1034/1624-25 from the appointed collector, Kii~iik <;avu§. After
submitting the money to the treasury, they found that the cizye of
Egin had been re-awarded to someone named Kara Siileyman and that
of Arapkir to Zulf1kar, both personnel from the imperial army. Upon
their complaint, an order was sent prohibiting the second collection
by the military men and commanding them to return to the reaya any
money already collected. 18
Detailed orders for collection of the avanz similar to those for the
cizye were not found in the records. Information on avanz collection
comes from complaints about problems or abuses occurring in con-
nection with various levies. It is clear, however, that unless he was
a kad1, an avanz collector, like a cizye collector, was expected to
make his collection in accordance with the emr and defter given to
him. In the case of a kad1, his office was his authorization and he
would already have in his possession a copy of the tahrir register,
so he only needed to be informed of the rate of the avanz for the
year in question. For this reason, the kad1 skills are likely to contain
additional information on avanz rates and collection practices.
The records used for this study do not give details of specific
procedures employed by tax collectors to obtain money directly from
taxpayers. Other sources, such as kad1 skills, might provide a better
description of actual collection processes than do the documents of
the central government. Aspects of the process giving rise to difficul-
ties and abuses were mentioned in petitions. It is probable, however,
that collection was ordinarily handled by a procedure similar to that
used in assessment; in other words, the collector proceeded from district
17
For an instance of dual assignment of a single source of revenue for military salaries
see Ostapchuk, "Ottoman Black Sea Frontier," 211-13.
18
MM 2728 (3457), p. 21.
194 CHAPTER SIX
to district in the order in which they were recorded in the register

and, with the assistance of local government officials and the local
kad1, received payments from individuals or from representatives of
taxpaying groups. 19 In areas where central government personnel were
barred from operating, the collector's job was simpler; there he had
only to accept a lump sum payment from whoever had the right to
collect it.
iltizam Collection
Tax collection by iltizam was essentially the same as tax collection

by any other method, with the exception of certain problems peculiar
to tax farming. Once a collection order was issued, the tax collection
process passed out of the hands of the central finance department, and
thus out of its records, unless a problem arose. For agricultural taxes,
collection was made at harvest time, while for other types of revenues,
such as customs dues, a year-round staff had to be maintained from
whom iltizam holders periodically obtained their revenues (unless they
themselves were involved in operating the mukataa). Unlike other
taxes, iltizam revenues were ordinarily delivered in installments, either
annually, semi-annually, or quarterly. The government's conditions
for awarding iltizam rights required miiltezims to guarantee submis-
sion of the full amount contracted for, to record and report their
activities properly, and to abide by law and justice. The finance
department took what measures it could to ensure fulfillment of the
contract; for example, in a case mentioned earlier, in which the
miiltezim's conditions included a 2000-ak~e incre~se for the zeamet
of Mustafa, it stipulated that Mustafa would get his increase only after
the first year's returns came in. 20
Whether a miiltezim was appointed centrally or locally, tax col-
lection could not proceed without a berat of authorization (ni§an) from
the government, given only to those properly selected and recorded.
19
Cohen indicates that in Jerusalem updating the registers could be done at the same
time as collecting the revenues, and that collectors simultaneously gave the taxpayers
receipts for the sums collected, but that actual collection from individuals was made by
a member of the community (Jewish Life, 233 and n. 40). The same was often true in
tribal and village groups (Elihu Grant, The People of Palestine [Phifadelphia: J.B. Lippincott,
1921], 150).
20
MM 241 (115), fol. 94b.
Prohibitions against collection of state revenues without a berat are

frequent in the registers. This rule was so stringent that in 1042/1632-
33 one emin allowed himself to get into trouble for not having made
his collection; for a whole year he had waited unavailingly for a berat,
but without it he had not dared to proceed. Possession of a berat in
his name identified the official collector to those from whom he collected
revenue and to provincial and central officials. Any request by a
miiltezim for a berat authorizing tax collection was first checked against
the registers of the muhasebe and mukataa bureaus to verify that he
was duly authorized. If so, the finance department issued a tezkire
attesting to his appointment to the position named and authorizing
issuance of the berat. A typical register entry for a berat on an iltizam
in 1038/1628-29 explained that the iltizam of the coffeehouse of Konya
and related mukataas had been sold by the Karaman treasury to one
Abdulgani, that the ba§ muhasebe registers at the capital had been
checked and his iltizam for that year was recorded there, that the
revenues had been assigned to pay for gunpowder and must not be
appropriated by the defterdar of Karaman for provincial expenses, and
finally that a tezkire had been written ordering the production of a
berat by the finance scribes. Another iltizam collection order described
how an emin's subordinate brought his tezkire in person to the finance
scribes in order to obtain a berat. 21
Berats identified the iltizam, the miiltezim, and the temporal limits
of the iltizam, indicating amounts due and payment schedules, amounts
paid in advance, destinations of the remaining funds, and how they
were to be submitted. They listed special conditions applying to the
iltizam and mentioned whether kefils still had to be found. They also
included instructions as to how milltezims and emins were to proceed
and what rules they were to observe. The berats warned collectors
to adhere to tax rates established by kanun, local custom, and central
government registers, and not to attempt to take any revenues before
the proper time. A special exception, proving the rule, was made for
the miiltezim of the Filibe and Sofya mukataas in the year 1000/1591-
92: the miiltezim, while still waiting for production of his official
berat, was given an order (htikm) permitting his men to begin the
collection immediately. 22 There must have been some unusual reason
21
AE III. Mehmed 170, pp. 9-10; KK 5019, p. 165; MM 2728 (3475), p. 83; KK 5019
p. 4; MM 3881 (2765), p. 65.
22
MM 687 (9820), p. 85; for orders containing these specifications see MM 3881
196 CHAPTER SIX
for collection of these revenues to proceed with such haste, but it was
not mentioned in the order. When berats were written at the center
for iltizams awarded at the provincial level, the governor and pro-
vincial defterdar were notified; otherwise, notification was sent to the
miifetti§ of the mukataa or the kad1 of the area.
Every attempt was made to install an experienced miiltezim of proven
ability. The document awarding an iltizam on port revenues of Chios
in the troubled year of 976/1568-69 stressed that appointing the
proposed miiltezim would be profitable for the treasury as he had held
such a position before. When the price of the Yiirilk mukataa of Mente§e
was too high to attract bidders, the former emin, now serving as naztr
of the province, nominated as emin a relative named Ali, because he
stood a good chance of collecting the full amount with the naztr's
advice. The finance department, on its part, stipulated that Ali be
experienced enough to control the emanet successfully and insisted
that a higher bidder obtaining the iltizam be required to provide
guarantors for the sum pledged. 23
A newly appointed collector sometimes had difficulty gaining recog-
nition as the authorized official. One example is the case of the miiltezim
Ahmed <;avu§, who faced potential resistance to his collection of
revenues. Ahmed undertook the iltizam of several mukataas in the
sancaks of Vize and Ktrkkilise after Hasan, the emin-i miiltezim, died,
offering a separate iltizam for the arrears (bakzye) left by Hasan. The
order sent to the miifetti§ particularly commanded him to keep a close
eye on the beytiilmal-1 hassa (repository of estates of deceased members
of the ruling class) and report anyone from the sipahi or kul classes
who tried to prevent Ahmed from collecting funds in arrears. 24
As was the case in cizye collection, the berat or ni§an granting
authorization to an iltizam collector had to be supplemented by a
specific order to collect (hiikm-i §erif or emr-i §erif). This need is
evident in a petition from the miiltezim of the port revenues of Trablus-
~am for a hiikm-i §erif to allow him to proceed with revenue col-
lection in accordance with the new, corrected, authorized kanunname
that had already been issued to him with his berat, and in a request
by the joint miiltezims of an iltizam in Diyarbekir for an emr-i §erif
(2765), p. 18 (collection to take place at the harvest of the crops), 39, 63, 99; MM 357
(20115), p. 116.
23
MM 241 (115), fols. 94a, 38a.
24
MM 687 (9820), p. 181.
in accord with the imperial berat in their hands. 25 It was in the berats
and hilkms that the government set forth the conditions under which
tax farmers were allowed to collect state revenues. Besides collection
according to law, these conditions included the milltezim' s accurate
and timely reporting of his collection activities, their results, and any
difficulties incurred. Reports by taxation agents constituted one of the
central government's links to the outside world, a principal source of
information about conditions in the empire, and reporting was a vital
part of the tax collectors' function. The need to update the central
government's registers was uppermost in the minds of the finance
scribes. Only when a steady stream of new records came in from kad1s
and tax officials could the central registers, the all-important instrument
of control, reflect actual conditions in the empire. Finance department
orders constantly reiterated that the submission of documents and
accounts was one of the "important affairs" of the govemment. 26 Any
study of decentralization and control would do well to examine the
flow of papers and reports between the provinces and the capital.
Since central finance officials could not provide on-the-spot super-
vision, they relied on correct procedure and recording in registers to
distinguish between legitimate iltizam holders and intruders. In a case
in Ttrhala, Yusuf and Hilseyin had been granted an iltizam, but while
they were waiting for their berat, Hasan <;avu§ attempted to collect
the mukataa's revenues without a berat but with a tezkire from the
milfetti§. The finance department told the milfetti§ that if he wanted
to award the mukataa to someone other than the current holders, he
had to find someone capable and wealthy and apply in the proper
manner to the finance department, sending to the capital a signed and
sealed copy of his register showing sufficient kefils along with a detailed
petition describing the bid, so that a berat could be properly issued.
In another case, iskender, the emin of the Baghdad customs for 1055/
1645-46, petitioned the capital complaining that the former emin,
Sefer, was still collecting revenues even though his term had passed,
and that if this was a ruse to obtain the collection rights again, at
accounting time Sefer should be held responsible for this period. The
order issued in response, however, commanded Sefer to give iskender
the revenues he had collected since his term had officially ended. 27
25
MM 357 (20115), p. 116; MM 2728 (3457), p. 75.
26
Umur-z muhimme, AE III. Mehmed 170, p. 15.
27
AE III. Mehmed 170, p. 11; MM 3881 (2765), p. 185.
198 CHAPTER SIX
These and similar decisions demonstrate the government's desire to

run the iltizam system "by the book." As far as the finance department
was concerned, whoever was recorded in the finance department's
registers was the official collector.
By the 1620s the finance department was fully prepared for con-
flicts over mukataa collection rights, and from then on its orders
frequently contained clauses addressing this issue. An example con-
cerns part of the sultanic has in Selanik, formerly given as has to
the vizier Bayram Pa§ a and farmed to Mustafa, a resident of Selanik.
When Bayram Pa§a' s revenues reverted to the status of sultanic has
in 1038/1628-29, threatening conflict between collectors, the finance
department issued a long and detailed order providing for Mustafa' s
having made payments in advance and authorizing his subsequent
collection of has revenues for the duration of his iltizam without
interference from muhassils, nazrrs, emins, ummal, or other has col-
lection personnel. 28
The death of a milltezim usually occasioned confusion over the
status of the iltizam. First of all, the capital had to be informed of
the event and a decision made about who would handle the change
of milltezims. When Fazlullah, one of the milltezims of Mente§e, fell
ill and died, the nazrr petitioned to inform the finance department and
to request permission to award the mukataa to someone else. An award
made at such a time was sometimes challenged. After the nazu of
Belgrad died having made only a partial collection, the office of nazrr
was awarded to Mehmed ~avu§ for a lesser amount. But two other
men named Mehmed and ibrahim went to the divan and undertook
the iltizam at the old total on condition that this Mehmed also be made
a ~avu§; the higher iltizam was accepted and Mehmed was given a
position in the ~avu§ corps. 29 A more complicated case took place in
Karaman, where a man named Abdi petitioned concerning a mukataa
which had been held in an iltizam of one year by his deceased brother
Yusuf. At the time of Yusuf's death, three months into the year, he
had already submitted the total amount of the iltizam to the treasury
in advance of collection, and Abdi was now engaged in collecting
the revenues of the mukataa. In Muharram 1055/March 1645, Abdi
requested and received a berat for finishing out the collection. How-
28
KK 5019, p. 176. A tezkire bound between pages 15 and 16 of the same register
and a telhis copied onto page 16 record a previous iltizam for this same mukataa.
29
MM 241 (115), fol. 81a; MM 687 (9820), p. 155.
TAX COLLECTION, REMITIANCE, AND REPORTING 199
ever, the following month Abdi had to petition again because another
man, Bostanc1 Hiiseyin, had requested an order to collect the mukataa' s
revenues because the iltizam had not been completed. But since Yusuf's
submission of the full amount as well as Abdi's berat for collection
were documented in the registers at the capital, an order was written
prohibiting Hiiseyin's interference in the mukataa for the rest of the
year. Hiiseyin apparently petitioned again on the ground that his berat
for 1055 entitled him to begin collection at the beginning of the year,
even though Abdi was still collecting at that time. The central gov-
ernment upheld this berat and issued a counter-order against Abdi.
Later it was discovered that the problem lay not in the greed of
miiltezims but in a conflict in the registers. According to the central
government's registers, Hiiseyin's iltizam began in Muharrem, the
first month of the year, while in the records of the provincial treasury
of Karaman it began in Saban, the second month. The revenues of
Muharrem 1055 were quite correctly collected by Abdi against the
1054 iltizam. Since the problem was bound to recur at the beginning
of every year, Hiiseyin requested another order to clarify matters for
the 1056 iltizam. The central treasury wrote to the defterdar of the
province detailing the whole problem, rescinding its previous order,
and instructing the provincial treasury not to prevent Abdi from
collecting a full year's taxes. 30
If a deceased miiltezim had made his collection but had not sent
the money to the treasury, it had to be claimed from his estate, or
from his heirs if the estate had already been divided. For instance,
when Ali Hamza the silahdar, miiltezim of the mukataa of the wine
barrel tax in Edime, died leaving a debt to the treasury of 125,000
ak~e, an order was written to the kad1 of Zagra-1 Atik (probably his
home) to demand the sum without delay from Ali Hamza' s estate,
his ~iftlik, and other properties. When Mehmed b. Ali, miiltezim of
taxes in the Dskiidar area, died owing 34,492 ak~e, his kefils offered
to undertake the tahvil themselves in order to discharge the debt. 31
If the status of a revenue source altered, it might become necessary
to change collectors in the middle of an iltizam. For instance, the area
designated as the has of Mesih Pa~a in the sancak of Silistre was
awarded in iltizam to Saban b. Aydm in 1002/1593-94, but by the
time the new miiltezim obtained his berat, the area had been made
30
MM 3881 (2765), pp. 9, 34, 39, 121, 126.
31
KK 5019, pp. 180, 172; MM 267 (2775), p. 778.
200 CHAPTER SIX
part of the vizier Cafer Pa~a's has. For two years the vizier's voyvodas
collected-, the has revenues, although the miiltezim of record was still
~aban. When the situation was finally brought to the government's
attention in 1004/1595-96, the finance department annulled ~aban's
berat, releasing him from responsibility for the revenue. A more
complex situation arose when a mukataa of Haleb farmed in 1055/
1645-46 was made into has for the mir-i alem Hiiseyin, who was to
receive the revenue as of the beginning of the iltizam. The old emin
had already paid into the treasury some of the money, which then
had to be refunded. The finance department made an extra effort to
see that the transaction was properly recorded in the treasury's ruznam~e
(daybook) and the collectors' account registers (muhasebe). 32
The length of time needed to generate the paperwork for an iltizam
and the inadequacy of supervision left room for the duplication or
overlapping of collection rights, whether deliberate or inadvertent.
The danger was especially acute during the time when mukataas were
in the process of changing hands. The fact that iltizams could be
awarded at both central and provincial levels increased the possibility
that duplicate appointments would occur. A dispute over a mukataa
in Haleb between the miiltezim Kas1m, appointed by the Haleb pro-
vincial treasury, and a bidder named Omer who had submitted an
advance payment and received a berat from the campaign treasury,
was solved by awarding Omer the following year's collection. Du-
plicate collectors could also result from finance department errors in
awarding collection rights. The Trrhala has was actually awarded twice,
once to Marko and again to Mehmed and Abdi. Marko had paid a
substantial sum in advance, and the finance department only allowed
Mehmed and Abdi to retain the iltizam if they repaid the full amount
of the advance to Marko. The same problem could occur at the
provincial level. The Haleb treasury, which had awarded the ihtisab
of Antalya to Mehmed Abdullah, also awarded it to someone else,
but since Mehmed Abdullah's name was recorded in the central finance
department's registers and he held an imperial berat, the order was
issued in his favor. 33
Collection of farmed taxes in advance does not seem to have posed
the problem for taxpayers that sometimes occurred with respect to
other kinds of revenues. The reason may have been that tax farming
32
MM 687 (9820), p. 140; MM 3881 (2765), p. 153.
33
MM 2252 (7726), p. 12; AE Ill. Mehmed 170, p. 4; MM 3881 (2765), p. 38.
could only be undertaken by men wealthy enough to pay first and

collect later; if so, they could also afford to wait until the proper
collection time arrived before reimbursing themselves. Tax farming
thus served to even out the flow of revenue to the treasury and to
prevent at least one kind of oppression. The only complaint encoun-
tered in the mukataa registers concerning a demand for iltizam rev-
enue in advance was not made by taxpayers but by a tax farmer whose
proceeds were designated for support of the Erzurum garrison. For
an unspecified reason, the 1067/1657-58 revenues had all been sent
directly to the central treasury, and now the garrison was demanding
its 1067 salaries out of the 1068 revenues, to be collected in advance.
The emin refused to do this, protesting that it would be oppressive,
and requested an order to prevent it. 34
If for some reason taxes could not be collected for an entire year,
the whole revenue schedule was thrown off, creating hardships for
both taxpayers and collectors. When this happened, the finance depart-
ment took special care to ensure that taxes were collected equitably
and that miiltezims remained responsible for the funds they had bid
for. In 1068/1658-59 the <;orum mukataa emini, ibrahim, approached
the kad1 to report that the previous year's emin had not yet collected
the 1067 revenues and the reaya would have to pay two years' tax
in one year. He was afraid the peasants would leave the land, causing
permanent harm to the revenue and making it impossible for him to
meet his own iltizam. When the registers were checked, information
on the <;orum mukataas could not be located. In accordance with the
information in ibrahim's berat, therefore, an order for him to collect
the 1068 revenues was granted, but a clause was added warning him
to be extremely careful not to commit oppression in the process. 35
A series of orders in a single register illustrates the problems resulting
from collection without authorization by a berat from the center, and
the seriousness with which the government took this matter. 36 In this
instance several mukataas were involved, at least two kad1s lost their
jobs, and the difficulties stretched over a number of years. The in-
stigator of the problem seems to have been a kad1 named Ahmed,
34
MM 7455, p. 9.
35
MM 4646 (7455), p. 50: hzlaf-i §ar' (ve) kanun zulm ettikten bi-gayet ihtiraz eyliyesin,
you should guard to the utmost against committing oppression contrary to Islamic and
sultanic law. Another case in which the finance department urged special care by the
milltezim on account of overlapping collections is MM 4646 (7455), p. 30.
36
AE III. Mehmed 170, pp. 3-11.
202 CHAPTER SIX
miifetti§ in charge of the extensive mukataas of Egriboz and Trrhala.

Another(?) miifetti§ named Tursunzade was also involved. For several
years prior to 1008/1599-1600, on the pretext that there were no bidders,
men appointed by Ahmed collected the revenues of several mukataas
without obtaining berats from the capital. Their only authorization
was a letter from the kad1 and a tezkire from the nazrr, which they
obtained by pretending to offer higher bids in the kad1' s court. Their
remittances were in deficit because Ahmed was embezzling the money,
but when the finance department demanded his receipts he denied
responsibility, protesting, "I am not the miiltezim." This was the more
reprehensible as the money was destined for the imperial army at the
Austrian front, where it was urgently needed. When Ahmed's activi-
ties were finally detected, he and(?) Tursunzade were dismissed from
their posts as kad1 and miifetti§, and Ahmed's men were ousted from
the mukataas. New bids were sought, new miiltezims and officials
appointed, and the mukataas of Trrhala and Egriboz were placed under
a new nazrr, Turak Bey. A new kad1, Zeyniilabidin, was installed as
miifetti§. Even after the new men took up their positions, however,
Ahmed and his men continued to make collection rounds, brandishing
false documents to fool people into handling tax moneys over to them.
The new miiltezims, unable to avoid deficits in their 1009/1600-1601
taxes, complained to the capital. Since they could not complete the
collection, their accounts could not be audited nor the final mukataa
registers compiled. Orders issued to correct the matter went unheeded,
and the new kad1 appeared to be walking in the path of the old.
Petitions were again submitted, in response to which the new miifetti§
and nazrr were sent extremely strongly worded orders telling them
not to permit continued collection by persons without berats or kefils.
By allowing it, they were told, the miifetti§ and nazrr would create
chaos and disorder and diminution and deficit in the revenues. This
matter was among the great affairs of state, not comparable to any
other. By taking it upon themselves to permit impropriety and des-
picable behavior, they were forsworn guardians [of the law], allowing
collection and activity and supervision without a berat. The miifetti~
himself was responsible for making good any deficits in the state's
revenues, or he would be dismissed and expelled from office and be
severely punished and degraded, in order that he might serve as a
warning to others. He was admonished to be exceedingly cautious not
to miss the least opportunity for exhibiting his carefulness and
perseverence on behalf of the state. He should tolerate no delay and
permit no impropriety in the collection of revenues, and should make

haste to send a complete account of the matter to the capital. 37
This forceful language clearly conveyed the immense significance
of the relationship expressed by the grant of a berat: it represented
the delegation of the authority of the state, of which the kad1s were
guardians. For a kad1, the dispenser of law and order, not only to
permit but to be personally involved in subversion of the state's author-
ity structure was a transgression that could not be tolerated. 38 The
centralized Ottoman administrative system, exerting control over vast
distances despite inadequate means of communication, depended on
the existence of an ultimate check which was completely trustworthy
and could not be challenged. This ultimate check was provided by
the kad1s, the representatives of Holy Law within the state apparatus.
Even the authority granted by the sultan's berat was upheld by them.
Remittance and Reporting
Finance documents of the central government do not usually describe

the specific procedures by which tax collectors obtained money from
taxpayers or revenue sources, hinting at them only when problems
occurred. Delivery (or non-delivery) of tax revenues to the treasury
brought the collection process once again under the finance department's
light and into its records. After gathering the taxes, the official col-
lector was responsible for ensuring that the money reached Istanbul
and was deposited in the treasury; it was considered his personal debt
to the state. He was also responsible for seeing that the accounting
procedures and paperwork were properly done and submitted. About
these procedures we have a great deal of information, as the central
finance bureaus once again became involved in the process. Orders
to tax agents to begin collection usually included specific instructions
about what to do with the money collected. For the most part, these
37
38 In his study of the legal system, Gerber found that complaints of kad1 corruption
were very few, and that most concerned local assistants (naibs) rather than central
government appointees. Most complaints dealt with excessive tax collection or embezzle-
ment of property, not corruption of legal decisions (State, Society, and Law, 158-61). On
the other hand, Faroqhi has uncovered a number of instances of kad1s colluding with
governors and their men or with brigands and rebels in their misdeeds ("Political Activity
among Ottoman Taxpayers," 18-20). The question of the frequency of such activity cannot
yet be answered from these isolated examples.
204 CHAPTER SIX
instructions followed a standardized form: the collector was to put

the money into purses, seal each one with his personal seal, and deliver
them to the imperial treasury. 39 Occasionally he was ordered to deliver
the money elsewhere, to an imperial emin for expenses, for example,
or to a military unit for salaries.
The normal procedure for submitting tax receipts to the treasury
(teslim-i hazine) was for the depositor to travel to Istanbul, deposit
the money in person at the outer treasury in the sultan's palace, and
obtain a receipt for it. 40 Register KK 2576 records numerous avanz
deposits of this sort. A typical entry reads as follows:
In relation to a payment of money by Mustafa Bey, which was presented
against the assignment [tahvil] of Piri ~aban Kurd from the standing
cavalry, 244th company, [earning] 27 [ak~e] per day, agent for the avanz
of the kazas of Yeni§ehir and Fener in the sancak of Tirhala for the
year 1042/1632-33; from the hand of the aforesaid Mustafa Bey, on
11 Ramazan 1043/18 July 1633, 1212 ak~e were registered in the imperial
daybook; and this amount has been put into the "ziyade-i an el-asl"
(increase over the original amount) and it [the collection] was success-
ful [completed] and a tezkire for the payment has been ordered to be
written [given].
1212 [ak~e]. Written on 25 Ramazan 1043/1 August 1633.41
The term "tahvil" can be translated as transfer, assignment, term, or
debt, according to context; in fiscal matters it refers to the transfer
or assignment of tax collection responsibilities to an individual for
a fixed term, the amount to be collected being treated as the individual's
personal debt. 42 In the example above, the man possessing the tahvil,
39
The usual wording of these instructions is: ve hasil olan mall kiseleyip ve miihiirleyip
mezbur Ahmed zide kadruhu bittamam teslim ve yarar ve mutemad aleyh adamlarzyla
teslim-i hazine ettirile; or kiseleyip ve miihiirleyip bittamam merkum Ahmed Aga'ya eda
ve teslim edip temessiik alayiz ve yarar ve mutemad aleyh adamlar ko§up asitane-i saadetim
hazinesine ettiresiz (both examples from KK 2576, p. 86).
40
For the distinction between the outer and the inner treasuries, see ismail Hakk1
Uzun~ar§th, "Osmanh Devleti Maliyesinin Kurulu§u ve Osmanh Devleti i~ Hazinesi,"
Belleten 42 (1978): 67-93.
41
Be-cihet-i eda-l ak~e-i Mustafa bey ki pi§ ezin an tahvil-i Piri Saban Kurd an
ebna-i sipahiyan [bOlii] k 244 fl yevm 27 emin an ak~e-i avarzz-i kaza-i Yeni§ehir ve Fener
der liva-i Tirhala an vacib-i sene 1042 an yed-i Mustafa bey el-mezbur fl 11 ramazan
sene 1043 be-ruznam(;e-i hiimayun 1212 ak~e kayd §iide bud ve meblag-i mezbure der
ziyade-i an el-as/ kerde ve [kabze§] miiyesser §Ude ve tezkire-i eda nevi§ten [or daden]
fermude. 1212. Tahriren fl 25 ramazan sene 1043 (KK 2576, p. 1; words in brackets are
variants found in similar entries).
42
Nedim Filipovic, "O Izrazu 'Tahvil'-L'expression 'tahvil'," POF 2 (1951/52): 239-
47. Tax collectors whose accounts were in arrears could be imprisoned untif they paid;
or assignment, of collecting this particular tax, the collector of record,

was someone named Piri Saban Kurd. But the person actually depos-
iting the money was Mustafa Bey, perhaps an agent or assistant of
Piri Saban Kurd. Making deposits through an agent was, in fact, the
typical procedure; on the rare occasions when the official collector
made a deposit in person, it was noted as being "against his own
assignment. "43
While in 26 out of 31 cases from 1044/1634-35 the assigned
collectors were from the standing cavalry forces, like Piri Saban Kurd,
the actual depositors of the money were a much more varied group.
None were from the Six Boliiks and only two were milteferrika
guardsmen, while the other twenty-nine were not military men at all.
One deposit was made by a kapzcz, four by ~avu§es, three by the agent
for the imperial kitchens (emin-i matbah), eight by civilian officials
(people called relebi or efendi), two by agas and seven by beys (all
possibly, and one definitely, in the palace service), two by the financial
supervisors (muhassils) of the areas concerned, and two by Jews, one
as the representative of his religious community (taife) and the other
probably as an agent for a member of the palace cavalry. Money-
changers (sarraflar) became extensively involved in transmitting tax
moneys as well as in guaranteeing iltizams, and at times they, too,
appeared as depositors. 44 Likewise, the additional functionaries of
iltizams generally came from different strata of society than the
milltezims: in a register from 990-97/1582-89 listing appointments
and salaries of iltizam emins, most of those listed were military men,
but not members of the standing cavalry; they were timar holders and
members of local garrisons. Two-thirds of the sixty-one emins resided
in the area of the iltizam, a smaller number lived elsewhere in the
provinces, and only five were attached to the capital. 45
for lists of jailed tax farmers see Gokbilgin, Edirne ve Pa§a Livasz, 92-103; Fekete,
Siyiiqat-Schrift, #3, 1: 128-37 and 2: plates 5-6. The English customs collectors were
also personally responsible to the treasury for their accounts (Dietz, English Public Finance,
2: 305).
43
An tahvil-i hod, as in KK 2576, p. 5.
44
Necibe Sevgen, "Nasil Somtiri.ildtik? Sarraftar," Belgelerle Turk Tarihi Dergisi 3, no.
13 (1968/69): 46-59; no. 14 (1968/69): 66-68; no. 15, (1968/69): 59-65; no. 16 (1968/
69): 54-61; no. 17 (1968/69): 62-66; no. 18 (1968/69): 76-78; 4, no. 19 (1969): 66-67;
no. 20 (1969): 69-70; no. 21 (1969): 67-69; no. 22 (1969): 66-67; no. 23 (1969): 54-
55; no. 24 (1969): 54-60; no. 25 (1969nO): 73-74; Haim Gerber, "Jews and Moneylending
in the Ottoman Empire, Jewish Quarterly Review n.s. 72 (1981/82): 100-18; Epstein, The
Ottoman Jewish Communities and Their Role, 133-34; Gibb & Bowen, 2: 24.
45
MM 518 (15259). On the subject of new careers for timar holders, Timar Ruznam~e
206 CHAPfER SIX
Tax revenues were remitted to the treasury either in a lump sum

or in a number of installments. A single person might make several
deposits relating to a particular tahvil, or several individuals might
be involved in collection and transmission of the funds. Since the
assignment was considered a personal debt owed by the collector of
record, he had to keep careful track of the sums deposited by di:fferent
agents against his tahvil. He did this by obtaining for each deposit
a finance department receipt called a temessiik (document) or tezkire
(note). Tax collectors also obtained temessiiks or tezkires as receipts
for moneys submitted somewhere other than to the treasury: if tax
revenues were paid to a military unit or an imperial emin, to one of
the provincial treasuries, or to an individual with a havale, the col-
lector obtained a tezkire or temessiik bearing the seal of the person
to whom he had given the money, vouching for his collection of the
sum even though it was no longer in his hands. 46 When the cizye of
Kibns was granted as has, for instance, the cizye collector was
instructed that upon delivery of the money to the holder of the has,
he should obtain both a temessiik and a kad1' s huccet (copy of an
entry in the kad1' s register verifying the disposition of the money)
to submit in lieu of the actual cash. 47
Several kinds of temessiik or tezkire were used in Ottoman fiscal
practice, some of which have already been discussed. Documents called
temessi.ik or tezkire, attesting to the levels and types of taxation for
which they were assessed, were issued to villagers and townspeople
during surveys to prevent illegal tax collection. Similar documents,
also called temessi.ik or tezkire and showing amounts actually paid,
were issued by tax collectors to taxpayers at the time of collection
and could be used as proof of payment. For example, when a group
of reaya were relocated to another sancak after already having paid
taxes in their original home, their new bey was told not to collect
taxes from them if they had temessiiks in hand proving prior pay-
Defteri 111 dated 991/1582-83 should be mentioned: it includes entries describing how
some timar holders took up careers as katibs (pp. 381, 393).
46
KK 2576, pp. 95, 128. The Ali Emiri collection contains a large number of various
kinds of tezkires. AE I. Ahmet 579 contains tezkires for deposits of the cizye of Moldavia,
AE I. Ahmed 738 is a tezkire for an amount taken from the ziyade-i cizye by the ba~
defterdar, and AE I. Ahmed 798 is a temessiik for a sum paid by the miiltezim of the
Vidin mukataas to the beylerbey of Teme§var as part of his annual income (salyane).
47
MM 3881 (2765), p. 120. For kad1s' hiiccets verifying temessiiks for the deposit of
tax revenues see Ongan, Ankara'mn iki Numaralz Ser'iye Sicili, no. 391, and other entries
listed there.
ment. 48 Tax collectors, usually not local residents nor previously as-
signed to the area, were uninformed about conditions in their ap-
pointed locations, so the production of temessilks verifying prior pay-
ments was vital to preventing double collection. 49
Temessilks showing tax payments were also needed because the
taxes of a particular year were typically not deposited or recorded
at the center until the following year, and in some cases the delay
was greater still. On the other hand, there were times when taxes were
collected in advance. In the sample entry shown above, revenue for
1042/1632-33 was deposited in the following year, 1043/1633-34.
The same register contains records of a deposit due for 1042/1632-
33 made in 1044/1634-35, two years later, and of a deposit due for
1045/1635-36 also made in 1044/1634-35, one year in advance. 50 The
potential for confusion resulting from overlapping collections neces-
sitated some documentary record of payments already made and
amounts still due.
So essential was a temessilk in proving payment that it was not
unknown for taxpayers to forge these documents in attempts at tax
evasion. 51 The collector of the yava cizye of Istanbul in 1040/1630
found that many people whose names had not been recorded in the
register of collected taxes nevertheless had tezkires in their hands.
When he complained, he was told to go by the names in the register
and to disregard any tezkires that did not match. At the same time,
he was ordered to refrain from using this as an excuse to transgress
against the reaya in any way. 52 Production of temessilks for tax
collectors at the time of deposit was motivated by a similar need for
verification.
Temes silks or tezkires for tax collectors were generated by a complex
process. First, the bureau recording receipt of the incoming revenue
48
MM 3881 (2765), p. 128. Other entries recording the use of temessilks as proof of
payment include KK 2576, pp. 61, 69, 70, 76, 77, 92. Cvetkova records the presentation
of a tezkire to prove payment of taxes by the inhabitants of Ke~an (/nstitutions ottomanes
en Europe, 102). French tax collectors have been reported as refusing to issue receipts
for taxes paid to them in order to be able to steal the revenues undetected (Parker, Europe
in Crisis, 249-50).
49
Orders documenting the issuance of temessilks or tezkires specifically for this purpose
can be found in MM 2728 (3457), p. 65 and KK 2576, pp. 70 and 89.
5
° KK 2576, p. 9.
51
Such a case can be found in register KK 2576, p. 44, as well as a suspected case,
ibid., p. 105.
52
KK 5019, p. 185.
208 CHAPTER SIX
(in the seventeenth century, the ruznam~e bureau) requested, by means

of a tezkire, the production of an order of the type called sebeb-i
tahrir (from the first two words of its opening phrase, "the reason
for writing"). This order, written by the maliye ahkam bureau, com-
manded the production of a receipt (temessiik or tezkire) vouching
for delivery of a particular sum of money to the treasury. Some original
orders calling for the production of temessiiks have been preserved. 53
Register MM 4118 (1888) 1059/1649-50 records receipts (tezakir) for
remittances of ziyade-i cizye, avanz, and other taxes; it was generated
from marginal notes (der kenar) in the ruznam~e defter (daily account
register) recording requests for these orders. Other ruznam~e registers
may similarly record the production of temessiiks. They are also
mentioned in other types of records, such as an ahkam register which
states, "Because we received the aforesaid sum from the hand of
Hiiseyin Bey, he was given a temessiik to be used as evidence
in case of need."54 The temessiik that was produced in response to
the sebeb-i tahrir consisted of an exact copy of the register entry for
the payment showing tahvil, amount deposited, date, and depositor; the
receipt was dated and signed with the penr;e (stylized signature) of
the ba~ defterdar. 55 This receipt was transmitted to the tax collector
of record and was used in his accounting to the central government.
Although collection procedures for iltizam revenues were similar
to those governing the cizye and avanz, there was an important
difference in remittance procedures: iltizam revenues, much more
frequently than cizye and avanz revenues, were assigned to recipients
other than the central treasury. A considerable amount of iltizam
revenue was deposited in provincial treasuries or paid directly to the
designated recipient or to a kadt. Thus, it was all the more necessary
for collectors of farmed revenues to obtain receipts for the sums they
paid out. These temessiiks showed the amount and date, the name of
the person who actually made the payment, where and/or to whom
it was paid, and the name and status of the person holding the tahvil
who was ultimately responsible for that portion of the revenue. Such
53
See AE I. Mustafa, docs. 1-4, dated 1032/1622-23; see also AE I. Ahmed 200, 814.
A similar order from six decades earlier with almost exactly the same wording is recorded
in ahkam register MM 267 (2775) 973/1565-66, p. 57.
54
KK 4990, p. 18: meblag-1 mezbur mezkur Hiiseyin Bey yedinden alzp kabz eyledigimiz
ecilden yedine temessuk verildi ki vakt-i hacette ihticac idine.
55
A temessiik or receipt of this type for the cizye of Midilli for 1015/1606-7 is AE
I. Ahmed 510, dated 1017/1608-9.
documents enabled miiltezims' accounts to be balanced against records

of what had actually come into the treasury. Few actual temessiiks
are available in the archives, but many entries and documents mention
obtaining temessiiks for moneys deposited and provide the details
contained in them. As an example, an order for a temessiik for a
treasury deposit from the Ku§ mukataa of Karadag on 13 Rebiiilevvel
1032/15 January 1623 identifies the miiltezim as Mustafa, the former
sancak bey of Teme§var, the depositor as Osman, a kap1c1, and the
amount as 3,413 ak~e plus 48 ak~e tefaviit (currency exchange fee)
making 3,451 ak~e. 56
Finance registers contain many orders notifying those responsible
for overseeing mukataa revenues of assignments of specific revenues
to specific expenditures; such assignments could be either temporary
or permanent. The orders carefully specified the purpose for which
the revenue would be used, the identity of the recipient, the amount
of money, and the due date of the tax from which the payment would
be drawn or on which the change of assignment would take place. 57
Officials were reminded to note these payments in their account registers
and to obtain temessiiks for revenues handed over in this fashion.
Even when a revenue assignment involved regular annual payments,
an order from the finance department was required each time before
mukataa officials were allowed to deliver funds to a third party. 58
Funds not deposited directly into the central treasury or into one of
the provincial treasuries were usually spent on salaries or on the
purchase of supplies for the palace, the armory, the navy yard, or a
military campaign. An exception was the mukataa revenues of the
Syrian sancaks, designated for the expenses of pilgrimage caravans
to Mecca. 59 The finance department records are thus a mine of
56
AE I. Mustafa 5, p. 5. KK 4990 p. 19 is a temessiik given by a kad1 for a deposit
made in a local court, while MM 357 (20115) p. 113 (actually 115) and MM 267 (2775)
p. 14 are copies of temessiiks given for deposits to the central treasury.
57
AE III. Mehmed 135 is a kad1's huccet, or evidentiary document, testifying to the
assignment of the salary of Mustafa Oda-1 Kii~iik of the ebna-1 sipahiyan on the mukataas
of Vize, the acknowledgement of the havale Nurullah ~avu§, and his delivery of the
money; similar documents are AE III. Murad 176, 177, 400, and AE IV. Murad 22. At
this period in France over half of government revenues were expended on the provincial
level and most of the rest by the equivalent of the havale; less than 1% of the revenues
actually reached the central treasury (Dent, Crisis in Finance, 41).
58 KK 5019, p.
188; MM 687 (9820), p. 280; KK 5019, pp. 163, 167.
59
The phrase used in all orders regarding these funds is hacet-i §erif muhimmatz i~in.
For more on the hajj and its financing see Suraiya Faroqhi, Pilgrims and Sultans: The
Hajj under the Ottomans (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994).
210 CHAPTER SIX
information on the functioning of these institutions as well as on urban

economic history.
Collectors of farmed revenues were frequently required to pay them,
not to the official recipients, but to intermediaries whose job was to
transfer them to their designees. This created new problems of control
for the finance department. Agents of the miiltezims, agents of the
ultimate recipients, and others in addition to government havales might
be involved in handling these funds. An order to the miifetti§ and naztr
of the sancak of Dskiip illustrates the functioning of a havale and the
steps taken by the finance department to maintain control over trans-
fers of funds. The order notified the provincial finance officials of the
appointment of a kul named Siileyman to the position of havale for
the mukataas of the Uskiip sancak. Siileyman had been given a hiikm
and a tevzi defteri showing the tax farms of the region, their revenues,
and the names of those responsible for them. He was to gather from
the miiltezims of the sancak the iltizam revenues due on Nevruz 981/
1574 and transmit them to a ~avu§ of the Porte named Mustafa, a
resident of Uskiip; in tum, Mustafa, with the cooperation of the naztr
and miifetti§, was to bring the money to the treasury by Nevruz. A
new tevzi defteri would be sent for 982/1574-75, according to which
Siileyman was to collect the Agustos installment and bring the money
to the capital himself. The order stressed the urgency of receiving the
money on time; the reason for this particular order was the need to
make collection prior to the due date. Thus, the naztr, miifetti§, ~aVU§,
and havale were all made aware of the details of the proposed trans-
mission of funds and could serve as checks on each other in case of
transgressions. 60 Registers detailing amounts due from the miiltezims
and orders explaining the transmission procedure and assigning re-
sponsibility increased the transparency of the tax farming process.
The fluctuating value of revenue sources sometimes made it nec-
essary to shift the assigned destination of mukataa revenues from one
recipient to another. If one source was unable to meet the demands
placed on it, the need could be met from a nearby source producing
a surplus. For example, four bostanc1s received their salaries from the
beytiilmal of Edirne, funded by contributions from the Muslim com-
60
MM 357 (20115), p. 100. An entry in KK 5019, p. 8, recording the transfer of the
job of havale for the Nevruz 1038/1629 revenues of Selanik from Htiseyin Veli to Ismail
Hasan also indicates that Htiseyin Veli had already received an order (emr-i ~erif) and
a tevzi defteri to enable him to carry out his function.
munity; when the beytiilmal began to have difficulty paying these

amounts, the bostanc1s' salaries were reassigned on the ihtisab, or
marketplace tax, which drew on trade revenues. Likewise, the salary
of Seyyid Seyh Ali, drawn on the revenue of the salt works of Aydm,
was reassigned on the revenue of the salt works of Ahyolu when the
first source became inadequate. 61 Changes of this kind had to be
carefully documented to avoid confusion and loss of revenue. Assign-
ments of expenses to sources of revenue, however, were not systematic.
The connection between a revenue source and an item of expenditure
was usually not a logical or necessary one but a product of convenience
and estimation. This opened the door for competition over mukataa
revenues and created new problems for miiltezims in reconciling
their accounts.
The difficulty of delivering mukataa revenues to their designated
recipients is suggested by an order to the kad1s of Yanya, Narda, and
Ayamavra concerning the mukataa of the Narda salt work, which was
obliged to pay all its revenue in cash directly to the treasury. The
order stressed that no revenue from this mukataa was to be sent to
any other place without an imperial order, and it called on the kad1s
to supervise closely the payment of these revenues so that none were
disbursed without valid imperial orders. If unauthorized payments were
in fact made, miiltezims and emins would still be considered to owe
the full sum to the government. One thoughtful emin attempted to
avoid this problem by making it one of the conditions for his new
six-year iltizam on the mukataas of Ahyolu that he alone should
transmit and submit his revenues to the treasury. He was also insistent
that the Tuna defterdan should not interfere with his iltizam and that
he should report to the ba~ defterdar alone. If there was a deficit,
it should be demanded from him and his staff in accordance with
the law (§er' ve kanun) and by people favorably inclined to him
(miiteveccih). 62
These examples, considered together with those above regarding
collection, suggest that the diversion of iltizam revenues from their
intended recipients was a major problem, severe enough to cause
concern and to stimulate attempts to improve supervision. Competi-
tion between multiple collectors representing diverse final recipients
61
KK 5019, p. 10; MM 687 (9820), p. 183.
62 KK 5019, p. 188; MM 687 (9820), p. 25. One is forced to wonder about the re-
lationship between this emin and the Tuna defterdan.
212 CHAPTER SIX
was part of a wider pattern of conflict over access to revenues. Such

conflict was probably inevitable, especially because, over time, money
was increasingly earmarked for specific recipients rather than being
deposited directly into the treasury. More significant for evaluating
Ottoman governance than the existence of competition is how the
resulting problems were handled. Parties to the conflict appealed to
the registers at the central government, to the conditioi:is recorded in
a successful bid, and to previously-issued orders. 63 These written records
served as the basis for central government control over collection and
over the final destinations of funds, providing the last word on who
could legitimately benefit from the money collected. From these records,
we may be able to compile estimates of the distribution of the empire's
revenues and to track changes in the flow of funds. Through their
study it may even be possible to quantify, however roughly, the
problems presented in taxpayers' complaints.
63
See KK 5019, p. 181. An order settling a conflict over collection rights on the yava
cizye between some unnamed intruders and the nazrr of the mukataas of Uskiip, to whom
the collection rights were assigned in the registers and in favor of whom the decision
was made, is in Hans Georg Majer, "Nesto za java-dzizieto i maden mukataa nezaretot
na Skopje i Vucitm vo 1663 godina," Glasnik na Institutot za Nacionalna /storija 18,
no. 3 (1974): 127-38.
CHAPTER SEVEN
ARREARS, ACCOUNTING, AND BALANCE-SHEETS
Budgetary deficits are often seen as symptomatic of Ottoman decline,

but the precise nature of the relationship is unclear: was decline the
reason for the budgetary deficits, or did the deficits themselves cause
decline? Expanding the question highlights its inherent difficulties: did
a decline in administrative efficiency or ethics prevent the collection
of adequate revenue, and did lack of revenue then cause or contribute
to military decline? 1 Stereotypes of the finance department as "rapa-
cious" and "insatiable" and of the army as poorly led, poorly armed,
and poorly paid beg the question. So little is known about the Ottomans'
military funding, training, strategy, and tactics in the seventeenth
century that assessments of capability are not yet possible. Steps can
be taken, however, toward a better understanding of Ottoman admin-
istrative ability with respect to revenue. Through the finance de-
partment's procedures for allocating incoming funds and accounting
for arrears in collection, we catch a glimpse of its goals and priorities
in the face of the budgetary deficits of the seventeenth century.
Collectors' Accounts (Muhasebe)
Together with the money collected (or the final installment) and a
detailed record of collection, the tax collector of record presented to
the treasury an accounting register (muhasebe) itemizing amounts
collected and disbursements made. He was allowed to deduct his salary
from the total before submitting it. The money submitted, plus the
amounts disbursed, for which the collector presented temessiiks, were
required to equal the total sum for which the collector had been made
responsible at the outset. The submission of a muhasebe served as
a signal that collection had been made and as a testimony to its correct
performance. An order issued in the year 1010/1601-2, one of a number
1The decline of the Spanish Empire has similarly been ascribed to budgetary deficits
(Kamen, Iron Century, 428).
214 CHAPTER SEVEN
concerning missing muhasebes, declared that since the year 1000/

1591-92 it had been necessary and important for emins of the beytiilmal
in Edirne to submit muhasebe registers to the treasury and called for
the submission of muhasebes for the intervening ten years, all of which
were still outstanding. Finance scribes, taking the absence of muhasebe
registers as an indication that taxes had not been collected, tried to
monitor this problem carefully. Appointment of a new bureau head
presented an opportunity for arrears collection, as suggested by a series
of orders on this subject dated immediately after the appointment in
1022/1612 of a new mukataac1, Mehmed Efendi. 2
That the submission of a muhasebe register was regarded as evi-
dence for the completion of tax collection is shown by an order to
the kad1 of Izmir. This kad1, serving as muhassil-i emval (financial
supervisor), petitioned in 1049/1639--40 to say that the collector of
the bedel-i niiziil for the previous year had counted Izmir as 40 hanes,
but the inhabitants claimed that 20 hanes had earlier been subtracted
from their assessment. When the registers in the capital were exam-
ined it was noted that 20 hanes had indeed been subtracted in 1034/
1624-25, but it was also discovered that the muhasebe for a kiirek~i
bedeli levied in the intervening period had never been submitted, and
the finance scribes assumed the tax had never been collected. To make
up the deficiency, the assessment of 40 banes in 1048/1638-39 was
allowed to stand. Submission of a muhasebe register also formed proof
of payment in the case of Hasan Aga, a cizye collector in Bosna, who
submitted all his payments in advance but learned at collection time
that the cizye collection post had been awarded to someone else.
Because Hasan Aga had submitted a muhasebe register proving
payment, however, the Bosna treasury was ordered either to return
his advance payments in accordance with the register or to permit him
to collect the tax. Conversely, it was often the absence of an account
register that alerted finance scribes to the fact that the tax in a particular
locality had not been collected or remitted. Such was the case in
Balyabadra, where avanz collection for the year 1048/1638-39 had
been assigned to a local resident, Kose Mehmed, but four years later
his account register had not been seen (muhasebesi gorUlmeyip). On
the assumption that the tax had not been collected, an order was sent
2
MM 1513 (7316), pp. 44, 45, 56; MM 22603 (9824), p. 31 (see also KK 2576, pp.
121, 122).
ARREARS, ACCOUNTING, AND BALANCE-SHEETS 215
to the kad1 and kethudas to collect the total amount immediately and
send it with any temessiiks to the treasury. 3
The finance department in this period supervised farmed revenues
as assiduously as it did those collected by its own agents. The absence
of a muhasebe for an iltizam indicated that the miiltezim was not
doing his job and should be called to account. For example, an order
sent to the miifetti§ and nazir of Samako noted that the Samako
beytiilmal, previously handled ber vech-i emanet, had sometime earlier
been converted to iltizam and added to the Samako mukataas under
miiltezim Mahmud, but that since then no money or muhasebe reg-
isters had arrived at the treasury. Reiterating that their submission was
necessary and important, the order instructed the miifetti§ and nazir
to lose no time in getting Mahmud to send them, further commanding
an on-the-spot inspection of the beytiilmal and a search of the court
registers to determine what should have been paid. When the emin
Fazlullah was removed from his post in 969/1561-62 because his
payments were in arrears and he did not present a muhasebe, the new
appointee, though experienced, required special endorsement by ehl-i
vukuf, knowledgeable people who could testify that he would fulfill
his undertaking. The submission of muhasebes was considered so
important that the fact that none had come in from the mukataas of
Egriboz in the year 1010/1601-2 warranted dismissal of the miifetti§. 4
A tax collector who submitted less than the assessed amount was
held personally liable for the difference unless he could produce
documentation to show either that the required amounts had been
submitted previously or that the taxpayers were unable to pay him
the sums demanded, a situation calling for reassessment or partial
forgiveness of the amount. There were many circumstances-Celali
uprisings, bad weather, epidemics, peasant flight-preventing collec-
tion of amounts specified in the registers. Tax collectors customarily
petitioned the government with this news, in part to inform the finance
department of the situation and to request instructions, and in part
to absolve themselves of responsibility for a revenue shortfall. 5 For
example, Bekir Bey, avanz collector for the province of Rum for the
year 1010/1601-2, found himself unable to collect the full amount
3 KK 2576, p. 41; MM 2256 (5712), p. 63; KK 2576, p. 122 (see also 102, 121).
4 MM 357 (20115), p. 117 (actually 119; see also KK 5019, p. 175); MM 241 (115),
fol. 43a; AE III. Mehmed 170, p. 8.
5 Tax farmers could be imprisoned for non-payment; see Fekete, Siyaqat-Schrift, #3,
1: 128-37, 2: plates 5-6.

216 CHAPTER SEVEN
assessed. Along with the tax money, Bekir handed in a defter showing
exactly what he had managed to collect. He also submitted two petitions
from the kad1 of Rum. In the first, the kad1 notified the government
\__
that disruption in the province caused by Celali raids had prevented

the agent from completing his avanz collection. The kad1 explained
that many of the province's inhabitants had been killed or had left
the area, and that those remaining were having a hard time cultivating
their land and paying taxes. The second petition was written by the
kad1 on behalf of the local notables, the provincial ayan, who testified
to the parlous state of affairs and tendered their considered opinion
that Bekir Bey had collected as much as could be expected. The tacit
hope was that the outstanding amount would be written off. 6
Uncollected taxes were sometimes brought to official notice by a
petition from a tax collector. The petition of the beylerbey of Kibns
(Cyprus) for an order to collect cizye arrears also reported that the
cizye for 1023/1614-15 had been 303 banes short, a difference which
he as collector had made up. When Zulflkar <;avu§ petitioned for
appointment as a cizye collector in 1055/1645-46, a search of the
registers revealed that the cizye for 1054/1644-45 had not yet been
deposited. Mehmed Yeni~eri of the ebna-1 sipahiyan, petitioning to
collect the avar1z of <;atalca for 1049/1639-40, seems to have ben-
efited from inside information on missing muhasebes. According to
his petition, collection of the tax had first been awarded to the late
Fazli, kethuda of the late Mehmed Pa§a, and after Fazli's death to
a miiteferrika of the Porte named Mehmed living in Nigbolu. By 1052/
1642-43 miiteferrika Mehmed's account had not yet been seen, and
presumably no returns had been made; the treasury was owed 64,744
ak~e, which Mehmed Yeni~eri now petitioned to collect. 7
When collectors' muhasebes were inspected by the central finance
department, the record of inspection sometimes included notice to the
provincial miifetti§ acknowledging full payment of the revenues in
question; this was probably done when the iltizam had been awarded
at the provincial level. A letter confirming such an inspection, sent
in 981/1573-74 to the kad1 of Bey§ehir in his capacity as miifetti§,
6
Petitions from kad1s in Hamid in the year 1022/1613-14 explaining why they were
unable to collect the total amounts of avanz recorded in the defters can be found in the
Ali Emiri Tasnifi, I. Ahmed, docs. 240, 241a, 24lb, 242, and 243. For a tax collector
with a shortfall, see MM 1491 (16596), pp. 1-3; for another such case, KK 2576, p. 91.
7
MM 3881 (2765), p. 142; MM 2256 (5712), p. 21; KK 2576, p. 101. For the promotion
of janissaries to the sipahi corps see Finkel, Administration of Warfare, 84.
reported that the muhasebe of Bali, miiltezim of certain has properties

in the three-year period beginning on 24 ~evval 977/1 April 1570,
together with Bali's detailed register (miifredat defteri), had been
sealed in a purse and sent to the capital; it further announced that
the muhasebe had been inspected and that nothing further was owing
on Bali's account. 8
Kadis were frequently made responsible for collecting arrears left
by delinquent collectors. For example, when the appointed collectors
of a bedel, or substitution price, for horses in Bolu province disap-
peared without submitting their accounts, collection was delegated
to the kadis of the province. 9 Kadis also formed an important link
between the finance department and tax collectors, as well as serving
in supervisory posts, so most orders regarding the submission of
accounts for all kinds of taxes were addressed to them. The following
one is typical:
It is my order that the emins who are collecting for various dates according
to their berats and conditions of undertaking pertaining to the year 1041/
1631-32 be sent to the Threshold of Felicity, together with the money
that ought to have come in according to the amount they owed per day,
and with all their receipts. 10
Some original firmans ordering the submission of muhasebes can be

found in the Ali Emiri collection of documents; AE Kanuni 198, for
example, is a firman addressed to the kadi who was miifetti~ of Florina
calling for the examination of the account of a miiltezim who had
only served a partial term, while AE Kanuni 199 is a firman to the
kadi of Karadag notifying him that one of the mtiltezims in his area
had not sent in his muhasebe. The firman AE Kanuni 382 notified
the kadi of izvornik that a deceased emin had not submitted a muhasebe
and ordered him to demand that the man's heirs find his detailed
account register, establish what he owed, and pay it. Numerous entries
in the ahkam registers record submission, or requests for submission,
of muhasebes and/or summarize the information they contain. An order
to a timar-holder farming twenty-nine mukataas in Kostendil describes
8
MM 357 (20115), p. 72.
9
KK 2576, p. 45.
10 Bin kzrk bir senesine mahsub olmak uzere berat ve §art-z iltizamlarz mucebince teva-
rih-i muhtelife ile zabt eyliyen umenamn ber muceb-i kzst el-yevm zimmetlerine lazzm gelen
malzm ile ve cumle temssukleri ile asitane-i saadete irsal ve iysal etmek emrim olmu§tur
(KK 5019, p. 163). See also KK 4990, pp. 23, 24, 25; KK 4994, p. 54.
218 CHAPTER SEVEN
the typical reporting procedure: he was to submit his receipts to the

treasury every six months and his records once a year; he was to
obtain a temessilk for each payment, whether to the treasury directly
or to another recipient such as the §ehremini; and these instructions
were to be written into his berat, so that there could be no mistake. I I
Individual milltezims' account registers can be found in the ar-
chives; examples are MM 1393 (16038), the muhasebe of Abdilrrah-
man, mtiltezim of Mihali~, made on 1 Dekuris or 13 Cemazitilevvel
1007/1598, and AE I. Ahmed 5, a muhasebe register for the mukataa
of the zeamet of Uskildar for the period 1015-17/1606-9. According
to the catalogue description, Katib Mehmed's muhasebe for the
mukataas of Kefe, including both income and expenditures (KK 2283),
was made from his detailed (milfredat) register for 986-88/1578-81. 12
Muhasebe registers submitted by miiltezims who controlled multiple
iltizams or who sub-farmed their iltizams include income and expen-
diture totals for all the subdivisions, arranged separately by tahvil or
emanet (as in KK 2281 dated 961/1553-54 for Mente§e), or with all
the income entries together followed by all the expenses. Some
muhasebe registers cover more than one iltizam: register MM 1876
(3303) dated 1019-20/1610-11 contains muhasebe registers from a
group of mtiltezims supervised by the same nazrr, and register KK
5503, though labeled "Mukataa ait arz tezkireleri" in the catalogue,
contains a number of muhasebes as well.
Information from individual collectors' registers was combined by
scribes in the central bureaus into summary accounting registers also
called muhasebes. In provinces with provincial treasuries, this task
was performed by provincial finance scribes, who remitted the prov-
ince's receipts in an annual lump sum together with a summarized
muhasebe. The number of individual muhasebe records in the archive
catalogues seems too small for the number of tax collectors; many
account records may have been disposed of after summary registers
were compiled, while others may still exist among the uncatalogued
materials in the archives or in former provinces. The scribes of pro-
vincial treasuries also kept daily records (ruznam~e), from which we
may be able to track provincial finances in some detail. 13 In addition,
11
MM 687 (9820) pp. 60-62.
12
The distinction between miifredat and muhasebe registers can be seen in the examples
of each published in Fekete, Siyiiqat-Schrift, #16, 1: 318-25, 2: plate 31; #15, 1: 304-
17, 2: plates 29-30.
13
Examples of provincial ruznam~es have been published in Fekete, Siyiiqat-Schrift,
some individual registers can be found bound together in groups by

province or bureau; for instance, register AE Kanuni 26 is a bound
collection of muhasebes for iltizams in the city of Tokat for the pe-
riod 965-70/1557-64, while MM 1660 (22203) for the mukataas of
Kefe, labeled heyet raporu ("condition report"), is also a collection
of muhasebes.
Individual accounting registers were submitted in several different
formats. The simplest was a register showing remittances as lump
sums. A tax collector's individual muhasebe defter of this type in the
archives is MM 2635 (15518) dated 1034-35/1624-26; one page long,
it has the following heading:
Account [book] of the poll tax on unbelievers in the sancak of Canik
from 1 Ramazan 1034/7 June 1625 to 29 ~aban 1035/26 May 1626, the
responsibility of Mehmed Ali Tabbah of the ebna-1 sipahiyan, 54th com-
pany, 25 [ak~e] per day, [as] emin and Nesuh (?) Gilman-1 Acemiyan,
from the same corps, 13th company, 10 [ak~e] per day, [as] scribe. 14
The first item after the heading is the tahvil or assignment: 1469 banes
at 220 ak~e per bane (totalling 223,180 ak~e). The second item is
the total amount to be collected, the haszl (product), which is listed
as 323,180 ak~e. This figure includes an accession increase (ziyade-i
ciilus) of 100,000 ak~e (approximately 68 ak~e per bane; in compari-
son, Table 6 showed that in the same year the cizye of Bosna in-
creased 60 ak~e ). The third item is a list of eleven remittances, headed
by the words vuzz'a min zalike (teslim temamen), "deposited out of
that: (submitted in full)." The individual entries for remittances in-
clude date of deposit, amount submitted, and, if the deposit was not
delivered by the collector of record, the name of the person who
delivered it. Attached notes indicate that three of the payments to-
taling 98,600 ak~e were made in advance, in 1032/1622-23, and that
one installment of 47,282 ak~e was used to pay the salaries of the
emin and katib. The sum of the deposits recorded was 293,267 ak~e,
29,913 ak~e less than the assignment including the accession increase
#12, 1: 236-79, 2: plates 20--25; #22, 1: 374-93, 2: plates 39-40; #34, 1: 594--609, 2:
plates 69-70. For an analysis of the first of these, see Kaldy-Nagy, "Cash Book of the
Ottoman Treasury in Buda," 173-82.
14 Muhasebe-i cizye-i gebran-i vilayet-i Canik an gurre-i ramazan el-mubarek sene 1034
ila gayet-i §aban el-muazzam sene 1035 deruhde-i Mehmed Ali Tabbah an ebna-i sipahiyan
54. [bOlu]kfi yevm 25 emin ve Nesuh (?) Gilman-i Acemiyan an c[emaat-i] m[ezbur] 13.
[bOlu]k fi yevm JO katib.
220 CHAPTER SEVEN
(if the collection was deemed to be "submitted in full," the Caruk

cizye that year actually increased only 47 ak~e per hane). Listed after
the deposits are two expenditures made from these funds, one for
the salary of a member of the corps of cannoneers (topruyan) who
presented a havale for the sum, and the other for the stipends of
several pensioners (vazifehoran).
A more elaborate register of the same general type, MM 1579
(15715), is a muhasebe defteri of the ziyade-i cizye for the years
1013-1018/1604--1610 submitted by Mustafa Bey, muhassil-i emval
of Rumeli, on behalf of five vak1f villages near Gelibolu. The heading
describes the tax and names the villages, mentions that the register
was written by Mustafa Bey and delivered to the treasury by his
retainer Hilseyin and the ~avu§ Kas1m Selami, and records one of the
remittances, 38,000 ak~e deposited in the imperial treasury on 19
Safer 1015/26 June 1606. Subsequent entries give a breakdown of
deposits for each year of the period. Copied into the register are three
additional items: a petition from the kad1 of Gelibolu explaining that
part of the tax had been held back to compensate for a previous illegal
collection of kilrek~i bedeli from which the five villages ought to have
been exempt; a copy of the exemption document (muafname); and
a copy of an entry in the kad1' s register documenting the testimony
of Mustafa Aga, milteferrika, regarding his receiving an order to collect
the tax, conducting a face-to-face survey (tahrir) in one of the villages
to determine the number of banes, and collecting from each bane the
exact amount specified by the order (the totals cannot be checked,
however, as the tax was submitted as a lump sum from all five villages).
Some registers were designated by the term irsaliye (transmission),
signifying in this usage that all money collected had been disbursed
for various purposes, only the account book being submitted to the
treasury. Register MM 2550 (5855), an irsaliye defteri compiled in
1032/1622-23, is a summary register of such accounts, reflecting
collections of cizye, ziyade-i cizye, and other taxes of which not one
ak~e was sent to the capital. The heading of each entry, beginning
with the word irsaliye, describes the tax, location, collection period,
and collectors, followed by number of hanes, amount collected from
each, and the total (hasil). Listed below that are sums expended, with
notations as to the purpose, date, and authorization for each entry.
Totals show that amounts disbursed equalled amounts collected.
Register MM 1476 (7486) is an irsaliyat register of the muhassil-i
emval of the sancaks of Aydm, Saruhan, and Mente§e for the years
1006-10/1597-1602; for each sancak in each year, the income, ex-

penditures, and treasury payments of each emanet are listed. These
registers were obviously put together from the accounts of individual
collectors. In place of the date when funds were received, akham
register entries recording the delivery of irsaliye registers say irad ve
masraf §Ude, "it was collected and spent" or "income and expenditure
were made.''
Another type of muhasebe register recorded amounts collected from
taxpayers rather than amounts remitted to the treasury. A typical head-
ing reads:
This is a register which describes the avanz money collected according
to an imperial order from the avanzhanes of the kaza of Lapseki as
ordered for the year 1014/1605--6, written in the first ten days of Muhar-
rem 1016/28 April-7 May 1607. 15
Below the heading, avanzhanes are listed by neighborhood (mahalle)
within the city and by village (karye) in the countryside. Appended
notes report a loss of 24 avanzhanes in the kaza since the last tahrir
and record an order in 1010/1601-2 for the collection of 240 ak~e
per bane as bedel-i kiirek~iyan (presumably this order still governed
tax collection four years later). Also included in the register is a survey
of the avanzhanes of Gordiik and a petition requesting a reduction
of 17 banes in the official count for that kaza because of deaths and
flight from the land.
Most muhasebe registers in the catalogues belong to the type showing
amounts collected rather than sums remitted. The difference between
such registers and assessment or tahrir registers, showing amounts to
be demanded, is small, and the two types can easily be confused.
Catalogue descriptions of muhasebe registers often include the term
"teslimat" (submissions), denoting a collection register rather than a
tahrir, but in other cases the catalogues do not identify the category
to which a particular register belongs, and only close inspection of
the registers themselves will permit the distinction to be made. By
comparing muhasebe registers to tahrir registers held in the treasury,
finance scribes could determine whose taxes were paid in full and
whose taxes were in arrears; they hoped, of course, that the registers
15
Defter oldur ki kaza-1 Lapseki sene hamse a§ere ve elf tarihinden f erman olunan
avarzz hanelerin ber muceb-i emr-i §erif tahsil olunan avarzz ak~eleridir zikr olunur-
tahriren fi evail-i muharrem el-haram sene sitte a§ere ve elf MM 1720 (15562) dated
1015/1606--7.
222 CHAPTER SEVEN
would be identical. Their comparison was assisted by detailed com-

ments in collectors' registers explaining why the taxes of a particular
karye or mahalle could not be collected; such details should prove
extremely useful to local historians. These comments permitted the
finance department to correct its registers and to decide when new
surveys were necessary. They also enabled the government to set in
motion the collection of arrears.
Arrears and their Collection
The procedure for collecting tax arrears (bakiye, bakaya, "remainder,"

or zimmet, "debt") was substantially the same as for collecting the
original tax. For example, a register entry for 1045/1635-36 lists arrears
(bakaya) in the bedel-i niiziil from five different kazas and records
the assignment of their collection to Receb Bey, who was given an
order and a register (emr ii defter) specifying how much to collect.
An order to the kad1s of Mora stated that agents (miiba§irler) assigned
to collect the avanz in Mora had sent copies of their registers to the
treasury, from which an arrears register (bakaya defteri) had been
compiled. Using a copy of this register, the kad1s were to demand
the missing amounts from the agents, from the agents' heirs if they
had died, or from the taxpayers if the agents had not collected them. 16
Like centrally appointed tax collectors, miiltezims were subject to
regular accounting procedures, but with respect to arrears there were
differences in procedure. Arrears in the collection of farmed revenues
did not need to be reassigned to new collectors; one of the main
advantages of tax farming was the ability to hold a miiltezim and his
kefils personally responsible for the full sum contracted for. The actions
taken when iltizam revenues were discovered to be in arrears can be
illustrated by a case in Egriboz. When the emins of the has of Egriboz
and Tirhala for the year 1000/1591-92 were found in 1009/1600-
16
KK 2576, p. 91; register MM 2908 (15972) dated 1038-41/1628-32, a bakaya register
for the bedel-i avanz of Mora, is probably not the register referred to in this order but
is of the same type. For the issuance of a similar bakayat defteri for Tuna province see
ibid., p. 1. A zimmet defteri for the mukataa of the mints has been published; see Sahillioglu,
"Bir Miiltezim Zimem Defterine gore XV. Yiizyd Sonunda Osmanh Darphane Mukataalan,"
145-218. A group of orders for the collection of arrears commanding the issuance of emr
ii defter, an order and a register, is in KK 2576, p. 74. Contemporary France followed
similar procedures for collecting arrears (Dent, Crisis in Finance, 62).
1601 not to have submitted a single coin to the treasury, the Egriboz
kad1 was appointed milfetti§ and ordered to examine their muhasebes,
collect the money owed, put it in purses, seal it, and send it directly
to the grand vizier on campaign. He was to make an accurate record
of the amounts sent, keeping a copy in his own sicil and sending a
signed and sealed copy to the capital. He was also ordered to replace
emins whose terms were over with local people of wealth who would
undertake increases in the amounts to be raised, locating suitable kefils
and recording these new iltizams for the treasury. A similar procedure
was employed in 1038/1628-29 when the miifetti~ of Halomi~ re-
ceived an order informing him that for the mukataas under his charge
in the periods 1029-32/1619-23 and 1033-36/1623-27, not one page
of a defter had been seen in the capital, nor had any remittances been
sent. The milfetti§ was ordered to have the emins found and brought
into court, their documents forwarded to the treasury, and their debt
paid, by the kefils if necessary. The results would be recorded in the
treasury's registers, and signed and sealed copies of their muhasebes
given to the emins. This procedure seems predicated on the assump-
tion that the delay was not deliberate. If it was, more serious measures
would be taken, as in the case of the emin of the Bogdan customs
mukataa in 1055/1645-46, who had not submitted a muhasebe since
the conquest of the area; his mukataa was taken away and given to
someone else. 17
The actions resorted to if revenues remained uncollected depended
on whether or not the lapse was the collector's fault. The finance
department was well aware that some causes of non-payment were
outside a tax collector's control. When Ferhad, miiltezim of the Izmir
has in 972/1564-65, reported that he had been unable to collect rent
on the shops of a particular bazaar because they had been burned in
a fire and had been under repair for eight or nine months, the milfetti~
and nazrr were told to subtract 7200 ak~e from Ferhad's iltizam. In
a case in 1006/1597-98, the nazrr of the Filibe zeamet reported that
he was having difficulty collecting the amount he had undertaken
because Filibe, being on the main road, was exposed to acts of brig-
andage by soldiers returning from the Austrian war. He suggested
the appointment of an emin ber vech-i emanet and nominated Rama-
zan c;avu§, whom local people vouched for as knowledgeable and
capable of managing a zeamet. The finance department approved the
17 AE III. Mehmed 170, pp. 3-4; KK 5019, pp. 171, 175; MM 3881 (2765), p. 40.
224 CHAPfER SEVEN
nomination and sent an order to the miifetti§ and nazrr of Filibe outlining
procedures for Ramazan <;avu§ to follow. When Kemal Yehudi amassed
a deficit of 216,323 ak~e after two years of a three-year iltizam on
the customs dues of Istanbul, the kad1 demanded an examination of
his muhasebe. Kemal explained to the kad1, however, that the deficit
was due to the Venetian rebellion and the consequent disruption of
trade. Requesting a new iltizam comprising the remaining year plus
two more, he promised to pay the deficit out of his own money,
expecting to reimburse himself during the new iltizam. Since the
delay in payment was not Kemal's fault, his petition was granted.
Another defaulting miiltezim was allowed to proceed with collection
but was· given only twenty days to deliver what he owed. 18
Collection could also fall into arrears because of taxpayer de-
linquency. Like taxpayers everywhere, the Ottoman reaya found ways
to evade payment. There should have been 400 banes in the sancak
of Hiidavendigar providing chickens for the imperial kitchens, but for
some time collection was made on the basis of a lower figure because
the villagers had purportedly fled. There was no evidence of flight,
however, and when this anomaly was discovered, the agent of the
imperial kitchens was commissioned to determine whether or not
the village's account was paid in full. In the year 1049/1639-40, the
bedel-i niiziil assessed on the inhabitants of the sancak of Biga went
unpaid on the excuse that there was no campaign that year. The
following year, the Dani§mendlu Tiirkmens did not produce the 3,000
head of sheep they owed as a campaign contribution (siirsat), on the
flimsy pretext that there were no reaya on that campaign. The
government's view, however, was that the tribe still owed the sheep
and could pay them to janissaries on garrison duty. The kad1 and
voyvoda were ordered to see that the sheep were delivered. 19
There were, of course, other reasons for arrears in tax remittances
that were not the fault of the reaya. One of the most common was
the death of the appointed collector in the midst of the collection
process. This immediately raised the question of how much tax he
had collected before his death and how much was still uncollected.
An order sent to Arslan Pa§a, beylerbey of Budin, recorded that his
predecessor, iskender Pa§a, had submitted his provincial accounts
18
MM 241 (115), fol. 89a; MM 687 (9820), p. 196; KK 4994, pp. 29, 41; MM 1513
(7316), p. 48; see also p. 31 and KK 5019, p. 170.
19
KK 2576, pp. 120, 41, 57.
completely up to date, but that the latter's predecesssor, Mehmed

Pa§a, had died owing the treasury 118,066 ak~e. The present order
commanded that the province's arrears be submitted from Mehmed
Pa§a' s estate, along with a register; finance officials seemed confident
that Mehmed Pa§a had collected the money from the reaya. Another
group of taxpayers petitioned concerning arrears in their avanz to
inform the finance department that they had indeed paid their tax but
that the collection agents (milba§irler) had died, and the arrears should
be demanded from the agents' heirs. Arrears of iltizam revenues col-
lected by islam Aga were submitted by others, presumably his family
or retainers, after he was killed. 20
When mukataa revenues could not be deposited because they had
never been collected, the government usually moved to install new
and more effective collectors. The men of the Anabolu garrison in
Mora had not been paid for two years because the mukataas support-
ing their salaries had not been granted in iltizam for the years 980-
981/1572-73. When garrison commanders appeared with havales to
obtain the funds, they found that no one had collected the revenues.
The local kad1 petitioned on their behalf and was told to supervise
collection of two years' revenue and see that the garrison received
its pay. In another case, Abdi, emin of the port of Akkerman in 995/
1586-87, stopped collecting and retired in the middle of his term.
When the milltezim, Hildaverdi, submitted a deficit accounting at the
end of Jhe iltizam, he was relieved of his post and a new bidder
installed. Soon afterward, two men named Yusuf and Haci Receb
were granted the iltizam of the ports of Kili and Akkerman for six
years, but after three of those years the nazir of Kili had to report
that they had not arranged for (yerle§tirmek) their ziyade, not a scrap
of an accounting had been submitted, they had been unable to provide
any kefils, and they owed the sum of 2,500,000 ak~e. The nazir wanted
them removed and replaced, nominating several people in whom he
apparently had more confidence. 21 In general, the finance department
tried to maximize its chance of receiving its revenue and would accept
a lesser sum provided that delivery was reasonably secure.
A milltezim might appear to be in arrears when he had actually
paid, due to the overlapping of collectors' assignments. For instance,
20 KK 2576, pp. 74, 43, 90; MM 267 (2775), p. 13 (see also KK 67, p. 2; KK 2576,
p. 106).
21 KK 4990, p. 40; MM 687 (9820), pp. 59, 216.
226 CHAPTER SEVEN
the miiltezim Hilseyin Aga complained before the kad1 of Sirem that
he was being charged for a deficit of 24,614 ak~e in the muhasebe
of the emins of the Karlof~a mukataa in 976/1568-69. He claimed
that he had personally deposited the money in the treasury and had
received an order against the time of accounting. The kad1 was ordered
to bring the disputing parties face to face and make them settle their
accounts "according to custom and law" (adet ve kanun uzere). The
same claim, made by an emin-i miiltezim in Sofya in 981/1573-74,
was treated similarly. 22
Other reasons for arrears of taxes were more unusual than those
above. The collection of oarsmen {kilrek~i) in Debri and Kalkandelen
in 980/1572-73 was interrupted when_ the kad1 charged with collection
was rotated out of office (mazul), and an order had to be sent to the
next kad1 to continue the collection. One group of villagers, who were
probably being dunned for arrears in their avanz, petitioned to notify
the government that the tax had been collected but that the collectors
lived some distance away (and had presumably taken the money home
with them). The villagers requested that the finance department del-
egate recovery of the money to the kad1s and kethiidas in the areas
where the collectors resided. A levy of onions from the Canik and
Samsun areas was delayed through the corruption of the purchasing
agent (emin). He ought to have purchased the onions from onion-
raising villages at the market price, but he simply took them without
payment and farced villages that did not grow onions to buy some
so he could collect them. The miitevelli of the evkaf to which these
villages belonged petitioned to say that if this practice were not stopped
the villagers would flee. As a result, an order was sent to the kad1
of Canik and to the sancak bey, also supervisor of the imperial larder
(kilar naz1n) in Samsun, commanding them to see that the onions
were legally purchased. 23
Individual misbehavior was always a possibility, but punitive action
was rare in the absence of proof. Ali b. Nesuh, miiltezim of the Kar-
lof~a mukataas in 973/1565-66, had not remitted what he owed to
the capital; when questioned, he claimed that Hasan and Hasan,
voyvodas of the bey of Sirem, had appropriated it all. An inspection
of his muhasebe had been ordered but could not be carried out
(gorUlmek muyessir olmayzp). This was suspicious, but in view of the
22
MM 357 (20115), pp. 30, 91.
23
MM 357 (20115), p. 142 (actually 144); KK 2576, p. 74; MM 2728 (3457), p. 59.
lack of evidence, the kad1 was told to bring these men to court. If
any amount remained to be paid, according to their records and the
law, he was to extract it and send it to the capital; if the miiltezim
had insufficient funds to cover the arrears, his goods were to be sold.
On the other hand, when the muteferrika ibrahim, miiltezim of the
salt works of Selanik, was found in 1041/1631-32 to be 4 million
ak~e in debt, the order sent to the kad1 commanded him to seize all
salt in the storehouses for the treasury and to prevent ibrahim and
his men from having anything to do with the salt works again. 24
Although the central finance authorities had no control over the
award of many provincial iltizams, they were unwilling to let super-
visory authority slip completely out of their hands and demanded that
provincial treasuries keep them informed. An order to the beylerbey
of Basra dated 973/1565-66 commanded him to compile a register
showing sale prices of the mukataas in his province, amounts to be
submitted to the provincial treasury, its expenditures, and the differ-
ence between income and outgo. He was to prepare a sealed muhasebe
(in this case a provincial accounting register) and send it to the capital,
and he was to include with it a petition describing how these processes
were accomplished. An order to the miifetti§ of Yeni§ehir and Trrhala
in 1010/1601-2 conveys the impression of a need for greater control
in those districts. It commanded that documents and receipts for all
iltizams under this miifetti§' s supervision should be sent to the capital
to be properly inspected and recorded, and that, after collection of
any outstanding revenue, summarized accounting registers should be
reviewed, claims settled, and official mukataa registers compiled. If
mukataa revenues were sent to the army on campaign, signed copies
of all documents should be sent to the capital. All miiltezims whose
term was over should be located, their muhasebes inspected, and any
arrears demanded and sent off to the campaign treasury. Mukataas
should not be put into the hands of anyone holding a previous iltizam
who had not settled his accounts with the finance department, or anyone
who did not have a berat. Kefils, nazrrs, and milfetti§es were to be
held responsible for any defaults and make good any losses. 25
The cooperation of the courts (marifet-i §er') was sometimes
24 MM 357 (20115), p. 4; KK 5019, p. 168.

25 MM 267 (2775), p. 31; AE III. Mehmed 170, pp. 1-2. According to Selaniki, around
1006/1597-98 only half of the expected annual revenue reached the treasury in Istanbul;
the rest was in arrears (Tarih-i Selanikf, ed. ip§irli, 2: 733).
228 CHAPTER SEVEN
necessary to ensure payment of what was owed. When the sancak

bey of Homs, miiltezim of certain of its revenues, paid in full in
advance but had trouble making collection in rebellious areas, the
court was asked to facilitate his collection while restraining the sancak
bey from oppression. Entrusting collection to powerful officials such
as sancak beys or defterdars meant that the courts could have diffi-
culty forcing compliance in cases of non-payment. The full weight
of provincial government sometimes had to be brought to bear on a
defaulting collector. A case in point is that of Hiiseyin Pa§a, miiltezim
of a number of mukataas in Haleb in the year 1011/1602-3, whose
remittances were in arrears. One condition of his iltizam had been
that no havale would be sent from the capital to collect money from
him, so to obtain the balance the finance department was forced to
request the provincial governor and kad1 to exert what pressure they
could on this powerful person. When provincial authority could not
produce compliance, the central government sometimes had to exer-
cise its own influence. In a case of arrears owed to the provincial
treasury in Bosna, when orders by provincial finance officials were
insufficient to enforce payment, central officials stepped in, ordering
the kad1 to summon the defaulting miiltezims to court, review their
unexamined muhasebes, and, with the cooperation of a representative
of the capital, compel them to produce the missing money. 26
Special agents called bakz kullarz (tax inspectors) were sometimes
appointed to assist in collection of arrears. They collected debts owed
to the treaury and had authority to imprison those who did not pay;
they heard complaints and investigated bribery and embezzlement. By
the eighteenth century there was a staff of sixty bak1 kullan headed
by a ba§ bakz kulu (chief tax inspector), reporting directly to the ba§
defterdar. 27 They appear only intermittently, however, in orders con-
cerning arrears from the first half of the seventeenth century. A baki
kulu was sent, for instance, to collect the arrears or debt (zimmet)
of the emin Abdiilaziz, who was behind in remitting the avanz of
Manastir for 1042/1632-33.28 In this period, however, arrears were
26
MM 3881 (2765), pp. 16, 24; MM 1513 (7316), p. 56; MM 2256 (5712), p. 72.
For the tension between the central government and increasingly powerful provincial officials
with their own military forces, see further Inalcik, "Centralization and Decentralization,"
27-28.
27
Pakalm, Osmanli Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sozliigii, 1: 149; Uzun~ar~1h, Merkez
ve Bahriye Te§kilati, 333; d'Ohsson, Tableau general de l' empire ottoman, 7: 273.
28
KK 2576, p. 44.
more often collecteq by the same categories of people who received

appointment as tax collectors.
Occasionally, arrears went uncollected for so long that they lost
some of their importance, as in the case of the bedel-i niizi.il of Giresun
and Ke§an for 1045/1635-36, assessed at 20 kamil kuru§ per bane.
The original collector, Be§ir, left Giresiin 57.5 banes and Ke§an 16
banes in arrears. Seyyid Yusuf was appointed to collect the arrears
but died leaving the debt uncollected, as his brother, Seyyid Aydm,
reported in 1051/1641--42. Since the due date of the money was a
full six years earlier (and perhaps because the need for the money
had become less acute), the amount owed was lowered from 20 to
12 kuru§ per bane. A defter itemizing the sums to be collected was
sent to the kad1s, who were instructed that if the mahalles and villages
could show receipts (makbuzat or temessiikler) from either Be§ir or
Seyyid Yusuf, these should be taken from them and added into the
account, and from those who had no receipts the kad1s should collect
the tax. 29
At other times, when the treasury was short of funds, special efforts
were made to collect arrears in taxes, and successful recovery of ar-
rearages could be rewarded with exceptional assignments. For example,
ismail, head of the mukataa-1 Rumeli bureau, collected 25 million
ak~e of outstanding arrears in Rumeli in the year 1014/1605-6 and
was awarded the collection of the Istanbul customs dues and
wine tax, which probably paid a substantial salary. 30 The collection
of arrears became especially important at times of need, such as the
inception of a military campaign or the approach of a pay period.
The beginning of the Crete campaign in 1055/1645, for instance, was
marked by an outpouring of orders to tax collectors urging them to
make payments in full. Some of them, for unknown reasons, had
consistently sent to the capital or to assigned payees only part of what
they owed. Revenues from a salt works in Syria supporting the
Damascus janissaries had not been fully paid, nor had revenues from
the mukataas of Trablus-~am supporting troops on the Baghdad
campaign. Now mukataa officials were enjoined to make their pay-
ment record complete. 31 Mention of finances in Selaniki's history for
the year 1001/1593-94 occurs most frequently in connection with
29
KK 2576, p. 98.
30
AE I. Ahmed 166.
31 MM 3881 (2765), pp. 157, 183; a compilation of the arrears of Rumeli in the years
1060--67/1650-57, MM 4287 (12585), is probably also related to funding this campaign.

230 CHAPTER SEVEN
collection of tax arrears; expenses that year must have run high. 32 In
the period between 1590 and 1610 revenue collection became difficult
and large arrears piled up, so it is not surprising that financing the
Long War with Austria became a serious problem. Numerous orders
were issued in those decades commanding the inspection of muhasebes
and the collection of arrears. The problem is usually ascribed to Celali
rebels, but it occurred outside areas of Celali activity as well. Register
MM 1513 (7316), compiled in 1013/1604-5 by the muhasebeci of
Rumeli, contains numerous orders regarding unsubmitted accounts in
Rumeli, especially around the year 1010/1601-2. In the area of Yeni-
§ehir in Trrhala it was found that no taxes had been collected between
994 and 1002/1585-94. 33 A study of this widespread problem should
afford greater insight into the unrest of the early seventeenth century.
Some cases of arrears in taxes were highly complex and dragged
on for years. The registers contain long orders or groups of orders
about tax collection problems in various regions involving multiple
bids, invalid documentation, machinations by miiltezims and appoint-
ees, complaints from taxpayers, and strenuous efforts by the finance
department to obtain revenue. 34 New collectors were appointed and
reappointed to collect arrears left by the old, temessiiks were issued
and later questioned, and defters of amounts collected and amounts
still outstanding were repeatedly compiled. Numerous arrears registers
(called bakaya or bakzye defterleri or zimmet defterleri) survive in the
archives testifying to the extent of this problem and to the renewed
attempts maae to collect amounts owed. It is not yet known what
percentage of Ottoman taxes was in arrears at any given time, or how
much was eventually recovered. Nor at this stage can we say how
much of the arrearage can be attributed to embezzlement by tax
collectors, lack of funds, resistance by taxpayers, or overestimates in
the assessment registers.
In general, it was impossible for the finance department to compile
a composite figure for arrears in taxes. If taxes were, in theory, collected
during the year for which they were due, they would be submitted
32
Peachy, "A Year in Selaniki's History."
33
AE III. Mehmed 170, p. 6; MM 1513 (7316), p. 81.
34
Such orders provide an extensive history of certain iltizams and should be extremely
interesting to scholars of local history studying the urban and rural economy; examples
can be found in KK 5019, pp. 163-65 for Edirne and 173-74 for Selanik, in MM 3881
(2765) pp. 8 and 74 for Erzurum, and in KK 2576, pp. 44, 56, 63, 75, regarding a levy
of horses for the Baghdad campaign.
to the treasury late that year or in the course of the next. The largest
portion of tax money was submitted within twelve months after the
end of the year to which it pertained. It was only after that, at the
beginning of the second year after taxes were due, that a summarized
accounting or balance-sheet could be made. Earlier attempts to do so
would produce an unrealistic account, omitting large amounts of money
shortly to arrive. After the balance-sheet was made, unpaid taxes were
deemed to be in arrears and their collection was reassigned. For the
next four years, increasing-ly smaller sums could be retrieved. After
the fifth year following the due date, however, any remaining arrears
were written off as uncollectible. 35
Central Accounting Procedures
Records of deposit, in addition to detailing remittance procedures for

tax receipts, demonstrate how money and papeiwork submitted by tax
collectors were handled once they reached the finance department.
These procedures are clearly outlined in the deposit record cited earlier
from avanz ahkam register KK 2576, quoted again here:
In relation to a payment of money by Mustafa Bey, which was presented
against the assignment [tahvil] of Piri ~aban Kurd from the standing
cavalry, 244th company, [earning] 27 [ak~e] per day, agent for the avanz
of the kazas of Yeni§ehir and Fener in the sancak of Trrhala for the
year 1042/1632-33; from the hand of the aforesaid Mustafa Bey, on
11 Ramazan 1043/18 July 1633, 1212 ak~e were registered in the imperial
ruznam~e; and this amount has been put into the "ziyade-i an el-asl"
(increase over the original amou9t) and it [the collection] was success-
ful [completed] and a tezkire for the payment has been ordered to be
written [given].
1212 [ak~e]. Written on 25 Ramazan 1043/1 August 1633.
This entry states that the money paid in by Mustafa Bey was reg-
istered on a specific date in the imperial ruznam~e, the finance
35 In France, the accounting process itself could take up to four years (Bonney, The
King's Debts, 12). In Spain, the accounting system was so slow that by the time audits
were concluded and arrears discovered, their collection was impossible. Audits were only
rarely conducted; in 1565 audits from the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella were still
outstanding (Thompson, War and Government, 58-59, 78). The Spanish treasury appar-
ently never wrote off its arrears; in the seventeenth century it was still carrying on its
books arrears that were 150 years old (Parker, Europe in Crisis, 249).
232 CHAPTER SEVEN
department's chronological daily record of transactions. 36 A descrip-

tion of finance department procedure upon receipt of tax money has
been preserved in the Atif Efendi Kanunnamesi. In this description,
the bureau responsible for each tax recorded deposits of funds (by
tahvil) in their own registers. 37 Then the scribes of that bureau made
a copy (suret) of the register entry and gave it to the ruznam~e scribes,
who copied it precisely into their own registers and passed it on to
the varidat scribes of the defterdarhk concerned, who in tum copied
it into their registers. In this way, without the benefit of computerized
data sorting, three complete records would be made of the government's
income: one organized by type of tax (the avanz, cizye, mukataa, or
other register), one organized by date of receipt (the ruznam~e), and
one organized by the defterdarhk to which the money belonged (the
varidat register). According to the kanunname, the only job of the
varidat bureaus was to record payments submitted to the treasury. In
later years, when the finance department moved away from geographi-
cal allocation of revenues and parallel but separate jurisdictions, a
record of income by defterdarhk must have become superfluous.
Perhaps the varidat bureaus disappeared in the eighteenth century
because their job had become unnecessary, and perhaps it was this
consolidation of imperial finance that allowed the second and third
defterdarhks to be regarded as sinecures.
According to the description of finance department procedures in
the Atif Efendi Kanunnamesi, the tahvil entry quoted above should
exemplify the first step in the process, recording the deposit in the
relevant bureau's registers. It indeed begins by specifying the assign-
ment (tahvil edip), and then describes (tahrir yaz1p) the deposit made.
But a discrepancy can immediately be noted between the kanunname's
description and what the entry itself tells us: the deposit was recorded
in the ruznam~e two weeks before the date of the entry in the avanz
register. Sometime after the writing of the kanunname, it appears, a
procedural change made the biiyilk ruznam~e kalemi a prior stop on
the winding path of revenue deposits through the bureaus. As a result,
only after the money was received, counted, weighed, and recorded
36
For a detailed description of the ruznam~e registers, including their Ilkhanid prece-
dents, see Goyiin~, "Ta>rih Ba§hkh Muhasebe Defterleri." For a published example see
Fekete, Siyaqat-Schrift, #33, 1: 572-93, 2: plates 65--68.
37
Mukataaczlar ve mevkufatr;zlar kendi defterlerine tahvil edip ve tahvillik altzna tahrir
yazzp ve ol tahvillik suretin ruznamecilere verip ruznameciler dahi ayniyle ger;irip ve
mekzur suretleri her efendinin kaleminde vaki olan varidatr;iye verirler; fol. 124b.
in the ruznam~e was the mevkufat bureau notified of its arrival.

According to entries in register KK 2576, the normal interval between
the date of the ruznam~e entry and the date of the ahkam register
entry was about two weeks, but it could vary from the same day to
several months. The bilyilk ruznam~e kalemi, after recording the pay-
ment, presumably sent the mevkufat kalemi a suret and the collection
register, from which the mevkufat bureau eventually recorded the entry
in its own registers. As evidence, one tahvil register of the mevkufat
bureau contains an entry marked an suret-i ruznam~e nevi§te, "written
from the copy of the ruznam~e"; another entry is an exact copy of
a tezkire (from the ruznam~e?) bound into the volume. 38
Destroying the surets after they were recorded would have ensured
that the same sums were not copied twice into the registers; thus, it
is improbable that masses of these surets still await cataloguing in
the archives. Occasionally, a small piece of paper with a copy of an
entry on it--doubtless one such suret-can be found glued or sewn
into a register. Entry and suret were mutually exclusive: when these
slips of paper are found in the registers, there is usually no corre-
sponding register entry. 39 One can easily imagine a scribe, after
completing his register, discovering that he had omitted an entry and
inserting the suret "in its proper place" as a substitute. It would not
have been necessary, under these procedures, for the money itself to
accompany the documentation from bureau to bureau; it was probably
deposited at the beginning of the process.
There were many types of registers bearing the name "ruznam~e."
Individuals kept ruznam~e registers, as did evkaf, provincial treasur-
ies, the army on campaign, and a number of central government
departments. 40 The bilyilk ruznam~e kalemi produced two types of
ruznam~e: income (varidat) and expenditure (masarif). 41 Sometimes
these were combined into a single register, but in the seventeenth
38
KK 2574 (1040/1630--31).
39
Examples can be seen in ruznam~e defteri KK 1770, dated 981/1573-74, at pages
12, 21, 28, 31, 52, 72, and 77.
40
A grand vizier's ruznam~e is KK 717 dated 968/1560--61 (pp. 11-54), a ruznam~e
of the larder (kiler) of the Siileymaniye imaret is MM 596 (513) dated 993/1585-86, a
ruznam~e of the provincial treasury of Diyarbekir is MM 791 (365) dated 999/1590--91,
and a ruznam~e of timar and zeamet bestowals is MM 531 (17666) dated 990/1582-83.
For campaign ruznam~es see Finkel, Administration of Warfare, 218-35. For the ruznam~e
of the customs dues of Budin see Fekete, Siyaqat-Schrift, #11, 1: 224--35, 2: plate 19.
41
The French treasury had similar registers, and income and expenses were reported
weekly. After the summaries were checked, however, the original records were burned,
234 CHAPTER SEVEN
century they typically occupied separate registers. Most are catalogued

in the Kamil Kepeci Tasnifi, but there are a few in the Maliyeden
Miidevver Tasnifi as well. Coverage is patchy for the sixteenth cen-
tury but nearly complete for the seventeenth. Some registers are
designated as musvedde, rough draft; in these registers the handwriting
is scribbled and hasty, and various kinds of entries are mixed together.
Other registers not so described are obviously fair copies made from
the rough drafts; in them the handwriting is neat, and entries are lined
up correctly and segregated into categories. These registers, while
easier to read, contain errors visibly due to careless copying, such as
the creation of two words out of one. A comparison of ruznam~e
registers KK 1866 dated 971/1563-64, KK 1785 dated 1015/1606-7,
and KK 1954 dated 1071/1660-61 (all for income) shows that the
format of the ruznam~e registers changed very little over the century
1560-1660. Two examples from register KK 1785 will suffice to
demonstrate how tax receipts were recorded there.
1 Muharrem 1016/28 April 1607
From the assignment of Hamza b. Mehmed of the ebna-1 sipahiyan,
90th company, 27 [ak~e] per day and Mehmed Zulftkar from the
same regiment, 69th company, 18 [ak~e] per day, havalegan for the
money of the ziyade-i cizye and other [taxes] of the reaya of the evkaf
of the late Sultan Bayezid I in Edime due for the year 1015/1606--
7, delivered by Mehmed Sipahi, 71,614 [ak~e].
1 (as above)
From the assignment of the below-mentioned [persons] on the money
of the bedel-i niiziil of the following kazas in the sancak of Kastamonu
due for the year 1015/1606--7, paid in advance from their own money
and deposited in the treasury by themselves, 83,500 [ak~e]. 42
so no further comparisons could be made. By the mid-seventeenth century, secret expen-

ditures not recorded in the registers equalled those made openly (Dent, Crisis in Finance,
78, 85).
42
Fi gurre-i muharrem el-haram sene 1016. An tahvil-i Hamza b. Mehmet an ebna-1
sipahiyan 90. [bOIU]k ft yevm 27 ve Mehmet Zulftkar an c[emaat-l] m[ezbur] 69. [bO-
lu] k ft yevm 18 el-havalegan an ak~e-i ziyade-i cizye ve saire-i reaya-z evkaf-z merhum
Sultan Yzldmm Bayezid Han der Edirne der vacib-i sene 1015 an yed-i Mehmet Sipahi
71,614 (p. 41 ); and Fi gurre-i m[ezbur] sene-i m[ezbur]. An tahvil-i mezkurin an
ak~e-i bedel-i nuzul-i kaza-1 mezkurin tabi liva-1 Kastamonu an vacib-i sene 1015 ber
vech-i pi§in an mal-1 hod be-hazine mande an yed-i hod 83 ,500 (p. 42); no breakdown
follows, which is strange in that the Ottoman scribes did not generally use the word
mezkurin (mentioned) without a referent, indicating that the entry must have been copied
from a source that did have a breakdown, i.e., from a miisvedde or rough draft.
When these entries from the ruznam~e register are compared with the
entry from the mevkufat bureau's ahkam register examined above, it
can be seen that although the same information is included, the emphasis
is different. While the mevkufat's register entry focuses on the act
of deposit, the ruznam~e entries emphasize the responsibility of the
appointed collector. This is a little surprising; common sense suggests
that the ruznam~e bureau, where the money first arrived, would be
more interested in the act of deposit, while the mevkufat bureau,
responsible for a particular tax, would be concerned about the degree
to which the collector had fulfilled his assignment. This anomaly must
be a holdover from before the change in deposit procedure, when the
deposit was made at the mevkufat bureau.
The procedure for cizye deposits differed slightly from the one used
for other taxes. According to the At1f Efendi Kanunnamesi, cizye
collectors submitted their collection registers with the money to the
muhasebe bureaus. The figures in the registers were checked by ap-
prentices in the muhasebe bureaus (or other apprentices, if the muhasebe
staff was too busy) and compared with the figures from the previous
register (muhasebe-i atik). 43 After the figures were compared, a tahvil
register was compiled showing collection results and a copy was
produced and sent to the ruznam~e bureau. The money was deposited
in the treasury in accordance with the tahvil; thus, the tahvil register
should contain all deposits for a particular period. After the deposit
was made, the tahvil register was returned to the muhasebe bureau,
where a list, called afihrist, was produced of the income for the year.
Some registers recording deposits of cizye funds, however, suggest
a change in direction for the flow of cizye papeiwork similar to the
one described above for the avanz. The heading of register MM 657
(5240), dated 996--1006/1587-98, states that it is a copy of the ruznam~e
register (suret-i ruznamre-i hzzane-i amire) containing tahvil entries
in chronological order for the bedel-i hamr and ispenre taxes, which
were collected with the cizye and handled by the cizye bureaus. Most
seventeenth-century cizye tahvil registers, however, do not indicate
how or by whom they were made. Register MM 2134 (15824) records
the tahvilat of the cizye of Rumeli and Anadolu for the year 1024/
1615-16. Over 100 pages long, it is organized by month according
43 For this purpose, the livas were divided among the scribes of the accounting bureau;
a register located showing this division, MM 3872 (15410) dated 1054/1644-45, is headed,
"tevziat register of the §agirds of the muhasebe-i cizye kalemi".
236 CHAPTER SEVEN
to the date of submission of the money. For each deposit it lists the
assignment (tahvil) to which it belonged, name of collector, time period,
name of depositor, amount deposited, and date of submission. Inserted
at page 11 is a 2" x 3" slip of paper headed "suret--fi 16 muharrem
sene 1024" containing an entry omitted from the register. According
to the kanunname, this register should have been compiled by the
cizye muhasebe kalemi and a copy sent to the ruznam~e kalemi, but
it is more likely to have been compiled by the ruznam~e bureau, like
register MM 657 (5240) above. Since the ruznam~e bureau in the
seventeenth century was the point of deposit for all tax moneys, it
probably also compiled tahvilat registers for the cizye as well as other
taxes and sent them to the bureaus controlling each tax. 44 Submissions
of avanz and mukataa revenues were likewise recorded in tahvilat
registers during the seventeenth century; register MM 2663 (18304)
is an avanz tahvil ruznam~e for Anadolu for the year 1033/1623-24,
and KK 5172 is a tahvilat register of the maadin kale mi for the period
1026-31/1617-22. Registers called tahsilat or hastlat (products, yields)
or teslimat (submissions), like tahvilat defters, list submissions of tax
moneys to the treasury in date order, with the names of appointed
collectors and actual depositors.
Since the ruznam~e-i evvel kalemi was required to sort by type of
tax (really by tax bureau) all tax collection assignments and all receipts
of funds for the whole empire and compile separate annual registers
for each tax, it is not surprising that in the seventeenth century it
employed more scribes than any other bureau. This new arrangement
replaced the geographically-oriented varidat accounting system of three
divisions with a system containing as many divisions as there were
types of taxes or tax bureaus. The system operated completely within
the ruznam~e bureau rather than involving a separate group of scribes.
More research will be required to determine whether the system had
to be readjusted every time taxes were transferred from one bureau's
jurisdiction to another, as happened frequently in the late seventeenth
century. We may find that taxes were transferred in sets corresponding
to the way they were recorded in tahvilat registers.
The annual fihrist, or list, of cizye revenues called for by the
kanunname took the form of a general muhasebe defteri, or account-
ing register. Register MM 1520 (5334) is one such register, a cizye
muhasebesi defteri for Rumeli and Anadolu showing income (varidat)
44
A portion of a tahvil ruznam~e for 1024/1615-16 for cizye and associated taxes has
been published in Fekete, Siyiiqat-Schrift, #33, 1: 572-93, 2: plates 65--68. In the sixteenth
and expenditures (masarif or ihracat) of cizye funds due in the twelve-

month period Ramazan 1013-~aban 1014/January-December 1605.45
After summarizing the total income received and the total amount
expended, the register records for each liva the emin and katib, number
of banes, amount collected, expenditures made, and remittances to the
treasury. The dates of remittances extend from 1013/1604-5 through
1018/1609-10, with a concentration in 1014/1605-6 and 1015/1606-7;
thus, the register must have been compiled five full years after the
year to which the taxes pertained. As we saw above, this was the
point at which the finance department ceased to expect collection of
any further arrears in payment. Fihrist registers for mukataas were
compiled by provincial treasuries for the central finance department's
information; examples are MM 1541 (1583), for a number of sancaks
in western Anatolia, or MM 3876 (5189) for the mukataas of Haleb,
Diyarbekir, and other provinces of eastern Anatolia. Information from
this type of register will enable us to make global statements about
amounts of taxes collected, amounts of arrears, relative contributions
of different areas at different times, and so forth. Comparison of such
information among provinces may prove as significant as population
statistics for determining the economic history of different regions of
the Ottoman Empire. 46
Balance-Sheets and Budgets
After muhasebes had been submitted and deposits recorded, a bal-

ance-sheet of the year's income and expenses was produced, adding
together the accounts of Rumeli and Anadolu with the accounts sent
in by provincial treasuries. These balance-sheets or accounting sum-
maries, called icmal-z muhasebe (summary of the accounts; often
translated "budgets," although they were produced after the fact),
comprised the final step in the central government's accounting pro-
cedures.47 Few of these balance-sheets have been preserved; for the
century the ba§ muhasebe kalemi oversaw the registers of evkaf, cizye, and the imperial
emins (At1f Efendi Kanunnamesi, fol. 125b).
45
For a fifteenth-century example see lnalcik, "XV. Asrr Osmanh Maliyesine Dair
Kaynaklar," 128-34.
46 Rhoads Murphey has made a similar point in connection with his study of a tax
farming summary for Anatolia (Murphey, Regional Structure, xxiii).

47 In the seventeenth century the French produced estimated budgets at the beginning
of the year and summaries at the end, but even the final summaries were only approxi-
mations (Dent, Crisis in Finance, 30-31). The beginning of a Spanish budgetary system
238 CHAPTER SEVEN
century and a half from 1520 to 1670 we have summary totals for
20 years and full balance-sheets for only 11.48 From 1687 on, more
of them are preserved. Annual totals for the period 1679 through 1748
have also been figured from the ruznam~e registers recording daily
income and expenditures. 49 Although they may not document all the
finances of the empire, these sources give an indication of the re-
sources at the Ottoman government's disposal.
Figures available to date show that between 1523 and 1748 cash
income received by the central treasury rose from 117 million ak~e
to 1.65 billion, an increase of 1410%, while expenditures rose from
119 million to 1. 71 billion, an increase of 1440%. When the figures
are controlled for the period's inflation rate of 333%, the rise in Ottoman
central government income amounts to 326% and the rise in expen-
ditures to 333%; in real terms, the budget quadrupled between 1523
and 1748. 50 Most of the rise took place in the period after 1690, when
income and expenditure totals, which had hovered between 500 and
600 million ak~e per year for much of the seventeenth century, leaped
to 1 billion in 1699 and then to 1 billion 600 million in 1748. In
was marked by the revolutionary idea that a 1590 tax should be used only to meet the
expenses for which it had been imposed (Jaime Vicens Vives, An Economic History of
Spain [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969], 441 ), and by the submission in the
1590s of regular budgetary estimates (Thompson, War and Government, 79). Even in the
seventeenth century, however, expenditure decisions were made without consulting either
the Council of War or the Council of Finance (ibid., 80). The Austrian administration
began producing budgetary estimates in the second half of the seventeenth century (Robert
John Weston Evans, The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1550-1700: An Interpre-
tation [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979], 148). The English system made comprehensive
income and expense summaries impossible until the nineteenth century (Craig, History
of Red Tape, 33).
48
Ahmet Tabakoglu, "XVII ve XVIIl Yiizyd Osmanl1 Biit~eleri," Ord. Prof Omer Liitfi
Barkan'a Armagan: iUiFM 41 (1985): 396-97; the figures he reports for 1643 cannot
be found in the register to which he attributes them, but Hezarfen provides other figures
for that year. Most of the budget summaries can be found in published form: Sahillioglu,
"1524-1525 Osmanl1 Biit~esi," 415-52, also containing figures for 1523-24; Barkan, ''H.
933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Mali Yilma ait Biit~e Omegi," 238-329; idem, "954-955 (1547-
1548) Mali Yilma ait bir Osman11 Biit~esi," 219-76, also containing figures for 1546-
47; idem, "H. 974-975 (M. 1567-1568) Mali Yilma ait bir Osman11 Biit~esi," 277-332;
Mantran, Istanbul, 280-81, figures for 1040/1630-31; ibid., 282-83, figures for 1063/
1652-53; Unat, "Kara Mustafa Pa~a Layihas1," 469-70, figures for 1049/1639-40; Barkan,
"1070-1071 (1660-1661) Tarihli Osmanl1 Biit~esi ve Bir Mukayese," 304-47; and idem,
"1079-1080 (1669-1670) Mfili Yilma ait bir Osman11 Biit~esi ve Ek>leri," 225-303.
49
Tabakoglu, Gerileme Donemine Girerken Osmanlz Maliyesi, 75-82. Ordinarily,
ruznam~e records show more money coming in or out than balance-sheets do. For what
is included in these records and what is not, see Sahillioglu, "Income and Expenditures
of the Ottoman Treasury."
50
Tabakoglu, Gerileme Donemine Girerken Osmanlz Maliyesi, 17-18.
addition, income exceeded expenditures most of the time after 1690.

Ascribing seventeenth-century Ottoman budgetary deficits to the decline
of the empire leaves unexplained the cessation of these deficits in the
eighteenth century.
For the period before 1690, however, a much less rosy picture
emerges. Over the century from 1560 to 1660, Ottoman cash income
increased from 183 million ak~e to 581 million, and expenditures
from 189 million ak~e to 593 million, a nominal rise in income of
217% and in expenditures of 213%. 51 During that period, however,
the rate of inflation of the ak~e was higher still, amounting to 225%.
The government budget, despite increases in taxation rates, failed to
keep pace with inflation; both real income and real expenditures
decreased. 52 It should also be noted that up to 1580, income exceeded
expenditure almost every year, but between that date and the end of
the seventeenth century, nearly every year saw a deficit. 53 The first
big deficit appeared in 1581, when the Ottomans experienced a
budgetary shortfall of 56 million ak~e. 54 The largest deficit, 400 million
ak~e, occurred in 1597. Only after 1700 did these deficits in the official
budget disappear. At the very end of the seventeenth century, changes
in the fiscal system were introduced, such as the institution of the life
term tax farm (malikane), that succeeded in balancing the budget as
long as the empire kept out of major wars. For most of the seventeenth
century, however, expenditure exceeded income by an average of nearly
14%, increasing during war years.
During the seventeenth century, treasury income from various sources
rose at differing rates. The total amount of cizye collected (including
ispen~e) increased 256% in nominal terms between 1560 and 1660,
51
Over this same period, the standing army doubled in size (Murphey, ed., Kanun-
Name-i Sultanf Ii 'Azfz Efendi, 7). The French budget in the same period rose 500% (Dent,
Crisis in Finance, 9).
52
Contrary to Mutafcieva' s assertion, then (Agrarian Relations in the Ottoman Empire,
192), the tax burden on the peasantry could not have increased overall, though it may
have spiked in certain years due to lags between inflationary and tax increases. As a
comparison, the revenues of Spain only increased by 50% in the first half of the sixteenth
century, although inflation over that period was 100%; the difference was made up by
loans and, eventually, by the sale of bonds (Elliott, Imperial Spain, 197). France, too,
despite much larger tax increases, depended on loans to fund its deficit in the seventeenth
century (Dent, Crisis in Finance, 66).
53 In contrast, the French "budget" counted fanned income twice, putting the state's
nominal income far above its actual receipts and creating a much more favorable picture
(Dent, Crisis in Finance, 63).
54
Sahillioglu, "Szvz§ Year Crises," 240 n. 20.
240 CHAPTER SEVEN
making up approximately 21 % of the central government's budget in

954/1547-48, 15% in 974/1567-68, and 20% in 1070/1660-61. In real
terms, with inflation at 225%, this increase barely kept up with the
change in the value of silver. Moreover, since the nominal rates of
the cizye rose 306%-480% over the same period, the increase of
256% in the amount collected is anywhere from 50% to 224% less
than should be expected. This discrepancy may be attributed in part
to the fact that the figure for the end of the period excludes a portion
of the cizye administered by the ba§ muhasebe bureau and not sepa-
rable from that bureau's other revenues. Other possible reasons for
it include conversion and population decrease among non-Muslims
and communal bargaining for lower tax rates. Reforms in cizye
collection at the end of the seventeenth century, including the insti-
tution of high, medium, and low rates and the establishment of quotas,
more than doubled the government's nominal cizye revenue during
the eighteenth century.
As for the avanz, the increase over the period in the annual total
of cash collected was 1021 % in nominal terms and 236% corrected
for inflation, despite the fact that nominal rates of the cash avanz
increased only 108%-436%. The extremely rapid growth in the total
collected can be accounted for by the inclusion of the bedel-i niiziil
in the avanz totals and by extension of the avanz to people who had
previously escaped paying it. 55 In terms of the overall budget, the
avanz, which had made up only 4% of the total Ottoman central
revenue in 975/1567-68, amounted to nearly a third of the total by
1040/1630--31 and to 20% in 1080/1669-70. 56 These figures convey
some idea of the growth in the tasks of assessment and collection for
this tax. In some provinces, the avanz accounted for over half the
revenue collected. 57
The impact of tax farming on the government's income is more
difficult to assess. The available balance-sheets are not strictly com-
parable, because alterations in the allocation of revenues among finance
department bureaus produced differences over the decades in the
55
On the bedel-i ntiziil and related taxes see Gti~er, Osmanlz imparatorlugunda Hububat
Meselesi, 67-135.
56
Barkan, "H. 974-975 (M. 1567-1568) Mali Yilma ait bir Osmanh Btit~esi," 303;
Mantran, Istanbul, 280-81; Barkan, "1079-1080 (1669-1670) Mali Yilma ait Bir Osmanh
Btit~esi ve Ek'leri," 226.
57
McGowan, Economic Life, 112 and fig. 7. In France at the same period a similar
position was held by the taille, which by the seventeenth century provided more than half
of the state's revenue; the taille was farmed in 1643 (Parker, Europe in Crisis, 274-75).
categories into which mukataa income was divided. The overall income
for 1560-1660, however, did not rise faster than inflation, while the
avanz and cizye did. The remainder left after subtracting the avanz
and cizye from the total is composed primarily of mukataa revenues.
This remainder rose much more slowly than inflation, from 303 mil-
lion ak~e in 974--75/1567--68 to 341.5 million in 1070-71/1660--61,
a decrease of 66% in real terms. 58 Addition of vacant timars to the
sultanic has, and their revenues to mukataa income, does not seem
to have occurred on a large scale in the first half of the seventeenth
century. In the period 1560-1660, the greatest increase in state rev-
enues is attributable not to tax farming but to the avanz; growth in
farmed revenues reaching the central treasury fell far behind the
inflation rate. Even with the avanz and cizye added, the treasury's
exactions did not exceed inflation during the seventeenth century.
Consideration of these figures leads inescapably to the conclusion
that in this period, at least with respect to legitimate central govern-
ment revenues, tax farming was not as extortionate as the decline
stereotype would suggest. If there was overexaction of revenues during
this period, it was not in the legally sanctioned revenues of the central
finance department. As far as the official business of Ottoman tax col-
lection is concerned, words like "rapacious" and "oppressive" simply
do not apply. 59 Expansion in tax collection took place in other areas.
One of these was the unofficial extraction of revenues, collections of
funds that do not appear in any government document. Officials and
tax farmers were often accused of taking revenues that never saw
the treasury's coffers but merely lined their own pockets. 60 Detailed
study of petitions of complaint will furnish more information on
these abuses and may enable us to chart their incidence in rough
terms, although it will not permit the degree of precision obtainable
for official government revenues. Recourse against such activities lay
58
In contrast, the revenue of the farm of English customs dues tripled in the period
1604-1664, and that of French tax farms rose even faster (Bonney, "Failure of the French
Revenue Farms," 15). In both countries, these revenues made up over half the state's
budget.
59 Gerber comes to similar conclusions from a study of the legal system in the seven-
teenth century (State, Society, and Law, 20, 162-65).

60 It is in fact the collection of illegal revenues, not legal ones, that Ko~i Bey and others
complain about (Kori Bey Risalesi, ed. Aksiit, 47); see also Gibb & Bowen, 2: 47. The
levying of taxes by provincial authorities for their own benefit was apparently the tra-
ditional way of financing provincial government in much of the Middle East (Richards,
"A Mamluk Petition and a Report," 4).
242 CHAPTER SEVEN
in the enforcement mechanisms of the government, which may have

been less effective in the seventeenth century than before.
Another area of expansion in revenue-raising during the seventeenth
century was the provincial budgets. Between 1560 and 1660 there was
a significant diminution in the proportion of total Ottoman revenue
that lay at the disposal of the central government: the percentage of
official Ottoman revenue (including timar revenues) reaching the central
treasury fell from 58% in the 1520s to 25% in the 1660s.61 If central
government income rose by 217% while its percentage of the take
fell to 25%, then the overall revenue of the empire must have gone
up 868%, or 386% corrected for inflation. The ability to quadruple
the revenue yield suggests that the empire as a whole may have been
growing richer, not poorer, during this period. 62 Most of the additional
revenue, however, remained in the provinces, either in the hands of
provincial treasuries and local tax collectors or disbursed on the local
level without passing through the central government's books (for
example, as ocakhk). 63 It is usually assumed that these revenues went
directly into the hands of private individuals, but that is an over-
simplification. This money also swelled provincial treasuries and formed
the basis for the growth of provincial power in the eighteenth century.
No study has yet been made of this problem, but any estimates of
the Ottoman Empire's economic health during the seventeenth cen-
tury will be defective if they do not take into account these provin-
cial revenues. 64
61
Tabakoglu, Gerileme Donemine Girerken Osmanlz Maliyesi, 14 n. 3, 18; Barkan, "H.
933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Mali Ytlma ait Biit~e Ornegi," 256. In England, as well, the
proportion of collected taxes that reached the central treasury fell from approximately 75%
in 1608 to 25% in 1619 and 1635 (Frederick Charles Dietz, The Receipts and Issues of
the Exchequer during the Reigns of James I and Charles I, Smith College Studies in
History, 13, no. 4 [Northampton, MA: The Department of History of Smith College,
1928], 126).
62
ilber Ortayh sees the Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683 as evidence that the empire
disposed of more resources at that period than is customarily thought ("The Ottoman
Empire at the End of the XVIIth Century," Revue d' histoire maghrebine 14 (1987): 179.
63
It is possible that some of this money remained in the hands of the producers; Sella's
comment that the purchasing power of Ottoman consumers decreased in the early seven-
teenth century refers to elite purchases of imported goods (Domenico Sella, "Venice: The
Rise and Fall of the Venetian Wool Industry," in The Late Italian Renaissance, 1525-
1630, ed. Eric Cochrane [New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper and Row, 1970], 342).
However, reports of extra-legal "taxes" collected by provincial officials and notables are
legion; see Inalcik, "Military and Fiscal Transformation," 322-27.
64
This point has also been noted by Islamoglu and Keyder, "The Ottoman Social
Formation," 308-9. Kiernan's analysis was that state transformations connected with the
seventeenth-century crisis led, in the Ottoman case, neither to revolution nor to the return
The severe deficits and economic disorder experienced by the

Ottomans were shared with other states of the early modem period.
In the mid-seventeenth century France spent nearly its entire annual
income in advance. Spain had already done so in the 1530s, again
in the 1570s, and again in 1607; by 1621 Spain was spending its
income four years in advance. England's fiscal expedients in this period
are well known: Queen Elizabeth's sale of privileges, including profits
from colonization in the New World, and James I's tax farming and
monopolies. By 1618 Austria had emptied its treasury and was re-
duced to borrowing. In the face of the inflation and deficits suffered
by so many governments of the period, European monarchs all engaged
in tax farming, sold offices, created new taxes, raised the rates of
old ones, and contracted massive government debt. 65 Many of these
financial difficulties affiicted states we normally think of as rising
rather than declining at this time; the relationship between budgetary
deficits and state power, therefore, must be examined more closely.
The fact that a substantial proportion of Ottoman provincial rev-
enues escaped the central treasury in the seventeenth century laid the
major burden for supporting the empire's military efforts on the core
provinces, Rumeli and Anadolu. 66 A similar pattern in the Spanish
Empire was a critical factor in Spain's withdrawal from the front rank
of military powers in the later seventeenth century: the core province
of the old regime, but to provincialization (State and Society in Europe, 255). The motivation
for fiscal decentralization may have been efficiency, the desire to reduce delays in payment
caused by poor communications (Murphey, "Functioning of the Ottoman Army," 260).
According to Faroqhi, however, provincial governments' budgets rose because their re-
sponsibilities had increased ("Crisis and Change," 566).
65
For France see Beik, Absolutism and Society, 258-59; Dent, Crisis in Finance, 71;
Parker, Europe in Crisis, 247. France had begun running large deficits as early as 1522
(Tilly, "War Making and State Making," 179), especially since the absence of any kind
of revenue survey and the frequency of secret expenditures made it impossible for the
French to gain an accurate picture of their own finances (Mousnier, Institutions of France
under the Absolute Monarchy, 2: 181). For Spain see Elliott, Imperial Spain, 197; Lynch,
Spain under the Habsburgs, 2: 38; Geoffrey Parker, Spain and the Netherlands, 1559-
1659: Ten Studies (Short Hills, NJ: Enslow Publishers, 1979), 31-32; Robert Ignatius
Burns, S.J., Medieval Colonialism: Postcrusade Exploitation of Islamic Valencia (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1975). For the English use of tax farming see Dietz, "Eliza-
bethan Customs Administration"; Ashton, "Revenue Farming under the Early Stuarts." For
Austria see Thomas Mack Barker, Army, Aristocracy, Monarchy: Essays on War, Society,
and Government in Austria, 1618-1780 War and Society in East Central Europe, 7 (Boulder:
Social Science Monographs, 1982), 10--11.
66
The percentage of central government revenues spent on wages, largely for the mili-
tary, nearly doubled between 1567 and 1627 (Murphey, "Functioning of the Ottoman
Army," 222).
244 CHAPfER SEVEN
of Castile, no matter how rich or how heavily taxed, could not maintain
the advance of the Empire on all fronts when denied the support of
the Netherlands, Milan, Portugal, Catalonia, and Sicily, despite all the
riches of the lndies. 67 The English solution to military financing lay
in the Bank of England and the national debt, and the French solution
in the official sale of offices and privileges, which brought in more
revenue than the land tax. 68 The Ottoman treasury was forced to cope
without those resources. 69 Had it not been for the inner treasury, whose
records have yet ~o be studied in this regard, and perhaps for addi-
tional revenue not reported in official balance-sheets, it might have
foundered by the end of the century. 70
The development of centralized states in the early modem period
rested on the ability of rulers to mobilize resources other than their
own. In this respect it is important to point out a major distinction
between the European experience and that of the Ottoman Empire or
China. In contrast to western European monarchs emerging from the
decentralized feudalism of the middle ages, the rulers of what Eisenstadt
has called the "historic bureaucratic empires" entered the early modem
period already possessing a centralized bureaucracy and state account-
ing system, control over the major land resources of their territo-
ries, and domination of their noble classes. They had no need to ally
themselves with merchant classes to achieve these aims; as a result,
in those empires the ideology of mercantilism was not adopted at the
level of the state. 71 This difference in state financial policies and class
67
Kiernan, State and Society in Europe. 251. In Spain, this fiscal decentralization was
supported by an ideology of ancient liberties belonging to the kingdoms joined to the
Crown of Castile (Thompson, War and Government, 47).
68
David D. Bien, "The Secretaires du Roi: Absolutism, Corps, and Privilege under the
Ancien Regime," in Vom Ancien Regime zur Franzosischen Revolution: Forschungen und
Perspektiven, ed. Ernst Hinrichs, Eberhard Schmitt, and Rudolph Vierhaus, Veroffentli-
chungen des Max-Planck-Instituts ftir Geschichte, 55 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1978), 159-60.
69
Although forced loans and contributions, subsidies, and confiscation were sporadi-
cally employed, proportional taxation of the wealthy political classes and the religious
establishments was unfeasible at this time; see the case of the grand vizier Dervi§ Pa§a,
whose execution of a prominent Jewish merchant for unpaid taxes "proved his undoing"
(Griswold, Great Anatolian Rebellion, 160 and n. 11 ).
°
7
For the inner treasury, a repository for precious objects and surplus cash, see Necipoglu,
Architecture, Ceremonial and Power, 87, 134; Uzun~ar§th, "Osmanh Devleti Maliyesinin
Kurulu§u ve Osmanh Devleti i~ Hazinesi"; on balance-sheets see Sahillioglu, "Income
and Expenditures of the Ottoman Treasury," 65-84; Gibb & Bowen, 2: 10; on borrowing
from the inner treasury to meet current expenses see Murphey, "Functioning of the Ottoman
Army," 212-13, 234, 237-41.
71
For the influence of the mercantile bourgeoisie on state economic and legal policies
relationships played a key role in the subordination of those empires

in the face of European development. On the other hand, the historic
bureaucratic empires did not undergo the constitutional crises and
struggles against absolutism affiicting many western European states
in the seventeenth century. On the contrary, provincial officials con-
tinued to seek legitimation through sultanic appointment and to entangle
themselves with the state in complex military and financial relation-
ships. In fact, the transformation characteristic of the Ottoman Empire
in this period has been called a "qualified oligarchy," a broadening
of the base of state power by the incorporation of agents in the provinces
that permitted the central government to retain control while deep-
ening its penetration into the empire's economy. 72 Thus, the growth
in provincial power and resources did not lead at this time to the
independence movements and imperial disintegration that ensued with
the rise of nationalism.
in western Europe, see Hugh Trevor-Roper, "Religion, the Reformation and Social Change,"
in The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 1-45;
Douglass Cecil North and Robert Paul Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New
Economic History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). Policy shifts toward
mercantile values do not necessarily result from the absence of traditionalism or ortho-
doxy, as Goldstone maintains (Revolution and Rebellion, p. 452).
72 Murphey, "Functioning of the Ottoman Army," 263--65; Barkey, Bandits and Bureau-
crats, 240.
CHAPTER EIGHT
COMPLAINTS AND CORRUPTION
Complaints by seventeenth-century Ottoman subjects of overtaxation

and oppression have always been taken as proof of the decline of the
empire. Greedy and rapacious officials, it is thought, extorted high
taxes from the peasants and squeezed them off the land, causing a
decline in cultivation and impoverishing the empire. Because records
of complaints from the fifteenth century or the reign of Siileyman have
not been preserved, it has been concluded that the problems com-
plained of by seventeenth-century taxpayers did not exist or were not
as prevalent in earlier times. As an argument from silence, this is
unconvincing. Even if complaints increased, however, we have seen
that they need not have been caused by corruption among tax officials.
Demographic and economic conditions were serious enough to gen-
erate ~ growth in complaints in the absence of any other causes. When
population and wealth were generally increasing, as seems to have
been the case during the sixteenth century, it was to the advantage
of the reaya not to be resurveyed but to continue to pay taxes at the
old rate as long as possible. No complaints would be made, and Istanbul
would not be notified of changing conditions, except perhaps by revenue
officials. On the other hand, if the people of an area perceived them-
selves to be declining in numbers or in economic resources, their
interest lay in having their assessment reduced accordingly as soon
as possible. This second situation prevailed in many locations during
the early seventeenth century and, predictably, led to reiterated de-
mands from the populace for changes in their assessments. 1 From the
tum of the century onward, complaints about high taxes and requests
for reassessment flooded the government's financial offices, and pro-
cedures for altering the registers in response to such requests had
1
The absence of automatic reassessments was not unusual for the period. In seven-
teenth-century Spain, the people were taxed on revenue assessments made during the
1590s, although individual communities could request reductions, granted when a community
had lost one-third to one-half of its population (Lynch, Spain under the Habsburgs, 2:
157). England in 1604 paid customs dues according to assessments made in the mid-
sixteenth century (Dietz, English Public Finance, 2: 119).
COMPLAINTS AND CORRUPTION 247
to be developed, or rather, expanded and routinized.

The exposure of oppression (azhar-z tazallum) by petition of the
oppressed was a tradition going back to the pre-Islamic era. The
provision of justice, the protection of the weak from the strong, was
central to the Near Eastern concept of state from earliest times, and
kings had regular days when they "sat in justice." Archaeologists have
unearthed petitions on clay tablets addressed to Hammurabi and other
ancient rulers, as well as royal responses to petitions now lost. 2 Stories
of the ceremonies in which Sasanian Persian rulers received petitions
and dispensed justice were well known in the early Islamic courts and
were retold by authors of advice literature and mirrors for princes. 3
Abbasid caliphs, Seljuk sultans, and most if not all other Middle Eastern
rulers or their representatives-viziers or judges-held court regularly
for the purpose of hearing grievances and receiving petitions. 4 The
petition, according to Ibn al-Sayrafi, author of a Fatimid treatise on
the bureaucracy, brought injustices to the attention of the ruler, ini-
tiated investigations, promoted the good behavior of officials, and
thereby improved the reputation of the state. 5 In surviving petitions
from the Islamic regimes of Egypt, the evolution of the petition and
the petition process can be traced through Fatimid, Ayyubid, and
Mamluk practice. 6 Details of procedure altered over the course of
time, but many practices applied to Ottoman petitions were already
in place in the Fatimid era, some extending back even to Hammurabi's
time. Over the centuries, one of the most common reasons for com-
plaint was inequities in tax administration.
2
King, Letters and Inscriptions of Hammurabi, King of Babylon; see also Briefe aus
dem British Museum (L/H und CT2-33 ), ed. R. Frankena, Altbabylonische Briefe im
Umschrift und Ubersetzung, 2 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966).
3 On the Sasanians, see Frye, The Heritage of Persia; Christensen, L' Iran sous Les
Sassanides. For the retelling of their stories by Muslim writers see al-Ghazali, Ghazali' s
Book of Counsel for Kings (Nasihat al-Muluk), ed. Jalal Huma'i, trans. F.R.C. Bagley,
University of Durham Publications (London: Oxford University Press, 1964; 2nd ed. 1971);
Nizam al-Mulk, The Book of Government or Rules for Kings, trans. Hubert Darke, Persian
Heritage Series, 32 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960; 2nd ed. 1978).
4 H.F. Amedroz, "The Mazalim Jurisdiction in the Ahkam Sultaniyya of Mawardi,"
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 1911: 635-74; Emile Tyan, Histoire de I' organisation
judiciaire en pays d' Islam, Annales de l'Universite de Lyon, ser. 3, fasc. 4, 2 vols. (Paris:
Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1938-43), 1: 147; 2: 141-289.
5
Henri Masse, "lbn el-<;arrafi, Code de la chancellerie d'etat (Periode fatimide)," Bulletin
de l' lnstitut fram;ais d' archeologie du Caire 11 (.1914): 113-15.
6 S.M. Stem, "Three Petitions of the Fatimid Period," Oriens 15 (1962): 172-209; idem,
Fatimid Decrees: Original Documents from the Fatimid Chancery, All Souls Studies
(London: Faber and Faber, 1964); idem, "Petitions from the Ayyubid Period," BSOAS 27
248 CHAPfER EIGHT
The Petition Process
Like other Near Eastern rulers, Ottoman sultans were bound to hear
and redress the complaints of their people; justice was often defined
as the ability of the people to present complaints directly to the ruler
a~d to expect redress. 7 Advice writers urged rulers to render justice
to the poor and powerless, women and slaves. Petitions were received
both at court, in the divan, where one day a week was devoted to
hearing petitions, and in the field, when the sultan rode out among
the people. 8 A petition was scrutinized by the ruler or his ministers
and, if necessary, relevant government records were examined to
ascertain the facts of the case. Response came in the form of an order
addressed to officials in the provinces, charged with doing what was
necessary to rectify the problem. Records of orders issued in response
to petitions, containing summaries of the petitions, were kept in the
milhimme defteri, the register of important matters, maintained by the
scribes of the grand vizier. 9 The sultan's servants, functioning as
(1964): 1-32; idem, "Petitions from the Mamluk Period (Notes on the Mamluk Documents
from Sinai)," BSOAS 29 (1966): 233-76; D.S. Richards, "A Fatimid Petition and 'Small
Decree' from Sinai," Israel Oriental Studies 3 (1973): 140--58; idem, "A Mamluk Petition
and a Report"; Geoffrey Khan, "A Petition to the Fatimid Caliph al-'Amir," IRAS 1990:
44--54; idem, "The Historical Development of the Structure of the Medieval Arabic Petition,"
BSOAS 52 ( 1990): 8-30. The basic format of the petition as known to the Ottomans is
thought to have been invented by the Fatimids, petitions of the Abbasid period and earlier
apparently having been submitted in the form of a simple letter.
7
Inalcik, "~ikayet Hakk1," 33.
8
Kor;i Bey Risalesi, ed. Aksiit, 121; Unat, "Kara Mustafa Pa§a Layihas1," 467. In the
seventeenth century, even Mehmed Ill's mother Safiye Sultan received petitions on her
way back from an outing (Peirce, Imperial Harem, 196--97).
9
The Ottoman imperial order is studied in Friedrich Kraelitz[-Greifenhorst], "Osmanische
Urkunden in tiirkischer Sprache aus der zweiten Halfte des 15. Jahrhunderts: Ein Beitrag
zur osmanischen Diplomatik," Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philo-
sophisch-historische Klasse, 197, III (Vienna, Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1921 ); Lajos
Fekete, Einfuhrung in die osmanisch-turkische Diplomatik der turkischen Botmiissigkeit
in Ungarn (Budapest: Konigliche Ungarische Staatsarchivs, 1926); Jan Reychmann and
Ananiasz Zajaczkowski, Handbook of Ottoman-Turkish Diplomatics, trans. Andrew S.
Ehrenkreutz (The Hague: Mouton, 1968); ismail Hakk1 Uzun~ar§Ih, "Tugra ve Pen~eler
ile Ferman ve Buyuruldulara Dair," Belleten 5 (1941): 101-57 and plates 24--60; Nicolaas
H. Biegman, The Turco-Ragusan Relationship: According to the Firmans of Murad III
(1575-1595) Extant in the State Archives of Dubrovnik (The Hague: Mouton, 1967); Uriel
Heyd, "Farman: ii. Ottoman Empire," EI2 2: 804-5. The diplomatics of the government's
registers have barely begun to be studied; orders recorded in the miihimme registers are
examined by Heyd, Ottoman Documents on Palestine. The petition process is discussed
from miihimme records by Suraiya Faroqhi, "Political Initiatives 'From the Bottom Up'
in the Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Empire: Some Evidence for Their
Existence," in Osmanistische Studien zur Wirschafts- und Sozialgeschichte in Memoriam
extensions of royal power, also had the power to rectify abuses: officers
of the army on campaign, for example, had authority to hear com-
plaints from the people. 10
From at least the mid-sixteeenth century onward, petitions on taxation
or other strictly financial matters were ordinarily handled by the ba§
defterdar and his staff, who kept their own records of outgoing orders
paralleling the miihimmes, called registers of finance department orders
(maliye ahkam defterleri). By the late seventeenth century there also
existed a series of registers called §ikayet defterleri, complaint reg-
isters, containing only responses to complaint petitions. 11 This grow-
ing specialization may have resulted from an increase in the volume
of complaints or simply from organizational development. The maliye
ahkam records have not been methodically exploited for local studies;
finance department orders recorded in kad1 sicills have been more
widely used. Individual register entries cannot convey the central
government's impact on conditions in the provinces but must be set
in a broader context of provincial practice. There is evidence, in the
form of reiterated orders on the same topic, that some orders were
not enforced; on the other hand, there are occasional complaints about
overzealous enforcement.
Finance department orders on most petition matters were addressed
to the kad1 of the area concerned. It was the kad1's job to amend local
registers and to supervise the collection of taxes controlled by the
maliye (questions regarding timars and their taxes were handled by
the defterhane under the supervision of the grand vizier). In certain
cases, local financial agents of has holders, such as a voyvoda or
muhassil-i emval, were included among the addressees. The beylerbey
or sancak bey, who headed the empire's enforcement mechanism in
the provinces, received orders for the collection of additional sums
or for the suppression of abuses by government officials. Orders
concerning the finances of a whole province or the movement of
sums to or from a provincial treasury were addressed to the provin-
cial defterdar.
Vanco Boskov, ed. Hans Georg Majer (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1986), 24-33; she
finds there many of the same procedures employed in the finance department.
10 Murphey, "Functioning of the Ottoman Army," vi; Ostapchuk, "Ottoman Black Sea
Frontier," 192.
11 One such register has been published: Hans Georg Majer, ed., Das Osmanische
"Registerbuch der Beschwerden" ($ikayet Defteri) von Jahre 1675, vol. 1, Introduction
and Facsimile (Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1984).
Its contents are analyzed in Inalcik, "~ikayet Hakk1," and Gerber, State, Society, and Law.
250 CHAPTER EIGHT
The maliye ahkam registers of the mid-sixteenth century finance

department are bound in annual volumes of up to 2000 pages. These
large volumes contain several sections composed of separate fascicules
(ciiz) for each month. 12 The maliye ahkam registers of the late six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries are quite different in format, rarely
exceeding 300 pages and covering only part of a year. There are
sometimes several different registers for a given year, suggesting that
no methodical effort was made to assemble all finance department
orders for a single year in one place. In this later period, ahkam
records were also kept by bureaus other than the maliye ahkam kalemi.
After about 1000/1591-92 the ba§ muhasebe bureau seems to have
become the main producer of ahkam registers, registers containing
records of appointments (including those of provincial, but not central,
treasury staff) and orders regarding assessment and collection of taxes
and disbursement of funds, as well as responses to petitions. 13 During
the seventeenth century the mevkufat and mukataa bureaus also began
to keep ahkam defters, recording orders connected with the taxes they
administered. Ahkam registers produced by individual tax bureaus
must have been maintained in the bureaus themselves rather than the
maliye ahkam kalemi, as in addition to orders they record in chron-
ological order receipts of money, revenue surveys, and alterations of
the registers. Most entries are written in an extremely cursive and
scribbled divani script, some in siyakat. Orders appear to have been
written into the registers at some stage of the drafting process rather
than after the final copies were written, as even the mid-sixteenth
century registers contain errors and amendments in many entries. 14 In
the later registers, entries close with commands for an order to be
12
The surviving examples of maliye ahkam registers falling within our period are MM
267 (2775) for 973-4/1565-67, of 1984 pages; KK 67 for 980/1572-73, of nearly 2000
pages; and MM 407 (7534) for 984/1576-77, of 1850 pages. Register MM 357 (20115)
for 981/1573-74 is part 3 (u~uncu cuz) of that year's volume; it somehow failed to be
bound with the remainder of the year's fascicules. In that register there appear to be several
fascicules for each month; there are six fascicules, for example, for the month of Muharram
973. The dates of the orders in each fascicule show that the fascicules are not consecutive
but parallel; each contains orders dated throughout the month.
13
Examples of these registers include MM 1513 (7316), written by the Rumeli muhase-
besi in 1013/1604-5; MM 2256 (5712), a register of tahvilat (assignments) of the muha-
sebe-i Rumeli dated 1026/1617-18; MM 2728 (3457), a register of the ba~ muhasebe
kalemi dated 1036-37/1626-28; and MM 3881 (2765), an ahkam register of the muha-
sebe-i evvel dated 1055/1645-46.
14
On this issue see William S. Peachy, "Register of Copies or Collection of Drafts?
The Case of Four M uhimme Defters from the Archives of the Prime Ministry in Istanbul,"
Turkish Studies Association Bulletin 10 (1986): 79-85.
produced rather than with the closing protocols of the orders them-
selves. 15 Also, seventeenth-century registers no longer indicated the
names of the persons to whom finished orders were given for delivery,
which suggests that the orders themselves were not completed when
the entries were made.
No original complaint petitions from this period were uncovered
by this study .16 Register entries, however, record the contents of petitions
and the procedures to which they were subjected. The ahkam registers
of the seventeenth century are labeled differently from those of the
sixteenth-they are called in the catalogues hukm or ahkam kayztlarz
(order records) or ahkam tezkire defterleri (registers of tezkires for
orders)-and their entries have a different appearance. These registers
record not outgoing orders themselves but tezkires, notes issued by
a bureau constituting both a request for production of an order and
a draft of its contents. Designation of entries as records of tezkires
occurs sporadically in a register dated as early as 1010/1601-2, 17 and
by the time of register MM 2256 (5712) dated 1023/1613-14 it was
the normal practice. Orders recorded in tezkire form do not appear
to have been subsequently re-recorded in the regular maliye ahkam
registers. This change in procedure must relate to an alteration in the
order-preparation process. In the seventeenth century, once a decision
had been reached on a petition matter, the petition must normally have
been sent back to the relevant tax bureau for the composition and
recording of a tezkire, which was then routed to the ahkam bureau
for production of the final order. 18 We have previously noted a dramatic
15
One late sixteenth-century entry ends with an abbreviated form of the closing pro-
tocol, §iiyle bilesin deyu (MM 357 [20115] 981/1573-74, p. 118). Exceptionally, one later
register contained a copy of an order with an extended closing protocol and locatio (MM
2770 [16163] 1036/1626-27, p. 20).
16
The most extensive study of the Ottoman petition process, by Halil Inalcik ("Osmanh
Btirokrasisinde Aklam ve Muamelat") uses eighteenth-century petitions for timar appoint-
ments, which were handled by the grand vizier's staff. Procedures for handling complaints
employed during the seventeenth century by the finance department appear from the defter
entries to have been similar. Mamluk petitions requesting appointments and those demand-
ing redress of grievances, and the procedures applied to them, also resembled each other
closely (Stern, "Petitions from the Mamluk Period," 246). Asparouch Velkov analyzes a
petition with its accompanying marginal notes and their possible variations in "Les !1otes
complementaires dans les documents financiers ottomans des XVIe-XVIIIe siecles: Etude
diplomatique et paleographique," Turcica 11 (1979): 37-77. Photographs of petitions bearing
marginal notes can be found in ismail Hakk1 Uzun~ar§1h, "Buyruld1," Belleten 5 (1941):
plates 2, 3, and 4.
17
MM 1513 (7316), containing orders written in 1010-11/1602-4; see pp. 34, 37, 48.
18
Shinder notes that orders on naval matters were also brought to the maliye kalemi
in draft, there to be written up in final form ("Ottoman Bureaucracy," 35).
252 CHAPTER EIGHT
rise in the number of scribes employed in the maliye ahkam bureau

and speculated that one possible reason for this expansion was the
increased workload generated by the progressive bureaucratization of
the empire. It seems reasonable to believe that some of the overload
was relieved by having other finance bureaus keep their own order
records, making the ahkam scribes responsible only for penning fair
copies of the orders and not for searching the records. The petitions
themselves seem to have gone up in smoke. 19 Alternatively, they may
have been returned to petitioners as evidence that their complaint had
been heard, as was the practice in pre-Ottoman Egypt. 20
The ahkam tezkire registers functioned as a sort of index or guide
to the finance department's growing volume of transactions. In ad-
dition to outgoing orders, they recorded in chronological order incom-
ing payments, newly made surveys, copies of survey registers given
to assessors and collectors, internal departmental correspondence,
documents issued to verify the tax obligations or exemptions of
individuals and communities, and sometimes (in the absence of sepa-
rate appointments registers) appointments of officials and tax collec-
tors. One such register, KK 2576, an ahkam tezkire register of the
mevkufat kalemi containing approximately 625 entries dated from 22
Ramazan 1043/23 March 1634 to 15 Safer 1053/5 May 1643, was
examined in detail. About 30% of its entries are records of the receipt
of avanz moneys by the treasury. Another 30% deal with problems
of tax assessment; about one-fourth of them concern the making of
tahrirs and the rest are responses to complaints regarding assessments.
Approximately 15% of the entries in the register are orders on the
collection process, and an additional 7% concern arrears in collection.
About 10% are grants of tax exemptions (muafiyet) or renewal (tecdid)
of such exemptions. The remaining 8% comprises items of informa-
tion, such as the appointment of a new head of the mevkufat bureau
or a change in the exchange rates, and items recording that a register
entry or note had been made in another spot or that an official copy
of an entry (suret) had been issued.
Some entries in the register record the actions of the bureau itself,
for example, entries mentioning the provision of register copies to
19
Literally-see the frontispiece and the description of late eighteenth century office
life, depicting the charcoal braziers that warmed the scribes as they worked, in Carter
Vaughn Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1988).
20
Stem, "Three Petitions of the Fatimid Period," 196; "Petitions from the Ayyubid
Period," 32; "Petitions from the Mamluk Period," 249.
survey officials, recording the results of surveys, or noting the receipt

of tax moneys. Other register entries seem to have been made so that
information could be easily located at a later date. These entries,
accompanied by the formula, "an explanation (§erh) was given in this
very spot,"21 usually referred to complicated issues on which future
problems might be expected to arise. One such issue was the status
of a village in the kaza of Yeni§ehir in Trrhala; most of the village's
200 inhabitants were saltmakers, traditionally exempt from avanz,
and there were only 10 avanzhanes. When the entire village was
surveyed as avanzhanes and the villagers petitioned to complain, it
was ordered that the village be returned to saltmaker status and "in
this spot the above explanation was given."22 This type of entry was
also made to record a problem originating in another division of the
administration. An instance of this practice concerned villages in the
province of Anadolu that traditionally supplied chickens for military
campaigns; after a complaint, it was decided that chickens need only
be provided when the campaign was led by the sultan in person. The
finance department was notified of this order by the purveyor for the
imperial kitchens (matbah emini), and it "was explained and recorded
in this spot. " 23 In this case, the original order to the matbah emini
was probably recorded in his defters, but the notification sent to the
mevkufat bureau was entered in the ahkam register for future reference.
Responses to petitions in seventeenth-century order registers, in
contrast to those from the sixteenth century, enumerate each step in
the petition-handling process. All entries written in response to pe-
titions, after designating the addressee, describe first how the petition
or complaint reached the government. A villager or official, or a group
of villagers, might present the petition in person to the divan or to
the sultan himself. 24 An example of the basic formula noting the
21
i§bU mahalla §erh verildi.
22
Vech-i me§ruh uzere i§bu mahalla §erh verildi (KK 2576, p. 65).
23
i§bu mahalla §erh verilip kayd olundu (KK 2576, p. 31). See also KK 2576, p. 23,
an order taking two villages of Argiri Kasn out of avanzhane status and making them
into ocakhk (support) for the imperial dockyards (tersane): "it was recorded in its proper
place [in the ocakhk and avanz registers] and in this spot [in the maliye ahkam tezkire
defteri] an explanation was given" [mahallma kayd olunup i§bu mahalla §erh verildi].
In Egyptian practice, as well, it was customary for the various finance offices to register
orders addressed to other offices which might affect them (Stern, Fatimid Decrees, 167-
70; idem, "Petitions from the Ayyubid Period," 31 ).
24
Suraiya Faroqhi has investigated in the milhimme registers the question of who sent
petitions and how they are referred to in petitionary language ("Political Initiatives 'From
the Bottom Up'," 27-29). She found that "very often provincial personages got together
254 CHAPfER EIGHT
presentation of a petition runs: "A person named Hac1 Mehmed son

of Omer, one of the residents of a village called Koseler belonging
to the aforementioned judicial district [Gordes], came to the imperial
divan and presented a petition" [the essence of the petition, a com-
plaint about the inclusion of an imam's family in the avanz defteri,
follows]. 25 Several petitions recorded in the register came from the
reaya of different villages, one was from a §eyh resident in a particular
village, and one was submitted by a tax collector who petitioned
concerning a village's assessment. Petitions could also be sent to the
capital by messenger, particularly if the petitioner was a kad1 or
beylerbey. An instance of the formula denoting this circumstance reads:
"An order to the kad1 of Iskrepar: you recently sent a petition to my
Threshold of Felicity. " 26 Orders lacking either of these formulas may
have been initiated centrally, as an official's action on a problem
presented earlier or discovered in checking the registers. 27
Upon receipt, petitions were routed to the appropriate bureaus for
verification in the records; pertinent defter entries, and sometimes
official opinions or explanations, were copied onto their margins.
to hire a messenger who was to convey their complaint" ("Political Activity among Ottoman
Taxpayers and the Problem of Sultanic Legitimation [157(}-1650]," JESHO 35 [1992]:
2). In the case of the petitions she studied, the petitioners were far from being the poorest
and least powerful of the village residents. However, "in the Ottoman government system,
even the humblest member of the society had the right to take his complaints to the
imperial council" (Halil Inalcik, "State and Ideology under Sultan Siileyman I," in The
Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society,
Indiana University Turkish Studies and Turkish Ministry of Culture Joint Series, 9
[Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993], 72). As a member of the Fatimid bureauc-
racy stated, "This is an important matter for many reasons. It involves a man's obtaining
his right from another and the establishment of justice in the kingdom. Also, most of those
with a grievance are powerless people, paupers and retiring women, most of whom arrive
from distant parts of the kingdom, believing that they approach one who will help them
and redress their grievances and assist them against their adversaries" (cited in Stem,
"Three Petitions of the Fatimid Period," 187). In this ideology, even if the petitioners were
not literally poor, it was advantageous for them to present themselves as if they were.
25
KK 2576, p. 126: kaza-z merkuma tabi Koseler nam karye sakinlerinden Haci Mehmed
veled-i Omer nam kimesne divan-z humayuna gelip arz-u-hal sunup; a variation is asi-
tane-i saadetime gelip, "came to the Threshold of Felicity." See also pages 121, 122, 125,
127, petitions from villagers presented in the divan requesting corrections to the registers.
26
KK 2576, p. 99: lskrepar kadzszna hukum ki hdla asitane-i saadetime arz gonderup.
27
An order regarding koprilciis which does not seem to have been issued directly in
response to a petition begins, "An order to the kad1 of the Istanbul has properties: Although
the Muslim reaya of the town of Kii~iik ~ekmece formerly did not belong to avanzhanes,
some time ago its registrar Dilaver registered them as eight banes"; hasha-z istanbul
kadzszna hukum ki nefs-i Ku~uk <;ekmece'nin musliiman reayasznzn mukaddema avanz
haneleri olmamagla bundan akdem muharriri olan Di/aver sekiz hane kayd olup" (KK
2576, p. 108; similar examples on pp. 64, 103).
Routine copying of defter entries on petitions is not usually noted in

the ahkam registers, but the checking of defters is often referred to
in subsequent orders: "When the mevkufat defterleri kept in my imperial
treasury were examined ... " 28 Some entries in the ahkam register do
refer explicitly to the provision of explanations or opinions, presuma-
bly also written in the margins of petitions. Register MM 849 (18142)
contains an actual petition (not a copy) concerning the sale of an
iltizam with an explanation (§erh) in the margin referring to the previous
history of that iltizam in the muhasebe registers. 29 It is sometimes
clear that the §erh was meant to be included in the order to be issued,
as in an entry for an order to the kad1 of Gemlik regarding redis-
tribution of an annual levy of oars (klirek). The entry ends with a
comment the mevkufat official obviously wished to be written into
the order: "Let an explanation be given saying that you should make
a register concerning the redistribution and submit it to the Threshold
of Felicity. " 30 Another example appears in the response to a petition
from the inhabitants of Gevnik, who owed a levy of chickens to the
imperial kitchens and complained that the number of chickens de-
manded was beyond their means. In this case, two explanations were
to be given: first, that for the current year, 1053/1643-44, half their
assessment had been forgiven, and second, that chickens would be
demanded only from the 488 hanes listed in the old survey, while
the 173 hanes added in the new survey would be assessed 420 ak~e
each in cash. 31 In other cases, the explanation may have been pro-
vided solely for the enlightenment of the decision-makers, as its
inclusion in an order does not seem necessary. For example, the
response to a request for renewal of the tax exemption of a village
in Sivas reads: "An explanation was given that there is a marginal
28
Hazine-i amiremde mahfuz olan mevkufat defterlerine nazar olundukta (in an order
subtracting an assessment of barley on villages in the kaza of Edirne which were already
registered as giving oarsmen for the navy and carts for the stables, KK 2576, p. 120);
a variant is hazine-i amiremde mahfuz olan mevkufat defterlerinde, "In the mevkufat registers
kept in my imperial treasury ... " (in an order forbidding the collection of avartz from
five villages in Erzurum not listed in the mufassal defter of Erzurum as being liable for
that tax; KK 2576, p. 87). Entries that did record the making of a marginal note (der
kenar) on the petition include KK 2576, pp. 50, 67, 94.
29
MM 849 (18142) 1001-8/1592-1600, p. 42.
3
° KK 2576, p. 65: tevzi oldugu iizere defter edip asitane-i saadetime arz eyliyesin ...
deyii §erh verile.
31
KK 2576, p. 125: bin elli Uf senesinde be§er tavuklarz ref oluna deyu emr-i §erif
verilmegin §erh verile, and tahrirde ziyade olan yiiz yetmi§ Uf haneden dorder yiiz yirmi§er
ak~e miri ifin taleb ve tahsil olunmak i~in §erh verile.
256 CHAPTER EIGHT
note in the mevkufat registers [saying] that the above-mentioned village

had no hanes."32 Renewal of a tax exemption for a village in Seyyid
Gazi was granted in the words: "An explanation was given for it to
be renewed."33 A dispute over the yiiriik status of villages in Giimiil~ine
was settled with the statement: "And since the names of certain Yilriik
villages registered in the Yilriik defters were not found in the mevkufat
defters, an explanation was given accordingly."34
In the next step of the petition-handling process, the matter was
decided and the decision recorded in the margin of the petition. As
it was not possible to locate complaint petitions from the period studied
that had undergone bureaucratic handling, there are no illustrations
for this stage in the decision-making process, although the decisions
are known to us from the resulting orders. The only petitions bearing
marginal notes retained in the archives seem to have been those
regarding appointments. A number of seventeenth-century petitions on
finance matters exist in the Ali Emiri Collection of the Ba§bakanllk
Ar§ivi, but these do not seem to have passed through the order-issuing
process; at any rate, they have nothing written in their margins. After
a decision was finalized, however, two processes still remained to be
carried out: the issuing of an order to the provincial official respon-
sible for enforcement, and the updating of the finance department's
registers to reflect the new state of affairs.
Finance department orders to provincial officials were copied for
presentation by the calligraphers of the maliye ahkam bureau, the ba§
defterdar's chancery, on the basis of tezkires from the tax bureaus. 35
32
KK 2576, p. 66: mevkufat defterlerinde karye-i mezburenin hanesi olmadzgz der kenar
olmagla §erh verildi; similarly, an entry on p. 123 reads: kaza-z mezburun avarzz defterinde
karye-i mezburun hanesi olmadzgzn §erh verildi, an explanation was given that in the
avanz defter of that kaza [Brusa] the above-mentioned village had no banes.
33
KK 2576, p. 59: tecdid olunmak ir;in §erh verildi.
34
KK 2576, p. 116: ve yuruk defterlerinde mukayyed olan bazz yuriik karyesinin ismi
mevkufat defterlerinde bulunmamagzn mucebince §erh verildi.
35
Facsimiles of finished orders on finance matters can be found in Uzun~ar~tl1, "Buyruld1,"
plate 7, and Matuz, Das Kanzleiwesen Sultan Siileymans des Priichtigen, plates 2 and 6.
Petitions from the Fatimid period typically closed with a request for an order to be issued
(Stem, "Three Petitions of the Fatimid Period," 192). In Fatimid as in Ottoman practice,
noting the decision and drafting the order in its final form were two separate procedures.
Comments and decisions were written either on the back of the petition or in the margins;
the Secretary of the Fine Pen "writes on them what is necessary under the circumstances
according to the order of the caliph or the vizier or on his own initiative," after which
the Secretary of the Thick Pen drafted the final order, adding the proper honorifics and
details of diplomatics (Stem, "Three Petitions of the Fatimid Period," 185--196; Richards,
"A Fatimid Petition and 'Small Decree'," 155-56). When the order was finished, a copy
These tezkires cannot be described physically, as no examples of this

type of tezkire were located. Other kinds of tezkires that were ex-
amined proved to be small individual pieces of paper ranging in size
from about 2" x 3" to about 4" x 6" containing exact copies of defter
entries; maliye ahkam tezkires were probably similar in form. 36 In
content, they resembled the register entries, including the addressee's
title, though usually not his name and never his honorifics; the prob-
lem presented in the petition (arzuhal); the request made (rica), if any;
and the decision (hiikm), including actions to be taken and any
subsidiary considerations. The tezkires communicated to the maliye
ahkam scribes the texts of orders to be written; their wording was
based on the register entries, as can be deduced from the fact that
many entries end with the phrase, "and a tezkire was given for the
writing of an order stating the above" or "a tezkire was given com-
manding the giving of an imperial order in the manner described
above." 37 After being recorded in the ahkam register, these tezkires
were sent on to the maliye kalemi, where the proper honorifics and
other formulas were added by the maliye akham scribes in the course
of calligraphy. The final phrase in the defter about the provision of
the tezkire was, of course, omitted in the tezkire itself. In the finished
order it was replaced by clauses enjoining compliance with the impe-
rial command.
Although the original petitions, the bureau's tezkires, and the final
orders are all unavailable for examination, the procedural comments
in the register entries elucidate the system quite clearly. The follow-
ing two examples, provided in full, record each step in the process,
from the arrival of the petition, through the checking of the registers,
the making of a decision, its communication to the mevkufat bureau
for recording, and the production of a tezkire requesting an appro-
priate order. 38
(possibly on a separate sheet of paper rather than in a register) was made and filed before
the original was sent out (Stern, Fatimid Decrees, 167).
36
Examples of seventeenth-century tezkires on various matters can be found in Diindar
Giinday, Ar§iv Belgelerinde Siyakat Yaz1s1 Ozellikleri ve Divan Rakamlarz, Tiirk Tarih
Kurumu Yaymlar1, ser. 7, v. 57 (Ankara: Tiirk Tarih Kurumu Bas1mevi, 1974), 68, 95,
97. For the use of written documentation as testimony to claims made in petitions see
Faroqhi, "Political Activity Among Ottoman Taxpayers," 7-10.
37
Vech-i me§ruh ilzerelmucebincel . .. deyil hukmlemr-i §erif verilmeklyazzlmak i~in
tezkire verildi; or, hilkm-i §erif verilmek Jerman olmagzn tezkire verildi.
38
KK 2576, pp. 130 and 121.
258 CHAPTER EIGHT
An order to the kad1 of Ak§ehir: The people of the city of Ak§ehir came
to the imperial divan and presented a petition. They have notified [us]
saying that the city has 35 1/2 avanzhanes; 20 banes are registered for
support of the post system [menzil] for provision for 5 head of post
horses, and 15 112 are registered for avanz, but 20 banes for the post
system are not enough. When the mevkufat registers were examined,
it was found recorded that the above town has 35 112 avar1zhanes, and
of these 20 banes were appointed as menzil and 15 112 banes as avanz.
It was ordered that a hilkm-i §erif be given saying that 5112 banes should
be assigned to the post system, and avanz should be taken from only
10 banes; it has been registered in the mevkufat and a tezkire was given.
An order to the muhassil of Aydm and the kad1 of Tazile(?): In the

mevkufat registers the above kaza has 1133 avanzhanes, but since its
reaya are unable to bear the payment of that many banes, its current
kad1, the leader of the judges and the Muslims, Mevlana Mustafa, may
his virtues be increased, has notified [us] saying that its collection is
impossible: it was ordered that a hilkm-i §erif be given to leave 1000
banes and to subtract 13[3] banes; accordingly, a tezkire was given by
the mevkufat: on 13 Safar 1053.
The last stage in the complaint-handling process was updating the

records to reflect the decisions made. Among the entries in the ahkam
registers are some that record changes to survey defters kept by the
finance department. For example, one entry recorded the registration
of a tax exemption for a certain non-Muslim who informed the central
government that he had been exempted from payment of avanz in
return for his services on the eastern campaign: "Since it was ordered
that he be exempt, it was registered accordingly in its proper place
[i.e., in the avanz defteri]."39 Similar entries record the proper reg-
istration of exemption renewals. Another part of the updating proce-
dure involved issuing temessiiks verifying their new status to people
whose assessment had been changed. For instance, a village in Hiida-
vendigar requested and obtained the commutation of its old levy, a
number of chickens for the imperial kitchens, to a lump sum in cash.
The entry on the subject specified that, to ensure that there would be
no oppression, the villagers were given a copy of their entry in the
avanz defteri. 40 The ahkam register records the provision of a copy
39
KK 2576, p. 39: muaf ve musellem olmak Jerman olunmagm mucebince mahallma
kayd olundu. For exemption renewals see KK 2576, pp. 67, 80, 88.
40
KK 2576, p. 14: rencide olunmamak ifin suret-i mevkufat dir ki nakl olundu. On
the provision of copies of register entries for exemptions see KK 2576, p. 66; for the
of the register entry (suret-i defter) in many other cases, especially

when exemptions were granted, wh~n avanzhanes were subtracted
from the surveyed total, or when repeated attempts to collect excess
or illegal taxes had been made. Most of the time, the updating pro-
cess involved both changing the defters and issuing verification doc-
uments, as in the case of six villages near Dimetoka exempted from
taxation in return for service to the imperial stables in Edime; here
the ahkam register entry reads: "Since it was commanded that an
order be given in accordance with the exemption documents in their
hands, it was registered accordingly in its proper place [i.e., in the
avanz register] and a copy of the mevkufat register [entry, i.e., a
temessiik] was issued."41
Some entries not only mention changing the assessment register but
reproduce the defter entry as it actually appeared in the other register,
in siyakat script and in the layout of the assessment register. An example
is an entry regarding four villages in the sancak of Gelibolu whose
defter registration was precisely copied into the ahkam register,
accompanied by an explanation of how their status had changed and
how the changes had been recorded. These villages had formerly been
contributors to the post system (menzilcis); at a later date this ob-
ligation had been lifted and they had been registered in avanzhanes.
Now, however, their services in support of the post system were again
required, and their hanes were subtracted from the avanz defter. In
case of future questions, a copy of the entry was made in its chron-
ological place in the ahkam register with the following comment:
"Since their banes were ordered to be subtracted, it was recorded in
its proper place, and this is a copy of the avanz defteri [stating] that
they would be menzilcis as described above, which was transferred
from its place [in the avanz defteri]."42 The procedure was often used
subtraction of banes from the assessment see ibid., pp. 43, 75, 104, 119; for a suret given
on account of an attempt to collect tekalif-i orfiye from four villages in Nigbolu that were
exempt see ibid., p. 35. The giving of a suret-i defter when a new tahrir was made is
recorded in KK 2576, pp. 44, 103.
41
KK 2576, p. 39: yedlerinde olan muaJnameleri mucebince hiikm-i §erif verile deyii
Jerman olunmagzn mucebince mahallzna kayd olunup suret-i defter-i mevkuJat nakl olundu.
Other examples noting registration in the defter together with issuance of a suret occur
on pp. 22 (subtraction of 2 banes from a village that could not pay its assessment), 81
(exemption from avanz of an area that had become the grand vizier's temlik), 113
(subtraction of half their assessment for villages newly registered that were formerly exempt),
and 123 (reduction in number of banes for a village whose inhabitants had moved away).
42
KK 2576, p. 25: hanesi fiirunihdde oluna deyii Jerman olunmagzn mahallzna kayd
olunup vech-i me§ruh iizere menzilciler olduklarzna i§bu suret-i mevkuJat dir ki mahal-
260 CHAPTER EIGHT
in connection with tahrirs as well; a copy of the entry in the tahrir

defter (in siyakat) or of the totals listed there for the location surveyed
appears in the ahkam register in its chronological place, with a descrip-
tion of the reason for the survey and the appointment of the surveyor.
The same format was used to show that a survey had been completed:
on the page containing the order (discussed in Chapter Three) com-
manding Pir Mehmed el-Miiderris to conduct the avanz tahrir of
Mente~e and S1gla, the results of the survey were later recorded in
the margins around the order. 43
Changing the Assessment
The records make it abundantly clear that the government's tax

accounting procedures relied on matching amounts collected with
amounts listed in assessment registers, and tax collectors were ordered
again and again to collect the exact amount assigned in the registers
they were given. If a tax collector with a defter attempted to collect
more than the amount written, seventeenth-century taxpayers could
petition for a sort of restraining order, enforceable by the soldiers of
the sancak bey, mandating collection of the amount on record. The
registers in the capital were checked, and the order specified precisely
what could be collected. Alternatively, excessive collections might be
reported by taxpayers to the kad1, who could then petition for a similar
order. 44 Other solutions to this problem were also available. In one
case of overcollection in Premedi, the sancak bey petitioned for a new
tahrir to be conducted. In another instance, when an amount of avanz
greater than the total in the defter was collected in ~am, the finance
department took collection of avanz out of the hands of the appointed
collector and entrusted it to the kad1, notifying the provincial governor
of the change. The investigation of a similar problem in Haleb was
delegated to the provincial defterdar. In another case, a village in
Mezistre experienced repeated attempts to collect a greater amount
of avanz than was specified in the defter; as a result, the inhabitants
lmdan nakl olundu; similar examples can be found on pp. 41 (in the liva of Nigde, where
15 112 banes were added to the total) and 114 (in the liva of Silistre, where 15 banes were
subtracted). The graphic depiction of a cizye transaction (the subtraction of 500 banes
from an assessment of 2000) can be found in MM 2728 (3457), p. 66.
43
KK 2576, p. 48.
44
Examples of petitions from villagers for such restraining orders are KK 2576, pp.
41, 42, 62, 64, 112, 114, 126, 203.
of the village petitioned to collect and submit their own avanz as a

lump sum. The finance department officials agreed to this plan, raising
the total of the avanz slightly to adjust for future population growth. 45
If the figures in the registers were regarded by the government as
authoritatively determining the amounts to be collected, it was im-
portant for the reaya, especially in a period of declining prosperity,
to ensure that their tax assessments were accurate or, if not, that they
erred on the low side. During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries, keeping the defters accurate and up to date became in-
creasingly difficult. Rapid transformations in people's circumstances
made tahrir registers obsolete almost as soon as they were compiled.
Changes in the value of the coinage and in the incidence of certain
levies suddenly altered the weight of taxation for individuals and com-
munities. The survey process itself was interrupted by rebellion and
warfare. The petition was the vehicle by which people sought to adjust
the government's records, requesting reductions in their assessments
and corrections to the registers. With respect to the validity of this
type of request, Jennings has observed that "it is difficult to know
how much credence to give to these claims .... The complaint of three
people from Baf [a small town in Cyprus] might epitomize the
complaints of the entire island. However, it might also reflect only
the feelings of three people with grudges."46 Still, the kinds of com-
plaints made and the government's reactions to them provide a sense
of what people considered the most important problems amenable to
official solution and suggest the range of responses available to the
Ottoman state.
Most assessment problems presented in petitions from the first half
of the seventeenth century fall into two categories: overassessment
of an area beyond what its inhabitants could bear, and inclusion in
the tax registers of individuals or communities which were either not
required to pay at all or which had already paid another levy. Register
KK 2576 contains 80 entries, some 13% of the total, granting reduc-
tions in assessments. Mistakes in the registers or outdated survey totals
were often detected only when an attempt was made to collect incor-
rect or double taxes. Sometimes the problem seems to have originated
45 KK 2576, pp. 100, 70; MM 2256 (5712) 1026/1617-18, p. 93; KK 2576, p. 8; for
a similar case in a village in Sivas province, see MM 2728 (3457), p. 49.
46
Ronald C. Jennings, Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the Mediter-
ranean World, 1571-1640, NYU Studies in Near Eastern Civilization, 16 (New York: New
York University Press, 1992), 369.
262 CHAPTER EIGHT
with an overgenerous estimate of an area's capacity; sometimes there

had been an error in compiling or copying the registers; and some-
times the tax status of a village had altered since the assessment was
made. Occasionally, an entry cites Celali disturbances, flood or drought,
or the death or emigration of the population; usually, however, the
reason given for inability to pay was simply that that the taxpayers
were or had become "poor" (fakir). Many entries give no reason at
all, merely showing the old assessment, the amount subtracted
(furunihade), and the new assessment. On occasion, petitioners speci-
fied how their assessment should be modified, as when the reaya of
Yeni Han, who could not afford to support six post horses, requested
to support only four. 47
In register KK 2576 there are 30 entries, about 5%, in which people
already liable for one levy were erroneously assessed a second;
ordinarily the second demand was waived, occasionally the first. For
example, two villages in the area of Dimetoka regularly supplied barley
for the imperial stables but were registered in avanzhanes in a new
tahrir; when the villagers complained about the double assessment,
they were relieved of the levy of barley. 48 Other victims of double
recording errors included a kaza in Kastamonu which had been exempt
from avanz but was mistakenly registered in a new avanz tahrir made
after the Celali uprisings; a village in the kaza of Selanik, located
(
close to Alasonya and recorded in both kazas in error; residents of

a particular street in Haleb who claimed they belonged to a different
mahalle and were being charged twice; and a group from Sivas who
had fled to Tokat and found themselves registered for ispen~e in both
places. 49 In an individual case, the name of Timurhan b. Mehmed
seemingly appeared in two places in the register, as he was more than
once forced to pay double taxes. In these cases, a petition to the center
produced an order correcting the error in the registers; occasionally
a separate order was sent to the kad1 to correct his records as well.
An unusual type of error occurred when the avanzhanes of Vidin
were somehow added to the cizyehanes, while other reaya remained
unregistered; in that case a new tahrir was ordered to straighten out
the figures. 50
47
KK 2576, p. 72.
48
KK 2576, p. 112; other examples of relief from dual assessment are on pp. 35, 43,
104, 108, 114, 199, 120.
49
KK 2576, pp. 81, 115, 59, 123.
so MM 3881 (2765), p. 165; KK 2576, p. 108.
It is usually impossible to tell whether these double assessments

were mistakes on the part of those compiling the registers or attempts
at official extortion, but it is easy to see how errors could have been
made. Individuals or communities discovered by a tahrir to be absent
from the old registers might have escaped previous registration, or
they might be exempt from taxation or already registered in a different
set of defters. Taxpayers without exemption documents were entered
into the new registers and required to correct any error by petition.
Dual assessments brought to the finance department's attention were
almost invariably disallowed. 51 The various levies subsumed under the
name of avanz were considered to be mutually exclusive; in deter-
mining the total tax burden of the Ottoman reaya, they should not
be added together unless there is definite evidence to the contrary for
a particular area, period, or group of people. The only regular ex-
ception to this generalization seems to have been made for the niiziil,
a levy of grain for the army, which was assessed on the avanzhanes.
A few entries, however, indicate that people liable for levies other
than avanz in cash were exempt from niiziil. 52
Other kinds of assessment problems occurred with less regularity.
In register KK 2576 there are 20 requests for a change in the type
of levy (3% of entries), of which 19 were granted and one was denied.
For example, when a village near Edime that traditionally owed a
levy of barley found that levy too onerous, it was transmuted into
a levy of oarsmen. On the other hand, when a village whose assess-
ment had been divided between service to the stables and payment
of avanz requested that it be completely devoted to stable service,
its request was denied. 53 Redistribution (tevzi) of sums demanded with-
out a change in their total occurred in 3 cases; one concerned a levy
of oars which had grown too onerous for the people of one town and
was consequently redistributed among the surrounding villages. 54
The government was occasionally able to detect that a request for
tax remission was spurious. Register KK 2576 recorded 7 instances
51
For that reason, 7 banes were subtracted from the assessment of a village whose
14 banes had all been registered as avanzhanes in a survey, although half of them had
long been madencis (KK 2576, p. 11; similar cases on pp. 25, 112).
52
See, for instance, KK 2576, p. 5, where a village owing chickens to the imperial
kitchens was excused from niiziil and siirsat.
53
KK 2576, pp. 119, 109. The latter entry, together with a request concerning collection
that was also denied, suggests that the idea that negative answers to petitions do not appear
in the registers (and thus might vastly outnumber positive answers) may need to be modified.
54
KK 2576, p. 65.
264 CHAPTER EIGHT
of tax evasion. A village that had previously always paid avanz, for
example, was found trying to avoid payment by claiming, "We are
exempt," muaftz. The reaya in Bursa were apparently not paying avanz
on lands outside the town on the grounds that they were abandoned
(metruke); if, however, they were cultivating them, their tax assess-
ment should rise by 8 hanes. In Ku~adas1, a number of people moved
into the citadel and refused to pay taxes (perhaps claiming to be
askeri). The inhabitants of Mara kaza in the sancak of Ohri claimed
to be exempt from avanz, although they were listed in the avanz
register as owing that tax. Here the kad1s and the sancak bey were
ordered to send any exemption documents (muafiyetler) to the impe-
rial divan for verification, while avanz was to be collected as ordered
from those not possessing such documents. 55
Taxpayers could resort to tricks and lies in an attempt to evade
taxation. The reaya of Biiyiik <;ekmece in Istanbul tried to reduce their
menzilci service on the ground that although the neighborhood was
once inhabited by non-Muslims, many had converted to Islam and
only a few were left to pay the tax. The finance department, however,
knew perfectly well that both Muslims and non-Muslims were liable
for such levies and ordered both groups to pay. In another case, a
village in Argiri Kasn which was obligated to provide pass-guarding
services (derbendci) was also registered in the avanz defter. The
villagers petitioned to have one of these levies lifted, citing peasant
flight as a reason for hardship. When the most recent registers at the
capital were checked, however, it was found that of the 171 taxpayers
in the village, 80 were registered as derbendcis and 91 as avanz payers.
In the old register there had been 83 taxpayers in the village, all
registered as derbendcis; therefore, only the newcomers were being
required to pay avanz. There was no double taxation and no peasant
flight, so the petition was denied. 56
Some petitions reaching the finance department were sent not by
villagers but by tax collectors. When Ottoman taxpayers refused to
pay, tax collectors tried to ensure that they would not be held per-
sonally responsible for the missing sums. This anxiety seems to have
animated a cizye collector in Bosna, one Osman, who went to the
55
KK 2576, pp. 69, 85, 41, 109. A copy of an order in a kad1 sicil regarding attempts
by reaya to evade payment of taxes on the grounds of being sipahis or nomads can be
seen in Ongan, Ankara'mn iki Numarall Ser'iye Sicili, no. 1679.
56
KK 2576, pp. 128, 108.
extent of testifying in the kad1's court regarding his inability to collect

the taxes assessed. The kad1 made a petition on Osman's behalf,
verifying that the non-Muslim residents of two villages in Bosna had
become rebellious and would not pay their cizye for 1020/1611-12
without the intervention of the sancak bey. An order was issued stating
that collection must be made by the sancak bey, by force if necessary,
in accordance with the defter and the berat previously given, although
a warning was included that this must not become a pretext for oppres-
sion or extortion on the part of provincial authorities. In another case,
the avanz collector for Nigde, Han Timur Ahmed, reported that the
reaya in a number of villages had been driven off their land by
moneylenders who then refused to pay the canonical taxes on the land
they had appropriated; the government responded with an order stat-
ing that whoever held the land had to pay the taxes. 57
Tax collectors occasionally discovered that between the time their
registers were issued and the time they began to collect a tax, certain
villages had, or claimed to have, undergone a change in their tax
status. This discovery necessitated a petition to the finance bureaus
to ascertain the correct amounts to be collected. When the avanz
collector for the kaza of Kirkkilise in 1050/1640--41 learned that a
new tahrir had been conducted before he could make his collection,
he informed the government and was sent an order detailing the number
of avanzhanes according to the latest count. In a contrary case, Mustafa,
appointed to collect the 1051/1641--42 avanz in the kaza of Nigde,
learned that a village registered at 23 banes in the old tahrir claimed
to have been assessed at only 3 banes in a newly-completed survey.
When the registers in the capital were checked in response to Mustafa's
petition, it was found that the surveyor had not yet submitted the
results of the new tahrir, and the truth of the village's claim could
not be ascertained; consequently, the village was required to pay
according to its old assessment for one more year. That the central
government's registers were regarded as the final authority in such
cases is demonstrated by the example of a village in iznikmid in 1038/
1628-29 which had been recorded in the finance department's register
for the last 30 years at 30 banes, although the provincial register still
listed 76 banes; an attempt to collect on the basis of 76 banes was
disallowed. On occasion the registered assessment was found to be
57
MM 2256 (5712) 1026/1617-18, p. 62; KK 2576, p. 111.
266 CHAPTER EIGHT
excessive and was revised, as in the case of a village which had

formerly paid an avanz of 3500 ak~e plus 8 kantar of straw per bane
and was assessed at 10 banes in a new tahrir. When the collection
agent (miiba§ir) demanded the new rate of 130 kantar of straw, or
13 kantar per bane, the villagers found themselves unable to produce
that much, and it was ordered that the village should be returned to
its former tax rate. 58
Most of the problems mentioned above arose out of the government's
desire to expand its tax base and its consequent strict instructions to
surveyors not to leave anyone out of the tax registers, but they derived
their peculiar urgency from the decline in economic welfare which
caused taxpayers to demand immediate adjustments as soon as the
tax registers ceased to reflect actual conditions. Bringing the registers
into harmony with people's circumstances without neglecting the
government's needs was an ongoing process. There is no way at present
to determine the overall effect of remissions and reductions in taxation
on the empire and its budget; some of them were temporary and others
were permanent, and their impact on different regions of the empire
varied. At the very least, however, the petition process offered to
Ottoman taxpayers a third alternative to starvation or revolt. By drawing
the attention of officials to their plight, they were able to negotiate
a livable compromise allowing them freedom from payment while still
maintaining the authority of the government. In seventeenth-century
Spain it was also possible to negotiate the tax burden; 167 commu-
nities are known to have obtained tax reductions due to inability to
pay, though it is not known what percentage of the population these
reductions covered. France apparently had no such tax adjustment
mechanism and revolt seems to have been the only recourse in times
of hardship; there, the correlation between bad harvests and popular
revolts was particularly high. 59 Because of the frequent rotation of
officials, Ottoman peasants did not have the long-term connection with
their overlords that facilitated peasant rebellion in France, nor did they
58
KK 2576, pp. 97, 55, 64, 94; see also 79.
59
For Spain see Antonio Dominguez Ortiz, La sociedad espanola en el siglo XVII, 2
vols., Monografias hist6rico-sociales, 7 (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones
Cientificas, Instituto "Balmes" de Sociologia, Departamente de Historia Social, 1963-70),
1: 325-37; for France see Kamen, Iron Century, 373. French lawsuits appealing overtaxation
do not appear until the 1670s (Pierre Goubert, "The French Peasantry of the Seventeenth
Century: A Regional Example," Past & Present 10 [1956]: 55-77; rpt. in Trevor Aston,
ed., Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660 [New York: Anchor Books, 1967], 143).
have the organization and articulation that fostered peasant political

participation in England; nevertheless, they did have access to a
mechanism for administrative change that enabled them to participate
in adjusting the system of governance under which they lived. 60
Corruption in Tax Collection
As we have seen, certain kinds of collection problems were perennial,

resulting from the low level of administrative technology of the age
and the general condition of internal upheaval in the empire. Other
sorts of problems were the products of wrongdoing by individuals
involved in the system. Complaints about tax collection in register
KK 2576 were fewer in number than those regarding tax assessment,
and almost all were related to problems in the assessment registers.
If further research confirms this result for the whole period, it would
support the conclusion that tax collection by government agents was
not the most onerous burden on the reaya between 1560 and 1660.
On the other hand, it may reflect the composition of this particular
register at a time when an intensified effort was made to reassess the
avanz, and corruption in collection may have posed more significant
problems at other times. On the whole, though, this study uncovered
relatively few problems in the collection of avanz and cizye that could
be ascribed to extortion and corruption on the part of tax collectors;
tax farming, as we shall see, gave wider scope for misbehavior. The
case of Celil was a nearly unique instance of simple extortion in
connection with avanz-related taxes; as collector for the bedel-i siirsat
of Traklu Borlu, he collected almost four times the assessed amount,
until a petition from the villagers generated an order to the kad1 to
enforce collection according to law. 61
Collection of double taxes due to interference from unauthorized
persons was a more frequent occurrence. Some problems of dual col-
lection, like those examined earlier, were accidental, but others re-
sulted from fraudulent claims on the part of would-be tax collectors.
The collector of the deymos (a form of tithe) in Antep for 1056/
60 For the comparison with French peasants see Barkey, "Rebellious Alliances"; for the
political participation of peasants generally see Eisenstadt, Political Systems of Empires,
208-9.
61
KK 2576, p. 41.
268 CHAPTER EIGHT
1646-47, noting that this tithe had been divided among several
collectors in the previous year, felt he needed to petition for an order
preventing any of them from encroaching on his assignment, whether
out of ignorance of his appointment or unwillingness to give up their
privileges. Shortly afterward this collector had to petition again for
a specific injunction against Murad Pa§a Ogullugu Mustafa, who was
interfering in his collection of the tax in disregard of the general order
sent previously. In another case, a silahdar named Yusuf Veli was
given an iltizam in Nigde, but Abdi Yusuf, one of the ebna-1 sipahiyan,
claiming that it had been given to him, interfered in the revenue
collection. When the registers were examined, it was found that the
mukataa had indeed been granted to Yusuf Veli, with another silahdar,
ibrahim, as yamak (assistant). ibrahim had later been removed, but
Yusuf Veli was still in office, so an order was issued to prevent
interference on the part of Abdi Yusuf, ibrahim, or anyone else. 62
Timar holders anxious about their ability to obtain their own rev-
enues from their reaya entered into competition with tax collectors
from the central government. For example, the avanz collector for
several kazas in the area of Ohri found that while the reaya there were
willing to pay their taxes, timar holders Hocaoglu Ali and Kap1c10glu
Ali were preventing him from collecting them. The collector was
ordered to report on the location of the timar holders and their chief
villages, so that their illegal acts could be punished. In such cases
a kad1 can often be found petitioning on behalf of the government's
tax collector to prevent his being held liable for the missing amounts.
A similar concern was expressed, this time on his own behalf, by the
kad1 of Alaiye in a 1016/1607-8 petition regarding the avanz of that
province, uncollected for a number of years because of Celali unrest.
The kad1 explained that he had previously requested a new tahrir of
the area. The tahrir had been made, subtracting the banes no longer
in existence, but the people of the area were still unwilling to pay
their taxes. The kad1 feared being accused of negligence and losing
his post because of delinquent tax returns, so he now petitioned for
the appointment of a special agent (miiba§ir) who could work with
local magnates and devote his whole effort to tax collection. 63
62
MM 3881 (2765), pp. 188, 199; MM 2728 (3457), p. 73.
63
On the timar holders of Ohri see KK 2576, pp. ~5. For two similar cases in 1592
and 1634 see Cvetkova, Institutions ottomanes, 97-98. For the kad1's petition see MM
1491 (16596), p. 3.
Even if taxes were properly collected, there was no iron-clad

guarantee that the treasury would receive what it was owed. Despite
all checks and counter-checks, at times the official tax collector simply
made off with the money. In 980/1572-73, the man appointed to collect
the 978/1570-71 avanz from several kazas around Erzurum apparent-
ly did so but failed to remit the proceeds to the treasury. He was said
to be living in Tokat, so the beylerbey of Sivas and the kad1 of Tokat
received an order to go after him, retrieve the money and collection
register, and send them on by a trustworthy ~avu§. It must have been
difficult to exert central control in far-away places like Erzurum. An
order from around 1010/1601-2 relates that the defterdar of Erzurum
had died and his men were pocketing the tax receipts; a local ~avu§
offered to collect them for the treasury in return for an appointment
as sancak bey. Around the year 1026/1617-18, it was found that the
provincial moneychanger (sarraf) of Kibns was siphoning off the cizye
after it was collected; when this was discovered, the office of cizye
collector was given to the man who reported it. The most exciting
case concerned Hasan and Mehmed, who collected the avanz of Silistre
for 1050/1640-41. As they were bringing their proceeds to the treas-
ury, Mehmed and two of his men took the money and vanished into
the wilds of Silistre. The government notified the kad1 that it was
sending fit and trustworthy men to join Hasan in the effort to find
Mehmed and his men and retrieve the money. 64
Many of the problems in collecting farmed taxes were similar to
collection problems for any other tax, but there were other ways to
corrupt the system besides collecting too much money. Turning the
revenue source into personal property, withholding from the treasury
all or part of the revenue collected, appointing men to positions in
place of government appointees, and collecting revenues assigned to
someone else were tactics used to divert revenues from the treasury.
In the complex and extensive iltizam system, with insufficient super-
vision and means of communication, there were naturally people who
tried to bend the system to their own advantage. Their attempts did
not go entirely unnoticed, however; a fair number of register entries,
though the number is not as large as the stereotype would suggest,
record corruption and oppression by mtiltezims. These entries, of course,
64 KK 67, p. 4; MM 1513 (7316), p. 32; MM 2256 (5712), p. 9; KK 2576, p. 85. On

embezzlement see also Halil Inalcik, "Tax Collection, Embezzlement and Bribery in Ottoman
Finances," Turkish Studies Association Bulletin 15 (1991): 327-46.
270 CHAPTER EIGHT
represent only instances that were observed and dealt with; the number
of unrecorded problems of this sort is unknown.
A large increase in the amount demanded, though legal, could be
as oppressive to taxpayers as illegal exactions, and very few cases
were found where such an increase was allowed without significant
change in the revenue source. A case in point was that of an island
off Koca iii whose inhabitants complained of oppression by their
miiltezim, Hasan. The sancak bey, ordered to inspect and report on
the situation, was told that Hasan had undertaken an iltizam for 17 ,000
ak~e, a 13% increase over the former tax amount. Thirty-five taxpay-
ers had fled the land and their tax had been divided among those
remaining, who could not afford to pay it. The people requested the
removal of Hasan and the lowering of the iltizam to its former level
of 15,000 ak~e, which was done. 65 The assumption in most of the
literature seems to be that this case was typical, that an increase in
the price of an iltizam always resulted in a higher rate of tax paid
by the individual taxpayer. As we have seen, however, even when
the amount of an iltizam was higher than the surveyed total, it was
possible for the increased amount to come from growth in popula-
tion, commodity prices, or volume of transactions over what was
recorded in the defter, leaving the taxpayer no worse off. The gov-
ernment did its best to see that actual tax increases were the exception
rather than the rule.
Tax farmers sometimes collected the revenues of their mukataas
properly but failed to remit them in full to the government. The beytiil-
mal of Edime in 1043/1633-34 was in the hands of Omer and Mehmed,
but they were found to be embezzling the revenues, so the iltizam
was taken away from them and given to ilyas and Cafer, together
with an order prohibiting interference by Omer and Mehmed. The
nazrr of the mukataa of the rice fields in Filibe refused to pay out
the revenues he had collected on the pretext that he had been dis-
missed before payment. The ayan and reaya of Gilmil§hane complained
when their miiltezim was 20,000 kuru§ in arrears; it is probable that
he had already collected the money but had not sent it to the treasury,
and they feared they would have to pay a second time. In 973/1565-
66 an ulufeci named Ahmed, sent to inspect the muhasebes of the
mukataas of Oskilp, was found to have embezzled the money instead.
65
MM 115, fol. 25b.
A miiltezim for the Danube ports, Y ako Yehudi, not content with
embezzling the proceeds from his own iltizam, was also found to be
meddling in the iltizam of David and Menahim. In another case the
treasury, discovering that wheat from has lands in Yeni§ehir, Trrhala,
<;atalca and other places had not been delivered to the imperial ovens
and the storehouses were empty, found that the milltezims Mahmud
and Zulflkar had for several years been selling it off. Besides the
increased expense of buying grain to supply campaigns or to feed the
capital, this act was said to be a form of oppression toward the reaya
from whom the grain was collected as tithes. The treasury declared
that the practice must stop but apparently could not recover the lost
funds. The same two milltezims were again at fault when the finance
department discovered it had no record that the revenues of another
of their mukataas, the beytiilmal-1 hassa of Trrhala, had been submit-
ted. The two claimed that the money had been properly collected and
presented to the inner treasury by the janissary aga, but this "seemed
to be a trick", because no record of it could be found. A strongly
worded order went out demanding submission of these funds. 66
Actual theft of iltizam revenues appears to have been more frequent
when the recipient of the money was a fortress garrison or other
distant payee rather than the central treasury, which would immedi-
ately notice a delay in payment. Perhaps the defaulting miiltezim hoped
to be long gone before his dereliction was reported to the authorities.
Htiseyin, milltezim of the salt works of Tekfur Golti in Silistre, seems
to have succeeded in that aim: the central government was not in-
formed until two years after the beginning of his iltizam in 1003/
1594-95 that although Htiseyin had collected his revenues, he had
not submitted them to the treasury. 67 Also successful was Yasif, the
emin of the mukataas of Rodas, the proceeds of which were intended
for the men of the galleys based on Rhodes. The men were unpaid,
a havale sent for the money never returned, and an order to pay was
brought back by its carrier. In despair, the Rados authorities asked
66 KK 5019, p. 197; MM 22603 (9824), p. 1; MM 267 (2775), p. 52; MM 3881 (2765),

p. 131; MM 22603 (9824), p. 68; AE III. Mehmed 170, p. 5, docs. 1 and 2.
67 MM 687 (9820), p. 153; the iltizam was granted to the man who blew the whistle.
See also MM 241 (115), fol. 26a, where an entry of 971/1563-64 records the appointment
of Ahmed to two mukataas in place of Mustafa who had embezzled (bel' u ketm kerde,
"swallowed and concealed") the iltizam revenues. The appointment took place after two
years of a three-year tahvil, showing that Mustafa had already had a second chance to
prove himself after not delivering the receipts of the first year.
272 CHAPTER EIGHT
to have the men paid out of the revenues of Egriboz, and it was so
ordered. 68 As far as we know, in neither case was the money recovered.
Less successful in making off with mukataa revenues were the
milltezims of Budin in 1023/1613-14, where revenues failed to reach
the garrison troops; the milltezims received stem orders to tum over
the money. The same was true in Trabzon in 1067/1656-57, where the
emins of the port taxes (iskele), who were supposed to have paid the
salaries of ten cannoneers (topcular), tried to retain the money by
claiming that their accounts were closed and that they owed no more.
But when the ba§ muhasebe registers at the capital were checked, a
marginal note (der kenar) was found recording an order that unequivo-
cally made the milltezims of that iltizam responsible for the salaries
of these ten cannoneers. They were therefore commanded to come
up with the money to pay the men, retaining the temessilks of payment
against the annual accounting. 69
Rather than simply keeping tax revenues for themselves, some
collectors were found to be funneling them in other directions, oc-
casionally at the demand of someone in power with no actual authority
over the revenues. In one instance, ship captains in the Mediterranean
who received their salaries and expenses as ocakhk from the mukataas
of the ports of Balyabadra and Halomi~ stopped receiving their
remittances when these mukataas were awarded to the retired
muteferrika Zulf1kar. It was discovered that the money was being
diverted, with the kapudan pa~a's connivance, to pay the salaries of
fortress garrison troops in the Mediterranean. As a result, the mukataas
were restored to the control of the captains or their appointees on
condition that they remit to the treasury all proceeds over and above
their salaries and expenses. The kad1s of Balyabadra and Halomi~
were informed of the change, and the milfetti§ of the mukataas of
Mora was strongly reprimanded and told to see that the mukataa
revenues reached the proper recipients and were not given to people
who did not have imperial orders for them. Another case concerned
the garrison of Aleppo, which was accustomed to receive its salaries
from the revenues of the Sabun Han and the sheep market tax. In
1039/1629-30, the Sabun Han was illegally sold to Omer, the hoca
of Sultan Osman, who made it into a vaktf for the Two Holy Cities
68
AE III. Mehmed 170, p. 8, 1008/1600. See also an ongoing case of embezzlement
by the nazrr of the Vidin mukataas, MM 22603 (9824 ), pp. 4, 20, 72, 80.
69
MM 2256 (5712), p. 8; MM 4646 (7455), p. 10.
and appointed himself revenue collector. When the misappropriation

was discovered, Omer was removed from revenue collection and it
was entrusted directly to the garrison. 70
The classic mode of corruption in the tax farming system is col-
lection of excessive amounts of revenue from the people, and there
were some complaints of this, but not nearly as many as might be
expected from descriptions of Ottoman decline. In one case, a customs
emin in Edirne was found to be collecting customs dues on tax-free
items and was ordered to stop. In another instance, taxpayers com-
plained about oppression by Yusuf Silahdar, who held the iltizam of
their tithes in 971/1563-64 at the amount of 36,600 ak~e; rather than
collecting a straight tithe, he daily increased the amount demanded.
A Galata resident, timariot iskender b. Abdullah, offered to replace
him at an increase of 10,000 ak~e and provided kefils for the sum,
so his iltizam was immediately accepted. Not long afterward, how-
ever, the nazrr of the mukataa sent a letter stating that iskender had
not yet sent anything to the treasury, his kefils were bankrupt, and
he was in debt; if his debt increased (which certainly seemed likely)
he was threatening to flee to Ferengistan (western Europe) at the end
of his tahvil. The government decided to cut its losses, give up the
10,000-ak~e increase, and renew Yusuf Silahdar's iltizam at the old
amount of 36,600 ak~e despite the reaya's complaints, this time
demanding that Yusuf present kefils for his undertaking. 71
Some types of oppression were unrelated to monetary exactions.
While complaints and imperial orders rarely enumerate specific op-
pressive acts, it seems at times that the amount of money demanded
was not the source of the problem. The reaya of a mukataa in
Giimii~hane, for instance, complained of oppression (izhar-z tazallum
eylediler) on the part of their emin, Mehmed, who forced them to
transport their harvest a long distance. They found this so oppressive
that they threatened to leave the area unless a better emin was appointed;
Mehmed was quickly replaced. Another rather uninformative entry
appears at first to· record a case of overtaxation, but closer exami-
nation reveals a deeper problem. The people of the imperial has in
Karahisar-i Teke paid a three-year iltizam of 35,200 ak~e to the
miiltezim Mehmed b. Abu ishak; meanwhile, a man named Mirza had
offered a 35,000-ak~e increase, almost doubling their tax. He received
° KK
7
5012 dated 1040/1630, p. 172, 184; MM 3457, p. 99.
71
KK 5019, p. 182; MM 241 (115), fols. 44b, 48a.
274 CHAPTER EIGHT
a berat for the iltizam, but the people of the has complained about
his oppression (§ekva edip izhar-i tazallum edip ), asking to have
Mehmed back, and Mehmed agreed to return at Mirza's iltizam of
70,200 ak~e. Since the level of the iltizam was not reduced, the
oppression complained of may not have been the amount of money
Mirza demanded but the methods he used to obtain it. A case in
Dimetoka specified what those methods might be. A successful bid
by Mustafa ~avu§ raised his mukataa's taxes from 30,000 to 40,000
ak~e per year, and to be sure of collecting the higher sum, Mustafa
came with forty or fifty horsemen, causing most of the reaya to flee
and those remaining to complain. When they threatened to leave as
well, the iltizam was taken away from Mustafa ~avu§ and granted
to someone else, but as the new iltizam was higher than the old, the
real issue was the collection method, not the increased tax. In a similar
case, the reaya themselves outbid an overaggressive collector in order
to escape his oppressive ways. The iltizam of an island in the sancak
of Naxos, formerly held by the reaya at the sum of 375,000 ak~e,
had been awarded to the late kapudan pa§a for a bid of 475,000 ak~e.
The reaya now complained that the person holding the iltizam since
the kapudan pa§a's death had come with 20 to 30 soldiers and
janissaries and behaved oppressively. They therefore put in a bid of
500,000 ak~e, saying that they themselves would be responsible for
collection and delivery of the revenue via their vekil, Salmun veled-i
David. This group's bid shows that they had enough money to pay
the higher amount; what they objected to was the miiltezim's collec-
tion of taxes by armed force. Their bid was accepted and entered in
the mukataa registers with a clause warning "sancak beys and kethudas
and emins and others" not to interfere in collection, and another clause
ordering a copy of this entry for them. A case of collection by force
(nice atlu ile, with numbers of horsemen) combined with embezzle-
ment of the proceeds was perpetrated by emins in Haleb collecting
revenue for the soldiers on the frontier; it was solved by directing
the money through the treasury before sending it on to its recipients. 72
These instances suggest that the Celali problem may have been one
aspect of a larger pattern of rural administration by force; this issue
needs much further study, however, to discover whether its incidence
was increasing.
72
MM 3881 (2765), p. 127; MM 241 (115), fol. 53b (see also MM 22603 [9824], pp.
4-5); MM 687 (9820), p. 219; KK 5012, p. 4; MM 1513 (7316), p. 46.
If berats and official procedures were insufficient to control oppres-

sive behavior, the government could call in other officials to aid in
enforcement. In 1009/1600-1601, a report was received from Mahmud,
a miiltezim in Egriboz, concerning oppression of the reaya by H1ztr
Bey, a local resident. H1ztr Bey collected taxes without authority,
causing the reaya to flee. Although the petitioner held a berat and
an imperial order prohibiting H1ztr Bey's action, he refused to comply
with it. A new order reaffirmed Mahmud's possession of the iltizam,
ordering him to collect the taxes and H1ztr Bey to desist. This time
the order called on the sancak bey as well as the miifetti§ to supervise
and oversee the process. 73 It was the intervention of a sancak bey with
military and police powers that would prove decisive in enforcing
Mahmud's collection rights. As we have seen, however, the kad1s
were the primary agents of control for the finance department. The
kad1 of ~am, commanded to go after the avanz collector for 1050/
1640--41 (who, not content with collecting the amount ordered, had
collected extra from the reaya), was told, "It is necessary that those
who collect more than they are ordered be punished." He was ordered
to look into the situation and collect the avanz himself according to
the imperial order. In 1022/1613-14 things had come to such a pass
in Sofya province that the mukataa miifetti§es were dismissed and the
kad1s were ordered to oversee revenue collection in their place. 74
It was possible for people to farm their own taxes, as the island
inhabitants did above, especially when the behavior of outside col-
lectors became oppressive. A village in the province of Haleb sent
three reaya with a petition to the divan to bid on the 1056/1646--47
tax of the nacre mine which they worked, on account (they said) of
the oppression of the horsemen of the emins who came every year.
A second order indicates that they received the iltizam, because they
paid the entire sum in advance, in two installments, and information
to that effect was to be included in their berat. In another example,
the <;akallu tribe in the area of Diyarbekir sent several men to the
divan to complain about their miiltezim, Rt§van Mustafa Bey, and to
offer to pay whatever was recorded in the defter themselves on condition
that neither the bey's men nor anyone else should have a hand in
their taxation. The presence in the Diyarbekir area of a Rt§van tribe
73
74KK 2576, p. 70: emr-i §erifimden ziyade almlarm haklarmdan gelinmek ldzzm
gelmegin .... MM 22603 (9824), p. 9.
276 CHAPTER EIGHT
probably explains the c;akallu' s unhappiness with Rl§van Mustafa Bey

as tax collector. The government's order relieved the Rt§van bey of
all tax collection responsibilities for groups other than his own. 75
According to the evidence of the registers, charges of extortionate
taxation by the finance department cannot be sustained. Overcollection
of taxes ordinarily profited only the tax collector, not the central
government. The finance department's efforts were devoted to ensur-
ing that tax collection was strictly legal and in accordance with the
registers. As we have seen, total amounts collected exceeded neither
the rate of inflation nor the needs of the treasury. One case in 980/
1572-73 in which the emin-i miiltezim reported collecting a surplus
was so unusual that the nazrr received special instructions from the
finance department to send for the emin and examine his detailed
registers with care. If anything appeared suspicious, he was to check
the muhasebe regarding what had been collected in addition to re-
mittances already sent to the treasury, take from the emin anything
he owed, put it in purses, seal them, and send them by suitable garrison
troops to the capital for submission to the treasury. He was also to
sign and seal the emin's muhasebe and send it along, together with
his detailed registers and a petition of explanation. 76
Judging by the complaints addressed to the finance department, the
major preoccupation of tax collectors appears to have been the avoid-
ance of a revenue deficit which they would personally have to make
up. For taxpayers, errors or incorrect assessments in the registers seem
to have created more problems, or at any rate more complaints, than
actual extortion by official tax collectors. 77 Discrepancies in the reg-
isters might result from deliberate falsification, perhaps in return for
a bribe, but it is impossible to separate such cases from the unavoid-
able mistakes caused by the inability of taxation and administration
75
MM 3881 (2765), pp. 139, 182; MM 2256 (5712), p. 44.
76
KK 67, p. 1.
77
This conclusion may be a product of the sources: finance registers contain many more
requests for alterations in the registers and adherence to procedures than complaints about
the oppressiveness of the system itself, and a detailed study of responses to complaints
in other registers might expose a larger problem of oppressive collection practices. Analysis
of the complaints in a published §ikdyet defteri, however, led Gerber to a similar con-
clusion (Gerber, State, Society, and ww, 161-62). On illegal methods used to extort
money from taxpayers, see Halil Inalcik, "The Ottoman Decline and Its Effects upon the
Reaya," in Aspects of the Balkans: Continuity and Change, ed. Henrik Birnbaum and
Speros Vryonis, Jr. (The Hague: Mouton, 1972), 338--54; rpt. in The Ottoman Empire:
Conquest, Organization and Economy, Selection X, Collected Studies Series, CS87
(London: Variorum Reprints, 1978).
procedures to keep up with the rate of change in people's circumstan-

ces in a period of rapid economic fluctuation. When the government's
demands could not be met, taxes were reduced or remitted, either
temporarily, by forgiving all or part of a year's assessment, or per-
manently, by altering the assessment in the registers. If extra taxes
were collected, either illegally or inadvertently, other taxes were often
forgiven to compensate for the excess amount taken. 78 With respect
to tax farming, extortionate collection methods seem to have gener-
ated more complaints than high taxes per se.
Whether the total tax burden was truly excessive is a question which
cannot be answered at our current state of knowledge about economic
life in the seventeenth century. For the early sixteenth century the total
rent/tax burden on the reaya has been computed at 30-35% of what
they produced, but as yet we have no good estimates for the seven-
teenth century. 79 Agricultural taxes were usually assessed on a per-
centage basis; while their cash value must have increased due to rising
prices after the mid-sixteenth century, so too did the value of the crops
remaining to the reaya. In the seventeenth century, the overall amount
of the agricultural product may have decreased on account of bad
harvests, peasant flight, and a shift to stockraising, but whether that
resulted in a per capita decrease is uncertain. In addition, an unknown
sum in extra-legal exactions presumably added to the taxpayers' burden.
On the other hand, increases in fixed-rate taxes, as we have seen,
barely kept pace with inflation. Their extension to people formerly
78
See KK 2576, p. 41; MM 1579 (15715), petition in back of defter.
79
Even the estimate of the Ottoman tax burden in the early sixteenth century as 35%
is too high (see Ch. 3, n. 25, and Mutafcieva, "De l'exploitation feodale dans les terres
de population bulgare," 166). Bent Hansen estimated the tax burden for sixteenth-century
Egypt at 30% ("An Economic Model for Ottoman Egypt: The Economics of Collective
Tax Responsibility," in The Islamic Middle East, 700-1900: Studies in Economic and
Social History, ed. Abraham L. Udovitch, Princeton Studies on the Near East [Princeton:
Dmwin Press, 1981], 473-519). Mutafcieva estimated the rent/tax burden at the end of
the sixteenth century at over 80% of the average household's grain production, mainly
because of increases in the avanz (Agrarian Relations in the Ottoman Empire, 192), but
this estimate does not appear to take inflation into account. In France the tax burden
doubled in the first half of the seventeenth century (Charles Tilly, "Routine Conflicts and
Peasant Rebellions in Seventeenth-Century France," in Power and Protest in the Coun-
tryside: Studies of Rural Unrest in Asia, Europe, and Latin America, ed. Robert P. Weller
and Scott E. Guggenheim, Duke Press Policy Studies [Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 1982], 24-25). During the second half of the century it is estimated at over 50%
of a peasant's total production (Goubert, "French Peasantry of the Seventeenth Century,"
155; Steensgaard, "The Seventeenth Century Crisis," 39). Such a comparison should also
take into account productivity and prices, but here our information is much less adequate.
278 CHAPTER EIGHT
exempt would have increased the burden on those particular individu-

als, but on a per capita basis the impact must have been less, espe-
cially since many of these taxes were assessed on groups rather than
individuals. Any estimate has to take into account the inflated income
of the Ottoman populace during this period, the question of population
decrease, and the lowered value of the ak~e. The much higher revenue
coming into the central treasury in the mid-seventeenth century, if
divided among a lowered population of (at a guess) 20 million,
represents an increase of only 150--250 ak~e per household over mid-
sixteenth century totals, a decrease in real terms.
The decline paradigm, by focusing attention on corruption and
injustice, has led us to ignore the real meaning of the changes in
procedure we have observed. In the first half of the seventeenth century,
the Ottoman finance department apparently attempted to introduce
direct central collection of taxes by state officials to replace delegation
of revenue collection to timar-holding military forces living on the
land. 80 The period's frequent surveys, annual appointments of collec-
tion personnel, and regular examinations of accounts were procedures
for controlling a centrally administered bureaucratic taxation system.
Survey and appointment procedures developed when the empire was
small were adapted and extended as central treasury revenues ex-
panded and the number of centrally-appointed revenue officials grew.
The finance department's aim was apparently to extend the kind of
control it had over the cizye to other categories of income. Taking
assessment and collection of the avanz out of the hands of kad1s, and
even for a while controlling collection of farmed taxes, it subjected
all its revenues to similar procedures and papeIWork. The procedural
similarities of the seventeenth century to the tried and true habits of
the sixteenth-the defters, orders, petitions, kad1s' adjudication of dis-
80
Likewise, Gerber finds a trend toward codification and universalization in the Otto-
man legal system during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (State, Society, and Law,
72-76, 90, 107). Attempts to centralize tax collection were made at the same time not
only in western Europe but also in China, Japan, and elsewhere (Niels Steensgaard, "The
Seventeenth-Century Crisis and the Unity of Eurasian History," Modern Asian Studies 24
[1990]: 692-93; Ray Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance in Sixteenth-Century
Ming China, Cambridge Studies in Chinese History, Literature and Institutions [London:
Cambridge University Press, 1974], 313-16). Brewer asserts that the British tax collection
system was not professionalized until the eighteenth century at the earliest; even in 1690
the excise administration consisted of only 51 bureaucrats and 1262 full-time collectors,
though these numbers grew to 309 and 4601 by 1783 (John Brewer, The Sinews of Power:
War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 [Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1988], 91).
putes-served to legitimate the innovations inherent in the new systems.

Direct administration of the whole empire's taxes by the central
finance bureaus, however, was a task far greater in scope than del-
egation of revenue collection to a timariot class limited in numbers
and personally beholden to the sultan, and treating the two as inter-
changeable could not succeed. 81 Orderly and efficient collection of
taxes in this period was impossible without a larger and better-con-
trolled fiscal bureaucracy. To conduct sometimes annual censuses of
an empire of perhaps 20 or 30 million people and to collect cizye
taxes which differed from place to place and avanz taxes which varied
in amount from person to person, from village to village, and from
year to year, the Ottoman finance administration had a permanent staff
of a little over 23 individuals and a large number of part-time as-
sistants from the military and civilian populations. 82 At the same time,
with a staff of about 49, it attempted to control hundreds of tax farmers,
many assigned in the provinces, whose collection rights changed hands
once a year or even more frequently. This was an ambitious under-
taking, and it is not surprising that many errors were made or that
amateur collectors with little or no supervision were sometimes able
to get away with extortion or abuse.
To address the question of a decline in moral standards in the askeri
class would require a very different study than this one. It is not
necessary to postulate such a decline, however, to explain the majority
of the problems facing the finance officials in this period; the ·size of
the task they set themselves is explanation enough. In the second half
of the century the attempt was abandoned, perhaps because it proved
impossible, and perhaps also because the state began to employ other
ways of harnessing the services and loyalties of those who admin-
istered its revenues. Central finance department control over tax
collection broadened in the first half of the seventeenth century, at
the same time that, according to Kunt, the palace exercised influence
over provincial governorships; after 1656, according to Abou-El-Haj,
control over high office passed to retainers of the great men of state,
and it is not unreasonable to believe that control over tax collection
altered as well. 83 Barkey's model of state consolidation through
81 Moreover, the very growth of the state may have given the reaya "both increased
capacity to protest and new reasons to do so" (Root, Peasants and King in Burgundy, 21).
82 The figure of 23 staff represents the salaried scribes of the mevkufat and muha-
sebe-i cizye bureaus in the 1030s/1620s. The mukataa bureaus of the same era had a
salaried staff of at most 49.
83 Kunt, The Sultan's Servants; Abou-El-Haj, The 1703 Rebellion, 43-49.
280 CHAPTER EIGHT
negotiation implies a new organization of revenue collection and

distribution to support deals made for participation in governance
after mid-century. Before then, however, the problems of direct tax
collection became pervasive enough to generate a large number of
complaints and to make accurate assessment and fair collection both
economically and politically desirable to those responsible for dealing
with these complaints.
The dismay of government officials confronted with large numbers
of petitions and the wide array of problems they represented is not
hard to comprehend. Comparing this sea of difficulties to the tight
control implied by the terse kanun and regular tahrirs of an earlier
period, they could easily have concluded that the empire was in decline,
that central government power was fading, and that provincial
officialdom was a morass of iniquity. There may, however, be another
interpretation for these phenomena. In the traditional petition process
of the Near East, the central government formed a court of last resort
for people whose attempts to obtain justice elsewhere had failed. Thus,
a petition's arrival at the capital could be interpreted as the break-
down of provincial administration, incapacity or corruption on the
part of local landholders, lower-level officials, and the judicial net-
work. Centralizing the fiscal administration invalidated this interpre-
tation. Over the period 1560-1660, as the finance department became
more involved in tax assessment and collection, its intervention became
increasingly necessary for solving taxation problems. Cizye surveys
took the place of timar tahrirs; avanz taxes, administered by central
officials rather than by timar-holders, were collected more frequently
and from a broader segment of the population; and tax farming was
controlled by the central bureaus. These changes created a greater
need for central government authorization and documentation on tax
matters, making the capital increasingly the first resort of both offi-
cials and_ the populace. Petitioning the central government came to
represent, not the failure of other levels of authority, but their subordina-
tion to the imperial level in tax matters. In addition, the regular need
for finance department documentation implies a growth in orderliness
and impersonal procedure, a rule of law----or at least of regulation-
supplanting the more personal and local government of a bygone era.
The flood of petitions to the center, heretofore taken as evidence of
growing chaos, may in fact be evidence of increasing regularity in
government operation.
CHAPTER NINE
REVENUE-RAISING AND LEGITIMACY
The sovereign cannot rule without troops,

He has no troops without money,
There is no money if the land is not prosperous,
The land will not prosper without good and just government,
Therefore one cannot reign except by justice.
Hasan Kafi al-Akhisari
Hundreds, even thousands, of petitions from all over the empire were
recorded in Ottoman registers year after year. They document the fact
that Ottoman subjects were able to protest the actions of government
and make their wishes known from within the system, and that they
took advantage of this ability. 1 Moreover, they successfully induced
the government to alter its behavior. In the Ottoman Empire, peti-
tioning the ruler was not a mere formality; it generated lasting and
sometimes wide-ranging changes in the application of the laws and
regulations of the empire. The initiative for making such changes
came primarily from the local level. It was most often the taxpaying
reaya who initiated a request or pointed out a problem, and their
petitions often contained some suggestion for a solution. Of the 625
entries in register KK 2576, there are only two or three in which a
course of action proposed by petitioners was rejected by central officials.
This makes sense in view of the limitations on communication in pre-
industrial society. 2 As far as the finance scribes were aware, the
information in their registers was correct and up to date, and they
1
Studies of complaints indicate that petitioners knew what was legal and how illegality
should be dealt with (Gerber, State, Society, and Law, 162-63). The principal scholar who
has studied Ottoman response to complaints is Inalcik; see his "~ikayet Hakk1," "Turkish
and Iranian Political Theories," "State and Ideology under Siileyman I," and "Village,
Peasant and Empire." E.P. Thompson has demonstrated for England the existence of a
popular consensus defining what was legitimate and the endorsement of that consensus
by the ruling class ("The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,"
in Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture [New York: The New
Press, 1991], 188-208).
2 On these difficulties see Bruce McGowan, "Ottoman Political Communication," in
Propq,ganda and Communication in World History, vol. 1: The Symbolic Instrument in

282 CHAPTER NINE
depended on input from outside to adjust it. Only people on the spot,
local officials or villagers and townspeople themselves, were familiar
enough· with local conditions to know what constituted a reasonable
response to changing circumstances. The central government relied
heavily on the initiative of people in the provinces for information
and for suggestions as to what to do or whom to appoint to positions.
As a matter of policy, petitioners were given the benefit of the doubt.
It is probable that the number of petitions not acted upon was small,
and that most requests for tax remission were granted.
Knowing the financial condition of the Ottoman treasury in the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, this should surprise us. Fi-
nance officials were well aware of the size of the deficit. Fiscally,
the government's interest lay in increasing revenue as much as possible.
Why would a government so badly in need of income act against its
own interests by reducing people's taxes? The answer must be that
it had an interest more important than raising money, a need for le-
gitimation which became particularly acute in the circumstances of
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.
In the decline paradigm, the multiplication of complaints is usually
taken as evidence of a breakdown in government, a lapse of central
control over tax collection in the provinces due to corruption in the
bureaucracy, attributable ultimately to sultanic inadequacy: "The fish
begins to stink at the head." Although, as we have seen, complaints
and their language cannot always be taken at face value, the existence
of a petition marks a problem somewhere in the system. Studies of
decline as a trope in the Ottoman literary genre of mirrors for princes
find that the Ottoman state is often described in metaphors of the
human body or the life cycle, where decline consists of an imbalance
of humors or a progression from maturity toward senescence, decay,
and death. 3 Complaints about extortionate taxation and oppression by
state officials signal threats to the balance of the social order, or to
the proper hierarchy of society, or to the health of the body politic.
In this concept of state and society, threats posed by taxation problems
are minor in comparison to the incapacity of Ottoman sultans, usur-
pation of their authority by their own servants or by members of the
Early Times, ed. Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and Hans Speier, An East-West
Center Book (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1979), 446, 482-88.
3
Douglas A. Howard, "With Gibbon in the Garden: Decline, Death and The Sick Man
of Europe," Fides et Historia 26 (1994): 22-37.
REVENUE-RAISING AND LEGITIMACY 283
harem, or adulteration of the ranks of timar holders and janissaries

by unqualified outsiders, all of which represent the overturn of the
proper order of being. There was, however, another Ottoman model
of the state in which taxation and its difficulties played a more central
role, the model of the Near Eastern concept of state, as encapsulated
in the quotation from Akhisari at the head of the chapter.
Reverzue and Legitimacy: The Circle of Justice
Muslim writers traced the Near Eastern concept of state to the

Sasanians, but elements of this concept can be identified in the earliest
royal inscriptions and lawcodes of the Sumerians and Babylonians,
for whom divine favor, military strength, productivity and justice were
inextricably bound together. The Sasanians related these qualities to
their understanding of social hierarchy as reflecting the order of the
supernatural and natural universe and to their definition of justice as
the maintenance of that social hierarchy. Though of pre-Islamic origin,
the Near Eastern concept of state became part of Islamic political
thought from a very early date; Muslim writers from Ibn al-Muqaffa<
to al-Mawardi to Ibn Khaldun employed it to describe the caliphate
from the point of view of duties (as opposed to selection of a can-
didate, which had to conform to Qur'anic and/or historical norms). 4
The definition of justice and social order was expanded to include
the implementation of Islamic law, and divine favor was redefined
in Islamic terms. Thus expanded, the elements of the concept could
be written around the edge of a circle, emphasizing the interdepen-
dency of royal authority, military power, the state treasury, the pro-
duction of wealth by the subjects, and the justice of the ruler under
the holy law which granted him authority. The Ottoman philosopher
Kmahzade reproduced one such circle, labeling it daire-i adliye, the
Circle of Justice or Cycle of Equity. 5
4
The tacit use of this essentially pre-Islamic concept by al-Mawardi is particularly
interesting, since his work has been considered as the embodiment of Islamic political
norms; see al-Mawardi, al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya, trans. E. Fagnan as Les statuts
gouvernemen-taux, ou Reg/es de droit public et administratif (Algiers: Librairie de
l'Universite, 1915), 3~31.
5 Kmahzade Ali ~elebi, Ahlak-i 'Ala'f, 3 vols. (Bulaq: Matbaa-i Bulaq, 1248/1833),
3: 49; see Cornell H. Fleischer, "Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism, and 'Ibn Khaldunism'
in Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Letters," Journal of Asian and African Studies 18 (1983):
198-220.
284 CHAPfER NINE
In this concept, the ruler's provision of justice and good admin-

istration was necessary to create the prosperous conditions under which
peasants, artisans, and merchants could produce a surplus to be garnered
as taxes. Those conditions included internal security, an infrastructure
of roads, markets, and irrigation works, regular landholding proce-
dures, a reliable legal system, and social stability, as well as protec-
tion from foreign invaders, marauding soldiers, bandits, oppressive
overlords or officials, and greedy tax collectors. This protection was
extended to all subjects regardless of religion, language, or social
status. The surplus went to the treasury, managed by officials, and
paid for troops who protected the land and provided the security. If
the circle was complete, with all elements functioning properly, the
system worked to maintain peace and prosperity. Trouble at any point
alerted those in power to a break in the circle. For example, a military
rebellion might signal that the treasury was not delivering the soldiers'
pay, a condition that could be caused either by corruption among
officials or peasant inability to produce a surplus. Such inability in
tum might be due either to natural causes or to unchecked depreda-
tions by landlords, officials, the military, or external enemies. Petitions
from the taxpayers requesting remissions were a warning that those
responsible for "justice and good administration," the rulers, had not
provided the conditions necessary for the production of a surplus. The
petition, then, was a device for calling the power of the ruler into
action in order to correct the eccentricities of the circle. His failure
to respond adequately called into question his own legitimacy as the
pinnacle of the structure.
Some studies of the Circle of Justice focus on a definition of justice
as maintenance of the social order and, relating it to the unchanging
order of the universe, emphasize the conservative and repressive ten-
dencies of this ideology. This interpretation may result from an initial
examination of the Near Eastern concept of state through Iranian
sources, which do stress a strictly hierarchical model. The idea that
enforcing justi~e meant keeping everyone in his place and preventing
social and other forms of mobility was certainly present in Ottoman
thought. The Ottomans' definition of justice, however, was broader
than this: social order required that each position in the social hier-
archy have its proper function, which could only be performed under
appropriate conditions; maintaining those conditions became a nec-
essary corollary. This concept of state functioned simultaneously to
legitimize and restrain power, as rulers needed money to secure the
loyalty of the army, and money was only forthcoming if the taxpayers
were protected. 6 The ideology of the Circle of Justice included within
itself the possibilities of both consent and resistance. 7
Calls for justice on the part of the ruler were not, of course, restricted
to the Near East. European royal imagery saw justice as the jewel
in the crown of a Christian king, and the right of petition, however
bounded and limited, was never eliminated completely. 8 In fact, the
metaphor of the ruler as a fountain flowing with bounty and justice,
which might become poisoned or corrupted, was a powerful image
that, like the Near Eastern Circle, could be used to reinforce or critique
the monarch. 9 Nor was the myth of the "just king" simply a device
6
That royal protection was a genuine benefit in the seventeenth century is suggested
by the high cost of military defenses and the inability of dwellers in towns and fortified
sites to pay this cost themselves (Murphey, "Functioning of the Ottoman Army," 207).
For the dual use of this ideology see Fodor, "State and Society, Crisis and Reform," 218;
Engin D. Akarh, "The State as a Socio-Cultural Phenomenon and Political Participation
in Turkey," in Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Prob-
lems, ed. Engin D. Akarh and Gabriel Ben-Dor (Istanbul: Bogazi~i University, Department
of Social Sciences, 1975), 141. For the Iranian version see Ann K.S. Lambton, "Justice
in the Medieval Persian Theory of Kingship," Studia Islamica 17 (1962): 91-119. A
general study of the use of dominant discourses by subordinates to challenge hegemonic
institutions is Bruce Lincoln's Discourse and the Construction of Society: Comparative
Studies of Myth, Ritual, and Classification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
7
Hurl islamoglu-inan allows for consent ("Introduction: 'Oriental Despotism' in World-
System Perspective," in The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy, ed. Hurl islamoglu-
inan, Studies in Modem Capitalism [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987], 20-
21). In wondering whether taxpayers were aware of the extent of their options, it is well
to remember "the role of culturally rooted traditions of rural protest" (Edmund Burke III
and Walter Goldfrank, "Introduction," in Global Crises and Social Movements: Artisans,
Peasants, Populists, and the World Economy, ed. Edmund Burke ill [Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1988], 6). According to Steven Feierman, even the selection of a form of discourse
is not a passive act (Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania [Madi-
son: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990], 3). What Miller says about Europe is just as
true of the Ottoman Empire: "The effectiveness of any premodem regime depended at
least as much on the subject's acceptance as on the monarch's iJOWer of coercion" (John
Miller, Absolutism in Seventeenth-Century Europe [Basingstoke: Macmillan Education,
1990], 13).
8 For a comprehensive discussion of European ideologies of justice and protest see
Yves-Marie Berce, Revolt and Revolution in Early Modern Europe: An Essay on the
History of Political Violence, trans. Joseph Bergin (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1987), 4-33. Monarchs could demonstrate their justice in a variety of ways; the
Spanish kings appealed to the loyalty of their subjects by granting town charters and
decentralizing authority (Nader, Liberty in Absolutist Spain, 1).
9 In seventeenth-century England, "the language of corruption provided a powerful
mode of criticism and challange to the court and the king in a society shaped by order
and consensus" (Linda Levy Peck, Court Patronage and Corruption in Early Stuart England
[Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990], 11). For Ottoman use of the language of corruption and
286 CHAPTER NINE
on the part of monarchs or elites for repressing dissent; the moral

economy of the peasant also included a vision of justice. 10 Often enough,
however, this vision represented a hope or longing impossible to realize,
not an element of practical politics. Its king was "far away," and
requesting justice was expensive if not impossible; in Russia and British
India, peasants who petitioned the government were punished.U An
unjust ruler, however, was bound to be unsuccessful as well, unable
to command, from his major revenue source, the means of preserving
the empire against revolt or invasion. A European "circle" of the early
seventeenth century points to commercial sources of revenue: "It is
impossible to make war without arms, to support men without pay,
to pay them without tribute, to collect tribute without trade. " 12 In place
of this justification for mercantilism, the Ottoman Empire's ideology
of state embodied a vision of agrarian-oriented justice; only the Chi-
nese mandate of heaven tied the provision of justice to the peasants
more closely to royal legitimacy.
The definition of justice as the maintenance of conditions necessary
for cultivation can be found, combined with other ways of concep-
tualizing the state and its functions, throughout Ottoman political
decline see Cornell H. Fleischer, "From ~ehzade Korkud to Mustafa Ali: Cultural Origins
of the Nasihatname," in Ill. Congress on the Social and Economic History of Turkey,
ed. Heath W. Lowry and Ralph S. Hattox, Varia Turcica 15 (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1990),
74; and Cemal Kafadar, "On the Purity and Corruption of the Janissaries," Turkish Studies
Association Bulletin 15 (1991): 273-80. "Decline" in this sense is decline from a high
ideal, not from some former reality; in those terms every age is an age of decline (Fleischer,
"The Lawgiver as Messiah," 174).
10
For Europe see Eric J. Hobsbawm, "Peasants and Politics," Journal of Peasant Studies
1 (1973): 14; for Asia see James C. Scott, "Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance,"
Journal of Peasant Studies 13, no. 2 (1985/86): 9.
11
Daniel Field, Rebels in the Name of the Tsar (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), 19;
Berce, Revolt and Revolution in Early Modern Europe, 6-9; Michael Adas, "Market Demand
Versus Imperial Control: Colonial Contradictions and the Origins of Agrarian Protest in
South and Southeast Asia," in Global Crises and Social Movements: Artisans, Peasants,
Populists, and the World Economy, ed. Edmund Burke, Ill (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1988), 101.
12
Antoine Montchrestien, cited in Tilly, "Routine Conflicts and Peasant Rebellions,"
20. In much of Europe, the king's justice was connected with, his possession of land and
his position as supreme magistrate; for Prussia royal justice is defined as "the income-
yielding protection of established rights and privileges in the realm" (Rosenberg, Bureau-
cracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy, 4). An exception was Spain, where the sovereign was
bound to rule and defend the people, to administer justice, and to care for the common
good, which was thought to include spending tax revenues on roads, bridges, irrigation
works, and flood control; public buildings and town walls; salaries of public officials; and
internal and external peace (John Laures, The Political Economy of Juan de Mariana [New
York: Fordham University Press, 1928], 172-74.. 187).
literature, beginning with fourteenth-century translations of older

classics of political thought. 13 The fifteenth-century historian Tursun
Beg, in the introduction to his history of Mehmed the Conqueror,
stated that the ruler was to repay his debt of gratitude to God for
appointing him to high position by developing the moral virtues of
wisdom, courage, and justice; an important component of justice was
restraint in taxation. 14 This statement supported and justified the imperial
system, but at the same time embodied (and was meant to embody)
Tursun's critique of recent tax policies. The sixteenth-century grand
vizier Liitfi Pa§a' s book of advice also reflected both criticism and
support for imperial administration: "The sultanate runs on the treas-
ury, and the treasury runs on good management; it does not run on
tyranny." 15 The preamble to the 925/1519 kanunname for Trablus-
Sam stated that justice was "bonded in the character of the Ottoman
sultans," and that it would be carried out "by relieving them (the
reaya) of injustice and reconciling them (to the ruler) through the right
and proper action, and by ascertaining what is canonically permissible
to give in the form of jizya, 'ushr, and kharaj." 16 Sultan Murad III
(1574-1595) was famous even in Europe for his justice, based on
reestablishment of a government of law and right religion after the
transgressions of Selim II (1566-1574). 17 The council hall in Topkap1
Palace, where petitions were read, was built with open walls to
symbolize free access of the empire's subjects to imperial justice. 18
Liitfi Pa§a's contemporary, the historian Celalzade, universalized the
Circle of Justice by attributing to it Greek and Persian as well as
Islamic antecedents. 19 Likewise, Akhisari attributed the version at the
13 Fodor, "State and Society, Crisis and Reform," 220.

14
Tursun Beg, The History of Mehmed the Conqueror, trans. Halil Inalcik and Rhoads
Murphey (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1978), 21-23.
15
Liitfi. Pa§a, Das Asa/name des Lutfl Pascha, ed. and trans. Rudolf Tschudi (Leipzig:
W. Drugulin, 1910).
16 Rifa<at cAli Abou-El-Haj, "Aspects of the Legitimation of Ottoman Rule as Reflected
in the Preambles to Two Early Liva Kanunnameler," Turcica 21-23 (1991): 376.
17 Lucette Valensi, "The Making of a Political Paradigm: The Ottoman State and Oriental
Despotism," in The Transmission of Culture in Early Modern Europe, ed. Anthony Granton
and Ann Blair, Shelby Cullom Davis Center for Historical Studies, Princeton University
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 185.
18
Necipoglu, Architecture, Ceremonial and Power, 84.
19 Ahmet Ugur, Osmanlz Siyaset-Nameleri (Ankara?: Kultur ve Sanat Yaymlan, 1985?),
168; Fleischer, "Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism, and 'Ibn Khaldfinism' ," 201. The
concept had Turkic antecedents as well, for which see Halil Inalcik, "Kutadgu Bilig'de
Tiirk ve iran Siyaset Nazariye ve Gelenekleri," in Re§it Rahmeti Arat i~in (Ankara: Ttirk
Ki.ilttirtinii Ara§trrma Enstittisti, 1966), 259-75, trans. as "Turkish and Iranian Political
288 CHAPTER NINE
head of this chapter to the Sasanian ruler Ardashir and set it in the
context of an admonition from the Prophet Muhammad concerning
the need to govern with equity and justice. 20 The ruler's justice was
even considered to validate holding Friday prayers in his name and
thus to legitimize the public ritual of faith. 21
In Ottoman political literature, the Circle of Justice came into its
own in the works of the commentators and advice writers of the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Ottoman writers comment-
ing on the critical conditions of the period found it useful as an ana-
lytical tool, to pinpoint areas of weakness in the state, and as a call
to action. According to Mustafa Ali, writing during a time of war,
justice meant putting things in the places where they belong; accord-
ingly, for the sultans, who were concerned with "the well-being of
the subjects and the prosperity of the victorious army," justice meant
keeping "an eye on the statesmen," while for viziers, justice meant
"preventing the tyranny of the oppression-prone administrators, and
in particular to make strong efforts for the improvement of the state
of the poor" and to "provide for the life necessities of the country's
population in general. " 22 The poet Veys!, around the tum of the century,
wrote that "the source of appropriate action for the padishah is justice
and equity ... oppression and injustice cause the subjects to disperse. " 23
Not only sultans but the common people as well came in for criticism
by Selaniki on this account: "The common people have abandoned
dealing equitably and acting justly with each other. There remains no
way or possibility for the produce of the Protected Domains to be
collected." Rulers did not escape his critique, however; their rapacity
was presented as the cause of the infertility of the land and the
Theories and Traditions in Kutadgu Bilig," in The Middle East and the Balkans under
the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society, Indiana University Turkish Studies
and Turkish Ministry of Culture Joint Series, 9 (Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish
Studies, 1993), 1-18; Robert Dankoff, Introduction to Wisdom of Royal Glory (Kutadgu
Bilig): A Turko-Islamic Mirror for Princes, by Yusuf Khass Hajib, Publications of the
Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 16 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983),
3-9.
20
Garcin de Tassy, "Principes de Sagesse, touchant l'art de gouvemer," Journal Asiatique
4 (1824): 219-20; on Akhisari see Mehmet ip§irli, "Hasan Kati el-Akhisari ve Devlet
Dilzenine ait Eseri UsQJu'l-Hikemfi Nizami'l-Alem," Tarih Enstitusu Dergisi 10-11 (1981):
239-78.
21
Abou-El-Haj, The 1703 Rebellion, 24.
22
Mustafa Ali, Mustafa Alf's Counsel for Sultans of 1581 (Nasihat al-Salatin), ed. and
trans. Andreas Tietze, Denkschriften der Philosophisch-Historische Klasse (Vienna: Verlag
der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1979), 18-19.
23
Quoted in Fodor, "State and Society, Crisis and Reform," 237.
inadequacy of the Nile flood. 24 The anonymous Kitab-z Mustetab,

written about 1620, contains the verse, "It is justice, justice, justice,
that gives the subjects rest," and according to Hzrzu'l-Muluk, "the
permanency of the sultanate is justice. "25 In Ko~i Bey's opinion, justice
was the reason for length of life; writing in 1632, he quoted the old
saw, "The world will endure with unbelief but not with injustice."26
For Katip ~elebi, kingship and property could not exist without the
military, nor the military without the sword, nor the sword without
money, nor money without the people, nor the people without jus-
tice. 27 The famous historian Naima also cited the Circle of Justice,
attributing it to Kmahzade and lbn Khaldun, and the employment of
the concept continued into the eighteenth century in the work of San
Mehmed the Defterdar. 28
The work of the finance department, the equitable allocation and
proper collection of taxes, held a special place in the ideology of the
Circle of Justice. That place was defined by Aziz Efendi in his 1630s
analysis of the Ottoman state: if taxes are collected "from everyone
alike without fear or dread ... the wounds of the poor tax-payers will
be relieved, and not only will the villages previously abandoned again
produce their full share of revenues for the treasury, but in this era
of justice, the ruler Nushirevan will rest in the retreat of oblivion and
forgetfulness in comparison, and the tax-paying populace, because
they have found comfort and ease, will engage themselves day and
night in singing the praises of the sovereign. Moreover, since the
treasury will be filled on time, and since the fruit of the trees of his
heart which is justice and equity increases day by day," God will
reward the ruler with Paradise. 29 For all these thinkers, an empty
24
Peachy, "A Year in Selaniki's History," 359, 286.
25 Adllletdir adllletdir adlllet/Ki ta asude-hal ola ra'iyyet, in Ya§ar Yiicel, ed., Osmanli
Dev/et Te§kilatma dair Kaynaklar, Atatiirk Kiiltiir, Oil ve Tarih Yiiksek Kurumu, Tiirk
Tarih Kurumu Yaymlar1, ser. 3, no. 13 (Ankara: Tiirk Tarih Kurumu Bas1mevi, 1988),
22; 176.
26
Ko~i Bey Risalesi, ed. Aksiit, 48.
27
Ugur, Osmanli Siyaset-Nameleri, 169.
28 On Naima see Lewis V. Thomas, A Study of Naima, ed. Norman Itzkowitz, NYU
Studies in Near Eastern Civilization, 4 (New York: New York University Press, 1972),
78; Fleischer, "Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism, and 'Ibn Khaldiinism' ," 201. On San
Mehmed Pa§a, the Defterdar, see Ottoman Statecraft: The Book of Counsel for Vezirs and
Governors, ed. and trans., W.L. Wright, Jr. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1935;
rpt. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971 ), 119.
29 Murphey, ed., Kanun-Name-i Sultani Ii 'Azfz Efendi, 3, 23. It was not long after this
was written that the reassessment of the avar1z described in Chapter Three was made.
290 CHAPTER NINE
treasury reflected poverty in the countryside, and filling it again

necessitated meeting the needs of the peasant producers. The petitions
of taxpayers gave administrators vital information about the causes
of blockages in the flow of revenues. In Aziz Efendi' s view, for instance,
the main issue was not so much high taxes in themselves but inequi-
ties in tax collection that caused abandonment of cultivation, with the
result that tax revenues were not sufficient to pay the military. If the
sultan could remedy this problem through the exercise of justice, other
positive results would follow. 30 Thus, petitions were a form of protest
from within, signalling a need for the application of justice. 31 Bud-
getary deficits, a difficulty in themselves, also constituted a signal of
inequities in the system.
Taxpayers' petitions were not the only, or even the most significant,
sign that something was amiss in the empire. Peasant flight from the
land, as Aziz Efendi noted, was disastrous in its implications for the
treasury. Moreover, refusal to participate in the creation of a surplus
was tantamount to resistance or agrarian strike, somewhere on a
continuum that began with foot-dragging and ended with peasant
rebellion. 32 Although in the Ottoman case there were a number of
"pull factors" inducing peasants to leave the land, discussion of flight
focused on its negative impact on agriculture and its function as a
protest against injustice. In the early seventeenth century, flight from
the land was perceived as having grown to unacceptable proportions;
the years from 1603 to 1608 were known as "The Great Flight" (Buyilk
30
Abou-El-Haj has theorized (in "Nature of the Ottoman State") that the Ottoman class
structure was in the process of changing, although the old model of class structure continued
to be held up as an ideal; so, too, the ideal of justice inherited from the past continued
to be pursued, even as its attainment grew less likely.
31
Faroqhi has also commented on the political nature of the complaint process ("Po-
litical Initiatives 'From the Bottom Up'," 27; see also Scott, "Everyday Forms of Peasant
Resistance," 22; Amy Singer, Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Officials: Rural Admin-
istration around Sixteenth-Century Jerusalem, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization
[Cambridge University Press, 1994]). Nathan J. Brown, in studying Egyptian peasants,
classifies petitioning as a form of resistance by "legal and institutional action," as opposed
to "atomistic" or "communal" actions or actual revolt and revolution (Peasant Politics
in Modern Egypt: The Struggle Against the State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990),
7-8. In a country with a well-developed legal system, court cases can also be seen as
a form of protest from within the system (Root, Peasants and King in Burgundy, 3).
32
Matkovski, "La resistance des pay sans macedoniens." Students of peasant life in
other parts of the globe have written extensively on migration and flight as means of
protest: A.J. Asiwaju, "Migrations as Revolt: The Example of the Ivory Coast and the
Upper Volta before 1945," Journal of African History 4 (1976): 577-94; Hobsbawm,
"Peasants and Politics," 14; Scott, "Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance," 22; Adas,
"Market Demand Versus Imperial Control," 99-100. On peasant rebellion see Roland E.
Ka~gun) in Anatolia. An inspection of timars done in 1632-1633

uncovered a large number of timars which were unproductive because
they had become uninhabited. 33 The very ease of escape from the
village to pursue an alternative career seems to have contributed to
the absence of actual rebellion. 34 We do not yet know how many reaya
left the land, or how the problem differed from place to place or time
to time within the empire, or whether the flight was temporary or
permanent. What we do know is that peasant flight filled Ottoman
officials with consternation and caused them to seek remedies. The
officials were undoubtedly motivated by practical considerations, as
abandoned lands could support neither timar holders nor the treasury.
At the same time, however, flight from the land represented a protest
against rural conditions of overtaxation, illegal impositions, and
banditry, a statement that justice did not extend to the countryside.
As a protest, the threat of flight, which became a commonplace in
tax-related petitions, was almost equivalent to flight itself. 35 The
conditions necessary for production were not available, and if the
sultan did not provide them he could no longer be considered legiti-
mate. Thus, depositions and assassinations of sultans during this period
can be seen as restorative rather than disruptive acts. The system of
governance as a whole was not challenged, as the absence of justice
and provision was interpreted as a temporary rather than a systemic
phenomenon, but the pursuit of justice might demand replacement of
an individual ruler. For that reason, the image of the just king led
astray by his advisors was often invoked, both by rulers in self-
Mousnier, Peasant Uprisings in Seventeenth-Century France, Russia, and China, trans.

Brian Pearce (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).
33 Howard, "Timar System and Its Transformation," 222-23. On the Great Flight see
Mustafa Akdag, "Celali isyanlarmdan Biiyiik Ka~gunluk," Tarih Ara§tzrmalari Dergisi 2

(1964): 1-49; on landless vagrants and their military options see Mustafa Cezar, Osmanlz
Tarihinde Levendler, istanbul Giizel Sanatlar Akademisi Yaymlar1, 28 (Istanbul: ~elik
cilt Matbaas1, 1965); lnalcik, "Military and Fiscal Transformation"; on resettlement efforts
in the 1630s see Faroqhi, Towns and Townsmen in Ottoman Anatolia, 272-87. Accord-
ing to Ostapchuk, the most common non-military problem facing the Ottoman com-
mander of the Black Sea expedition of 1627 was peasant migration ("Ottoman Black Sea
Frontier," 260).
34 Suraiya Faroqhi, "Political Tensions in the Anatolian Countryside Around 1600: An
Attempt at Interpretation," in Tiirkische Miszellen: Festschrift Robert Anhegger, Varia

Turcica, 9 (Istanbul: Divit Press, 1987), 126; Barkey (Bandits and Bureaucrats, 90) em-
phasizes a lack of alliances with the landholding class.
35 For the increased bargaining power afforded by the threat of flight see Faroqhi,
"Political Activity among Ottoman Taxpayers," 28; Scott, "Everyday Forms of Peasant
Resistance," 22.
292 CHAPTER NINE
justification and by people attempting to mitigate or soften their

criticisms. 36
The most extreme form of ruler replacement was millenarianism,
the expectation of the end of the age and the imminent arrival of a
divine representative to "fill the world with justice as it is now filled
with iniquity. " 37 In a sense, millenarianism did not challenge absolute
rule as such but sought to replace a human, fallible ruler with another,
more perfect one in a way that could not be construed as treasonous.
By the end of the sixteenth century, messianic hopes raised by the
reign of Siileyman had been bitterly disappointed, and the millennium,
the year 1000/1591-92, found the empire militarily and economically
in sad straits. 38 The great Jewish messianic movement of Sabbatai
Sevi in the mid-seventeenth century swept up tens of thousands of
Ottoman subjects, largely Jews but also non-Jews, in imminent ex-
pectation of a better age, and it was followed by several smaller im-
itations. Adherence to heterodox religious sects, puritanism, and the
clothing of calls for justice in religious terms were equally forms of
protest, if less dramatic. 39 The Kizdba§ and extremist Sufi beliefs that
attracted so many in the countryside were easily transformed into
ideologies of protest and demands for justice.40 The seventeenth-century
preaching of the Kad1zadelis, besides being part of a religious dispute
and an extension of factional Istanbul politics, was also a religious
reaction against the distress of the times and a quest for restoration
of divine favor, lost because of the iniquity and impure religion of
the sultan, his advisors, Sufi leaders, and large portions of the Istanbul
populace. Even sultans who did not much favor the Kad1zadelis, like
Murad IV, could be induced to implement at least portions of their
36
For the use of this device in the Ottoman context, see Faroqhi, "Political Activity
among Ottoman Taxpayers," 16; for Russia, Field, Rebels in the Name of the Tsar, 14;
for France, Berce, Revolt and Revolution in Early Modern Europe, 31.
37
For religion as resistance. see Hobsbawm, "Peasants and Politics," 16; Scott, "Every-
day Forms of Peasant Resistance," 29.
38
For Siileymanic messianism see Fleischer, "The Lawgiver as Messiah," 159-77.
39
J. Michael Hayden, "Rural Resistance to Central Authority in Seventeenth-Century
France," Canadian Journal of History 26 (1991): 7-20. In France, rebellion against taxes
could be seen as an act of ritual purification that would bring in the golden age (Yves-
Marie Berce, History of Peasant Revolts: The Social Origins of Rebellion in Early Modern
France, trans. Amanda Whitmore (Cambridge: Polity Press/Basil Blackwell, 1990), 272-
76. On the radical use of tradition see Craig Jackson Calhoun, "The Radicalism of Tradition:
Community Strength or Venerable Disguise and Borrowed Language?" American Journal
of Sociology 5 (1983): 886-914.
40
Examples are the ~eyh Bedreddin and ~ah Kulu rebellions, while the original Celalis
were part of a series of Kmlba§ revolts supporting the Safavi heterodoxy.
program, lest they be regarded as unbelievers, unqualified to rule. 41

Disruptions among the military forces were still more alarming,
manifesting directly the reign of injustice. Traditional timar cavalry
forces had proved both ineffective in battle and resistant to control,
as large numbers failed to appear at muster. Discharged units of the
infantry, trained and armed with new and more effective gunpowder
weapons, preyed on towns and countryside, forming the bandit gangs
known as Celalis. 42 Among the bandits were sipahis whose timar
revenues had been lost for nonperformance as well as mercenaries
of reaya origin, dismissed without means of support at the end of
campaigns. These Celalis took over portions of the countryside, col-
lecting the revenues for themselves, extorting more, and barring ac-
cess by tax collectors and government o:fficials. 43 Nor was this Celali
activity the only mark of dissatisfaction among the military. Units of
the standing army, no longer satisfied with protests over unpaid salaries,
took it upon themselves to interfere in government. For some time
the janissaries had taken an active part in choosing high officials such
as viziers and defterdars, rioting against and even killing those whose
policies they disliked. 44 In the early seventeenth century they extended
this behavior even to the sultanate; they were the principal actors in
the deposition and death of Osman II in 1622, they violently opposed
the policies of Murad IV, and in mid-century they battled the palace
cavalry in support of Kosem Sultan's attempt to dethrone Mehmed
IV. The uncontrollability of the military forces, more than their fail-
ure to win the war against Austria, presented a powerful challenge
to Ottoman governance in terms of the Circle of Justice. 45 The military's
41
Madeline C. Zilfi, The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical
Age (1600-1800 ), Studies in Middle Eastern History, 8 (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica,
1988).
42
On the Celalis see Akdag, Turk Halkzmn Dirlik ve Diizenlik Kavgasz; Griswold, The
Great Anatolian Rebellion; Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats.
43
In folk culture, bandits, such as the Balkan haiduks, are often celebrated as heroes
of resistance against the state (Scott, "Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance," 29). Judith
M. Wilks describes the epic metamorphosis of an Anatolian bandit into a just king in
"The Persianization of Koroglu: Banditry and Royalty in the Central Asian Versions of
the Koroglu Epic," (paper presented at the Middle East History and Theory Conference,
Chicago, 1993).
44 Devaluation of the coinage was also seen as injustice; for a dramatic description of
military intervention in government see Kafadar, "When Coins Turned Into Drops of
Blood."
45
The historian Solakzade developed this theme: see Rhoads Murphey, "Solakzade' s
Treatise of 1652: A Glimpse at Operational Principles Guiding the Ottoman State during
Times of Crisis," in V. Milletlerarasz Tiirkiye Sosyal ve iktisat Tarihi Kongresi, Tebligler,
294 CHAPTER NINE
turn from defending the realm to preying upon it betrayed the sultan's
loss of control over his own men and the treasury's fiscal incapacity,
as it was the absence of salary payments that set off revolt. If the
ruler could not maintain control, he was guilty of a double injustice
toward his subjects, creating the fiscal problem in the first place through
currency devaluation and then allowing further depredations by his
men. Barkey portrays the Ottoman state as wily and shrewd in its
negotiations with bandits, but perhaps it should be seen as worried
or desperate, because loss of control over the military, especially over
its operations inside the empire, like an empty treasury or petitions
from the subjects, threatened the sultan's very legitimacy.
The petitions from subjects, the emptiness of the treasury, the mili-
tary rebellions, the lack of success in the Long War with Austria, all
forced the men in charge to realize that the circle was beginning to
come apart. Adequate conditions for cultivation were not provided,
money to pay troops was unavailable, and the military's willingness
to defend the empire and maintain the peace was in doubt. The peasants'
reiterated threats to leave the land if their petitions were not granted
formed the fourth leg in the structure of injustice. The external threat
posed by Iran or Austria was secondary to the internal danger that
the interdependency between rulers and ruled would break down,
cultivation would stop, soldiers would go unpaid, and the ruler's power
would vanish. This was what decline meant in the seventeenth-century
works of advice literature, this was the threat that the empire urgent-
ly had to meet in order to survive, and this was why the Ottoman
government remitted taxes when it desperately needed the money. 46
Concessions to taxpayers, new rewards for officials, cooptation and
control of bandits and provincial officials, and new systems of military
organization and compensation all served to shore up the legitimacy
of the Ottoman state.
The Ottomans were highly flexible in their use of legitimizing
ideologies, and the Circle of Justice was not the only form in which
Atatiirk Killtiir, Dil ve Tarih Yiiksek Kurumu, Tiirk Tarih Kurumu Yaymlan, ser. 26,
no. 4 (Ankara: TUrk Tarih Kurumu Bas1mevi, 1990), 31.
46
James R. O'Connor points out that states "must try to fulfill two basic and often
mutually contradictory functions-accumulation and legitimization" (The Fiscal Crisis of
the State [New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973], 6). Faroqhi wonders if the Ottoman state
was aware of this contradiction ("Political Activity among Ottoman Taxpayers," 33), but
although it is fashionable in some circles to consider political ideologies as mere window-
dressing, the lies governments tell when they want to commit particularly outstanding
crimes, in this case we can actually see the government acting in accordance with its
ideology.
claims to legitimacy were organized. The late sixteenth century, the

end of the great conquests, brought into prominence several discourses
centering around ruling and lawgiving, building rather than conquer-
ing, maintaining rather than extending the faith and the realm-
ideologies which, like the Near Eastern concept of state, assumed a
sedentary and stable realm. 47 If, however, the Ottoman state's pro-
tection of the peasantry indeed "constituted the basis for the state's
absolute political authority,"48 the Circle of Justice was a crucial
political statement. Simultaneous challenge to all of its terms con-
veyed an ominous message to those in power. To stave off decay,
the empire's institutions had to be restored to the level of effectiveness
known at the time of Siileyman the Lawgiver, when Ottoman subjects
could believe that they served the World-Conqueror, the Restorer of
the Age. It was to restore confidence and faith in the system of
governance that the seventeenth-century commentators recommended
a return to the timar system of old, not because they necessarily believed
that timar cavalry would be successful against armies with gunpowder
weapons. 49 They also recommended a return to the tax levels of the
mid-sixteenth century, which was patently impossible. These recom-
mendations were treated as symbolic gestures by decision-makers:
governmental actions in the early seventeenth century were not de-
signed to restore a rigid, outdated hierarchy or the fiscal system of
the past, but rather to codify whatever order was necessary to bring
about social harmony and military success. 50 Serious regard was paid,
however, to their underlying motive, the need to repair the fortunes
of both ruling and subject classes, to restore military effectiveness,
47
A number of Ottoman forms of legitimation are discussed by Suraiya Faroqhi in "Die
Legitimation des Osmanensultans: Zur Beziehung von Religion, Kunst und Politik im 16.
und 17. Jahrhundert," Zeitschrift fer Turkeistudien 2 (1989): 49-67; idem, "Crisis and
Change," 609-22; Howard, "Ottoman Historiography and the Literature of 'Decline'," 56;
Peirce, Imperial Harem, 153; Fleischer, "The Lawgiver as Messiah," 160--61.
48
islamoglu-inan, "State and Peasants in the Ottoman Empire," 127; see also Inalcik,
"Village, Peasant and Empire," 149.
49
At least, that was one reason; better internal control of the provinces was doubtless
another, and a third one which has been suggested is that by so doing they were protecting
their class interests (Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the Modern State).
50
Howard has noted, however, that altering the timar system threatened kanun, its legal
base, and thus also the legitimacy of an empire founded on kanun. Moreover, the advice
works forbidding its alteration were written by members of the scribal corps, who saw
themselves uniquely as guardians of kanun, as the ulema were guardians of Islamic law,
and for whom kanun was the primary instrument of justice (Douglas A. Howard, "The
'Ruling Institution', Genre, and the Story of the Decline of the Ottoman Empire" [Grand
Rapids, MI: unpublished paper, 1992], 22, 28; idem, "Ottoman Historiography and the
Literature of 'Decline'," 59). Kanun here would have to be taken in the sense of the
296 CHAPTER NINE
and to improve morale. The seventeenth century's leadership vacuum

made attaining these objectives difficult, but much of the history of
the century can be seen as experiments aimed in that direction.
Middle Eastern rulers established legitimacy in a number of ways.
Besides announcing their names on coins and in the Friday sermon
(sikke and hutbe), they proclaimed their legitimacy and power in visual
terms through architecture and ceremonial.51 But rulers also commu-
nicated with their subjects through administrative procedure. Like ritual,
administrative procedure formed a link between the individual and the
larger society, an embodiment of political myth. 52 In administration,
the link was simultaneously symbolic and actual: taxation and the
provision of justice were at once manifestations and reliable indices
of the power and legitimacy of those in charge, revealing both the
extent of their control and the legality and morality with which they
exercised it. Administration spoke directly to the whole population
of the empire, unlike court ceremonial and palace architecture, viewed
mainly by the elite. Through his administration a ruler most effec-
tively gained or alienated the loyalty of his ordinary subjects.
A large minority of petitions to the finance department constituted
requests for reduction or remittance of taxes, and another significant
portion complained about the misbehavior of officials. In cases where
something could be done, the government sent orders to kad1s and
governors to do it: correct the registers or compile new ones, lower
tax assessments, investigate cases, chase down bandits, or remove
corrupt or incompetent officials. Not much could be done about
providing good weather and preventing crop failure, but taxes could
be and were remitted in order to leave the peasants their seed grain.
In addition, the government took the initiative by issuing justice decrees
(adaletnames) especially to correct official behavior and eliminate
Siileymanic kanunnames, not simply sultanic edicts in general. On the relationship be-
tween Islamic law, kanun, bureaucratization, and legitimacy see Fleischer, Bureaucrat and
Intellectual, 8; Gerber, State, Society, and Law, 63--04.
51
Necipoglu, Architecture, Ceremonial, and Power; Howard Crane, "The Ottoman
Sultan's Mosques: Icons of Imperial Legitimacy," in The Ottoman City and Its Parts:
Urban Structure and Social Order, ed. Irene A. Bierman, Rifa<at cAli Abou-El-Haj, and
Donald Preziosi, Subsidia Balcanica, Islamica et Turcica, 3 (New Rochelle, NY: Aristide
D. Caratzas, 1991), 173-243; Paula Sanders, Ritual, Politics, and the City in Fatimid
Cairo, SUNY Series in Middle East History (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994).
52
On political ritual see David I. Kertzer, Ritual, Politics and Power (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1988); Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, The Great Arch: English State
Formation as Cultural Revolution, rev. ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991 ).
abuses. 53 In the adaletnames the reasons for the actions taken, often
suppressed in responses to petitions, were made explicit: enforcement
of justice (adalet) and suppression of illegality (bid' at, here construed
as something contrary to Islamic law, kanun, the sultan's orders, and/
or the official registers). 54 Two constant themes in these adaletnames
were rectification of general problems in taxation and control of officials
such as timar holders, kad1s and their assistants, tax collectors, and
governors. Moreover, though addressed to high administrators, whose
job it was to monitor their subordinates, adaletnames were meant to
be read aloud so that the general public could hear and understand
them. Claims to legitimacy are addressed to audiences, and discus-
sions of justice in the advice literature were directed primarily toward
the ruling class. Putting justice into action by chastising administrators
and forgiving taxes, however, was a dramatization of legitimacy that
could be understood by the poorest and most illiterate subject, Muslim
or non-Muslim.
Declaring justice, of course, is not the same as seeing justice done.
In view of disturbed conditions in the countryside and the possibility
of disobedience to government orders by government officials, pre-
senting a petition and even obtaining a sultanic order might prove
ineffective in correcting injustice. 55 What, then, motivated townspeople
and villagers in a time of drastic inflation to scrape together the
often considerable sums required to send a representative to Istanbul
and push a petition through the obstacle course of bureaucratic pro-
cess?56 It was not certainty of redress, though the hope of it was not
53
Halil Inalcik has examined justice decrees and the correction of abuses in his article
"Adfiletnameler" (Beige/er 2, nos. 3-4 [1965]: 49-145).
54
An explicit reference to justice is rare in the finance department's responses to petitions,
but an exception occurs in MM 357 (20115), p. 136, where it was commanded that collection
be made with justice (be vech-i adalet cem ve tahsil edip). In another case, a village in
Trrhala subjected to double taxation by the sancak bey blew the whistle (izhar-1 tazalliim,
exposed the oppression) to a vizier who was making an inspection tour (tefti§), and as
a result, part of its levy was subtracted from the total owed (MM 2728 [3457], p. 67;
on tefti§ see Gerber, State, Society, and Law, 70; such inspections were also carried out
during the tahrir process).
55 Josef Matuz, "Transmission of Directives from the Center to the Periphery in the
Ottoman State from the Beginning until the Seventeenth Century," in Decision Making
in the Ottoman Empire, ed. Caesar Farah (Kirksville, MO: Thomas Jefferson University
Press, 1993), 19-27.
56 This question has been asked in another context by Faroqhi ("Political Initiatives
'From the Bottom Up'," 30--31 ); she cites the material benefits in "Political Activity
among Ottoman Taxpayers." As Haim Gerber points out, however, appeals to justice
expect to be met (State, Society, and Law, 163).
298 CHAPTER NINE
unreasonable. Petitioning was assuredly safer than armed revolt, where

failure tended to result in executions and exactions. It was probably
also more likely to be successful. 57 There was a purely pragmatic
justification in the need to seek relief from oppressive taxation, but
it is arguable that, to make it worth the cost, the process itself must
have had a powerful result in a less tangible sphere.
Considered as a weapon, the petition could become a tool against
the powerful. 58 It transformed the common people from victims into
actors, legitimizing them as essential parts of the political system and
delegitimizing corrupt officials, oppressive landlords, and stray ban-
dits. Petitions, especially those containing suggestions for change which
were essentially rubber-stamped by central officials, represented a
considerable amount of initiative on the part of the subject population,
although such initiative, recognizing the sultan's superior authority,
did not lead to autonomy. 59 Wittfogel has therefore categorized local
initiative under the rubric of "politically irrelevant freedoms." 60 Per-
haps, in the sense that the use of absolutist language disguised from
the participants the real power of the peasants and reinforced a
consciousness in which the overthrow of the sultanate was incon-
ceivable, villagers' petitions could be considered politically irrelevant.
If political irrelevance, however, means that through their use the
57
Small and ineffective though Ottoman administration might be, it was larger and
more effective than any contemporary government outside China. It was widely acknowl-
edged that the sultan's power of command outweighed that of any European king, his
nobility was more subordinate, his army greater, and his bureaucracy the marvel of all
observers; see Jean Bodin, The Six Bookes of a Commonweale, A Facsimile reprint of
the English translation of 1606 ... [by Richard Knolles], ed. Kenneth Douglas McRae
(rpt. ed., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).
58
Eisenstadt's analysis of the weapons of struggle available to peasants does not include
the petition process; he may have been seduced by the rhetoric of submission proper to
the petition (Eisenstadt, Political Systems of Empires, 213). The petition process itself
belies its submissive vocabulary; as Munck points out, "Anyone who has worked with
seventeenth-century sources will be only too aw are that the language used for complaints,
petitions and requests was highly rhetorical and formalised even to the point of stereo-
type ... intended specifically to create an overwhelming impression in the reader" (Thom-
as Munck, Seventeenth Century Europe: State, Conflict and the Social Order in Europe,
1598-1700, Macmillan History of Europe [London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1990], 28).
Even non-governmental sources such as the Jewish responsa literature suggest that Otto-
man subjects saw paying taxes as a way to ensure government protection (Shmuelevitz,
Jews of the Ottoman Empire, 108).
59
Sultanic edict also upheld customary law (lnalcik, "Orf," iA 9: 480; Haim Gerber,
"Sharia, Kanun and Custom in the Ottoman Law: The Court Records of 17th-Century
Bursa," International Journal of Turkish Studies 2, no. 1 [1981]: 131-147; idem, State,
Society, and Law, 124).
60
Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism, 124-25.
common people could not influence the distribution of resources or

call to book the abuses and misdeeds of officials, petitions were far
from being irrelevant to the political process. The initiative of the
subjects was an intrinsic part of political reality in Near Eastern empires,
actualizing the ruler's authority in a system lacking modem commu-
nications.61 For the Circle of Justice to be a true circle, all parts of
the political system had to be weighted equally. The petition process
constituted one means by which the weight of the peasantry could
make itself felt.
Revenue-Raising and Decline
Alterations in finance department procedures, documents, and admin-

istrative arrangements in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries indicate no decline either in standards or in technical ca-
pability over that period. Rather, they show that finance officials
responded in a reasonable and sometimes creative way to the chal-
lenges of economic change, fiscal difficulty, and widespread popular
dissatisfaction. Outside the field of finances, the legal system of the
seventeenth century continued to develop in the direction of merging
Islamic and sultanic law, meeting people's needs in a relatively
organized and honest manner. The government's negotiations with
bandits were not an indication of weakness but represented an inten-
sified effort to harness military elements for state purposes. Provincial
decentralization resulted from demarcation of borders and establish-
ment of garrison forces rather than loss of control. Changes in dy-
nastic family organization giving greater power to women were a
natural development of sedentarization, not the result of immorality
or folly. The decline of Aleppo as a commercial center was paralleled
by the rise of Izmir. 62 Increasingly, the evidence demands that we do
without decline or its euphemisms to describe and explain the events
61
Abou-El-Haj also comments on "the contradiction between the Ottoman theory of
power-wherein the sultans were absolute rulers-and the reality that evolved in the
second half of the seventeenth century" (The 1703 Rebellion, 6). He is talking about the
devolution of ruling authority on members of the government; nevertheless, the point that
we have been blinded by the rhetoric of absolutism is well taken.
62
Gerber, State, Society, and Law; Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats; Murphey, "Func-
tioning of the Ottoman Anny"; Peirce, Imperial Harem; Daniel Goffman, Izmir and the
Levantine World, 1550-1650, Publications on the Near East, 5 (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1990).
300 CHAPTER NINE
of this period. If we cannot avail ourselves of the catchall concept

of decline, we must find a way to discuss these developments that
allows for both positive internal development and international loss
of power, one that explains Ottoman inability to increase or even
maintain the size of the empire despite, rather than because of, the
changes of the seventeenth century. Many of the empire's problems
in the early seventeenth century can be related to the "seventeenth-
century crisis," but that was a temporary phenomenon from which
Ottoman economic production and exchange were to recover in a later
period. 63 Economic recovery, however, was not accompanied by
renewed military might, so a simple economic explanation is insuffi-
cient. The crisis paradigm seems better able to account for the problems
the empire faced than for the outcome of its efforts to solve them.
Theorists of the European state relate its development to the ex-
pansion of warfare and economic control in the early modem period. 64
The absolutist monarchs of seventeenth-century Europe, engaged in
a struggle to promote their military aims on a broader scale than ever
before, sought to maximize the effectiveness of their power, although
law and custom might limit its scope. 65 Having attained absolute rule
in the sense of freedom from domination by external powers such
as the pope, they attempted to assert their superiority to nobles and
representative bodies and their control over taxation, in order to acquire
the means of building armies and waging war. For this purpose, rulers
made efforts to expand the bureaucracy, subordinate the nobility,
harness the merchant class, domesticate or do without parliaments and
assemblies, and develop closer relations and better communications
with the provinces. Although these efforts were not always successful,
63
Gerber, Economy and Society in an Ottoman City: Bursa, 213; Faroqhi, "Crisis and
Change," 525.
64
Michael Mann, States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1988), ix; idem, Sources of Social Power. According to Tilly, it was
against the efforts of states to assemble the means of war that the French peasant rebellions
took place ("Routine Conflicts and Peasant Rebellions," 40).
65
A useful summary of an extensive scholarship is Nicholas Henshall, The Myth of
Absolutism: Change and Continuity in Early Modern European Monarchy (London:
Longman, 1992). Also helpful are James Daly, "The Idea of Absolute Monarchy in
Seventeenth-Century England," Historical Journal 21 (1978): 227-50; John Miller, "The
Potential for 'Absolutism' in Later Stuart England," History 69 (1984): 187-207; A. Lloyd
Moote, "The French Crown Versus Its Judicial and Financial Officials, 1615-83," Journal
of Modern History 34 (1962): 146-60; Ragnhild Hatton, ed., Louis XIV and Absolutism
(London: Macmillan Press, 1976); and James B. Collins, Fiscal Limits of Absolutism:
Direct Taxation in Early Seventeenth-Century France (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1988).
they did result in a greater degree of centralization and governmental

control. Seventeenth-century Ottoman financial administration can be
seen in this light as an extension of governmental control over the
taxation process for the purpose of building up the military. Ottoman
rulers had already subordinated their elites to a degree incredible to
westerners, and the shift from the timar system to centrally-operated
taxation mechanisms brought about, for a brief period at least, bureau-
cratic fiscal control. Thus, one way of regarding the Ottoman seven-
teenth century is as a culmination of some of the absolutist tendencies
of European society. This formulation accords with the thinking of
contemporary observers, for whom the Ottoman sultan was simply the
most absolute of the European monarchs, embodying the aspirations
of Renaissance political thought. 66 Despite wide abhorrence of its slave
system and non-Christian religion, the Ottoman Empire became in
many ways a model for absolutist monarchs.
Eventually, according to theorists of state formation, the emphasis
on amassing the means of war led to a general decline in the power
of tributary empires, including the Ottoman, as the national state became
a more successful form of organization for obtaining men and money. 67
Low communication and transportation technology had necessitated
the loose organization of empires, which left local administration and
finance to fairly autonomous regional powerholders; but if the means
of coercion were dispersed or overcome, the bonds holding provinces
to the state were so weak that the empire easily fragmented. A national
state, on the other hand, was impelled to develop close ties with its
territory through the processes of bargaining and negotiation by which
it harnessed the means of coercion, enabling it to provide services,
become involved in production, and exercise a much greater degree
of local control than an empire. 68 Increased ability to command the
means of war-men and money-permitted national states to outfight
66
Bodin, Six Bookes of a Commonweale, 201; Julian H. Franklin, Jean Bodin and the
Rise of Absolutist Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Friedrich
Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d' Etat and Its Place in Modern History,
trans. Douglas Scott (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), 86.
67
Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 15-25. Virginia H. Aksan, working
from an eighteenth-century viewpoint, has also commented on the relevance of Tilly's
work for Ottoman history ("Feeding the Troops in the 1768-74 Russo-Turkish War,"
Turkish Studies Association Bulletin 18 [ 1994]: 27). In the Ottoman case, war may actually
have drained the economy (Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change," 469).
68
Mechanisms by which national states attempted to obtain the necessary consent and
cooperation are discussed by Brewer, Sinews of Power; Henshall, Myth of Absolutism, 4.
302 CHAPTER NINE
both the large, loosely controlled empires and the better-organized but
miniscule city-states of an earlier age. The timing of this process has
been connected with the rise of capitalism and the monetarization of
the economy. As long as land ownership was the dominant form of
possession, real control could only be exerted over a limited territory,
but when the dominant form of property became money, which could
be transported to a single center, power could be shared and a larger
territory administered without decentralization. 69
Oddly enough, this analysis neglects the role of ideology in en-
abling states to harness resources. In the Ottoman Empire, for ex-
ample, the Near Eastern concept of state legitimized and institution-
alized the possibility of resistance to rulers and their policies.
Conversely, by constructing oppression as the particular injustice of
an individual ruler, it eliminated or lessened resistance to the imperial
form of government as a whole. 70 The result was an extremely stable
form of government, but one that could attract only a low level of
commitment from most of its subjects. Even that degree of commit-
ment was based on the government's performance: no rewards for the
elite and no justice for the populace meant no loyalty, no military
support, and no taxes. National ideologies, on the other hand, based
loyalty on invisible ties of blood, language, religion, culture, and history,
not state-related and existing independently of any particular govern-
ment or ruler. States that could plausibly mobilize such ideologies
were better able to command the loyalty, wealth, and military service
of their subjects even if the government was ineffectual or, indeed,
unjust. They thus had a better chance of coming out on top in the
warfare of the early modem period.
The Ottoman Empire may easily be described in terms of this model.
Because the government's ties to provincial notables and the notables'
relationship to the peasantry were both weak, the empire could not
recruit a people's army; popular loyalties did not engender a rush to
the colors. Probably the economy could not support the loss of a
substantial proportion of the empire's rather small population, and the
government did not have the means to increase economic output. Nor
69
Norbert Elias, State Formation and Civilization, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1993 ), 390-91.
70
Samir Amin argues that peasant protests actually strengthened centralization by causing
the ruler to put an end to the abuses of feudal lords (Unequal Development: An Essay
on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism, trans. Brian Pearce [New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1976], 25, 34).
did it have strong connections with mercantile groups able to provide

cash on demand in return for investment in the state. Taxes were
diverted from the treasury for provincial self-aggrandizement, provin-
cial commitment to the center was not high, the center had little coercive
power over the provinces, and the empire ended by disintegrating.
What kept disintegration at bay for so long was the ability to coopt
military and financial leaders through governance and tax farming
positions. Allowing for diversity in custom and law, while it made
a national synthesis impossible, paradoxically postponed revolt, as did
administrative reform and the provision of justice. The external military
decline of the Ottomans can thus be explained without recourse to
an internal devolution which, as we have seen, was more mythologi-
cal than real.
The ability granted by a model of this kind to separate the Otto-
mans' late sixteenth and early seventeenth-century period of crisis
from the eventual fate of the empire allows us to discuss the fiscal
history of this period in new terms. The changes in fiscal organization
and procedure that we have observed can be considered in light of
their contribution to the longevity and stability of the empire. In the
period after the mid-sixteenth century, when the military strength of
the states on the Ottoman frontiers began to grow, the process of
continuing the conquests or staving off territorial losses became more
difficult and more expensive, demanding increased tax revenues at a
time when global conjunctures and internal conditions made a growth
in revenue harder to achieve. The finance department succeeded in
meeting some of the state's increasing financial needs by the continu-
ation of cizye assessment and collection outside the timar tahrir system,
and by the development and extension of the procedures for avanz
assessment and collection. It also expanded the domain of tax farming
while maintaining administrative control, though hard pressed by tax
farmers and those seeking to enter the system. These maneuvers enabled
it to increase revenue sufficiently to maintain the empire's viability
until the eighteenth century ushered in a new international configu-
ration and a new internal organization (the as yet ill-explored work-
ings of which are beyond the scope of this book). At the same time,
the petition process and the government's issuance of justice decrees
attempted to compensate, on an ad hoc basis, for the looser control
of an imperial system.
Through the regularization and bureaucratization of provincial and
local government and the provision of justice for the subjects of the
304 CHAPTER NINE
empire, finance department procedures contributed to internal stability.

Ordinarily, the finance department is not credited with this achieve-
ment, the usual understanding being that it participated fully in the
falling off of standards and embrace of corruption that made this
period so difficult. While this may have been true of certain individ-
uals, our investigation has shown that it was not the case on the
institutional level. For the period 1560-1660, the picture of the finance
department conveyed by the documents it produced contradicts the
image of decline and corruption. Although the finance department was
the instrument by which increased taxation impacted the subject
population, at the same time it took on the job of adjusting the system
to the varying needs of individuals and groups, functioning as an
agency of legitimation for the governmental system and a stabilizing
element in a period of turmoil.
Inside the department itself, the sixteenth century was a time of
multiple structural reorganizations. A series of organizational experi-
ments adjusted the ordering of provincial finances and the number and
responsibilities of the defterdars. New conquests precipitated reassign-
ments of geographical responsibilities until, in the end, a geographical
approach to the subdivision of revenues at the center was abandoned
and a new organizational format established that lasted with minor
alterations into the eighteenth century. The critical years around the
tum of the century had a severe impact on the finance department,
malting revenue collection at once more necessary and more difficult
and precipitating changes in the department's tasks. The absence of
an ongoing series of timar tahrirs necessitated expansion and reor-
ganization of the cizye tahrirs in order to keep control of cizye
collection. Disturbed conditions and fiscal needs caused the transfor-
mation of the avanz from an extraordinary to an ordinary annual
tax and the development of a separate assessment system for it. Direct
administration of these revenues by the finance department involved
developing, expanding, and routinizing procedures and documents for
assessment and collection and adapting to the avanz procedures
originally developed for direct collection of the cizye. Expansion of
iltizam staff and record-keeping with the growth of tax farming
contributed to controlling tax farmers and ensuring that they collected
only the taxes due. While competent and incompetent sultans came
and went, battles were won and lost, and political tugs-of-war became
the rule in the palace, the finance staff plugged steadily away at the
provision of the empire's fiscal needs. For help with the legwork, they
turned to the standing cavalry forces, providing salaries and peacetime

employment in return for assistance in the making of tax surveys and
the collection and remittance of revenues. The contributions of kad1s
were also crucial to the finance department's success. By the 1030s/
1620s, the new systems were fully operational, continuing in use until
the late seventeenth century, when major revisions were again made.
For the empire as a whole, the later sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries form a period of consolidation after an initial expansionary
phase. In the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, Ottoman insti-
tutions had been organized for continuous growth. The timar system,
the fiscal organization on a province-by-province basis, the training
of sultans as warriors and governors, the manning of the janissary
corps by levies of boys-these institutional arrangements were de-
signed for an empire expanding by conquest. In the later sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries the same institutions were reoriented to serve
a consolidating empire with relatively fixed boundaries. 71 Warfare was
no longer important for sultans, the army no longer needed to be
detached from ordinary society, harem women moved into the palace,
and boys from ordinary Muslim families moved into government
service. The timar system was converted to funding governmental
expenses, creating new problems in provincial administration, and the
judicial system reconciled the various strands of law it administered,
generating a new need for legitimation in Islamic terms. The fiscal
system rearranged its revenue categories by type rather than by lo-
cation, redefined its assessment and collection procedures to accom-
modate changes in the military system, and expanded its tax base
inside the empire.
When in the seventeenth century the economic conjuncture and
institutional alterations combined to create hardship for the populace,
rulers attempted to mitigate the hardship where it occurred. Not to
respond to the subjects' needs would have been to acknowledge publicly
their own illegitimacy and unfitness to rule over their empire. In order
to continue on the throne, they made restoring the balance of the
Circle of Justice their first priority, remitting taxes for peasants in
difficulty, striving to build up the treasury by other means, and working
to meet the demands of rebelling soldiers and governors and coopt
71
See also Suraiya Faroqhi, "The Venetian Presence in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-
30," in Hurl islamoglu-inan, ed., The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy, Studies
in Modern Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 311-44.
306 CHAPTER NINE
them into the state's service. The survival and internal effectiveness
of the empire demonstrate that the consolidation efforts of the seven-
teenth century did work, even if imperfectly. Although the state could
not eliminate all stresses and strains, it coped sufficiently well to keep
the empire from dividing at that time. Through their administration,
the Ottoman sultans successfully redeemed themselves as legitimate
rulers, able to provide the justice people yearned for and so retain
their place at the top of the circle.
GLOSSARY
The words in this glossary are defined according to their finance department
usage in the seventeenth century. The words are listed as spelled in the text,
followed by a transliteration into the alphabet used by the Encyclopaedia of
Islam, with two differences: ~is represented by q, and 1 is represented by i.
Ada/et ('adala) Justice

Adaletname Justice decree, issued to condemn illegal ac-
('adalatnama) tivity and check .abuses
Adam (adam) Man, employee
Adet-i agnam ('adat-i Sheep tax
aghnam)
Agnam (aghnam) Sheep (sing. ganem [ghanam])
Ahkam (aQkam) Orders (sing. hukm [l)ukm])
Ahkam-z maliye See maliye ahkam
(aQkam-1 maliyya)
Ahali (ahali) Local residents of a place
Ak{'e (aqce) Small silver Ottoman coin, asper
Ala)l-ruus ('ala al-ru'us) Term designating the payment of taxes on an
individual basis
Ala (acla) For tax assess~ent purposes, the highest level
of household income
Altz boluk (alti boliik) The "Six Boliiks," or regiments of standing
cavalry, comprising the sipahiyan, silahda-
ran, ulufeciyan-z yasar, ulufeciyan-z yemin,
gureba-z yasar, and gureba-z yemin
A/tun, hasene (altiln, Ottoman gold coin
hasana)
Amil ('amil) Agent, tax farmer (pl. ummal ['ummal])
Anbar (anbar) Storehouse; the grain storage system
Arab ve Acem Defterdar or chief treasurer of the Arab lands,
defterdarz ('arab ve located in Damascus from 1516 to 1521 and
<adj am daftardari) in Aleppo thereafter
Araba ('araba) Cart, wagon
Arpa (arpa) Barley
Arz, arzuhal ('arg, <arg Petition; problem presented in a petition
})al)
Askeri ('askari) Lit. "military," but refers to anyone of the
308 GLOSSARY
ruling class, including, besides the military,

administrators, judges, palace servants, and the
royal family
Asl (a§l) Original (sum)
A§ar (a<shar) Tithes (sing. O§r [<ushr])
Avarzz «awari(i) Levy, extraordinary tax
Avarzz ak~esi «awari(i An assessment in cash
aqcesi)
Avarzzluine «awari(i- Household or group of households liable for
khana) avarzz taxation
Avarzz-z divaniye ve Extraordinary impositions and customary
tekalif-i orfiye levies
«awari(i-i diwaniyya
wa takfilif-i <urfiyya)
Ayan (a<yan) Provincial and local notables, involved in
allocation of tax assessments
Baki kullarz (baqi Agents assigned to the collection of arrears in
qullari) taxation
Bakaya, bakzye (baqaya, Remainder, arrears
baqiya)
Bakaya defteri (baqaya Arrears register
daftari)
Ba§ baki kulu (bash Chief of collectors of arrears
baqi qulu)
Ba§ defterdar (bash Chief defterdar, when there was more than one
defterdar)
Ba§tina (bas.htina) Indivisible agricultural proprietorship (Balkans)
Bedel (badal) Equivalent, price, substitute
Bedel-i cizye (badal-i Substitute for the cizye, paid by relatives of
djizya) voynuks
Bedel-i guher~ile Cash substitute for saltpeter levy
(badal-i giihercile)
Bedel-i hamr (badal-i Wine tax paid by non-Muslims
khamr)
Bedel-i kefalet (badal-i Substitute for kefils
kafala)
Bedel-i kirpas (badal-i Cash equivalent for a levy of linen
kirbas)
Bedel-i muafiyet (badal- Exemption fee
i mu<afiyya)
Bedel-i nuzUl (badal-i Cash equivalent for grain levy
nuzul)
Bedel-i tabhane (badal-i Cash equivalent for the cooking of biscuit or
tabkhana) gunpowder
GLOSSARY 309
Ber vech-i emanet (bar By a salaried emin

wadjl}-i amana)
Ber vech-i iltizam (bar By tax farming
wadjl}-i iltizam)
Ber vech-i i§tirak (bar In partnership
wadjl}-i ishtirak)
Ber vech-i maktu (bar In a lump sum
wadjl}-i maqtiic)
Ber vech-i pi§in (bar In advance
wadjl}-i pi§in)
Ber vech-i tekaiid (bar As a pension
wadjl}-i taqa<ud)
Berat (berat) Diploma granting a privilege
Beylerbey (beglerbegi) Governor of an eyalet
Beytiilmal (bayt al-mfil) Treasury fund for the benefit of the Muslim
community at large, especially widows and
orphans
Bostancz (bostandj1) Gardener, member of a corps of palace servants
Buyuruldu (buyuruldi) "It has been ordered"; an order
Cabi (djabi) Collector of the revenues of a vakif
Cami (djamic) Tax collector; person who did the actual vil-
lage-to-village or house-to-house collecting of
taxes such as cizye or avarzz
Cebehane-i amire Imperial armory
(djebekhana-i camira)
C ebeci, cebef (djebedji, Armorer; member of the corps of armorers
djebe'i)
Cebelii (djebeli) Armed retainer, man at arms
Celali (Qjalali) Rebel, particularly one of a group of dis-
charged military men living on banditry and
theft of tax revenues
Celebke§an Sheep drovers for the state, or an equivalent
(djelebkeshan) sheep tax
Cem eder (djamc eder) Lit. "will collect"; designates the person who
will actually perform the task of tax collection
Cemaat (djama<a) A group, especially a cadre of government
employees or soldiers, or a tribe
Ceyb-i hiimayun (djayb- "The imperial pocket"; the sultan's personal
i humayun) expenses
Cizye (djizya) Poll tax on non-Muslim Ottoman subjects; also
called hara~ (kharadj)
Cizye muhasebesi Accounting bureau for the poll tax
kalemi (djizya
muhasabasi qalami)
310 GLOSSARY
Cizyedar (djizyadar) Agent for cizye

Cizyehane (djizyakhana) Household liable for cizye
CU/us (djulfis) Accession (of a sultan)
Cuz (djuz)) Part, fascicule of a defter
<;a§negir (cashnagir) Taster
<;avu§ (ca)iish) Herald or messenger
<;avu§an-l dergah-l ali Palace heralds or messengers
(ca)iishan-1 dargah-1
Cali)
<;elebi (celebi) Civilian administrator, lettered man
<;eltuk (celtiik) Rice field, paddy
<;eltuk~i (celtiik~i) Rice grower, exempt from avarzz
Dade (dade) Given
Daire-i adliye (da)ira-i Circle of Justice
<adliyya)
Damga (damgba) Stamp (usually on textiles)
Damga resmi (damgba Stamp tax
rasmi)
Damga-z akmi§e Stamp tax on fabric
(damgba-1 aqmisha)
Defter (daftar) Register, record book
Defter-i hakanf (daftar-i The timar registry or its registers
khaqani)
Defterdar (defterdar) A head of the finance administration
Defterdar kapzsz The Porte of the ba§ defterdar, finance depart-
(defterdar qapusu) ment headquarters outside the palace
Defterdar-z Anadolu Second highest ranking defterdar
(defterdar-1 Anadolu)
Defterdar-z Istanbul Third (il~ilncu) defterdar, head of the second
(defterdar-1 Istanbul) division (§zkk-z sani) of treasury finances
Defterdar-z Rumeli Ba§ defterdar, head of the first division (§zkk-z
(defterdar-1 Rumeli) evveI) of treasury finances
Defterdarlzk Section of the maliye headed by a defterdar
(defterdarliq) or his area of jurisdiction
Dellaliye (dallaliyya) Brokerage fees, often farmed
Der kenar (dar kanar) Marginal note
Der kise (dar kisa) (Coin) packed in purses (see kise)
Derbend, derbendci Guardian of mountain passes, exempt from
(derbend, derbenddji) avarzz
Deruhde-i (dar <uhda-i) In the responsibility of
Dev§irme (devshirme) Levy of boys to serve as janissaries and palace
staff
Deymos (dimiis) Tithe assessed in the former Mamluk lands
GLOSSARY 311
Dica (dika) Hungarian tithe

Dirlik (dirlik) A living, revenue granted as a living
Divan, divan-z humayun Imperial council, presided over by the grand
(diwan, diwan-i vizier
humayiin)
Dizdar (dizdar) Fortress commander
Ebna-z sipahiyan Member of one of the standing cavahy regiments
(abna'-i sipahiyan)
Edna (adna) For tax assessment purposes, the lowest level
of household income
Efendi (efendi) Scholar, official
Eflak (Eflaq) Vlachs, breeders of cavalry horses
Ehl-i kalem (ahl-i People of the pen (or the bureau), that is, well-
qalam) trained or of scribal background
Ehl-i vukuf (ahl-i Knowledgeable people, experts
wuqiif)
Emanet (amana) Work of an emin; direct tax collection assign-
ment; government agency concerned with pro-
curement of supplies for a jurisdiction such as
§ehir, city; harc-z hassa, the sultan's expenses;
kilar, larder; matbah, kitchen; arpa, barley;
tersane, dockyards; tophane, arsenal; etc.
Emin (amin) Agent, person in charge of an emanet (often
translated "intendant"); often used to refer to
a person in charge of tax collection
Emin-i defter (amin-i Superintendent or director appointed to take
daftar) charge of a survey
Emr-i §erif (amr-i Imperial ("noble") order
sharif)
Emr u defter (amr wa An order and a copy of the assessment register,
daftar) given to those appointed to collect taxes
Erkam-z cizye (arqam-1 Cizye figures, a summarized register of cizye
djizya) amounts without names
Esami, esami defteri Names (sing. ism [ism]); register of names of
(asami, asami daftari) cizye payers
Esedi kuru§ (asadi Dutch silver coin circulating in the Ottoman
quriish) Empire
Esham (asl)am) Shares
Evkaf (awqaf) Pious foundations (plural of vakif [waqf])
Evlad-z kul taifesi Sons of janissaries and state servants
(awlad-i qiil ta'ifasi)
Evsat (awsaO For tax assessment purposes, a medium level
of household income
312 GLOSSARY
Eyalet (ayfila) Province

Fakir (faqir) Poor, humble (used by petitioners to refer to
themselves)
F arzg etmek (fan&b To resign
etmek)
Feragat (faragha) Resignation
Fesh olunmak (faskh To be cancelled, annulled
olunmak)
Fihrist (fihrist) List
Furuht (furiikht) Sale, award of a tax farm
Furunihade (furiinihada) Subtracted
Gebran (gabran) Non-Muslims
Giyah-z hu§k (giyah-1 Fodder, dried grass
khushk)
Gulamiye (ibulamiyya) Salary of tax collector and scribe, paid by
taxpayers in addition to their tax
Gureba-z yesar, Units of the standing cavalry forces
gureba-z yemin
(ghuraba>-i yasar,
ghuraba>-i yamin)
Guher~ile (giihercile) Saltpeter, a levy on retired janissaries in lieu
of avarzz
Hacegan (khwadjegan) Lit. "masters," bureau heads in the finance de-
partment (sing. hace [khwadja])
Halife (khalifa) Deputy, second in command of a bureau (later
kalfa)
Hane (khana) Household, for tax purposes
H arac, hara~ (kharadj) Term used for cizye by the Ottomans, espe-
cially in the sixteenth century; in earlier Is-
lamic practice it referred to a land tax
Hara~cz (kharadjdji) Agent for cizye
Hara~guzar Person liable for cizye
(kharadjguzar)
Harc-z hassa (khardj-i Sultanic expenses
kha~~a)
Haremeyn-i §erifeyn The Two Holy Cities, Mecca and Medina
(haramayn-i
sharifayn)
Has (kha~~) Largest revenue grant under the timar system,
belonging to the ruler and his household or
to provincial governors (pl. havas [khawa~~]
or hasha [kha~~ha] or haslar [kha~~lar])
Hass-z humayun or Imperial or "crown" lands, royal domains
havass-z humayun
GLOSSARY 313
(kha~~-i humayiin,
khawa~~-i
humayiin)
Haszl (Q.a~il) Product, total to be collected (pl. haszlat
[I,a~ilat])
Havale (Q.awala) Assignation; the assignment on a particular
revenue source of the payment of a particular
item of expenditure; also used for the docu-
ment of assignment and for the person to whom
it was awarded (pl. havalegan [I,awalagan])
Hazine-i amire The state treasury (also hzzane-i amire
(khazine-i amira) [khizane-i amira])
Hazine mande (khazine For a tax collector to leave his salary in the
mande) treasury and recompense himself with the fees
from tax collecting
Hizmet (khi<Jma) Service, duty
Hoca (khwadja) Teacher, especially of the sultan or his sons
Huddam (khuddam) Servants, esp. eunuchs (sing. hadzm [khadim])
Huccet nmdjdja) Copy of an entry in the kad1 's register or sicil
Hukm (Q.ukm) Order; decision made on a matter presented
in a petition
Hukm-i §erif (Q.ukm-i Imperial ("noble") order
sharif)
Hutbe (khutba) Friday sermon, in which the name of the
legitimate ruler is mentioned
Istabl-z amire (istabl-i The imperial stables
amira)
ibn (ibn) Son of; in certain cases, but not in finance
department salary registers, indicates a Muslim
ibtida (ibtida') Beginning; refers to a register entry made the
first time a person draws a salary from the
treasury
icmal defter (idjmal Summary register; the icmal defter of the tahrir
daftar) recorded assignment of revenues as timar,
zeamet, or has
icmal-z muhasebe Summary of accounts, balance-sheet (often
(idjmal-i muhasaba) called a "budget")
ihracat (iQ.radjat) Expenses, expenditures (sing. hare [I,ardj])
ihtisab (il,tisab) Market supervision tax, often farmed
iltizam (iltizam) Lit. "undertaking," but refers to tax farming,
usually called the mukataa system, in which
collection of government revenues was farmed
out to private bidders
imza (im<Ja') Stylized signature or monogram
314 GLOSSARY
intisab (intisab) Connections, patronage

irad ve masraf (irad Income and expenditure made; accounting
wa ma~raf) register showing income and expenditures
irsaliye (irsaliyya) Lit. "transmissions," direct payments made by
tax collectors without having sent the money
to the treasury
iskele (iskala) Dock, port (port fees often farmed)
ispen~e (ispendje) Personal tax paid by non-Muslims
i zhar-i tazallum Exposure of oppression
(idhhar-i tadhallum)
Kabiz-i ma/ (qabidh-i Receiver of funds
mal)
Kabil ve iltizam etmek To accept, undertake (a tax farm)
(qabil wa iltizam
etmek)
Kadi (qa9i) Judge in an Islamic court, an important ad-
ministrative official on the local scene
Kale (qal'a) Castle, fortress (pl. kila [qila '])
Ka/em (qalam) Lit. "pen," a bureau in the Ottoman maliye
Kami/ kuru§ (kamil Large silver coin
gburiish)
Kantar (qantar) A weight, 44 okka or about 120 pounds
Kanun (qaniin) Edict, law; the corpus of sultanic law
Kanunname Code of regulations, digest of laws
(qaniinnama)
Kapan (qabban) Weighing scale for commodities
Kapan resmi (qabban Weighing fee, often farmed
rasmi)
Kapici (qap1dji) Doorkeeper
Kapicilar kethudasi Superintendent of doorkeepers in the palace,
(qap1djilar a powerful figure
ketkhudasi)
Karye (qarya) Village
Katib (katib) Broadly, a scribe, record-keeper; in the sev-
enteenth-century finance department, a title
referring to the rank of head of department
(pl. kuttab [kuttab])
Kayd etmek (qaid To record
etmek)
Kaza (qa9a') Judicial district, jurisdiction of a kad1
Kazasker (qaQi 'asker) One of the two chief judges of the empire,
responsible for cases relating to the askeri class
K efil (kafil) Guarantor (of a tax farm)
GLOSSARY 315
Kefil defteri, kefilname, Register of kefils

kufe/a defteri (kafil
daftari, kafilnama,
kufala' daftari)
Ke§i§ (kashish) Christian monk or priest
Kethuda (ketkhuda) Head of a community or group, deputy of an
official
Kibtiyan emiri (qibtiyan Emir of the gypsies
amiri)
Kist el-yevm (qist al- Daily portion or share of an annual sum
yawm)
Kilar (kilar) Imperial larder
Kile (kila) Grain measure, bushel
Koyun emini (quyiin Overseer of sheep for the state
amini)
Koprucu (kopriidji) One who maintains bridges, exempt from
avarzz
Kuru§, guru§ (gburiish) Groush, piaster; large silver coin, at first of
foreign origin, circulating in the Ottoman
Empire
Kur;uk ruznamr;e kalemi Finance bureau which disbursed the salaries
(kilcilk riiznamdje of certain central government employees
qalami)
Kurek (kiirek) Oar(s)
Kurekr;i (kiirekdji) Oarsman, exempt from avarzz
Kurekr;i bedeli (kiirekdji Substitute price for oarsman levy
badali)
Liva (liwa') Subprovince, sancak
Maa§ (ma'ash) Salary; a second salary charged to taxpayers
in addition to the gulamiye and paid to the
person who actually collected the tax
Maden (ma'din) Mine (pl. maadin [ma'adin])
Madenci (ma'dendji) Miner, exempt from avarzz
Maha/le (maQ.alla) Urban neighborhood
Mahkeme (maQkama) Kadi' s court
Mahsub (mal}.siib) Due (for a particular period), counted as (cov-
ering a particular period)
Makbul (maqbiil) Well-esteemed
Makbuz (maqbiicJ) Receipt (pl. makbuzat [maqbiicJat])
Maktu (maqtii') Payment of taxes by a community in a lump
sum rather than individually
Mal defterdarz (mal A head of provincial finance administration
defterdfui)
316 GLOSSARY
Maldar (mfildar) Wealthy

Mal edasma kadir (mfil Able to pay
edasina qadir)
Malikane (malikana) Life-term tax farm
Maliye (maliyya) Ottoman state treasury and finance department
Maliye ahkam defterleri Registers of outgoing orders of the finance
(mfiliyya aQ.kam department
daftarlari)
Maliye ahkam tezkire Registers of notes requesting the issuance of
defterleri (mfiliyya orders
al}.kam tadhkira
daftarlari)
Maliye kalemi (maliyya Main order-writing bureau in the finance
qalami) department
Marifet-i §ar' (macrifat-i Judicial supervision
share)
Martolos (Martolos) Christian paramilitary and auxiliary forces
Maslahatgiizar Capable of a business
(maslahat giizar)
Masarif (maarif) Expenditures (sing. masraf [ma~raf])
Matbah-z amire Imperial kitchens
(maQbal}-i amira)
Mazul (macziil) Out of office (in a rotational system)
Medrese (madrasa) Religious college
Mehter (mihtar) Military band
Mektup~u kalemi Correspondence bureau of the finance depart-
(maktiibdji qalami) ment in the eighteenth century (see oda)
Memlaha (mamlaQa) Salt works (workers exempt from avarzz)
Menzil (manzil) Imperial posting system
Menzilci (manzildji) Supporter of post stations and post horses,
exenipt from avarzz
Metruk, metruke Abandoned (lands)
(matriik, matriika)
Mevcudat~z Finance official who counted incoming cash
(mawdjiidatdji) and kept records of the contents of the treaswy
Mevkufat kalemi Finance bureau that recorded income from
(mawqiifat qalami) properties temporarily in the possession of the
treasury; later in charge of the avarzz
Mevkufat~i Finance official in charge of the mevkufat
(maw qiifatdji) kalemi
Mezkur (madhkiir) Mentioned, the aforesaid (pl. mezkurin
[madhkiirin])
Mimar (micmar) Architect
GLOSSARY 317
Mir-i a/em (mir-i Troop leader

<alam)
Miri (miri) Belonging to the state, used especially in
reference to land and revenues
Mizan-z harir (mizan-i Weighing station for silk; fees often farmed
Qarir)
Muaf (mu<af) Exempt from taxation (muafen [mu<afan]: by
exemption)
Muafname, muafiyet Document of exemption from taxation
(mu<afnama,
mu<afiyya)
Mufassal defter Detailed register; listed taxpayers by name and
(mufassal daftar) status according to their place of residence
and the taxes assessed on them
Muharrir (muQarrir) Registrar
Muhasebe (muQasaba) Accounting; accounting register
Muhasebe-i atik Previous account register
(muQasaba-i <atiq)
Muhasebe-i Anadolu Finance bureau responsible for examination
kalemi (muQasaba-i of accounts of emins and cizye for Anadolu
Anadolu qalami)
Muhasebe-i cizye See cizye muhasebesi kalemi
kalemi (muQasaba-i
djizya qalami)
Muhasebe-i evkaf Finance bureau responsible for examination
kalemi (muQasaba-i of accounts of pious foundations
awqaf qalami)
Muhasebe-i evvel Finance bureau responsible for examination
kalemi (muQasaba-i of accounts for Rumeli
awwal qalami)
Muhasebe-i haremeyn Finance bureau responsible for examination
kalemi (muQasaba-i of accounts of evkaf dedicated to the two holy
Qaramayn qalami) cities, Mecca and Medina, the haremeyn-i
§erifeyn
Muhasebeci Finance official in charge of drawing up
(muQasabadji) and auditing the accounts (muhasebe) of the
state
Muhassil-i emval Fiscal supervisor of a province or region
(muQa~~d-i amwal)
Mukabele (muqabala) Comparison
Mukabeleci Finance official who compared (mukabele)
(muqabaladji) wage tickets with salary registers and author-
ized their payment
318 GLOSSARY
Mukataa (muqata<a) Lit. "subdivision," subdivision of government

revenues for collection purposes, especially in
the form of tax farming (iltizam)
Mukataacz (muqata<adji) Finance official who kept the books of the
mukataas
Mukataalz yer Land or revenues not subject to tapu (heredi-
(muqata<ali yar) tary tenancy)
Mukataat-z cedide Revenue bureau of new mukataas
kalemi (muqata<at-i
djadida qalami)
Mukataat-z mensuhe Bureau collecting revenues of cancelled or
kalemi (muqata<at-i annulled tax farms
mansiikha qalami)
Muba§ir (mubashir) Agent
Mud (mudd) Measure of 20 kile
Muderris (mudarris) Teacher in a medrese
Mufetti§ (mufattish) Inspector of finances for the imperial has
Miifredat (mufradat) Details, detailed
Muhimme defteri Register of important matters, the record of
(niuhimma daftari) outgoing orders from the divan
Muhur (muhr) Seal
MU/azim (mulazim) Adherent, novice, candidate
Mulk (mulk) Private ownership, land privately owned
MU/kname (mulknama) Deed of ownership
MU/tezim (multazim) Tax farmer, one who undertakes an iltizam
Mun§eat (munsha'at) Collection of sample documents
Murde (murda) The deceased, to be deleted from the tax rolls
Musadere (mu~adara) Confiscation (of the property of high officials
executed for crimes)
Musel/em (musallam) Auxiliary cavalry, exempt from avarzz taxa-
tion, discontinued by the end of the sixteenth
century
Musellim (musallim) Financial agent of a sancak bey
Musvedde (muswadda) Rough draft
Mu§aherehoran Salary registers for all governmental employees
mevacibi defterleri whose salaries were paid on a monthly-basis,
(mushaharakhwaran including scribes of central finance bureaus
mawajibi daftarlari)
Muteferrika Member of an elite guard unit of palace cavalry
(mutafarriqa)
Miitekaid (mutaqa<id) Retired (pl. mutekaidin [mutaqa cidin])
Mutesellim (mutasallim) Financial supervisor in a sancak
GLOSSARY 319
Muteveccih Favorably inclined

(mutawadjdjil))
Muteveffa (mutawaffa) Deceased
Mutevelli (mutawalli) Supervisor of a vakif
Muzekka (muzakka) Legally competent as a witness
Naib (na'ib) Assistant judge
Nasihatname Advice memorandum, literary genre flourish-
(nasi:Qatnama) ing in the first half of the seventeenth century.
Nazir (nadhir) Inspector of a vakif or a tax farm
Nazzr-z emval (nadhir-i Inspector of finances
amwal)
Nazzr-z nuzzar (nadhir-i Inspector of inspectors
nudhdhar)
Nefer (nafar) Individual; refers to a soldier or a taxpayer
Nev-muslim (naw- "New Muslim," a convert
muslim)
Nev-yafte (naw-yafta) Newly enrolled for taxation (pl. nev-yaftegan
[naw-yaftagan])
Type of berat or diploma bearing the sultan's
tugra to be shown by a functionary as autho-
rization
Ni§ancz (nishandji) Official responsible for drawing the sultan's
tugra on documents and checking that they
conformed to kanun
Noksan uzere, kesr At a lesser sum
uzere (nuqsan i.izere,
qasr i.izere)
Oda (uda) Room, those who share a room; nickname for
the mektup~u kalemi
Ortakcz (ortaqdji) Sharecropper, exempt from avarzz
Orf Curf) Sultanic law, often enshrining customary practice
O§r CCushr) Tithe on crops (pl. a'§ar)
Pen~e (pandja) Stylized signature with a "tail" or long curv-
ing stroke at the end, used by grand viziers
Perakende [ve peri§an]) Dispersed [and scattered]
(parakanda [wa
parishan])
Pi§ke§ (pishkash) Gifts to a superior
Piyade (piyada) Auxiliary footsoldiers, exempt from avarzz
taxation, discontinued by the end of the six-
teenth century
Praktika (praktika) Byzantine records of domains and revenues
320 GLOSSARY
Reaya (ra<aya) The taxpaying class, especially peasants

Resm-i hane, resm-i Fee for tax collection paid by the taxpayers
kalem, resm-i kitabet
(rasm-i khana, rasm-i
qalam, rasm-i kitaba)
Revgan-z sade Clarified butter, a levy
(raw~an-i sada)
Rica (ridja') Request; request made in a petition
Ruus (ru'iis) Document of appointment to high office; also,
the register where such documents were re-
corded
Ruznam~e, ruzname Day book; especially, the treasury's official
(riiznamdje, riiznama) daily record of receipts and disbursals in
chronological order
Ruznameci (riiznamadji) Finance official in charge of the journal or
daybook who recorded all receipts and pay-
ments
Saadet ile (sa<ada ila) With good fortune
Salyane (salyana) Lit. "annual," refers to salaries, provincial
revenues, or an annual bonus
Sancak (sandjaq) Lit. "banner," sub-province, subdivision of an
eyalet
Sancak bey (sandjaq begi) Governor of a sancak
Sara~ (sarradj) Member of the corps of saddlers
Sarra/ (sarraf) Money changer
Sebeb-i tahrir (sabab-i Type of order, so called from the first two
talpir) words of its opening phrase
Sefer (safar) Campaign (military)
Serbest (sarbast) Lit. "free," lands free from government in-
spection and intervention for tax collection
purposes
Sicil (sidjill) Register of court cases and imperial orders
kept by a kadz
Sikke (sikka) Coin, on which the legitimate ruler's name
appears
Sikke-i filori (sikka-i Gold coin, florin
filiiri)
Silahdar (silal}dar) Sword-bearer, member of one of the standing
palace cavalry regiments
Sipahi (sipahi) Cavalryman, either a timar-holder or a mem-
ber of the standing palace cavalry forces
Siyakat (siyaqat) Cryptic sty le of script, the shorthand-cum-
secret-code of the finance department
GLOSSARY 321
Suba§z (~ubashi) Urban commander, chief of police

Suret (siira) Copy (of a register entry)
Sagird (shagird) Apprentice, rank of scribe below katib (pl.
Sagirdan [shagirdan])
Sart (shaq) Condition (pl. §artlar or §Urut [shaqlar, shurii!])
Sehremini (shahir Purveyor of the city of Istanbul
amini)
Semhane (shamckhana) Candle works, a government monopoly, usu-
ally farmed
Ser>i (sharci) According to sharia, Islamic law
Seyhulislam (shaykh al- Grand Mufti of the empire
islam)
Szkk-z evvel (shiqq-i First division of imperial finances
awwal)
Szkk-z salis (shiqq-i Third division of imperial finances
thalith)
Szkk-z sani (shiqq-i Second division of imperial finances
thani)
Sikayet defteri (shikaya Register of complaints
daftari)
Suhud (shuhiid) Official court witnesses
Tahsilat or haszlat Registers showing the product or yield of
defterleri (tal)~ilat, taxation
l}a~ilat daftari)
Tahvil (tal}wil) Transfer, assignment, term, or debt; in fiscal
matters, refers to the transfer or assignment of
tax collection responsibilities to an individual
for a fixed term, the amount to be collected
being treated as the individual's personal debt
Tahvil ruznam~e (tal}wil Daily record of appointments to tax collection
riiznamdje) responsibilities
Tahvilat (tal}wilat) Assignments or transfers; assignments of tax
collection responsibilities or of revenues, and
registers recording such assignments
Taife (!a'ifa) Group, category of people, religious community
Tahrir (taQ.rir) Taxation survey, held at least once a genera-
tion; generated records now used to study land
and property use, population, agricultural and
industrial production, and commercial trans-
actions during the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries
Tahrir defteri (tal)rir Record of taxation survey
daftari)
322 GLOSSARY
Talebname (talabnama) Document of request (for a tax farm)

Talib (talib) Bidder on a tax farm
Tapu (tapii) Hereditary peasant proprietorship of agricul-
tural land (tapulu yer), confirmed by payment
of a fee (tapu resmi)
T ecdid (tadjdid) Renewal (of a berat)
Tefaviit-ii hasene [ve Fee for changing money, charged when taxes
kuru§] (tafawut-i assessed in ak9e were paid in other coinages
Qasana [wa ghuriish])
Tefti§ (teftish) Inspection, investigation, inquiry (into the state
of affairs in the countryside or the behavior
of officials)
Tekke (taqqa) Dervish lodge
Te/his (talQis) Report
Temessiik (tamassuk) Document that could be presented as verifi-
cation
T erakki (taraqqi) Increase (to a timar)
Tersane-i amire The imperial dockyards
(tarsana-i amira)
Teslim-i hazine (taslim-i Submitted to the treasury
khazina)
Teslim tamamen (taslim Submitted in full
tamaman)
Teslimat (taslimat) Submissions of tax payments
Teslimat defterleri Submissions registers, showing in order of date
(taslimat daftarlari) the submissions of tax moneys to the treasury,
with the names of the responsible collector
and the person submitting the money
Teslimat91 (taslimatdji) Finance official who recorded fabrics and robes
and kept track of those removed from the
treasury to be worked or embroidered by
palace craftsmen
Te§rifat kanunnamesi Ceremonial code regulating duties, relative
(tashrifat ranks, promotion paths, and privileges of high
qaniinnamasi) administrative officials
Te§rifat91 (tashrifiitdji) Finance department official who recorded
pi§ke§, gifts and presents
Tetimme (tatimma) Remainder
Tevcih (tawdjih) Bestowal (pl. tevcihat [tawdjihat])
Tevzi (tawzi') Distribution, redistribution (pl. tevziat
[tawzicat])
Tevzi-i cizye defterleri Registers of the distribution of the cizye; also
(tawzi'-i djizya called tevziat-1 cizye, cizye tevzi, or cizye
daftarlari) tevziatz
GLOSSARY 323
T ezkire (tadhkira) Memorandum or note

Tezkireci (tadhkiradji) Finance official in charge of the bureau that
wrote memoranda and notes
Tezkireci-i ahkam Finance official who prepared tezkires for
(tadhkiradji-i aQkam) orders on matters not relating to fortress
garrisons
Tezkireci-i kzla Finarice department official who wrote tezkires
(tadhkiradji-i qilac) for orders regarding fortress garrisons
Timar defterdarz (timar Registrar of timar grants
daftadan)
Timar system (timar) Landholding system in which revenues of rural
and urban production and exchange were
surveyed and registered and awarded as grants
called timars in lieu of salary or other recom-
pense to members of the Ottoman ruling class
military personnel, administrators and judges,
and members of the ruling house
Top(;u (tflbdju) Cannoneer (pl. top(;uyan [tflbdjuyan])
Tophane (!flbkhana) Imperial arsenal
Tugra {tflgbra) Sultan's characteristic monogram, serving as
his signature
Tuzcu (tflzdju) Salt maker, exempt from avarzz
Tuna defterdarz (Tuna Defterdar of the Danube, head of the third
defterdan) division (§zkk-z salis) of treasury finances
Ulema Culama') Scholars of the Islamic sciences, upper layer
of religious hierarchy
Ulufeciyan-z yemin, Units of the standing palace cavalry force
ulufeciyan-z yesar
Culflfadjiyan-i yamin,
<ulflfadjiyan-i yasar)
Vakif (waqf) Pious foundation, property dedicated in per-
petuity whose revenue supports a religious or
charitable purpose (pl. ejkaf [awqaf])
Varidat (wandat) Income
Varidat(;l (waridatdji) Finance official responsible for recording in-
coming payments to the treasury
Vazifehoran Pensioners
(wa~ifakhwaran)
Veled (walad) Son of; in certain cases, but not in finance
department salary registers, indicates a non-
Muslim
Vezir-i azam (wazir-i Grand vizier
acdham)
324 GLOSSARY
Vilayet-i 'Arab Province consisting of the Arab lands and

(wilayat-i <arab) eastern Anatolia
Voynuk (Voynuk) Member of a non-Muslim military group
Voyvoda (woywoda) Deputy, especially a financial agent in a kaza
Vuzz'a min zalike Deposited out of that (out of a total sum)
(wmWa min dhalika)
Yarar (yarar) Suitable or fit for a job
Yasak~z (yasaqdji) Enforcer of kanun, especially of iltizam regu-
lations
Yava cizye (yawa Poll tax paid by non-Muslims who had left
djizya) their original place of residence
Yayaba§z (yayabashi) Officer of foot soldiers
Yazzcz (yazidji) Registrar
Yekun (yakiin) Total
Yerli yurtlu (yerli Local resident
yurtli)
Zam (zamm) Increase
Zam-z cedid (zamm-i New increase (in taxes)
djadid)
Zaviye (zawiya) Dervish lodge
Zeamet (zi<ama) Medium-sized revenue grant in the timar
system, given to sancak beys, beys of the
standing army, and administrators
Zimmet (dhimma) Debt, arrears
Ziyade (ziyada) Increase; can refer to a raise in salary or in
the level of a tax or iltizam
Ziyade-i cizye (ziyada-i Extra cizye, increase in cizye
djizya)
Ziyade-i cU/us (ziyada-i Accession increase
djulfls)
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INDEX
Abou-El-Haj, Rifa'at A. 279 avarizhanes in 107; beytiilmal

Absolutism 300-301 collectors of 132; cizye collectors
Abu Bali 98 of 162; cizye in 112 n. 87, 170,
Accession increase 109, 112, 219-20 235; cizye summary of 86;
Account register. See Muhasebe defterdar of 54, 56, 64; finance
Accounting 232, 235-36; and bureaus of 60, 62; iltizam of 125;
balance-sheet 237; defters in 260 muhasebe of 73, 74, 76
Adaletname 297 Anatolia, eastern 41-43, 76, 109
Adam (man) 129 Ankara 24, 115, 125 n. 15, 165, 190
Adana 109 Antalya 142, 152, 153
Adet-i agnam 110 and nn. 80-81; in Antep 267
Rumeli and Anadolu 112 n. 87; Anushirvan 29, 30. See also Sasanians
collectors of 170 Appointment documents, for cizye 162;
Advance, appointment of cizye for iltizam 182; of finance
collectors 191; payment by scribes 182; procedures for 161
collectors 191-92; payment by Apprentices. See ~agirds
taxpayers 191; payment not Arab lands, cizye in 109; finance
demanded 192 n. 14 bureaus of 61; garrisons, payment
Advice literature. See N asihatname of 63; iltizam in 122; revolt
Agriculture 6, 125, 194 in 60; tahrir in 35
Ahkam registers 250; cizye in 84; Arab ve Acem defterdar1 54 and n. 15
collectors' accounts in 217; irsaliye Araba (carts), levy of 89, 255 n. 28
in 221; mukataa in 133, 141; of Arapkir 193
maliye 249, 250 and n. 12; of Archives 6, 16-18, 45 n. 68, 49;
tezkires 251-52 account registers in 218-19; avar1z
Ahkam-1 maliye. See Maliye kalemi registers in 91, 165; cizye registers
Ahmed I (1603-1617) 110 in 84, 162-63; complaint petitions
Ahyolu 211 in 251, 256; deposit records in 233;
Ak~e, value of 36-39, 40, 108 n. 74, fires in 61; firmans in 217; iltizam
109-11. See also Coinage; Counterfeit; records in 133, 137-139; muhasebe
Silver registers in 221; ruznam~e registers
Akdag, Mustafa 109-10 in 234; salary records in 57; tahrir
Akhisar 115 registers in 33, 35
Akhisari 287 Argiri Kasn 253 n. 23, 264
Akkerman 154, 157, 225 Armenians 164 n. 7
Aksaray 116 Armory. See Cebehane
Ak§ehir 258 Arnavut. See Albania
Alaca Hisar 141 Arrears 222; accounting of 214-15;
Alaiye 92 n. 33, 133, 268 and military financing 230; causes
Ala§ehir 145 of 223-27; collection of 222-23,
Albania 24, 64 228; collection of, by kad1 217;
Aleppo. See Haleb liability for 215; register entries
Allocations, scribal 62, 66 on 252; registers of 222 and n. 16,
Amasra 173 230; totals of 227 n. 25, 230, 231;
Amasya 97 uncollected 229
Amil (pl. ummal) 130 Arz (petition) 19, 20; and
Anadolu, avar1z in 113, 115, 117, 174, assessment 261; and
253; avar1z summary of 93; centralization 280, 303; and political
354 INDEX
power 299; and register entries 251, 113-117; regularization of 47;

263 n. 53, and revolt 266, 298; and registers of 33; sale of collection
tax collector's liability 215, 216 176
and n. 6, 220, 221; as bid on A vanz ak~esi 87 and n. 16. See also
iltizam 136-41; as initiative 281, Avanz, cash
282; as protest 281, 284, 290; cost A vanz registers 97 n. 4 7; compilation
of 297; decision making on 256; of 91, 92, 96; compilers of 93;
Fatimid 247 n. 6; for favors in number of 94; summary 92
return for service 96; for iltizam A vanz tahriri 91 n. 30; procedures
collection 133, 196; for reduction of for 94-99
iltizam 142, 143, 152, 153, 157, 178; A vanzhane 84, 89-90; number
for tahrir 31, 97; for tax collection of 117; size of 105-107. See also
order 188-90; for tax remission Hane
115, 261; format of 248 n. 9; from Avanz-1 divaniye ve tekalif-i orfiye. See
tax collector 265, 268; Mamluk 251 Avanz
n. 16; on conflict in assignments Ayan 216
193; on conflict in collection 192, Aydm, avanz in 258; iltizam in
193, 265; on iltizam appointments 128-29, 144-49, 152, 211; revenue
147, 150, 167, 181, 182, 198; on accounting of 77
oppression 162, 241, 247, 260; Aziz Efendi 289, 290
procedure for 248 and n. 8, 251,
252, 254; response to 248, 249, 253, Baghdad 197
257; written by kad1 138 Bakaya, bak1ye. See Arrears
Asiatic Mode of Production 7 Bakaya defteri. See Arrears, registers of
A§tkpa§azade 24 Bak1 kullan 228
Askeri 24; and tax exemption 89 Balance-sheet 45; and arrears 231;
n. 22, 95; as iltizam collectors 179; and ruznam~e 238 and n. 49; bureau
taxation of 48 structure in 55, 56, 64; production
Assessment, changes in 246; errors of 237; revenue in 238
in 262, 263; problems of 252, 261, Baltkesir 106, 113, 115
262; resistance to 230 Balkans 41, 42, 111, 123 n. 10
Assignments of revenue 193, 209; Balyabadra 214, 272
registers of, for emins 132 Bandits 14; and resistance 293 n. 43,
Athens 146, 147, 149 and tax collection 223; collusion
Attf Efendi Kanunnamesi, on avanz with 203 n. 38; negotiation
72; on cizye deposits 235; on with 294
deposit of revenues 232; on maliye Barkan, Omer Liitfi, on avar1z 113
organization 62-66, 71; on n. 89, 115; on inflation 117; on
mukataa 75; on tezkires 73 population 41; on price
Auction 136, 137 and n. 50 revolution 10, 35, 39
Austria 237 n. 47, 243 Barkey, Karen, on consolidation 14;
Avanz 27, 87 and n. 13; and Celali on negotiation 279, 294
unrest 216; and niiztil 88 n. 20; Barley, levy of 255 n. 28, 262, 263
and ocakhk 253 n. 23, 175; Basra 134
assessment of 83, 175, 289; Ba§ bak1 kulu 228
cash 27, 87, 113, 115; collection Ba§ defterdar 49, 78; bureaus of 52,
of 165, 166, 174, 193, 194; 62; handling of complaints by 249;
communal payment of 98; deposit importance of 73; professionalization
of 236; exemption from 88, 95; of 79 n. 53; responsibility of 54,
frequency of 90 and n. 25, 93; 55, 63. See also Defterdar of Rumeli
iltizam of 28, 4 7, 126; importance Ba§bakanhk Ar§ivi. See Archives
of 82; imposition of 90, 91 n. 29, Bayezid I (1389-1402) 24, 51
94, 95 and n. 42, 96; increase Bayezid II (1481-1512) 54
of 117, 240; rates of 108, Bedel 88
INDEX 355
Bedel-i hamr 75, 110 and n. 80, Byzantines 23, 30, 51

163 n. 4
Bedel-i kiirek~iyan 165 Cabi (vaktf revenue collector) as avanz
Bedel-i muafiyet 111 n. 82 collector 173 n. 30, 175
Bedel-i niiziil, arrears of 222; collected Camels, levy of 166
by havale 173; collected by Cami (cizye collector) 173 and n. 30,
kad1 165; exemption from 263 173
n. 52; rates of 115 Candle works. See ~emhane
Bedel-i tabhane (cookery fee) 169 Canik 219, 220, 226
Bekof~a 75 Cantacuzenus, Michael 121 n. 5
Belgrad 198 Career paths 46 n. 70, 50, 52
Belgrad/Berat 64 Carts. See Araba
Berat 25; as control instrument 201-3, Cebeciyan (armorers) 169
275; collection without 195, 202; Cebehane (armory) 89
contents of 195; in iltizam Celalis 14, 82; and decline 1, 7, 11;
collection 194-97; instructions and population 43, 92; and rural
in 189; reporting procedures in 218 administration by force 274; and tax
Ber~ama 64 arrears 146, 215, 216, 230, 262, 268;
Beylerbey 26; in tax collection 174, as military protest 159, 292 n. 40,
189; in tahrirs 31 293. See also Rebellion; Unrest
Bey§ehir 99, 107, 216 Celalzade 287
Beytiilmal 27; emanet of 128; Centralization, administrative 67; and
iltizam of 137, 211; emins of 132, absolutism 301; and control 9, 10,
163 n. 4 244; and iltizams 181; and
Bidders 136; conditions of 151; legitimacy 245; and peasant
identities of 139 and n. 56, 140 protest 302 n. 70; and petition
Biga 224 process 280; discourses of 295; of
Bitola 111 n. 82, 115 tax collection 278 and n. 80, 280
Bogaz Hisar 166 Ceyb-i hiimayun 79 and n. 54
Bogdan 223 Cezayir 64, 76
Bolo 64, 217 Chicken fat, levy of 90
Borrowing, treasury. See Loans Chickens, levy of 27, 89, 253, 255,
Bosna 86, 116, 214, 264 258, 263 n. 52
Bostanlt 107 China 13, 278 n. 80, 286
Boyahane (dye house) 27, 126 Chios. See Saktz
Bozdogan 150 Circle of Justice 283-89; and economic
Bribes 58 conjuncture 305; and protest 293,
Bridges, repair of 27, 87 299; collapse of 294
Budget, and tax remissions 266; Cizye 27, 82; accession increase
provincial, expanding 242 and n. 62. in 112; amount collected 240;
See also Balance-sheet assessment of 83; centralized tax
Budin 125, 233 n. 40, 272 collection, model for 278; collection
Bulgaria 103 costs of 112; collection
Bureaucracy 1, 77; and procedures 187, 189; collectors
patrimonialism 20 and n. 38, 79 and of 162, 171, 172, 193; communal
n. 55; development of 23-24, 45; in assessment of (maktu) 103; deposit
governance 160; inadequacy of 279 procedure for 235-36; exemption
Bureaus, number of 50; organization from 89, 90, 101, 109, 113; iltizam
of 52, 57, 71; size of 58 of 27, 47, 126, 174, 193; rate
Bursa 43, 76, 172, 264 of 82, 108 and n. 72, 110 and
Butter, levy of 89, 174 n. 81, 111, 112 and n. 87, 117;
Buyuruldu. See Order remittance of 219; tahrir of 85
Biiyiik Kale 73 Cizye muhasebesi kalemi 86, 87, 235
Biiyiik ruznam~e kalemi 23 2 Cizye registers 33, 84-86; and tahrir
356 INDEX
defters 101; avanzhanes in 91, 94; Court records. See Kadi sicills
cizye collectors in 173; compilation Customs dues 27, 45, 63, 76; as
of 83, 96; format of 235, 237; mukataa 123; collection of 194;
irsaliye 220; population figures control of 63; iltizam of 47, 126,
in 101; summary (icmal) 86; 152, 171; in England 132 n. 34;
updating of 83, 194 n. 19. See also muhasebe of 133; officials of 129;
Tevzi-i cizye defterleri registers of, in economic history 125
Cizyedar 83 n. 15
Cizyehanes 86 Ciilus. See Accession increase
Climate 9, 44 Cvetkova, Bistra A. 110, 124 n. 12,
Coffee tax 45, 75 131 n. 32
Cohen, Amnon 102, 110 and n. 80 Cyprus. See Kibns
Coinage 36, 44; debased 171; demand
for 38; devaluation of 38, 39, 114, (:akallu 275
293 n. 44; value of 37, 38 n. 45, 39 (:atalca 89, 216, 271
n. 49, 180, 261. See also Ak~e; (:avu§ 148 and n. 73; as bidder on
Counterfeit; Silver iltizam 140; as cizye collector 169;
Commerce. See Trade as nazrr of iltizam 131, 148, 152-53;
Communications 130 and n. 31, 281 number of 45, 148
Competition, for iltizams 150, (:eltiik (rice farm) 151; as
180--182; for office 178; over mukataa 123; iltizam of 126, 145;
revenue 211, 212, 268 operation of 129, 177
Complaint 45; and decline 246; as (:eltiik~i 88
indicator of problems 282; as (:e§me 128
political action 281 n. 1, 290 n. 31; (:1zak~a, Murat 180, 181
handling of 246--49; in finance (:irmen 64
registers 276 n. 77; and (:orum 201
iltizam 201, 273; of tax
collector 276; of taxpayer 241, D'Ohsson, Ignatius Mouradgea 3, on
247, 267, 276; J?etition of 251 defterdarhks 54 n. 15, 55 n. 16, 56
Condition (on iltizam). See Sart n. 20, 56 n. 21, 78; on finance
Confiscation 48 bureaus 50, 71, 73, 77
Conflict, over access to revenues 212; Damascus 54, 89, 109 n. 76, 142
over revenue assignment 192, 193; Damga resmi (stamp tax) 142
over tax collection 192, 198, 212 Danube 56
n. 63 Dating bureau 77 and n. 49
Consolidation 8, 13, 14, 305; and Daybook. See Ruznam~e
legitimacy 306 Debri 114, 226
Contract, iltizam agreement as 152 Deceased (miirde) 83
Control, by kad1s 203; of iltizam 182, Decentralization 7, and iltizams 181,
21 O; of taxation 161; of tax motives for 242 n. 64
collection 227; loss of and tax Decline 1-8; administrative, lack
farming 119 of 299; alternatives to 300; and
Converts (nev-miislim) 83 complaints 246, 273; and crisis 11
Coron 65 and n. 24, 13, 14 n. 31, 15, 19; and
Corruption l, 32; and arrears 226; deficit 213, 243; and finance
and decline 186, 246, 282; and department 48, 49, 51; and
finance department 49, 51, 304; by iltizam 119, 123 n. 10, 161, 177
kad1 203 n. 38; by milfetti§ 154, n. 40, 184; and petitions 280; and
155; by miiltezim 269; checks procedural chan~ 278; and
on 159; concept of, as critique of revenue 241; and rural unrest 97,
government 285; in iltizam 100; and tahrir 35, 81; and
system 119, 122, 159, 273; in tax taxation 107-108, 118, 186; as
collection 267 breakdown of social
Counterfeit 10, ·37, 40 inter~ependency 294; economic 266;
INDEX 357
moral 279; metaphors for 282; Direct taxation 278-80

military 303 Dirlik 24, 25
Deficit, and decline 213, 243; and Divan 17; defterdars in 78; iltizam
state power 243; and tax bids in 136, 137, 140; petitions
remission 282; budgetary 239; in in 248, 253, 254; scribes of 183
iltizam revenues 128, 145 Diyarbekir, avanz in 114; iltizam
Defters 18; as final authority 265; in 135 n. 46, 158, 196, 275; treasury
changes to 259; errors in 276; in ruznam<;e of 233 n. 40
petition process 255, in preventing Dockyards. See Tersane
overcollection 260. See also Document fees 126
Archives; Assignment registers; Avanz Documents, administrative 17;
registers; Cizye registers; Kadi sicills; false 202
Maliye ahkam registers; Muhasebe; Double taxation 207, 261--63, 267;
Mufassal; Milfredat defteri; Milhimme spurious claim of 264
defteri; Salary registers; Tahrir Drama 108 n. 72
registers; Tevcihat registers; Tevzi Dubrovnik 141
registers Dukakin 84
Defterdar, ba§. See Ba§ defterdar Duplication, of tax collection
Defterdar kap1s1 78 assignments 181, 200
Defterdar of the Danube. See Tuna Dye house. See Boyahane
defterdan
Defterdar of Rumeli 54, 56. See also Edirne, arrears in 230 n. 34; avanz
Ba§ defterdar in 255 n. 28, beytillmal of 210,
Defterdar of Anadolu 54, 64, 76; 214; cizye in 113, 164 n. 7; iltizam
second 56 n. 20 in 137, 141, 167, 182, 183, 199,
Defterdars, formation of 54 and n. 14; 270; iltizam supervision in 153;
55-56; fourteenth-century 51; overcollection in 273; revenues,
fourth 56 and n. 20; in salary control of 64; ziyade-i cizye in 234
registers 53 n. 13, 58; number Egin 193
of 77; organization of 67; Egriboz 202, 215, 222, 223, 275
professionalization of 78; Egnbucak 93 n. 36
provincial 55 n. 16; second 54; Egypt, iltizam in 121, 143 n. 62;
second and third, as sinecures 78; revenue surveys in 30; tax burden
third, bureau structure of 62; third, in 277 n. 79; tax farmers as
creation of 54, 55 and n. 18, 61; officials in 124 n. 12
third, jurisdiction of 64, 76 Eisenstadt, S.N. 20 n. 38
Dellaliye 156 Elmah 145
Dendrochronology 44 Emanet, and iltizam 127, 130 n. 29;
Denmark 30 n. 23, 114 n. 93 and mukataa 123; for urban
Deposit, of cizye 219; of money in revenues 126; records of 132
treasury 205; procedures for Embezzlement 154, 156; and
231-33, 235-36; records, for arrears 230; by kad1 203 n. 38; by
emanet 132, 133; records, for milfetti§ 202; by mtiltezim 270-72;
iltizam 134 by tax collector 269; checks on 159
Depositors 205 Emecen, Feridun 107
Derbendci (guardian of mountain Emin, in cizye collection 163, 169,
pass) 27, 87, 88, 95 191; in timar tahrir 31-32; of
Der kenar (marginal note) 34, 251 emanet 129; of iltizam 129, 147,
n. 16, 255 167; responsibility of 130; salary
Dervish 44, 95, 113 of 168; selection of 196
Deserted villages 43, 94 Emins, imperial 74 and n. 44
Devaluation 10 Emr ti defter 166, 188, 222
Dev§irme 46, 178 Emr-i §erif. See Order
Dica (church tithe) registers 101 Enforcement of orders 249
Dimetoka 107, 164 n. 7, 259, 262, 274 England, assignment of farmed revenues
358 INDEX
in 157 n. 98, 158 n. 99, 180; Finance department. See Maliye

budgets of 237 n. 47; bureaucracy Finance documents. See Archives
in 160 n. 104; central vs. provincial Finance scribes. See Scribes
wealth of 242 n. 61; centralization Fines 27, 126
in 278 n. 80; crisis in 9; deficits Firearms 9, 46
in 243, 244; extraordinary taxation Firewood, levy of 166
in 87; fiscal organization of 60 Fiscal system, history of 29-31, 51-53,
n. 29, 66 n. 39, 79 n. 56; peasant 121-22, 301-3
political participation in 267, 281 Flight from the land. See Peasant flight
n. 1; reassessment in 246 n. 1; Florina 217
revenue increase in 241; sub-farming Fortress garrison. See Garrison
in 131, 132 n. 34; tax farming Fortress repairers, levy of 106
in 28 n. 13, 47, 120 n. 3, 121 n. 5, France, budget of 237 n. 47, 239
121 n. 6, 124 n. 11, 136 n. 47, 143 n. 51; bureaucracy in 71 n. 41, 79
n. 62; tax farming officials in 129, n. 56, 160 n. 104; crisis in 9; deficit
130 n. 30, 204 n. 42; taxation in 29 in 239, 243, 244; embezzlement
n. 15 in 207 n. 48; extraordinary tax
Errors, in registers 276, 277 in 93; government borrowing in 47,
Erzurum, avanz in 255, 269; cizye 180; rebellion in 266, 292 n. 39;
in 187; military expenses in 63, receipts for tax payments in 207;
173; iltizam in 201; plague in 97; revenue accounting in 78 n. 52,
revenues, control of 64; tax arrears 231, 233 n. 41; revenue increase
in 230 n. 34; tahrir in 97-98 in 239 n. 52, 241; sale of office
E§kinciyan 104 in 60 n. 29; sub-farming of revenues
Europe, centralization in 278 n. 80; in 132 n. 34; surveys of 30 n. 23,
Ottoman image in 1; patronage 32 n. 27, 34 n. 36; tax arrears
in 177 n. 40; population in 43; in 222 n. 16; tax burden in 277;
silver in 37; tax farming in 120, tax collectors' salaries in 111 n. 86;
122, 131 n. 32, 139 n. 56 tax farmers in 136 n. 47, 187; tax
Evkaf (sing. vaktf) 26, 31; cizye farming in 28 n. 13, 47, 120 n. 3,
collection in 162, 164, 170; exempt 121 n. 6, 155 n. 92; taxation in 29
from avanz 88, 95 and n. 42, 99; n. 15, 94 n. 39, 104, 1~6, 266;
payments to 83, 113; revenues transfer of farmed reveniies in 157
of 27; taxation of 4 7 n. 98, 209 n. 57
Exchange fee. See Tefaviit
Exchange rate 37, 187, 189 Garrison, and decentralization 299; in
Exemption, from additional cizye 113; iltizam 140, 150, 157; payment
from avanz 88 and n. 18, 89, from orders for 63, 65, 73; salaries from
cizye 83, 109 cizye 187, 190 n. 10; salaries from
Exemption documents (muafiyetler) 264 iltizam 225, 271-73; supported by
Expenditures, bureaus responsible ocakhk 175
for 66; conflicts over 193; Gelibolu 64, 220, 259
connected with ocakhk 175; in tax Gemlik 255
accounting 220; increase in 117, General crisis of the seventeenth
238, 239 century 8. See also England; France;
Explanation. See ~erh Spain; Seventeenth-century crisis
Gevnik 255
Factionalism. See Patronage Giresun 187, 229
Family size 101 Goldstone, Jack A. 12, 13
Faroqhi, Suraiya 10, 15 Gokbilgin, M. Tayyib 131 n. 32
Fees 27, 58 and n. 24 Gordes 254
Ferhad Pa§a, grand vizier 34 Gordiik 115, 221
Fihrist 235, 236, 237 Government, patrimonial 79. See also
Filibe, emanet of 128, 133; iltizam Bureaucracy
in 141, 195, 223, 224, 270 Governor. See Beylerbey
INDEX 359
Grain, levy of 27, 89, 106; storage as 159; military veterans as 179;
system (anbar), suppliers of 89 responsibilities of 157-59, 210
Greece 64 Havale (assignment document), for cizye
Grozdanova, Elena 103 collection 173; letter of transfer 157
Gulamiye, increase in 117, 168, 172; Hemp, levy of 105 n. 66, 106
salary of cizye collector 174. See Hersek 141
also Maa§; Salaries Heyd, Uriel 103
Giihen;ile (saltpeter) 89 Hezarfen, Hiiseyin 77
Giimiil~ine 256 HlZlr ilyas 135
Giimil§hane 270, 273 Hizmet (service), as cizye collector 169
Gypsies (k1bttyan) 75, 111 n. 82 and n. 22; as iltizam collector 180
Homs 228
Hacegan 52, 53 and n. 12 Honey, levy of 89
Hadzibegic, Hamid 110 and n. 80, 111 Horsemen 274
n. 82, 111 n. 85 Household, and competition for
Haleb 43, 44, 54 and n. 15; assessment office 178; and patronage 177
in 262; avanz in 93, 113; bedel-i n. 40; patrimonial, Ottoman
nilziil in 116; cizye in 111; government as 79 and n. 55;
diversion of revenues in 272; iltizam taxpaying, see Hane
in 200, 275; overcollection in 260 Hungary, cizye rates in 109 n. 76;
Halifes. See Scribes, ~agirds iltizam in 125; population in 101,
Halomi~ 223, 272 102; tahrir in 31
Hamid, avanz in 92 and n. 34, 216 Hiiccet, for delivery of revenues 206
n. 6; bedel-i kiirek~iyan in 165; n. 4 7, 209 n. 57; for transfer of funds
emanet in 133; iltizam in 127, 142, in kad1 court 206
143 n. 61 Hildavendigar 224, 258
Hammer-Purgstall, Joseph von 3, 50 Hiikm. See Order
Hammurabi 29, 247
Hane 32 n. 27, 82, 98; avanz Ibn al-Sayrafi 247
of 113-16; cizye of 84, 104, 108, lbtida (starting salary) 167
113, 176, 187, 190; fractions of 107; Ilkhanid, administrative techniques 51;
registration of 85-86, 92-93, 94-97; fiscal organization 60 n. 30; scribal
size of 101 and n. 56, 105-106. See manuals 30; scribal practices 52
also Avanzhane n. 9, 232 n. 36
Hapsburgs, Long War with 93 Inalcik, Halil 10, 37
Harac. See Cizye Income and expense summary. See
Hara~gilzar 83 Balance-sheet
Harput 92 Income, increase of 238, 239
Harran 29 India 286
Has, vizierial iltizam of 200. See also Inflation 1, 8, 10; and budgets 239;
Hass-i hilmayun and coinage 35, 37-40, 47; and
Hastl 219 iltizam prices 143, 144, 178; and
Hass-i hiimayun 25, 26; and military salaries 176; and tax
mukataa 123, 127; and cizye 162; rates 117, 277
emanet of 133; iltizam of 27, 47, Initiative 298, 299
126, 142, 200; in Aydm and Iran 38
S1gla 128; in Hamid and Teke 127; Islamic law 26, 201 n. 35, 299; cizye
officials of 129, 192; revenue rate in 82
accounting of 74 Istanbul, avanz in 92, 117; beytiilmal
Hatvan 113 and n. 88 in 128; cizye in 103, 112, 207;
Havale (assignee of revenues) 130 and iltizam in 156, 224; revenues, control
n. 31; as cizye collector 173; in of 64, 76; tax evasion in 264
transport of iltizam revenue 158 Italy 37
n. 99; locally nominated (mukim
havale) 158; members of Six BOliiks icma~ (summary), for avanz 92; for
360 INDEX
cizye 86; for emanet 132; for Jerusalem 102, 109 n. 77, 194 n. 19
iltizam 125, 132-34; for tahrir 33; Jews 97, 103, 128, 164 n. 7
muhasebe 237. See also Balance- Judge. See Kadi
sheet Justice 24, 194; and decline 286 n. 9;
iltizam, accounting of 215, 227; and and petitions 248, 253 n. 24, 297
centralization 181; and emanet 127; and n. 54; and moral economy of
and mukataa 123; and timar 127; peasant 286; and rebellion 284,
annulling of 128; arrears of 145, 293; and state formation 302; as
146, 222, 230 n. 30; award of 156, index of legitimacy 294-97; in
179; bidding on 136, 139-40, 180; European ideology 285 and n. 8,
bidding wars 141, 144, 145, 156; 286; in the Near Eastern state 247;
collection of 194, 196; collectors millenarian demands for 292;
of 167, 179, 199, 227; competition Ottoman concepts of 287-90
over 178, 181, 182, 198, 199, 200;
conditions on 146, 149-52, 199; Kabiz-i mal (receiver of money) 130
corruption in 269, 273; duration Kadi, as arrears collector 217, 228; as
of 134, 135, 178, 179 and n. 44; avanz collector 165, 166 and n. 13,
embezzlement in 202, 270-72; for 193; as avanz surveyor 92, 93 and
urban revenues 126; "frozen" n. 36; as cizye assessor 82, 83; as
180-81; havale in 157; importance guardian of sultanic authority 203; as
of 82; increase in revenues of 240, instrument of control 275; as
270; kefils in 156; officials of 130, mtifetti§ 131 n. 32, 154; as
131, 147, 149, 167, 205; oppression nazrr 131; as supervisor of revenue
in 274; payment of military salaries payments 211; corrupt 201, 202,
by 225, 229; price of 137, 144, 203 and n. 38; fiscal responsibility
178, 145; records of 133, 134; of 249; in cizye collection 190; in
remittance procedures of 208; iltizam 131 n. 32, 136, 138, 140,
resignation from 182; recipients of 141, 155, 157; in overcollection 260;
revenue of 208, 21 O; routinization in timar tahrir 32; nomination of as
of 181; sub-farming of 131, 132; condition on iltizam 149; petitions
summary records (icmal) of 125; by 254
supervision of 131, 152, 153, 160, Kadi sicills 15; cizy,e in 84, 112;
182, 198, 200, 269; transformations finance department orders in 249;
in 178 and n. 42. See also Mukataa; iltizam in 125 n. 15, 136, 140; tax
Tax farming payments in 215
inebahtt 64, 65 Kalavurna 173
intisab, and decline 177 n. 40; and Kad1zadelis 292
factionalism 177 n. 40, 178; and Kfildy-Nagy, Gyula 101, 102
standing army 184; in iltizam 149, Kalkan 172
150, 158, 160; in tax collection Kalkandelen 114, 226
appointments 176, 177 Kalonya 144
irsaliye 162, 220, 221 Kanun 26, 28; and legitimacy 295
isaak~i 154 n. 50; governing tax rates 161; on
iskele (port revenues) 128, 142 avanz 115; on cizye 109
iskenderiye 64, 172 Kanunname, ceremonial, of Mehmed
ispen~e 163 n. 4 II 52 and n. 11, 53; for
istabl (stables), suppliers of 89 Trablus-~am, on justice 287; in
istanbul mukataasi kalemi 76 valuing of iltizam 141; timar 32,
istankoy 116 33. See also Atif Efendi Kanunnamesi
izmir 214, 223 Kapan, iltizam of 142, 143
iznikmid 265 Karadag 91 n. 30, 209, 217
izvornik 115, 217 Karahisar-i Teke 127, 142, 273
Karaman 64, 98, 99, 145, 198, 199
Janissaries 95, 169, 229, 293 Karesi 64
Japan 278 n. 80 Karlof~a 226
INDEX 361
Kastamonu 146, 234, 262 centralization 245, 306; and

Katib 51 and n. 7, 53; of cizye 163, justice 284, 286; and kanun 295
168, 169; of emanet 129; of n. 50, and military unrest 294; and
iltizam 130, 148, 167; of peasant flight 291; and
maliye 57, 58 n. 24, 66 n. 40; of taxation 278, 294, 304; challenge
nazrr 153; timar holder as 205 to 282, 285 n. 6, 290-94; concept
n. 45. See also Scribes of 295-97
Katip <;elebi 289 Lepanto 97
Kayacik 93, 107 Lewis, Bernard 11, 49
Kayseri 93, 97 n. 48, 142 Little Ice Age 9, 44
Kefe 64, 76, 174, 218, 219 Liva 163 and n. 6, 235 n. 43
Kefil defteri, kiifela defteri, Loans 47 and n. 73
kefilname 155 Liitfi Pa§a, grand vizier 34, 287
Kefil, of iltizam 131, 153, 155-57; Lybyer, Albert Howe 50
payment of deceased miiltezim' s debts
by 199 Maa§, cizye collectors' salary 111, 168,
Kemanke§ Kara Mustafa Pa§a, grand 173; increase in 117, 172. See also
vizier 34 n. 35, 94 Salaries
Ke§an 229 Madenci (miner) 263 n. 51
Kibns, avanz of 106, 115; cizye Maktu 104, 105; iltizam of 145
of 85, 189, 206, 216, 269 Mal defterdar 52
Kmahzade 28~ Malakas 85
Krrkkilise 196, 265 Malazgirt 107
Krr§ehir 93 Malikane 74, 239
Kist el-yevm 135 Maliye 22, 51; and direct
K1Z1lba§ 292 taxation 278; and legitimacy 304;
Kiel, Machiel 102 and state formation 303; adaptability
Kili 154, 225 of 100; control of tax collection
Kira (Jewish harem vendor) 171 by 161, 190, 214-15; control of tax
Kitchen. See Matbah farming by 124, 132; in Circle of
Koca iii 89, 93, 270 Justice 289; organization of 18,
Ko~i Bey, on avanz 115; on cizye 52-54, 60, 62, 67, 71; quarters
rates 111; on justice 289; on of 78; reorganization of 79, 80,
revenue collection 162, 180, 241 304, 305; study of 14
n. 60 Maliye ahkam kalemi 65, 75; and
Konya 43, 195 revenue deposits 208; production of
Koyun (village) 107 orders by 256, 257
Kopriicii (bridge keeper) 89, 95 Maliye ahkam registers. See Ahkam
Kopriilii grand viziers 13 registers
Kosem Sultan 293 Maliye kalemi. See Maliye ahkam
Kostendil 217 kale mi
Kunt, i. Metin 279 Manastir 107, 115, 228
Ku§adas1 264 Mara§ 114, 177, 188 n. 6
Kii~iik evkaf muhasebesi kalemi 74 Mardin 114
Kii~iik Kale 73 Marginal note. See Der kenar
Kii~iik ruznam~e kalemi 45 n. 68 Market taxes 27, 126
Kiirek (oars), suppliers of 89; levy Marmara 115
of 255, 263 Marriage taxes 126
Kiirek~i (oarsman), levy of 27, 113 and Matbah (kitchen) 87, 89
n. 89, 190, 255 n. 28, 263 McGowan, Bruce 43, 113 n. 91
Kiirek~i bedeli 114, 165 Mecca and Medina 27, 74
Mehmed II (1451-1481) 52
Lapseki 114, 221 Mehmed III (1595-1603) 93, 110
Leather, levy of 89 Mehmed IV ( 1623-1640) 293
Legitimacy 19, 20, 49; and Mektu~u kalemi 73
362 INDEX
Melons, levy of 89 amounts collected 221; of amounts

Memlaha. See Tuzcu remitted 219, 220; of avanz 166; of
Menlik 176 cizye 163, 220, 236; of
Mente§e, avanz in 92 and n. 34, 94; emanet 132-33; of iltizam 134,
iltizam in 144, 153, 196, 198; 153, 223; provincial 84, 227;
revenue accounts of 133, 218 summarized (icmal) 218
Menzil (post system), levy for 27, 87, Muhasebe bureaus 73
258, 259, 262 Muhasebe-i cizye kalemi 74
Menzilci 89 Muhasebe-i evkaf kalemi 74
Mercantilism 244 and n. 71, 286 Muhasebe-i evvel kalemi 71
Mevcudat~1 65, 72 Muhasebe-i haremeyn kalemi 74, 76
Mevkufat-1 Rumeli kalemi 91 Muhasebe-i vilayet-i Arab 73
Mevkufat kalemi 72 and n. 42, 90--91, Muhasebeci 53 and n. 12, 65
166 Muhassil-i emval 55; as avanz
Mevkufat~1 65 surveyor 93 n. 36, 95; as cizye
Mezistre 159, 260 collector 93, 172; responsibility
Mezraa 126 of 95 n. 43
Midilli 64, 85, 144, 165 Mukabeleci 53, 65, 72
Mihali~ 218 Mukataa, and iltizam 123; and
Milan 9 timar 127; bureau structure 74, 75;
Military forces, in taxation 150--51, bureaus, responsibility of 75; deposit
169-71, 179-81, 183-84; protests procedures for 236; increase in
of 293; salaries of, from revenues of 241; officials,
iltizam 180--81 responsibility of 129; records
Military procurement 125 of 125, 132. See also iltizam; Tax
Military revolution 9, 10, 46, 117, 184 farming
Millenarianism 292 Mukataa iltizam defterleri 134, 136
Mills 27, 126 Mukataa/mukataaya ait arz
Miner. See Madenci tezkireleri 133
Mines 27, 63, 75, 129 Mukataa-1 agnam kalemi 77
Mint 27, 123, 126, 129, 222 n. 16 Mukataa-1 Agnboz kalemi 77
Mizan-i harir (silk scales) 76 Mukataa-i Anadolu kalemi 71, 76
Modernization 7 Mukataa-1 Avlonya kalemi 76
Modon 65 Mukataa-1 Brusa kalemi 76
Mohair 125 n. 15 Mukataa-i evvel kalemi 71, 76
Moldavia 75, 206 n. 46 Mukataa-1 haremeyn kalemi 76
Moneychanger 205, 269 Mukataa-1 hasha kalemi 77
Moneylender 265 Mukataa-1 hasha-1 cedide kalemi 77
Mongols 30 Mukataa-1 hasha-1 cedide-i sani
Monks (ke§i§) 89 kalemi 77
Monopolies 126 and n. 21 Mukataa-1 istanbul kalemi 77
Mora, arrears in 222 n. 16; avanz Mukataa-1 Kefe kalemi 76
in 173, 222; emanet in 128; Mukataa-1 mensuhe kalemi 77
garrison in 65; iltizam in 159, 225, Mukataa-1 Rumeli kalemi 76
272; revenues, control of 64, 272 Mukataac1 53
Mountain pass, guardian of. See Mukim havale 158
Derbendci Murad I (1362-1389) 23
Mudanye 158 Murad III (1574-1595) 85, 93
Mufassal defter 33 Murad IV (1623-1640) 43, 94 n. 39,
Muhasebe (account register), and tax 292, 293
collection 213, 214; compilation Mustafa Ali 288
of 218; format of 218 n. 12, 219; Mutafcieva, Vera 113 n. 89
in duplicate assignments 226; Miiba§ir, of avanz 174, 225, 266, 268;
inspection of 216, 217, 226; of mukataa 129
missing 214, 217, 225, 227; of Miifetti§, corrupt 154, 155, 202;
INDEX 363
identity of 131 n. 32; responsibility Nepotism 49

of Bl, 153~ 1·5A., 215, 223, 227 Nev-mi.islim 83
Miifredat defteri, for emanet 132; for Nev-yaftegan 84, 85 and n. 9
iltizam 134; 217, 218 and n. 12 Nevruz 135
Miihimme defteri 248 and fl. 9_, 253 Nigbolu 128, 152, 258 d. 40
Miilazim 158; as iltizam collector 179, Nigde 259 and n. 42, 265, 268
180; as cizye collector 169 Ni§an. See Order
Miilk 24, 31 Ni§anc1 34
Miilkname 192 Nomads 43
Miiltezim 123, 129; as emin 167; Novobrdo 172
choice of 196; control. of 124;
death of 198-99; embezzlement Oars. See Kurek
by 270-72; exploitation of iltizam Oarsman. See Ki.irek~i
by 159; liability of 222; collection Ocakhk 165, 175-76; and avanz 253
problems of 196; relationship with n. 23; and "frozen" iltizams 181; for
emin of 129, 130; responsibility of ship captains 272; supervision
130, 202, 215, 225; turnover of 179 of 153
Miin§eat 17 Ohri 264, 268
Mi.isellem (former auxiliary cavalry) 91, Oil, levy of 89, 145 n. 67
92, 93 Onions, levy of 27, 89, 226
Mi.isellem (village) 107 Oppression 45, 186;. by advance
Mi.isellim 129 payment 201; by collection
Miitesellim 129 method 241, 274; by
Miiteferrika corps 46; as cizye embezzlement 271; by high
collectors 169, 171. See also taxes 107; by iltizam i 19, 124,
Standing cavalry 144, 145, 159, 228, 27,0; by
Miitekaidin 95, 107 tahrir 24; ~omplaints of 246;
Miitevelli 129, 170, 172 control of 162; exposure of 247;
non-monetary 273, 274; recourse
Naib 93 from 275
Naima 289 Order, as response to petition 248; for
Naples 120 n. 3 iltizam collection 196, 197, 210 and
Narda 211 n. 60; for tahrir 32; granting
Na.sihatname 3, 5, 40, 58 n. 24; and iltizam 137; missing 190; on
legitimacy 295 n. 50; audience assessment 94-99, 187; on collection
of 297; on decline 3 and n. 9, 282, procedures 187, 188; production
294; on justice 247, 248, 288; pn of 251; use in preventing
standing army 184; recommendations competition 189
of 295 Orban (1324-1362) 23
Navy, levy for 87 Orientalism. 2, 13, 15, 50
Naxos 274 Ortakc1 (sharecropper) 88
Nazir, ~avu§ as 153; embezzlement Osman I (1280-1324) 23
by 202; of iltizam 130, 131, 137; Osman II (1618-1622) 293
nomination of 148; responsibility
of 153 Palace staff 45-46; as cizye
Nazrr-1 emval 55 collectors 170, 171; offering revenues
Nazrr-1 nuzzar 131, 148 n. 72 in farm 123
Near Eastern concept of state 247-48, Papeiwork 73; for iltizam 200, 203;
280, 283; and resistance 295, 302; for revenue deposits 231-34
and social order 284 Pa§a sancag1 95 n. 42, 115
Negotiation 14; and consolidation 280, Patrimonial government, Ottoman 20
299, 301; of iltizam bid 140, 142; of and n. 38, 79 and n. 55
iltizam conditions 151, 152; of tax Patronage. See intisab
assessments 175, 176; with Patros 97
Celalis 294 Payment, communal, of taxes 83, 98;
364 INDEX
delays, in iltizam 201; to evasion; farming of taxes by 275;

non-treasury recipients 211 flight of, see Peasant flight; migrating,
Payment in advance, as loan 180 return of 96; petitions by 253 and
n. 48; as risk avoidance 191; as n. 24, 254, 281; tax burden of 263,
substitute for iltizam kefils 156; 277
collection orders on 190, 191; not Rebellion 8-14; and assessment 261;
required 192 n. 14, of cizye 219; as signal of injustice 284;
of iltizam revenues 200; for iltizam military 293. See also Celalis;
collection privileges 180; verification Provincial disorder; Unrest
of, by temessiik 207 Redistribution. See Tevzi
Peasant flight 43, 44, 275; and Registers. See Defters
agriculture 97, 277; and non-payment Reisiilkiittab 49; and iltizam
of taxes 215, 221, 224; as appointments 158, 182, 183
protest 290 and n. 32, 291; fear Repairs, providers of 89
of 201; spurious claim of 264; Resettlement, of reaya 94 n. 39
threat of 270, 291 Resignation (feragat) 182
Peasants 24, 26; and justice 284, 286; Revenue, classical system of 22, 23,
and landlords 266; and political 32; deficits in 47; extra-legal 241;
power 298; and resistance 285 n. 7, sources of 26, 32; surveys of,
290; in tahrir 43, 44 pre-Islamic 29; transport of 130
Perenyi, Josef 102 Revolts. See Rebellion; Unrest
Petition. See Arz Rhodes. See Rodos
Pious foundations. See Evkaf Rice farm. See ~eltiik
Piyade 91-93, 107 Rice grower. See ~eltiik~i
Plague 97 Rodos 116, 271
Poll tax. See Cizye Rotation of officials 57
Population 4, 6, 10, 13; and crisis 9; Routinization, of iltizams 181; of
and inflation 37; decline of 43-44, procedures 280
105; movement of 97; registration Rum 215, 216
of 32, 41; study of 28 and n. 14, Rumeli 63; arrears in 229, 230; avar1z
10{}-103 in 107, 113, 117; bedel-i niiziil
Post system. See Menzil in 116; beytiilmal collectors in 132;
Premedi 260 cizye in 86, 162, 170, 235; cizye
Previ§te 75 rates in 108 n. 72, 109, 112 n. 87;
Price revolution 4, 8, 11 n. 26, defterdar of 54, 64, 76; finance
35-41, 81 bureaus of 60, 61; garrison payments
Pri§tine 172 of 63, 65; population in 43;
Private ownership. See Miilk revenues of 55, 63, 75, 76
Procedure, and legitimacy 296; and Russia 30, 121 n. 5, 286
personal governance 280; as control Ruz-1 Kas1m 135
instrument 27 5 Ruznam~e defteri 53, 232; and
Production, and iltizam prices 143; in balance-sheet 238 and n. 49; for
mukataa records 125 deposits 231; for emanet 132; for
Protection 284, 285 n. 6 iltizam 134; format of 234-35; of
Protest 288, 290, 292; and collectors' appointments 163; of
legitimacy 285 n. 7 provincial treasury 218; types
Provincial administration 76 n. 47, 242; of 233 and n. 40
disorder in 100 and n. 55. See also Ruznam~e kalemi (ruznam~e-i evvel},
Celalis; Rebellion; Unrest creation of 61; growth of 72;
Prussia 79 n. 55, 286 responsibility of 232-33
Ruznam~e-i sani 61
Reassessment 215 Ruznameci 53
Reaya 24, 25; and iltizam 179; and Riius 181-83
justice 253 n. 24; tax assessments
of 261; tax evasion by, see Tax Sabbatai Sevi 292

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(The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage 6) Darling, Linda T.-Revenue Raising and Legitimacy - Tax Collection and Finance Administration in The Ottoman Empire 1560-1660-Brill (1996) PDF

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REVENUE-RAISING AND LEGITIMACY

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

SURAIYA FAROQ,HI AND HALIL INALCIK

Fikret Adanir · Idris Bostan · Arnnon Cohen · Cornell Fleischer

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

C Copyright 1996 by EJ. Brill, Uiden, The Nether/,ands

Autkori~ation to photocopy items for internal or persona/,

List of Tables ............................................................................... ix

Introduction: The Myth of Decline ............................................. 1

I. Classical Ottoman Finance .................................................. 22

II. The Ottoman Central Finance Department ........................ 49

III. Revenue Assessment by the Central

IV. Taxation Without Assessment?

V. Tax Collection Personnel .................................................. 161

VI. Tax Collection, Remittance, and Reporting ..................... 186

VII. Arrears, Accounting, and Balance-Sheets ........................ 213

VIII. Complaints and Corruption ............................................... 246

1. Price Inflation in the Ottoman Empire, 1555-1655 ....................... 36

the encouragement of further research, Ottoman terms have generally

AE Ali Emiri Tasnifi, Ba§bakanhk Ar§ivi.

Archival documents are identified by the abbreviation for the archive

THE MYTH OF DECLINE

"The sick man of Europe"-everyone has heard of him. The Ottoman

militarily, economically, or intellectually, then colonization by an

The Myth of Ottoman Decline

This literature, however, employs "decline" in two distinct senses, one

of military. fortunes that it was unhesitatingly accepted and incorpo-

weaker power and finally disappeared, every earlier difficulty they

early seventeenth century than in the early sixteenth--or the early

early modem states. Modernization, decentralization, world systems

expand was a perversion of its raison d'etre, 17 then seventeenth-cen-

Crisis and the Ottoman State

The "general crisis of the seventeenth century," a widely-used model

the economic and political trends of the sixteenth and seventeenth

the flow of resources encouraged rulers to violate traditions and lib-

The most influential summary of these trends was made by Bernard

not be equivalent to decline in the Ottoman case either. The general

single process, the causes, symptoms, and effects of these phenomena

Sources for the Study of the Post-Classical Age

One of the most sophisticated bureaucracies of its time, the Ottoman

show taxes as assessed or revenue actually collected? Was the ac-

examples. 37 Here, the documents are treated instead as parts of a

produced. Salary registers of finance department personnel permit

challenges that arose in this period of turmoil. Orders issued in response

improved. Critics will undoubtedly detect a bias toward the Ottoman

CLASSICAL OTTOMAN FINANCE

Osman I (1280-1324), the eponymous founder of the Ottoman dy-

The reign of Bayezid I (1389-1402) is thought to have seen the

(kanun) promulgated by the rulers and adhered to in the making of

the "crown" revenues, comprising unallocated land revenues and most

diversity, the only practical way for a small bureaucracy to administer

Revenue Assessment by Survey (Tahrir)

commissioned judges to supervise assessment and collection in their

The Ottomans employed regular tahrirs, or surveys, to determine

the Ottomans also employed scribes from the conquered population,

party's interest to expose misrepresentation or cheating by the others,

defters. 31 If necessary, the defters were updated by means of marginal

The Monetary System and the Price Revolution

Table 1. Price Inflation in the Ottoman Empire, 1555-1655

1555-56 875,184 100.00 639,759 100.00

Turquie entre 1490 et 1655," in Histoire economique du monde mediterranean, 145-1650:

Major discrepancies can be noted between the rise in prices expressed