Immigration, Ethnic Conflict, and Political Turmoil - Assam, 1979-1985

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Immigration, Ethnic Conflict, and Political Turmoil--Assam, 1979-1985

Author(s): Sanjib Baruah
Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 11 (Nov., 1986), pp. 1184-1206
Published by: University of California Press
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IMMIGRATION, ETHNIC CONFLICT,
AND POLITICAL TURMOIL— ASSAM
1979-1985
Sanjib Baruah
The Assam accord signed on August 15, 1985, be-

tween Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and leaders of the movement that de-
manded the expulsion and disenfranchisement of “ foreigners” marked the
end of six years of ethnic conflict and political instability in the state of
Assam in northeastern India. The political turmoil began in the fall of
1979 when the All Assam Students Union (AASU) and the Assam Gana
Sangram Parishad (AGSP), an ad hoc coalition of a few regional political
and cultural organizations, sponsored a campaign drawing attention to the
problem of illegal immigration into the state, mostly from Bangladesh.
Relying on census data and electoral rolls that showed significantly higher
rates of growth of population and of voters in Assam compared to that in
the rest of the country, the movement leaders demanded that the central
government take steps to identify, disenfranchise, and deport illegal aliens.
Several rounds of negotiations between the government of India and the
movement leaders failed to reach agreement on modes of determining the
legality of alleged illegal aliens and on retroactively legalizing the status of
some of the aliens. The years since 1979 saw governmental instability ,
sustained civil disobedience campaigns, and some of the worst ethnic vio-
lence in the history of post -independence India, including the killing of
3,000 people during the February 1983 elections. The Assam accord in-
corporated significant concessions by the Government of India to the
movement’s demands. Fresh elections were held to the State Assembly in
December 1985 and a new regional party, the Asom Gana Parishad
—- Sanjib Baruah is Assistant Professor of Political Studies at Bard

College, Annandale-on - Hudson, New York . This article was written while he was Visiting
Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin at Madison .
© 1986 by The Regents of the University of California
1184
SANJIB BARUAH 1185
(AGP), was elected to power, which marked the return to political nor -
malcy in the state. 1
This article will analyze this episode of political turmoil in which ethnic
conflict was a central theme. The events in Assam once again underline
the volatility of ethnic conflicts in the politics of South Asia . The course of
events reflects the changing and oscillating nature of ethnicity and the cen-
tral role of manipulation of cultural symbols by elites in the formation of
ethnic identities, emphasized in recent scholarship on ethnicity. 2 How-
ever, while some of these recent theoretical perspectives are more useful
than approaches that explain ethnic mobilization in terms of primordial
givens or structural factors such as economic underdevelopment or split
labor markets, the focus on identity formation even with an “ instrumental-
ist ” orientation cannot sufficiently explain certain aspects of the Assam
—
events for example, the variability of ethnic alignments and the changing
political saliency of ethnicity in the short run. In the course of the Assam
movement, the leaders constantly confronted the problem of political man-
agement of the coalition in support of their demands. The task was only
partly a matter of reproduction of Assamese ethnic identity through ma -
nipulation of Assamese cultural and historical symbols. To a significant
extent it also involved downplaying the ethnic Assamese identity in order
to maintain a broad coalition. Apart from Assamese cultural and histori-
cal symbols, the movement leaders drew on legal and constitutional argu -
ments and symbols as well. Despite the presence of ethnic themes in the
process of political mobilization, constitutional values significantly struc-
tured the demands of the movement.
In Assam, ethnic categories cannot be viewed as primordial givens that
take determinate political forms. They are better thought of as political
projects: attempts at organizing particular forms of ethnic solidarity.
Such attempts, of course, are not always successful. Ethnic boundaries
therefore are fluid. For instance, at certain times linguistically defined eth-
nic solidarity may be salient; at other times religiously defined solidarity
1. The use of the spelling “ Asom ” by the new party , which is closer to the Assamese
pronunciation than the conventional Anglicized spelling “ Assam , ” signifies the assertion of
cultural pride that accompanied the Assam movement.
2. Paul Brass has developed an “ instrumentalist” model of ethnic political mobilization ,
which he contrasts with the “ primordialist ” model. Brass’s model emphasizes the role of
manipulation of cultural symbols by elites in the creation of ethnic identities . See Paul Brass,
Language, Religion and Politics in North India (London : Cambridge University Press, 1974).
On the notion of ethnic oscillation according to situational requirements, see Judith Nagata ,
“ What Is Malay? Situational Selection of Ethnic Identity in a Plural Society,” American
Ethnologist , 1:2 (May 1974), p. 346. On ethnic change, see Charles F. Keyes, ed., Ethnic
Change { Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981).
1186 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVI , NO. 11, NOVEMBER 1986
may become salient; and at other times neither form of ethnic solidarity
may be salient. Nor are the boundaries of particular forms of loyalty, say,
of language loyalty, determinate. Since bilingualism is widespread, partic-
ular groups may express solidarity with speakers of one or the other lan -
guage. Thus the scope of the ethnic category “ Assamese” can be exclusive
or inclusive. It is therefore significant that none of the political or cultural
organizations that were behind the Assam movement, e.g., the All Assam
Students Union, Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (The Assam Organiza -
tion for Peoples’ Struggle), Asom Sahitya Sabha (The Literature Society of
Assam [not Assamese Literary Society] ), and the new political party, the
Asom Gana Parishad (The Peoples’ Association of Assam), have the word
“ Assamese” or the autonym “ Asamiya ” attached to them. Instead they
refer to the territory of Assam. This can be called an open-door approach
to the self-definition of an ethnic group: an effort at an inclusive as op-
posed to an exclusive definition that adapts to the imperatives of cultural
diversity and the logic of ethnic oscillation according to situational re-
quirements and continual ethnic change. Thus an inclusive definition of
the term Assamese would in effect be a coalition that would include all
residents of Assam; an exclusive definition could include only those actu -
ally speaking the Assamese language or perhaps only those who are indige-
nous speakers of the language rather than recent immigrants. Other ethnic
categories such as “ Bengalis, ” “ Bengali Hindus,” “ Bengali Muslims,”
“ Assamese Hindus, ” “ Assamese Muslims, ” “ Hindus,” “ Muslims,”
“ Bodos, ” and statutory categories such as “ plain tribals” or “ minorities,”
or a category like “ tea garden workers” are all political projects that have
more or less political saliency and differing incorporating capacities at dif -
ferent points of time. The same applies to some caste groupings as well.
Politics constitutes and reconstitutes these categories. An ethnic group
therefore is an ethnic coalition potentially divisible into many smaller eth-
nic subgroups. It follows that there are weak links in all ethnic projects,
and even in subethnic projects. In the course of the Assam movement,
strains on the Assamese ethnic coalition developed around some of these
weak links. But before turning to the political turmoil of recent years, I
will provide a background of Assam’s demographic transformation and
ethnic diversity.
Immigration and Ethnic Diversity in a

Frontier Region
The factor underlying the political turmoil is the demographic transforma-
tion of the frontier region, which includes the present state of Assam as
well as other smaller states in northeastern India, through large-scale im-
SANJIB BARUAH 1187
migration from many parts of the subcontinent, but mostly from the land -
scarce neighboring areas of East Bengal, over the past one hundred years.
Table 1 compares population growth rates of the present territory of As-
sam and the rest of the country.
TABLE 1 Population Growth Rate in Assam and India ( percentage )
Years Assam India

1901-11 16.8 5.7
1911-21 20.2 -0.3
1921-31 20.1 11.0
1931-41 20.5 14.2
1941-51 20.1 13.3
1951-61 35.0 21.6
1961-71 35.2 24.8
1971-81(estimated) 36.3 24.7
SOURCE: Myron Weiner, “ The Political Demography of Assam’s Anti Immigrant -
Movement , ” in Population and Development Review , 9 :2 (June 1983), p. 283.
The census figures permit some rough estimates of the number of immi-
grants in Assam. Myron Weiner has noted that had Assam’s population
grown at the same rate as the rest of India between 1901 and 1971, the
population in 1971 would have been 7.6 million rather than 15 million. It
is likely that immigrants and their descendants account for the 7.4 million
difference. However, since large-scale immigration started in the nine-
teenth century , with the opening of tea plantations, Weiner also makes an
estimate based on projection from the 1891 census. Immigrants and their
descendants would then number 8.5 million and locals and their descend -
—
ants 6.5 million a minority.3
Even without immigration, Assam’s indigenous population is extremely
diverse in cultural, linguistic, and religious terms. The 1971 census classi-
fies Assam’ s population into speakers of 76 languages and dialects and a
residual category consisting of 48 other languages and dialects. Table 2
lists only those languages that were declared as mother tongue by more
than 50,000 people.
3. Myron Weiner, Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 81. For a comparable exercise, see Atul Goswami and
Jayanta Gogoi , “ Migration and Demographic Transformation of Assam, 1901-1971, ” in
B. L. Abbi, ed ., Northeast Region: Problems and Prospects of Development (Chandigarh :
Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development , 1984), pp. 60-80.
1188 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVI, NO. 11 , NOVEMBER 1986
TABLE 2 Major Language Groups in Assam, 1971
Number of Speakers Percentage of Total

Language (as mother tongue ) Population
1. Assamese 8, 904, 917 60.89
2. Bengali 2, 882,039 19.71
3. Hindi 792,481 5.42
4. Bodo 533,713 3.65
5. Gorkhali/ Nepali 349, 116 2.39
6. Mikir 191, 354 1.31
7. Miri/ Mishing 177, 226 1.21
8. Oriya 150, 196 1.03
9. Manipuri/Meitei 87,167 0.60
10. Santali 86,086 0.59
11. Munda 76, 894 0.53
12. Garo 76,004 0.52
13. Others 317,959 2.17
Total 14, 625, 152 100.02
SOURCE: Adapted from table in Census of India , 1971, Series 3: Assam , Part 1 -A ,
General Report (Government of India, Controller of Publications, 1979), p. 90.
Of the languages that appear in Table 2, Assamese is an indigenous lan-

guage. While speakers of Bengali are mostly immigrants in the districts of
the Brahmaputra valley , Bengali is an indigenous language in Cachar dis-
trict where, according to the 1971 census, 77.8% of the population spoke
Bengali.4 Hindi, Gorkhali/ Nepali, Oriya, Santhali, and Munda are lan-
guages spoken by immigrant groups. Bodo, Mikir, Miri/ Mishing, and
Garo are indigenous languages, the first three being spoken by groups that
fall within the statutory category “ plains tribals.” As for religious beliefs,
the 1971 census records 72.5 % of Assam’ s population as Hindus, 24.6%
as Muslims, 2.61 % Christians, and smaller numbers of Buddhists, Jains,
Sikhs, and residuals.
It should be remembered, however, that the census figures cannot be
taken as indicators of a prepolitical and static objective reality about ethnic
diversity. To a large extent they reflect a group’s subjective ethnic identifi -
cation , which is changeable over time. The category Assamese speakers,
for instance, is not unambiguous. The total number of Assamese speakers
4. Of course indigenous and migrant are only relative terms. Many indigenous groups too
were descendants of migrants. Here migrant groups refer to groups that were part of the
modern migration since the mid-19 th century.
SANJIB BARUAH 1189
in the census is likely to include substantial numbers of immigrants who

may or may not actually speak Assamese. Large numbers of East Bengali
Muslim peasant immigrants into the state identify themselves as Assa-
mese-speaking, resulting in a rise of Assamese speakers in the area that
constitutes Assam today from 36 % in 1931 to 62 % in 1951 to 61% in
1971.
The Number of “ Foreigners”

The leaders of the Assam movement argue that all immigrants from for-
—
eign countries, mostly from East Bengal that is, the province of East
Pakistan from 1947 to 1971 that became the sovereign state of Ban -
—
gladesh and from Nepal, except those who were legally granted citizen-
ship status in India, are illegal aliens. How many “ foreigners” are there in
Assam? This question , at the crux of the political turmoil in Assam , un-
fortunately is extremely difficult to answer. According to estimates made
by organizations behind the Assam movement, the number is as high as
4.5 to 5 million, or 31 % to 34 % of the total population of the state in
1971.5
The problem of estimation arises for a number of reasons. There are no
official records of the entry of illegal aliens. The only source for making
estimates is the census, but there are several problems with using the cen-
sus data. The only set of relevant census data that are likely to provide a
direct estimate is the data on birthplace, but it is unlikely that immigrants
of dubious legal status would provide accurate information on this. The
language data are not helpful because of the tendency of Bengali Muslim
immigrants to declare Assamese as their mother tongue. Most census -
based estimates therefore are based on calculating the difference between
the assumed natural rate of population growth and the actual rate of
growth. This approach, apart from the methodological problems of arriv-
ing at an accurate natural rate of population growth of Assam, obviously
does not allow for differentiation between immigrants from the rest of In-
dia and from foreign countries. Furthermore, since there was no census in
Assam in 1981 because of the political turmoil, even such crude estimates
are not possible for the period 1971 to 1981 when, according to partisans
of the Assam movement, large-scale immigration took place.
Perhaps the lowest estimate is that which could be deduced from the
census data on birthplace. According to the estimates made on the basis of
5. This estimate is made by the North East Regional Students Union, an organization that
attempted to focus on the issue of “ foreigners” in all seven states of northeastern India. Cited
by Debo Prasad Barooah, “ Silent Civilian Invasion : India ’s Danger in the Northeast, ” in
Abbi, p. 291 .
1190 ASIAN SURVEY , VOL. XXVI, NO. 11 , NOVEMBER 1986
these figures, there were 1.6 million foreign nationals with or without valid
documents in Assam in 1971, amounting to 11 % of the 1971 population of
Assam. Estimates of the difference between the projected population
based on Assam’s natural rate of population growth and the actual popula -
tion puts the number of immigrants into Assam at 1.9 million, or 13% of
the 1971 population.6 These estimates are significantly lower than the esti-
mates cited by the organizations behind the Assam movement. While
their estimates are likely to be exaggerations, it should be remembered that
the present estimates are only valid for the number of immigrants in 1971.
These figures are also lower than the Myron Weiner’s estimates of Assam’s
immigrant population cited above. Weiner’s estimate, which suggests that
immigrants and their descendants constituted a majority of Assam’s 1971
population, is based on the difference between Assam’s actual 1971 popu -
lation and the projected population based on Assam’s 1891 and 1901 cen -
suses. While one must carefully distinguish estimates of foreigners from
estimates of immigrants and descendants, the latter are nonetheless signifi-
cant for understanding Assam’s ethnic politics.
From Ethnic Accommodation to

Ethnic Conflict
The issue of immigration from East Bengal had caused political instability
in the area prior to the independence and partition of India in 1947. How-
ever, between independence and the Assam movement that began in 1979,
it had not been a subject of major political controversy.7 Two factors that
helped keep the immigration issue out of the political agenda were, first,
the centrality of language issues in defining the contours of ethnic conflicts
in the state and, second, the aggregation of interests within political par-
ties, primarily the Congress, but in other parties as well, which in effect
produced a tacit agreement among political leaders not to raise this explo-
sive issue.
Since independence, the ethnic Assamese political leadership, in re-
sponse to popular campaigns, pursued cultural policies that sought to de-
—
fine the state as Assamese for instance to have Assamese as the official
language of the state and as the language of instruction in the state’s edu -
cational institutions. They also made claims to preferential policies in
6. These two estimates are from Goswami and Gogoi, pp. 66, 63.
7. For a discussion of the immigration issue in Assam politics in the preindependence
period , see Amalendu Guha, “ East Bengal Immigrants and Bhasani in Assam Politics
-
1928-47,” Indian History Congress, Proceedings of the Thirty fifth Session, Jadavpur (Cal -
cutta), 1974 ( New Delhi: Indian History Congress, n.d . ), pp. 348-365.
SANJIB BARUAH 1191
jobs. 8 The creation of a linguistic state superimposed on Assam’s ethnic

diversity and demographic transformation had assuaged the fears of the
ethnic Assamese and , despite the alienation of significant segments of As-
sam’s indigenous “ tribal ” population, it had managed to achieve ethnic
accommodation in the residual state of Assam. The Bengali Muslim im-
migrants allied with the ethnic Assamese on cultural policy issues, while
Bengali Hindus were among the most vociferous opponents of these poli-
cies.
The immigration issue, however, had occasionally burst into the open in
the politics of the state since independence. In 1965 when relations with
Pakistan were deteriorating, the state government under instructions from
New Delhi began expelling Pakistani “ infiltrators.” 9 But the process had
to be stopped when eleven members of the state Legislative Assembly pro-
tested that Indian Muslims were being harassed in the process, and
threatened to resign. Major Muslim politicians from Assam such as Fakh-
ruddin Ali Ahmed, who became the President of India, and Moinul Haque
Chaudhuri, who was a member of the central cabinet in the early 1970s,
were persuaded to relinquish their claims to the state’s chief ministership
and leave state politics because it was feared that such moves, which might
suggest growing immigrant political power, might be politically destabi-
lizing.10
With the Assam movement that started in 1979 the issue of Assam’s
demographic transformation as a result of immigration returned to the
state’s political agenda with a vengeance. It ruptured carefully nurtured
ethnic coalitions that were at the foundation of political stability in the
state, setting the stage for a prolonged period of political turmoil.
-
The Assam movement began in 1979 after a bye election to the Man-
galdoi parliamentary constituency, which is located in an area with a
heavy concentration of East Bengali immigrants, drew public attention to
a rapid expansion of the number of voters since the previous election two
8. Myron Weiner, “ Seeking Ethnic Equality in Assam, ” in Myron Weiner and Mary Fain -
sod Katzenstein , India’s Preferential Policies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981),
pp. 91-119.
9. Ironically, at that time the government of India’s position on illegal immigration from
East Pakistan was quite close to the position later taken up by the leaders of the Assam
movement . See the pamphlet on that issue published by the Indian government: Influx:
Infiltration From East Pakistan (Delhi: DAVP, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting,
Government of India, 1963).
10. K. N . Deka, “ Assam: The Challenge of Political Integration and Congress Leader -
ship, ” in Iqbal Narain, ed ., State Politics in India (Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1976), pp.
34, 45.
years earlier . The event followed reports of fresh large-scale illegal immi-
gration from Bangladesh into the state.
On June 8, 1979 , the All Assam Students Union sponsored a 12-hour
general strike ( bandh ) in the state to demand the “ detection , disen-
franchisement and deportation ” of foreigners. That event turned out to be
only the first of a protracted series of protest actions. On August 26, 1979,
the AGSP was formed as an ad hoc coalition to coordinate a sustained
statewide movement. An unprecedented mass popular upsurge followed
in the form of sit-ins, picketings in front of government offices, strikes, and
symbolic disobedience of the law.
Between 1980 and 1982, there were 23 negotiating sessions between the
movement leaders and the central government. Even though the Assam
movement had immense popular support, there was considerable disagree-
ment on the demands of the movement in Assam as well as in the rest of
the country . For the government of India the political costs of agreeing to
those demands would have been high. 11 By the end of 1982, there was
agreement that illegal aliens who came between 1951 and 1961 would be
given Indian citizenship and that those who came after 1971 would be
deported, but the status of those who came between 1961 and 1971 was
unresolved. It was reported that in the negotiations of October 1980, the
government’s position was that these immigrants should stay and the gov -
ernment would pay for their rehabilitation. There were also disagreements
on the procedures to be used for the detection of aliens that is, on the
kind of documents to be relied upon to prove when a person had actually
—
immigrated . The Assam movement leaders combined negotiations with
general strikes and civil disobedience campaigns designed to demonstrate
their power capability.12
The Assam movement succeeded in significantly disrupting the func-
tioning of the governmental institutions in Assam, including the 1980 par -
11. To treat Hindu immigrants from East Pakistan and what subsequently became Ban -
gladesh as illegal , irrespective of what the citizenship laws state, would have alienated signifi-
cant sections of Hindu opinion in the country. On the other hand , to explicitly distinguish
between Hindu “ refugees” and Muslim “ illegal aliens” would have cut into the secular fabric
of the state and would have alienated India’s Muslim minority . To expel “ foreigners” would
also have political costs internationally in terms of India’s relations with Bangladesh: the
official Bangladeshi position is that there are no illegal immigrants from Bangladesh in India .
12. The notion of power capability is borrowed from Charles W . Andersen . In delineating
the contours of the Latin American political system, where there are various contenders for
power with different political resources, he noted : “ As a strike may demonstrate the power
capability of a labor union, or insurrection that of a military faction , so election tests and
demonstrates the power capability of a political party. ” Politics and Economic Change in
Latin America ( New York : Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1967), p. 94.
SANJIB BARUAH 1193
liamentary elections and the Assembly elections in 1983. The leadership

of the movement declared established political parties to be “ irrelevant ” to
the problems of the state and successfully mobilized campaigns of nonrec-
ognition of elected state governments, arguing that they were elected on
the basis of invalid electoral rolls that included the names of large numbers
of illegal aliens. President’s Rule had to be imposed intermittently as
elected governments lost their majorities in the State Assembly. Since ne-
gotiations appeared unlikely to produce a settlement, the Indian govern-
ment sought to reassert the legitimacy of the governmental institutions and
attempted to cut into the popular base of the Assam movement by seeking
to wean away ethnic subgroups that constitute weak links in the Assamese
ethnic coalition. These efforts, combined with the strains caused by the
movement itself, repeatedly changed the ethnic alignments in the state.
However, the movement remained quite strong. The political crisis was
eventually resolved when the Indian government recognized the power ca-
pability of the movement and made important concessions to their de-
mands. This once again altered the conditions of Assam’s ethnic politics.
It is useful to view the political developments in Assam of the past six
years in terms of changes in the government’s strategy and their impact on
ethnic alignments. Five phases can be distinguished: (1) June 1979 to
November 1980; (2) December 1980 to January 1983; ( 3) the election of
February 1983; (4) March 1983 to May 1984; and (5) June 1984 to Decem-
ber 1985.
Festival of Protest
The first phase of the Assam movement started with demonstrations and
rallies with widespread participation by ethnic Assamese in support of the
demands. This phase began with a mood of optimism about a negotiated
settlement and ended with considerable pessimism about the prospects of a
solution and signs of increasing fissures in the Assamese ethnic coalition.
The movement began in the last days of the Janata period . The Janata
ministry headed by Golap Borbora collapsed in September 1979, and the
ramshackle coalition ministry that came to power, headed by Jogen
Hazarika and consisting of factions of the erstwhile Janata Party, fell
within three months. President’s Rule was imposed in December 1979
until the following December, when a Congress (I) government came to
power. That inaugurated a new phase in the state’s politics. The first
phase began with festive and mostly peaceful protest actions, but with
some reports of ethnic violence. Ethnic conflicts and signs of confronta-
tion between the government and the movement began to show by the
middle of 1980. The next phase marked a significant accentuation of these

trends.
A report of an investigation committee of the Delhi-based Peoples’
Union for Civil Liberties gives a flavor of the early phase of the Assam
movement . In a satyagraha (symbolic disobedience of the law) in Novem-
ber 1979 nearly 700,000 people in the city of Gauhati and an estimated
two million people in the state as a whole courted arrest. “ The sat-
yagraha ” says the report, “ is fairly simple. People walk to the High Court
in Gauhati or some such office in other towns, court arrest and are released
a few hours later. ” The entire government machinery, said the report, was
party to the satyagraha . “ The Government of Assam, ” a witness told the
committee, “ is running the movement and the AASU is running the gov -
ernment.» 1 3 In December 1979, the civil disobedience campaign was ex-
tended to an economic blockade, and movement supporters stopped the
flow of crude oil and plywood from Assam to the rest of the country. Sup-
port for the movement by officials of the state government and the fact that
such officials, most of whom were ethnic Assamese, were often in charge of
dealing with protest actions, kept confrontation between the state and the
movement to a minimum. Even when the government adopted a tough
posture, usually as a result of proddings by the central government, con-
frontations between the protesters and the police were avoided .
With enthusiastic support for the demands of the movement by major
—
sectors of Assamese intellectual and cultural life for example, literary so-
cieties, cultural associations, newspapers, magazines, and school and col-
lege teachers associations, apart from the leadership role of the All Assam
—
Students Union the Assam movement had extremely broad support
among the ethnic Assamese. The campaign, in which hundreds of
thousands participated with displays of distinctive Assamese cultural and
historical symbols, acquired the appearance of a statewide cultural festival .
Individuals and organizations with influence among segments of the
“ plains tribals, ” a group that had lost significant amounts of cultivable
land to East Bengali immigrants over time, and of tea plantation workers
also supported the movement . There were, however, some distinguished
ethnic Assamese intellectuals and political figures, mostly of the political
left, who were opposed to the movement. They complained of a suffocat -
ing intellectual atmosphere where there was little room for dissent. There
were reports of terrorist attacks on opponents of the movement.
The ethnic subgroups directly threatened by the demands of the move-
ment were the East Bengali immigrants, both Hindu and Muslim. The
13. “ Magnitude of Assam Disorder: Report of PUCL Team , ” Mainstream ( New Delhi)
18:28 (March 8, 1980), pp. 18-21.
SANJIB BARUAH 1195
increasing tendency to lump all East Bengali immigrants as “ Ban-

gladeshis” irrespective of when they came, did little to assuage their fears.
There were reports of increasing violence against East Bengali immigrants
in the atmosphere created by the movement, even though the violence was
condemned by the sponsors of the movement. Initially the attitude of
most East Bengali immigrants was to lie low, and there were few efforts to
present an organized opposition to the Assam movement by groups di-
rectly threatened by its demands.
Immigrants from other states of India also felt insecure. The leaders of
the movement had to do some careful conflict management to assuage the
fears of some of these groups. Despite the support for the movement by
important organizations of tea workers, there were reports of clashes be-
tween tea workers and student picketers attempting to close down tea
plantations. The AASU responded by excluding tea plantations from
picketing, and the assistance of tea workers’ unions was sought in order to
explain to the workers that the agitation was not directed against them. 14
The leaders of the movement called for a boycott of the parliamentary
elections of December 1979 unless the government agreed to remove the
names of foreigners from the rolls. Potential candidates were asked not to
contest elections until the electoral rolls were revised . Picketing of candi-
dates by movement supporters led to confrontations with the police. Own-
ers of printing presses in Assam refused to print the electoral rolls for the
election. As a result of the boycott, the election that returned Indira Gan-
dhi to power nationally could be held only in two constituencies in Assam,
located in the predominantly Bengali-speaking Cachar district . Elections
had to be canceled in twelve of Assam’s fourteen parliamentary constitu -
encies.
By May 1980 ethnic subgroups directly threatened by the demands of
the movement began to form organizations to oppose these demands. In
May 1980, a new organization , the All Assam Minority Students Union
(AAMSU), which attempted to include both Muslim and Hindu East Ben -
gali immigrant students, appeared on the scene to rival the AASU. While
not disputing the seriousness of the problem of illegal immigration, the
AAMSU demanded that all immigrants who came before 1971 be given
citizenship status and that harassment against minorities be stopped . The
AASU opposed the new organization, and in certain strong immigrant
strongholds strike calls on days that AAMSU had called for protest dem-
onstrations led to violent conflicts between AASU and AAMSU support -
14. U . M . , “ Assam: Set for Confrontation,” Economic and Political Weekly , 14:49 (De-
cember 8, 1979), pp. 1993-1994, and Udayon Misra , “ Fresh Tensions in Tea Belt , ” Economic
and Political Weekly , 15:31 (August 2, 1980), p. 1300.
1196 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVI, NO. II , NOVEMBER 1986
ers. Apart from ethnic violence, a growing number of terrorist attacks on

state officials and state property began to be reported in Assam.
By September 1980 the immigrant organizations had become a third
force in the negotiations on the Assam movement’s demands. The govern-
ment invited AAMSU leaders to Delhi for consultation during the negotia-
tions between the government and the movement leaders. The leader of
the Assam Congress (I), Anwara Taimur, who was elected to the state
Assembly from a heavily East Bengali immigrant constituency and was
seen as a representative of immigrant interests, was also in Delhi during
the negotiations.
As the negotiations appeared less and less likely to produce an agree-
ment, the movement leaders intensified their protest actions. The govern-
ment attempted to raise the costs of participation in the movement by
using more and more coercion in dealing with protesters and by taking
disciplinary actions against state government officials who participated in
the movement. The Assamese press that was sympathetic to the demands
of the movement came under censorship. In November 1980 the Indian
army was used to break the eleven-month-old oil blockade.
Confrontation
The inauguration of a Congress (I) government led by an Assamese Mus-
lim , Anwara Taimur, in December 1980 marked a new phase in the Assam
movement . The Taimur government, formed as a result of defections to
the Congress (I) from other parties, survived for only six months. Presi-
dent’s Rule was then imposed once again in June 1981. In January 1982 a
new Congress (I) government led by Keshab Gogoi came to power, but
survived only two months. In March 1982 President’s Rule was imposed
once again and the State Assembly , elected in 1978 under very different
political conditions, was dissolved . The dissolution of the State Assembly
meant that the day of reckoning in Assam was approaching because the
constitution did not allow for the extension of President’s Rule beyond a
year and elections would have had to take place unless the constitution
itself was amended. Yet it was unlikely that an election could be held
without an agreement between the movement leaders and the government.
The decision to end President’s Rule and to form a state government in
December 1980 had indicated New Delhi’s decision to challenge the power
capability of the movement and to back electoral institutions that reflected
the demographic realities of the state. The movement’s power capability
lay on the streets, since it could mobilize the ethnic Assamese almost to a
person, but the same power capability cannot be translated into electoral
strength because of the state’s ethnic diversity and transformed demo-
SANJIB BARUAH 1197
graphic reality. Not unexpectedly, the movement leaders greeted the state
government with a call for a general strike. The government, whom the
leaders of the movement refused to “ recognize” as legitimate, had to rule
with maximum police protection and minimal public visibility.
The Taimur government took action against ethnic Assamese govern-
ment officials who were known sympathizers of the movement, including
the arrest of one of the top-most police officials of the state. In order to use
coercive measures against the movement, Taimur effectively had to trans-
form the state bureaucracy. For instance, her personal secretariat, it was
reported, had only Muslim gazetted officers or executives. 15 These meas-
ures accentuated the legitimacy crisis in the state, for the process appeared
to be one of de-Assamization of the state bureaucracy and it reinforced the
fear of Assamese minoritization, the loss of Assamese hegemony to immi-
grants. The election of Taimur to the chief ministry of the state itself had
ruptured the subtle rules on ethnic accommodation in Assam’s politics. 16
In the months following the inauguration of the Taimur ministry, there
was an increase in the incidence of violence. In April 1981, one of the
state’s highest-ranking civil servants, who was identified with measures to
tighten discipline among state government employees, was killed in a ter-
rorist bomb attack. There were signs of tensions in the Assamese ethnic
coalition . However, there was little evidence of any significant erosion of
the movement’s support base in the ethnic Assamese areas of the Brahma-
putra valley. State coercion was a double-edged device. While it was ex-
pected to increase the costs of participation in the movement, it also
reinforced a sense of justice of the cause, while the erosion of influence of
ethnic Assamese officials reinforced the fears of Assamese minoritization.
The choice of Gogoi as chief minister in January 1982 was an attempt to
limit the damage. Gogoi, an ethnic Assamese, was Ahom by caste, 17
which was another potential weak link in the Assamese ethnic coalition .
While his government survived for only two months, the period was char-
acterized by a somewhat reduced level of coercive actions and the release
of the senior ethnic Assamese police official arrested by the Taimur gov-
ernment.
The President’s Rule regime that was brought in after the collapse of the
Gogoi government in March 1982 once again went about the task of
15. “ Plains Tribals Save Assam’s Ministry, ” Sunday , 8:32 (April 5, 1981), p. 34.
16. See Deka, “ Assam, ” pp. 34, 45.
17. The Ahoms, whose forefathers immigrated from present-day Thailand into Assam and
-
ruled Assam for six centuries before the British, are now considered a separate ethnic Assa
mese caste. There had been a rise of Ahom awareness of separateness from the ethnic Assa-
mese in the years prior to the Assam movement.
cleansing the administration of officials in sympathy with the movement.

There was increasing use of coercion . By January 1983 it was reported
that the capital city of Gauhati and the towns of the Brahmaputra Valley
were “ virtually armed camps.” In view of the “ presumed unreliability” of
the state police forces, paramilitary forces were brought in from the center
and from other states. On the streets of the capital city, according to an
Economic and Political Weekly editorial, there was “ a premium in not be-
ing an Assamese,” because ethnic Assamese young men were likely to be
arrested and beaten up. The Republic Day celebration of January 26,
1983, which was boycotted by movement supporters, turned into a “ bla-
tant display of military muscle against its citizens.” 18
The twenty-third round of negotiations between the government and the
movement leaders took place in December 1982 amid reports that the gov-
ernment was determined to hold elections in Assam by March 1983.
The Breakdown of Order

The State Assembly election of February 1983 marked the breakdown of
Assam’s framework of ethnic accommodation and of political order. The
election was a direct challenge of the central government to the Assam
movement. The election was to be held on the basis of the electoral rolls
prepared in 1979, which had precipitated the Assam movement . No at-
tempt was made to revise the rolls to incorporate the points of agreement
—
between the movement leaders and the government that is, to remove the
names of post-1971 immigrants from the rolls. Indeed, apart from
sidestepping all the thorny questions of illegal aliens that had rocked the
-
state for three years, the use of four year-old electoral rolls was problem-
atic since it did not include voters who had come of age during the preced -
ing four years.
The question in the election was not who would win , but whether there
would be an election at all. The holding of the election became the focus
of a contest between the Assam movement and the center. An election
with a moderate to high turnout would have weakened the movement’s
claims about its representativeness and its power capability. The move-
ment leaders, as expected, called for a boycott of the elections. They por-
trayed the election as Assam’s “ last struggle for survival. ” The East
Bengali immigrants, on the other hand, had few alternatives but to display
their appreciation of the center’s support for their cause by participating in
the voting in large numbers. The breakdown of the framework of ethnic
accommodation was complete.
18. “ Fraud in Assam , ” Economic and Political Weekly, 18:3 (January 29, 1983).
SANJIB BARUAH 1199
Voter participation mostly followed a pattern predictable from the eth-

nic settlement patterns. In constituencies where Bengalis were predomi-
nant, the polling was high; in Assamese strongholds, it was low. The
attitude to the election, however, did not vary only across the Assamese-
Bengali divide. The developments of the preceding two years had led to
fissures in the weak links of the Assamese ethnic coalition. Moreover,
apart from the Congress (I), some opposition parties also contested the
election. In areas where there were significant numbers of both pro-elec -
-
tion and anti election ethnic subgroups, violent confrontations took place.
In a detailed investigative report, the Indian journalist Arun Shourie called
the violence a “ Hobbesian war of all against all” :
They testified not so much to “ communalism ” as to the total breakdown of
governance: in Nellie Lalung tribals killed Bengali Muslims, in Kokrajhar sub-
division Boro Kacharis fought Bengali Hindus and Muslims; in Goreswar and
Khairabari Sarani and Boro Kacharis fought Bengali Hindus; in Gohpur Boros
fought Assamese Hindus; in Dhemaji and Jonai Mishing tribals fought Bengali
Hindus and Muslims; in Samaguri Muslims killed Hindus; in Dhaila and
Thekrabari again Muslims killed Hindus; in Chaowlkhowa Chapori Assamese
Hindus and Muslims together killed Bengali Muslims. And each community
that was a victim in one place was a predator in another.19
The pattern of violence reflected the total breakdown of order. If the
violence did not follow neat ethnic cleavages, it is because of the oscillating
and coalitional nature of ethnic projects in Assam. The violence took
place along the weak links in ethnic coalitions. Most of the violence oc-
curred as supporters of the election clashed with opponents. In so far as
—
the attitude toward the election which to many became Assam’s “ last
—
struggle for survival ” defined the contours of ethnic conflict in Assam,
the violence reflected the local variations in ethnic alignments.
The violence took place partly because of inadequate intervention by the
police. Even though there was no doubt in anyone’s mind that the election
would be violent, the holding of an election amidst the prevailing ethnic
and political polarization was no ordinary law and order problem. Arun
Shourie’s investigative report revealed that the government estimated that
the election could be held safely in 30 of the 126 constituencies despite
ethnic Assamese opposition . In 78 constituencies, polling was expected to
be between 30% and 65% and in the rest between 1 % to 30% .20 These
estimates were probably based on calculations of settlement patterns of
19. Arun Shourie, “ Assam Elections: Can Democracy Survive Them?, ” India Today , 8:
10 (May 31, 1983), p. 57.
20. Arun Shourie, “ Assam Elections: Come What May, ” India Today, 8:9 (May 15,
1983), p. 56.
1200 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVI, NO. 11, NOVEMBER 1986
ethnic subgroups. A prior secret intelligence report had calculated that

the ethnic Assamese were a minority in as many as 85 of the state’s 126
constituencies. 21
The government prepared for the anticipated disruption and poll vio-
lence by mobilizing large contingents of military and police forces from the
rest of the country. The estimated need for security personnel was so high
that the election was staggered over three days to allow for the movement
of security personnel. Furthermore, all intelligence warnings about poten-
tial violent ethnic conflicts in areas other than the polling stations them-
selves had to be ignored in order to concentrate security personnel at the
polling stations. One of these was from a local police official who warned
that “ one thousand Assamese villagers [are] getting ready to attack ” East
Bengali immigrant villages “ with deadly weapons. ” That warning, which
anticipated the massacre in Nellie that was reported widely in the interna -
tional press, was filed three days before the massacre. According to official
figures, 1, 383 men , women, and children were killed in that massacre.22
The poll boycott was quite effective in the districts of the Brahmaputra
Valley. Of Assam’s 126 Assembly constituencies, only Congress (I) candi -
dates contested and won unopposed in four constituencies. In 14 constitu -
encies elections had to be canceled because of the “ total breakdown of law
and administration . ” In some strong ethnic Assamese constituencies, the
polling was as low as 0.38 % (269 voters), 0.40% ( 360 voters), and 0.68 %
(440 voters).23
Contest Between the State and the Movement

The expectation of a moderately legitimate government was considerably
undercut by the extent of the violence and the effectiveness of the boycott
campaign. The election brought a new Congress (I) government headed
by Hiteshwar Saikia, an ethnic Assamese who is Ahom by caste. The
choice of an Ahom as chief minister for the second consecutive time is
significant since there was a widespread perception that the Assam move-
ment had its strongest support among ethnic Assamese “ upper” castes.
The new government’s strategy of dealing with the movement combined
political maneuvering with the use of coercion. It sought to wean support
away from the Assam movement by allocating governmental patronage to
groups that constitute weak links in the Assamese ethnic coalition. The
election violence had already strained the coalition. Ever since the election
21. “ Suspended Agony,” India Today , 7:22 ( November 30, 1982), p. 26.
-
22. Shourie, “ Assam Elections, ” pp. 65 66.
23. Jaswant Singh, “ Assam’s Crisis of Citizenship, ” Asian Survey , 24: 10 (October 1984) , p.
1067.
SANJIB BARUAH 1201
of Anwara Taimur as chief minister there had been some signs that sec-
tions of ethnic Assamese Muslims might have had second thoughts about
their participation in the movement. The large number of Muslim victims
in the election violence and the national and international press coverage
of it as a case of Muslims being killed strained the Assamese Muslim atti-
tude toward the movement . 24
By May 1983 there was indication of a split in the AASU. At a secret
conclave, several Muslim members of the AASU leadership issued an ulti-
matum to the AASU leadership demanding correction of a “ pro- Hindu
communal tilt.” Their memorandum demanded a “ firm definition ” of a
foreigner. The press gave some credit for the growing Hindu -Muslim rift
in the ethnic Assamese coalition to the Saikia government.25
Rifts began to show in other weak links of the Assamese ethnic coalition
as well . The election violence included some instances of conflict between
ethnic Assamese opponents of the election and plains tribal supporters. In
the following months important conferences of plains tribals made de-
mands that emphasized their distinctiveness from the ethnic Assamese, de-
mands that smacked of a rebellion from the Assamese coalition. These
demands included recognition of Bodo as an associate official language, the
adoption of the Roman script instead of the Assamese script for writing
certain other tribal languages, and creation of autonomous districts and
regions for plains tribals. The Saikia government probably played a signifi-
cant role in these rifts: for instance, the government actively patronized
the Bodo Sahitya Sabha and promoted it as a rival of the Assam Sahitya
Sabha in plains tribal areas. The annual session of the organization was
attended by most members of the Saikia cabinet . By contrast, the declin-
ing share of government resources and patronage forced the Assam Sahi-
tya Sabha to reconsider its involvement in the Assam movement.26
The leadership of the movement had to guard against the growing divi-
sions in the movement. The election violence forced the leadership to sus-
pend the movement and concentrate attention on healing the rifts in the
Assamese coalition. In January 1984 the AASU held a National Conven-
tion, which was attended by a number of prominent Assamese intellectuals
as well as movement activists, in order to search for ways and means for
24. The political impact of the international coverage can be gauged by the fact that Indira
— —
Gandhi sent an emissary an Assamese Muslim politician to the Gulf countries to explain
the situation in Assam . See “ The Communal Divide, ” India Today, 8:9 (May 15, 1983) , p.
31.
25. Ibid . p. 31.
26. Udayon Misra, “ Assam Sahitya Sabha: Retreat from Populist Politics, ” Economic and
Political Weekly, 19:15 (April 14, 1984), p. 620-622.
“ regeneration of the Assamese nationality and to provide a united socio-

cultural as well as political platform. ” The emphasis on unity was a recog-
nition of the impact of the rifts. At the second AASU convention in De-
cember 1984, the need to adapt to the ethnic diversity of the state
dominated the discussions. The convention formed a committee to com-
plete the “ process of political unification of the various ethnic groups of
the Assamese people.” There was discussion that stressed the need to in-
clude tea garden workers, Indian Nepalis, the tribal communities, and “ al -
-
ready assimilated religious minorities” and “ like minded Indians” in
future protest actions.27
The Saikia government tried to compete for legitimacy with the Assam
movement by emphasizing that the government, led by an ethnic Assa-
mese, was serious about stopping future immigration and about removing
the names of post -1971 illegal aliens from the electoral rolls, on which
there was agreement between the movement leaders and the central gov-
ernment . Other measures aimed at redefining the policy agenda in order
to wean support away from the movement included the carving out of new
administrative districts and subdivisions, and symbolic concessions to As-
samese ethnic pride such as changing the English spelling of the Assamese
city from the Anglicized Gauhati to the more Assamese Guwahati. The
government secured popular support for some of these measures. For in-
stance, the response to the calls for strikes by the movement leaders to
greet the inauguration of the headquarters of the new districts was weak
even in the movement’s strongholds. “ We should have ignored the move, ”
said a AASU leader after the failure of their strike calls. “ How do you
expect people to protest against a step that upgraded their small towns to
district headquarters?” 28 Even though political maneuvering to break the
Assamese coalition was a major part of the new government’s strategy in
dealing with the Assam movement, coercion also continued to play a ma-
jor role. Journalists working for Assamese newspapers and magazines
were the special targets of the new coercive measures. Many were arrested
and beaten up in police lock - ups. 29
The measures, however, failed to cut into the movement’s popular base.
During its 33-month rule, members of the Saikia cabinet were greeted by
27. Cited by Udayon Misra , “ AASU ’s Search for a Alternative Platform,” Economic and
Political Weekly, 19:50 (December 15, 1984), p. 2115. The quotations are attributed to
AASU leaders.
28. “ Assam: Bracing For Showdown , ” India Today, 8:15 (August 15, 1983), p. 33.
29. For a description of an incident in which the police shot and killed seven ethnic Assa-
mese villagers, see Udayon Misra, “ Remembering a Police Killing, ” Economic and Political
Weekly , 19:17 (April 28, 1984). See also Udayon Misra, “ Assam : Assertion of Regional
Identity , ” Economic and Political Weekly , 21:1 (January 4, 1986), pp. 13-14.
SANJIB BARUAH 1203
strikes and boycotts during their visits to ethnic Assamese areas. The
sponsors of the movement refused to extend “ recognition ” to the Saikia
government . The nonrecognition was effective enough that when the cen-
tral government decided to return to the negotiating table in the spring of
1984, it carefully left out the Saikia government since its participation
would have led the movement leaders to leave the talks. The agreement to
dissolve the state Assembly when the Assam accord was signed was a con-
cession to the movement’s continued power capability.
Accommodation
After 18 months, negotiations between the government of India and the
movement leaders were initiated once again in April 1984. An accord was
signed between prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and leaders of the Assam
movement on August 15, 1985, India’s Independence Day. According to
the accord, illegal aliens who entered the state between January 1966 and
March 1971 will be disenfranchised for ten years and those who came after
March 1971 will be deported . The state Assembly elected in 1983 was
dissolved and fresh elections based on revised electoral roles took place in
December 1985. An amendment to India’s citizenship law that was en-
acted by the parliament in November 1985 stipulated that noncitizens who
are found to have entered Assam between 1961 and 1971 will enjoy all
rights of citizens except the right to vote for ten years.
The accommodation phase had begun in the middle of 1984. Several
factors brought back an atmosphere of optimism about the prospects for a
negotiated settlement. First, the central government recognized the move-
ment’s power capability by keeping the state government away from the
negotiations. Second, administrative measures for revising electoral rolls,
based on earlier points of agreement such as the disenfranchisement of
post -1971 aliens, helped win the trust of the movement leadership. Third,
even though the ice had been broken before the assassination of Indira
Gandhi, the change of leadership in Delhi in late 1984 was a factor in the
renewed goodwill between the center and the leaders of the movement.
Election officials were increasingly taking the AASU into their confi-
dence in the process of revising the rolls. By the end of 1984 there was a
break between the AASU , which supported the administrative process of
revising the electoral rolls, and one of the regional political parties behind
the movement which believed that the measures were unlikely to be effec-
tive. The AASU began to consider the formation of a new regional polit -
ical party. Its second National Convention in December 1984 emphasized
the need to bring together different ethnic subgroups in the Assamese eth-
nic coalition under a common political platform .
1204 ASIAN SURVEY , VOL. XXVI, NO. 11, NOVEMBER 1986
Once the accord was signed the revision of electoral rolls was taken up
even more earnestly. The procedures followed were controversial. Critics
claimed that a large number of names of legal citizens were removed from
the electoral rolls.30 The final electoral roll on the basis of which the De-
—
cember election was contested had 9, 806,285 voters 689, 715 fewer than
on the updated electoral roll of October 1984, which listed 10,496,000 vot -
ers. 31
After the signing of the accord, two new parties emerged: the Asom
Gana Parishad (AGP), formed by the student leaders of the Assam move-
ment, and the United Minorities Front (UMF), formed by major East Ben-
gali Hindu and Muslim politicians who had been members of the Congress
(I). If the implementation of the Assam accord was the main issue for the
AGP, the UMF demanded that the accord be scrapped. In the election
the AGP won 64 seats and 35.17 % of the popular vote, followed by the
Congress (I) with 25 seats and 23.43 % of the popular vote and the UMF
with 17 seats and 11.09 % of the votes.
The election results allow some preliminary formulations on the pattern
of ethnic voting. While the UMF hoped to bring all “ minorities” for
example, immigrant Muslims, Bengali Hindus, Assamese Muslims,
—
—
Nepalis, and tribals within its framework, it did not do well except for
some major concentrations of East Bengali Muslims. 32 The UMF faired
poorly in Hindu Bengali areas where most voters seemed to have sup-
ported the Congress (I). The AGP itself came much closer to grasping the
imperatives of Assam’s transformed demographic reality as it entered the
electoral fray and used “ Minorities are not Foreigners, AGP for all, all for
AGP” as a major campaign slogan.
The AGP came to power on a wave of popular support that was remark -
ably inclusive: its appeal was not only to the ethnic Assamese, but to
many other ethnic subgroups. The AGP won in major “ plains tribal ” con -
stituences in Kokrajhar district, the autonomous district of Karbi An-
glong, and the plains-tribal inhabited constituencies in the districts of
Lakhimpur, Sonitpur, and Darrang . The AGP also won in constituencies
that have major concentrations of tea plantation workers mostly immi — -
—
grants from Bihar, Orissa, and Andhra Pradesh and were traditional
30. For a critique of the procedures followed in the revision , see Sujit Choudhuri , “ Elec-
tion Commission and the Assam Accord , ” Economic and Political Weekly , 20:49 (December
7 , 1985), pp. 2146-2147.
31 . The 1984 figure is from “ The Faces of Assam , ” Sunday , 12 : 50 ( November 17-23,
1985). The figure of the final electorate is from Sentinel (Guwahati) , December 30, 1985.
32. A pre-poll report had also concluded that the UMF’s support was evident primarily
among East Bengali Muslims, “ Caste, Religion Crucial in Assam,” Times of India , Novem -
ber 15, 1985.
SANJIB BARUAH 1205
strongholds of the Congress (I). The significant number of Muslims on the

AGP’s list of candidates suggests that the support for the Assam move-
ment and the AGP among Assamese Muslims despite reversals during cer-
tain phases of the movement remained quite high. Certain sections of
Bengali Hindus and Bengali Muslims too appear to have voted for the
AGP. The AGP victory in the immigrant Bengali- Muslim dominated
Barpeta Assembly and Parliamentary constituences and the Nowgong Par-
liamentary constituency supports this hypothesis. 33 This is not surprising
when one considers the likely effect of the accord on reconstituting the
basis for political alignments on the part of East Bengali immigrants.
Apart from the disenfranchisement of significant numbers of aliens, the
accord also legitimized the citizenship status of a large number of immi-
grants: those who came before 1966 and those who came between 1966
and 1971, who were to be legitimized in phases. The past tendency of East
Bengali immigrant Muslims to vote as a bloc for the ruling party, which in
that context was consistent with support for the ethnic Assamese project,
was partly due to the insecurity that went with the legal ambiguity of their
status, despite the inclusion of their names on the electoral rolls. To some
extent the basis for that insecurity and bloc voting for the ruling party was
gone. An Indian reporter surmised that some immigrants, “ especially
those surrounded by Assamese-speaking inhabitants voted for the AGP as
a safe course. ” 34 The support for the AGP among some sections of Ben-
gali Muslims is also consistent with their support for ethnic Assamese
causes in earlier controversies over cultural policy issues.
Conclusion
The election results reflect ethnic polarization as well as new beginnings of
ethnic accommodation. At one level the emergence of two new regional
—
political parties one based primarily on the ethnic Assamese and the
other on those threatened by the demands of the Assam movement indi-
cates significant ethnic polarization . However, the inclusive nature of the
—
AGP’s support, in particular its ability to secure some support among Ben -
gali Muslim immigrants, and the somewhat limited nature of the UMF’s
support indicate that the forces of polarization were mediated by the forces
of accommodation .
One of the most significant effects of the Assam movement is that the
immigration issue has been put firmly on the public agenda . Earlier
33. Some parts of this preliminary analysis parallels that of Udayon Misra , “ Assam: As-
sertion of Regional Identity, ” pp. 13-14.
34. “ The Assam Showdown, ” Sunday , December 29, 1985-January 4, 1986, p. 47 .
1206 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVI , NO. 11, NOVEMBER 1986
frameworks of ethnic accommodation attempted to obscure the immigra-

tion question . The AGP ministry has a new portfolio of Accord Imple-
mentation under the chief minister. It indicates the importance attached
to the issue by supporters of the Assam movement and of the AGP. Now
that the issue has left the backrooms of political horse-trading , there is
space for new innovations in dealing with the question . It is likely that
electoral realities will bring about an approach to the problem that focuses
more on stopping the future influx than on deporting those who are al-
—
ready there. New modes of incorporating illegal aliens for example, the
—
status of “ guest workers” or of “ permanent residents” may be considered
as options by a government that enjoys the trust of the ethnic Assamese on
this question. However, the Assamese are unlikely to accept non-deporta-
tion of the post -1971 illegal aliens. Yet deportation will be no easy task.
The official position of the Bangladeshi government is that none of their
citizens have illegally crossed the border into India . It is unlikely that the
Indian government will risk deterioration of its relations with Bangladesh
and exacerbation of tensions between Hindus and Muslims in India by
seeking to force the issue by the deportation of illegal aliens. There are
already indications of opposition in Assam to efforts at soft pedalling the
implementation of the accord . 35 Nonetheless, since all ethnic subgroups in
Assam do take the issue seriously, there is room for a political resolution.
The AGP leadership has shown signs of flexibility by acquiescing to a con-
stitutional amendment introduced during the election campaign that al -
lows disenfranchised non-citizens to continue enjoying all other rights of
citizens. Some mix of resettlement of illegal aliens in the rest of the coun-
try and phased enfranchisement in return for measures that will stop any
future influx may be an acceptable compromise.
The ability to evolve a new framework of ethnic accommodation will
remain the key to political stability in Assam . In the course of the Assam
movement, the leadership learned that the road to cultural survival of the
Assamese lies as much in an inclusive definition of Assameseness as in
restricting numbers. If ethnic diversity has the potential to cause political
turmoil in Assam, it also holds the possibility for political stability. Even
though the old framework of ethnic accommodation broke down, the logic
of electoral politics and the imperatives of ethnic diversity will continue to
force contestants to search for ethnic accommodation .
35. “ The Endangered Accord , ” India Today, 11 : 5 ( March 15, 1986), pp. 30-33.

Immigration, Ethnic Conflict, and Political Turmoil - Assam, 1979-1985

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

Advancing Knowledge, Driving Change

Immigration, Ethnic Conflict, and Political Turmoil--Assam, 1979-1985

The Assam accord signed on August 15, 1985, be-

—- Sanjib Baruah is Assistant Professor of Political Studies at Bard

Immigration and Ethnic Diversity in a

TABLE 1 Population Growth Rate in Assam and India ( percentage )

Years Assam India

TABLE 2 Major Language Groups in Assam, 1971

Number of Speakers Percentage of Total

Of the languages that appear in Table 2, Assamese is an indigenous lan-

in the census is likely to include substantial numbers of immigrants who

The Number of “ Foreigners”

From Ethnic Accommodation to

jobs. 8 The creation of a linguistic state superimposed on Assam’s ethnic

liamentary elections and the Assembly elections in 1983. The leadership

middle of 1980. The next phase marked a significant accentuation of these

increasing tendency to lump all East Bengali immigrants as “ Ban-

ers. Apart from ethnic violence, a growing number of terrorist attacks on

cleansing the administration of officials in sympathy with the movement.

The Breakdown of Order

Voter participation mostly followed a pattern predictable from the eth-

ethnic subgroups. A prior secret intelligence report had calculated that

Contest Between the State and the Movement

“ regeneration of the Assamese nationality and to provide a united socio-

strongholds of the Congress (I). The significant number of Muslims on the

frameworks of ethnic accommodation attempted to obscure the immigra-

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