foreknowledge Essential Resources for Intelligence Analysts

Issue One
February 2012

Toolbox:
www.foreknowledge.info
ISSN 2225-5613

Strategic indicators
The effective Analysts’ judgement
analyst of probability

Richards Heuer:
Induna of
Upcoming intelligence analysis
conferences

Intelligence manager
responsibilities
Contents Editor:
From the editor 3 Dalene Duvenage

Dalene chats with Richards Heuer 4

Publisher:
Psychology of intelligence analysis 6 4Knowledge Analysis Solutions
PO Box 40467
Analyst toolbox : strategic indicators 8
Moreleta Park
Strategic indicators for early warning 10 Pretoria
Strategic indicators for measuring peacefulness 11 0044
South Africa
Strategic indicators in crime intelligence 12
Strategic indicators resources 13
Contributions and advertising enquiries:
Analysts’ judgement of probability 14 editor@foreknowledge.info

News about our profession 17

Ubuntu and the target-centric approach 18
The effective analyst 19
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Intelligence managers’ responsibilities 20 Editorial submissions

Meet Mary Lattig 22
A case study of Korean Intelligence Failure 23
Upcoming conferences 24
Advertise in Foreknowledge
Call for papers 27
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2 February 2012 • Foreknowledge
 From
the
editor
I
ntelligence analysts are busy knowledge work-
ers. We work in national security agencies, de-
fence departments, law enforcement units,
compliance offices, investigation task teams, business
strategy work groups. We analyse political trends,
climate change, money laundering, identity theft,
leaders’ personalities, international investment, rebel
group movements, terrorism, competitors’ acquisition
strategies, economic sector opportunities and threats,
tax evasion, diamond smuggling, illegal migration
patterns, corruption and border security to name a
few.
Our shared job description: making sense of informa-
tion in a manner that will assist decision makers to
take action. We evaluate possible deceiving reports,
sift through the OSINT tsunami, think creatively
about new and familiar problems, liaise with counter-
parts and produce actionable intelligence against tight
deadlines.
It is ironic that we conduct environmental scanning
on terrorism, but do not apply the same methodology
to the intelligence analysis profession. We rarely have
the time to contemplate new research on topics of in-
telligence interest or read new books and publica-
tions. We definitely do not have the luxury of
philosophising about the future of their profession. Or
attend interesting conferences, debate the usefulness
of new tools or be aware of what intelligence analysts
in other parts of the world are doing to counter the
same threats.
If we are serious about professionalising intelli-
gence analysis, we should become mindful about
what we do, how we do it, create an institutional
memory of best practices and implement recommen-
dations aimed at improving intelligence analysis.
Keeping up to date with developments in our pro-
fession is difficult. There are limited resources or
February 2012 • Foreknowledge
compendiums for those interested in the “what and
how” of intelligence analysis that is practical, non-
academic and easy to read. You might find reading
lists, but usually they are dated, focusing on the en-
tire field of intelligence studies with only a cursory
glance at intelligence analysis. Or they are primarily
focused on American national security intelligence,
ignoring the richness of intelligence from other parts
of the world. Sometimes one would come across
misplaced elitism where contributions from law en-
forcement, compliance and business are rejected as
not being “real” intelligence despite their use of the
same methodologies and tools - but just in a different
context with different intelligence priorities.
In the last few years we have seen an explosion of
new books, tools, research papers, conferences, blogs,
discussion groups and organisations dedicated to the
improvement of intelligence analysis across domains.
But, they are scattered throughout the Internet, on
library shelves, hidden in the tacit knowledge and
expertise of thousands analysts.
UNTIL NOW.
Foreknowledge aims to be the “hub” of all things and
events related to intelligence analysis. Its purpose is
to provide an accessible space where intelligence an-
alysts who are serious about their job can learn from
experts, reflect on new developments, share experi-
ences and raise the profession to new heights.
In essence, this will contribute to a shared under-
standing and vocabulary of intelligence analysis
across domains and continents in an easy-going, in-
formal and non-academic manner. We discuss differ-
ent tools and techniques in the Analyst Toolbox
section and offer some interesting nice-to-knows and
need-to-shares that will broaden your understanding
of intelligence analysis concepts and practices. ●
Dalene Duvenage
3
 people
Richards Heuer
Richards J. Heuer Jr. is best known
for his pioneering book, Psychology of
Intelligence Analysis. Retired from the
CIA, Mr. Heuer has worked with the
Intelligence Community in various
roles for over five decades. He has
won multiple awards for his research
and writing, including the CIA Seal Me-
dallion for development of the Analy-
sis of Competing Hypotheses
technique. He is the co-author of
Structured Analytic Techniques for
Intelligence, and editor of the 1978
book Quantitative Approaches to Po-
litical Intelligence: The CIA Experience.
You can download a copy of Psycholo-
gy of Intelligence Analysis here.
4 February 2012 • Foreknowledge
Dalene chats with
Induna of intelligence analysis
Induna: Zulu: meaning advisor, great
leader, ambassador, headman, or
commander of group of warriors.
H
ow do you define a man who has been instrumental in the pro-
fessionalisation of intelligence analysis, not only in his own
agency and country, but around the world? Who, through a
single book written in 1999, forced intelligence analysts to reflect on
what they do and how they do it? His writings ushered in a new era of
research, debate and writing in our profession.
Pioneer, doyen, vanguard? No. Induna says it all. In the African cul-
ture, elders are revered as wise leaders and advisors. Now 84, he stays
intellectually engaged and interested in the intelligence field. For this
first edition of Foreknowledge, I posed some questions to Dick on his
career and how he sees intelligence analysis in the future. We salute
him!
What was the defining moment in your career as an intelligence offic-
er?
A defining moment in my career came at the 1977 annual conference of
the International Studies Association. I chaired a panel called Quantita-
tive Approaches to Political Intelligence: The
CIA Experience. Afterwards I was ap-
proached by a man with a foreign accent
who said, “The answer is not in the numbers!
It's in the head!” We went to lunch together,
and he told me about the new approach to
the psychology of human judgment pio-
neered by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tver-
sky. This man who changed the direction of
my career was Zvi Lanir, a senior Israeli in-
telligence officer who, after the Israeli intelli-
gence failure in the Yom Kippur War, had
been sent to the United States to learn new
quantitative approaches to political analysis
that might prevent such intelligence failures. After learning from him
about Kahneman and Tversky's work, I began learning about, writing,

Intelligence analysts
should be self-con-
scious about their
reasoning processes.
They should think
about how they
make judgments and
reach conclusions,
not just about the
judgments and con-
clusions themselves.
(Heuer)
See our open and customised in-house training offers at
February 2012 • Foreknowledge
and lecturing on the many cognitive issues associated with intelligence
analysis. This is the work that eventually became my book, Psychology of
Intelligence Analysis.
What advice would you give to in-
spire intelligence analysts?
My advice to young analysts, and
my hope for the future of intelli-
gence analysis, is to be more self-con-
scious of how we think, not just what
we think. In recent years there has
been a plethora of books about
thinking that have been written
for a broad audience, not as aca-
demic texts. Several of these, such as The
Black Swan and Blink are very well known. Other interest-
ing titles are: On Being Uncertain, The Invisible Gorilla, The Checklist Mani-
festo, The Paradox of Choice, and The Halo Effect. All these make good
reading.
How do you see the future of intelligence analysis?
The relatively new field of neurocognition enables us to observe the inner
workings of the brain as it thinks. This research is providing a better un-
derstanding of how the brain functions, and we can hope that it might
eventually also lead to ways to make the brain work better. ●
www.4knowledge.co.za
Contact dalene@4knowledge.co.za
5
 thinking
Psychology of intelligence
analysis Richards Heuer
There are still thousands of
intelligence analysts and their
managers who have not yet
read the seminal Psychology of
Intelligence Analysis by
Richards Heuer.
We will carry excerpts from
the book’s chapters in each
edition of Foreknowledge,
starting with chapter 1.
You can also download the en-
tire book here.
6 February 2012 • Foreknowledge
I
ntelligence analysis is funda-
mentally a mental process, but
understanding this process is
hindered by the lack of conscious
awareness of the workings of our
own minds. When we speak of
improving intelligence analysis,
we are usually referring to the
quality of writing, types of analyt-
ical products, relations between
intelligence analysts and intelli-
gence consumers, or organization
of the analytical process. Little at-
tention is devoted to improving
how analysts think.
Thinking analytically is a skill
like carpentry or driving a car. It
can be taught, it can be learned,
and it can improve with practice.
But like many other skills, such as
riding a bike, it is not learned by
sitting in a classroom and being
told how to do it. Analysts learn
by doing.
This book aims to help intelli-
gence analysts achieve a higher
level of performance. It shows
how people make judgments
based on incomplete and ambigu-
ous information, and it offers
simple tools and concepts for im-
proving analytical skills.
People construct their own
version of "reality" on the basis of
information provided by the
senses, but this sensory input is
mediated by complex mental
processes that determine which
information is attended to, how it
is organized, and the meaning
attributed to it.
What people perceive, how
readily they perceive it, and how

they process this information af-
ter receiving it are all strongly in-
fluenced by past experience,
education, cultural values, role
requirements, and organizational
norms, as well as by the specifics
of the information received.
This process may be visual-
ized as perceiving the world
through a lens or screen that
channels and focuses and thereby
may distort the images that are
seen.
To achieve the clearest possi-
ble image of China, for example,
analysts need more than informa-
tion on China. They also need to
understand their own lenses
through which this information
passes. These lenses are known
by many terms--mental models,
mind-sets, biases, or analytical
assumptions.
Intelligence analysts must un-
derstand themselves before they
can understand others. Training
is needed to (a) increase self-
awareness concerning generic
problems in how people perceive
and make analytical judgments
concerning foreign events, and
(b) provide guidance and practice
in overcoming these problems.
Mind-sets and mental models
are inescapable. They are, in es-
sence, a distillation of all that we
think we know about a subject.
The problem is how to ensure
that the mind remains open to
alternative interpretations in a
rapidly changing world.
The disadvantage of a mind-
set is that it can color and control
our perception to the extent that
an experienced specialist may be
among the last to see what is real-
ly happening when events take a
new and unexpected turn.
When faced with a major para-
digm shift, analysts who know
February 2012 • Foreknowledge
the most about a subject have the
most to unlearn. This seems to
have happened before the reunifi-
cation of Germany, for example.
Some German specialists had to
be prodded by their more gener-
alist supervisors to accept the sig-
nificance of the dramatic changes
in progress toward reunification
of East and West Germany.
A generation ago, few intelli-
gence analysts were self-con-
scious and introspective about
the process by which they did
analysis. The accepted wisdom
was the "common sense" theory
of knowledge--that to perceive
events accurately it was necessary
only to open one's eyes, look at
the facts, and purge oneself of all
preconceptions and prejudices in
order to make an objective judg-
ment.
Today, there is greatly in-
creased understanding that intel-
ligence analysts do not approach
their tasks with empty minds.
They start with a set of assump-
tions about how events normally
transpire in the area for which
they are responsible. Although
this changed view is becoming
thinking
Intelligence
analysts think
for a living
conventional wisdom, the Intelli-
gence Community has only be-
gun to scratch the surface of its
implications.
The reaction of the Intelligence
Community to many problems is
to collect more information, even
though analysts in many cases
already have more information
than they can digest.
What analysts need is more
truly useful information--mostly
reliable HUMINT from knowl-
edgeable insiders--to help them
make good decisions.
Or they need a more accurate
mental model and better analyti-
cal tools to help them sort
through, make sense of, and get
the most out of the available am-
biguous and conflicting informa-
tion. ●
7
 toolbox
What we really want from information, intelligence
and knowledge is asymmetry. We want to know
things others don’t, or at least to know things before
others do. We want and need early warning signals
Analyst
to be able to connect the dots and provide foresight of
future events and the early identification of threat.

Richard Marrs
Strategic indicators
Dalene Duvenage
environmental scanning. It also

A
good tool to ascertain
the future developments
of an intelligence prob-
lem or issue, is strategic indica-
tors, attributes or signals.
Indicator development is a phase
in a complex process which can
be found in the study fields of in-
dications and warning (I & W)
and futures thinking amongst oth-
ers.
Indicators are a pre-estab-
lished set of observable phenome-
na that are periodically reviewed
to help track events, spot emerg-
ing trends and warn of unantici-
pated change.1
They are useful throughout
the intelligence process as it forc-
es the analyst constantly to con-
duct situational awareness and
ment
s
es
s
as
categorise “clues” and makes it
easier to conceptualise and narrow
down variables that might influ-
ence our analysis.
During the planning phase, in-
dicators are developed to assist in
the collection plan. The analyst
goes through an iteration process
whereby the issue at hand is brain-
stormed thoroughly, hypotheses
developed and “clues” or indica-
tors are then identified that may
support or refute these hypotheses
- “If this is true, what will hap-
pen?” Detailed questions are then
asked about each indicator and
sources tasked.
During the analysis phase, in-
dicators helps analysts to look ob-
jectively at detailed factors that
Scenario &
ind
ica
might impact on our forecasting
and influence our probability
judgements. It frames our think-
ing so that we are not distracted
by overwhelming data.
Indicators also make the warn-
ing process more rigorous and
alert the analyst of events that
might otherwise have not been
noticed. A so-called black swan,
wild card or strategic surprise
could be observed earlier than
what would have been the case if
analysts did not go through the
indicator development process.
However, as with all thinking
and analytical tools, analysts have
to caution against myopic think-
ing and slavishly following only
the indicators and become blind
to any event that does not fit the
indicator list.
Strategic indicators are used in
many sectors, especially in strate-
gic business planning, resilience
engineering, risk management,
conflict prevention and early

tor

warning contexts.
Indicator

m
developmen

viron ental s In intelligence disciplines it is

En ca
most common among military,
nn
ng

political and economic risk ana-

ing
ntal scanni

lysts in national security intelli-

t
Environ

gence agencies. In the law

enforcement arena, strategic intel-
e
nm

ligence is slowly making inroads

me
o

e.g., with the Sleipnir organised

r

vi ta
En sca l
nning crime group threat assessment
framework developed by the
RCMP in 1999. ●

In g
d ic in 1 Pherson Associates (2008) Handbook of analyt-
ator m o n it o r Adapted from CICS document ical tools and techniques
by D Duvenage

8 February 2012 • Foreknowledge

 toolbox
Ÿ Your indicators should address as many a possible factors: politics,
economy, society, technology, environment, legal, organisational
etc. Or ask yourself what are the driving forces or inhibitors behind
some event? Another useful tool for developing indicators is Crys-
tal balling: Pretend you’re in the future where a scenario has real-
ised. Now “look back” to today and list all those events, forces and When we talk about early
factors that led to the scenario becoming true. This technique is al- warning signals, do we all
so called Future Backwards. mean the same thing?
Ÿ Consider the possibility of denial and deception signals sent out by When we create, apply and
your target. recognize them do we use
Ÿ Setting your alarm threshold too low, and warning too early and the same basic processes?
too frequently leads to a “cry wolf’ syndrome. After all, one person’s early
Ÿ Beware of falling victim to the “alert fatigue syndrome” when var- warning signal is another’s
ious signals appear without your scenario actually happening and Leading Indicator, which
you become desensitised with time to any signal and miss the “tip- may be another person’s
ping point” event.
Key Intelligence Question,
Ÿ Sometimes indicators will give insights into which scenarios are
which may be another per-
not developing.
son’s Weak Signal, which
Ÿ Developments can also be indications of indications rather than
may be another person’s
proof of what you expected. Be sure to get confirmation from other
sources before you accept any indication at face value! Wildcard. In fact, we have
all heard these terms used
Ÿ Review your indicator list often to include 1) overlooked events 2)
changes in collection capabilities and 3) changes in target behav- interchangeably. (Marrs)
iour

Good indicators: It’s not a good indicator if:

Ÿ Are clearly defined
Ÿ Have a rating scale with explanation of
each point of the scale
Ÿ Can be used periodically for assess-
ment (e.g. annual threat assessment)
Ÿ Allow references/sources that are
used in the rating
Ÿ You can’t gather data or tell if it is
there
Ÿ You can’t return to it in a year or two
Ÿ Others using comparable methods
can’t observe it
Ÿ It doesn’t relate to what you are
trying to measure
Ÿ It measures more than one thing

February 2012 • Foreknowledge 9

 toolbox
Strategic indicators for early warning
Various private think tanks and NGO’s have developed their own risk,
early warning or signal detection instruments. We discuss two of these
instruments and challenge you to benchmark the indicators to yours.
The Fund for Peace (FFP) Failed States Index is an excellent example of
application of strategic indicators. Thousands of reports and information
from around the world are collected, detailing the existing social, eco-
nomic and political pressures faced by each of the 177 countries that they
analyse. The Fund for Peace’s CAST software performs content analysis
on this collected information.
Through sophisticated search parameters and algorithms, the software
separates the relevant data from the irrelevant - guided by 12 primary
social, economic and political indicators (each split into an average of 14
sub indicators). What make the FFP's model so useful for intelligence an-
alysts, is that each indicator is discussed in various measures(or sub-indi-
cators that are measurable) with possible questions to ask at each that
will assist in collection planning. Read more here. ●
The Fund for Peace methodology tri-
angulates data from three primary Social Indicators
sources and subjects them to critical 1. Mounting demographic pressures
review to obtain final scores for the 2. Massive movement of refugees or internally displaced persons
Failed States Index. The main data
3. Legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia
collection methods are content
4. Chronic and sustained human flight
analysis (electronic scanning),
Economic indicators
quantitative data, and qualitative
input. This multi-stage process has
5. Uneven economic development along group lines
several layers of scrutiny to ensure 6. Sharp and/or severe economic decline
the highest standards of methodo- Political and military indicators
logical rigor, the broadest possible 7. Criminalization and/or delegitimization of the state
information base including both 8. Progressive deterioration of public services
quantitative and qualitative exper- 9. Suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law and widespread
tise, and the greatest accuracy. human rights abuse
10. Security apparatus operates as a "state within a state"
Indicator: Criminalization and/or 11. Rise of factionalized elites
12. Intervention of other states or external political actors
Delegitimization of the State
Sub-indicators or measures
Ÿ Massive and endemic corruption or
profiteering by ruling elites.
FFP Failed States Index 2011
Ÿ Resistance of ruling elites to transpar-
ency, accountability and political repre-
sentation, revealed by scandals,
investigative journalism, criminal pros-
ecution or civil action.
Ÿ Widespread loss of popular confidence
in state institutions and processes, e.g.,
widely boycotted or flawed elections,
mass public demonstrations, sustained
civil disobedience, inability of the state
to collect taxes, resistance to military
conscription, rise of armed insurgencies.
Ÿ Growth of crime syndicates linked to
ruling elites.

10 February 2012 • Foreknowledge

 Strategic toolbox
indicators for
measuring
peacefulness

The indicators have been selected

as being the best available data
sets that reflect the incidence or
absence of peace, and contain both
quantitative data and qualitative
scores from a range of trusted
sources. All scores for each indica-
tor are “banded”, either on a scale
of 1-5 (for qualitative indicators)
or 1-10 (for quantitative data, such
as military expenditure or the
jailed population, which have then
been converted to a 1-5 scale for
comparability when compiling the
final index). Go to the report for a
detailed discussion on the method-
ology of assigning values and scor-
ing the various indicators and
subsets of data.
Reuters
The Global Peace Index (GPI) is composed of 23 qualitative and quantita-
tive indicators from respected sources, which combine internal and exter-
nal factors ranging from a nation’s level of military expenditure to its
relations with neighbouring countries and the level of respect for human
rights. These indicators were selected by an international panel of aca-
demics, business people, philanthropists and members of peace institu-
tions.
The GPI brings a snapshot of relative peacefulness among nations while
continuing to contribute to an understanding of what factors help create
or sustain more peaceful societies. The GPI was founded by Steve Kille-
lea, an Australian international technology entrepreneur and philanthro-
pist. It forms part of the Institute for Economics and Peace, a global think
tank dedicated to the research and education of the relationship between
economic development, business and peace. The GPI is collated and cal-
culated by the Economist Intelligence Unit. Read the complete report
here. ●

Measures of on-
going domestic and
international conflict
• Number of external and internal
conflicts fought: 2004-2009
• Estimated number of deaths from
organised conflict (external)
• Number of deaths from organised
conflict (internal)
• Level of organised conflict (internal)
• Relations with neighbouring
countries
Measures of societal
safety and security
• Perceptions of criminality in society
• Number of refugees and displaced
people as a percentage of the
population
• Political instability
• Political Terror Scale
• Potential for terrorist acts
• Number of homicides per 100,000
people
• Level of violent crime
• Likelihood of violent demonstrations
• Number of jailed population per
100,000 people
• Number of internal security officers
and police per 100,000 people
Measures of
militarisation
• Military expenditure as a percentage
of GDP
• Number of armed services personnel
per 100,000 people
• Volume of transfers (imports) of
major conventional weapons per
100,000 people
• Volume of transfers (exports) of
major conventional weapons per
100,000 people
• Budgetary support for UN
peacekeeping missions: percentage
of outstanding payments versus
annual assessment to the budget of
the current peacekeeping missions
• Aggregate number of heavy weapons
per 100,000 people
• Ease of access to small arms a and
light weapons
• Military capability/sophistication

February 2012 • Foreknowledge 11

 toolbox
In Norse mythology,
Sleipnir is the eight-
legged horse of Odin.
Sleipnir uses a rank-ordered set of
attributes to measure the threat of
organized crime (potential or real).
Organized crime groups are placed
along one axis and the attributes along
the other.
12
Strategic indicators in
crime intelligence
The RCMP’s Sleipnir Organised Crime
Group Capability Measurement Matrix
The Sleipnir technique provides intelligence analysts working on
organized crime groups with a comprehensive and transparent
method to assist in developing and presenting recommendations
and supporting intelligence in a concise manner. This framework
is not intended to produce a matrix which stands in isolation, but
to be fleshed out in the context of a strategic analytical assessment
which explains the details and significance of the comparisons.
The attribute set serves as a skeleton of the collection plan for the
assessment, and the matrix as a clear illustration of the rankings
and of the reasons behind the judgments. It utilizes the consensus
of experts or Delphi approach to determine the weight to be given
to the various attributes.
Sleipnir is a two-stage process. First, a weighting for various or-
ganized crime group characteristics is established. Second, investi-
gators assess the capacity of various organised crime groups
against the (currently 12) characteristics and these capacity esti-
mates are weighted according to the values established in the first
stage. This then generates an overall score.
The matrix uses a system of colour-coding, reflecting evaluations
of the degree of the attribute: High (red), Medium (orange), Low
(yellow), Nil (green) and Unknown (blue). Identified groups can
be evaluated over time to monitor changes within the criminal or-
ganization, possibly due to law enforcement or to changes in the
market.
The success of this model is dependent on the ability to rank accu-
rately the attributes and to identify the organized crime groups to
place into the model. ●
Violence: The use of violence, and intimidation through explicit or implicit
threats of violence, against targets outside the group to further any organiza-
tional objective.
High Violence and/or intimidation used as an offensive tactic, an integral
part of strategy, applied in a premeditated manner.
Medium Violence and/or intimidation used spontaneously as an offensive
tactic for short term gain, without regard to strategic implications.
Low Violence and/or intimidation used as a defensive tactic only.
Nil Violence and/or intimidation never used.
February 2012 • Foreknowledge
 toolbox
Strategic indicators
resources
Books
Grabo, Cynthia and Goldman, Jan
(2010) Handbook of warning intelli-
gence: assessing the threat to national
On the web security. Scarecrow Press
Ÿ RCMP Sentinel threat assessment process here Heuer, Richards J. and Pherson,
Ÿ CISC Integrated threat assessment model here Randolph H. (2009) Structured Ana-
lytic Techniques For Intelligence Anal-
Ÿ RCMP Sleipnir version 2 here
ysis. CQ Press
Ÿ Luyk, Joël (2011).Towards Improving Detection of Early Warning
Khalsa, Sundri (2004) Forecasting
Signals within Organizations here
Terrorism: Indicators and Proven An-
Ÿ Williams, Phil. (2005) Warning Indicators, Terrorist Finances, and alytic Techniques. Scarecrow Press
Terrorist Adaptation[1] Strategic Insights, Volume IV, Issue 1 here McDowell, Don. (2009) Strategic
Ÿ Marrs, Richard (2005) Early Warning Signals: A conversation for ex- Intelligence: a Handbook for Practi-
ploration here tioners, Managers and Users. Scare-
Ÿ Counterintelligence and Espionage Indicators here crow Press

Ÿ Global Peace Index here Pherson Associates (2008) Handbook

of analytical tools & techniques. Pher-
Ÿ Fund for Peace here
son

In t h e
y … .
nav
U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate Airman Ricardo J. Reyes

US Naval Intelligence (ONI) Counter-Piracy Branch Chief, Brian Green in a recent interview:
“The analysts here are very talented, very dedicated, and highly motivated in what they do.
They very much have a passion for their work. At the forefront of their minds is indications and
warnings. I think that’s at the heart of intelligence analysis and it definitely applies to piracy and
maritime crime. We do intelligence. We try to pinpoint threats, threats to the United States,
threats to U.S. citizens, long term, short term, immediate, what have you, and that’s just good old
fashioned intelligence work.”

February 2012 • Foreknowledge 13

 need2share
Analysts’ judgement of
One of the most difficult tasks of
an analyst is to convey his/her
level of certainty that something
will happen … or not happen.
There are various factors that
play a role in this important step:
the complexity of the intelligence
problem, decision-makers’ unre-
alistic belief that intelligence
equals evidence, politicisation of
intelligence where the analysts
probability
are expected to prove or support
a political agenda, an organisa-
tional culture that forces early
judgement on weak signals, the
analyst’s own inability to verbal-
ise his subjective judgement or
the fear of being wrong. In coun-
tries where English is the first
language, analysts find it easier to
make a distinction between “like-
ly” and “probably” than those for
whom English is a 2nd or 3rd lan-
guage. For the latter, opting for
the easier word increases the pos-
sibility that the analyst will con-
vey a message that the
decision-maker will misunder-
stand.
A lot have been written and said
about this topic. Here are a few
perspectives. Click on the links to
access the web documents.

From the movies

From Fair Game (2010):
Paul: One point about intelligence, nothing is 100 %.
Libby: So, what, are you 99 % sure? 98 %?
Paul: I'm saying that you can't put an exact figure on it. I'm saying that...
Libby: But if you had to say?
Paul: You cannot be that precise.
Libby: Could you say you're 97 % sure? Is there a 3 % chance you've got
this wrong? Or four or five? Still pretty good odds. Do you like those
odds, Paul? Are you willing to put your name to that? Ready to make
that call?
Paul: I don't make that call, sir.
Libby: Yes, you do, Paul. Each time you interpret a piece of data. Each
time you choose a maybe over a perhaps you make a call, a decision.
Right now you're making a lot of little decisions adding up to a big
decision. But what if there's only a 1 % chance that you're wrong? Can
you say for sure that you'll take that chance and state as a fact that this
equipment is not intended for a nuclear weapons program? Do you
know what 1 % of the population of this country is?
Paul: It's 3,240,000 souls. Okay, sir. Look, we're not machines. We look
at the evidence. We game it out. And believe it or not, not everybody
agrees all the time. It's a process.
Libby: It's a process.
Paul: Yes.
Libby: And not everyone agrees.
Paul: Exactly.

14 February 2012 • Foreknowledge

 need2share
What
Kris Weaton:
percentage “As analysts, they have an obliga-

is tion to communicate as effectively

as possible the results of their intel-
ligence analysis to decision makers.
… there is not yet a perfect way to
“slam dunk?” do this; there is only a best practice
that tries to balance the competing
concerns.”

Michael Schrage

US NIE on Iran 2007

Estimates of Likelihood. Because analytical judgments are not certain, we use probabilistic language to re-
flect the Community’s estimates of the likelihood of developments or events. Terms such as probably, like-
ly, very likely, or almost certainly indicate a greater than even chance. The terms unlikely and remote indicate
a less then even chance that an event will occur; they do not imply that an event will not occur. Terms
such as might or may reflect situations in which we are unable to assess the likelihood, generally because
relevant information is unavailable, sketchy, or fragmented. Terms such as we cannot dismiss, we cannot rule
out, or we cannot discount reflect an unlikely, improbable, or remote event whose consequences are such
that it warrants mentioning. The chart provides a rough idea of the relationship of some of these terms to
each other.
Remote Very Unlikely Unlikely Even chance Probably/ Likely Very likely

Although Sherman
Kent's efforts to quan-
tify what were essen-
tially qualitative
judgments did not
prevail, the essay's
general theme remains
important today.
Phillip Fellman
“This is all just scientific window dressing. There is plenty of
smoke, but we are never shown what is behind the mirrors. This
isn’t science, it’s the art of advocacy, precisely what the original
National Intelligence Estimates and estimative process was de-
signed to eliminate. In this context, the product displayed here is
exactly the opposite of a scientific estimate. The scale of judg-
ments from Remote to Almost Certainly is simply a modification
of the 5 point Likert scale, a simple ordinal measure of typically
anecdotal probability developed to aid research in the field of
psychology in 1932.“
Description Probability range
Will Greater than 90%
The UK Ministry Likely/probably Between 60% and 90%
of Defence
May/possibly Between 10% and 60%
Probability scale
Unlikely/Improbable Less than 10%

February 2012 • Foreknowledge 15

 need2share
Nathan Dieckmann
“Consumers perceived forecasts
with numerical estimates of likeli-
hood and potential harm as more
useful than forecasts with only a
narrative evidence summary.
However, consumer's risk and
likelihood perceptions were more
greatly affected by the narrative
evidence summary than the stat-
ed likelihood information.
These results show that even "pre-
cise" numerical estimates of likeli-
hood are not necessarily
RACHEL F. KESSELMAN
evaluable by consumers and that
perceptions of likelihood are af- “While the Kesselman List of Estimative Words will likely be
fected by supporting narrative tweaked by others in the community, it is a step in the right di-
information. rection. Analysts have an obligation to communicate as effec-
tively as they can the results of their estimates. The best case
Numeracy also moderated the ef-
scenario is that the NIC and the IC take into consideration this
fects of stated likelihood and the
new estimative scale above and produce several more iterations
narrative evidence summary.
of their own list until employees of the community can come to
Consumers higher in numeracy
agreement on a set of clear-cut words that all are both willing
were more likely to use the stated
to accept and employ in daily practice.”
likelihood information and con-
sumers lower in numeracy were
more likely to use the narrative
evidence to inform their judg-
ments.
Michael Schrage

The moderating effect of likeli-

hood format and consumer's per-
ceptions of forecasts in hindsight
are also explored. Explicit esti-
mates of uncertainty are not nec-
essarily useful to all intelligence
consumers, particularly when
presented with supporting narra-
tive evidence.
How consumers respond to intel-
ligence forecasts depends on the :
Ÿ structure of any supporting
narrative information,
Ÿ the format of the explicit
uncertainty information,
and
Ÿ the numerical ability of the
individual consumer.
Forecasters should be sensitive to
these three issues when present-
ing forecasts to consumers.”
“The simplest, easiest, cheapest and most powerful way to
transform the quality of intelligence would be to insist that
analysts attach two little numbers to every report they file.
The first number would state their confidence in the
quality of the evidence they've used for their analysis: 0.1
would be the lowest level of personal/professional
confidence; 1.0 would be -- former CIA director George
Tenet should pardon the expression -- a "slam dunk," an
absolute certainty.
The second number would represent the analyst's own
confidence in his or her conclusions. Is the analyst 0.5 -- the
"courage of a coin toss" confident -- or a bolder 0.75
confident in his or her analysis? Or is the evidence and
environment so befogged with uncertainty that the best
analysts can offer the National Security Council is a 0.3
level of confidence?
These two little numbers would provoke intelligence
analysts and intelligence consumers alike to think extra
hard about analytical quality, creativity and
accountability.”

16 February 2012 • Foreknowledge


News about our profession
Medical intelligence
analysts
VOA: 27 Sept 2011 (ed: excerpted)
Not all spies target military, polit-
ical or economic intelligence.
Some gather medical intelligence.
Presidents, prime ministers and
other leaders do not always like to
talk about their health. Some dis-
appear from public life for a while
and then reappear, with or with-
out an explanation.
Spy agencies search for informa-
tion about physical and mental
health. The idea that a leader
might even lose his mind and
launch a war or a nuclear attack is
not an imaginary threat.
The Central Intelligence Agency
has a Medical and Psychological
Assessment Cell. It employs or
consults with doctors, sociolo-
gists, political scientists and cul-
tural anthropologists to examine
the conditions of top officials.
Jonathan Clemente is a doctor do-
ing research for a book on medical
intelligence. He says the CIA team
tries to predict how a leader will
act.
“What they try and do on the psy-
chological side of things is de-
scribe a constellation of
psychiatric signs and symptoms,
and then to describe for the policy
makers how someone with that
particular set of findings may re-
act to certain situations.”
February 2012 • Foreknowledge
"In the late fifties and early nine-
teen sixties, the CIA decided that
they had expertise to look more
carefully and in a more rigorous,
analytical way at the health of
foreign leaders in order to help
give policy makers some fore-
warning of a transition in a gov-
ernment, stability of foreign
governments, and also looking
for potential points of diplomatic
leverage.”
China opens string
of spy schools
The Telegraph, 24 June 2011 (ed: excerpted)
In June 2011 China opened its
eighth National Intelligence Col-
lege on the campus of Hunan Uni-
versity in the central city of
Changsha. Since January, similar
training schools have opened in-
side universities in Beijing, Shang-
hai, Xian, Qingdao and Harbin.
The new schools aim to transform
and modernise the Chinese intelli-
gence services, producing spies
who are trained in the latest meth-
ods of data collection and analy-
sis. Each school will recruit
around 30 to 50 carefully-selected
existing undergraduates each
year.
The move echoes similar efforts
by Western intelligence agencies,
including MI5, to improve their
analytical capabilities and use of
technology.
The United States has a similar
project, named the National Secu-
rity Education Program, that was
set up in the wake of the first Gulf
war in order to boost language
and culture training for US spies.
The Chinese programme began in
2008 with the founding of the first
Intelligence College at Nanjing
career
university. A second school was
set up in the southern province of
Guangdong at the end of last year,
and the programme has now been
dramatically accelerated.
"China does not have the talents
and skills it needs in its intelli-
gence departments," said Cao
Shujin, the deputy dean of the
Zhongshan National Intelligence
College, and a professor of infor-
mation management. "We needed
to set up specific degree courses to
fill those requirements," he added.
"After students spend a year stud-
ying information management,
they can elect to switch to the In-
telligence College. We have not
decided the exact screening proc-
ess yet."
Taiwan spy's
cooking class raises
a stink
The China Post:, 17 Oct 2011 (ed: excerpt-
ed)
Taiwan's military-intelligence
body has come under fire after
one of its agents returned as a Le
Cordon Bleu- certified chef fol-
lowing a so-called undercover
mission in France, a newspaper
said.
The agent’s NT$1 million
(S$42,000) tuition for the cooking
classes in France was sponsored
by the military.
17
 opinion UBUNTU AND THE TARGET-
CENTRIC APPROACH TO
INTELLIGENCE CAN WIN THE
FIGHT AGAINST ORGANISED
Intelligence research and
analysis services on
A
ttempting to fight a very dy-
Africa’s political, economic
namic structure such as an or-
and criminal threats ganised crime network with
*** intelligence tools and concepts that are
not suitable to a modern crime-combat-
Due diligence and ing environment is a recipe for failure.
background reports on Yet across the globe we see that private
and public agencies combating organ-
Persons and Companies of
ised crime teach and make use of an in-
Interest throughout Africa telligence approach that is predictable,
compartmentalised and weakened by
***
its exclusive structure and nature.
Setting up of intelligence This “traditional approach” or basic in-
units telligence cycle, is often implemented as
a business process (which it is not) and
*** is adapted with minor changes to suit
the requirements of contemporary
Intelligence information
crime-combating environments. In
management and systems worst case scenarios, the approach or
cycle itself is protected by legislation
***
and, unknowingly to the intelligence
Intelligence training practitioner and investigating officer,
curriculum development integrally weakens the intelligence and
investigative effort.
*** The cycle itself is anti-social and per-
son-centric and the intelligence pro-
Customised OSINT reports
duced is often the result of individuals
working in silos with the end product
www.4knowledge.co.za seldom a collective effort. This cycle
does not respond positively to change
and, because information is slow to be
shared, the usability of intelligence
products reduces significantly over
short periods of time.
When we think about organised crime,
we generally do not think about a per-
son functioning on his own, serving his
own individual interest. Instead, we
think about a network of people that
executes their activities in a structured
and well-thought-out fashion. Al-
though compartmentalised in certain
aspects, the network is aware that it
cannot function in isolation but is de-
pendent on its members for growth and
sustainability.
The organised crime network cannot
achieve the greater benefit when its
members operate as single entities.
18
CRIME
Mario Eybers - South Africa
Within the organised crime network we
see that there is one denominator that
binds the organised group together,
and that is the importance of the social
network for survival. This denomina-
tor is also found in the concepts of
ubuntu and the Target-Centric Ap-
proach to Intelligence.
Ubuntu speaks about the individual and
his relationship within a group or a net-
work. The individual does not exist in
isolation but, because of the group and
his fellow human beings, enjoys growth
and prosperity. Within this network
the actions of the individual has direct
influence on the success of the group.
The concept of ubuntu is not based on
technology, systems and cycles but fo-
cuses on the positive interaction be-
tween individuals to achieve common
goals and objectives.
The Target–Centric Approach is by na-
ture a network approach and a social
process. Intelligence is generated by the
team rather than the analyst working
on his own. It is collaborative in nature
and information is optimised to such an
extent that each member of the team
can utilise the intelligence to his own
advantage and to the greater benefit of
the network.
Together, ubuntu and the Target Centric
Approach offers an alternative that
guarantees the same benefits to which
organised crime networks are accus-
tomed. Both these approaches are more
compatible with modern policing con-
cepts such as sector policing and com-
munity policing than the traditional
intelligence cycle. In a very dynamic
way they adjust rapidly to a changing
environment and optimise the social
network as a platform to assimilate,
produce the best intelligence product
possible.
This article is based on the readings and
interpretation of Clark, Robert M. (2008). Intelli-
gence analysis: A target-centric approach. Wash-
ington DC: CQ Press.●
February 2012 • Foreknowledge

The effective analyst
Associate Investigator, Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Australia
In this, the first in a series of four articles, Janet takes us through the findings of research by her and
Mark Kebbell on what makes intelligence analysts effective.
Having worked
as an analyst and
then as a manager
of analysts I often
wondered what
made some ana-
lysts effective and others ...well
just not! I pondered it for several
years and finally had the opportu-
nity while working with Mark
Kebbell at The Centre of Excel-
lence in Policing and Security to
really nut this out.
I wanted to establish the skills
and abilities required by an ana-
lyst to be recognised as effective.
I set about looking for 30 subject
matter experts (in our speak that
is analysts, managers of analysts
who have substantial experience
and decision-makers who use an-
alytical products) who I could talk
to.
Being the combination of an ac-
ademic nerd and an analyst
meant I wasn’t happy just asking
them in one way what made an
analyst effective, I had to ask in
three ways.
The first method was using the
Repertory Grid Technique (for
those who are interested I recom-
mend reading Kelly, 1955) and
then I used semi structured inter-
19
Janet Evans
views and the Critical Incident
Technique (see Flanagan, 1954).
What I found was all three
methods gave me similar results
but each method added a little
that the other two methods didn’t
reveal. The study showed that
there were three main ways sub-
ject mater experts identified an
effective analyst;
Ÿ The analyst would have
skills and abilities that could
contribute to the develop-
ment and dissemination of
an analytical product,
Ÿ The analyst would have an
attitude that included being
productive, seeking out
work, having a high level
commitment and pride and
having a ‘can do’ attitude,
Ÿ Some physical and personal
attributes, like gender and
age were included that sub-
ject matter experts thought
characterised effectiveness.
In subsequent issues I will talk
more specifically about the find-
ings in each of these three areas
and the meaning it has for us as
analysts and managers.
Overall, the main findings are a
change from the analyst being
career
seen as a technical specialist (who
can create maps, do crime stats)
to a growing understanding of
the analyst as part of a support
structure for decision makers.
For example an analyst who us-
es technical skills to answer a
question posed by management
will only have to engage limited
thinking skills where as in the
role of supporting a decision-
maker the analyst needs to be a
problem-solver who generates
recommendations for action and
would need extensive thinking
ability. Subject matter experts
said these thinking skills included
lateral thinking, critical thinking
and the ability to think ‘outside
the box’.
Analysts
are becoming
decision-makers’ aides
For me, all this has implications
for recruitment, and what train-
ing or development opportunities
we need to be offering our exist-
ing analysts to move them from
technician to a decision-makers
aid. ●
February 2012 • Foreknowledge
 managing
Intelligence managers’ responsibilities
I
n a recent study by the De-
fence Research and Develop-
ment Canada on “Issues in
Intelligence Production - summa-
ry of interviews with Canadian
managers of intelligence ana-
lysts” the following responsibili-
ties were cited:
Ÿ Generating the production
outlook for their group; this
includes defining the scope
and framing the questions
for analytic products.
Ÿ Establishing and maintain-
ing an interface with clients,
that is, the consumers of in-
telligence products. This is
especially important for de-
fining priorities for assess-
ments and seeking feedback
on final products.
Ÿ Actively participating in the
intelligence community
through chairing interde-
partmental meetings.
Ÿ Ensuring production and
timely delivery of analytic
20
manager is a perpetual
change agent: always
prioritisation of work
(Quarmby & Young)
products of satisfactory
quality.
Ÿ Ensuring analytic rigour
through monitoring analytic
processes and challenging
analysts in their assump-
tions, process, and judg-
ments. This challenge
function can be difficult for
both analysts and their man-
agers. It requires deep
knowledge of analytic proc-
esses, solid area knowledge,
and a great deal of tact from
managers.
Ÿ Mentoring and developing
(new) intelligence analysts.
Ÿ Evaluating the quality of an-
alytic products and analysts’
performance.
Ÿ Being involved in the ana-
lysts’ promotion process.
Ÿ Fulfilling financial manage-
ment duties and managing
budgets.
Ÿ Scheduling and allocating
resources.
The intelligence
influencing decision,
influencing direction
and influencing the
Ÿ Providing opportunities for
professional development
for their analysts.
Ÿ Being good listeners in at-
tending to analysts’ con-
cerns.
Ÿ Shielding their group from
various external pressures as
much as possible to allow
them to concentrate on do-
ing analysis.   ●
Food for thought
Why should an analyst want to
work in the intelligence com-
munity when managers cannot
promise analysts electronic
connectivity, state-of-the-art
collaborative technologies, or
ready access to the Internet
and outside experts?
John Gannon
Analyzing intelligence: Origins,
obstacles and innovations (2008)
February 2012 • Foreknowledge
 managing
Focus areas of intelligence managers

I
n their excellent book Managing Intelligence - the Art of Influence, Neil Quarmby and Lisa Jane Young offer
a conceptual model of the role and function of an intelligence manager, irrespective of the specific setting in
which he or she operates. Success relies on careful attention to each of three inter-related areas of focus, often
simultaneously. They
conclude that these are:
Ÿ Upward organi-
sational focus to
ensure that the
intelligence func-
tion is under-
stood, utilised
and valued by
executives and
other senior staff
as an efficient
means of achiev-
ing organisational
goals;
Ÿ Downward focus to direct reports and other junior staff to ensure that long term organisational goals are
understood and used to prioritise intelligence work in the short and medium terms and to ensure that
staff are sufficiently equipped and motivated to provide quality intelligence and
Ÿ Focus on self, with respect to understanding personal strengths and weaknesses as a manager and practi-
tioner.

The limits of intelligence

Paul R. Pillar, deputy director of the CIA’s
Counterterrorist Center from 1997 to 1999
Foreign Policy Jan/Feb 2012
Many things we would like our intelligence services to know are too complex to
model or predict. What the community should be expected to provide is a
strategic understanding of conditions and attitudes that, given the right spark,
could ignite into a full-blown revolution.
No amount of moving around boxes on a flowchart can eliminate unpleasant
surprises, and there will always be new challenges -- especially in an age of
endlessly proliferating information.
Intelligence can help manage uncertainty, defining its scope and specifying what
is known and what is likely to stay unknown. It can distinguish true uncertainty
from simple ignorance by systematically assembling all available information,
but it cannot eliminate uncertainty and it cannot prevent all surprises, including
some big ones. Leaders must accept this reality; they must expect - and
prepare - to be surprised. With due acknowledgment to Donald Rumsfeld, it also
means expecting unknown unknowns. Not only will we not know all the right
answers -- we will not even be asking all the right questions.

February 2012 • Foreknowledge 21

 people
Meet Mary Lattig
Crime intelligence analyst
Government Analyst II (GA)
Mary Lattig has been employed
by the US Florida Department of
Law Enforcement (FDLE) for 22
years. Mary is assigned to the
FDLE Lakeland Field Office
where she supports a squad of six
(6) special agents and a special
agent supervisor tasked with the
investigation of multi jurisdiction-
al felony crimes including eco-
nomic crimes (fraud), violent
crimes, drug crimes, and public
integrity investigations. Mary is a
certified law enforcement trainer
for FDLE and serves as a volun-
teer trainer for the International
Association of Law Enforcement
Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA).
She also volunteers as a mentor
for a regional analyst mentoring
program.
What is the role and function of
intelligence analysts in your
agency?
Within our agency analyst duties
can vary depending on assigned
program area, but as a field office
analyst working in the investiga-
tions program area, my primary
role is to provide analytical sup-
port for criminal investigations
and intelligence gathering. My
routine duties include:
Ÿ the identification of target
subjects
Ÿ preparation of biographical
and background files
Ÿ identification of associates and
assets
22
Local law enforcement, Florida, US
Ÿ obtaining and analyzing com-
munication and financial
records
Ÿ preparation of charts and re-
ports documenting these ef-
forts.
I also assist in the preparation and
service of search warrants and with
subject interviews. I take part in
case briefings and may testify in
court during the prosecution phase.
FDLE analysts are also tasked with
providing analytical support for
other law enforcement agencies
that either don’t have analytic per-
sonnel or need specialized assist-
ance.
Who are your clients and what
type of products do you provide to
them?
FDLE analysts document their
work in investigative reports and
these reports are part of the investi-
gative case file. Other products in-
clude analytical charts (association,
flow, network, etc.), timelines, sus-
pect composites, financial analysis,
spreadsheets, communications fre-
quency lists and charts and maps.
These products are used both dur-
ing an investigation by agents and
during the prosecution phase by
prosecutors.
What is your specialist area and
what do you do to stay informed
and abreast of new developments?
Although I support investigations
involving drugs, violent crime, and
public integrity, my personal area
of interest is economic crime. I seek
out advanced training, newsletters,
blogs, list-serves and articles re-
garding economic crime and try to
stay abreast of fraud trends. I en-
joy the puzzle of identifying the
steps in a fraud or scam and fol-
lowing the money.
What are the greatest challenges
you face as an intelligence ana-
lyst and how do you overcome
them?
One of my greatest challenges is
time management. This challenge
has increased as resources availa-
ble to analysts have increased –
there is never enough time to
check every resource, but without
doing so an analyst wonders
“what have I missed?” I overcome
that challenge by adhering to what
I consider the most important step
in the intelligence cycle – plan-
ning. If an analyst understands the
primary focus (goals) of an investi-
gation and plans accordingly, it
reduces the time spent gathering
needed information.
What can intelligence analysts do
to promote our profession?
Always be willing to lend a hand
to another analyst. If you have a
strong network of analyst contacts,
you will be seen as someone who
can always find an answer, solve a
problem, and get the job done. I
would also encourage all analysts
to join and participate in profes-
sional organizations such as
IALEIA, and participate in local
and regional analytical working
groups. ●
February 2012 • Foreknowledge
 A Case Study of Korean Intelligence Failure: the
nice2know
Second Battle of Yeonpyeong
In his Masters thesis at the Insti-
tute of International and Area
Studies at the Sogang University
in South Korea, Joo Hyeon Lee
under the mentorship of Prof Kyu
Young Lee, analyses the main
causes of intelligence failure of
the Second Battle of Yeon-
pyeong in 2002 using the
framework below.
“The most obvious nature of
intelligence failure is a mis- *
match between the analysis
done at the time and what later
information reveals to have
been true.
In other words, the most cru-
cial and common factor of in-
telligence failure is the
analysis. Many observers also
believe that intelligence failure
ultimately boils down to individ- *Ed: Shifting should read sifting?
ual misperception. the prevailing military organiza-
According to Jung-in Moon and tional culture. Most of all, the in-
the National Intelligence Forum, telligence failure of the On June 29, 2002, the Sec-
there are two major problems Yeonpyeong Naval Battle was ei- ond Battle of Yeonpyeong
with individual analytic failures; ther caused by an intentional dis-
occurred when, as the 2002
capability of analysts and cogni- tortion of information, or by an
tive errors. Korea/Japan World Cup
order of the defense minister to
Problems caused by the capability delete information. was drawing successfully
of analysts are inappropriate And its backdrop was the Sun- to a close, a North Korean
analysis techniques , erroneous shine Policy of the Kim Dae-Jung patrol boat crossed the
assumptions, and lack of exper- administration, which had been northern limit line, attack-
tise. Cognitive failures include influencing the analysis of intelli- ing two South Korean pa-
mirror imaging, cry wolf syn- gence agencies. trol boats. As a result, four
drome, clientism, group thinking, In order to prevent another intel- South Korean sailors were
and received opinion. ligence failure, it is necessary that
killed, with one missing,
Using an analytical framework, intelligence agencies be able to
this study analyzes the case of the and 27 wounded who were
maintain their objectivity.
Second Battle of Yeonpyeong, aboard one of the ships
And it is important to create an
which is an actual and represent- that was originally at-
institutional environment where
ative case of a Korean intelligence analysts are able to investigate tacked. That ship subse-
failure. accurately and objectively. quently sank as it was
Although the Yeonpyeong Naval Through such countermeasures, being towed back to port.
Battle was an incident that oc- future tragedies like the Cheonan
curred over a single-day, it was incident or Yeonpyeong Naval
caused by multiple factors, name- Battle may be averted.”
ly cognitive error by analysts and

February 2012 • Foreknowledge 23

 events discuss collaborate
share
il 2 0 12
Apr
International Studies
San Diego Association
Annual Convention
1 - 4 April 2012 : Hilton San Diego Bayfront, US
The Intelligence Studies Section's contribution to the
annual ISA conference is 18 intelligence studies
oriented panels, and a number of single papers on
other panels that are intelligence (national security
and defense) related including:
▪ Intelligence, IT, and the Global Information Age
▪ Beyond the intelligence cycle

LEIU & IALEIA Annual ▪ Intelligence transformation in new democracies

Conference
April 30 – May 4, 2012
Loews Coronado Bay, San Diego, US
A wide range of topics and training sessions on law
enforcement intelligence related topics
For more information: Click here
▪ Who's Watching? Intelligence and surveillance in
the Information Age
▪ Explaining and evaluating Intelligence Analysis
▪ Intelligence cooperation and communication
▪ Intelligence and the private sector
▪ Improving intelligence analysis methodologies
For conference information click here
For programme information, click here

May
2012
International Association for Intelligence
Education (IAFIE) 8th Annual Conference
21- 24 May 2012 : Washington DC, US
Intelligence Education: Theory and Practice

Call for papers on the following topics:

▪ Research initiatives
▪ History of intelligence analysis
▪ Future trends in the field of intelligence analysis
▪ Nexus between intelligence education and intelligence training
▪ Successes and lessons learned in intelligence education
▪ International perspectives in developing the profession
Contact Bascom D. Talley, Events Committee Chair, at dittalley@jhu.edu no later than close of business on February
29, 2012. More info on CFP here, more info on conference here

24 February 2012 • Foreknowledge


2 0 1 2
J une
International BISA-ISA
conference
20-22 June 2012 : Edinburgh, Scotland
British International Studies Association and the
International Studies Association Joint
International Conference has the following intelli-
gence related themes:
▪ Risks and Challenges: Information, Intelligence
and Procurement in the Military
▪ International Perspectives on the Teaching of
Intelligence
▪ Intelligence, Misconduct and Torture
▪ Understanding Intelligence: From National Sys-
tems to Abstract
For conference information click here
events
ISPM conference
Strategic foresight, strategic agility and future
orientation special interest group
17-20 June 2012 : Barcelona, Spain
Not an intelligence conference, but topics has
relevance to intelligence business and
methodologies
▪ Strategic agility
▪ Environmental scanning and peripheral vision
▪ Strategic foresight
▪ Future orientation
For conference information click here
For special interest group information, click here

July
2012
The Australian Institute of Professional
Intelligence Officers (AIPIO) Annual
conference
Intelligence 2012: Anticipating Risk & Influencing Action
24th - 26th July 2012: Sydney, Australia

Intelligence 2012 explores the challenges arising from the growing

partnership between intelligence practitioners and their customers.
Customer expectations of intelligence officers are growing as
intelligence-led approaches are becoming more widely employed
in government and the private sector.
Two key challenges to be explored at Intelligence 2012 concern:
▪ anticipating risks in the operating environment; and
▪ influencing action by decision-makers.
Intelligence 2012 will include case-based perspectives from
practitioners, managers and customers, offering practical advice to
address these topical professional challenges. You can also attend
two master classes in critical thinking and collective intelligence.
For more information: Click here

February 2012 • Foreknowledge 25

 Advertise in Foreknowledge!
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February 2012 • Foreknowledge
Contribute to the growing body of
knowledge in the intelligence
discipline by writing for journals
and presenting at the following
conferences. Send notices of CFP’s
to editor@foreknowledge.info

Call for Papers

Due in February 2012
IEEE International Conference of Intel-
ligence and Security Informatics.
Theme: Cyberspace, border and immi-
gration securities, June 11-14, 2012,
Washington DC, US.
Proposals: February 15, 2012
Due in March 2012
Information here The Journal of Strategic Security (JSS), a
publication of Henley-Putnam University,
Conference on Strategic Foresight,
seeks manuscripts for the Summer 2012 (Vol.
strategic agility and future orientation,
5, No. 2) issue on the effects – if any – of the
June 17-20, 2012, Barcelona, Spain.
Arab Spring on strategic security around the
Proposals: February 29, 2012.
Information here globe. JSS is a peer-reviewed professional
journal published quarterly by Henley-Putnam
IAFIE conference, May 21-24, 2012, University Press and provides a multi-discipli-
Washington DC, US. nary forum for scholarship and discussion of
Proposals: February 29, 2012. strategic security issues drawing from the fields
Information here of intelligence, terrorism and counterterrorism
studies and protection, among others. The
Journal looks forward to receiving submissions
by the March 15, 2012 deadline. Proposals
Due in April 2012 and inquiries are welcome.
More information here.
International Symposium on Founda-
tions of Open Source Intelligence and
Security Informatics: August 27 & 28,
2012, Istanbul, Turkey. Proposals: 15
April 2012. Information here
Due in May 2012
Workshop on Innovation in Border
Control 2012, August 21-22, 2012, Need to Know II: Lessons learned:
Odense, Denmark. Proposals: 30 April October 16-17 21-22, 2012, Odense,
2012. Information here Denmark. Proposals: May 20, 2012.
Information here
International Symposium on Open
Source Intelligence & Web mining IALEIA Journal Summer 2012:
2012, August 21-22, 2012, Odense, Manuscripts: May 15, 2012.
Denmark. Proposals: 30 April 2012. Information here
Information here

February 2012 • Foreknowledge 27

 Intelligence analysis is less fun than a policy
rotation or an overseas assignment.
It is less honored and romanticized than
other aspects of the Great Game.
It is frustrating. It is exhausting.
And even the best efforts will be picked at.
The analyst’s work will be criticized by the
knowledgeable and the ignorant alike.
It will even be demonized at times -
independent of its quality - and it will always be
hostage to the politics of the moment.
But - and I say this with my four decades
of perspective - what intelligence analysts
do has impact.
It matters.
I have seen the quiet victories of intelligence
and the mistakes averted, and I have seen
critics become advocates
because of what analysts do every day.

Martin Petersen (2011)

Retired senior CIA Directorate of Intelligence (DI) officer and the author
of a number of articles on intelligence and intelligence analysis in recent
article in the CIA’s Studies in Intelligence.

28 February 2012 • Foreknowledge