Gonzales, Timothy Joseph C.

JD-2A

Central Board of Liquidators vs Banco Filipino Savings and Bank

GR No. 173399

FACTS:

The Monetary Board (MB) of the then Central Bank (CB) issued MB Resolution No. 955 placing Banco
Filipino under conservatorship. Respondent bank filed with the RTC a Complaint against the CB for the
annulment of MB Resolution No. 955. Thereafter, the CB issued MB Resolution No. 75 ordering the
closure of Banco Filipino and placing the latter under receivership. Banco Filipino filed a Complaint with
the RTC against the MB, assailing the latter's act of placing the bank under receivership. The CB issued
another Resolution placing Banco Filipino under liquidation. Respondent then filed another Complaint
with the RTC to question the propriety of the liquidation.

The three cases were consolidated. Thereafter, this Court nullified MB Resolution No. 75 and ordered
the CB and its MB to reorganize the bank and allow it to resume business. During the pendency of the
three consolidated cases, R.A. No. 7653, or the New Central Bank Act of 1993, took effect. Under the
new law, the CB was abolished and, in its stead, the BSP was created. The new law also created the
Central Bank Board of Liquidators (CB-BOL) for the purpose of administering and liquidating the CB's
assets and liabilities, not all of which had been transferred to the BSP.

Banco Filipino filed a Motion to Admit Attached Amended/Supplemental Complaint in the three
consolidated cases before the RTC. In its Amended/Supplemental Complaint, respondent bank sought to
substitute the CB-BOL for the defunct CB and its MB. The RTC granted the Motion to Admit filed by
Banco Filipino and accordingly admitted the latter's Amended/Supplemental Complaint. Consequently,
the CB-BOL was substituted for the defunct CB in respondent's civil cases, which are still pending with
the RTC. More than 10 years from the enactment of R.A. 7653, Banco Filipino again filed a Motion to
Admit Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint in the consolidated civil cases before the RTC. In that
Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint, respondent sought to include the BSP and its MB - "the
purported successor-in-interest of the old CB" - as additional defendants. Banco Filipino's Motion to
Admit its Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint was opposed by the CB-BOL based on the following
grounds: (1) Banco Filipino's Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint was not supported by a board
resolution that authorized it to file the amended or supplemental complaint; (2) the second
supplemental complaint raised new and independent causes of action against a new party- the BSP -
which was not an original party; (3) the second supplemental complaint was violative of the rule on the
joinder of causes of action, because it alleged those that did not arise from the same contract,
transaction or relation between the parties - as opposed to those alleged in the complaint sought to be
amended or supplemented - and differed from the causes of action cited in the original Complaint; and
(4) the admission of the second supplemental complaint would expand the scope of the dispute in the
consolidated civil cases to include new causes of action against new parties.
The RTC granted the Motion to Admit Banco Filipino's Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint. The
CA affirmed in toto the RTC's Order.

ISSUE: Whether the admission of Banco Filipino’s Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint was
proper.

RULING:

The second amendment of the Complaint was improper. The prevailing rule on the amendment of
pleadings is one of liberality, with the end of obtaining substantial justice for the parties. However, the
option of a party-litigant to amend a pleading is not without limitation. If the purpose is to set up a
cause of action not existing at the time of the filing of the complaint, amendment is not allowed. If no
right existed at the time the action was commenced, the suit cannot be maintained, even if the right of
action may have accrued thereafter. In the instant case, the causes of action subject of the Second
Amended/Supplemental Complaint only arose after the original Complaint, which was based on the
alleged illegal closure of Banco Filipino effected by the defunct CB and its MB. On the other hand, the
Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint stemmed from the alleged oppressive and arbitrary acts
committed by the BSP and its MB against Banco Filipino after respondent bank was reopened. Since the
acts or omissions allegedly committed in violation of respondent's rights are different, they constitute
separate causes of action. A closer examination of the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint, in
which respondent asks the Court to order the petitioner to pay, among others, actual damages of at
least ₱18.8 billion "as a consequence of the acts herein complained of." The "acts complained of'' cover
not just the conservatorship, receivership, closure, and liquidation of Banco Filipino, but also the alleged
acts of harassment committed by the BSP and its MB after respondent bank was reopened. These acts
constituted a whole new cause of action. In effect, respondent raised new causes of action and asserted
a new relief in the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint. If it is admitted, the RTC would need to
look into the propriety of two entirely different causes of action. This is not countenanced by law. In the
instant case, Banco Filipino, through the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint, attempted to raise
new and different causes of action. These causes of action had no relation whatsoever to the causes of
action in the original Complaint, as they involved different acts or omissions, transactions, and parties. If
the Court admits the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint under these circumstances, there will
be no end to the process of amending the Complaint. For these reasons, whether viewed as an
amendment or a supplement to the original Complaint, the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint
should not have been admitted.

Sps. Viluga vs Kelly Hardware & Construction Supply

GR No. 176579

FACTS:

The respondent corporation filed with the RTC a Complaint for a Sum of Money and Damages against
the petitioners-spouses Villuga, alleging that the petitioners made purchases of various construction
materials from the respondent corporation in the sum of P259,809.50, which has not been paid up to
the present time, both principal and stipulated interests due thereon. Respondent corporation made
several demands, oral and written, for the petitioners to pay all their obligations due, but the latter
failed and refused to comply. In their Answer to Complaint, petitioners admitted having made purchases
from respondent, but alleged that they do not remember the exact amount thereof as no copy of the
documents evidencing the purchases were attached to the complaint. Petitioners, nonetheless, claimed
that they have made payments to the respondent in the amounts of P110,301.80 and P20,000.00, and
they are willing to pay the balance of their indebtedness after deducting the payments made and after
verification of their account. In a Manifestation, petitioners stated that they were willing to pay
respondent the principal sum of P259,809.50, but without interests and costs, and on installment basis.
Respondent signified that it was amenable to petitioners' offer to pay the principal amount of
P259,809.50. However, respondent insisted that petitioners should also pay interests, as well as
litigation expenses and attorney's fees, and all incidental expenses. Subsequently, respondent filed a
Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings contending that petitioners were deemed to have
admitted in their Answer that they owed respondent the amount of P259,809.50 when they claimed
that they made partial payments amounting to P130,301.80. Based on this premise, respondent prayed
that it be awarded the remaining balance of P129,507.70. The RTC ruled that there is no clear and
specific admission on the part of petitioners as to the actual amount that they owe respondent.
Respondent filed an Amended Complaint, with leave of court, alleging that petitioners purchased from it
[respondent] various construction materials and supplies, the aggregate value of which is P279,809.50,
and that only P20,000.00 had been paid leaving a balance of P259,809.50. In their Answer to Amended
Complaint, petitioners reiterated their allegations in their Answer to Complaint. Respondent filed a
Request for Admission asking that petitioners admit the genuineness of various documents, such as
statements of accounts, delivery receipts, invoices and demand letter attached thereto as well as the
truth of the allegations set forth therein. Respondent basically asked petitioners to admit that the
latter's principal obligation is P279,809.50 and that only P20,000.00 was paid. Respondent filed a
Manifestation and Motion before the RTC praying that since petitioners failed to timely file their
comment to the Request for Admission, they be considered to have admitted the genuineness of the
documents described in and exhibited with the said Request as well as the truth of the matters of fact
set forth therein, in accordance with the Rules of Court. Petitioners filed their Comments on the Request
for Admission stating their objections to the admission of the documents attached to the Request.
Respondent filed its Second Amended Complaint, again with leave of court. The amendment modified
the period covered by the complaint. The amendment also confirmed petitioners' partial payment in the
sum of P110,301.80, but alleged that this payment was applied to other obligations which petitioners
owe respondent. Respondent reiterated its allegation that, despite petitioners' partial payment, the
principal amount which petitioners owe remains P259,809.50. Petitioners filed their Answer to the
Second Amended Complaint denying the allegations therein and insisting that they have made partial
payments. Respondent filed a Motion to Expunge with Motion for Summary Judgment. The RTC granted
the same. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied. The CA rendered affirmed
the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent waived its Request for Admission when it filed its Second Amended Complaint.

RULING:

The Court agrees with the CA in holding that respondent's Second Amended Complaint supersedes only
its Amended Complaint and nothing more. Section 8, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 8.
Effect of amended pleading. – An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. However,
admissions in superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the pleader; and claims or
defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended pleading shall be deemed waived. From the
foregoing, it is clear that respondent's Request for Admission is not deemed abandoned or withdrawn
by the filing of the Second Amended Complaint. The Court also finds no error when the CA ruled that
petitioners' Comments on the Request for Admission was filed out of time. Nonetheless, the Court takes
exception to the ruling of the CA that by reason of the belated filing of petitioners' Comments on the
Request for Admission, they are deemed to have impliedly admitted that they are indebted to
respondent in the amount of P259,809.50. A careful examination of the said Request for Admission
shows that the matters of fact set forth therein are simply a reiteration of respondent's main allegation
in its Amended Complaint and petitioners had already set up the affirmative defense of partial payment
with respect to the above allegation in their previous pleadings.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government

(PCGG), petitioner, -versus- SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. (as
executor of the estate of FERDINAND E. MARCOS), respondents. G.R. No. 148154, SECOND DIVISION,
December 17, 2007, QUISUMBING, J

FACTS:

Roman Cruz is impleaded as an alleged crony of President Ferdinand Marcos. When the Presidential
Commission on Good Governance went after the cronies, in hopes of recovering the wealth he and his
family and cronies amassed during his reign, an alias summons was served upon him in Hawaii, his place
of exile. Since he was not able to file a responsive pleading, he was then declared in default, upon
motion by the Republic of the Philippines. When the order of exile was lifted after the death of the fallen
President, his wife, Imelda Marcos moved to set aside the order of default, which motion was granted
by the Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan found that a myriad of events, such as their exile, President
Marcos’ ill health and numerous other civil and criminal suits against the latter was reasonable cause to
lift the order of default. The President’s son, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. (Bong- Bong), as the executor of his
father’s estate, petitioned the court for extension of time to file a responsive pleading, which the court
granted. However, instead of filing an answer, Bong-Bong filed a Motion For Bill of Particulars, praying
for clearer statements of the allegations which he called “mere conclusions of law, too vague and
general to enable defendants to intelligently answer.” Sandiganbayan upheld respondent, explaining
that the allegations against former President Marcos were vague, general, and were mere conclusions of
law. It pointed out that the accusations did not specify the ultimate facts of former President Marcos'
participation in Cruz's alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, effectively preventing respondent from
intelligently preparing an answer. It noted that this was not the first time the same issue was raised
before it, and stressed that this Court had consistently ruled in favor of the motions for bills of
particulars of the defendants in the other ill-gotten wealth cases involving the Marcoses. The Republic
argued that since Bong-Bong filed a motion for extension of time to file an answer, the Sandiganbayan
should not have accepted the former’s motion for bill of particulars. It argued that the charges were
clear, and that other parties, such as Cruz, also linked to the controversy of illgotten wealth, have
already filed their own answers, thus proving that the complaint was not in fact couched in too general
terms.

ISSUE:

Whether the court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
granting respondent's motion for a bill of particulars as executor of former President Marcos' estates
considering that the deceased defendant was then a defaulting defendant when the motion was filed.

RULING:

Given the existence of the default order then, what is the legal effect of the granting of the motions to
file a responsive pleading and bill of particulars? In our view, the effect is that the default order against
the former president is deemed lifted. Considering that a motion for extension of time to plead is not a
litigated motion but an ex parte one, the granting of which is a matter addressed to the sound discretion
of the court; that in some cases we have allowed defendants to file their answers even after the time
fixed for their presentation; that we have set aside orders of default where defendants' failure to
answer on time was excusable; that the pendency of the motion for a bill of particulars interrupts the
period to file a responsive pleading; and considering that no real injury would result to the interests of
petitioner with the granting of the motion for a bill of particulars, the three motions for extensions of
time to file an answer, and the motion with leave to file a responsive pleading, the anti-graft court has
validly clothed respondent with the authority to represent his deceased father. The only objection to the
action of said court would be on a technicality. But on such flimsy foundation, it would be erroneous to
sacrifice the substantial rights of a litigant. Rules of procedure should be liberally construed to promote
their objective in assisting the parties obtain a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their case.
In his motion for a bill of particulars, respondent wanted clarification on the specific nature, manner and
extent of participation of his father in the acquisition of the assets cited above under Cruz; particularly
whether former President Marcos was a beneficial owner of these properties; and the specific manner
in which he acquired such beneficial control. While the allegations as to the alleged specific acts of Cruz
were clear, they were vague and unclear as to the acts of the Marcos couple who were allegedly "in
unlawful concert with" the former. There was no factual allegation in the original and expanded
complaints on the collaboration of or on the kind of support extended by former President Marcos to
Cruz in the commission of the alleged unlawful acts constituting the alleged plunder. All the allegations
against the Marcoses, aside from being maladroitly laid, were couched in general terms. The alleged
acts, conditions and circumstances that could show the conspiracy among the defendants were not
particularized and sufficiently set forth by petitioner.
 BENGUET ELECTRlC COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioner, - versus -NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, PETER COSALAN and BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.,
respondents. G.R. No. 89070, THIRD DIVISION, May 18, 1992, FELICIANO, J.

FACTS:

Private respondent Peter Cosalan was the General Manager of Petitioner Benguet Electric Cooperative,
Inc. (BENECO), having been elected as such by the Board of Directors of BENECO, with the approval of
the National Electrification Administrator, Mr. Pedro Dumol. Respondent Cosalan received Audit
Memorandum No. 1 issued by the Commission on Audit (COA), which noted that cash advances received
by officers and employees of petitioner BENECO in the amount of P129,618.48 had been virtually
written off in the books of BENECO. The COA likewise issued Audit Memorandum No. 2, addressed to
respondent Peter Cosalan, inviting attention to the fact that the audit of per diems and allowances
received by officials and members of the Board of Directors of BENECO showed substantial
inconsistencies with the directives of the NEA.

Having been made aware of the serious financial condition of BENECO, and what appeared to be
mismanagement, respondent Cosalan initiated implementation of the remedial measures
recommended by the COA. The respondent members of the Board of BENECO reacted by adopting a
series of resolutions, abolishing the housing allowance of respondent Cosalan; reducing his salary and
his representation and commutable allowances; directing him to hold in abeyance all pending personnel
disciplinary actions; and striking his name out as a principal signatory to transactions of petitioner
BENECO. The respondent BENECO Board members adopted another series of resolutions which resulted
in the ouster of respondent Cosalan as General Manager of BENECO and his exclusion from performance
of his regular duties as such, as well as the withholding of his salary and allowances.

Respondent Cosalan nevertheless continued to work as General Manager of BENECO, in the belief that
he could be suspended or removed only by duly authorized officials of NEA, in accordance with
provisions of P.D. No, 269, as amended by P.D. No. 1645 (the statute creating the NEA), the loan
agreement between NEA and petitioner BENECO, and the NEA Memorandum. Accordingly, respondent
Cosalan requested petitioner BENECO to release the compensation due him. BENECO, acting through
respondent Board members, denied the written request of respondent Cosalan. Respondent Cosalan
then filed a complaint with the NLRC against respondent members of the BENECO Board, challenging
the legality of the Board resolutions which ordered his suspension and termination from the service and
demanding payment of his salaries and allowances.

Cosalan amended his complaint to implead petitioner BENECO and respondent Board members, the
latter in their respective dual capacities as Directors and as private individuals. The LA rendered a
decision: (a) confirming Cosalan's reinstatement; (b) ordering payment to Cosalan of his backwages and
allowances by petitioner BENECO and respondent Board members, jointly and severally, x x x; and (3)
ordering the individual Board members to pay, jointly and severally, to Cosalan moral damages of
P50,000.00 plus attorney's fees of 10% of the wages and allowances awarded him.
Issue:

Whether the respondent Board members’ appeal was filed out of time.

RULING:

There is no dispute about the fact that the respondent BENECO Board members received the decision of
the LA on April 21, 1988. Accordingly, and because May 1, 1988 was a legal holiday, they had only up to
May 2, 1988 within which to perfect their appeal by filing their memorandum on appeal. It is also not
disputed that the respondent Board members' memorandum on appeal was posted by registered mail
on May 3, 1988 and received by the NLRC the following day. Clearly, the memorandum on appeal was
filed out of time. Respondent Board members, however, insist that their Memorandum on Appeal was
filed on time because it was delivered for mailing on May 1, 1988 to the Garcia Communications
Company, a licensed private letter carrier. The Board members in effect contend that the date of
delivery to Garcia Communications was the date of filing of their appeal memorandum. Respondent
Board member's contention runs counter to the established rule that transmission through a private
carrier or letter-forwarder - instead of the Philippine Post Office - is not a recognized mode of filing
pleadings. The established rule is that the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding
agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court, and that in such cases, the date of
actual receipt by the court, and not the date of delivery to the private carrier, is deemed the date of
filing of that pleading. Accordingly, the applicable rule was that the ten-day reglementary period to
perfect an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, that failure to file an appeal within the
reglementary period renders the assailed decision final and executory and no longer subject to review.
The respondent Board members had thus lost their right to appeal from the decision of the LA and the
NLRC should have forthwith dismissed their appeal memorandum.

SALVADOR O. MOJAR, EDGAR B. BEGONIA, Heirs of the late JOSE M. CORTEZ, RESTITUTO GADDI,
VIRGILIO M. MONANA, FREDDIE RANCES, and EDSON D. TOMAS, Petitioners, - versus - AGRO
COMMERCIAL SECURITY SERVICE AGENCY, INC., et al.,Respondents.

G.R. No. 187188

FACTS:

Petitioners were employed as security guards by respondent and assigned to the various branches of the
Bank of Commerce in Pangasinan, La Union and Ilocos Sur. In separate Office Orders, petitioners were
relieved from their respective posts and directed to report to their new assignments in Metro Manila.
They, however, failed to report for duty in their new assignments, prompting respondent to send them a
letter, requiring a written explanation why no disciplinary action should be taken against them, but the
letter was not heeded. Petitioners filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent and the Bank
of Commerce, before the NLRC. The LA ruled that petitioners were illegally dismissed. The NLRC affirmed
the LA. Respondent filed a Motion for Extension to file a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. The same
was granted. On February 9, 2008, respondent filed its Petition for Certiorari before the CA within the
reglementary period. The CA noted that no comment on the Petition had been filed, and that the case
was now deemed submitted for resolution. The CA found that the Orders transferring petitioners to
Manila is a valid exercise of management prerogative. Thus, petitioners’ refusal to comply with the
transfer orders constituted willful disobedience of a lawful order of an employer and abandonment,
which were just causes for termination under the Labor Code. However, respondent failed to observe
the due process requirements in terminating them. Petitioner Mojar filed a Manifestation before the CA,
stating that he and the other petitioners had not been served a copy of the CA Petition. He also said that
they were not aware whether their counsel, Atty. Jose Espinas, was served a copy thereof, since the
latter had already been bedridden since December 2007 until his demise on February 25, 2008. Neither
could their new counsel, Atty. Mario Aglipay, enter his appearance before the CA, as petitioners failed to
get the folder from the office of Atty. Espinas, as the folder can no longer be found. Thereafter,
petitioners filed a Motion to Annul Proceedings before the CA. They moved to annul the proceedings on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They argued that the NLRC Decision had already attained finality, since
the Petition before the CA was belatedly filed, and the signatory to the certification of non-forum
shopping lacked the proper authority. The CA denied the Motion to Annul Proceedings. Respondent filed
its Comment on the Petition, arguing that the CA Decision had already become final and executory,
inasmuch as the Motion to Annul Proceedings, was filed 44 days after the service of the CA Decision on
the counsel for petitioners. Further, Atty. Aglipay had then no legal standing to appear as counsel,
considering that there was still no substitution of counsel at the time he filed the Motion to Annul
Proceedings. In any case, petitioners are bound by the actions of their counsel, Atty. Espinas. The
petitioners stated, among others, that the CA Petition did not contain the required affidavit of service,
which alone should have caused the motu proprio dismissal thereof. They also argue that there is no
rule on the client’s substitution in case of the death of counsel. Instead, the reglementary period to file
pleadings in that case must be suspended and made more lenient, considering that the duty of
substitution is transferred to a non-lawyer.

ISSUE:

1. Whether there was proof of service attached to the Motion for Extension to file a Petition for
Certiorari before the CA.

2. Whether there was a valid service of the CA Petition upon the petitioners’ former counsel of record

RULING:

Affidavit of Service Section 3, Rule 46 provides that the petition for certiorari should be filed together
with the proof of service thereof on the respondent. Under Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, if
service is made by registered mail, as in this case, proof shall be made by an affidavit of the person
mailing and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. Section 3, Rule 46 further provides that the
failure to comply with any of the requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition. There was no indication that the petitioners had been served a copy of the CA Petition. No
other proof was presented by respondent to show petitioners’ actual receipt of the CA Petition. In any
case, this knowledge, even if presumed, would not – and could not – take the place of actual service and
proof of service by respondent. Indeed, while an affidavit of service is required merely as proof that
service has been made on the other party, it is nonetheless essential to due process and the orderly
administration of justice. Be that as it may, it does not escape the attention of this Court that in the CA
Resolution, the CA stated that their records revealed that Atty. Espinas, petitioners’ counsel of record at
the time, was duly served a copy of the following: (1) CA Resolution, granting respondent’s Motion for
Extension of Time to file the CA Petition; (2) CA Resolution, requiring petitioners to file their Comment
on the CA Petition; and (3) CA Resolution, submitting the case for resolution, as no comment was filed.
Such service to Atty. Espinas, as petitioners’ counsel of record, was valid despite the fact he was already
deceased at the time. If a party to a case has appeared by counsel, service of pleadings and judgments
shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party is specifically ordered by
the court. It is the duty of party-litigants to be in contact with their counsel from time to time in order to
be informed of the progress of their case. It is likewise the duty of parties to inform the court of the fact
of their counsel’s death. Their failure to do so means that they have been negligent in the protection of
their cause.

MERCEDES S. GATMAYTAN, Petitioner - versus -FRANCISCO DOLOR (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS) AND
HERMOGENA DOLOR, Respondents

G.R. No. 198120

FACTS:

The instant case stemmed from the RTC's March 27, 2006 Decision, resolving an action for reconveyance
against petitioner Gatmaytan, and in favor of the respondents-spouses Francisco and Hermogena Dolor
(Dolor Spouses). The RTC ordered Gatmaytan to convey the subject lot to the Dolor Spouses. Gatmaytan
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. Gatmaytan then filed an appeal with the CA. The
CA dismissed Gatmaytan's appeal, ruling that the RTC's March 27, 2006 Decision had already attained
finality as Gatmaytan filed her Motion for Reconsideration beyond the requisite 15-day period. First, the
RTC's Decision was rendered on March 27, 2006. Second, per the registry return receipt attached to the
back portion of the last page of the RTC's Decision, Gatmaytan's counsel, Atty. Raymond Palad, received
a copy of the same Decision on April 14, 2006. Finally, Gatmaytan filed her Motion for Reconsideration
only on June 16, 2006. Gatmaytan filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The CA denied the same. It
emphasized that the Receipt at the back of the last page of the RTC's Decision indicated that a copy of
the same Decision was received by a certain Maricel Luis, for and on behalf of Atty. Palad, on April 14,
2006. The CA added that previous orders of the RTC were likewise received by Luis, and that Luis'
authority to receive for Atty. Palad had never been questioned. Gatmaytan filed the Present Petition,
insisting that the RTC's March 27, 2006 Decision has not attained finality as the April 14, 2006 service
was made to her counsel's former address (at No. 117 West Avenue, Quezon City) as opposed to the
address (at Unit 602, No. 42 Prince Jun Condominium, Timog Avenue, Quezon City) that her counsel
indicated in a June 8, 2004 Notice of Change of Address filed with the RTC. Gatmaytan adds that the RTC
noted the change of address in an Order, and directed that, from then on, service of papers, pleadings,
and processes was to be made at her counsel's updated address at Unit 602, No. 42 Prince Jun
Condominium, Timog Avenue, Quezon City.
ISSUE:

Whether the RTC’s March 27, 2006 Decision has already attained finality, thus, precluding the filing of
petitioner Gatmaytan’s appeal with the CA.

RULING:

It is just as basic that a judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified as soon as it becomes
final and executory. Once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid
to rest. Accordingly, a final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification
is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of
the land. In accordance with Rule 36, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, unless a Motion for
Reconsideration is timely filed, the judgment or final order from which it arose shall become final.In
turn, Rule 37, Section 1, in relation to Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, allows for
15 days from notice of a judgment or final order within which a Motion for Reconsideration may be
filed. Reckoning the date when a party is deemed to have been given notice of the judgment or final
order subject of his or her Motion for Reconsideration depends on the manner by which the judgment
of final order was served upon the party himself or herself. When, however, a party is represented and
has appeared by counsel, service shall, as a rule, be made upon his or her counsel. While petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC's March 27, 2006 Decision, there is a dispute as to the date
from which the 15-day period for filing a Motion for Reconsideration must be reckoned. That is, there is
a dispute as to when petitioner was given notice of the Decision.

PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Petitioner, -versus- JULIE CHANDUMAL, Respondent.

G.R. No. 195619

Facts:

PDB filed an action for judicial confirmation of notarial rescission and delivery of possession against
Chandumal. Summons was issued and served by deputy sheriff. According to his return, the Sheriff
attempted to personally serve the summons upon Chandumal on three separate instances but it was
unavailing as she was always out of the house on said dates. Hence, the sheriff caused substituted
service of summons by serving the same through Chandumal’s mother who acknowledged receipt
thereof. For her failure to file an answer within the prescribed period, Chandumal was declared in
default. Chandumal then filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default and to Admit Attached
Answer. The RTC denied Motion and rendered a Judgment against Chandumal. On appeal, Chandumal
claimed, among others, that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over her person.

Issues:

1. Whether there was a valid substituted service of summons.

2. Whether Chandumal voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Ruling:

Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, service of summons may be
made through personal service, that is, summons shall be served by handing to the defendant in person
a copy thereof, or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. If the defendant cannot
be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, it is then that substituted service may be
made. Personal service of summons should and always be the first option, and it is only when the said
summons cannot be served within a reasonable time can the process server resort to substituted
service. In this case, the sheriff’s return failed to justify a resort to substituted service of summons. The
Return of Summons does not specifically show or indicate in detail the actual exertion of efforts or any
positive step taken by the officer or process server in attempting to serve the summons personally to
the defendant. The return merely states the alleged whereabouts of the defendant without indicating
that such information was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Indeed, the sheriff’s
return shows a mere perfunctory attempt to cause personal service of the summons on Chandumal.
There was no indication if he even asked Chandumal’s mother as to her specific whereabouts except
that she was "out of the house", where she can be reached or whether he even tried to await her
return. The "efforts" exerted by the sheriff clearly do not suffice to justify substituted service and his
failure to comply with the requisites renders such service ineffective. 2. Despite that there was no valid
substituted service of summons, the Court, nevertheless, finds that Chandumal voluntarily submitted to
the jurisdiction of the trial court. When Chandumal filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default
and to Admit Attached Answer, she effectively submitted her person to the jurisdiction of the trial court
as the filing of a pleading where one seeks an affirmative relief is equivalent to service of summons and
vests the trial court with jurisdiction over the defendant’s person.