G.R. No. L-27876 April 22, 1992 surviving spouse, Severo Maneclang, through his counsel, Atty.

lang, through his counsel, Atty. Teofilo Guadiz,

ADELAIDA S. MANECLANG, in her capacity as Administrator of the
Intestate Estate of the late Margarita Suri Santos, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN T. BAUN and AMPARO S. BAUN, ET AL., defendants. CITY OF
DAGUPAN, defendant-appellant.
no such notice was sent to the heirs of Margarita.
On 9 September 1949, despite the absence of notice to the heirs, the intestate
court issued an Order "authorizing the administrator to mortgage or sell so much
of the properties of the estate for the purposes (sic) of paying off the obligations"
referred to in the petition.

Pursuant to this Order, Oscar Maneclang, the new administrator of the intestate
estate, executed on 4 October 1952 a deed of sale  in favor of the City of
1

The issue presented in this case is the validity of a sale of a parcel of land by the Dagupan, represented by its mayor, Angel B. Fernandez, of a portion consisting
administrator of an intestate estate made pursuant to a petition for authority to of 4,415 square meters of the aforementioned Lot No. 203 for and in
sell and an order granting it which were filed and entered, respectively, without consideration of P11,687.50. This sale was approved by the intestate court on 15
notice to the heirs of the decedents. March 1954.

The records disclose that on 12 June 1947, Margarita Suri Santos died intestate. The City of Dagupan immediately took possession of the land and constructed
She was survived by her husband Severo Maneclang and nine (9) children. On thereon a public market, known as the Perez Boulevard Public Market, at a cost
30 July 1947, a petition for the settlement of her estate was filed by Hector S. of P100,00.00, more or less. It has been in continuous and uninterrupted
Maneclang, one of her legitimate children, with the Court of First Instance at possession of the property since the construction of the market.  2

Dagupan City, Pangasinan; the case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 3028. At
the time of the filing of the petition, the ages of her children were as follows: Some other parcels of land belonging to the intestate estate were sold by the
administrator pursuant of the same authority granted by the 9 September 1949
Hector Maneclang –– 21 years old Order. 3

Cesar Maneclang –– 19
Oscar Maneclang –– 17 On 28 September 1965, the new judicial administratrix of the intestate estate,
Amanda Maneclang –– 16 Adelaida S. Maneclang, daughter of the late Margarita Suri Santos, filed with the
Adelaida Meneclang –– 13 Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an action for the annulment of the sales
Linda Maneclang –– 7 made by the previous administrator pursuant to the order of 9 September 1949,
Priscila Maneclang –– 6 cancellation of titles, recovery of possession and damages against the vendees
Natividad Maneclang –– 3 Juan T. Baun and Amparo Baun, Marcelo Operaña and Aurora Pagurayan,
Teresita Maneclang –– 2 Crispino Tandoc and Brigida Tandoc, Jose Infante and Mercedes Uy Santos,
Roberto Cabugao, Basilisa Callanta and Fe Callanta, Ricardo Bravo and
No guardian ad litem was appointed by the court for the minor children. Francisca Estrada, the City of Dagupan, and Constantino Daroya and Marciana
Caramat.   The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. D-1785. The cause of
4

Margarita left several parcels of land, among which is Lot No. 203 of the action against the City of Dagupan centers around the deed of sale executed in its
Cadastral Survey of Dagupan City containing an area of 7, 401 square meters, favor on 4 October 1952 by former judicial administrator Oscar S. Maneclang. In
more or less , and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1393. its Answer filed on 5 November 1965,   the City of Dagupan interposed the
5

following affirmative defenses: (a) the sale in its favor is valid, legal and above
board; (b) plaintiff has no cause of action against it, or that the same, if any, had
On 2 September 1949, Pedro M. Feliciano, the administrator of the intestate
prescribed since the complaint was filed thirteen (13) years after the execution of
estate of Margarita, filed a petition in SP Proc. No. 3028 asking the court to give
the sale; (c) plaintiff is barred by estoppel and laches; (d) it is a buyer in good
him "the authority to dispose of so much of the estate that is necessary to meet
faith; and (e) it has introduced necessary and useful improvements and
the debts enumerated" in the petition. While notice thereof was given to the
contructed a supermarket worth P200,000.00; hence, assuming arguendo that the
sale was illegal, it has the right to retain the land and the improvements until it is
reimbursed for the said improvements.
On 30 March 1966, plaintiff and the City of Dagupan entered into a Stipulation
of Facts wherein they agreed on the facts earlier adverted to. They, however,
agreed: (a) to adduce evidence concerning the reasonable rental of the property
in question and other facts not embodied therein but which are material and vital
to the final determination of the case, and (b) to request the court to take judicial
notice of SP Proc. No. 3028.
The evidence adduced by plaintiff discloses that Oscar Maneclang was induced
by its then incumbent Mayor, Atty. Angel B. Fernandez, to sell the property to
the City of Dagupan and that the said City has been leasing the premises out to
numerous tenants at the rate of P0.83 per square meter per month, or a total
monthly rental of P3,747.45, since 4 October 1952.  6
Defendant shall also pay the costs.
On 9 November 1966, the trial court rendered a partial decision in Civil Case
No. D-1785 against the City of Dagupan, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the
Court hereby renders judgment:
(a) Annulling (sic) the Deed of Sale executed by the
Administrator on October 4, 1952 (Exh. F) being null and
void ab initio;
(b) Ordering the cancellation of the Certificate of Title issued in
favor of the defendant City of Dagupan by virtue of said Deed
of Sale, and directing the Register of Deeds of said City to issue
a new Certificate of Title in favor of the plaintiff as
Administratrix covering the property in question;
(c) Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan to restore the
possession to the plaintiff in her capacity as Judicial
Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Margarita Suri Santos
of the parcel of land in question, together with all the
improvements thereon existing;
(d) Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan City to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P584,602.20 as accumulated rentals or
reasonable value of the use of the property in question from
October 4, 1952 up to the filing of the complaint in 1985, plus
interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from the later date;
(e) Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan to pay a monthly
rental or reasonable value of its occupation of the premises in
the amount of P3,747.45 from October 9, 1985 up to the date
the possession of the premises is delivered (sic) the plaintiff by
said defendant, and
(f) Ordering the plaintiff to reimburse the defendant City of
Dagupan the sums of P100,000.00 and P11,687.50 both
amounts to be deducted from the amount due the plaintiff from
said defendant.
SO ORDERED.  7
In arriving at the said disposition, the trial court held that:
(a) Under Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, 8 which is similar to the
provisions of Section 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is essential and mandatory
that the interested parties be given notices of the application for authority to sell the estate
or any portion thereof which is pending settlement in a probate court. As held in the early
case of Estate of Gamboa vs. Floranza,  9 an order issued by a probate court for the sale of
real property belonging to the estate of a deceased person would be void if no notice for
the hearing of the petition for such sale is given as required by said Section 722. Under
this section, when such a petition is made, the court shall designate a time and place for
the hearing and shall require notice of such hearing to be given in a newspaper of general
circulation; moreover, the court may require the giving of such further notice as it deems
proper.
In the instant case, no notice of the application was given to the
heirs; hence, both the order granting authority to sell and the
deed of sale executed in favor of the City of Dagupan pursuant
thereto, are null and void.
(b) Estoppel does not lie against plaintiff as no estoppel can be
predicated on an illegal act and estoppel is founded on
ignorance. In the instant case, the nullity is by reason of the
non-observance of the requirements of law regarding notice;
this legal defect or deficiency deprived the probate court of its
jurisdiction to dispose of the property of the estate. Besides, the
City of Dagupan was represented in the transaction by lawyers
who are presumed to know the law. This being the case, they
should not be allowed to plead estoppel; finally, estoppel cannot
 give validity to an act which is prohibited by law or is against
public policy. 
10
(c) Laches and prescription do not apply. The deed of sale being
void ab initio, it is in contemplation of law inexistent and
therefore the right of the plaintiff to bring the action for the
declaration of inexistence of such contract does not prescribe. 
11
(d) The City of Dagupan is not a purchaser in good faith and for
value as the former judicial administrator, Oscar Maneclang,
testified that he was induced by then incumbent Mayor of the
City Councilor Atty. Teofilo Guadiz, Sr. to sell the property;
moreover, the City Fiscal signed as witness to the deed of sale.
These lawyers are presumed to know the law.
Not satisfied with the decision, the City of Dagupan appealed to this
Court   alleging that said decision is contrary to law, the facts and the evidence
12
on record, and that the amount involved exceeds P500,000.00.
In its Brief, the City of Dagupan submits the following assigned errors:
FIRST ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
SALE EXECUTED BY THE JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR
TO THE CITY OF DAGUPAN IS NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO.
SECOND ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PLAINTIFF IS NOT IN ESTOPPEL FROM ASSAILING THE
LEGALITY OF THE SALE.
THIRD ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
INSTANT ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY LACHES AND
PRESCRIPTION.
FOURTH ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
DEFENDANT CITY OF DAGUPAN IS NOT A
PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE.
FIFTH ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
DEFENDANT CITY OF DAGUPAN TO PAY THE
PLAINTIFF THE SUM OF P584,602.20 AS
ACCUMULATED RENTALS OR REASONABLE VALUE
OF (sic) THE USE OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION
FROM OCTOBER 4, 1952 UP TO THE FILING OF THE
COMPLAINT IN 1965, PLUS INTEREST THEREON AT
THE RATE OF 6% PER ANNUM FROM THE LATER
DATE.
SIXTH ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
DEFENDANT CITY OF DAGUPAN TO PAY A MONTHLY
RENTAL OR REASONABLE VALUE OF (sic) ITS
OCCUPATION OF THE PREMISES IN THE AMOUNT OF
P3,747,45 FROM OCTOBER 9, 1965 UP TO THE DATE
THE POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES IS DELIVERED TO
THE PLAINTIFF BY SAID DEFENDANT.
We shall consider these assigned errors sequentially.
1. In support of the first, appellant maintains that notice of the application for
authority to sell was given to Severo Maneclang, surviving spouse of Margarita.
As the designated legal representative of the minor children in accordance with
Article 320 of the Civil Code, notice to him is deemed sufficient notice to the
latter; moreover, after Oscar Maneclang signed the deed of sale   in his capacity
13
as judicial administrator, he "sent copies of his annual report and the deed of sale
to Severo Maneclang, and his brothers Hector Maneclang and Oscar Maneclang
and sister Amanda Maneclang, all of legal ages (sic), while the other minor heirs
received theirs through his lawyer."   Besides, per Flores vs. Ang Bansing,   the
14 15
sale of property by the judicial administrator cannot be set aside on the sole
ground of lack of notice.
These contentions are without merit.
Article 320 of the Civil Code does not apply. While the petition for authority to
sell was filed on 2 September 1949, the Civil Code took effect only on 30
August 1950.   Thus, the governing law at the time of the filing of the petition
16
was Article 159 of the Civil Code of Spain which provides as follows:
The father, or in his default, the mother, shall be the legal
administrator of the property of the children who are subject to
parental authority.
However, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on guardianship
impliedly repealed those of the Civil Code relating to that portion of the  patria
potestad  (parental authority) which gave to the parents the administration and
usufruct of their minor children's property; said parents were however entitled,
under normal conditions, to the custody and care of the persons of their minor
children. 
17
Article 320 of the present Civil Code, taken from the aforesaid Article 159,
incorporates the amendment that if the property under administration is worth
more than two thousand pesos (P2,000.00), the father or the mother shall give a
bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. This provision then
restores the old rule   which made the father or mother, as such, the
18
administrator of the child's property. Be that as it may, it does not follow that for
purposes of complying with the requirement of notice under Rule 89 of the Rules
of the Court, notice to the father is notice to the children. Sections 2, 4 and 7 of
said Rule state explicitly that the notice, which must be in be writing, must be
given to the heirs,  devisees, and legatees and that the court shall fix a time and
place for hearing such petition and cause notice to be given to the interested
parties.
There can be no dispute that if the heirs were duly represented by counsel or by a
guardian ad litem  in the case of the minors, the notice may be given to such
counsel or guardian ad litem.  In this case, however, only the surviving spouse,
Severo Maneclang, was notified through his counsel. Two of the heirs, Hector
Maneclang and Oscar Maneclang, who were then of legal age, were not
represented by counsel. The remaining seven (7) children were still minors with
no guardian ad litem  having been appointed to represent them. Obviously then,
the requirement of notice was not satisfied. The requisite set forth in the
aforesaid sections of Rule 89 are mandatory and essential. Without them, the
authority to sell, the sale itself and the order approving it would be null and
void ab initio.   The reason behind this requirement is that the heirs, as the
19
presumptive owners   since they succeed to all the rights and obligations of the
20
deceased from the moment of the latter's death,   are the persons directly affected
21
by the sale or mortage and therefore cannot be deprived of the property except in
the manner provided by law.
Consequently, for want of notice to the children, the Order of 9 September 1949
granting the application, the sale in question of 4 October 1952 and the Order of
15 March 1954 approving the sale are all void ab initio  as against said children.
Severo Maneclang, however, stands on different ground altogether. Having been
duly notified of the application, he was bound by the said order, sale and
approval of the latter. However, the only interest which Severino Maneclang
would have over the property is his right of usufruct which is equal to that
corresponding by way of legitime pertaining to each of the surviving children
pursuant to Article 834 of the Civil Code of Spain, the governing law at that time
since Margarita Suri Santos died before the effectivity of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
2 Estoppel is unavailable as an argument against the administratrix of the estate
and against the children.
As to the former, this Court, in Boñaga vs. Soler, supra, reiterated the rule "that a
decedent's representative is not estopped to question the validity of his own void
deed purporting to convey land;   and if this be true of the administrator as to his
22
own acts, a fortiori, his successor can not be estopped to question the acts of his
predecessor are not conformable to law."   Not being the party who petitioned
23
the court for authority to sell and who executed the sale, she cannot be held
liable for any act or omission which could give rise to estoppel. Under Article
1431 of the Civil Code, through estoppel an admission or representation is
rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon. In estoppel by  pais,  as related to
the party sought to be estopped, it is necessary that there be a concurrence of the
following requisites: (a) conduct amounting to false representation or
concealment of material facts or at least calculated to convey the impression that
the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party
subsequently attempts to assert; (b) intent, or at least expectation that this
conduct shall be acted upon, or at least influenced by the other party; and (c)
knowledge, actual or constructive of the actual facts.   In estoppel by conduct, on
24
the other hand, (a) there must have been a representation or concealment of
material facts; (c) the party to whom it was made must have been ignorant of the
truth of the matter; and (d) it must have been made with the intention that the
other party would act upon it. 25
As to the latter, considering that, except as to Oscar Maneclang who executed the
deed of sale in his capacity as judicial administrator, the rest of the heirs did not
participate in such sale, and considering further that the action was filed solely
by the administratrix without the children being impleaded as parties plaintiffs or
intervenors, there is neither rhyme nor reason to hold these heirs in estoppel. For
having executed the deed of sale, Oscar Maneclang is deemed to have assented
to both the motion for and the actual order granting the authority to sell. Estoppel Adelaida Maneclang 18 31
operates solely against him. Linda Maneclang 12 25
Priscila Maneclang 11 24
3 As to prescription, this Court ruled in the Boñaga case that "[a]ctions to Natividad Maneclang 8 20
declare the inexsistence of contracts do not prescribe (Art. 1410, N.C.C.), a Teresita Maneclang 7 20
principle applied even before the effectivity of the new Civil Code (Eugenio, et
al. vs. Perdido, et al., supra, citing Tipton vs. Velasco, 6 Phil. 67, and Sabas vs. It is an undisputed fact that the City of Dagupan immediately took possession of
Germa , 66 Phil. 471 )." the property and constructed thereon a public market; such possession was open,
uninterrupted and continuous. Obviously, Hector, Cesar, Oscar and Amanda
4. Laches is different from prescription. As the court held in Nielsen & Co. Inc . were already of legal age when the deed of sale was executed. As it was Oscar
vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co.,  the defense of laches applies
26 who executed the deed of sale, he cannot be expected to renounce his own act.
independently of prescription. While prescription is concerned with the fact of With respect to Hector, Cesar and Amanda, they should have taken immediate
delay, laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of steps to protect their rights. Their failure to do so for thirteen (13) years
time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be amounted to such inaction and delay as to constitute laches. This conclusion,
enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the however, cannot apply to the rest of the children — who were then minors and
property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. not represented by any legal representative. They could not have filed an action
Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is to protect their interests; hence, neither delay nor negligence could be attributed
based on fixed time, laches is not. to them as a basis for laches. Accordingly, the estate is entitled to recover 5/9 of
the questioned property.
The essential elements of laches are the following: (1) conduct on the part of the
defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which 5. In ruling out good faith, the trial court took into account the testimony of
complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in Oscar Maneclang to the effect that it was Mayor Fernandez of Dagupan City and
asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having been afforded an Councilor Teofilo Guadiz, Sr., both lawyers, who induced him to sell the
opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the property and that the execution of the sale was witnessed by the City Fiscal.
defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit;
and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the We are unable to agree.
complainant, or the suit is not held barred. 
27

In the instant case, from time the deed of sale in favor of the City of Dagupan
was executed on 4 October 1952, up to the time of the filing of the complaint for
annulment on 28 September 1965, twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and
twenty-four (24) days had elapsed.
The respective ages of the children of Margarita Suri Santos on these two dates
were, more or less, as follows:
While the order granting the motion for authority to sell was actually issued on 9
September 1949, the same was secured during the incumbency of the then
judicial administrator Pedro Feliciano. Even if it is to be assumed that Mayor
Fernandez and Councilor Guadiz induced Oscar Maneclang to sell the property,
the fact remains that there was already the order authorizing the sale. Having
been issued by a Judge who was lawfully appointed to his position, he was
disputably presumed to have acted in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and that
his official duty was regularly performed.   It was not incumbent upon them to
28

go beyond the order to find out if indeed there was a valid motion for authority
Upon execution At the filing to sell. Otherwise, no order of any court can be relied upon by the parties. Under
of the deed of sale of the complaint Article 526 of the Civil Code, a possessor in good faith is one who is not aware
that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it;
furthermore, mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the
Hector Maneclang 26 39
basis of good faith. It implies freedom from knowledge and circumstances which
Cesar Maneclang 24 37
ought to put a person on inquiry.   We find no circumstance in this case to have
29

Oscar Maneclang 22 35
alerted the vendee, the City of Dagupan, to a possible flaw or defect in the
Amanda Maneclang 21 34
authority of the judicial administrator to sell the property. Since good faith is
always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the
possessor rests the burden of proof,   it was incumbent upon the administrator to
30
established such proof, which We find to be wanting. However, Article 528 of
the Civil Code provides that: "Possession acquired in good faith does not lose
this character except in the case and from the moment facts exist which show
that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or
wrongfully." The filing of a case alleging bad faith on the part of a vendee gives
cause for cessation of good faith.
In Tacas vs. Tobon,   this Court held that if there are no other facts from which
31
the interruption of good faith may be determined, and an action is filed to
recover possession, good faith ceases from the date of receipt of the summons to
appear at the trial and if such date does not appear in the record, that of the filing
of the answer would control.  32
The date of service of summons to the City of Dagupan in Civil Case No. D-
1785 is not clear from the record. Its Answer, however, was filed on 5 November
1965. Accordingly, its possession in good faith must be considered to have lasted
up to that date. As a possessor in good faith, it was entitled to all the fruits of the
property and was under no obligation to pay rental to the intestate of Margarita
for the use thereof. Under Article 544 of the Civil Code, a possessor in good
faith is entitled to the fruits received before the possession is legally interrupted.
Thus, the trial court committed an error when it ordered the City of Dagupan to
pay accumulated rentals in the amount of P584,602.20 from 4 October 1952 up
to the filing of the complaint.
6. However, upon the filing of the Answer, the City of Dagupan already became
a possessor in bad faith. This brings Us to the issue of reasonable rentals, which
the trial court fixed at P3,747.45 a month. The basis thereof is the monthly
earnings of the city from the lessees of the market stalls inside the Perez
Boulevard Supermarket. The lesses were paying rental at the rate of P0.83 per
square meter. Appellant maintains that this is both unfair and unjust. The
property in question is located near the Chinese cemetery and at the time of the
questioned sale, it had no access to the national road, was located "in the
hinterland" and, as admitted by the former judicial administrator, Oscar
Maneclang, the persons who built houses thereon prior to the sale paid only
P6.00 to P8.00 as monthly rentals and the total income from them amounted only
to P40.00 a month. Appellant contends that it is this income which should be
made the basis for determining the reasonable rental for the use of the property.
There is merit in this contention since indeed, if the rental value of the property
had increased, it would be because of the construction by the City of Dagupan of
the public market and not as a consequence of any act imputable to the intestate
estate. It cannot, however, be denied that considering that the property is located
within the city, its value would never decrease; neither can it be asserted that its
price remained constant. On the contrary, the land appreciated in value at least
annually, if not monthly. It is the opinion of this Court that the reasonable
compensation for the use of the property should be fixed at P1,000.00 a month.
Taking into account the fact that Severo Maneclang, insofar as his usufructuary
right is concerned, but only until his death, is precluded from assailing the sale,
having been properly notified of the motion for authority to sell and considering
further that the heirs, Hector, Cesar, Oscar and Amanda, all surnamed
Maneclang, are, as discussed above, barred by laches, only those portions of the
monthly rentals which correspond to the presumptive shares of Adelaida, Linda,
Priscila, Natividad and Teresita, all surnamed Maneclang, to the extent
untouched by the usufructuary right of Severo Maneclang, should be paid by the
City of Dagupan. There is no showing as to when Severo Maneclang died; this
date of death is necessary to be able to determine the cessation of his
usufructuary right and the commencement of the full enjoyment of the fruits of
the property by the unaffected heirs. Under the circumstances, and for facility of
computation, We hereby fix the presumptive shares in the rentals of the
aforenamed unaffected heirs at P500.00 a month, or at P100.00 each, effective 5
November 1965 until the City of Dagupan shall have effectively delivered to the
intestate estate 5/9 of the property in question. The latter, however, shall
reimburse the City of Dagupan of that portion of the real estate taxes it had paid
on the land corresponding to 5/9 of the lot commencing from taxable year 1965
until said 5/9 part is effectively delivered to the intestate estate.
Pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code, the City of Dagupan may retain
possession of the property until it shall have been fully reimbursed the value of
the building in the amount of P100,000.00 and 5/9 of the purchase price
amounting to P6,493.05
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the decision in all
respects, except to the extent as above modified. As modified, (a) the sale in
favor of the City of Dagupan, executed on 4 October 1952 (Exhibit "F"), is
hereby declared null and void; however, by reason of estoppel and laches as
abovestated, only 5/9 of the subject property representing the presumptive shares
of Adelaida, Linda, Priscila, Natividad and Teresita, all surnamed Maneclang,
may be recovered; (b) subject, however, to its right to retain the property until it
shall have been refunded the amounts of P100,000.00 and P6,493.05, the City of
Dagupan is hereby ordered to reconvey to the intestate estate of Margarita Suri
Santos 5/9 of the property in question, for which purpose said parties shall cause
the appropriate partition thereof, expenses for which shall be borne by them
proportionately; and (c) the City of Dagupan is further ordered to pay reasonable
compensation for the use of 5/9 of the property in question at the rate of P500.00
a month from 5 November 1965 until it shall have effectively delivered the
possession of the property to the intestate estate of Margarita Suri Santos. Upon
the other hand, said intestate estate is hereby ordered to refund to the City of
Dagupan that portion of the real estate taxes the latter had paid for the lot
corresponding to 5/9 thereof effective taxable year 1965 and until the latter shall
have delivered to said intestate estate.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur.

Bonaga vs. Soler
Bonaga vs. Soler
2 SCRA 755 |  30 June 1961

Spouses Alejandro Ros and Maria Isaac died in 1935 and 1940,
respectively. The probate court appointed Juan Garza as administrator of the estate.
Upon application, the probate court authorized Garza to sell certain parcels of land
pertaining to the estate. Garza sold parcels of land (consisting of 21 parcels of abaca,
coconut, pasture and forest lands with an aggregate area of more than 1,001 hectares)
to Roberto Soler.

During World War II, the records of the case were destroyed. Upon
reconstitution, the court appointed Julian Bonaga as administrator. Bonaga filed suit,
in his capacity as administrator, to annul the sales in favor of Soler. He alleged that
said transactions were fraudulent, made without notice to the heirs of Alejandro Ros
of the hearing of the application to sell, and that the sales were not beneficial to the
heirs for various reasons.

Soler filed three motions to dismiss, the first two were dismissed. He
alleged in the third motion to dismiss various grounds including estoppel,
prescription, and non-inclusion of necessary parties. The trial court dismissed the
case.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the action without trial on the
merits considering that there is allegation that the sale of the parcels of land to Soler
did not comply with the requirements under the Rules of Court?

HELD: Yes, the trial court erred in dismissing the action without a hearing on the
merits. The sale did not comply with requisites under the Rules of Court. Among
these requisites, the fixing of the time and place of hearing for an application to sell,
and the notice thereof to the heirs are essential; and without them, the authority to
sell, the sale itself, and the order approving it would be null and void ab initio.
This requirement should apply regardless of the place of residence of those required
to be notified under said rule.

Moreover, neither the deed of sale nor the orders issued by the probate court   in
connection therewith show whether the personal properties were insufficient to pay
the debts and expenses of administration. Neither is there showing that the sale was
made for the purpose of paying the debts or expenses of administration
G.R. No. L-15445             April 29, 1961
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
MERCEDES CANO. FLORANTE C. TIMBOL, administrator-appellee,
vs.
JOSE CANO, oppositor-appellant.
Jose P. Fausto for administrator-appellee.
Filemon Cajator for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Hon. Arsenio
Santos, presiding, dated August 25, 1958, approving petitions of the
administrator Florante C. Timbol dated January 6 and 8, 1958. The order
appealed from authorizes the administrator to increase the area of a subdivision
to be formed out of the lands under administration from 30 hectares to 41.9233
hectares and approves the plan of such increased area.
The intestate Mercedes Cano died in August, 1945, leaving as her only heir her
son Florante C. Timbol then only 11 years old. On September 27, 1946, Jose
Cano, brother of the intestate, was appointed administrator. On April 13, 1951
Jose Cano, filed a petition, thru his counsel Atty. Filemon Cajator, also an uncle
of the minor Florante C. Timbol, proposing that the agricultural lands of the
intestate be leased to the administrator Jose Cano for an annual rental of P4,000,
this rental to be used for the maintenance of the minor and the payment of land
taxes and dues to the government. Judge Edilberto Barot, then presiding the
court, approved the motion in an order dated April 27, 1951, which reads:
WHEREFORE, the motion of the administrator and his lawyer dated
April 13,1951, is hereby granted under the conditions therein set forth
and the further condition that all previous obligations of the
administration including the previous deficits are assumed by said
administrator, and that the arrangement will continue only as long as, in
the judgment of contageous to the heir, the Court, the same continues to
be advantageous to the heir, Florante C. Timbol. (p. 27, Rec. on Appeal)
On January 14, 1956 the court, upon motion of the administrator and the
conformity of the minor heir and his uncles, approved the reduction of the annual
rental of the agricultural lands of the intestate leased to the administrator from
P4,000 to P2,400 and the conversion of 30 hectares of the agricultural lands into
a subdivision.
On April 2, 1957, upon motion of the administrator, a project of partition was
approved, designating Florante C. Timbol the sole and exclusive heir of all the
properties of the intestate.
On June 6, 1957 Florante C. Timbol was appointed administrator in place of Jose
Cano and on January 6, 1958 he presented a motion, which he modified ina
subsequent one of January 8, 1958, alleging among other things (a) that the area
destined for the projected subdivision be increased from 30 hectares to 41.9233
hectares and (b) that the plan submitted be approved. The motions were
approved but the approval was immediately thereafter set aside to give
opportunity to the former administrator and lessee Jose Cano to formulate his
objections to the motions. Cano's objections are (1) that the enlargement of the
subdivision would reduce the land leased to him and would deprive his tenants
of their landholdings, and (b) that he is in possession under express authority of
the court, under a valid contract, and may not be deprived of his leasehold
summarily upon a simple petition.
The court granted the motions of the administrator, overruling the objections of
Jose Cano, in the order now subject of appeal, which reads:
The said contract of lease is on all forms illegal. Under article 1646 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, — a new provision, — "the persons
disqualified to buy referred to in articles 1490 and 1491, are also
disqualified to become lessee of the things mentioned therein," and
under article 1491 (3) o the same Code, executors and administrators
cannot acquire by purchase the property of the estate under
administration.
If, as already stated, Florante C. Timbol was only pointed administrator
on June 6, 1957 and the said contract of lease having been executed on
July 9, 1956, the same fall within the prohibition provided by law.
However, Jose C. Cano avers that this Court, in the instant proceedings,
cannot pass upon the legality of the aforesaid lease contract, but in its
general jurisdiction. There is no need for the court to declare such
contract illegal and, therefore, null and void as the law so expressly
provides.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations the court hereby
grants Florante C. Timbol's petitions date January 6 and 8, 1958,
approving the amended plan for sub division, attached thereto, and
overrules Jose C. Cano's motion for reconsideration dated May 9, same
 year. (pp. 151-152 Record on Appeal) The above is the subject of the
present appeal.
The above is the subject of the present appeal.
In the first assignment of error appellant claims that the consideration of the
motions of the administrator July 6 and 8, 1958, without due notice to him, who
is lessee is a violation of the Rules of Court. This objection lost its force when
the court, motu proprio set aside it first order of approval and furnished copy of
the motion to appellant and gave him all the opportunity to present his objections
thereto.
In the second and third assignments of error appellant argues that the court
below, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to deprive the appellant of his
rights under the lease, because these rights may be annulled or modified only by
a court of general jurisdiction. The above arguments are without merit. In
probate proceedings the court orders the probate of the will of the decedent (Rule
80, See. 5); grants letters of administration to the party best entitled thereto or to
any qualified applicant (Id., Sec. 6); supervises and controls all acts of
administration; hears and approves claims against the estate of the deceased
(Rule 87, See. 13); orders payment of lawful debts (Rule 89, Sec. 14); authorizes
sale, mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate (Rule 90, Sec. 2); directs the
delivery of the estate to those entitled thereto (Rule 91, See. 1). It has been held
that the court acts as a trustee, and as such trustee, should jealously guard the
estate and see that it is wisely and economically administered, not dissipated.
(Tambunting vs. San Jose, G.R. No. L-8152.) .
Even the contract of lease under which the appellant holds the agricultural lands
of the intestate and which he now seeks to protect, was obtained with the court's
approval. If the probate court has the right to approve the lease, so may it order
its revocation, or the reduction of the subject of the lease. The matter of giving
the property to a lessee is an act of administration, also subject to the approval of
the court. Of course, if the court abuses its discretion in the approval of the
contracts or acts of the administrator, its orders may be subject to appeal and
may be reversed on appeal; but not because the court may make an error may it
be said that it lacks jurisdiction to control acts of administration of the
administrator.
In the fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the effect of the reduction
of the area under lease would be to deprive the tenants of appellant of their
landholdings. In the first place, the tenants know ought to know that the lands
leased are lands under administration, subject to be sold, divided or finally
delivered to the heir, according to the progress of the administration of the lands
of the intestate. The order appealed from does not have the effect of immediately
depriving them of their landholdings; the order does not state so, it only states
that the lands leased shall be reduced and subdivided. If they refuse to leave their
landholdings, the administrator will certainly proceed as the law provides. But in
the meanwhile, the lessee cannot allege the rights of his tenants as an excuse for
refusing the reduction ordered by the court.
In the fifth assignment of error, appellant claims that his rights as lessee would
be prejudiced because the land leased would be reduced without a corresponding
reduction in the rentals. This would be a matter to be litigate between the
administrator and himself before the probate court. But the fact of the prejudice
alone cannot bar reduction of the land leased, because such reduction is
necessary to raise funds with which to pay and liquidate the debts of the estate
under administration.
The sixth assignment of error merits no attention on our part; it is appellant
himself who, as administrator since 1945, has delayed the settlement of the
estate.
In the seventh assignment of error, appellant argues that since the project of
partition had already been approved and had become final, the lower court has
lost jurisdiction to appoint a new administrator or to authorize the enlargement of
the land to be converted into a subdivision. This assignment of error needs but a
passing mention. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts the remaining estate
delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. In the case at bar, the debts
had not yet been paid, and the estate had not yet been delivered to the heirs as
such heir.
We have taken pains to answer all the arguments adduced by the appellant on
this appeal. But all said arguments are squarely laid to naught by the declaration
of the court that the lease of the agricultural lands of the estate to the appellant
Cano, who was the administrator at the time the lease was granted, is null and
void not only because it is immoral but also because the lease by the
administrator to himself is prohibited by law.(See Arts. 1646 and 1491, Civil
Code of the Philippines). And in view of the declaration of the court below that
the lease is null and void, which declaration we hereby affirm, it would seem
proper for the administrator under the direction of the court, to take steps to get
back the lands leased from the appellant herein, or so much thereof as is needed
in the course of administration.

[ G.R. No. L-15445, April 29, 1961 ]
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF THE DECEASED MERCEDES
CANO. FLORANTE C. TIMBOL,
ADMINISTRATOR AND APPELLEE VS.
JOSE C. CANO, OPPOSITOR AND
APPELLANT.
DECISION
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Hon. Arsenio
Santos, presiding, dated August 25, 1958, approving petitions of the
administrator Florante C. Timbol dated January 6 and 8, 1958. The order
appealed from authorizes the administrator to increase the area of a subdivision
to be formed out of the lands under administration from 30 hectares to 41.9233
hectares and approves the plan of such increased area.
The intestate Mercedes Cano died in August, 1945, leaving as her only heir her
son Florante C. Timbol then only 11 years old. On September 27, 1946, Jose
Cano, brother of the intestate, was appointed administrator. On April 13, 1951
Jose Cano filed a petition, thru his counsel Atty. Filemon Cajator, also an uncle
of the minor Florante C. Timbol, proposing that the agricultural lands of the
intestate be leased to the administrator Jose Cano for an annual rental of P4,000,
this rental to be used for the maintenance of the minor and the payment of land
taxes and dues the government. Judge itdilberto Barot, then presiding the court,
approved the motion in an order dated April 27, 1951, which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the motion of the administrator and his lawyer
dated April 13, 1951, is hereby granted under the conditions
therein set forth and the further condition that all previous
obligations of the administration including the previous deficits
are assumed by said administrator, and that the arrangement will
continue only as long as, in the judgment of the Court, the same
continues to be advantageous to the heir, Florante C. Timbol." (p.
27, Rec. on Appeal).
On January 14, 1956 the court, upon motion of the administrator and the
conformity of the minor heir and his uncles, approved the reduction of the annual
rental of the agricultural lands of the intestate leased to the administrator from
P4,000 to P2,400 and the conversion of 30 hectares of the agricultural lands into
a subdivision.
On April 2, 1957, upon motion of the administrator, a project of partition was
approved, designating Florante C. Timbol the sole and exclusive heir of all the
properties of the intestate.
On June 6, 1957 Florante C. Timbol was appointed administrator in place of Jose
Cano and on January 6, 195S he presented a motion, which he modified in a
subsequent one of January 8, 1958, alleging among other things (a) that the area
destined for the projected subdivision be increased from 30 hectares to 41.9233
hectares and (b) that the plan submitted be approved. The motions were
approved but the approval was immediately thereafter set aside to give
opportunity to the former administrator and lessee Jose Cano to formulate his
objections to the motions. Cano's objections are (1) that the enlargement of the
subdivision would reduce the land leased to him and would deprive his tenants
of their landholdings, and (b) that he is in possession under express authority of
the court, under k valid contract, and may not be deprived of his leasehold
summarily upon simple petition.
The court granted the motions of the administrator, overruling the objections of
Jose Cano, in the order now subject of appeal, which reads:
"The said contract of lease is on all fours illegal. Under article
1646 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, a new provision ,'the
persons disqualified to buy referred to in articles 1490 and 1491,
are also disqualified to become lessees of the things mentioned
therein', and under article 1491 (3) of the same Code, executors
and administrators cannot acquire by purchase the property of the
estate under administration.
"If, as already stated, Florante C. Timbol was only appointed
administrator on June 6, 1957 and the said contract of lease
having been executed on July 9, 1956, the same falls within the
prohibition provided by law. However, Jose C. Cano avers that
this court, in the instant proceeding's, cannot pass upon the
legality of the aforesaid lease contract, but in its general
jurisdiction. There is no need for the court to declare such
contract illegal and, therefore, null and void as the law so
expressly provides.
"Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, the court
hereby grants Florante C. Timbol's petitions dated January 6 and
8, 1958, approving the amended plan for subdivision, attached
thereto, and overrules Jose C Cano"s motion for reconsideration
dated May 9, same year." (pp. 151-152, Record on Appeal)
The above order is the subject of the present appeal.
In the first assignment of error appellant claims that the consideration of the
motions of the administrator cf July 6 and 8, 1958, without due notice to him,
who is a lessee is a violation of the Rules of Court. This objection lost its force
when the court, motu propio, set aside its first order of approval and furnished
copy of the motions to appellant and gave him all the opportunity to present his
objections thereto.
In the second and third assignments of error appellant argues that the court
below, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to deprive the appellant of his
rights under the lease, because these rights may be annulled or modified only by
a court of general jurisdiction. The above arguments are without merit. In
probate proceedings the court orders the probate of,the will of the decedent (Rule
80, Sec. 5); grants letters, of administration of the party best entitled thereto or to
any qualified applicant (Id., Sec. 6); supervises and controls all acts of
administration; hears and approves claims against the estate of the deceased
(Rule 87, Sec. 13); orders payment of lawful debts (Rule 89, Sec. 11); authorizes
sale, mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate (Rule 90, Sec. 2); directs the
delivery of the estate to those entitled thereto (Rule 91, Sec. 1). It has been held
that the court acts as a trustee, and as such trustee, should jealously guard the
estate and see "that it is wisely and economically administered, not dissipated.
(Tambunting vs. San Jose, 97 Phil., 491.)
Even the contract of lease under which the appellant holds the agricultural lands
of the intestate and which he now 3eeks to protect, was obtained with the court's
approval. If the probate court has the right to approve the lease, so may it order
its revocation, or the reduction of the subject of the lease. The act of giving the
property to a lessee is an act of administration, also subject to the approval of the
court. Of course, if the court abuses its discretion in the approval of the contracts
or acts of the administrator, its orders may be subject to appeal and may be
reversed on appeal; but not because the court may make an error may it be said
that it lacks jurisdiction to control acts of administration of the administrator.
In the fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the effect of the reduction
of the area under lease would be to deprive the tenants of appellant of their
landholdings. In the first place the tenants know or ought to know that the lands
leased are lands under administration, .subject to be sold, divided or finally
delivered to the heir, according to the progress of the administration of the lands
of the intestate. The order appealed from does not have the effect of immediately
depriving them of their landholdings; the order does not state so, it only states
that the lands leased shall be reduced and subdivided. If they refuse to leave their
landholdings, the administrator will certainly proceed as the law provides. But in
the meanwhile, the lessee cannot allege the rights of his tenants as an excuse for
refusing the reduction ordered by the court.
In the fifth assignment of error, appellant claims that his rights as lessee would
be prejudiced because the land leased would be reduced without a corresponding
reduction in the rentals. This would be a matter to be litigated between the
administrator and himsellf before the probate court. But the fact of the prejudice
alone cannot bar the reduction of the land leased, because such reduction is
necessary to raise funds with which to pay and liquidate the debts of the estate
under administration.
The sixth assignment of error merits no attention on our part; it is appellant
himself, who as administrator since 1945, has delayed the settlement of the
estate.
In the seventh assignment of error, appellant argues that since the project of
partition had already been approved and had become final, the lower court has
lost jurisdiction to appoint a new administrator or to authorize the enlargement of
the land to be converted into a subdivision. This assignment of error needs but a
passing mention. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate
delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. In the case at bar the debts had
not yet been paid, and the estate had not yet been delivered to the heir as such
heir.
We have taken pains to answer all the arguments adduced by the appellant on
this appeal. But all said arguments are squarely laid to naught by the declaration
of the court that the lease of the agricultural lands of the estate to the appellant
Cano, who was the administrator at the time the lease was granted, is null and
void not only because it is immoral but also because the lease by the
administrator to himself is prohibited.by Jaw. (See Arts. 1646 and 1491, Civil
Code of the Philippines). And in view of the declaration of the courtbelow that
the lease is null and void, which declaration we hereby affirm, it would seem
proper for the administrator under the direction of the court, to take steps to get
back the lands leased from the appellant herein, or so much thereof as is needed
in the course of administration.
The court's order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.
Celedonia Solivio v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990
FACTS:
On October 11, 1959, Esteban Javellana, Jr.’s mother Salustia died
leaving all her property, including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo
City, to him. Esteban Jr,” died a bachelor, without descendants,
ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving
relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner CeledoniaSolivio,
the spinster half-sister of his mother, SalustiaSolivio; and (2) the
private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his
deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
Pursuant to an agreement between Concordia and Celedonia, the latter
would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the
foundation. Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her
counsel, filed for a Special Proceeding for her appointment as special
administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr., praying that
letters of administration be issued to her; that she be
declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all claims
and rendition of inventory and
accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her.
Concordia filed a civil case in the RTC of Iloilo for partition, recovery
of possession, ownership and damages. Celedonia averred that the
estate of Esteban Jr. was subject to reservatroncal and thus it should
redound to her as a relative within the 3rd degree on his mother side.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate of the deceased was subject to reservatroncal
and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on
his mother’s side
RULING:
No. There is no merit in the petitioner’s argument that the estate of the
deceased was subject to reservatroncal, and that it pertains to her as his
only relative within the third degree on his mother’s side. The
reservatroncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891
which reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to
the line from which said property came.
The persons involved in reservatroncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor
(reservista)—the
ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his
descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved
are the reservees (reservatarios)—relatives within the third degree
counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line
from which the property came.
3. The propositus—the descendant who received
by gratuitous title and died without issue, making his other ascendant
inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956
Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not
reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the
descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the
properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold
his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia
Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mother’s
side. The reservatroncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant
from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a brother
or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from
his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
 of the 750 hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the area
FACTS: are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay.  Further,  it  is  provided  that 
President  Marcos  through  a  presidential  decree  created  PEA,  which  was tasked  AMARI  will  reimburse  the  actual  costs  in reclaiming the areas of land and it will
with  the  development,  improvement,  and  acquisition,  lease,  and sale of all kinds shoulder the other reclamation costs to be incurred.  
of lands.  The then president also transferred to PEA the foreshore and offshore lands  
of Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the 
Road and Reclamation Project.    public  domain,  waters  and  other  natural  resources  and  consequently owned by
  the State.  As such, foreshore and submerged areas shall not be alienable  unless 
Thereafter,  PEA  was  granted  patent  to  the  reclaimed  areas  of  land  and then, they  are  classified  as  agricultural  lands  of  the  public domain.  The mere
years later, PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI for the development of  the  reclamation of these areas by the PEA doesn’t convert these  inalienable  natural 
Freedom  Islands.    These  two  entered  into  a  joint  venture  in  the absence of any resources  of  the  State  into  alienable  and disposable lands of the public domain. 
public bidding. There must be a law or presidential
  proclamation  officially  classifying  these  reclaimed  lands  as  alienable  and
Later,   a   privilege   speech   was   given   by   Senator   President   Maceda disposable  if  the  law  has  reserved  them  for  some  public  or  quasi-public use.
denouncing the JVA as the grandmother of all scams.  An investigation was
conducted and it was concluded that the lands that PEA was conveying to AMARI 
were  lands  of  the  public  domain;  the  certificates  of  title  over  the
Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was illegal.  This prompted Ramos to
form an investigatory committee on the legality of the JVA.
 
Petitioner  now  comes  and  contends  that  the  government  stands  to  lose billions 
by  the  conveyance  or  sale  of  the  reclaimed  areas  to  AMARI.    He also asked
for the full disclosure of the renegotiations happening between the parties.   
 

ISSUE:
W/N  stipulations  in  the  amended  JVA  for  the  transfer  to  AMARI  of  the
lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
 

HELD:
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in
the Regalian doctrine, which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the
public domain.   
 
The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine.  It declares that all natural 
resources  are  owned  by  the  State  and  except  for  alienable agricultural  lands 
of  the  public  domain,  natural  resources  cannot  be alienated.  
 
The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares.  Only 157.84 hectares