Assignment No. 14 - Crimpro

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ASSIGN NO 14 1
People of the Philippines vs. Joy Alcala
G.R. No. 201725 July 18, 2014
FACTS: A buy bust operation was organized by the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force of the Central Police District,
Station 11, Quezon City, upon receipt of a report from a female informant that a certain alias Joy was engaged in an illegal drug
activities in the vicinity of Lantana St., Barangay Immaculate Conception, Cubao, Quezon City. As a result thereof, Joy Alcala, the
accused herein, was arrested and brought to the police station. Thereat, the confiscated plastic sachet was marked and then
turned over to the duty desk office who prepared the standard request for laboratory examination. After a qualitative
examination, it was reported that the contents of the plastic sachet proved positive for the presence of shabu, a dangerous
drug. The accused was charged for Illegal Selling of Dangerous Drugs or for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. As a
defense, she alleged that she accompanied her fried, alias Baba, to the police station to talk to a very important person there.
However, while they were in the station, she was arrested and detained. The RTC found her guilty as charged which was
affirmed by the CA. Upon elevation of the case to the SC, accused, through PAO, raised the issue that the court a erred in
convicting the accused notwithstanding the prosecution’s failure to establish the chain of custody and integrity of the alleged
seized illegal drugs for failure to comply with the mandatory procedures under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC and CA erred in finding that the evidence of prosecution was sufficient to convict the accused?
HELD:No. In the absence of any showing that substantial or relevant facts bearing on the elements of the crime have been
misapplied or overlooked, this Court can only accord full credence to such factual assessment of the trial court which had the
distinct advantage of observing the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses during the trial. Absent any proof of motive to
falsely charge an accused of such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the
findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility ofwitnesses shall prevail over his/her bare allegation.
As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, failure to strictly comply with the prescribed procedures in the inventory of
seized drugs does not render an arrest ofthe accused illegal or the items seized/confiscated from her inadmissible. What is
essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
People of the Philippines vs .Benjamin Ramos
G.R. No. 88301 October 28, 1991
FACTS: A buy bust operation was conducted by NARCOM Office in Bitas, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, upon report of a civilian
informant regarding a person selling marijuana leaves or Indian Hemp at the “Hang Out” restaurant located at the diversion
road in Cabanatuan City. As result thereof, Ramos was arrested and charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act (RA
6245, Art. II, Sec. 4). Ramos denies any "buy-bust" operation, claiming that the marijuana leaves were planted evidence, that he
was arrested because of a heated argument with the restaurant owner, Dr. Melvin Garcia, over an alleged P30.00-unpaid
account. Accused was convicted. Accused claimed that the RTC erred as the Judge who heard the evidence is not the one who
rendered the judgment.
ISSUE: Whether the judgment rendered is erroneous?
RULING:No. Likewise, the defense claims that Tirso Y. Reyes did not hear the case, but Judge Nathanael Gorospe (now Associate
Justice of Sandiganbayan), and therefore did not see the demeanor of the witnesses. We have ruled that "the fact that the
judge who heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment and that for that reason the latter did not have the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses during the trial, but merely relied on the records of the case does not render
the judgment erroneous
.
The prosecution was able to establish the "buy-bust" operation through the testimonies of the arresting officers, Sgt. Danilo
Maulon and Airman First Class Francisco Cabiao, then members of the Narcotics Command stationed at Cabanatuan City, who,
as rightly pointed out by the Solicitor General, are entitled to full faith and credence as they are presumed to have acted in the
regular performance of official duty.
People of the Philippines vs. Paterno [G.R. No. 148000. February 27, 2003]
FACTS: Mario Austria, Officer-in-Charge Provincial Warden of the Batangas Provincial Jail located at Brgy. Cuta Bilibid, Batangas
City, was charged for falsification of public official document by feloniously falsifying a Memorandum Receipt for Colt MKIV
Series ’80 Government Model, Pistol Cal. .380 SN-26917 with 40 rounds of ammunitions that the same was a provincial
government property duly registered with the Firearms and Explosives Unit and issued to Mr. Alberto Tesoro, Civilian Agent, for
his own use in connection with the performance of his official duties and functions, when in truth and in fact said statements
are absolutely false as it is not registered with the Firearms and Explosives Units of Batangas and Alberto Tesoro is not an
employee of the Provincial Government of Batangas. Apparently, out of the eleven witnesses listed in the Information, only the
first three witnesses were notified of said arraignment and pre-trial. the trial court discovered that none of the three witnesses
who were allegedly earlier notified by the court was in attendance. On motion of the accused and over the objection of the
public prosecutor, the trial court issued an order dismissing the case for failure of said witnesses to appear before it. The trial
court posits that under R.A. No. 8493 pre-trial is mandatory and the presence of the complaining witnesses is likewise required
during the trial for the parties to participate in the plea bargaining and stipulation of facts during said proceedings. If the
complaining witnesses are absent, the principal purpose of the pre-trial cannot be achieved. It was incumbent on the public
prosecutor to procure the attendance of its witnesses for the pre-trial but this, he failed to do. The trial court stated that there
were instances in the past when the public prosecutor manifested to the trial court that it had no witness for the pre-trial and
moved for the dismissal of criminal cases. The trial court contended that if the dismissal of the case was precipitate, it was the
fault of the public prosecutor and not the trial court. The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals under Rule 65. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the
petition on the ground that the errors committed by the trial court were mere errors of judgment which are not correctible by a
writ of certiorari. The appellate court also stated that a reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 10766 will place the private
respondent in double jeopardy. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether absence during pre-trial of any witness for the prosecution a valid ground for the dismissal of a criminal case?
HELD:No. Under R.A. 8493, the absence during pre-trial of any witness for the prosecution listed in the Information, whether or
not said witness is the offended party or the complaining witness, is not a valid ground for the dismissal of a criminal
case. Although under the law, pre-trial is mandatory in criminal cases, the presence of the private complainant or the
complaining witness is however not required. Even the presence of the accused is not required unless directed by the trial
court.It is enough that the accused is represented by his counsel.
Manalo Fule vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 79094 June 22, 1988
FACTS:This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV, convicting petitioner (the accused-appellant) of Violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law) on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into between the prosecution and the
defense during the pre-trial conference in the Trial Court. At the hearing of August 23, 1985, only the prosecution presented its
evidence. At the subsequent hearing on September 17, 1985, petitioner-appellant waived the right to present evidence and, in
lieu thereof, submitted a Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court convicted petitioner-appellant.
On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the judgment of conviction. Hence, this
recourse, with petitioner-appellant contending that the Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals erred in the decision of the
Regional Trial Court convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the cold fact that the basis of the conviction was
.
based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor
by his counsel. In Sec.4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference
shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel. (Rule 118) [Emphasis
supplied]
Having been effective since January 01, 1985, the above rule is applicable.
ISSUE:Whether or not the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules,
renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence.
HELD:Yes. Judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is hereby ordered RE-OPENED and REMANDED to
the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, for further reception of evidence.By its very language, the
Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while
those in the affirmative are merely directory. The use of the term “shall” further emphasizes its mandatory character and
means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced. And more importantly, penal statutes whether
substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in
favor of the accused.
People of the Philippines vs.Castro-Bartolome
G.R. No. 45037 November 21, 1991
FACTS: Petitioner George Litton Sr. charged Leonor Sochayseng and Rogelio Paz with adultery. Respondents Sochaysen and Paz
filed their respective demurrer to evidence (motions to dismiss) substantially raising similar grounds for the dismissal of the
adultery charge that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence of marriage between Litton, Sr. and
Sochayseng during the alleged period of commission of adultery and that assuming arguendo that said marriage did in fact exist
and that both respondents committed acts of adultery during coverture, petitioner Litton, Sr. has condoned and pardoned the
adulterous acts of his wife and Paz. Nine (9) months after the prosecution rested its case and before respondent Judge could
resolve the motions to dismiss submitted by Sochayseng and Paz, the private prosecutor (Atty. Estanislao Fernandez) filed a
motion to reopen the case for the purpose of presenting additional evidence.
Private prosecutor, justified the move, it was stated that these documents were not presented by the private prosecutor Dakila
F. Castro at the close of the evidence of the prosecution in his belief that he had sufficiently proven the marriage between
complaining witness George Litton, Sr. and the accused Leonor Trinidad Sochayseng, with the testimony, among others, of said
George Litton, Sr., about said marriages. Granting that said opinion of Atty. Castro is erroneous, in the highest interest of
justice, we are presenting this motion to enable us to present the above-mentioned documents to conclusively prove the fact of
marriage between the complaining witness, George Litton, Sr. and the accused Leonor Sochayseng.
Respondent Judge Castro-Bartolome denied the motion to reopen trial. An urgent motion for reconsideration by petitioner was
similarly rejected.
ISSUE: WON Motion to reopen the trial is possible for presentation of additional evidence
HELD: Under the factual milieu of the case at bar, the court find that respondent Judge correctly rejected petitioner's motion to
reopen the trial. Even the so-called paramount interests of justice cannot free petitioner from his self-imposed predicament.
His counsel took a big gamble in not presenting the certificates attesting to the fact of marriage between petitioner and Leonor
Sochayseng on the erroneous belief that said marriage had been amply established by the testimony of the aggrieved husband.
Petitioner's counsel realized his folly when private respondents understandably moved for the quashal of the complaint on the
material ground that coverture was not prove beyond reasonable doubt.
.
Moreover, records show that petitioner had already consumed a great deal of the court's time, or about three (3) years and five
(5) months, and presented eight (8) witnesses, and that it was only after nine (9) months from the date private respondent filed
their separate demurrer to evidence that Litton's private prosecutor underwent a change of heart, or to be more accurate, a
change of strategy in order to salvage what appeared to be a weak case for George Litton, Sr.
All considered, we hold that there was no abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge to warrant the corrective writ of
certiorari.
G. R. No. 94555 August 17, 1992
People of the Philippines vs. Ocimar and Mendoza
G. R. No. 94555 August 17, 1992
FACTS: EDUARDO LABALAN OCIMAR and ALEXANDER CORTEZ MENDOZA, together with ALFONSO RAMOS BERMUDEZ,
ALBERTO VENZIO CRUZ, VENZIO CRUZ alias "BOY PANA" and JOHN DOE alias "BUNSO" were charged in the court a quo for
violation of P.D. 532, otherwise known as the "Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of 1974. Accused Eduardo Ocimar and
Alexander Mendoza were arraigned. With the assistance of counsel de oficio, they pleaded "Not Guilty". 2 The other accused
were not arraigned because they could not be accounted for. Alfonso Bermudez was finally brought before the court. He was
accordingly arraigned and with the assistance likewise of counsel de oficio, he entered a plea of "Guilty". The other two
accused, Alberto Venzio Cruz and Venzio Cruz alias "Boy Pana", were never arraigned as the former was never arrested, while
the latter jumped bail before arraignment. After the prosecution had already presented four witnesses, the prosecuting Fiscal
moved for the discharge of accused Bermudez to be utilized as state witness. Although he had already entered a plea of guilt
earlier, no judgment was as yet rendered against him. The trial court granted the motion of the prosecution for the discharge of
Bermudez. On March 21, 1988, after he testified for the prosecution, Bermudez was released.The trial court rendered judgment
finding accused Eduardo Labalan Ocimar and Alexander Cortez Mendoza guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the
violation of P.D. 532 and accordingly sentenced each of them to reclusion perpetua, and directing them jointly and severally to
indemnify the heirs of the late Capt. Cirilo Cañeba, Jr.Ocimar imputes ERROR to the court a quo in (a) discharging accused
Bermudez, who had earlier pleaded guilty to the charge, to be utilized as a state witness; (b) giving credence to the testimony of
Bermudez; and, (c) not holding that the prosecution failed to prove his (Ocimar) guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On his part,
accused Mendoza maintains that the lower court ERRED in (a) relying on the lone testimony of accused Bermudez; and, (b)
convicting him (Mendoza) notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt.
ISSUE: WON the discharge of the accused depends sound judicial discretion
HELD: As may be gleaned from the aforequoted Sec. 9 of Rule 119, the trial court must be satisfied that the conditions
prescribed by the rule exist. The court therefore, upon prior determination by the public prosecutor, retains the prerogative of
deciding when a co-accused may be discharged to become a state witness. With Sec. 9 providing the guidelines, the discharge
of an accused depends on sound judicial discretion. Once that discretion is exercised under those guidelines and a co-accused is
discharged to become a state witness, and subsequently testifies in accordance with his undertaking with the government, any
legal deficiency or defect that might have attended his discharge from the information will no longer affect the admissibility and
credibility of his testimony, provided such testimony is otherwise admissible an credible. Ocimar contends that in the case at
bar Bermudez does not satisfy the conditions for the discharge of a co-accused to become a state witness. He argues that no
accused in a conspiracy can lawfully be discharged and utilized as a state witness, for not one of them could satisfy the requisite
of appearing not to be the most guilty. Appellant assets that since accused Bermudez was part of the conspiracy, he is equally
guilty as the others. The matter of discharging a co-accused to become state witness is left largely to the discretion of the trial
fiscal, subject only to the approval of the court. The reason is obvious. The fiscal should know better than the court, and the
defense for that matter, as to who of the accused would best qualify to be discharged to become state witness. The public
prosecutor is supposed to know the evidence in his possession ahead of all the rest. He knows whom he needs to establish his
case.The court agreed with the observations of the Solicitor General that the rule on the discharge of an accused to be utilized
as state witness clearly looks at his actual and individual participation in the commission of the crime, which may or may not
have been perpetrated in conspiracy with the other accused. Since Bermudez was not individually responsible for the killing
.
committed on the occasion of the robbery except by reason of conspiracy, it cannot be said then that Bermudez appears to be
the most guilty. Hence, his discharge to be a witness for the government is clearly warranted.
. People of the Philippines vs. Rosendo Amaro
G.R. No. 199100 July 18, 2014
FACTS: In front of Boots & Maya located at Mal var Street, Puerto Princesa City, the accused, by means of deceit at the
beginning and of force and intimidation later and with lewd designs, abduct one [AAA],3 a seven (7) year old girl, by forcing her
and took her to his house at Bgy. Tagburos, Puerto Princesa City and without any justifiable reason, accused detained and
deprived her of her liberty for a period of twenty eight (28) [sic] days; that while she is being detained accused ROSENDO
AMARO had carnal knowledge of said AAA all committed against her will.
Appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial then proceeded. AAA, who was then only 7 years old,testified that she was walking on her
way home from school when she passed by Boots & Maya store. She met a man, whom she later identified in court as the
appellant, who asked her to buy cigarettes. After buying the cigarettes and handing it to appellant, the latter gave her bread
and banana cue. After eating them, she suddenly became dizzy and passed out. AAA was brought to the house of appellant.
When she regained consciousness, she saw appellant naked. Appellant then undressed her, kissed her on the lips and neck, and
inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her to feel pain. AAA cried but appellant covered her mouth with his hand. AAA was
detained for six (6) days and was raped five (5) times by appellant. AAA clarified that appellant’s penis touched the outer
portion of her vagina. During the cross-examination, AAA admitted that she voluntarily went with appellant because the latter
promised to bring her home.
On the last day of her detention, AAA and appellant went out of the house. On their way to San Jose, a certain Aunt Ruthie saw
AAA walking and immediately picked her up and brought her to the police station. Appellant noticed AAA being taken away but
he did nothing.
The prosecution also presented AAA’s mother, BBB, to corroborate her daughter’s testimony.
Appellant testified on his behalf. He denied abducting and raping AAA but admitted that he brought the latter to his house
when AAA approached him asking for bread first, before begging him to take her with him because she was always being
scolded by her parents.
The trial court found AAA’s testimony as credible and straightforward and supported by medical findings.
Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision affirming the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON in the prosecution of rape cases, conviction on acquittal depends on the complainant’s testimony
HELD: YES. In the prosecution of rape cases, conviction or acquittal depends on the complainant's testimony because of the fact
that usually only the participants are witnesses to their occurrences. The issue therefore boils down to credibility. Significantly,
findings of fact of the trial court should not be disturbed on appeal since conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape
cases lie heavily on the sound judgment of the trial court which is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying.
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, saysthat
she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show thatrape has in fact been committed. When the offended
party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only
her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.17 Moreover, AAA testified in a straightforward manner.
On the other hand, appellant set-up the defense of denial and alibi.1âwphi1 It is jurisprudential that denial and alibi are
intrinsically weak defenses which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Mere denial,
.
without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the child-victim of the identity of
the appellant and his involvement in the crime attributed to him. Alibi is evidence negative in nature and self-serving and
cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence.
The appellate court is correct in affirming the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
People of the Philippines vs.Calantiao.
G.R. No. 203984 June 18, 2014
FACTS: PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ were on duty, a certain EDWIN LOJERA arrived at their office and
asked for police assistance regarding a shooting incident. Per report of the latter, it appears that while driving a towing truck
and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City, he had a traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a white taxi cab prompting him to
follow said vehicle until they reached along 8th Avenue Street corner C-3 Road, Caloocan City. Thereat, the passengers of said
taxi cab, one of them was accused Calantiao, alighted and fired their guns. Surprised, Lojera could not do anything but
continued his driving until he reached a police station nearby where he reported the incident.
The police officers on duty then were PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ. PO1 Mariano testified that they
immediately responded to said complaint by proceeding to 5th Avenue corner 8th Street, Caloocan City where they found the
white taxi. While approaching said vehicle, two armed men alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards them (police officers)
and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but they were subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao a
black bag containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops and a magazine of super 38 stainless with ammos, while PO3
Ramirez recovered from Calantiao’s companion [a] .38 revolver.
The suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to SPO3 PABLO TEMENA, police investigator at Bagong Barrio
Police Station for investigation. Thereat, PO1 Mariano marked the bricks of marijuana contained in a black bag with his initials,
"NM". Thereafter, said specimen were forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result of the
examination conducted by P/SINSP. JESSSE DELA ROSA revealed that the same was positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.
The foregoing testimony of PO1 MARIANO was corroborated by PO3 RAMIREZ who testified that he personally saw those bricks
of marijuana confiscated from the accused. He confirmed that he was with PO1 Mariano when they apprehended said accused
and his companion and testified that while PO1 Mariano recovered from the accused a black bag containing marijuana, on his
part, he confiscated from accused’s companion a .38 revolver.
MR. CRISENDO AMANSEC, the driver of the taxi where the suspects boarded was also presented in open court and testified as
to what he knows about the incident. He confirmed that on that date, two (2) persons boarded on his taxi and upon reaching C-
3 Road, they alighted and fired three (3) shots and ran away.
RTC rendered its Decision giving credence to the prosecution’s case.
The Court of Appeals found no reason to overturn Calantiao’s conviction.
ISSUE: WON the admissibility of the marijuana found in his possession can be used as evidence against him on the grounds of
either it was discovered via an illegal search, or because its custodial chain was broken.
HELD: The Court finds no merit in Calantiao’s arguments. The Court cannot subscribe to Calantiao’s contention that the
marijuana in his possession cannot be admitted as evidence against him because it was illegally discovered and seized, not
having been within the apprehending officers’ "plain view.
The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is "to protect the arresting officer from
being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying
evidence within reach."13 It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the State’s police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the
injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the
.
arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence under the control and within the
reach of the arrestee.
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search incident to
a lawful arrest outside the suspect’s person and premises under his immediate control. This is so because "[o]bjects in the ‘plain
view’ of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence."16 "The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object x x x. [It] serves to supplement the prior justification – whether
it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being
present unconnected with a search directed against the accused – and permits the warrantless seizure."
The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiao’s situation because the police officers purposely searched him
upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come across the black bag, which was in Calantiao’s possession; they
deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to Calantiao’s lawful arrest.
MANOLITO GIL Z. ZAFRA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 176317 July 23, 2014
Facts: On February 17, 2004 Manolito Gil Z. Zafra, a Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assigned
in Revenue District 3 in San Fernando, La Union was guilty of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of
public documents. Appellant was the only Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Revenue District 3,
in San Fernando, La Union from 1993-1995.
“The CARs (Certificate Authorizing Registration (CAR) relating to the real property transactions, which contained, among other
data, the number of the issued ROR, its date, name of payor, and the amount the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax
paid.) showed that documentary stamp tax and capital gains tax for ROR Nos. 1513716, 1513717, 1513718, 1513719, 2018017,
and 2023438 totalled Php114,887.78, while the MRCs and COA’s copies of the RORs submitted by appellant, the sum of the
taxes collected was only Php227.00, or a difference of Php114,660.78. ROR Nos. 2018017 and 2023438, mentioned in CAR as
duly issued to taxpayers and for which taxes were paid, were reported in the MRC as cancelled receipts.” CA affirmed.
ISSUE: In appealing the decision and assuming he was only liable for malversion through negligence may he be protected from
double jeopardy in case he was found liable for malversion for falsification. NO 2. About rule 120 sec 2 what should be the
correct penalties prescribed?
HELD: Even if it were assumed that the findings by the CA warranted his being guilty only of malversation through negligence,
the Court would not be barred from holding him liable for the intentional crime of malversation of public funds through
falsification of public documents because his appealing the convictions kept the door ajar for an increase in his liability. It is
axiomatic that by appealing he waived the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, leaving him open to being
convicted of whatever crimes the Court would ultimately conclude from the records to have been actually committed by him
within the terms of the allegations in the informations under which he had been arraigned.
The findings of fact of the RTC were affirmed by the CA. Hence, the petitioner was correctly convicted of the crimes charged
because such findings of fact by the trial court, being affirmed by the CA as the intermediate reviewing tribunal, are now
binding and conclusive on the Court. Accordingly, we conclude that the Prosecution sufficiently established that the petitioner
had beenthe forger of the falsified and tampered public documents, and that the falsifications of the public documents had
been necessary to committhe malversations of the collected taxes.
.
LEO M. FLORES, MODESTO L. LICAROS and MARIO LOPEZ VITO, petitioners,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ABELARDO B. LICAROS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-63677 August 12, 1983
Facts: June 5, 1982, the Legaspi City Branch of the Central Bank of the Philippines was robbed and divested of cash amounting
to P19,731,320.00. On June 9, 1982, a sizable portion of the money was recovered at the Home Savings Bank & Trust Company
Building in Intramuros, Manila after a raid by the police authorities. the Tanodbayan filed an information with the
Sandiganbayan charging Modesto Licaros, Leo Flores, Ramon Dolor, Glicerio Balansin Rolando Quejada Pio Edgardo Flores,
Mario Lopez Vito and Rogelio dela Cruz, as principals, and herein private respondent Abelardo B. Licaros, as accessory
On November 26, 1982, the Tanodbayan filed an amended information naming the same persons as principals, except Rogelio
dela Cruz who is now charged as an accessory, together with private respondent Abelardo B. Licaros.
They pleaded not Guilty. On January 7, 1983 The Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan a "Motion for Discharge" of accused
Abelardo B. Licaros to be utilized as state witness Sandigan granted the Motion. The petitioners co-accused protested.
ISSUE: WON Licaros could be state witness? [No not Necessary]
HELD: Petitioners contend that there can be no basis for the prosecution "to honestly assert that there is absolute necessity for
the testimony of Abelardo B. Licaros for the purpose of establishing the participation of Modesto Licaros in delivering the
money to the Home Savings Bank. At most, the intended testimony of Abelardo B. Licaros is only corroborative of the
statements of the other witnesses submitted by the NBI to the Tanodbayan. This is true.
In the case at bar, considering the opposition of herein petitioners to the motion for the discharge of Abelardo B. Licaros,
particularly the contention that he (herein private respondent) is the most guilty and that his testimony is not absolutely
necessary, the trial court should have held in abeyance or deferred its resolution on the motion until after the prosecution has
presented all its other evidence. Thereafter, it can fully determine whether the requisites prescribed in Section 9, Rule 119 of
the new Rules of Court, are fully complied with. Besides, there lies the danger where one or more of the defendants are
discharged before the commencement of the hearing, he/they may disappear in which case the purpose of his/their exclusion
will come to naught. It is necessary that certain safeguards be taken, otherwise an injustice may be committed.
.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANITO BEBERINO alias NIT (appeal withdrawn), GERARDO CASAÑ;A alias BANDONG (appeal withdrawn), LEODEGARIO
ESTRADA (appeal withdrawn), and IGNACIO CALVArio, defendants, IGNACIO CALVARIO, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-23092 October 28, 1977
Facts: Evening of February 3, 1960, the house of Gregoria Nuñ;ez situated in sitio Balibayon, barrio Lakandula, Placer, Suripo del
Norte, was broken into and robbed by several persons of cash and other articles of value amounting to P 605.00, on the
occasion of which Gregoria Nuñ;ez was strangled to death.
On March 1, 1960, Cpl. Michael Desoloc was dispatched to Placer to conduct an investigation. In barrio Lakandula, he received
information that one Ignacio Calvario had knowledge of the crime and was willing to testify if the authorities would utilize him
as a witness in the case
Ignacio Calvario was, accordingly, taken into custody, and after questioning, he executed an affidavit wherein he described the
means by which the crime was committed and the role he played in the commission thereof. He also named (Bandong) Gerardo
Casañ;a, (Nit) Anito Beberino, (Mandot) Rumaldo Guibao, Floro Abas, Gario Estrada, Rose Bebang, Penoy, Busio and (Pelesio
Simplicio) Guibao as his confederates.
Following further investigations, a complaint for robbery in band with murder was filed by Cpl. Desoloc before the Justice of the
Peace Court of Placer, Surigao against the afore-named persons. Ignacio Calvario was listed in the complaint as one of the
witnesses for the prosecution. Finding a prima facie case against the accused, the Justice of the Peace issued a warrant of their
arrest, and, upon termination of the preliminary investigation, remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Surigao for
trial on the merits. A re-investigation of the case was conducted by the Fiscal after which he filed an information before the
Court of First Instance of Surigao charging the accused, including Ignacio Calvario who had by then demonstrated hostility to
the prosecution and indicated that he would no longer testify for the government, with the crime of robbery with homicide.
In due time following the conclusion of the trial, judgment was rendered finding the accused Anito Beberino, Gerardo Casañ;a
and Leodegario Estrada guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The accused Ignacio Calvario was found guilty as an accomplice.
ISSUE: WON evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to sustain a conviction because the extra-judicial confession of Calvario
upon which said judgment is based was obtained from him by means of threats, and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence.
HELD: Yes.The appellant's statements in his extra-judicial statement is corroborated by Severo Enriquez who declared that he
saw the appellant Ignacio Calvario, Leodegario Estrada, Gerardo Casañ;a. Anito Beberino, Flor Abas and several others
disembark from a launch at about 10:00 in the evening of February 3, 1960 and of Gregoria Nuñ;ez with the appelant Ignacio
Calvario in the lead. The appellant was to be used as a government witness which was not done because he later denied the
facts that he had revealed in his confession. This Court has earlier held that where one of several co-defendants tums state's
evidence on a promise of immunity by the prosecuting attorney, but later retracts and fails to keep his part of the agreement,
his confession made under such a promise may then be used against him.
.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MA. HARLETA VELASCO y BRIONES, MARICAR B. INOVERO, MARISSA DIALA, and BERNA M. PAULINO, Accused,
MARICAR B. INOVERO, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 195668 June 25, 2014
Facts: On March 17, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City Filed information charging Inovero, Ma. Harleta
Velasco y Briones, Marissa Diala and Berna Paulino with illegal recruitment and 11 estafa. Only Inovero was arrested and
prosecuted, the other accused having remained at large.
Six cases charging estafa and one of the two charging illegal recruitment (Criminal Case No. were provisionally dismissed
because of the failure of the complainants to prosecute.
The seven cases were later permanently dismissed after the complainants did not revive them within two years.
The remaining 5 cases for estafa and one for illegal recruitment were prosecuted.
On January 14, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment acquitting Inovero of five counts of estafabut convicting her of illegal
recruitment committed in large scale (life Imprisonment). CA affirmed.
ISSUE: what is the real extent of the judgment?
HELD: The RTC and the CA did not adjudicate Inovero’s personal liability for them in their judgments (only fine of 500,000) (See
sec 2 rule 120 ROC). Their omission needs to be corrected, notwithstanding that the complainants did not appeal, for not doing
so would be patently unjust and contrary to law. The Court, being the ultimate reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority
but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice. It is, indeed, a basic tenet of our criminal law that every
person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Civil liability includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and
indemnification for consequential damages. To enforce the civil liability, the Rules of Court has deemed to be instituted with
the criminal action the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged unless the offended party
waives the civil action, or reserves the right to institute the civil action separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action. Considering that the crime of illegal recruitment, when it involves the transfer of funds from the victims to the
accused, is inherently in fraud of the former, civil liability should include the return of the amounts paid as placement, training
and processing fees. Hence, Inovero and her co-accused were liable to indemnify the complainants for all the sums paid to
them.
Can vs Galing
G.R. No. L-54258 November 27, 1987
Facts: On 31 May 1978, an information for Robbery was filed with the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon against the
aforenamed accused. The case was assigned to Branch III, presided over by respondent Judge. Upon arraignment, all the
accused pleaded not guilty.
On 29 November 1979, the prosecuting fiscal moved to discharge the accused Emilio Daria from the information, to be used as
a state witness, on the following grounds: That the prosecution has no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed except the testimony of accused Emilio Daria; That there is absolute necessity for the
testimony of the accused Emilio Daria, whose discharge is hereby requested in this motion; That defendant Emilio Daria does
not appear to be the most guilty considering the accused Domingo Can is the master-mind of the robbery.
The fiscal's motion was opposed by petitioner, the respondent Judge issued the Order discharging Daria from the information
so that he may be utilized as a state witness.
.
Issue: WON the discharge from the information in Criminal Case No. 500 of the accused, Emilio Daria, in order to be utilized as a
state witness is proper?
Ruling: No. Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court in force when this petition was brought to this Court, Petitioner alleges
that the above criteria have not been followed in the discharge of Daria from the information.The court agrees. There was no
absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused Daria to qualify him as a state witness. The prosecution itself admitted that
one of the government witnesses, named Michael Yu, testified that he saw and recognized the accused, Domingo Can, as one of
those who committed the robbery. Such testimony is direct evidence of Can's participation and clearly negates the absolute
need for Daria's testimony in Identifying Can as one of the perpetrators of the offense. If at all, Daria's testimony would be
merely corroborative and not essential. Neither is there a finding of non-availability of direct evidence other than the accused
Daria's testimony. The assertion of the accused that without Daria's confession the indictment of the other accused stands on
no evidentiary foothold is misleading. The Identities of the three other accused were already knows to the authorities even
before they learned that the accused Emilio Daria took part in robbery. As a matter of fact it was the accused Sgt. Jesus Abion
who informed the PC that the accused Emilio Daria was with him and the other accused when they committed the robbery.
The records of this case also disclose convictions of the accused Daria for various crimes, as follows: attempted murder
(Criminal Case No. 35330); carrying of deadly weapon (Criminal Case No. 2657); slander by deed (Criminal Case No. 2175)
slight physical injuries (Criminal Case No. 2400) and carrying of deadly weapon (Criminal Case No. 3233). His untrustworthiness
as a witness on the ground of moral turpitude is apparent.
Aquino vs Sison
G.R. No. 86025. November 28, 1989
Facts: On February 29, 1988, an information was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Dagupan City charging private
respondent Rodolfo Mejia, alias "Ruding" with the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm. Upon being arraigned, private
respondent entered a plea of "not guilty", after which the prosecution began the presentation of its evidence. Complainant
Virgilio Quinto was the prosecution’s first witness. After the cross-examination of Virgilio Quinto, the defense verbally moved
for the dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Acting on said motion, and despite the vigorous
objection of the prosecution, the respondent Judge, dismissed the case as prayed for.
On October 24, 1988, petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by respondent Judge in his order
dated November 21, 1988, Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking to nullify respondent Judge’s Orders dated October 14,
1988 and November 21, 1988 even as it prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent Judge to reinstate
criminal case No. D-8439, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Mejia.
Issue: WON respondent judge prematurely dismissed the case thus committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction?
Held: Yes. Petitioners question respondent Judge’s dismissal of Criminal Case No. D-8439. They claim that the prosecution had
been deprived of due process considering that only one witness so far had been presented by it and that it has neither
terminated the presentation of its evidence nor rested its case.
Under Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1980 Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is only after the prosecution has rested its case that the
accused may file a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It is therefore clear that private
respondent’s motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence suffers from prematurity, having been interposed at
the time when the prosecution was still presenting its evidence. The orders issued by the respondent judge dismissing the case
was capricious and tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. Double jeopardy would therefore
not attach in such a case.
The orders prematurely filed dismissing the case pursuant to the motion to dismiss is capricious and tainted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. Double jeopardy will therefore not attach in such a case
.
People vs. Chaves
G.R. No. 131377 February 11, 2003
Facts: Informations for Multiple Murder for the killing of members of the Bucag family in Gingoog City were filed against Felipe
Galarion and others with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and convicted. All the other
accused were at large. Two years later, Felizardo Roxas, also known as "Ely Roxas", "Fely Roxas" and "Lolong Roxas," was
identified as another member of the group who was responsible for the slaying of the Bucag family. An amended information
was filed on October 6, 1988 to implead Roxas as a co-accused. He engaged the services of private respondent Miguel
Paderanga as his counsel. In his counter-affidavit, Roxas implicated Atty. Paderanga as the mastermind of the killings.
Consequently, the amended information was again amended to include private respondent Paderanga as one of the accused in
Criminal Case No. 86-39.
The following day, May 19, 1993, it sustained private respondent’s objection on the ground that the presentation of Roxas’
testimony will violate his right against self-incrimination. The trial court ruled further that before Roxas can be presented as a
witness for the prosecution, he must first be discharged as a state witness. Otherwise put, the prosecution cannot present
Roxas as a hostile witness.
On June 29, 1993, the trial court issued an Order allowing the presentation of the testimony of Felizardo Roxas for purposes of
proving the conditions of Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules of Court on the discharge of a state witness. Private respondent
interposed an objection, which the trial court overruled. The next day, June 30, 1993, he filed a motion for reconsideration,
arguing that the presentation of Roxas’ testimony will be tantamount to allowing him to testify as a state witness even before
his discharge as such; that the qualification of a proposed state witness must be proved by evidence other than his own
testimony; and that at the hearing for the discharge of a proposed state witness, only his sworn statement can be presented
and not his oral testimony. The MR was upheld by the trial court thus reversing its first order. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of RTC and dismissed the petition of the prosecution for lack of merit.
Issue: WON the CA erred in limiting the evidence of the prosecution in its motion to discharge to the respective Sworn
Statement executed by its proposed witness and in upholding the triak court’s denial of the presentation of other evidence?
Held:Yes. The petition has merit. It is true that an accused cannot be made a hostile witness for the prosecution, for to do so
would compel him to be a witness against himself. However, he may testify against a co-defendant where he has agreed to do
so, with full knowledge of his right and the consequences of his acts. It is not necessary that the court discharges him first as
state witness. Petitioner also maintains that it can validly present the testimony of Ely Roxas and Julito Ampo at the hearing for
their discharge as state witnesses. We agree. Rule 119, Section 17 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (formerly Rule
119, Section 9), provides that the trial court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that
they may be witnesses for the state "after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each
proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge". The provision does not make any distinction as to the kind of
evidence the prosecution may present. What it simply requires, in addition to the presentation of the sworn statement of the
accused concerned, is the presentation of such evidence as are necessary to determine if the conditions exist for the discharge,
so as to meet the object of the law, which is to prevent unnecessary or arbitrary exclusion from the complaint of persons guilty
of the crime charged. No exemption from the term evidence is provided by the law as to exclude the testimony of the accused.
When the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
People vs Terrafranca
G.R. No. L-67302 June 18, 1987
Facts: Accused Antonio Torrefranca alias "Tony", Sofronio Gilbolingo alias "Ponyong", Isaias Daro alias "Ely", Tirso Melencio
alias "Tirso", Olipio Arellano alias "Apyot" and Benedicto Botohoy were charged with the crime of Robbery in Band with Double
Homicide before the Regional Trial Court of the City of Tagbilaran, The fiscal filed a motion requesting the discharge of accused
Botohoy. After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its evidence (accused Botohoy was among the
.
prosecution witnesses who testified) the trial court granted the said motion for discharge and ordered Botohoy's release from
detention. Trial proceeded against the other accused, and in a decision dated January 25, 1984, the trial court rendered
judgment, them guilty.
In their appeal, the appellants assail the credibility of the testimony of their co-accused Botohoy. They also contend that the
discharge of Botohoy to become a state witness was in violation of Rule 119, Section 9, for he appears to be the most guilty
(Botohoy had been working in the plantation of the deceased spouses and had known the extent of their earnings) and has
been a fugitive from justice for attempted rape, a crime involving moral turpitude.
Issue: WON Botohoy should be discharged as a state witness?
Held: Yes after carefully examined the records of the case and SC find no plausible reason to alter the trial court's appreciation
of the credibility of Botohoy's testimony. In the discharge of a co-accused, the trial court may reasonably be expected to err
Where such error is committed, however, the error of the court in discharging such accused cannot affect the legal
consequences of his discharge (US vs. Mendiola, 82 Phil. 740). Neither can such error affect the testimony and the quality of his
testimony. Even if the discharged witness should lack some of the qualifications enumerated by Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court, his testimony will not, for that reason alone, be discarded or disregarded (US vs. Abanzado, 37 Phil. 658; People vs.
Jamero, 24 SCRA 206).
Thus, the trial court correctly gave credence to Botohoy's testimony in court, which confirmed the material allegations of his
extrajudicial confession, pointing to the appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.
Indeed, appellants' mere denial and stories of alibi cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Botohoy, that the appellants
killed the Diaganon spouses and ransacked the latter's house. Post mortem findings of Dr. Estanislao Camacho corroborate
Botohoy's testimony on the injuries sustained by the victims. The results of the searches conducted in the respective residences
of the appellants, likewise, substantiate Botohoy's description of the t-shirts worn by the appellants at the time of the incident,
the weapons used by them, and the articles which formed part of the loot
PEOPLE v. GAZMEN,
G.R. No. 110034, August 16, 1995.
Facts:While Rosemarie was at home resting with her family, she peeped outside and saw saw Juanito Macasaddu arguing with
appellant. The protagonists were around five (5) meters away from each other, with their fathers, Manuel Macasaddu and
Eleuterio Gazmen, standing near them. The altercation became more heated, lead to traded sling shots where Eleuterio
Gazmen was shot. The appellant and his father left and returned with weapons. The Macasaddus sought refuge in Rosemarie’s
house. Appellant accused Rosemarie as one of them, thus he burned the house. Thus, the accused, after being prosecuted, was
found guilty with the crime of arson.
Issue: Whether or not the conviction of the accused is proper despite inconsistencies of the testimonies of the witnesses?
Whether or not the judgment rendered by the judge who did not hear the case was valid?
Held: At any rate, the test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether or not such is in conformity with
knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind. Further, the credibility of witnesses can also be assessed on the
basis of the substance of their testimony and the surrounding circumstances. A critical evaluation of the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses reveals that their testimony accords with the aforementioned tests, and carries with it the ring of truth
end perforce, must be given full weight and credit. Accused-appellant points out that the declaration of Danilo Bautista to the
effect that Eleuterio Gazmen was armed with a gun is inconsistent with the testimony of Rosemarie Galamay that Eleuterio was
armed only with a pipe and a stone. Further, accused-appellant likewise directs our attention to the testimony of Danilo
Bautista that the Gazmens did not fire a single shot which contradicts the testimony of Rosemarie Galamay that accused-
appellant fired his gun and hit the left arm of one Juanito Macasaddu. The alleged inconsistencies are not material to the
offense charged and of which accused-appellant was found guilty.
.
It is also to be expected that the testimony of witnesses regarding the same incident may be inconsistent in some aspects
because different persons may have different impressions or recollection of the same incident. The most honest witnesses may
make mistakes sometimes but such innocent lapses do not necessarily impair their credibility; the testimony of a witness must
be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein. More so, as in
the case at bench where the inconsistencies in the testimony of the witnesses concern minor details, having nothing to do with
the integrity of the witness, and may be disregarded if they do not impair the essential veracity of his testimony. The main
substance of the testimony of Danilo Bautista that he saw accused-appellant set fire to the house of Rosemarie Galamay
remains untouched and unaffected by the alleged inconsistency in his testimony and, therefore, must be accepted.
No. It is well-settled that the decision of a judge who did not try the case is not by that reason alone erroneous. Although it is
true that the judge who heard the witnesses testify is in a better position to observe the witnesses on the stand and determine
by their demeanor whether they are telling the truth or mouthing falsehood, it does not necessarily follow that a judge who
was not present during the trial cannot render a valid decision since he can rely on the transcript of stenographic notes taken
during the trial as basis of his decision.
PEOPLE v. HAMTON, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 134823-25, January 14, 2003.
Facts: Jun Notarte and Reynaldo Yambot, entered the Garcias’ office and showroom, and announced a holdup. After
emptying the drawer, they took the victims with them inside a van. When leonida, his wife, saw the plight of hert husband, she
approached them and and sked why they were taking him with them. As a response, appellant hit her nose with a gun and
pushed her away. The van immediately sped away. Inside the van they divested Teofilo with his belongings, jewelries and
money. Teofilo was kept inside a house with no windows to prevent escape. The abductors demanded P2 000 000.00 from his
wife. All this time, Leonida had been coordinating with the Task Force Habagat of the PACC. Alerted of these latest
developments, they planned for the delivery of the ransom money and Teofilo’s rescue. During the operation, only appellant
Arthur Pangilinan, and Reynaldo Yambot were arrested. Separately apprehended in connection with his kidnapping incident
was Antonio Hamton. Having somehow learned about Teofilo’s abduction, Antonio, at the same time that appellant was
negotiating with [Leonida] for the ransom money, was also calling up Leonida, pretending to be her husband’s kidnapper.
Antonio’s ruse was eventually discovered, but not before he was already able to extort Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) from
Leonida. The RTC found them guilty of the offenses of Kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and illegal possession
of firearms.
Issue: (1.) Whether or not the conviction of the crimes charged was valid?
(2.) Whether or not the judgment rendered by the judge who did not hear the case is erroneous?
Held: Yes. At the outset, we emphasize that the identities of all the accused were adequately established by the clear and
convincing testimonies of the victim and his wife. Particularly persuasive was the narration by Garcia of the events that led to
his abduction, his captivity, the ransom payment and his eventual release and rescue. His testimony included details of how he
had been fed, how he had relieved himself during his detention, and how he had been asked by appellant Lopez to write a
letter to his family to assure them that he was still alive. He detailed the events leading to the pay-off, from the time he was
awakened to the time of the actual shoot-out that eventually led to the arrest of appellants. Certainly, the positive
identification of them by the victim and his wife, who had ample opportunity to see and remember their faces, more than
satisfies the judicial mind and conscience. It is natural for victims of crimes to strive to remember the faces of their assailants
and the manner in which they committed the crime. Hence, there is usually no reason for us to doubt their testimonies or to
suspect their motives. The present witnesses had close contact with the kidnappers when the victim was abducted and his wife
was hit with a gun. Further, the victim was held for ten (10) days, which was more than ample time for him to be familiar with
them. His wife, on the other hand, was in constant communication with one of the appellants during the ransom payment
negotiations. She again saw them during the actual ransom payment. Moreover, the appellants did not even deny their
presence during the abduction or the ransom payment. This fact bolsters the credibility of the spouses and confirms that they
did not simply make up their narration of the kidnapping.
.
For denial and alibis to prosper, however, it is not enough for them to prove that they were somewhere else when the crime
was committed; they must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time. This, appellants miserably failed to show. It cannot be gainsaid that self-serving declarations are inadmissible
as evidence of the facts asserted. As a general rule, the reason is that, if received, it would most likely consist of falsehoods
fabricated for the occasion and mislead more than enlighten. Time and time again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are
the weakest of all defenses, because they are easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Furthermore, they cannot prevail over
the positive and unequivocal identification of appellant by the offended party. Absent any showing of ill motive on the part of
the eyewitness testifying on the matter, a categorical, consistent and positive identification of the accused prevails over denial
and alibi. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, denial and alibi are negative, self-serving and undeserving of any
weight in law. In the instant case, there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of the victim or his wife to testify
falsely against the accused or to implicate them falsely in the commission of so heinous a crime. The logical conclusion, then, is
that no such improper motive exists and that the testimonies are worthy of full faith and credence
The fact that the judge who penned the decision was not the same one who had heard the testimonies of all the witnesses is
not a compelling reason to jettison the findings of the court a quo. This circumstance does not ipso facto render the judgment
erroneous, more so when it appears to be fully supported by the evidence on record. While a judge in such a situation has no
way to test the credibility of all the witnesses, since he did not have the unique opportunity of observing their demeanor and
behavior under oath, the trial court’s factual findings are nonetheless binding on this Court when these are ably supported by
the evidence on record. Unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the validity of a decision is not necessarily
impaired by the fact that its ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial.
ABAY, SR. v. GARCIA,
G.R. No. L-66132 June 27, 1988.
Facts: The accused were charged with direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority. They were duly arraigned and
both pleaded not guilty. At the continuation of the trial on July 1, 1977, both accused appeared without their counsel. The trial
fiscal, Assistant Fiscal Angel Lobaton, was present, but the complainant, Garque who was still to be cross-examined, failed to
appear despite due notice. The private prosecutor, Atty. Henry Trocino, also failed to appear. Whereupon, City Judge Felino
Garcia verbally ordered, motu proprio, the dismissal of the case. Fiscal Lobaton did not object to the dismissal. Both accused
remained silent and later left the courtroom after the judge dictated the order of dismissal. That same day Atty. Trocino and
Garque appeared and verbally moved to have the order of dismissal set aside. In the presence of special counsel Navarro, Atty.
Trocino was allowed to present evidence in support of the verbal motion for reconsideration and to explain the failure of
Garque to appear on time. In his written order of July 1, 1977, Judge Garcia granted the verbal motion for reconsideration and
set aside the verbal order of dismissal. He further ordered the resetting of the case for hearing on another date. Subsequently,
the accused, through counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of July 1, 1977, invoking double jeopardy, claiming
that the verbal order of dismissal, even if provisional, was rendered without the express consent of the accused.
Issue: Whether double jeopardy can be invoked in this case?
Held: Yes. We fully agree with the findings of the respondent court. Where there is a valid information and the accused has
been arraigned, an order of dismissal issued by the court, motu proprio, in the course of a trial of a criminal case, whether
based on the merits or for failure of prosecution witnesses to appear, has the effect of a judgment of acquittal and double
jeopardy attaches. The order is also immediately executory. However, this order of dismissal must be written in the official
language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him conformably with the provisions of Rule 120, section
2 of the Rules of Court. In the instant case, it is very clear that the order was merely dictated in open court by the trial judge.
There is now showing that this verbal order of dismissal was ever reduced to writing and duly signed by him. Thus, it did not yet
attain the effect of a judgment of acquittal, so that it was still within the powers of the judge to set it aside and enter another
order, now in writing and duly signed by him, reinstating the case.
.
ANGELO CAL v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 114343 December 28, 1995.
Facts: After an information for illegal recruitment was filed with the aforementioned trial court on September 5, 1990,
petitioner posted bail for his provisional liberty. On June 8, 1992, a decision was rendered in the aforesaid criminal case
wherein the petitioner herein was found guilty of illegal recruitment. In July 16, petitioner, assisted by his counsel, filed with the
court a quo an application for probation, an affidavit of recognizance, and an application for release on recognizance. However,
petitioner filed with the trial court a "Motion to Withdraw Application for Probation and Notice of Appeal", alleging that he
"hastily filed his application 'because of the threats employed upon him by the authorities' and that 'he was not able to
intelligently consult with his lawyer and reflect on the legal consequences and effects of his application for probation under the
law' so that he may not be considered to have waived his right to appeal the decision". On account of the serious nature of said
allegations, the lower court conducted a full-blown hearing to verify the petitioner's allegations. The trial court denied this
appeal because the accusations were baseless and in the words of the trial court, he chose the easy way out which was to apply
for probation in order that he will not be detained because he could not post his bailbond, “this would impute negligence,
misconduct, fraud and worst threats upon his lawyer and a personnel of the Court whose only fault was to help him and
accommodate his lawyer's request. The accused would feign ignorance and stupidity in not knowing what he was doing when in
fact his mind was working in a diabolical way by imputing fraud and wrongdoing in others. What simply happened here was
that the accused decided to apply for probation because it was an easy way to avoid being detained in jail, to avoid the trouble
of putting up a bailbond; to avoid further expenses of counsel and to end the case once and for all without suffering
incarceration. But after his employer induced him to appeal, helped him to post his bail bond and perhaps even provided him
with another counsel, the accused changed his mind. He was fully aware and he knew what he was doing. He was properly
advised by his lawyer who told him that if he will file his application for probation, he would lost his right to appeal although of
course he was given contrary advice by his employer in Manila. It would be a dangerous precedent to allow the accused to
make a mockery of the Probation Law.” On December 14, 1992, petitioner filed a "Notice of Appeal from the Order dated
November 20, 1992", which was denied by the court a quo on January 4, 1993, on the ground that petitioner had availed of the
benefits of the Probation Law and therefore cannot avail of the remedy of appeal. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
last-mentioned order was likewise denied through an order dated June 1, 1993. Then petitioner filed on July 9, 1993 a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for restraining order, with the respondent Court of Appeals, which
denied due course to and dismissed the same in its Decision of November 11, 1993. A motion for reconsideration thereof was
also denied, for having been filed out of time by 23 days. Hence this petition before us.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment of petitioner’s confinement after promulgation of
judgment but before same became final and executory, i.e., prior to the lapse of the period for filing appeal, notwithstanding
that petitioner had posted bail?
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s decision of denying his motion to withdraw and not giving
course to his Notice of Appea?
Held: there is no dispute that, as a rule, and unless the trial court directs otherwise, the bail bond posted by an accused
remains in force at all stages of the case until its final determination. Petitioner should have challenged the legality of such
commitment order. However, instead of doing so, petitioner, after having been properly advised by counsel on the effects and
consequences of probation, voluntarily — and with the assistance of counsel — filed an application for probation, along with an
affidavit of recognizance and an application for release on recognizance of his counsel. Petitioner's actuations thus foreclosed
his right to appeal. And that is only right since the legal positions behind appeal and probation, respectively, are diametrically
opposed. This is because an accused applying for probation is deemed to have accepted the judgment in fact, ". . . the
application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the crime which led to the judgment of
conviction and . . . the application for probation is considered a waiver upon his part to file an appeal, . . . Thus, in this case, the
petitioner's application for probation had the effect of a final determination of his case, and the cancellation of his bail bond.
Therefore, the respondent Court of Appeals could not have done otherwise than to affirm the trial court's order of July 15, 1992
for petitioner's immediate confinement after promulgation of judgment, in view of the subsequent application for probation
which rendered the said judgment final and immediately executory.
.
The respondent Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial court's order of November 20, 1992, denying the
petitioner's motion to withdraw his application for probation and rejecting his notice of appeal, partook of the nature of an
order granting probation, which is not appealable. Inasmuch as "(P)robation is a mere privilege and its grant rests upon the
discretion of the court . . . (and) the grant of probation is . . . not automatic or ministerial" 5, and considering further that "(a)n
order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable" 6, therefore, the appellate Court correctly affirmed the trial
court's order of November 20, 1992, and denied the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, etc.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.HONORABLE JUAN L. BOCAR
G.R. NO. L-27935 AUGUST 16, 1985
FACTS: Accuses CESAR S. URBINO, JOSE GIGANTE and SERAPION CLAUDIO are charged for the crime of theft, by stealing without
the consent of the owner over the latter’s six (6) pieces of dao Veneer 1 Grade Exportable round logs, valued at -P7,104.62 all
valued at P7,104.62 belonging to one JUAN B. BAÑEZ, JR. On May 3, 1967, the three accused, upon arraignment, pleaded "not
guilty" .Proceedings were had on July 7, 1967. On said date, the respondent Judge conducted a "summary investigation"
directing questions to the complainant as well as to the accused. At the end of the "investigation," the respondent Judge issued
the order under review. Upon a summary investigation of this case the Court is of the opinion that the same is more civil than
criminal. The issue is who the owner of the logs is. Both parties claim ownership and both claim that they can prove ownership.
CASE DISMISSED.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SAID DISMISSAL was valid?
RULING: NO. It is evident from the brief transcript of the proceedings held on July 7, 1967 that the parties were not placed
under oath before they answered the queries of the respondent Judge. Verily, no evidence in law had as yet been entered into
the records of the case before respondent Court. Court's issuance of the questioned dismissal order was arbitrary, whimsical
and capricious, a veritable abuse of discretion which this Court cannot permit.
Moreover, it is clear from the same transcript that the prosecution never had a chance to introduce and offer its evidence
formally in accordance with the Rules of Court. Verily, the prosecution was denied due process. Where the prosecution is
deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus,
the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction
(Aducayen vs. Flores, L- 30370, [May 25, 1973] 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L- 30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any
judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an
outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head" (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
RENE RONULO V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 182438, JULY 02, 2014
FACTS:Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic
Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario
Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse,
Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong, and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and
guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the
petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple
that they had no marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He conducted the ceremony in the
presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.
.
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed against the petitioner before
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony. The petitioner
entered the plea of “not guilty” to the crime charged on arraignment.
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the ceremony that they take each other
as husband and wife. Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with
Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the couple.
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple was tantamount to a
solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law. The accused was convicted!
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of the accused was valid?
RULING: YES. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize
any illegal marriage ceremony. These provisions were taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied
from Section 324 of the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments.
The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails to persuade us. A judge may
examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to
extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or
rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds
happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party. At any rate, if the defense found the line of
questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to timely register this bars it from belatedly invoking any irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission regarding the circumstances of the
ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed been the declaration by the couple that they take each other as
husband and wife. The testimony of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these clear and
convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had
any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.
PEOPLE V. BLANDINO SAN MIGUEL
G.R. NO. L-39746. SEPTEMBER 27, 1983
FACTS: BLANDINO SAN MIGUEL, ALBERT ADIN, JR. and JOHN DOE alias BALUT were accused FOR the crime of homicide after
killing one LUIS TARUM Y BINAG by stabbing him, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which was the direct
and immediate cause of his death. Luis Tarum was sleeping under a mosquito net inside his house located at the squatter’s
area, suddenly the three defendants arrived. He suddenly stabbed Luis Tarum and dragged him outside the house where the
two other defendants Blandino San Miguel and "Balut" were waiting. Thety killed him and ran away.
The counter of the accused was they merely acted in self- defense when in fact the victim was the one who provoked the attack
first before them.
The appellant was charged with homicide only but the trial court adjudged him guilty of murder. The appellant complains with
justification that the trial court treated him harshly.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court’s decision must be appreciated?
RULING: YES. APPRECIATION OF TRIAL COURT ENTITLED TO MORE WEIGHT. If it is true that the deceased turned on the
appellant, what the latter should have done was simply to run and get away as far as possible. Instead, he got hold of a pipe,
confronted the deceased and struck him twice with the pipe. The circumstances do not paint a picture of self-defense. Upon
the other hand, the trial court said, "after considering all the facts and the circumstances of the case, as well as the demeanor
of the witnesses during the trial, [the court] is more inclined to accept the version of Lolita Tarum, who was the lone witness for
.
the prosecution." We have no reason to disturb this factual finding of the court a quo which was in a better position to
appreciate the credibility of witnesses.
If the circumstance of abuse of superior strength is not alleged in the information, it may only be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance in the imposition of the corresponding penalty.
ROSALIO L. FLORENDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 110886 DECEMBER 20, 1994
FACTS: Petitioner, together with his co-accused, was found guilty of the crime of falsification of commercial documents by
respondent Judge Josephine D. Ceballos of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Capas, Tarlac in Criminal Cases Nos. 362 to 365
and 368. Thereafter, promulgation of judgment was set on June 15, 1992. On the latter date, all the accused, except petitioner,
were present. However, petitioner's counsel was present at the promulgation and he moved for the resetting of the
promulgation to June 23, 1992. Respondent Judge denied the motion, finding no valid ground therefor. The promulgation
proceeded. Petitioner's counsel was furnished a copy of the Decision on June 15, 1992 as evidenced by his signature
acknowledging receipt at the back of the last page of the original copy thereof.
On June 16, 1992, respondent Judge issued an order, modifying her earlier decision dated March 26, 1992 with the deletion of
the name of accused Alejandro Dizon from the decision considering that he was never arraigned.
On June 17, 1992, respondent Judge issued warrants of arrest against all the accused, including petitioner, for their failure to
renew their bail bonds.
A notice of appeal filed by petitioner on July 6, 1992 was denied by respondent Judge, in an order dated July 11, 1992, for
having been filed out of time.
On August 4, 1992, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Promulgation of Judgment but the same was denied by respondent Judge in
an order dated August 14, 1992. Likewise, a motion for the reconsideration of said order was denied on September 29, 1992.
On October 24, 1992, petitioner elevated the matter before the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari and mandamus to
question the orders of respondent Judge. On June 30, 1993, the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said orders ware indeed invalid?
RULING: NO.The resolution of the instant petition hinges on the proper interpretation of Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure. If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by
the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon request of
the court that rendered judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and
to approve the bail pending appeal.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring
him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. In case the accused fails to appear thereat the promulgation shall consist
in the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof shall be served upon the accused or counsel. If the
judgment is for conviction, and the accused's failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the court shall further order the
arrest of the accused, who may appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision to him or his counsel (Emphasis
supplied).
Under the first paragraph of Section 6 of the Rule, the presence in person of the accused at the promulgation of judgment is
mandatory in all cases except where the conviction is for a light offense, in which case the accused may appear through counsel
or representative.
.
Under the third paragraph of Section 6 of the Rule, all the accused, regardless of the gravity of the offense charged against
them, must be given notice of the promulgation of judgment and the requirement of their presence. They must appear in
person or in case of those facing a conviction for a light offense, through counsel or representative. If the accused fails to
appear at the arraignment, the second and third sentences of paragraph three become operative.
The last paragraph of Section 6 of Rule 120 is a new provision introduced by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
provides for the promulgation of judgment in absentia (Gupit Jr., Rules of Criminal Procedure 362-363 [1986]). The amendment
was intended to obviate the situation in the past where the judicial process could be subverted by the accused jumping bail to
frustrate the promulgation of judgment.
The first paragraph of the Rule deals with the personal presence of the accused at the promulgation of judgment and its
exception, i.e., in the case of a light offense where his personal presence is dispensed with. The third paragraph of the same
Rule deals with the presence of all the accused at the promulgation regardless of the penalty imposed on them. There is no
exception under this paragraph. All the accused must be present in person or through counsel or a representative.
People vs. Baculanta,
726 SCRA 458, G. R. No, 207513, June 16, 2014
Facts: The accused-appellant Briccio Baculanta was indicted before the R TC of Carigara, Leyte for the crime of rape. Upon
arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. The
prosecution claimed that the victim AAA, a 7 year old girl together with EEE his younger brother was left in their family house
together with the accused-appellant. While at home, he ordered AAA to fetch water from the river, that is about 4-5 meters
away from their house, to which order AAA acceded. Accused-appellant followed AAA to the river in which the rape incident
happen. After he has consumated his dastardly act, he threatened his to kill his victim if she would report the incident to
anyone. CCC discovered that AAA was raped. AAA then confided to her mother that she was raped by the accused-appellant.
Only the accused-appellant testified for his defense. While he admitted that he was at AAA's house when the incident
happened, he denied having raped the child. The RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. CA affirmed RTC's decision. Hence, the present appeal.
Issue: Whether the testimony of the victim AAA should be given credence
Ruling: Yes. Settled is the doctrine that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of witnesses, and its assessment of the
probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This
is truer if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, in which case, as in the case at bar, said findings are generally
binding upon us.
The testimony in court of AAA, as corroborated by the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses and supported by the
records of the case, sufficiently established the fact of carnal knowledge by the accused-appellant of the offended party. In
People v. Abellera, the Court proclaimed that testimonies of victims of tender age are credible, more so if they are without any
motive to falsely testify against their offender. Their revelations that they were raped, coupled with their willingness to undergo
public trial where they could be compelled to describe the details of the assault on their dignity could not be easily dismissed as
concoctions. It would be the height of moral and psychological depravity if they were to fabricate sordid tales of sexual
defloration if these were untrue.
People vs. Bon
396 SCRA 506, G. R. No. 149199, January 28, 2003
Facts: An Information was filed against accused-appellant charging him for the crime of rape before the RTC Caloocan. Accused-
appellant pleaded not guilty.Thereafter, trial on the merits followed. The victim, Maricris Bonode was 6 years old when the
incident happen. She was staying in their house together with the accused-appellant who is the eldest brother of Violeta
Bonode, the victim’s mother. After finishing her laundry, Violeta went upstairs and accused-appellant lying on top of the victim.
.
They were fully clothed when she saw them. He had his pants on while Maricris was wearing “sando and shorts”. Upon seeing
Violeta, accused-appellant immediately stood up and ran downstairs. Maricris also ran downstairs crying. Violeta feared
accused-appellant so she chose not to confront him about the incident. Instead, she transferred to Atimonan, Quezon with her
family. Violeta revealed to her husband that accused-appellant molested their daughter. Thus, a complaint for rape was filed
against him. Testifying in his own behalf, accused-appellant denied the accusation against him and claimed that Violeta filed the
rape case against him because she was influenced by her sister-in-law who filed a case for acts of lasciviousness against him.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of rape committed on a child below seven 7 years of age. He was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of death, pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. In view of
the imposition of the death penalty, the case is now before us on automatic review.
Issue: Whether the findings of the trial court is conclusive and should not be disturbed on appeal
Ruling: Yes. The general rule is that factual findings by the trial court deserve a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which could alter the result of the case. However, a careful review of the evidence on record of the case
compels us to take exception to the aforesaid rule.
Santos vs. People
395 SCRA 507, G. R. No. 147615, January 20, 2003
Facts: AAA filed with the Regional Trial Court a Criminal Complaint against Virgilio Santos, charging him with Attempted Rape.
The accused was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. Private complainant AAA was on her way to buy katol when
the accused-appellant grabbed her and pulled into a vacant lot. The accused covered her mouth, and then started embracing
and kissing her. He also touched her private parts. After forcibly raising the victim’s skirt and removing her underwear, the
accused lowered his own pants and briefs, and began “poking” the victim’s vagina with his penis. They heard AAA’s mother-in-
law, CCC, calling her name. The accused immediately stood up and warned the victim not to tell anyone about what happened,
otherwise, he would kill her. Still holding the bladed weapon, the accused left. The following morning, AAA decided to tell her
mother-in-law about the incident. Two days after the incident, CCC and AAA reported the incident to the chairman of the
barangay. She also filed a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court which, however, dismissed said complaint for lack of
probable cause. Private complainant appealed the dismissal to the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan who likewise dismissed the
complaint. Unfazed, the private complainant elevated her complaint to the Secretary of the Department of Justice who
reversed the earlier rulings and issued an Order directing the Provincial Prosecutor to file an appropriate case against the
accused. The accused denied the accusation against him. Judgment was rendered by Judge EEE of the Regional Trial Court
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape. The accused filed a Motion for New Trial or
Reconsideration. Four days later, he filed a Supplemental Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration. Judge FFF, granted the
motion and set aside the February 10, 1993 Decision. Assisting Judge HHH then rendered a Decision, dated June 6, 1995, on the
“inherited case” finding the accused guilty for the crime of Attempted Rape. On appeal, the RTC Decision was affirmed in toto
by the Court of Appeals. The accused moved to reconsider but his motion was denied. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether the dismissal of the complaint by the municipal trial court, and subsequently, by the provincial prosecutor,
during its preliminary investigation, should be taken into account in determining whether the accused is criminally liable.
Ruling: No. “It may be stated that although the instant case had been earlier dismissed during its preliminary investigation and
said dismissal was later sustained by the provincial prosecutor, said case however was allowed to be refiled by the Department
of Justice upon appeal of the dismissal of the case thereto.
The previous dismissal of the case during its preliminary investigation stage before the fiscal is immaterial for the records
gathered therein do not even form part of the present records of the present case. Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedureprovides:
.
‘Sec. 8. Record of preliminary investigation—The record of preliminary investigation whether conducted by a judge or a fiscal
shall not form part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial Court. However, the said court, on its own initiative or that of
any party may order the production of the record or any part thereof whenever the same shall be necessary in the resolution of
the case or any incident therein, or shall be introduced as evidence by the party requesting for its production.’”
In the case of People vs. Crispin, this Court held that the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the
regional trial court records unless introduced as evidence during the trial. Absent such introduction, the records of preliminary
investigation cannot be treated as evidence in court; neither may the trial court be compelled to take judicial notice of the
same. A careful review of the records of this case, however, will show that the accused presented, and formally offered as
evidence, the records of the preliminary investigation. Nonetheless, we remain unconvinced that these records will exculpate
the accused. The dismissal of the case by the investigating municipal trial judge and by the provincial prosecutor was based on
the report in the barangay blotter which we earlier held as highly unreliable and undeserving of any probative value. For good
reasons, the dismissal of the case was reversed by the Secretary of Justice.
Magat vs. People
201 SCRA 21, G. R. No. 92201, August 21, 1991
Facts:The petitioners were charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City under a complaint filed by Ma. Luisa F.
Domocmat for serious slander allegedly committed on May 12, 1985 in Room 335 of the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital in
Pasay City. The petitioners are spouses working for the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Rudolfo is a practising physician in the
hospital while Minerva is the secretary-receptionist in the Radiology Department of the same institution.
After trial, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay convicted the accused spouses of light slander. On appeal, the Regional Trial
Court modified the decision and found the appellants guilty of the original charge of serious slander. The defense appears to
have been characterized by negligence or poor handling. The petition for review filed with the Court of Appeals was not verified
and was not accompanied by certified true copies of the questioned decision. The respondent court promptly denied it due
course for failure to comply with the Rules. When the petitioners came to this Court, their counsel forgot to submit proofs of
service of the petition to the respondent court and the adverse party.
Issue: Whether the crime of which both petitioner were convicted had already prescribed.
Ruling: Yes. When the trial court rendered its decision onJanuary 19, 1989 and found the petitioners guilty of light slander, it
had no jurisdiction to sentence them to a P150.00 fine with moral damages, attorney's fees, and costs. The offense ascertained
from the evidence adduced during trial was a light offense and under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, light offenses
prescribe in two months. We ruled in Francisco vs. Court of Appeals (122 SCRA 538 [1983]): Where an accused has been found
to have committed a lesser offense includible within the offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense, if it has
already prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to sanction the circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple
expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense. It is, therefore, evident that the trial court committed reversible
error in convicting the petitioners of a crime that had already been extinguished through prescription. It was likewise error for
the Regional Trial Court to try to correct the error by simply convicting the petitioners of the higher offense.
WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE, Petitioner,

vs.
NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH UY,1 Respondent.
G.R. No. 183994 June 30, 2014
FACTS: New Prosperity Product (NPP) is the private complainant in a criminal case for violation of B.P. 22 filed against William
Co (Co) which were raffled in the MeTC. In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were provisionally dismissed on
June 9, 2003 in open court. Uy received a copy of the June9, 2003 Order on July 2, 2003, while her counsel-of-record received a
copy a day after. A year after, Uy filed a motion to revive the criminal case which was granted. Co filed a "Motion for
Permanent Dismissal" on July 13, 2006. Uy opposed the motion, contending that the motion raised the same issues already
.
resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096. In spite of this, Co’s motion was granted (sept 4, 2006). When the court
subsequently denied Uy’s motion for reconsideration, Uy filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC which acted favorably on
the petition, annulling and setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006 and directing the MeTC
Branch 50 to proceed with the trial of the criminal cases. Co then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which, as
aforesaid, dismissed the petition and denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this present petition with prayer for
TRO/WPI.
Co argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634
should be considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to speedy trial was denied. Assuming that the criminal
cases were only provisionally dismissed, Co further posits that such dismissal became permanent one year after the issuance of
the June 9, 2003 Order, not after notice to the offended party. He also insists that both the filing of the motion to revive and the
trial court’s issuance of the order granting the revival must be within the one-year period. Lastly, even assuming that the one-
year period to revive the criminal cases started on July 2, 2003 when Uy received the June 9, 2003 Order, Co asserts that the
motion was filed one day late since year 2004 was a leap year.
ISSUE: (1) whether the right to speedy trial of Co was violated
(2) Whether the provisional dismissal of the crim case shall be permanently dismissed applying the time-bar rule.
(3) Whether the dismissal of the cases became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order and
not after notice to the offended party.
HELD: (1) NO. Obviously, he failed to show any evidence that the alleged "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay in the
trial was attended with malice or that the same was made without good cause or justifiable motive on the part of the
prosecution. This Court has emphasized that "‘speedy trial’ is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept." In determining
whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the
proceedings. The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or
failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not
suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and
that particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
(2) NO. Co is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules, which are
conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph thereof, to wit: (1) the prosecution with the
express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the
prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a
provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and (4)
the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. In this case, it is apparent from the
records that there is no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and
209634 or of the hearing thereon which was served on the private complainant at least three days before said hearing as
mandated by Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules. The fact is that it was only in open court that Co moved for provisional dismissal
"considering that, as per records, complainant had not shown any interest to pursue her complaint." The importance of a prior
notice to the offended party of a motion for provisional dismissal is aptly explained in People v. Lacson: x x x It must be borne in
mind that in crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or parties or the heirs of the
victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may
be served on the offended party or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public
prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with him
before the hearing or appear in court during the hearing. The proof of such service must be shown during the hearing on the
motion, otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will become illusory.
(3) NO. When the Rules states that the provisional dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance of the order
temporarily dismissing the case, it should not be literally interpreted as such. Of course, there is a vital need to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process; thus, said in one case: Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of
.
dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision
should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of
dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public
prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
We hasten to add though that if the offended party is represented by a private counsel the better rule is that the reckoning
period should commence to run from the time such private counsel was actually notified of the order of provisional dismissal.
Petition is DENIED.
JOEL LUCES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
[G.R. No. 149492. January 20, 2003]
FACTS: Joel Luces was originally charged with murder of Clemente Dela Garcia by stabbing the latter with a knife. Upon
arraignment Luces pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits thereafter followed. Dante Regino and Nelson Magbanua are
witnesses of the prosecution who were executed a sworn statement identifying Luces. On cross-examination, Dante Reginio
was confronted with an affidavit of desistance dated November 14, 1997 allegedly executed by him and Nelson. Dante Reginio,
however, denied knowledge of the affidavit and claimed that his signature appearing thereon was a forgery. Nelson Magbanua
was presented as hostile witness for the defense. He admitted that he signed an affidavit of desistance stating, inter alia, that
the person who stabbed the victim “…was not Joel Luces but it might be some other persons…” He stressed, however, that he
knew it was the petitioner who stabbed the victim but he yielded to the pleas of petitioner’s wife and signed the affidavit
because he pitied her as she was then pregnant. Atty. Maribeth T. Padios, a branch Clerk of Court before whom the affidavit of
desistance was allegedly subscribed, declared that two persons who represented themselves as Dante Reginio and Nelson
Magbanua signed the affidavit in her presence. She claimed that she did not explain the contents of the affidavit to the affiants
inasmuch as the same is no longer her duty. RTC found Luces guilty of Homicide. on appeal, petitioner’s conviction for the crime
of homicide was affirmed. Dissatisfied, petitioner interposed the instant petition for review anchored. Petitioner contends that
the statement in the said affidavit that the person who stabbed the victim “…was not Joel Luces but it might be some other
persons…” shows that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the culprit.
ISSUE: Whether the affidavit of desistance should be consider in the guilt of accused.
RULING: NO. Dante Reginio declared that the signature appearing above his type-written name on the affidavit of desistance
was not his, while Nelson Magbanua stated that he merely signed the affidavit out of pity for the petitioner’s wife. As between
the assailed affidavit of desistance and the sworn testimonies of the witnesses before the court, the latter should prevail. An
affidavit of desistance obtained as an afterthought and through intimidation or undue pressure attains no probative value in
light of the affiant’s testimony to the contrary.
Moreover, the reliance of petitioner on the testimony of Atty. Padios before whom the affidavit of desistance was allegedly
subscribed is misplaced. The only participation of Atty. Padios was to administer the oath to the persons who signed the
affidavit. From her testimony it appears that she did not ascertain if the persons who appeared before her and represented
themselves as the affiants were indeed Dante Reginio and Nelson Magbanua. Moreover, she did not even explain the contents
of the affidavit to determine whether the affiants voluntarily and knowingly executed the same. Hence, her testimony
regarding the execution of the affidavit of desistance cannot outweigh the testimony of Dante Reginio and Nelson Magbanua
denying the veracity of the said affidavit and unequivocally pointing to petitioner as the person who stabbed the victim.
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC.,petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL
OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

.
FACTS: On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, issued two
(2) search warrants where the premises at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers, respectively. Pursuant to
the said search warrants, the business premises of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers were searched.
Accordingly, office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature
allegedly possessed by Jose Burgos, Jr., publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper, were seized. Thereafter, the premises
of both printing offices were padlocked and sealed thereby preventing the publication of the aforementioned newspapers.
A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after 6
months following the raid to question the validity of said search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates,
substitute or successors from using the articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al.
Respondents sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the petitioners came immediately before the Supreme
Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before Judge Cruz- Paño.
ISSUES: (1) Whether the immediate recourse to the Supreme Court was proper to question the validity of the two (2) search
warrants.
(2_ Whether the two (2) search warrants were validly issued.
RULING: (1) No. However the Court took cognizance of the petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional
issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the “We Forum” offices, which was televised in
Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies.
The correct remedy for petitioners was to file a motion to quash the search warrants –Indeed, petitioners, before impugning
the validity of the warrants before this Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them
(Templo v. Dela Cruz, 60 SCRA 295 [1974]). But this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view
of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by the search of
the “We Forum” offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this
special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. It is always in the power of the
Supreme Court to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purpos es of jus tice require
it.
(2) NO. Use of evidence seized in an illegal search does not prevent a party from questioning its validity – Respondents also
submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as evidence some of the seized documents in
Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the
logic of respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with
them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or
invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has
been held “that the executing officer’s prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to
be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that
the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the executing
officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched.”
The seizure of articles belonging to other persons not named in the warrant does not invalidate the search warrant or the
search conducted – Section 2 of Rule 126 (now Section 3 of Rule 126) of the Rules of Court provides that a search warrant may
be issued for the search and seizure of (a) property subject of the offense; (b) property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds
.
or fruits of the offense; and (c) property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. It does not require
that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not
be owned by him. In fact, under Section 2(b), one of the properties that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen
property must be owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure.
Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has
control or possession of the property sought to be seized.
Probable cause for issuance of a search warrant must be based on personal knowledge of the applicant or his witness – Equally
insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M.
Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, “that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above-
mentioned and the articles and things above- described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in
conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free
Philippines, and April 6 Movement.”
In mandating that “no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, … after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; the Constitution requires no less than
personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be
justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance (64 Phil. 33), this Court ruled that “the oath required must refer to the truth of the
facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause.”
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs. ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991
FACTS: Andre Marti went to a forwarding agency to send four packages to a friend in Zurich. Initially, the accused was asked by
Anita Reyes (the proprietress) if the packages can be examined. However, he refused. Before delivering said packages to the
Bureau of Customs and the Bureau of Posts, the husband of Anita opened said boxes for final inspection. From that inspection,
included in the standard operating procedure and out of curiosity, he took several grams of its contents.
He brought a letter and the said sample to the National Bureau of Investigation. When the NBI was informed that the rest of the
shipment was still in his office, three agents went back with him. In their presence, the husband totally opened the packages.
Afterwards, the NBI took custody of said packages. The contents , after examination by forensic chemists, were found to be
marijuana flowering tops. The appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the agents for
questioning. Later on, the trial court found him guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
ISSUES: (1) Whether the items admitted in the searched illegally searched and seized.
(2) Whether custodial investigation properly applied.
RULING: (1) No. “The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily
discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State
authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated. Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation
of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. It was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding
agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on
the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a
warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not
a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search.”
.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and
seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is
his residence, his papers, and other possessions. . . .. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access
except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus
is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to
respect the privacies of his life. . . .
(2)No. “The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they
have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there
being no evidence to the contrary.”
As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by the defense that appellant gave uncounselled confession while
being investigated. What is more, we have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any
reference made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial investigation which was utilized in the finding of conviction.
Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced.
Stonehill v. Diokno
20 SCRA 283 (1967)
Facts: Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants against the petitioner and the corporation to
search persons and premises of several personal properties due to an alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom
Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. As a results, search and seizures were conducted in
the both the residence of the petitioner and in the corporation's premises. The petitioner contended that the search warrants
are null and void as their issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants. Thus,he filed a
petition with the Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized effects from being
introduced as evidence in the deportation cases against the petitioner. The court issued the writ only for those effects found in
the petitioner's residence.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search and seizure in both premises
RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but not those done in the corporation's premises. The
petitioner has no cause of action in the second situation since a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from the
personality of its officers or herein petitioner regardless of the amount of shares of stock or interest of each in the said
corporation, and whatever office they hold therein. Only the party whose rights has been impaired can validly object the
legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be exercised by a third party. The right to object belongs to the
corporation ( for the 1st group of documents, papers, and things seized from the offices and the premises).
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LO HO WING alias PETER LO, LIM CHENG HUAT alias ANTONIO LIM and REYNALDO TIA y SANTIAGO, defendants. LO HO
WING alias PETER LO, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 88017 January 21, 1991
Facts: the Special Operations Group, a unit of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the Philippine Constabulary (PC),
received a tip from one of its informers about an organized group engaged in the importation of illegal drugs, smuggling of
contraband goods, and gunrunning. After an evaluation of the information thus received, a project codenamed "OPLAN
SHARON 887" was created in order to bust the suspected syndicate.
Appellant and Tia left for China. As they arrived in the country, a team composed of six operatives headed by Captain Palmera
was formed to act on the tip given by Tia. On the expected date of arrival, the team proceeded to the NAIA. Captain Palmera
notified the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) Detachment at the airport for coordination. After a briefing, the operatives were
.
ordered to take strategic positions around the arrival area. Two operatives stationed just outside the arrival area were the first
ones to spot the suspects emerging therefrom. Word was passed on to the other members of the team that the suspects were
in sight. Appellant was pulling along his red traveling bag while Tia was carrying a shoulder bag. The operatives also spotted Lim
meeting their quarry.
Upon seeing appellant and Tia leave the airport, the operatives who first spotted them followed them. Along Imelda Avenue,
the car of the operatives overtook the taxicab ridden by appellant and Tia and cut into its path forcing the taxi driver to stop his
vehicle. Meanwhile, the other taxicab carrying Lim sped away in an attempt to escape. The operatives disembarked from their
car, approached the taxicab, and asked the driver to open the baggage compartment. Three pieces of luggage were retrieved
from the back compartment of the vehicle. The operatives requested from the suspects permission to search their luggage. A
tin can of tea was taken out of the red traveling bag owned by appellant. Sgt. Roberto Cayabyab, one of the operatives, pried
the lid open, pulled out a paper tea bag from the can and pressed it in the middle to feel its contents. Some crystalline white
powder resembling crushed alum came out of the bag. The sergeant then opened the tea bag and examined its contents more
closely. Suspecting the crystalline powder to be a dangerous drug, he had the three traveling bags opened for inspection. From
the red traveling bag, a total of six (6) tin cans were found, including the one previously opened. Nothing else of consequence
was recovered from the other bags. Tia and appellant were taken to the CIS Headquarters in Quezon City for questioning.
Issue: WON TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE ON THE ACCUSED AS ILLEGAL.
Held: As correctly averred by appellee, that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule.
There are at least three (3) well-recognized exceptions thereto. As set forth in the case of Manipon, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, 3 these are: [1] a search incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of evidence in
plain view (emphasis supplied). The circumstances of the case clearly show that the search in question was made as regards a
moving vehicle. Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on appellant and his co-accused.
In this connection, We cite with approval the averment of the Solicitor General, as contained in the appellee's brief, that the
rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the
search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons
to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge—a requirement which borders on the impossible in
the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with
impunity. 4 We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought."
MARIA CASTRO and CO LING petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE JAVIER PABALAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, and SGT. ERNESTO LUMANG, respondents.
G.R. No. L-28642 April 30, 1976
Facts: respondent Ernesto I. Lumang admitted that "he has been informed" and therefore was of the belief that petitioners
Maria Castro and Co Ling, whose place of residence was not even indicated, although subsequently mention was made of their
being at Barrio Padasil, Bangar, La Union, "have in possession narcotics and other contraband." 11 There is a claim that he had
verified the report and that therefore he had "reasons to believe that a Search Warrant should be issued to enable the
undersigned to take possession" of such narcotics and other contraband. 12 The application was accompanied by the joint
affidavit of a Sergeant Francisco C. Molina and a Corporal Lorenzo G. Apilado of the Philippine Constabulary. 13 Again, mention
was merely made of their information about narcotics and other contraband being kept by petitioners. They did allege therein
that they conducted rigid surveillance, but all they could come out with is that petitioner Co Ling is an overstaying alien for
almost ten years conducting such traffic and that after verification, he was not registered in the Immigration Office. 14 Then, on
the very same day, July 10, 1967, the search warrant was issued for illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband. 15 Again, there
was reference to the possession by petitioners of such forbidden goods. As to the complete and detailed description of the
properties to be seized, the search warrant merely mentioned illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband inside the warehouse
.
and premises of petitioners. 16 In the resolution upholding the validity of the search warrant, respondent Judge did state the
following: "On July 10, 1967, Ernesto Lumang, Sgt. of the PC, with a long service behind, appeared in chamber before the
Presiding Judge of Branch I of this Court. With him were Sgt. Molina and Cpl. Apilado both of the PC Command of La Union. The
three submitted to the Presiding Judge in chamber an application for search warrant which is Exhibit I in this case and a joint
affidavit supporting the search warrant asked. As Sgt. Lumang said, testifying regarding this incident, those appearing were
asked, although not in writing and not recorded, some questions by the Presiding Judge regarding their request of the search
warrant on the knowledge of Molina and Apilado on the facts stated on the application and on the joint affidavit. The inquiry
was brief. The barrio to be searched was handwritten in ink, Maria Cristina cancelling the typewritten name Padasil. But this
correction was not done in the duplicates. Anyhow Padasil and Maria Cristina are adjoining barrios. After the routine taking of
their oath and examination questions and answers, the Presiding Judge of this Branch signed the application for search warrant,
the joint affidavits, and forthwith issued the search warrant.
Issue: Won search warrant issued without complying with the requisites of the Constitution and the rules of court shuld have
been nullified.
Held: respondent Judge conducted the required "examination under oath" be justified merely because respondent Lumang was
"a Sergeant of the PC, with a long service behind [him]." 23 Moreover, contrary to the Rules of Court, he did not even bother to
take the depositions of the witnesses in writing, attaching them to the record. 24 There was thus a manifest and palpable
violation of the constitutional standard as to the quantum of proof to show the existence of probable cause,
the illegality of the search warrant does not call for the return of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited by
law. This is the established doctrine in this jurisdiction. As far back as Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 32 a 1920 decision, it was held:
"That although in the issuance of the search warrant in question the judge did not comply with the requirements of section 98
of General Orders No. 58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return of the opium. and its paraphernalia which were found
and seized under said warrant, and much less are they entitled to be exonerated because of such omission of the judge.
It is likewise the decision of this Court that notwithstanding the illegality of such search warrant, the challenged order of
respondent Judge can be sustained only insofar as it would limit the return of the articles seized to the liquor, the pack of
playing cards, the bottle of distilled water and five bottles of Streptomycin taken under such search warrant. No costs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARLOS ALHAMBRA Y MASING,
.G.R. No. 188133 July 7, 2014
Facts: Carlos Alhambra y Masing (Alhambra) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of: (1) rape, as defined in Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended; and (2) sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610,
otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
AAA is the daughter of accused-appellant Alhambra. AAA testified that, on October 6, 2004, while she was changing her clothes
inside her room, Alhambra suddenly entered her room, pushed her, removed her undergarments, and kissed her on the neck,
breasts, and vagina. At that time, AAA’s mother was not around as she was then working. AAA tried to resist her father’s
advances, but the latter overpowered her. AAA did not dare make any noise as she was afraid that her father would harm her
siblings, who at that time were just in the living room. Alhambra then inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina, while kissing her on
the breast and undressing her. AAA alleged that something sticky came out of his father’s penis and spilled on her mouth.
Thereafter, Alhambra put on his clothes and left AAA crying. Initially, AAA did not divulge to anyone what her father did to her.
AAA then got dressed and asked permission from her father to visit a nearby friend. As she got out of their house, AAA chanced
upon Senior Police Officer 2 Jesus Ubaldo (SPO2 Ubaldo) who, together with SPO1 Roland Costales (SPO1 Costales) and two
civilian agents, was in the area to conduct a buy-bust operation. AAA then reported to them that her father was molesting her.
Thereupon, SPO2 Ubaldo and SPO1 Costales went to AAA’s house and, after having informed him of his constitutional rights,
arrested Alhambra. They then went to the place of work of AAA’s mother to inform her of Alhambra’s arrest.
ISSUE: WON ACCUSED IS LIABLE IN THE CRIME CHARGED

.
HELD: the elements necessary to sustain a conviction for rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and
(2) that said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.”14cralawred
After a thorough perusal of the records of this case, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to establish beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC. AAA testified that Alhambra succeeded in having
carnal knowledge with her on October 16, 2004, and, thus, being AAA’s father, is presumed to have employed force and/or
intimidation.15
It is well-settled that, in a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect on
appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence on record. It is only in exceptional circumstances,
such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual
findings of the court below.16 The Court sees no reason to depart from the foregoing rule.
Furthermore, contrary to Alhambra’s insinuation, AAA’s delay in filing a complaint against him, for the alleged rape incident,
which happened during the summer of 1999, cannot be taken against AAA’s claim. “[D]elay in reporting an incident of rape
does not create any doubt over the credibility of the complainant nor can it be taken against her.”17 That it took several years
before AAA was able to divulge what Alhambra did to her during the summer of 1999 does not tarnish her credibility and the
veracity of her allegations. The threat made by Alhambra against her is sufficient reason to cow AAA into silence, especially
considering that she was just 12 years old then.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
OLIVER RENATO EDAÑO y EBDANE,
Facts: The prosecution charged the appellant and Godofredo Siochi with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 under
two separate Informations, The evidence for the prosecution established that on the evening of August 6, 2002, members of
the Metro Manila Drugs Enforcement Group, composed of PO3 Corbe, PO3 Nelson Javier, PO3 Dennis Padpad, PO3 Marcelo
Alcancia, Jr., together with a female informant, went to the parking area of McDonalds, West Avenue to conduct an
entrapment operation against a certain alias "Nato."4
At around 7:00 p.m., the appellant arrived on board a space wagon driven by Siochi.5 The informant approached the appellant
and talked to him inside the vehicle. Afterwards, the informant waved at PO3 Corbe.6 When PO3 Corbe was approaching the
appellant, the latter went out of the vehicle and ran away. PO3 Corbe, PO3 Padpad and PO3 Alcancia chased the appellant; PO3
Corbe was able to grab the appellant, causing the latter to fall on the ground. PO3 Corbe recovered a "knot-tied" transparent
plastic bag from the appellant’s right hand, while PO3 Alcancia seized a gun tucked in the appellant’s waist. The other members
of the police arrested Siochi. Thereafter, the police brought the appellant, Siochi and the seized items to the police station for
investigation
the appellant essentially alleged that PO3 Corbe’s testimony was "vague and equivocal;"18 it lacked details on how the
appellant was lured to sell shabu to the informant, and how the entrapment operation had been planned. The appellant also
argued that his warrantless arrest was illegal since he was not committing any crime when the police arrested him. He
alsoclaimed that the police did not mark and photograph the seized items, and that there was a broken chain of custody over
the confiscated drugs.
Issue: WON the acussed is liable in the crime charged.
Held: NO.Warrantless arrest invalid; seized items inadmissible

.
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. This is known an arrest in flagrante delicto.
"For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delictoto be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be properly attributed to the appellant
to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he (appellant) had just committed, was actually committing, or was attempting
to commit a crime. In fact, PO3 Corbe testified that the appellant and the informant were just talking with each otherwhen he
approached them.
PEOPLE vs. EDAÑO.
Facts: The prosecution charged the appellant and Godofredo Siochi with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 under
two separate Informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-111200 and Q-02-112104.The appellant and Siochi pleaded
not guilty to the charge on arraignment. Joint trial on the merits followed.The prosecution presented, as itswitnesses, Police
Inspector (P/Insp.) Aylin Casignia and Police Officer (PO) 3 Elmer Corbe. The appellant, Siochi and Ruben Forteza took the
witness stand for the defense.The evidence for the prosecution established that on the evening of August 6, 2002, members of
the Metro Manila Drugs Enforcement Group, composed of PO3 Corbe, PO3 Nelson Javier, PO3 Dennis Padpad, PO3 Marcelo
Alcancia, Jr., together with a female informant, went to the parking area of McDonalds, West Avenue to conduct an
entrapment operation against a certain alias "Nato.”
Issue: Whether the arrest in this case was valid.
Ruling: Warrantless arrest invalid; seized items inadmissible. Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. This is known an arrest in flagrante
delicto.
"For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delictoto be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer."
In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be properly attributed to the appellant
to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he (appellant) had just committed, was actually committing, or was attempting
to commit a crime. In fact, PO3 Corbe testified that the appellant and the informant were just talking with each otherwhen he
approached them. For clarity and certainty, we reproduce PO3 Corbe’s court testimony dated February 21, 2003,
People vs Fernandez
Facts: The said defendant, together with three others, namely, Dario Sitoy, Clemente Reposala and Vencio Almonte, was
accused of the crime of "Robbery with Frustrated Homicide and Multiple Homicide" in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
del Sur.
The above-named accused, with deliberate intent and with intent to gain conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and violence upon one Sebastian Espelita,
Sr., take, steal and carry away cash in the amount of THREE HUNDRED FIFTY (P350.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency to the
damage and prejudice of the latter of said amount, with deliberate intent and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack one Sebastian Espelita, Jr., with the use of their hunting knives, wounding him on the chest, as
consequence thereof, performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of homicide but nevertheless
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is the timely and able assistance rendered to
.
him as per Medical Certificate hereto attached; and in the occasion thereof, further, the said accused, with deliberate intent,
and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and assault the following: Sebastian
Espelita, Sr., Dolores Espelita, George Espelita, and Alejandra Espelita, with the use of their hunting knives thereby inflicting
fatal wounds on their bodies which directly caused the death of said Sebastian Espelita, Sr., Dolores Espelita, George Espelita
and Alejandra Espelita.
That Dolores Espelita died pregnant with five months baby inside her stomach.
That the crime was committed in the darkness of the night.
Issue: Whether the propriety of the penalty imposed by the court a quo, considering the existence of the mitigating
circumstance of the plea of guilty and the absence of a finding as to any aggravating circumstance to offset it.
Ruling: There is, to be sure, an allegation in the information "that the crime was committed in the darkness of the night," but
this circumstance, in order to be considered as aggravating the offense, must be such that it "may facilitate the commission of
the offense." Art. 14(6) Rev. Penal Code. The jurisprudence on this subject is to the effect that nocturnity must have been
sought or taken advantage of to improve the chances of success in the commission of the crime or to provide impunity for the
offenders.* Here the bare statement in the information that the crime was committed in the darkness of the night fails to
satisfy this criterion.
In any event, even if this particular circumstance be considered as aggravating it would only offset the mitigating circumstance
of the plea of guilty; and under Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code, where there is neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance the lesser penalty should be applied of, as in this case, the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, namely reclusion perpetua to death (Art. 294, Sub-paragraph 1).
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is modified by reducing the penalty imposed upon the accused Enrique Fernandez
to reclusion perpetua, with the accessories provided by law, and affirmed in all other respects.
People vs Del Rosario
Facts: Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegalpossession of firearms and illegal possession and sale of
drugs, particularly methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance of the search warrant, which authorized the search and
seizure of an undetermined quantity of methamphetamine and its paraphernalia’s, an entrapment was planned that led to the
arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu, its paraphernalia’s and of a .22 caliber pistol with 3 live ammunition.
Issue: Whether the seizure of the firearms was proper.
Held No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a searchwarrant must particularly describe the things to be
seized. In herein case, the only objects to be seized that the warrant determined was the methamphetamine and the
paraphernalia’s therein. The seizure of the firearms was unconstitutional.
Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted.
Miguel Cirera y Ustelo v. People
FACTS: Romeo Austria testified that at around 8:30 a.m. on April 20, 2000, he was playing a lucky nine game at a wake on
Araneta Avenue, Quezon City. Miguel arrived, asking money from Austria so he could buy liquor. In response, Austria asked
Miguel to keep quiet. Gerardo Naval arrived and asked Austria to go home. There was an exchange of words between Naval
and Miguel. Austria stood up and felt that he was stabbed. As he ran home, he noticed Miguel armed with a knife, this time
chasing Naval. Austria was hospitalized and was confined for more than a month. On cross-examination, Austria testified that
he saw Miguel attempt to stab him again.
Gerardo Naval testified that Miguel was irked when he asked Austria to go home. After he and Miguel had an exchange of
words, he felt a hard blow on his back. Naval retaliated. However, he ran away when he saw Miguel holding a knife. Miguel
.
chased Naval who fell on the ground. When Naval saw that Miguel was about to stab him again, he hit Miguel with a bench and
left him lying on the ground, unable to stand. According to Naval, he did not see the [knife] land on his back. Naval was also
confined at the hospital but only for six (6) days. Regional Trial Court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
(2) counts of frustrated murder. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether there is circumstantial evidence to prove that petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: Yes. This court held that "findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial
court," which is in the best position to observe the witnesses’ demeanor while being examined in court. This court gives more
weight to such findings if affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The exception to the rule is when the trial court misconstrued facts
which if properly appreciated could alter the outcome of the case.
We find that there is nothing in the circumstances of this case that warrants the application of the exception, with respect to
the findings that: 1) there was intent to kill; 2) petitioner was the willful author of the stab wounds, which almost killed private
complainants; and that 3) petitioner’s failure to kill private complainants was a result of circumstances independent of his will.
Circumstantial evidence was used to identify the perpetrator in this case.
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that a person may be convicted based on circumstantial evidence if the
requisites are present. It provides:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.— Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based purely on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the following
requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) the combination of all the
circumstance es is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, the following facts were considered:
1) Petitioner was identified by private complainants to be at the scene of the crime;
2) Private complainants were able to describe how they obtained their injuries;
3) Petitioner was seen holding the knife at the scene of the crime;
4) Only three persons were involved in the incident — private complainants and petitioner;
5) Petitioner "was standing very close to the private complainants";
6) Petitioner was the only one who had an altercation with private complainants, and petitioner was seen chasing and about to
stab at least one of the private complainants;
7) Private complainants sustained stab wounds;
8) The stab wounds sustained by private complainants would have been fatal had it not been given appropriate medical
attention.
.
The combination of these circumstances "constitutes an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the petitioner, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person."
The version offered by petitioner that it was he who was punched and hit with a hard object is not inconsistent with the facts as
stated by private complainants. It may even be true. However, it does not remove such reasonable conclusion that he was the
author of the acts complained about in this case.
Petitioner’s intent to kill is evident from his attempt to stab private complainants more than once. Petitioner chased private
complainants after they had tried to flee from him. The wounds inflicted by petitioner were also shown to have been fatal if no
medical attention had been given to private complainants immediately after the incident.
Mendez v. People
FACTS: The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) filed a complaint-affidavit with the Department of Justice against the petitioner.
The BIR alleged that the petitioner had been operating as a single proprietor doing business and/or exercising his profession for
taxable years 2001 to 2003. Based on these operations, the BIR alleged that petitioner failed to file his income tax returns for
taxable years 2001 to 2003 and, consequently evaded his obligation to pay the correct amount of taxes due the government.
In his defense, the petitioner admitted that he has been operating as a single proprietor under these trade names in Quezon
City, Makati, Dagupan and San Fernando. However, he countered that he did not file his income tax returns in these places
because his business establishments were registered only in 2003 at the earliest; thus, these business establishments were not
yet in existence at the time of his alleged failure to file his income tax return.
After a preliminary investigation, State Prosecutor Juan Pedro Navera found probable cause against petitioner for non-filing of
income tax returns for taxable years 2001 and 2002 and for failure to supply correct and accurate information as to his true
income for taxable year 2003, in violation of the National Internal Revenue Code. The accused was arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. The prosecution filed a "Motion to Amend Information with Leave of Court." The petitioner failed to file his comment to
the motion within the required period, thus, the CTA granted prosecution’s motion. The CTA ruled that the prosecution’s
amendment is merely a formal one as it "merely states with additional precision something already contained in the original
information." The petitioner failed to show that the defenses applicable under the original information can no longer be used
under the amended information since both the original and the amended information charges the petitioner with the same
offense
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution’s amendment is a substantial amendment prohibited under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
HELD: No. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the matter of amending the information:
Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at
any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with
leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from
the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with
leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,
especially the offended party.
Once the accused is arraigned and enters his plea, however, Section 14 prohibits the prosecution from seeking a substantial
amendment, particularly mentioning those that may prejudice the rights of the accused. One of these rights is the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him, a right which is given life
during the arraignment of the accused of the charge of against him. The theory in law is that since the accused officially begins
to prepare his defense against the accusation on the basis of the recitals in the information read to him during arraignment,
then the prosecution must establish its case on the basis of the same information.
.
In the amended information, the prosecution additionally alleged that petitioner is "doing business under the name and style of
‘Weigh Less Center’/Mendez Medical Group.’" Given the nature of a sole proprietorship, the addition of the phrase "doing
business under the name and style" is merely descriptive of the nature of the business organization established by the
petitioner as a way to carry out the practice of his profession. As a phrase descriptive of a sole proprietorship, the petitioner
cannot feign ignorance of the "entity" "Mendez Medical Group" because this entity is nothing more than the shadow of its
business owner - petitioner himself.
People vs Buclao
Facts: The undersigned prosecutor accuses OLIVER A. BUCLAO of the crime of Rape, defined under Article 266-A, par. 1 (a & c),
and penalized under Article 266-B, both of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known as
"The Anti-Rape Law of 1997", in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, committed as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That on or about the third week of September 2004, at Camanggaan, Virac, Municipality of Itogon, Province of Benguet,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is the biological father of the
complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, threats, intimidation and grave abuse
of authority, have carnal knowledge with her daughter AAA who is a minor, being fifteen (15) years old, against her will and
consent, to her great damage, prejudice and mental anguish.
Issue: Whether the accused-appellant is guilty of two counts of rape beyond reasonable doubt.
Held: Yes. The accused-appellant Oliver Buclao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape and sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, for each count of rape, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
This court has recognized the moral ascendancy and influence the father has over his child.61 In cases of qualified rape, moral
ascendancy or influence supplants the element of violence or intimidation.62 It is not only an element of the crime, but it is also
a factor in evaluating whether the delay in reporting the incident was unreasonable. With all the elements of qualified rape duly
alleged and proven, the Court of Appeals was correct in modifying the trial court's decision. Under Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, the proper penalty to be imposed is death. However, with the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346,67 the
imposition of death was prohibited, and the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole should be imposed
instead.
In rape cases, the award of civil indemnity is mandatory upon proof of the commission of rape, whereas moral damages are
automatically awarded without the need to prove mental and physical suffering.69 Exemplary damages are also imposed, as
example for the public good and to protect minors from all forms of sexual abuse.

Assignment No. 14 - Crimpro

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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ASSIGN NO 14 1

People of the Philippines vs. Joy Alcala

G.R. No. 201725 July 18, 2014

People of the Philippines vs .Benjamin Ramos

G.R. No. 88301 October 28, 1991

ISSUE: Whether the judgment rendered is erroneous?

People of the Philippines vs. Paterno [G.R. No. 148000. February 27, 2003]

Manalo Fule vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 79094 June 22, 1988

People of the Philippines vs.Castro-Bartolome

G.R. No. 45037 November 21, 1991

G. R. No. 94555 August 17, 1992

People of the Philippines vs. Ocimar and Mendoza

G. R. No. 94555 August 17, 1992

. People of the Philippines vs. Rosendo Amaro

G.R. No. 199100 July 18, 2014

Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision affirming the ruling of the RTC.

People of the Philippines vs.Calantiao.

G.R. No. 203984 June 18, 2014

RTC rendered its Decision giving credence to the prosecution’s case.

The Court of Appeals found no reason to overturn Calantiao’s conviction.

MANOLITO GIL Z. ZAFRA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 176317 July 23, 2014

LEO M. FLORES, MODESTO L. LICAROS and MARIO LOPEZ VITO, petitioners,

G.R. No. L-63677 August 12, 1983

ISSUE: WON Licaros could be state witness? [No not Necessary]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

G.R. No. L-23092 October 28, 1977

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

MARICAR B. INOVERO, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 195668 June 25, 2014

ISSUE: what is the real extent of the judgment?

G.R. No. L-54258 November 27, 1987

G.R. No. 86025. November 28, 1989

People vs. Chaves

G.R. No. 131377 February 11, 2003

G.R. No. L-67302 June 18, 1987

Issue: WON Botohoy should be discharged as a state witness?

G.R. No. 110034, August 16, 1995.

PEOPLE v. HAMTON, et al.,

G.R. Nos. 134823-25, January 14, 2003.

ABAY, SR. v. GARCIA,

G.R. No. L-66132 June 27, 1988.

Issue: Whether double jeopardy can be invoked in this case?

ANGELO CAL v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 114343 December 28, 1995.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.HONORABLE JUAN L. BOCAR

G.R. NO. L-27935 AUGUST 16, 1985

ISSUE: Whether or not the SAID DISMISSAL was valid?

RENE RONULO V. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 182438, JULY 02, 2014

ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of the accused was valid?

PEOPLE V. BLANDINO SAN MIGUEL

G.R. NO. L-39746. SEPTEMBER 27, 1983

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court’s decision must be appreciated?

ROSALIO L. FLORENDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 110886 DECEMBER 20, 1994

ISSUE: Whether or not the said orders ware indeed invalid?

People vs. Baculanta,

726 SCRA 458, G. R. No, 207513, June 16, 2014

People vs. Bon

396 SCRA 506, G. R. No. 149199, January 28, 2003