IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

SEAN RODRIGUEZ, 2d Crim. No.

CHRISTOPHER HUNTFOX,
ISAEL ELENES, Santa Barbara Superior
PRISONERS OF THE SANTA Court Nos. 20CR01871,
BARBARA COUNTY JAIL WHO ARE 19CR11756, 18CR03770
HELD PENDING TRIAL,
PETITION FOR WRIT
Petitioners, OF MANDATE
vs. or in the alternative
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF OF HABEAS CORPUS
SANTA BARBARA; and Supporting Exhibits

WILLIAM BROWN, SHERIFF, IMMEDIATE RELIEF

SANTA BARBARA COUNTY, SOUGHT
Respondents,
Following Criminal Division
Directive Prohibiting
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
Petitioners From Being
CALIFORNIA,
Heard on Issue of Pretrial
Release
Real Party in Interest.
(Hon. Michael Carrozzo,
Presiding Judge)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND HABEAS CORPUS

TRACY MACUGA
Public Defender
County of Santa Barbara
Mark Saatjian
Deputy Public Defender
State Bar No. 242853
1100 Anacapa Street
Santa Barbara, CA 93101
(805) 346-7500
Attorneys for Petitioner

1
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................... 3, 4

TABLE OF EXHIBITS ................................................................. 5

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND ............................ 6

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

VERIFICATION ......................................................................... 17

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ............. 17

STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................... 17

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 20

CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 32

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT .......................................... 33

PROOF OF SERVICE ................................................................ 34

2
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CODES, STATUTES, RULES

Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. § 1085 ........................................................ 7

Evidence Code section 452(g) ..................................................... 12

Evidence Code section 452(h) ..................................................... 12

Government Code section 68115 .......................................... 11, 19

Government Code section 26500 ................................................ 24

Penal Code section 1270.2 ............................................................ 8

Penal Code section 1275 ............................................................. 25

Penal Code section 1490 ............................................................. 14

Rules of Court, Rule 8.204(c) ...................................................... 33

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Fourteenth Amendment ............................................................... 8

Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (1977)
433 U.S. 424,433 ............................................................... 22
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950)
339 U.S. 306, 313 .............................................................. 28
Matthews v. Eldridge (1976)
424 U.S. 319, 335 .............................................................. 29

3
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION

Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10 ......................................................... 7, 22

Cal. Const., art. I, § 12 .................................................................. 8

Cal. Const., art. III, § 3 ............................................................... 21

CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT CASES

People v. Superior Court (1973)
9 Cal.3d 283, 286 ................................................................8
In re Walters (1975)
15 Cal.3d 738, 746............................................................. 14
People v. Tenorio (1970)
3 Cal.3d 89, 94................................................................... 26
In re Alvernaz (1992)
2 Cal.4th 924, 941 ............................................................. 28

CALIFORNIA APPELLATE CASES

Reaves v. Superior Court (1971)
22 Cal.App.3d 587, 590, 591 ............................. 9, 23, 25, 26
People v. Lamoureux (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 241, 252 ................................................... 22
In re Humphrey (2018)
19 Cal.App.5th 1006 ......................................................... 25
Bryce v. Superior Court (1988)
205 Cal.App.3d 671 ........................................................... 28

4
 TABLE OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit A: Emails from Clerk re SC-3035 Agreements ............. 8

Exhibit B: Declaration of Lea Villegas, Chief Trial Deputy ...... 8

Exhibit C: Email from Clerk re Ex Parte Motion for Release ... 9

Exhibit D: Petitioner Rodriguez Superior Court Documents .... 9

And Emails

Exhibit E: Petitioner Huntfox Superior Court Documents ..... 10

and Emails

Exhibit F: Petitioner Elenes Superior Court Documents ........ 10

and Emails

Exhibit G: Email re SC-3035 Order for Release of ................. 11

Prisoner; Email re Covid-19 Court Filing
Information (Email Filing)

Exhibit H: Declaration of Lea Villegas, Chief Trial Deputy; ..11

March 23, 2020 Email re Ex Parte Motion for
Release

Exhibit I: March 16, 2020 Order from Chief Justice .............. 18

Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye

Exhibit I: March 18, 2020 Order from Chief Justice .............. 18

Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye

5
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX

SEAN RODRIGUEZ, 2d Crim. No.

CHRISTOPHER HUNTFOX,
ISAEL ELENES, Santa Barbara Superior
PRISONERS OF THE SANTA Court Nos. 20CR01871,
BARBARA COUNTY JAIL WHO ARE 19CR11756, 18CR03770
HELD PENDING TRIAL,
Petitioners,
vs.
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE
OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF
SANTA BARBARA;

WILLIAM BROWN, SHERIFF,

SANTA BARBARA COUNTY,
Respondents,

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA,

Real Party in Interest.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE

AND WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
IMMEDIATE RELIEF SOUGHT

Petitioners, SEAN RODRIGUEZ, CHRISTOPHER

HUNTFOX, AND ISAEL ELENES, by and through counsel, the

Office of the Public Defender for Santa Barbara County,

6
respectfully petition for a writ of mandate and a writ of habeas

corpus, and by this verified petition state:

Jurisdiction

1. This court has original jurisdiction over this petition for writ

of habeas corpus. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10.) This Court also has

original jurisdiction in proceedings for extraordinary relief,

including mandamus. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10; Cal. Code of Civ.

Pro. § 1085.) The petition is filed in the first instance in the Court

of Appeal rather than the Superior Court because the petition

challenges the policy of the Superior Court to bar hearing of any

petition for release for which there is not already a stipulated

agreement between the defense and the prosecution.

2. In misdemeanor cases, the Appellate Division of the Superior

Court has original jurisdiction in proceedings for extraordinary

mandamus relief. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10.) Petitioner SEAN

RODRIGUEZ is charged with a misdemeanor. SEAN

RODRIGUEZ requests that the Court of Appeal take up this

challenge in equity. The Superior Court’s directive in response to

the COVID-19 pandemic does not appear to provide access to the

court’s appellate division where SEAN RODRIGUEZ would have a

7
writ of mandate heard. SEAN RODRIGUEZ requests that his

petition for writ of mandamus be heard along with his writ of

habeas corpus under the inherent authority of this court to do

equity. (People v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 283, 286.)

3. Each Petitioner is imprisoned by the Sheriff of Santa

Barbara County at the Santa Barbara County Jail. Each

Petitioner is held pending trial. Each named Petitioner sought

hearing on the question of own recognizance release or bail

reduction. Each named Petitioner was refused a court date.

4. Each named Petitioner received notice from the court

requesting that Petitioner “resubmit request as a stipulation

signed by the defense attorney and District Attorney as well as

agreed upon terms of release as an O.R. or Supervised Pretrial

release using one of the attached forms.” (Exhibit A.)

5. In each case, the prosecution declined to offer a stipulation.

6. Chief Trial Deputy of the Office of the Public Defender, Lea

Villegas, confirmed that this is the policy of the court. Petitioners’

counsel is not permitted to file motions for release or reduction of

bail pursuant to Penal Code section 1270.2, Article I section 12 of

the California Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the

8
United States Constitution on behalf of all Petitioners. The

Court’s directive excludes these proceedings from essential

functions, and the Clerk’s Office is closed. (Exhibit B.)

7. The clerk of the court confirmed on March 23, “At this time,

the only available option for release is to submit a stipulation

signed by both the prosecution and defense.” (Exhibit C.)

8. Other unnamed Petitioners who are being held pending trial

are similarly situated to the named Petitioners in that they are

being held without opportunity for hearing on the question of O.R.

release, supervised release, bail reduction, or modification of the

conditions of release after the change of circumstances presented

by the appearance of COVID-19. (Reaves v. Superior Court (1971)

22 Cal.App.3d 587, 591.)

9. Petitioner SEAN RODRIGUEZ is incarcerated in the Santa

Barbara County Jail. On March 24, 2020, he attempted to file an

Emergency Request for Ex Parte Order for Release or Setting of

Hearing for Bail and Own Recognizance Consideration. (True and

correct copies of a declaration, the complaint, Request for release

or calendaring, and email correspondence from the court are

attached hereto as Exhibit D.) Respondent Court emailed

9
petitioner’s counsel that the pleading was “received and rejected.”

The same correspondence directed Petitioner to seek a stipulation

from the District Attorney as the only avenue to secure his release.

Respondent Court has not calendared Petitioner’s matter, and

there is no future court date. Petitioner remains incarcerated.

10. Petitioner CHRISTOPHER HUNTFOX is incarcerated in the

Santa Barbara County jail. On March 23, 2020, he attempted to

file an Emergency Request for Ex Parte Order for Release or

Setting of Hearing for Bail and Own Recognizance Consideration.

(True and correct copies of a declaration, the complaint, Request

for release or calendaring, and email correspondence from the

court are attached hereto as Exhibit E.) Respondent Court

emailed petitioner’s counsel that the pleading was “received and

rejected.” The same correspondence directed Petitioner to seek a

stipulation from the District Attorney as the only avenue to secure

his release. Respondent Court has not calendared Petitioner’s

matter, and there is no future court date. Petitioner remains

incarcerated.

11. Petitioner ISAEL ELENES is incarcerated in the Santa

Barbara County Jail. On March 23, 2020, he attempted to file an

10
Emergency Request for Ex Parte Order for Release or Setting of

Hearing for Bail and Own Recognizance Consideration. (True and

correct copies of a declaration, the complaint, Request for release

or calendaring, and email correspondence from the court are

attached hereto as Exhibit F.) Respondent Court emailed

Petitioner’s counsel that the pleading was “received and rejected.”

The same correspondence directed Petitioner to seek a stipulation

from the District Attorney as the only avenue to secure his release.

Respondent Court has not calendared Petitioner’s matter, and

there is no future court date. Petitioner remains incarcerated.

12. Confronted with the novel coronavirus pandemic, Presiding

Judge Michael Carrozzo requested a Judicial Emergency Order

pursuant to Government Code section 68115. Two orders were

ultimately authorized by the chief justice to apply to Santa

Barbara County courts. (Exhibit G.) The Presiding Judge did not

request authorization to delay hearings of pretrial release motions.

13. The Respondent Court described its policy in a series of

emails to the defense bar. (Declaration of Lea Villegas, Chief Trial

Deputy; March 23, 2020 Email between Jenny Andrews and Jenni

Mehlenbacher, Exhibit H.)

11
14. Petitioners argue that their imprisonment is unlawful

because the doors to the court have been closed to each Petitioner

unless his or her attorney can first persuade the prosecutor to open

them. Respondent court will only hear matters of pretrial release

that have stipulated agreements. All other petitions are rejected.

Only when a stipulation is presented will a judge accept and

review it. The Santa Barbara Superior Court has ceded its

discretion to the prosecutor.

COVID-19 Pandemic and the Jail

15. The County of Santa Barbara, as much of the world, is facing

a global pandemic. (Evid. Code section 452 (g), (h).) To slow the

spread of the COVID-19 virus, the governor ordered “all

individuals living in the State of California to stay home or at their

place of residence except as needed to maintain continuity of

operations.”1 The order implements health care directives to

maintain physical distance so as not to contract or spread the

disease. On March 27, 2020, the Governor purports to give

1https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/3.19.20-attested-EO-N-33-20-
COVID-19-HEALTH-ORDER.pdf

12
sweeping powers to the Judicial Council to suspend statutes that

conflicted with court rules adopted by the Judicial Council.2

16. Jails and prisons are at increased risk from contagious

pathogens.3 A nurse at the Santa Barbara jail has tested positive

for COVID-19. One day before becoming symptomatic, the nurse

had contact with both prisoners and staff.4

17. The Santa Barbara County Jail is ill-equipped to handle a

wave of sick prisoners. The Sheriff himself acknowledged serious

deficiencies of the jail in his request for funding for a new jail:

“Santa Barbara County Sheriff Bill Brown said his jail did

not have a dedicated medical clinic but a "hodgepodge" of

exam rooms spread throughout the jail […].”

Brown said inmates in his jail could get basic medical care

such as physicals, checkups and exams, and intervention and

treatment for minor injuries or illnesses.

2 https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/3.27.-20-EO-N-38-20-text.pdf
3 “The Cook County sheriff’s office announced Saturday that 89 detainees at the Cook
County Jail have tested positive for COVID-19, an increase of 51 cases from the day
before.” https://chicago.suntimes.com/coronavirus/2020/3/28/21198407/cook-county-jail-
coronavirus-covid-19-cases-inmates-89.
4 https://www.sbsheriff.org/sheriffs-contract-employee-tests-positive-for-covid-19-no-

additional-inmates-or-staff-require-self-isolation/

13
 "But if it's anything more than that, it requires us to take

them out of the jail to a hospital or a specialist," Brown said.

"If it's an emergency, or if they need regular dialysis, or have

cancer and need chemotherapy, that's also off-site." 5

18. In the event that Petitioners are released from custody

before a decision on the petition has been made, Petitioner

respectfully submits that mootness should not serve as a bar to

this Court hearing the petition because the case presents an issue

of importance affecting the rights of all prisoners in the Santa

Barbara County Jail whose matters are not subject to stipulation

by the prosecutor. (See In re Walters (1975) 15 Cal.3d 738, 746.)

19. Petitioners have no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at

law. Writ of mandamus is the appropriate remedy to address an

unlawful order by the trial court, and habeas corpus is the

appropriate remedy for a prisoner entitled to a hearing on bail.

(Penal Code § 1490.)

5Christopher McGuinness, Captive patients: Central Coast jails struggle to care for sick
inmates, Santa Maria Sun, April 26, 2018, available at:
https://www.centerforhealthjournalism.org/fellowships/projects/captive-patients-central-
coast-jails-struggle-care-sick-inmates.)

14
20. Petitioner hereby incorporates by reference the

accompanying memorandum and all records, documents and

pleadings on file with this Court and any further material to be

developed at any future hearing that may be ordered.

WHEREFORE petitioner respectfully prays:

1. That this Court issue a writ of mandate requiring

Respondent court to provide Petitioners with a constitutionally

adequate procedure for holding individualized hearings within 48

hours; and that these hearings be presided over by a Superior

Court Judge who shall release any Petitioner about whom the

prosecution cannot establish by clear and convincing evidence that

continued detention is justified and necessary; and that this

determination shall consider, in addition to other mandated

factors, the risks of detention to Petitioners’ health and well-being,

including Petitioners’ vulnerability to COVID-19, and ability to pay

the bail amount;

2. That this Court issue a writ of mandate directing the

Superior Court to immediately provide judges to rule on the merits

15
of pleadings received and rejected since the implementation of

Respondent’s email filing policy, including all pleadings that seek

O.R. release, bail reduction, or modification of conditions of

confinement;

3. That this Court issue an order to show cause requiring

Respondent to provide its authority for the delegation of judicial

discretion to the prosecution; AND

4. That this Court grant such other and further relief as may

seem just and proper.

Dated: March 30, 2020

Respectfully submitted,
TRACY MACUGA
Public Defender

By: /s/ Mark Saatjian

MARK SAATJIAN
Deputy Public Defender
Attorneys for Petitioner

16
 VERIFICATION

I, Mark Saatjian, declare under penalty of perjury as follows:

I am an attorney at law, duly licensed to practice in the State

of California and am a Deputy Public Defender with the Santa

Barbara County Public Defender’s Office, the attorney for

Petitioners.

In this capacity, I represent Petitioners in the foregoing

petition, and I make this verification as their attorney acting on

their behalf in that the allegations made therein are more within

the knowledge of the undersigned than Petitioners.

I have read the foregoing petition and know of my own

personal knowledge that the matters alleged therein are true from

said reading.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true

and correct and that this verification was executed this March 30,

2020, at Santa Barbara, California.

/s/ Mark Saatjian

Mark Saatjian

17
 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Issue Presented

Does the Superior Court’s Policy of only accepting

stipulations for release signed by the district attorney,
and rejecting any defense petitions for pretrial release
where the prosecution has not stipulated, violate Due
Process and unconstitutionally delegate its judicial
power to the prosecution?

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Petitioners are imprisoned pretrial in the Santa Barbara

County Jail. Named petitioners have sought release from the

jail. They have sought an opportunity to argue that the unique

dangers of being in jail during the COVID-19 pandemic present a

changed circumstance and gives them a right to a hearing on the

question of appropriate bail or O.R. release. The Santa Barbara

Superior Court has announced that only criminal defendants for

whom there is a stipulation between defense and prosecutor will

be considered for pretrial release. Each named Petitioner has

been unable to obtain a stipulation. Each named petitioner has

attempted to file a motion, and Respondent court has rejected

18
each motion. Respondent court has informed each named

petitioner that only a stipulated agreement for release will be

accepted by the court at this time. This policy effectively makes

the district attorney, not the court, the arbiter of which

defendants will be released or remain in jail pending trial during

the COVID-19 epidemic.

Governor Gavin Newsom and President Donald Trump

have proclaimed states of emergency because of the COVID-19

pandemic. The Santa Barbara County Court has sought and

received orders from the Chief Justice pursuant to Government

Code section 68115. (Exhibits I and J.) The court also

implemented a policy whereby petitions for release in criminal

cases will only be heard if accompanied by a stipulation of the

prosecutor. (Declaration of Lea Villegas, Chief Trial Deputy;

March 23, 2020 Email between Jenny Andrews and Jenni

Mehlenbacher, Exhibit H.)

On March 20, 2020, California Supreme Court Chief

Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye made urgent recommendations to

19
all criminal courts. The Chief Justice recommends, inter alia,

that the courts:

In setting an adult or juvenile defendant’s conditions of

custody, including the length, eligibility for alternative
sentencing, and surrender date, the court should consider
defendant’s existing health conditions, and any
conditions existing at defendant’s anticipated place
of confinement that could affect the defendant’s
health, the health of other detainees, or the health of
personnel staffing the anticipated place of
confinement.6

INTRODUCTION

The world is in the grip of a pandemic that puts prisoners

at heightened risk. The judicial council has made

recommendations for the courts to implement in mitigating this

risk. The impartial function of a bench officer is urgently

necessary to determine appropriate conditions of release for

people who are detained pretrial in light of this changed

circumstance. When a stipulation by the prosecution is a

prerequisite for a judicial audience, the Santa Barbara Superior

6https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/news/california-chief-justice-issues-second-advisory-on-
emergency-relief-measures

20
Court cedes the court’s judicial oversight to the prosecution. By

accepting only those pleadings that evidence a stipulation of the

parties, the Respondent court has deprived prisoners of

procedural due process under the state and federal constitution.

1. The Superior Court delegates a core aspect of its

judicial function when it permits the Prosecution to

dictate which defendants’ requests for release may be

heard during the COVID-19 pandemic.

This matter raises the most fundamental principle of

constitutional law: Separation of Powers. The California

Constitution establishes a system of state government in which

power is divided among three coequal branches. (Cal. Const., art.

III, § 3).

This division of power limits the authority of one of the

three branches of government to arrogate to itself the core
functions of another branch. [citations] Through this
limitation, we avoid both the concentration of power in a
single branch of government, and the ‘overreaching’ by one
branch against the others. [citations]

21
 (People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241, 252

[internal citations omitted.], review denied (Feb. 19, 2020).)

Here, the problem is not of arrogation of functions -- the

usurping of power from a co-equal branch -- but of delegation.

The Superior Court has voluntarily granted an aspect of its core

responsibility to a partial advocate, the prosecution.

Not surprisingly, few cases present this issue precisely.

The norm is that a branch seeks to wrest power from another

branch -- not, as here, that one branch voluntarily bestows its

power to another. To determine whether the court’s action

impermissibly grants one branch the authority to exercise powers

properly belonging to another branch, the court considers

whether the scheme “prevents [the affected branch] from

accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions” and if so,

whether that impairment is justified by “an overriding need to

promote objectives…” (Nixon v. Administrator of General Services

(1977) 433 U.S. 424, 433.)

22
 Here, the superior court’s procedure for calendaring

requests to release named Petitioners does not provide for

judicial review when the prosecutor declines to stipulate. Instead

the court solicits stipulations without pleadings, without

declarations, without supporting documentation. The judgment

of the prosecutor in accepting the stipulation is the one condition

precedent to obtaining audience with the court.

In Reaves v. Superior Court (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 587, 590,

Petitioners sought a writ of mandate challenging the San Joaquin

County’s procedure of involving the district attorney’s office in

processing emergency writs. For example, upon receipt of any

emergency petition, the court would forward the petition to the

district attorney “so that any factual information can be verified,

or if any factual information is necessary, that information can be

obtained.” (Id.) The district attorney then prepared a “proposed

order based upon the factual information contained in the

petition or obtained as a result of their inquiries.” The judicial

23
officer would then review the proposed order and “the order is

either signed as submitted or signed as modified.” (Id.)

When reviewing these procedures, Court of Appeal noted,

“the district attorney’s prime function is to act as the public

prosecutor and he serves as the attorney for the People.” (Id. at

596, citing Gov. Code § 26500.) It also noted, “superior courts

have been granted original jurisdiction in proceedings for

extraordinary relief.” (Id., citing Cal. Const., art VI, § 10.) Court

of Appeal held that “when the district attorney reviews a

particular petition at the superior court's request, obtains the

needed information from the various correction authorities

himself, and then drafts the order, we think that this results in

an improper delegation of the judicial function.” (Id.)

The County of Santa Barbara Superior Court is partaking

in a strikingly similar delegation of its judicial power.

Petitioners and their counsel must contact the district attorney’s

office, not the court, to make a pitch as to whether they should be

released. The assigned deputy district attorney hears the

24
argument. If the district attorney can be persuaded to release

the defendant, the parties prepare a stipulated order and submit

it to the judge. The judge either signs the order as written or

signs a modified order. The judge does not hear about any issues

related to bail including whether or not the defendant has the

ability to pay the bail currently set. (See In re Humphrey (2018)

19 Cal.App.5th 1006, review granted May 23, 2018, S247278.)

The judge does not hear any information about defendant’s

criminal record, employment, ties to the community, history (or

lack of history) of failing to appear in court, or other factors

related to bail. (See Penal Code § 1275.)

Santa Barbara Superior Court’s procedure has the same

constitutional infirmities as the procedure in Reaves. All

discretion as to who is released and who is detained is bestowed

upon the district attorney’s office, a decidedly non-neutral party.

The Santa Barbara Superior Court has divested all of its

discretion on this issue. Judicial officers are playing no role

whatsoever in decisions of bail, O.R., and pretrial detention. As

25
such, much like the court in Reaves, the Santa Barbara Superior

Court has improperly delegated its judicial function.

In People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89, a unanimous

California Supreme Court invalidated a statute that provided for

a similar prosecutorial veto. The defendant in Tenorio objected to

the constitutionality of the statutory scheme that created a

minimum sentence for persons convicted of marijuana possession

with a prior. The scheme required the prosecutor to file a motion

to strike a prior conviction. When the prosecution did not file a

motion to strike the prior, the trial court in Tenorio struck the

prior on its own. The government appealed.

The Court held the statutory scheme to be an

unconstitutional delegation of judicial power to the prosecution.

“[J]udicial power is compromised when a judge, who believes that

a charge should be dismissed in the interests of justice, wishes to

exercise the power to dismiss but finds that before he may do so

he must bargain with the prosecutor. (People v. Tenorio (1970) 3

Cal.3d 89, 94.)

26
 Here, the dynamic of negotiation is displaced but no less

contrary to the separation of powers. The court has implemented

a system whereby the prosecutorial veto shields the court from its

duty to weigh all statutorily identified factors in assessing

Petitioners’ right to hearing on O.R. release and bail. Without

stipulation, the court is closed to a reasoned determination of

pretrial release.

The court’s judicial function extends to plea bargains. In

exercising their discretion to approve or reject proposed

plea bargains, trial courts are charged with the protection

and promotion of the public's interest in vigorous

prosecution of the accused, imposition of appropriate

punishment, and protection of victims of crimes. [citations]

For that reason, a trial court's approval of a proposed plea

bargain must represent an informed decision in

furtherance of the interests of society [citations]; as

recognized by both the Legislature and the judiciary, the

27
 trial court may not arbitrarily abdicate that responsibility.

(In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 941.)

Under the separation of powers doctrine of the California

Constitution, the “judicial branch must manage the processing of

felony cases under the guidance of the California Constitution,

the Legislature, and the Judicial Council. The authority of the

executive branch to prosecute does not include the right to

impose settlement rules or confer veto power over procedures

adopted by the judiciary.” (Bryce v. Superior Court (1988) 205

Cal.App.3d 671.) For named Petitioners, the court has made

settlement itself the only path to the courthouse, thereby giving

to the prosecutor inordinate coercive power.

2. To condition calendaring and hearing of a petition

for release or bail reduction upon the Stipulation by the

Prosecution denies Petitioners due process.

The most basic procedural safeguard against governmental

interference with life, liberty, or property is notice and an

opportunity to be heard. (Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &

28
Trust Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 313.) Defendants who were

arraigned prior to the emergency circumstances have no

opportunity to bring claims based on the emergency, changed

circumstances, or constitutional claims about less restrictive

alternatives to pretrial incarceration.

To establish the adequacy of procedural due process, the

court considers three distinct factors:

First, the private interest that will be affected by the

official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation

of such interest through the procedures used, and the

probable value, if any, of additional or substitute

procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's

interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and

administrative burdens that the additional or substitute

procedural requirement would entail. (Matthews v.

Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 335.)

Here, the private interests affected by the government

action are the interest in pretrial freedom, the right to seek

29
alternative placements or release to escape unconstitutional

conditions of confinement, and statutory and constitutional rights

of review of money bail orders that hold people in custody for

want of bail.

Second, the Court’s Policy involves significant risk of

erroneous deprivation of Petitioners’ interests. Petitioners,

who fear being incarcerated and unable to distance

themselves from other prisoners and Sheriffs’ staff who are

infected, are likely to agree to terms of release that are

unfair, just to secure stipulation of the partial adversary, the

prosecutor.

Third, while the Court’s policy may promote the government

interest of preventing people from coming in contact with

each other in the courthouse, the Government’s broader

interest is not served. The governmental interest in

mitigating the dangers of COVID-19 aligns with a policy

that would permit expedited constitutional and statutory

release hearings.

30
 A person naïve to the power relationship between the

accused and the prosecution, might think it only fair for the

court to accept stipulated agreements for release, after all, both

parties have settled upon the terms; after all, an unreasonable

defendant may have some ability to thwart the prosecutor’s

access to the courthouse, were the prosecutor seeking to modify

terms of release. This would be to forget that Petitioners are in

a desperate situation. Petitioners, detained in an aging facility

with a history of inadequate response to medical care and

awaiting the wave of disease that is about to break over them,

are motivated to accept any terms for release that the

prosecutor would propose.

Petitioners remain detained in the Santa Barbara County

Jail with no future court dates and no legal avenue to argue for

pretrial release absent a stipulated release agreement from the

prosecution.

///

///

31
 CONCLUSION

In delegating its judicial function to the prosecution at a

time when the Superior Court’s independent judicial function is

urgently needed, the Court has deprived Petitioners of their

fundamental rights under constitutions of the state and federal

government. The relief sought in the petition for writ of mandate

and writ of habeas corpus should be granted.

Dated: March 30, 2020

Respectfully submitted,
TRACY MACUGA
Public Defender

By: /s/ Mark Saatjian

MARK SAATJIAN
Deputy Public Defender
Attorney for Petitioners

32
 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Rule 8.204(c) of the California Rules of Court, I
hereby certify that this brief contains 4970 words, including
footnotes. In making this certification, I have relied on the word-
count of the computer program used to prepare the brief.

By /s/ Valerie Albitre

33
 PROOF OF SERVICE
I am a citizen of the United States, over the age of 18 years,
employed by the Public Defender of the County of Santa Barbara, and
not a party to the within action; my business address is Courthouse
Annex, 1st Floor, Santa Barbara, California 93101.

On March 30, 2020, I served the within

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE or in the alternative
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

_x__ VIA ELECTRONIC SERVICE

dasbrecords@co.santa-barbara.ca.us
Joyce Dudley, District Attorney
1112 Santa Barbara Street
Santa Barbara, CA 93101

SBCriminalFilings@sbcourts.org
County Clerk, Criminal Division
Santa Barbara County Superior Court
The Honorable Michael Carrozzo
118 E. Figueroa Street
Santa Barbara, CA 93101

I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true

and correct. Executed this 30th day of March, 2020 at Santa Barbara,
California.

/s/ Valerie Albitre

Office of the Public Defender

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