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MGMT104 Fall 2010 Lecture 03
MGMT104 Fall 2010 Lecture 03
Industrial Relations and Human Resource Management
Professor Iwan Barankay
Lecture 3
Recap of Worksheet 1
Worksheet 2
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 1
A recap from last lecture
The Principal‐Agent model has the following components
1) The technology of production consisting of the output,
the actions taken by the agent to produce the output, and
the events that affect output that are outside the control of
the agent.
2) The set of feasible contracts
3) The payoff to the parties
4) The timing of events
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 2
Events outside of control
exogeneous shocks to productivity (weather,
technological failure, law suits)
unanticipated changes in demand for final goods
(financial crisis) or supply of inputs (bankruptcy of supplier)
from the agent’s perspective: to some extend actions by
the principal
from the principal’s perspective: to some extend actions
by the agent
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Contracts can take on many forms
Fixed Wage/Compensation
Linear contracts, e.g. piece rates ($ per crate or kg of fruit
picked subject to achieving a predefined quality level)
Non‐linear contract, e.g. compensation above and below a
threshold
Bonus schemes
Retention Tournaments
Linked to Company‐level performance (e.g. stock options)
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Contracts can be complete or incomplete
Complete contracts describe a course of action and
compensation in all contingencies
Incomplete contracts
stay deliberately silent on actions and compensation in some
situations
or
it may be impossible or too costly to describe actions and
compensation in all contingencies
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Assumptions we needed to make when discussing which
contracts might be used
Who can observe actions?
If only the worker can see the actions then worker’s might
have a moral hazard to engage in actions the principal would
not find optimal.
If the actions map directly to productivity and agents are
risk‐neutral (the case we consider this week) then we can
still implement a good outcome from the principal’s
perspective.
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Worker Heterogeneity
Some people might be more able (or talented etc.) than
others. We often refer to that as agent’s types.
When employees work under comparable conditions and
some are more productive than others then contracts can be
used to effectively sort agents by ability.
Under the same contract, people with higher ability will be
more productive.
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Performance Targets
These can have the undesirable effect that those who know
they can’t or don’t want to achieve them will give up.
Those who don’t know their ability type will experiment and
learn their ability either by observing their output directly or
through feedback from the principal. We will return to the
question of feedback later in the course.
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Payoffs:
By this we mean what the principal and the agent in the end
want to have the most of.
Here is a common example of a payoff for a principal
Principal: profit = output ‐ wages
What else might a principal care about?
Worker satisfaction, or the payoff across workers (e.g. equal
pay for all; ensuring a minimum wage; capping
compensation at the top)
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Agent’s payoff
The agent wants to maximize what economists refer to as
utility.
Example: U(compensation, cost of effort)
What else, instead of own compensation might a worker care
about?
The principal’s payoff (e.g. in a family business)
The payoff of the final consumer of output (e.g. in a charity)
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 10
Outside option
Opportunity cost is the value of what you are willing to pass
on as the result of making a decision. (going to the beach,
party, another job etc.)
It is very (!) important to be aware of the level and the
change in outside options.
This will determine if people will accept or reject contracts
Outside options can also change when the demand for labor
changes (Note: Companies demand labor and workers supply
labor)
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The selection effect of contracts – whether people accept a
contract ‐ is often just as important as the incentive effect –
how much effort they put in.
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 12
The Cost Function of Effort
It is intuitive to assume the cost function of effort to have
the following properties:
(i) putting in more effort is always more costly than
putting in less, and (If not worker would be willing to
pay for being allowed to work e.g. altruistic people,
those enrolling in education etc.
(ii) initially it is really easy to put in more effort but each
additional amount of effort gets harder and harder.
(what if not? Then under some conditions workers
would put in endless effort, e.g. when the marginal
cost is zero)
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 13
Q7) Agent is being offered a linear contract
w = a + b*y
w is the wage,
a is a fixed payment (e.g. $5000),
b is a piece‐rate (e.g. $0.50)
y = e + ε is output (e.g. kg of fruit picked) determined by the
effort of the employee, e, and some random shock ε beyond
the control of the agent.
The outside option and the degree of risk aversion will
determine if the size and the sign of the fixed part of
compensation “a”.
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What is the implication of a large piece‐rate b for the
principal?
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What is the implication of a large piece‐rate b for the
principal?
The implication for the principal hinges upon what it will do
to profits. The farmer faces the following trade‐off: a higher
piece rate induces the worker to pick more fruit but then the
principal also has to spend more money on wages. In the
next worksheet we show that given this trade‐off how the
principal should choose the piece rate.
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Suppose now that the piece‐rate is large but also ε the
random shock is large: How and when will a large ε affect the
actions of the agent?
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 17
Suppose now that the piece‐rate is large but also ε the
random shock is large: How and when will a large ε affect the
actions of the agent?
A large error term matters when the worker cares about risk.
When the worker is risk‐averse, then he will choose a lower
level of effort than when he would be risk‐neutral. The
intuition is that a risk‐averse person does not like that the
return to effort is uncertain, therefore he feels the return to
effort is lower. (This is different when people set themselves
income targets. In that case they will work harder to ensure
they reach the income target.)
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 18
Worksheet 2
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 19
Let’s think of the farmer and the fruit picker again.
Assumptions
Production technology: No random shocks i.e. ε = 0.
(alternatively we could assume the workers are risk neutral)
Contracts: The farmer offers a linear contract w = a +b*y
Payoffs: The farmer wants to maximize profit = output –
wages.
The picker wants to maximize utility = wage – cost of effort
Let’s assume that cost of effort = 0.5∙e2
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Timing of events:
The principal offers the contract which the agent accepts;
the agent then chooses how much effort to exert but the
principal can’t see the effort; as the agent implements his
effort choice the random shock occurs resulting in the
output; the output is observed by the principal and the agent
gets paid.
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How hard will the picker work – i.e. how much fruit will she
pick – when she is offered this contract
w = $5 + $1*y
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How hard will the picker work – i.e. how much fruit will she
pick – when she is offered this contract
w = $5 + $1*y
recall our assumption about the picker’s payoff
u = w – c
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 23
How hard will the picker work – i.e. how much fruit will she
pick – when she is offered this contract
w = $5 + $1*y
recall our assumption about the picker’s payoff
and recall that y=e
u(e) = w – c
2
= $5 + $1*e – 0.5*e
u u
1 e 0
e setting e yields e =1
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 24
So under this contract the picker will pick 1 kg of fruit.
Suppose instead of
w = $5 + $1*y
she is being offered
w = $10 + $1*y
or
w = $5 + $2*y
how much fruit will she pick now?
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 25
How much fruit will she pick now?
u(e) = w – c
= $a + $b*e – 0.5*e2
డ௨ డ௨
Now , so setting yields
డ డ
A worker will work until the marginal reward for effort
equals the marginal cost of effort.
So what about the $5 additional fixed wages?
What about the higher piece rate?
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 26
Changing a, the fixed wage component does not affect the
amount of fruit picked here.
Changing the piece rate b does.
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 27
Solving the general case
Let us now find out what piece rate the farmer should set
given our assumptions.
I will solve the general case and we can later replace the
variables with numbers.
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 28
The technology of production is such that effort translates
directly into output, y = e.
Now recall that the picker will maximize utility, which is
compensation minus the cost of effort:
ଵ ଶ
ଶ
డ௨ డ௨
Now , so setting yields
డ డ
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 29
Given the terms of the compensation package, the worker
will pick
(1)
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 30
The farmer’s profit maximization problem
Let us not turn to the farmer’s problem. We assumed that
the farmer wants to maximize profits.
The question is: what should be the piece rate to maximize
profits?
In our case:
Now the farmer knows that the picker will choose effort such
that Replacing this we have that
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 31
כ כ
ଶ
To find the optimal piece rate he needs to set:
כ
כ
כ
(2)
ଶ
The profit maximizing piece rate is related to the marginal
product.
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 32
Again this result is intuitive. When there is a lot of money to
be made by selling fruit, the farmer wants to entice the
picker to pick more fruit.
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 33
Now we are ready to calculate the farmer’s profits, given
prices:
כ כ כ
כ כ כ כ
כ כ כ כ
כ
ଶ ଶ ଶ
כ మ
(3)
ସ
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 34
So finally we can also say what the maximum level of the
fixed wage component, a, is that the farmer should offer the
picker. Look at equation (3) on the previous page. In order to
make any profit and so to stay in business he can only offer a
fixed wage component such that
మ
ସ
as otherwise he would make a loss.
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 35
To summarize the whole issue can be summarized into three
equations:
כ
The profit maximizing piece rate is ;
ଶ
כ
The worker’s effort will be
כ మ
And the farmer’s profit given that .
ସ
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 36
Example:
If the prize offered to the farmer by the supermarket is
$2/kg, he will offer a piece‐rate of $1/kg to the worker. The
worker will pick 1kg. To avoid making a loss, the farmer has
మ
to set the fixed wage component such that or .
ସ
If the worker demands a fixed wage component of a = $5,
then the farmer would make a loss of $4. So he should either
lower a to $1 or below or he should quit the fruit harvesting
business.
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 37
Bonus question 1:
What about the fixed wage component a? What is the profit‐
maximizing level of a?
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 38
Bonus question 1:
What about the fixed wage component a? What is the profit‐
maximizing level of a?
Recall our discussion about the role of the fixed wage
component. In many situations it will respond to the outside
option of the worker.
Given that a will not affect the amount of fruit picked in our
model with risk‐neutral agents, the farmer should set a as
low as possible. Why? As otherwise it will eat into his profits.
See the preceding slides for the calculations.
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 39
Bonus question 2: Worker Heterogeneity
What about worker heterogeneity?
Suppose we have slow and fast pickers in the sense that the
marginal cost of effort for the slow people is higher than for
the fast pickers. So the slope of the cost function varies
across pickers
2
cost of effort = 0.5∙θ∙e
What is the effect of worker heterogeneity on what piece
rate the farmer should set?
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 40
Recall that
u(e) = w – c
= $a + $b*e – 0.5*θ*e2
u u
b e 0 כ
e setting e yields
ఏ
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 41
Now the farmer continues to maximize profits:
pe * a be *
But now e* = b/θ. So:
pb b2
pe * a be* a
Now he sets
0. ,
b
p 2b
b
p
so the profit‐maximizing piece‐rate is still b* 2 .
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 42
Hang on a minute….
Did nothing change?
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 43
Note that a worker will work until the marginal reward for
effort equals the marginal cost of effort.
u
0 כ
You can see this here: e yields
ఏ
This means that pickers with different cost functions will pick
different amounts of fruit! This is intuitive. Faster pickers tire
out less quickly so will pick more fruit until the marginal cost
of effort is equal to the marginal benefit – the piece rate b.
What else is changing?
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 44
What else is changing?
The profit:
pb b 2e
pe * a be* a
Note that θ is in the denominator. So a larger marginal cost
will make those fractions smaller and this will make profits
smaller.
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 45
Draw a figure with the piece rate b on the horizontal and
profit π on the vertical axis.
What does the relationship between piece rate and profit
look like?
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 46
Final question: Outside option
As before assume that the price of strawberries is $2.
And that initially the farmer offers this contract:
w = b*y = y (i.e. no fixed wage and the piece rate is set to
maximize profits, in this case p=1).
Suppose that the there are two workers.
Fast worker θ =1: cost of effort = 0.5∙e2
2 2
Slow worker θ =2: cost of effort = 0.5∙2∙e = e
Suppose now that both of them are offered a job at a
different company with a fixed wage of $0.45.
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 47
What will happen?
Who will leave and who will stay at the farm?
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What will happen?
Remember that the worker will pick so that
u
0 כ ଵ
e which yields
ఏ
The utility of workers at the farm are:
for the fast picker, θ =1, u= w ‐ c= e* ‐ .5e*2 = $.5
for the slow picker, θ =2, u= w ‐ c= e* ‐ .5*2*e*2 =$0.25
The slow picker will leave and the fast picker will stay.
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 49
Here is a graph that links the piece rate to profits (to make
the graph simpler I set a = 0).
π
fast
picker
slow
picker
0
כ
b
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 50
Reading for next week
Worksheet 3 Tournament (Netflix)
“Fixing Bankers’ Pay,” by Lucian Bebchuk appeared in The
Economist’s Voice, December 2009.
“Should Banker Pay Be Regulated?” by Steven N. Kaplan
appeared on The Economist’s Voice, December 2009.
Management 104 2010 – Professor Iwan Barankay 51