Schleiermacher’s Feeling of Absolute Dependence

Assessing Schleiermacher’s “Feeling of Absolute Dependence”

and its meaningfulness.

ABSTRACT
This essay will explicate and evaluate Schleiermacher’s concept of the feeling of
absolute dependence and his contention that it forms the basis of all religions. The
feeling of absolute dependence is the foundation for Schleiermacher’s metaphysics of
theology, yet has given rise to a wide range of interpretive descriptions, not all of which
are compatible. By cross-referencing said later interpretations with Schleiermacher’s
own descriptions in different works, we will develop a clear statement of what
Schleiermacher meant by “feeling” in general and the feeling of absolute dependence in
particular. This explication will reveal difficulties in characterising feeling inherent
within Schleiermacher’s definition. In particular, I shall show that because feeling is
pre-conceptual (and therefore pre-linguistic) descriptions of it are necessarily inexact,
abstract and problematic. I shall further demonstrate it is not possible to determine
whether talk of feeling, as defined by Schleiermacher, is meaningful because the
referent of such talk cannot be clearly established. Finally, I shall demonstrate that
Schleiermacher fails to prove his contention that the feeling of absolute dependence is
the sole cause of all religious expression.

We will examine Schleiermacher’s contention that the feeling of absolute

dependence upon the universe is an essentially religious experience. We shall first
explore what Schleiermacher meant by feeling, and then explore the feeling of absolute
dependence and its relation to the feeling of freedom. We shall demonstrate that such a
feeling, if it exists, must, of necessity, be religious, and that this is merely a tautological
contention unless Schleiermacher can demonstrate that the feeling of absolute
dependence actually refers to anything more substantial than a conceptual aggregation
of particulars for the purposes of convenience. Finally we shall argue that, as is the case
with all phenomenological descriptions, of which the feeling of absolute dependence is
an example, it is not possible to demonstrate that there is any meaning in the content.
Our response to Schleiermacher thus concerns his methodology rather than the internal
consistency or logic of his position.

Though a Christian theologian, Schleiermacher’s propositions regarding the

basis of religion in general can be considered without reference to Christianity. He
states there is a common origin in all faiths and that they can all therefore be subject to

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Schleiermacher’s Feeling of Absolute Dependence

the same analysis in terms of origin1. His conception of a particular form of feeling
(Gefühl) as the causal basis for religious activity sits on a foundation consisting of his
own metaphysics and phenomenology. Space forbids an account of his metaphysics,
but we will refer to it when absolutely necessary.

The use of the word ‘feeling’ (Gefühl) by Schleiermacher is not ideal. He stated
he would have preferred to use the term ‘disposition’ (Gesinnung), but he feared some
popular connotations for that term would be misleading.2 Schleiermacher does not
mean feeling to be taken as some form of emotion, but defines it as a Stimmung, a
permanent mood, and a Gemütszustand, which may be paraphrased in English as “the
general state of heart, mind and soul.”3 One may describe it as the mode of one’s
experience of one’s own being as the ground of consciousness, or as “the original mode
of dependent self-consciousness”.4 It is important to note feeling is not a mode of
consciousness in itself, but an aspect of one’s awareness of one’s consciousness.
Feeling is not an object of self-consciousness, nor an element in it, but a mode of self-
consciousness itself. Similarly, feeling is not a conceptual or representational mode of
consciousness.5 In this respect, feeling has both a transcendental aspect to it and it is
present whether one is conscious of it or not, though at a pre-conceptual level.

Feeling has an operational function as well as a transcendental mode.

Schleiermacher divides the functional operation of the mind into just two modes. In
Christian Ethics they are called ‘representation’ (Vorstellen) and ‘intentional action’

1
Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith – 1st & 2nd Edition on Facing Pages, translated by D.M.
Baillie (Edinburgh: W.F.Henderson, 1922), 1st Edition; #6 - #7, p.42.
2
Friedrich Schleiermacher, “On the "Glaubenslehre": Two Letters to Dr. Licke”, trans. James Duke and
Francis Fiorenza (Chico, Calif.: Scholars, 1981), p. 39.), in Louis Roy, “Consciousness According
to Schleiermacher”, in The Journal of Religion (Vol. 77, 1997), pp. 217 – 232,
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1205770> [Accessed: 02/03/2012], , p.218).
3
My own translation, via extension of Roy’s translation; "state of our heart and soul", (Roy, p.218).
4
Manfred Frank, “Metaphysical foundations: a look at Schleiermacher’s Dialectic”, in The Cambridge
Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher, edited by Jacqueline Mariña, pp. 15 – 34, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 26.
5
Dalia T. Nassar, “Immediacy and Mediation in Schleiermacher's "Reden Über Die Religion"”, in The
Review of Metaphysics (Vol. 59, 2006), pp. 807 – 840, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20130702>
[Accessed: 02/03/2012], p.823.

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Schleiermacher’s Feeling of Absolute Dependence

(Handeln) while in The Christian Faith he uses the terms ‘knowing’ and ‘doing.’6 The
human mind is in either one mode or the other, constantly alternating between them.
Feeling provides the connective constancy of self across time as one switches between
knowing and doing.7 This is not to say that one has three equivalent modes of feeling,
knowing and doing. Rather, feeling is present throughout, but retreats into the
background during knowing and doing. It is described and paraphrased in various ways
by different writers in attempts to explicate the concept; for example as “the final end of
thinking and the beginning of willing,"8 as “mediating between thought and its object”9
and as the “horizon” to the “foreground” of knowing and doing.10 We can thus
explicate its function as providing the continuity of the sense of self across time as the
various modes and objects of consciousness change, and thus serving to provide the pre-
conceptual sense of “I.” In this sense, Schleiermacher’s feeling serves as his answer to
the question of what enables us to maintain a sense of identity over time despite the fact
our physical and mental constituents constantly change.

Feeling is thus transcendental. In that it is essentially pre-conceptual, any

thought about feeling, and reflection upon it (even any cognisance of it at all) is a
reflection of, or abstraction about, feeling but cannot be feeling itself. As a
transcendental mode present through knowing, doing, and the switch between them,
feeling cannot be separated from objects of conscious attention, but is present
throughout them all. We may say feeling is immanent within all conscious activity.
Any sense we may have of feeling, any impressions created within thought, are

6
Eilert Herms, “Schleiermacher’s Christian Ethics”, in The Cambridge Companion to Friedrich
Schleiermacher, edited by Jacqueline Mariña, pp. 209 – 228, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005), p. 214.
7
Louis Roy, “Consciousness According to Schleiermacher”, in The Journal of Religion (Vol. 77, 1997),
pp. 217 – 232, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1205770> [Accessed: 02/03/2012], p.220.
8
Ibid.
9
Edmund H. Hollands, “Schleiermacher's Development of Subjective Consciousness”, in The
Philosophical Review (Vol. 15, 1906), pp. 293 – 306, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2177375>
[Accessed: 02/03/2012], p.305.
10
Robert Williams, “Schleiermacher and Feuerbach on the Intentionality of Religious Consciousness”, in
The Journal of Religion (Vol. 53, 1973), pp. 424 – 455, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1201732>
[Accessed: 02/03/2012], p.432.

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Schleiermacher’s Feeling of Absolute Dependence

abstracted representations of feeling, not feeling itself. Linguistic characterizations of a

feeling are but conceptual interpretations of a nonconceptual state of consciousness.11

That is not to say that feeling has no focus. Feeling is of something. Feeling is
“the general organ of receptivity, of openness to and apprehension of being.”12 In this
case, the feeling of absolute dependence must be understood in contrast to the feeling of
freedom (Freiheitsgefahl). The feeling of freedom derives from the combination of the
unity of the self (as the binding agent uniting all experience) with our ability to govern
and direct consciousness largely as we see fit, thus choosing how we bind experience
into unity via the attribution of meaning. In that the feeling of freedom does not rely on
any particular set of ideas, but accompanies all consciousness as a mode, it can be
ignored or overlooked, but it cannot be eliminated.13

However, we are not completely free in the sense of being able to do whatever
we can imagine, nor in terms of being in complete control of our existence. In addition,
items impinge upon our consciousness from elsewhere; we are aware that they have
their being prior to, and independent of, our awareness of them. Similarly, we have a
sense that much exists beyond our immediate awareness. Thus our function of knowing
is dependent upon a feeling of the universe as being more than our immediate self-
consciousness and not totally subject to our whim. Doing also depends upon more than
just the will. We rely upon the universe as working in certain ways. Our ability to act
depends upon the elements within the universe being connected in a specific manner
which makes doing possible, such as having causal relationships. We thus recognise
that we are not infinite beings, co-extensive with the universe, but rather we are limited
and finite, dependent upon the rest of the universe for our consciousness and freedom.
As a mode of consciousness, present both in knowing and doing, this becomes the
feeling of absolute dependence:

11
Robert Merrihew Adams, “Faith and Religious Knowledge”, in The Cambridge Companion to
Friedrich Schleiermacher, edited by Jacqueline Mariña, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005) pp. 35 – 52, p.39.
12
Robert Williams, “Schleiermacher and Feuerbach on the Intentionality of Religious Consciousness”, in
The Journal of Religion (Vol. 53, 1973), pp. 424 – 455, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1201732>
[Accessed: 02/03/2012], p.432.
13
Charles E. Scott, “Schleiermacher and the Problem of Divine Immediacy”, in Religious Studies (Vol. 3,
1968), pp. 499 – 512, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20004697> [Accessed: 02/03/2012], p.502.

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Schleiermacher’s Feeling of Absolute Dependence

“This feeling of absolute dependence, in which our self-consciousness in general

represents the finitude of our being, is therefore not an accidental element, nor a
thing which varies from person to person, but is a universal element of life.”14

The feeling of freedom therefore contrasts with the feeling of absolute

dependence. We are free so long as the universe persists. Our freedom is thus curtailed
and bounded by the extent of our being, beyond which lies more being, but a being
beyond our experience and control and upon which we are dependant.

In and of itself, this feeling need not necessarily lead to any religious sensibility,
unless it and the universe function in a particular way. We must remember that this is
not a metaphysical construct. Instead, as a feeling, it is pre-conceptual. The feeling of
absolute dependence is not, therefore, a concept describing the metaphysical,
ontological, or causative relationships between the individual and the universe, nor is it
a reaction to any such conception. At the same time, it is a relational mode. It requires
something which is dependant and something which is depended upon. In positing a
relation of dependence a hierarchical ontology of some form is implied, one in which
the dependant is posterior to that upon which it depends. In Schleiermacher dependence
is a relation of causal determination. Absolute dependence is a relationship in which X
is completely causally determined by Y, but there is no reverse causality from X to Y at
all. The feeling of dependence is not an affective reaction to such a relationship.15 As
Gefühl, it refers to a mode of being, a combination of conceptual schema, behavioural
disposition, patterns and processes of motivation, and so forth - “heart, mind and soul.”
In this sense, the feeling of absolute dependence is the manifestation of that relationship
within individual subjective self-consciousness.

However, for this to be in any way connected with religion, that upon which we
depend must be a particular type of thing. The boundaries of the self constitute the form
of our finitude, and the totality of that which lies beyond our finitude is necessarily
unbounded and infinite. Feeling provides the unity of identity which holds the self

14
Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith – 1st & 2nd Edition on Facing Pages, translated by D.M.
Baillie (Edinburgh: W. F. Henderson, 1922), 1st Edition; #33, p.15.
15
Behrens, Georg, “Feeling of Absolute Dependence or Absolute Feeling of Dependence? (What
Schleiermacher Really Said and Why It Matters)”, in Religious Studies (Vol. 34, 1998), pp. 471 –
481, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20008189> [Accessed: 02/03/2012], p.476.

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Schleiermacher’s Feeling of Absolute Dependence

together. Feelings are necessarily therefore totalising modes in which all is treated as a
unity, rather than merely as a collection of particulars. The feeling of absolute
dependence, as a relationship between a unitary self and a unitary other, thus treats of
the universe as unitary. As unitary, it must be internally coherent. Furthermore, as we
have shown, Schleiermacher’s feeling provides the sense of unity across time. Change
is central to existence and time. The feeling of absolute dependence must treat of
change as a coherent aspect of the universe. The feeling of absolute dependence thus
provides to self-consciousness a universe which is dynamic and within which all
particulars and all changes form a coherent whole - the sense of the universe as a living
organism. In his earlier publications, it seems to me that Schleiermacher alternates
between “the universe,” “the infinite” and “God” in a manner which indicates they are
synonymous. By the time of The Christian Faith “God” is the only term used. This
relation of absolute dependence upon the universe is thus a relation of absolute
dependence upon God.

Furthermore, any feeling of relation with God must be a feeling of absolute

dependence because that is the truth of the relationship between God and the individual.
As Schleiermacher says:

“Every religious and Christian self-consciousness presupposes and thus also

actually contains the immediate feeling of absolute dependence, as the only way
in which, in general, one's own being and the infinite being of God can be one in
self-consciousness.”16 (my italics)

The reasons for this are straight-forward; God made the universe, and continues
to sustain it:

“The original expression of this relation, viz., that the world subsists only in
absolute dependence on God, breaks up in ecclesiastical doctrine into the two
propositions, that the world was created by God, and that God sustains the
world.”17

16
Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith – 1st & 2nd Edition on Facing Pages, translated by
D.M. Baillie (Edinburgh: W. F. Henderson, 1922), 1st Edition; #32, p. 14.
17
Ibid, 1st Edition; #46, p. 14.

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Schleiermacher’s Feeling of Absolute Dependence

We must bear in mind this is feeling, and thus pre-conceptual:

“The piety which forms the basis of all ecclesiastical communions is, considered
purely in itself, neither a Knowing nor a Doing, but a modification of Feeling, or
of immediate self-consciousness.”18

It is not therefore a reflection upon God, nor an action in response, but it is

rather the seed from which knowing and doing will spring. As a transcendental mode,
the feeling of absolute dependence constitutes the defining boundaries which provide
the form to those products of knowledge and action which justify us in ascribing the
label “religious” to them. The feeling of absolute dependence thus stands revealed as a
mode, or disposition, of self-consciousness constituted by the relationship between the
self and everything else, and in which the self is seen as absolutely dependent.

The question arises as to the validity of Schleiermacher’s concept. It is surely

tautological to state that the experience of God is a religious experience. The issue is
not, therefore, one as to whether the feeling of absolute dependence, as defined by
Schleiermacher, essentially religious. The issue is rather one of whether any such
feeling exists in all people.

The process of coming to understand a phenomenological exposition such as

Schleiermacher’s is to search one’s internal world in an effort to find an internal state or
aspect of consciousness which one can accept as the referent of the phenomenological
description. That I can internally locate something which I then use as the referent does
not mean it is the same referent as that used by the writer or any other person reading
the exposition. Since the referent of Schleiermacher’s description is an internal state, it
is identified alone by each according to his understanding of the description and his own
internal sensibilities. Since the referent used by each is internal to them, and because
feeling is pre-conceptual and consequently external to language, it is impossible for us
to compare referents and see if we are all talking about the same thing. If we are all
talking about the same thing then the discourse is meaningful. If we are not, then the
discourse is meaningless because meaning cannot be exchanged when each uses a
different (and indeterminate) referent for shared terms. The nature of the subject matter

18
Ibid, 1st Edition; #3, p. 7.

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Schleiermacher’s Feeling of Absolute Dependence

under discussion (internal states of consciousness) renders it logically necessary that it

is impossible to determine if any writing on the feeling of absolute dependence,
including Schleiermacher’s, possesses any meaning at all.

Furthermore, as feeling is pre-conceptual, and as it is not knowing, it cannot be

subject to any form of analysis to determine if our descriptions of it are complete. Any
form of analysis would not be of feeling, but of the linguistic representation of feeling
within knowing. Consequently Schleiermacher himself cannot be certain that the
internal referent within his own self-consciousness for his term “the feeling of absolute
dependence” is the same internal referent each time he writes the term. Thus, we cannot
even be sure Schleiermacher is talking about the same thing each time, and neither can
he. Thus Schleiermacher stands revealed as unable to establish, even for himself,
whether his writing is meaningful. This is, of course, the problem with all
phenomenology, and one which I suspect may be insoluble. To Schleiermacher’s
assertion that there is a feeling of absolute dependence I need only reply that I don’t find
such a feeling within myself. How can he then prove that what he experiences within
himself is found within everyone else? Since he fails to provide any argument to
support his contention that this experience exist, we are reduced to a pantomime of “yes
it does; no it doesn’t.”

If such a feeling existed, it would necessarily be a religious feeling. However,

Schleiermacher must first provide an argument to show that feeling exists, that it is
more than a mere linguistic convenience of summary. Next he must show that there is a
feeling of absolute dependence upon the universe present in all humans. Instead he
merely extrapolates his own understanding of his own internal experience into a
universal aspect of all humanity.

Schleiermacher’s position is certainly internally consistent. The concept of

Gefühl is useful as a short-hand term. Whether it reflects anything beyond a conceptual
aggregation of particulars remains unprovable. In postulating something pre-
conceptual, the existence of feeling as anything more than a linguistic convenience
remains undemonstrated, though not necessarily undemonstrable at some stage in the
future. Even if we accept there is an objective referent for the concept of feeling, that

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Schleiermacher’s Feeling of Absolute Dependence

would not demonstrate the existence of a feeling of absolute dependence. While we can
construct arguments to create a metaphysical or phenomenological schema which
sustains such a concept, such would not prove the existence of any referent for the
concept. If such a feeling did exist, it would certainly be a religious feeling and would
certainly, within the framework of Schleiermacher’s philosophy of mind, give rise to
religious knowing and doing. However, that is mere tautology, for if we paraphrase
Schleiermacher we get nothing more than “the feeling of God is a religious feeling.”

In the end Schleiermacher is damned by his methodology and his subject matter.
His methodology is mere description of his own understanding of his own inner
experience. There is no way to confirm that any two people are using the same
referents when discussing inner experience, and so no way to establish whether
phenomenological discourse has any meaning. Schleiermacher’s work on the feeling of
absolute dependence thus constitutes mere statements of personal belief and
explorations of how that supports a pre-existing religious schema (i.e.: Christianity).
This is not to say that the rest of his work lacks merit, but such work is not the subject
of this essay. However, his work on the feeling of absolute dependence, lacking proper
argumentation, and without any means of establishing a common reference for
discourse, cannot be shown to have any meaning and thus remains of dubious value.

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Schleiermacher’s Feeling of Absolute Dependence

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adams, Robert Merrihew, “Faith and Religious Knowledge”, in The Cambridge
Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher, edited by Jacqueline Mariña,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 35 – 52.
Behrens, Georg, “Feeling of Absolute Dependence or Absolute Feeling of Dependence?
(What Schleiermacher Really Said and Why It Matters)”, in Religious Studies
(Vol. 34, 1998), pp. 471 – 481, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20008189>
[Accessed: 02/03/2012].
Frank, Manfred, “Metaphysical foundations: a look at Schleiermacher’s Dialectic”, in
The Cambridge Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher, edited by Jacqueline
Mariña, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 15 – 34.
Herms, Eilert, “Schleiermacher’s Christian Ethics”, in The Cambridge Companion to
Friedrich Schleiermacher, edited by Jacqueline Mariña, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), pp. 209 – 228.
Hollands, Edmund H., “Schleiermacher's Development of Subjective Consciousness”,
in The Philosophical Review (Vol. 15, 1906), pp. 293 – 306,
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2177375> [Accessed: 02/03/2012].
Nassar, Dalia T., “Immediacy and Mediation in Schleiermacher's "Reden Über Die
Religion"”, in The Review of Metaphysics (Vol. 59, 2006), pp. 807 – 840,
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20130702> [Accessed: 02/03/2012].
Roy, Louis, “Consciousness According to Schleiermacher”, in The Journal of Religion
(Vol. 77, 1997), pp. 217 – 232, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1205770>
[Accessed: 02/03/2012].
Schleiermacher, Friedrich, The Christian Faith, translated by D.M. Baillie (Edinburgh:
W. F. Henderson, 1922).
Scott, Charles E., “Schleiermacher and the Problem of Divine Immediacy” in Religious
Studies (Vol. 3, 1968), pp. 499 – 512, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20004697>
[Accessed: 02/03/2012].
Williams, Robert, “Schleiermacher and Feuerbach on the Intentionality of Religious
Consciousness”, in The Journal of Religion (Vol. 53, 1973), pp. 424 – 455,
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1201732> [Accessed: 02/03/2012].

10