FRANCISCO, MARY JOY RUBECCA, B.

CATLY VS. NAVARRO

G.R. No. 167239

May 5, 2010

Principle:

The principle of quantum meruit (as much as he deserves) may be a

basis for determining the reasonable amount of attorneys fees.
Quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the
equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit
without paying for it. It is applicable even if there was a formal written
contract for attorneys fees as long as the agreed fee was found by the
court to be unconscionable. In fixing a reasonable compensation for
the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit,
factors such as the time spent, and extent of services rendered;
novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; importance of the
subject matter; skill demanded; probability of losing other
employment as a result of acceptance of the proferred case;
customary charges for similar services; amount involved in the
controversy and the benefits resulting to the client; certainty of
compensation; character of employment; and professional standing of
the lawyer, may be considered.[57] Indubitably entwined with a
lawyers duty to charge only reasonable fee is the power of the Court to
reduce the amount of attorneys fees if the same is excessive and
unconscionable in relation to Sec. 24, Rule 138 of the Rules. Attorneys
fees are unconscionable if they affront ones sense of justice, decency
or unreasonableness.
BARCENAS VS ALVERO

A.C No. 8159

April 23,2010

Principle:

We come to the penalty imposable in this case.

In Small v. Banares, the respondent was suspended for two years for
violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly for failing to file a case for which the amount of
P80,000.00 was given him by the client, and for failing to return the
said amount upon demand. Considering that similar circumstances are
attendant in this case, the Court finds the Resolution of the IBP
imposing on respondent a two-year suspension to be in order.

As a final note, we reiterate: the practice of law is not a right, but a

privilege. It is granted only to those of good moral character. The Bar
must maintain a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. For the
practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance
of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good
moral character. Those who are unable or unwilling to comply with the
responsibilities and meet the standards of the profession are unworthy
of the privilege to practice law.
SUICO INDUSTRIAL CORP. VS. LAGURA-YAP

G.R. No. 177711

September 5, 2012

Principle:

Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with
the rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes.
Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of
justice. These are provided to effect the prompt, proper and orderly
disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court
Decision 15 G.R. No. 177711 dockets. Utter disregard of these rules
cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction. The failure to file the pre-trial brief is then attributable to
the fault or negligence of petitioners’ counsel. The settled rule is that
the negligence of a counsel binds his clients. Neither counsel nor his
clients can now evade the effects thereof by invoking that the failure
amounts to an inexcusable negligence which, by jurisprudence, should
not bind the parties. It is absurd for a counsel to emphasize on the
gravity of his own inaction and then invoke the same misfeasance to
evade the consequences of his act.

Furthermore, the claim of petitioners’ counsel that his failure to file a

pretrial brief may be regarded as an inexcusable negligence is
inconsistent with his plea for the court to consider the fact that he
attended the scheduled pretrial conference but only needed more time
to file the pre-trial brief.
SOFIO VS. VALENZUELA

G.R. No. 157810

February 15, 2012

Principle:

Any act performed by the counsel within the scope of his general or
implied authority is still regarded as an act of the client.—Although the
petitioners’ former counsel was blameworthy for the track their case
had taken, there is no question that any act performed by the counsel
within the scope of his general or implied authority is still regarded as
an act of the client. In view of this, even the negligence of the former
counsel should bind them as his clients. To hold otherwise would result
to the untenable situation in which every defeated party, in order to
salvage his cause, would simply claim neglect or mistake on the part
of his counsel as a ground for reversing the adverse judgment. There
would then be no end to litigation, for every shortcoming of the
counsel could become the subject of challenge by his client through
another counsel who, if he should also be found wanting, would
similarly be disowned by the same client through yet another counsel,
and so on ad infinitum. This chain of laying blame could render court
proceedings indefinite, tentative and subject to reopening at any time
by the mere replacement of the counsel. When the counsel’s mistake
is so great and so serious that the client is prejudiced and is denied his
day in court, or when the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting
in the client’s deprivation of his property without due process of law,
the client is not concluded by his counsel’s mistakes and the case can
be reopened in order to give the client another chance to present his
case.
PHILWORTH ASIA, INC. VS. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL
INTERNATIONAL BANK

G.R. No. 161878

June 5, 2013

Principle:

Code of Professional Responsibility; Canon 12 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility requires an attorney to exert every effort
and to consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.—On the part of petitioners’ counsel, he was
expectedly aware of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which required him as an attorney to exert every effort
and to consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. He should not ever ignore such duty, even
upon the pretext of giving his entire devotion to the interest of his
clients. He ought not to forget that as an attorney, he was, first and
foremost, an officer of the court, bound to exert every effort to comply
with the requirement under Canon 12.
FERDINAND A. SAMSON VS. ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA

A.C. No. 6664

July 16, 2013

Principle:

A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written

consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.―Rule
15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that: “A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.” Atty. Era thus owed to Samson and his group entire devotion to
their genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense
of their rights. He was expected to exert his best efforts and ability to
preserve the clients’ cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his
clients likewise served the ends of justice.
CAWALING VS. MENESE

A.C. No. 9698

November 13, 2013

Principle:

Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction and, as

such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution,
only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer
of the court and member of the bar. This Court has consistently held
that only a clear preponderant evidence would warrant the imposition
of such a harsh penalty. It means that the record must disclose as free
from doubt a case that compels the exercise by the court of its
disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done, as well as
the motivation thereof, must be clearly demonstrated. In disbarment
proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the complainant and this
Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if the complainant
establishes his case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.
This complainants failed to do.
MAGSAYSAY MARTIME CORPORATION VS. LOBUSTA,

G.R. No. 177578

January 25, 2012

Principles:

Counsels are reminded that lawyers are called upon to obey court
orders and willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only for
contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. We note petitioners’
repeated failure to comply with our resolutions, as well as the orders
issued by the tribunals below. We remind petitioners and their
counsels that our resolutions requiring them to file pleadings are not to
be construed as mere requests, nor should they be complied with
partially, inadequately or selectively. Counsels are also reminded that
lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and willful disregard
thereof will subject the lawyer not only for contempt but to disciplinary
sanctions as well. We may also dismiss petitioners’ appeal for their
failure to comply with any circular, directive or order of the Supreme
Court without justifiable cause. In fact, we actually denied the instant
petition on July 9, 2008 since petitioners failed to file the required
reply to the comment filed by Lobusta.
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION VS. VIRGILIO L.
MAZAREDO

G.R. No. 201359

September 23, 2015

Principle:

The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) provides that “[a] lawyer

shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct”
(Rule 1.01); he “shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause” (Rule
1.03); he “shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in Court, nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice” (Rule 10.01); and he “shall not knowingly x x x assert as a
fact that which has not been proved” (Rule 10.02). The Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct” (Rule 1.01); he
“shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man’s cause” (Rule 1.03); he “shall not do
any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice” (Rule 10.01);
and he “shall not knowingly x x x assert as a fact that which has not
been proved” (Rule 10.02). Let this serve as a warning to Attys. Tria
and Pampolina. Another transgression shall warrant the initiation of
proceedings for their disbarment. Suffice it to state that lawyers
should not transcend the bounds of propriety and commit a travesty
before this Court by willfully, intentionally and deliberately resorting to
falsehood and deception in handling their client’s case in order to
misguide, obstruct and impede the proper administration of justice.
MA. ELENA CARLOS NEBREJA VS. ATTY. BENJAMIN REONAL

A.C. No. 9896

March 19, 2014

Principle:

The mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the
client is considered per se a violation. Despite the engagement of his
services, respondent did not file the contracted petition. His conduct,
as held in Vda. De Enriquez v. San Jose, 516 SCRA 486 (2007),
amounted to inexcusable negligence. This was found to be contrary to
the mandate prescribed in Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which enjoined a lawyer not to neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides for the rule on negligence and
states: Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable. This Court has consistently held, in construing this
Rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations due
to the client is considered per se a violation. Thus, a lawyer was held
to be negligent when he failed to do anything to protect his client’s
interest after receiving his acceptance fee. In another case, this Court
has penalized a lawyer for failing to inform the client of the status of
the case, among other matters. In another instance, for failure to take
the appropriate actions in connection with his client’s case, the lawyer
was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months and
was required to render accounting of all the sums he received from his
client.
CAMPOS VS. CAMPOS

A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761

February 8, 2012

Principle:

Supreme Court agrees with the investigating judge and the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) in finding respondent guilty of simple
misconduct in causing the registration of the title over OCT No. P-
28258 in his son’s name with the intention of defrauding a possible
judgment-obligee.—We agree with the investigating judge and the
OCA in finding respondent guilty of simple misconduct in causing the
registration of the title over OCT No. P-28258 in his son’s name with
the intention of defrauding a possible judgment-obligee. The Court
defined simple misconduct as follows: Simple misconduct has been
defined as an unacceptable behavior that transgresses the established
rules of conduct for public officers. It is an unlawful behavior.
“Misconduct in office is any unlawful behavior by a public officer in
relation to the duties of his office, willful in character. It generally
means wrongful improper, unlawful conduct motivated by a
premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose although it may not
necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.” Simple misconduct is a
transgression of some established rule of action, an unlawful behavior,
or negligence committed by a public officer. In this case, respondent
knew at that time of the registration of the property that he had a
pending case and that he could possibly lose the case. In order to
manipulate the situation and taking advantage of his knowledge of the
law, respondent caused the registration of the property in Alistair’s
name with the intention of defrauding a possible judgment-obligee.
Clearly, it was an improper behavior which warrants a disciplinary
sanction by this Court.

ANGELES VS. DIY

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2248

September 29, 2010

Principle:

Violation of the basic tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New

Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and the Code of
Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of Canons 1 and 12 as well as
Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.—
Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, this administrative case against
respondent shall also be considered a disciplinary proceeding against
her as a member of the bar. Violation of the basic tenets of judicial
conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary and the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a
breach of Canons 1 and 12 as well as Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
BERNAS VS. REYES

A.M. No. MTJ-09-1728 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1623-MTJ)

July 21, 2010

Principle:

Established is the norm that judges should not only be impartial but
should also appear impartial; Judges must not only render just, correct
and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free from any
suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity. Established is
the norm that judges should not only be impartial but should also
appear impartial. Judges must not only render just, correct and
impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free from any
suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.

As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in

the performance of his official duties renders him liable; In the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his
official capacity do not always constitute misconduct although said acts
may be erroneous.—As a matter of public policy, not every error or
mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties renders him
liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a
judge in his official capacity do not always constitute misconduct
although said acts may be erroneous. It is true that a judge may not
be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error was
made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice. This
does not mean, however, that a judge need not observe propriety,
discreetness and due care in the performance of his official functions.
Indeed, all members of the Bench are enjoined to behave at all times
as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
DR. TERESITA LEE VS. ATTY. AMADOR L. SIMANDO

A.C. NO. 9537

June 10, 2013

Principle:

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act

as counsel for a person whose interest conflict with that of his present
or former client. Clearly, it is improper for respondent to appear as
counsel for one party (complainant as creditor) against the adverse
party (Mejorado as debtor) who is also his client, since a lawyer is
prohibited from representing conflicting interests. He may not, without
being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person
whose interest conflict with that of his present or former client.
Respondent’s assertion that there is no conflict of interest because
complainant and respondent are his clients in unrelated cases fails to
convince. His representation of opposing clients in both cases, though
unrelated, obviously constitutes conflict of interest or, at the least,
invites suspicion of double-dealing. Moreover, with the subject loan
agreement entered into by the complainant and Mejorado, who are
both his clients, readily shows an apparent conflict of interest, moreso
when he signed as co-maker.

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds

application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the
same general matter however slight the adverse interest may be. It
must be stressed that the proscription against representation of
conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting interests
arise with respect to the same general matter however slight the
adverse interest may be. It applies even if the conflict pertains to the
lawyer’s private activity or in the performance of a function in a non-
professional capacity. In the process of determining whether there is a
conflict of interest, an important criterion is probability, not certainty,
of conflict.
MARCOS VS. PINTO

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2180 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2817-RTJ]

July 27, 2010

Principle:

Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper

considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with
ignorance of the law can find refuge.  It does not mean, however, that
a judge, given the leeway he is accorded in such cases, should not
evince due care in the performance of his adjudicatory prerogatives.
As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts
are erroneous. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge
charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. It does not mean,
however, that a judge, given the leeway he is accorded in such cases,
should not evince due care in the performance of his adjudicatory
prerogatives.

Upon assumption of office, a judge becomes the visible representation

of the law and of justice. Membership in the Judiciary circumscribes
one’s personal conduct and imposes upon him a number of inhibitions,
whose faithful observance is the price one has to pay for holding such
an exalted position. Thus, a magistrate of the law must comport
himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or
otherwise, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny, for the
ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the
preservation of the people’s faith in the judicial system. This Court
does not require of judges that they measure up to the standards of
conduct of the saints and martyrs, but we do expect them to be like
Caesar’s wife in all their activities. Hence, we require them to abide
strictly by the Code of Judicial Conduct.
FAVOR VS UNTALAN

A.M. No. RTJ-08-215 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-2018-RTJ)

April 13, 2010

Principle:

While the Supreme Court is duty-bound to sternly wield a corrective

hand to discipline its errant employees and to weed out those who are
undesirable, it also has the discretion to temper the harshness of its
judgment with mercy.—While this Court is duty-bound to sternly wield
a corrective hand to discipline its errant employees and to weed out
those who are undesirable, this Court also has the discretion to temper
the harshness of its judgment with mercy. Thus, in the interest of fair
play and compassionate justice, considering that this was respondent
Judge’s first offense, we resolve to grant the instant motion for
reconsideration
ADELPHA E. MALABED VS. ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE LA PEÑA

A.C. No. 7594

February 9, 2016

Principle:

For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule

8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).—For
using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule
8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
states: Rule 8.01 – A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Notarization is different from representation. Complainant accuses

respondent of conflict of interest when the latter allegedly notarized a
deed of donation of a parcel of land executed by complainant’s family
in favor of the Roman Catholic Church. Eventually, respondent
allegedly sought to litigate as counsel for the opposing parties who are
occupants in the lot owned by complainant’s family. Suffice to state
that notarization is different from representation. A notary public
simply performs the notarial acts authorized by the Rules on Notarial
Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations, jurats,
signature witnessing, and copy certifications. Legal representation, on
the other hand, refers to the act of assisting a party as counsel in a
court action
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. CASALAN

A.M. No. RTJ-14-2385

April 20, 2016

Principle:

The position of judge exacts nothing less than faithful observance of

the law and the Constitution in the discharge of official duties.
Concededly, the honor and integrity of the judicial system is measured
not only by the fairness and correctness of decisions rendered, but
also by the efficiency with which disputes are resolved. “Thus, judges
must perform their official duties with utmost diligence if public
confidence in the judiciary is to be preserved. There is no excuse for
mediocrity in the performance of judicial functions. The position of
judge exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the law and the
Constitution in the discharge of official duties.”

Judges should treat directives from the Office of the Court

Administrator (OCA) as if issued directly by the Court and comply
promptly and conscientiously with them since it is through the OCA
that the Court exercises its constitutionally-mandated administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.—The OCA duly
noted that Judge Casalan’s failure to comply with the directives in its
memoranda dated August 28 and 30, 2012 also constitutes
insubordination and disrespect for the Court’s lawful orders and
directives. It bears emphasis that judges should treat directives from
the OCA as if issued directly by the Court and comply promptly and
conscientiously with them since it is through the OCA that the Court
exercises its constitutionally-mandated administrative supervision over
all courts and the personnel thereof. Unjustified failure to comply with
such directives constitutes misconduct and exacerbates administrative
liability.

MENDOZA VS DIASEN, JR
A.M. No. MTJ-17-1900

August 9, 2017

Principle:

The Code of Judicial Conduct instructs that judges “should avoid

impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.”—This
Court adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Office of
the Court Administrator. The Code of Judicial Conduct instructs that
judges “should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all activities.” Judges must at all times conduct themselves in a
manner beyond reproach to ensure the public’s continued confidence
in the judiciary.
PERFECTO VS. DESALES-ESIDERA

A.M. No. RTJ-11-2270

January 31, 2011

Principle:

Respondent’s act of proceeding to the Prosecutor’s Office under the

guise of soliciting for a religious cause betrays not only her lack of
maturity as a judge but also a lack of understanding of her vital role as
an impartial dispenser of justice.—Respondent’s act of proceeding to
the Prosecutor’s Office under the guise of soliciting for a religious
cause betrays not only her lack of maturity as a judge but also a lack
of understanding of her vital role as an impartial dispenser of justice,
held in high esteem and respect by the local community, which must
be preserved at all times. It spawns the impression that she was using
her office to unduly influence or pressure Atty. Yruma, a private lawyer
appearing before her sala, and Prosecutor Diaz into donating money
through her charismatic group for religious purposes.