[G.R. No. 199067. November 11, 2013.

NISSAN GALLERY-ORTIGAS, petitioner, vs. PURIFICACION F.

FELIPE, respondent.

This case stemmed from a criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 (BP 22) filed by petitioner Nissan Gallery-Ortigas (Nissan), an entity engaged in
the business of car dealership, against respondent Purificacion F. Felipe (Purificacion)
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The said office found probable
cause to indict Purificacion and filed an Information before the Metropolitan Trial Court,
(raffled to Branch 41), Quezon City (MeTC), for her issuance of a postdated check in the
amount of P1,020,000.00, which was subsequently dishonored upon presentment due to
"STOP PAYMENT."

Purificacion issued the said check because her son, Frederick Felipe (Frederick),
attracted by a huge discount of P220,000.00, purchased a Nissan Terrano 4x4 sports and
utility vehicle (SUV) from Nissan. The term of the transaction was Cash-on-Delivery and
no downpayment was required. The SUV was delivered on May 14, 1997, but Frederick
failed to pay upon delivery. Despite non-payment, Frederick took possession of the
vehicle. 4HTCISE

Since then, Frederick had used and enjoyed the SUV for more than four (4)
months without paying even a single centavo of the purchase price. This constrained
Nissan to send him two (2) demand letters, on different dates, but he still refused to pay.
Nissan, through its retained counsel, was prompted to send a final demand letter.
Reacting to the final demand, Frederick went to Nissan's office and asked for a grace
period until October 30, 1997 within which to pay his full outstanding obligation
amounting to P1,026,750.00. Through further negotiation, the amount was eventually
reduced to P1,020,000.00. 5

Frederick reneged on his promise and again failed to pay. On November 25, 1997,
he asked his mother, Purificacion, to issue the subject check as payment for his
obligation. Purificacion acceded to his request. Frederick then tendered her postdated
check in the amount of P1,020,000.00. The check, however, was dishonored upon
presentment due to "STOP PAYMENT." 6

Ultimately, the question presented before the Court is whether or not Purificacion
is civilly liable for the issuance of a worthless check despite her acquittal from the
criminal charge.

Well-settled is the rule that a civil action is deemed instituted upon the filing of a criminal
action, subject to certain exceptions. Section 1, Rule 111
 As can be gleaned from the foregoing, with respect to criminal actions for
violation of BP 22, it is explicitly clear that the corresponding civil action is deemed
included and that a reservation to file such separately is not allowed.

The rule is that every act or omission punishable by law has its accompanying
civil liability. The civil aspect of every criminal case is based on the principle that every
person criminally liable is also civilly liable. 16 If the accused, however, is not found to
be criminally liable, it does not necessarily mean that he will not likewise be held civilly
liable because extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil action. 17 This rule more specifically applies when (a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares
that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does
not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. 18 The
civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in
the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. 19

It can, therefore, be concluded that if the judgment is conviction of the accused,

then the necessary penalties and civil liabilities arising from the offense or crime shall be
imposed. On the contrary, if the judgment is of acquittal, then the imposition of the civil
liability will depend on whether or not the act or omission from which it might arise
exists.cCaDSA

Purificacion was charged with violation of BP 22 for allegedly issuing a worthless

check. The essential elements of the offense of violation of BP 22 are the following:

(1) The making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account
or for value;

(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of

issue there were no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and

(3) The dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of

funds or credit or the dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid cause, ordered the drawee bank to stop payment. 20

Here, the first and third elements were duly proven in the trial. Purificacion,
however, was acquitted from criminal liability because of the failure of the prosecution to
prove the fact of notice of dishonor. Of the three (3) elements, the second element is the
hardest to prove as it involves a state of mind. 21 Thus, Section 2 of BP 22 creates a
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds which, however, arises only after it
is proved that the issuer had received a written notice of dishonor and that within five (5)
days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make
arrangements for its payment. 22 CDcaSA

Purificacion was acquitted because the element of notice of dishonor was not sufficiently
established. Nevertheless, the act or omission from which her civil liability arose, which
was the making or the issuing of the subject worthless check, clearly existed. Her
acquittal from the criminal charge of BP 22 was based on reasonable doubt and it did not
relieve her of the corresponding civil liability

[G.R. No. 181986. December 4, 2013.]

ELIZALDE S. CO, petitioner, vs. LUDOLFO P. MUÑOZ, n JR.,

respondent.

The case springs from the statements made by the respondent against the
petitioner, Elizalde S. Co (Co), in several interviews with radio stations in Legaspi City.
Muñoz, a contractor, was charged and arrested for perjury. Suspecting that Co, a wealthy
businessman, was behind the filing of the suit, Muñoz made the following statements:

(a)  Co influenced the Office of the City Prosecutor of Legaspi City to expedite
the issuance of warrant of arrest against Muñoz in connection with the
perjury case;

(b)  Co manipulated the results of the government bidding involving the

Masarawag-San Francisco dredging project, and;

(c)  Co received P2,000,000.00 from Muñoz on the condition that Co will sub-
contract the project to Muñoz, which condition Co did not comply with.
5 AcHSEa

Consequently, Co filed his complaint-affidavit which led to the filing of three criminal
informations for libel before the RTC. 6 Notably, Co did not waive, institute or reserve
his right to file a separate civil action arising from Muñoz's libelous remarks against him.
.  Whether the respondent is liable for damages arising from the libelous remarks despite his
acquittal.
In Ching v. Nicdao and CA, 28 the Court ruled that an appeal is the proper remedy that a
party — whether the accused or the offended party — may avail with respect to the
judgment
Moreover, an appeal is favored over the institution of a separate civil action because the
latter would only add to our clogged dockets
To reiterate, the extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the
extinction of the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the
criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is a
finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which
the liability may arise exists. Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when,
notwithstanding the accused's acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil liability
ex delicto: (a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) if the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil;
and (c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused is acquitted. We thus now proceed to determine if Co's claim
falls under any of these three situations
The respondent is not civilly liable
because no libel was committed.
Jurisprudence supplements the enumeration in Article 354 of the RPC. In Borjal v. CA,
35 we held that in view of the constitutional right on the freedoms of speech and of the
press, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged
In the present case, the CA declared that the libelous remarks are privileged. The legal
conclusion was arrived at from the fact that Co is a public figure, the subject matter of the
libelous remarks was of public interest, and the context of Muñoz' statements were fair
comments

In light of the privileged nature of Muñoz' statements and the failure of the
prosecution to prove malice in fact, there was no libel that was committed by Muñoz.
Without the crime, no civil liability ex delicto may be claimed by Co that can be pursued
in the present petition. There is no act from which civil liability may arise that exists.

G.R. No. 184861. June 30, 2009.]

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., petitioner, vs. CLEOFE S.

JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, respondents.

On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-
President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit
dated October 5, 2004 4 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against
private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas
City
On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil
complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 2006 5 for the rescission
of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings dated July 24, 2007 6 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the
civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such
that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent claimed
that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases. cISDHE

The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the

Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two

conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.

SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. — The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
are susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The
phrase "previously instituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is
not susceptible of alternative interpretations
Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases
involved here show that the filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought on the
part of private respondent and interposed for delay. And as correctly argued by
petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court seeks to
prevent. Thus, private respondent's positions cannot be left to stand.
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance
of the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up
the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of cases 21 that the
agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution
for violation of BP 22.
Lee v. Court of Appeals 23 is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the issue of
lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on dishonored
for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of BP 22
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial
question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the
criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question
exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case before us

[G.R. No. 239521. January 28, 2019.]

PRIMO A. MINA, FELIX DE VERA, POMPEYO MAGALI,

BERNADETTE AMOR and PURIFICACION DELA CRUZ,
petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO C.
TANDOC, respondents.

This case stemmed from an Affidavit-Complaint 4 for Perjury, as defined and penalized
under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), filed by petitioners against
respondent Rodolfo C. Tandoc (Tandoc) before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pangasinan (OPP). After the requisite preliminary investigation proceedings, the OPP
dismissed petitioners' criminal complaint against Tandoc for lack of probable cause. 5
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed before the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor
(ORSP) located in San Fernando City, La Union. However, the ORSP affirmed the OPP's
findings that no probable cause exists to indict Tandoc for the crime of Perjury.
Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
To recapitulate, the CA ruled that petitioners should have first elevated the
adverse ORSP ruling to the SOJ before availing of judicial remedies. On the other
hand, petitioners maintain that the ORSP ruling is already final, and as such, it
correctly elevated the matter to the courts by filing a petition for certiorari before the
CA.

The Issue before the Court

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the
ground of petitioners' supposed availment of a wrong remedy. CAIHTE
 all petitions for review of resolutions of Provincial/City Prosecutors in cases
cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, except in the National Capital Region, shall be filed with the
Regional State Prosecutor concerned who shall resolve such petitions with finality
As may be gleaned above, DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A delegated to the
ORSPs the authority to rule with finality cases subject of preliminary
investigation/reinvestigation appealed before it, provided that: (a) the case is not filed
in the National Capital Region (NCR); and (b) the case, should it proceed to the
courts, is cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial
Courts (MTCs) and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) — which includes not
only violations of city or municipal ordinances, but also all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties attached thereto. 14 This is,
however, without prejudice on the part of the SOJ to review the ORSP ruling, should
the former deem it appropriate to do so in the interest of justice. The foregoing
amendment is further strengthened by a later issuance
A reading of the foregoing provisions shows that the prevailing
appeals process in the NPS with regard to complaints subject of preliminary
investigation would depend on two factors, namely: where the complaint was
filed, i.e., whether in the NCR or in the provinces; and which court has
original jurisdiction over the case, i.e., whether or not it is cognizable by the
MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs. Thus, the rule shall be as follows:
(a) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is cognizable by
the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OPP may be appealable by
way of petition for review before the ORSP, which ruling shall be with
finality;
(b) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is not cognizable by
the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OPP may be appealable by way
of petition for review before SOJ, which ruling shall be with finality;
(c) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is cognizable by the
MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OCP may be appealable by way of
petition for review before the Prosecutor General, whose ruling shall be with
finality;
(d) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is not cognizable by
the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OCP may be appealable by way
of petition for review before the SOJ, whose ruling shall be with finality;
(e) Provided, that in instances covered by (a) and (c), the SOJ may,
pursuant to his power of control and supervision over the entire National
Prosecution Service, review, modify, or reverse the ruling of the ORSP or
the Prosecutor General, as the case may be. 17 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied) aDSIHc
 In this case, records show that petitioners filed a criminal complaint before the
OPP accusing Tandoc of Perjury. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the OPP
and such dismissal was upheld by the ORSP. Since (a) the criminal complaint was
filed outside of the NCR; (b) perjury cases are cognizable by the first-level courts
since the maximum penalty therefor is imprisonment for less than six (6) years; 18
and (c) it appears that the SOJ did not exercise its power of control and supervision
over the entire NPS by reviewing the ORSP ruling, the ORSP's affirmance of the OPP
ruling was with finality. As such, petitioners have already exhausted its administrative
remedies and may now go to the CA via a petition for certiorari.
In this light, the Court concludes that the CA gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing outright the petition for certiorari filed before it by petitioners. On this
note, since the Court recognizes that the dismissal of petitioners' petition for
certiorari filed before the CA was due to a mere technicality, it is only appropriate
that this case be remanded to the said appellate court for its resolution on the merits.

[G.R. No. 189402. May 6, 2010.]

LIGAYA SANTOS and ROBERT BUNDA, petitioners, vs.

DOMINGO I. ORDA, JR., respondent.

On April 2, 2001, Francis Orda (Francis), the son of respondent Domingo

Orda, Jr., was shot to death in Parañaque City. He was then twenty years old and an
engineering student
RTC, Branch 258, issued an Order dated July 5, 2005, allowing the withdrawal
of the Informations against the accused and consequently recalling the warrants for
their arrest.
Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 158236, the Court finally resolved petitioners' motion
for reconsideration, holding that the RTC, Branch 258, 11 must make an independent
evaluation of the records before allowing the withdrawal of the Informations against
petitioners. This impelled Ligaya to file before the RTC, Branch 257, an Urgent
Motion to Resolve Anew and on the Merits Previous Motion to Withdraw Criminal
Informations Pursuant to the DOJ Finding on Lack of Probable Cause
On September 30, 2005, the RTC issued an Order 14 dismissing the case for
murder, ratiocinating that no probable cause existed to indict them for their crime.
Consequently, it lifted the warrants for their arrests and ordered their immediate
release from detention. The prosecution's motion for reconsideration was denied
Simply put, the issues for resolution are: 1) whether a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the correct remedy in assailing the
RTC decision allowing the withdrawal of the Informations and consequently
dismissing the case for lack of probable cause; and 2) whether the CA erred in finding
that there was probable cause against petitioners.
We grant the petition
On the first issue, the petition for certiorari filed by respondent under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court is inappropriate. It bears stressing that the Order of the RTC,
granting the motion of the prosecution to withdraw the Informations and ordering the
case dismissed, is final because it disposed of the case and terminated the proceedings
therein, leaving nothing to be done by the court. Thus, the proper remedy is appeal
A closer scrutiny of the Order of the RTC reveals that the Presiding Judge
allowed the withdrawal of the Informations, consequently dismissed the case against
petitioners, and lifted the warrants for their arrest on the following grounds: 1) the
incredibility of the earlier statements of Gina, Ernesto and Dennis because of their
subsequent recantation; 27 2) the improbability that Dennis and Ernesto saw and
heard the conversations of the accused in view of the counter-evidence submitted by
Ligaya, showing the physical set-up of her residence or building, the kind of door she
maintained thereat, and the inner private room she had; 28 3) the lack or insufficiency
of evidence at the level of prosecution for purposes of determining probable cause; 29
and 4) the incredibility of the testimonies of Sabino and Jonas because of the absence
of corroborating evidence. 30
Given the foregoing, we find that the RTC did not err in finding that no
probable cause existed to indict the petitioners for the crime of murder. Neither did it
gravely abuse its discretion in making said conclusion. There was no hint of
whimsicality, nor of gross and patent abuse of discretion as would amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to
act at all in contemplation of law on the part of the Presiding Judge. 31 On the
contrary, he came to the conclusion that there was no probable cause for petitioners to
commit murder, by applying basic precepts of criminal law to the facts, allegations
and evidence on record. Said conclusion was thoroughly explained in detail in the
lengthy Order dated September 30, 2005. We would like to stress that the purpose of
the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause is to insulate from the very
start those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a
public trial
 A.M. No. RTJ-14-2367. January 13, 2014.]
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3879-RTJ)

SR. REMY ANGELA JUNIO, SPC and JOSEPHINE D. LORICA,

complainants, vs. JUDGE MARIVIC A. CACATIAN-BELTRAN,
BRANCH 3, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, TUGUEGARAO CITY,
CAGAYAN, respondent.

Claire Ann Campos, a 17-year old student, filed an affidavit-complaint for

violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 (the Child Abuse Law) and R.A. No. 7277
(the Magna Carta for the Disabled) before the Tuguegarao City Prosecution Office
against Sr. Remy Angela Junio and Dr. Josephine D. Lorica, the President and the Dean
of the School of Health Services, respectively, of St. Paul University of the Philippines
(SPUP).

In its resolution dated August 22, 2008, the prosecutor's office found probable
cause to indict Junio and Lorica of the crimes charged, and recommended the filing of the
corresponding informations against them.

On April 27, 2011, the cases were assigned to Judge Marivic A. Cacatian-Beltran
of the RTC, Branch 3, Tuguegarao City, due to the inhibition of Judge Aquino.

On May 5, 2011, the RTC found probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against
Junio and Lorica. Accordingly, it issued the warrants of arrest against them.
cCaEDA

Meanwhile, DOJ Secretary Leila de Lima granted Junio and Lorica's motion
for reconsideration and set aside the February 24, 2011 resolution of Undersecretary
Salazar. Accordingly, in her resolution dated August 8, 2011, she directed the
Cagayan Provincial Prosecutor to immediately cause the withdrawal of the
informations for violations of R.A. Nos. 7610 and 7277 against Junio and Lorica for
lack of probable cause

In its order of January 6, 2012, the RTC denied the joint motion to withdraw
informations for lack of merit.

The City Prosecutor, Junio and Lorica moved to reconsider this order, but the RTC
denied their motion in its order dated April 10, 2012.
 Junio and Lorica filed an affidavit-complaint against Judge Cacatian-Beltran for
violation of Rules 1.02, 3.01, 3.02, and 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. They
alleged that Judge Cacatian-Beltran only resolved the joint motion to withdraw
informations after almost four months from the time it was submitted for resolution. They
claimed that four months was beyond the period prescribed by existing rules for the
resolution of simple motions.

Junio and Lorica further alleged that Judge Cacatian-Beltran "arrogated unto
herself the role of a prosecutor and a judge" 3 when she insisted that they stand for
trial although she did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of Justice
Secretary De Lima.

However, the records are bereft of any evidence showing that there had been
undue delay (as shown by the records), any attendant bad faith, any intent to prejudice a
party to the case, or some other ulterior ends. The OCA, in fact, pointedly ruled that the
inaction was not attended with malice: Judge Cacatian-Beltran resolved the joint motion
to withdraw informations two (2) days after she learned of its existence on January 4,
2012.

To our mind, these circumstances are sufficient to mitigate the liability of Judge
Cacatian-Beltran and keep us from imposing a fine or suspension from office.
Accordingly, we find sufficient and warranted the OCA's recommended penalty of
admonition.

The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case; in the
exercise of its discretion, it may agree or disagree with the recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice. Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would be
an abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. 6
We stress that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition
of the case (whether it be a dismissal, an acquittal or a conviction of the accused) rests
within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court; it is the
best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it. 7

In resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw the information filed by the

public prosecutor (on his own initiative or pursuant to the directive of the Secretary of
Justice), either for insufficiency of evidence in the possession of the prosecutor or for
lack of probable cause, the trial court should not merely rely on the findings of the public
prosecutor or of the Secretary of Justice that no crime had been committed or that the
evidence in the possession of the public prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment
of conviction of the accused. 8 To do so is to surrender a power constitutionally vested in
the Judiciary to the Executive.
 In the present case, Judge Cacatian-Beltran does not appear to have arbitrarily
denied the joint motion to withdraw informations. The records show that she evaluated
and assessed the informations, the resolution of the City Prosecutor, the affidavit and
reply-affidavit of the complainants, the counter-affidavit and rejoinder and the appeal
memorandum of Junio and Lorica, and the supporting documents attached to them.

[G.R. No. 178947. June 26, 2013.]

VIRGINIA DE LOS SANTOS-DIO, as authorized representative of

H.S. EQUITIES, LTD., and WESTDALE ASSETS, LTD., petitioner,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE RAMON S.
CAGUIOA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 74, Regional
Trial Court, Olongapo City, and TIMOTHY J. DESMOND,
respondents.

[G.R. No. 179079. June 26, 2013.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. TIMOTHY J.

DESMOND, respondent.

petitioner Virginia De Los Santos-Dio (Dio), the majority stockholder of H.S.

Equities, Ltd. (HS Equities) and authorized representative of Westdale Assets, Ltd.
(Westdale), 4 was introduced to Desmond, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) of the Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc. (SBMEI), and the authorized
representative of Active Environments, Inc. and JV China, Inc. (JV China), the
majority shareholder of SBMEI. 5 After some discussion on possible business
ventures, Dio, on behalf of HS Equities, decided to invest a total of US $1,150,000.00
6 in SBMEI's Ocean Adventure Marine Park (Ocean Adventure), a theme park to be
constructed at the Subic Bay Freeport Zone which, when operational, would showcase
live performances of false-killer whales and sea lions. In this relation, Dio claimed
that Desmond led her to believe that SBMEI had a capital of US$5,500,000.00,
inclusive of the value of the marine mammals to be used in Ocean Adventure, 7 and
also guaranteed substantial returns on investment.
Dio further claimed that she found out that, contrary to Desmond's
representations, SBMEI actually had no capacity to deliver on its guarantees, and that
in fact, as of 2001, it was incurring losses amounting to P62,595,216.00. 19 She
likewise claimed to have discovered false entries in the company's books and financial
statements
Eventually, after Dio was ousted as Director and Treasurer of SBMEI, 23 she
filed, on April 19, 2004, two (2) criminal complaints 24 (subject criminal complaints)
for estafa (a) through false pretenses under Article 315 (1) (b) 25 of the Revised Penal
 Code 26 (RPC); and (b) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence through
misappropriation or conversion under Article 315 (2) (a) 27 of the RPC, both against
Desmond before the Olongapo City Prosecutor's Office (City Prosecutor's Offic

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it dismissed the subject
informations for lack of probable cause.

The Court's Ruling

The petitions are meritorious. RTC dismissal was improper

Determination of probable cause may be either executive or judicial.

In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds
with his primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a
warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor
to submit additional evidence, in case he doubts the existence of probable cause. 56

Applying these principles, the Court finds that the RTC's immediate dismissal, as
affirmed by the CA, was improper as the standard of clear lack of probable cause was not
observed. In this case, records show that certain essential facts — namely, (a) whether or
not Desmond committed false representations that induced Dio to invest in Ocean
Adventure; and (b) whether or not Desmond utilized the funds invested by Dio solely for
the Miracle Beach Project for purposes different from what was agreed upon — remain
controverted. As such, it cannot be said that the absence of the elements of the crime of
estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) 57 and 315 (1) (b) 58 of the RPC had already been
established, thereby rendering the RTC's immediate dismissal of the case highly
improper.

[G.R. No. 180661. December 11, 2013.]

GEORGE ANTIQUERA y CODES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
 On January 13, 2004 the second Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasay City
charged the accused George Codes Antiquera * and Corazon Olivenza Cruz with
illegal possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs 1 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case 04-0100-CFM

on board a patrol car and a tricycle were conducting a police visibility patrol on
David Street, Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified men rush out of house number
107-C and immediately boarded a jeep. DcSACE

Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the
house from where the men came and peeked through the partially opened door. PO1
Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a
pink lighter. Beside him was his live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an aluminum
foil and an improvised burner. They sat facing each other at the living room. This
prompted the police officers to enter the house, introduce themselves, and arrest
Antiquera and Cruz
The Issue Presented

The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding accused Antiquera
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia based on the
evidence of the police officers that they saw him and Cruz in the act of possessing drug
paraphernalia.

Ruling of the Court

But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.

The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified
men suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime
had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that
the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle.
Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave
priority to the house even when they heard no cry for help from it.

2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the
house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially
opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it. Thus, PO1 Cabutihan
testified:

Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that
authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned
rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it
was likewise illegal. 16 Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police
officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from
an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused. 17

One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his
arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during the illegal warrantless arrest

[G.R. No. 213225. April 4, 2018.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENANTE

COMPRADO y BRONOLA, accused-appellant.

On 19 July 2011, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 11,

Article 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
a confidential informant (CI) sent a text message to Police Inspector
Dominador Orate, Jr. (P/Insp. Orate), then Deputy Station Commander of Police
Station 6, Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, that an alleged courier of marijuana together
with a female companion, was sighted at Cabanglasan, Bukidnon. The alleged courier
had in his possession a backpack containing marijuana
the policemen stopped the bus bearing the said body and plate numbers. P/Insp.
Orate, Police Officer 3 Teodoro de Oro (PO3 De Oro), Senior Police Officer 1
Benjamin Jay Reycitez (SPO1 Reycitez), and PO1 Rexie Tenio (PO1 Tenio) boarded
the bus and saw a man matching the description given to them by the CI. The man
was seated at the back of the bus with a backpack placed on his lap. After P/Insp.
Orate asked the man to open the bag, the police officers saw a transparent cellophane
containing dried marijuana leaves

ISSUES

I. Whether accused-appellant's arrest was valid;

II. Whether the seized items are admissible in evidence; and
III. Whether accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged.

OUR RULING
 The Court finds for accused-appellant.
The Bill of Rights requires that a search and seizure must be carried out with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, any evidence obtained from such warrantless search is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 14 This proscription, however,
admits of exceptions, namely: 1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2)
Search of evidence in plain view; 3) Search of a moving vehicle; 4) Consented
warrantless search; 5) Customs search; 6) Stop and Frisk; and 7) Exigent and
emergency circumstances
STOP AND FRISK VS SITLA
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is
questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was
merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made —
the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the
arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within
which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize
any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime,
or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which
might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
xxx xxx xxx
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a
"stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons,"
as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing
may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course
of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing
in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled [to]
the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be
used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct
a "stop and frisk" it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a
"stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience
and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a
police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach
a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable
cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the
police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed
with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
The Court finds that the totality of the circumstances in this case is not
sufficient to incite a genuine reason that would justify a stop-and-frisk search on
accused-appellant. An examination of the records reveals that no overt physical act
could be properly attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse suspicion in the minds of
the arresting officers that he had just committed, was committing, or was about to
commit a crime
In his dissent from Esquillo v. People, 27 Justice Lucas P. Bersamin
emphasizes that there should be "presence of more than one seemingly innocent
activity from which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal
activity." This principle was subsequently recognized in the recent cases of Cogaed 28
and Sanchez v. People. 29 In the case at bar, accused-appellant was just a passenger
carrying his bag. There is nothing suspicious much less criminal in said act.
Moreover, such circumstance, by itself, could not have led the arresting officers to
believe that accused-appellant was in possession of marijuana
Here, without the tip provided by the confidential informant, accused-appellant
could not be said to have executed any overt act in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officers which would indicate that he was committing the crime of illegal
possession of marijuana. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge
of facts indicating that accused-appellant had just committed an offense. Again,
without the tipped information, accused-appellant would just have been any other bus
passenger who was minding his own business and eager to reach his destination. It
must be remembered that warrantless arrests are mere exceptions to the constitutional
right of a person against unreasonable searches and seizures, thus, they must be
strictly construed against the government and its agents. While the campaign against
proliferation of illegal drugs is indeed a noble objective, the same must be conducted
in a manner which does not trample upon well-established constitutional rights. Truly,
the end does not justify the means.
The search in this case, however, could not be classified as a search of a
moving vehicle. In this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a
specific person. Further, in search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally
used as a means to transport illegal items. It is worthy to note that the information
relayed to the police officers was that a passenger of that particular bus was carrying
marijuana such that when the police officers boarded the bus, they searched the bag of
the person matching the description given by their informant and not the cargo or
contents of the said bus. Moreover, in this case, it just so happened that the alleged
drug courier was a bus passenger. To extend to such breadth the scope of searches on
moving vehicles would open the floodgates to unbridled warrantless searches which
can be conducted by the mere expedient of waiting for the target person to ride a
motor vehicle, setting up a checkpoint along the route of that vehicle, and then
stopping such vehicle when it arrives at the checkpoint in order to search the target
person.
Any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 34 This
exclusionary rule instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of
such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded
for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained
from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding. 35
Without the confiscated marijuana, no evidence is left to convict accused-
appellant. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite accused-appellant's failure to object
to the regularity of his arrest before arraignment. The legality of an arrest affects only
the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal,
warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

[G.R. No. 189806. January 12, 2011.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO

MANLANGIT y TRESBALLES, accused-appellant.

On November 25, 2003, an information was filed charging Manlangit with

violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165,
team spotted Manlangit standing in front of his house. The informant
approached Manlangit and convinced the latter that Serrano wanted to purchase shabu
from him. Manlangit asked Serrano how much shabu he wanted, to which Serrano
replied that he wanted two hundred pesos (PhP200) worth of shabu. Manlangit went
inside his house and later reappeared with a plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance. Manlangit handed over the plastic sachet to Serrano who, in
turn, gave Manlangit the marked money. Then Serrano gave the pre-arranged signal
of lighting a cigarette to indicate to the rest of the team that the buy-bust operation
had been consummated. Thus, the rest of the team approached Manlangit and
proceeded to arrest him while informing him of constitutional rights and the reason
for his arrest. The marked money was recovered from Manlangit's pocket. The plastic
sachet was then marked with the initials "FTM" and sent to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) crime laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City for analysis. The PNP
crime laboratory identified the white crystalline substance as Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride in Chemistry Report No. D-1190-03. Manlangit was also brought to
the PNP crime laboratory for a drug test, which yielded a positive result for use of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride
The Issues
The issues, as raised in the Brief for the Accused-Appellant dated September
29, 2008, are:

1. The Court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the
prosecution's failure to prove his built beyond reasonable doubt. 9

2. The Court a quo gravely erred in finding that the procedure for the custody and
control of prohibited drugs was complied with
The Ruling of the Court

The appeal is bereft of merit.

Accused-appellant's guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt

The pieces of evidence found in the records amply demonstrate that all the
elements of the crimes charged were satisfied. The lower courts gave credence to the
prosecution witnesses' testimonies, which established the guilt of accused-appellant
for the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies — particularly those
of the police officers involved, which both the RTC and the CA found credible — are
now beyond question
Furthermore, accused-appellant's contention that the buy-bust team should
have procured a search warrant for the validity of the buy-bust operation is misplaced

Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without

a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an
offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a
buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest
him even without a warrant.

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has

been accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In a
buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender,
without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. If carried out
with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation
deserves judicial sanction.

[G.R. No. 197930. April 17, 2018.]

 EFRAIM C. GENUINO, ERWIN F. GENUINO and SHERYL G.
SEE, petitioners, vs. HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as
Secretary of Justice, and RICARDO V. PARAS III, in his capacity as
Chief State Counsel, CRISTINO L. NAGUIAT, JR. and the
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, respondents.

[G.R. No. 199034. April 17, 2018.]

MA. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, petitioner, vs. HON.

LEILA M. DE LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of Justice and
RICARDO A. DAVID, JR., as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Immigration, respondents.

[G.R. No. 199046. April 17, 2018.]

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, petitioner, vs. HON. LEILA M. DE

LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of Justice and RICARDO V.
PARAS III, as Chief State Counsel, Department of Justice and
RICARDO A. DAVID, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner, Bureau
of Immigration, respondents.

DOJ Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III issued DOJ Circular No. 17, prescribing
rules and regulations governing the issuance of HDOs. The said issuance was
intended to restrain the indiscriminate issuance of HDOs which impinge on the
people's right to travel.
On April 23, 2007, former DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez issued DOJ
Circular No. 18, prescribing rules and regulations governing the issuance and
implementation of watchlist orders. In particular, it provides for the power of the DOJ
Secretary to issue a Watchlist Order (WLO) against persons with criminal cases
pending preliminary investigation or petition for review before the DOJ. Further, it
states that the DOJ Secretary may issue an ADO to a person subject of a WLO who
intends to leave the country for some exceptional reasons. 6 Even with the
promulgation of DOJ Circular No. 18, however, DOJ Circular No. 17 remained the
governing rule on the issuance of HDOs by the DOJ.
view of the foregoing criminal complaints, De Lima issued DOJ WLO No.
2011-422 dated August 9, 2011 against GMA pursuant to her authority under DOJ
Circular No. 41. She also ordered for the inclusion of GMA's name in the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) watchlist. 10 Thereafter, the BI issued WLO No. ASM-11-237, 11
implementing De Lima's order.
 Also, on November 8, 2011, De Lima issued an Order, 27 denying GMA's
application for an ADO-(De Lima didn’t follow TRO to stop WLO and allow ADO)
On November 18, 2011, the Court issued a Resolution, 47 requiring De Lima
to show cause why she should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt of
court for failure to comply with the TRO. She was likewise ordered to immediately
comply with the TRO by allowing the petitioners to leave the country. At the same
time, the Court denied the Consolidated Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or to
Lift TRO dated November 16, 2011 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General.

The right to travel and its limitations

The right to travel is part of the "liberty" of which a citizen cannot be deprived
without due process of law. 75 It is part and parcel of the guarantee of freedom of
movement that the Constitution affords its citizen
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed
by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as
may be provided by law
It is apparent, however, that the right to travel is not absolute. There are
constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations regulating the right to travel. Section
6 itself provides that the right to travel may be impaired only in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law
Clearly, under the provision, there are only three considerations that may
permit a restriction on the right to travel: national security, public safety or public
health. As a further requirement, there must be an explicit provision of statutory law
or the Rules of Court 80 providing for the impairment

The issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41

has no legal basis

To begin with, there is no law particularly providing for the authority of the secretary
of justice to curtail the exercise of the right to travel, in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health. As it is, the only ground of the former DOJ
Secretary in restraining the petitioners, at that time, was the pendency of the
preliminary investigation of the Joint DOJ-COMELEC Preliminary Investigation
Committee on the complaint for electoral sabotage against the

To be clear, DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is not a legislative enactment which
underwent the scrutiny and concurrence of lawmakers, and submitted to the President
for approval. It is a mere administrative issuance apparently designed to carry out the
provisions of an enabling law which the former DOJ Secretary believed to be
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of
1987.

A plain reading of the foregoing provisions shows that they are mere general
provisions designed to lay down the purposes of the enactment and the broad
enumeration of the powers and functions of the DOJ. In no way can they be
interpreted as a grant of power to curtail a fundamental right as the language of the
provision itself does not lend to that stretched construction

The questioned circular does not come under the inherent power of the executive
department to adopt rules and regulations as clearly the issuance of HDO and WLO is
not the DOJ's business. As such, it is a compulsory requirement that there be an
existing law, complete and sufficient in itself, conferring the expressed authority to
the concerned agency to promulgate rules. On its own, the DOJ cannot make rules, its
authority being confined to execution of laws. This is the import of the terms "when
expressly provided by law" or "as may be provided by law" stated in Sections 7 (4)
and 7 (9), Chapter 2, Title III, Book IV of E.O. 292. The DOJ is confined to filling in
the gaps and the necessary details in carrying into effect the law as enacted. 97
Without a clear mandate of an existing law, an administrative issuance is ultra vires

The DOJ therefore cannot justify the restraint in the liberty of movement
imposed by DOJ Circular No. 41 on the ground that it is necessary to ensure presence
and attendance in the preliminary investigation of the complaints. There is also no
authority of law granting it the power to compel the attendance of the subjects of a
preliminary investigation, pursuant to its investigatory powers under E.O. No. 292. Its
investigatory power is simply inquisitorial and, unfortunately, not broad enough to
embrace the imposition of restraint on the liberty of movement.
That there is a risk of flight does not authorize the DOJ to take the situation
upon itself and draft an administrative issuance to keep the individual within the
Philippine jurisdiction so that he may not be able to evade criminal prosecution and
consequent liability. It is an arrogation of power it does not have; it is a usurpation of
function that properly belongs to the legislature.
Without a law to justify its action, the issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 is an
unauthorized act of the DOJ of empowering itself under the pretext of dire exigency
or urgent necessity. This action runs afoul the separation of powers between the three
branches of the government and cannot be upheld. Even the Supreme Court, in the
exercise of its power to promulgate rules is limited in that the same shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. 109 This should have cautioned the DOJ,
which is only one of the many agencies of the executive branch, to be more
scrutinizing in its actions especially when they affect substantive rights, like the right
to travel.
The DOJ cannot issue DOJ Circular
No. 41 under the guise of police
power

DOJ Circular No. 41 transcends

constitutional limitations

The exceptions to the right to travel

are limited to those stated in Section
6, Article III of the Constitution

It bears reiterating that the power to issue HDO is inherent to the courts. The courts
may issue a HDO against an accused in a criminal case so that he may be dealt with in
accordance with law. 135 It does not require legislative conferment or constitutional
recognition; it co-exists with the grant of judicial power

[G.R. No. 172716. November 17, 2010.]

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, petitioner, vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA

MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, respondents.

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler

(petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71
(MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of
respondent Ponce's husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce's
vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case
No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction,
petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing
him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
SICDAa

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the

Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari
(S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005,
invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question

The Issues
 Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his
standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his
non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the
negative, whether petitioner's constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioner's non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal
Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A.
2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from
prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. ADETca

Petitioner's Non-appearance at the Arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did

not Divest him of Standing to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803

The mischief in the RTC's treatment of petitioner's non-appearance at his arraignment

in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident
when one considers the Rules of Court's treatment of a defendant who absents himself
from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114 11 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the defendant's absence merely renders his bondsman
potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to
produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should
he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted.
Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused
underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the
accused's status to that of a fugitive without standing

Petitioner's Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 Bars his Prosecution in

Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused's negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense" 13 protects him from, among others, post-
conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. 14 It is not disputed that
petitioner's conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question
whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same
offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern
the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate
offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
"as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." 15  

We find for petitioner. ITS

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted
under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365
defining and penalizing quasi-offenses

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable: ISDCaT

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than
those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court
shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be
imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the

Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case the
defendant shall be punished by prision correctional in its medium and
maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or

failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to
perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those

cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the
danger clearly manifest. ASTDCH

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon
the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this
hand to

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of

Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
Hence, we find merit in petitioner's submission that the lower courts erred in
refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double
Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner's
case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also
involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations with
"Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious
Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former,
the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the
accused's claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted
with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its pro
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a
stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy
Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing
formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated
by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light
offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is
so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the
sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed
under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave
or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses.
Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes
occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

[OCA IPI No. 17-4663-RTJ. March 7, 2018.]

ATTY. BERTENI C. CAUSING and PERCIVAL CARAG

MABASA, complainants, vs. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE LORENZO
R. DELA ROSA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Manila, respondent.

Atty. Causing and his client, Mabasa (Complainants), charged respondent

Judge Dela Rosa with gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct and gross
incompetence for reversing 2 the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 09-268685-86
entitled People v. Eleazar, et al. (Libel Cases), wherein Mabasa was one of the
accused.
Complainants alleged that the Libel Cases were dismissed by former Acting
Presiding Judge Gamor B. Disalo (Judge Disalo) in an Order 3 dated April 13, 2015
on the ground that the right of the accused to speedy trial had been violated. The
prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 13, 2015 Order before the
RTC Br. 4 Manila, now presided by respondent Judge Dela Rosa.
Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled
jurisprudence. 40 A judge may also be administratively liable if shown to have been
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or
failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence. 41
 The Court however has also ruled that "not every error or mistake of a judge in
the performance of his official duties renders him liable.
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or
actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found
erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad
faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive. As a matter of policy, in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity
are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. 43
The Court agrees with the OCA that it would be absurd to hold respondent
Judge Dela Rosa liable for his November 23, 2015 Order when he had himself
rectified this in his subsequent June 20, 2016 Order. To rule otherwise would be to
render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the
law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 44 To
hold otherwise "would be nothing short of harassing judges to take the fantastic and
impossible oath of rendering infallible judgments." 45
Furthermore, nothing in the records of the case suggests that respondent Judge
Dela Rosa was motivated by bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious
error in rendering his decision. Other than their bare assertions, Complainants failed
to substantiate their allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed
46 and this Court cannot conclude bad faith intervened when none was actually
proven
Court likewise finds no merit in Complainants' allegation that respondent
Judge Dela Rosa should have first required Atty. Causing to show cause for his act of
posting matters pertaining to the pending criminal case on the internet. The Court
agrees with the OCA that respondent Judge Dela Rosa's act of referring the matter to
the IBP, an independent tribunal who exercises disciplinary powers over lawyers, was
a prudent and proper action to take for a trial court judge

[G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458. July 31, 2018.]

CESAR MATAS CAGANG, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN,

FIFTH DIVISION, QUEZON CITY; OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 210141-42. July 31, 2018.]

CESAR MATAS CAGANG, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN,

FIFTH DIVISION, QUEZON CITY; OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
 Leonen
Every accused has the rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases.
Inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation will
result in the dismissal of the case against the accused. Delay, however, is not
determined through mere mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the
facts and circumstances surrounding each case. Courts should appraise a reasonable
period from the point of view of how much time a competent and independent public
officer would need in relation to the complexity of a given case. Nonetheless, the
accused must invoke his or her constitutional rights in a timely manner. The failure to
do so could be considered by the courts as a waiver of right
On February 10, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman received an anonymous
complaint alleging that Amelia May Constantino, Mary Ann Gadian, and Joy Tangan
of the Vice Governor's Office, Sarangani Province committed graft and corruption by
diverting public funds given as grants or aid using barangay officials and cooperatives
as "dummies." The complaint was docketed as CPL-M-03-0163 and referred to the
Commission on Audit for audit investigation. A news report of Sun Star Davao dated
August 7, 2003 entitled "P61M from Sarangani coffers unaccounted" was also
docketed as CPL-M-03-0729 for the conduct of a fact-finding investigation.
On December 31, 2002, the Commission on Audit submitted its audit report
finding that the officials and employees of the Provincial Government of Sarangani
appear to have embezzled millions in public funds by sourcing out the funds from
grants, aid, and the Countrywide Development Fund of Representative Erwin
Chiongbian using dummy cooperatives and people's organizations. 8 In particular, the
Commission on Audit found that:
(1) There were releases of financial assistance intended for non-governmental
organizations/people's organizations and local government units that
were fraudulently and illegally made through inexistent local
development projects, resulting in a loss of P16,106,613.00;
(2) Financial assistance was granted to cooperatives whose officials and
members were government personnel or relatives of officials of
Sarangani, which resulted in the wastage and misuse of government
funds amounting to P2,456,481.00;
(3) There were fraudulent encashment and payment of checks, and frequent
travels of the employees of the Vice Governor's Office, which resulted
in the incurrence by the province of unnecessary fuel and oil expense
amounting to P83,212.34; and
(4) Inexistent Sagiptaniman projects were set up for farmers affected by
calamities, which resulted in wastage and misuse of government funds
amounting to P4,000,000.00. 9
 In a 293-page Resolution 18 dated August 11, 2004 in OMB-M-C-0487-J, the
Ombudsman found probable cause to charge Governor Miguel D. Escobar, Vice
Governor Felipe Constantino, Board Members, and several employees of the Office
of the Vice Governor of Sarangani and the Office of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
with Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of
Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019
On June 17, 2010, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision 25 in Crim. Case
No. 28331 acquitting Escobar, Maglinte, and Cagang for insufficiency of evidence.
Maglinte, however, was ordered to return P100,000.00 with legal interest to the
Province of Sarangani. The cases against Rudes and Camanay were archived until the
Sandiganbayan could acquire jurisdiction over their persons
On September 10, 2012, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution 38 denying the
Motions to Quash/Dismiss. It found that Cagang, Macagcalat, and Mangalen
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by the filing of the motions. 39 It
also found that there was no inordinate delay in the issuance of the information,
considering that 40 different individuals were involved with direct participation in
more or less 81 different transactions
Procedurally, the issues before this Court are whether or not the pendency of a
petition for certiorari with this Court suspends the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan, and whether or not the denial of a motion to quash may be the subject
of a petition for certiorari. This Court is also tasked to resolve the sole substantive
issue of whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner Cesar Matas Cagang's Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to
Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest and Urgent Motion to Quash Order of Arrest on
the ground of inordinate delay.
Contrary to petitioner's arguments, the pendency of a petition for certiorari
before this Court will not prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding to trial absent
the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction
Since this Court did not issue injunctive relief when the Petition in G.R. Nos.
206438 and 206458 was filed, the Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted from proceeding
with trial. It was only upon the filing of the Petition in G.R. Nos. 210141-42 that this
Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayanx
As a general rule, the denial of a motion to quash is not appealable as it is
merely interlocutory. Likewise, it cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari.
The denial of the motion to quash can still be raised in the appeal of a judgment of
conviction. The adequate, plain, and speedy remedy is to proceed to trial and to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused
Ordinarily, the denial of a motion to quash simply signals the commencement
of the process leading to trial. The denial of a motion to quash, therefore, is not
necessarily prejudicial to the accused. During trial, and after arraignment, prosecution
proceeds with the presentation of its evidence for the examination of the accused and
the reception by the court. Thus, in a way, the accused is then immediately given the
opportunity to meet the charges on the merits. Therefore, if the case is intrinsically
without any grounds, the acquittal of the accused and all his suffering due to the
charges can be most speedily acquired.
The rules and jurisprudence, thus, balance procedural niceties and the
immediate procurement of substantive justice. In our general interpretation, therefore,
the accused is normally invited to meet the prosecution's evidence squarely during
trial rather than skirmish on procedural points.
To summarize, inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a
preliminary investigation violates the accused's right to due process and the speedy
disposition of cases, and may result in the dismissal of the case against the accused.
The burden of proving delay depends on whether delay is alleged within the periods
provided by law or procedural rules. If the delay is alleged to have occurred during
the given periods, the burden is on the respondent or the accused to prove that the
delay was inordinate. If the delay is alleged to have occurred beyond the given
periods, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that the delay was reasonable
under the circumstances and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result
of the delay.
The determination of whether the delay was inordinate is not through mere
mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case. Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the point of
view of how much time a competent and independent public officer would need in
relation to the complexity of a given case. If there has been delay, the prosecution
must be able to satisfactorily explain the reasons for such delay and that no prejudice
was suffered by the accused as a result. The timely invocation of the accused's
constitutional rights must also be examined on a case-to-case basis.
This Court proceeds to determine whether respondent committed inordinate
delay in the resolution and termination of the preliminary investigation against
petitioner.
There is no showing that this case was attended by malice. There is no
evidence that it was politically motivated. Neither party alleges this fact. Thus, this
Court must analyze the existence and cause of delay.
The records of the case show that the transactions investigated are complex and
numerous. As respondent points out, there were over a hundred individuals
investigated, and eventually, 40 of them were determined to have been involved in 81
different anomalous transactions. 166 Even granting that the Commission on Audit's
Audit Report exhaustively investigated each transaction, "the prosecution is not bound
by the findings of the Commission on Audit; it must rely on its own independent
judgment in the determination of probable cause." 167 Delays in the investigation and
review would have been inevitable in the hands of a competent and independent
Ombudsman.