Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Crim Pro 2nd Batch
Crim Pro 2nd Batch
DECISION
MENDOZA, J : p
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to
review, reverse and set aside the June 30, 2011 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 120100, 2 and its October 21, 2011 Resolution, 3 for being issued in
a manner not in accord with law and jurisprudence.
This case stemmed from a criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 (BP 22) filed by petitioner Nissan Gallery-Ortigas (Nissan), an entity engaged in
the business of car dealership, against respondent Purificacion F. Felipe (Purificacion)
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The said office found probable
cause to indict Purificacion and filed an Information before the Metropolitan Trial Court,
(raffled to Branch 41), Quezon City (MeTC), for her issuance of a postdated check in the
amount of P1,020,000.00, which was subsequently dishonored upon presentment due to
"STOP PAYMENT."
Purificacion issued the said check because her son, Frederick Felipe (Frederick),
attracted by a huge discount of P220,000.00, purchased a Nissan Terrano 4x4 sports and
utility vehicle (SUV) from Nissan. The term of the transaction was Cash-on-Delivery and
no downpayment was required. The SUV was delivered on May 14, 1997, but Frederick
failed to pay upon delivery. Despite non-payment, Frederick took possession of the
vehicle. 4HTCISE
Since then, Frederick had used and enjoyed the SUV for more than four (4)
months without paying even a single centavo of the purchase price. This constrained
Nissan to send him two (2) demand letters, on different dates, but he still refused to pay.
Nissan, through its retained counsel, was prompted to send a final demand letter.
Reacting to the final demand, Frederick went to Nissan's office and asked for a grace
period until October 30, 1997 within which to pay his full outstanding obligation
amounting to P1,026,750.00. Through further negotiation, the amount was eventually
reduced to P1,020,000.00. 5
Frederick reneged on his promise and again failed to pay. On November 25, 1997,
he asked his mother, Purificacion, to issue the subject check as payment for his
obligation. Purificacion acceded to his request. Frederick then tendered her postdated
check in the amount of P1,020,000.00. The check, however, was dishonored upon
presentment due to "STOP PAYMENT." 6
A demand letter was served upon Purificacion, through Frederick, who lived with
her. The letter informed her of the dishonor of the check and gave her five (5) days from
receipt within which to replace it with cash or manager's check. Despite receipt of the
demand letter, Purificacion refused to replace the check giving the reason that she was
not the one who purchased the vehicle. On January 6, 1998, Nissan filed a criminal case
for violation of BP 22 against her. 7
CaDSHE
After trial, the MeTC rendered its judgment acquitting Purificacion of the charge,
but holding her civilly liable to Nissan. The dispositive portion of the judgment states
that:
SO ORDERED. 8
Purificacion appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Branch 105 thereof
affirmed the MeTC decision on December 22, 2008. The RTC ruled that Purificacion was
estopped from denying that she issued the check as a "show check" to boost the credit
standing of Frederick and that Nissan agreed not to deposit the same. 9 Further, the RTC
considered Purificacion to be an accommodation party who was "liable on the instrument
to a holder for value even though the holder at the time of taking the instrument knew
him or her to be merely an accommodation party." 10 SEIDAC
It added that Purificacion could not be an accommodation party either because she
only came in after Frederick failed to pay the purchase price, or six (6) months after the
execution of the contract between Nissan and Frederick. Her liability was limited to her
act of issuing a worthless check, but by her acquittal in the criminal charge, there was no
more basis for her to be held civilly liable to Nissan. 12 Purificacion's act of issuing the
subject check did not, by itself, assume the civil obligation of Frederick to Nissan or
automatically made her a party to the contract. 13 Thus, the decretal portion of the
judgment reads:
SO ORDERED. 14 ICASEH
GROUNDS
A.
B.
Ultimately, the question presented before the Court is whether or not Purificacion
is civilly liable for the issuance of a worthless check despite her acquittal from the
criminal charge.
Well-settled is the rule that a civil action is deemed instituted upon the filing of a
criminal action, subject to certain exceptions. Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
specifically provides that:HTAIcD
The rule is that every act or omission punishable by law has its accompanying
civil liability. The civil aspect of every criminal case is based on the principle that every
person criminally liable is also civilly liable. 16 If the accused, however, is not found to
be criminally liable, it does not necessarily mean that he will not likewise be held civilly
liable because extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil action. 17 This rule more specifically applies when (a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares
that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does
not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. 18 The
civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in
the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. 19
(1) The making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account
or for value;
Here, the first and third elements were duly proven in the trial. Purificacion,
however, was acquitted from criminal liability because of the failure of the prosecution to
prove the fact of notice of dishonor. Of the three (3) elements, the second element is the
hardest to prove as it involves a state of mind. 21 Thus, Section 2 of BP 22 creates a
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds which, however, arises only after it
is proved that the issuer had received a written notice of dishonor and that within five (5)
days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make
arrangements for its payment. 22 CDcaSA
Purificacion was acquitted because the element of notice of dishonor was not
sufficiently established. Nevertheless, the act or omission from which her civil liability
arose, which was the making or the issuing of the subject worthless check, clearly
existed. Her acquittal from the criminal charge of BP 22 was based on reasonable doubt
and it did not relieve her of the corresponding civil liability. The Court cannot agree more
when the MeTC ruled that:
The Court is also one with the CA when it stated that the liability of Purificacion
was limited to her act of issuing a worthless check. The Court, however, does not agree
with the CA when it went to state further that by her acquittal in the criminal charge,
there was no more basis for her to be held civilly liable to Nissan. The acquittal was just
based on reasonable doubt and it did not change the fact that she issued the subject check
which was subsequently dishonored upon its presentment. STaIHc
Purificacion herself admitted having issued the subject check in the amount of
P1,020,000.00 after Frederick asked her to do it as payment for his obligation with
Nissan. Her claim that she issued the check as a mere "show check" to boost Frederick's
credit standing was not convincing because there was no credit standing to boost as her
son had already defaulted in his obligation to Nissan. Had it been issued prior to the sale
of the vehicle, the "show check" claim could be given credence. It was not, however, the
case here. It was clear that she assumed her son's obligation with Nissan and issued the
check to pay it. The argument that it was a mere "show check" after her son was already
in default is simply ludicrous.
The Court shall not be belabored with the issue of whether or not Purificacion was
an accommodation party because she was not. Granting that she was, it is with more
reason that she cannot escape any civil liability because Section 29 24 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law specifically bounds her to the instrument. The crux of the controversy
pertains to the civil liability of an accused despite acquittal of a criminal charge. Such
issue is no longer novel. In cases like violation of BP 22, a special law, the intent in
issuing a check is immaterial. The law has made the mere act of issuing a bad check
malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by the legislature for being deemed pernicious and
inimical to public welfare. Considering the rule in mala prohibita cases, the only inquiry
is whether the law has been breached. 25 The lower courts were unanimous in finding
that, indeed, Purificacion issued the bouncing check. Thus, regardless of her intent, she
remains civilly liable because the act or omission, the making and issuing of the subject
check, from which her civil liability arises, evidently exists.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2011 Decision and the
October 21, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-
08-151734, dated December 22, 2008, affirming the Judgment of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 41, Quezon City, for Violation of B.P. 22 is REINSTATED with
MODIFICATION with respect to the legal interest which shall be reduced to 6% per
annum from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction. 26cEAaIS
SO ORDERED.
(Nissan Gallery-Ortigas v. Felipe, G.R. No. 199067, [November 11, 2013], 720 PHIL
|||
828-840)
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
BRION, J : p
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari 1 seeking to set aside the decision 2
dated January 31, 2007 and resolution 3 dated March 3, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29355. The CA rulings reversed and set aside the decision 4
dated February 24, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legaspi City, Branch 5, in
Criminal Case Nos. 9704, 9705 and 9737, and acquitted respondent Ludolfo P. Muñoz,
Jr. (Muñoz) of three counts of libel.
Factual Antecedents
The case springs from the statements made by the respondent against the
petitioner, Elizalde S. Co (Co), in several interviews with radio stations in Legaspi City.
Muñoz, a contractor, was charged and arrested for perjury. Suspecting that Co, a wealthy
businessman, was behind the filing of the suit, Muñoz made the following statements:
(a) Co influenced the Office of the City Prosecutor of Legaspi City to expedite
the issuance of warrant of arrest against Muñoz in connection with the
perjury case;
(c) Co received P2,000,000.00 from Muñoz on the condition that Co will sub-
contract the project to Muñoz, which condition Co did not comply with.
5 AcHSEa
In its decision, the RTC found Muñoz guilty of three counts of libel. The RTC
ruled that the prosecution established the elements of libel. In contrast, Muñoz failed to
show that the imputations were true and published with good motives and for justifiable
ends, as required in Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). 9 In light of the
Ombudsman's dismissal of Muñoz' charges against Co, the RTC also held that Muñoz'
statements were baseless accusations which are not protected as privileged
communication. 10
The CA Ruling
The CA held that the subject matter of the interviews was impressed with public
interest and Muñoz' statements were protected as privileged communication under the
first paragraph of Article 354 of the RPC. 12 It also declared that Co was a public figure
based on the RTC's findings that he was a "well-known, highly-regarded and recognized
in business circles." 13 As a public figure, Co is subject to criticisms on his acts that are
imbued with public interest. 14 Hence, the CA reversed the RTC decision and acquitted
Muñoz of the libel charges due to the prosecution's failure to establish the existence of
actual malice.
In the present petition, Co acknowledges that he may no longer appeal the criminal
aspect of the libel suits because that would violate Muñoz' right against double jeopardy.
Hence, he claims damages only on the basis of Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court (ROC), which states that the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
the extinction of the civil action. He avers that this principle applies in general whether
the civil action is instituted with or separately from the criminal action. 15 He also claims
that the civil liability of an accused may be appealed in case of acquittal. 16
CHcESa
First, the CA erred when it disregarded the presumption of malice under Article
354 17 of the RPC. To overcome this presumption, Muñoz should have presented
evidence on good or justifiable motive for his statements. 18 On the contrary, the context
of Muñoz's radio interviews reflects his evident motive to injure Co's reputation instead
of a sincere call of public duty. 19
Second, the CA erred in declaring Co as a public figure based on the RTC findings
that he is known in his community. He claims this as a relatively limited community
comprising of his business associates. 20
Muñoz argues that Co misunderstood Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC because,
as its title suggests, the provision presupposes the filing of a civil action separately from
the criminal action. Thus, when there is no reservation of the right to separately institute
the civil action arising from the offense, the extinction of the criminal action extinguishes
the civil action. Since Co did not reserve his right to separately institute a civil action
arising from the offense, the dismissal of the criminal action bars him from filing the
present petition to enforce the civil liability. 21
Muñoz further posits that Co is not entitled to recover damages because there is no
wrongful act to speak of. Citing De la Rosa, et al. v. Maristela, 22 he argues that if there
is no libel due to the privileged character of the communication and actual malice is not
proved, there should be no award of moral damages. 23
Lastly, Muñoz avers that Co is indirectly challenging the factual and legal issues
which the CA has already settled in acquitting him. Muñoz explains that this Court may
no longer overturn the CA's findings as the doctrine of double jeopardy has set in. 24
The Issues
2. Whether the respondent is liable for damages arising from the libelous
remarks despite his acquittal.
The parties have conflicting interpretations of the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule
111 of the ROC, which states:
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
(Emphasis ours)
Muñoz claims that the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC applies only
if the civil liability ex delicto is separately instituted or when the right to file it
separately was properly reserved. In contrast, Co claims that Muñoz' acquittal of the
crime of libel did not extinguish the civil aspect of the case because Muñoz' utterance
of the libelous remarks remains undisputed.
We reject Muñoz' claim. The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC
applies to civil actions to claim civil liability arising from the offense charged, regardless
if the action is instituted with or filed separately from the criminal action. Undoubtedly,
Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC governs situations when the offended party opts to
institute the civil action separately from the criminal action; hence, its title "When
separate civil action is suspended." Despite this wording, the last paragraph, by its terms,
governs all claims for civil liability ex delicto. This is based on Article 100 of the RPC
which states that that "[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
Each criminal act gives rise to two liabilities: one criminal and one civil.
Reflecting this policy, our procedural rules provide for two modes by which civil
liability ex delicto may be enforced: (1) through a civil action that is deemed impliedly
instituted in the criminal action; 25 (2) through a civil action that is filed separately,
either before the criminal action or after, upon reservation of the right to file it separately
in the criminal action. 26 The offended party may also choose to waive the civil action.
27 This dual mode of enforcing civil liability ex delicto does not affect its nature, as may
be apparent from a reading of the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 120 of the ROC,
which states:
If, as Muñoz suggests, the extinction of the penal action carries with it the
extinction of the civil action that was instituted with the criminal action, then Section 2,
Rule 120 of the ROC becomes an irrelevant provision. There would be no need for the
judgment of the acquittal to determine whether "the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist." The Rules precisely require the judgment to declare if
there remains a basis to hold the accused civilly liable despite acquittal so that the
offended party may avail of the proper remedies to enforce his claim for civil liability ex
delicto.
In Ching v. Nicdao and CA, 28 the Court ruled that an appeal is the proper remedy
that a party — whether the accused or the offended party — may avail with respect to the
judgment:
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment
on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the
judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both
may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the
period therefor.
From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the
offended party, may appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding
respondent Nicdao's acquittal by the CA. The civil action was impliedly
instituted with the criminal action since he did not reserve his right to
institute it separately nor did he institute the civil action prior to the
criminal action. (Emphasis ours)
Moreover, an appeal is favored over the institution of a separate civil action because
the latter would only add to our clogged dockets. 29
To reiterate, the extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the
extinction of the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the
criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is a
finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which
the liability may arise exists. Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when,
notwithstanding the accused's acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil liability
ex delicto: (a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) if the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil;
and (c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused is acquitted. We thus now proceed to determine if Co's claim
falls under any of these three situations.
There are few circumstances wherein malice in law is inapplicable. For instance,
Article 354 of the RPC further states that malice is not presumed when:
(2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which
are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public
officers in the exercise of their functions. 34
Jurisprudence supplements the enumeration in Article 354 of the RPC. In Borjal v.
CA, 35 we held that in view of the constitutional right on the freedoms of speech and
of the press, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged. In
Guingguing v. CA, 36 we ruled that the remarks directed against a public figure are
likewise privileged. In order to justify a conviction in libel involving privileged
communication, the prosecution must establish that the libelous statements were made
or published with actual malice or malice in fact — the knowledge that the statement
is false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true. 37 In other words,
our rulings in Borjal and Guingguing show that privileged communication has the
effect of destroying the presumption of malice or malice in law and consequently
requiring the prosecution to prove the existence of malice in fact.
In the present case, the CA declared that the libelous remarks are privileged. The
legal conclusion was arrived at from the fact that Co is a public figure, the subject matter
of the libelous remarks was of public interest, and the context of Muñoz' statements were
fair comments. Consequently, malice is no longer presumed and the prosecution has the
burden of proving that Muñoz acted with malice in fact. The CA found that the
prosecution failed in this respect.
Co assails the CA's ruling by raising arguments that essentially require a review of
the CA's factual and legal findings. However, the Court cannot, through the present
petition, review these findings without going against the requirements of Rule 45 with
respect to factual matters, and without violating Muñoz' right against double jeopardy
given that the acquittal is essentially anchored on a question of fact.
In light of the privileged nature of Muñoz' statements and the failure of the
prosecution to prove malice in fact, there was no libel that was committed by Muñoz.
Without the crime, no civil liability ex delicto may be claimed by Co that can be pursued
in the present petition. There is no act from which civil liability may arise that exists.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Co v. Muñoz, Jr., G.R. No. 181986, [December 4, 2013], 722 PHIL 729-743)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 184861. June 30, 2009.]
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J : p
The Case
Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26,
2008 Decision 1 in SCA No. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253
in Las Piñas City. The Decision affirmed the Orders dated October 16, 2007 2 and
March 12, 2008 3 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Piñas City.
The Facts
On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion,
and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a
Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 2004 4 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33.
Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against
private respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 55554-61, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.
On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a
civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 2006 5 for the
rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for
damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Piñas City and
docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal
cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings dated July 24, 2007 6 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the
civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such
that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent claimed
that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.
cISDHE
Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the
nullification of the checks issued as the same are without consideration, then the
instant criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22 must be dismissed. The
belated filing of the civil case by the herein accused did not detract from the
correctness of her cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action may
be filed at any time before the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised
Rules of Court). 8
In an Order dated March 12, 2008, 9 the MTC denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration dated November 29, 2007.
Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13, 2008.
Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed decision dated August 26, 2008, denying the
petition. On the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled:
The Issue
Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases 12 that the elements of a
prejudicial question, as stated in the above-quoted provision and in Beltran v. People,
13 are:
Petitioner interprets Sec. 7 (a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a
prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be established that
the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner
argues, is specifically to guard against the situation wherein a party would belatedly
file a civil action that is related to a pending criminal action in order to delay the
proceedings in the latter.
On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by
rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be
in conflict with the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.) HTASIa
Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal prosecution may
be instituted or may proceed" must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question
exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action
or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that there
is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in
that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the
criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.
First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change in
phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to
change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had". 14 In the instant
case, the phrase, "previously instituted", was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil
action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This
interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of "subsequent" directly before the
term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except
to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must
precede the criminal action.
Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena 15 that:
Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal
complaint and from the time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment
from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was instituted more than
two and a half (2 1/2) years from the time that private respondent allegedly stopped
construction of the proposed building for no valid reason. More importantly, the civil
case praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for lack of consideration
was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the construction agreement.
Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases
involved here show that the filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought on the
part of private respondent and interposed for delay. And as correctly argued by
petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court seeks to
prevent. Thus, private respondent's positions cannot be left to stand.
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal
action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.
To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court are: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and
(2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided
in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply
to the present controversy.
Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement
between the parties is declared null and void for want of consideration, the checks
issued in consideration of such contract would become mere scraps of paper and
cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution.
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account
or for value;AHDaET
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support
the issuance of the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration
does not make up the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of
cases 21 that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is
irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v. People, 22 we ruled:
Lee v. Court of Appeals 23 is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that
the issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later
on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for
violation of BP 22, to wit:
Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for
value.
Petitioner's claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a
check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same
was issued for valuable consideration. Valuable consideration, in turn, may
consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who
makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility,
to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is
an obligation to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract,
such as the maker or indorser.
At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act
of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is because the thrust of
the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into
circulation. 24 (Emphasis supplied.)
Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction
agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect
the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is
that private respondent indeed issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for
insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a
prejudicial question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would
determine whether the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case.
Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case
before us.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the August 26, 2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch 253
in Las Piñas City and the Orders dated October 16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in
Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in Las Piñas City. We order the
MTC to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with dispatch.
cSDIHT
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Chico-Nazario, Nachura and Peralta, JJ., concur.
(Dreamwork Construction, Inc. v. Janiola, G.R. No. 184861, [June 30, 2009], 609 PHIL
|||
245-259)
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p
Assailed in this petition for certiorari 1 are the Resolutions dated May 22,
2017 2 and March 12, 2018 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
150130 which dismissed petitioners Primo A. Mina, Felix De Vera, Pompeyo Magali,
Bernadette Amor, and Purificacion Dela Cruz's (petitioners) petition for certiorari
before it for purportedly availing of a wrong remedy.
The Facts
The CA Ruling
In a Resolution 7 dated May 22, 2017, the CA dismissed the petition outright
on the ground that petitioners availed of a wrong remedy. It held that under
Department of Justice (DOJ) Department Circular No. 70-A, petitioners should have
first appealed the adverse ORSP ruling to the Secretary of Justice (SOJ) before
elevating the matter to the regular courts. 8
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was denied in a Resolution
9 dated March 12, 2018; hence, this petition. 10
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the
ground of petitioners' supposed availment of a wrong remedy. CAIHTE
To recapitulate, the CA ruled that petitioners should have first elevated the
adverse ORSP ruling to the SOJ before availing of judicial remedies. On the other
hand, petitioners maintain that the ORSP ruling is already final, and as such, it
correctly elevated the matter to the courts by filing a petition for certiorari before the
CA.
The Court finds for petitioners.
DOJ Department Circular No. 70 11 dated July 3, 2000, entitled the "2000 NPS
Rule on Appeal," which governs the appeals process in the National Prosecution
Service (NPS), provides that resolutions of, inter alia, the Regional State Prosecutor,
in cases subject of preliminary investigation/reinvestigation shall be appealed by
filing a verified petition for review before the SOJ. 12 However, this procedure was
immediately amended by DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A 13 dated July 10, 2000,
entitled "Delegation of Authority to Regional State Prosecutors to Resolve Appeals in
Certain Cases," which reads:
DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 70-A
SUBJECT: Delegation of Authority to Regional State
Prosecutors to Resolve Appeals in Certain Cases
In order to expedite the disposition of appealed cases governed by
Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000 ("2000 NPS RULE ON
APPEAL"), all petitions for review of resolutions of Provincial/City
Prosecutors in cases cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, except in the
National Capital Region, shall be filed with the Regional State Prosecutor
concerned who shall resolve such petitions with finality in accordance with
the pertinent rules prescribed in the said Department Circular.
The foregoing delegation of authority notwithstanding, the Secretary
of Justice may, pursuant to his power of supervision and control over the
entire National Prosecution Service and in the interest of justice, review the
resolutions of the Regional State Prosecutors in appealed cases.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As may be gleaned above, DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A delegated to the
ORSPs the authority to rule with finality cases subject of preliminary
investigation/reinvestigation appealed before it, provided that: (a) the case is not filed
in the National Capital Region (NCR); and (b) the case, should it proceed to the
courts, is cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial
Courts (MTCs) and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) — which includes not
only violations of city or municipal ordinances, but also all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties attached thereto. 14 This is,
however, without prejudice on the part of the SOJ to review the ORSP ruling, should
the former deem it appropriate to do so in the interest of justice. The foregoing
amendment is further strengthened by a later issuance, namely DOJ Department
Circular No. 018-14 15 dated June 18, 2014, entitled "Revised Delegation of
Authority on Appealed Cases," pertinent portions of which read:
DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 018-14
SUBJECT: Revised Delegation of
Authority on Appealed Cases
In the interest of service and pursuant to the provisions of existing
laws with the objective of institutionalizing the Department's Zero Backlog
Program on appealed cases, the following guidelines shall be observed and
implemented in the resolution of appealed cases on Petition for Review and
Motions for Reconsideration: DETACa
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
NACHURA, J : p
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated May 20,
2009 and its Resolution 2 dated September 10, 2009. The assailed Decision reversed
and set aside the Orders dated September 30, 2005 and December 28, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 274, 3 while the assailed
Resolution denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Ligaya Santos
(Ligaya) and Robert Bunda (Robert). aCTHEA
Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 158236, the Court finally resolved petitioners' motion
for reconsideration, holding that the RTC, Branch 258, 11 must make an independent
evaluation of the records before allowing the withdrawal of the Informations against
petitioners. This impelled Ligaya to file before the RTC, Branch 257, an Urgent
Motion to Resolve Anew and on the Merits Previous Motion to Withdraw Criminal
Informations Pursuant to the DOJ Finding on Lack of Probable Cause. 12
The aforesaid incidents were assigned for resolution to the RTC, Branch 274,
to which the case was re-raffled upon the inhibition of the Presiding Judge of Branch
257. 13
On September 30, 2005, the RTC issued an Order 14 dismissing the case for
murder, ratiocinating that no probable cause existed to indict them for their crime.
Consequently, it lifted the warrants for their arrests and ordered their immediate
release from detention. The prosecution's motion for reconsideration was denied on
December 28, 2005. 15
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, claiming
that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that no probable cause
existed against the accused.
On May 20, 2009, the CA granted the petition, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
SO ORDERED. 16
The CA concluded that the RTC turned a deaf ear to the crucial testimonial
evidence of the prosecution that, more likely than not, the crime charged was
committed by the accused. It specifically pointed out that Sabino positively identified
the accused and related in detail their supposed participation in killing Francis. The
court could not also ignore the statements made by Jonas at the risk of incriminating
himself. With these, the CA found it necessary that a full blown trial be conducted to
unearth the truth behind their testimonies. In disregarding the evidence presented by
the prosecution, the CA declared that, indeed, the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion. It, however, clarified that, in making the above pronouncements, the court
was not enunciating that the accused were guilty of the crime charged. 17 For possible
bias and prejudice, the court likewise ordered the inhibition of the Presiding Judge
and the subsequent re-raffle of the case. 18 HSCATc
On motion of petitioners, the CA clarified that the reversal of the RTC Orders
carried with it the reversal of the trial court's finding that petitioners were entitled to
bail. 19
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:
(c) On March 24, 2006, two (2) months after the September 30, 2005
final order has become final and executory, the private complainant Fiscal
Domingo Orda, Jr. filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
questioning the orders of September 30, 2005 and December 28, 2005.
Certiorari could not be a substitute for a lost appeal. "Where petitioner has
failed to file a timely appeal from the trial court's order, it could not longer
avail of the remedy of the special civil action for certiorari in lieu of his lost
right of appeal." [Mabuhay Insurance & Guaranty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
32 SCRA 245; Mathay, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 91]
(f) The Joint Order of September 30, 2005 was issued by the Regional
Trial Court in compliance with the decision of the Supreme Court that the trial
court must act on the issue of probable cause using its own discretion.
Reversing the September 30, 2005 Joint Order is like reversing the Supreme
Court.
(h) The final order of September 30, 2005 does not state that the
dismissal is "without prejudice." There is nothing in the order of September
30, 2005 from which we could derive that the dismissal of the action is
"without prejudice." While it may be true that the defense of double jeopardy
may not be invoked by the petitioners simply because they were not yet
arraigned, it does not follow that another information for murder could be filed
against them on the same evidence that the court dismissed the information for
lack of probable cause. A new information could still be filed against the
petitioners but the same must not be based on the same evidence already
repudiated in the September 30, 2005 order. 20
Simply put, the issues for resolution are: 1) whether a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the correct remedy in assailing the
RTC decision allowing the withdrawal of the Informations and consequently
dismissing the case for lack of probable cause; and 2) whether the CA erred in finding
that there was probable cause against petitioners.
We grant the petition. DEcITS
On the first issue, the petition for certiorari filed by respondent under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court is inappropriate. It bears stressing that the Order of the RTC,
granting the motion of the prosecution to withdraw the Informations and ordering the
case dismissed, is final because it disposed of the case and terminated the proceedings
therein, leaving nothing to be done by the court. Thus, the proper remedy is appeal. 21
Respondent filed with the CA the special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal, not because it was the only
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to him under the law, but, obviously, to
make up for the loss of his right to an ordinary appeal. It is elementary that the special
civil action of certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the
latter remedy is available, as it was in this case. A special civil action under Rule 65
cannot cure a party's failure to timely appeal the assailed decision or resolution. Rule
65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost
remedy of an ordinary appeal. 22
To be sure, a petition for certiorari is dismissible for being the wrong remedy.
Indeed, we have noted a number of exceptions to this general rule, to wit: 1) when
public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; 2) when the broader
interest of justice so requires; 3) when the writs issued are null and void; 4) when the
questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority; 5) when, for
persuasive reasons, the rules may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; or 6) in other
meritorious cases. 23
None of the above exceptions are present in the instant case; hence, we apply
the general rule. Respondent not having availed himself of the proper remedy to assail
the dismissal of the case against petitioners, the dismissal has become final and
executory. 24
For reasons that will be discussed below, even on the merits of the case, the
CA erred in reversing the Orders of the RTC.
The task of the Presiding Judge when an Information is filed with the court is
first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for
the arrest of the accused. Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances that
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged
in the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the
facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence
of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a
crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause
demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify
conviction. 25 HcDaAI
SO ORDERED.
||| (Santos v. Orda, Jr., G.R. No. 189402, [May 6, 2010], 634 PHIL 452-463)
SECOND DIVISION
RESOLUTION
BRION, J : p
For our resolution is the Report and Recommendation 1 dated August 13, 2013 of
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3879-RTJ.
The Antecedents
In her complaint, Claire alleged that she was refused enrolment by SPUP for the
B.S. Nursing course in her sophomore year because of her cleft palate; she alleged that
the refusal was made despite her completion of SPUP's College Freshmen Program
Curriculum.
In its resolution dated August 22, 2008, the prosecutor's office found probable
cause to indict Junio and Lorica of the crimes charged, and recommended the filing of the
corresponding informations against them.
On September 8, 2008, Junio and Lorica appealed the August 22, 2008 resolution
of the prosecutor's office, but Undersecretary Jose Vicente Salazar of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) denied their petition for review in his resolution of February 24, 2011.
On March 31, 2011, the prosecutor's office filed two informations against Junio
and Lorica for violations of Section 10 (a), Article VI, in relation with Article 3 (a) and
(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and Section 12 of R.A. No. 7277 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 4, Tuguegarao City, presided by Judge Lyliha Aquino.
On April 27, 2011, the cases were assigned to Judge Marivic A. Cacatian-Beltran
of the RTC, Branch 3, Tuguegarao City, due to the inhibition of Judge Aquino.
On April 4, 2011, Junio and Lorica sought a reconsideration of the DOJ's February
24, 2011 resolution.
On May 5, 2011, the RTC found probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against
Junio and Lorica. Accordingly, it issued the warrants of arrest against them.cCaEDA
On May 24, 2011, Lorica posted bail for her provisional liberty.
On May 25, 2011, Junio and Lorica filed an urgent motion to hold in abeyance
further proceedings and to recall warrants of arrest. Junio posted bail on the same day.
In its order dated June 14, 2011, the RTC denied Junio and Lorica's urgent motion
to hold in abeyance further proceedings and to recall warrants of arrest.
Meanwhile, DOJ Secretary Leila de Lima granted Junio and Lorica's motion for
reconsideration and set aside the February 24, 2011 resolution of Undersecretary Salazar.
Accordingly, in her resolution dated August 8, 2011, she directed the Cagayan Provincial
Prosecutor to immediately cause the withdrawal of the informations for violations of R.A.
Nos. 7610 and 7277 against Junio and Lorica for lack of probable cause.
On August 12, 2011, Junio and Lorica filed a manifestation and motion before the
RTC, praying for the cancellation of their scheduled arraignment, and for the dismissal of
the cases against them.
On September 5, 2011, the City Prosecutor, Junio and Lorica filed a joint motion
to withdraw informations in view of Secretary De Lima's August 8, 2011 resolution.
On September 14, 2011, Judge Cacatian-Beltran issued an order stating that "the
motion relative to the resolution of the Department of Justice is deemed submitted for
resolution." 2
On December 20, 2011, Junio, Lorica and the City Prosecutor filed a joint motion
for resolution.
In its order of January 6, 2012, the RTC denied the joint motion to withdraw
informations for lack of merit.
The City Prosecutor, Junio and Lorica moved to reconsider this order, but the RTC
denied their motion in its order dated April 10, 2012.
Junio and Lorica further alleged that Judge Cacatian-Beltran "arrogated unto
herself the role of a prosecutor and a judge" 3 when she insisted that they stand for trial
although she did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of Justice Secretary De
Lima. aETAHD
In her comment, Judge Cacatian-Beltran explained that Junio and Lorica might
have conducted a follow-up of the motions to dismiss at Branch 4 where the records of
the criminal cases had been retained, and that the staff of Branch 4 failed to inform her of
any follow-up by Junio and Lorica and/or by their counsel. She maintained that she "lost
no time in finishing the draft" 4 of her January 6, 2012 order when the joint motion for
resolution was brought to her attention.
Judge Cacatian-Beltran maintained that the RTC was not bound by the findings of
the Secretary of Justice since her court had already acquired jurisdiction over the case.
She added that she made an independent assessment of the evidence before denying the
motion. She further stated that she acted promptly on all other incidents in the case.
In its Report and Recommendation dated August 13, 2013, the OCA
recommended that: (1) the administrative complaint against Judge Cacatian-Beltran be
dismissed for being judicial in nature; and (2) Judge Cacatian-Beltran be admonished to
strictly comply with the reglementary periods to act on pending motions and other
incidents in her court.
The OCA held that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative
functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings. It explained that the
aberrant acts allegedly committed by Judge Cacatian-Beltran relate to the exercise of her
judicial functions, and added that only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross
ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice should be administratively
sanctioned.
Our Ruling
Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution requires lower court judges to
decide a case within the period of ninety (90) days. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct likewise holds that judges should administer justice without delay and
directs every judge to dispose of the courts' business promptly within the period
prescribed by law. Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are
indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases.
Thus, the ninety (90) day period is mandatory. This mandate applies even to motions or
interlocutory matters or incidents pending before a magistrate. 5
In the present case, the City Prosecutor's joint motion to withdraw informations
was deemed submitted for resolution on September 14, 2011. Judge Cacatian-Beltran,
however, did not act on the motion within the prescribed three (3) month period (or up to
December 13, 2011), and instead ruled on it only on January 6, 2012.
In her defense, Judge Cacatian-Beltran explained that Junio and Lorica might have
conducted a follow-up of the motions to dismiss at Branch 4 where the records of the
criminal cases were retained, and that the staff of Branch 4 failed to inform her of any
follow-up by Junio and Lorica and/or their counsel. We note, however, that Branch 4 is
paired with Judge Cacatian-Beltran's Branch 3 per Circular No. 7-74, as amended by SC
Circular No. 19-98. Since Criminal Case Nos. 14053-54 had been assigned to Judge
Cacatian-Beltran, it was incumbent upon her to update herself on the developments in
these consolidated cases; she should have kept her own record of cases and noted therein
the status of each case to ensure prompt and effective action. To do this, Judge Cacatian-
Beltran should have adopted a record management system and organized her docket —
an approach that she appears not to have done. IDSETA
Sections 9 and 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-
10-SC, classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge,
with the following administrative sanctions: (a) suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or (b) a fine
of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
However, the records are bereft of any evidence showing that there had been
undue delay (as shown by the records), any attendant bad faith, any intent to prejudice a
party to the case, or some other ulterior ends. The OCA, in fact, pointedly ruled that the
inaction was not attended with malice: Judge Cacatian-Beltran resolved the joint motion
to withdraw informations two (2) days after she learned of its existence on January 4,
2012.
To our mind, these circumstances are sufficient to mitigate the liability of Judge
Cacatian-Beltran and keep us from imposing a fine or suspension from office.
Accordingly, we find sufficient and warranted the OCA's recommended penalty of
admonition.
The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case; in the
exercise of its discretion, it may agree or disagree with the recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice. Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would be
an abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. 6
We stress that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition
of the case (whether it be a dismissal, an acquittal or a conviction of the accused) rests
within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court; it is the
best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it. 7
In her January 6, 2012 order, Judge Cacatian-Beltran notably explained the basis
for her denial. No proof whatsoever exists in all these, showing that bad faith, malice or
any corrupt purpose attended the issuance of her order. It is also important to note in this
regard that the issue of whether Judge Cacatian-Beltran correctly denied the joint motion
to withdraw informations, despite the finding of Secretary De Lima of lack of probable
cause, is judicial in nature: Junio and Lorica's remedy under the circumstances should
have been made with the proper court for the appropriate judicial action, not with the
OCA by means of an administrative complaint.
We also find unmeritorious Junio and Lorica's argument that Judge Cacatian-
Beltran "arrogated unto herself the role of a prosecutor and a judge" 9 when she insisted
that the accused stand trial although she did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the
part of Justice Secretary de Lima. When a court acts, whether its action is consistent or
inconsistent with a prosecutor's recommendation, it rules on the prosecutor's action and
does not thereby assume the role of a prosecutor. The case of Hipos, Sr. v. Bay 10 best
explains why we so rule: CAIaHS
With the independent and thorough assessment and evaluation of the merits of the
joint motion to withdraw information that Judge Cacatian-Beltran undertook before
dismissing it, she acted as a judge should and can in no way be said to have assumed the
role of a prosecutor. The parties, for their part, are not without any remedy as the Rules of
Court amply provide for the remedy against a judicial action believed to be grossly
abusive when the remedy of direct appeal is not available. We cannot rule on this point in
the present case, however, as this is a matter not before us in this administrative recourse
against Judge Cacatian-Beltran.
SO ORDERED.
(Junio v. Cacatian-Beltran, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2367, [January 13, 2014], 724 PHIL 1-
|||
12)
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p
Before the Court are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari 1 assailing the
November 8, 2006 Decision 2 and July 19, 2007 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 88285, upholding the validity of the trial court's dismissal of
separate criminal informations for estafa against private respondent Timothy J. Desmond
(Desmond) due to lack of probable cause.
The Facts
In 2001, petitioner Virginia De Los Santos-Dio (Dio), the majority stockholder of
H.S. Equities, Ltd. (HS Equities) and authorized representative of Westdale Assets, Ltd.
(Westdale), 4 was introduced to Desmond, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) of the Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc. (SBMEI), and the authorized
representative of Active Environments, Inc. and JV China, Inc. (JV China), the majority
shareholder of SBMEI. 5 After some discussion on possible business ventures, Dio, on
behalf of HS Equities, decided to invest a total of US $1,150,000.00 6 in SBMEI's Ocean
Adventure Marine Park (Ocean Adventure), a theme park to be constructed at the Subic
Bay Freeport Zone which, when operational, would showcase live performances of false-
killer whales and sea lions. In this relation, Dio claimed that Desmond led her to believe
that SBMEI had a capital of US$5,500,000.00, inclusive of the value of the marine
mammals to be used in Ocean Adventure, 7 and also guaranteed substantial returns on
investment. 8 Desmond even presented a Business Plan, indicating that: (a) Ocean
Adventure's "attendance will rise from 271,192 in 2001 to just over 386,728 in 2006, with
revenues rising from US$4,420,000.00 million to US$7,290,000.00 million in the same
time frame"; (b) "[e]arly investors are expected to reap an annual return of 23% in 2001,
rising to 51% in 2006"; and (c) "[f]ully priced shares [would yield a 19% return] in 2001,
rising to 42% in 2006." 9 Thus, on January 18, 2002, a Subscription Agreement 10 was
executed by Desmond, as representative of SBMEI and JV China, and Dio, as
representative of HS Equities.
Dio further claimed that she found out that, contrary to Desmond's representations,
SBMEI actually had no capacity to deliver on its guarantees, and that in fact, as of 2001,
it was incurring losses amounting to P62,595,216.00. 19 She likewise claimed to have
discovered false entries in the company's books and financial statements — specifically,
its overvaluation of the marine animals and its non-disclosure of the true amount of JV
China's investment 20 — which prompted her to call for an audit investigation.
Consequently, Dio discovered that, without her knowledge and consent, Desmond made
certain disbursements from Westdale's special account, meant only for Miracle Beach
expenditures (special account), and diverted a total of US$72,362.78 therein for the
operating expenses of Ocean Adventure. 21 When Desmond refused to execute an
undertaking to return the diverted funds, Dio, in her capacity as Treasurer of SBMEI,
suspended the release of the remaining funds in the aforesaid special account. 22
Eventually, after Dio was ousted as Director and Treasurer of SBMEI, 23 she
filed, on April 19, 2004, two (2) criminal complaints 24 (subject criminal complaints) for
estafa (a) through false pretenses under Article 315 (1) (b) 25 of the Revised Penal Code
26 (RPC); and (b) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence through misappropriation or
conversion under Article 315 (2) (a) 27 of the RPC, both against Desmond before the
Olongapo City Prosecutor's Office (City Prosecutor's Office), docketed as IS Nos. 04-M-
992 and 04-M-993.
In reply, Dio insisted that SBMEI, at the outset, never had sufficient assets or
resources of its own because, contrary to Desmond's claims, the total amount of
US$2,300,000.00 it purportedly invested in buildings and equipment actually came from
the investments Dio's company made in SBMEI. 29
The elements of the crimes charged were thus established in these cases,
namely Dio parted with her money upon the prodding and enticement of
respondent on the false pretense that he had the capacity and resources for the
proposed project. In the end, Dio was not able to get her money back, thus
causing her damage and prejudice. Moreover, such defraudation or
misappropriation having been committed by Desmond through his company
SBMEI involving funds solicited from Dio as a member of the general public in
contravention of the public interest, the probable cause clearly exists to indict
Desmond for the crime of Estafa under Article 315 (1)(b) and (2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to PD No. 1689. 31
CONTRARY TO LAW.
That in or about and sometime during the period from June 2002 to July
2002, in Olongapo City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud Westdale Assets, Limited represented in this
case by Virginia S. Delos Santos-Dio in the following manner to wit: the said
accused received in trust and for administration from the said Virginia S. Delos
Santos-Dio the amount of One Million US Dollars ($1,000,000.00) under the
express obligation of using the same to pay the loan facility of the Subic Bay
Marine Exploration, Inc. (SBMEI) with First Metro Investment Corporation and
to fund the construction and development of the Miracle Beach Project but the
said accused, once in possession of the said amount, with grave abuse of
confidence and with intent to defraud, misapplied, misappropriated and
converted the same for his own use and benefit by devoting it to a purpose or
use different from that agreed upon and despite repeated demands made upon
him to account for and to return the said amount, he failed and refused and still
fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said Westdale
Assets, Limited in the amount of US $1,000,000.00 or its equivalent to FIFTY
MILLION (Php50,000,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, the dollar being
computed at the rate of Php50.00 to $1.00 which was the prevailing rate of
exchange at the commission of the offense, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter in the aforementioned amount. aTEScI
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Furthermore, the court cannot find any sufficient evidence that the
accused personally assured the complainant about his so-called power, influence
and credit with the SBMA and other financial institutions that would supposedly
insure the viability and profitability of the project. Note that nowhere in the
Complaint-Affidavit of the private complainant are there specific factual
allegations that would show that the accused had personal business meetings
with the SBMA and said financial institutions. As to how and in what manner
and scope accused exercised such alleged power, influence and credit over these
juridical entities remain a bare and self-serving averment in the absence of any
factual detail or account.
Finally, it cannot be gainsaid [sic] that accused was the one who
personally valuated the marine mammals contributed by JV China, Incorporated
to the Subic Bay Marine Exploration, Inc. as capital amounting to US$3.724
Million. Evidence clearly point to an independent valuation done by a third
party namely Beijing Landa Aquarium that valued the marine mammals under
the Buy-Out Agreement dated September 9, 1998. Needless to state, the onus is
on complainant to controvert this valuation. Again, however, no adequate proof
was adduced along this line. HSIaAT
Moreover and more revealing, is the fact that again there was no
showing that it was accused who personally caused the payment of these
expenses allegedly in violation of the objective of the investment. It must be
noted that SBMEI is a corporation and not a single proprietorship. Being a
corporation, expenses paid of such a kind as utilities and salaries are not
authorized personally and solely by the President nor the Chief Executive
Officer nor even by the Chairman of the Board for that matter. These are
corporate acts that are passed through board resolutions. Hence, these corporate
acts can in no way be considered personal acts of the accused. Yet, he was
singled out among all 5 members of the Board of Directors who presumably, in
the ordinary course of business, approved by resolution the payments of such
utilities and salaries. Consequently, there is again insufficiency of evidence that
the accused alone caused the payment of these salaries and utilities for the sole
purpose of pocketing the money thereby using the same for personal gain. 40
Consequently, the RTC denied the issuance of a warrant of arrest and hold
departure order against Desmond and ordered the dismissal of the cases against him:
SO ORDERED. 41
Given the RTC's dismissal of the foregoing criminal cases, the City Prosecutor's
Office filed motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied. As such, it filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus 42 before the CA on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. Relatedly, Dio also filed a petition-in-intervention 43 before the CA, praying
for the reinstatement of the subject criminal complaints.
The CA Ruling
In the same manner, the facts in the case at bar that would allegedly
constitute a criminal charge of estafa under par. 1(b) are wanting. Be it noted
that under the said paragraph, estafa with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence
through misappropriation or conversion of the money, goods or any other
personal property must be received in trust, on commission, for administration,
or under any other obligation which involves the duty to make delivery thereof
or to return the same. It is not amiss to note that a perusal of private
complainants' Complaint-Affidavit shows that subject money in the amount of
US$ 1,000,000.00 to be used for the Miracle Beach Project was placed in a
special account with Equitable-PCI Bank. As the records show, the said funds
were placed by Dio under the control of Fatima Paglicawan, an employee of
Westdale, such that, no money can be withdrawn from the special account
without the signature of the said employee, Desmond and a certain John
Corcoran. Therefore, at such time, it cannot be said that the funds were received
for administration or already under the juridical possession of Desmond.
Meanwhile, we would like to emphasize that to constitute conversion, it
presupposes that the thing has been devoted to a purpose or use different from
that agreed upon. Verily, a facial examination of the Journal Voucher and
Check Voucher pertaining to the withdrawals made on such account clearly
shows that the disbursements were not only authorized by Paglicawan but
likewise indicated that the purpose for such withdrawals was to cover payments
for BIR taxes and the salaries of local employees and expatriates.
The City Prosecutor and Dio filed their respective motions for reconsideration
which were both denied in a Resolution 46 dated July 19, 2007.
The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it dismissed the subject
informations for lack of probable cause.
The second is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused. In this respect, the judge must satisfy himself that,
on the basis of the evidence submitted, there is a necessity for placing the accused under
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge, therefore, finds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. 48 Notably, since
the judge is already duty-bound to determine the existence or non-existence of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused immediately upon the filing of the information, the
filing of a motion for judicial determination of probable cause becomes a mere
superfluity, 49 if not a deliberate attempt to cut short the process by asking the judge to
weigh in on the evidence without a full-blown trial.
In the case of Co v. Republic, 50 the Court emphasized the settled distinction
between an executive and a judicial determination of probable cause, viz.: 51
On this score, it bears to stress that a judge is not bound by the resolution of the
public prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation and must himself
ascertain from the latter's findings and supporting documents whether probable cause
exists for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest. This prerogative is granted by no less
than the Constitution which provides that "no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce." 52
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial
Court. — Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information,
the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest, or acommitment order if the accused had already
been arrested, pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted
preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed
pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable
cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within
five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within
thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds
with his primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a
warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor
to submit additional evidence, in case he doubts the existence of probable cause. 56
Applying these principles, the Court finds that the RTC's immediate dismissal, as
affirmed by the CA, was improper as the standard of clear lack of probable cause was not
observed. In this case, records show that certain essential facts — namely, (a) whether or
not Desmond committed false representations that induced Dio to invest in Ocean
Adventure; and (b) whether or not Desmond utilized the funds invested by Dio solely for
the Miracle Beach Project for purposes different from what was agreed upon — remain
controverted. As such, it cannot be said that the absence of the elements of the crime of
estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) 57 and 315 (1) (b) 58 of the RPC had already been
established, thereby rendering the RTC's immediate dismissal of the case highly
improper.
SO ORDERED.
(De Los Santos-Dio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 178947 & 179079, [June 26, 2013],
|||
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
ABAD, J : p
This case is about a supposed warrantless arrest and a subsequent search prompted
by the police officers' chance sighting through an ajar door of the accused engaged in pot
session.
On January 13, 2004 the second Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasay City charged
the accused George Codes Antiquera * and Corazon Olivenza Cruz with illegal
possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasay City in Criminal Case 04-0100-CFM. 2 Since the accused Cruz jumped bail, the
court tried her in absentia. 3
The prosecution evidence shows that at around 4:45 a.m. of February 11, 2004,
PO1 Gregorio Recio, PO1 Laurence Cabutihan, P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania,
and two civilian operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle were conducting a police
visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified men rush
out of house number 107-C and immediately boarded a jeep. DcSACE
Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the
house from where the men came and peeked through the partially opened door. PO1
Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a
pink lighter. Beside him was his live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an aluminum foil
and an improvised burner. They sat facing each other at the living room. This prompted
the police officers to enter the house, introduce themselves, and arrest Antiquera and
Cruz. 4
Accused Antiquera gave a different story. He said that on the date and time in
question, he and Cruz were asleep in their house when he was roused by knocking on the
door. When he went to open it, three armed police officers forced themselves into the
house. One of them shoved him and said, "D'yan ka lang, pusher ka." He was handcuffed
and someone instructed two of the officers to go to his room. The police later brought
accused Antiquera and Cruz to the police station and there informed them of the charges
against them. They were shown a box that the police said had been recovered from his
house. 7
On July 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a Decision 8 that found accused Antiquera
and Cruz guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them to a prison term ranging from
six months and one day to two years and four months, and to pay a fine of P10,000.00
each and the costs of the suit.
DTCSHA
The RTC said that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the police
caught accused Antiquera and Cruz in the act of using shabu and having drug
paraphernalia in their possession. Since no ill motive could be attributed to PO1 Recio
and PO1 Cabutihan, the court accorded full faith and credit to their testimony and
rejected the self-serving claim of Antiquera.
The trial court gave no weight to accused Antiquera's claim of illegal arrest, given
PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan's credible testimony that, prior to their arrest, they saw
Antiquera and Cruz in a pot session at their living room and in possession of drug
paraphernalia. The police officers were thus justified in arresting the two without a
warrant pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 9 IHDCcT
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a Decision 10 on September 21,
2007 affirming in full the decision of the trial court. The accused moved for
reconsideration but the CA denied it. 11 The accused is now before this Court seeking
acquittal.
The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding accused Antiquera
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia based on the
evidence of the police officers that they saw him and Cruz in the act of possessing drug
paraphernalia.
The prosecution's theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a case
of valid warrantless arrest in that the police officers saw accused Antiquera and Cruz
through the door of their house, in the act of having a pot session. That valid warrantless
arrest gave the officers the right as well to search the living room for objects relating to
the crime and thus seize the paraphernalia they found there.
The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested positive for
shabu, they were no doubt used for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting,
ingesting, or introducing dangerous drug into the body in violation of Section 12 of
Republic Act 9165. That the accused tested negative for shabu, said the prosecution, had
no bearing on the crime charged which was for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia,
not for illegal use of dangerous drugs. The prosecution added that even assuming that the
arrest of the accused was irregular, he is already considered to have waived his right to
question the validity of his arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to the court's
jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty. 12
aDcETC
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense." This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. 13 The overt act constituting
the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 14
But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante
delicto.
1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified
men suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime
had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that
the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle.
Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave
priority to the house even when they heard no cry for help from it.
2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the
house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially
opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it. Thus, PO1 Cabutihan
testified:
THE COURT:
Q By the way, Mr. Cabutihan, when you followed your companion towards the
open door, how was the door open? Was it totally open, or was it
partially open?
Q By how much, 1/3, 1/2? Only by less than one (1) foot?
Q So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the house if the door
was only open by 6 inches? Or did you have to push the door? EHcaAI
Q Were you allowed to just go towards the door of the house, push its door and
peeped inside it, as a police officer?
Q Are you not allowed to — Are you not required to get a search warrant before
you can search the interior of the house?
Q What do you mean by yes? Would you first obtain a search warrant before
searching the interior of the house?
Q So why did you not a [sic] secure a search warrant first before you tried to
investigate the house, considering your admission that you suspected
that there was something wrong inside the house?
A Because we saw them that they were engaged in pot session, Your Honor.
Q But before you saw them, you just had to push the door wide open to
peep through its opening because you did not know what was
happening inside?
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that
authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned
rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it
was likewise illegal. 16 Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police
officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from
an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused. 17
One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest
by itself is not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest
does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest. 18
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated
September 21, 2007 and Resolution dated November 16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR 28937 and ACQUITS the accused George Antiquera y Codes of the crime
of which he is charged for lack of evidence sufficient to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court further ORDERS the cancellation and release of the bail
bond he posted for his provisional liberty.
SO ORDERED. TcDIaA
(Antiquera y Codes v. People, G.R. No. 180661, [December 11, 2013], 723 PHIL 425-
|||
432)
THIRD DIVISION
MARTIRES, J : p
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated 19 May 2014, of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01156 which affirmed the Decision 2 dated 18
April 2013, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Misamis Oriental (RTC), in
Criminal Case No. 2011-671 finding Renante Comprado y Bronola (accused-
appellant) guilty of illegal possession of marijuana. caITAC
THE FACTS
The CA Ruling
OUR RULING
I.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 13
The Bill of Rights requires that a search and seizure must be carried out with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, any evidence obtained from such warrantless search is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 14 This proscription, however,
admits of exceptions, namely: 1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2)
Search of evidence in plain view; 3) Search of a moving vehicle; 4) Consented
warrantless search; 5) Customs search; 6) Stop and Frisk; and 7) Exigent and
emergency circumstances. 15
II.
III.
IV.
On the other hand, the Court found no sufficient justification in the stop and
frisk committed by the police in People v. Cogaed (Cogaed). 24 In that case, the
police officers received a message from an informant that one Marvin Buya would be
transporting marijuana from Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La Union, to the
Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union. A checkpoint was set up and when a passenger
jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at the checkpoint, the jeepney driver
disembarked and signaled to the police officers that the two male passengers were
carrying marijuana.
SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later identified
as Victor Cogaed and Santiago Dayao. SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao
what their bags contained. Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not
know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their barrio mate named
Marvin. After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of
what looked like marijuana. The Court, in that case, invalidated the search and seizure
ruling that there were no suspicious circumstances that preceded the arrest. Also, in
Cogaed, there was a discussion of various jurisprudence wherein the Court adjudged
that there was no valid stop-and-frisk:
The circumstances of this case are analogous to People v. Aruta. In
that case, an informant told the police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be
bringing in drugs from Baguio City by bus. At the bus terminal, the police
officers prepared themselves. The informant pointed at a woman crossing the
street and identified her as "Aling Rosa." The police apprehended "Aling
Rosa," and they alleged that she allowed them to look inside her bag. The bag
contained marijuana leaves.
In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was
illegal. There were no suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta's arrest
and the subsequent search and seizure. It was only the informant that
prompted the police to apprehend her. The evidence obtained was not
admissible because of the illegal search. Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.
Aruta is almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney
driver, not the police's informant, who informed the police that Cogaed was
"suspicious."
The facts in Aruta are also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin.
Here, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming
Aminnudin as somebody possessing drugs. The NBI waited for the vessel to
arrive and accosted Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a boat. Like
in the case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudin's bag and found bundles of
what turned out to be marijuana leaves. The court declared that the search and
seizure was illegal. Aminnudin was acquitted.
xxx xxx xxx
People v. Chua also presents almost the same circumstances. In this
case, the police had been receiving information that the accused was
distributing drugs in "different karaoke bars in Angeles City." One night, the
police received information that this drug dealer would be dealing drugs at the
Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a stakeout. A car "arrived and parked" at
the hotel. The informant told the police that the man parked at the hotel was
dealing drugs. The man alighted from his car. He was carrying a juice box.
The police immediately apprehended him and discovered live ammunition and
drugs in his person and in the juice box he was holding.
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious
about Chua's situation when the police apprehended him and ruled that
"[t]here was no valid 'stop-and-frisk.'" 25 (citations omitted)
The Court finds that the totality of the circumstances in this case is not
sufficient to incite a genuine reason that would justify a stop-and-frisk search on
accused-appellant. An examination of the records reveals that no overt physical act
could be properly attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse suspicion in the minds of
the arresting officers that he had just committed, was committing, or was about to
commit a crime. P/Insp. Orate testified as follows:
[Prosecutor Vicente]:
Q: On that date Mr. Witness, at about 6:30 in the evening, what happened, if
any?
A: At about 6:30 in the evening, I received an information from our
Confidential Informant reporting that an alleged courier of marijuana
were sighted in their place, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
[Court]:
Q: Aside from the sighting of this alleged courier of marijuana, what else was
relayed to you if there were anything else?
A: Our Confidential Informant told me that two persons, a male and a female
were having in their possession a black pack containing marijuana, Sir.
cTDaEH
V.
VI.
The appellate court, in convicting accused-appellant, reasoned that the search
and seizure is valid because it could be considered as search of a moving vehicle:
Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in
recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said
circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases,
however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is
limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the
officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising
out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other
vehicle contains [an] item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure
and destruction. 33
The search in this case, however, could not be classified as a search of a
moving vehicle. In this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a
specific person. Further, in search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally
used as a means to transport illegal items. It is worthy to note that the information
relayed to the police officers was that a passenger of that particular bus was carrying
marijuana such that when the police officers boarded the bus, they searched the bag of
the person matching the description given by their informant and not the cargo or
contents of the said bus. Moreover, in this case, it just so happened that the alleged
drug courier was a bus passenger. To extend to such breadth the scope of searches on
moving vehicles would open the floodgates to unbridled warrantless searches which
can be conducted by the mere expedient of waiting for the target person to ride a
motor vehicle, setting up a checkpoint along the route of that vehicle, and then
stopping such vehicle when it arrives at the checkpoint in order to search the target
person.
VII.
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J : p
The Case
This is an appeal from the August 28, 2009 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03273, which affirmed in toto the Decision dated July
12, 2007 2 in Criminal Case Nos. 03-4735 and 03-4961 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 64 in Makati City. The RTC found accused-appellant Francisco
Manlangit y Tresballes guilty of drug-sale and drug-use penalized by Republic Act
No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
That on or about the 24th day of November 2003, in the City of Makati,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there
willfully and feloniously sell, give away, distribute and deliver zero point zero
four (0.04) gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), which is a
dangerous drug. 3
On December 11, 2003, another information was filed against Manlangit for
breach of Sec. 15, Art. II of RA 9165, to wit:
During the arraignment for both cases, Manlangit pleaded not guilty.
Afterwards, the cases were tried jointly.
At the trial of the case, the prosecution adduced evidence as follows: HCaEAT
SO ORDERED. 8
From such Decision, Manlangit interposed an appeal with the CA. ACDTcE
1. The Court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the
prosecution's failure to prove his built beyond reasonable doubt. 9
2. The Court a quo gravely erred in finding that the procedure for the custody
and control of prohibited drugs was complied with. 10
First Issue:
Accused-appellant's guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt
The first paragraph of Sec. 5 of RA 9165 punishes the act of selling dangerous
drugs. It provides:
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction
or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of
corpus delicti.
The pieces of evidence found in the records amply demonstrate that all the
elements of the crimes charged were satisfied. The lower courts gave credence to the
prosecution witnesses' testimonies, which established the guilt of accused-appellant
for the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies — particularly those
of the police officers involved, which both the RTC and the CA found credible — are
now beyond question. As the Court ruled in Aparis v. People: 12
Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy
does not affect the legality of the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook
method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has left to the discretion
of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers.
A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary, especially where
the police operatives are accompanied by their informant during the entrapment.
Flexibility is a trait of good police work. We have held that when time is of the
essence, the police may dispense with the need for prior surveillance. In the
instant case, having been accompanied by the informant to the person who
was peddling the dangerous drugs, the policemen need not have conducted
any prior surveillance before they undertook the buy-bust operation. 14
(Emphasis supplied.)
Second Issue:
The chain of custody of the seized drug was unbroken
Accused-appellant contends that the arresting officers did not comply with the
requirements for the handling of seized dangerous drugs as provided for under Sec. 21
(1) of RA 9165: TCaEAD
While the marking of the specimen was done in the place of incident by
MADAC operative Soriano, the inventory of the item was done at Cluster 4.
There was no photograph made of the plastic sachet in the presence of the
accused, media, any elected local official, or the DOJ representatives, in clear
violation of Section 21, R.A. No. 9165. 17
Based on such alleged failure of the buy-bust team to comply with the
procedural requirements of Sec. 21, RA 9165, accused-appellant posits that he should,
therefore, be acquitted. Such reasoning is flawed.
In People v. Rosialda, 18 the Court addressed the issue of chain of custody of
dangerous drugs, citing People v. Rivera, as follows:
Anent the second element, Rosialda raises the issue that there is a
violation of Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165, particularly the requirement that the
alleged dangerous drugs seized by the apprehending officers be photographed
"in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel." Rosialda argues
that such failure to comply with the provision of the law is fatal to his
conviction.
This Court can no longer find out what justifiable reasons existed, if any,
since the defense did not raise this issue during trial. Be that as it may, this
Court has explained in People v. Del Monte that what is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt
or innocence of the accused. The existence of the dangerous drug is a
condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the crime and the
fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Thus, it is essential that
the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. The chain of
custody requirement performs the function of ensuring that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary
doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed.
Here, accused-appellant does not question the unbroken chain of evidence. His
only contention is that the buy-bust team did not inventory and photograph the
specimen on site and in the presence of accused-appellant or his counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public
official. However, as ruled by the Court in Rosialda, as long as the chain of custody
remains unbroken, even though the procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of
RA 9165 was not faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected.
And as aptly ruled by the CA, the chain of custody in the instant case was not
broken as established by the facts proved during trial, thus:
Lastly, the contention of appellant, that the police officers failed to
comply with the provisions of paragraph 1, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 for the
proper procedure in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs, is
untenable. Record shows that Serrano marked the confiscated sachet of shabu in
the presence of appellant at the place of incident and was turned over properly
to the investigating officer together with the marked buy-bust money.
Afterwards, the confiscated plastic sachet suspected to be containing "shabu"
was brought to the forensic chemist for examination. Likewise, the members of
the buy-bust team executed their "Pinagsanib na Salaysay sa Pag-aresto"
immediately after the arrest and at the trial, Serrano positively identified the
seized drugs. Indeed, the prosecution evidence had established the unbroken
chain of custody of the seized drugs from the buy-bust team, to the investigating
officer and to the forensic chemist. Thus, there is no doubt that the prohibited
drug presented before the court a quo was the one seized from appellant and that
indeed, he committed the crimes imputed against him.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA's August 28, 2009 Decision in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03273 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. SCaDAE
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.
(People v. Manlangit y Tresballes, G.R. No. 189806, [January 12, 2011], 654 PHIL
|||
427-443)
EN BANC
DECISION
REYES, JR., J : p
These consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders (TRO) and/or Writs of Preliminary
Injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assail the constitutionality of
Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 41, series of 2010, otherwise known as the
"Consolidated Rules and Regulations Governing Issuance and Implementation of
Hold Departure Orders, Watchlist Orders and Allow Departure Orders," on the
ground that it infringes on the constitutional right to travel.
CAIHTE
Also, in G.R. Nos. 199034 and 199046, the petitioners therein seek to annul
and set aside the following orders issued by the former DOJ Secretary Leila De Lima
(De Lima), pursuant to DOJ Circular No. 41, thus:
1. Watchlist Order No. ASM-11-237 dated August 9, 2011; 1
2. Amended Watchlist Order No. 2011-422 dated September 6, 2011; 2 and
3. Watchlist Order No. 2011-573 dated October 27, 2011. 3
In a Supplemental Petition, petitioner Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) further
seeks the invalidation of the Order 4 dated November 8, 2011, denying her application
for an Allow-Departure Order (ADO).
Similarly, in G.R. No. 197930, petitioners Efraim C. Genuino (Efraim), Erwin
F. Genuino (Erwin) and Sheryl Genuino-See (Genuinos) pray for the nullification of
the Hold-Departure Order 5 (HDO) No. 2011-64 dated July 22, 2011 issued against
them.
Antecedent Facts
On March 19, 1998, then DOJ Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III issued DOJ
Circular No. 17, prescribing rules and regulations governing the issuance of HDOs.
The said issuance was intended to restrain the indiscriminate issuance of HDOs which
impinge on the people's right to travel.
On April 23, 2007, former DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez issued DOJ
Circular No. 18, prescribing rules and regulations governing the issuance and
implementation of watchlist orders. In particular, it provides for the power of the DOJ
Secretary to issue a Watchlist Order (WLO) against persons with criminal cases
pending preliminary investigation or petition for review before the DOJ. Further, it
states that the DOJ Secretary may issue an ADO to a person subject of a WLO who
intends to leave the country for some exceptional reasons. 6 Even with the
promulgation of DOJ Circular No. 18, however, DOJ Circular No. 17 remained the
governing rule on the issuance of HDOs by the DOJ.
On May 25, 2010, then Acting DOJ Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued the
assailed DOJ Circular No. 41, consolidating DOJ Circular Nos. 17 and 18, which will
govern the issuance and implementation of HDOs, WLOs, and ADOs. Section 10 of
DOJ Circular No. 41 expressly repealed all rules and regulations contained in DOJ
Circular Nos. 17 and 18, as well as all instructions, issuances or orders or parts thereof
which are inconsistent with its provisions.
After the expiration of GMA's term as President of the Republic of the
Philippines and her subsequent election as Pampanga representative, criminal
complaints were filed against her before the DOJ, particularly:
(a) XVI-INV-10H-00251, entitled Danilo A. Lihaylihay vs. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., for plunder; 7
(b) XVI-INV-11D-00170, entitled Francisco I. Chavez vs. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., for plunder, malversation and/or illegal use of
OWWA funds, graft and corruption, violation of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC), violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials, and qualified theft; 8 and
(c) XVI-INV-11F-00238, entitled Francisco I. Chavez vs. Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, et al., for plunder, malversation, and/or illegal use of public funds,
graft and corruption, violation of the OEC, violation of the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and qualified theft. 9
In view of the foregoing criminal complaints, De Lima issued DOJ WLO No.
2011-422 dated August 9, 2011 against GMA pursuant to her authority under DOJ
Circular No. 41. She also ordered for the inclusion of GMA's name in the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) watchlist. 10 Thereafter, the BI issued WLO No. ASM-11-237, 11
implementing De Lima's order.
On September 6, 2011, De Lima issued DOJ Amended WLO No. 2011-422
against GMA to reflect her full name "Ma. Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo" in the BI
Watchlist. 12 WLO No. 2011-422, as amended, is valid for a period of 60 days, or
until November 5, 2011, unless sooner terminated or otherwise extended. This was
lifted in due course by De Lima, in an Order dated November 14, 2011, following the
expiration of its validity. 13
Meanwhile, on October 20, 2011, two criminal complaints for Electoral
Sabotage and Violation of the OEC were filed against GMA and her husband, Jose
Miguel Arroyo (Miguel Arroyo), among others, with the DOJ-Commission on
Elections (DOJ-COMELEC) Joint Investigation Committee on 2004 and 2007
Election Fraud, 14 specifically:
(a) DOJ-COMELEC Case No. 001-2011, entitled DOJ-COMELEC Fact
Finding Team vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., (for the Province of
Maguindanao), for electoral sabotage/violation of the OEC and COMELEC
Rules and Regulations; 15 and
(b) DOJ-COMELEC Case No. 002-2011, entitled Aquilino Pimentel III vs.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., for electoral sabotage. 16
Following the filing of criminal complaints, De Lima issued DOJ WLO No.
2011-573 against GMA and Miguel Arroyo on October 27, 2011, with a validity
period of 60 days, or until December 26, 2011, unless sooner terminated or otherwise
extended. 17 DETACa
In three separate letters dated October 20, 2011, October 21, 2011, and October
24, 2011, GMA requested for the issuance of an ADO, pursuant to Section 7 of DOJ
Circular No. 41, so that she may be able to seek medical attention from medical
specialists abroad for her hypoparathyroidism and metabolic bone mineral disorder.
She mentioned six different countries where she intends to undergo consultations and
treatments: United States of America, Germany, Singapore, Italy, Spain and Austria.
18 She likewise undertook to return to the Philippines, once her treatment abroad is
completed, and participate in the proceedings before the DOJ. 19 In support of her
application for ADO, she submitted the following documents, viz.:
1. Second Endorsement dated September 16, 2011 of Speaker Feliciano
Belmonte, Jr. to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, of her Travel Authority;
2. First Endorsement dated October 19, 2011 20 of Artemio A. Adasa, OIC
Secretary General of the House of Representatives, to the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, amending her Travel Authority to include travel to Singapore, Spain
and Italy;
3. Affidavit dated October 21, 2011, 21 stating the purpose of travel to
Singapore, Germany and Austria;
4. Medical Abstract dated October 22, 2011, 22 signed by Dr. Roberto
Mirasol (Dr. Mirasol);
5. Medical Abstract dated October 24, 2011, 23 signed by Dr. Mario Ver;
6. Itinerary submitted by the Law Firm of Diaz, Del Rosario and Associates,
detailing the schedule of consultations with doctors in Singapore.
To determine whether GMA's condition necessitates medical attention abroad,
the Medical Abstract prepared by Dr. Mirasol was referred to then Secretary of the
Department of Health, Dr. Enrique Ona (Dr. Ona) for his expert opinion as the chief
government physician. On October 28, 2011, Dr. Ona, accompanied by then
Chairperson of the Civil Service Commission, Francisco Duque, visited GMA at her
residence in La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City. Also present at the time of the visit
were GMA's attending doctors who explained her medical condition and the surgical
operations conducted on her. After the visit, Dr. Ona noted that "Mrs. Arroyo is
recuperating reasonably well after having undergone a series of three major
operations." 24
On November 8, 2011, before the resolution of her application for ADO, GMA
filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
docketed as G.R. No. 199034, to annul and set aside DOJ Circular No. 41 and WLOs
issued against her for allegedly being unconstitutional. 25
A few hours thereafter, Miguel Arroyo filed a separate Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under the same rule, with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, likewise assailing the constitutionality of DOJ
Circular No. 41 and WLO No. 2011-573. His petition was docketed as G.R. No.
199046. 26
Also, on November 8, 2011, De Lima issued an Order, 27 denying GMA's
application for an ADO, based on the following grounds:
First, there appears to be discrepancy on the medical condition of the
applicant as stated in her affidavit, on the other hand, and the medical abstract
of the physicians as well as her physician's statements to Secretary Ona during
the latter's October 28, 2011 visit to the Applicant, on the other.
xxx xxx xxx
Second, based on the medical condition of Secretary Ona, there
appears to be no urgent and immediate medical emergency situation for
Applicant to seek medical treatment abroad. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
Third, Applicant lists several countries as her destination, some of
which were not for purposes of medical consultation, but for attending
conferences. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
Fourth, while the Applicant's undertaking is to return to the
Philippines upon the completion of her medical treatment, this means that her
return will always depend on said treatment, which, based on her presentation
of her condition, could last indefinitely. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
Fifth, x x x. Applicant has chosen for her destination five (5)
countries, namely, Singapore, Germany, Austria, Spain and Italy, with which
the Philippines has no existing extradition treaty. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the application for an Allow
Departure Order (ADO) of Congresswoman MA. GLORIA M.
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 28
On November 9, 2011, De Lima, together with her co-respondents, Ricardo V.
Paras, III, Chief State Counsel of the DOJ and Ricardo A. David, Jr., who was then BI
Commissioner, (respondents) filed a Very Urgent Manifestation and Motion 29 in
G.R. Nos. 199034 and 199046, praying (1) that they be given a reasonable time to
comment on the petitions and the applications for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction before any action on the same is undertaken by the Court; (2) that the
applications for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction be denied for lack of merit,
and; (3) that the petitions be set for oral arguments after the filing of comments
thereto. 30
On November 13, 2011, GMA filed a Supplemental Petition 31 which included
a prayer to annul and set aside the Order dated November 8, 2011, denying her
application for ADO. On the following day, GMA filed her Comment/Opposition 32
to the respondents' Very Urgent Manifestation and Motion dated November 9, 2011,
in G.R. No. 199034.
On November 15, 2011, the Court issued Resolution, 33 ordering the
consolidation of G.R. Nos. 199034 and 199046, and requiring the respondents to file
their comment thereto not later than November 18, 2011. The Court likewise resolved
to issue a TRO in the consolidated petitions, enjoining the respondents from enforcing
or implementing DOJ Circular No. 41 and WLO Nos. ASM-11-237 dated August 9,
2011, 2011-422 dated September 6, 2011, and 2011-573 dated October 27, 2011,
subject to the following conditions, to wit:
(i) The petitioners shall post a cash bond of Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00) payable to this Court within five (5) days from notice hereof.
Failure to post the bond within the aforesaid period will result in the automatic
lifting of the temporary restraining order;aDSIHc
II
WHETHER THE DOJ HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE DOJ CIRCULAR NO.
41; and
III
There is also no question that the instant petitions involved a matter of public
interest as the petitioners are not alone in this predicament and there can be several
more in the future who may be similarly situated. It is not far fetched that a similar
challenge to the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 41 will recur considering the
thousands of names listed in the watch list of the DOJ, who may brave to question the
supposed illegality of the issuance. Thus, it is in the interest of the public, as well as
for the education of the members of the bench and the bar, that this Court takes up the
instant petitions and resolves the question on the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No.
41.
The right to travel is part of the "liberty" of which a citizen cannot be deprived
without due process of law. 75 It is part and parcel of the guarantee of freedom of
movement that the Constitution affords its citizen. Pertinently, Section 6, Article III of
the Constitution provides:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law.
Liberty under the foregoing clause includes the right to choose one's residence,
to leave it whenever he pleases and to travel wherever he wills. 76 Thus, in Zacarias
Villavicencio vs. Justo Lucban, 77 the Court held illegal the action of the Mayor of
Manila in expelling women who were known prostitutes and sending them to Davao
in order to eradicate vices and immoral activities proliferated by the said subjects. It
was held that regardless of the mayor's laudable intentions, no person may compel
another to change his residence without being expressly authorized by law or
regulation.
It is apparent, however, that the right to travel is not absolute. There are
constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations regulating the right to travel. Section
6 itself provides that the right to travel may be impaired only in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law. In Silverio vs.
Court of Appeals, 78 the Court elucidated, thus:
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to
mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court
Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not
armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits
only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and
"as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the
1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition,
1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a
reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime
when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of
eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party. 79 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, under the provision, there are only three considerations that may
permit a restriction on the right to travel: national security, public safety or public
health. As a further requirement, there must be an explicit provision of statutory law
or the Rules of Court 80 providing for the impairment. The requirement for a
legislative enactment was purposely added to prevent inordinate restraints on the
person's right to travel by administrative officials who may be tempted to wield
authority under the guise of national security, public safety or public health. This is in
keeping with the principle that ours is a government of laws and not of men and also
with the canon that provisions of law limiting the enjoyment of liberty should be
construed against the government and in favor of the individual. 81 SDAaTC
(2) Establish the policies and standards for the operation of the Department
pursuant to the approved programs of governments;
(3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department
objectives, policies, functions, plans, programs and projects;
(4) Promulgate administrative issuances necessary for the efficient
administration of the offices under the Secretary and for proper
execution of the laws relative thereto. These issuances shall not
prescribe penalties for their violation, except when expressly
authorized by law;
xxx xxx xxx
(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law. (Emphasis Ours)
It is indisputable that the secretaries of government agencies have the power to
promulgate rules and regulations that will aid in the performance of their functions.
This is adjunct to the power of administrative agencies to execute laws and does not
require the authority of a law. This is, however, different from the delegated
legislative power to promulgate rules of government agencies.
The considered opinion of Mr. Justice Carpio in Abakada Guro Party List
(formerly AASJS), et al. vs. Hon. Purisima, et al. 95 is illuminating:
The inherent power of the Executive to adopt rules and regulations to
execute or implement the law is different from the delegated legislative power
to prescribe rules. The inherent power of the Executive to adopt rules to
execute the law does not require any legislative standards for its exercise
while the delegated legislative power requires sufficient legislative standards
for its exercise.
xxx xxx xxx
Whether the rule-making power by the Executive is a delegated
legislative power or an inherent Executive power depends on the nature of the
rule-making power involved. If the rule-making power is inherently a
legislative power, such as the power to fix tariff rates, the rule-making power
of the Executive is a delegated legislative power. In such event, the delegated
power can be exercised only if sufficient standards are prescribed in the law
delegating the power.
If the rules are issued by the President in implementation or execution
of self-executory constitutional powers vested in the President, the rule-
making power of the President is not a delegated legislative power. x x x. The
rule is that the President can execute the law without any delegation of power
from the legislature. Otherwise, the President becomes a mere figure-head and
not the sole Executive of the Government. 96
The questioned circular does not come under the inherent power of the
executive department to adopt rules and regulations as clearly the issuance of HDO
and WLO is not the DOJ's business. As such, it is a compulsory requirement that there
be an existing law, complete and sufficient in itself, conferring the expressed authority
to the concerned agency to promulgate rules. On its own, the DOJ cannot make rules,
its authority being confined to execution of laws. This is the import of the terms
"when expressly provided by law" or "as may be provided by law" stated in Sections
7 (4) and 7 (9), Chapter 2, Title III, Book IV of E.O. 292. The DOJ is confined to
filling in the gaps and the necessary details in carrying into effect the law as enacted.
97 Without a clear mandate of an existing law, an administrative issuance is ultra
vires.
Consistent with the foregoing, there must be an enabling law from which DOJ
Circular No. 41 must derive its life. Unfortunately, all of the supposed statutory
authorities relied upon by the DOJ did not pass the completeness test and sufficient
standard test. The DOJ miserably failed to establish the existence of the enabling law
that will justify the issuance of the questioned circular.
That DOJ Circular No. 41 was intended to aid the department in realizing its
mandate only begs the question. The purpose, no matter how commendable, will not
obliterate the lack of authority of the DOJ to issue the said issuance. Surely, the DOJ
must have the best intentions in promulgating DOJ Circular No. 41, but the end will
not justify the means. To sacrifice individual liberties because of a perceived good is
disastrous to democracy. In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc.
vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 98 the Court emphasized:
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the
rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is
not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means
employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency
will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the
strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a
few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It
is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under
Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of
the nation who would deny him that right. 99
The DOJ would however insist that the resulting infringement of liberty is
merely incidental, together with the consequent inconvenience, hardship or loss to the
person being subjected to the restriction and that the ultimate objective is to preserve
the investigative powers of the DOJ and public order. 100 It posits that the issuance
ensures the presence within the country of the respondents during the preliminary
investigation. 101 Be that as it may, no objective will ever suffice to legitimize
desecration of a fundamental right. To relegate the intrusion as negligible in view of
the supposed gains is to undermine the inviolable nature of the protection that the
Constitution affords.
Indeed, the DOJ has the power to investigate the commission of crimes and
prosecute offenders. Its zealousness in pursuing its mandate is laudable but more
admirable when tempered by fairness and justice. It must constantly be reminded that
in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over the right of the
State to prosecute, and when weighed against each other, the scales of justice tilt
towards the former. 102 Thus, in Allado vs. Diokno, 103 the Court declared, viz.:
The sovereign power has the inherent right to protect itself and its
people from vicious acts which endanger the proper administration of justice;
hence, the State has every right to prosecute and punish violators of the law.
This is essential for its self-preservation, nay, its very existence. But this does
not confer a license for pointless assaults on its citizens. The right of the State
to prosecute is not a carte blanche for government agents to defy and
disregard the rights of its citizens under the Constitution. 104
The DOJ stresses the necessity of the restraint imposed in DOJ Circular No. 41
in that to allow the petitioners, who are under preliminary investigation, to exercise an
untrammelled right to travel, especially when the risk of flight is distinctly high will
surely impede the efficient and effective operation of the justice system. The absence
of the petitioners, it asseverates, would mean that the farthest criminal proceeding
they could go would be the filing of the criminal information since they cannot be
arraigned in absentia. 105
The predicament of the DOJ is understandable yet untenable for relying on
grounds other what is permitted within the confines of its own power and the nature
of preliminary investigation itself. The Court, in Paderanga vs. Drilon, 106 made a
clarification on the nature of a preliminary investigation, thus:
A preliminary investigation is x x x an inquiry or proceeding for the
purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well
founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial. x x x A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full
and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of
such evidence only as may engender a well grounded belief that an offense
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. 107 AcICHD
The DOJ's reliance on the police power of the state cannot also be
countenanced. Police power pertains to the "state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare." 112 "It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."
113 Verily, the exercise of this power is primarily lodged with the legislature but may
be wielded by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking
bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay, by virtue of a valid delegation
of power. 114
It bears noting, however, that police power may only be validly exercised if (a)
the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably
necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. 115
On its own, the DOJ cannot wield police power since the authority pertains to
Congress. Even if it claims to be exercising the same as the alter ego of the President,
it must first establish the presence of a definite legislative enactment evidencing the
delegation of power from its principal. This, the DOJ failed to do. There is likewise
no showing that the curtailment of the right to travel imposed by DOJ Circular No. 41
was reasonably necessary in order for it to perform its investigatory duties.
In any case, the exercise of police power, to be valid, must be reasonable and
not repugnant to the Constitution. 116 It must never be utilized to espouse actions that
violate the Constitution. Any act, however noble its intentions, is void if it violates the
Constitution. 117 In the clear language of the Constitution, it is only in the interest of
national security, public safety and public health that the right to travel may be
impaired. None one of the mentioned circumstances was invoked by the DOJ as its
premise for the promulgation of DOJ Circular No. 41. TAIaHE
Apart from lack of legal basis, DOJ Circular No. 41 also suffers from other
serious infirmities that render it invalid. The apparent vagueness of the circular as to
the distinction between a HDO and WLO is violative of the due process clause. An
act that is vague "violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid and leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
the Government muscle." 118 Here, the distinction is significant as it will inform the
respondents of the grounds, effects and the measures they may take to contest the
issuance against them. Verily, there must be a standard by which a HDO or WLO
may be issued, particularly against those whose cases are still under preliminary
investigation, since at that stage there is yet no criminal information against them
which could have warranted the restraint.
Further, a reading of the introductory provisions of DOJ Circular No. 41 shows
that it emanates from the DOJ's assumption of powers that is not actually conferred to
it. In one of the whereas clauses of the issuance, it was stated, thus:
WHEREAS, while several Supreme Court circulars, issued through the
Office of the Court Administrator, clearly state that "[HDO] shall be issued
only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the [RTCs]," said
circulars are, however, silent with respect to cases falling within the
jurisdiction of courts below the RTC as well as those pending determination
by government prosecution offices;
Apparently, the DOJ's predicament which led to the issuance of DOJ Circular
No. 41 was the supposed inadequacy of the issuances of this Court pertaining to
HDOs, the more pertinent of which is SC Circular No. 39-97. 119 It is the DOJ's
impression that with the silence of the circular with regard to the issuance of HDOs in
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MTC and those still pending investigation,
it can take the initiative in filling in the deficiency. It is doubtful, however, that the
DOJ Secretary may undertake such action since the issuance of HDOs is an exercise
of this Court's inherent power "to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its
jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused." 120 It is an exercise of
judicial power which belongs to the Court alone, and which the DOJ, even as the
principal law agency of the government, does not have the authority to wield.
Moreover, the silence of the circular on the matters which are being addressed
by DOJ Circular No. 41 is not without good reasons. Circular No. 39-97 was
specifically issued to avoid indiscriminate issuance of HDOs resulting to the
inconvenience of the parties affected as the same could amount to an infringement on
the right and liberty of an individual to travel. Contrary to the understanding of the
DOJ, the Court intentionally held that the issuance of HDOs shall pertain only to
criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, to the exclusion of
criminal cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MTC and all other cases. The
intention was made clear with the use of the term "only." The reason lies in seeking
equilibrium between the state's interest over the prosecution of the case considering
the gravity of the offense involved and the individual's exercise of his right to travel.
Thus, the circular permits the intrusion on the right to travel only when the criminal
case filed against the individual is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, or
those that pertains to more serious crimes or offenses that are punishable with
imprisonment of more than six years. The exclusion of criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the MTC is justified by the fact that they pertain to less serious
offenses which is not commensurate with the curtailment of a fundamental right.
Much less is the reason to impose restraint on the right to travel of respondents of
criminal cases still pending investigation since at that stage no information has yet
been filed in court against them. It is for these reasons that Circular No. 39-97
mandated that HDO may only be issued in criminal cases filed with the RTC and
withheld the same power from the MTC.
Remarkably, in DOJ Circular No. 41, the DOJ Secretary went overboard by
assuming powers which have been withheld from the lower courts in Circular No. 39-
97. In the questioned circular, the DOJ Secretary may issue HDO against the accused
in criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the MTC 121 and against defendants,
respondents and witnesses in labor or administrative cases, 122 no matter how
unwilling they may be. He may also issue WLO against accused in criminal cases
pending before the RTC, 123 therefore making himself in equal footing with the RTC,
which is authorized by law to issue HDO in the same instance. The DOJ Secretary
may likewise issue WLO against respondents in criminal cases pending preliminary
investigation, petition for review or motion for reconsideration before the DOJ. 124
More striking is the authority of the DOJ Secretary to issue a HDO or WLO motu
proprio, even in the absence of the grounds stated in the issuance if he deems
necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public health. 125
It bears noting as well that the effect of the HDO and WLO in DOJ Circular
No. 41 is too obtrusive as it remains effective even after the lapse of its validity period
as long as the DOJ Secretary does not approve the lifting or cancellation of the same.
Thus, the respondent continually suffers the restraint in his mobility as he awaits a
favorable indorsement of the government agency that requested for the issuance of the
HDO or WLO and the affirmation of the DOJ Secretary even as the HDO or WLO
against him had become functus officio with its expiration.
It did not also escape the attention of the Court that the DOJ Secretary has
authorized himself to permit a person subject of HDO or WLO to travel through the
issuance of an ADO upon showing of "exceptional reasons" to grant the same. The
grant, however, is entirely dependent on the sole discretion of the DOJ Secretary
based on his assessment of the grounds stated in the application.
The constitutional violations of DOJ Circular No. 41 are too gross to brush
aside particularly its assumption that the DOJ Secretary's determination of the
necessity of the issuance of HDO or WLO can take the place of a law that authorizes
the restraint in the right to travel only in the interest of national security, public safety
or public health. The DOJ Secretary has recognized himself as the sole authority in
the issuance and cancellation of HDO or WLO and in the determination of the
sufficiency of the grounds for an ADO. The consequence is that the exercise of the
right to travel of persons subject of preliminary investigation or criminal cases in
court is indiscriminately subjected to the discretion of the DOJ Secretary.
This is precisely the situation that the 1987 Constitution seeks to avoid — for
an executive officer to impose restriction or exercise discretion that unreasonably
impair an individual's right to travel — thus, the addition of the phrase, "as may be
provided by law" in Section 6, Article III thereof. In Silverio, the Court underscored
that this phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on
international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel
Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of
an interested party. 126 The qualifying phrase is not a mere innocuous appendage. It
secures the individual the absolute and free exercise of his right to travel at all times
unless the more paramount considerations of national security, public safety and
public health call for a temporary interference, but always under the authority of a
law.
In the subject WLOs, the illegal restraint on the right to travel was subtly
incorporated in the wordings thereof. For better illustration, the said WLOs are hereby
reproduced as follows: cDHAES
Nationality: Filipino
Nationality: Filipino
Nationality: Filipino
The DOJ argues that Section 6, Article III of the Constitution is not an
exclusive enumeration of the instances wherein the right to travel may be validly
impaired. 133 It cites that this Court has its own administrative issuances restricting
travel of its employees and that even lower courts may issue HDO even on grounds
outside of what is stated in the Constitution. 134
The argument fails to persuade.
It bears reiterating that the power to issue HDO is inherent to the courts. The
courts may issue a HDO against an accused in a criminal case so that he may be dealt
with in accordance with law. 135 It does not require legislative conferment or
constitutional recognition; it co-exists with the grant of judicial power. In Defensor-
Santiago vs. Vasquez, 136 the Court declared, thus:
Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be
implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly
conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary
for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or essential to the
existence, dignity and functions of the court, as well as to the due
administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable
to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain
the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants. 137
The inherent powers of the courts are essential in upholding its integrity and
largely beneficial in keeping the people's faith in the institution by ensuring that it has
the power and the means to enforce its jurisdiction.
As regards the power of the courts to regulate foreign travels, the Court, in
Leave Division, explained:
With respect to the power of the Court, Section 5 (6), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall have
administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. This
provision empowers the Court to oversee all matters relating to the effective
supervision and management of all courts and personnel under it. Recognizing
this mandate, Memorandum Circular No. 26 of the Office of the President,
dated July 31, 1986, considers the Supreme Court exempt and with authority
to promulgate its own rules and regulations on foreign travels. Thus, the Court
came out with OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (B).
Where a person joins the Judiciary or the government in general, he or
she swears to faithfully adhere to, and abide with, the law and the
corresponding office rules and regulations. These rules and regulations, to
which one submits himself or herself, have been issued to guide the
government officers and employees in the efficient performance of their
obligations. When one becomes a public servant, he or she assumes certain
duties with their concomitant responsibilities and gives up some rights like the
absolute right to travel so that public service would not be prejudiced. 138
It is therefore by virtue of its administrative supervision over all courts and
personnel that this Court came out with OCA Circular No. 49-2003, which provided
for the guidelines that must be observed by employees of the judiciary seeking to
travel abroad. Specifically, they are required to secure a leave of absence for the
purpose of foreign travel from this Court through the Chief Justice and the Chairmen
of the Divisions, or from the Office of the Court Administrator, as the case may be.
This is "to ensure management of court dockets and to avoid disruption in the
administration of justice." 139
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 is therefore not a restriction, but more properly, a
regulation of the employee's leave for purpose of foreign travel which is necessary for
the orderly administration of justice. To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person
from doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or direct according to rule. 140 This
regulation comes as a necessary consequence of the individual's employment in the
judiciary, as part and parcel of his contract in joining the institution. For, if the
members of the judiciary are at liberty to go on leave any time, the dispensation of
justice will be seriously hampered. Short of key personnel, the courts cannot properly
function in the midst of the intricacies in the administration of justice. At any rate, the
concerned employee is not prevented from pursuing his travel plans without
complying with OCA Circular No. 49-2003 but he must be ready to suffer the
consequences of his non-compliance.
The same ratiocination can be said of the regulations of the Civil Service
Commission with respect to the requirement for leave application of employees in the
government service seeking to travel abroad. The Omnibus Rules Implementing Book
V of E.O. No. 292 states the leave privileges and availment guidelines for all
government employees, except those who are covered by special laws. The filing of
application for leave is required for purposes of orderly personnel administration. In
pursuing foreign travel plans, a government employee must secure an approved leave
of absence from the head of his agency before leaving for abroad.
To be particular, E.O. No. 6 dated March 12, 1986, as amended by
Memorandum Order (MO) No. 26 dated July 31, 1986, provided the procedure in the
disposition of requests of government officials and employees for authority to travel
abroad. The provisions of this issuance were later clarified in the Memorandum
Circular No. 18 issued on October 27, 1992. Thereafter, on September 1, 2005, E.O.
No. 459 was issued, streamlining the procedure in the disposition of requests of
government officials and employees for authority to travel abroad. Section 2 thereof
states:cHDAIS
The Court recognizes the predicament which compelled the DOJ to issue the
questioned circular but the solution does not lie in taking constitutional shortcuts.
Remember that the Constitution "is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation
to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights
are determined and all public authority administered." 142 Any law or issuance,
therefore, must not contradict the language of the fundamental law of the land;
otherwise, it shall be struck down for being unconstitutional.
Consistent with the foregoing, the DOJ may not promulgate rules that have a
negative impact on constitutionally-protected rights without the authority of a valid
law. Even with the predicament of preventing the proliferation of crimes and evasion
of criminal responsibility, it may not overstep constitutional boundaries and skirt the
prescribed legal processes.
That the subjects of DOJ Circular No. 41 are individuals who may have
committed a wrong against the state does not warrant the intrusion in the enjoyment
of their basic rights. They are nonetheless innocent individuals and suspicions on their
guilt do not confer theirs lesser privileges to enjoy. As emphatically pronounced in
Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo, et al., 143 "the constitution is an
overarching sky that covers all in its protection. It affords protection to citizens
without distinction. Even the most despicable person deserves the same respect in the
enjoyment of his rights as the upright and abiding.
Let it also be emphasized that this Court fully realizes the dilemma of the DOJ.
The resolution of the issues in the instant petitions was partly aimed at encouraging
the legislature to do its part and enact the necessary law so that the DOJ may be able
to pursue its prosecutorial duties without trampling on constitutionally-protected
rights. Without a valid legislation, the DOJ's actions will perpetually be met with legal
hurdles to the detriment of the due administration of justice. The challenge therefore
is for the legislature to address this problem in the form of a legislation that will
identify permissible intrusions in the right to travel. Unless this is done, the
government will continuously be confronted with questions on the legality of their
actions to the detriment of the implementation of government processes and
realization of its objectives.
In the meantime, the DOJ may remedy its quandary by exercising more
vigilance and efficiency in the performance of its duties. This can be accomplished by
expediency in the assessment of complaints filed before its office and in the prompt
filing of information in court should there be an affirmative finding of probable cause
so that it may legally request for the issuance of HDO and hold the accused for trial.
Clearly, the solution lies not in resorting to constitutional shortcuts but in an efficient
and effective performance of its prosecutorial duties.
The Court understands the dilemma of the government on the effect of the
declaration of unconstitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 41, considering the real
possibility that it may be utilized by suspected criminals, especially the affluent ones,
to take the opportunity to immediately leave the country. While this is a legitimate
concern, it bears stressing that the government is not completely powerless or
incapable of preventing their departure or having them answer charges that may be
subsequently filed against them. In his Separate Concurring Opinion, Mr. Justice
Carpio, pointed out that Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8239, otherwise known as the
Philippine Passport Act of 1996, explicitly grants the Secretary of Foreign Affairs or
any of the authorized consular officers the authority to issue verify, restrict, cancel or
refuse the issuance of a passport to a citizen under the circumstances mentioned in
Section 4 144 thereof. Mr. Justice Tijam, on the other hand, mentioned Memorandum
Circular No. 036, which was issued pursuant to R.A. No. 9208 or the Anti-Trafficking
in Persons Act of 2003, as amended by R.A. No. 10364 or the Expanded Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Acts of 2012, which authorizes the BI to hold the departure of
suspected traffickers or trafficked individuals. He also noted that the Commissioner of
BI has the authority to issue a HDO against a foreigner subject of deportation
proceedings in order to ensure his appearance therein. Similarly, the proposal of Mr.
Justice Velasco for the adoption of new set of rules which will allow the issuance of a
precautionary warrant of arrest offers a promising solution to this quandary. This, the
Court can do in recognition of the fact that laws and rules of procedure should evolve
as the present circumstances require.
Contempt charge against respondent
De Lima
It is well to remember that on November 18, 2011, a Resolution 145 was issued
requiring De Lima to show cause why she should not be disciplinarily dealt or be held
in contempt for failure to comply with the TRO issued by this Court.
In view, however, of the complexity of the facts and corresponding full
discussion that it rightfully deserves, the Court finds it more fitting to address the
same in a separate proceeding. It is in the interest of fairness that there be a complete
and exhaustive discussion on the matter since it entails the imposition of penalty that
bears upon the fitness of the respondent as a member of the legal profession. The
Court, therefore, finds it proper to deliberate and resolve the charge of contempt
against De Lima in a separate proceeding that could accommodate a full opportunity
for her to present her case and provide a better occasion for the Court to deliberate on
her alleged disobedience to a lawful order.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, Department of Justice
Circular No. 41 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All issuances which
were released pursuant thereto are hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to REDOCKET the Resolution of
the Court dated November 28, 2011, which required respondent Leila De Lima to
show cause why she should not be cited in contempt, as a separate petition. ISHCcT
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe,
Jardeleza, Martires, Tijam and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Sereno, * C.J., is on indefinite leave.
Carpio, J., see concurring opinion.
Velasco, Jr., J., see separate concurring opinion.
Leonen, J., see separate opinion.
Caguioa, ** J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
CARPIO, Acting C.J., concurring:
I concur.
Proceeding now to the substantive issue, I agree that DOJ Circular No. 041-10
violates the constitutional right to travel.
Section 6, Article III of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by
law. (Emphasis supplied)
As above-quoted, the right to travel is not absolute. However, while it can be
restricted, the only permissible grounds for restriction are national security, public
safety, and public health, which grounds must at least be prescribed by an act of
Congress. In only two instances can the right to travel be validly impaired even
without a statutory authorization. The first is when a court forbids the accused from
leaving Philippine jurisdiction in connection with a pending criminal case. 10 The
second is when Congress, pursuant to its power of legislative inquiry, issues a
subpoena or arrest order against a person. 11
The necessity for a legislative enactment expressly providing for a valid
impairment of the right to travel finds basis in no less than the fundamental law of the
land. Under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution, the legislative power is vested
in Congress. Hence, only Congress, and no other entity or office, may wield the
power to make, amend, or repeal laws. 12
Accordingly, whenever confronted with provisions interspersed with phrases
like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law," the Court turns to acts
of Congress for a holistic constitutional construction. To illustrate, in interpreting the
clause "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law" in relation to the right
to information, the Court held in Gonzales v. Narvasa 13 that it is Congress that will
prescribe these reasonable conditions upon the access to information:
The right to information is enshrined in Section 7 of the Bill of Rights
which provides that —
The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law. CAacTH
Under both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, this is a self-executory
provision which can be invoked by any citizen before the courts. This was our
ruling in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, wherein the Court classified
the right to information as a public right and "when a mandamus proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is
satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of
the general 'public' which possesses the right." However, Congress may
provide for reasonable conditions upon the access to information. Such
limitations were embodied in Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the
"Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,"
which took effect on March 25, 1989. This law provides that, in the
performance of their duties, all public officials and employees are obliged to
respond to letters sent by the public within fifteen (15) working days from
receipt thereof and to ensure the accessibility of all public documents for
inspection by the public within reasonable working hours, subject to the
reasonable claims of confidentiality. 14 (Emphasis supplied; Citations
omitted)
In Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals, 15 the
Court made a jurisprudential survey on the interpretation of constitutional provisions
that are not self-executory and held that it is Congress that will breathe life into these
provisions:
As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered
self-executing, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement. For
if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law
can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions
have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing.
In Tañada v. Angara, the Court specifically set apart the sections
found under Article II of the 1987 Constitution as non self-executing and
ruled that such broad principles need legislative enactments before they can be
implemented:
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a
"declaration of principles and state policies." x x x These
principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are
used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its
power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its
enactment of laws.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, this
Court declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article
XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution are not self-
executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court referred
to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution
as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. These
provisions, which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from
other constitutional provisions as non self-executing and, therefore, cannot
give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights.
Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were
taken from Article II of the Constitution — specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11,
13, 15 and 18 — the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be
non self-executing in the aforecited case of Tañada v. Angara. 16 (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)
In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, 17 the Court
construed the constitutional provisions on the party-list system and held that the
phrases "in accordance with law" and "as may be provided by law" authorized
Congress "to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution," to wit:
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not
mean, however, that any political party — or any organization or group for
that matter — may do so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as
laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty
per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated
to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector."
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory.
It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or
"as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in
granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. x x x. 18 (Italicization in the
original; boldfacing supplied)
Unable to cite any specific law on which DOJ Circular No. 041-10 is based,
respondent invokes Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987. In particular, respondent cites the DOJ's mandate to
"investigate the commission of crimes" and "provide immigration x x x regulatory
services," as well as the DOJ Secretary's rule-making power. 19
I disagree.
In the landmark case of Ople v. Torres, 20 an administrative order was
promulgated restricting the right to privacy without a specific law authorizing the
restriction. The Office of the President justified its legality by invoking the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987. The Court rejected the argument and nullified the
assailed issuance for being unconstitutional as the Revised Administrative Code of
1987 was too general a law to serve as basis for the curtailment of the right to privacy,
thus:
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is
not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the
President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of
identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of
every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates
their right to privacy.
IAETDc
The identical language between the grounds to cancel passports under the
above-quoted provision and the grounds to impair the right to travel under Section 6,
Article III of the Constitution is not by accident cognizant of the fact that passport
cancellations necessarily entail an impairment of the right. Congress intentionally
copied the latter to obviate expanding the grounds for restricting the right to travel.
Can the DFA Secretary, under Section 4 of RA 8239, cancel the passports of
persons under preliminary investigation? The answer depends on the nature of the
crime for which the passport holders are being investigated on. If the crime affects
national security and public safety, the cancellation squarely falls within the ambit of
Section 4. Thus, passport holders facing preliminary investigation for the following
crimes are subject to the DFA Secretary's power under Section 4:
(1) Title One, (Crimes against National Security and the Law of Nations), Title
Three (Crimes against Public Order), Title Eight (Crimes against
Persons), Title Nine (Crimes against Liberty), Title Ten (Crimes against
Property) and Title Eleven (Crimes against Chastity), Book II of the
Revised Penal Code;
(2) Section 261 (Prohibited Acts), paragraphs (e), 24 (f), 25 (p), 26 (q), 27 (s),
28 and (u) 29 of the Omnibus Election Code; 30 and
(3) Other related election laws such as Section 27 (b) of RA 7874, as amended
by RA 9369. 31
Indeed, the phrases "national security" and "public safety," which recur in the
text of the Constitution as grounds for the exercise of powers or curtailment of rights,
32 are intentionally broad to allow interpretative flexibility, but circumscribed at the
same time to prevent limitless application. At their core, these concepts embrace acts
undermining the State's existence or public security. At their fringes, they cover acts
disrupting individual or communal tranquility. Either way, violence or potential of
violence features prominently.
Thus understood, the "public safety" ground under Section 4 of RA 8239
unquestionably includes violation of election-related offenses carrying the potential of
disrupting the peace, such as electoral sabotage which involves massive tampering of
votes (in excess of 10,000 votes). Not only does electoral sabotage desecrate electoral
processes, but it also arouses heated passion among the citizenry, driving some to
engage in mass actions and others to commit acts of violence. The cancellation of
passports of individuals investigated for this crime undoubtedly serves the interest of
public safety, much like individuals under investigation for robbery, kidnapping, and
homicide, among others. 33
As to whether respondent must be cited in contempt for allegedly defying the
Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court, I agree that it cannot be resolved
simultaneously with these consolidated petitions. Until the contempt charge is
threshed out in a separate and proper proceeding, I defer expressing my view on this
issue.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petitions and to declare DOJ Circular No.
041-10, and the assailed Watchlist Orders issued pursuant to the circular,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being contrary to Section 6, Article III of the
Constitution. As regards, the contempt charge against respondent, I DEFER any
opinion on this issue until it is raised in a separate and proper proceeding.
VELASCO, JR., J., concurring:
LEONEN, J.:
A person's right to bail before conviction is both guaranteed and limited under
the Constitution. Article III, Section 13 states:
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required.
Courts have the jurisdiction to determine whether a person should be admitted
to bail. This jurisdiction springs from the Constitution itself, which imposes
limitations on the right to bail. However, the discretion of courts is not restricted to
the question of whether bail should be granted to an accused as Courts have the
inherent power "to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines." 16
Regional Trial Courts, in particular, are empowered to issue hold departure orders in
criminal cases falling within their exclusive jurisdiction. 17 Persons admitted to bail
are required to seek permission before travelling abroad. 18
Similar to the power of this Court to control foreign travel of court personnel,
the power to restrict the travel of persons admitted to bail is neither based on a
legislative enactment nor founded upon national security, public safety, or public
health considerations. The power of courts to restrict the travel of persons on bail is
deemed a necessary consequence of the conditions imposed in a bail bond. 19 In
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals 20 this Court explained:
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security
required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law,
that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required
as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.
"Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of
the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the
accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the
proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the
call of the court and do what the law may require of him."
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all
times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction
on his right to travel. As we have held in People v. Uy Tuising[:]
". . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to
hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and
processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from
leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise,
said orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as
the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not
extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no
binding force outside of said jurisdiction."
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without
sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
"The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or
filed of record, and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody
of the accused from the public officials who have him in their charge to
keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely as a
continuation of the original imprisonment. The sureties become invested with
full authority over the person of the principal and have the right to prevent the
principal from leaving the state." 21 (Citations omitted)
Although Manotoc was decided under the 1973 Constitution, the nature and
functions of bail remain essentially the same under the 1987 Constitution. 22 Hence,
the principle laid down in Manotoc was reiterated in Silverio v. Court of Appeals 23
where this Court further explained that:
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be
construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means
necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before
them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may
be employed by such Court or officer.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by
preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid
restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance
with law. 24 (Citation omitted)
Moreover, the power of courts to restrict the travel of persons out on bail is an
incident of its power to grant or deny bail. As explained in Santiago v. Vasquez: 25
Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be
implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly
conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary
for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or essential to the
existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due
administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable
to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain
the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.
Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the incidental
powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the
absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental
powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and
constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has the power to do
all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within
the scope of its jurisdiction. Hence, demands, matters, or questions ancillary
or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the
above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined,
since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even
though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which,
as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance.
Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make interlocutory
orders necessary to protect its jurisdiction. Such being the case, with more
reason may a party litigant be subjected to proper coercive measures where he
disobeys a proper order, or commits a fraud on the court or the opposing
party, the result of which is that the jurisdiction of the court would be
ineffectual. What ought to be done depends upon the particular circumstances.
Turning now to the case at bar, petitioner does not deny and, as a
matter of fact, even made a public statement that she had every intention of
leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher studies abroad. We uphold the
course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of
such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte
the hold departure order, in justified consonance with our preceding
disquisition. To reiterate, the hold departure order is but an exercise of
respondent court's inherent power to preserve and to maintain the
effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused. 26
HCaDIS
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
CARPIO, J : p
The Case
The petition seeks the review 1 of the Orders 2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower court's ruling finding inapplicable the
Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the accused's previous
conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from
the same incident grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler
(petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71
(MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of
respondent Ponce's husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce's
vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case
No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction,
petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing
him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
SICDAa
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari
(S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005,
invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner's
motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner's
absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. 4 Seven days later, the MeTC
issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to suspend proceedings and postponing
his arraignment until after his arrest. 5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the
filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the
RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner's loss of standing to maintain the
suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803,
narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner's forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A.
No. 2803 arising from the MeTC's order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at
the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of
S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but this proved unavailing. 6 HITEaS
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC's decision
forfeiting petitioner's standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits,
respondent Ponce calls the Court's attention to jurisprudence holding that light
offenses (e.g., slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g., homicide). Hence, the
prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the
slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage
to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor
General's motion not to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge
is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his
standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his
non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the
negative, whether petitioner's constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioner's non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal
Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A.
2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from
prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. ADETca
Further, the RTC's observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he
failed to attend the scheduled proceeding" 12 at the MeTC is belied by the records.
Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTC's
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in
S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC's refusal to defer arraignment (the order for
which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner's arrest), petitioner sought
reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioner's Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 Bars his Prosecution in
Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused's negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense" 13 protects him from, among others, post-
conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. 14 It is not disputed that
petitioner's conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question
whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same
offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern
the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate
offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
"as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." 15
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by
a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times
such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed
upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some
wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound
discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than
those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court
shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be
imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article
shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured
parties such help as may be in this hand to give.
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that
their commission results in damage, either to person or property. 19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction
to hear a case for "Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction
being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime
conceptually incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law 20 (the normative ancestry of our present day
penal code) and since repeatedly reiterated, 21 stands on solid conceptual foundation.
The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller 22 that "[r]eckless
impudence is not a crime in itself . . . [but] simply a way of committing it . . . ," 23 has
long been abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two
decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller's
conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are
distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found
expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence 24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal
confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article
365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-
crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related
branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses,
barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior
conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising
from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based.
caADSE
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its
logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken
line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v.
Estipona, 36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the
subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the
same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was
based. Estipona's inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices
to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982
in Buerano. 37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals' conviction of an accused for
"damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight
and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same act
upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on
Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan: 38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this
Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on November 14,
1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29,
1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that —
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his
earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the
Court's attention:
Hence, we find merit in petitioner's submission that the lower courts erred in
refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double
Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner's
case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also
involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations with
"Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious
Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former,
the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the
accused's claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted
with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:
42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959
and dismissed the case, holding: —
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the
doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, . . . In the
case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of
the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries
through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two
automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid
complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other
criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in
connection with the same collision one for damage to property through
reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of
the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical
injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the
passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were
filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted
of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his
acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical
injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured
passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one
filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The
motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted,
whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the
meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless imprudence
filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had
been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga
had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such
remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two
informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through
reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First
Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double
jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order
of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following
language:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the
case, on the ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the
accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence.
In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of
the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case . . ., upon which the
order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General,
however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for
the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless,
that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts
of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no
practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which
would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga
case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in
the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April
30, 1959. 45 (Emphasis supplied) DIHETS
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which
involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-
crime with its multiple consequences 48 unless one consequence amounts to a light
felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts
amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level
courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the
charge with the first level courts. 49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC
impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic
Act No. 7691, 50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the
most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correctional in its medium
period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the
"complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts
penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of
all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is
penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave
offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a
light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave
offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single
prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge,
regardless of their number or severity, 51 penalizing each consequence separately.
Thus, in Angeles v. Jose, 52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation
to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less
serious physical injuries," as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have
only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than
25 pesos.
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article
365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in
this field demands choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the
"complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate
offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its
present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz
lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate
intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we
forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes,
require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and
severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the
distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon
and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases. TaCIDS
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with the
accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or
less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this
Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] . . .:
[T]he prosecution's contention might be true. But neither was the
prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious
charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense
in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which
acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a
position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out
of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has
been previously cleared by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant . . . by the
Justice of the Peace . . . of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both
charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular
accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy
for the same offense. 54 (Emphasis supplied) CDTHSI
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
(Ivler y Aguilar v. Modesto-San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, [November 17, 2010], 649
|||
PHIL 478-510)
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J : p
Before the Court is the Complaint 1 dated January 6, 2017 filed before the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by Atty. Berteni C. Causing (Atty. Causing)
and Percival Carag Mabasa a.k.a. Percy Lapid (Mabasa) against respondent Judge
Jose Lorenzo R. Dela Rosa (respondent Judge Dela Rosa), Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch (Br.) 4, Manila.IAETDc
Antecedents
In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby adopts and approves the findings of
facts and conclusions of law in the above-mentioned OCA Report and
Recommendation.
Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled
jurisprudence. 40 A judge may also be administratively liable if shown to have been
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or
failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence. 41
The Court however has also ruled that "not every error or mistake of a judge in
the performance of his official duties renders him liable." 42
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or
actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found
erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad
faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive. As a matter of policy, in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity
are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. 43
The Court agrees with the OCA that it would be absurd to hold respondent
Judge Dela Rosa liable for his November 23, 2015 Order when he had himself
rectified this in his subsequent June 20, 2016 Order. To rule otherwise would be to
render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the
law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 44 To
hold otherwise "would be nothing short of harassing judges to take the fantastic and
impossible oath of rendering infallible judgments." 45
Furthermore, nothing in the records of the case suggests that respondent Judge
Dela Rosa was motivated by bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious
error in rendering his decision. Other than their bare assertions, Complainants failed
to substantiate their allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed
46 and this Court cannot conclude bad faith intervened when none was actually
proven. 47
The Court likewise finds no merit in Complainants' allegation that respondent
Judge Dela Rosa should have first required Atty. Causing to show cause for his act of
posting matters pertaining to the pending criminal case on the internet. The Court
agrees with the OCA that respondent Judge Dela Rosa's act of referring the matter to
the IBP, an independent tribunal who exercises disciplinary powers over lawyers, was
a prudent and proper action to take for a trial court judge. The Court has explained, in
the case of Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution Management Association of
the Philippines, 48 that judges' power to punish contempt must be exercised
judiciously and sparingly, not for retaliation or vindictiveness, viz.:
x x x [T]he power to punish for contempt of court is exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and only occasionally should
a court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which
the administration of justice must falter or fail. As judges[,] we ought to
exercise our power to punish contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost
restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the power for the correction and
preservation of the dignity of the Court, not for retaliation or vindictiveness.
49
In fine, the administrative charge against respondent Judge Dela Rosa should
be, as it is hereby, dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against respondent
Presiding Judge Jose Lorenzo R. Dela Rosa, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Manila
is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. aTHCSE
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, * Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
||| (Causing v. Dela Rosa, OCA IPI No. 17-4663-RTJ, [March 7, 2018])
EN BANC
LEONEN, J : p
Every accused has the rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases.
Inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation will
result in the dismissal of the case against the accused. Delay, however, is not
determined through mere mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the
facts and circumstances surrounding each case. Courts should appraise a reasonable
period from the point of view of how much time a competent and independent public
officer would need in relation to the complexity of a given case. Nonetheless, the
accused must invoke his or her constitutional rights in a timely manner. The failure to
do so could be considered by the courts as a waiver of right.aScITE
G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458 are Petitions for Certiorari with an urgent
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction 1 assailing the Resolutions dated September 12, 2012 2 and January 15,
2013 3 of the Sandiganbayan. The assailed Resolutions denied Cesar Matas Cagang's
(Cagang) Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of
Arrest in Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0456 and SB-11-CRM-0457.
G.R. Nos. 210141-42, on the other hand, refer to a Petition for Certiorari with
an urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction 4 assailing the June 18, 2013 Order 5 and September 10, 2013
Resolution 6 of the Sandiganbayan. The assailed Resolutions denied Cagang's Motion
to Quash Order of Arrest in Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0456 and SB-11-CRM-
0457.
Both Petitions question the Sandiganbayan's denial to quash the Informations
and Order of Arrest against Cagang despite the Office of the Ombudsman's alleged
inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation.
On February 10, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman received an anonymous
complaint alleging that Amelia May Constantino, Mary Ann Gadian, and Joy Tangan
of the Vice Governor's Office, Sarangani Province committed graft and corruption by
diverting public funds given as grants or aid using barangay officials and cooperatives
as "dummies." The complaint was docketed as CPL-M-03-0163 and referred to the
Commission on Audit for audit investigation. A news report of Sun Star Davao dated
August 7, 2003 entitled "P61M from Sarangani coffers unaccounted" was also
docketed as CPL-M-03-0729 for the conduct of a fact-finding investigation. 7
On December 31, 2002, the Commission on Audit submitted its audit report
finding that the officials and employees of the Provincial Government of Sarangani
appear to have embezzled millions in public funds by sourcing out the funds from
grants, aid, and the Countrywide Development Fund of Representative Erwin
Chiongbian using dummy cooperatives and people's organizations. 8 In particular, the
Commission on Audit found that:
(1) There were releases of financial assistance intended for non-governmental
organizations/people's organizations and local government units that
were fraudulently and illegally made through inexistent local
development projects, resulting in a loss of P16,106,613.00;
(2) Financial assistance was granted to cooperatives whose officials and
members were government personnel or relatives of officials of
Sarangani, which resulted in the wastage and misuse of government
funds amounting to P2,456,481.00;
(3) There were fraudulent encashment and payment of checks, and frequent
travels of the employees of the Vice Governor's Office, which resulted
in the incurrence by the province of unnecessary fuel and oil expense
amounting to P83,212.34; and
(4) Inexistent Sagiptaniman projects were set up for farmers affected by
calamities, which resulted in wastage and misuse of government funds
amounting to P4,000,000.00. 9
On September 30, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order
terminating Case Nos. CPL-M-03-0163 and CPL-M-03-0729. It concurred with the
findings of the Commission on Audit and recommended that a criminal case for
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents and
Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 be filed against the public
officers named by the Commission on Audit in its Summary of Persons that Could be
Held Liable on the Irregularities. The list involved 180 accused. 10 The case was
docketed as OMB-M-C-0487-J.
After considering the number of accused involved, its limited resources, and
the volumes of case records, the Office of the Ombudsman first had to identify those
accused who appeared to be the most responsible, with the intention to later on file
separate cases for the others. 11
In a Joint Order dated October 29, 2003, the accused were directed to file their
counter-affidavits and submit controverting evidence. The complainants were also
given time to file their replies to the counter-affidavits. There was delay in the release
of the order since the reproduction of the voluminous case record to be furnished to
the parties "was subjected to bidding and request of funds from the Central Office." 12
Only five (5) sets of reproductions were released on November 20, 2003 while the
rest were released only on January 15, 2004. 13 HEITAD
All impleaded elective officials and some of the impleaded appointive officials
filed a Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, Injunction with Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with Branch 28, Regional Trial Court of
Alabel, Sarangani. The Regional Trial Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining the Office of the Ombudsman from enforcing its October 29, 2003 Joint
Order. 14
In an Order dated December 19, 2003, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the
Petition on the ground that the officials had filed another similar Petition with this
Court, which this Court had dismissed. 15 Thus, some of the accused filed their
counter-affidavits. 16
After what the Office of the Ombudsman referred to as "a considerable period
of time," it issued another Order directing the accused who had not yet filed their
counter-affidavits to file them within seven (7) days or they will be deemed to have
waived their right to present evidence on their behalf. 17
In a 293-page Resolution 18 dated August 11, 2004 in OMB-M-C-0487-J, the
Ombudsman found probable cause to charge Governor Miguel D. Escobar, Vice
Governor Felipe Constantino, Board Members, and several employees of the Office
of the Vice Governor of Sarangani and the Office of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
with Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of
Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. 19 Then Tanodbayan Simeon V. Marcelo
(Tanodbayan Marcelo) approved the Resolution, noting that it was modified by his
Supplemental Order dated October 18, 2004. 20
In the Supplemental Order dated October 18, 2004, Tanodbayan Marcelo
ordered the conduct of further fact-finding investigations on some of the other
accused in the case. Thus, a preliminary investigation docketed as OMB-M-C-0480-K
was conducted on accused Hadji Moner Mangalen (Mangalen) and Umbra
Macagcalat (Macagcalat). 21
In the meantime, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information dated July
12, 2005, charging Miguel Draculan Escobar (Escobar), Margie Purisima Rudes
(Rudes), Perla Cabilin Maglinte (Maglinte), Maria Deposo Camanay (Camanay), and
Cagang of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public Documents. 22
The Information read:
That on July 17, 2002 or prior subsequent thereto in Sarangani,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Miguel Draculan Escobar, being the Governor of the Province of Sarangani,
Margie Purisima Rudes, Board Member, Perla Cabilin Maglinte, Provincial
Administrator, Maria Deposo Carnanay, Provincial Accountant, and Cesar
Matas Cagang, Provincial Treasurer, and all high-ranking and accountable
public officials of the Provincial Government of Sarangani by reason of their
duties, conspiring and confederating with one another, while committing the
offense in relation to office, taking advantage of their respective positions, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, convert and
misappropriate the amount of THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY[-]FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P375,000.00), Philippine Currency, in public funds
under their custody, and for which they are accountable, by falsifying or
causing to be falsified Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-7-10376 and its
supporting documents, making it appear that financial assistance has been
sought by Amon Lacungam, the alleged President of Kalalong Fishermen's
Group of Brgy. Kalaong, Maitum, Sarangani, when in truth and in fact, the
accused knew fully well that no financial assistance had been requested by
Amon Lacungan and his association, nor did said Amon Lacungan and his
association receive the aforementioned amount, thereby facilitating the release
of the above-mentioned public funds in the amount of THREE HUNDRED
SEVENTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P375,000.00) through the
encashment by the accused of Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
Check No. 11521401 dated July 17, 2002, which amount they subsequently
misappropriated to their personal use and benefit, and despite demand, said
accused failed to return the said amount to the damage and prejudice of the
government and the public interest in the aforesaid sum.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 23
The Sandiganbayan docketed the case as Crim. Case No. 28331. Escobar,
Maglinte, and Cagang were arraigned on December 6, 2005 where they pleaded not
guilty. Rudes and Camanay remained at large. 24
On June 17, 2010, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision 25 in Crim. Case
No. 28331 acquitting Escobar, Maglinte, and Cagang for insufficiency of evidence.
Maglinte, however, was ordered to return P100,000.00 with legal interest to the
Province of Sarangani. The cases against Rudes and Camanay were archived until the
Sandiganbayan could acquire jurisdiction over their persons. 26 ATICcS
CONTRARY TO LAW. 33
The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-0456 and SB-11-0457.
Cagang filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside
Order of Arrest while Macagcalat and Mangalen separately filed their own Motion to
Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest. Cagang argued
that there was an inordinate delay of seven (7) years in the filing of the Informations.
Citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan 34 and Roque v. Ombudsman, 35 he argued that the
delay violated his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy disposition of
cases. 36 The Office of the Ombudsman, on the other hand, filed a
Comment/Opposition arguing that the accused have not yet submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of the court and that there was no showing that delay in the filing was
intentional, capricious, whimsical, or motivated by personal reasons. 37
On September 10, 2012, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution 38 denying the
Motions to Quash/Dismiss. It found that Cagang, Macagcalat, and Mangalen
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by the filing of the motions. 39 It
also found that there was no inordinate delay in the issuance of the information,
considering that 40 different individuals were involved with direct participation in
more or less 81 different transactions. 40 It likewise found Tatad and Roque
inapplicable since the filing of the Informations was not politically motivated. 41 It
pointed out that the accused did not invoke their right to speedy disposition of cases
before the Office of the Ombudsman but only did so after the filing of the
Informations. 42
Cagang filed a Motion for Reconsideration 43 but it was denied in a Resolution
44 dated January 15, 2013. Hence, Cagang filed a Petition for Certiorari 45 with this
Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458. 46
In an Urgent Motion to Quash Order of Arrest 47 dated June 13, 2013 filed
before the Sandiganbayan, Cagang alleged that an Order of Arrest was issued against
him. 48 He moved for the quashal of the Order on the ground that he had a pending
Petition for Certiorari before this Court. 49
In an Order 50 dated June 28, 2013, the Sandiganbayan denied the Urgent
Motion to Quash Order of Arrest on the ground that it failed to comply with the three
(3)-day notice rule and that no temporary restraining order was issued by this Court.
Cagang filed a Motion for Reconsideration 51 but it was denied by the
Sandiganbayan in a Resolution 52 dated September 10, 2013. Hence, he filed a
Petition for Certiorari with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, 53 essentially seeking to
restrain the implementation of the Order of Arrest against him. This Petition was
docketed as G.R. Nos. 210141-42.
On February 5, 2014, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order 54 in
G.R. Nos. 210141-42 enjoining the Sandiganbayan from continuing with the
proceedings of the case and from implementing the warrant of arrest against Cagang.
This Court likewise consolidated G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458 with G.R. Nos.
210141-42. 55 The Office of the Special Prosecutor submitted its separate Comments
56 to the Petitions on behalf of the People of the Philippines and the Office of the
Ombudsman. 57
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed his Motion to Quash/Dismiss since the Informations filed against
him violated his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy disposition of
cases. Citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 58 he argues that the Office of the Ombudsman
lost its jurisdiction to file the cases in view of its inordinate delay in terminating the
preliminary investigation almost seven (7) years after the filing of the complaint. 59
Petitioner further avers that the dismissal of cases due to inordinate delay is not
because the revival of the cases was politically motivated, as in Tatad, but because it
violates Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution 60 and Rule 112, Section 3 (f) 61 of
the Rules of Court. 62 He points out that the Sandiganbayan overlooked two (2)
instances of delay by the Office of the Ombudsman: the first was from the filing of
the complaint on February 10, 2003 to the filing of the Informations on November 17,
2011, and the second was from the conclusion of the preliminary investigation in
2005 to the filing of the Informations on November 17, 2011. 63 AIDSTE
Petitioner asserts that the alleged anomalous transactions in this case were
already thoroughly investigated by the Commission on Audit in its Audit Report;
thus, the Office of the Ombudsman should not have taken more than seven (7) years
to study the evidence needed to establish probable cause. 64 He contends that "[w]hen
the Constitution enjoins the Office of the Ombudsman to 'act promptly' on any
complaint against any public officer or employee, it has the concomitant duty to
speedily resolve the same." 65
Petitioner likewise emphasizes that the Sandiganbayan should have granted his
Motion to Quash Order of Arrest since there was a pending Petition before this Court
questioning the issuance of the Informations against him. He argues that the case
would become moot if the Order of Arrest is not quashed. 66
The Office of the Special Prosecutor, on the other hand, alleges that petitioner,
along with his co-accused Camanay, Zoleta, Macagcalat, and Magalen have remained
at large and cannot be located by the police, and that they have not yet surrendered or
been arrested. 67 It argues that the parameters necessary to determine whether there
was inordinate delay have been repeatedly explained by the Sandiganbayan in the
assailed Resolutions. It likewise points out that petitioner should have invoked his
right to speedy disposition of cases when the case was still pending before the Office
of the Ombudsman, not when the Information was already filed with the
Sandiganbayan. It argues further that Tatad was inapplicable since there were peculiar
circumstances which prompted this Court to dismiss the information due to inordinate
delay. 68
The Office of the Special Prosecutor argues that the Sandiganbayan already
made a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause pursuant to its duty
under Rule 112, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. 69 It points out that a petition for
certiorari is not the proper remedy to question the denial of a motion to quash and
that the appropriate remedy should be to proceed to trial. 70
Procedurally, the issues before this Court are whether or not the pendency of a
petition for certiorari with this Court suspends the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan, and whether or not the denial of a motion to quash may be the subject
of a petition for certiorari. This Court is also tasked to resolve the sole substantive
issue of whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner Cesar Matas Cagang's Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to
Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest and Urgent Motion to Quash Order of Arrest on
the ground of inordinate delay.
To give full resolution to this case, this Court must first briefly pass upon the
procedural issues raised by the parties.
Contrary to petitioner's arguments, the pendency of a petition for certiorari
before this Court will not prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding to trial absent
the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. Under
Rule 65, Section 7 71 of the Rules of Court:
Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. — The court in which the
petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also
grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition
shall not interrupt the course of the principal case, unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued, enjoining
the public respondent from further proceeding with the case.
The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten
(10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or
tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, or
upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the
principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge.
Since this Court did not issue injunctive relief when the Petition in G.R. Nos.
206438 and 206458 was filed, the Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted from proceeding
with trial. It was only upon the filing of the Petition in G.R. Nos. 210141-42 that this
Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan.
As a general rule, the denial of a motion to quash is not appealable as it is
merely interlocutory. Likewise, it cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari.
The denial of the motion to quash can still be raised in the appeal of a judgment of
conviction. The adequate, plain, and speedy remedy is to proceed to trial and to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Thus, in Galzote v. Briones: 72 AaCTcI
II
The combination of both Tatad and the balancing test was so effective that it
was again applied in Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, 106 where this Court took note that:
[D]elays per se are understandably attendant to all prosecutions and are
constitutionally permissible, with the monition that the attendant delay must
not be oppressive. Withal, it must not be lost sight of that the concept of
speedy disposition of cases is a relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of
whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered
and balanced are the length of delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion
or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the
delay. 107
Determining the length of delay necessarily involves a query on when a case is
deemed to have commenced. In Dansal v. Fernandez, 108 this Court recognized that
the right to speedy disposition of cases does not only include the period from which a
case is submitted for resolution. Rather, it covers the entire period of investigation
even before trial. Thus, the right may be invoked as early as the preliminary
investigation or inquest.
In criminal prosecutions, the investigating prosecutor is given a specific period
within which to resolve the preliminary investigation under Rule 112, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court. 109 Courts are likewise mandated to resolve cases within a specific
time frame. Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date
of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme
Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all
other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon
the filing of the last pending, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of
Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this
effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be
issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and
served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or
resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court,
without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in
consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted
thereto for determination, without further delay.
Under Republic Act No. 8493, or the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the entire trial
period must not exceed 180 days, except as otherwise provided for by this Court. 110
The law likewise provides for a time limit of 30 days from the filing of the
information to conduct the arraignment, and 30 days after arraignment for trial to
commence. 111 In order to implement the law, this Court issued Supreme Court
Circular No. 38-98 112 reiterating the periods for the conduct of trial. It also provided
for an extended time limit from arraignment to the conduct of trial:
Section 7. Extended Time Limit. — Notwithstanding the provisions of the
preceding Sections 2 and 6 for the first twelve-calendar-month period
following its effectivity, the time limit with respect to the period from
arraignment to trial imposed by said provision shall be one hundred eighty
(180) days. For the second twelve-month period, the time limit shall be one
hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period the time
limit shall be eighty (80) days.
The Circular likewise provides for certain types of delay which may be
excluded in the running of the periods:
Section 9. Exclusions. — The following periods of delay shall be excluded in
computing the time within which trial must commence:
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the
accused, including but not limited to the following:
(1) delay resulting from an examination of the physical and
mental condition of the accused;
(2) delay resulting from proceedings with respect to other
criminal charges against the accused;
(3) delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against
interlocutory orders;
(4) delay resulting from pre-trial proceedings: Provided, that
the delay does not exceed thirty (30) days;
ICHDca
Republic Act No. 9372, 118 Section 48 mandates continuous trial on a daily
basis for cases of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism:
Section 48. Continuous Trial. — In cases of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism, the judge shall set the continuous trial on a daily basis from
Monday to Friday or other short-term trial calendar so as to ensure speedy
trial.
Republic Act No. 9516 119 amends Presidential Decree No. 1866 120 to
provide for continuous trial for cases involving illegal or unlawful possession,
manufacture, dealing, acquisition, and disposition of firearms, ammunitions, and
explosives:
Section 4-B. Continuous Trial. — In cases involving violations of this Decree,
the judge shall set the case for continuous trial on a daily basis from Monday
to Friday or other short-term trial calendar so as to ensure speedy trial. Such
case shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the
accused.
Implementing rules and regulations have also provided for the speedy
disposition of cases. The Implementing Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases 121 provide that trial shall commence within three
(3) days from arraignment:
Section 21. Speedy Trial of Child Abuse Cases. — The trial of child abuse
cases shall take precedence over all other cases before the courts, except
election and habeas corpus cases. The trial in said cases shall commence
within three (3) days from the date the accused is arraigned and no
postponement of the initial hearing shall be granted except on account of the
illness of the accused or other grounds beyond his control.
The Revised Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 9208, 122
as amended by Republic Act No. 10364, 123 mandates the speedy disposition of
trafficking cases:
Section 76. Speedy Disposition of [Trafficking in Persons] Cases. — Where
practicable and unless special circumstance require; otherwise, cases
involving violation of R.A. No. 9208 shall be heard contiguously: with
hearing dates spaced not more than two weeks apart. Unnecessary delay
should be avoided, strictly taking into consideration the Speedy Trial Act and
SC Circular No. 38-98 dated 11 August 1998.
Laws and their implementing rules and regulations, however, do not generally
bind courts unless this Court adopts them in procedural rules. 124 In any case, this
Court has already made several issuances setting periods for the conduct of trial.
Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure in Environmental Cases 125
provide that trial must not exceed three (3) months from the issuance of the pre-trial
order:
Section 1. Continuous trial. — The court shall endeavor to conduct continuous
trial which shall not exceed three (3) months from the date of the issuance of
the pre-trial order.
Rule 14, Section 2 of the Rules of Procedure for Intellectual Property Rights
Cases 126 limits the period of presenting evidence to 60 days per party:
Section 2. Conduct of trial. — The court shall conduct hearings expeditiously
so as to ensure speedy trial. Each party shall have a maximum period of sixty
(60) days to present his evidence-in-chief on the trial dates agreed upon during
the pre-trial.
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 25-2007 127 provides that trial in
cases involving the killings of political activists and members of the media must be
conducted within 60 days from its commencement:
The cases referred to herein shall undergo mandatory continuous trial and
shall be terminated within sixty (60) days from commencement of trial.
Judgment thereon shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from submission
for decision unless a shorter period is provided by law or otherwise directed
by this Court.
The Guidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails by Enforcing the Right of the
Accused to Bail and to Speedy Trial 128 provide for strict time limits that must be
observed:
Section 8. Observance of time limits. — It shall be the duty of the trial court,
the public or private prosecutor, and the defense counsel to ensure, subject to
the excluded delays specified in Rule 119 of the Rules of Court and the
Speedy Trial Act of 1998, compliance with the following time limits in the
prosecution of the case against a detained accused: cTDaEH
(a) The case of the accused shall be raffled and referred to the trial court to
which it is assigned within three days from the filing of the information;
(b) The court shall arraign the accused within ten (10) days from the date of
the raffle;
(c) The court shall hold the pre-trial conference within thirty (30) days after
arraignment or within ten (10) days if the accused is under preventive
detention; provided, however, that where the direct testimonies of the
witnesses are to be presented through judicial affidavits, the court shall give
the prosecution not more than twenty (20) days from arraignment within
which to prepare and submit their judicial affidavits in time for the pre-trial
conference;
(d) After the pre-trial conference, the court shall set the trial of the case in the
pre-trial order not later than thirty (30) days from the termination of the pre-
trial conference; and
(e) The court shall terminate the regular trial within one hundred eighty (180)
days, or the trial by judicial affidavits within sixty (60) days, reckoned from
the date trial begins, minus the excluded delays or postponements specified in
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court and the Speedy Trial Act of 1998.
A dilemma arises as to whether the period includes proceedings in quasi-
judicial agencies before a formal complaint is actually filed. The Office of the
Ombudsman, for example, has no set periods within which to conduct its fact-finding
investigations. They are only mandated to act promptly. Thus, in People v.
Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, 129 this Court stated that a fact-finding investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman should not be deemed separate from
preliminary investigation for the purposes of determining whether there was a
violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases:
The State further argues that the fact-finding investigation should not
be considered a part of the preliminary investigation because the former was
only preparatory in relation to the latter; and that the period spent in the
former should not be factored in the computation of the period devoted to the
preliminary investigation.
The argument cannot pass fair scrutiny.
The guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article III of
the Constitution applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial
or administrative bodies. The guarantee would be defeated or rendered inutile
if the hair-splitting distinction by the State is accepted. Whether or not the
fact-finding investigation was separate from the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman should not matter for purposes of
determining if the respondents' right to the speedy disposition of their cases
had been violated. 130 (Emphasis supplied)
People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division 131 must be re-examined.
When an anonymous complaint is filed or the Office of the Ombudsman
conducts a motu proprio fact-finding investigation, the proceedings are not yet
adversarial. Even if the accused is invited to attend these investigations, this period
cannot be counted since these are merely preparatory to the filing of a formal
complaint. At this point, the Office of the Ombudsman will not yet determine if there
is probable cause to charge the accused.
This period for case build-up cannot likewise be used by the Office of the
Ombudsman as unbridled license to delay proceedings. If its investigation takes too
long, it can result in the extinction of criminal liability through the prescription of the
offense.
Considering that fact-finding investigations are not yet adversarial proceedings
against the accused, the period of investigation will not be counted in the
determination of whether the right to speedy disposition of cases was violated. Thus,
this Court now holds that for the purpose of determining whether inordinate delay
exists, a case is deemed to have commenced from the filing of the formal complaint
and the subsequent conduct of the preliminary investigation. In People v.
Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, 132 the ruling that fact-finding investigations are
included in the period for determination of inordinate delay is abandoned.
With respect to fact-finding at the level of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman
must provide for reasonable periods based upon its experience with specific types of
cases, compounded with the number of accused and the complexity of the evidence
required. He or she must likewise make clear when cases are deemed submitted for
decision. The Ombudsman has the power to provide for these rules and it is
recommended that he or she amend these rules at the soonest possible time. cSaATC
These time limits must be strictly complied with. If it has been alleged that
there was delay within the stated time periods, the burden of proof is on the defense to
show that there has been a violation of their right to speedy trial or their right to
speedy disposition of cases. The defense must be able to prove first, that the case took
much longer than was reasonably necessary to resolve, and second, that efforts were
exerted to protect their constitutional rights. 133
What may constitute a reasonable time to resolve a proceeding is not
determined by "mere mathematical reckoning." 134 It requires consideration of a
number of factors, including the time required to investigate the complaint, to file the
information, to conduct an arraignment, the application for bail, pre-trial, trial proper,
and the submission of the case for decision. 135 Unforeseen circumstances, such as
unavoidable postponements or force majeure, must also be taken into account.
The complexity of the issues presented by the case must be considered in
determining whether the period necessary for its resolution is reasonable. In
Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan 136 this Court found that "the long delay in
resolving the preliminary investigation could not be justified on the basis of the
records." 137 In Binay v. Sandiganbayan, 138 this Court considered "the complexity
of the cases (not run-of-the-mill variety) and the conduct of the parties' lawyers" 139
to determine whether the delay is justifiable. When the case is simple and the
evidence is straightforward, it is possible that delay may occur even within the given
periods. Defense, however, still has the burden to prove that the case could have been
resolved even before the lapse of the period before the delay could be considered
inordinate.
The defense must also prove that it exerted meaningful efforts to protect
accused's constitutional rights. In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, 140 the failure of the
accused to timely invoke the right to speedy disposition of cases may work to his or
her disadvantage, since this could indicate his or her acquiescence to the delay:
Petitioner was definitely not unaware of the projected criminal
prosecution posed against him by the indication of this Court as a
complementary sanction in its resolution of his administrative case. He
appears, however, to have been insensitive to the implications and
contingencies thereof by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the
disposition of the matter, which inaction conduces to the perception that the
supervening delay seems to have been without his objection hence impliedly
with his acquiescence. 141
In Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan, 142 this Court equated this acquiescence as
one that could amount to laches, which results in the waiver of their rights:
[I]t is worthy to note that it was only on 21 December 1999, after the case was
set for arraignment, that petitioners raised the issue of the delay in the conduct
of the preliminary investigation. As stated by them in their Motion to
Quash/Dismiss, "[o]ther than the counter-affidavits, [they] did nothing." Also,
in their petition, they averred: "Aside from the motion for extension of time to
file counter-affidavits, petitioners in the present case did not file nor send any
letter-queries addressed to the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao which
conducted the preliminary investigation." They slept on their right — a
situation amounting to laches. The matter could have taken a different
dimension if during all those four years, they showed signs of asserting their
right to a speedy disposition of their cases or at least made some overt acts,
like filing a motion for early resolution, to show that they were not waiving
that right. Their silence may, therefore be interpreted as a waiver of such right.
As aptly stated in Alvizo, the petitioner therein was "insensitive to the
implications and contingencies" of the projected criminal prosecution posed
against him "by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of
the matter, which inaction conduces to the perception that the supervening
delay seems to have been without his objection, [and] hence impliedly with
his acquiescence." 143
This concept of acquiescence, however, is premised on the presumption that
the accused was fully aware that the preliminary investigation has not yet been
terminated despite a considerable length of time. Thus, in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan,
144 this Court stated that Alvizo would not apply if the accused were unaware that the
investigation was still ongoing:
Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy
resolution of their case because they were completely unaware that the
investigation against them was still on-going. Peculiar to this case, we
reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were merely asked to comment, and not
file counter-affidavits which is the proper procedure to follow in a preliminary
investigation. After giving their explanation and after four long years of being
in the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume that the charges
against them had already been dismissed. 145 cHDAIS
The prosecution must likewise prove that no prejudice was suffered by the
accused as a result of the delay. Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan 157 defined prejudice to the
accused as:
Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that
the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-
trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial;
and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the
most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to
prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also
prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of
the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still
disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of
anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained,
his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy. 158
In Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan: 159
Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not
merely hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration
of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a
criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time. Akin to the
right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that an innocent
person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise,
of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible
with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he
may interpose. This looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages
carried by the passage of time should be weighed against the State and in
favor of the individual. 160
The consequences of delay, however, do not only affect the accused. The
prosecution of the case will also be made difficult the longer the period of time
passes. In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan: 161
Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden
of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it
difficult or impossible for the government to carry its burden. The
Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or extraordinary
efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate
that such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly
prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the
government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show
two things: (a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that
which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was
no more delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of
justice. 162
The consequences of the prosecution's failure to discharge this burden are
severe. Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules of Court requires that the case against the
accused be dismissed if there has been a violation of the right to speedy trial:
Section 9. Remedy where accused is not brought to trial within the time limit.
— If the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by
Section 1(g), Rule 116 and Section 1, as extended by Section 6 of this rule, the
information may be dismissed on motion of the accused on the ground of
denial of his right to speedy trial. The accused shall have the burden of
proving the motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going forward
with the evidence to establish the exclusion of time under section 3 of this
Rule. The dismissal shall be subject to the rules on double jeopardy.
Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a
waiver of the right to dismiss under this section.
Tatad, as qualified by Angchangco, likewise mandates the dismissal of the case
if there is a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases. The immediate
dismissal of cases is also warranted if it is proven that there was malicious
prosecution, if the cases were politically motivated, or other similar instances. Once
these circumstances have been proven, there is no need for the defense to discharge its
burden to prove that the delay was inordinate. CAacTH
III
IV
This Court now clarifies the mode of analysis in situations where the right to
speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial is invoked.
First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to
speedy trial. While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial
may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The right to
speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether
judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is that the accused may already be
prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases to be
invoked.
Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior
to a conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that
the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due
regard to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will
be taken against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior
to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of
whether there has been inordinate delay.
Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If
the right is invoked within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court
resolutions and circulars, 171 and the time periods that will be promulgated by the
Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was
justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is
invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.
If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is
motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is attended by utter lack
of evidence, and second, that the defense did not contribute to the delay.
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove
first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary
investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the
issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no
prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.
Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must
consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to
the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.DcHSEa