1

RULE 1.02 and the same is not material in the resolution of the endeavored to correct it by making the parties sign
present case, we do not find it necessary to make any another document cancelling the previous one.
EN BANC express finding as to whether the full amount or any
A.C. No. 932             June 21, 1940 portion thereof was paid or, as contended by the The respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of
In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO, respondent, respondent, the service were rendered free of charge. malpractice and is hereby suspended from the practice
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta as petitioner- of law for a period of one year. So ordered.
complainant. The respondent did not deny the preparation of Exhibit
A, put up the defense that he had the idea that seven Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran,
LAUREL, J.: years separation of husband and wife would entitle JJ., concur.
either of them to contract a second marriage and for
This is an administrative case initiated upon complaint that reason prepared Exhibit A, but immediately after
of the Solicitor-General against the respondent Roque the execution of said document he realized that he had
Santiago, charging the latter with malpractice and made a mistake and for that reason immediately sent
praying that disciplinary action be taken against him. for the contracting parties who, on June 30, 1939,
came to his office and signed the deed of cancellation
Exhibit A.
It appears that one Ernesto Baniquit, who was living
then separately from his wife Soledad Colares for some
nine consecutive years and who was bent on There is no doubt that the contract Exhibit A executed
contracting a second marriage, sought the legal advice by and between the spouses Ernesto Baniquit and
of the respondent, who was at the time a practicing Soledad Colares upon the advice of the respondent and
and notary public in the Province of Occidental prepared by the latter as a lawyer and acknowledged
Negros. The respondent, after hearing Baniquit's side by him as a notary public is contrary to law, moral, and
of the case, assured the latter that he could secure a tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. The
separation from his wife and marry again, and asked advice given by the respondent, the preparation and [G.R. No. 1203. May 15, 1903. ]
him to bring his wife on the afternoon of the same day, acknowledgment by him of the contract constitute
May 29, 1939. This was done and the respondent right malpractice which justifies disbarment from the In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D.
then and there prepared the document Exhibit A in practice of law. The admission of a lawyer to the TERRELL from the practice of law.
which it was stipulated, among other things, that the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his
contracting parties, who are husband and wife continued enjoyment of the privilege conferred is Solicitor-General Araneta for Government.
authorized each other to marry again, at the same time dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to
renouncing or waiving whatever right of action one society. When it appears that he, by recklessness or W . A. Kincaid for defendant.
might have against the party so marrying. After the sheer ignorance of the law, is unfit or unsafe to be
execution and acknowledgment of Exhibit A by the entrusted with the responsibilities and obligations of a SYLLABUS
parties, the respondent asked the spouses to shake lawyer, his right to continue in the enjoyment of this 1. ATTORNEYS; SUSPENSION. — The promotion of an
hands and assured them that they were single and as professional privilege should be declared terminated. organization for the purpose of violating or evading
such could contract another and subsequent marriage. In the present case, respondent was either ignorant of the penal laws amounts to such malpractice on the
Baniquit then remarked, "Would there be no trouble?" the applicable provision of the law or carelessly part of an attorney at law as will justify removal or
Upon hearing it the respondent stood up and, pointing negligent in giving the complainant legal advice. suspension.
to his diploma hanging on the wall, said: "I would tear Drastic action should lead to his disbarment and this is
that off if this document turns out not to be valid." the opinion of some members of the court. The D E C I S I O N
Relying on the validity of Exhibit A, Ernesto Baniquit, majority, however, have inclined to follow the
on June 11, 1939, contracted a second marriage with recommendation of the investigator, the Honorable PER CURIAM:
Trinidad Aurelio. There is also evidence to show that Sotero Rodas, in view of the circumstances stated in
the respondent tried to collect for this service the sum the report of said investigator and the fact that Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to
of P50, but as the evidence on this point is not clear immediately after discovering his mistakes, respondent
 2

show cause in the Court of First Instance. in the city of office, and for which he may be removed or suspended. Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant,
Manila, on the 5th day of February, 1903, why he (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 21.) The assisting of a obtained a favorable judgment from the Municipal
should not be suspended as a member of the bar of the client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be Trial Court, Bangued, Abra (MTC) which ordered Elsa
city of Manila for the reasons:chanrob1es virtual 1aw dishonest, or the conniving at a violation of law, are Dy Co to vacate the premises subject of the ejectment
library acts which justify disbarment. case (Civil Case No. 844). Co, through respondent as
counsel, appealed the decision to the Regional Trial
First, that he had assisted in the organization of the In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in Court, Branch 11, Bangued, Abra (RTC). She neither
"Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after he had been notified the case of United States v. Terrelle was acquitted on filed a supersedeas bond nor paid the rentals adjudged
that the said organization was made for the purpose of the charge of estafa, and has not, therefore, been by the MTC. The RTC affirmed in toto the decision of
evading the law then in force in said city; and, convicted of crime, and as the acts with which he is the MTC.
charged in this proceeding, while unprofessional and
Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas hence to be condemned, are not criminal in their The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Co's appeal from
Artes" during the time of and after its organization, nature, we are of opinion that the ends of justice will the decision of the RTC for failure to comply with
which organization was known to him to be created for be served by the suspension of said Howard D. Terrell Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 and Section 22(b) of the
the purpose of evading the law. from the practice of law in the Philippine Islands for Interim Rules and Guidelines (CA-G.R. CV No. 11404).
the term of one year from the 7th day of February, According to the CA, Co should have filed a petition for
The accused appeared on the return day, and by his 1903. review and not an ordinary appeal (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 22).
counsel, W. A. Kincaid, made answer to these charges,
denying the same, and filed affidavits in answer It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell The judgment of the MTC became final and executory
thereto. After reading testimony given by said Howard be suspended form the practice of law for a term of on November 19, 1986.
D. Terrell, in the case of the United States v. H. D. one year from February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.
Terrell, 1 wherein he was charged with estafa, and On January 2, 1987, a Manifestation and Motion was
after reading the said affidavits in his behalf, and filed by respondent as counsel for Co in CA-G.R. CV
hearing his counsel, the court below found, and RULE 1.03 No. 11404, arguing that the decisions of the MTC and
decided as a fact, that the charges aforesaid made the RTC were null and void for being contrary to law,
against Howard D. Terrell were true, and thereupon A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995 justice and equity for allowing the lessor to increase by
made an order suspending him from his office as a RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner, 300% the rentals for an old house. Respondent,
lawyer in the Philippine Islands, and directed the clerk vs. admitting his mistake in filing an ordinary appeal
of the court to transmit to this court a certified copy of ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent. instead of a petition for review, prayed that he be
the order of suspension, as well as a full statement of allowed to file an action for annulment.
the facts upon which the same was based.
QUIASON, J.: On February 23, 1987, the CA gave due course to
We have carefully considered these facts, and have respondent's Manifestation and Motion and let the
reached the conclusion that they were such as to This is a complaint for disbarment. Pursuant to records remain with it. However, on November 10,
justify the court below in arriving at the conclusion paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised 1987, the said court ordered the records in CA-G.R. CV
that the knowledge and acts of the accused in Rules of Court, this Court resolved to refer it to the No. 11404 to be remanded to the court a quo.
connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
Artes" Club were of such a nature and character as to investigation, report and recommendation. On March 9, 1987, respondent filed with the CA a
warrant his suspension from practice. Petition for Annulment of Decisions and/or
On April 15, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors Reformation or Novation of Decisions of the MTC and
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of rendered a decision, finding respondent guilty of the RTC (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690), insisting that the
their objects, for the purpose of violating or evading malpractice and recommending that he be suspended decisions were not in accordance with existing laws
the laws against crime constitutes such misconduct on from the practice of law. and policies. On December 17, 1987, the CA dismissed
the part of an attorney, an officer of the court, as the petition for annulment or novation explaining that
amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his I —
 3

. . . , aside from the reliefs provided in these two
sections (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 38), there is no other
means whereby the defeated party may procure final
and executory judgment to be set aside with a view to
the renewal of the litigation, unless (a) the judgment is
void for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of
law, or (b) it has been obtained by fraud, . . . . There is
no allegation in the present complaint to the effect
that the judgments in the former cases were secured
through fraud (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 35; Emphasis supplied).
On January 15, 1988, respondent filed an Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Set Motion
for Reconsideration for Oral Arguments of the CA
decision. The CA denied the motion. Again, respondent
requested the CA to set his Motion For Oral
Arguments on April 14, 1988.
reconsideration, which was denied. The RTC affirmed
the order for the issuance of the writ of execution.
Thus, a writ of execution was issued on October 18,
1988.
On October 26, 1988, respondent filed a special civil
action (SP CV No. 624) with the RTC, Branch 1,
Bangued, Abra for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction
against the MTC, Provincial Sheriff and complainant's
mother, seeking to annul the writ of execution issued
in MTC Civil Case No. 844 and RTC Civil Case No.
344. Respondent alleged that the order granting the
writ of execution was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since a
petition to annul the decisions (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690)
was still pending with the CA.
Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits the
attorney to use any arguable construction of the law or
rules which is favorable to his client. But the lawyer is
not allowed to knowingly advance a claim or defense
that is unwarranted under existing law. He cannot
prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or
institute clearly groundless actions (Annotated Code of
Professional Responsibility 310 [1979]). Professional
rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with
necessary restrictions and qualifications (Wolfram,
Modern Legal Ethics 579-582 [1986]).
Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer is required to exert every
effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice. Implementing
said Canon are the following rules:

In a resolution dated February 12, 1988, the CA deniedOn October 28, 1988, the provincial sheriff, Romulo V. Rule 12.02. — A lawyer shall not file multiple actions
the Motion for Oral Argument and in a resolution Paredes, deferred the implementation of the writ of arising from the same cause.
dated October 18, 1988, denied the motion for execution until the petition filed in SP CV No. 624
reconsideration of the February 12 Resolution. for certiorari was resolved. The CA denied in SP CV xxx xxx xxx
No. 624 respondent's Urgent Motion to Set Aside and
Respondent then filed a Petition for Review Declare Null and Void the Writ of Execution. Rule 12.04. — A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case,
on Certiorari with this Court (G.R. No. 86084) impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
questioning the decisions of the MTC and the RTC in From the decision of the RTC, Branch 1, Abra in SP CV processes.
favor of petitioner's mother. In a Resolution dated No. 624 denying the Petition for Certiorari,
January 4, 1989, we denied the petition for having Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use
been filed and paid late on December 12, 1988 and Prohibitory Order, respondent again filed an Appeal the judicial process, like the filing of dilatory motions,
November 12, 1988, respectively. A motion for and/or Review by Certiorari, Etc. with the CA (CA-G.R. repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole
reconsideration from such resolution was likewise SP No. 17040). purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a
denied with finality. judgment (Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory Motions
II Practice: Time for Change, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 1069
Respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a [1976]; Overmeyer v. Fidelista and Deposit Co., 554 F.
Prohibitory or Restraining Order (dated July 6, 1988) We have no reason to reverse the findings of the IBP 2d 539, 543 [2d Cir. 1971]).
in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690. Board of Governors.
The rights of respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844
On April 12, 1988, the mother of complainant filed a Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional of the MTC were fully protected and her defenses were
Motion for Execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. Responsibility, a lawyer is required to represent his properly ventilated when he filed the appeal from the
844. Respondent filed an Opposition to the Motion for client "within the bounds of the law." The Code enjoins MTC to the RTC. But respondent thereafter resorted to
Execution on the ground that the case was still a lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to devious and underhanded means to delay the
pending review by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) execution of the judgment rendered by the MTC
and therefore the motion for execution was premature. and warns him not to allow his client to dictate the adverse to his client. The said decision became
On August 23, 1988, the MTC ordered the issuance of procedure in handling the case (Rule 19.03). In short, executory even pending its appeal with the RTC
a writ of execution. Respondent filed a motion for a lawyer is not a gun for hire. because of the failure of Co to file a supersedeas bond

and to pay the monthly rentals as they fell due.
Furthermore, his petition for annulment of the
decisions of the MTC and RTC which he filed with the
CA (CA-G.R. No. 11690) was defective and dilatory.
According to the CA, there was no allegation therein
that the courts had no jurisdiction, that his client was
denied due process, or "that the judgments in the
former cases were secured through fraud."
As ruled in Regidor v.  Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 530
(1993):
A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a)
that the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for
lack of due process of law, or (b) that it has been
obtained by fraud. . . . (at p. 534).
Moreover, when the CA ordered that the records of the
case be remanded, respondent knew very well that the
decision of the MTC was already ripe for execution.
This Court, in People of Paombong, Bulacan v.  Court
of Appeals, 218 SCRA 423 (1993), ruled:
. . . [w]hen the judgment of a superior court is
remanded to the trial court for execution, the function
of the trial court is ministerial only; the trial court is
merely obliged with becoming modesty to enforce that
judgment and has no jurisdiction either to modify in
any way or to reverse the same. . . . (at p. 430).
(See also Valenzona v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA
306 [1993] and Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA
250 [1993]).
Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or
petitions to frustrate the execution of the MTC
judgment in Civil Case No. 844, to wit:
(1) Civil Case No. 344 — Appeal from the decision
rendered in Civil Case No. 844 of the Municipal Trial
Court, Bangued, Abra, with the Regional Trial Court,
Abra;
4
(2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 — Appeal from the decision By having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of
of the Regional Trial Court, Abra; recourse in his efforts to get a favorable judgment,
which efforts were all rebuffed, respondent violated
(3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 — An Action For the the duty of a member of the Bar to institute actions
Annulment of Decisions And/Or Reformation or only which are just and put up such defenses as he
Novation of Decisions filed with the Court of Appeals; perceives to be truly contestable under the laws
(Garcia v. Francisco, 220 SCRA 512 [1993]). As
(4) G.R. No. 86084 — Petition For Review correctly noted by the Committee on Bar Discipline "in
On Certiorari filed with the Supreme Court; filing a number of pleadings, actions and petitioner,
respondent 'has made a mockery of the judicial
(5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 — Appeal And/Or Review processes' and disregarded canons of professional
By Certiorari, Etc. filed also with the Court of Appeals; ethics in intentionally frustrating the rights of a
and, litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was
rendered, thus, 'abused procedural rules to defeat
(6) SP Civil Action No. 624 — Petition For Certiorari, ends of substantial justice'" (Report and
Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of Recommendation, IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, p.
Prohibitory Order filed with the Regional Trial Court, 2).
Branch 1, Bangued, Abra.
WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one
Judging from the number of actions filed by year.
respondent to forestall the execution of the same
judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum shopping. SO ORDERED.
In Villanueva v. Adre 172 SCRA 876 (1989), the Court Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
explained that forum shopping exists when, by reason
of an adverse decision in one forum, defendant
ventures to another for a more favorable resolution of
his case. In the case of Gabriel v.  Court of Appeals, 72 RULE 1.04
SCRA 272 (1976), this Court explained that:
G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994
Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of
the Court's processes and improper conduct that tends JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,
to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of vs.
justice and will be punished as contempt of court. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
Needless to add, the lawyer who filed such multiple or (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and JON DE
repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the YSASI, respondents.
execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects
himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not
knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.
as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts
and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.
be just and are consistent with truth and honor (at p.
275).
REGALADO, J.:

The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously
stood for naught in this case, notwithstanding
the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the
parties. It would indeed have been the better part of
reason if herein petitioner and private respondent had
reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial
atmosphere of familial amity and with the grace of
reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead
for judicial intervention despite the inevitable
acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with distaste,
the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their
dispute with the same reasoned detachment accorded
any judicial proceeding before it.
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was
employed by his father, herein private respondent, as
farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran,
Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980. Prior
thereto, he was successively employed as sales
manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and
later as operations manager of Top Form
Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm
administrator was on a fixed salary, with other
allowances covering housing, food, light, power,
telephone, gasoline, medical and dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for
the supervision of daily activities and operations of the
sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting,
weeding, fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with third
persons in all matters relating to the hacienda and
attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to
him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived
on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house
there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner
moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to
work daily. He suffered various ailments and was
hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and
August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent
fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a
deep sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which
lasted over four months, he was under the care of Dr.
Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute
5
gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis damages and attorney's fees because of illegal
from December, 1983 to January, 1984. dismissal. The discussion of these issues will
necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, by private respondent, such as the exact date when
private respondent took care of his medical expenses petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator,
and petitioner continued to receive compensation. the character of the pecuniary amounts received by
However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private petitioner from private respondent, that is, whether
respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner the same are in the nature of salaries or pensions, and
made oral and written demands for an explanation for whether or not there was abandonment by petitioner
the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty. of his functions as farm administrator.
Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and
legal adviser, as well as for the remittance of his In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the
salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon. Solicitor General recommended a modification of the
decision of herein public respondent sustaining the
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor findings and conclusions of the Executive Labor
6
Relations Commission (NLRC, for brevity), Regional Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84,  for which reason
Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on
17, 1984, docketed therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, the petition. In compliance with the Court's resolution
7
against private respondent for illegal dismissal with of November 16, 1992,  NLRC filed its comment on
prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority February 12, 1992 largely reiterating its earlier
rights and payment of full back wages, thirteenth position in support of the findings of the Executive
month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and Labor Arbiter.
8
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal observation of the labor arbiter is worth noting:
was dismissed by the NLRC,1 holding that petitioner
abandoned his work and that the termination of his This case is truly unique. What makes
employment was for a valid cause, but ordering private this case unique is the fact that because
respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 of the special relationship of the parties
as penalty for his failure to serve notice of said and the nature of the action involved,
termination of employment to the Department of Labor this case could very well go down (in)
and Employment as required by Batas Pambansa Blg. the annals of the Commission as perhaps
130 and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil the first of its kind. For this case is an
Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, action filed by an only son, his father's
et al.2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of the NLRC, namesake, the only child and therefore
Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto.3 the only heir against his own father.9
His motion for reconsideration4 of said decision having Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
been denied for lack of merit,5 petitioner filed this
petition presenting the following issues for resolution: . . . After an exhaustive reading of the
(1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally records, two (2) observations were noted
dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to that may justify why this labor case
reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth deserves special considerations. First,
month pay and other benefits; and (3) whether or not most of the complaints that petitioner
he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary
 6

and private respondent had with each conducted the hearing. The fact that the judge who any immediate member of his family or his duly
other, were personal matters affecting heard the case was not the judge who penned the authorized representative; and (e) other causes
father and son relationship. And decision does not impair the validity of the analogous to the foregoing.
secondly, if any of the complaints pertain judgment,11 provided that he draws up his decision and
to their work, they allow their personal resolution with due care and makes certain that they The employer may also terminate the services of any
relationship to come in the way.10 truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final employee due to the installation of labor saving
dispositions on the bases of the facts of and evidence devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from submitted in the case.
12
or the closing or cessation of operation of the
employment was illegal because of want of just cause establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for
therefor and non-observance of the requirements of Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned the purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions
due process. He also charges the NLRC with grave to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio, who conducted of the Labor Code, by serving a written notice on the
abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July workers and the Department of Labor and Employment
executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did 11, 1985, and was later transferred to Executive Labor at least one (1) month before the intended date
not conduct the hearings thereof. Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually decided the case, thereof, with due entitlement to the corresponding
presents no procedural infirmity, especially separation pay rates provided by law. 15 Suffering from
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was considering that there is a presumption of regularity in a disease by reason whereof the continued
abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm the performance of a public officer's functions,  which
13
employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is
administrator, thereby arming private respondent with petitioner has not successfully rebutted. prejudicial to his and his co-employee's health, is also
a ground to terminate his employment at Hacienda a ground for termination of his services provided he
Manucao. It is also contended that it is wrong for We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in receives the prescribed separation pay. 16 On the other
petitioner to question the factual findings of the the Labor Code relaxing the application of technical hand, it is well-settled that abandonment by an
executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as only questions rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due employee of his work authorizes the employer to effect
of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court. process, ever mindful of the long-standing legal the former's dismissal from employment.17
Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of the instant precept that rules of procedure must be interpreted to
petition, private respondent faults herein petitioner for help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we After a careful review of the records of this case, we
failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to find that public respondent gravely erred in affirming
transcripts of stenographic notes, erroneously citing nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments. the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that
Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section The strength of one's position cannot be hinged on petitioner abandoned his employment and was not
16[c] and [d], mere procedural niceties but on solid bases in law and illegally dismissed from such employment. For want of
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of jurisprudence. substantial bases, in fact or
Court, which provide that want of page references to in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and
the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal. The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and conclusiveness normally accorded to the factual
due process dictate that no worker shall be dismissed findings of an administrative agency, such as herein
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of except for just and authorized cause provided by law public respondent NLRC,18 as even decisions of
Article 221 of the Labor Code that technical rules of and after due process. 14 Article 282 of the Labor Code administrative agencies which are declared "final" by
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall enumerates the causes for which an employer may law are not exempt from judicial review when so
not be controlling, and that every and all reasonable validly terminate an employment, to wit: warranted. 19
means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts in (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
each case shall be availed of, without regard to employee of the lawful orders of his employer or The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor
technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of due representative in connection with his work; (b) gross General on this point deserve acceptance:
process. and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c)
fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust It is submitted that the absences of
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized petitioner in his work from October 1982
the decision in a case to be rendered by a judge, or a representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by to December 1982, cannot be construed
labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who the employee against the person of his employer or as abandonment of work because he has

a justifiable excuse. Petitioner was
suffering from perennial abscess in the
peri-anal around the anus and fistula
under the medical attention of Dr.
Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical
Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn, Vol. III,
Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).
This fact (was) duly communicated to
private respondent by medical bills sent
to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr.
Tan, January 22, 1987 at 49-50).
During the period of his illness and
recovery, petitioner stayed in Bacolod
City upon the instruction(s) of private
respondent to recuperate thereat and to
handle only administrative matters of
the hacienda in that city. As a manager,
petitioner is not really obliged to live and
stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda
Manucao.
xxx xxx xxx
After evaluating the evidence within the
context of the special circumstances
involved and basic human experience,
petitioner's illness and strained family
relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II
may be considered as justifiable reason
for petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence
from work during the period of October
1982 to December 1982. In any event,
such absence does not warrant outright
dismissal without notice and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of abandonment as a
ground for dismissal of an employee are
as follows:
(1) failure to report for
work or absence without
valid or justifiable reason;
and (2) clear intention to
sever the employer-
employee tie (Samson
Alcantara, Reviewer in
Labor and Social
Legislation, 1989 edition,
p. 133).
This Honorable Court, in several cases,
illustrates what constitute abandonment.
In Dagupan Bus Company v. NLRC  (191
SCRA 328), the Court rules that for
abandonment to arise, there must be a
concurrence of the intention to abandon
and some overt act from which it may be
inferred that the employee has no more
interest to work. Similarly, in Nueva
Ecija I Electric Cooperative,
Inc.  v.  NLRC (184 SCRA 25), for
abandonment to constitute a valid cause
for termination of employment, there
must be a deliberate, unjustified refusal
of the employee to resume his
employment. . . Mere absence is not
sufficient; it must be accompanied by
overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact
that the employee simply does not want
to work anymore.
There are significant indications in this
case, that there is no abandonment.
First, petitioner's absence and his
decision to leave his residence inside
Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his
illness and strained family relations.
Second he has some medical certificates
to show his frail health. Third, once able
to work, petitioner wrote a letter (Annex
"J") informing private respondent of his
intention to assume again his
employment. Last, but not the least, he
at once instituted a complaint for illegal
7
dismissal when he realized he was
unjustly dismissed. All these are
indications that petitioner had no
intention to abandon his employment.20
The records show that the parties herein do not
dispute the fact of petitioner's confinement in the
hospital for his various afflictions which required
medical treatment. Neither can it be denied that
private respondent was well aware of petitioner's state
of health as the former admittedly shouldered part of
the medical and hospital bills and even advised the
latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to work
again. The disagreement as to whether or not
petitioner's ailments were so serious as to necessitate
hospitalization and corresponding periods for
recuperation is beside the point. The fact remains that
on account of said illnesses, the details of which were
amply substantiated by the attending physician, 21 and
as the records are bereft of any suggestion of
malingering on the part of petitioner, there was
justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from work.
We repeat, it is clear, deliberate and unjustified refusal
to resume employment and not mere absence that is
required to constitute abandonment as a valid ground
for termination of employment.22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda
Manucao, petitioner unmistakably may be classified as
a managerial employee23 to whom the law grants an
amount of discretion in the discharge of his duties.
This is why when petitioner stated that "I assigned
myself where I want to go," 24 he was simply being
candid about what he could do within the sphere of his
authority. His duties as farm administrator did not
strictly require him to keep regular hours or to be at
the office premises at all times, or to be subjected to
specific control from his employer in every aspect of
his work. What is essential only is that he runs the
farm as efficiently and effectively as possible and,
while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model
employee, in this regard he proved to be quite
successful, as there was at least a showing of
increased production during the time that petitioner
was in charge of farm operations.

If, as private respondent contends, he had no control
over petitioner during the years 1983 to 1984, this is
because that was the period when petitioner was
recuperating from illness and on account of which his
attendance and direct involvement in farm operations
were irregular and minimal, hence the supervision and
control exercisable by private respondent as employer
was necessarily limited. It goes without saying that the
control contemplated refers only to matters relating to
his functions as farm administrator and could not
extend to petitioner's personal affairs and activities.
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of
discharging his duties as farm administrator,
petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm,
there really was no explicit contractual stipulation (as
there was no formal employment contract to begin
with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of
his employment or that any transfer of residence
would justify the termination of his employment. That
petitioner changed his residence should not be taken
against him, as this is undeniably among his basic
rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residence per
se be a valid ground to terminate an employer-
employee relationship.
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as
he was yet uncertain of his son's intention of returning
to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept
petitioner on the payroll, reported him as an employee
of the hacienda for social security purposes, and paid
his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions
therefrom until the end of December, 1982. It was only
in January, 1983 when he became convinced that
petitioner would no longer return to work that he
considered the latter to have abandoned his work and,
for this reason, no longer listed him as an employee.
According to private respondent, whatever amount of
money was given to petitioner from that time until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an
allowance or mere gratuitous doles from a father to a
son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual
deductions were made therefrom. It was only in April,
1984 that private respondent completely stopped
giving said pension or allowance when he was angered
by what he heard petitioner had been saying about manifested by some overt acts. Such intent we find
sending him to jail. dismally wanting in this case.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one
Manolo Gomez taken on oral deposition regarding
petitioner's alleged statement to him, "(h)e quemado
los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have burned my
bridges with Manucao") as expressive of petitioner's
intention to abandon his job. In addition to insinuations
of sinister motives on the part of petitioner in working
at the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon
accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent
takes the novel position that the agreement to support
his son after the latter abandoned the administration
of the farm legally converts the initial abandonment to
implied voluntary resignation.25
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private
respondent undoubtedly knew about petitioner's
illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical
bills. The assertion regarding abandonment of work,
petitioner argues, is further belied by his continued
performance of various services related to the
operations of the farm from May to the last quarter of
1983, his persistent inquiries from his father's
accountant and legal adviser about the reason why his
pension or allowance was discontinued since April,
1984, and his indication of having recovered and his
willingness and capability to resume his work at the
farm as expressed in a letter dated September 14,
1984.26 With these, petitioner contends that it is
immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are
designated, whether as salary, pension or allowance,
with or without deductions, as he was entitled thereto
in view of his continued service as farm
administrator.27
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a
finding of abandonment may justly be made there must
be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure
to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship, with the second
element as the more determinative factor and being
8
It will be recalled that private respondent himself
admitted being unsure of his son's plans of returning
to work. The absence of petitioner from work since
mid-1982, prolonged though it may have been, was not
without valid causes of which private respondent had
full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to
believe that petitioner was no longer returning to
work, private respondent neither explains nor
substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived
at such a conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment
cannot be given credence as even after January, 1983,
when private respondent supposedly "became
convinced" that petitioner would no longer work at the
farm, the latter continued to perform services directly
required by his position as farm administrator. These
are duly and correspondingly evidenced by such acts
as picking up some farm machinery/equipment from
G.A. Machineries, Inc.,28 claiming and paying for
additional farm equipment and machinery shipped by
said firm from Manila to Bacolod through Zip
Forwarders,29 getting the payment of the additional
cash advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984
from Agrotex Commodities, Inc.,30 and remitting to
private respondent through
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with
receipts for medicine and oil.31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which
petitioner took care of, relate to the normal activities
and operations of the farm. True, it is a father's
prerogative to request or even command his child to
run errands for him. In the present case, however,
considering the nature of these transactions, as well as
the property values and monetary sums involved, it is
unlikely that private respondent would leave the
matter to just anyone. Prudence dictates that these
matters be handled by someone who can be trusted or
at least be held accountable therefor, and who is
familiar with the terms, specifications and other details
relative thereto, such as an employee. If indeed

petitioner had abandoned his job or was considered to
have done so by private respondent, it would be
awkward, or even out of place, to expect or to oblige
petitioner to concern himself with matters relating to
or expected of him with respect to what would then be
his past and terminated employment. It is hard to
imagine what further authority an employer can have
over a dismissed employee so as to compel him to
continue to perform work-related tasks:
It is also significant that the special power of
attorney32 executed
by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of
petitioner, specifically stating —
xxx xxx xxx
That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal
age, married, and a resident of Hda.
Manucao, hereinafter called and
referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a
sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill
District, and a duly accredited planter-
member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA
PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I
have check/checks with BIPA
representing payment for all checks and
papers to which I am entitled to (sic) as
such planter-member;
That I have named, appointed and
constituted as by these presents
I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND
CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
JON de YSASI III
whose specimen signature is hereunder
affixed, TO GET FOR ME and in my
name, place and stead, my check/checks
aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-
FACT being herein given the power and
authority to sign for me and in my name,
place and stead, the receipt or receipts
or payroll for the said check/checks.
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the
said check/checks, but to turn the same
over to me for my proper disposition.
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM
the acts of my
Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said
check/checks and signing the receipts
therefor.
That I further request that my said
check/checks be made a "CROSSED
CHECK".
xxx xxx xxx
remained in force even after petitioner's employment
was supposed to have been terminated by reason of
abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous
requests for an explanation regarding the stoppage of
his salaries and benefits, 33 the issuance of withholding
tax reports,34 as well as correspondence reporting his
full recovery and readiness to go back to work,35 and,
specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal
dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has
abandoned his work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of
Manolo Gomez, as witness for private respondent,
ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly imagine how abandonment can be impliedly converted
indicative of the latter's intention to abandon his work.
We perceive the irregularity in the taking of such
deposition without the presence of petitioner's
counsel, and the failure of private respondent to serve
reasonably advance notice of its taking to said counsel,
thereby foreclosing his opportunity to elements constitutive of abandonment.
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also
failed to serve notice thereof on the Regional
Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that
there was a violation by private respondent of the due
9
by Administrative Assistant Celestina G. Ovejera of
said office.36 Fair play dictates that at such an
important stage of the proceedings, which involves the
taking of testimony, both parties must be afforded
equal opportunity to examine and cross-examine a
witness.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to
petitioner, whether denominated as salary, pension,
allowance or ex gratia handout, there is no question as
to petitioner's entitlement thereto inasmuch as he
continued to perform services in his capacity as farm
administrator. The change in description of said
amounts contained in the pay slips or in the receipts
prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to
be determinative of petitioner's employment status in
view of the peculiar circumstances above set out.
Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of
allowances given by a parent out of concern for his
child's welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts
therefor37 should be necessary and required as if they
were ordinary business expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's
theory that petitioner's alleged abandonment was
converted into an implied voluntary resignation on
account of the father's agreement to support his son
after the latter abandoned his work. As we have
determined that no abandonment took place in this
case, the monthly sums received by petitioner,
regardless of designation, were in consideration for
services rendered emanating from an employer-
employee relationship and were not of a character that
can qualify them as mere civil support given out of
parental duty and solicitude. We are also hard put to
into a voluntary resignation without any positive act on
the part of the employee conveying a desire to
terminate his employment. The very concept of
resignation as a ground for termination by the
employee of his employment38 does not square with the

process requirements under the Labor Code for want
of notice and hearing.39 Private respondent, in
opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
applies only to cases where the employer seeks to
terminate the services of an employee on any of the
grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor
Code, but not to the situation obtaining in this case
where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on
any ground since it was petitioner who allegedly
abandoned his employment.40
The due process requirements of notice and hearing
applicable to labor cases are set out in Rule XIV, Book
V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
in this wise:
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any
employer who seeks to dismiss a worker
shall furnish him a written notice stating
the particular acts or omission(s)
constituting the grounds for his
dismissal. In cases of abandonment of
work, notice shall be served at the
worker's last known address.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The
worker may answer the allegations as
stated against him in the notice of
dismissal within a reasonable period
from receipt of such notice. The
employer shall afford the worker ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The
employer shall immediately notify a
worker in writing of a decision to dismiss
him stating clearly the reasons therefor.
10
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. — Any that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an
decision taken by the employer shall be employee, especially when there is just cause therefor,
without prejudice to the right of the the requirements of due process cannot be lightly
worker to contest the validity or legality taken. The law does not countenance the arbitrary
of his dismissal by filing a complaint exercise of such a power or prerogative when it has
with the Regional Branch of the the effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee
Commission. of security of tenure in favor of the employee.42
xxx xxx xxx On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on
the Wenphil case, the Solicitor General rejoins as
Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The follows:
employer shall submit a monthly report
to the Regional Office having jurisdiction The Labor Arbiter held thus:
over the place of work at all dismissals
effected by him during the month, While we are in full
specifying therein the names of the agreement with the
dismissed workers, the reasons for their respondent as to his
dismissal, the dates of commencement defense of implied
and termination of employment, the resignation and/or
positions last held by them and such abandonment, records
other information as may be required by somehow showed that he
the Ministry for policy guidance and failed to notify the
statistical purposes. Department of
Labor and Employment for
Private respondent's argument is without merit as his sons'
there can be no question that petitioner was denied his (sic)/complainants' (sic)
right to due process since he was never given any aba(n)donment as
notice about his impending dismissal and the grounds required by BP 130. And
therefor, much less a chance to be heard. Even as for this failure, the other
private respondent controverts the applicability of the requisite for a valid
mandatory twin requirements of procedural due termination by an
process in this particular case, he in effect admits that employer was not
no notice was served by him on petitioner. This fact is complied with. This
corroborated by the certification issued on September however, would not work
5, 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the to invalidate the otherwise
Department of Labor that no notice of termination of (sic) existence of a valid
the employment of petitioner was submitted thereto.41 cause for dismissal. The
validity of the cause of
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this dismissal must be upheld
case, it nonetheless cannot be denied that notice still at all times provided
had to be served upon the employee sought to be however that sanctions
dismissed, as the second sentence of Section 2 of the must be imposed on the
pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires respondent for his failure
service thereof at the employee's last known address, to observe the notice on
by way of substantial compliance. While it is conceded due process requirement.
 11

(Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, security of tenure.44 To give teeth to this constitutional time of his reinstatement. (Morales vs.
G.R. No. 80587). (Decision and statutory mandates, the Labor Code spells out the NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But in Pacific
Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, relief available to an employee in case of its denial: Cement Company, Inc. vs.  NLRC, 173
Annex "C" Petition), . . . SCRA 192, this Honorable Court held
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases that when it comes to reinstatement,
This is thus a very different case of regular employment, the employer differences should be made between
from Wenphil Corporation v.  NLRC, 170 shall not terminate the services of an managers and the ordinary workingmen.
SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the rule applied to employee except for a just cause or The Court concluded that a company
the facts is: once an employee is when authorized by this Title. An which no longer trusts its managers
dismissed for just cause, he must not be employee who is unjustly dismissed from cannot operate freely in a competitive
rewarded work shall be entitled to reinstatement and profitable manner. The NLRC should
re-employment and backwages for without loss of seniority rights and other know the difference between managers
failure of his employer to observe privileges and to his full backwages, and ordinary workingmen. It cannot
procedural due process. The public inclusive of allowances, and to his other imprudently order the reinstatement of
policy behind this is that, it may benefits of their monetary equivalent managers with the same ease and
encourage the employee to do even computed from the time his liberality as that of rank and file workers
worse and render a mockery of the rules compensation was withheld from him up who had been terminated. Similarly, a
of discipline required to be observed. to the time of actual reinstatement. reinstatement may not be appropriate or
However, the employer must be feasible in case of antipathy or
penalized for his infraction of due Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to antagonism between the parties
process. In the present case, however, reinstatement with full back wages in the absence of (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
not only was petitioner dismissed just cause for dismissal.45 The Court, however, on
without due process, but his dismissal is numerous occasions has tempered the rigid application In the present case, it is submitted that
without just cause. Petitioner did not of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that in petitioner should not be reinstated as
abandon his employment because he has some cases certain events may have transpired as farm administrator of Hacienda
a justifiable excuse.43 would militate against the practicability of granting Manucao. The present relationship of
the relief thereunder provided, and declares that petitioner and private respondent (is) so
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter where there are strained relations between the strained that a harmonious and peaceful
erred in disregarding the mandatory provisions of employer and the employee, payment of back wages employee-employer relationship is
Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an and severance pay may be awarded instead of hardly possible.49
illegally dismissed employee to reinstatement and back reinstatement,46 and more particularly when
wages and, instead, affirmed the imposition of the managerial employees are concerned.47 Thus, where III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral
penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent for reinstatement is no longer possible, it is therefore damages, arguing that his dismissal from employment
violation of the due process requirements. Private appropriate that the dismissed employee be given his was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted
respondent, for his part, maintains that there was fair and just share of what the law accords him.48 oppression, or was contrary to morals, good customs
error in imposing the fine because that penalty or public policy. He further prays for exemplary
contemplates the failure to submit the employer's We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of
report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional Solicitor General's ratiocination, to wit: unjust dismissal by other employers.
office, as required under Section 5 (now, Section 11),
Rule XIV of the implementing rules, and not the failure As a general rule, an employee who isMoral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code,
to serve notice upon the employee sought to be unjustly dismissed from work shall bemay be awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries
dismissed by the employer. such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation,
entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and to his backwages wounded feelings, and social humiliation, provided
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in computed from the time his that such injuries spring from a wrongful act or
no uncertain terms the right of every worker to compensation was withheld up to the omission of the defendant which was the proximate

cause thereof.50 Exemplary damages, under Article this case because petitioner has a
2229, are imposed by way of example or correction for justifiable excuse for his absence, or
the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, such absence does not warrant outright
liquidated or compensatory damages. They are not dismissal without notice and hearing.
recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to the Private respondent, therefore, is guilty
court to decide whether or not they should be of illegal dismissal. He should be
adjudicated.51 ordered to pay backwages for a period
not exceeding three years from date of
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement,
of cases in the past allowing recovery of moral petitioner may be paid separation pay
damages where the dismissal of the employee was equivalent to one (1) month('s) salary for
attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act every year of service, a fraction of six
oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary months being considered as one (1) year
to morals, good customs or public policy, 52 and of in accordance with recent jurisprudence
exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But
wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. 53 We do not all claims for damages should be
feel, however, that an award of the damages prayed dismissed, for both parties are equally at
for in this petition would be proper even if, seemingly, fault.54
the facts of the case justify their allowance. In the
aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as
exemplary damages were awarded, the dismissed revealed by the records, sorely disappoints the Court
employees were genuinely without fault and were and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be
undoubtedly victims of the erring employers' reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to
capricious exercise of power. represent their clients with
zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients'
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and respective causes in court. It is just as much their
private respondent can equally be faulted for fanning responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all
the flames which gave rise to and ultimately reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts,
aggravated this controversy, instead of sincerely preferably out of court and especially in consideration
negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties
claims. The records reveal how their actuations between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that
seethed with mutual antagonism and the undeniable the useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct
enmity between them negates the likelihood that litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising
either of them acted in good faith. It is apparent that settlement or withholding suit. He is often called upon
each one has a cause for damages against the other. less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise
For this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator
damages can rightfully be awarded to petitioner. for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather
than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the litigation.56
validity of the following recommendation of the
Solicitor General: Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall encourage his
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will
Case No. 0452-84 should be modified. admit of a fair settlement." On this point, we find that
There was no voluntary abandonment in both counsel herein fell short of what was expected of
12
them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the
court. The records do not show that they took pains to
initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement
between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic
and protracted exchanges could not but have
exacerbated the situation even as they may have found
favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective
clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who
handled this regrettable case has been less than
faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code
mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts
towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute
within his jurisdiction." 57 If he ever did so, or at least
entertained the thought, the copious records of the
proceedings in this controversy are barren of any
reflection of the same.
One final word. This is one decision we do not
particularly relish having been obliged to make. The
task of resolving cases involving disputes among
members of a family leaves a bad taste in the mouth
and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful
and enduring resolution is really achieved in such
situations. While we are convinced that we have
adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the
bases of law and jurisprudence, sans sentimentality,
we are saddened by the thought that we may have
failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father
and son who figured as parties to this dispute, and that
our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly
contribute to the breaking, instead of the
strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the
parties herein actually emerges victorious. It is the
Court's earnest hope, therefore, that with the impartial
exposition and extended explanation of their
respective rights in this decision, the parties may
eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution
of their differences on more convivial terms.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National
Labor Relations Commission is hereby SET ASIDE.
Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back
wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years,

without qualification or deduction,58 and, in lieu of
reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6)
months being considered as one (1) whole year.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-29543      November 29, 1969
GLORIA PAJARES, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JUDGE ESTRELLA ABAD SANTOS, MUNICIPAL
COURT OF MANILA and UDHARAM BAZAR
CO., respondents-appellees.
Moises C. Nicomedes for petitioner-appellant.
Tomas Lopez Valencia for respondents-appellees.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
We dismiss as frivolous petitioner-appellant's appeal
from the lower Court's Order of dismissal of her
petition for a writ of certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction against respondent judge's
order denying her motion for a bill of particulars as the
defendant in a simple collection case.
The origin of the case is narrated in the Court of
Appeals' Resolution dated August 16, 1968 certifying
the appeal to this Court as involving purely questions
of law:
This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Gloria
Pajares from the order dated July 21, 1962
issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila,
dismissing her petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction against respondent
Judge Estrella Abad Santos of the Municipal
Court of Manila and respondent Udharam Bazar
& Co.
There is no dispute that on April 25, 1962, the
Udharam Bazar & Co. sued Gloria Pajares
before the Municipal Court of Manila for
recovery of a certain sum of money. The lawsuit
was docketed in the inferior court as Civil Case
No. 97309 and was eventually assigned to the
sala of the respondent Judge Abad Santos.
In its complaint the Udharam Bazar & Co.
averred, among others, as follows:
"2. That defendant in 1961, ordered from
the plaintiff quantities of ready made
goods and delivered to her in good
condition and same were already sold,
but did not make the full payment up to
the present time;
"3. That defendant is still indebted to the
plaintiff in the sum of P354.85,
representing the balance of her account
as the value of the said goods, which is
already overdue and payable."
Instead of answering the complaint against her,
Gloria Pajares, however, moved for a bill of
particulars praying the inferior court to require
the Udharam Bazar & Co. to itemize the kinds
of goods which she supposedly purchased from
the said company, the respective dates they
were taken and by whom they were received as
well as their purchase prices, alleging that
without this bill she would not be able to meet
the issues raised in the complaint.
After due hearing, the inferior court denied the
motion of Gloria Pajares for a bill of particulars.
Her motion for reconsideration having been
13
denied too by the said court, she then brought
the incident on certiorari to the Court of First
Instance of Manila, alleging in support of her
petition that in denying her motion for a bill of
particulars, the respondent judge acted in
grave abuse of discretion.
But on July 19, 1962, herein respondent
Udharam Bazar & Co. filed a motion to dismiss
the petition for a writ of certiorari, as well as
the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction,
for the reasons: (1) that the allegations of the
complaint filed by the said company in the
inferior court, particularly paragraphs 2 and 3
thereof, are clear, specific and sufficiently
appraise the defendant, now herein petitioner
Gloria Pajares, of the nature of the cause of
action against her so as to enable her to
prepare for her defenses; and (2) that things
asked for in the motion for a bill of particulars
are evidentiary matters, which are beyond the
pale of such bill. Convinced that the said motion
of the company is well founded, the lower court
accordingly dismissed the petition on April 21,
1962.
Her subsequent motion for reconsideration
having been similarly denied by the court
below, Gloria Pajares undertook the present
appeal to this Court, contending under her lone
assignment of error to maintain her such appeal
that the lower court erred in dismissing her
petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction, in its order dated July 21, 1962, as
amended by its order dated August 18, 1962.
The only genuine issues involved in the case at
bar are: (1) whether the allegations of the
complaint sufficiently appraise Gloria Pajares of
the nature of the cause of action against her;
and (2) whether the items asked for by the said
Gloria Pajares in her motion for a bill of
particulars constitute evidentiary matters. To
our mind these are purely legal questions. A
perusal of the brief of the parties has shown
 14

that no genuine factual questions are at all her answer whether from her records the outstanding much more than the amount in litigation in this
involved in this appeal. balance of her indebtedness was in the sum of worthless cause.
P354.85, as claimed by appellee, or in a lesser amount.
It is plain and clear that no error of law, much less any As we recently said in another case, 3 the cooperation
grave abuse of discretion, was committed by The record shows, furthermore, that a month before of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that
respondent judge in denying appellant's motion for a appellee filed its collection case, it had written needless clogging of the court dockets with
bill of particulars in the collection case instituted in appellant a demand-letter for the payment of her unmeritorious cases may be avoided. There must be
the Municipal Court of Manila by private respondent- outstanding account in the said sum of P354.85 within more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the
appellee for the recovery of her indebtedness of one week. Appellant, through her counsel, wrote Rules of Court which provides that "the signature of an
P354.85 representing the overdue balance of her appellee under date of March 23, 1962, acknowledging attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has
account for ready-made goods ordered by and her said indebtedness but stating that "Due to losses read the pleading and that to the best of his
delivered to her in 1961. Appellee's complaint she has sustained in the operation of her stall, she knowledge, information and belief, there is good
precisely and concisely informed appellant of the would not be able to meet your request for payment of ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for
ultimate or essential facts constituting the cause of the full amount of P354.85 at once. I would therefore delay" and expressly admonishes that "for a willful
action against her, in accordance with the request you to be kind enough to allow her to continue violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to
requirements of the Rules of Court.1 paying you P10.00 every 15th and end of the month as disciplinary action."
heretofore."
It was therefore improper for appellant, through her WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed,
counsel, to insist on her motion that appellee as No error was therefore committed by the lower court and petitioner-appellant's counsel shall pay treble
plaintiff "submit a bill of particulars, specifying therein in summarily dismissing appellant's petition costs in all instances. This decision shall be noted in
in detail the goods represented by the alleged amount for certiorari against respondent judge's order denying the personal record of the attorney for petitioner-
of P354.85, giving the dates and invoice numbers on her motion for a bill of particulars, as pretended by appellant in this Court for future reference. So
which they were delivered to the defendant, the appellant in her lone assignment of error. Well may we ordered.
amount due on each such invoice and by whom they apply to this appeal, the words of Mr. Justice J.B.L.
were received." These particulars sought all concerned Reyes in an analogous case, 2 that "the circumstances
evidentiary matters and do not come within the scope surrounding this litigation definitely prove that appeal
of Rule 12, section 1 of the Rules of Court which is frivolous and a plain trick to delay payment and CANON 2
permits a party "to move for a definite statement or for prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such attitude
a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred deserves condemnation, wasting as it does, the time
[A.C. NO. 5365 : April 27, 2005]
with sufficient definiteness or particularly to enable that the courts could well devote to meritorious cases."
him to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare
SPOUSES FRANKLIN and LOURDES OLBES,
for trial." Here, this simple collection case has needlessly Complainants, v. ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE,
clogged the court dockets for over seven years. Had Respondent.
Since appellant admittedly was engaged in the appellant been but prudently advised by her counsel to
business of buying and selling merchandise at her stall confess judgment and ask from her creditor the DECISION
at the Sta. Mesa Market, Quezon City, and appellee reasonable time she needed to discharge her lawful
was one of her creditors from whom she used to buy indebtedness, the expenses of litigation that she has PANGANIBAN, J.:
on credit ready made goods for resale, appellant had incurred by way of filing fees in the Court of First
no need of the evidentiary particulars sought by her to Instance, premiums for her appeal bond, appellate Constituting a serious transgression of the Code of
enable her to prepare her answer to the complaint or court docket fees, printing of her appellant's brief, and Professional Responsibility was the malevolent act of
to prepare for trial. These particulars were just as attorney's fees would have been much more than respondent, who filled up the blank checks entrusted
much within her knowledge as appellee's. She could sufficient to pay off her just debt to appellee. Yet, here to him as security for a loan by writing on those checks
not logically pretend ignorance as to the same, for all she still remains saddled with the same debt, burdened amounts that had not been agreed upon at all, despite
she had to do was to check and verify her own records by accumulated interests, after having spent uselessly
of her outstanding account with appellee and state in
 15

his full knowledge that the loan they were meant to well as any other loans that might be obtained in the Quezon City to transact business with respondent.
secure had already been paid. future.6 Allegedly, they were in their office at the time, as
shown by their Daily Time Records; so it would have
The Case On August 31, 1999, Lourdes paid respondent the been physically impossible for them to transact
amount of P14,874.37 corresponding to the loan plus business in Cainta, Rizal, and, after an interval of only
Before us is a verified Petition1 for the disbarment of surcharges, penalties and interests, for which the thirty minutes, in Quezon City, especially considering
Atty. Victor V. Deciembre, filed by Spouses Franklin latter issued a receipt,7 herein quoted as follows: the heavy traffic conditions in those places.12
and Lourdes Olbes with the Office of the Bar Confidant
of this Court. Petitioners charged respondent with "August 31, 1999 Petitioners averred that many of their office mates - -
willful and deliberate acts of dishonesty, falsification among them, Juanita Manaois, Honorata Acosta and
and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. After Received the amount of P14,874.37 as payment of the Eugenia Mendoza - - had suffered the same fate in
he had filed his Comment2 on the Petition, the Court loan of P10,000.00 taken earlier by Lourdes Olbes. their dealings with respondent.13
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and (Sgd.) Atty. Victor V. Deciembre In his Comment,14 respondent denied petitioners'
recommendation. 8-31-99 claims, which he called baseless and devoid of any
P10,000.00 truth and merit. Allegedly, petitioners were the ones
The IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), PNB Check No. 46241 '8/15/99"8 who had deceived him by not honoring their
through Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay, held several Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, commitment regarding their July 15, 1999
hearings. During those hearings, the last of which respondent filled up four (of the five) blank PNB transactions. Those transactions, totaling P200,000,
was held on May 12, 2003,3 the parties were able to Checks (Nos. 0046241, 0046242, 0046243 and had allegedly been covered by their four PNB checks
present their respective witnesses and documentary 0046244) for the amount of P50,000 each, with that were, however, subsequently dishonored due to
evidence. After the filing of the parties' respective different dates of maturity - - August 15, 1999, August "ACCOUNT CLOSED." Thus, he filed criminal cases
formal offers of evidence, as well as petitioners' 20, 1999, October 15, 1999 and November 15, 1999, against them. He claimed that the checks had already
Memorandum,4 the case was considered submitted for respectively.9 been fully filled up when petitioners signed them in his
resolution. Subsequently, the commissioner rendered On October 19, 1999, respondent filed before the presence. He further claimed that he had given them
his Report and Recommendation dated January 30, Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal an Affidavit- the amounts of money indicated in the checks, because
2004, which was later adopted and approved by the Complaint against petitioners for estafa and violation his previous satisfactory transactions with them
IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XV-2003- of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22. He alleged therein that convinced him that they had the capacity to pay.
177 dated July 30, 2004. on July 15, 1999, around one-thirty in the afternoon at
Cainta, Rizal, they personally approached him and Moreover, respondent said that the loans were his
The Facts requested that he immediately exchange with cash private and personal transactions, which were not in
their postdated PNB Check Nos. 0046241 and any way connected with his profession as a lawyer.
In their Petition, Spouses Olbes allege that they were 0046242 totaling P100,000.10 The criminal cases against petitioners were allegedly
government employees working at the Central Post private actions intended to vindicate his rights against
Office, Manila; and that Franklin was a letter carrier Several months after, or on January 20, 2000, their deception and violation of their obligations. He
receiving a monthly salary of P6,700, and Lourdes, a respondent filed against petitioners another Affidavit- maintained that his right to litigate should not be
mail sorter, P6,000.5 Complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22. He curtailed by this administrative action.
stated, among others, that on the same day, July 15,
Through respondent, Lourdes renewed on July 1, 1999 1999, around two o'clock in the afternoon at Quezon Report of the Investigating Commissioner
her application for a loan from Rodela Loans, Inc., in City, they again approached him and requested that he
the amount of P10,000. As security for the loan, she exchange with cash PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and In his Report and Recommendation, Commissioner
issued and delivered to respondent five Philippine 0046244 totaling P100,000.11 Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended
National Bank (PNB) blank checks (Nos. 0046241-45), from the practice of law for two years for violating
which served as collateral for the approved loan as Petitioners insisted that on the afternoon of July 15, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
1999, they never went either to Cainta, Rizal, or to
 16

The commissioner said that respondent's version of the Q. These four checks were accordingly issued to Q. What is the name of that retainer client of
facts was not credible. Commissioner Dulay rendered you by the complainants on July 15, 1999, is that yours?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
the following analysis and evaluation of the evidence correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
presented: ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
A. I will consult my records, You Honor, because
"In his affidavit-complaint x x x executed to support his it's quite a long time. Yes, Your Honor, the first two Your Honor, may I object because what is the
complaint filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office checks is in the morning and the next two checks is in materiality of the question?
of Rizal respondent stated that: the afternoon (sic).
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
2. That last July 15, 1999, in the jurisdiction of COMM. DULAY:
Cainta, Rizal, both LOURDES E. OLBES and That is very material. I am trying to test your
FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and Which are the first two checks? credibility because according to you these checks have
requested me to immediately exchange with cash, been issued in Pasig in the place of your client on a
right there and then, their postdated checks totaling ATTY. DECIEMBRE: retainer. That's why I am asking your client'
P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in
their business venture. The first two checks covering check Nos. 46241 and COMM. DULAY:
46242 in the morning. And Check No. 46243 and
"Again in his affidavit-complaint executed to support 46244 in the afternoon, Your Honor. The name of the client is not material I think. It is
his complaint filed with the Office of the City enough that he said it was issued here in Pasig. What
Prosecutor of Quezon City respondent stated that: ATTY. PUNZALAN: building?

2. That last July 15, 1999, at around 2PM, in the Q. Could you recall what particular time in the ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
jurisdiction of Quezon City, M.M., both LOURDES E. morning that these two checks with number 0046241
OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and 0046242 xxx have been issued to you? AIC Corporate Center, Your Honor.
and requested me to immediately exchange with cash, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
right there and then, their postdated checks totaling COMM. DULAY:
P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in A. I could not remember exactly but in the middle
their business venture. part of the morning around 9:30 to 10:00. What is the materiality of knowing the name of his
client's office?
"The above statements executed by respondent under Q. This was issued to you in what particular place?
oath are in direct contrast to his testimony before this chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ATTY. PUNZALAN:
Commission on cross-examination during the May 12,
2003 hearing, thus: A. Here in my office at Garnet Road, Ortigas Because, Your Honor, the materiality is to find out
Center, Pasig City. whether he is telling the truth. The place, Your
ATTY PUNZALAN: (continuing) Honor, according to the respondent is his client. Now
Q. Is that your house?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary I am asking who is that client?
Q. Based on these four (4) checks which you
claimed the complainant issued to you, you filed two A. No, it's not my house? COMM. DULAY:
separate criminal cases against them, one, in Pasig chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
City and the other in Quezon City, is that correct? Your answer.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Q. What is that, is that your law office?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
A. Yes, Your Honor, because the checks were
deposited at different banks. A. That is my retainer client. A. It is AIC Realty Corporation at AIC Building.
 17

Q. And the same date likewise, the complainants in the circumstances described by respondent does not administration of justice.19 Lawyers should act and
the afternoon issued PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and appear credible given the background of the previous comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a
0046244, is that correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary transaction and personal circumstances of manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the
complainants. That respondent who is a lawyer would public's faith in the legal profession.20
A. Yes. not even bother to ask from complainants a receipt for
the money he has given, nor bother to verify and ask
Q. So would you want to tell this Honorable office them what businesses they would use the money for
that there were four checks issued in the place of your contributes further to the lack of credibility of The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically
client in Pasig City, two in the morning and two in the respondent's version. These circumstances really cast mandates the following:
afternoon?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary doubt as to the version of respondent with regard to
the transaction. The resolution of the public "Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey
A. That is correct, sir. prosecutors notwithstanding we believe respondent is the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
clearly lacking in honesty in dealing with the legal processes.
"Respondent was clearly not being truthful in his complainants. Complainant Franklin Olbes had to be
narration of the transaction with the complainants. As jailed as a result of respondent's filing of the criminal x x x
between his version as to when the four checks were cases. Parenthetically, we note that respondent has xxx xxx
given, we find the story of complainant[s] more also filed similar cases against the co-employees of
credible. Respondent has blatantly distorted the complainants in the Central Post Office and "Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
truth, insofar as the place where the transaction respondent is facing similar complaints in the IBP for integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
involving the four checks took place. Such distortion his actions."15 support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
on a very material fact would seriously cast doubt on
his version of the transaction with complainants. x x x
The Court's Ruling xxx xxx
"Furthermore respondent's statements as to the time
when the transactions took place are also obviously We agree with the findings and conclusions of "Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in
and glaringly inconsistent and contradicts the written Commissioner Dulay, as approved and adopted by the conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
statements made before the public prosecutors. Thus IBP Board of Governors. However, the penalty should practice law, nor should he, whether in public or
further adding to the lack of credibility of respondent's be more severe than what the IBP recommended. private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
version of the transaction. discredit of the legal profession."
Respondent's Administrative Liability
"Complainants' version that they issued blank checks A high standard of excellence and ethics is expected
to respondent as security for the payment of a loan of Membership in the legal profession is a special and required of members of the bar.21 Such conduct
P10,000.00 plus interest, and that respondent filled up privilege burdened with conditions.16 It is bestowed of nobility and uprightness should remain with them,
the checks in amounts not agreed upon appears to be upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, whether in their public or in their private lives. As
more credible. Complainants herein are mere but also known to possess good moral character.17 "A officers of the courts and keepers of the public's faith,
employees of the Central Post Office in Manila who lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose they are burdened with the highest degree of social
had a previous loan of P10,000.00 from respondent conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all
and which has since been paid x x x. Respondent law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the times in a manner consistent with truth and honor.22
does not deny the said transaction. This appears to be advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for
the only previous transaction between the parties. In which he [or she] has sworn to be a fearless The oath that lawyers swear to likewise impresses
fact, complainants were even late in paying the loan crusader."18 upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of
when it fell due such that they had to pay interest. good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships
That respondent would trust them once more by giving By taking the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a with others. The oath is a sacred trust that must be
them another P200,000.00 allegedly to be used for a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an upheld and kept inviolable at all times. Thus, lawyers
business and immediately release the amounts under indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their
 18

professional or in their private capacity, if such As a matter of fact, one of the petitioners (Franklin) law for five years. Here, the conduct of herein
conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of was detained for three months26 because of the respondent is even worse. He used falsified checks as
the court.23 Complaints. Respondent is clearly guilty of serious bases for maliciously indicting petitioners and thereby
dishonesty and professional misconduct. He caused the detention of one of them.
In the present case, the IBP commissioner gave committed an act indicative of moral depravity not
credence to the story of petitioners, who said that they expected from, and highly unbecoming, a member of WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found
had given five blank personal checks to respondent at the bar. guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01
the Central Post Office in Manila as security for the and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
P10,000 loan they had contracted. Found untrue and Good moral character is an essential qualification for He is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED from the
unbelievable was respondent's assertion that they had the privilege to enter into the practice of law. It is practice of law effective immediately. Let copies of
filled up the checks and exchanged these with his cash equally essential to observe this norm meticulously this Decision be furnished all courts as well as the
at Quezon City and Cainta, Rizal. After a careful during the continuance of the practice and the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is directed to
review of the records, we find no reason to deviate exercise of the privilege.27 Good moral character append a copy to respondent's personal record. Let
from these findings. includes at least common honesty.28 No moral another copy be furnished the National Office of the
qualification for bar membership is more important Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Under the circumstances, there is no need to stretch than truthfulness and candor.29 The rigorous ethics of
one's imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion. the profession places a premium on honesty and SO ORDERED.
Respondent does not deny the P10,000 loan obtained condemns duplicitous behavior.30 Lawyers must be
from him by petitioners. According to Franklin Olbes' ministers of truth. Hence, they must not mislead the Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
testimony on cross-examination, they asked court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
respondent for the blank checks after the loan had their dealings, they are expected to act in good Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
been paid. On the pretext that he was not able to faith.31 Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
bring the checks with him,24 he was not able to return
them. He thus committed abominable dishonesty by Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely
abusing the confidence reposed in him by petitioners. unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and RULE 2.03
It was their high regard for him as a member of the dishonorable;32 they reveal a basic moral flaw. The
bar that made them trust him with their blank standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by A.C. No. 5299               August 19, 2003
checks.25 conduct that merely enables one to escape the
penalties of criminal laws.33
It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court
Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his Considering the depravity of the offense committed by Administrator and Chief, Public Information
malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by respondent, we find the penalty recommended by the Office, Complainant,
indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of vs.
all and despite respondent's full knowledge that the law to be too mild. His propensity for employing ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.
loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His
been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention x-----------------------x
commercial document, resorted to for his material of one petitioner is loathsome.
gain. G.R. No. 157053               August 19, 2003
In Eustaquio v. Rimorin,34 the forging of a special
And he did not stop there. Because the checks were power of attorney (SPA) by the respondent to make it ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,
dishonored upon presentment, respondent had the appear that he was authorized to sell another's vs.
temerity to initiate unfounded criminal suits against property, as well as his fraudulent and malicious IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and
petitioners, thereby exhibiting his vile intent to have inducement of Alicia Rubis to sign a Memorandum of ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as
them punished and deprived of liberty for frustrating Agreement to give a semblance of legality to the SPA, Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
the criminal duplicity he had wanted to foist on them. were sanctioned with suspension from the practice of Information Office, Respondents.
 19

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid
advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue
of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which
reads: "ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-
4333/521-2667."1
served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer
advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer
advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-
old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed
that he be exonerated from all the charges against him
and that the Court promulgate a ruling that
advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is
not contrary to law, public policy and public order as
long as it is dignified.4
We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306
and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be
done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the
Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called
up the published telephone number and pretended to
be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo,
who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo,
was an expert in handling annulment cases and can
guarantee a court decree within four to six months,
provided the case will not involve separation of
property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said
that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of
which is payable at the time of filing of the case and
the other half after a decision thereon has been
rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court
Administrator and the Public Information Office
revealed that similar advertisements were published in
the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin
and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.2
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his
capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of
the Public Information Office, filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for
improper advertising and solicitation of his legal
services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court.3
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed
to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per
se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to
change our views about the prohibition on advertising
and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use
Philippines for investigation, report and of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. regarding his qualifications or legal services.
XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of violation of
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for
one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member of the
similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The
IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
11, 2002.7
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction
for Reconsideration,8 which was denied by the IBP in of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029 violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was authority to do so.
docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty. Rizalino
T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, is not a business. 12 
It is a profession in which duty to
public service, not money, is the primary
Respondents." This petition was consolidated with A.C.
No. 5299 per the Court’s Resolution dated March 4, consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be
a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a
2003.
capital that necessarily yields profits. 13 The gaining of a
livelihood should be a secondary consideration. 14 The
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties duty to public service and to the administration of
were required to manifest whether or not they were justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers,
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of who must subordinate their personal interests or what
the pleadings.10 Complainant filed his Manifestation on they owe to themselves.15 The following elements
April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any distinguish the legal profession from a business:
additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the
case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings
and records thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, 1. A duty of public service, of which the
emolument is a by-product, and in which one
filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
 20

may attain the highest eminence without otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or
making much money; from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so. standing of the profession.

2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also
administration of justice involving thorough altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be permitted. The card may contain only a statement of
sincerity, integrity and reliability; proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the his name, the name of the law firm which he is
legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous connected with, address, telephone number and
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
fiduciary; the bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of
name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement office address, being for the convenience of the
characterized by candor, fairness, and in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have
unwillingness to resort to current business permissible.21  Even the use of calling cards is now his name listed in a telephone directory but not under
methods of advertising and encroachment on acceptable. Publication in reputable law lists, in a a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and
their practice, or dealing directly with their manner consistent with the standards of conduct italics supplied)
clients.16 imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and
informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent
stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:22 RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation
There is no question that respondent committed the
acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
the publication of the advertisements. While he Such data must not be misleading and may include Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
professes repentance and begs for the Court’s only a statement of the lawyer’s name and the names Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the of his professional associates; addresses, telephone ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this
fact that he advertised his legal services again after he numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a
pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had date and place of birth and admission to the bar; repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt
no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees with more severely.
filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-
in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record
Ads Newspaper.17 Ten months later, he caused the teaching positions; membership and offices in bar as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
same advertisement to be published in the October 5, associations and committees thereof, in legal and Philippines and all courts in the country for their
2001 issue of Buy & Sell. 18 Such acts of respondent are scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of information and guidance.
a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court’s listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
authority. addresses of references; and, with their written SO ORDERED.
consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in Vitug, (Acting Chairman),Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,
advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of The law list must be a reputable law list published concur.
Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman ), abroad, on official
erodes and undermines not only the stability but also supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade business.
the sanctity of an institution still considered journal or periodical which is published principally for
sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not
properly publish his brief biographical and informative A.C. No. 6672               September 4, 2009
permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring
prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or
society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,
in four to six months from the time of the filing of the
be published in a law list the conduct, management, or vs.
case,19 he in fact encourages people, who might have
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
 21

RESOLUTION The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar

362- Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
CORONA, J.: 7820 Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
2nd Flr. Rm. M- Fax: recommendation.8
01 (632)
This is a complaint for disbarment 1 filed by Pedro 6th Ave., cor 362- Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the
Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan M.H. Del Pilar 7821 CBD, in its report and recommendation, 9 found that
Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for Grace Park, Cel.: respondent had encroached on the professional
solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional Caloocan City (0926) practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and
services. 270171 other canons11 of the Code of Professional
9 Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of
paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients 2 to rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or
transfer legal representation. Respondent promised through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27,
them financial assistance3 and expeditious collection Back Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD
on their claims.4 To induce them to hire his services, recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a
he persistently called them and sent them text stern warning that any repetition would merit a
messages. heavier penalty.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical
sworn affidavit5 of James Gregorio attesting that SERVICES OFFERED: conduct of respondent but we modify the
Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer- recommended penalty.
client relations with complainant and utilize CONSULTATION AND
respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan ASSISTANCE The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged
of ₱50,000. Complainant also attached "respondent’s" TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN intrusion by respondent into complainant’s
calling card:6 REPATRIATED DUE TO professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the
ACCIDENT, CPR. And the means employed by respondent in
Front INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, furtherance of the said misconduct themselves
DEATH constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT
CLAIMS Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers
ABROAD. must adhere to, including the manner by which a
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO lawyer’s services are to be made known. Thus, Canon
1avvphi1 3 of the CPR provides:
LAW OFFFICE
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
SERVICES objective information or statement of facts.
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
(emphasis supplied)
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the
Fe Marie L. Labiano practice of law is a profession and not a business;
Hence, this complaint.
Paralegal lawyers should not advertise their talents as
merchants advertise their wares.13 To allow a lawyer to
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano
advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the
1st MIJI Mansion, Tel: and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said
practice of law, degrade the profession in the public’s
calling card. 7
 22

estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer
that high character of service to which every member employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of
of the bar is called.14 Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the the case or an additional stake in its outcome. 23 Either
Rules of Court.1avvphi1 of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides: consider his own recovery rather than that of his
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of client, or to accept a settlement which may take care
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the
any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the
retain him by a promise of better service, good result client’s cause.24
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for or reduced fees for his services.  Again the Court
20

the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid notes that respondent never denied having these
agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from
malpractice, a ground for disbarment.16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 another’s legal practice. He cannot escape liability
of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive
or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay
any man’s cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the
solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an
attorney, personally or through an agent in order to
gain employment)17 as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial
evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the
very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to
respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed
solicited legal business as well as profited from
referrals’ suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano
in his answer, he later admitted it during the
mandatory hearing.
Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice
was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to
transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s
word that respondent could produce a more favorable
result.
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation
constitutes malpractice25 which calls for the exercise of
Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-
Labiano’s connection to his office.21 Respondent solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for
committed an unethical, predatory overstep into initiating contact with a prospective client for the
purpose of obtaining employment. 26 Thus, in this
under Rule 8.02 of the CPR. jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public
from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal
with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule profession.
16.04:
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his (including violation of the prohibition on lending
client unless the client’s interests are fully protected money to clients), the sanction recommended by the
by the nature of the case or by independent advice. IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance findings.
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for
the client. A final word regarding the calling card presented in
evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s best advertisement
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
client. The only exception is, when in the interest of and fidelity to trust based on his character and
27
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as conduct.  For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to
filing fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of announce their services by publication in reputable
stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety law lists or use of simple professional cards.
bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the
client. Professional calling cards may only contain the
following details:
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s
independence of mind so that the free exercise of his (a) lawyer’s name;
judgment may not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to
ensure his undivided attention to the case he is (b) name of the law firm with which he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to connected;
the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to the
 23

(c) address;

(d) telephone number and

(e) special branch of law practiced.28

Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with

financial assistance." The phrase was clearly used to
entice clients (who already had representation) to
change counsels with a promise of loans to finance
their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients
away from their original lawyers, thereby taking
advantage of their financial distress and emotional
vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the
integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal
profession. However, in the absence of substantial
evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not
prepared to rule that respondent was personally and
directly responsible for the printing and distribution of
Labiano’s calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino

for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and
Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one year effective immediately from receipt
of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his

records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme
Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.