405

THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF
SPACE: PROSPECTS AND BARRIERS

Ray A. Williamson

In the USA, and also in some Western European countries,

there is noticeable business and government confidence in a
larger, more productive role for private invetment in space
applications. The industrialization of space is now a serious
possibility. This paper examines the role of private interests
in this field, explores how government can stimulate or assist
private space ventures particularly through removing
barriers to investment and offering incentives, and discussess
the pros and cons of possible policy initiatives.

K~ww&: space technology; industrial economics; policy formation

THERE IS A GROWING IMPRESSION that the pursuit of space technology for useful
purposes is at a watershed-a feature which is noted by other contributors to
this volume. In sharp contrast to the situation of a decade ago, when the USA
decided to develop the Shuttle, it is now possible to contemplate seriously the
industrialization of space.
Two major developments, vastly different in character, have contributed to
this growing change of attitude towards investment in space, and have led to a
new optimism about mankind’s future in the space environment.’ First, the
technology has developed and begun to mature. Many of the technological
systems that were but dreams in the minds of the space visionaries a quarter of a
century ago have now proved their usefulness. Among the industrialized
countries, dependence on space technology is high and growing rapidly.?
Second, many countries other than the USA and the USSR now have flourish-
ing space programmes. There is therefore a much wider base ofinterest in using
space technology than ever before. However, at the same time that some evince
increased optimism, others are highly sceptical about the future benefits of the
development of space and cite major barriers to its industrialization.3

Ray A. \Villiamson is with the Of&x of Trchnoiogy Assessment (OTA), Congress of the United States,
Washington, DC 20510, USA. This paper is based, in part, on a report by the OTA, CiviiianSpace Pofiq and
~P~~icQ~~u~.However, the views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the OTA, the Technical
Assessment Board, or ofindi~idual members ofCongress. The author acknowledges the generous assistance
and advice of Richard DaiBelIo, Gordon Law and Adam Wasserman in preparing this paper. Philip
Chandler, Skip Jones, and Jean Monroe are due thanks for their helpful criticisms, as is Jannie Coles for
typing the manuscript.

FlKURESOct&erl902 0016-3267/62/060405-l 2$03.00 0 1982Butteworth& Co (Publishers)

Ltd
406 The industrialization of‘space: prospecls and barrws

Context for space industrialization

According to proponents, the primary elements for achieving the industrializa-

tion of space in the near term-the Shuttle and its major supporting
components, Spacelab and the remote manipulator arm-are already in hand.4
The Shuttle, though costly and still in need of extensive testing, has indeed
opened important new possibilities for both scientific and engineering testing
and use. It will not only be able to carry massive, sophisticated payloads to low
earth orbit but, more important, it will be able to return them to earth. This will
make possible (for a cost) two important new capabilities in space: ( 1) testing of
new instruments and returning them for alterations and retesting; and (2)
manufacturing products under conditions of extremely low gravity. In addition
to the return feature of the Shuttle, the presence of humans aboard will make
these experiments and tests much more flexible than they could otherwise be.
Trained specialists will be able to supervise and interact with the test equip-
ment as they follow the course of the experiment.
Spacelab, the European-built laboratory designed to make the Shuttle
particularly useful for experimentation, is expected to contribute significantly
to the ability of the Shuttle to serve the needs of industry. Spacelab is especially
designed for materials science and biological research, since it will be
pressurized to allow a shirtsleeve environment and the direct interaction of
experimenters with their equipment.
The international context for space has changed radically in recent years. For
many years, the USA and the USSR were the only countries capable of placing
men and objects into orbit. The space programmes of other countries were
nearly entirely dependent on the US and Soviet satellites, launchers, and
associated tracking and data relay systems. Now the Europeans and the
Japanese have developed their own satellites and major launching systems. As
noted, the European Space Agency (ESA) has build Spacelab for use on the
Shuttle. Canada has also developed and built the Shuttle’s remote manipulator
arm. In addition, India has a growing space programme, China is developing
its capability, and Brazil and Pakistan have also recently announced plans to
develop their own space programmes. Clearly, as is detailed in a recent OTA
report,” these developments signal strong competition for US industry.
However, while acting as incentives for US industry to be more innovative in
space, foreign space programmes may also open up new markets for US
technologies.
In the USA, these changes have led to an increase in private sector interest in
space technology. Although this interest is still small and confined mainly to the
aerospace industries, broader private investment in space is likely to increase ;f
the Shuttle development proceeds apace and if a few ventures in addition to
communications satellites prove successful. There is no overall agreement
about the policy strategies that the US civilian space programme should
follow,” but decisionmakers in government and the private sector are increas-
ingly confident of a larger, more productive role for private investment in space
applications.
Beginning in the Carter administration and continuing more strongly in the
Reagan administration ,7 US policy has been driven by the conviction that the

FUTURES October 1982

 The industrialization of space:prospects and barriers 107

public good will ultimately be better served if the private sector takes a much
more active part in the development of space and space technology. This paper
examines the role of private interests in developing and applying new tech-
nology for useful purposes in space. It also explores how government can
enhance and expand private sector involvement by making private access to
space more attractive and trouble-free. What barriers to private investment in
space exist? What incentives are needed? This paper also explores these issues
and discusses the pros and cons ofpossible policy initiatives. It is founded on the
following axioms.8

a Continued expansion into spaceforpeacefulpurposes will be beneficial to mankin&-ie

it will serve the public good. Although this axiom can be demonstrated only in
hindsight, the success of satellite communications for meeting national and
global communications needs is perhaps the clearest example ofits truth. In
addition, space systems developed by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) have demonstrated their capacity for meeting
educational needs in rural areas, for monitoring weather, assisting in navi-
gation, and for managing renewable and non-renewable resources. Aero-
space research has also resulted in a number of non-aerospace applications,
such as the cardiac pacemaker or advanced gas turbines, that have created
new industries, provided jobs and helped to maintain the US technological
edge in world markets.
l Many applications of technology in space will be appropriatefor private development
and operation. Experienced investment bankers feel that raising private funds
to purchase a fifth Shuttle is possible given adequate incentives or
guarantees.9 Communications satellites already support a multi-billion
dollar global industry. In the near future, satellite remote sensing and space
materials procesing technologies may also offer attractive US domestic
investment opportunities. (The F rench already have a semi-private
corporation to market data collected by their future remote sensing satellite
system, SPOT.) The private sector may also have an important function in
owning and operating systems presently under government control eg
expendable launchers, tracking equipment, launch pad maintenance and
control.
l Government has a continuing role to playin encouraging innovationin space technology.
Except for communications, the government remains the chief investor in
space technology. As more companies recognize that profits are to be made
in space, the role of the government as initiator of new projects could well
evolve into a more responsive one ofsupporting industry needs. In the USA
the situation may be likened to that of commercial aviation before world
war 2. In that case, government shouldered the burden of funding naviga-
tional beacons, airports, support equipment, test equipment and the
development of improved communications. This support provided the
infrastructure necessary for a strong commercial market to develop.
l A range of incentives to involve theprivate sector is needed. Maintaining a high level
of R and D activity in industry is only one aspect of the process of
commercializing a new technology. A new technology must be economi-
cally viable as well as technically feasible before the private sector can be

FUlURESOctober1982
408 The industrialization of space: prospects and barriers

TABLE 1. FACTORS INVOLVED IN DETERMINING ECONOMIC VIABILITY

l Potential size and value of the market.

. Certaintyof the market (includingpriceelasticity).
l Lengthof time fromcommitment of capitalresourcesuntilthe startof paybadcend projectedbreak-even.
. The expected rate of returnon investments.
l The costs of money, materials and labour, and their stability.
l Competiiive market structure for the service or product.

expected to adopt it. Because the determination of economic viability

involves a complex analysis of many variables (Table l), policy initiatives
that focus primarily on hardware development may produce technologies
which are poorly adapted for the commercial marketplace. Incentives that
relate to developing a market, altering the cost ofmoney, increasing the rate
ofreturn on investments, or the other categories ofTable 1 are also needed.

Opportunities for investing in space

What prospects are there for private investment and involvement in space? The
list varies greatly depending on the interests of the list-maker and how much ofa
visionary he is. However, it can generally be divided into those products and
services that would be available before the end of the century and those that
would be developed after AD 2000. Because visionaries often confuse the
prospects for the long term with the more immediate ones, it is important to
bear in mind that what we are able and willing to do in the next century will
depend directly on what technologies we develop between now and then.
For example, proponents of a solar power satellite (SPS) system have often
argued that we could have the first component of a system in place before the
end of this century. 10Perhaps we could, but it would require pulling out all the
financial and technical stops to get there. However, the development of an SPS,
if a system is ever built, will necessarily depend on our experience with the
Shuttle, with space stations, with new materials, and with many other tech-
nologies that are either under development or have not yet been started.” These
first have to be tried and proved and then experience gathered before the next
step is taken. On the other hand, although it is important to keep a careful eye
on the present for short-term benefits, it is also important to cast our vision
forward and attempt to divine what the future could be. Both kinds ofvision are
necessary for developing private investment and also for instituting government
incentives and policies.
The level of private investment in space will be driven by the amount of
investment in government programmes as well as by policy incentives. A
relatively high commitment from government will naturally result in a higher
interest in new space ventures among the private sector. Investment will also
depend directly on the technological developments that are achieved by
government programmes, eg the Shuttle, new propulsion systems, space
stations etc. The length of the list of private space ventures and the size of the
individual investments will also depend on the extent of international coopera-
tion and the number ofjoint ventures that are instituted to exploit the space
environment. It is likely that a higher degree of international cooperation will
be attempted, both by governments and by private industry because of the

FlJlURESOctober1982
 The industn’aliza&ion ofspace: prospects and barriers 409

extremely high cost attached to developing space systems. One area that looks
promising for international cooperation between corporations in the research
stages, at least, is materials processing in space.12
Table 2 presents the major opportunities for industrial involvement in space
systems before AD 2000.13 Since most systems will continue to be developed,
owned and operated by the government, this list does not represent the full
range of possible space development. In this list, the dependence on the Shuttle
and associated components is strong.
Table 3 extends the list ofopportunities into the early part ofthe 2 1st century.
Here, there is a much greater dependence on large, unmanned and manned
space platforms, since I have assumed that by the 21st century, there will be
space platforms and space stations operated by several countries, regardless of
the near-term results of the current US debate over whether to build a space
station. It is also likely that there will be a second-generation Shuttle of higher
capacity and greater efficiency to transport more mass to orbit at cheaper unit
cost. Certainly, the further out in time we attempt to see, the cloudier our vision
becomes. These lists represent a deliberately conservative view since I
attempted to separate the probable from the possible developments of space
technology.

TABLE 2. POTENTIAL FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT BEFORE AD 2000

Applications syi3tsms/services
Transportation Expendable launchers before 1990; Ariane
now in service
Shuttle before 1985
Ground operations before 1985
Marketing before 1985
Ownership after 1QQO
upper stages now being marketed
and developed
Communications 3WO GHz System cl985
Large communications platforms after 1990
Remote servicing after 1995
Remote sensing General land remote sensing 1Q&l (SPOT), later
(active and passive) for US systems
Special purpose GSO platforms for after 1985
exploration, land use planning,
crop assessment
Weather (special purpose warning systems) after 1QQO
Materials
Processing in space Furnaces, processing modules 1985
New materials for now being developed
space structures
Structures Small multipurpose platforms for
manufacturing, testing (LEO)’
GE02 platfon (communications, after 1QQO
remote sensing)
Space power Photovoltaic systems
Thermal-electric systems

1 LEO = Low earth orbit

* GE0 = Geosynchronous orbit

FllTlJRESOctober1982
4 10 Th industrializationofspace: prospectsand bamm

TABLE 3. POTENTIAL FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT AD 2000-2020

Applkstlons SptWWUseS

Transportation 2nd generationShuttle

Mafle3ting
G~~~s~
Ownership
Upperstages
Otbii transfervehicles c2ooo
Solar sails c2010
Communications 2ndI3rd generation,30/20 GHs systems C2OW

Remotesensing G&tionery platforms c2ooo

Materials amine c2010

Lunar-basedminiqprocessing c 2020
Structures Largespace structures c2010
Space power Advancedphotovokaicsystems c2ooo
Advancedthermal,nuclearsystems c2010

Barriers to private investment

The course of technological innovation from R and D to the marketplace

generally includes barriers related to the technical and economic uncertainties
of a new process or product. Innovations in space technology face additional
barriers related to the expense and technical difIiculty of placing men and
equipment into orbit. Table 4 lists the most important of these barriers,
including those that are specific to the environment of space. It is these barriers
to which incentives are directed. Lowering the barriers reduces the economic
risk.
The importance of any particular barrier will, of course, differ from tech-
nology to technology. For satellite communi~tions, for example, the market,
though unknown in detail, was sufficiently strong to encourage investment; the
greatest uncertainty lay in the technical operation of the system. For the early
land remote-sensing system, by contrast, both the operation of new satellite
systems and the market for data were uncertain. Today, the technology for
multispectral scanner systems is well understood, but the market remains
uncertain.

Incentives for at&acting private capital

The most attractive future investments will be those for which an assured
market exists, and for which, in addition, likely profits are high. As noted, it is
these reasons that were responsible for the relative ease with which investment
capital was obtained for the lirst geosynchronous satellites. A similar condition
exists for certain high value pharmaceuticals or catalysts. A ready market exists
for these products. If it can be shown that they or other low mass, high value
products can be manufactured in space more economically than on earth, they
too will constitute attractive investments.
Many different successful incentives for overcoming the barriers shown in
Table 4, and for reducing the risk of the private sector, have been used. Most of
these incentives are in some way appropriate for space technology. The follow-

FuruREsoctobs?1962
 The industrialization of space: prospects and barriers 4 1I

TABLE 4. BARRIERS TO
INVESTMENT IN SPACE

Technological
Uncertain technology
Systems tend to be complex
Uncertaintyof space environment1
Economic
High cost to reach space’
Market risksuncertain
High cost of technologydevelopment
Regulatory/policy
Government controlsaccess1
Status of civilianspace programmeuncertain’

l Unique to space environment

ing discussion presents some possible ones designed to reduce these barriers. It
is necessarily a partial list, and focuses on the most important incentives for
space technology. Because this paper is written from the perspective of US
policy, the discussion necessarily emphasizes the particular needs and problems
of the US private sector. The private sector in other countries has related
concerns, but has available somewhat different institutional means to address
them.

Joint industrylgovernment R and D projects

In a sense, any NASA or other governmental programmes that contract with
industry to develop new technologies for government use acts to reduce the
barriers to innovation, since many of these products also find extensive use in
commercial applications. However, although such work may aid some com-
panies, the spinoffs are accidental and generally not under the control of the
corporation.
One way ofensuring that industry has a genuine stake and early involvement
in technological innovation is to design and fund Rand D programmes in which
government and industry work together on projects of mutual interest. NASA’s
proposed Ka band (30/20 GH z ) satellite communications demonstration
project is an excellent example of such a possibility.14
As Congressional hearings on the proposed 30/20 GHz demonstration
project suggest,15 government encouragement of industry participation in a
given project or technology depends on the structure of the industry and the
amount of capital available to undertake long-term projects. In the case of
satellite communications, the greatest potential profits from a new technology
are likely to be reaped by the firms that lease satellite transponder time (ie the
broadcast firms) rather than by the satellite builders. Hence, the future
expected profits accruing to the satellite manufacturers may not be sufficient to
allow them to pursue advanced communications research independently. This
circumstance suggests that it might be profitable for the satellite builders and
the broadcasters to team up to mount a demonstration project in concert with
NASA. Such an arrangement would have the effect of reducing NASA’s fman-
cial role, and placing more of the burden of development costs in the hands of
those who will profit most.

FUlURESOctober1982
4 I2 The indutrialization ofspace: prospects and barriers

Designatede.@y
One way to involve the private sector in using space technology is to designate a
single entity to commercialize technology developed by the government or with
government funding. The development of satellite communications by Comsat
is an important example of this mechanism. However, as the OTA report
argues, “there is no single best model for commercializing space applications
technologies. The particular series of steps that led to the Comsat Corporation,
for example, though effective in promoting satellite communications, will not
necessarily serve as a paradigm for other technologies. Commercialization of
other space technologies requires that the special circumstances and different
requirements of each be considered in determining whether and to what extent
a particular system should be privately owned.“16
For example, if the Landsat system is turned over to a private entity, as is
planned by the current US administration, it may be in the best interests of the
USA to commercialize the space and the ground segments at different rates.17
Such a scheme was not considered necessary for communications satellites. In
another example, although US expendable launchers may be commercialized
by the private sector, it may be appropriate for the federal government to own
and operate the launch facilities and tracking and data relay systems until such
time as they also become commercially viable enterprises.18

Tax benefits
It may be possible to involve the private sector in the development and
operation of new space systems by altering the tax laws. Three of the main
incentives in the present US tax systems are depreciation allowances, invest-
ment tax credits, and the ability to deduct R and D outlays. By tailoring these
incentives to apply more generously to research on particular space systems, the
private sector may be encouraged to participate in research that might other-
wise involve too high a degree of risk. One of the main advantages of using tax
benefits rather than alternative devices to stimulate Rand D is that they involve
less direct government control.

Encouraging industrialconsortia
An obvious alternative to the more common case of projects directed by a single
firm is to encourage research joint ventures or indust~al consortia. Such a joint
venture would be a formal means to pool resources (~nan~ia1, technical, and
physical) and liabilities among the participating firms. The joint venture could
be established by manufacturers with other manufacturers or with sub-
contractors to do advanced research in space systems. Recently, more than a
score of the largest US computer manufacturers and their semiconductor
suppliers have formed such a consortium under the Semiconductor Industrial
Association to conduct advanced electronics research. SPOTIMAGE and
Arianespace are good examples of European efforts to use this technique.
However, the US antitrust laws may present certain barriers to such a plan.
Whether or not a joint venture violates the current antitrust laws is a function of
its design and the circumstances under which it is established. The articulation

FUl’URESOctoberl982
of a clear US government policy encouraging consortia and clarifying their
position with respect to the antitrust laws would greatly facilitate their use.

Joint Endeavor Agreement and Related Agreement

The NASA Joint Endeavor Agreement UEA) seems a particularly effective tool
ofgovernment policy towards private investment in space.19Designed by NASA
to encourage private firms to risk R and D capital experimenting in space with
materials and materials processing, the JEA makes possible a high degree of
cooperation between government and industry. Both parties risk capital and
other resources to test new processes in space. NASA provides the
trans~rtation and considerable experience in working in space. The company
develops the necessary equipment, does the initial ground testing and
theoretical research. The experiment must meet the critera of technical and
economic merit and must contribute to innovation. In order to make the
arrangement attractive, NASA allows the company to retain certain agreed
proprietary rights to the results, particularly those that lead to a competitive
edge in marketing products of the space-based process. The latter is an
important, perhaps essential, concession on the part of NASA to the business
community. NASA has the power to retain the results of work done under
contract to NASA as public property held in trust by NASA. By allowing some
restricted sets of data to be designated as proprietary information, NASA allows
the company entering the Agreement to retain a necessary advantage over
competitors.
To date, only McDonnell-Douglas ( 1980) and GTI Corporation ( 1982) have
signed JEAs with NASA. Together, NASA and McDonnell-Douglas will use
the capabilities of the Shuttle to investigate continuous flow electrophoresis in
space. In a subsidiary agreement, Ortho Pharmaceutical has joined
McDonnell-Douglas to explore the ability of the process to produce large
enough quantities of high value, low mass pharmaceuticals to show a profit on
the process. GTI Corporation is developing a furnace with multiple sub-
enclosures designed to perform and control several separate experiments in
solidification. The company will sell space in the furnace to interested manu-
facturers for materials expe~mentation.
For at least two companies, the JEA is a strong incentive for investing in
research in space. They are committing research funds for the express purpose
of making a profit on the processes so tested and are trying out very specific,
narrowly defined experiments. Other corporations interested in different
aspects of experimenting in space may also join NASA in JEAs as they become
more familiar with the prospects and problems of working in space. Several
have expressed interest, and a few have signed lesser agreements such as the
Technical Exchange Agreement and the Industrial Guest Investigator’s
Agreement to share information, personnel and expertise.
As it stands, some industrial critics complain that the JEA is structured in
such a way that a company must be able to commit a substantial investment to
the Agreement in order to enter into it. They must also be willing to do the
marketing, linancing, and hardware development. However, by encouraging
different companies to take on different tasks, each committing itself to only
part of the total investment, more companies might be able to enter the field.

FUTURES October 1982

414 The industrialization of space: prospccls and barnem

NASA, in turn, would be able to strengthen an already powerful tool.

Ext~d~~g theJEA
The concept of the JEA has so far been applied only to materials processing.
Can it be extended to other profit-making activities in space? Two arrange-
ments, suggested by OTA,2* seem worth exploring.

l Shuttle experiments. For predelined areas of research with potential to meet

national needs, the ofIer of free transportation for testing an experimental
process or a piece of equipment would be a powerful incentive in other
technologies as well. It could be used to test new equipment in space:
sensors, robot devices, cameras. However, for the smaller experiments, a
formal agreement such as the JEA is much too expensive. If NASA were to
make a small percentage of the Shuttle payload available for industrial
experimentation at a reduced charge, more companies could become
involved for relatively little investment. NASA’s Getaway Special
experimental packages already satisfy part of this need. However, each of
the experiments must be completely self-contained and have no access to
power from the Shuttle, nor can they be exposed to space. Thus, only a
limited range of experiments can be carried out under these circumstances.
In order to test sensors or any other equipment that need access to space or
onboard power sources, a wider range of experimental possibilities is
necessary.
It should be noted that such an incentive would require more total
Shuttle capacity than is presently available on current, or planned, Shuttle
vehicles. Therefore, this or other incentives that require higher transport-
ation capacity would also require either a fifth Shuttle or additional expend-
able launchers. In order for strong private markets for space technology to
develop, a sufficient transportation capacity must be available.
l Public Service. Because of the maturity of satellite communications tech-
nology, and the low earth orbit of the Shuttle, widespread testing of
communications devices on the Shuttle would be of little use. However, it
should be possible to construct suitable arrangements for using a specified
percentage of a new communication satellite’s transponders for public
service (eg rural telecommunications for health and education) in return for
transporting it to space. Operations and maintenance costs for the trans-
ponders could be borne by the public users. This a~angement would have
the advantage of reducing the risk for the corporation, and providing a
long-term service for the public good. If the satellite were successful, all
would benefit. The corporation that designed and flew the satellite would
earn a viable return from the balance ofthe satellite’s capacity and, in effect,
it would be paying for the launch service over a very long period. If the
satellite failed, each would have lost only a portion of the total investment.
In the past, NASA has used the opportunity provided by satellite system
demonstration projects to provide similar public services. The foreign and
domestic experiments with public broadcasting and voice transmission on
the NASA Applications Technology Satellite Series are excellent examples
of this practice. Such experiments have served the public well by demon-

FUTlJRESOCtObF19S2
 The industrializationofspace:
prospectsand barriers 4 15

strating the utility of satellites for providing health care and educational
services, disaster assessment and relief, and emergency medical services to
remote locations. An arrangement with private industry to provide similar
public services in return for the launch of a new satellite could provide new
and expanded public service opportunities and could also eventually pro-
vide new markets for the communications industry.
l Royal arrangements. Another arrangement that has been suggested*’ for
making Shuttle operations profitable, and incidentally encouraging the
private sector to consider investing in space, is to provide free launch
services in return for a royalty payment on the net profit from a space
endeavour. This would have the effect of providing a substantial income for
the Shuttle from highly profitable ventures and at the same time not unduly
penalizing corporations whose enterprises do not work out as well. Such an
arrangement might also have the effect of reducing total government
investment in Shuttle and provide valuable experience for eventual transfer
of the Shuttle to the private sector.

Although some combination of the above incentives may be necessary to spur

private investment in space, they are not sufficient in the absence of clear and
consistent broad goals and specific strategies for the government space pro-
gramme. In the USA, the lack of consensus about the goals, and strategies to
achieve them,22 has led to considerable uncertainty in the private sector about
its possible role in space activities. In every country, the government is the
largest investor in space technology. Even in the USA, with its strong emphasis
on private sector involvement, this state of affairs is likely to continue for some
time. Thus abrupt changes in government policy and of funding of government
programmes can have a strong effect on private investment in space. In
addition, the government controls private access to space through control ofthe
launchers and launching facilities. If private investment in space is to be
encouraged, it will be essential to establish clear and workable policies and
regulations for private launchers, satellite and other space technologies.23 For
space technology, as for few other areas of high technology the role of the
international community is very great. Thus, these policies will have to take
into account the policies and agreements within the international community as
well as domestic needs.

Notes and references

1. C.L. Gould, “Space to benefit mankind, 1980-2000”, Advanced Earth Oriented Applications
Space Technology, I, 198 1, pages 49-64.
2. See Chapter 5, “Our dependence on space,” Civilian Space Policy and Applications (Office of
Technology Assessment, US Congress, OTA-STI-177, 1982), pages 105-109.
3. See N. Wilford, “The industrialization ofspace: why business is wary”, Nerv York Times, 22
March 1981; H.S.F. Cooper, Jr, “A reporter at large: Shuttle I, II”, TheNew Yorker, February
198 1, pages 43ff; 16 February 1981, pages 65ff.
4. J. Grey, “Implications of the Shuttle: our business in space”, Technology Review, October
198 I, pages 35-46.
5. Civilian Space Polig and Applications, op tit, reference 2, chapter 7.
6. Ibid, pages 28, 29.
7. “National space policy”, White House Fact Sheet, 4 July 1982.
8. R.A. Williamson, “Civilian space policy and applications”, Statement for the Record,

FUlURESOctober1982
$ I6 The industrialimtionofspace: prospectsand harriers

Hearings before the US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology,

Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, 2 March 1982.
9. K.P. Heiss, “A private initiative to fund Orbiter V” (Space Trans~rtation Company Inc,
1982).
IO. His/z Frontier (Heritage Foundation Report, tVashington, DC, 1981).
11. Solo7 Power Satellites (ORice ofTechnology Assessment, OTA-E-144, August 1981).
12. R. DalBeIlo and S. Finer, “Prospects for international cooperation in materials processing
technologies”, 33rd International Astronautical Congress, Paris, September 1982.
13. My selections are taken from R.F. Brodsky and B.C. Morais, “Space 2020: technolo<gy, the
missions likely 2040 years from now", Aeronautics andAstronautics, 20 (5), 1982, pages 54-73.
14. “NASA space communications program”, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Space
Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology, US House of
Representatives, 8 and 9 July 1981.
15. Ibid.
16. Civilian Space Puliq and Applications, op tit, reference 2, page 10.
17. Ibid, pages 284-288.
18. Ibid, pages 2884?9 I.
19. Ibid, pages 67-73.
20. R.A. \ViIIiamson, op tit, reference 8.
21. J. Grey, “NASA’s struggle for survival”, Aeronautics and Astronautics, 25 ( I), 1982, pages
IWLI.
22. Civilian Space Poliq and Applications, op tit, reference 2, page 273.
23. Ibid, chapter 10.

FUTURESOctober