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MERCULLO V RAMON (CANON 1)
The complaint for the disbarment of Atty.
Marie Frances E. Ramon for violating
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the
Lawyer's Oath for deceiving the
complainants in order to obtain the
substantial amount of P350,000.00 on
the pretext of having the foreclosed asset
of the latter's mother redeemed.
NHMFC sent several demand letters to
Carmelite T. Vedaño regarding her
unpaid obligations secured by the
mortgage covering her residential
property in Novaliches, Caloocan City. To
avoid the foreclosure of the mortgage,
Carmelita authorized her
children,complainants herein, to inquire
from the NHMFC about the status of the
obligations. Verlita and Raymond learned
that their mother's arrears had amounted
to P350,000.00, and that the matter of
the mortgage was under the charge of
respondent Atty. Ramon, but who was
not around at that time.
They later found out she wasn’t involved
with the company any longer.
IBP: violated Canon 1
HELD:
The Court declares the respondent guilty
of dishonesty and deceit. The respondent
certainly transgressed the Lawyer's Oath
by receiving money from the
complainants after having made them
believe that she could assist them in
ensuring the redemption in their
mother's behalf. She was convincing
about her ability to work on the
redemption because she had worked in
the NHFMC. She did not inform them
soon enough, however, that she had
meanwhile ceased to be connected with
the agency. It was her duty to have so
informed them. She further misled them
about her ability to realize the
redemption by falsely informing them
about having started the redemption
process. She concealed from them the
real story that she had not even initiated
the redemption proceedings that she had
assured them she would do. Everything
she did was dishonest and deceitful in
order to have them part with the
substantial sum of P350,000.00. She
took advantage of the complainants who
had reposed their full trust and
confidence in her ability to perform the
task by virtue of her being a lawyer.
Surely, the totality of her actuations
inevitably eroded public trust in the Legal
Profession.
The respondent's conduct patently
breached Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which
provides:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and for legal
processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.
5 years
NULADA V PAULMA (CANON 1)
Disbarment by reason of dishonesty and
conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude filed by Complainant Alex
Nulada.
Complainant alleged that on September
30, 2005, respondent issued in his favor a

check in the amount of P650,000.00 as
payment for the latter's debt. Because of
respondent's standing as a respected
member of the community and his being
a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
the Municipality of Miagao, Province of
Iloilo, complainant accepted the check
without question.
Unfortunately, when he presented the
check for payment, it was dishonored due
to insufficient fluids. Respondent failed to
make good the amount of the check
despite notice of dishonor and repeated
demands, prompting complainant to file
a criminal complaint for violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22
IBP: It found that the offense for which
respondent was found guilty of, i.e.,
violation of BP 22, involved moral
turpitude, and that he violated his
lawyer's oath and the CPR when he
committed the said offense. Stressing the
importance of the lawyer's oath, the IBP
held that by his conviction of the said
crime, respondent has shown that he is
"unfit to protect the administration of
justice or that he is no longer of good
moral character” which justifies either his
suspension or disbarment.
ISSUE: The issue advanced for the
Court's resolution is whether or not
respondent should be administratively
disciplined for having been found guilty
of a crime involving moral turpitude.
HELD:
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates all
members of the bar "to obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law x x
x." Rule 1.01 thereof specifically provides
that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
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conduct." By taking the lawyer's oath, a
lawyer becomes a guardian of the law and
an indispensable instrument for the
orderly administration of justice. As such,
he can be disciplined for any conduct, in
his professional or private capacity, which
renders him unfit to continue to be an
officer of the court.
In this case, respondent's conviction for
violation of BP 22, a crime involving
moral turpitude, had been indubitably
established. Such conviction has, in fact,
already become final. Consequently,
respondent violated the lawyer's oath, as
well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, as
aptly found by the IBP and, thus, must be
subjected to disciplinary action.
Suspended 2 years.
Hernandez v Padilla (CANON 5)
Emilia Hernandez (complainant) against
her lawyer, Atty. Venancio B. Padilla
(respondent) of Padilla Padilla Bautista
Law Offices, for his alleged negligence in
the handling of her case.
The records disclose that complainant
and her husband were the respondents in
an ejectment case filed against them with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).
The RTC ordered that the Deed of Sale
executed in favor of complainant be
cancelled; and that the latter pay the
complainant therein, Elisa Duigan
(Duigan), attorney’s fees and moral
damages.
Complainant and her husband filed their
Notice of Appeal with the RTC.
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals (CA)
ordered them to file their Appellants’
Brief. They chose respondent to represent
them in the case. On their behalf, he

filed a Memorandum on Appeal
instead of an Appellants’ Brief. No
Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the
Resolution dismissing the appeal was
filed by the couple. Complainant claims
that because respondent ignored the
Resolution, he acted with "deceit,
unfaithfulness amounting to malpractice
of law."3 Complainant and her husband
failed to file an appeal, because
respondent never informed them of the
adverse decision. Respondent explained
that he was not the lawyer of
complainant. He averred that prior to the
mandatory conference set by the IBP on
13 December 2005, he had never met
complainant, because it was her husband
who had personally transacted with him.
IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland
R. Villadolid, Jr. found that respondent
violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (the Code).
He recommended that respondent be
suspended from practicing law from 3 to
6 months.
HELD:
When the RTC ruled against complainant
and her husband, they filed a Notice of
Appeal. Consequently, what should apply
is the rule on ordinary appealed cases or
Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Rule 44 requires that the appellant’s brief
be filed after the records of the case have
been elevated to the CA. Respondent, as a
litigator, was expected to know this
procedure. Canon 5 of the Code reads:
CANON 5 — A lawyer shall keep abreast
of legal developments, participate in
continuing legal education programs,
support efforts to achieve high standards
in law schools as well as in the practical
training of law students and assist in
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disseminating information regarding the
law and jurisprudence.
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
SIX (6) MONTHS and STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or
a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.
BENGCO V BERNARDO (CANON 2
& 3)
Facts:
    Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco
filed a complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo for deceit,
malpractice, conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar, and violation of
duties and oath as a lawyer. From 15 April
1997 to 22 July 1997, the respondent –
with the connivance of Andres Magat –
willfully and illegally committed
fraudulent act with intent to defraud
against the complainants by using false
pretenses and deceitful words to the
effect that he would expedite the titling of
land belonging to the Miranda Family of
Tagaytay City, who are the acquaintance
of the complainants.
    It started when the respondent
convinced the complainants to finance
and deliver to him PhP 495,000.00 as
advanced money to expedite the titling of
the subject land. He further committed
misrepresentation by presenting himself
as the lawyer of William Gatchalian, the
prospective buyer of the land. He also led
complaints to believe that he has
contracts at NAMRIA, DENR, CENRO
and the Register of Deeds which
representation he well knew were false,
fraudulent and were only made to induce
the complainants to give and deliver the
said amount. Upon receipt of the money,

he did not comply with his obligation to
expedite the titling of the land but instead
use the money for personal use. The
complainants demanded the return of the
money to no avail.
Issue:
    Whether or not the respondent violated
the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR)?
Held:
    The Supreme Court held that the
respondent committed the acts
complained of. He, himself, admitted in
his answer that his legal services were
hired by the complainants through Magat
regarding the purported titling of land
supposedly purchase. He used his
position as a lawyer in order to deceive
the complainants into believing that he
can expedite the titling of the subject
properties. He never denied that he did
not benefit from the money given by the
complainants in the amount of PhP
495,000.00.
    The Supreme Court find the
respondent in violation of the Rule 2.03,
Canon 2 and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the
CPR. The respondent was suspended
from practice of law for one year and
return the amount of PhP 200,000.00 to
Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco with
10 days upon receipt of decision. The
respondent is required to submit to the
Supreme Court proof of compliance.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or
permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business.
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3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal
services.
SPS RAFOLS V BARRIOS
(LAWYER’S OATH)
Facts:  Dismissed Judge Dizon Jr.
extorted money from the complainant for
the favorable outcome of their case under
the Judge’s sala. The said Judge was
introduced to the complainant by their
lawyer respondent. In a resolution the
Court approved the recommendations,
and directed the Office of the Bar
Confidant to investigate the actuations of
the respondent, and to render its report
and recommendation thereon. in the
proceedings of the OBC, only the
respondent appeared. Denying the
charges against him, he sought the
dismissal of the complaint and re-
affirmed the contents of his comment.
Despite notice, the complainants did not
appear before the OBC. However, the
complainants and the respondent had
testified during the administrative
hearing involving Judge Dizon, Jr. before
Court of Appeals Associate Justice Jose
Sabio Jr. In its Report and
Recommendation of the OBC opined that
the administrative case against the
respondent could not be dismissed on the
ground of failure to prosecute due to the
complainants’ failure to appear in the
scheduled hearing despite due notice.
Based on the facts already established
and identified, as rendered in the
decision against the dismissed Judge
Teodoro A. Dizon, the OBC rejected the
respondent’s denial of any knowledge of
the transaction between his clients and
the judge.

Issue: Whether the OBC erred in finding
the Respondent violating his oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility?
Held: No, the court find  the
recommendation of the OBC to be fully
and competently supported by the
evidence adduced by the complainants
and their witnesses, but we impose the
supreme penalty of disbarment, which we
believe is the proper penalty. To begin
with, the respondent’s denial of
knowledge of the transaction between the
complainants and Judge Dizon, Jr. was
not only implausible, but also
unsubstantiated. It was the respondent
himself who had introduced the
complainants to the judge. His act of
introducing the complainants to the judge
strongly implied that the respondent was
aware of the illegal purpose of the judge
in wanting to talk with the respondent’s
clients.
Secondly, the respondent’s insistence that
he did not see the complainants’ act of
handing the money to the judge is
unbelievable. In his comment, the
respondent even admitted having himself
received the ₱80,000.00 from the
complainants, and having kept
₱30,000.00 of that amount pursuant to
the instruction of the judge as a token of
the friendship between him and the
judge. The admission proved that the
respondent had known all along of the
illegal transaction between the judge and
the complainants, and belied his feigned
lack of knowledge of the delivery of the
money to the judge.
Thirdly, his attempt to explain that the
complainants had given the money to the
judge as a loan, far from softening our
strong impression of the respondent’s
liability, confirmed his awareness of the
gross impropriety of the transaction.
Being the complainants’ attorney in the
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civil case being heard before the judge,
the respondent could not but know that
for the judge to borrow money from his
clients was highly irregular and outrightly
unethical. If he was innocent of
wrongdoing, as he claimed, he should
have desisted from having any part in the
transaction. Yet, he did not, which
rendered his explanation unbelievable.
Compounding the unworthiness of his
explanation was his admission of having
retained ₱30,000.00 of the “borrowed”
money upon the judge’s instruction.
And, lastly, the OBC has pointed out that
the respondent’s act of requesting the
NBI Regional Office in Davao City to
investigate was an afterthought on his
part. We agree with the OBC, for the
respondent obviously acted in order to
anticipate the complainants’ moves
against him and the judge. To be sure, the
respondent sensed that the complainants
would not simply forgive and forget the
mulcting they had suffered at the hands
of the judge and their own attorney from
the time that the complainants assured
him that they were no longer interested to
get back their money despite their being
very angry at the judge’s greed.
Overall, the respondent’ denials were
worthless and unavailing in the face of
the uncontradicted evidence showing that
he had not only personally arranged the
meeting between Manuel and Judge
Dizon, Jr., but had also communicated to
the complainants the judge’s illegal
reason for the meeting. It is axiomatic
that any denial, to be accepted as a viable
defense in any proceeding, must be
substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. This need derives from the
nature of a denial as evidence of a
negative and self-serving character,
weightless in law and insufficient to

overcome the testimony of credible
witnesses on affirmative matters.
The conclusion that the respondent and
the disgraced Judge Dizon, Jr. were
conspirators against the former’s own
clients, whom he was sworn to protect
and to serve with utmost fidelity and
morality, is inevitable for the Court to
make in this administrative case. And,
being conspirators, they both deserve the
highest penalty. The disbarment of the
respondent is in order, because such
sanction is on par with the dismissal of
Judge Dizon, Jr.
PCGG vs Sandiganbayan, et al.
G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005.
(CANON 6)
Facts:
In 1976, General Bank and Trust
Company (GENBANK) encountered
financial difficulties. GENBANK had
extended considerable financial support
to Filcapital Development Corporation
causing it to incur daily overdrawings on
its current account with the Central Bank.
It was later found by the Central Bank
that GENBANK had approved various
loans to directors, officers, stockholders
and related interests totaling P172.3
million, of which 59% was classified as
doubtful and P0.505 million as
uncollectible. As a bailout, the Central
Bank extended emergency loans to
GENBANK which reached a total of P310
million. Despite the mega loans,
GENBANK failed to recover from its
financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the
Central Bank issued a resolution
declaring GENBANK insolvent and
unable to resume business with safety to
its depositors, creditors and the general
public, and ordering its liquidation. A
public bidding of GENBANK's assets was
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held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein
the Lucio Tan group submitted the
winning bid. Subsequently, former
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza
filed a petition with the then Court of
First Instance praying for the assistance
and supervision of the court in
GENBANK's liquidation as mandated by
Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution
toppled the Marcos government. One of
the first acts of President Corazon C.
Aquino was to establish the Presidential
Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten
wealth of former President Ferdinand
Marcos, his family and his cronies.
Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on
July 17, 1987, filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for
"reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages" against
respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao
Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P.
Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee,
Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito
Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr.,
Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe
Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo,
Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth
Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong,
Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita,
Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation
(Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance
Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic
Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc.,
Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan
Development Corp., Himmel Industries,
Iris Holdings and Development Corp.,
Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing
Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw
Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern
Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive
Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay
Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings &

Development Corp., (collectively referred
to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda
R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar
Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio
Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan. In connection
therewith, the PCGG issued several writs
of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by the above-named persons by
taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former
President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this
Court and filed petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction to nullify,
among others, the writs of sequestration
issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the
parties' comments, this Court referred the
cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper
disposition. These cases were docketed as
Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these
cases, respondents Tan, et al. were
represented by their counsel, former
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza,
who has then resumed his private
practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed
motions to disqualify respondent
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan,
et al. with the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0005
and 0096-0099. The motions alleged that
respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor
General and counsel to Central Bank,
"actively intervened" in the liquidation of
GENBANK, which was subsequently
acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and
became Allied Banking Corporation.
Respondent Mendoza allegedly
"intervened" in the acquisition of
GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al.
when, in his capacity as then Solicitor
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General, he advised the Central Bank's
officials on the procedure to bring about
GENBANK's liquidation and appeared as
counsel for the Central Bank in
connection with its petition for assistance
in the liquidation of GENBANK which he
filed with the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was
docketed as Special Proceeding No.
107812. The motions to disqualify
invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03
prohibits former government lawyers
from accepting "engagement or
employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while
in said service."
On April 22, 1991, the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
denying PCGG's motion to disqualify
respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No.
0005. It found that the PCGG failed to
prove the existence of an inconsistency
between respondent Mendoza's former
function as Solicitor General and his
present employment as counsel of the
Lucio Tan group. It noted that
respondent Mendoza did not take a
position adverse to that taken on behalf
of the Central Bank during his term as
Solicitor General. It further ruled that
respondent Mendoza's appearance as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was
beyond the one-year prohibited period
under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No.
6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor
General in the year 1986. The said section
prohibits a former public official or
employee from practicing his profession
in connection with any matter before the
office he used to be with within one year
from his resignation, retirement or
separation from public office. The PCGG
did not seek any reconsideration of the
ruling.

Issue:
            Whether or not the present
engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel
for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Cases
Nos. 0096-0099 violates the interdiction
embodied in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Held:
            No. The Supreme Court ruled that
Atty. Mendoza can be a counsel if Tan, et
al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 without
violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The act of
respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General
involved in the case at bar is "advising the
Central Bank, on how to proceed with the
said bank's liquidation and even filing the
petition for its liquidation with the CFI of
Manila." In fine, the Court should resolve
whether his act of advising the Central
Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is included within the concept
of "matter" under Rule 6.03. the Supreme
Court held that this advice given by
respondent Mendoza on the procedure to
liquidate GENBANK is not the "matter"
contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It is given
that respondent Mendoza had nothing to
do with the decision of the Central Bank
to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given
that he did not participate in the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter"
where he got himself involved was in
informing Central Bank on the procedure
provided by law to liquidate GENBANK
thru the courts and in filing the necessary
petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the
then Court of First Instance. The subject
"matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812,
therefore, is not the same nor is related to
but is different from the subject “matter”
in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No.
0096 involves the sequestration of the
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stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al.,
in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that
they are ill-gotten. The case does not
involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor
does it involve the sale of GENBANK to
Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock
of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-
gotten is far removed from the issue of
the dissolution and liquidation of
GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by
the Central Bank due, among others, to
the alleged banking malpractices of its
owners and officers. In other words, the
legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is
not an issue in the sequestration cases.
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does
not include the dissolution and
liquidation of banks. It goes without
saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility cannot apply
to respondent Mendoza because his
alleged intervention while a Solicitor
General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an
intervention on a matter different from
the matter involved in Civil Case No.
0096.
ALI V BUBONG (CANON 6,
DISBARRED)
This is a verified petition for
disbarment filed against Atty.
Mosib Ali Bubong for having been
found guilty of grave misconduct
while holding the position of
Register of Deeds of Marawi City.
Off-shoot of the administrative case
earlier filed by complainant against
respondent. In said case, which was
initially investigated by the Land
Registration Authority (LRA),
complainant charged respondent with
illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance
of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).

The case was then forwarded to the
Department of Justice for review and in a
report dated 08 September 1992, then
Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon
exonerated respondent of the charges of
illegal exaction and infidelity in the
custody of documents. He, however,
found respondent guilty of grave
misconduct for his imprudent issuance of
TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the
criminal case for violation of the Anti-
Squatting Law instituted against Hadji
Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter's co-
accused. As a result of this finding,
Secretary Drilon recommended
respondent's dismissal from service.
HELD:
In the case at bar, respondent's grave
misconduct, as established by the Office
of the President and subsequently
affirmed by this Court, deals with his
qualification as a lawyer. By taking
advantage of his office as the Register of
Deeds of Marawi City and employing his
knowledge of the rules governing land
registration for the benefit of his
relatives, respondent had clearly
demonstrated his unfitness not only to
perform the functions of a civil servant
but also to retain his membership in the
bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It
reads:
Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government
service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests,
nor allow the latter to interfere with his
public duties.
Respondent's conduct manifestly
undermined the people's confidence in
the public office he used to occupy and
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cast doubt on the integrity of the legal
profession. The ill-conceived use of his
knowledge of the intricacies of the law
calls for nothing less than the withdrawal
of his privilege to practice law.
ABELLA V BARRIOS (CANON 6)
FACTS:
Complainant obtained a favorable
judgment from the Court of Appeals
involving a Labor Case. Complainant then
filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Execution before the Regional Arbitration
Branch which the respondent was the
Labor Arbiter. After the lapse of five (5)
months, complainant’s motion remained
unacted, prompting him to file a Second
Motion for Execution. However, still,
there was no action until the complainant
agreed to give respondent a portion of the
monetary award thereof after the latter
asked from the former how much would
be his share. Thereafter, respondent
issued a writ of execution but the
employer of the complainant moved to
quash the said writ. Eventually, issued a
new writ of execution wherein
complainant’s monetary awards were
reduced to the effect that it modifies the
DECISION of the CA. Complainant now
filed the instant disbarment complaint
before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), averring that
respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility for (a)
soliciting money from complainant in
exchange for a favorable resolution; and
(b) issuing a wrong decision to give
benefit and advantage to PT&T,
complainant’s employer.
I: violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon
1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code.

Held:
YES. The above-cited rules, which are
contained under Chapter 1 of the Code,
delineate the lawyer’s responsibility to
society: Rule 1.01 engraves the overriding
prohibition against lawyers from
engaging in any unlawful, dishonest,
immoral and deceitful conduct; Rule 1.03
proscribes lawyers from encouraging any
suit or proceeding or delaying any man’s
cause for any corrupt motive or interest;
meanwhile, Rule 6.02 is particularly
directed to lawyers in government
service, enjoining them from using one’s
public position to: (1) promote private
interests; (2) advance private interests; or
(3) allow private interests to interfere
with public duties. It is well to note that a
lawyer who holds a government office
may be disciplined as a member of the
Bar only when his misconduct also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer. The infractions of the respondent
constitute gross misconduct.
Jurisprudence illumines that immoral
conduct involves acts that are willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and that show a
moral indifference to the opinion of the
upright and respectable members of the
community. It treads the line of grossness
when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the
community’s sense of decency. On the
other hand, gross misconduct constitutes
"improper or wrong conduct, the
transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character,
and implies a wrongful intent and not
mere error of judgment." In this relation,
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
states that when a lawyer is found guilty
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of gross immoral conduct or gross
misconduct, hemay be suspended or
disbarred.However, the Court takes
judicial notice of the fact that he had
already been disbarred in a previous
administrative case, entitled Sps. Rafols,
Jr. v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr., which
therefore precludes theCourt from
duplicitously decreeing the same. In view
of the foregoing, the Courtdeems it
proper to, instead, impose a fine in the
amount of P40,000.00 in order to
penalize respondent’s transgressions as
discussed herein and to equally deter the
commission of the same or similar acts in
the future.
VILLATUYA V TABALINGCOS
(RULE 9 and 2)
In this Complaint for disbarment filed on
06 December 2004 with the Office or the
Bar Confidant, complainant Manuel G.
Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty.
Tabalingcos (resrondent) with unlawful
solicitation of cases, violation of the Code
or Professional Responsibility for
nonpayment of fees to complainant, and
gross immorality for marrying two other
women while respondent’s first marriage
was subsisting.
In his defense, respondent denied the
charges against him. He asserted that
complainant was not an employee of his
law firm – Tabalingcos and Associates
Law Office14 – but of Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc., where the former is a
major stockholder.15 Respondent alleged
that complainant was unprofessional and
incompetent in performing his job as a
financial consultant, resulting in the
latter’s dismissal of many rehabilitation
plans they presented in their court cases.
16 Respondent also alleged that there was
no verbal agreement between them

regarding the payment of fees and the
sharing of professional fees paid by his
clients. He proffered documents showing
that the salary of complainant had been
paid.
First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in
the fees
The first charge of complainant against
respondent for the nonpayment of the
former’s share in the fees, if proven to be
true is based on an agreement that is
violative of Rule 9.0245 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is
proscribed by the Code to divide or agree
to divide the fees for legal services
rendered with a person not licensed to
practice law. Based on the allegations,
respondent had agreed to share with
complainant the legal fees paid by clients
that complainant solicited for the
respondent. Complainant, however, failed
to proffer convincing evidence to prove
the existence of that agreement.
Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients
Complainant charged respondent with
unlawfully soliciting clients and
advertising legal services through various
business entities. Complainant submitted
documentary evidence to prove that Jesi
& Jane Management Inc. and Christmel
Business Link, Inc. were owned and used
as fronts by respondent to advertise the
latter’s legal services and to solicit clients.
In its Report, the IBP established the
truth of these allegations and ruled that
respondent had violated the rule on the
solicitation of clients, but it failed to point
out the specific provision that was
breached.
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A review of the records reveals that
respondent indeed used the business
entities mentioned in the report to solicit
clients and to advertise his legal services,
purporting to be specialized in corporate
rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of
the case, he violated Rule 2.0347 of the
Code, which prohibits lawyers from
soliciting cases for the purpose of
profit.
Third Charge:
Bigamy
The third charge that respondent
committed bigamy twice is a serious
accusation. To substantiate this
allegation, complainant submitted NSO-
certified copies of the Marriage Contracts
entered into by respondent with three (3)
different women. The latter objected to
the introduction of these documents,
claiming that they were submitted after
the administrative case had been
submitted for resolution, thus giving him
no opportunity to controvert them.52 We
are not persuaded by his argument.
We find him guilty of gross immorality
under the Code. DISBARRED
CLARISSA V ADVINCULA
(babaero; CANON 7, Rule 1)
This administrative case stemmed from
the complaint for disbarment dated June
16, 2006 brought to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) against Atty.
Leonardo C. Advincula (Atty. Advincula)
by no less than his wife, Dr. Ma. Cecilia
Clarissa C. Advincula (Dr. Advincula).
Dr. Advincula has averred that Atty.
Advincula committed unlawful and
immoral acts; that while Atty. Advincula
was still married to her, he had extra-
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marital sexual relations with Ma. Judith fitness to practice law, nor should he,
Ortiz Gonzaga (Ms. Gonzaga); that the whether in public or private life, behave
extra-marital relations bore a child in the in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
name of Ma. Alexandria Gonzaga the legal profession.
Advincula (Alexandria); that Atty.
Advincula failed to give financial support WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND
to their own children; that he admitted in DECLARES ATTY. LEONARDO C.
the affidavit of late registration of birth of ADVINCULA GUILTY of immorality; and
Alexandria that he had contracted SUSPENDS him from the practice of law
another marriage with Ms. Gonzaga. for a period of THREE MONTHS
EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE HEREOF,
IBP: In the light of the foregoing with a STERN WARNING
disquisition, having, in effect,
Respondent's own admission of having
committed an extra-marital affair and
fathering a child, it is respectfully
recommended that he be suspended from
the practice of law for at least one month
with the additional admonition that
should he repeat the same, a more severe
penalty would be imposed.

HELD:
The good moral conduct or character
must be possessed by lawyers at the time
of their application for admission to the
Bar, and must be maintained until
retirement from the practice of law. In
this regard, the Code of Professional
Responsibility states:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in

unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

xxxx

CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times

uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxxx

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in

conduct that adversely reflects on his