2016 2017 2019 (No Answer) Rem Barqs

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Bar Exam 2016 Suggested Answers in

Remedial Law by the UP Law Complex


March 21, 2019

State at least five (5) civil cases that fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts (RTC’s). (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

The Regional Trial Courts inter alia shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in the
following civil cases:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim exceeds
Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim
exceeds Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00);

(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate
exceeds Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila,
where such gross value exceeds Four Hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00);

(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;

(7) in all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian Relations as now provided
by law; and

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney’s fees litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds
Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the
demand exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Four Hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000,00)” (Section 1, Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
“Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).

II

Briefly explain the procedure on “Interrogatories to Parties” under Rule 25 and state the effect of
failure to serve written interrogatories. (2.5%)

(B) Briefly explain the procedure on “Admission by Adverse Party” under Rule 26 and the effect
of failure to file and serve the request. (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

(A) PROCEDURE

1 Any party desiring to elicit material and relevant facts from any adverse parties shall file and
serve upon the latter written interrogatories to be answered by the party served or, if the party
served is a public or private corporation or a partnership or association, by any officer thereof
competent to testify in its behalf (Section 1, Rule 25, Rules of Court).

2. The interrogatories shall be answered fully in writing and shall be signed and sworn to by the
person making them. The party upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall file and
serve a copy of the answers on the party submitting the interrogatories within fifteen (15) days
after service thereof, unless the court on motion and for good cause shown, extends or shortens
the time (Section 2, Rule 25, Rules of Court).

3. Objections to any interrogatories may be presented to the court

within ten (10) days after service thereof, with notice as in case of a motion; and answers shall be
deferred until the objections are resolved, which shall be at as early a time as is practicable
(Section 3. Rule 25, Rules of Court).

Should a party fail to file and serve written interrogatories on adverse party, he cannot compel
the latter to give testimony in one court or to give deposition pending appeal, unless allowed by
the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice (Section 6. Rule 25, Rules of
Court; Spouses Vicente Afulugencia and Leticia Afulugencia v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.,
et al., G.R. No. 185145 February 5, 2014).

(B) PROCEDURE

1. At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file and serve upon any party a written
request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and relevant document
described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material and relevant matter of
fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the request unless
copies have already been furnished (Section 1, Rule 26, Rules of Court).

2. Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless,
within a period designated in the request, which shall not be less than fifteen (15) days after
service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom
the request directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement
either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in
detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.

3. Objections to any request for admission shall be submitted to the court by the party requested
within the period for and prior to the filing of his sworn statement as contemplated in the
preceding paragraph and his compliance therewith shall be deferred until such obligations are
resolved, which resolution shall be made as early as practicable (Section 2, Rule 26, Rules of
Court).

4. Any admission made by a party pursuant to such request is for the purpose of the pending
action only and shall not constitute an admission by him for any other purpose nor may the same
be used against him in any other proceeding (Section 3, Rule 26). Unless otherwise allowed by
the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice a party who fails to file and
serve a request for admission on the adverse party of material and relevant facts at issue which
are, or ought to be, within the personal knowledge of the latter, shall not be permitted to present
evidence on such facts (emphasis supplied] (Section 5, Rule 26, Rules of Court).

III

What are the contents of a judicial affidavit? (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

A judicial affidavit shall be prepared in the language known to the witness and, if not in English
or Filipino, accompanied by a translation in English or Filipino, and shall contain the following:
(a) The name, age, residence or business address, and occupation of the witness; (b) The name
and address of the lawyer who conducts or supervises the examination of the witness and the
place where the examination is being held; (c) A statement that the witness is answering the
questions asked of him, fully conscious that he does so under oath, and that he may face criminal
liability for false testimony or perjury; (d) Questions asked of the witness and his corresponding
answers, consecutively numbered, that: (1) Show the circumstances under which the witness
acquired the facts upon which he testifies; (2) Elicit from him those facts which are relevant to
the issues that the case presents; and (3) Identify the attached documentary and object evidence
and establish their authenticity in accordance with the Rules of Court; (e) The signature of the
witness over his printed name; and (f) A jurat with the signature of the notary public who
administers the oath or an officer who is authorized by law to administer the same (Section 3,
A.M. No. 12-8-8 SC, Judicial Affidavit Rule).

IV.
Eduardo a resident of the City of Manila, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
a complaint for the annulment of a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage he signed in favor of Galaxy
Bank (Galaxy), and the consequent foreclosure and auction sale on his mortgaged Makati prop
erty, Galaxy filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue alleging that the
complaint should be filed with the RTC of Makati since the complaint involves the ownership
and possession of Eduardo’s lot. Resolve the motion with reasons. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

The Motion to dismiss should be granted. An action for nullification of the mortgage documents
and foreclosure of the mortgaged property is a real action that affects the title to the property;
thus, venue of the real action is before the court having jurisdiction over the territory in which
the property lies (Jimmy T. Go v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 156187, November
11, 2004; Chua v. Total Office Products & Services, G.R. No. 152808, September 30, 2005).

In Fortune Motors v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112191, February 7, 1997), the Supreme Court
also held that an action to annul a foreclosure sale of a real estate mortgage is no different from
an action to annul a private sale of real property. While it is true that petitioner does not directly
seek the recovery of title or possession of the property in question, his action for annulment of
sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the
building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of which is
petitioner’s primary objective.

The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property
does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is
to recover said real property. It is a real action (Paglaum Management & Development
Corporation v. Union Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179018, June 18, 2012).

Being a real action, it shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction
over the area where the real property involved. or a portion thereof, is situated (Section 1, Rule 4,
Rules of Court). The complaint should be filed in the RTC of Makati where the mortgaged
property is situated.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER

The motion to dismiss should be denied. An action for the annulment of a real estate mortgage is
a personal action, which may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides or may
be found, at the election of plaintiff (Sec. 2, Rule 4, Rules of Court; Chua v. Total Office
Products & Services, G.R. No. 152808, September 30, 2005; Orbeta v. Orbeta, G.R. No.
166837, November 27, 2006). Since the plaintiff resides in Manila, the complaint was properly
filed in RTC of Manila.

V.
(A) What is the “most important witness” rule pursuant to the 2004 Guidelines of Pre-trial and
Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures? Explain. (2.5%)

(B) What is the “one day examination of witness” rule pursuant to the said 2004 Guidelines?
Explain. (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

(A) Under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC or the “2004 Guidelines of Pre-trial and Use of Deposition-
Discovery Measures,” in civil cases where no amicable settlement was reached by the parties, the
trial judge is directed to determine the most important witnesses and limit the number of such
witnesses to be heard. The court shall also require the parties and/or counsels to submit the
names, addresses and contact numbers of the witnesses to be summoned by subpoena. The facts
to be proven by each witness and the approximate number of hours per witness shall also be
fixed by the trial judge (Section (1)(A) (5) (i) of A.M. No. 03-01-09-SC or the “2004 Guidelines
of Pre-trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures”, July 13, 2004).

(B) The rule requires that a witness has to be fully examined in one (1) day only. This rule shall
be strictly adhered to subject to the courts’ discretion during trial on whether or not to extend the
direct and/ or cross-examination for justifiable reasons. On the last hearing day allotted for each
party, he is required to make his formal offer of evidence after the presentation of his last witness
and the opposing party is required to immediately interpose his objection thereto. Thereafter, the
judge shall make the ruling on the offer of evidence in open court, but the judge has the
discretion to allow the offer of evidence in writing in conformity with Section 35, Rule 132
(Section (1)(A)(5)(i) of A.M. No. 03-01-09-SC or the “2004 Guidelines of Pre-trial and Use of
Deposition-Discovery Measures”, July 13, 2004).

VI.

Pedro and luan are residents of Barangay Ifurug, Municipality of Dupac, Mountain Province.
Pedro owes Juan the amount of P50,000.00. Due to non-payment, Juan brought his complaint to
the Council of Elders of said barangay which implements the bodong justice system. Both
appeared before the council where they verbally agreed that Pedro will pay in installments on
specific due dates. Pedro reneged on his promise. Juan filed a complaint for sum of money
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Pedro filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
case did not pass through the barangay conciliation under R.A. No. 7160 and that the RTC, not
the MTC, has jurisdiction. In his opposition, Juan argued that the intervention of the Council of
Elders is substantial compliance with the requirement of R.A. No. 7160 and the claim of
P50,000.00 is clearly within the jurisdiction of the MTC. As MTC judge, rule on the motion and
explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

The Motion to Dismiss should be denied. As a general rule, no complaint involving any matter
within the authority of the Lupon shall be instituted or filed directly in court for adjudication
unless there has been a confrontation between the parties in the barangay and no settlement was
reached (Section 412(a) of Republic Act No. 7160; April Martinez, v. Rodolfo G. Martinez, G.R.
No. 162084, June 28, 2005). However, in barangays where majority of the inhabitants are
members of indigenous cultural communities, local systems of settling disputes through their
councils of datus or lders shall be recognized without prejudice to the applicable provisions of e
Local Government Code (Sections 399, R.A. 7160). As a consequence, customs and traditions of
indigenous cultural communities shall be ned in settling disputes between members of the
cultural communities (Sections 412, R.A. 7160), thus, the confrontation between Pedro and Juan
before the Council of Elders of their barangay is sufficient compliance with the precondition for
filing the case in court under Section 412 of R.A. No. 7160 (Zamora v. Heirs of Izquierdo, G.R.
No. 146195, November 18, 2004).

Be that as it may, it is well-settled that the mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement under
the Katarungan Pambarangay Law does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041 of the
Civil Code (Crisanta Miguel v. Montanez, G.R. No. 191336, January 25, 2014). Accordingly,
when Juan filed a complaint for sum of money in the MTC, he is deemed to have rescinded the
compromise agreement reached before the Council of Elders of the barangay. Henceforth, Pedro
is incorrect in alleging that the RTC, not the MTC, has jurisdiction over Juan’s claim.
Considering that the claim is only for P50,000.00, the case is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the MTC under B.P. Blg. 129 and may proceed pursuant to A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC or the “Rules of
Procedure for Small Claims Cases.” Notably, a motion to dismiss is among the prohibited
pleadings under Section 14(a) of said rules. Similarly, Juan’s claim of P50,000.00 may be
governed by the 1991 Rules on Summary Procedure which clearly falls within the jurisdiction of
the MTC, ergo, the motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter should
be denied (Section 19 (a), 1991 Rules on Summary Procedure).

VII

Spouses Marlon and Edith have three (3) children ages, 15, 12 and 7, who are studying at public
schools. They have combined gross monthly income 0f P30,000.00 and they stay in an apartment
in Manila with a monthly rent of P5,000.00. The monthly minimum wage per employee in Metro
Manila does not exceed P13,000.00. They do not own any real property. The spouses want to
collect a loan of P25,000.00 from Jojo but do not have the money to pay the filing fees.

(A) Would the spouses qualify as indigent litigants under Section 19, Rule 141 on Legal Fees?
(2.5%)]

(B) If the spouses do not qualify under Rule 141, what other remedy can they avail of under the
rules to exempt them from paying the filing fees? (2.5)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

(A) No. Spouses Marlon and Edith would not qualify as indigent litigants. Under Section 19 of
Rule 141, Indigent litigants include those (a) whose gross income and that of their immediate
family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and (b)
who do not own real property with a fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration of
more than three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) pesos, shall be exempt from payment of legal
fees (Section 19 of Rule 141, Administrative Matter No. 04-2-04-SC, August 16, 2004; Algura
v. Local Government Unit of the City of Naga, G.R. No. 150135, October 30, 2006). Here, the
spouses combined gross monthly income of P30,000.00 exceeds the limit provided by Section
19, Rule 141; accordingly, the spouses do not qualify as indigent litigants.

(B) The spouses can avail the following remedies under the rules in order to be exempted from
the payment of the filing fees:

1. If the applicant for exemption meets the salary and property requirements under Section
19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On the other hand, when
the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the application should not
be denied outright; instead, the court should apply the “indigency test” under Section 21
of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for
exemption (Algura v. Local Government Unit of the City of Naga, G.R. No. 150135,
October 30, 2006). Hence, the spouses may be authorized to litigate as indigents if the
court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that they do not have money
or property sufficient and available for food, shelter, and basic necessities for themselves
and their family (Rule 3, Sec. 21, Rules of Court; Re: Query of Mr. Roger Prioreschi,
A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC, August 19, 2009).

2. The Spouses can also file a motion to sue as indigent under the Rules of Procedure on Small
Claims. The Motion shall be referred to the Executive Judge for immediate action in case of
multi-sala courts. If the motion is granted by the Executive Judge, the case shall be raffled off or
assigned to the court designated to hear small claims cases. If the motion is denied, the plaintiff
shall be given five (5) days within which to pay the docket fees, otherwise, the case shall be
dismissed without prejudice. In no case shall a party, even if declared an indi gent, be exempt
from the payment of the P1,000.00 fee for service of summons and processes (Section 10, A.M.
No. 08-8-7-SC, 2016 Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases).

3. The spouses may also claim exemption from payment of legal fees by seeking the help of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines pursuant to A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC (IRR), Rule on the Exemption
from the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid and of the
Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

VIII

Juan sued Roberto for specific performance. Roberto knew that Juan was going to file the case so
he went out of town and temporarily stayed in another city to avoid service of summons. Juan
engaged the service of Sheriff Matinik to serve the summons but when the latter went to the
residence of Roberto, he was told by the caretaker thereof that his employer no longer resides at
the house. The caretaker is a high school graduate and is the godson of Roberto. Believing the
caretaker’s story to be true, Sheriff Matinik left a copy of the summons and complaint with the
caretaker. Was there a valid substituted service of summons? Discuss the requirements for a
valid service of summons. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER
No. There was no valid substituted service of summons. In an action strictly in personam,
personal service on the defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of
the summons to the defendant in person. If defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be served
with the summons within a reasonable period, then substituted service can be resorted to. While
substituted service of summons is permitted, it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of
the usual method of Service; hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed
requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules. Compliance with the rules regarding the
service of summons is as important as the issue of due process for the Court to acquire
jurisdiction. For the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty to apply, the
Sheriff’s Return must show that serious efforts or attempts were exerted to personally serve the
summons and that said efforts failed. These facts must be specifically narrated in the Return. It
must clearly show that the substituted service must be made on a person of suitable age and
discretion living in the dwelling or residence of defendant; otherwise, the Return is flawed and
the presumption cannot be availed of. The Supreme Court laid down the requirements as follows:

1. Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted service or the
sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt
service within a reasonable time, Reasonable time being “so much time as is necessary under the
circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract
or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if
any..] to the other party”. Moreover, it must be indicated therein that the sheriff has made several
attempts at personal service for at least three (3) times on at least two (2) different dates.

2. Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts
and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.

3. Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at defendant’s
house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendant’s office or regular place of
business (Ma. Imelda M. Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130974 August 16, 2006).

IX

(A) Is the buyer in the auction sale arising from an extra-judicial foreclosure entitled to a writ of
possession even before the expiration of the redemption period? If so, what is the action to be
taken? (1%)

(B) After the period of redemption has lapsed and the title to the lot is consolidated in the name
of the auction buyer, is he entitled to the writ of possession as a matter of right? If so, what is the
action to be taken? (2%)

(C) Suppose that after the title to the lot has been consolidated in the name of the auction buyer,
said buyer sold the lot to a third party without first getting a writ of possession. Can the
transferee exercise the right of the auction buyer and claim that it is a ministerial duty of the
court to issue a writ of possession in his favor? Briefly explain. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER
(A) Yes, the buyer in the auction sale is entitled to a writ of possession even before the
expiration of the redemption period upon the filing of the ex parte petition for issuance of a writ
of possession and posting of the appropriate bond. Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended, the writ of possession may be issued to the purchaser in a foreclosure sale either within
the one-year redemption period upon the filing of a bond, or after the lapse of the redemption
period, without need of a bond (LZK Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters
Development Bank, G.R. No. 167998, April 27, 2007). Stated otherwise, Section 7 of Act No.
3135, as amended, also refers situation wherein the purchaser seeks possession of the foreclosed
property during the 12-month period for redemption. Hence, upon the purchaser’s filing of the ex
parte petition and posting of the appropriate bond, the RTC shall, as a matter of course, order the
issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the purchaser (Spouses Nicasio Marquez and Anita
J. Marquez v. Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog, G.R. No. 184045, January 22,
2014; Spouses Jose Gatuslao and Ermila Gatuslao v. Leo Ray Yanson, G.R. No. 191540, January
21, 2015).

(B) Yes, the auction buyer is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right. It is settled that
the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not
redeemed within a period of one year after the registration of the certificate of sale. He is,
therefore, entitled to the possession of the property and can demand it at any time following the
consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of
title. In such a case, the bond required in Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is no longer necessary.
Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner.
Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a
ministerial duty of the court (LZK Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters
Development Bank, G.R. No. 167998, April 27, 2007; Spouses Nicasio C. Marquez and Anita J.
Marquez v. Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog, G.R. No. 184045, January 22, 2014;
Spouses Jose Gatuslao and Ermila Gatuslao v. Leo Ray Yanson, G.R. No. 191540, January 21,
2015).

(C) Yes. The transferee can exercise the right of the auction buyer. A transferee or successor-in-
interest of the auction buyer by virtue of the contract of sale between them, is considered to have
stepped into the shoes of the auction buyer. As such, the transferee is necessarily entitled to avail
of the provisions of Section 7 of Act 3135, as amended, as if he is the auction buyer (Spouses
Jose Gatuslao and Ermila Gatuslao v. Leo Ray Yonson, G.R. No. 191540, January 21, 2015),
When the lot purchased at a foreclosure sale is in turn sold or transferred, the right to the
possession thereof, along with all other rights of ownership, transfers to its new owner (Spouses
Gallent v. Velasquez, G.R. No. 203949, April 6, 2016), ergo, it is a ministerial duty of the court
to issue a writ of possession in favor of the transferee of the auction buyer.

Hannibal, Donna, Florence and Joel, concerned residents of Laguna de Bay, filed a complaint of
mandamus against the Laguna Lake Development Authority, the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, the Department of Public Works and Highways, Department of Interior
and Local Government, Department of Agriculture, Department of Budget, and Philippine
National Police before the RTC of Laguna alleging that the continued neglect of defendants in
performing their duties has resulted in serious deterioration of the water quality of the lake and
the degradation of the marine life in the lake. The plaintiffs prayed that said government agencies
be ordered to clean up Laguna de Bay and restore its water quality to Class C waters as
prescribed by Presidential Decree 1152, otherwise known as the Philippine Environment Code.
Defendants raise the defense that the cleanup of the lake is not a ministerial function and they
cannot be compelled by mandamus to perform the same. The RTC of Laguna rendered a decision
declaring that it is the duty of the agencies to clean up Laguna de Bay and issued a permanent
writ of mandamus ordering said agencies to perform their duties prescribed by law relating to the
cleanup of Laguna de Bay.

(A) Is the RTC correct in issuing the writ of mandamus? Explain. (2.5%)

(B) What is the writ of continuing mandamus? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

(A) Yes, the RTC is correct in issuing the writ of mandamus. Generally, the writ of mandamus
lies to require the execution; of a ministerial duty. While the implementation of the Government
agencies mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the
very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled
by mandamus.

Here, the duty to clean up Laguna lake and restore its water quality to Class C is required not
only by Presidential Decree No. 1152, otherwise known as the Philippine Environment Code, but
also in its charter. It is, thus, ministerial in nature and can be compelled by mandamus.

Accordingly, the RTC may issue a writ of continuing mandamus directing any agency or
instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by
final judgment which shall remain effective until the judgment is fully satisfied (Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48,
December 18, 2008).

(B) A writ of continuing mandamus is a writ issued when any agency or instrumentality of the
government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the
enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file
a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto
supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or
regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or
series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner
by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or
regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping (A.M.
No. 09-6-8-SC also known as Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases).
A Writ of Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing
any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of
acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied
(Section 7, Rule 8, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC also known as Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases).

XI

Miguel filed a Complaint for damages against Jose, who denied liability and filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. In an Order received by Jose on
January 5, 2015, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss. On February 4, 2015, Jose sought
reconsideration of that Order through a Motion for Reconsideration. Miguel opposed the Motion
for Reconsideration on the ground that it was filed out of time. Jose countered that the 15-day
rule under Section 1 of Rule 52 does not apply where the Order sought to be reconsidered is an
interlocutory order that does not attain finality. Is Jose correct? Explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

No. Jose is not correct. While Jose’s reliance on Section 1 of Rule 52 is misplaced because the
said Rule applies only to cases pending before the Court of Appeals, his argument that the fifteen
day rule does not apply because the order sought to be reconsidered is an interlocutory order that
has basis in jurisprudence. In Denso Philippines, Inc. v. The Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R.
No. 75000. February 27, 1987), the Supreme Court held that a motion for reconsideration of an
interlocutory order is not subject to the usual limiting fifteen-day period of appeal prescribed for
final judgments and orders. Be that as it may, since the motion for reconsideration is a condition
sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari which is the appropriate remedy, the same
can be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the denial of the motion to dismiss;
otherwise, a legal aberration would ensue where a party who has merely 60 days from notice of
an adverse interlocutory order to interpose a special civil action for certiorari would be allowed a
longer period to move for reconsideration of such order.

Consequently, since Jose’s motion for reconsideration was filed 31 days after he received the
order denying his motion to dismiss, the same was still filed on time.

ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER

No. Jose is not correct. Rule 52 applies only to motions for reconsideration of judgments or final
resolutions of the Court of Appeals in appealed cases. This case, however, involves proceedings
before the trial court. Under Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, the period to file a motion
for reconsideration shall be within the period for taking an appeal, which under Section 3, Rule
41, should be made within fifteen (15) days from notice of the assailed order. Applying the
foregoing, Jose should have filed his motion for reconsideration within 15 days from January 5,
2015, or until January 20, 2015. Clearly, Jose’s motion for reconsideration was filed out of time.

XII
Tailors Toto, Nelson and Yenyen filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 from an
adverse decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on the complaint for
illegal dismissal against Empire Textile Corporation. They were terminated on the ground that
they failed to meet the prescribed production quota at least four (4) times. The NLRC, decision
was assailed in a special civil action under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals (CA). In the
verification and certification against forum shopping, only Toto signed the verification and
certification, while Atty. Arman signed for Nelson. Empire filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of defective verification and certification. Decide with reasons. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

The motion to dismiss should be granted. The verification and certification of non-forum
shopping were not signed by all the petitioners. There was no showing that Toto nor Atty. Arman
were duly authorized by the other petitioners through a special power of attorney to sign on their
behalf; hence, the motion to dismiss should be granted.

ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER

The motion to dismiss should be denied, because there is substantial compliance of the
requirements of the rules. Verification is not a jurisdictional but merely a formal requirement
which the court may motu proprio direct a party to comply with ar correct, as the case may be.
On the other hand, regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping, the general rule is that all the
petitioners or plaintiffs in a case should sign it. However, the Supreme Court has time and again
stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote the orderly
administration of justice, do not interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under
justifiable circumstances. As ruled by the Court, the signature of any of the principal petitioners
or principal parties, would constitute a substantial compliance with the rule on verification and
certification of non-forum shopping. And should there exist a commonality of interest among the
parties, or where the parties filed the case as a collective, raising only one common cause of
action or presenting a common defense, then the signature of one of the petitioners or
complainants, acting as representative, is sufficient compliance (Irene Marcos-Araneta v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 154096, August 22, 2008). Evidently, since there is a commonality of
interest among Tailors Toto, Nelson and Yenyen, there is substantial compliance with the rules
on verification and certification against forum shopping, when Toto signed the verification and
certification, and Atty. Arman signed the same for Nelson.

XIII

The officers of “Ang Kapaligiran ay Alagaan, Inc.” engaged your services to file an action
against ABC Mining Corporation which is engaged in mining operations in Sta. Cruz,
Marinduque. ABC used highly toxic chemicals in extracting gold. ABC’s toxic mine tailings
were accidentally released from its storage dams and were discharged into the rivers of said
town. The mine tailings found their way to Calancan Bay allegedly to the waters of nearby
Romblon and Quezon. The damage to the crops and loss of earnings were estimated at P1
Billion. Damage to the environment is estimated at P1 Billion. As a lawyer for the organization,
you are requested to explain the advantages derived from a petition for writ of kalikasan before
the Supreme Court over a complaint for damages before the RTC of Marinduque or vice-versa.
What action will you recommend? Explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

As a lawyer for the organization, I would recommend the filing of a petition for issuance of a
Writ of Kalikasan. The Writ of Kalikasan is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person,
entity authorized by law, people’s organization, non-governmental organization, or any public
interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons
whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or
entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces (Section 1 of Rule 7, A.M. No. 09-6-8-
SC also known as Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases).

The following reliefs may be included under the writ of kalikasan: (a) Directing respondent to
permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting the performance of a duty in
violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or damage; (b) Directing
the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve,
rehabilitate or restore the environment; (c) Directing the respondent public official, government
agency, private person or entity to monitor strict compliance with the decision and orders of the
court; (d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or
entity to make periodic reports on the execution of the final judgment; and (e) Such other reliefs
which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection,
preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to
individual petitioner (Sec. 15, Rule 7. Ibid).

The rules also provide interim reliefs in favor of the petitioner upon filing a verified motion,
namely: (i) Ocular inspection; or (ii) Production or inspection of documents or things (Sec. 12,
Rule 7, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC also known as Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases).

Additionally, the petition for Writ of Kalikasan is more advantageous compared to a complaint
for damages before the RTC because it may be filed directly with the Supreme Court or with any
of the stations of the Court of Appeals. Unlike a complaint for damages before the RTC which
can only be filed by a real-party-in-interest as defined in Rule 3(2) of the Rules of Court, the rule
on locus standi is relaxed in petitions for Writ of Kalikasan which allows the petition to be filed
by parties as citizen suit. In addition, any of the following may file a petition for Writ of
Kalikasan: (a) natural or juridical person; (b) entity authorized by law; or (c) POs, NGOs or any
public interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency on behalf of
persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated (Sec. 1, Rule
7, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC). Besides, the petition for Writ of Kalikasan is exempted from the
payment of docket fees.

From the foregoing, it is clear that filing a petition for Writ of Kalikasan would be the best
remedy to address all the environmental problems caused by the release of the toxic waste to the
waters of Romblon and Quezon without the burden of paying docket fees. After all, the filing of
a petition for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil,
criminal or administrative actions; thus, the organization can later file a complaint for damages
with the Regional Trial Court, should they desire to do so. At any rate, the rules provide that
judgment must be rendered within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for
decision which expedites the proceedings significantly considering the urgency of the situation in
the instant case. As lawyer for the organization I would recommend, therefore, the filing of a
petition for a Writ of Kalikasan with the Supreme Court.

XIV

Pedro, the principal witness in a criminal case, testified and completed his testimony on direct
examination in 2015. Due to several postponements by the accused, grounded on his recurring
illness, which were all granted by the judge, the cross-examination of Pedro was finally set on
October 15, 2016. Before the said date, Pedro died. The accused moved to expunge Pedro’s
testimony on the ground that it violates his right of confrontation and the right to cross-examine
the witness. The prosecution opposed the motion and asked Pedro’s testimony on direct
examination be admitted as evidence. Is the motion meritorious? Explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

The Motion is meritorious. The cross-examination of a witness is an absolute right, not a mere
privilege, of the party against whom he is called. With regard to the accused, it is a right
guaranteed by the fundamental law as part of due process. Article III, Sec. 14, par. (2), of the
1987 Constitution specifically mandates that “the accused shall enjoy the right to meet the
witnesses face to face,” and Rule 115, Sec. 1, par. (f), of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
enjoins that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be entitled to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Accordingly, the testimony of a witness given on
direct examination should be stricken off the record where there was no adequate opportunity for
cross-examination (People v. Fernando Monjey Rosario, G.R. No. 146689, September 27,
2002).

In People v. Manchetti (G.R. No. L-48883, August 6, 1980), the Supreme Court also held that if
a party is deprived of the opportunity of cross examination without fault on his part, as in the
case of the illness and death of a witness after direct examination, he is entitled to have the direct
testimony stricken from the records. Since the accused was deprived of an opportunity to cross
examine the witness without fault on his part, the motion to expunge is meritorious.

ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER

The Motion is not meritorious. The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing
witnesses in a judicial litigation is a personal one which may be waived, expressly or impliedly,
by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Where a party has had
the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits
the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be
received or allowed to remain in the record. The conduct of a party which may be construed as
an implied waiver of the right to cross-examine may take various forms. The common basic
principle underlying the application of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was given the
opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it
for reasons attributable to himself alone (People of the Philippines v. Adones Abatayao, G.R.
No. 139456, July 7, 2004). Under the Doctrine of incomplete testimony, the direct testimony of a
witness who dies before conclusion of the cross-examination can be stricken only insofar as not
covered by the cross-examination (Curtice v. West, 2 NYS 507,50 Hun 47, affirmed 24 N.E.
1099, 121 N.Y. 696), and that a referee has no power to strike the examination of a witness on
his failure to appear for cross-examination where a good excuse is given (People v. Hon. Alberto
V. Seneris, G.R. No. L-48883 August 6, 1980). At any rate, the accused may be deemed to have
waived his right to confront and cross-examine the witness when he asked the postponements of
the hearing for several times; therefore, the direct testimony of a witness who died before the
conclusion of the cross-examination should not be expunged from the records.

XV

Chika sued Gringo, a Venezuelan, for a sum of money. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
(MeTC) rendered a decision ordering Gringo to pay Chika P50,000.00 plus legal interest. During
its pendency of the appeal before the RTC, Gringo died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis. Atty.
Perfecto, counsel of Gringo, filed a manifestation attaching the death certificate of Gringo and
informing the RTC that he cannot substitute the heirs since Gringo did not disclose any
information of his family. As counsel for Chika, what remedy can you recommend to your client
so that the case can move forward and she can eventually recover her money? Explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

As counsel for Chika, I would recommend that she immediately procure the appointment of an
executor or administrator for the estate of Gringo. Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that if no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party,
or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the
opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or
administrator for the estate of the deceased, and the latter shall immediately appear for and on
behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs. After the appointment of an executor or
administrator, the action shall be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable
judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in
these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person (Section 20, Rule 3,
Rules of Court).

ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER

As counsel for Chika, I would recommend the filing of the money judgment as a claim against
the estate of Gringo. Under Section 20. Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, when the action is on
recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry
of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall
not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A
favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially
provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. Relative
thereto, Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court provides that all claims for money against the
decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise they are barred forever.

Accordingly, I would recommend the filing of the money judgment as a claim against the estate
of Gringo.

XVI

Under Section 5, Rule 113 a warrantless arrest is allowed when an offense has just been
committed and the peace officer has probable cause to believe, based on his personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has committed it. A policeman
approaches you for advice and asks you how he will execute a warrantless arrest against a
murderer who escaped after killing a person. The policeman arrived two (2) hours after the
killing and a certain Max was allegedly the killer per information given by a witness. He asks
you to clarify the following:

(A) How long after the commission of the crime can he still execute the warrantless arrest?
(2.5%)

(B) What does “personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested
committed it” mean? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

(A) In executing a warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113, the Supreme Court held that the
requirement that an offense has just been committed means that there must be a large measure of
immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest (Joey M.
Pestilos v. Moreno Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014). If there was an
appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest
must be secured. In any case, personal knowledge by the arresting officer is an indispensable
requirement to the validity of a valid warrantless arrest. The exact period varies on a case to case
basis. In People v. Gerente (G.R. Nos. 95847-48, March 10, 1993), the Supreme Court ruled that
a warrantless arrest was validly executed upon therein accused three (3) hours after the
commission of the crime. In People v. Tonog, Jr. (G.R. No. 94533. February 4, 1992), the
Supreme Court likewise upheld the valid warrantless arrest which was executed on the same day
as the commission of the crime. However, in People v. Del Rosario (G.R. No. 127755. April 14,
1999, 365 Phil. 292), the Supreme Court held that the cantless arrest effected a day after the
commission of the crime is invalid. In Go v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 101837, February 11,
1992), Supreme Court also declared invalid a warrantless arrest effected (6) days after the
commission of the crime.
(B) The phrase “personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances that the person to be
arrested committed it” means that matters in relation to the supposed commission of the crime
were within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the
scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing,
he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances
at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person
sought to be arrested has committed the crime; however, the determination of probable cause and
the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the
crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.

The arresting officer’s determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or
circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.
A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on
the part of the peace officers making the arrest. The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest
ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged, or an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on
actual facts (Joey M. Pestilos v. Moreno Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014).

XVII

The information against Roger Alindogan for the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article
336 of the Revised Penal Code avers:

“That on or about 10:30 o’clock in the evening of February 1, 2010 at Barangay Matalaba; Imus,
Cavite and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
and unchaste design, through force and intimidation, did then and  there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter, Rose Domingo, a minor of 11 years old,
either by raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness on her, against her will and consent to
her damage and prejudice.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.”

The accused wants to have the case dismissed because he believes that the charge is confusing
and the information is defective. What ground or grounds can be raise in moving for the quashal
of the information? (Explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

The accused may move to quash the information based on any of the following grounds: (a) That
the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) That it does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form; and (c) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment
for various offenses is prescribed by law (Section 3 Rule 117, Rules of Criminal Procedure).
In People v. dela Cruz (G.R. Nos. 135554-56, June 21, 2002, 383 SCRA 410); the Supreme
Court ruled that the phrase “either by raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness” does not
constitute an offense since it does not cite which among the numerous sections or subsections of
R.A. No. 7610 has been violated by accused-appellant. Moreover, it does not state the acts and
omissions constituting the offense, or any special or aggravating circumstances attending the
same, as required under the rules of criminal procedure. These are conclusions of law, and not
facts. Thus, the information violated accused’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him and therefore should be quashed on the ground that the
information charges acts that do not constitute an offense.

XVIII

John filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Anne on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. He obtained a copy of the
confidential psychiatric evaluation report on his wife from the secretary of the psychiatrist. Can
he testify on the said report without offending the rule on privileged communication? Explain.
(5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

Yes. John can testify. Under the rule on privileged communication, the husband or the wife,
during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage except in a
civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the
other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants (Rule 130, Sec. 24 (a), Rules of Court). In
this case, Anne cannot prevent john from testifying against her since the petition for declaration
of nullity is a civil case filed by one spouse against the other; hence, the rule on privileged
communication between the spouses does not apply, John could testify on the confidential
psychiatric evaluation report of his wife that he obtained from the secretary of the psychiatrist,
without offending the rule on privileged communication.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER

No. John cannot testify. A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in
a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given
by him or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a
professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and
which would blacken the reputation of the patient (Section 24 (c), Rule 130, Rules on Evidence).
Relative thereto, the Rule pertains only to the Physician authorized to practice medicine, surgery
or obstetrics in a civil case who will testify without the consent of the patient. The husband can
testify, therefore, on the copy of the psychiatric evaluation report on his wife that he obtained
from the secretary of the psychiatrist. After all, the husband can testify because the marital
disqualification rule does not apply in a civil case filed by one against the other (Section 22, Rule
130, Rules on Evidence).

XIX.
Tristan filed a suit with the RTC of Pasay against Arthur King and/or Estate of Arthur King for
reconveyance of a lot declared in the name of Arthur King under TCT No. 1234. The complaint
alleged that “onaccount Arthur King’s residence abroad up to the present and the uncertainty of
whether he is still alive or dead, he or his estate may be served with summons by publication.”
Summons was published and nobody filed any responsive pleading within sixty (60) days
therefrom. Upon motion, defendants were declared in default and judgment was rendered
declaring Tristan as legal owner and ordering defendants to reconvey said lot to Tristan, Jojo, the
court-designated administrator of Arthur King’s estate, filed a petition for annulment of
judgment before the CA praying that the decision in favor of Tristan be declared null and void
for lack of jurisdiction. He claims that the action filed by Tristan is an action in personam and
that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over defendants Arthur King and/or his estate. On the
other hand, Tristan claims that the suit is an action in remor at least an action quasi in rem. Is the
RTC judge correct in ordering service of summons by publication? Explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

Yes. The RTC Judge is correct in ordering the service of summons by pubii cation. An action for
declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is a
real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it
concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded (Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez cited in Emerita Munoz v. Atty.
Victoriano R. Yabut, jr. and Samuel Go Chan, G.R. No. 142676, June 6, 2011).

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. is necessary for the court
to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does
not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided
under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons
within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said
Rule (Spouses Domingo M. Beleri, et al. vi Hon. Pablo R. Chavez, et al., G.R. No. 175334,
March 26, 2008).

Under Section 14, Rule 14, Rules of Court, in any action where the defendant is designated as an
unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time as the
court may order. This rule applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem
(Pedro T. Santos, Jr. v. PNOC Exploration Corporation, G.R. No. 170943, September 23,
2008). Clearly, since the action for reconveyance is an action in personam, the RTC Judge is
correct in ordering service of summons by publication.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER

No. The RTC Judge is not correct in ordering service of summons by publication. It is well-
settled that in an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does not
voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the
state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. This method of service is
possible if such defendant is physically present in the country. If he is not found therein, the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the
case against him (Spouses Domingo M. Belen, et al. v. Hon. Pablo R. Chavez, et al., G.R. No.
175334, March 26, 2008). Accordingly, the RTC Judge is not correct in ordering service of
summons by publication.

XX.

Royal Bank (Royal) filed a complaint for a sum of money against Ervin and Jude before the RTC
of Manila. The initiatory pleading averred that on February 14, 2010, Ervin obtained a loan from
Royal in the amount of P1 million, as evidenced by Promissory Note No.’007 (PN) signed by
Ervin. Judé signed a Surety Agreement binding herself as surety for the loan. Royal made a final
demand on February 14, 2015 for Ervin and Jude (defendants) to pay, but the latter failed to pay.
Royal prayed that defendants Ervini and Jude be ordered to pay the amount of P1 million plus
interests. In their answer, Ervin admitted that he obtained the loan from Royal and signed the
PN. Jude also admitted that she signed the Surety Agreement. Defendants pointed out that the
PN did not provide the due date for payment, and that the loan has not yet matured as the
maturity date was left blank to be agreed upon by the parties at a later date. Defendants filed a
Motion for a Judgment on the Pleadings on the ground that there is no genuine issue presented
by the parties’ submissions. Royal opposed the motion on the ground that the PN’s maturity is an
issue that must be threshold out during trial.

(A) Resolve the motion with reasons. (2.5%)

(B) Distinguish “Summary Judgment” and “Judgment on the Pleadings.” (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(A) The Motion for judgment on the pleadings should be denied.

First, judgment on the pleadings is available to the plaintiff and not to the defendant.

Second, judgment on the pleadings. is proper only when the Answer fails to tender any issue,
that is, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material
allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/ or omitting
to deal with them at all. Here, while defendants’ Answer to the Complaint practically admitted
all the material allegations therein, it nevertheless asserts the affirmative defenses that the loan is
not yet due. As issues obviously arise from these affirmative defenses, a judgment on the
pleadings is clearly improper in this case. Besides, it should be emphasized that judgment on the
pleadings is based exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and
the annexes, if any, without consideration of any : evidence aliunde. Henceforth, when it appears
that not all the material allegations of the complaint were admitted in the answer for some of
them were either denied or disputed, and the defendant has set up certain special defenses which,
if proven, would have the effect of nullifying plaintiff’s main cause of action, judgment on the
pleadings cannot be rendered (Philippine National Bank v. Mereto B. Aznar, G.R. No. 171805,
May 30, 2011).
(B) What distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment is the presence of
issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the Answer fails to tender any issue, that is, if it
does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the
adverse party’s pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them
at all, a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. On the other hand, when the – Answer
specifically denies the material averments of the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses, or in
other words raises an issue, a summary judgment is proper provided that the issue raised is not
genuine. A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as
distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived or which does not constitute a
genuine issue for trial (Eugenio Basbas v. Beata Sayson and Roberto Sayson, Jr., G.R. No.
172660, August 24, 2011).

SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO THE 2017


BAR EXAMINATION QUESTIONS IN
REMEDIAL LAW UP Law Complex
August 4, 2019

I.

What trial court outside Metro Manila has exclusive original jurisdiction over the following
cases? Explain briefly your answers. 

(a) An action filed on November 13, 2017 to recover the possession of an apartment unit being
occupied by the defendant by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, after the former ignored the last
demand to vacate that was duly served upon-and received by him on July 6, 2016.(2.5%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWER: 

(a) It depends. The instant action is an accion publiciana considering that more than a year
has lapsed from the date of last demand (Natalia Realty, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 126462,
November 12, 2002; Penta Pacific Realty Corporation v. Ley Construction and Development
Corpora tion, G.R. No. 161589, November 24, 2014). Thus, if the assessed value of the
apartment unit does not exceed P20,000.00, the Municipal Trial Court has the exclusive
original jurisdiction over the action (Penta Pacific Realty Corporation, supra; BP Big. 129.
Sec. 1). 

On the other hand, if the assessed value of the apartment unit exceeds P20,000.00, the
Regional Trial Court has the exclusive original jurisdiction over the action (Penta Pacific
Realty Corporation, supra; BP Blg. 129, Sec. 19). The allegation of the assessed value of the
apartment unit must be found in the complaint, otherwise the action should be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction because the trial court is not thereby afforded the means of determining
from the allegations of the pleading Whether jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
pertains to it or to another court (Penta Pacific Realty Corporation, supra). 

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

(b) A complaint in which the principal relief sought is the enforcement of a seller’s contractual
right to repurchase a lot with an assessed value of P15,000.00: (2.5%). 

SUGGESTED ANSWER 

1. (b)  The Regional Trial Court has the jurisdiction over an action in which the principal
relief sought is the enforcement of a seller’s contractual right to repurchase a lot. Since said
action is one for specific performance to enforce a contractual right, it is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and therefore cognizable by the Regional Trial Court (Surviving Heirs of
Bautista v. Lindo; G.R. No. 208232, March 10, 2014; BP Blg. 129, Sec 19). 

II.

Santa filed against Era in the RTC of Quezon City an action for specific performance praying for
the delivery of a parcel of land subject of their contract of sale. Unknown to the parties, the case
was inadvertently raffled to an RTC designated as a special commercial court. Later, the RTC
rendered judgment adverse to Era, who, upon realizing that the trial court was not a regular RTC,
approaches you and wants you to file a petition to have the judgement annulled for lack of
jurisdiction.” 

What advice would you give to Era? Explain your answer. (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

I will advise Era that a petition to have the judgment annulled for lack of jurisdiction has
no basis. In Gonzales v. GJH Land, Inc. (G.R. NO. 202664 November 10, 2015), the
Supreme Court ruled that the fact that a particular branch which tras been designated as a
Special Commercial, Court does not shed the RTC’s general jurisdiction over ordinary
civil cases under the imprimatur of statutory law, L.E. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The
designation of Special Commercial Court was merely intended as a procedural tool to
expedite the resolution of commercial cases in line with the court’s exercise of jurisdiction.
This designation was not made by statute but only by an internal Supreme Court rule
under its authority to promulgate rules governing matters of procedure and its
constitutional mandate to supervise lower courts.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

I will advise Era that a petition for annulment of judgment is untenable, I will tell Era that
the available post-judgment remedies could be any of the following depending upon the date
of his receipt of the judgment: Motion for Reconsideration, Appeal, Petition for Relief from
Judgment, or Certiorari.

The Regional Trial Court, despite its having been designated as Special Commercial Court
remains possessed of authority as a court of general jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of
cases, whether civil or criminal. The Constitution vests not only in the Supreme Court, but
in all Regional Trial Courts, the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding
laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law (Jesus C. Garcia v. The
Hon. Kay Alan T. Drilon, GR No 179267, June 25, 2013). The designation of the court as a
special commercial court is an internal arrangement for lower courts-that could be allowed by
the Supreme Court, with the Office of the Court Administra tor as the implementing arm,
with the purpose of giving priority to com mercial cases on top of the trial court’s regular
cases. 

III.

Answer the following briefly 

(a) What elements should cončur for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for conviction?
(2%). 

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) For circumstantial evidence to warrant the conviction of the accused, the following
elements should concur: 

1. There is more than one circumstance;

2. The facts from which the circumstances arose are duly established in court; and 

3. The circumstances form the unbroken chain of events leading i to the conclusion of the
culpability of the accused for the crime for which he is convicted (Bacolod v. People, G.R.
No. 206236, July 15, 2013).

(b) When is bail a matter of judicial discretion? (2%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWERS 

(b) Under Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court bail is a matter of judicial discretion
under the following circumstances: 

1. Before conviction; in cases where the offense charged is punishable by reclusion’


perpetua; and  

2. After accused’s conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
In People: Leviste (G.R. No: 189122, March 17, 2010), the Supreme Court ruled that the
absence of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rulę 114 of the
Rules of Court does not automatically result in the grant of bail, Such finding will simply
authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.

(c) Give at least two instances when a peace officer or a private person may make a valid
warrantless arrest (2%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWER 

(c) Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court; a peace officer or a private person may
make a valid warrantiess arrest in the fol lowing instances: 

1. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has commit ted, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense; 

2. When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and 

3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

(d) What is a tender of excluded evidence? (2%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWERS 

(d) Tender of excluded evidence is a remedy embodied under Section 40. Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, which states that “if documents or things offered in evidence are excluded
by the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the
evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal
circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.

In Cruz-Arevalo v. Querubin-Layosa (A.M. No. RT.-06-2005, July 14, 2006), the Supreme
Court ruled that this procedure, also known as offer of proof, is made for purposes of
appeal. If an adverse judgment is eventually rendered against the offeror, he may in his
appeal assign as error the rejection of the excluded evidence. The appellate court will better
understand and appreciate the assignment of error if the evidence involved is included in the
record of the case.

IV.

Give brief answers to the following: 


1. What is the doctrine of hierarchy of courts? (2%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWER 

(a) The doctrine of hierarchy of courts, as a rule, requires that recourse must be first made
to the lower-ranked courts exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court (Dio v.
Subic Bay Marine Exploration, Inc., G.R. No. 189532. June 11, 2014).

(b) What is the Harmless Error Rule in relation to appeals? (2%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(b) Under Rule 51, Section or of the Rules of Court the Harmless Error Rule states that no
error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any
ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is
a ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court to be inconsistent
with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any
error or defect which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 

(c) – When does a public prosecutor conduct an inquest instead : of a preliminary investigation?
(2%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWER 

(c) Under Rule: 112, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, a public prosecutor conducts aquest
instead of a preliminary investigation when a person is lawfully arrested without an arrest
warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation. 

V.

After working for 25 years in the Middle East, Evan returned to the Philippines to retire in
Manila, the place of his birth and childhood. Ten years before his retirement, he bought for cash
in his name a house and lot in Malate, Manila. Six months after his return, he learned that his
house and lot were the subject of foreclosure proceedings commenced by ABC Bank on the basis
of a promissory note and a deed of real estáte mortgage he had allegedly executed in favor of
ABC Bank five years earlier. 

Knowing that he was not in the country at the time the promissory note and deed of mortgage
were supposedly executed, Evan forthwith initiated a complaint in the RTC of Manila praying
that the subject documents be declared null and void. 

ABC Bank filed a motion to dismiss Evan’s complaint on the ground of improper venue on the
basis of a stipulation in both documents designating Quezon City as the exclusive venue in the
event of litigation between the parties arising out of the loan and mortgage. 
Should the motion to dismiss of ABC Bank be granted? Explain your answer(5%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWER. 

No. ABC Bank’s motion to dismiss should be denied in Briones Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
204444, January 14, 2015), the Supreme Court ruled that a complaint directly assailing the
validity of the written instrument itself should not be bound by the exclusive venue
stipulation contained therein and should be filed in accordance with the general rules on
venue. The Supreme Court ruled that it would be inherently inconsistent for a complaint of
this nature to recognize the exclusive venue stipulation when it, in fact, precisely assails the
validity of the instrument in which such stipulation is contained. 

In this case, Evan’s complaint directly assails the validity of the promissory note and deed of
mortgage, which contains said venue stipulation; hence, said venue stipulation is not
binding on him. Evan correctly filed his complaint with the Manila RTC pursuant to Rule of
the Rules of Court.

VI.

Hanna, a resident of Manila, filed a complaint for the partition of a large tract of land located in
Oriental Mindoro. She impleaded her two brothers John and Adrian as defendants but did not
implead Leica and Agatha, her two sisters who were permanent residents of Australia.

Arguing that there could be no final determination of the case without impleading all
indispensable parties, John and Adrian moved to dismiss the complaint. 

Does the trial court have a reason to deny the motion? Explain your answer (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER. 

Yes, the trial court has reason to deny the motion. Section 11, Rule 3 Rules of Court states
that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of: parties is a ground for the dismissal of an
action. The petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead Leica and
Agatha, for under the same rule, such amendment to implead an indispensable party may
be made on motion of any party or on the trial court’s own initiative at any stage of the
action and on such terms as are just (Ablaza v. Reput. lic; G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010).

VII.

Elise obtained a loan of P3 Million from Merchant Bank. Aside from executing a promissory
note in favor of Merchant Bank, she executed a deed of real estate mortgage over her house and
lot as security for her obligation. 

The loan fell due but remained unpaid; hence, Merchant Bank filed an action against Elise to
foreclose the real estate mortgage. A month after, and while the foreclosure suit was pending,
Merchant Bank also filed an action to recover the principal sum of P3 Million against Elise based
on the same promissory note previously executed by the latter. In opposing the motion of Elise to
dismiss the second action on the ground of splitting of a single cause of action, Merchant Bank
argued that the ground relied upon by Elise was devoid of any legal basis considering that the
two actions were based on separate contracts, namely, the contract of loan evidenced by the
promissory note, and the deed of real estate mortgage. 

Is there a splitting of a single cause of action? Explain your answer. (4%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWER 

Yes, there is splitting of a cause of action. A creditor cannot file a civil action against the
debtor for collection of the debt and subsequently file an action to foreclose the mortgage:
This is an example of splitting of a single cause of action, a practice that is vexatious and
oppressive (Dunao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-48276, June 6, 2001). 

VIII.

A.

Laura was the lessee of an apartment unit owned by Louie. When the lease expired, Laura
refused to vacate the property. Her refusal prompted Louie to file an action for unlawful detainer
against Laura who failed to answer the complaint within the reglementary period. 

Louie then filed a motion to declare Laura in default Should the motion be granted? Explain your
answer. (3%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWER 

No, the motion should not be granted because it is a prohibited pleading Under Section 19
(h) of the Rules on Summary Procedure, a motion to declare defendant in default is among
the pleadings that are prohibited in cases covered by said Rule: Considering that an action
for unlawful detainer is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, Louie’s motion to
declare Laura in default is a prohibited pleading, and thus, should not be granted.

B.

 Agatha filed a complaint against Yana in the RTC in Makati City to collect P350,000.00, än
amount representing the unpaid balance on the price of the car Yana had bought from Agatha.
Realizing a jurisdictional error in filing the complaint in the RTC, Agatha filed a notice of
dismissal before she was served with the answer of Yana. The RTC issued an order confirming
the dismissal . 

Three months later, “Agatha filed another complaint against Yana based on the same cause of
action this time in the MeTC of Makati City. However, for reasons personal to her, Agatha
decided to have the complaint dismissed without prejudice by filing a notice of dismissal prior to
the service of the answer of Yana. Hence, the case was dismissed by the MeTC.
A month later, Agatha refiled the complaint against Yana in the same MeTC. 

May Yana successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule to bar Ag atha’s third complaint?
Explain your answer (3%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWER 

No, Yana cannot successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule: In order for the Two-
Dismissal Rule to apply, Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Court requires that both
dismissals through plaintiff’s notices were made by a competent court. Moreover, in Ching v.
Cheng (G.R. No. 175507, October 8, 2014), the Supreme Court ruled that the following
requisites should concur for the Two-Dismissal Rule to apply: 

 (a) There was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent courts 

(b) Both cases were based on or include the same claim; 

(c) Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and. 

(d) When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on
the ground that the latter paid and satisfied all the claims of the former. 

In this case, the Makati City RTC had no jurisdiction over the first complaint which was
dismissed through Agatha’s notice, because it is below its jurisdictional amount of at least P
400,000.00. Therefore, the Two-Dismissal Rule can not be successfully invoked in this case. 

IX

Abraham filed a complaint for damages in the amount of P750,000.00 against Salvador in the
RTC in Quezon City for the laiter’s alleged breach of their contract of services. Salvador
promptly filed his answer, and included a counterclaim for P250,000.00 arising from the
allegedly baseless and malicious claims of Abraham that compelled him to litigate and to engage
the services of counsel, and thus caused him to suffer mental anguish.

Noting that the amount of the counterclaim was below the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
RTC, Abraham filed a motion to dismiss vis-a-vis the counterclaim on that ground. 

Should the counterclaim of Salvador be dismissed? Explain your answer: (4%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWER 

No, Salvador’s counterclaim is compulsory in nature, and thus should not be dismissed.
Section 7, Rule of the Rules of Court defines a compulsory counterclaim as any claim for
money or any relief, which a defending party may have against an opposing party, which at
the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff’s complaint (Bung cayao v: Fort
Ilocandia, G.R. No: 170483, April 19, 2010). A counterclaim is compulsory where: 

1. It arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party’s claim;

2. It does not require the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction, and; 

3. The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim (Spouses Arenas v CA G.R. No
126640, November 23, 2000) 

Regarding the trial court’s jurisdiction, Section 7, Rute 6 of the Rules of Court explicitly
states that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may be
considered compulsory regardless of the amount. In relation thereto, the Supreme Court
held in Alday v. FGU Insurance Corp. (GR No. 138822, January 23, 2001), that claims for
damages, allegedly suffered as a result of plaintiff’s filing of a complaints are compulsory. In
this case, the court’s jurisdiction over Salvador’s counterclaim, despite being below the
jurisdictional amount is evident from the following: Salvador’s claims for litigation
expenses arise out of Abraham’s complaint for damages; Salvador’s claims do not require
the presence of third parties, and being compulsory in nature, the trial court may exercise
jurisdiction over said claim.

X.

 On the basis of an alleged promissory note executed by Harold in fa vor of Ramon; the latter
filed a complaint for P950,000.00 against the former in the RTC of Davao City, In an unverified
answer, Harold specifically denied the genuineness of the promissory note. During the trial,
Harold sought to of. fer the testimonies of the following: (1) the testimony of an NBI
handwriting expert to prove the forgery of his signature; and (2) the testimony of a credible
witness to prove that if ever Harold had executed the note in favor of Ramon, the same: was not
supported by a consideration.

May Ramon validly object to the proposed testimonies? Give a brief explanation of your answer.
(5%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWER. 

Ramon may validly object to the proposed testimony of the NBI handwriting expert The
alleged promissory note attached to Ramon’s complaint is an actionable document since it
is a written instrument upon which an action or defense is grounded (Asian Construction
and Development Corporation 1. Mendoza, G.R. No: 176949, June 27, 2012). Accordingly,
Harold’s failure to specifically deny under oath the genuineness of said actionable
document amounts to an implied admission of its genuineness and due execution under
Rule 8, Section 8 of the Rules of Court. Harold cannot thus raise the defense of forgery by
presenting the testimony of a handwriting expert. Well-settled is the rule that the trial court
may reject evidence that a party adduces to contradict a judicial admission he previously
made since such admission is conclusive as to him (Equitable Card Network Inc., Capistrano;
G.R. No. 180157 February 8, 2012). 

However, Ramon may not validly object to the testimony of a credible witness to prove that
the promissory note was not supported by a consideration. The admission of the
genuineness and due execution of a document does not bar the defense of want of a
consideration (Hibberd v. Rohde and McMillani GR No. L-8414, December 9, 1915). 

XI

Teddy filed against Buboy an action for rescission of a contract for the sale of a commercial lot,
After having been told by the wife of Buboy that her husband was out of town and would not be
back until after a couple of days the sheriff requested the wife to just receive the summons in
behalf of her husband. The wife acceded to the request; received the summons and a copy of the
complaint, and signed for the same. 

(a) Was there a valid service of summons upon Buboy? Explain – your answer briefly. (3%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWER 

(a) No, there was no valid service of summons in this case; since the summons was not
personally received by Buboy, For substituted service of summons to be available, there
must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a
reasonable period. “Several attempts: means at least three tries, preferably on at least two
different dates” (Manotoc v Court of Appeals, GR No. 130974, August 16, 2006). 

b) If Buboy files a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the twin grounds of lack of
jurisdiction over his person and prescription of the cause of action, may he be deemed to have
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court? Explain your answer briefly (3%). 

SUGGESTED ANSWERS 

(b) No, the filing of the motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not a voluntary submission to the
court’s jurisdiction (Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 170122, October 12, 2009). Under
Section 20. Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the defendant’s voluntary appearance in the
action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss on
other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance. 

The filing of a motion is deemed voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction only when
it constitutes an unqualified voluntary appearance before the court, such that the
defendant failed to object to the court’s jurisdiction over his person (PVIB . Spouses Dy,
G.R. No. 171137, June 5 2009). 
B. 

What is the mode of appeal applicable to the following cases, and what issues may be raised
before the reviewing court tribunal? 

(a) The decision or final order of the National Labor Relations Commission (145%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWERS 

(a) Strictly, there is no appeal from an NLRC decision: However, NLRC decisions or final
orders are reviewable on petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; filed
before the Court of Appeals (S4 Martin Funeral Homes . NLRC, G.R. No. 130866,
September 16, 1998). Petitioner may raise the issue on whether the NLRC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction (Pfizer Inc, v. Galan, G.R. No.
158460. August 24, 2007).

(b) The judgment or final order of the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction: (1.5%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWER 

(b) The mode of appeal is petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court Petitioner
may raise errors of fact, law, or both Under Section 2 of Rule 42.

XII.

Judgment was rendered against defendant Jaypee in an action for unlawful detainer. The
judgment ordered Jaypee to vacate and to pay attorney’s fees in favor of Bart, the plaintiff. To
prevent the immediate execution of the judgment would you ad vise the posting of a supersedeas
bond as counsel for Jaypee? Explain your  answer briefly (2%). 

SUGGESTED ANSWER 

I would advise Jaypee to post a supersedeas bond, but I would also advise him that the
posting of a supersedeas bond alone does not prevent the immediate execution of the
judgment. To stay the immediate execution of the judgment in an ejectment case, the
defendant: 

1. Must perfect an appeal, 

2. File a supersedeas bond; and 

3. Periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal;

otherwise, the writ of execution will issue upon motion of the plaintiff (Achang v. Hon.
Luczon, G.R. No: 164246, January 15, 2014; Rule 70. Sec tion 19 of the Rules of Court). 
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: 

As counsel for Jaypee, I would not advise the posting of a supersedeas bond. The
supersedeas bond shall be equivalent to the unpaid rentals, damages and costs which
accrued down to the time of the judgment (Section 19, Rule 70, Rules of Court; Chua v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113886, February 24, 1998). In other words, the supersedeas bond
covers the monetary judgment of the lower court; thus, if the judgment does not make any
pronouncement as to the pecuniary liability of the defendant, the posting of the
supersedeas bond should not be required. Attorney’s fees are not covered by a supersedeas
bonds (Once v. Gonzales,  GR No. L-44806, March 31, 1977) 

B.

A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued on September 20, 2017 by the RTC against
defendant Jeff enjoining him from entering the land of Regan, the plaintiff. 

On October 9, 2017, upon application of Regan, the trial court, allegedly in the interest of justice,
extended the TRO for another 20 days based on the same ground for which the TRO was issued. 

On October 15, 2017, Jeff entered the land subject of the TRO. May Jeff be liable for contempt
of court? Why? (4%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWER 

No, Jeff may not be held liable for contempt. Under Rute 58. Sec tion 5 of the Rules of
Court, a Temporary Restraining Order is valid for 20 days. Its effectivity is not extendible
without need of any judicial declaration to that effect, and no court shall have authority to
extend or renew the same on the same ground for which it was issued, thus, Jeff cannot be
held liable for contempt.

XIII

Police officers arrested Mr. Druggie in a buy-bust operation and confiscated from him 10 sachets
of shabu and several marked genuine peso bills worth P5,000.00 used as the buy-bust money
during the buy-bust operation. 

At the trial of Mr Druggie for violation of RA. No.9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act of
2002), the Prosecution offered in evidence; among others, photocopies of the confiscated marked
genuine peso bills. The photocopies were offered to prove that Mr. Druggie had engaged at the
time. of his arrest in the illegal selling of dangerous drugs. 

Invoking the Best Evidence Rule, Atty. Maya Bang, the defense counsel; objected to the
admissibility of the photocopies of the confiscated marked genuine peso bills. 

Should the trial judge sustain the objection of the defense counsel? · 
Briefly explain your answer (5%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWERS 

No, the trial judge should not sustain the defense counsel’s objection. In People v. Tandop
(GR No. 80505, December 4, 1990) the Supreme Court held that the best evidence rule applies
only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry Where the issue is only as
to whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists; or the circumstances
relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible. 

Here, the marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of
establishing its existence and not its contents. Other substitutionary evidence, like a
photocopy thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of presenting the original.
Hence, the best evidence rule does not apply in this case. The trial judge, therefore, should not
sustain the defense counsel’s objection. 

Atty. Maya Bang, however, may object to the photocopies of the confiscated marked
genuine peso bills for being hearsay evidence. Since it does not appear that the prosecution
was able to establish that its sub mission of photocopied documents is justified under Rute
130, Sections 3 (a), (b), and (d) of the Rules of Court, said photocopied documents do not
have any probative weight and should be disregarded whether objected to or not (Republic
u. Mupas, G.R. No. 181892, April 19, 2016). 

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: 

The photocopies of the confiscated marked money should be excluded as evidence under
the Best Evidence Rule: To be admissible as secondary evidence the prosecution should
have shown that the original marked money has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, or that it is in the custody of the adverse party (People v Pamarito, GR No.
108453, July 11, 1994) 

XIV.

Immediately before he died of gunshot wounds to his chest, Venancio told the attending
physician; in a very feeble voice, that it was Arnulfo, his co-worker, who had shot him Venancio
added that it was also Arnulfo who had shot Vicente, the man whose cadaver was lying on the
bed beside him. 

In the prosecution of Arnulfo for the criminal killing of Venancio and Vicente, are all the
statements of Venancio admissible as dying declarations? Explain your answer. (5%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWER 

No, not all statements of Venancio are admissible as dying declarations. A dying declaration
is a statement made under the consciousness of an impending death (Rules of Court, Rule
130, Section 37). It may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry,
as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. In.. this case,
presuming there is evidence that Venancio was conscious of his impending death when he
made his statement that it was Arnulfo who ; shot him, said statement may be considered
as a dying declaration which is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.
The degree and seriousness of the gunshot wounds sustained by Venancio and the fact that
death supervened thereafter may constitute substantial evidence of his consciousness of his
impending death (People v. Tanaman, G.R. No. 71768, July 28, 1987). White Venancio’s
statement about the death of Vicente may not be considered as a dying declaration, it may
still be admitted in evidence as part of res gestae, which is also an exception to the hearsay
rule (Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 42). Venancio’s statement about the killing of Vicente
may be considered to have been made after the occurrence of a startling occurrence. Thus,
it may be admitted in evidence.

 XV. 

In an attempt to discredit and impeach: a Prosecution witness in a .. 

homicide case; the defense counsel called to the stand a person who had been the boyhood friend
and next-door neighbor of the Prosecution witness for 30 years. One question that the defense
counsel asked of the impeaching witness was: “Can you tell this: Honorable Court about the
general reputation of the prosecution witness in your community for aggressiveness and violent
tendencies?” 

Would you, as the trial prosecutor interpose your objection to the question of the defense
counsel? Explain your answer: (4%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWER

Yes Under Rule 132, Section 11 of the Roles of Court, a witness may be impeached only by
contradictory evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or
by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony. A witness may not be in peached by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except
that it may be shown by the examination of the witness; or the record of the judgment; that
he has been convicted of an offense (Rules. of Court Rule 132, Section 11). Accordingly, the
defense counsel may not ‘impeach the prosecution witness through testimonial evidence
showing his general reputation for aggressiveness and violent tendencies. 

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER 

As trial prosecutor, I would not interpose an objection to tire question of the defense
counsel, because it may be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, being a common
reputation.

Under the Rules, common reputation existing previous to the controversy, respecting facts
of public or general interest more than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or moral
character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be
received as evidence of common reputation (Section 41, Rule 130, Rules of Court). Hence,
the general reputation in the community of the prosecution witness for aggressiveness and
violent tendencies may be admissible in evidence as a common reputation. 

XVI.

Engr. Magna Nakaw, the District Engineer of the DPWH in the Province of Walang Progreso,
and Mr. Pork Chop, a private contractor, were both charged in the Office of the Ombudsman for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) under a conspiracy
theory. 

While the charges were undergoing investigation in the Office of the Ombudsman, Engr. Magna
Nakaw passed away. Mr. Pork Chop immediately filed a motion to terminate the investigation
and to dismiss the charges against Him, arguing that because he was charged in conspiracy with
the deceased there was no longer a conspiracy to speak of and, consequently, any legal ground to
hold hün for trial had been extinguished. 

Rule on the motion to terminate filed by Mr. Pork Chop, with brief reasons (5%).

SUGGESTED ANSWER 

The motion to terminate should be denied. In People v. Go (G.R. No. 168539, March 24,
2014), the Supreme Court ruled that the avowed policy of the State and the legislative
intent to repress acts of public officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or
corrupt. practices would be frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the
prosecution of a private person who conspired with such public officer in violating R.A. No.
3019. Since the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and involves
evidentiary matters, the allegation of conspiracy against Mr. Pork Chop is better ventilated
before the trial court during the trial, where he can adduce evidence to prove or disprove
its presence. 

XVII

Juancho entered a plea of guilty when he was arraigned under an information for homicide: To
determine the penalty to be imposed, the trial court allowed Juancho to present evidence proving
any mitigating circumstance in his favor. Juancho was able to establish complete self-defense.
Convinced by the evidence adduced by Juancho, the trial court rendered a verdict of
acquittal.May the Prosecution assail the acquittal without infringing the constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy in favor of Juancho? Explain your answer: (5%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the prosecution may assait Juancho’s acquittal without violating his right against double
jeopardy. In the similar case of People v. Balisacan (GR No. L-26376, August 31, 1966), the
Supreme Court held that if an accused who first entered a plea of guilty was later on allowed
to prove any mitigating circumstance, his prior plea is deemed vacated. 

The court should require him to plead anew on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea
of not guilty be entered for him. Thus in this case, since Juancho was allowed to present
evidence to prove mitigating circumstances in his favor, there can be no double jeopardy
with respect to the prosecution’s appeal. 

Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled in the Balisacan case that a plea of guilty is an
unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right
to defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose
the penalty fixed by daw under the circumstances. Since Juancho was only allowed to
testify in order to establish mitigating circumstances for the purposes of fixing the penalty,
his testimony, thus, could not be taken as a trial on the merits to determine his guilt or
innocence. Juancho’s acquittal: is therefore void considering that the prosecution was not
afforded an opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the
defendants 

XVIII.

Tomas was criminally charged with serious physical injuries allegedly committed against Darvin
During the pendency of the criminal case, Darvin filed a separate civil action for damages based
on the injuries he had sustained.

Tomás filed a motion to dismiss the separate civil action on the ground of litis pendentia;
pointing out that when the criminal action was filed against him the civil action to recover the
civil liability from the offense charged was also deemed instituted. He insisted that the basis of
the separate civil action was the very same act that gave rise to the criminal action. 

Rule on Tomas’ motiön to dismiss with brief reasons. (5%) 

SUGGESTED ANSWERS 

The motion to dismiss should be denied. Darvin’s civil action is based on physical injuries,
and is therefore an independent civil action which may proceed independently of the
criminal case (Article 33, Civil Code)However, Darvin cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal action (Rule 111, Section 2, Rules of
Court). 

As the Supreme Court ruled in People v. Lipata (G.R. No. 200302, April 20, 2016); “the
independent civil actions in Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176, as well as claims from sources of
obligations other than delict, are not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be
filed separately by the offended party even without reservation” 

XIX.
Boy Maton, a neighborhood tough guy, was arrested by a police officer on suspicion that he was
keeping prohibited drugs in his clutch bag. When Boy Maton was searched immediately after the
arrest, the officer found and recovered 10 sachets of shabu neatly tucked in the inner linings of
the clutch i bag. At the time of his arrest; Boy Maton was watching a basketball game being
played in the town plaza, and he was cheering for his favorite team. He was subsequently
charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs, and he entered a plea of not guilty when he
was arraigned. 

During the trial, Boy Mäton moved for the dismissal of the information on the ground that the
facts revealed that he had been illegally arrested. 

He further moved for the suppression of the evidence confiscated from him as being the
consequence of the illegal arrest, hence; the fruit of the poisonous tree. 

The trial court, in denying the motions of Boy Maton, explained that at the time the motions
were filed Boy Maton had already waived the right to raise the issue of the legality of the arrest.
The trial court observed that; pursuant to the Rules of Court Boy Maton, as the accused, should
have assailed the validity of the arrest before entering his plea to the information. Hence, thie
trial court opined that any adverse consequence of the alleged illegal arrest had also been equally
waived. 

SUGGESTED ANSWER 

The trial court is correct insofar as Boy Matou is considered to have waived his objections
to the illegality of his arrest In Villanueva v.. People: (GR No.199042, November 17, 2014),
the Supreme Court held that objections to the irregularity of arrest must be made before
his arraignment. In this case, Boy Maton made no objection to the irregularity of his arrest
before his arraignment. Hence the trial court is correct when it ruled that Boy Maton had
already waived his right to question the illegality of his arrest. Any irregularity attending
the arrest of an accused should be timely raised in a motion to quash the information at
any time before arraignment; failing (in) which, he is deemed to have waived” his right to
question the regularity of his arrest (People y Cunanan, G.R. No. 198924, March 16, 2015). 

However, the trial court erred when it ruled that Boy Maton likewise waived his right to
assail the illegal search. In the Villanueva case; (supra), the Supreme Court ruled that a
waiver of an illegal arrest is not a waiver of an illegal search. It further held that “while the
accused has already waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed to
have equally waived his right to contest the legality of the search.” Therefore, Boy Maton
may still move for the suppression of the evidence confiscated from him being the
consequences of the illegal arrest.

A.1.
ABC Homeowners Association, Inc. sued Mr. X before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
collection of unpaid association dues. Mr. X filed a motion to dismiss solely on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, asserting that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board has exclusive
jurisdiction over disputes among homeowners and their associations. The RTC denied Mr. X's
motion, maintaining that it has jurisdiction over the case. This prompted Mr. X to file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme Court, alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in denying his motion to dismiss.

(a) Is Mr. X's chosen remedy of certiorari and direct recourse to the Supreme Court
proper? Explain. (2.5%)

(b) Assuming that Mr. X's motion was instead granted by the RTC, what is the
proper remedy of ABC Homeowners Association, Inc. to challenge the RTC ruling?
Explain. (2.5%)

A.2.

Ms. A filed a complaint for damages against Ms. B, alleging that Ms. B negligently caused the
demolition of her house's concrete fence, the top half of which fell on the front portion of Ms.
A's car and permanently damaged its engine. In her answer, Ms. B denied any personal liability
for the damage caused to Ms. A's car, averring that she merely acquiesced to the advice of her
contractor, XYZ Construction Co., to have the concrete fence demolished. Thus, damages, if
any, should be collected from it.

Thereafter, Ms. A filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, alleging that Ms. B's statement
in her answer is actually a negative pregnant. Ms. B opposed the motion, reiterating her defense
in her answer which purportedly rendered judgment on the pleadings improper. Ms. B also
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of non-joinder of XYZ Construction Co.,
which she alleged is an indispensable party to the case.

(a) Is Ms. A's motion for judgment on the pleadings proper? Explain. (3%)

(b) Is XYZ Construction Co. an indispensable or a necessary party? Explain. (3%)

(c) Assuming that XYZ Construction Co. is an indispensable party, is its non-
joinder a ground for the dismissal of the case? Explain. (3%)

A.3.

Mr. C sued Mr. D for reconveyance of property and damages, claiming that Mr. D, through fraud
and forgery, was able to obtain the title to Lot No. 1234, which was previously registered in Mr.
C's name. The complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court.

Instead of filing an answer, Mr. D moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of cause
of action. In opposition, Mr. C argued that lack of cause of action is not a ground for a motion to
dismiss as the ground provided under Section 1 (g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court is failure to
state a cause of action.

Distinguish the concepts of lack of cause of action and failure to state a cause of
action. Based on this distinction, is Mr. C's opposition tenable? Explain. (5%)

A.4.

Mrs. E filed a complaint for sum of money against Mr. F in the amount of ₱1,000,000.00 before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC). After due proceedings, the RTC ruled in favor of Mrs. E, and
since no appeal was interposed thereto, the ruling became final and executory as evinced by an
Entry of Judgment dated July 2, 2012. However, Mrs. E was unable to immediately move for the
execution of said judgment because she had a work engagement overseas.

On June 29, 2017, Mrs. E returned to the country and, on the same day, filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution before the RTC. On July 7, 2017, the RTC granted the motion,
and consequently, issued a writ of execution in Mrs. E's favor.

Was the RTC's issuance of the writ of execution procedurally infirm? Explain. (3%)

A.5.

Mrs. G defaulted in the payment of her loan obligation with Z Bank. As such, Z Bank extra-
judicially foreclosed Mrs. G's mortgaged property and sold it at public auction where it emerged
as the highest bidder. Eventually, a certificate of sale was issued in Z Bank's favor, and title to
the property was later consolidated under the bank's name.

Claiming that Z Bank used fraudulent machinations in increasing the interest and penalty charges
on the loan, thereby making it impossible for her to pay, Mrs. G filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) a complaint for cancellation of consolidation of ownership over a real property with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against Z Bank. Immediately
thereafter, the RTC issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Z Bank from
disposing of the foreclosed property or taking possession thereof.

Did the RTC err in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction ex parte? Explain.
(3%)

A.6.

Mr. H filed a complaint against Mr. I to recover the amount of ₱500,000.00 based on their
contract of services. In his answer, Mr. I admitted that he has yet to pay Mr. H for his services
based on their contract but nevertheless, interposed a counterclaim alleging that Mr. H still owed
him rental arrearages for the lease of his apartment also amounting to ₱500,000.00.

It has come to Mr. H's attention that Mr. I did not pay any filing fees when he filed his answer.
As such, Mr. H moved to dismiss the counterclaim. In response to Mr. H's motion, Mr. I averred
that the non-payment of filing fees was purely based on inadvertence and that the said filing fees
had already been paid as of date, as evinced by the official receipt issued by the clerk of court
therefor.

(a) What is the nature of Mr. l's counterclaim? Is the payment of filing fees required
for such counterclaim to prosper? Explain. (3%)

(b) Should Mr. I's counterclaim be dismissed? Explain. (3%)

A.7.

As a result of an anonymous complaint, Mr. J, a local public official, was held administratively
liable for Grave Misconduct by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in Administrative
Case No. 1234. As such, he was imposed the penalty of dismissal from service. The Ombudsman
also found probable cause to indict him for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No.3019,
or the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in Criminal Case No. 4321. Mr. J moved for the
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Joint Decision but was denied.

Unperturbed, Mr. J filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the
Court of Appeals (CA), assailing the Ombudsman's Joint Decision in Administrative Case No.
1234 and Criminal Case No. 4321. However, the CA dismissed the petition outright, holding that
such petition constitutes an improper remedy to assail the administrative and criminal aspects of
the aforementioned Ombudsman ruling.

Was the CA's dismissal of Mr. J's petition correct? Explain. (5%)

A.8.

Ms. A filed a petition for a writ of amparo, claiming that she was being threatened by Mr. B, her
ex-boyfriend, with whom she has a child out of wedlock, named C. Ms. A alleged that since she
started dating someone else, Mr. B began stalking her, parking his car on the street outside her
house, and watching her house until the wee hours of the morning. She thus feared for her life.

(a) Is Ms. A entitled to a writ of amparo? Explain. (2.5%)

(b) Assuming that Mr. B took away C without Ms. A's knowledge and consent, what
is the proper remedy for Ms. A to immediately recover C's custody? Explain. (2.5%)

A.9.

Ms. N initiated a special proceeding for the correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), impleading only the Local
Civil Registrar therein. In her petition, Ms. N sought to change the entry in her birth certificate
with respect to the date of her parents' marriage from "May 22, 1992" to "not married." The
Office of the Solicitor General opposed the petition, arguing that Ms. N's parents should have
been impleaded in the proceeding. In response, Ms. N argued that this was not necessary since it
was an entry in her own birth certificate which she intended to change. Hence, it was a matter
personal to her, and as such, the participation of her parents in the case could be dispensed with.

Is Ms. N's position correct? Explain. (3%)

A.10.

Distinguish the following:

(a) Writ of kalikasan and writ of continuing mandamus (3%)

(b) Warrant to Search, Seize, and Examine Computer Data (WSSECD) and
Warrant to Examine Computer Data (WECD) (3%)

- END OF PART I -

Note: This marks the end of Part I. The forthcoming problem sets will fall under Part II and the
answers therefor should be written in Booklet II.

PART II

Note: As stated in the Instructions, Part II covers problem sets labelled B.11. to B.20. All
answers to these questions should be written in Booklet II.

B.11.

Mr. X filed a complaint for sum of money against his old friend, Mr. Y. In order to ensure that
Mr. Y would not be able to file a responsive pleading and much more, participate in the case, Mr.
X paid off Mr. Y's counsel, Atty. Z, who deliberately let the case proceed as such without his
client's knowledge.

Eventually, judgment was rendered on March 1, 2016 in Mr. X's favor, a copy of which was
received by Atty. Z on April 4, 2016. Bothered by his conscience, Atty. Z brought the copy of
the decision to Mr.Y on June 1, 2016, thereby surprising the latter and causing him grief.
Meanwhile, the decision became final and executory in due course on April 19, 2016.

Thereafter, Mr. Y took steps in vindicating his rights, which culminated on August 15, 2016
when he, as represented by a new counsel, filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the
Court of Appeals (CA) on the ground of extrinsic fraud. The CA dismissed the petition on the
ground that Mr. Y failed to submit a satisfactory explanation as to why he directly resorted to a
petition for annulment of judgment, when he could have filed a petition for relief from judgment.

(a) What are the differences between a petition for relief from judgment and a
petition for annulment of judgment in terms of grounds and periods to file? (3%)

(b) Was the CA's dismissal of Mr. Y's petition for annulment of judgment proper?
Explain. (2%)

B.12.

Ms. R received a subpoena ad testificandum from a Regional Trial Court (RTC) directing her to
appear and testify in a case. Despite notice and without any sufficient justification, Ms. R failed
to appear. This prompted the RTC to issue a show-cause order directing Ms. R to explain, within
ten (10) days, why she should not be cited for contempt for her nonappearance despite receipt of
the subpoena. Ms. R, however, did not file her comment. After due hearing with notice to the
parties, the RTC cited her in indirect contempt, and consequently, ordered her arrest.

Ms. R moved to quash the warrant issued for her arrest, claiming that a formal charge should
have been filed against her, and that the same should have been docketed and prosecuted as a
separate case against her. She thus claimed that since this procedure was not followed, the order
citing her in contempt is null and void.

(a) Is Ms. R's contention tenable? Explain. (3%)

(b) What is the proper mode of appeal should Ms. R decide to assail her contempt
citation? Will the filing of such appeal automatically result in the suspension of the
execution of judgment? Explain. (2%)

B.13.

In a neighborhood bicycle race, Mr. A bumped the bicycle of one of his competitors, Mr. B, in
order to get ahead. This caused the latter to lose control of the bike which hit the concrete
pavement and sent Mr. B crashing headfirst into the sidewalk. By the time the organizers got to
him, Mr. B was dead. Law enforcement authorities who witnessed the incident arrested Mr. A
without a warrant, and immediately brought him to the inquest prosecutor for the conduct of an
inquest. Thereafter, an Information for Homicide was filed by the inquest prosecutor without the
conduct of a preliminary investigation. The next day Mr. A requested for the conduct of a
preliminary investigation.

(a) Is the inquest prosecutor's filing of the Information without the conduct of
preliminary investigation proper? (2.5%)

(b) Is Mr. A's request permissible? Explain. (2.5%)

B.14.
Mr. P was charged with Plunder before the Sandiganbayan along with several government
officials. Before his arraignment, he filed a petition for bail. This was objected to by the
prosecution which insisted that he should first be arraigned before he applies for bail,
considering that grant of bail will result in the accused fleeing the court's jurisdiction.

(a) When is bail a matter of right before conviction? (2%)

(b) Is the objection of the prosecution valid? Explain. (3%)

B.15.

In an Information filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Mr. C was charged with
Carnapping for supposedly taking the motorcycle of Mr. O and joyriding with it around the city.
When Mr. C was arraigned, he entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge. After the prosecution
rested its case, Mr. C proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence. The demurrer was denied by the
RTC.

(a) Would Mr. C be allowed to present evidence in his defense after the denial of his
demurrer? Explain. (2%)

(b) Assuming that the demurrer was granted by the RTC and the prosecution's
motion for reconsideration thereto is denied, what is the prosecution's further
procedural recourse? Explain. (3%)

B.16.

Mr. W was charged with raping his neighbor's seventeen (17)-year old daughter, AAA. When he
was arraigned, Mr. W expressed his desire to plead "guilty," provided that his sentence be
substantially reduced. Both AAA's mother and the prosecutor were amenable to the proposal.
Consequently, the judge entered a plea of guilty for Mr. W and sentenced him to serve a reduced
straight penalty of only ten (10) years of imprisonment, as agreed upon.

(a) Did the judge properly enter a plea of guilty for Mr. W? Explain. (2%)

(b) Assuming that Mr. W was once more charged with the crime of Rape committed
against AAA based on the same incident, may Mr. W validly invoke the defense of
double jeopardy through a motion to quash and will such motion prosper? Explain.
(3%)

B.17.

In a case for specific performance and damages, plaintiff Q presented photocopies of the
contracts he had executed with defendant R for the purpose of establishing their existence.
Defendant R's counsel objected to the admission of said photocopies, invoking the best evidence
rule.
(a) Should the objection of defendant R's counsel be sustained? Explain. (3%)

(b) Assuming that the best evidence rule applies, under what circumstances will the
photocopies be admissible in evidence? (2%)

B.18.

In a case for Attempted Parricide brought against Mr. M by his wife, Mrs. N, their son, C, was
called as a witness for the prosecution. Mr. M's counsel objected, invoking the filial privilege
rule.

Meanwhile, in a separate case for Serious Physical Injuries also brought against Mr. M, but this
time by his son, C, Mrs. N was called to testify against Mr. M. Mr. M's counsel objected,
invoking the marital disqualification rule.

Should the objections of Mr. M's counsel in both cases be sustained? Explain. (5%)

B.19.

A criminal complaint for Theft was filed against Mr. T by his employer for allegedly stealing
company property. During trial, the prosecutor called Mr. T's former supervisor, Mr. V, to the
stand and attempted to question him on similar incidents also involving Mr. T with his previous
employer. Mr. T's counsel objected to the question, invoking the rule on res inter alias acta. In
response, the prosecutor argued that the question should be allowed since he was trying to
establish Mr. T's habit of stealing things from the workplace.

(a) Should the objection of Mr. T's counsel be sustained? Explain. (2.5%)

(b) Assuming that the prosecution presents evidence on the bad moral character of
Mr. T, may the same be admitted in the present case? Explain. (2.5%)

B.20.

AAA, a ten (10)-year old minor, was sleeping inside her room when she was awakened by her
uncle, Mr. G, who was reeking of alcohol and was already on top of her. After Mr. G succeeded
in having carnal knowledge of AAA, the former immediately left the latter's room. Thereafter,
AAA rushed into the room of her mother, MMM, and spontaneously and frantically reported the
incident. Eventually, Mr. G was arrested and was indicted for the crime of Rape.

During trial, MMM was presented as a witness to testify on what AAA reported to her and
AAA's gestures and disposition at that time. Mr. G's counsel objected to MMM's testimony on
the ground that it is hearsay evidence. The prosecutor countered that the subject of MMM's
testimony may be admitted as an independently relevant statement and as part of the res gestae.

(a) May MMM's testimony be admitted on the ground that it constitutes an


independently relevant statement? Explain. (2.5%)
(b) May AAA's statement to MMM be admitted on the ground of res gestae?
Explain. (2.5%)

OU CAN BRING HOME THE QUESTIONNAIRE.

JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Chairperson
2018 Bar Examinations

Danielle, a Filipino citizen and permanent resident of Milan, Italy, filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Davao City, where she owns a rest house, a complaint for ejectment against Dan,
a resident of Barangay Daliao, Davao City. Danielle's property, which is located in Digos City,
Davao del Sur, has an assessed value of PhP 25,000. Appended to the complaint was Danielle's
certification on non-forum shopping executed in Davao City duly notarized by Atty. Dane
Danoza, a notary public.

(a) Was there a need to refer the case to the Lupong Tagapamayapa for prior barangay
conciliation before the court can take cognizance of the case? (2.5%)

(b) Was the action properly instituted before the RTC of Davao City? (2.5%)

(c) Should the complaint be verified or is the certification sufficient? (2.5%)

II

Dendenees Inc. and David, both stockholders owning collectively 25% of Darwinkle Inc., filed
an action before the RTC of Makati to compel its Board of Directors (BOD) to hold the annual
stockholders' meeting (ASM) on June 21, 2017, as required by Darwinkle Inc. 's By-Laws, with
prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction to use as record date April 30, 2017. The complaint
alleged, among others, that the refusal to call the ASM on June 21, 2017 was rooted in the plan
of the BOD to allow Databank Inc. (which would have owned 50% of Darwinkle Inc. after July
15, 2017) to participate in the ASM to effectively dilute the complainants' shareholdings and
ease them out of the BOD. Dendenees Inc. and David paid the amount of PhP 7 ,565 as filing
fees based on the assessment of the Clerk of Court. The BOD filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. They averred that the filing fees should have been based on the
actual value of the shares of Dendenees Inc. and David, which were collectively worth PhP 450
million.

If you were the Judge, will you grant the motion to dismiss? (5%)

III

On February 3, 2018, Danny Delucia, Sheriff of the RTC of Makati, served the Order granting
the ex-parte application for preliminary attachment of Dinggoy against Dodong. The Order,
together with the writ, was duly received by Dodong. On March 1, 2018, the Sheriff served upon
Dodong the complaint and summons in connection with the same case. The counsel of Dodong
filed a motion to dissolve the writ.

(a) Can the preliminary attachment issued by the Court in favor of Dinggoy be dissolved?
What ground/s can Dodong's counsel invoke? (2.5%)

(b) If Dodong posts a counter bond, is he deemed to have waived any of his claims for
damages arising from the issuance of the Order and writ of attachment? (2.5%)

IV

Dick Dixson had sons with different women - (i) Dexter with longtime partner Delia and (ii)
Dongdong and Dingdong with his housemaid Divina. When Dick fell ill in 2014, he entrusted all
his property titles and shares of stock in various companies to Delia who, in turn, handed them to
Dexter for safekeeping. After the death of Dick, Dexter induced Dongdong and Dingdong to sign
an agreement and waiver of their right to Dick's estate in consideration of PhP 45 million. As
Dexter reneged on his promise to pay, Dongdong and Dingdong filed a complaint with the RTC
of Manila for annulment of the agreement and waiver. The summons and complaint were
received by Dalia, the housemaid of Dexter, on the day it was first served. Dexter filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person. RTC Manila granted the motion
to dismiss.

Dongdong and Dingdong thereafter filed a new complaint against Dexter for annulment of the
agreement and waiver. Before Dexter could file his answer, Dongdong and Dingdong filed a
motion to withdraw their complaint praying that it be dismissed without prejudice. An Order was
issued granting the motion to withdraw without prejudice on the basis that the summons had not
yet been served on Dexter. Dexter filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal. He
argued that the dismissal should have been with prejudice under the "two-dismissal rule" of Rule
17, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, in view of the previous dismissal of the first case.

Will the two-dismissal rule apply making the second dismissal with prejudice? (5%)

Dorton Inc. (Dorton) sued Debra Commodities Inc. (Debra), Daniel, and Debbie in the RTC of
Manila for recovery of sum of money. The complaint alleged that, on October 14, 2017, Debra
obtained a loan from Dorton in the amount of PhP 10 million with interest of 9% per annum. The
loan was evidenced by a promissory note (PN) payable on demand signed by Daniel and Debbie,
the principal stockholders of Debra, who also executed a surety agreement binding themselves as
sureties. Copies of both the PN and the surety agreement were attached to the complaint. Dorton
further alleged that it made a final demand on March 1, 2018 for Debra and the sureties to pay,
but the demand was not heeded.

Debra, Daniel, and Debbie filed their answer, and raised the affirmative defense that, while the
PN and the surety agreement appeared to exist, Daniel and Debbie were uncertain whether the
signatures on the documents were theirs. The PN and the surety agreement were pre-marked
during pre-trial, identified but not authenticated during trial, and formally offered.

Can the RTC of Manila consider the PN and the surety agreement in rendering its decision? (5%)

VI

Daribell Inc. (Daribell) filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against spouses Dake
and Donna Demapilis for unpaid purchases of construction materials in the sum of PhP 250,000.
In their answer, spouses Demapilis admitted the purchases from Daribell, but alleged that they
could not remember the exact amount since no copies of the documents were attached to the
complaint. They nevertheless claimed that they made previous payments in the amounts of PhP
110,000 and PhP 20,000 and that they were willing to pay the balance of their indebtedness after
account verification. In a written manifestation, spouses Demapilis stated that, in order to buy
peace, they were willing to pay the sum of PhP 250,000, but without interests and costs.
Subsequently, Daribell filed a motion for partial summary judgment. Thereafter, Daribell filed an
amended complaint, alleging that the total purchases of construction materials were PhP 280,000
and only PhP 20,000 had been paid. Daribell also served upon the spouses Demapilis a request
for admission asking them to admit to the genuineness of the statement of accounts, delivery
receipts and invoices, as well as to the value of the principal obligation and the amount paid as
stated in the amended complaint.

Daribell thereafter amended the complaint anew. The amendment modified the period covered
and confirmed the partial payment of PhP 110,000 but alleged that this payment was applied to
the spouses' other existing obligations. Daribell however reiterated that the principal amount
remained unchanged.

(a) Is the request for admission deemed abandoned or withdrawn by the filing of the
second amended complaint? (2.5%)

(b) Can the amendment of the complaint be allowed if it substantially alters the cause of
action? (2.5%)

(c) Can the facts subject of an unanswered request for admission be the basis of a
summary judgment? (2.5%)

VII

Dory Enterprises Inc. (Dory) leased to Digna Corporation (Digna) a parcel of land located in
Diliman, Quezon City. During the term of the lease, Digna was informed by DBS Banking
Corporation (DBS) that it had acquired the leased property from the former owner Dory, and
required Digna to pay the rentals directly to it. Digna promptly informed Dory of DBS' claim of
ownership. In response, Dory insisted on its right to collect rent on the leased property.

Due to conflicting claims of Dory and DBS over the rental payments, Digna filed a complaint for
interpleader in the RTC of Manila. Digna prayed that it be allowed to consign in court the
succeeding monthly rentals, and that Dory and DBS be required to litigate their conflicting
claims. It later appeared that an action for nullification of a dacion en pago was filed by Dory
against DBS in the RTC of Quezon City. In said case, Dory raised the issue as to which of the
two (2) corporations had a better right to the rental payments. Dory argued that, to avoid
conflicting decisions, the interpleader case must be dismissed.

Does the action for nullification of the dacion en pago bar the filing of the interpleader case?
(2.5%)

VIII

Spouses Dondon and Donna Dumdum owned a residential lot in Dapitan City. Doy Dogan
bought said lot and took possession thereof with the promise to pay the purchase price of PhP 2
million within a period of six (6) months. After receiving only PhP 500,000, spouses Dumdum
executed the deed of absolute sale and transferred the title to Doy Dogan. The balance was not
paid at all. Spouses Dumdum, through counsel, sent a demand letter to Doy Dogan for him to
pay the balance of PhP 1.5 million plus interest of PhP150,000. Doy Dogan responded in a letter
by saying that "while the remaining balance is admitted, the interest charged is excessive." There
being no payment, spouses Dumdum filed with the RTC of Dapitan City a complaint for
reconveyance with damages against Doy Dogan.

In his answer, Doy Dogan raised, by way of affirmative defense, that the purchase price had been
fully paid and for this reason the complaint should have been dismissed. Spouses Dumdum then
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings which was granted by the RTC of Dapitan City.
The Court awarded PhP1 .5 million actual damages representing the balance of the purchase
price, PhP 200,000 as moral damages, PhP 200,000 as exemplary damages, PhP 90,000 as
interest, PhP 50,000 as attorney's fees, and PhP 5,000 as cost of suit.

Was it proper for the RTC of Dapitan City to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings?
(2.5%)

IX

In 2015, Dempsey purchased from Daria a parcel of land located in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental.
The latter executed a deed of absolute sale and handed to Dempsey the owner's duplicate copy of
TCT No. 777 covering the property. Since he was working in Manila and still had to raise funds
to cover taxes, registration and transfer costs, Dempsey kept the TCT in his possession without
having transferred it to his name. A few years thereafter, when he already had the funds to pay
for the transfer costs, Dempsey went to the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete and discovered that,
after the sale, Daria had filed a petition for reconstitution of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT
No. 777 which the RTC granted. Thus, unknown to Dempsey, Daria was able to secure a new
TCT in her name.

What is Dempsey's remedy to have the reconstituted title in the name of Daria nullified? (5%)

X
In a buy-bust operation, 30 kilos of shabu were seized from Dave and Daryll. They were arrested
and placed on inquest before Prosecutor Danilo Doon who ordered their continued detention.
Thereafter, the information for the sale and distribution of shabu was filed in court. When
arraigned, Dave and Daryll pleaded not guilty to the charge. During pre-trial, counsel for both of
the accused raised, for the first time, the illegality of the arrest. The case proceeded to trial. After
trial, the court scheduled the promulgation of judgment with notice to both the accused and their
counsel, Atty. Dimayuga. During the promulgation, only Dave and Atty. Dimayuga were
present. Both the accused were convicted of the crime charged.

(a) Was the challenge to the validity of the arrest timely raised? (2.5%)

(b) What is the remedy available to Daryll, if any, to be able to file an appeal? (2.5%)

XI

In 2007, Court of Appeals Justice (CA Justice) Dread Dong (J. Dong) was appointed to the
Supreme Court (Court) as Associate Justice. Immediately after the appointment was announced,
several groups questioned his qualification to the position on the ground that he was not a natural
born Filipino citizen. In the same year, the Court issued an Order enjoining him from accepting
the appointment or assuming the position and discharging the functions of his office until he is
able to successfully complete all the necessary steps to show that he is a natural born citizen of
the Philippines. However, he continued to exercise his functions as CA Justice.

Since the qualification of a natural born citizen applies as well to CA Justices, Atty. Dacio, a
practicing lawyer, asked the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), through a verified request, to
initiate a quo warranto proceeding against J. Dong in the latter's capacity as incumbent CA
Justice. The OSG refused to initiate the action on the ground that the issue of J. Dong's
citizenship was still being litigated in another case.

When the OSG refused to initiate a quo warranto proceeding, Atty. Dacio filed a petition for
certiorari against the OSG and certiorari and prohibition against J. Dong. The petition for
certiorari against the OSG alleged that the OSG committed grave abuse of discretion when it
deferred the filing of a quo warranto proceeding against J. Dong, while the petition for certiorari
and prohibition against J. Dong asked the Court to order him to cease and desist from further
exercising his powers, duties and responsibilities as CA Justice. In both instances, Atty. Dacio
relied on the fact that, at the lime of J. Dong's appointment as CA Justice, his birth certificate
indicated that he was a Chinese citizen and his bar records showed that he was a naturalized
Filipino citizen.

(a) May the OSG be compelled, in an action for certiorari, to initiate a quo warranto
proceeding against J. Dong? (2.5%)

(b) Does Atty. Dacio have the legal personality to initiate the action for certiorari and
prohibition against J. Dong? (2.5%)

XII
Dodo was knocked unconscious in a fist fight with Dindo. He was rushed to the emergency room
of the Medical City where he was examined and treated by Dr. Datu. As he was being examined,
a plastic sachet appearing to contain shabu fell from Dodo's jacket which was on a chair beside
him. Dodo was thus arrested by the same policemen who assisted him to the hospital. At Dodo's
trial, the public prosecutor called Dr. Datu to the witness stand. When the public prosecutor
asked Or. Datu as to what he saw in the emergency room, Dodo's counsel objected, claiming
doctor-patient privilege rule.

How would you rule on the objection? (2.5%)

XIII

Denny is on trial for homicide. The prosecution calls Danilo, a police officer, who interviewed
the victim, Drew, shortly after the shooting. Danila's testimony is being offered by the
prosecution for purposes of proving that (i) Drew is now dead; (ii) while in the emergency room,
Drew was posting his medical condition on Facebook and was "liking" the posts of his Facebook
friends; (iii) Drew asked the nurse for water but was refused because he was bleeding, which
subsequently angered Drew; and (iv) that before dying, Drew signed a statement in which he
identified Denny as the shooter.

Is the proposed testimony of Danilo admissible? (2.5%)

XIV

Dave is on trial for sexual assault of Delly, a law student who sidelines as a call center agent.
Dave offers the testimony of Danny, who says that Dave is known in the community as a decent
and discerning person. The prosecution presents a rebuttal witness, Dovie, who testifies that, if
Dave was reputed to be a good person, that reputation was a misperception because Dave had
been previously convicted of homicide.

Is Dovie's testimony admissible as to the character of Dave? (2.5%)

XV

Atty. Dalmacio, the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, applied for a search
warrant before the Executive Judge of RTC Manila. He alleged in his application that a certain
alias Django was keeping about 10 kilos of shabu in a wooden cabinet located at Dillian's Store
in Paseo de Sta. Rosa, Laguna. The Executive Judge of Manila personally examined Atty.
Dalmacio and his witnesses and thereafter issued the search warrant particularly describing the
place to be

searched and the items to be seized.

(a) Can the search warrant issued by the Executive Judge of Manila be enforced in
Laguna? (2.5%)
(b) Can the legal concept of "venue is jurisdictional" be validly raised in applications for
search warrants? (2.5%)

XVI

Danjo, a stay-in gardener at the Dy family home in Quezon City, applied for overseas
employment in Riyadh as a flower arranger. After he left for abroad, Dino Dy, head of the
family, discovered that all his wristwatches were missing. Dino followed Danjo's lnstagram
account and in one instance saw Danjo wearing his Rolex watch. He filed a complaint for
qualified theft against Danjo with the Office of the Prosecutor (OP), Quezon City. The subpoena
with the affidavit-complaint was served on Denden, Danjo's wife, at their house. No counter-
affidavit was filed by Danjo who continued to work in Riyadh. After conducting a preliminary
investigation, the OP found probable cause against Danjo and subsequently filed the information
for qualified theft before the RTC of Quezon City. The court likewise found probable cause and
issued in 2016 a warrant for Danjo's arrest.

Danjo was repatriated to the Philippines in 2018. While Danjo was lurking outside the Dys'
house, which was only about 100 meters away from the police station, SPO1 Dody recognized
Danjo. Realizing that the police station had a copy of Danjo's warrant of arrest, SPO1 Dody
immediately pursued and arrested Danjo.

(a) Was the warrant of arrest issued against Danjo who was not in the Philippines valid?
(2.5%)

(b) Can the warrant of arrest be served on Danjo upon his return? (2.5%)

XVII

Don Deles, a contractor, was sued together with Mayor Dante Dungo and Congressman Dal
Dilim for malversation of public funds before the Office of the Ombudsman. Danny Din, a
material witness of the complainant Diego Domingo, was hired as an engineer by a construction
company in Qatar, and had to depart in two (2) months. To perpetuate Danny Din's testimony,
Diego Domingo applied for his conditional examination before the Sandiganbayan.

Should the application for conditional examination of Danny Din be granted? (2.5%)

XVIII

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a complaint with the Sandiganbayan in
connection with the sequestered assets and properties of Demo Companies Inc. (Demo) and
impleaded its officers and directors. Since the complaint did not include Demo as defendant, the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution where it ordered Demo to be impleaded. Thereafter, the
Republic filed an amended complaint naming Demo as additional defendant, which amendment
was later admitted.
Demo filed a motion for bill of particulars for the Republic to clarify certain matters in its
amended complaint. The Sandiganbayan immediately granted the motion. Upon submission of
the bill of particulars by the Republic, Demo filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the answers
in the bill of particulars were indefinite and deficient responses to the question of what the
alleged illegally acquired funds or properties of Demo were. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the
case.

(a) Was the Sandiganbayan correct in dismissing the case? (2.5%)

(b) What can the defendant, in a civil case, do in the event that his motion for bill of
particulars is denied? (2.5%)

XIX

Drylvik, a German national, married Dara, a Filipina, in Dusseldorf, Germany. When the
marriage collapsed, Dara filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC of
Manila. Drylvik, on the other hand, was able to obtain a divorce decree from the German Family
Court. The decree, in essence, states:

The marriage of the Parties contracted on xxx before the Civil Registrar of Dusseldorf is
hereby dissolved. The parental custody of the children Diktor and Daus is granted to the
father.

Drylvik filed a motion to dismiss in the RTC of Manila on the ground that the court no longer
had jurisdiction over the matter as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving
his marriage to Dara. Dara objected, saying that while she was not challenging the divorce
decree, the case in the RTC still had to proceed for the purpose of determining the issue of the
children's custody. Drylvik counters that the issue had been disposed of in the divorce decree,
thus constituting res judicata.

(a) Should Drylvik's motion to dismiss be granted? (2.5%)

(b) Is a foreign divorce decree between a foreign spouse and a Filipino spouse,
uncontested by both parties, sufficient by itself to cancel the entry in the civil registry
pertaining to the spouses' marriage? (2.5%)

XX

Dominic was appointed special administrator of the Estate of Dakota Dragon. Delton, husband of
Dakota, together with their five (5) children, opposed the appointment of Dominic claiming that
he (Dominic) was just a stepbrother of Dakota. After giving Dominic the chance to comment, the
court issued an Order affirming the appointment of Dominic.

(a) What is the remedy available to the oppositors? (2.5%)


(b) If there are no qualified heirs, can the government initiate escheat proceedings over
the assets of the deceased? To whom, in particular, shall the estate of the deceased go and
for whose benefit? (2.5%)

XXI

The municipality of Danao, Cebu was a quiet and peaceful town until a group of miners from
Denmark visited the area and discovered that it was rich in nickel. In partnership with the
municipal mayor, the Danish miners had to flatten 10 hectares of forest land by cutting all the
trees before starting their mining operations. The local DENR, together with the Samahan Laban
sa Sumisira sa Kalikasan, filed a petition for writ of kalikasan against the municipal mayor and
the Danish miners in the RTC of Cebu.

(a) Is the petition within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Cebu? (2.5%)

(b) What is the Precautionary Principle? (2.5%)

XXII

Danica obtained a personal loan of PhP 180,000 from Dinggoy, payable in 18 equal monthly
installments of PhP 10,000 until fully paid. In order to complete her payment at an earlier date,
Danica instead paid PhP 20,000 monthly, and continued doing so until the 15th month, which
payments Dinggoy all accepted. Later on, she realized that she had overpaid Dinggoy by 100%
as she should have already completed payment in nine (9) months. She demanded the return of
the excess payment, but Dinggoy completely ignored her. Thus, Danica availed of the Rules of
Procedure for Small Claims Cases by filing before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) a statement
of claim, together with the required documents.

Should the MTC proceed with the case under the: (i) Revised Rules Summary Procedure; (ii) the
Rules of Procedure for Small Claims; or (iii) the regular procedure for civil cases? (5%)

-NOTHING FOLLOWS-

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