IEEE 979-2012 1.0 Guide For Substation Fire Protection

IEEE Guide for Substation Fire
Protection
IEEE Power and Energy
Society
Sponsored by the Substations
Committee
IEEE
3 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10016-5997 USA
27 November 2012
IEEE Std 979TM-2012 (Revision of IEEE Std 979-1994)
Authorized licensed use limited to: Universidad Del Norte Biblioteca. Downloaded on December 15,2014 at
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TM
IEEE Std 979 -2012
(Revision of IEEE Std 979-1994)
IEEE Guide for Substation Fire Protection

Sponsor
Substations Committee
of the
IEEE Power and Energy Society
Approved 30 August 2012
IEEE-SA Standards Board
Figure B.1 to Figure B.5 are reprinted with permission from CEATI, Report T023700-3022, © 2005.
Abstract: Guidance is provided to substation engineers in determining the design, equipment, and
practices deemed necessary for the fire protection of substations.
Keywords: fire, fire protection, hazard, IEEE 979TM, risk, safety, substation design, substations
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. 3 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10016-5997, USA
Copyright © 2012 by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.

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iv
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Participants
At the time this guide was completed, the E3 Working Group had the following membership: Don Delcourt,
Chair
Hanna Abdallah Radoslav Barac Scott Bryant Randall Clelland Gary Engmann
Brian Farmer Ajay Garg

Raj Ghai
Joseph Gravelle Matt Hulcher Thomas La Rose
Debra Longtin Patrick McShane Bob Panero Steven Shelton Boris Shvartsberg
The following members of the individual balloting committee voted on this guide. Balloters may have voted
for approval, disapproval, or abstention.
Hanna Abdallah William Ackerman Ali Al Awazi

Steven Alexanderson Stan Arnot
Peter Balma
Thomas Barnes Michael Bayer George Becker
W. (Bill) J. Bergman Steven Bezner Thomas Blackburn Daniel Blaydon William Bloethe Chris Brooks
Steven Brown Gustavo Brunello Scott Bryant William Byrd Thomas Callsen Robert Carruth Michael Champagne Robert
Christman Randall Clelland Kurt Clemente
Jerry Corkran
Don Delcourt
Gary Donner
Michael Dood
Randall Dotson
Fred Elliott
Gary Engmann
Brian Farmer
Jorge Fernandez Daher Patrick Fitzgerald Marcel Fortin
Rostyslaw Fostiak Ajay Garg George Gela David Gilmer Jalal Gohari Edwin Goodwin Joseph Gravelle Randall Groves
Charles Haahr David Harris Gary Heuston Scott Hietpas Werner Hoelzl Robert Hoerauf Philip Hopkinson David Horvath
R. Jackson
Gael Kennedy
Yuri Khersonsky James Kinney Hermann Koch Robert Konnik
Jim Kulchisky Donald Laird Chung-Yiu Lam Thomas La Rose Debra Longtin Federico Lopez William McBride Patrick
McShane Daleep Mohla
Anne Morgan
Mark Morgan
Jerry Murphy Arthur Neubauer Michael S. Newman David Nichols
vi
Gary Nissen
Robert Olen
Lorraine Padden
Bansi Patel
Christopher Petrola Alvaro Portillo Jean-Christophe Riboud Michael Roberts Edward Rowe
Thomas Rozek Anne-Ma Sahazizian Daniel Sauer

Bartien Sayogo Devki Sharma
Gil Shultz
James Smith
Jeremy Smith
Jerry Smith
John Spare
Gary Stoedter
Brian Story
David Tepen Malcolm Thaden Wayne Timm
Eric Udren
John Vergis
Loren Wagenaar David Wallach Barry Ward
Joe Watson
Yingli Wen
Donald Wengerter Kenneth White Alexander Wong Roland Youngberg Luis Zambrano
When the IEEE-SA Standards Board approved this standard on 30 August 2012, it had the following
membership:
Satish Aggarwal Masayuki Ariyoshi Peter Balma William Bartley Ted Burse
Clint Chaplin
Wael Diab Jean-Philippe Faure
*Member Emeritus
Richard H. Hulett, Chair

John Kulick, Vice Chair Robert Grow, Past Chair Konstantinos Karachalios, Secretary
Alexander Gelman Paul Houzé

Jim Hughes
Young Kyun Kim Joseph L. Koepfinger* David J. Law
Thomas Lee Hung Ling
Oleg Logvinov Ted Olsen

Gary Robinson
Jon Walter Rosdahl Mike Seavey
Yatin Trivedi Phil Winston Yu Yuan
Also included are the following nonvoting IEEE-SA Standards Board liaisons: Richard DeBlasio, DOE
Representative
Michael Janezic, NIST Representative Don Messina
IEEE Standards Program Manager, Document Development
Malia Zaman
IEEE Client Services Manager, Professional Services
vii
Introduction
Since the original edition of IEEE Std 979 (issued in 1994 and reaffirmed in 2004) was prepared, the body of
knowledge on fire protection has increased significantly. This revision captures much of this knowledge and
presents it for use by both the substation designer and the fire protection professional.
This introduction is not part of IEEE Std 979-2012, IEEE Guide for Substation Fire Protection.
viii
Contents
1. Overview .................................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Scope ................................................................................................................................................... 1 1.2
Purpose ................................................................................................................................................ 1 1.3
General ................................................................................................................................................ 1
2. Normative references.................................................................................................................................. 3
3. Definitions.................................................................................................................................................. 3
3.1 General terms....................................................................................................................................... 4 3.2
Fire-suppression system terms............................................................................................................. 4 3.3 Fire
detection system terms ................................................................................................................. 5
4. Fire hazards ................................................................................................................................................ 6

4.1 General ................................................................................................................................................ 6 4.2
Combustible oil hazards ...................................................................................................................... 6 4.3
Flammable and combustible liquid and gas hazards............................................................................ 7 4.4 Fire
exposure hazards .......................................................................................................................... 7 4.5 Indoor
substation hazards .................................................................................................................... 8 4.6 Critical loss
assets................................................................................................................................ 8 4.7 Maintenance and
construction ............................................................................................................. 9
5. Fire protection considerations for substation sites...................................................................................... 9

5.1 General ................................................................................................................................................ 9 5.2
External exposures............................................................................................................................... 9 5.3 Site
grading........................................................................................................................................ 10 5.4 Prevailing
winds ................................................................................................................................ 11 5.5 Fire emergency
response capability................................................................................................... 11 5.6 Available firefighting
water supplies................................................................................................. 11 5.7 Emergency access to the
substation................................................................................................... 11
6. Fire protection for substation buildings.................................................................................................... 12

6.1 General .............................................................................................................................................. 12 6.2
Use and occupancy ............................................................................................................................ 12 6.3
Underground substations ................................................................................................................... 13 6.4
High-rise substations ......................................................................................................................... 13 6.5
Indoor substations.............................................................................................................................. 14 6.6
Construction ...................................................................................................................................... 14 6.7 Fire
alarm and detection systems....................................................................................................... 18 6.8 Fire
suppression................................................................................................................................. 18 6.9 Life
safety.......................................................................................................................................... 19 6.10
Combustible materials ..................................................................................................................... 20
7. Fire protection for substations .................................................................................................................. 20

7.1 Spatial separation of outdoor mineral-oil-insulated equipment ......................................................... 20 7.2
Prescriptive separation requirements ................................................................................................. 21 7.3
Calculated separation requirements ................................................................................................... 23 7.4
Ground surface material .................................................................................................................... 23 7.5
Cable raceway systems ...................................................................................................................... 23 7.6
Water supply...................................................................................................................................... 25 7.7 Fire
extinguishers .............................................................................................................................. 25
ix

8. Fire protection for equipment ................................................................................................................... 25

8.1 Oil-spill-containment systems ........................................................................................................... 25 8.2
Stone flame suppression .................................................................................................................... 26 8.3 Fire
barriers ....................................................................................................................................... 27 8.4 Fire-
suppression systems ................................................................................................................... 27 8.5
Explosion suppression ....................................................................................................................... 28 8.6
Equipment design .............................................................................................................................. 29
9. Fire protection measures selection ........................................................................................................... 29

9.1 General .............................................................................................................................................. 29 9.2
Fire protection objectives .................................................................................................................. 29 9.3
Performance factors........................................................................................................................... 29 9.4 Life
cycle factors ............................................................................................................................... 30 9.5 Risk-
based economic analysis ........................................................................................................... 30 9.6
Benefit/cost analysis .......................................................................................................................... 30
Annex A (normative) Additional information to main body clauses............................................................ 32

Annex B (informative) Quantitative methods for analysis of hazards.......................................................... 47
Annex C (informative) Selection of fire protection systems and substation design ..................................... 56
Annex D (informative) Fire emergency plan, incident management, and recovery ..................................... 65
Annex E (informative) Examples ................................................................................................................. 69
Annex F (informative) Bibliography............................................................................................................ 84

IMPORTANTNOTICE:IEEE Standards documents are not intended to ensure safety, health, or
environmental protection, or ensure against interference with or from other devices or networks.
Implementers of IEEE Standards documents are responsible for determining and complying with all
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This IEEE document is made available for use subject to important notices and legal disclaimers. These
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also be obtained on request from IEEE or viewed at http://standards.ieee.org/IPR/disclaimers.html.
1. Overview 1.1 Scope
The original guide (1994) was developed to identify substation fire protection practices that generally have
been accepted by industry. This revision includes changes in industry practices for substation fire protection.
New clauses on fire hazard assessment and pre-fire planning have been added.
1.2 Purpose
The purpose of the original guide (1994) was to give design guidance, fire hazard assessment, and pre-fire
planning in the area of fire protection to substation engineers. Existing fire protection standards, guides, and
so on that may aid in the design of specific substations or substation components are listed in Annex F. This
revision updates that guidance.
1.3 General
The guide outlines substation fire protection practices based on industry standards and good practices. It
incorporates lessons learned from substation fires, substation fire protection research and testing,
advancements in fire protection engineering practices, and changes in fire protection due to risk and
IEEE Std 979-2012

environmental concerns. The guide provides design guidance in the area of fire protection for substation
engineers and others involved in substation fire safety and protection.
The predominant dielectric insulating fluid for transformers is mineral oil, and mineral oil constitutes one of
the primary fire hazards in the substation. Consequently, much of this guide addresses hazards and protection
measures based on mineral oil fires. There are several alternative fluids with improved fire safety properties
(higher flash and fire points), known as “less-flammable” dielectric fluids, which have been introduced. Many
of these fluids have been recognized as reducing the hazard and the risk of a fire occurring relative to mineral
oil. Use of a “less flammable” fluid is one means to reduce the risk of fire at a substation. See 8.4.2 and A.21
for additional information on these fluids.
It is the intent of this guide that the analysis and decisions made may require the use of a team approach
comprising various specialists. These specialists will be able to provide specific guidance on their areas of
expertise; provide interpretation of the related codes, standards, and practices; and help formulate fire
protection solutions. The following are some of the specialists that could be involved:
 ⎯ Substation design engineers (civil, electrical, mechanical, and structural)

 ⎯ Substation operation and maintenance staff
 ⎯ Fire protection engineers and specialists
 ⎯ The local fire department
 ⎯ The authority having jurisdiction over the substation
 ⎯ Architects and code consultants
This guide provides fire protection guidance for the following types of substations that have the
principal power delivery functions accomplished with alternating current (ac) or direct current (dc)
power and are operated at voltages of 1 kV and above:
⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
The types follows:
⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
Generating plant switchyards Customer substations Switching substations Transmission substations

Distribution substations Capacitor substations Converter station switchyards
of substations listed can be designed in a number of different configurations and layouts as
Outdoor substations
Indoor substations
Multistory above-grade substations
Multistory below-grade substations
Substations in mixed-use buildings including high-rise (>22.9 m) buildings
Substations in conjunction with other related operations (e.g., offices, maintenance facilities, and control
centers)
IEEE Std 979-2012

This guide provides electric power engineers and fire protection professionals with fire protection and safety
guidelines for application in the planning, design, and operation of substations. Guidelines are outlined in the
following critical areas of application:
 ⎯ The identification of substation fire hazards
 ⎯ The fire protection aspects for substation sites, buildings, and switchyards
 ⎯ Issues to be considered when selecting the various types and levels of fire protection
 ⎯ Recommended typical fire protection applications
 ⎯ Fire planning and incident management
This guide is not intended to be the primary standard for the minimum levels of fire protection
required for new and existing substations. The minimum required level of substation fire safety and
protection is based on the minimum requirements of governing authorities and on the level of risk
the asset owner is willing to accept. This guide provides design options and strategies for the
mitigation of substation fire hazards once the minimum required level of substation fire safety and
protection is determined.
The application of this guide is not meant to take precedence over local building, fire, safety, and
electrical codes. It is intended to be used in conjunction with these governing codes and standards for
the purpose of providing specialized substation fire protection guidance for asset protection and
customer service reliability. This document does not necessarily cover aspects of life safety covered
by local building, fire, safety, and electrical codes.
Refer to A.1 for additional information.
2. Normative references
The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document (i.e., they
must be understood and used, so each referenced document is cited in text and its relationship to this
document is explained). For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references,
the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments or corrigenda) applies.
1, 2
IEEE Std 980TM, IEEE Guide for Containment and Control of Oil Spills in Substations.
NFPA 850, Recommended Practice for Fire Protection for Electric Generating Plants and High
Voltage Direct Current Converter Stations.3
NFPA 851, Recommended Practice for Fire Protection for Hydroelectric Generating Plants.
When exploring the additional information in NFPA 850 and NFPA 851, keep in mind that these
documents were developed for generating facilities that have different hazards and risks than
transmission and distribution substations.
3. Definitions
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply. The IEEE Standards
4
Dictionary Online should be consulted for terms not defined in this clause.
1
The IEEE standards or products referred to in this clause are trademarks of The Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, Inc. 2 IEEE publications are available from The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(http://standards.ieee.org/).
3
NFPA publications are available from the National Fire Protection Association (http://www.nfpa.org/).

3.1 General terms
IEEE Std 979-2012

control building: A building or structure in a substation that contains protection, control, system control and
data acquisition (SCADA), and telecommunications equipment, electrical panels, battery banks, and other
auxiliary equipment. In this guide, this term may be used interchangeably with other commonly used terms
such as control house or control enclosure.
fire protection: The study and application of measures to prevent, detect, extinguish, control, or deal with
fires, and the subsequent impact on people, assets, business activities, or the environment.
hazard: Any source of potential damage, harm, or adverse health effects on something or someone under
certain conditions at work.
risk: The chance or probability that a person will be harmed or experience an adverse health effect if exposed
to a hazard. It may also apply to situations with property or equipment loss.
switchyard: The outdoor portion of a substation with only a single voltage level. In multivoltage substations,
the switchyards are typically connected by one or more power transformers.
3.2 Fire-suppression system terms
clean agent gas fire extinguishing systems: A fire protection system that uses clean gaseous agents that are (1)
electrically nonconducting, (2) volatile or gaseous, and (3) do not leave a residue on evaporation. The system
discharges the agent for the purpose of achieving a specified minimum agent concentration throughout a
hazard volume. A clean agent complies with restrictions on the production of certain Halon fire extinguishing
agents under the Montreal Protocol signed September 16, 1987.
deluge sprinkler system: A sprinkler system employing open sprinklers that are attached to a piping system
that is connected to a water supply through a valve that is opened by the operation of a detection system
installed in the same areas as the sprinklers. When this valve opens, water flows into the piping system and
discharges from all sprinklers attached thereto.
double interlock preaction sprinkler system: A Preaction system that admits water to sprinkler piping on
operation of both detection devices and automatic sprinklers and only discharges from opened sprinklers. This
type of arrangement provides the most redundancy to reduce the probability of accidental sprinkler discharge
by requiring both detection devices and sprinklers to activate independently prior to water being admitted to
the piping network. This type of arrangement also allows for pressure monitoring to detect leaks in the piping
network or open sprinklers prior to water being admitted to the system.
dry pipe sprinkler system: A system employing automatic sprinklers that are attached to a piping system
containing air or nitrogen under pressure, the release of which (as from the opening of a sprinkler) permits the
water pressure to open a valve known as a dry pipe valve, and the water then flows into the piping system and
out the opened sprinklers.
foam-water system: A sprinkler system that generates a foam-water solution and discharges it onto the hazard
to be protected utilizing air-aspirating foam-water sprinklers or nozzles or non–air-aspirating standard
sprinklers.
overhead sprinkler system: The installation includes at least one automatic water supply that supplies one or
more systems. The portion of the sprinkler system above ground is a network of specially sized or
hydraulically designed piping installed in a building, structure, or area, generally overhead, and to which
4
The IEEE Standards Dictionary Online subscription is available at http://www.ieee.org/portal/innovate/products/standard/
standards_dictionary.html.
IEEE Std 979-2012
sprinklers are attached in a systematic pattern. Each system has a control valve located in the system riser or
its supply piping. Each sprinkler system includes a device for actuating an alarm when the system is in
operation. The installation includes at least one automatic water supply that supplies one or more systems.
The system is usually activated by heat from a fire and discharges water over the fire area.
single interlock preaction sprinkler system: A single interlock system is a Preaction system that admits water-
to-sprinkler piping upon operation of detection devices and discharges out only the opened sprinklers. This
type of arrangement reduces the probability of accidental sprinkler discharge by requiring the activation of a
detection device prior to admitting water to the sprinkler piping and then requiring a sprinkler head to open
prior to water flow.
water mist system: A distribution system connected to a water supply or water and atomizing media supplies
that is equipped with one or more nozzles capable of delivering water mist intended to control, suppress, or
extinguish fires. Water mist systems must only be used for applications that they are listed for or where
specific research and testing has validated the application.
water-oscillating monitor: Typically a supplement to an overhead sprinkler or foam system, they provide
additional delivery of the liquid suppression agent to areas shadowed from the overhead sprinkler system.
wet pipe sprinkler system: A sprinkler system utilizing automatic sprinklers attached to a piping system
containing water and connected to a water supply so that water discharges immediately from sprinklers
opened by heat from a fire.
video image detection: The principle of using automatic analysis of real-time video images to detect the
presence of smoke or flame.
3.3 Fire detection system terms
beam detector: A type of photoelectric light obscuration smoke detector where the beam spans the protected
area.
dry-pilot line detector: A system of heat detection employing automatic sprinklers on a pressurized dry pipe
network. The activation of a sprinkler causes a loss in system pressure, which is annunciated as an alarm
signal.
electronic heat detector: A fire detector that detects either an abnormally high temperature or a rate of
temperature rise or both.
linear heat detector: A heat-sensitive cable that has a fixed alarm temperature rating or a heat-sensitive cable
in which the impedance with changes in temperature can be adjusted to specific resistance levels to establish
alarm temperature thresholds.
optical flame detector (IR3): A flame detection device sensitive to various portions of the infrared spectrum
commonly emitted from flaming fires. This type of fire detection is not sensitive to smoldering fires, and
detection is limited to each sensor’s field of view.
pneumatic rate-of-rise heat detector: A line-type detector comprising small-diameter tubing, usually copper,
which is installed throughout the protected area. The tubing is terminated in a detector unit containing
diaphragms and associated contacts set to actuate at a predetermined pressure. The system is sealed except for
calibrated vents that compensate for normal changes in temperature.
5
IEEE Std 979-2012

smoke aspirating system: The principle of using an air sample drawn from the protected area into a high-
humidity chamber combined with a lowering of chamber pressure to create an environment in which the
resultant moisture in the air condenses on any smoke particles present, forming a cloud. The cloud density is
measured by a photoelectric principle. The density signal is processed and used to convey an alarm condition
when it meets preset criteria.
spot-type ionization detector: The principle of using a small amount of radioactive material to ionize the air
between two differentially charged electrodes to sense the presence of smoke particles. Smoke particles
entering the ionization volume decrease the conductance of the air by reducing ion mobility. The reduced
conductance signal is processed and used to convey an alarm condition when it meets preset criteria. This
type of smoke detection is best applied to flaming or incipient fires in which small particulate matter is
produced.
spot-type photoelectric detector: The principle of using a light source and a photosensitive sensor onto which
the principal portion of the source emissions is focused. When smoke particles enter the light path, some of
the light is scattered and some is absorbed, thereby reducing the light reaching the receiving sensor. The light
reduction signal is processed and used to convey an alarm condition when it meets preset criteria. This type of
smoke detection is best applied to fires in which larger particulate matter is produced.
wet-pilot line detector: A system of heat detection employing automatic sprinklers on a pressurized wet pipe
network. The activation of a sprinkler causes a loss in system pressure, which is annunciated as an alarm
signal.
4. Fire hazards 4.1 General
The impact of fire hazards on health, safety, continuity of operations, and asset preservation is a reason to
provide fire prevention, fire protection, and other fire safety measures. Fire hazards are the conditions that
create the potential for a fire. Fire hazards have at least the following attributes:
 ⎯ The magnitude of a possible fire

 ⎯ The consequence of the potential loss
 ⎯ The probability of an occurrence over a period of time (i.e., risk)
Subclauses 4.2 through 4.7 present recognized fire hazards found in substations. Refer to A.2 for
additional information.
4.2 Combustible oil hazards
Based on mass and potential for energy release, mineral-oil-insulated equipment is normally the
largest fuel source present in most substations. Mineral-oil-insulated equipment includes the
following:
a) Transformers and reactors 1) Main tanks

2) Bushings 3) Radiators
IEEE Std 979-2012

4. 4) Conservator tanks
5. 5) Tap changers
6. 6) Cooling pumps
2. b) Instrument transformers
3. c) Voltage regulators
4. d) Circuit breakers
5. e) Cables
1. 1) Oil insulated
2. 2) Pipe type
3. 3) Potheads
4. 4) Transition joints
6. f) Capacitors
7. g) Lubricating oil systems (e.g., for synchronous condensers)
8. h) Oil pump houses
9. i) Oil processing plants
4.3 Flammable and combustible liquid and gas hazards
Other equipment-related fuel sources that may be found at substations include the following:
1. a) Hydrogen-cooled synchronous condensers

2. b) Oxy-acetylene used for maintenance and construction purposes
3. c) Battery rooms
1. 1) Heat from short circuits or thermal runaway
2. 2) Hydrogen gas generated by battery charging
4. d) Diesel- or propane-fueled generators and fuel cells for backup power
5. e) Propane heating fuels
6. f) Flammable and combustible liquid storage, handling, and dispensing
4.4 Fire exposure hazards
Critical substation equipment and other assets can be compromised due to external fire exposures in addition
to internal failure modes. Some example of exposure hazards include the following:
a) Auxiliary structures
1. 1) Office areas
2. 2) Warehouse areas
3. 3) Oil storage areas
4. 4) Shop areas
IEEE Std 979-2012

5. 5) Stand-by diesel generator buildings

6. 6) Hazardous materials storage areas
2. b) Any building, room, or support structure that is of combustible construction

3. c) Miscellaneous combustible storage
4. d) Vegetation (nearby forests, hedges, and shrubs).
4.5 Indoor substation hazards
Indoor substations present a unique set of hazards requiring a higher level of fire protection for the following
reasons:
 ⎯ Any smoke and other products of combustion contained in the building can create an exposure
hazard to building occupants, emergency personnel, and possibly a corrosive exposure to critical
substation equipment.
 ⎯ Heat (flame impingement, radiative and convective exposures) and the blast pressures from fires
and explosions contained within the structure can expose the structure and/or equipment to damage.
 ⎯ The egress of building occupants and access by emergency personnel for manual firefighting and
rescue operations can be complicated by the smoke, heat, structural damage, and travel distances.
4.6 Critical loss assets
The following are critical elements of a substation that if destroyed or damaged can impact the
substation’s
ability to a)
b) c) d) e) f) g) h)
function:
Control, computer, protection, switchgear rooms, and equipment 1) System protection equipment
2) Communication equipment
3) SCADA equipment
4) Computers
Cable spreading areas, cable trenches, cable tunnels, and cable vaults Batteries and charger systems
Station service transformers (dry or liquid filled)
Power transformers
Circuit breakers
Bus structures
Auxiliary equipment
The annexes provide more information on fire hazards and their potential impacts.
IEEE Std 979-2012

4.7 Maintenance and construction
Maintenance and construction activities can create high-risk conditions within substations. The following
equipment and activities could present hazardous conditions:
a) Oil-processing equipment
b) Mobile transformers
c) Painting
d) Hot work (cutting, grinding, and welding) e) Maintenance activities
f) Increased fire exposure and fuel load associated with
1. 1) Temporary or permanent construction

2. 2) Combustibles and flammable transient fire loads (e.g., fuel cans, rags, and wood)
3. 3) Material and equipment storage
4. 4) Office trailers
5. 5) Parked vehicles
5. Fire protection considerations for substation sites 5.1 General
The following should be considered during new site selection or existing site analysis:
 ⎯ External exposures
 ⎯ Site grades
 ⎯ Available firefighting water supplies
 ⎯ Emergency access to the substation
 ⎯ Fire emergency response capability
 ⎯ Prevailing winds
 ⎯ Environmental consideration

5.2 External exposures
External exposures are fire hazards external to the substation. A fire involving these external hazards
has the potential to impact substation operations adversely and may spread into the substation with
more significant consequences. A review of site fire exposures should consider all of the following:
 ⎯ Type of exposure and possible spread mechanisms

 ⎯ Level of existing protection present in the external exposure
IEEE Std 979-2012

 ⎯ Risks involved
 ⎯ Additional fire protection features required to create an acceptable level of risk
Subclauses 5.2.1 through 5.2.3 discuss some typical external hazards. ANSI/NFPA 80A-2012 [B30]5
provides a method for the analysis and mitigation of external radiant heat threats from these types of
exposures.
5.2.1 Forested or grassland areas
Forest and grass fires can expose the substation to conductive smoke, fire plumes, radiant heat, and
soot. Generally, unplanned landscaping, trees, and vegetation should be removed for a minimum of
9.1 m (30 ft) beyond critical buildings, structures, and equipment. In addition, vertical vegetation
(i.e., trees) heights should be analyzed to minimize fall potentials that exist within 9.1 m (30 ft) of
operational critical buildings and equipment.
5.2.2 Hazardous industries or operations
Chemical plants, petroleum refineries, liquefied natural gas plants, and compressed gas tank farms
are examples of neighboring facilities that could pose an external threat to substation operations
should an emergency or fire occur at the neighboring site. Spatial separation or other fire protection
methods should be used to protect the substation from these types of external threats.
5.2.3 Combustible buildings
Nearby combustible buildings and warehouses often represent substantial fuel loads that can expose
the substation to conductive smoke, fire plumes, radiant heat, and soot. Spatial separation or other
fire protection methods should be used to protect the substation from these types of external threats.
Refer to 7.2.4 for additional information and other reference documents such as ANSI/NFPA 80A-
2012 [B30].
Temporary enclosures made of combustible materials and temporary heating for construction
activities require special considerations for fire prevention. Issues include providing safe heating
sources and isolation of combustible materials from hot work.
Wherever possible, buildings used to support the operation of a substation (e.g., offices and
warehouses) should be located outside the substation fence.
5.3 Site grading
Mineral oil spill fires can spread long distances over a wide area, potentially exposing critical
elements of the substation to fire. In addition, oil can cause environmental impacts if it reaches
nearby environmentally sensitive areas such as streams and rivers or is absorbed into the ground.
One of the most critical factors that can impact the fire protection of substation equipment and
buildings is the site grading. Special attention should be paid to site grading conditions, spatial
separation, and overall substation layout to minimize the degree and direction of oil spread.
5
The numbers in brackets correspond to those of the bibliography in Annex F. 10
5.4 Prevailing winds
IEEE Std 979-2012

The prevailing wind direction should be taken into consideration when determining mineral-oil-insulated
equipment locations. The prevailing winds can create an increase in the hazard from fires involving mineral-
oil-insulated equipment and combustible structures. In a fire situation, the wind can cause the flame and fire
plume to tilt. This can result in higher heat fluxes, smoke concentrations, and soot levels at downwind
buildings or equipment. Additional fire protection measures may be considered when the wind is found to
increase the fire hazard.
5.5 Fire emergency response capability
The fire response time and resources of either internal fire brigades or local fire departments are important
factors in determining the required level of fire protection. The substation designer should consider these
factors in the selection of fire protection mitigating measures in the substation design.
5.6 Available firefighting water supplies
In the event of a fire in the substation buildings or mineral-oil-insulated equipment, water is the most
commonly used fire-extinguishing agent. As part of the design process, the available firefighting water
supplies should be reviewed. Available water supply is an important design attribute for both automatic
suppression systems that may be considered as well as for responding fire departments or fire brigades.
5.7 Emergency access to the substation
Access roads should be designed to accommodate emergency response vehicles. Provisions for emergency
access at two locations should be considered around the station yard. Where feasible, vehicle entry gates
should conform to the following:
 ⎯ Not be located beneath overhead power lines

 ⎯ Not be adjacent to fire hazards (such as mineral-oil-insulated transformers) that could cause
them to be blocked during an incident
 ⎯ Be located as far apart as practical (a minimum of one half the overall station diagonal is
recommended)
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IEEE Std 979-2012

6. Fire protection for substation buildings 6.1 General
Substation buildings should be designed in accordance with applicable local building codes. In the absence of
applicable building code requirements, the following recommendations may be followed for the design and
construction of substation buildings.
Fire protection may be applied to substation buildings that meet one or more of the following criteria or where
fire protection is required by local codes:
2 2
 ⎯ The building area is greater than 1000 m (10 000 ft ).
 ⎯ The building is multistory.
 ⎯ The building contains mineral-oil-insulated equipment.
As a minimum, all new substation buildings should be of noncombustible construction and should
include the life safety recommendations in 6.9.
6.2 Use and occupancy
In the absence of explicit local building code classification criteria, electrical equipment buildings
and battery buildings should be classified as special-purpose industrial occupancies. Warehouse
buildings should be classified as storage occupancies. Maintenance shop areas should be considered
as industrial occupancies. Office areas separate from control building spaces should be considered
business occupancies.
6.2.1 Control buildings and rooms
Control buildings and rooms should be reserved for control equipment, metering equipment,
SCADA equipment, telemetry and communications equipment, low-voltage (<1 kV) station service
distribution equipment, metal-enclosed (non–oil-filled) switchgear cubicles and associated relays,
and minimal work and office areas necessary to facilitate these operations. Uses for other purposes
should be discouraged.
Storage of paper products (drawings, test reports, and instruction books), cleaning fluids, and other
combustible supplies in a control building are discouraged. If stored in the control building, then they
should be stored in separated areas with a 1 h or 2 h fire separation rating based on the hazard or in
cabinets to preclude a fire from spreading to the main control and relay areas (see A.11). Flammable
liquids should only be stored in approved containers and/or cabinets. Welding and other flammable
gases should never be stored in control buildings.
6.2.2 Battery rooms and areas
Battery main terminals and connections between the main battery terminals and the battery
overcurrent protection should be designed with insulation or separation to minimize short circuits
during maintenance and normal activities in the area of the battery. Battery rooms or areas in control
buildings need adequate ventilation. The flash arresting vents on battery cells should be maintained
to provide adequate diffusion of
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IEEE Std 979-2012

hydrogen and oxygen gases that evolve on battery charging. The maintenance should be to clean and/or
replace the flash arresters so the dissipation of gases can be accomplished without an appreciable pressure
buildup inside the battery cell jar.
Battery rooms and areas should be designed based on the requirements of the applicable safety and electrical
codes. Further guidance may be obtained from IEEE Std 484TM-2002 [B67].
6.2.3 Support buildings and separated areas
Office facilities for functions not directly related to substation control should be housed in buildings separate
from the substation control building or in areas separated by fire-rated construction provided in accordance
with the separation provisions of A.11. Maintenance buildings may incorporate indoor storage of substation
equipment and supplies.
6.3 Underground substations

Underground substations create high fire safety and fire protection risks that require a high level of fire
protection. Generally, underground substations are special structures and can create the following challenges:
 ⎯ Egress
 ⎯ Firefighting access
 ⎯ Smoke and heat venting
 ⎯ Automatic control of ventilation equipment
 ⎯ Blast pressure venting
 ⎯ Water containment
 ⎯ Presence of mineral-oil-insulated cable and electrical equipment
6.4 High-rise substations
The incorporation of substations in high-rise building (office buildings) may create significant
hazards to the building and building occupants. The following substation-related hazards are
examples that may create exposures to the other parts of the building:
o ⎯ Smoke and heat migration

o ⎯ Fire exposure and blast impact to building support structures
o ⎯ Presence of mineral-oil-insulated cable and electrical equipment
o ⎯ Water used for firefighting and fire protection
13
6.5 Indoor substations
IEEE Std 979-2012

Indoor substations create higher fire safety and fire protection hazards than outdoor substations and require a
higher level of fire protection. Generally, these substations are special structures and may have some of the
following challenges:
 ⎯ Egress
 ⎯ Firefighting access
 ⎯ Smoke and heat venting
 ⎯ Automatic control of ventilation equipment
 ⎯ Blast pressure venting
 ⎯ Water containment
 ⎯ Presence of mineral-oil-insulated cable and electrical equipment

6.6 Construction
6.6.1 Building materials
Materials used in the construction of substation buildings should be noncombustible or limited

combustible (e.g., gypsum wallboard).
High-rise building areas containing mineral-oil-insulated equipment or cables should incorporate

performance-based fire and blast resistance to protect structural elements.
6.6.2 Fire separation
Fire separations should be installed between adjacent occupancies with different uses within the
same building. Required minimum fire-resistance ratings for fire separation should be obtained from
applicable building codes.
Exception:
Self-contained modular substation packages consisting of buildings with switchgear (metal-clad or

gas-insulated switchgear), control equipment, and auxiliary equipment may be treated as single use.
Fire separation may be eliminated between the different areas provided there is a realization that the
entire module may be lost if a fire were to occur.
6.6.3 Floor and roof
Flooring should be noncombustible such as steel or concrete (with or without floor trenches) or
raised flooring.
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IEEE Std 979-2012

Roof covering should be constructed in accordance with ANSI/NFPA 256-2003 [B38]: “Class A” rated
requirements for a high-resistance ignition and burning. The roof supporting structural assembly should be of
noncombustible construction. Blast pressure venting devices on the roof should be considered when the power
transformer is located in a full enclosure (i.e., four walls and a roof).
Roof assemblies using foam plastic roof insulation should be constructed in accordance with Factory Mutual
“Class 1” requirements. These requirements are designed to provide roof assemblies that will not contribute
materially to flame spread on the underside of a roof when exposed to an interior fire exposure.

6.6.4 Cable trays
Cable trays should be constructed of noncombustible materials.
Vertical tray routings not protected by automatic sprinklers and 6.1 m (20 ft) or greater in height, but less than
9.1 m (30 ft) in height, should have fire breaks installed at mid-height and for runs 9.1 m (30 ft) or greater
height, at 4.6 m (15 ft) intervals. Fire break designs should prevent the propagation of fire for a minimum of
30 min when tested for the largest number of cable routings and cable density.
Penetrations of cable trays through firewalls, floors, and ceilings should be provided with fire breaks, seals, or
fire stops conforming to requirements of ANSI/IEEE 634-2004 [B6] and should have an equal or greater fire-
resistance rating than the wall or floor being penetrated.
The cable trays should be separated by a distance sufficient to minimize the propagation of a fire from one
tray to another. If flame-retardant cables are utilized, then the recommended separation distances are given in
IEEE Std 384TM-2008 [B65] and ANSI/IEEE 525-1992 [B4]. If cables are not flame retardant or the proper
separation cannot be achieved, then a fire-resistive barrier or shield can be used between the trays or a fire-
retardant coating may be applied to the cables. Fire hazards can also be minimized by utilizing fire stops. The
possible ampacity derating due to the thermal insulating properties of the fire break or fire stop material
should be taken into account.
6.6.5 Conduits and cables
Conduits should be made of noncombustible materials. Penetrations of conduits and cables through firewalls
should be provided with a fire break or seal conforming to requirements of the applicable codes and
ANSI/IEEE 634-2004 [B6] at ceiling, wall, and floor penetrations. Fire stopping used should have an equal or
greater fire-resistance rating than the wall or floor being penetrated.
Conduit and cable penetrations through building dividing walls, fire separations, smoke separations, and
firewalls should be sealed to prevent the spread of smoke and fire from a potential fire area to other areas.
The use of fire-retardant cable, such as those passing the flame propagation test of ANSI/IEEE 383-1974
[B3], is recommended.
Grouped electrical cables should be routed away from exposure hazards (major switchgear and sources of
flammable and combustible liquids) or provided with suitable fire protection measures to offset the risk.
Where possible, high-voltage cable trays should be located above or remote from low-voltage cable trays to
lessen the exposure hazard to the lower voltage cables.
Care should be taken in the selection of fire-retardant coatings, wraps, or tapes as they may derate the cable
ampacity, and this needs to be considered in the design.
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IEEE Std 979-2012

Use of mineral-oil-insulated cables within buildings should be discouraged or protected with an automatic
fire-suppression system.
6.6.6 Building openings
Guidance on the installation and maintenance of assemblies and devices used to protect openings in walls,
floors, and ceilings against the spread of fire and smoke within, into, or out of buildings can be found in
ANSI/NFPA 80-2013 [B29] and local building codes.
All doors and windows installed in rated separations should have a minimum fire-resistance rating equal to
that of the separation. Protected openings (doors and windows) in 2 h fire separations may have a reduced
rating of 1.5 h.
All doors should be equipped with self-closing devices. Fire-resistance-rated fire shutters should be installed
on operable windows installed in rated walls unless no exposure hazard exists (i.e., does not open to another
room, building, or piece of equipment). Shutters should have a minimum fire-resistance rating equal to that of
the wall.
6.6.7 Interior finish
Guidance on interior finishes can be found in Section 10.2 of ANSI/NFPA 101-2011 [B34] and local building
and fire codes.
Interior finish in substation buildings should have a low flame spread and smoke development characteristics
as required by local codes and standards.
Cellular and foam plastic materials (as defined in Annex A of ANSI/NFPA 101-2011 [B34]) are not
recommended as interior finishes. If used, these types of wall coverings should be covered with a minimum
13 mm (0.5 in) fire-resistance-rated gypsum wallboard on the fire-exposed side. Plywood used as a wall
backing for securing panels or equipment should be fire retardant or painted with fire retardant paint.
6.6.8 Lightning protection
Lightning strikes to substations can ignite flammable materials and damage equipment that can lead to fires.
Lightning protection may be provided in accordance with IEEE Std 998TM-1996 [B69] or ANSI/NFPA 780-
2011 [B42] as applicable.
6.6.9 Furnishings
The use of combustible materials should be avoided in the selection of desks, chairs, filing cabinets, storage
boxes, display boards, and so on. Guidance on contents and furnishings can be found in Section 10.2 of
ANSI/NFPA 101-2011 [B34].
6.6.10 Heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems
The design of HVAC systems should be based on the fire hazards of the specific areas serviced by these
systems. In general, the HVAC systems should be designed to shut down in the event of a fire to prevent
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IEEE Std 979-2012
the spread of smoke throughout the building. Guidance on HVAC shutdown can be found in ANSI/NFPA
90B-2012 [B32].
HVAC systems may incorporate a means for fire department or brigade personnel to control (shutdown,
startup, or override the controls) the HVAC systems manually during a fire incident. The fire department or
brigade should be contacted for guidance as to whether such controls would be useful on the HVAC system in
question. Where provided, these controls should be located in an area that is expected to be accessible during
a fire event.
The fresh air supply intakes for HVAC systems should be located to minimize the possibility of drawing
smoke into the system. Where this is not possible, the intakes should be installed with automatic smoke
dampers.
All ductwork should be of noncombustible construction.
Where the HVAC system penetrates fire-resistance-rated separations (i.e., rated walls and floors), fire
dampers with a minimum fire protection rating equal to the penetrated fire separation should be installed.
Where the HVAC system traverses areas where smoke could create fire safety or protection problems,
suitable smoke dampers should be installed.
Refer to A.14 for additional information
6.6.11 Smoke and heat management
A smoke and heat management scheme should be incorporated into the design of underground, high-rise, and
indoor substations. Venting heat and smoke creates more tenable conditions for responding fire department
personnel and occupants that are trapped or trying to exit the building safely.
Smoke and heat vents are one option to achieve more tenable firefighting conditions. Additional guidance on
the design of smoke and heat vents can be obtained in ANSI/NFPA 204M-1991 [B36]. Mechanical smoke
control pressurization systems are another option in achieving more tenable fire conditions in the protected
space. Additional guidance on the design of smoke control can be found in ANSI/NFPA 92A- 2009 [B33].
In control rooms, relay rooms, and computer rooms where a dedicated HVAC system serves these spaces, it
may be appropriate during fire conditions to continue to run the HVAC in the 100% fresh air and relief air
mode to reduce the impact of heat and smoke on the critical electrical and electronic components.
6.6.12 Drainage
Provisions around indoor mineral-oil-insulated equipment should be made in each building for removal of
liquids directly to safe areas or for containment in the fire area without endangering other areas. These
provisions should include piping systems that can withstand the high ignition temperatures of burning
insulating oils. Where sprinkler or water spray deluge systems are used, the drainage storage is designed for
these combined flow rates and volumes.
If the dielectric fluid is a less flammable fluid, then the fluid may be retained in the containment area of the
equipment.
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IEEE Std 979-2012

If not required by code or standard, then consideration should be given to the containment of electrolyte
within battery rooms or areas. Door sills or curbing may be effective techniques in containing battery
electrolyte.
6.7 Fire alarm and detection systems
The provision of fire alarm and detection systems may be required by the local building and fire codes based
on the size, number of stories, and hazard of the new or existing substation buildings. Even when not
specifically required by local codes, detection systems should still be considered for critical areas of
substation buildings for the purpose of personnel safety, asset preservation, and business continuity. Systems
not specifically required by local codes can be performance-based, designed to meet the intent of
ANSI/NFPA 72-2010 [B28].
Control rooms, computer rooms, communication rooms, switchgear areas, and mineral-oil-insulated
equipment areas represent the kinds of critical areas that should be provided with detection. Specific guidance
for detection system selection by area can be found in C.5.
Fire alarm systems for employee emergency notification should be provided in underground, multistory, and
indoor substations. ANSI/NFPA 72-2010 [B28] should be used as the basis for design, installation, and
maintenance of these systems.
Consideration should be given to providing remote offsite alarm notification for facilities that are not manned
continuously.
6.8 Fire suppression
The provision of automatic fire-suppression systems may be required by the local building and fire codes.
Even when not specifically required by local codes, automatic suppression systems should still be considered
for critical buildings and areas for the purpose of personnel safety, asset preservation, and business continuity.
These systems are of particular importance for substations that do not have a responding fire department to
assist in suppressing a fire.
Fire-suppression systems should be present throughout all portions of underground, multistory, and indoor
substations containing mineral-oil-insulated cables or mineral-oil-insulated electrical equipment above and
beyond any applicable building code requirements dictating otherwise. For alternative, less flammable, fluid-
filled equipment, refer to NFPA NEC article 450 in ANSI/NFPA 450-2013 [B39]) for options and
requirements.
Fire-suppression systems should be installed and maintained in accordance with the appropriate NFPA
standard.
Suppression systems can range from total flooding gaseous agents to more traditional wet pipe sprinkler
systems depending on the hazards present. A fire protection engineer should be consulted to select the
appropriate type of system for the building, environment, and hazards under consideration.
Refer to A.3 and A.17 for additional information.
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6.9 Life safety 6.9.1 General
IEEE Std 979-2012

In absence of or in addition to applicable local building code requirements, the following recommendations
are suggested for life safety.
6.9.2 Arrangement of exits
Guidance on exits can be found in NFPA 101-2011 [B34] and ANSI/NFPA 70E-2012 [B27] and applicable
building, electrical, and fire codes.
Substation buildings having a travel distance of more than 30 m (100 ft) to an exit should have two or more
exits located at opposite ends of the building. Doors should open outward with the direction of travel and be
equipped with interior panic hardware to allow egress even if locked. Exit doors shall not be padlocked,
bolted, or physically impeded in any way to allow egress during a fire.
Panel and equipment arrangements should be designed and installed to maintain sufficient clear widths 0.9 m
(3 ft) to allow personnel to exit the equipment areas safely from either end in case of a fire. Dead ends in
excess of 6.1 m (20 ft) in length should be avoided.
6.9.3 Emergency lighting
Guidance on emergency lighting can be found in ANSI/NFPA 101-2011 [B34] and applicable building,
electrical and fire codes.
Emergency lighting should be provided for all portions of the means of egress at a minimum lighting level of
11 lux at the floor or tread level. In absence of local building code requirements that often require longer
durations, the minimum duration recommended is 30 min or based on the exit time from the building,
whichever is greater.
6.9.4 Exit signage
Each exit door should be identified with an exit signage approved by the local authority having jurisdiction.
Additional approved exit signs should be placed in the means of egress such that no portion of the means of
egress is further than 30 m (100 ft) from an approved exit sign and so the entire exit path is evident.
6.9.5 Fire extinguishers

Portable fire extinguishers are installed in substations based on the types of hazard(s) present in accordance
with ANSI/NFPA 10-2012 [B7], where required by codes or standards or company practices (e.g., carried in
vehicle versus substation installation). When portable extinguishers are used in a substation, they should
always be rated for class C fires due to the presence of energized equipment (in addition to A or B rating).
Fire extinguishers for the protection of Class A hazards should be sized and distributed in accordance with
ANSI/NFPA 10-2012 [B7] for a hazard classification of ordinary (moderate).
Example: rating of 2A:C with 23 m (75 ft) travel distances. 19
IEEE Std 979-2012

Fire extinguishers for the protection of Class B hazards should be sized and distributed in accordance with
ANSI/NFPA 10-2012 [B7] for a hazard classification of extra (high).
Example: rating of 80B:C with 15 m (50 ft) travel distances. Refer to A.18 for additional information.
6.10 Combustible materials
The use of combustible materials with flame-spread, fuel-contributed, and smoke-developed ratings greater
than 25 should be avoided in the selection of desks, chairs, filing cabinets, storage boxes, display boards,
building insulation, interior wall panels, mounting boards, and so on. The flame spread is calculated utilizing
ANSI/NFPA 255-2006 [B37].
Guidance on interior finishes can be found in Section 10.2 of ANSI/NFPA 101-2011 [B34] and applicable
local building and fire codes.
Care should be taken to control the accumulation of combustible materials and refuse in substation buildings.
Combustible materials and refuse should be temporarily stored in metal safety refuse cans with self-closing
lids or metal garbage cans with metal lids. Any accumulated combustible materials and refuse should be
removed from the substation at least weekly.
7. Fire protection for substations

7.1 Spatial separation of outdoor mineral-oil-insulated equipment
Electrical equipment installed outdoors and containing mineral oil should be separated from other equipment,
buildings, and the adjacent property line to minimize the impact of a major fire. Spatial separation is an
effective method for reducing fire spread or damage from mineral-oil-filled equipment fires.
This clause provides two methods for determining acceptable minimum separation distances. Prescriptive
guidelines are presented in 7.2 followed by a performance-based alternative discussed in 7.3. The prescriptive
method is most commonly used, but this method may not provide adequate protection for all site conditions.
The performance-based method indicates a level of protection that more accurately models the specific site
conditions.
When it is not practical to apply the recommended spatial separations to new or existing substations,
mitigating measures such as firewalls, thermal barriers, flame-suppressing stone ground cover, automatic
suppression systems, and the use of less flammable dielectric fluids can be used to reduce spatial separation
values while maintaining an adequate level of protection. Refer to Clause 8 for specific guidance on these
alternative protection methods.
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IEEE Std 979-2012

7.2 Prescriptive separation requirements 7.2.1 Method for measuring spatial distances
Spatial separation distance is measured as a straight line from the anticipated flame front to the exposure of
concern. Mineral-oil-filled equipment fires are essentially pool spill fires with a three-dimensional object
inside the flame. The anticipated flame front can be approximated at the containment perimeter or the
anticipated spill area perimeter (where no containment or inadequate containment is provided).
The anticipated spill area perimeter is determined by reviewing the possible spill scenarios and selecting a
probable outcome. The example given in E.1 illustrates this.
When determining the spatial separation between two nonidentical pieces of equipment (for example,
different size transformers) or spill areas, two measurements are required (AB and BA) because the
anticipated flame front exposure distances may differ depending on which piece of equipment is on fire and
which piece of equipment is the fire target. Figure 1 illustrates the separation distance measurements. Note
that transformer B does not have containment and the anticipated spill area is based on the site characteristics.
There is no requirement to provide containment for small pieces of mineral-oil-insulated equipment. A criteria
of 1890 L (500 gal) or less of mineral oil is often used to classify small equipment. Distances for these small
pieces of mineral-oil-insulated equipment without oil containment may be measured from the nearest edge of
the equipment to the nearest portion of the adjacent exposure (equipment, building, or property line) provided
the site grade is sloped away from the adjacent exposure.
Figure 1—Separation distances between substation equipment
21

IEEE Std 979-2012

7.2.2 Equipment to equipment
Individual pieces of mineral-oil-insulated equipment should be separated from the anticipated flame fronts of
one another by the distances given in Table 1. Separation distances to adjacent equipment should be measured
from the edge of the postulated flame front to the nearest mineral-oil-filled component of the adjacent
equipment.
Table 1—Separation distances
a
Determining the type of physical separation to be used for mineral oil volumes less than 1890 L (500 gal) should be based on
consideration of the following:
 — Type and quantity of oil in the equipment

 — Size of a postulated oil spill (surface area and depth)
 — Construction of adjacent structures
 — Rating and bushing type
 — Fire-suppression systems provided
 — Protection clearing time
7.2.3 Equipment to buildings

Noncombustible or limited combustible buildings should be separated from adjacent mineral-oil-
insulated equipment containment area(s) by a 2 h rated firewall or the separation values in Table 1.
7.2.4 Equipment to property lines
Use of the most conservative separation criteria listed in 7.2.2 is good engineering practice when
determining separation criteria to the property line. This is done because the owner may not have
input or control regarding what is built on the adjacent property and how far that exposure will be set
back from the property line.
7.2.5 Exceptions
Multiple pieces of mineral-oil-insulated equipment used as a group on the same electrical circuit may
be permitted to be any distance apart with increased risk to all units. Risk and reliability issues
should be considered when taking this exception. This exception would typically be made for
medium voltage (≤35 kV) equipment (e.g., single-phase oil circuit breakers or voltage regulators)
with per-phase mineral oil volumes less than 1890 L (500 gal) or when the insulating fluid is listed
as less flammable.
Mineral-oil-insulated equipment with small oil volumes (e.g., auxiliary transformers) associated with
larger, mineral-oil-insulated piece of equipment (or three-phase group) may use the smaller spacing
criteria with the acknowledgment of increased risk of damage to the smaller piece of equipment.
22
Mineral oil volume, L (gal) Separation distance, m (ft)
<1890 (500) Footnote a

1890 to 18 930 (500 to
7.6 (25)
5000)
>18 930 (5000)

15.2 (50)
IEEE Std 979-2012

7.2.6 Other types of adjacent equipment

Where containment is provided in accordance with 8.1, other types of substation equipment should be no
closer than 10.7 m (35 ft) to an adjacent piece of mineral-oil-insulated equipment’s anticipated flame front (or
containment boundary). This distance is considered the minimum spatial separation distance.
Where crushed stone is provided in accordance with 8.2, the minimum separation distance may be reduced to
4.6 m (15 ft).
Where containment is not provided in accordance with 8.1, the minimum separation distance should be
calculated in accordance with 7.3.
7.3 Calculated separation requirements
As an alternative to the prescriptive values listed in 7.2, minimum separation distances may be derived from
deterministic heat flux calculations. Annex B outlines the theory and various methodologies. These methods
may be used when the prescriptive values are difficult to apply (e.g., the use of polymer bushings) or to gain a
better understanding of the fire hazards for a design.
Industry accepted methodologies are presented in various engineering guides, including the SFPE
Engineering Guide for Assessing Flame Radiation to External Targets from Pool Fires [B77].
7.4 Ground surface material
Special consideration should be given to ground surface material. The substation ground surface material
selected can impact the fire hazard created by existing site grading. The use of hard ground surface materials
or asphalt surfaces (impermeable surfaces) can allow spill fires to spread over greater distances. Crushed
stone ground surfaces can help to suppress or minimize a flaming spill fire.
7.5 Cable raceway systems 7.5.1 Cable trenches
Cable trenches within 3 m (10 ft) of mineral-oil-insulated equipment containing less than 1890 L (500 gal)
should have noncombustible, liquid-tight covers and be arranged to prevent liquids from entering the trench.
Cable trenches within 7.6 m (25 ft) of mineral-oil-insulated equipment containing 1890 L (500 gal) or more
should have noncombustible, liquid-tight covers and be arranged to prevent liquids from entering the trench.
Cable trenches within 6.1 m (20 ft) of buildings should have noncombustible covers.
The walls of cable trenches should be designed to prevent the entry of burning liquid through the sides of the
trench walls. Typically, this is achieved by having trench walls project above and below grade and by having
all joints and seams sealed liquid tight.
23
IEEE Std 979-2012

Cable trenches within oil-containment areas should be constructed entirely from noncombustible materials
with a 3 h fire-resistance rating and all penetrations fire stopped to maintain the 3 h fire-resistance rating.
Only liquid-tight covers should be used on the trench.
Fire stops should be installed within the trenches to prevent the spread of a cable fire or oil fire. These fire
stops can be constructed of concrete, fire stopping material, sandbags, or by filling the cable trench with sand.
Fire stops should be installed adjacent to cable trench intersections, adjacent to any major pieces of oil-
insulated equipment and before the entry into any substation building. The following conditions must be met:
1. a) Fire stops should be installed in cable trenches in order to prevent fire from spreading to other
parts of the cable system.
2. b) Fire stops should be installed at each junction where cables run in two or more directions.
3. c) Fire stops should be installed prior to cable trench connections to any substation building.
Exception:
The requirements for liquid-tight wall construction and internal trench fire stops (intermediate fire stops
within the trench) may be excluded where all of the following conditions exist:
 ⎯ Cables present are limited to control cables that meet the requirements of ANSI/IEEE 383-1974
[B3].
 ⎯ Cable trenches are not located within the anticipated oil spill area of any mineral-oil-insulated
equipment present.
 ⎯ Cable trenches are not entering any substation buildings.
 ⎯ The requirements for noncombustible, liquid-tight covers as described above are met.
Notwithstanding that this exception allows for the exclusion of internal trench fire stops, it is
recommended that a fire stop be installed at each building–trench interface so that fires do not spread
beyond these interfaces. This recommendation is made regardless of other safeguards that may be in
place, which could lead a designer to believe this building–trench interface fire stop may not be
necessary.
7.5.2 Conduits
Electrical cables serving major pieces of mineral-oil-insulated electrical equipment (>1890 L or 500
gal) should be installed in conduit wherever possible. In switchyards, conduits are commonly used to
enclose cables going to equipment. Polyvinyl chloride (PVC) conduit is commonly used. For
mineral-oil-filled equipment, the conduit may become a path for burning oil to flow away from the
equipment and out of any oil containment. The use of noncombustible materials and fire stops will
minimize this problem. Conduits should be sealed with a fire-resistive seal to keep moisture, dirt,
and debris out of the conduit.
Refer to 6.6.4 for considerations when conduits are used in buildings.
7.5.3 Tunnels
Walk-through cable tunnels (galleries) are used where there are a large number of cables. The cable
trays in these areas should be separated by a distance sufficient so that a fire in one tray will not
propagate to an adjacent tray. If flame-retardant cables are used, the recommended separation
distances are given in IEEE Std 384-2008 [B65] and ANSI/IEEE 525-1992 [B4]. If cables are not
flame retardant or the proper
24
IEEE Std 979-2012

separation cannot be achieved, then a fire-resistive barrier or shield can be used between the trays or a fire-
retardant coating may be applied to the cables. Fire hazards can also be minimized by utilizing fire stops.
Consideration should also be given to the installation of 2 h fire-rated separation, a fire-detection system, a
fixed extinguishing system, locating firefighting equipment at the tunnel entrances, and keeping air flows
through the tunnels to a minimum. Restricting air flow in a cable tunnel will result in a reduction in the
ampacity of the cables in it. This must be considered in planning the use of fire barriers.
7.6 Water supply
Where a local municipal water supply is available, fire hydrants should be considered for installation such that
mineral-oil-insulated equipment with capacities of 1890 L (500 gal) or more and buildings are no more than
150 m (500 ft) from a fire hydrant. In this case, the need to isolate electrically any metallic water pipes where
they enter the substation should be reviewed to determine whether the transfer of the substation’s ground
potential rise will be hazardous.
7.7 Fire extinguishers
Unless more restrictive local requirements apply, it is recommended that fire extinguishers be made available
where personnel are present performing maintenance activities. This requirement can be achieved by
permanent installation of fire extinguishers throughout the yard or by requiring service personnel to bring
suitable fire extinguishers with them during maintenance activities.
8. Fire protection for equipment 8.1 Oil-spill-containment systems
Substation oil-spill-containment systems have typically been installed for environmental reasons, but they
also provide fire protection benefits. By minimizing the surface area of a mineral-oil spill fire, the following
benefits arise:
 ⎯ Reduced overall size of the spill fire

 ⎯ Contained fire from spreading within the substation
 ⎯ Reduced flame height
 ⎯ Reduced radiant heat flux to noninvolved exposures
 ⎯ Reduced clean up and restoration area following the event
If oil-spill containment is not required for environmental reasons, then the substation designer should
consider the oil-spill containment for fire protection.
An oil-spill-containment system should be designed in accordance with IEEE Std 980.6 In addition to
containing the oil volume, the containment volume should allow for precipitation (typically 24 h of
the
6
Information on references can be found in Clause 2.
25
IEEE Std 979-2012

25-year storm density), automatic fire-suppression systems (refer to ANSI/NFPA 15-2012 [B16] for
guidance), and manual firefighting activities, as applicable.
Oil-containment systems should be designed to survive exposure to a minimum 3 h fire occurring within the
bounds of the containment system. This minimum fire-resistance time may be reduced to a 2 h exposure with
the installation of automatic suppression systems.
The perimeter of the spill containment should generally be located between 2 m and 3 m (6.6 ft and 9.8 ft)
beyond the portions of the electrical equipment containing oil, based on the height of typical bushings and
conservators.
Stone is frequently used in oil-containment pits. Refer to 8.2 for recommendations.
8.2 Stone flame suppression
It is common practice for substation designers to use stone for ground surface material in switchyards and to
provide stone in the containment pits of oil-insulated equipment. Testing has shown that a 150 mm (6 in)
depth of 18 mm (0.75 in) diameter stone can suppress the flaming combustion of mineral oil by lowering the
flame temperature and controlling the combustion air. When the level of the mineral oil rises to within 40 mm
(1.5 in) of the top of the stone surface, flaming combustion will occur. See Zalosh and Lin [B81] for further
details.
It is recommended that the stone used for ground surface material or in containment pits should be between
18 mm and 38 mm (0.75 in and 1.5 in) in diameter. Containment pits should be designed with a minimum
stone depth of 450 mm (18 in) so the liquid volume will not rise to within 50 mm (2 in) of the top surface of
the stone. Stone used for station surfacing will typically have a depth of 150 mm (6 in).
The void space for a layer of 18 mm (0.75 in) diameter stone is approximately 30% to 40% (the actual void
space for the stone being used in containment pits should be determined for design purposes). Therefore, the
overall volume of the oil containment will have to be significantly larger when flame-suppressing stone is
used to fill the entire volume of a containment pit. An alternative is to put a layer of stone on a grating system
in the containment pit. Refer to IEC 61936-1-2011 [B60] for further details.
The following considerations should be made when using stone:
 ⎯ Stone used as ground surfacing material with depths of more than 150 mm (6 in) may be difficult
to drive over.
 ⎯ The stone should be durable so it does not fracture under the expected loads.
 ⎯ The void ratio for stone used in containment pits should be considered in determining the liquid
(includes oil, rain water, melting snow, etc.) containment volume.
 ⎯ Crushing the stone so it has at least two faces will allow the stone to interlock and provide a
better surface for walking and driving. This reduces the void ratio and is taken into account when
determining the storage volume.
 ⎯ Washing stone before it is installed will reduce fines and organic material normally present in
new material from being deposited at the bottom of the layer and thus improve its effectiveness and
increase the period until the first maintenance.
 ⎯ Areas with snow accumulation may encounter spring melting conditions where snow melts in
daytime and freezes when it cools off at night. This may cause ice to form around the rock, which
would make the stone ineffective for fire-suppression or fire protection purposes.
26
IEEE Std 979-2012

⎯ Stone should be maintained on a regular basis to remove foreign debris such as sand, dirt, and weeds that
accumulate between the stones and reduce its effectiveness.
8.3 Fire barriers
Guidance on the design and installation of fire barriers for mineral-oil-insulated equipment can be found in
NFPA 850 and NFPA 851. Fire barriers should be of suitable construction to maintain effectiveness
throughout the duration of the expected exposure fire. Fire barriers should be designed to withstand wind
loads, seismic loads, and blast pressures, as applicable.
Fire barriers may be installed as a means of passive separation protection when the minimum spatial
separation distances defined in 7.2 are not achieved.
8.3.1 Height
The minimum barrier height should be based on site-specific calculations. In lieu of these calculations,
consider a barrier height between 0.3 m (1 ft) and 1 m (3.3 ft) above the highest mineral-oil-insulated
portion(s) of the adjacent equipment.
Where separating mineral-oil-insulated equipment from non–mineral-oil-insulated equipment or buildings,

the height of the barrier should not be less than that required to break all sight lines between the highest
mineral-oil-insulated component(s) and all portions of the non–mineral-oil-insulated equipment or buildings
within the minimum spatial separation distance(s) defined in 7.2.
8.3.2 Width
The barrier should extend to the outermost boundary of the oil-containment area(s) serving the mineral-oil-
insulated equipment or the boundary of the postulated pool fire.
Where separating mineral-oil-insulated equipment from non–mineral-oil-insulated equipment or buildings,
the width of the barrier should not be less than that required to break all sight lines between the outermost
edge of the oil-containment area serving the adjacent mineral-oil-insulated equipment and all portions of the
non–mineral-oil-insulated equipment or buildings within the minimum spatial separation distance(s) defined
in 7.2.
8.4 Fire-suppression systems
Active, automatic fire-suppression systems should be considered in lieu of fire barriers when the minimum
spatial separation distances defined in 7.2 are not achieved. These types of systems may also be installed in
addition to fire barriers or indoor equipment vaults for additional fire control.
In areas with gaseous fire extinguishing systems, smoke ventilation systems should be properly interlocked
for the effective operation of the extinguishing system.
27
8.4.1 Indoor equipment vaults
IEEE Std 979-2012

A minimum 3 h fire-resistance-rated vault should encompass all individual energized pieces of indoor
mineral-oil-insulated equipment containing 1890 L (500 gal) or more of mineral oil.
The minimum fire-resistance rating may be reduced to 2 h where automatic suppression is installed in
accordance with 8.4.
8.4.2 Alternative dielectric insulating medium
Alternative types of dielectric insulating liquids have been developed with higher flash and fire points to
minimize the likelihood and impact of fires. These are generally referred to as “less flammable” fluids as
defined by the National Electrical Code® (NEC®) (NFPA 70) [B75]. Such alternative dielectric insulating
fluids should always be considered where feasible, but they are particularly useful for minimizing fire impact
on indoor equipment applications and equipment arrangements where the minimum spatial separation
distances in 7.2 cannot be achieved.
8.5 Explosion suppression
Explosion suppression systems for power transformers are not widely deployed. Some methodologies may
minimize transformer explosion impacts as indicated in 8.5.1 through 8.5.3.
8.5.1 Distribution class transformers
For distribution class auxiliary transformers inside substations, tank rupture prevention/protection systems
may be used as per UL and FM listings requirements per Article 450-23 of NFPA 70 [B75]. An example is
FM Global’s FM Approved Transformers Standard 3990, which incorporates current limiting fusing and
equivalent means to limit the potential fault energy to an acceptable level.
8.5.2 Power class transformers
Explosion suppression systems have been developed, tested, and installed in high-risk transformer
applications. At this time, the industry has not accumulated enough experience to validate the effectiveness of
any of the designs. System manufacturers can provide both test data and user testimony. Substation designers
considering such an application should work closely with the transformer manufacturer and the explosion
suppression system manufacturer to determine the most appropriate design.
New designs using multiple containment structures and more pressure-resistant tank construction are being
developed by some manufacturers.
8.5.3 Alternative dielectric insulation medium
The use of high-fire-point fluids or nonflammable gases, such as SF6, as a dielectric medium in distribution
and power class transformers can significantly reduce the impact of a catastrophic failure inside a transformer
tank. Substation designers considering such an application should work closely with the transformer
manufacturer to determine the most appropriate design.
28
8.6 Equipment design
IEEE Std 979-2012

Below are a few suggestions to minimize the spread of fire from oil-filled equipment:
 ⎯ Avoid the use of low melting temperature valves and other fittings, especially at the lower
surfaces of transformer walls (an external fire will melt these valves and feed the fire)
 ⎯ Implement a scheme on transformers to stop the fans and pumps when there is a transformer trip
(prevent pumping oil or blowing air onto a fire or ruptured transformer that is on fire or spilling oil
[even if contained])
9. Fire protection measures selection 9.1 General
A fire risk evaluation should be initiated as early in the design process as practical so that the fire
prevention and fire protection recommendations as described in this document have been evaluated
in view of the substation-specific considerations regarding design, layout, and anticipated operating
requirements. The evaluation should result in a list of recommended fire prevention features to be
provided based on acceptable means for separation or control of common and special hazards,
decrease the probability of ignition, and the suppression of fires. The fire risk evaluation should be
approved by the owner prior to final drawings and installation.
Many factors are used in the selection of the most appropriate type of fire protection for substation
hazards. There is no one best solution for each of the individual hazards that substations have, but
there are a number of alternatives that can be used based on the needs of the owner, insurance
company, and regulator. The following are a number of commonly used methods for selecting fire
protection measures.
9.2 Fire protection objectives
Individual fire protection solutions can provide different damage levels for specific applications. The
owner needs to determine the acceptable level of fire loss to help determine the level of fire
protection to use.
A typical example of this method involves the fire protection for substation control buildings; some
owners have an objective of suppressing a fire at a cabinet components stage and thereby install
gaseous fire protection systems to extinguish those fires very rapidly. Other owners may be willing
to accept damage from a fire that would be limited to the loss of one or two cabinets and will
therefore install a preaction sprinkler system in the substation control facility.
9.3 Performance factors
Important criteria in the selection of the most appropriate fire protection for a substation are called
performance factors. The three typical criteria are as follows:
o ⎯ Reliability: The system will operate correctly when it is required to do so.

o ⎯ Availability: The system will have a low down time for maintenance or as a result of
failures.
o ⎯ Effectiveness: The system will suppress the fire before critical conditions can occur.
29
IEEE Std 979-2012

The various fire protection systems available provide differing levels for these criteria.
9.4 Life cycle factors
Fire protection systems have varying life expectancies. Sprinkler systems can continue to provide successful
performance for several decades, but software-based addressable detection systems become obsolete much
sooner (typically 1 to 15 years).
9.5 Risk-based economic analysis
The economic risk-based analysis is the evaluation of the investment measures in relation to the probability of
fire, the potential losses due to fire, and the cost of the fire protection measures. This analysis requires a
reasonable database of the probability of fires for the different hazard areas or types, an assessment of the
performance success of the proposed fire protection measures, an estimate of the fire loss costs, and
engineering judgment. The potential losses usually include the equipment loss as well as an assessment of the
lost revenue due to the outage resulting from the loss of equipment.
9.6 Benefit/cost analysis
One of the most common risk-based economic analysis is a benefit/cost analysis. This analysis is calculated
using Equation (1):
benefit p(F)×e(RM)×[RC+LR+SB+OC] cost RM

B/C= =
where
(1)
supervisory equipment or additional testing and switching costs associated with restoring
service
p(F) is the probability of major fire (probability of an outage due to a fire) RC is the replacement cost of
facility and equipment lost due to fire
RM is the cost of remedial measure
SB is the societal benefit (in $) lost due to customer outages created by fire
Once the potential financial loss due to a fire has been calculated, the designer should input costs and
effectiveness of any proposed fire protection measure into the benefit/cost equation and determine the B/C
ratio. If the B/C ratio is less than 1, then the provision of the fire protection measure is not an acceptable
investment.
Normally, the B/C ratio should be greater than 1 and preferably greater than 2. A B/C ratio of 2 means that the
avoided fire loss cost or benefit is twice that of the cost of the fire protection measure. Therefore it is a good
investment.
30

benefit is the value associated with lost revenue, operation, and building replacements that are avoided if a
major fire is prevented (benefit of avoided loss)
cost is the cost to protect against damage due to major fire

e(RM) is the effectiveness of remedial measure
LR is the lost revenue (in $) due to fire (lost load × mill rate)
OC is the operating cost associated with manning the station due to fire damage of
IEEE Std 979-2012

Any fire insurance coverage can also be included in this type of calculation. The insurance premiums can be
included as a fire protection cost, and an insurance payout will reduce the fire costs.
It should be noted that insurers will generally reduce the insurance costs for specific types of fire protection
installed. Companies should review the possible premium savings with their insurers and factor any savings
into the calculation.
Refer to C.6 for additional information and an example calculation.
31
Annex A
(normative)
IEEE Std 979-2012

Additional information to main body clauses
A.1 Purpose
This clause provides additional information to 1.2.
Fire protection measures reduce the fire risks to the public in the vicinity of the substation and to emergency
response personnel. These measures can also decrease the risk to operating personnel.
Fire protection should be integral to the planning, design, and operation of substations. In many instances, fire
protection is not considered. Too often, fire protection decisions are made after the planning and design of the
substation, which can lead to costly changes late in the project.
Although common cause events are considered, substation fires generally have not been considered in
assessing the reliability of the electric system. However, substation fire events have occurred, with significant
challenges to system reliability.
Careful consideration of the consequences of a substation fire, and alleviating those consequences throughout
the planning and design process, will help to mitigate the consequences of a fire in a substation.
Properly designed substation fire protection can minimize the effect of component failure during a fire on
overall reliability of the system supply. Having fire protection systems and processes will minimize the asset
and revenue losses from any fire.
A.2 Fire hazards
This clause provides additional information to Clause 4.
Identifying fire hazards can be a complex process. The fire hazard analysis process should be used for
planned, new, or existing substations to determine the appropriate level of fire protection necessary to
mitigate the consequence of fire. The fire hazard analysis process should be done by a team consisting of
substation designers, fire protection specialists, and substation operating staff so that all perspectives are
included in the process. The probability of fire and potential magnitude of its consequences should be
quantified to help justify the need for fire protection. For further information regarding the process for
evaluating industrial fire hazards, refer to Chapter 2, “Industrial Fire Hazard Assessment,” of the ANSI/NFPA
Industrial Fire Hazards Handbook, 3rd ed. [B46].
Historical information on substation fires can help with fire hazard analysis. There have been a wide range of
types and causes of fires experienced in substations. The types of fires are based on the equipment and
systems used in the substations. Fires involving dc valves, outdoor or indoor mineral-oil-insulated equipment,
mineral-oil-insulated cable, hydrogen-cooled synchronous condensers, or equipment with fluids containing
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) are usually well documented. Therefore, these types of equipment are
easily recognized as a fire hazard. There are a number of other substation fire types that are not as well
documented. Factory Mutual Data Sheets 5-4 [B57], 5-19 [B58], and 5-31 [B59]; NFPA 851; and CIGRE TF
14.01.04-1999 [B54] provide guidance on these types of fires.
Clause D.6 covers a study done by a major utility of reported substation fires listed by types. 32
IEEE Std 979-2012

A.3 Fire protection considerations for substation sites
This clause provides additional information to Clause 5 and 6.8.
A fire risk evaluation should be initiated as early in the design process as practical so that, in addition to other
applicable codes and/or regulations, the fire prevention and fire protection recommendations of this document
may be evaluated in view of the specific considerations regarding design, layout, and anticipated operating
requirements. The evaluation should result in a list of recommended fire prevention features to be provided
based on acceptable means for separation or control of common and special hazards, the control or
elimination of ignition sources, and the suppression of fires.
Fire Safety Decision Trees is a methodology commonly used to determine the most appropriate strategy for
fire protection. It can also be applied to the various hazards that are found in electrical substations. Refer to
NFPA 550-2012 [B40] for details on how to use this methodology.
A.4 Forested or grassland areas
This clause provides additional information to 5.2.1.
A fall hazard should be carried out on trees and other vertical vegetation around a substation. Fallen trees
should be a minimum of 9 m (30 ft) away from all critical substation assets. NFPA 1144-2013 [B44] provides
a method for evaluating this type of hazard under specific site conditions.
A.5 Prevailing winds
Prevailing wind direction data are available from many national weather organizations, local weather stations,
national forest organizations, and airports.
The Society of Fire Protection Engineers publishes several documents that present methodologies for
calculating the impact of wind-tilted fire plumes. Both the SFPE Handbook [B79] and the SFPE Engineering
Guide for Assessing Flame Radiation to External Targets from Pool Fires [B77] provide examples of
methodologies.
A.6 Fire emergency response capability
When designing a new substation or changing an existing substation, the substation designer should review
the capabilities of the fire service in the area of the station. If no public fire service or fire brigade is available
to fight a fire in the station, then the substation designer should not rely on any manual means of fire
protection but incorporate other specific safeguards. The designer could look at incorporating specific design
measures into the substation design.
If the local fire brigade or fire department can provide manual fire protection services to the substation, then
the designer should work with these groups to determine their specific capabilities. The ranges of fire
department or fire brigade capabilities can vary considerably.
Large, well-organized fire departments in major cities can provide significant resources in terms of equipment
and work force in a short time to deal with a major fire. Rural volunteer fire departments on the
33
IEEE Std 979-2012

other hand may not have the same level of equipment and personnel to deal with large-scale fires. Discussions
with the fire departments should be held to determine the following:
 ⎯ The maximum number of personnel the fire department has available

 ⎯ The type of equipment available such as pumper trucks, tanker trucks, aerial ladder trucks, foam
supplies, and other special equipment
 ⎯ The number and type of equipment and personnel that would be dispatched to a fire at the
substation
 ⎯ The expected response time
The designer could then review probable types of fires (design fires) that would be expected at the
substation and work with the emergency services to determine whether they have sufficient resources
to deal with a specific incident. If the local fire department does not have sufficient resources to deal
with the design fires at the station, then the designer should work with the local fire department and
determine whether there are adjacent fire departments or fire resources that could be used during an
incident. Several high-profile substation fires have been successfully suppressed using crash rescue
firefighting vehicles from adjacent airports. If such resources are not available, then consideration
should be given to including increased substation fire protection features or the possible purchase of
required resources for the local fire department.
If the substation designer finds that the local fire emergency resources and water supply are
inadequate for manual firefighting, then passive or active automatic fire protection measures should
be considered as part of the overall substation fire protection scheme. Some examples of passive
measures that could be used in the substation design are providing adequate spacing between oil-
filled equipment, provision of firewalls between closely spaced equipment, the use of
noncombustible construction for the control building, and the provision of stone-filled pits or other
oil containment means around all oil-filled equipment. Possible active automatic fire protection
measures include water spray, sprinkler, and inert gas systems.
Fire department personnel responding to substation fires can be exposed to significant fire and
electrical safety hazards that they may not be trained to deal with. The types of fire hazards found in
indoor and outdoor substations are significantly different from the typical hazards to which public
firefighters are normally exposed. As such, they may be putting their own safety at risk.
The most significant hazards that fire department personnel are exposed to are the electrical safety
hazards of the substation. Fire department personnel are trained to take an active role and
aggressively suppress fires. In the case of a fire in an electrical substation, there may be long delays
until substation operating personnel can arrive onsite and make the station electrically safe. In some
cases, it may take up to an hour for operating personnel to arrive onsite to make the station
electrically safe. Therefore, the fire department personnel want to enter the facility and suppress the
fire, before it is safe to do so.
Delays of this type create additional pressures on the responding fire departments because they are
concerned that while they are waiting to gain access to the substation fire, they cannot respond to
other alarms received. These tensions can create situations where responding personnel take serious
risks of electrical contacts and exposures.
The type of equipment and facilities found in the substation are foreign to most of the operating
environments to which the fire department personnel are exposed. Therefore, the installation of fire
protection in a substation will help control or suppress fires and allow the fire department to access
the facility safely.
A.7 Available firefighting water supplies

34

IEEE Std 979-2012

In the event of a fire in the station buildings or mineral-oil-insulated equipment, water is the most commonly
used fire extinguishing agent both directly and as part of fire extinguishing agent mixtures such as foam. As
part of the design process, the available firefighting water supplies should be reviewed for any station that has
a responding fire department or fire brigade. If there is no responding fire department or fire brigade, then the
designer may incorporate passive measures (i.e., greater spacing of mineral-oil-insulated electrical equipment)
into the station’s design.
The designer should also determine the requirement for firefighting water supplies, based on governing codes,
regulations, and bylaws. The following are some of the common standards for firefighting water supplies:
1. a) Piped municipal supplies

1. 1) Fire Underwriter Survey Water Supply requirements guide
2. 2) Insurance Advisory Organization
3. 3) American Water Works Association
2. b) Rural water supplies
1. 1) ANSI/NFPA 1142-2012 [B43]
2. 2) Various NFPA fire protection application standards such as ANSI/NFPA 13-2011
[B14], ANSI/NFPA 14-2010 [B15], ANSI/NFPA 15-2012 [B16], and ANSI/NFPA 24-2013 [B21]
During the water supply review, the substation designer should look at all possible sources of water adjacent
to the station such as lakes, streams and rivers, swamps, and so on. The designer should also be cognizant of
the relatively large quantity of water required for multiple hours of firefighting during major substation fires,
such as fully involved mineral-oil-insulated transformer fires.
If there is an insufficient water supply available for manual firefighting, then the designer should work with
the local fire department to determine whether they have adequate tanker capabilities to bring water to the
substation during the fire.
Where a local municipal water supply is not available, responding fire department personnel should be
consulted on their needs for fighting all probable fire scenarios. Water tanker trucks, onsite water storage
tanks, ponds, lakes, and streams are all possible sources of firefighting water. Passive fire protection measures
such as containment, spatial separation, and/or fire barriers are of particular importance where sufficient
firefighting water may not be available.
Hydrant systems intended for use by fire department personnel should have suitable grounding clamps and
cables available within the station to ground any firefighting vehicles operating within the station.
If the substation designer finds that the local fire emergency resources and water supply are inadequate for
manual firefighting, then passive or active automatic fire protection should be considered. Some examples of
passive measures that could be used in the substation design are providing adequate spacing between oil-
filled equipment, provision of firewalls between closely spaced equipment, the use of noncombustible
construction for the control building, and the provision of stone ground cover adjacent to all oil-filled
equipment.
A.8 Emergency access to the substation

35
IEEE Std 979-2012

When the substation designer is laying out the station or changing an existing station, he or she may consider
emergency vehicle access to all major buildings or major banks of oil-insulated equipment.
In most cases, the normal operating access for bucket trucks and crane trucks will be quite similar to that
required by the emergency services. Normally, fire department vehicles do not need to get within 150 m (500
ft) of major risk areas. If the distances are greater than 150 m (500 ft), then consideration should be made to
ensuring adequate access is available.
When laying out the overall site plan, the designer should make provisions for emergency access at a
minimum of two locations around the switchyard.
Typically, the emergency services vehicles require access roads with a minimum width of 6.1 m (20 ft),
centerline minimum turning radius of 12 m (40 ft), overhead clearances of 5 m, and roadbeds that will support
the expected load imposed by firefighting vehicles in the various seasonal conditions.
The access points to the station should have a minimum width of 6.1 m (20 ft). These access points should not
be located should beneath overhead power lines or adjacent to critical fire hazards that could cause them to be
blocked during an incident. The access points should also be remotely located such that the minimum distance
between them is no less than 1/2 the overall diagonal distance of the switchyard.
If the access roads throughout the station yard are dead-ended, then provision should be made for a suitable
turnaround facility.
A.9 Substation buildings
This clause provides additional information to 6.2 through 6.5 and 7.2.3.
The types of fires created by mineral-oil-insulated equipment or cable can create catastrophic risks to indoor
substations. The application of these types of equipment should be analyzed using fire performance- based
methods because guidelines may not recommend suitable levels of fire protection for indoor substations. A
performance-based method will be able to model more accurately the fire conditions and the impacts to the
building occupants, the structure, and other equipment.
The fire conditions can be reviewed based on some of the following types of criteria:
 ⎯ The blast pressure created by an explosion and the ability of the building to withstand the blast
pressures
 ⎯ The heat release rate and flame height of the fire
 ⎯ The activation time for fire detection devices and fire protection systems and the ability of fire
protection systems (i.e., sprinklers or water spray systems) to suppress the fire
 ⎯ The available safe egress time for building occupants (including detection time, egress time, and
smoke exposure time)
 ⎯ Volume of smoke being released during the fire
 ⎯ The temperature exposure conditions of building structural elements and predicted failure time
 ⎯ Time to allow the fire to burn out
 ⎯ Fire conditions that the fire department will be exposed to
 ⎯ Smoke and fire damage to other areas and equipment of the substation
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IEEE Std 979-2012

The various performance fire modeling (zone or computational fluid dynamics) techniques provide varying
degrees of fire details and simulation results. For an indoor mineral-oil-insulated transformer, target criteria
can be as simple as preventing a fire from taking out of service a second transformer, or it can be as complex
as radiant heat flux to the building structure or carbon monoxide exposures to building occupants.
The following are some of the recognized performance-based fire safety and protection documents that can be
used for a performance-based analysis:
 ⎯ SFPE Engineering Guide to Performance-Based Fire Protection [B78]

 ⎯ SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering [B79]
 ⎯ British Standards Institute, Fire Safety Engineering in buildings (Part 1 Guide to the application
of fire safety engineering principles) [B51]
 ⎯ Australian Building Codes Board, Fire Safety Engineering Guidelines [B49]
 ⎯ The Canadian National Building Code (objective-based) [B73]
 ⎯ AICHE Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis [B2]
 ⎯ EPRI TR-100443-1992 [B56]
 ⎯ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NUREG) documents
A.10 Construction
See NFPA 850 for further discussion on construction requirements. When exploring the additional
information available in NFPA 850, keep in mind that the information and requirements presented
may be overly conservative for direct application to substations because they are developed for
generation facilities, which involve different hazards and threats.
A.11 Fire separation
Fire separations are a form of compartmentalization to limit fire spread by isolating a room or space
containing a fire hazard. The fire separation compartment will be formed by fire-rated assemblies of
the floor, walls, and ceiling of the room. In the absence of applicable building code requirements, the
following are suggested fire-resistance ratings for separating substation areas from one another:
 ⎯ Control rooms, 2 h
 ⎯ Battery rooms, 2 h
 ⎯ Switchgear rooms, 2 h
 ⎯ Cable spreading rooms or tunnels, 2 h
 ⎯ Telecommunications rooms, 2 h
 ⎯ Shops,2 h
 ⎯ Offices, 2 h
 ⎯ Warehouse areas, 2 h
 ⎯ Emergency diesel generator, 2 h
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IEEE Std 979-2012

 ⎯ Flammable and combustible storage, 2 h

 ⎯ Transformer vaults, 3 h7
 ⎯ Indoor oil circuit breaker vaults, 3 h (see footnote 7)
A.12 Floor and roof
ANSI/NFPA 256-2003 [B38] outlines a method to measure the relative fire characteristics of roof
coverings. Class A (ANSI/NFPA 256-2003 [B38]) rated roof coverings are effective against severe
test exposure, which give a high degree of fire protection to the roof deck, which do not slip from
position, and which do not present a flying brand hazard.
A.13 Building openings
Most building codes permit opening protective systems (rated doors, windows, and shutter
assemblies) to have a slightly reduced rating due to the fact that combustible loading is typically
substantially less in front of openings when they are used as functional attributes of a compartment
(windows for viewing or doors for access to the space). This practice is supported in this guide by
allowing the reduction from a 2 h rating down to a 1.5 h rating requirement for doors and similar
opening protective systems.
Where nonoperable windows are installed as opening protective systems in rated separation walls,
many times wired glass, ceramic glazing, or specialized water spray systems can be used in lieu of
fire shutters.
A.14 Heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC)

The following is a list of areas where alternative designs should be considered:
o ⎯ The HVAC systems for control rooms, computer rooms, and communication rooms
would ideally be designed to provide a positive pressure for these rooms and to operate with
full exhaust/relief air and no return air, during a fire. These systems should not service other
areas. The objective is to help prevent smoke from a fire outside these rooms entering the
rooms and exhausting any smoke from a fire within the rooms. If these rooms are protected
by a total flooding gaseous system, then the HVAC system should be shut down so the
suppression systems can operate correctly.
o ⎯ Any HVAC system for areas having mineral-oil-insulated equipment, SF6, or high
concentrations of cable with combustible insulation jackets should be designed to operate in
a full exhaust mode in the event of a fire. These systems should not service other areas.
7
An analysis with input from a fire protection engineer, substation designer, and building official(s) should be
performed to determine the appropriate level of fire separation on indoor transformer and mineral-oil-insulated
circuit breaker vaults. This analysis should take into consideration the type of substation building involved
(underground, multistory, or located in a high-rise building), fire-resistance rating of the overall structure,
calculated blast pressure of the room boundaries and structure, blast venting, type of transformer or circuit breaker
used, electrical failure characteristics (arc tension, short-circuit current, and arc duration time), active fire
protection systems present, company response time, and fire department response adequacy.
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IEEE Std 979-2012

A.15 Smoke and heat management
Special consideration should be given to control and relay rooms that are located below grade or within a
multistory building, indoor transformer vaults, and other indoor areas that house large mineral-oil-insulated
equipment. Two important concerns are the protection of personnel and critical station equipment from
corrosive and toxic combustion products. Indoor fires can endanger occupants and assets far removed from
the actual fire event due to the spread of combustion products throughout the building.
Common concerns include the massive quantities of smoke that may be produced, toxic breakdown products
from SF6-insulated electrical equipment (SF4 sulfur tetrafluoride gas, S2F2 sulfur monofluoride gas, HF
hydrofluoric acid, H2SO4 sulfuric acid, and metallic fluoride dust), and the corrosive combustion products
released from halogen-bearing compounds (e.g., PVC and polyethylene cable jackets).
Consideration should be given to smoke venting from any areas that contain items capable of producing toxic
or corrosive smoke. Areas that could be impacted by corrosive smoke, such as control, relay, and
communication rooms, can be provided with a positive pressure ventilation system to prevent the migration of
smoke into those sensitive areas. ANSI/NFPA 92A-2009 [B33] provides detailed design guidance on smoke
control systems.
A.16 Fire alarm and detection systems

A.16.1 General
The following guidance is provided for the selection of industry-recognized detection strategies for specific
substation hazard areas. Generally, the following should be applied to substation buildings that meet one of
the following criteria:
 ⎯ A fire alarm and detection system is required by local codes.

 ⎯ The building area is greater than 1000 m2 (10 000 ft2).
 ⎯ The building is multistory.
 ⎯ The building contains oil-insulated equipment.
These recommendations are not intended to preclude the use of other detection methodologies
determined to be appropriate for the hazard.
A.16.2 Detection
Automatic detection should be designed in accordance with Section 5.7 of ANSI/NFPA 72-2010
[B28], “smoke-sensing fire detectors.” Where building and equipment configurations do not allow
for the prescriptive application of requirements, particularly in existing substation buildings,
performance-based designs are recommended in accordance with Section 5.3 of ANSI/NFPA 72-
2010 [B28].
The following are suggested applications for detection in specific substation buildings areas:
a) Control, relay, and telecommunication areas

1) Spot-type photoelectric detection at the ceiling and below the subfloor areas
39
IEEE Std 979-2012

2) Very early air sampling detection
NOTE—Unless rapid response is available from substation and emergency responders, there is little benefit to this
option.8
2. b) Feeder sections and switchgear areas

1. 1) Spot-type photoelectric detection
2. 2) Linear beam smoke detection
3. c) Cable spreading rooms and cable tunnels
1. 1) Spot-type photoelectric detection where environmental conditions permit
2. 2) Linear heat detection where humidity, temperature conditions, and other environmental
conditions are outside the photoelectric smoke detectors listed range
4. d) General substation building areas including shops, office, and warehouse areas
1) Spot-type photoelectric detection
e) Transformer vaults and mineral-oil-insulated equipment areas
1. 1) Linear beam smoke detection

2. 2) Rate-compensated thermal detectors, linear heat detection, or wet/dry pilot detection for deluge
system operation
A.16.3 Fire alarm/employee notification systems
Audible notification should be installed throughout all potentially occupied areas of underground, high-rise,
and indoor substation buildings in accordance with Section 7.4.3 of ANSI/NFPA 72-2010 [B28]. Public mode
visible notification should be provided throughout all areas with an average ambient sound level of 105 dB or
more.
Manual pull stations should be installed at each exit along with a single, visible notification device. The
minimum intensity rating should be 15 candela.
A.16.4 Monitoring
Fire alarm and detection systems should be monitored for alarm, supervisory, and trouble signals to a
constantly attended location.
A.17 Fire suppression
The following guidance is provided for the selection of industry-recognized suppression strategies for specific
substation hazard areas.
NOTE—These recommendations are not intended to preclude the utilization of other detection methodologies determined
to be appropriate for the hazard.
8
Notes in text, tables, and figures of a standard are given for information only and do not contain requirements needed to implement this
standard.
40
A.17.1 Cable spreading areas
IEEE Std 979-2012

Sprinkler systems should be installed throughout all cable-spreading areas. Design and installation of such
systems should be in accordance with NFPA 13 [B14]. Selection of design density should be based on the
type and density of cables present. See Section C-4 of NFPA 850, “Grouped Cable Fire Tests,” for additional
discussion on appropriate design densities.
Automatic sprinkler systems should be the wet pipe, closed-head type unless extenuating circumstances
prohibit this type (i.e., use dry pipe system in unheated areas subject to freezing).
Exception to wet pipe recommendation:
Preaction systems may be considered where extenuating circumstances dictate the need and the water delivery
delay time (and associated fire growth and damage level) is deemed acceptable. Circumstances may include
situations where equipment is present that does not react well to exposure to water and additional levels of
protection against inadvertent water discharge are deemed necessary.
A.17.2 Control, relay, and switchgear rooms/buildings
Suppression systems are generally not provided in control and relay rooms where all of the following are met:
1. a) A fire department with adequate personnel and equipment is available for emergency response in
a timely fashion.
2. b) An automatic detection system is arranged to dispatch automatically the fire department upon
receipt of any alarm signal.
3. c) Equipment present is limited to enclosed metal clad switchgear cubicles, relay and
communication panels, battery systems, miscellaneous electric panels, and associated conduit and
wiring. This type of equipment consists of minimal combustible material and is unlikely to
contribute to a deenergized fire scenario.
4. d) Mineral-oil-insulated equipment is not present.
5. e) Area is separated from other areas of the building by minimum 2 h fire-resistance-rated
construction.
Where the provisions of this clause are not all met, a double-interlock preaction sprinkler system should be
installed throughout the control and relay room(s).
Exception to preaction sprinkler recommendation:
Total flooding gaseous agent systems (e.g., clean agent) should be considered where extenuating
circumstances preclude the use of water (i.e., adjacent equipment areas with sensitive equipment in drainage
path and draining water poses an unacceptable threat to equipment). Such systems should be designed in
accordance with the appropriate NFPA standard and manufacturer design guidance.
A.17.3 Gas-insulated switchgear (GIS) areas
Sprinkler systems are not installed throughout all GIS areas except where there is mineral oil cable, mineral
oil potheads, or any other high fire hazards.
prohibit this type (i.e., use dry pipe systems in unheated areas subject to freezing).
41

IEEE Std 979-2012

Exception to wet pipe sprinkler recommendation:
Preaction sprinkler systems may be considered where extenuating circumstances dictate the need and the
water delivery delay time (and associated fire growth and damage level) is deemed acceptable. Circumstances
may include situations where equipment is present that does not react well to exposure to water and additional
levels of protection against inadvertent water discharge are deemed necessary.
A.17.4 Oil pump houses
Sprinkler systems should be installed throughout oil pump houses. Design and installation of such systems
shall be in accordance with ANSI/NFPA 13-2011 [B14].
prohibit this type (i.e., use dry pipe systems in unheated areas subject to freezing).
Exceptions to wet pipe sprinkler system recommendation:
Preaction sprinkler systems may be considered where extenuating circumstances dictate the need and the
water delivery delay time (and associated fire growth and damage level) is deemed acceptable. Circumstances
may include situations where equipment is present that does not react well to exposure to water and additional
levels of protection against inadvertent water discharge are deemed necessary.
Total flooding gaseous agent systems (i.e., CO2 or clean agent) may be considered where extenuating
circumstances preclude the use of water (i.e., adjacent equipment areas with sensitive equipment in drainage
path and draining water poses an unacceptable threat to equipment). Such systems should be designed in
accordance with the appropriate NFPA standard and manufacturer design guidance.
A.17.5 Indoor mineral-oil-insulated equipment vaults
The required suppression system applications for various mineral oil volumes within rated enclosure vaults
are listed in Table A.1. Where multiple system choices are listed, any single choice is acceptable.
Table A.1—Suppression systems for vaults
Total oil quantitya Required type of suppression system

Design standard
Overhead sprinkler (wet pipe, closed
0 L to 375 L (0 gal to 99 gal) ANSI/NFPA 13-2011 [B14]
head)
376 L to 1889 L (100 gal to Overhead sprinkler (wet pipe, closed
ANSI/NFPA 13-2011 [B14]
499 gal) head)
ANSI/NFPA 12-2011 [B11] or ANSI/NFPA 2001-
Total flooding Gaseous system
2012 [B45]
1890 L (500+ gal) Fixed water spray ANSI/NFPA 15-2012 [B16]
ANSI/NFPA 12-2011 [B11] or ANSI/NFPA 2001-
Total flooding Gaseous system
2012 [B45]
a
Less than 1890 L (500 gal) of mineral oil is present; the designer may have a qualified fire protection engineer conduct a benefit/cost
analysis to determine the added benefit of installing suppression in the vault. This analysis may demonstrate that sufficient benefit is not
gained to warrant the cost of the suppression system. See C.6 for additional discussion on benefit/cost analysis.
42
IEEE Std 979-2012

A.17.6 Miscellaneous indoor substation areas
Suppression systems should not be installed throughout miscellaneous indoor substation areas where all of the
following are met:
 ⎯ A fire department with adequate personnel and equipment is available for emergency response in
a timely fashion.
 ⎯ An automatic detection system is arranged to dispatch the fire department automatically on
receipt of any alarm signal.
 ⎯ Equipment present is limited to enclosed metal clad switchgear cubicles, relay and
communication panels, battery systems, miscellaneous electric panels, and associated conduit and
wiring. This type of equipment consists of minimal combustible material and is unlikely to
contribute to a deenergized fire scenario.
 ⎯ Mineral-oil-insulated equipment is not present.
 ⎯ Area is separated from other areas of the building by minimum 2 h fire-resistance-rated
construction.
Where the provisions of this clause are not all met, a sprinkler system or total flooding gaseous agent
suppression system should be installed.
Design and installation of sprinkler systems should be in accordance with ANSI/NFPA 13-2011
[B14]. Design density and classification should increase where conditions warrant a more severe
classification.
Design and installation of total flooding gaseous agent systems should be in accordance with the
appropriate NFPA standard (i.e., ANSI/NFPA 12-2011 [B11] and ANSI/NFPA 2001-2012 [B45]).
A.18 Fire extinguishers
Unless rigorous fire extinguisher training is provided on an ongoing basis, it is recommended that
Class B hazards be considered of nonappreciable depth when determining size and distribution
requirements in ANSI/NFPA 10-2012 [B7] because the extinguishers will be intended only for use
on small, incipient fires as opposed to larger oil spill fires, which may be of an appreciable depth.
Ongoing minimal training should be established for all personnel expected to use fire extinguishers
to assist them in identifying characteristics of fires that cannot be suppressed with the fire
extinguishers available and to provide education on proper technique.
Special consideration should be given to installing separate fire extinguishers (A:C and B:C) in areas
where both Class A and B hazards are present. Although triple-rated (A:B:C) extinguishers are
available and would seem an appropriate choice for these situations, the only suitable triple-rated
extinguisher (based on required minimum A and B rating) is the multipurpose dry chemical
extinguisher. This type of extinguisher is prone to leaving a residue on all surfaces with which it
comes in contact, and in the case of metal surfaces, this results in a corrosive chemical reaction that
in some instances can cause more damage than the fire. A residue of dry chemical is conductive and,
therefore, will cause shorts and grounds in electrical and electronic equipment.
Electrical substation employees are exposed to significant risks while trying to suppress fires
manually in substation buildings and apparatus. It is recommended that automatic fire protection
systems be used wherever practical instead of using employee for manual firefighting. Should
employees be expected to engage in manual suppression techniques they need to meet the following
requirements:
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IEEE Std 979-2012

 ⎯ Receive thorough ongoing training

 ⎯ Be supplied with adequate turnout gear and self-contained breathing apparatus that needs to be
inspected and tested on an ongoing basis
 ⎯ Be tested and restricted based on adequate fitness levels

 ⎯ Be clean shaven (otherwise, they cannot use self-contained breathing apparatus in smoke
environments without the risk of being exposed to smoke)
A.19 Equipment to property lines
There are a significant number of ways that substation fires can impact the public in adjacent
environs. Fire protection measures can be put in place to mitigate these impacts to the public. The
following is a list of some of the types of fire-related mechanisms that can occur and can impact the
public directly:
o ⎯ Shrapnel—bushing failures can result in shards or fragments of bushing ceramic being

propelled for distances up to 75 m (250 ft) or more. This shrapnel can be projected beyond
the perimeter of the station and expose adjacent buildings.
o ⎯ Blast pressure—explosion in transformers can create blast pressures or pressure waves
that could impact adjacent properties and structures.
o ⎯ Explosions and fires can result in oil spills that can migrate outside the perimeter of the
substations and impact on surrounding public properties.
o ⎯ Oil pool fires as a result of the failure of mineral-oil-insulated equipment can cause
thermal radiation beyond the perimeter of the station and possibly ignite combustible
vegetation and structures.
o ⎯ Oil pool fires can create very large fire plumes with significant flame heights and smoke
being spread from the fire pool. During periods of high winds, the fire flames and smoke
plumes can be tilted significantly and expose adjacent buildings and structures. As a result,
heat damage can occur to adjacent structures along with significant soot deposits in the
downwind plumes area.
o ⎯ In substations without oil containment, burning oil spill fires have been known to spread
beyond the station perimeter and impact adjacent buildings.
A fire in a substation can result in an electricity outage that may impact the general public.
The following are a list of some of the indirect impacts of an electricity outage:
 ⎯ Loss of heating or cooling systems during inclement weather, which can cause significant health
and safety concerns
 ⎯ Loss of lighting and elevators in large high-rise buildings
 ⎯ Loss of computer communications facilities in stores and businesses
 ⎯ Loss of business revenue during outages
 ⎯ Loss of wages during outage shutdown periods
A.20 Fire barriers
The optimum height of the fire barriers can also be calculated using the radiant heat flux
calculations. Firewalls and thermal heat shields are the two common types of barriers. Firewalls are
structures
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IEEE Std 979-2012

constructed of fire-resistive materials such as reinforced concrete, composite materials, or masonry. Thermal
heat shields use steel elements covered by heavy corrugated steel sheets on both sides. Thermal heat shields
can effectively reduce the radiant heat transfer from a fire to an adjacent piece of equipment, but after a major
incident, often they need to be replaced.
Outdoor fire barriers do not generally fall under the constraints of a building code. Several companies have
found that less expensive, nonrated, corrugated metal fire barriers have performed very effectively under fire
exposures although they generally need to be replaced after the fire exposure incident.
A.21 Alternative dielectric insulating medium
The elevated flashpoint property of many alternative dielectric fluids equates to the liquid being more
resistant to ignition sources and therefore not catching fire until it reaches the higher liquid temperature. The
temperature at which the liquid can catch fire in the presence of an ignition source, such as an energized
spark, is called the flashpoint. ASTM D5222-2008 [B47] specifies the fire point should be at least 300 oC
(572 °F) to qualify as a less flammable fluid.
Examples of alternative dielectric insulating mediums are listed as follows. For comparison, mineral oil has a
flash point of 145 oC (293 °F) and a fire point of 160 oC (320 °F).
 ⎯ High-molecular-weight hydrocarbons, flash point = 285 oC (545 °F), fire point = 308 oC (586 °F)
Successfully introduced in 1977 and used for distribution transformers and fully miscible with
conventional mineral oil. To ensure a fire point > 300oC, contamination with conventional mineral
oil must be <3%.
 ⎯ Natural ester fluids, flash point = 343 oC (649 °F), fire point = 360 oC (680 °F)
Successfully introduced in 1997 for distribution and power transformers and fully miscible with
oil must be <7%.
 ⎯ Synthetic ester fluids, flash point = 275 oC (527 °F), fire point = 322 oC (612 °F)
Successfully introduced in 1984 for distribution and power transformers and fully miscible with
oil must be <7%.
 ⎯ Silicones, flash point = 300 oC (572 °F), fire point = 330 oC (626 °F)
Successfully introduced in 1977 for distribution transformers (typically 35 kV or less). They are
not fully miscible with conventional mineral oil.
 ⎯ SF6 gas
Considered a noncombustible insulating agent. Available for a wide variety of electrical equipment
(e.g., circuit breakers and instrument transformers). It is seldom used in power transformers because
of the high cost. SF6 is a greenhouse gas and produces dangerous by- products under arcing
conditions.
A.22 Risk-based economic analysis
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IEEE Std 979-2012

One of the greatest difficulties is to estimate the frequency of fire for the specific hazards. Some companies
have extensive fire loss histories and loss databases. These databases can be used to estimate specific fire
frequencies, but the results may be poor because of the small statistical sample size based on the companies’
records. There are a number of other databases and reports that are in the public domain that provide useful
data (i.e., NFPA data shop, EPRI Fire Induced Vulnerability Evaluation Methodology, and IEEE 979
Transformer Fire Survey). The IEEE Std 979 Working Group, 1994 Transformer Fire Survey estimated
probability of fire is given in Table A.2.
Table A.2—IEEE 979–Working Group 1994 transformer survey
Additional examples of a simplified economic risk analysis can be found in CEATI Report No. T023700-
3022 [B52], and the book by Berry [B50] provides further examples of economic risk analyses of processes.
Transformer voltage
(kV)
Annual fire frequency per year
69 0.00034
115 to 180 0.00025
230 to 350 0.0006
500
0.0009
46
Annex B
(informative)
IEEE Std 979-2012

Quantitative methods for analysis of hazards B.1 Calculation methods
In order to calculate spatial separation based on the specifics of the substation equipment and the site
characteristics, a detailed evaluation needs to be made. The following are some of the specific characteristics
that are needed for the calculation:
 ⎯ Type and quantity of the oil used in the equipment

 ⎯ The height, width, and length of the equipment tank
 ⎯ The size of the concrete pad that the equipment rests on
 ⎯ Method of pressurization (gas or conservator) for the equipment
 ⎯ The adequacy of the spill containment and flame-suppressing stone
 ⎯ The type of construction used for the target equipment or building
 ⎯ Size and location of the postulated oil spill fire
The calculations should consider the following factors:

 ⎯ The heat release rate of the insulating fluids
 ⎯ Lack of spill containment
 ⎯ Lack of flame-suppressing stone
 ⎯ Prevailing winds direction and force at the site
 ⎯ Combustibility and type of the exposure
The design critical heat flux can be calculated using standard pool fire heat flux calculations. The
SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering [B79] or the SFPE Engineering Guide for Assessing
Flame Radiation to External Targets from Pool Fires [B77] outlines some of the procedures for these
calculations and the annexes cover other procedures for these calculations.
The key factor in determining the required spacing of mineral-oil-insulated equipment is the distance
between the leading edge of the exposing flame and the adjacent target bushing or exposed
transformer surface. The common criterion for the spatial separation of mineral-oil-insulated
equipment has been either the equipment energy output or the volume of insulating oil used in the
equipment. These important factors are somewhat interrelated, but they do not define the fire
exposure potential that could exist between mineral-oil-insulated equipment. Table B.1 and Table
B.2 provide typical oil volumes for oil-insulated transformers and circuit breakers. These may be
used when actual values are not available.
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IEEE Std 979-2012

Table B.1—Typical oil quantities in oil-insulated three-phase transformers
Electrical rating, MVA

Oil volume, L (gal)
≥100 ≥45 400 (≥12 000)
50 to 99 37 850 to 45 400 (10 000 to 11 999)
30 to 49 30 300 to 37 849 (8000 to 9999)
5 to 29 7570 to 30 299 (2000 to 7999)
<5
<7570 (<2000)
Table B.2—Typical oil quantities in three-phase oil-insulated circuit breakers
If the estimated critical heat flux from the calculation will indicate that damage or a failure will occur, then
mitigating measures should be considered if the equipment spacing cannot be changed. Two of the most
common methods of protecting electrical equipment that has been spaced too closely are firewalls/heat
shields, and the installation of water spray deluge systems. Water spray deluge systems are discussed in the
fire-suppression system terms in 3.2 of this guide.
Where there is a fire exposure risk to structures outside the substation, the mineral-oil-insulated electrical
equipment containing greater than 1890 L (500 gal) of oil should be separated from the adjacent property line
and the edge of the transformer tank by a minimum distance of 16 m (50 ft), and there should be spill
containment with flame-suppressing stone.
The control building should be located away from high fire hazard equipment such as mineral-oil-insulated
transformers or reactors. This should reduce the probability of fire from transferring to the control building. If
physical separation between the control building and the electric equipment is not possible, then other means
of protecting the control building should be employed, such as firewalls or heat shields, as well as the
installation of water spray deluge systems at the transformer.
Damage to adjacent equipment and structure because of the heat transfer from the exposing flame is a
function of the materials they are made from. As an example, the critical element of most transformers is the
2
ceramic bushing. Studies indicate that a heat flux as low as 5 kW/m will cause a ceramic bushing to fail.
Table B.3 lists critical heat flux values for substation equipment and structures. The design critical heat flux at
2
the property line should not exceed 20 kW/m .
Voltage rating,
kV
Oil volume, L (gal)
230 >3780 (>1000)
138 1890 to 3780 (500 to 1000)
69
<1890 (<500)
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IEEE Std 979-2012

Table B.3—Radiant heat flux level and damage
Heat flux (kW/m2)

Impact of radiant heat flux
Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment 37.5

Equipment failure 35
Damage to unprotected metal 30
Spontaneous ignition of wood 25
Cable insulation degrades 20
Pilot ignition of wood 12.5
Plastic melts 12.5
Pain threshold reached after 8 s Second-degree burns after 20 s 9.5
Possible failure of ceramic bushings 5
Skin burns
5
The heat flux nomographs in B.2 provide a graphic method of estimating the radiated heat flux at the adjacent
equipment.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NUREG) Fire Dynamics Tools spreadsheet can also be used to
9 10
estimate the radiated heat flux. Two spreadsheets are available, one ignores wind and one considers wind.
11
Documentation for the spreadsheets is also available.
B.2 Heat flux nomographs
The following radiant heat flux nomographs are reprinted with permission from CEATI in Report T023700-
12
3022 [B52]. The incident heat flux on a vertical target facing a cylindrical exposure source varies with
elevation. The maximum incident heat flux at a fixed horizontal distance occurs at an elevation midway
between the base and top of the exposure source.
The nomographs can be used to determine the performance-based spacing criteria for mineral-oil-insulated
equipment and ceramic bushings. Two types of nomographs are presented, and the steps to use them are given
as follows:
a) Figure B.1 to Figure B.4 depict the heat flux isograms for the 50 m2 through 300 m2 (540 ft2 through 3200
ft2) transformer oil pool fire exposure sources. The 5 kW/m2 (0.44 Btu/s-ft2) isoflux line, the heat flux that
may damage bushings, is bolded for ease of identification. Note the symmetry about the horizontal axis
passing through the mid-height of the source fire.
Using these nomographs:
1. 1) Determine the height of the bushing and draw a line horizontally from the height scale on the left.
2. 2) Where it intersects the 5 kW/m2 vertical curve, draw a vertical line down to where it intersects the
target distance from the pool fire edge scale.
3. 3) This result can then be used to determine the spacing from the edge of the postulated pool fire to
the nearest adjacent bushing.
9
This document is available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1805/05.1_Heat_Fluxx_Calculations_
Wind_Free.xxls.
10
This document is available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1805/05.2_heat_flux_calculations_
wind_rev1.xls.
11
This document is available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1805/final-report/. 12 Figure B.1 to Figure
B.5 are reprinted with permission from CEATI, Report T023700-3022, © 2005.
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IEEE Std 979-2012

b) The nomograph in Figure B.5 is provided to allow a rough estimate of either the maximum transformer
curbed area or the minimum distance between the curbed transformer edge and the nearest ceramic bushing
when the transformer is insulated with mineral oil.
1. 1) To determine the maximum transformer curbed area, draw a horizontal line from the known
2
distance on the vertical, maximum 5 kW/m isogram distance scale, from the intersection with the
vertical or horizontal target curve; then, draw a vertical line to intersect the horizontal, area enclosed
by curbs scale. This intersection will provide an estimate of the maximum transformer curbed area.
2. 2) To determine minimum distance to the nearest ceramic bushing, draw a vertical line from the
known area on the horizontal, area enclosed by curbs scale, from the intersection with the vertical or
2
horizontal target curve; then, draw a horizontal line to intersect the vertical, maximum 5 kW/m
isogram distance scale. This intersection will provide an estimate of the distance to the nearest
ceramic bushing.
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IEEE Std 979-2012

32.8
29.5 9 26.2 8 23.0 7 19.7 6 16.4 5 13.1 4
9.8 3 6.6 2 3.3 1 0.0 0
0.4 1
1.31
Exposure Source Flame Height

9.8
2 2 2 2
25 kW/m 20 kW/m 15 kW/m 10 kW/m
2
4 kW/m
10 100 Target Distance from Pool Edge (m)
10 100 328 Target Distance from Pool Edge (ft)
2 2
Figure B.1—Incident heat flux on a vertical target versus distance for a 50 m (540 ft ) pool fire area
exposure source [B52]
51
Target Elevation (ft)
Target Elevation (m)

2
90 kW/m
2
80 kW/m
2
70 kW/m
2 2
60 kW/m 50 kW/m
2 2
40 kW/m 30 kW/m
2
5 kW/m
2 2
3 kW/m 2 kW/m
2
1 kW/m
IEEE Std 979-2012

42.6 13
12.2 36.1 11 32.8 10 29.5 9 26.2 8 23.0 7 19.7 6 16.4 5 13.1 4 9.8 3 6.6 2 3.3 1 0.0 0
0.5
1.64

39.4
2 2 2 2
25 kW/m 20 kW/m 15 kW/m 10 kW/m
2 2
4 kW/m 3 kW/m
1 10 100 Target Distance from Pool Edge (m)
10 100 328 Target Distance from Pool Edge (ft)
2 2
Figure B.2—Incident heat flux on a vertical target versus distance for a 100 m (1100 ft ) pool fire
area exposure source [B52]
52
Target Elevation (ft)

2 2
85 kW/m 80 kW/m
2
70 kW/m
2
60 kW/m
2 2 2
50 kW/m 40 kW/m 30 kW/m
2
5 kW/m
2 2
2 kW/m 1 kW/m
IEEE Std 979-2012

2 2
53
IEEE Std 979-2012

2 2 2 2
25 kW /m 20 kW/m 15 kW/m 10 kW/m
2 2
4 kW/m 3 kW/m
16.8 16
14
52.5
45.9
39.4 12 32.8 10 26.2 8 19.7 6 13.1 4
6.6 2
0.0 0 0.5
1.64
10
Target Distance from Pool Edge (m)
10 100 Distance from Pool Edge (ft)
100
328
2 2
54
222
30kW/m 40 kW/m 50 kW/m
60 kW/m
70kW/m
75kW/m
22
1 kW/m 2 kW /m
5 kW/m
IEEE Std 979-2012

2
Figure B.5—Maximum distance allowable for 5 kW/m allowable heat flux for various fire pool areas
[B52]
55
Annex C
(informative)
IEEE Std 979-2012

Selection of fire protection systems and substation design C.1 Compliance
Some substation owners operate in jurisdictions with mandated fire protection requirements for electrical
substations. In these cases, the mandatory compliance with the appropriate codes and standards is a critical
fire protection performance objective. JEAG 4607-1999 [B72] adopted in Japan is one such mandatory
compliance code.
There are a number of other quasi-compliance objectives that the substation owner may have to use for the
design of a new substation or changes to an existing one. Specifically, recommended practices or guidelines
in the industry set out “good engineering practice.” Therefore, a substation owner can be exposed to some
pressure to meet these practice standards or guidelines. If an incident occurred and it was found that the
substation owner did not comply with the general guidelines or recommended practices within the industry,
then such information may be used in any litigation based on the incident. Also, the failure to be duly diligent
may also create political or customer satisfaction related issues. The information in this guide, along with the
NFPA and CIGRE substation fire protection documents, should be considered in the design of a new
substation or changes to an existing one to show diligence with regard to fire protection objectives.
C.2 Electrical supply reliability
Electrical supply customers are demanding higher levels of reliability for electrical services. This causes
electrical power utilities to review their operational reliability. Also, a number of utilities had been required
by their regulatory bodies to examine and justify their levels of operational reliability. Many utilities are
setting goals of having operational reliability of 99.96% or greater. As a result of these high levels of
operational reliability, the normal frequency of fires in circuit breakers and transformers could have a
significant impact on the utility’s operational reliability. Secondarily, the provision of suitable fire protection
could significantly lessen the station or equipment outage time, thereby helping the owner to meet its
operational reliability objective.
In the past, it has been difficult to quantify the impacts of fire-related outages on the customers. Several
research programs have quantified the societal impacts of substation outages. The societal impacts can be
quantified in terms of the dollar value per megawatt lost for different mixes of customers (industrial,
commercial, residential, and mixed). With the quantification of the societal loss, it becomes easier to estimate
the benefits (shortened outage each time) from the provision of fire protection. For example, the fire
protection will reduce the expected outage time from 24 h down to 2 h; then the benefit derived is the societal
impact for the station output for the 22 h period.
C.3 Revenue and asset preservation
One major objective of all companies that own substations is to generate revenue, or at least generate
sufficient cash flow to cover their operating costs. There are some substation fire-related losses that can
significantly affect a company’s ability to generate revenue and profit. A careful analysis of the substation
equipment and operation can identify critical equipment that creates a significant fire hazard. Based on the
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IEEE Std 979-2012

possible revenue loss from a fire in a critical structure or piece of equipment, automatic fire protection
systems may be justifiable.
Fires in electrical substations can have a very large impact on the station operating assets. A fire in a
substation control building can have a significant long-term impact on the ability of the station to operate.
Therefore, assets such as substation control buildings are very critical and should be reviewed to determine
the adequacy of the planned fire protection. Another example of significant substation assets would be
grouped transformers. There are very few fire-protection-related systems that can prevent a failure or fire in a
transformer, but systems such as water spray deluge systems can suppress a fire in the transformer that has
failed and likely can prevent it from spreading to adjacent transformers.
All utilities operate in regulated political environments. A major substation fire and accompanying outage
may create a number of political issues that can affect a utility’s revenue. The utility regulators can review the
utility’s operation and impose fines or directed actions to improve deficiencies. In government-owned
utilities, pressure can be imposed on the operating personnel to change their practices and philosophies to
address the risk of major outages. The utility or owner shareholders can also apply pressure to the
management of its substations to improve reliability. Customers can cause changes to be made in the level of
overall operational reliability through political, regulatory, or organizational channels. And in special cases,
the customers can show their dissatisfaction with the utility’s operational reliability by using another utility
supplier.
C.4 Oil-insulated energized equipment
There are a wide range of types and causes of fires experienced in electric power substations. The types of
fires are based on the equipment and systems used in the substations. Fire hazards include outdoor or indoor
oil-insulated equipment, oil-insulated cable, and fuel storage facilities for engine generator sets used for
standby station auxiliary power.
To understand fully the nature of the hazard, the failure mechanisms of energized oil-filled equipment need to
be fully understood. Most transformer oil is essentially a mineral oil. The flash point will generally be around
150 °C (300 °F), with an autoignition temperature of approximately 350 °C (655 °F). Whereas these
conditions are generally not achieved during normal operation, an internal electrical fault may generate
temperatures well in excess of 540 °C (1000 °F) and are therefore capable of igniting the oil. Internal faults
can result from the infiltration of water, failure of core insulation, exterior fault currents, and tap changer
failures.
Research has found that major internal arcs within transformers can create hydrogen and acetylene gas
bubbles in the transformer tank. As the oil heats during this fault process, it also expands both as a liquid and
as a vapor. Both of these actions cause the internal pressure to rise and may result in failure of the transformer
tank. When the tank ruptures, the gas and oil mist is then rapidly released to the atmosphere up to 15 m (50 ft)
away, where they auto ignite upon contact with oxygen. In the atmosphere, a deflagration can occur. The
resulting deflagration can create significant pressure waves, thereby severely damaging adjacent exposures.
The burning oil mist can also ignite adjacent combustible structures or surfaces.
As larger substation equipment may contain oil quantities in the range of thousands of liters, the magnitude of
these events can be catastrophic in nature. Equipment provided with fixed fire protection may see piping
blown away as a result of the failure. Other attached appurtenances such as bushings, cooling fans, or even oil
expansion tanks may be shattered or sheared off. Large power transformers have been known to lose an entire
side during these failures.
Bushing internal arcs can also create hydrogen and acetylene gas bubbles that can cause the bushing ceramic
to fail due to the resulting internal pressure. There are a number of documented incidences where the bushing
ceramic shrapnel has been projected over 75 m (250 ft). The bushing ceramic shrapnel can
57
IEEE Std 979-2012

cause the failure of ceramic bushings on adjacent electrical equipment, damage adjacent buildings, and even
injure substation staff or the public.
The flames and fire plume from a transformer oil fire can cause the failure of overhead bus structures,
transmission lines, and feeder lines. The flaming portion of the fire can rise to a height approximately 2.5
times the diameter of the spill fire. This region can have sufficiently high temperatures to cause the failure of
steel structures and buswork.
The resulting oil-fueled fire plume can result in soot contamination downwind of the fire. The high
concentration of carbon particles that gives the smoke its characteristic color will also conduct electricity and
initiate flashovers. Furthermore, any firefighting operations will add to the conductivity by providing a steam
component in the plume. Even dry chemical particles have been known to become conductive in high
humidity environments by absorbing moisture and therefore acting like “airborne mud.” Typically, this effect
is seen between high-energy points such as exposed conductors or bushings on transformers. When soot
contamination impacts public structures, it becomes a major concern for the operator. The specific exposure
of the downwind contamination is based on the wind speed and direction during the actual fire event. See the
discussion on incident management in D.3 for further information on dealing with soot contamination.
Mineral oil spills can be expected to pool and/or run with the effect of exposing adjacent equipment or
structures to fire. Oil may form a large pool fire depending on the volume of oil, spill containment, slope of
the surrounding area, and type of the surrounding ground cover (i.e., stone or soil).
Any mineral-oil spill fire can create significant radiant heat exposures to adjacent structures, buildings, or
equipment. The footprint of the spill fire and the distance between the edge of the spill fire and the exposure
are the key factors in determining whether a fire will damage or ignite the adjacent exposure. Equipment such
as adjacent phases of transformers, spares, or banks can also be heated to a point of case failure and provide
additional fuel to the incident. One major concern with spill fires is that these fires can spread to other areas of
the station and possibly outside of the station. A thorough analysis of the station grades and containment
provisions around mineral-oil-insulated equipment needs to be completed to determine where a possible spill
fire can spread. Containment provisions can then be designed to minimize oil spread in the event of a spill.
Oil has been known to enter grade-level cable trenches and flow into control buildings, creating significant
damage to the buildings and equipment, as well as compromising the operational control of the station.
In addition to mineral oil, other insulating mediums are used for certain types of electrical equipment in place
of oil that are noncombustible or of limited combustibility such as synthetic oils or sulfur hexafluoride gas.
The high heat environment of a fire may result in potentially toxic by-products such as dioxin and other
chemicals. Smoke and soot from such fires cause widespread contamination and require extensive
decontamination operations. This is of most significance when the equipment of origin is located in a building
or an underground vault.
C.5 Fire detection and signaling systems C.5.1 General
The provision of fire alarm and detection systems may be required by the building and fire codes based on the
size, height, and hazard of the new or existing substation building. The substation designer should work with
the local authority on determining the code-required level of detection and alarm. The local codes will
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IEEE Std 979-2012

also reference specific design, installation, and testing standards for fire alarm systems. Some codes only
require fire alarm and detection systems when the building occupancy exceeds certain levels.
Smaller substation facilities should be analyzed by the substation designer to determine whether the early
detection of a fire in a substation building will provide benefits in the protection of the assets and station
operation.
For example, if the substation building is unmanned but the company personnel and fire department (or fire
brigade) personnel have sufficient time to respond to an event before the building has major damage, then a
fire alarm and detection system should be considered. For stations where the company’s response is greater
than an hour, or where there are no responding fire personnel, the value of the provision of a fire alarm and
detection system may not warrant the expenditure.
Some companies have a policy of providing fire alarm and detection systems for all major unmanned remote
stations so that they have some remote indication of the incident and do not simply rely on the station
operational telemetry trip signals. Some companies have a policy of providing spot type smoke or heat
detectors tied to the substation building security system in order to give them rudimentary remote indication
of a fire occurrence.
The substation designer has to evaluate and select the three major components (fire detection, fire alarm
control panel, and signaling system) of any fire alarm system and determine the type of equipment most
suitable to the specific application. This analysis should be done in conjunction with the fire protection
engineer and/or a fire alarm manufacturer or specialist.
C.5.2 Fire detection equipment selection criteria
The following key criteria should be considered when selecting the appropriate type of fire detection
equipment:
 ⎯ Emergency personnel response time: If the station is unattended, personnel are present
infrequently, and company personnel or fire emergency personnel cannot respond for hours, then it
may not be cost-effective to install an air-sampling detection system that can detect a fire in the
smoldering stage.
 ⎯ Expected fire growth: Some fires will grow very quickly (transformer explosion or cable high-
energy arc fault), and others will grow more slowly (control panel relay failure and fire). The
analysis should look at the specific type of detector to detect this fire. Specifically, it may not be
appropriate to use a very sensitive detector like an air-sampling system to detect a high-energy, arc
fault fire. Slower detectors such as thermal detectors will be able to pick this up within seconds of
the initiation of the fire.
 ⎯ Type of fire signature: Each fire has a specific fire signature that will have different
characteristics of heat release, smoke production, smoke density, and smoke particulate size. One
common example is the type of fire detection for a control room facility with exposed control and
power cable. The cable jacketing combustion products produce a fire signature with large-size smoke
particles. Ionization detectors have greater difficulty detecting these larger size particles than
photoelectric detectors.
 ⎯ Operational success: Care should be taken in specifying the type of detection that will not cause
false alarms due to the existing substation processes. A simple example would be the use of sensitive
smoke detectors in lunch rooms where a toaster or microwave oven would be used.
 ⎯ Ceiling and building configuration: The height of the ceiling and whether the ceiling has deep
beam pockets can significantly influence the type of detector used and the spacing of the particular
detector to provide the required response time.
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IEEE Std 979-2012

The following are some alternatives for detection in substation buildings:
Control, relay, and telecommunication rooms:
 ⎯ Air sampling detection for critical facilities with a rapid response time for company and
emergency personnel
 ⎯ Spot-type photoelectric detection at the ceiling and below the subfloor areas for these facilities
Feeder sections and switchgear areas:
o ⎯ Linear beam smoke detection
o ⎯ Spot type photoelectric detection
Cable spreading rooms and cable tunnels:
⎯ Spot-type photoelectric detection General substation building areas:
⎯ Spot-type photoelectric detection at the top of stairs Shops, office, and warehouse areas:
⎯ Spot type rate-compensated thermal detectors Transformer vaults/oil-insulated equipment areas:
 ⎯ Linear beam smoke detection

 ⎯ Rate-compensated thermal detectors for deluge system operation or wet/dry pilot detection
C.5.3 Fire alarm panel
The most commonly used types of panels and systems are the relay-based systems and the computer-
based addressable systems. Relay-based systems and panels are older technology that is still widely
used because of its reliability and immunity to electromagnetic interference. This type of technology
is based on fire detection or supervision devices connected on an individual zone. The fire alarm
indication given is one of a particular zone. The zone could be wired to an individual device or group
of devices, and commonly they are zoned by floor. A fire alarm only indicates whether a particular
zone has gone into alarm.
Computer-based addressable systems are becoming more commonly used because of their lower cost
of installation, real-time information, and computer-based user interface. With the addressable
system, each individual detection device communicates with the main computer. In the event of a
specific device going into the alarm, the system can provide real-time information on the specific
detector in alarm. The system also can provide information on detectors that are getting dirty and
require cleaning.
One of the major advantages of the computer-based system is the graphical user interface of the
system. This user interface can provide a graphic screen showing the individual devices on a floor
plan or schematic drawing. In the event of the device going into an alarm, the interface will flash the
symbol for the device on the floor plan, give real-time information of when the device went into
alarm and can allow further screens to be accessed to give one-line diagrams or photos of the specific
device that is in alarm. The graphics interface will allow the operator easily to change the sensitivity
of the detection devices, program them out for maintenance work, and check the sensitivity of all the
devices.
The shortcomings of the addressable systems are the high cost of site-specific software interfaces,
degrade mode, and susceptibility to electromagnetic interference.
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IEEE Std 979-2012

Some addressable systems have a degrade mode that when a signal or indication occurs on the system that is
not known to the microprocessor, the fire alarm panel will operate all signaling devices and initiating circuits.
If the panel is operating initiating systems for gaseous-preaction systems or deluge systems, then the degrade
mode will cause them to operate. Many companies avoid these problems by only initiating circuits for
gaseous, preaction, and deluge systems with relay-based fire alarm panels.
In order to minimize problems with electrical interference of computer-based addressable systems, many
companies have specific test criteria that require systems be designed and constructed with an acceptable level
of electrical interference immunity. The following is a list of specific electrical interference tests used:
 ⎯ Conducted transient voltage tests: The equipment is tested for surge withstand capability in
accordance with IEEE Std C37.90.1TM-2002 [B61].
 ⎯ Radiated transient voltage (JAWS) test: This test simulates a “worst-case” industrial noise
environment consisting of high-voltage relays operating in close proximity to solid state equipment.
It is similar to subclause 5.3.1 of ANSI/IEEE 518-1982 [B4]. This standard is withdrawn, but the test
is still valuable.
 ⎯ 100 kHz Ring wave and combination wave surge tests for low-voltage ac power circuits: These
tests are based on IEEE Std C62.41 TM-1991 [B63].
 ⎯ Radiated high-frequency continuous wave tests: These tests look at the equipment’s susceptibility
to radiated waves from radios and cellular phones. Although there are no standard tests, the
following may be used as a guide in establishing tests.
The equipment shall be tested to determine the sensitivity of the equipment to radiated high-
frequency wave interference coupled from nearby radio transmitters.
The equipment shall be subjected to transmission from each of the following output frequencies:
1. 1) 15 W in the 47 MHz through 48 MHz band

4. 4) 0.6 W, 832 MHz (cellular phone region)
For the tests, the equipment enclosure (chassis) that acts to shield the solid-state portions of the equipment
shall be in the normal in service (closed) condition and in the open condition.
When the cabinet door is open, the radio antenna shall be brought to within 300 mm of the exposed operating
circuits. The radio transmitter shall be operated both continuously and interrupted once per second. Each test
shall be performed with the radio antenna oriented in each of the X, Y, and Z planes with respect to the
exposed operating circuits.
C.5.4 Signaling systems
The two key objectives of signaling systems are to warn the building occupants of a fire and to provide a
remote signal to initiate an emergency response to the facility. There are various codes that require that
signaling devices be installed within the building or station so that occupants in any area of the building are
informed of a fire situation.
The initial layout of the signaling appliances can be done based on audibility calculations contained in the
SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering [B79]. Once the installation is complete, it should be tested
using sound meters to determine the audibility in all areas of the station. In some areas of the station, the
ambient noise levels may be too high to allow the installation of audible signaling devices without exceeding
the allowable noise limits. The codes normally require that the signaling devices have a sound
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IEEE Std 979-2012

level 15 dB above the normal ambient levels. If the normal ambient levels are above 85 dB, then the required
resultant sound level would have to be 100 dB, which is in excess of normal safe limits for personnel. The
alternative solution in areas with high ambient noise levels is to install signaling devices with visual strobe
lights.
The fire alarm signaling system may also be designed to send a signal to the local fire department. Fire
detection signals should be sent to a central location (e.g., a utility’s control center).
The newer addressable systems provide a new level of information in the event of an alarm condition. These
systems can send out digital e-mail indications of alarm or trouble conditions to wireless phones or other
communication devices, they can send e-mail to specific e-mail accounts, and the systems can be accessed
and controlled remotely over a local area network or Internet system.
C.6 Benefit/cost analysis
One of the most common economic risk analysis measures is a benefit/cost analysis. Other methods can also
be used as preferred by the user.
The benefit/cost analysis is calculated using Equation (1). Businesses often require a benefit/cost ratio greater
than 2, and at minimum, it should be greater than 1. A benefit/cost ratio of 2 means that the avoided fire loss
cost or benefit is twice the cost of the fire protection. Therefore, it is a good investment. Refer to Table D.1
for relative fire frequency information.
Once the potential financial loss due to a fire has been calculated, the designer should input costs and
effectiveness of any proposed fire protection measure into the benefit/cost equation and determine the B/C
ratio. If the B/C ratio is less than 1, then the provision of the fire protection measure is not an acceptable
investment.
Simple benefit/cost example
A substation has four 138 kV single-phase oil-insulated transformers. One of these transformers is a spare and
is located remotely from the others. The load supplied by these transformers is 25 MW. A water spray deluge
system is being considered to suppress or control a fire in the transformers. The deluge system is expected to
protect the adjacent transformers. The estimated cost of a deluge system for all three transformers is $60 000.
The individual transformers have a replacement value of $300 000.
The company’s Chief Financial Officer asks whether this is a good investment.
 ⎯ The company uses a discount rate of 10% and requires that all investments have a benefit/cost
ratio of greater than 2. The assigned value of energy is $25/MW. The standard amortization period is
25 years.
 ⎯ The annual frequency of fire for a single 138 kV transformer is estimated to be 0.00025/year; see
Table A.2. Therefore, the combined frequency for the three transformers is as follows: p(F) =
0.00075 fires/year.
 ⎯ Although the probability of a fire occurring in any of the three transformers is the same, the
highest risk to adjacent transformers would be for a fire starting in the center phase because there are
units on either side at risk. The fire is assumed to originate in the center transformer in the bank of
three single-phase transformers. In this example, it is assumed that in the absence of the suppression,
the fire will spread to destroy the two adjacent transformers. The spare transformer is not affected
because it is remote from the other transformers.
 ⎯ In many cases, a deluge system cannot prevent the loss of the transformer in which the fire
originates. For this study, the transformer is assumed to be a total loss. However, the deluge system
is expected to be effective in reducing the probability of the fire from affecting the
62
IEEE Std 979-2012

adjacent transformers. In this case, the probability of the adjacent transformers being saved is assumed to be
90%. The effectiveness of the deluge system protecting the adjacent transformers is then as follows: e(RM) =
0.9.
 ⎯ The estimated station outage period for this scenario is the difference between the outage time to
replace all three transformers (a fire in the center transformer could destroy all three transformers)
and the outage time to replace the center transformer (assuming the deluge system will protect the
adjacent transformers). The outage time to replace a single unit is 5 days and to replace three units is
40 days. Therefore, the expected net outage loss period is 35 days.
 ⎯ The expected lost revenue is 35 days × 24 h per day × 25 MW/h × $25/MW = $525 000.
 ⎯ Because this is a simplified analysis, the societal benefits and operating costs will not be
considered. These costs could be significant. Examples include societal costs, loss of reputation, or
possible litigation costs.
 ⎯ It is not known when a transformer fire may occur over the 25 year period. To help analyze the
problem, the net present value (NPV) of the annual revenue and equipment losses will be used based
on the costs being equally divided over the 25 year period. This simplified approach ignores
inflation, depreciation, and other factors. The NPV of a series of equal payments is calculated using
13
the following formula :
1− 1 
where
is the net present value

is the periodic payment
is the number of periods (years in this case) is the discount rate
 ⎯ The yearly amount for the annual revenue loss is $21 000 ($525 000/25). The NPV over 25 years
with a discount rate of 10% is $190 618.
 ⎯ The yearly amount for the equipment loss is $24 000 (2 × $300 000/25). The NPV over 25 years
with a discount rate of 10% is $217 849.
 ⎯ The benefit/cost ratio is calculated using Equation (1) of 9.6 given as follows: benefit
B/C= =
p(F)×e(RM)×[RC+LR+SB+OC]
NPV=R
(1+i)
n
(C.1)
NPV
Rni
i 
where
benefit
cost
p(F) e(RM) RC LR
SB
cost
RM
is the value associated with lost revenue, operation, and building replacements that are avoided if a major fire
is prevented (benefit of avoided loss)
is the cost to protect against damage due to major fire
is the probability of major fire (probability of an outage due to a fire) is the effectiveness of remedial measure
is the replacement cost of facility and equipment lost due to fire
is the lost revenue (in $) due to fire (lost load × mill rate)
is the societal benefit (in $) lost due to customer outages created by fire 13 Formula taken from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annuity_(finance_theory).
63
IEEE Std 979-2012

RM is the cost of remedial measure

OC is the operating cost associated with manning the station due to fire
damage of supervisory equipment p(F)×e(RM)×[RC+LR+SB+OC]

B/C =
RM
Paramete
r
Value
p(F) 0.00075
e(RM) 0.9
RC $190 618
LR $217 849
SB $0
OC $0
RM
$60 000
0.00075×0.9×[$190618+$217849+$0+$0] $60 000

B/C = =$276/$60000=0.005
Conclusion
The calculated benefit/cost ratio of 0.005 is considerably less than the minimum required ratio of 2. The
proposal to install deluge protection should be rejected because it does not provide a large benefit given the
small risk involved. Other fire-protection measures could be considered or the risk could be transferred by
purchasing insurance to cover the possible loss of the assets (transformers) and the revenue. These other
measures can also be analyzed using this economic risk analysis methodology.
64
Annex D
(informative)
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 11)
Site drawings
Access routes
Building locations
Floor plans
Ventilation capabilities
Identification of major hazards
Locations of energized oil-filled equipment
Description of the nature and location of electrical hazards Location of detection/fixed protection (if any)
Location of water supplies (if any)
Electrical single line drawings
IEEE Std 979-2012

Fire emergency plan, incident management, and recovery D.1 Purpose
The purpose of this annex is to provide substation asset owners information to manage substation fire
incidents effectively with private or public emergency responders. This annex is not intended to be inclusive
of all the issues and considerations of a complete emergency response plan but to be an overview of the basic
elements that need to be addressed. To complete an actual plan, the asset owner should obtain the services of
a qualified emergency planning professional.
D.2 Preplanning for the fire emergency
The fires that result from oil-filled equipment failures tend to be large combustible liquid pool fires, with hot
metal inside and around them. The heat from the fire will be intense, unless mitigated in some fashion by
built-in features such as walls, containment, stone bases, and fixed fire protection systems. Furthermore, the
smoke from these events is typically thick and black. Coupled with the potential hazard of energized electrical
equipment, this makes emergency response and firefighting in substation environments difficult and
hazardous.
The following three essential elements of a fire emergency plan need to be established prior to the incident to
avoid confusion and allow for effective management of the incident:
a) A written and accessible fire preplan consisting of the following elements is required to assist emergency
responders in their incident management activities and to assure their safety. This cannot be done during the
emergency and should include drawings that include the following:
b) The fire preplan should include the organization and responsibilities of the incident management team
including:
1) Preestablish lines of communication.
65
IEEE Std 979-2012

2. 2) Identify who is going to be the emergency response organization (private or public) and who will
be the incident commander. They will have overall authority for the management of the incident.
3. 3) Identify site owner person in charge.
4. 4) Preestablish protocols so that authority is with the most senior, knowledgeable individual at all
times. This person acts as liaison with the incident commander in charge of the emergency response.
5. 5) Develop written organization charts that identify positions and reporting relationships.
6. 6) Conduct periodic site walk downs/drills to familiarize emergency responders and owner
representatives.
7. 7) Predetermine role of site owner.
8. 8) Determine participant role in the isolation of affected equipment/electrical circuits (local or
remote).
9. 9) Assign team member responsibilities in assisting emergency responders in size up of incident.
10. 10) Identify those qualified to use a self-contained breathing apparatus.
Environmental consideration during preplanning needs to be given to the retention of oil and firewater runoff
during and prior to firefighting operations. Amounts of absorbents and diking materials will need to be
determined as well as where such material can be expeditiously procured in a short period of time.
Consideration may be given to the installation of a secure cabinet at the entrance to the substation. This could
be accessed by first responders and would contain vital information such as owner’s personnel contact
information, fire preplan drawings, and a list of special hazards (e.g., PCB equipment) on site.
D.3 Incident management
The following personnel safety hazards must be identified:
 ⎯ Establish that responders do not enter any area where electric equipment is located until the
equipment is deenergized by a qualified individual.
 ⎯ Anticipate overhead structures that could be rendered unstable by fire exposure.
 ⎯ Establish access and egress routes for firefighting operations.
 ⎯ Anticipate potential changing wind direction.
Anticipate the fire scenario.
Radiant heat from a fire involving oil-filled transformers and other equipment will pose a severe
threat to neighboring equipment/structures and operations. If the distance or separation between the
fire and exposures is inadequate and fixed protection is not provided, then the damage may range
from blistered paint to additional failures, oil involvement, and propagation to adjacent structures.
Convective heat transfer from the fire and smoke plume will threaten overhead equipment. This may
include steelwork supporting the conductors or the conductors themselves.
As is the case with most hydrocarbon fires, smoke from a mineral oil fire will be voluminous, black,
and obvious to the public. As such, it will be seen as a source of air pollution. Although this will
prompt demands on the fire service to take steps to control the event, premature or inappropriate
action may cause
66
IEEE Std 979-2012

soil or water pollution whose effects far outweigh the damage to the atmosphere. As previously mentioned,
the smoke itself may be conductive because of the presence of carbon particles and steam.
If a fixed fire-suppression system is present, then the responders should identify the type and supplement the
water supply through fire department connections. Fixed water systems are installed for exposure protection
from adjacent fires, as well as to suppress the fire on the equipment of origin. However, unless properly
designed and installed, the fire-suppression system on the equipment of origin may be destroyed or damaged
in the initial event.
Exposure consideration will be critical with oil-insulated electrical equipment. Fire exposure to surrounding
structures and buildings maybe of longer duration where oil-insulated electrical equipment is involved
because of the time required to deenergize the electrical equipment for firefighter safety. Additional time may
have to be considered where it is necessary to have a qualified electrical equipment operator respond to the
scene to deenergize the equipment involved.
Establish what is needed to extinguish a fire involving oil-filled electrical equipment.
Mineral-oil-insulated electrical equipment typically uses a mineral oil with a high flash point in the range of
150 °C (300 °F). High-flash-point oils can be extinguished using water hose streams alone. However, unless
there is total spray impingement over the spill surface and any metals objects are cooled, the fire may not be
extinguished.
Successful extinguishment of oil-filled electrical equipment fires has been achieved by the use of water- based
extinguishing agents, such as firefighting foams and surfactants. These agents have achieved excellent results
when employed in sufficient quantity with water and at the proper application rate. The enhancements are
faster fire knock down, prevention of reflash, and use of less water, which reduces the amount of runoff, in
turn, lessening the environmental impact.
Each of these agents brings a set of advantages and disadvantages with it, and it is up to the fire service to
decide which will provide it with the best combination for its operation. For example, most public fire service
agencies use aqueous film forming foams (AFFFs) due to their superior knockdown capabilities and good
record on aircraft rescue applications. However, with large oil-filled equipment, there may be a fire in depth,
associated with highly preheated metal components of significant mass. Industry experience has shown that
more conventional protein or fluoroprotein foams may be more appropriate in these cases.
There are other extinguishing options available including dry chemical and gaseous agents such as carbon
dioxide. These agents can achieve extinguishment when the equipment is deenergized, and the fire is small
and/or confined by location indoors. However, they may not be successful on large outdoor fires due to their
limited cooling abilities and susceptibility to wind and thermal drafts.
Plan for what is needed to control and capture oil and water runoff.
Environmental exposure will involve the containment of oil runoff from the equipment involved. The runoff
can involve burning oil from the fire as well as oil floating on top of the water that is used to suppress the fire.
This will need to be contained and prevented from running into nearby streams, rivers, lakes, and so on. The
following should be considered in developing spill mitigation plans:
 ⎯ Slope of site
 ⎯ Drainage
 ⎯ Cable trenches and control building
 ⎯ Oil containment
 ⎯ Value of station stone
67
D.4 Recovery
IEEE Std 979-2012

The primary purpose of a post-fire recovery plan is to put in place procedures to promote the continued safety
of emergency responders as well as owner personnel responsible for damage assessment and equipment
restoration. The secondary purpose is to expedite the restoration of service to customers and to manage the
potential ongoing environmental exposure of oily/contaminated water and fire-suppression agents. Issues for
consideration include the following:
 ⎯ Air quality must be investigated, particularly in buildings that may be contaminated with PCBs
and asbestos.
 ⎯ Qualified personnel need to conduct air quality assessments; public fire departments do not
normally provide this service.
 ⎯ If air quality is not acceptable and restoration has to be expedited, then owner personnel will be
required to wear self-contained breathing apparatus or respirators depending on what contaminate is
present.
 ⎯ Fire protection systems that have operated should be restored to service. Discharged fire
extinguishers should be recharged.
 ⎯ A detailed damage assessment needs to be conducted to establish what needs to isolated prior to
restoration of service.
 ⎯ A root-cause analysis should be performed to minimize the potential for reoccurrence. D.5
Energized equipment
All alternatives to deenergize all equipment in the location of a fire must be explored prior to
initiating an attempt to extinguish the fire. There are techniques, beyond the scope of this guide, in
fire protection handbooks and other documents that may be used when equipment cannot be
deenergized and the fire must be extinguished.
D.6 Loss history
A study was carried out on the reported substation fires by a major utility for the period from 1971 to
1994. The data in Table D.1 give information on the types and relative percentage of fires
experienced. These values should be used only as “order of magnitudes” because the data are limited
to one utility. It is expected that the type and percentage of fires that occur will vary significantly
from utility to utility.
Table D.1—Substation fires
Percentage of total
Types of fires
Oil-insulated circuit breakers 14%
Current transformers 14%
Power transformers 9.3%
Hot work (welding, cutting, and
9.3%
grinding)
Voltage potential transformers 7.8%
Engine-driven generators 7.0%
Arson 6.3%
Smoking 6.0%
Lightning 4.7%
Flammable liquid storage or handling 3.1%
Terrorism 1.6%
Miscellaneous fires 15.8%
The miscellaneous fires category above covers a wide range of fires from grass fires to a plastic wall clock
failing and catching fire. It is impossible to predict all of the different types of fires that can occur.
68
Annex E
(informative)
Examples
IEEE Std 979-2012
The following examples show the various methods for analyzing and applying the fire protection concepts
and principles presented in this guide. The information used is from a typical substation that a substation
engineer may encounter. The example follows the steps that would be commonly used to carry out the fire
protection analysis.
E.1 Determining the flame front E.1.1 Transformer without containment
When a station lacks oil containment or spill containment, the designer should carry out an analysis of the
station to determine the fire exposure that a spill fire from a transformer will create. The critical conditions
that should be analyzed are as follows:
 ⎯ The station grades: The grades can cause the spill fires to spread and flow in specific directions
where the grade slopes or more randomly where the station grades are flat. These grades can cause
the spill to spread toward critical station equipment or facilities.
 ⎯ Ground cover: Ground cover material such as a 15 cm (6 in) deep layer of stone will lessen the
flame height of a spill fire, whereas hard-packed ground cover increases the spread of the spill fire.
 ⎯ Transformer oil volume: The larger the volume of oil, the larger the spill fire will be and the
greater distance that the spill fire can spread.
 ⎯ Transformer failure mode: A transformer tank failure can spread a large amount of oil more
quickly than a bushing failure.
The design of oil-containment systems can provide some insight into the oil flow and pooling during
a fire. Subclause 7.1 of IEEE Std 980-1994 states that typical containment systems are designed to
extend 1.5 m to 3.0 m (approximately 5 ft to 10 ft) beyond the edge of the tank in order to capture a
majority of the leaking oil. Although a clean hole near the bottom of a tank will likely project much
further than this, it is a practical range. The smaller distance might be used for smaller transformers
and the larger distances for larger transformers.
The initial spill fire may extend 1.5 m for a small transformer to 3.0 m for a large transformer. These
values, with consideration for spread because of the site grades, can be used to estimate the flame
front for the majority of fires. The designer needs to recognize that there is a risk that the flame front
will be larger than this estimate.
E.1.2 Transformer with containment and without flame-suppressing stone
A transformer and oil containment are shown in Figure E.1. The containment wall is not the same
distance from the transformer foundation on all sides. This often occurs due to physical constraints
of the installation or to provide additional storage volume. In this case, the oil-containment walls are
2.6 m (8 ft,
69
IEEE Std 979-2012

8 in) on the short sides of the transformer and 3.8 m (12 ft, 4 in). The distances are consistent with the
distances discussed in E.1.1.
Without stone in the containment, the flame front may extend to the edge of the walls. The perimeter size of
the flame front will be 11.5 m (37 ft, 8 in) × 13.5 m (44 ft, 4 in) when the wall thickness of 15 cm (6 in) is
taken into account. When evaluating fire separations, distances should be measured from the perimeter of the
flame front or spill containment.
Figure E.1—Foundation and oil-containment plan E.1.3 Transformer with containment and flame-
suppressing stone
The same transformer and containment is used as in the previous clause. The containment pit is designed so
the stone thickness extends 0.15 m (6 in) above the maximum oil level. This will suppress combustion of oil
in the containment. See 8.2. The anticipated flame front and spill fire size is reduced to the larger of the tank
perimeter or the tank foundation perimeter. The perimeter of the flame front will be 4.3 m (14 ft) × 8.5 m (28
ft). The use of flame-suppressing stone can reduce the fire separation by 2.5 m (8 ft, 2 in) to 3.6 m (11 ft, 10
in).
The flame-suppressing stone typically has a void volume of 30%, which decreases the effective liquid storage
capacity by approximately 2/3. This will result in an increased spill containment size. If the containment size
is too large, then consider the following:
 ⎯ The use of an IEC system (pit with grating and a 15 cm [6 in] layer of stone).
 ⎯ Use a separate storage tank.
 ⎯ Use a “burn off” pit. A “burn off” pit would be located in an area where the oil can burn without
jeopardizing adjacent equipment or structures.
70

E.2 Substation example E.2.1 General
IEEE Std 979-2012

This example illustrates some of the concepts presented in this guide and the methodology that the substation
designers and other concerned individuals would follow in order to ensure that the substation is adequately
protected from fire hazards.
E.2.2 Given information
Figure B.2 shows a conceptual 230 kV ring bus connected to two 230 kV to 69 kV transformers and two 230
kV lines. The 69 kV switchyard is located 30 m (100 ft) from the 230 kV switchyard, and because this
separation will provide adequate protection to its equipment, it will not be shown for simplicity. Its equipment
will not be considered in the evaluation.
The location of the substation was selected based on proximity to the 230 kV lines. No considerations are
given to other factors such as the wind magnitude, surrounding area, and substation slopes. There are no water
sources near the substation.
The 230 kV ties into the main bulk power system for the area and the substation is important to the utility’s
operation. The 69 kV from the substation ties into a regional power system that is highly reliable and
redundant. The loss of the 69 kV supply would not impact the system reliability.
Figure E.2—Substation (partial) layout

71
Equipment information:
IEEE Std 979-2012

 ⎯ 69 kV Circuit breaker: The 69 kV circuit breakers are SF6 type with polymer bushings and rated
2000 A, 650 kV BIL. No oil is used in these circuit breakers.
 ⎯ 230 kV Circuit breaker: The 230 kV circuit breakers are SF6 type with polymer bushings and
rated 2000 A, 900 kV BIL. No oil is used in these circuit breakers.
 ⎯ Control building: 15.2 m (50 ft) long × 9.1 m (30 ft) wide × 4.6 m (15 ft) high, metal with 2 h fire
rating walls and ceiling; door locations are as shown.
 ⎯ Power transformer: Two 180 MVA, 230 kV through 69 kV transformers are used in the
substation. Mineral oil is used in the tank, high-voltage bushings, and low-voltage bushings. The
following information is given for the transformers.
 ⎯ Transformer foundation and spill containment: The proposed layout is shown in Figure E.1. The
containment wall is not the same distance from the transformer foundation on all sides. This often
occurs due to physical constraints of the installation or to provide additional storage volume
(extending the size may not be possible on all sides). In this case, the spill containment walls are 2.6
m (8 ft, 8 in) from the foundation on the short sides of the transformer and 3.8 m (12 ft, 4 in) from
the long sides.
Without stone in the containment, the flame front will extend to the edge of the walls. The perimeter
size of the flame front will be 11.5 m (37 ft, 8 in) × 13.5 m (44 ft, 4 in) when the wall thickness of 15
cm (6 in) is taken into account. When evaluating fire separations, distances will be measured from
the perimeter of the flame front or spill containment.
 ⎯ Station service transformer: Two station service power transformers are used. Both are pad
mount, dry type, rated 12.47 kV to 480 V, 150 kVA.
 ⎯ Voltage transformer: Each of the voltage transformers contains 57 L (15 gal) of oil.
 ⎯ The substation area is graded with a 2% slope.
E.2.3 Fire sources in the substation
The following is a list of the significant fire sources in the station:
1. a) The two power transformers (T1 and T2)

2. b) Voltage transformers
3. c) Station service transformers
4. d) Switchyard maintenance activities
Metric
Transformer data
units
American system units
High-voltage bushing, height above base 7.6 m 25 ft
Low-voltage bushing, height above base 6.1 m 20 ft
Conservator tank, height above base 7.0 m 23 ft
Main tank oil volume 49 210 L 13 000 gal
Radiators oil volume 4540 L 1200 gal
Conservator oil volume 1890 L 500 gal
Total oil volume 55 650 L

14 700 gal
1. 1) Hot work
2. 2) Oil treatment
e) Control building
1) Control panels
72
IEEE Std 979-2012

2) Heating system 3) Smoking
4) Refuse
5) Hot work
The fire sources in the substation are summarized in Table E.1.
Table E.1—Fire sources
The power transformers are the most hazardous fire sources in the substation. The spacing of the transformers
to each other and to the control building is critical and will be examined as follows.
E.2.4 Fire protection assessments

E.2.4.1 Switchyard fire protection assessment
Source Number of items

Material
Power transformer 2 Mineral oil
Voltage transformers (VTs) 6 Mineral oil
Station service
2 Dry insulation
transformers
Control building 1 Multiple

Walls and roof Wire and cable
Items
Comments
Risk assessment
— Electric equipment layout and equipment types. See Figure E.2.
— Criticality of the various pieces of equipment. See E.2.2.
— Insulating fluids used and their flammability. Mineral oil.
 — T1 and T2: f =
0.0006/year/unit.
 — Station service
transformer: f <
— Historical frequency of fire for the various types of equipment. 0.0001/year/unit.
 — Voltage transformer: f <
0.0001/year/unit.
— Availability of a fire department response to the site. No response is available.

— Availability of a firefighting water supply at or adjacent to the site. The closest water source is 500 m away.
Radiant exposure assessment
— Spacing between individual single-phase transformers and breakers. NA
— Spacing between oil-insulated equipment such as three-phase transformers,
See E.2.5 for a detailed analysis.
banks of single-phase transformers, or groups of breakers.
— Spacing of oil-insulated equipment with respect to buildings. See E.2.6 for details.
NOTE 1—The presence of combustible surfaces and unprotected windows on

exposed surfaces of the buildings may require detailed thermal radiation
calculations or the application of safety factors to the table distances. The
Society of Fire Protection Engineers Engineering Guide for Assessing Flame
Radiation to External Targets from Pool Fires [B77] can be used as a reference
for detailed thermal radiation calculations.
The distance to the property line is not
— Distances between oil-insulated equipment and the property line. known, and the drawing does not give
any indication of other properties.
73
IEEE Std 979-2012

Items
Comments
NOTE 2—Combustible vegetation and building structures beyond the property line
of the substation may be exposed to high enough heat fluxes to ignite combustible
surfaces. Detailed thermal radiation calculations should be considered.
 — Mineral-oil-insulating
fluid used.
 — Equipment spacing as
shown.
 — Ground cover
assumed to be impervious
with no
— Use of the various methods of fire protection discussed in this guide that will
address the hazard determined in the radiant exposure assessment, such as changing
the type of equipment and insulating fluid used, increased spacing, provision of stone.
gravel ground cover, oil-containment, fire barriers, and automatic water deluge fire
protection.  — Oil containment
provided.
 — No fire barriers
installed.
 — No water spray deluge
installed.
Fire spread assessment

— Is the surface around oil-filled equipment pervious (gravel) or impervious? The
use of 30 cm (12 in) thick crushed stone ground covers will suppress the flames from Oil-spill containment is impervious
a burning oil spill fire. Impervious surfaces can allow the burning oil to form a large and will support a spill fire.
pool fire, which will increase the heat flux to adjacent equipment and structures.
— Is there any oil-spill containment in place around the oil-filled equipment? Oil-spill containment is in place.
— Does the grade surrounding the oil-filled equipment slope toward the equipment
or away from the oil- filled equipment toward adjacent oil-filled equipment, cable Site slope is 2%, but oil-spill
trenches, drainage facilities, or buildings? The burning oil released from ruptured containment is used so this is not
oil-filled equipment can spread for significant distances if the ground surrounding significant for fire protection.
the equipment has a slope greater than 1%.
— Review the use of the various methods of fire protection discussed in IEEE Std  — Mineral-oil-insulating
979 that will address the hazard determined in the fire spread assessment. These fluid used.
methods include the following:  — Equipment spacing as
shown.
1. 1) Changing the type of equipment and insulating fluid used  — Ground cover
2. 2) Increasing the spacing, use of gravel ground cover
3. 3) Provision of oil containment
4. 4) Changing the grade surrounding the
equipment assumed to be impervious

and no
5. 5) Use of liquid-tight noncombustible cable

stone.
trench cover adjacent to oil-filled

 — Oil-spill containment
provided.
equipment  — No fire barriers
installed.
6. 6) Fire stopping of cable trenches entries into  — No water spray deluge
installed.
control buildings
7. 7) The use of automatic water deluge fire
protection
74
IEEE Std 979-2012

E.2.4.2 Control building fire protection assessment
Item
Comments
Life safety assessment
The layout shows an outward swinging door and
a large double equipment door. However, both
doors are at one end of the control building. The
large equipment doors are usually closed and
secured with pins.
— Review the control room layout to ensure that the room has a
minimum of one outward swinging exit doors.
Confirm the locations of the doors are at
opposite ends of the building to provide shorter
travel distances. Also ensure that all doors will
not be secured such that they can still be used as
an exit at all times.
— Ensure that the travel distance from any area within the control
Travel distance is less than 30 m (100 ft).
building to an exit does not exceed 30 m (100 ft).
— Ensure that exit signs are installed at each exit door. No information on compliance.
— Review that emergency lighting is provided that will provide a
Yes.
minimum lighting level of 10 lux at the floor, along the exit paths.
— Review the size and number of stories of the building to ensure One story.
proper exits are provided to ensure that maximum travel distances to the
exits do not exceed 30 m (100 ft).
— Building or fire code requirements for the installation of a fire
None.
detection system.
Fire protection assessment
— Review the availability of a fire department response to the site. No fire department response.
 — Review the availability of firefighting water supply at or
adjacent to the site. No water supply available.
 — Review the adequacy of any existing control building fire None is provided other than portable fire
protection. extinguishers.
The control building is critical to the substation’s

reliability. Early detection of fires is critical to
— Review criticality of control building equipment, hazards involved,
prevent extensive damage. Fire detection is
response time of station personnel, and the fire department.
required, but fire suppression is considered too
costly.
— Determine the type of detection that will provide an acceptable, very Photoelectric smoke detectors will provide early
early detection (air sampling detection) to detect a fire at a very early detection of fires that typically occur in control
stage (small electronic component failure—arcing) or at an early stage buildings. The alarm will be sent to the utility’s
with smoke detection (photoelectric detection) to detect a fire at a control center to allow quick dispatching of staff
smoldering or small flame stage. and fire personnel.
— Determine the type of fire-suppression system that will provide
acceptable equipment losses and outages (i.e., gaseous suppression
systems to suppress a fire at an early stage [component loss] or None provided.
sprinkler protection to suppress a fire at the stage where the loss would
be restricted to a single control cabinet).
 — Review the occupied hours of the building and ability of The control building is only occupied during
site personnel to extinguish a fire safely with portable fire station checks and maintenance (typically 4 h per
equipment. week).
 — Determine the levels of portable fire equipment required Install two 10 lb fire extinguishers, rated ABC,
by the local fire code and that is suitable for safe staff one at each exit door. A clean agent fire
operation. extinguishant with lower toxicity and zero ozone
depletion may be considered.
Hazard assessment
— Other uses (shops, offices, storage, etc.) within the control building
No other uses are within the control building.
and their exposure to the critical substation equipment.
— Combustible construction in the control building (i.e., exterior The control building is of noncombustible, 2 h
surfaces and roofs). rated construction.
75
IEEE Std 979-2012

Item
Comments
All interior surfaces have low flame spread. The interior walls are surfaced with 0.5 in
— Interior surface finishes in the
drywall. Specific areas have 0.75 in plywood to allow mounting of equipment panels.
control building.
All walls surfaces are painted with two coats of latex paint.
— Combustibility of any exposed Cables are routed in ventilated cable tray. Cables have a FT1 rating in accordance with
cable used in the control building
(ensure that it meets the
IEEE Std 1202-2006 [B70].
requirements of IEEE Std
1202TM-2006 [B70]).
— Control building separation
walls to other occupancies to
ensure that the walls have a fire-
resistance rating of a minimum of
1 h. No other occupancies.
E.2.5 Transformer-to-transformer spacing E.2.5.1 Based on prescriptive values
From 7.2.2, the required separation between the anticipated transformer flame front and adjacent transformer
is 15.2 m (50 ft).
Because stone is not used in the spill containment, the anticipated flame front is the edge of the spill
containment to the closest bushing of the adjacent transformer. The distance to the closest bushing is chosen
because the bushing will typically be damaged first.
⎯ T1 fire: The minimum distance between the edge of the T1 spill containment to the closest part of the T2 is
16.95 m as detailed below:
Metric
Distance
units
American system units
T1 spill containment wall thickness 0.15 m 6 in
Distance between outside edges of the T1 and T2

13.8 m 45 ft, 3 5/8 in
spill containments
Distance between the T2 oil containment and its

2.6 m
tank
8 ft, 8 in
Distance between the T2 tank and the nearest

0.35 m 1 ft, 2 in
bushing
Total separation between anticipated T1 flame

16.95 m
front and T2
55 ft, 7 5/8 in
⎯ T2 fire: In this case, the transformers are symmetrical so the distances are the same as for T1- >T2 or 16.95
m.
The distance between transformers is 16.95 m, whereas the prescriptive distance is 15.2 m. The proposed
layout meets the prescriptive spacing requirements for T1 and T2.
E.2.5.2 Heat flux calculations
These calculations are based on two fire scenarios of a bushing failure and core failure. The assumptions used
for the calculations are as follows:
 ⎯ Mineral oil insulating fluid is used.

 ⎯ Transformers are conservator pressurized, not gas pressurized.
 ⎯ Transformer bushings are porcelain.
 ⎯ Transformer tank is 4.9 m (16 ft) high and the top is flat.
76
IEEE Std 979-2012

 ⎯ Flame-suppressing stone is not used in the spill containment.

 ⎯ Transformer pad size is the same as the transformer tank.
 ⎯ Transformer pad height is higher than the top of the containment walls.
Calculations follow. Refer to Chapter 5 of the NUREG documentation for details of the calculations.
See B.1 for references to this document.
a) Fire spill size
1) Bushing failure area (AB)

i) A common scenario is to take the fire area to be the area of the top of the
transformer tank plus the area of the spill containment.
— Tank and containment area: 13.5 m × 11.5 m = 155.3 m2

2
(44 ft, 4 in × 37 ft, 8 in = 1670 ft )
ii) Alternatively, using the scenario proposed in CEATI Report No. 1023700-3022 [B52], the area of the fire
is based on the area of the top of the transformer tank, half the area of the sides, and the area of the spill
containment. This scenario gives a worst-case result.
NOTE—The dimensions of the spill containment are reduced to account for a wall thickness of 15 cm (6 in).
2
 — Tank and containment area: 13.5 m × 11.5 m = 155.3 m
2
(44 ft 4 in × 37 ft 8 in = 1670 ft )
 — Area of half the tank height: 4.9m/2×(2×8.5m+2×4.3m)
2
= 62.7 m
2
(16 ft ÷ 2 × (2 × 28 ft + 2 × 14 ft) = 672 ft )
2 2 2
— Total fire area: 155.3 m2 + 62.7 m2 = 218.0 m2 (1670 ft + 672 ft = 2342 ft )
2) Tank failure fire area (AT)
A tank failure will cause the area between the transformer foundation and the containment walls to become
the possible spill area because stone is not used in the containment.
— Tank and containment area: 13.5 m × 11.5 m = 155.3 m2

2
(44 ft 4 in × 37 ft 8 in = 1670 ft )
 — Tankarea:
 — Fire area: Summary of fire areas:
2
8.5m×4.3m=36.6m2 (28 ft × 14 ft = 392 ft )
2 2 2 2 2 2
155.3 m – 36.6 m = 118.7 m (1670 ft – 392 ft = 1278 ft )
Fire area
(m2)
Scenario
Bushing failure (i) 155.3
Bushing failure (ii) 218.0
Tank failure 118.7
b) Pool fire radius:

In this case, the pool will be noncircular. Assume a circle with the same area as the pool fire.
0.5 0.5
⎯ Bushing (i): rBi= (A/π) = (155.3/π) = 7.0 m 77
c)
IEEE Std 979-2012

0.5 0.5
 ⎯ Bushing (ii): rBii= (A/π) = (218/π) = 8.3 m
0.5 0.5
 ⎯ Tank: rT= (A/π) = (118.7/π) = 6.1 m Heat release rate (MW) using Equation 5-2 of NUREG:
Q = m′′ΔHc A(1 – e–kβD)
Variabl
Description
e
Value
Mass loss rate for mineral oil per Table 3-1.2 in
m′′
SFPE or NUREG spreadsheet 0.039 kg/m2s
Net heat of combustion per Table 3-1.2 in SFPE or
Δ Hc 46.4 MJ/kg
NUREG spreadsheet
Bushing (i): 155.3 m2 Bushing (ii): 218.0 m2 Tank: 118.7
A Area of pool fire (m2)
m2
kβ Empirical constant (m–1) 0.7 m–1
D Diameter of burning area (m)
Bushing (i): 14.0 m Bushing (ii): 16.6 m Tank (i): 12.2 m
d)
e)
NOTE—The calculations can be been simplified in most cases by setting the factor (1 – e–kβD) to 1.
Distance between pool fire and target
 — Bushing of adjacent transformer:
This distance was calculated in E.2.5.1, LB = 16.95 m
 — Tank of adjacent transformer:

This distance will be the same as the previous value less the distance between the tank and bushing
(0.35 m), LT = 16.95 – 0.35 = 16.6 m
2 2
Heat flux (kW/m ) at bushing target using Equation 5-1 of NUREG: q”= Xr Q/(4πR )
 — Bushing (i):
 — Bushing (ii):
 — Tank:
–(0.7)(14)
Q = 46.4 × 0.039 × 155.3 × (1 – e ) = 280.9 MW Q = 280 900 kW
–(0.7)(16.6)
Q = 46.4 × 0.039 × 218 × (1 – e ) = 393.4 MW Q = 393 400 kW
–(0.7)(16.6)
Q = 46.4 × 0.039 × 118.7 × (1 – e ) = 214.8 MW Q = 214 800 kW
Variabl
Description
e
Value
Xr Fraction of total energy radiated 0.3
Bushing (i): 280 900 kW Bushing (ii): 393 400 kW
Q Heat release rate (kW)
Tank: 214 800 kW
Distance from the center of the fire to the edge of the Bushing (i): 7.0 + 16.95 m Bushing (ii): 8.3 + 16.95 m
R target (r + LB)(m) Tank: 6.1 + 16.95 m
 — Tank:
2 2 2 2
= (0.3 × 280 900)/(4π(7.0 + 16.95) ) = 11.7 kW/m = (0.3 × 393 400)/(4π(8.3 + 16.95) ) = 14.7 kW/m = (0.3
2 2
× 214 800)/(4π(6.1 + 16.95) ) = 9.6 kW/m
The SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering [B79] recommends multiplying the calculated heat flux
by a factor of two to account for variations between calculated and actual values. The heat flux can then be
taken to be within these ranges.
78
f)
2
Heat flux (kW/m ) at tank target using Equation 5-1 from NUREG.
The calculations will be identical to those in the previous subclause except LT is used instead of
g)
h)
Critical heat flux per Table B.3 for bushing damage — Bushing damage = 5 kW/m2
The separation is acceptable if the estimated heat flux at the target is below the critical heat flux of the target.
2
The minimum heat flux (9.6 kW/m ) for either a bushing or tank fire is about 90% higher than the critical heat
2
flux for bushings (5 kW/m ). Being that the heat fluxes are so much higher than the critical heat flux, there is
a significant risk of bushing damage to an adjacent transformer. Therefore, the separation does not provide
adequate protection to the bushings of an adjacent transformer.
2
Critical heat flux per Table B.3 for tank damage — Tank damage = 35 kW/m
2
The maximum heat flux (30.4 kW/m ) of either a bushing or tank fire is about 13% lower than the critical heat
2
flux for a tank (35 kW/m ). This means that the separation provides adequate protection to the tank of an
adjacent transformer even with the safety factor.
LB.
 — Tank:
2 2 2 2
= (0.3 × 280 900)/(4π(7.0 + 16.6) ) = 12.0 kW/m = (0.3 × 393 400)/(4π(8.3 + 16.6) ) = 15.2 kW/m = (0.3 ×
2 2
214 800)/(4π(6.1 + 16.6) ) = 9.9 kW/m
 — Tank:
IEEE Std 979-2012

2 2 2 2 2 2
= 11.7 kW/m to 23.4 kW/m = 14.7 kW/m to 29.4 kW/m = 9.6 kW/m to 19.2 kW/m
Doubling the values to include the recommended safety factor gives the following range:
 — Tank:
2 2 2 2
= 12.0 kW/m2 to 24.0 kW/m2 = 15.2 kW/m to 30.4 kW/m = 9.9 kW/m to 19.8 kW/m
The spacing as designed does not meet the requirements based on the heat flux calculations. The designer
might consider changing the type of insulating fluid, increasing the spacing between transformers, adding
stone to the oil containment (effectively increasing the spacing), or providing a fire barrier.
E.2.6 Transformer to control building spacing E.2.6.1 Prescriptive spacing
The control building location was chosen with the following considered:
 ⎯ Central within site to minimize cable lengths

 ⎯ Accessibility to control building for vehicles
 ⎯ Accessibility to equipment for maintenance
The edge of the anticipated transformer flame front for either a bushing fire or tank fire is the edge of
the spill containment. The minimum distance to the control building for a T1 fire follows.
79

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IEEE Guide for Substation Fire

IEEE Std 979TM-2012 (Revision of IEEE Std 979-1994)

(Revision of IEEE Std 979-1994)

IEEE Guide for Substation Fire Protection

IEEE Power and Energy Society

Approved 30 August 2012

IEEE-SA Standards Board

Copyright © 2012 by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.

PDF: ISBN 978-0-7381-7311-5 STD97286 Print: ISBN 978-0-7381-7326-9 STDPD97286

Comments on standards should be submitted to the following address:

Secretary, IEEE-SA Standards Board 445 Hoes Lane

Updating of IEEE documents

Copyright © 2012 IEEE. All rights reserved.

Copyright © 2012 IEEE. All rights reserved.

Brian Farmer Ajay Garg

Hanna Abdallah William Ackerman Ali Al Awazi

Copyright © 2012 IEEE. All rights reserved.

Thomas Rozek Anne-Ma Sahazizian Daniel Sauer

Richard H. Hulett, Chair

Alexander Gelman Paul Houzé

Thomas Lee Hung Ling

Oleg Logvinov Ted Olsen

Yatin Trivedi Phil Winston Yu Yuan

Michael Janezic, NIST Representative Don Messina

IEEE Standards Program Manager, Document Development

IEEE Client Services Manager, Professional Services

Copyright © 2012 IEEE. All rights reserved.

Copyright © 2012 IEEE. All rights reserved.

4. Fire hazards ................................................................................................................................................ 6

5. Fire protection considerations for substation sites...................................................................................... 9

6. Fire protection for substation buildings.................................................................................................... 12

7. Fire protection for substations .................................................................................................................. 20

Copyright © 2012 IEEE. All rights reserved.

8. Fire protection for equipment ................................................................................................................... 25

9. Fire protection measures selection ........................................................................................................... 29

Annex A (normative) Additional information to main body clauses............................................................ 32

Copyright © 2012 IEEE. All rights reserved.

IEEE Guide for Substation Fire Protection

1. Overview 1.1 Scope

Copyright © 2012 IEEE. All rights reserved.

IEEE Std 979-2012

 ⎯ Substation design engineers (civil, electrical, mechanical, and structural)

The types follows:

Generating plant switchyards Customer substations Switching substations Transmission substations

of substations listed can be designed in a number of different configurations and layouts as

Multistory above-grade substations

Multistory below-grade substations

Substations in mixed-use buildings including high-rise (>22.9 m) buildings

Copyright © 2012 IEEE. All rights reserved.

IEEE Std 979-2012

Refer to A.1 for additional information.

Copyright © 2012 IEEE. All rights reserved.

3.1 General terms

IEEE Std 979-2012

3.2 Fire-suppression system terms

Copyright © 2012 IEEE. All rights reserved.

3.3 Fire detection system terms

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IEEE Std 979-2012

4. Fire hazards 4.1 General

 ⎯ The magnitude of a possible fire

4.2 Combustible oil hazards

a) Transformers and reactors 1) Main tanks