UST Faculty Union vs. Bitonio / BLR - GR No.
131235 Case Digest
FACTS:
Private respondent Marinio et al were duly
elected officers of UST faculty. The union has a
5-year CBA with its employer and is set to expire
on May 31, 1998. On October 5, 1996 various
UST club presidents requested a general faculty
assembly thus union and non-union faculty
members convened. New set of officers were
elected, violative of the CBL and that the GA was
held with non-union members present. Union
officers were served with a notice to vacate the
union office, and CBA was ratified by an
overwhelming majority. Med-Arbiter declared the
election violative of the CBL while BLR director
Bitonio upheld the decision with a ruling that the
CBL which constituted the covenant between the
union and its members could not be suspended
during the general assembly of all faculty
members, since it ha not been authorized by the
union.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to recognize
the officers elected during the “general
assembly”.
RULING:
Self-organization is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution and the Labor
Code. Corollary to this right is the prerogative not
to join, affiliate with or assist a labor union.
Therefore, to become a union member, an
employee must not only signify the intent to
become one, but also take some positive steps
to realize that intent. The procedure for union
membership is usually embodied in the union’s
CBL. An employee who becomes a union
member acquires the rights and he concomitant
obligations that go with the new status and
becomes bound by the union’s rules and
regulations.
TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES supervisory and rank-and-file employees in
CORPORATION v. VS.TOYOTA MOTOR violation... of Article 245 of the Labor Code,[4]
PHILIPPINES CORPORATION LABOR UNION, and that at the time of the filing of its petition,
GR No. 121084, 1997-02-19 respondent union had not even acquired legal
personality yet.[5]
Facts:
On appeal, the Office of the Secretary of Labor...
On November 26, 1992, the Toyota Motor
set aside the Med-Arbiter's Order of March 3,
Philippines Corporation Labor Union (TMPCLU)
1993, and directed the holding of a certification
filed a petition for certification election with the
election among the... regular rank-and-file
Department of Labor, National Capital Region,
employees of Toyota Motor Corporation.
for all rank-and-file employees of the Toyota
Motor Corporation.[1]... petitioner filed a Position set aside the Med-Arbiter's Order of March 3,
Paper on February 23, 1993 seeking the denial 1993
of the issuance of an Order directing the holding
Not satisfied with the decision of the Office of the
of a certification election on two grounds:...
Secretary of Labor, petitioner filed a Motion for
first,... first, that the respondent union, being "in
Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 3,
the process of registration" had no legal
1993, reiterating its claim that as of the date of
personality... to file the same as it was not a
filing of petition for certification election,
legitimate labor organization as of the date of the
respondent TMPCLU had not yet... acquired the
filing of the petition... second,... second... econd,
status of a legitimate labor organization as
that the union was composed of both rank-and-
required by the Labor Code, and that the
file and supervisory employees in violation of
proposed bargaining unit was inappropriate.
law.[
the public respondent... set aside its earlier
The Med-Arbiter, Paterno D. Adap, dismissed
resolution and remanded the case to the Med-
respondent union's petition for certification
Arbiter... et aside its earlier resolution and
election for lack of merit.
remanded the case to the Med-Arbiter
he Med-Arbiter found that the labor concluding that the issues raised by petitioner
organization's membership was composed of both on appeal and in its motion for
reconsideration were factual... issues requiring
further hearing and production of evidence.[...
petitioner could not have been issued its
Certificate of Registration on November 24, 1992
when it applied for registration only on November
23, 1992 as shown by the official receipt of
payment of filing fee.
It is unlikely that an application for registration is
approved on the date... that it is filed or the day
thereafter as the processing course has to pass
thought routing, screening, and assignment,
evaluation, review and initialing, and
approval/disapproval procedure, among others,
so that a 30-day period is provided for under the
Labor Code for this... purpose, let alone
opposition thereto by interested parties which
must be also given due course."... urther citing
other pieces of evidence presented before her,
the Med-Arbiter concluded that respondent
TMPCLU could not have "acquire[d] legal
personality at the time of the filing of (its)
petition."[1
On April 20, 1996, the public respondent issued
a new Resolution,... directing the conduct of a
certification election among the regular rank-and-
file employees of the Toyota Motor Philippines
Corporation.
"directing the conduct of a certification election
among the regular rank-and-file employees of the
Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation.[13]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was...
denied by public respondent in his Order dated
July 14, 1995.[14]
ART. 245      Ineligibility of managerial
employees to join any labor organization; right of
supervisory employees. -- Managerial
Employees are not eligible to join, assist or form
any labor organization. Supervisory employees
shall not be... eligible for membership in a labor
organization of the rank-and-file employees but
may join, ass... assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own.
Issues:
petitioner contends that "the Secretary of Labor
and Employment committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in reversing, contrary to law and...
facts the findings of the Med-Arbiters to the effect
that: 1) the inclusion of the prohibited mix of
rank-and file and supervisory employees in the
roster of members and officers of the union
cannot be cured by a simple inclusion-exclusion
proceeding;
 1. the inclusion of the prohibited mix of rank-
and file and supervisory employees in the
roster of members and officers of the union
cannot be cured by a simple inclusion-
exclusion proceeding... and that 2) the
respondent... union had no legal standing
at the time of the filing of its petition for
certification election.[15]
2. the respondent... union had no legal
standing at the time of the filing of its
petition for certification election.[15]
Ruling:
based on this provision, a labor organization
composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory
employees is no labor organization at all. It
cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a legitimate
labor organization. Not being one, an
organization which carries a mixture of... rank-
and-file and supervisory employees cannot
possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor
organization, including the right to file a petition
for certification election for the purpose of
collective bargaining. It becomes necessary,
therefore, anterior to the granting of... an order
allowing a certification election, to inquire into the
composition of any labor organization whenever
the status of the labor organization is challenged
on the basis of Article 245 of the Labor Code.
The use of independent judgment in making the
decision to... hire, fire or transfer in the
identification of manpower requirements would
be greatly impaired if the employee's loyalties
are torn between the interests of the union and
the interests of management. A supervisory
employee occupying a level five position would
therefore find it... difficult to objectively identify
the exact manpower requirements dictated by
production demands.
Principles:
The purpose of every certification election is to
determine the exclusive representative of
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for
the purpose of collective bargaining. A
certification election for the collective bargaining
process is one of the fairest and most... effective
ways of determining which labor org... anization
can truly represent the working force.
In determining the labor organization which
represents the interests of the workforce, those
interests must be, as far as reasonably possible,
homogeneous, so... as to genuinely reach the
concerns of the individual members of a labor
organization.
an appropriate bargaining unit is a group of
employees of a given employer, composed of all
or less than the entire body of employees, which
the collective interests of all the employees,
consistent with equity to the employer... indicate
to be best suited to serve reciprocal rights and
duties of the parties under the collective
bargaining provisions of law.
we defined the bargaining unit as "the legal
collectivity for collective... bargaining purposes
whose members have substantially mutual
bargaining interests in terms and conditions of
employment as will assure to all employees their
collective bargaining rights."... the Labor Code
has made it a clear statutory policy to prevent
supervisory... employees from joining labor
organizations consisting of rank-and-file
employees as the concerns which involve
members of either group are normally disparate
and contradictory.
The holding of a certification election is based on
clear statutory policy which cannot be
circumvented.[23] Its rules, strictly construed by
this Court, are designed to eliminate fraud and
manipulation.
UNITED PEPSI-COLA VS. LAGUESMA
NOVEMBER 17, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
G.R. No. 122226 March 25, 1998
UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION
(UPSU), petitioner,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA and PEPSI-
COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES, INC.
respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner is a union of supervisory
employees. It appears that on March 20, 1995
the union filed a petition for certification election
on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola
Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition
was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal,
by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on
the ground that the route managers are
managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible
for union membership under the first sentence of
Art. 245 of the Labor Code, which provides:
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any
labor organization; right of supervisory
employees. — Managerial employees are not
eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization. Supervisory employees shall not be
eligible for membership in a labor organization of
the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist
or form separate labor organizations of their own.
Petitioner brought this suit challenging the
validity of the order, dismissed.
Hence, this petition. Pressing for resolution its
contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of
the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial
employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join
unions, contravenes Art. III, §8 of the
Constitution which provides:
The right of the people, including those employed
in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
ISSUES:
(1) whether the route managers at Pepsi-Cola
Products Philippines, Inc. are managerial
employees and
(2) whether Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits
managerial employees from forming, joining or
assisting labor unions, violates Art. III, §8 of the
Constitution.
HELD: YES and NO
As a class, managers constitute three levels of a
pyramid: (1) Top management; (2) Middle
Management; and (3) First-line Management
[also called supervisors].
FIRST-LINE MANAGERS — The lowest level in
an organization at which individuals are
responsible for the work of others is called first-
line or first-level management. First-line
managers direct operating employees only; they
do not supervise other managers. Examples of
first-line managers are the “foreman” or
production supervisor in a manufacturing plant,
the technical supervisor in a research
department, and the clerical supervisor in a large
office. First-level managers are often called
supervisors.
MIDDLE MANAGERS — The term middle
management can refer to more than one level in
an organization. Middle managers direct the
activities of other managers and sometimes also
those of operating employees. Middle managers’
principal responsibilities are to direct the
activities that implement their organizations’
policies and to balance the demands of their
superiors with the capacities of their
subordinates. A plant manager in an electronics
firm is an example of a middle manager.
TOP MANAGERS — Composed of a
comparatively small group of executives, top
management is responsible for the overall
management of the organization. It establishes
operating policies and guides the organization’s
interactions with its environment. Typical titles of
top managers are “chief executive officer,”
“president,” and “senior vice-president.” Actual
titles vary from one organization to another and
are not always a reliable guide to membership in
the highest management classification.
A distinction exists between those who have the
authority to devise, implement and control
strategic and operational policies (top and middle
managers) and those whose task is simply to
ensure that such policies are carried out by the
rank-and-file employees of an organization (first-
level managers/supervisors). What distinguishes
them from the rank-and-file employees is that
they act in the interest of the employer in
supervising such rank-and-file employees.
“Managerial employees” may therefore be said to
fall into two distinct categories: the “managers”
per se, who compose the former group described
above, and the “supervisors” who form the latter
group.
#1: It appears that this question was the subject
of two previous determinations by the Secretary
of Labor and Employment, in accordance with
which this case was decided by the med-arbiter.
To qualify as managerial employee, there must
be a clear showing of the exercise of managerial
attributes under paragraph (m), Article 212 of the
Labor Code as amended. Designations or titles
of positions are not controlling. As to the route
managers and accounting manager, we are
convinced that they are managerial employees.
Their job descriptions clearly reveal so (Worker’s
Alliance Trade Union (WATU) v. Pepsi-Cola
Products Philippines, Inc., Nov. 13, 1991)
This finding was reiterated in Case No. OS-A-3-
71-92. entitled In Re: Petition for Direct
Certification and/or Certification Election-Route
Managers/Supervisory Employees of Pepsi-Cola
Products Phils.Inc.
* doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to
adversary administrative proceedings
Thus, we have in this case an expert’s view that
the employees concerned are managerial
employees within the purview of Art. 212.
At the very least, the principle of finality of
administrative determination compels respect for
the finding of the Secretary of Labor that route
managers are managerial employees as defined
by law in the absence of anything to show that
such determination is without substantial
evidence to support it.
The Court now finds that the job evaluation made
by the Secretary of Labor is indeed supported by
substantial evidence. The nature of the job of
route managers is given in a four-page pamphlet,
prepared by the company, called “Route
Manager Position Description,” the pertinent
parts of which read:
A. BASIC PURPOSE
A Manager achieves objectives through others.
As a Route Manager, your purpose is to meet the
sales plan; and you achieve this objective
through the skillful MANAGEMENT OF YOUR
JOB AND THE MANAGEMENT OF YOUR
PEOPLE.
These then are your functions as Pepsi-Cola
Route Manager. Within these functions —
managing your job and managing your people —
you are accountable to your District Manager for
the execution and completion of various tasks
and activities which will make it possible for you
to achieve your sales objectives.
Xxxx
Distinction is evident in the work of the route
managers which sets them apart from
supervisors in general. Unlike supervisors who
basically merely direct operating employees in
line with set tasks assigned to them, route
managers are responsible for the success of the
company’s main line of business through
management of their respective sales teams.
Such management necessarily involves the
planning, direction, operation and evaluation of
their individual teams and areas which the work
of supervisors does not entail.
The route managers cannot thus possibly be
classified as mere supervisors because their
work does not only involve, but goes far beyond,
the simple direction or supervision of operating
employees to accomplish objectives set by those
above them.
While route managers do not appear to have the
power to hire and fire people (the evidence
shows that they only “recommended” or
“endorsed” the taking of disciplinary action
against certain employees), this is because thisis
a function of the Human Resources or Personnel
Department of the company.
# 2: Constitutionality of Art. 245
Art.245 is the result of the amendment of the
Labor Code in 1989 by R.A. No. 6715, otherwise
known as the Herrera-Veloso Law. Unlike the
Industrial Peace Act or the provisions of the
Labor Code which it superseded, R.A. No. 6715
provides separate definitions of the terms
“managerial” and “supervisory employees,” as
follows:
Art. 212. Definitions. . . .
(m) “managerial employee” is one who is vested
with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies and/or to hire
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge,
assign or discipline employees. Supervisory
employees are those who, in the interest of the
employer, effectively recommend such
managerial actions if the exercise of such
authority is not merely routinary or clerical in
nature but requires the use of independent
judgment. All employees not falling within any of
the above definitions are considered rank-and-
file employees for purposes of this Book.
The distinction between top and middle
managers, who set management policy, and
front-line supervisors, who are merely
responsible for ensuring that such policies are
carried out by the rank and file, is articulated in
the present definition. 30 When read in relation to
this definition in Art. 212(m), it will be seen that
Art. 245 faithfully carries out the intent of the
Constitutional Commission in framing Art. III, §8
of the fundamental law.
*Framer’s Intent: MR. LERUM. My amendment is
on Section 7, page 2, line 19, which is to insert
between the words “people” and “to” the
following: WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE
STATE OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS. In
other words, the section will now read as follows:
“The right of the people WHETHER EMPLOYED
BY THE STATE OR PRIVATE
ESTABLISHMENTS to form associations,
unions, or societies for purposes not contrary to
law shall not be abridged.”
Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art.
III, §8 infringed by a ban against managerial
employees forming a union. The right guaranteed
in Art. III, §8 is subject to the condition that its
exercise should be for purposes “not contrary to
law.” In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational
basis for prohibiting managerial employees from
forming or joining labor organizations.
PETITION is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.,
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU
INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and
INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-NATU
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.,
FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES
and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
FACTS: The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.,
Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance
Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU,
and Insular Life Building Employees Association-
NATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions),
while still members of the Federation of Free
Workers (FFW), entered into separate CBAs with
the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU
Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the
Companies).
Two of the lawyers of the Unions then
were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter
was formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW
and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU
unions and the Insular Life Building Employees
Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in
a circular issued in his name and signed by him,
tried to dissuade the members of the Unions
from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the
National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to
no avail.
Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured
employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the
Department of Justice. Thereafter,
the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of
1956 as assistant corporate secretary and legal
assistant in their Legal Department. Enaje was
hired as personnel manager of the Companies,
and was likewise made chairman of the
negotiating panel for the Companies in the
collective bargaining with the Unions.
Unions jointly submitted proposals to the
Companies; negotiations were conducted on the
Union’s proposals, but these were snagged by a
deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result
of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a
notice of strike for “deadlock on collective
bargaining.” The issue was dropped
subsequently (in short, nagkasundo). But, the
parties negotiated on the labor demands but with
no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the
matter of salary increases.
Meanwhile, 87 unionists were reclassified as
supervisors without increase in salary nor in
responsibility while negotiations were going
on in the Department of Labor after the notice
to strike was served on the Companies.
These employees resigned from the Unions.
On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their
acting manager and president, sent to each of
the strikers a letter (exhibit A) quoted verbatim
as follows:
We recognize it is your privilege both to strike
and to conduct picketing.
However, if any of you would like to come back
to work voluntarily, you may:
1. Advise the nearest police officer or security
guard of your intention to do so.
2. Take your meals within the office.
3. Make a choice whether to go home at the
end of the day or to sleep nights at the office
where comfortable cots have been prepared.
4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.
5. Be paid overtime for work performed in
excess of eight hours.
6. Be sure arrangements will be made for
your families.
7. The decision to make is yours — whether
you still believe in the motives of the strike or
in the fairness of the Management.
 
Unions, however, continued on strike, with the
exception of a few unionists who were convinced
to desist by the aforesaid letter
From the date the strike was called on May 21,
1958, until it was called off on May 31,
1958, some management men tried to break
thru the Unions’ picket lines xxx succeeded
in penetrating the picket lines in front of the
Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to
the picketers and also to the strike-breakers
due to the resistance offered by some
picketers.
Alleging that some non-strikers were injured
and with the use of photographs as evidence,
the Companies then filed criminal charges
against the strikers with the City Fiscal’s Office
of Manila.xxx
Another letter was sent by the company to the
individual strikers:
The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.
Our position remains unchanged and the strike
has made us even more convinced of our
decision.
We do not know how long you intend to stay out,
but we cannot hold your positions open for long.
We have continued to operate and will continue
to do so with or without you.
If you are still interested in continuing in the
employ of the Group Companies, and if there are
no criminal charges pending against you, we are
giving you until 2 June 1958 to report for work at
the home office. If by this date you have not yet
reported, we may be forced to obtain your
replacement.
Before, the decisions was yours to make.
So it is now.
Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal
charges filed against the members of the
Unions, except 3, were dismissed by the
fiscal’s office and by the courts. These three
cases involved “slight physical injuries” against
one striker and “light coercion” against two
others.
At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction against them as well as
the ultimatum of the Companies giving them until
June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be
replaced, the striking employees decided to call
off their strike and to report back to work on June
2, 1958.
* However, before readmitting the strikers, the
Companies required them not only to secure
clearances from the City Fiscal’s Office of Manila
but also to be screened by a management
committee among the members of which were
Enage and Garcia. The screening committee
initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal
charges. However, all non-strikers with pending
criminal charges which arose from the
breakthrough incident were readmitted
immediately by the Companies without being
required to secure clearances from the fiscal’s
office. Subsequently, when practically all the
strikers had secured clearances from the
fiscal’s office, the Companies readmitted only
some but adamantly refused readmission to
34 officials and members of the Unions who
were most active in the strike, on the ground
that they committed “acts inimical to the ISSUE: Whether or not respondent company is
interest of the respondents,” without however guilty of ULP
stating the specific acts allegedly
committed. Some 24 of the above number were HELD: YES
ultimately notified months later that they were
being dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958
The act of an employer in notifying absent
and given separation pay checks computed
employees individually during a strike following
under Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in
unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that
number) up to now have not been readmitted
the plant would be operated the next day and
although there have been no formal dismissal
that their jobs were open for them should they
notices given to them.
want to come in has been held to be an unfair
labor practice, as an active interference with
CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor the right of collective bargaining through
practice against the Companies under Republic dealing with the employees individually
Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the instead of through their collective bargaining
Companies with (1) interfering with the members representatives.
of the Unions in the exercise of their right to Although the union is on strike, the employer is
concerted action, by sending out individual letters still under obligation to bargain with the union as
to them urging them to abandon their strike and the employees’ bargaining representative.
return to work, with a promise of comfortable
cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime,
Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting
and, subsequently, by warning them that if they
their homes, with the employer or his
did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958,
representative urging the employees to cease
they might be replaced; and (2) discriminating
union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair
against the members of the Unions as regards
labor practice. All the above-detailed activities
readmission to work after the strike on the basis
are unfair labor practices because they tend to
of their union membership and degree of
undermine the concerted activity of the
participation in the strike.
employees, an activity to which they are entitled
free from the employer’s molestation.
Indeed, when the respondents offered
reinstatement and attempted to “bribe” the
strikers with “comfortable cots,” “free coffee and
occasional movies,” “overtime” pay for “work
performed in excess of eight hours,” and
“arrangements” for their families, so they would
abandon the strike and return to work, they were
guilty of strike-breaking and/or union-busting
and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is
equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an
employer to offer reinstatement to striking
employees individually, when they are
represented by a union, since the employees
thus offered reinstatement are unable to
determine what the consequences of returning to
work would be.
ULP also: (super short cut na to) Hiring of Enage
and Garcia with attractive compensations;
respondents reclassified 87 employees as
supervisors without increase in salary or in
responsibility, in effect compelling these
employees to resign from their unions;
respondents, thru their president and manager,
respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three
truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted
by armed men, who, despite the presence of
eight entrances to the three buildings occupied
by the Companies, entered thru only one gate
less than two meters wide and in the process,
crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the
premises of the Insular Life Building. This
resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers
and the strike-breakers; respondents brought
against the picketers criminal charges, only three
of which were not dismissed, and these three
only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of these
criminal actions, the respondents were able to
obtain an injunction from the court of first
instance restraining the strikers from stopping,
impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful
use of the Companies’ gates, entrance and
driveway and the free movement of persons and
vehicles to and from, out and in, of the
Companies’ buildings.
Verily, the above actuations of the respondents
before and after the issuance of the letters,
exhibit A and B, yield the clear inference that the
said letters formed of the respondents scheme to
preclude if not destroy unionism within them.
II. The respondents did not merely discriminate
against all the strikers in general. They separated
the active from the less active unionists on the Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers
basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket and members of the striking unions do not
lines. Unionists belonging to the first category indicate sufficient basis for dismissal.
were refused readmission even after they were
able to secure clearances from the competent
authorities with respect to the criminal charges
filed against them.

It is noteworthy that — perhaps in an anticipatory

effort to exculpate themselves from charges of
discrimination in the readmission of strikers
returning to work — the respondents delegated
the power to readmit to a committee.

III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record

shows that not a single dismissed striker was
given the opportunity to defend himself against
the supposed charges against him. As earlier
mentioned, when the striking employees reported
back for work on June 2, 1958, the respondents
refused to readmit them unless they first secured
the necessary clearances; but when all, except
three, were able to secure and subsequently
present the required clearances, the respondents
still refused to take them back.
H ARONSON VS ALU NONE

Victorias none

Sonedco none

MANU. CORP.
ROMMEL M. ZAMBRANO, ROMEO O.
CALIPAY, JESUS L. CHIN, et al., petitioners  vs.
PHILIPPINE CARPET MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION/ PACIFIC CARPET
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, DAVIDE.
T. LIM, and EVELYN LIM FORBES,
respondents.
G.R. No. 224099
June 21, 2017
FACTS:
On January 3, 2011,petitioners, who were
employees of private respondent Philippine
Carpet Manufacturing Corporation, were notified
of the termination of their employment effective
February 3, 2011 on the ground of cessation of
operation due to serious business losses. They
were of the belief that their dismissal was without
just cause and in violation of due process
because the closure of Phil Carpet was a mere
pretense to transfer its operations to its wholly
owned and controlled corporation, Pacific Carpet
Manufacturing Corporation (PacificCarpet). They
asserted that their dismissal constituted unfair
labor practice as it involved the mass dismissal
of all union officers and members of the
Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Employees
Association (PHILCEA).
In its defense, Phil Carpet countered that it
permanently closed and totally ceased its
operations because there had been a steady
decline in the demand for its products due to
global recession, stiffer competition, and the
effects of a changing market. Thus, in order to
stem the bleeding, the company implemented
several cost-cutting measures, including
voluntary redundancy and early retirement
programs. Phil Carpet likewise faithfully complied
with the requisites for closure or cessation of
business under the Labor Code. The petitioners
and the Department of Labor and Employment
were served written notices one (1) month before
the intended closure of the company. The
petitioners’ •were also paid their separation pay
and they voluntarily executed their respective
Release and Quitclaim before the DOLE officials.
In the September 29, 2014 Decision, the Labor
Arbiter dismissed the complaints for illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice. The NLRC
affirmed the findings of the LA, which was
subsequently affirmed by the CA.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were dismissed
from employment for a lawful cause.
2. Whether or not the petitioners’ termination
from employment constitutes unfair labor
practice.
3. Whether or not the quitclaims signed by
petitioners are valid and binding.
HELD:
1. Yes. The petitioners were terminated from
employment for an authorized cause. In this
case, the LA's findings that Phil Carpet suffered
from serious business losses which resulted in its
closure were affirmed in toto by the NLRC, and
subsequently by the CA. It is a rule that absent
any showing that the findings of fact of the labor
tribunals and the appellate court are not
supported by evidence on record or the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts, the
Court shall not examine anew the evidence
submitted by the parties.
Further, even if the petitioners refuse to consider
these losses as serious enough to warrant Phil
Carpet's total and permanent closure, it was a
business judgment on the part of the company's
owners and stockholders to cease operations, a
judgment which the Court has no business
interfering with. The only limitation provided by
law is that the closure must be "bonafide in
character and not impelled by a motive to defeat
or circumvent the tenurial rights of employees.
Thus, when an employer complies with the
foregoing conditions, the Court cannot prohibit
closure "just because the business is not
suffering from any loss or because of the desire
to provide the workers continued employment."
2. No. The dismissal of the petitioners did not
amount to unfair labor practice. Unfair labor
practice refers to acts that violate the workers'
right to organize. There should be no dispute that
all the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor
practice in essence relate to the workers' right to
self-organization. Thus, an employer may only be
held liable for unfair labor practice if it can be
shown that his acts affect in whatever manner
the right of his employees to self-organize.
The general principle is that one who makes an
allegation has the burden of proving it. The
petitioners miserably failed to discharge the duty
imposed upon them. They did not identify the
acts of Phil Carpet, which, they claimed,
constituted unfair labor practice. They did not
even point out the specific provisions, which Phil
Carpet violated.
3. Yes. The quitclaims were valid and binding
upon the petitioners. Where the person making
the waiver has done so voluntarily, with a full
understanding thereof, and the consideration for
the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the
transaction must be recognized as being a valid
and binding undertaking.

In this case, the petitioners question the validity

of the quitclaims they signed on the ground that
Phil Carpet's closure was a mere pretense. As
the closure of Phil Carpet, however, was
supported by substantial evidence, the
petitioners' reason for seeking the invalidation of
the quitclaims must necessarily fail. Further, as
aptly observed by the CA, the contents of the
quitclaims, which were in Filipino, were clear and
simple, such that it was unlikely that the
petitioners did not understand what they were
signing. Finally, the amount they received was
reasonable as the same complied with the
requirements of the Labor Code.

Wherefore, the SC affirmed the decision of the

CA in toto.
AQUINO NONE
SAN MIGUEL CORP EMPLOYEES UNION- ARTICLE XIV
PTGWO vs. CONFESOR

OCTOBER 25, 2012 ~ VBDIAZ DURATION OF AGREEMENT

G.R. No. 111262 September 19, 1996

Sec. 1. This Agreement which shall be binding
upon the parties hereto and their respective
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES
successors-in-interest, shall become effective
UNION-PTGWO, represented by its President
and shall remain in force and effect until June
RAYMUNDO HIPOLITO, JR. vs. HON. MA.
30, 1992.
NIEVES D. CONFESOR, Secretary of Labor,
Dept. of Labor & Employment, SAN MIGUEL
Sec. 2. In accordance with Article 253-A of the
CORPORATION, MAGNOLIA CORPORATION
Labor Code as amended, the term of this
(Formerly, Magnolia Plant) and SAN MIGUEL
Agreement insofar as the representation aspect
FOODS, INC. (Formerly, B-Meg Plant)
is concerned, shall be for five (5) years from July
1, 1989 to June 30, 1994. Hence, the freedom
FACTS: On June 28, 1990, petitioner-union San
period for purposes of such representation shall
Miguel Corporation Employees Union —
be sixty (60) days prior to June 30, 1994.
PTGWO entered into a CBA with private
respondent San Miguel Corporation (SMC) to
Sec. 3. Sixty (60) days prior to June 30, 1992
take effect upon the expiration of the previous
either party may initiate negotiations of all
CBA or on June 30, 1989.
provisions of this Agreement, except insofar as
the representation aspect is concerned. If no
This CBA provided, among others, that:
agreement is reached in such negotiations, this
Agreement shall nevertheless remain in force up
to the time a subsequent agreement is reached
by the parties.
Meanwhile, effective October 1, 1991, Magnolia
and Feeds and Livestock Division were spun-off
and became two separate and distinct
corporations: Magnolia Corporation (Magnolia)
and San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI).
Notwithstanding the spin-offs, the CBA remained
in force and effect.
After June 30, 1992, the CBA was renegotiated
in accordance with the terms of the CBA and
Article 253-A of the Labor Code. Negotiations
started sometime in July, 1992 with the two
parties submitting their respective proposals and
counterproposals.
During the negotiations, the petitioner-union
insisted that the bargaining unit of SMC should
still include the employees of the spun-off
corporations: Magnolia and SMFI; and that the
renegotiated terms of the CBA shall be effective
only for the remaining period of two years or until
June 30, 1994.
SMC, on the other hand, contended that the
members/employees who had moved to
Magnolia and SMFI, automatically ceased to be
part of the bargaining unit at the SMC.
Furthermore, the CBA should be effective for
three years in accordance with Art. 253-A of the
Labor Code.
Unable to agree on these issues with respect to
the bargaining unit and duration of the CBA,
petitioner-union declared a deadlock on
September 29, 1990.
(Notice of strike…Secretary assumed
jurisdiction)
Secretary’s decision: the CBA shall be effective
for the period of 3 years from June 30, 1992; and
that such CBA shall cover only the employees of
SMC and not of Magnolia and SMFI.
ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the duration of the
renegotiated terms of the CBA is to be effective
for three years of for only two years; and 2)
Whether or not the bargaining unit of SMC
includes also the employees of the Magnolia and
SMFI.
HELD: We agree with the Secretary of Labor.
Pertinent to the first issue is Art. 253-A of the
Labor Code as amended which reads:
Art. 253-A. Terms of a CBA. — Any CBA that the
parties may enter into shall, insofar as the
representation aspect is concerned, be for a
term of 5 years. No petition questioning the
majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent
shall be entertained and no certification election
shall be conducted by the Department of Labor
and Employment outside of the sixty-day period
immediately before the date of expiry of such five
year term of the CBA. All other provisions of the
CBA shall be renegotiated not later than 3 years
after its execution. Any agreement on such other
provisions of the CBA entered into within 6
months from the date of expiry of the term of
such other provisions as fixed in such CBA, shall
retroact to the day immediately following such
date. If any such agreement is entered into
beyond six months, the parties shall agree on the
duration of retroactivity thereof. In case of a
deadlock in the renegotiation of the CBA, the
parties may exercise their rights under this Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The “representation aspect” refers to the identity
and majority status of the union that negotiated
the CBA as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the appropriate bargaining unit
concerned. “All other provisions” simply refers to
the rest of the CBA, economic as well as non-
economic provisions, except representation.
The law is clear and definite on the duration of
the CBA insofar as the representation aspect is
concerned, but is quite ambiguous with the terms
of the other provisions of the CBA. It is a cardinal
principle of statutory construction that the Court
must ascertain the legislative intent for the
purpose of giving effect to any statute.
(as usual mahabang conversation ng mga
framers)
Obviously, the framers of the law wanted to
maintain industrial peace and stability by having
both management and labor work harmoniously
together without any disturbance. Thus, no
outside union can enter the establishment within
5 years and challenge the status of the
incumbent union as the exclusive bargaining
agent. Likewise, the terms and conditions of
employment (economic and non-economic) can
not be questioned by the employers or
employees during the period of effectivity of the
CBA. The CBA is a contract between the parties
and the parties must respect the terms and
conditions of the agreement.  Notably, the
framers of the law did not give a fixed term as
to the effectivity of the terms and conditions
of employment. It can be gleaned from their
discussions that it was left to the parties to
fix the period.
The issue as to the term of the non-
representation provisions of the CBA need not
belaboured. The parties, by mutual agreement,
enter into a renegotiated contract with a term
of three (3) years or one which does not
coincide with the said 5-year term, and said
agreement is ratified by majority of the
members in the bargaining unit, the subject
contract is valid and legal and therefore,
binds the contracting parties.
Thus, we do not find any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Secretary of Labor in
ruling that the effectivity of the renegotiated
terms of the CBA shall be for 3 years.
II. Undeniably, the transformation of the
companies was a management prerogative and
business judgment which the courts can not look
into unless it is contrary to law, public policy or
morals. Neither can we impute any bad faith on
the part of SMC so as to justify the application of
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.18 Ever
mindful of the employees’ interests, management
has assured the concerned employees that they
will be absorbed by the new corporations without
loss of tenure and retaining their present pay and
benefits according to the existing CBAs. 19 They
were advised that upon the expiration of the
CBAs, new agreements will be negotiated
between the management of the new
corporations and the bargaining
representatives of the employees concerned.
Indubitably, therefore, Magnolia and SMFI
became distinct entities with separate juridical
personalities. Thus, they can not belong to a
single bargaining unit.
Moreover, in determining an appropriate
bargaining unit, the test of grouping is mutuality
or commonality of interests. The employees
sought to be represented by the collective
bargaining agent must have substantial mutual
interests in terms of employment and working
conditions as evinced by the type of work they
performed. 22 Considering the spin-offs, the
companies would consequently have their
respective and distinctive concerns in terms of
the nature of work, wages, hours of work and
other conditions of employment. Interests of
employees in the different companies
perforce differ. The nature of their products and
scales of business may require different skills
which must necessarily be commensurated by
different compensation packages. The different
companies may have different volumes of work
and different working conditions. For such
reason, the employees of the different
companies see the need to group themselves
together and organize themselves into distinctive
and different groups. It would then be best to
have separate bargaining units for the different
companies where the employees can bargain
separately according to their needs and
according to their own working conditions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
ST. LIUKES NONE
DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN vs
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
and DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES
UNION-ALU
Topic: Deadlock Bar Rule
FACTS:
Divine Word University Employees Union
(DWUEU) was certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the Divine Word University.
Subsequently, the Divine Union submitted its
collective bargaining proposals March 7, 1985
The University replied and requested a
preliminary conference. However, two days
before the scheduled conference the DWUEU’s
resigned vice-president Mr. Brigido Urminita
wrote a letter addressed to the University
unilaterally withdrawing the CBA proposals.
Consequently, the preliminary conference was
cancelled.
After almost three years, or on March 11, 1988,
the DWUEU, which had by then affiliated with the
Associated Labor Union (ALU), requested a
conference with the University for the purpose of
continuing the collective bargaining negotiations.
A follow-up letter was sent regarding their
request but to no avail.
DWUEU -ALU filed with the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board of the Department of Labor
and Employment a notice of strike on the
grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor
practice acts, specifically, refusal to bargain,
discrimination and coercion on employees.
 After the filing of the notice of strike, a
conference was held which led to the conclusion
of an agreement between the University and
DWUEU-ALU on May 10, 1888
However, it turned out that an hour before the
May 10, 1988 agreement was concluded, the
University had filed a petition for certification
election
On the other hand, on May 19, 1988, DWUEU-
ALU, consonant with the agreement, submitted
its collective bargaining proposals. These were
ignored by the University.
Med-Arbiter Milado, acting on the University’s
petition for certification election, issued an Order
directing the conduct of a certification election to
be participated in by DWUEU-ALU and “no
union,” after he found the petition to be “well-
supported in fact and in law.
Said Order prompted the DWUEU-ALU to file
with the Secretary of Labor an urgent motion
seeking to enjoin Milado from further acting on
the matter of the certification election.
The Divine Word University Independent Faculty
and Employees Union (DWUIFEU), which was
registered earlier that day, filed a motion for
intervention alleging that it had “at least 20% of
the rank and file employees” of the University.
The Secretary of Labor dismissed not only the
case filed by DWUEU-ALU for unfair labor
practice on the   ground of the union’s failure to
prove the commission of the unfair labor practice
acts specifically complained of but also the
complaint filed by the University for unfair labor
practices and illegal strike for “obvious lack of
merit brought about by its utter failure to submit
evidence”
The DWUEU-ALU had filed a second notice of
strike charging the University with violation of the
return-to-work order which was previously
ordered by the Secretary of Labor and unfair
labor practices such as dismissal of union
officers, coercion of employees and illegal
suspension
Acting Secretary then concluded that for
reneging on the agreement of May 10, 1988 and
for its “reluctance and subscription to legal
delay,” the University should be “declared in
default.” He also maintained that since under the
circumstances the University cannot claim
deprivation of due process, the Office of the
Secretary of Labor may rightfully impose the
Union’s May 19, 1988 collective bargaining
agreement proposals motu proprio.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a deadlock or
an impasse in the collective bargaining process
RULING: YES. A thorough study of the records
reveals that there was no “reasonable effort at
good faith bargaining” especially on the part of
the University. Its indifferent attitude towards
collective bargaining inevitably resulted in the
failure of the parties to arrive at an agreement.
As it was evident that unilateral moves were
being undertaken only by the DWUEU-ALU,
there was no “counteraction” of forces or an
impasse to speak of. While collective bargaining
should be initiated by the union, there is a
corresponding responsibility on the part of the
employer to respond in some manner to such
acts.
However, the Court cannot help but notice that
the DWUEU was not entirely blameless in the
matter of the delay in the bargaining process.
While it is true that as early as March 7, 1985,
said union had submitted its collective bargaining
proposals and that, its subsequent withdrawal by
the DWUEU Vice President being unauthorized
and therefore ineffective, the same proposals
could be considered as subsisting, the fact
remains that said union remained passive for
three years. The records do not show that during
Be that as it may, the Court is not inclined to rule
this three-year period, it exerted any effort to
that there has been a deadlock or an impasse in
pursue collective bargaining as a means of
the collective bargaining process. As the Court
attaining better terms of employment.
earlier observed, there has not been a
“reasonable effort at good faith bargaining” on
the part of the University. While DWUEU-ALU
It was only after its affiliation with the ALU that
was opening all possible avenues for the
the same union, through the ALU Director for
conclusion of an agreement, the record is replete
Operations, requested an “initial conference” for
with evidence on the University’s reluctance and
the purpose of collective bargaining. That the
thinly disguised refusal to bargain with the duly
DWUEU abandoned its collective bargaining
certified bargaining agent, such that the
proposals prior to its affiliation with ALU is further
inescapable conclusion is that the University
confirmed by the fact that in the aforequoted May
evidently had no intention of bargaining with it.
10, 1988 agreement with the University, said
Thus, while the Court recognizes that technically,
Union bound itself to submit a new set of
the University has the right to file the petition for
proposals on May 13, 1988. Under the
certification election as there was no bargaining
circumstances, the agreement of May 10, 1988
deadlock to speak of, to grant its prayer that the
may as well be considered the written notice to
herein assailed Orders be annulled would put an
bargain referred to in the aforequoted Art. 250(a)
unjustified premium on bad faith bargaining. Bad
of the Labor Code, which thereby set into motion
faith on the part of the University is further
the machinery for collective bargaining, as in
exemplified by the fact that an hour before the
fact, on May 19, 1988, DWUEU-ALU submitted
start of the May 10, 1988 conference, it
its collective bargaining proposals.
surreptitiously filed the petition for certification
election. And yet during said conference, it factors are: (a) the union is the duly certified
committed itself to “sit down” with the Union. bargaining agent; (b) it made a definite request to
Obviously, the University tried to preempt the bargain and submitted its collective bargaining
conference which would have legally foreclosed proposals, and (c) the University made no
its right to file the petition for certification election. counter proposal whatsoever. As we said in Kiok
In so doing, the University failed to act in Loy, “[a] company’s refusal to make counter
accordance with Art. 252 of the Labor Code proposal if considered in relation to the entire
which defines the meaning of the duty to bargain bargaining process, may indicate bad faith and
collectively as “the performance of a mutual this is especially true where the Union’s request
obligation to meet and convene promptly and for a counter proposal is left unanswered.”
expeditiously in good faith.” Moreover, by filing
the petition for certification election while
agreeing to confer with the DWUEU-ALU, the
University violated the mandate of Art. 19 of the
Civil Code that “(e)very person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.”

Kiok Loy vs. NLRC is applicable in the instant

case considering that the facts therein have also
been indubitably established in this case. These
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, majority of the employees in an appropriate
ETC.   bargaining unit shall be the exclusive
representative of the employees in such unit for
VS purposes of collective bargaining.” Collective
bargaining covers all aspects of the employment
SECRETARY OF DOLE   relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the
certified union binds all employees in the
G.R. No. 181531 bargaining unit. Hence, all rank and file
employees, probationary or permanent, have a
[July 31, 2009]
substantial interest in the selection of the
ISSUE: bargaining representative. The Code makes no
distinction as to their employment status as basis
Whether employees on probationary status at the for eligibility in supporting the petition
time of the certification elections should be for certification election. The law refers to “all” the
allowed to vote employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to
be eligible to support the petition is to belong to
HELD: the “bargaining unit.” The significance of an
employee’s right to vote in a certification election
YES. The inclusion of Gatbonton’s vote was cannot thus be overemphasized. For he has
proper not because it was not questioned but considerable interest in the determination of who
because probationary employees have the right shall represent him in negotiating the terms and
to vote in a certification election. In conditions of his employment. But while the
a certification election, all rank and file Court rules that the votes of all the probationary
employees in the appropriate bargaining employees should be included, under the
unit, whether probationary or permanent are particular circumstances of this case and the
entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in period of time which it took for the appeal to be
Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the decided, the votes of the six supervisory
“labor organization designated or selected by the employees must be excluded because at the
time the certification elections was conducted,
they had ceased to be part of the rank and file,
their promotion having taken effect two months
before the election.
Compare Policy on Certification Election, 256,
257, 258sand Voluntary Recognition – BV, RI
(bbb); BV, IR, R VII;
BV; IR, RVIII, Sec. 23
Art. 256. Representation issue in organized
establishments.
In organized establishments, when a verified
petition questioning the majority status of the
incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the
Department of Labor and Employment within the
sixty-day period before the expiration of the
collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter
shall automatically order an election by
secret ballot when the verified petition is
supported by the written consent of at least
twenty-five percent (25%) of all the employees in
the bargaining unit to ascertain the will of the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. To
have a valid election, at least a majority of all
eligible voters in the unit must have cast their
votes. The labor union receiving the majority of
the valid votes cast shall be certified as the
exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in
the unit. When an election which provides for
three or more choices results in no choice
receiving a majority of the valid votes cast, a run-
off election shall be conducted between the labor
unions receiving the two highest number of
votes: Provided, that the total number of votes for
all contending unions is at least fifty percent
(50%) of the number of votes cast.
At the expiration of the freedom period, the
employer shall continue to recognize the majority
status of the incumbent bargaining agent where
no petition for certification election is filed. (As
amended by Section 23, Republic Act No. 6715,
March 21, 1989)
Art. 257. Petitions in unorganized
establishments. In any establishment where
there is no certified bargaining agent,
a certification election shall automatically be
conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a
petition by a legitimate labor organization. (As
amended by Section 24, Republic Act No. 6715,
March 21, 1989)
Art. 258. When an employer may file petition.
When requested to bargain collectively, an
employer may petition the Bureau for an election.
If there is no existing certified collective
bargaining agreement in the unit,
the Bureau shall, after hearing, order
a certification election.
All certification cases shall be decided within
twenty (20) working days.
The Bureau shall conduct a certification election
within twenty (20) days in accordance with the
rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary
of Labor.
BV, RI(bb) “Organized Establishment” refers to a
firm or company where there is a recognized or
certified exclusive bargaining agent.
RULE VII
Challenges and Run-Offs
SECTION 1. Challenging of votes. — (a) Any
vote may be challenged for a valid cause by any
observer before the voter has deposited his vote
in the ballot box. (b) If a ballot is challenged on
valid grounds, the Representation Officer shall
segregate it from the unchallenged ballots and
seal it in an envelope. The Representation
Officer shall indicate on the envelope the name
of the challenger and the ground of the
challenge.
SECTION 2. Run-off election. — When an
election which provides for three (3) or more
choices results in no choice receiving a majority
of the valid votes cast, and no objections or
challenges have been presented which if
sustained might change the results, the
representation officer shall motu proprio conduct
a run-off election within five (5) calendar days
from the close of the election between the labor
unions receiving the two highest number of
votes; Provided, that the total number of votes for
all contending unions is at least fifty (50%)
percent of the number of votes cast.
The ballots in the run-off election shall provide for
two choices receiving the highest and the second
highest number of the votes cast.
RULE VIII
Internal Union-Disputes
SECTION 1. Complaint. — A complaint for any
violation of the constitution and by-laws and the
rights and conditions of membership under
Article 242 may filed in the Regional Office where
the union is domiciled.
SECTION 2. Who may file. — If the issue
involves the entire membership of the union, the
complaint shall be signed by at least 30 percent
of the membership of the union.
In addition to the above requirement, the petition
must show on its face that the administrative
remedies provided for in the constitution and by-
laws have been exhausted or such remedies are
not readily available to the complaining members
through no fault of their own. However, if the
issue affects a single member only, such
member may alone file his complaint.
SECTION 3. Contents of complaint. — The
complaint must, among other things, contain the
following:
(a) The person or persons charged;
(b) The specific violation/s committed;
(c) The relief/s prayed for; and
(d) Other relevant matters.
Such complaint must be in writing and under
oath, and a copy thereof served on the
respondent.
SECTION 4. Procedure. — Upon receipt of the
complaint, the Regional Director shall
immediately assign the case to a Med-Arbiter.
The Med-Arbiter shall have twenty (20) working
days within which to settle or decide the case.
The decision of the Med-Arbiter shall state the
facts and the reliefs granted, if any. If the
conflicts involve a violation of the rights and
conditions of the membership enumerated under
Article 242 of the Code, the Med-Arbiter shall
order the cancellation of
the registration certificate of the erring union or
the expulsion of the guilty party from the union,
whichever is appropriate.
SECTION 5. Appeal. — The aggrieved party
may, within ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of the decision of
the Med-Arbiter, appeal the same to the
Secretary on any of the following grounds:
(a) Grave abuse of discretion; and
(b) Gross incompetence.
The appeal shall consist of a position paper
specifically stating the grounds relied upon by the
appellant and supporting arguments under oath.
SECTION 6. Where to file appeal. — The
appellant shall file his appeal, which shall be
under oath and copy furnished the appellee in
the Regional Office where the case originated.
SECTION 7. Period to answer. — The appellee
shall file his answer thereto within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of the appeal. The
Regional Director shall, within five (5) calendar
days, forward the entire records of the case to
the Office of the Secretary.
SECTION 8. Decision of the Secretary final and
inappealable. — The Secretary shall have fifteen
(15) calendar days within which to decide the
appeal from receipt of the records of the case.
The decision of the Secretary shall be final and
inappealable.
SECTION 9. Execution pending appeal. — The
execution of the order of the Med-Arbiter shall be
stayed pending appeal.
RULE VIII-A
Visitorial Power
SECTION 1. Exercise of visitorial power. — The
Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representative shall inquire into the
financial activities of any legitimate labor
organization and examine their books of
accounts and other records to determine
compliance with the law and the organization,
constitution and by-laws, upon filing of a
complaint under oath and duly supported by the
written consent of at least twenty (20%) percent
of the total membership of the labor organization
concerned.
SECTION 2. Period of inquiry or examination. —
No inquiry or examination of the financial
activities and books of accounts as well as other
records of any legitimate labor organization
mentioned in the preceding section shall be
conducted during the sixty (60) days freedom
period nor within thirty (30) days immediately
preceding the date of election of union officials.
UNION FILIPNO NONE

HSBC NONE
RODRIGUEZ VS. PAL
G.R. No. 178501 & G.R. NO. 178510
January 11, 2016
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The Case:
 
Before the Court are two consolidated Petitions
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court assailing the Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 71190.
 
The petitioners in G.R. No. 178501 are 24 former
pilots of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), namely,
Rodriguez, Alisangco, Ang, Ang, Arroyo,
Baquiran, Cruz, Delos Reyes, Ecarma, Galisim,
Garcia, Gutiza, Jadie, Jose, Labuga, Lastimoso,
Matias, Maturan, Ocharan, Piamonte, Sabado,
Sanchez, Corpus, and Alcañeses, hereinafter
collectively referred to as Rodriguez, et
al., deemed by PAL to have lost their
employment status for taking part in the illegal
strike in June 1998.
 
The petitioner in G.R. No. 178510 is PAL, a
domestic operating as a common carrier
transporting passengers and cargo through
aircraft. PAL named Rodriguez, et al. and
Rodolfo O. Poe (Poe) as respondents in its
Petition.
 
The Facts:
The 1st ALPAP case
On December 9, 1997, the Airline Pilots
Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) filed with
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) a Notice of Strike, docketed as NCMB
NCR NS 12-514-97 (Strike Case), on the
grounds of unfair labor practice and union-
busting by PAL.
 
The Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) assumed jurisdiction over
the Strike Case, and issued an Order on
December 23, 1997 prohibiting all actual and
impending strikes and lockouts. On May 25,
1998, the DOLE Secretary issued another Order
reiterating the prohibition against strikes and
lockouts.
 
Despite the abovementioned Orders of the DOLE
Secretary, ALPAP filed a second Notice of Strike
on June 5, 1998 and staged a strike on the same
day. The DOLE Secretary immediately called
PAL and ALPAP for conciliation conferences on
June 6 and 7, 1998 to amicably settle the dispute
between them. After his efforts failed, the DOLE
Secretary issued an Order8 on June 7, 1998
(Return-to-Work Order) ordering the striking
employees to return to work within 24 hours from
receipt of the order and for PAL management to
receive them under the same terms and
conditions prior to the strike.
 
On June 26, 1998, the members of ALPAP
reported for work but PAL did not accept them on
the ground that the 24-hour period for the strikers
to return set by the DOLE Secretary in his
Return-to-Work Order had already lapsed,
resulting in the forfeiture of their employment.
 
Consequently, ALPAP filed with the NLRC on
June 29, 1998 a Complaint for illegal lockout
against PAL, On August 21, 1998, the Acting
Executive Labor Arbiter ordered the
consolidation of the Illegal Lockout Case with the
Strike Case pending before the DOLE Secretary.
 
The DOLE Secretary issued a Resolution on
June 1, 1999 declaring the strike conducted by
ALPAP on June 5, 1998 and thereafter illegal for
being procedurally infirm and in open defiance of
the return-to-work order of June 7, 1998 and
consequently, the strikers are deemed to have
lost their employment status. Likewise, it
dismissed the complaint for illegal lockout for
lack of merit.
 
After failing to get favorable resolutions on their
motions for reconsideration with DOLE and
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the rules of court with the Court of Appeals,
ALPAP elevated the case to this Court by filing a
Petition for Certiorari, (1st ALPAP case). The
Court dismissed the Petition of ALPAP in a
minute Resolution dated April 10, 2002 for failure
of ALPAP to show grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the appellate court. Said Resolution
dismissing the 1st ALPAP case became final and
executory on August 29, 2002.
 
Meanwhile, 32 ALPAP members, consisting of
Rodriguez, et al, Poe, Dela Cruz, Musong, Peña,
Cruz, Noble, Versoza, Hinayon, hereinafter
collectively referred to as complainants - filed
with the NLRC on June 7, 1999 a Complaint for
illegal dismissal against PAL, docketed as
NLRC-NCR Case No. 00--06-06290-99 (Illegal
Dismissal Case).
 
Complainants alleged that they were not
participants of the June 5, 1998 strike of ALPAP
and that they had no obligation to comply with
the Return-to-Work Order of the DOLE
Secretary.They alleged that PAL terminated
complainants from employment together with the
strikers who disobeyed the Return-to-Work
Order, even though complainants had valid
reasons for not reporting for work.
 
In its Motion to Dismiss and/or Position Paper for
Respondent, PAL averred that the Complaint for
illegal dismissal is an offshoot of the Strike and
Illegal Lockout Cases wherein the DOLE
Secretary already adjudged with finality that the
striking pilots lost their employment for
participating in an illegal strike and/or disobeying
the Return-to-Work Order. Hence, PAL argued
that the Complaint was already barred by res
judicata.
In addition, PAL presented the following
evidence to refute complainants' allegation that
they were not strikers: (a) the logbook showing
that complainants belatedly complied with the
Return-to-Work Order on June 26, 1998; and (b)
the photographs showing that some of
complainants were at the strike area or picket
line.
 
The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision declaring
that the complainants were illegally dismissed.
Moreover, the LA opined that the illegal dismissal
case may proceed independently from the Strike
and Lockout Cases.PAL appealed before the
NLRC. The NLRC reversed the decision of the
LA declaring all but Jadie legally dismissed.
Aggreived, Rodriguez et al, dela Cruz and Poe
filed a Petition for Certiori with the CA, assailing
the NLRC decision for having been rendered with
grace abuse of discretion. Dela Cruz
subsequently withdrew his petition.The Court of
Appeals rendered their decision favoring
Rodriquez et al., and Poe. Finding them illegally
dismissed, the appellate court ordered PAL to
pay the complainants separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement. Motions for reconderation filed by
both parties were denied.
 
Hence, Rodriguez et al & PAL assail before this
Court the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals by way of separate Petitions for review
on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.178501 and
G.R. No. 178510, respectively.
 
The 2nd ALPAP Case
In the meantime, during the pendency of the
instant Petitions, the Court decided on June 6,
2011 Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines
v. Philippine Airlines, Inc,docketed as G.R. No.
168382 (2nd ALPAP case). The 2nd ALPAP
case arose from events that took place following
the finality on August 29, 2002 of the Resolution
dated April 10, 2002 which dismissed the
1st ALPAP case. On January 13, 2003,
ALPAP filed before the Office of the DOLE
Secretary a Motion in [the Strike Case],
requesting the said office to conduct an
appropriate legal proceeding to determine who
among its officers and members should be
reinstated or deemed to have lost their
employment with PAL for their actual
participation in the strike conducted in June
1998.
 
In a decision dated on June 6, 2011, the Court
declared that such proceeding would entail a
reopening of a final judgement which could not
be permitted. Settled in law is that once a
decision has acquired finality, it becomes
immutable and unalterable, thus can no longer
be modified in any respect. Moreover, there is no
necessity to conduct a proceeding to determine
the participants in the illegal strike or those who
refused to heed the return to work order because
the ambiguity can be cured by reference the
body of the decision and the pleadings filed.
 
The Decision dated June 6, 2011 of the Court in
the 2nd ALPAP case became final and executory
on September 9, 2011.
Issue:
Whether or not 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases
constitute res judicata on the issue issue of the
legality of the Rodriguez et al’s dismissal.
 
Ruling:
Bearing in mind the final and executory
judgments in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases, the
Court denies the Petition of Rodriguez, et al, in
G.R. No. 178501 and partly grants that
of PAL in G.R. No. 178510.
The Court, in the 2nd ALPAP
case, acknowledged the illegal dismissal cases
instituted by the individual ALPAP members
before the NLRC following their termination for
the strike in June 1998 (which were apart from
the Strike and Illegal Lockout Cases of ALPAP
before the DOLE Secretary) and affirmed the
jurisdiction of the NLRC over said illegal
dismissal cases. The Court, though, also
expressly pronounced in the 2nd ALPAP
case that "the pendency of the foregoing cases
should not and could not affect the character of
our disposition over the instant case. Rather,
these cases should be resolved in a manner
consistent and in accord with our present
disposition for effective enforcement and
Execution of a final judgement.”
The Petitions at bar began with the Illegal
Dismissal Case of Rodriguez, et al. and eight
other former pilots of PAL before the NLRC.
Among the Decisions rendered by Labor Arbiter
Robles, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals
herein, it is the one by the NLRC which is
consistent and in accord with the disposition for
effective enforcement and execution of the final
judgments in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases.
The 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases which became
final and executory on August 29, 2002 and
September 9, 2011, respectively, constitute res
judicata on the issue of who participated in the
illegal strike in June 1998 and whose services
were validly terminated.
 
In the 1st ALPAP case, the Court upheld the
DOLE Secretary's Resolution dated June 1, 1999
declaring that the strike of June 5, 1998 was
illegal and all ALPAP officers and members who
participated therein had lost their employment
status. The Court in the 2nd ALPAP case ruled
that even though the dispositive portion of the
DOLE Secretary's Resolution did not specifically
enumerate the names of those who actually
participated in the illegal strike, such omission
cannot prevent the effective execution of the
decision in the 1st ALPAP case. The Court
referred to the records of the Strike and Illegal
Lockout Cases, particularly, the logbook, which it
unequivocally pronounced as a "crucial and vital
piece of evidence." In the words of the Court in
the 2nd ALPAP case, "[t]he logbook with the
heading 'Return-To-Work Compliance/Returnees'
bears their individual signature signifying their
conformity that they were among those workers
who returned to work only on June 26, 1998 or
after the deadline imposed by DOLE.,
The logbook was similarly submitted as evidence
by PAL against the complainants in the Illegal
Dismissal Case now on appeal. Rodriguez, et
al., except for Jadie and Baquiran, were
signatories in the logbook as returnees,44 bound
by the Resolution dated June 1, 1999 of the
DOLE Secretary. The significance and weight
accorded by the NLRC to the logbook can no
longer be gainsaid considering the declarations
of the Court in the 2nd ALPAP case. Moreover,
the logbook entries were corroborated by
photographs showing Rodriguez, et al., excluding
Baquiran, Galisim, Jadie, Wilfredo S. Cruz, and
Piamonte, actually participating in the strike. The
objection that the photographs were not properly
authenticated deserves scant consideration as
rules of evidence are not strictly observed in
proceedings before administrative bodies like the
NLRC, where decisions may be reached on the
basis of position papers only. It is also worth
noting that those caught on photographs did not
categorically deny being at the strike area on the
time/s and date/s the photographs were taken,
but assert that they were there in lawful exercise
of their right while on official leave or scheduled
off-duty, or in the alternative, that they were
already dismissed from service as early as June
7, 1998 and their presence at the strike area
thereafter was already irrelevant.
longer existed as said aircraft was already
returned to its lessors in accordance with the
Amended and Restated Rehabilitation Plan of
PAL; (2) Per ATO certification, Jadie's license
expired in 1998; (3) the animosity between the
parties as engendered by the protracted and
heated litigation; (4) the possibility that Jadie had
already secured equivalent or other employment
after the significant lapse of time since the
institution of the Illegal Dismissal Case; and (5)
the nature of the business of PAL which requires
the continuous operations of its planes and, thus,
the hiring of new pilots. In lieu of reinstatement,
Jadie is entitled to separation pay

The Court declared that among the petitioner-

complainants Rodriguez, et al, only Jadie was
illegally dismissed by PAL. During the strike,
Jadie was already on maternity leave. Jadie did
not join the strike and could not be reasonably
expected to report back for work by June 9, 1998
in compliance with the Return-to-Work Order.
Indeed, Jadie gave birth on June 24, 1998.
However, as both the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals had held, Jadie can no longer be
reinstated for the following reasons: (1) Jadie's
former position as Captain of the E-50 aircraft no