In re LUIS B.
TAGORDA, 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
Duran & Lim for respondent.
Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of
Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish
and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela
(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land as
required by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your
application and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a
lawyer, he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or
against you. Come or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and
is willing to help and serve the poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in
his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:
ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928
MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our induction into
office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month. Before my induction
into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions or recommendations for the good of the
province in general and for your barrio in particular. You can come to my house at any time here
in Echague, to submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire.
I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here in
Echague. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on the following
day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary public. Despite my election
as member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and notary
public. In case you cannot see me at home on any week day, I assure you that you can always
find me there on every Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive any work regarding
preparations of documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary
public even on Sundays.
I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief
that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified
to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I would make it
clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here
in Echague.
I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your
meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with
you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as yet
contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles, I
would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every
registration.
Yours respectfully,
(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
Attorney  of Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the
Notary Public.
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. Section 21
of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar. In
1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act No.
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of
the Code of Ethics provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most worthy and effective advertisement possible,
even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be
the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business
cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per
se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal
communications or interview not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally
unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real
estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering
retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect
advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner
of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position,
and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are
intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. — It is unprofessional for a lawyer to
volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust
make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is
indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and
inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with
claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as
clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly,
those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen,
court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise of
giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant
or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon
every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner
immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a
crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney
was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a number of
jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The
reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a profession and not a
business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so
would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625; People vs. Mac
Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by
lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession.
It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results
in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That should
be distinctly understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent stands
convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly, the only
remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal
case, suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action should go further
than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this character of which unfortunately the
respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent
elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there
are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and
inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A
modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it should be
distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the considerations which have influenced
the court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance and should, therefore, not be taken as
indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B.
Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one
month from April 1, 1929,
Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
Separate Opinions
OSTRAND, J.,  dissenting:
I dissent. Under the circumstances of the case a reprimand would have been sufficient punishment.
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,  aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria
Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. &
Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-
7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising
these services should be allowed supposedly 
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly decided
by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required
the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association
of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their
respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar
associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this
Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate
that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document
search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business registration,
obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign
citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly
opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's
legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of
establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper
publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to
perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law
practice as aforedescribed.4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is
being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The
Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is)
the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very
name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully
submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic
connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic"
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present
case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is
being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the
advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a
lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature
of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as
claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice
does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal
support services," as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room
for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers,
whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only
meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements,
however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the Family
Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between
a man and woman entered into accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of
the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message
being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage
celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is
not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law.
At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where
certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is
outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that
shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with
the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a
"secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special
contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the
Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and
inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages
celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for
a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded
that the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are
accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being
encouraged or committed 
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent
offers do not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements
in question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the
bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the
publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least,
from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic
data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for
gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such
business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can
be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better
performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of
their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the
exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from
"encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great
benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer
will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the
illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar
but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its
services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the
Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between
which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made
available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be
prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad
of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law.
While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information
regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may
be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a
legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of
action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without
subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at
members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should
be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being
clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means
of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to
each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
Court.5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in
giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced
paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and
3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself
to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting
employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which
thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to
say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's
own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be
handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of
lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and
advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the
latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed.,
p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and
such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to
practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal
services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot
ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the
limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of
the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to
the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name,
the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The
practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be
assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons
who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but
also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in
unethical law practice.6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein,
are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and
patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal
Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it
merely renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public
as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See
pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated
above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit
outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and
Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly
on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the
Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the
legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and
which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities
of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally
term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should
be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited
by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of
study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and
pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the
administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as
such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study
and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the
Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to
protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with
the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers
which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that
lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from
advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised
not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be
taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give
the impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment
of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and
foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if
they avail of its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does
not help matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the
legal problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed
purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers
involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when
only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President
and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and
main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for
the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal
and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit
cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc.,
could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal
but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency
and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages
in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law.
And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain
from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the
use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one
(cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The
law has yet to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so,
are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about
having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and
seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is
deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by
our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for
clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses
of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as
management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not,
perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein,
however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in
independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not
necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective
service unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be
careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . .
.clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that
knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend, do
not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know
the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance with
broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law — accurate or
inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but
when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally
possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business
or profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar with
zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house
statutes, and who draws plans and specification in harmony with the law. This is
not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it
is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of
some measure that he recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations
Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no
separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal
question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a
lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and the
like, then an architect who performed this function would probably be
considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys.
Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or
custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this
is not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations experts are
the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are
lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the practice for
some years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a
management group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such
matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently,
consultants like the defendants have the same service that the larger
employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for
which appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The court
should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established
method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of
men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that
the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates
in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for
any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being
engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client
along the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law.
But such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are
along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within
which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits
the kind of building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or
information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the
practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he
would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew
employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in
the adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a
mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for
negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under
discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the employment whether
or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception
where the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are
negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends
on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess
the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the
same opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or
if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from differing
interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant
should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the
situation is not presented by the proofs.
 Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative
agencies of the federal government, especially before trial examiners of the
National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal government, acting by
virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation
of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to
interfere with such determination or to forbid representation before the agency
by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations
Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other
representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31.
'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a
lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor
Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A.
2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may
involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with
the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in
another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A"
Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license,
and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law.
However, if the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the
Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is
actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services
then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of
marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials
may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer
buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what
courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal
Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal
advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text which
purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does
not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and
the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice
of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to
the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor
does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and
client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general
advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's publication does
not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily
identified person in a particular situation — in their publication and sale of the kits, such
publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal
impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction
against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce,
separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to
matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against
defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and
against his having any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully
support, however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave
legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which might arise
in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or
pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The
injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly with
reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of
particular individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation
agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in
Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or
counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that
FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this
case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or
perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof
(which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only
"paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause
"practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have
laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of
which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render
any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel,
and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such
matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types
of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed
by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and
authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper
interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of
law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business
to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice
for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect
thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down
the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
 Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when
he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and
the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have
no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a
wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at
law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.],
pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in
Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of
the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of
law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it
has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained
paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory,
through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of
documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search;
evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information
about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce,
marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the
foreign country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in
court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for the
efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other
entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not
suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than
real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law,
furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That
is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be
paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in
court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice,
contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue
of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where
an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its
own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with
offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No
matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-
Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like
doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc.
has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation,
and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals,
counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical
field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the
big law firms.
 The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for
the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has
been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our
staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these
matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty.
Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly.
"If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to
inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation.
There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order,
and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property,
and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem.
Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would
need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court,
and gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which
it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently
establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation
and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals,
but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw
support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who
meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules
specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar
who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those
persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through
education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal
science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their
clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification
for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of
the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in
legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise
little control.27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction.
Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for
judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools
and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in
the Philippines. 28As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States,
standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or
guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of
Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal
assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of
professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American
Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice
law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services,
but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized
and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons
licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement
or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal
business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional
Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional
employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the
manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's
position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or
solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a
profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was
held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business
from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that
"the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice
with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
 capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community
has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of
effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of
able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which
they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are
expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced;
date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees
and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and
scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the
profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening
of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent
is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent
corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively
cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar.
Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees
for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate
of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or
impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being
invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an
exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in
Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found
that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow
the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what
is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to
advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice
of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder
and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will
be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which
the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to
refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative
parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course,
imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since,
under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage
in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising,
cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged
support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of
the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due
ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in
light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the
Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of
the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting,
directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of
Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate
action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo
and Quiason, JJ., concur
Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985
ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant  execution of the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court. Complainant alleges that the issuance of the
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES,
RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J.
CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR., respondents.
Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.
Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to
enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker &
McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.
In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker &
McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87
shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He
requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is
your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not having received any reply, he filed the
instant complaint.
We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1,
Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is
a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30
cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising
under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie
constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of
the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and
investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized
to practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-99-1292 February 26, 1999
JULIETA BORROMEO SAMONTE, complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO R. GATDULA, Branch Clerk of Court, respondent.
RESOLUTION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
The complaint filed by Julieta Borremeo Samonte charges Rolando R. Gatdula, RTC, Branch 220,
Quezon City with grave misconduct consisting in the alleged engaging in the private practice of law
which is in conflict with his official functions as Branch Clerk of Court.
Complainant alleges that she is the authorized representative of her sister Flor Borromeo de Leon, the
plaintiff, in Civil Case No. 37-14552 for ejectment, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 37. A typographical error was committed in the complaint which stated that the address
of defendant is No. 63-C instead of 63-B, P. Tuazon Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City. The mistake was
rectified by the filing of an amended complaint which was admitted by the Court. A decision was
rendered in favor of the plaintiff who subsequently filed a motion for execution. Complainant,
however, was surprised to receive a temporary restraining order signed by Judge Prudencio Castillo of
Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City, where Atty. Rolando Gatdula is the Branch Clerk Court, enjoining the
temporary restraining order was hasty and irregular as she was never notified of the application for
preliminary injunction.
Complainant further alleges that when she went to Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City, to inquire about the
reason for the issuance of the temporary restraining order, respondent Atty. Rolando Gatdula, blamed
her lawyer for writing the wrong address in the complaint for ejectment, and told her that if she
wanted the execution to proceed, she should change her lawyer and retain the law office of
respondent, at the same time giving his calling card with the name "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon,
Dimailig and Celera" with office at Rm. 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City;
otherwise she will not be able to eject the defendant Dave Knope. Complainant told respondent that
she could not decide because she was only representing her sister. To her consternation, the RTC
Branch 220 issued an order granting the preliminary injunction as threatened by the respondent
despite the fact that the MTC, Brach 37 had issued an Order directing the execution of the Decision in
Civil Case No. 37-14552.
Asked to comment, respondent Atty. Gatdula recited the antecedents in the ejectment case and the
issuance of the restraining order by the Regional Trial Court, and claimed that contrary to complainant
Samonte's allegation that she was not notified of the raffle and the hearing, the Notice of Hearing on
the motion for the issuance of a Temporary Retraining Order was duly served upon the parties, and
that the application for injunctive relief was heard before the temporary restraining order was issued.
The preliminary injunction was also set for hearing on August 7, 1996.
The respondent's version of the incident is that sometime before the hearing of the motion for the
issuance of the temporary restraining order, complainant Samonte went to court "very mad" because
of the issuance of the order stopping the execution of the decision in the ejectment case. Respondent
tried to calm her down, and assured her that the restraining order was only temporary and that the
application for preliminary injunction would still be heard. Later the Regional Trial Court granted the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The complainant went back to court "fuming mad"
because of the alleged unreasonableness of the court in issuing the injunction.
Respondent Gatdula claims that thereafter complainant returned to his office, and informed him that
she wanted to change counsel and that a friend of hers recommended the Law Firm of "Baligod,
Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera," at the same time showing a calling card, and asking if he
could handle her case. Respondent refused as he was not connected with the law firm, although he
was invited to join but he choose to remain in the judiciary. Complainant returned to court a few days
later and told him that if he cannot convince the judge to recall the writ of preliminary injunction, she
will file an administrative case against respondent and the judge. The threat was repeated but the
respondent refused to be pressured. Meanwhile, the Complainant's Motion to Dissolve the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was denied. Respondent Gatdula claims that the complainant must have filed
this administrative charge because of her frustration in procuring the ejectment of the defendant
lessee from the premises. Respondent prays for the dismissal of the complainant against him.
The case was referred to Executive Judge Estrella Estrada, RTC, Quezon City, for investigation, report
and recommendation.
In her report, Judge Estrada states that the case was set for hearing three times, on September 7,
1997, on September 17, and on September 24, 1997, but neither complainant nor her counsel
appeared, despite due notice. The return of service of the Order setting the last hearing stated that
complainant is still abroad. There being no definite time conveyed to the court for the return of the
complainant, the investigating Judge proceeded with the investigation by "conducting searching
question" upon respondent based on the allegations in the complaint, and asked for the record of Civil
Case No. Q-96-28187 for evaluation. The case was set for hearing for the last time on October 22,
1997, to give complainant a last chance to appear, but there was again no appearance despite notice.
The respondent testified in his own behalf to affirm the statements in his Comment, and submitted
documentary evidence consisting mainly of the pleadings in MTC Civil Case No. 37-14552, and in RTC
Civil Case No. Q-9628187 to show that the questioned orders of the court were not improperly issued.
The investigating judge made the following findings:
For failure of the complainant to appear at the several hearings despite notice, she
failed to substantiate her allegations in the complaint, particularly that herein
 respondent gave her his calling card and tried to convince her to change her lawyer.
This being the case, it cannot be established with certainty that respondent indeed
gave her his calling card even convinced her to change her lawyer. Moreover, as
borne by the records of the Civil Case No. Q-96-28187, complainant was duly
notified of all the proceedings leading to the issuance of the TRO and the
subsequent orders of Judge Prudencio Altre Castillo, Jr. of RTC, Branch 220.
Complainant's lack of interest in prosecuting this administrative case could be an
indication that her filing of the charge against the respondent is only intended to
harass the respondent for her failure to obtain a favorable decision from the Court.
However, based on the record of this administrative case, the calling card attached
as Annex "B" of the complainant's affidavit dated September 25, 1996 allegedly
given by respondent to complainant would show that the name of herein respondent
was indeed include in the BALIGOD, GATDULA, TACARDON, DIMAILIG & CELERA LAW
OFFICES. While respondent denied having assumed any position in said office, the
fact remains that his name is included therein which may therefore tend to show
that he has dealings with said office. Thus, while he may not be actually and directly
employed with the firm, the fact that his name appears on the calling card as
partner in the Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig & Celera Law Offices give the
impression that he is connected therein and may constitute an act of solicitation and
private practice which is declared unlawful under Republic Act. No. 6713. It is to be
noted, however, that complainant failed to establish by convincing evidence that
respondent actually offered to her the services of their law office. Thus, the violation
committed by respondent in having his name included/retained in the calling card
may only be considered as a minor infraction for which he must also be
administratively sanctioned.
and recommended that Atty. Gatdula be admonished and censured for the minor infraction
he has committed.
Finding: We agree with the investigating judge that the respondent is guilty of an infraction. The
complainant by her failure to appear at the hearings, failed to substantiate her allegation that it was
the respondent who gave her calling card "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera Law
Offices" and that he tried to convince her to change counsels. We find however, that while the
respondent vehemently denies the complainant's allegations, he does not deny that his name appears
on the calling card attached to the complaint, which admittedly came into the hands of the
complainant. The respondent testified before the Investigating Judge as follows:
Q: How about your statement that you even gave her a calling
card of the "Baligod, Gatdula, Pardo, Dimailig and Celera law
Offices at Room 220 Mariwasa building?
A: I vehemently deny the allegation of the complainant that I gave
her a calling card. I was surprised when she presented (it) to me
during one of her follow-ups of the case before the court. She told
me that a friend of hers recommended such firm and she found
out that my name is included in that firm. I told her that I have not
assumed any position in the law firm. And I am with the Judiciary
since I passed the bar. It is impossible for me to enter an
appearance as her counsel in the very same court where I am the
Branch Clerk of Court.
The above explanation tendered by the Respondent is an admission that it is his name
appears on the calling card, a permissible form of advertising or solicitation of legal
services. 1 Respondent does not claim that the calling card was printed without his knowledge
or consent, and the calling card 2 carries his name primarily and the name "Baligod, Gatdula,
Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera with address at 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City" in the left corner. The card clearly gives the impression that he is connected
with the said law firm. The inclusion/retention of his name in the professional card constitutes
an act of solicitation which violates Section 7 sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise known as "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for the Public Officials and
Employees" which declares it unlawful for a public official or employee to, among others:
(2) Engage in the private practice of their
profession unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, provided that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with official functions.
Time and again this Court has said that the conduct and behavior of every one connected with an
office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times must only be
characterized by propriety and decorum but above all else must be above suspicion. 3
WHEREFORE, respondent Rolando R. Gatdula. Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City is
hereby reprimanded for engaging in the private practice of law with the warning that a repetition of
the same offense will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to cause the exclusion of his
name in the firm name of any office engaged in the private practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12871             July 25, 1959
TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, petitioner, 
vs.
FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, respondent.
Baizas and Balderrama for petitioner.
City Attorney Francisco G. H. Salva in his own behalf.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by Timoteo V. Cruz
against Francisco G. H. Salva, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay City, to restrain him from
continuing with the preliminary investigation he was conducting in September, 1957 in connection
with the killing of Manuel Monroy which took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay City. To better
understand the present case and its implications, the following facts gathered from the pleadings and
the memoranda filed by the parties, may be stated.
Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as involved and
implicated in said crime. After a long trial, the Court of First Instance of Pasay City found Oscar
Castelo, Jose de Jesus, Hipolito Bonifacio, Bienvenido Mendoza, Francis Berdugo and others guilty of
the crime of murder and sentenced them to death. They all appealed the sentence although without
said appeal, in view of the imposition of the extreme penalty, the case would have to be reviewed
automatically by this Court. Oscar Castelo sought a new trial which was granted and upon retrial, he
was again found guilty and his former conviction of sentence was affirmed and reiterated by the same
trial court.
It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the case. The
purpose of said reinvestigation does not appear in the record. Anyway, intelligence agents of the
Philippine Constabulary and investigators of Malacañang conducted the investigation for the Chief
Executive, questioned a number of people and obtained what would appear to be confession, pointing
to persons, other than those convicted and sentenced by the trial court, as the real killers of Manuel
Monroy.
Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal Salva to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case presumably on the basis of the affidavits and confessions obtained by
those who had investigated the case at the instance of Malacañang. Fiscal Salva conferred with the
Solicitor General as to what steps he should take. A conference was held with the Secretary of Justice
who decided to have the results of the investigation by the Philippine Constabulary and Malacañang
investigators made available to counsel for the appellants.
Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the appellants filed a motion for new trial with this
Tribunal supporting the same with the so-called affidavits and confessions of some of those persons
investigated, such as the confessions of Sergio Eduardo y de Guzman, Oscar Caymo, Pablo Canlas,
and written statements of several others. By resolution of this Tribunal, action on said motion for new
trial was deferred until the case was studied and determined on the merits. In the meantime, the
Chief, Philippine Constabulary, head sent to the Office of Fiscal Salva copies of the same affidavits and
confessions and written statements, of which the motion for new trial was based, and respondent
Salva proceeded to conduct a reinvestigation designating for said purposes a committee of three
composed of himself as chairman and Assistant City Attorneys Herminio A. Avendañio and Ernesto A.
Bernabe.
In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee, petitioner
Timoteo Cruz was subpoenaed by respondent to appear at his office on September 21, 1957, to testify
"upon oath before me in a certain criminal investigation to be conducted at the time and place by this
office against you and Sergio Eduardo, et al., for murder." On September 19, 1957, petitioner Timoteo
Cruz wrote to respondent Salva asking for the transfer of the preliminary investigation from
September 21, due to the fact that this counsel, Atty. Crispin Baizas, would attend a hearing on that
same day in Naga City. Acting upon said request for postponement, Fiscal Salva set the preliminary
investigation on September 24. On that day, Atty. Baizas appeared for petitioner Cruz, questioned the
jurisdiction of the committee, particularly respondent Salva, to conduct the preliminary investigation
in view of the fact that the same case involving the killing of Manuel Monroy was pending appeal in
this Court, and on the same day filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. This Tribunal
gave due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition and upon the filing of a cash bond of
P200.00 issued a writ of preliminary injunction thereby stopping the preliminary investigation being
conducted by respondent Salva.
The connection, if any, that petitioner Cruz had with the preliminary investigation being conducted by
respondent Salva and his committee was that affidavits and confessions sent to Salva by the Chief,
Philippine Constabulary, and which were being investigated, implicated petitioner Cruz, even picturing
him as the instigator and mastermind in the killing of Manuel Monroy.
The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as the principal case of People vs.
Oscar Castelo, et al., G.R. No. L-10794, is pending appeal and consideration before us, no court, much
less a prosecuting attorney like respondent Salva, had any right or authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation of the case for that would be obstructing the administration of justice
and interferring with the consideration on appeal of the main case wherein appellants had been found
guilty and convicted and sentenced; neither had respondent authority to cite him to appear and testify
at said investigation.
Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all, it was because of
the latter's oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the investigation with his witnesses for
his own protection, possibly, to controvert and rebut any evidence therein presented against him.
Salva claims that were it not for this request and if, on the contrary, Timoteo Cruz had expressed any
objection to being cited to appear in the investigation he (Salva) would never have subpoenaed him.
Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having made such request that he be allowed to appear at
the investigation, we are inclined to agree with Fiscal Salva that such a request had been made.
Inasmuch as he, Timoteo Cruz, was deeply implicated in the killing of Manuel Monroy by the affidavits
and confessions of several persons who were being investigated by Salva and his committee, it was
but natural that petitioner should have been interested, even desirous of being present at that
investigation so that he could face and cross examine said witnesses and affiants when they testified
in connection with their affidavits or confessions, either repudiating, modifying or ratifying the same.
Moreover, in the communication, addressed to respondent Salva asking that the investigation,
scheduled for September 21, 1957, be postponed because his attorney would be unable to attend,
Timoteo Cruz expressed no opposition to the subpoena, not even a hint that he was objecting to his
being cited to appear at the investigation.
As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary investigation which he and his
committee began ordinarily, when a criminal case in which a fiscal intervened though nominally, for
according to respondent, two government attorneys had been designed by the Secretary of Justice to
handle the prosecution in the trial of the case in the court below, is tried and decided and it is
appealed to a higher court such as this Tribunal, the functions and actuations of said fiscal have
terminated; usually, the appeal is handled for the government by the Office of the Solicitor General.
Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion for said fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation to
determine criminal responsibility for the crime involved in the appeal.
However, in the present case, respondent has, in our opinion, established a justification for his
reinvestigation because according to him, in the original criminal case against Castelo, et al., one of
the defendants named Salvador Realista y de Guzman was not included for the reason that he was
arrested and was placed within the jurisdiction of the trial court only after the trial against the other
accused had commenced, even after the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had begun
to present its evidence. Naturally, Realista remained to stand trial. The trial court, according to
respondent, at the instance of Realista, had scheduled the hearing at an early date, that is in August,
1957. Respondent claims that before he would go to trial in the prosecution of Realista he had to chart
his course and plan of action, whether to present the same evidence, oral and documentary,
presented in the original case and trial, or, in view of the new evidence consisting of the affidavits and
confessions sent to him by the Philippine Constabulary, he should first assess and determine the value
of said evidence by conducting an investigation and that should he be convinced that the persons
criminally responsible for the killing of Manuel Monroy were other than those already tried and
convicted, like Oscar Castelo and his co-accused and co-appellants, including Salvador Realista, then
he might act accordingly and even recommend the dismissal of the case against Realista.
In this, we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva. For, as contended by him and as suggested by
authorities, the duty and role of prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure the
conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent.
We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of the prosecuting
officers of all cases handled by them, but whilst this court is averse to any form of vacillation
by such officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is unquestionable that they may, in
appropriate cases, in order to do justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they
have already filed the corresponding informations. In the language of Justice Sutherland of
the Supreme Court of the United States, the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of
an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such,
he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is
that guilt shall not escape nor innocent suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor
— indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike had blows, he is not at liberty to strike
foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. (69
United States law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309, cited in the case of Suarez vs. Platon, 69
Phil., 556)
With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to appear and testify before him at the
scheduled preliminary investigation, under the law, petitioner had a right to be present at that
investigation since as was already stated, he was more or less deeply involved and implicated in the
killing of Monroy according to the affiants whose confessions, affidavits and testimonies respondent
Salva was considering or was to consider at said preliminary investigation. But he need not be present
at said investigation because his presence there implies, and was more of a right rather than a duty or
legal obligation. Consequently, even if, as claimed by respondent Salva, petitioner expressed the
desire to be given an opportunity to be present at the said investigation, if he latter changed his mind
and renounced his right, and even strenuously objected to being made to appear at said investigation,
he could not be compelled to do so.
Now we come to the manner in which said investigation was conducted by the respondent. If, as
contended by him, the purpose of said investigation was only to acquaint himself with and evaluate
the evidence involved in the affidavits and confessions of Sergio Eduardo, Cosme Camo and others by
questioning them, then he, respondent, could well have conducted the investigation in his office,
quietly, unobtrusively and without much fanfare, much less publicity.
However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the investigation was
conducted not in respondent's office but in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City
evidently, to accommodate the big crowd that wanted to witness the proceeding, including members
of the press. A number of microphones were installed. Reporters were everywhere and photographers
were busy taking pictures. In other words, apparently with the permission of, if not the encouragement
by the respondent, news photographers and newsmen had a filed day. Not only this, but in the course
of the investigation, as shown by the transcript of the stenographic notes taken during said
investigation, on two occasions, the first, after Oscar Caymo had concluded his testimony respondent
Salva, addressing the newspapermen said, "Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask questions I am
willing to let you do so and the question asked will be reproduced as my own"; and the second, after
Jose Maratella y de Guzman had finished testifying and respondent Salva, addressing the newsmen,
again said, "Gentlemen of the press is free to ask questions as ours." Why respondent was willing to
abdicate and renounce his right and prerogative to make and address the questions to the witnesses
under investigation, in favor of the members of the press, is difficult for us to understand, unless he,
respondent, wanted to curry favor with the press and publicize his investigation as much as possible.
Fortunately, the gentlemen of the press to whom he accorded such unusual privilege and favor
appeared to have wisely and prudently declined the offer and did not ask questions, this according to
the transcript now before us.
But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place during the
investigation, and this involved headlines and extensive recitals, narrations of and comments on the
testimonies given by the witnesses as well as vivid descriptions of the incidents that took place during
the investigation. It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the killing of Manuel Monroy
which had already been tried and finally determined by the lower court and which was under appeal
and advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried and redetermined in the press, and all with the
apparent place and complaisance of respondent.
Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and
sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he
committed what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which we fail to find any excuse or
satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence,
discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal case is being
investigated by the authorities, even when it being tried in court; but when said publicity and
sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is pending consideration
by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest
of justice, is constrained and called upon to put an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by
meting an appropriate disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable.
Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel more strongly than the others favored the
imposition of a more or less severe penal sanction. After mature deliberation, we have finally agreed
that a public censure would, for the present, be sufficient.
In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in holding the preliminary
investigation involved in this case, insofar as Salvador Realista is concerned, for which reason the writ
of preliminary injunction issued stopping said preliminary investigation, is dissolved; that in view of
petitioner's objection to appear and testify at the said investigation, respondent may not compel him
to attend said investigation, for which reason, the subpoena issued by respondent against petitioner is
hereby set aside.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part and denied in part.
Considering the conclusion arrived at by us, respondent Francisco G. H. nbSalva is hereby publicly
reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism that he had
given to and allowed in connection with his investigation, which we consider and find to be contempt
of court; and, furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same would meet with a more severe
disciplinary action and penalty. No costs.
A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015
SAMUEL B. ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative case against Atty. Homobono A. Adaza (respondent) for his failure to comply
with the requirements of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) under Bar Matter No. 850.
The Antecedent Facts
In a letter, dated 15 March 2013, Atty. Samuel B. Arnado (complainant) called the attention of this
Court to the practice of respondent of indicating "MCLE application for exemption under process" in
his pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, and "MCLE Application for Exemption for
Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in 2012. Complainant informed the Court that he inquired from the
MCLE Office about the status of respondent's compliance and received the following Certification,
dated 2 January 2013, from Prof. Myrna S. Feliciano (Prof. Feliciano), MCLE's Executive
Director:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This is to certify that per our records, ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA with Roll Number 14118 of IBP MIS
AMIS ORIENTAL Chapter did not comply with the requirements of Bar Matter [No.] 850 for the following
compliance periods:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
a. First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 -April 14, 2004)
b. Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 -April 14, 2007)
c. Third Compliance Period (April 15, 2007 -April 14, 2010)
This is to further certify that Arty. Adaza filed an Application for Exemption from the MCLE requirement
on (sic) January 2009 but was DENIED by the MCLE Governing Board on (sic) its January 14, 2009
meeting.1
In its Resolution dated 17 June 2013, the Court referred this case to he MCLE Committee for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
In a letter, dated 5 August 2013, Atty. Jesusa Jean D. Reyes (Atty. Reyes), Assistant Executive Officer
of the MCLE Office, forwarded to the Court the rollo of the case together with the MCLE Governing
Board's Evaluation, Report and Recommendation. 2 In its Evaluation, Report and
Recommendation3 dated 14 August 2013,4 the MCLE Governing Board, through retired Supreme Court
Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo (Justice Pardo), MCLE Chairman, informed the Court that
respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods covering 15 April 2001
to 14 April 2004 and 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007, respectively, on the ground of "expertise in law"
under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on 14
January 2009. In the same letter, the MCLE Governing Board noted that respondent neither applied for
exemption nor complied with the Third Compliance period from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010.
In its 9 December 2013 Resolution, the Court directed the Second Division  Clerk of Court to furnish
respondent with complainant's letter of 15 March 2013. The Court likewise required respondent to file
his comment within ten days from notice.
In his Compliance and Comment5 dated 3 February 2014, respondent alleged that he did not receive a
copy of the 5 August 2013 letter of Atty. Reyes. He stated that he was wondering why his application
for exemption could not be granted. He further alleged that he did not receive a formal denial of his
application for exemption by the MCLE Governing Board, and that the notice sent by Prof. Feliciano
was based on the letter of complainant who belonged to Romualdo and Arnado Law Office, the law
office of his political opponents, the Romualdo family. Respondent alleged that the Romualdo family
controlled Camiguin and had total control of the judges and prosecutors in the province. He further
alleged that the law firm had control of the lawyers in Camiguin except for himself.
Respondent enumerated his achievements as a lawyer and claimed that he had been practicing law
for about 50 years. He stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
Fifth, with a great degree of immodesty, I was the first outsider of the Supreme Court WHOM
PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, offered, immediately after she took over government in February
1986, a seat as Justice of the Supreme Court but I refused the intended appointment because I did not
like some members of the Cory crowd to get me to the SC in an effort to buy my silence;
Sixth, I almost single-handedly handled the case of CORAZON C. AQUINO in the canvassing of the
results of the 1986 snap elections, DISCUSSING CONSTITUTIONAL and legal issues which finally
resulted to the EDSAI revolution;

xxxx
Eighth; I was one of the two lead counsels of now SENATOR MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO in the
national canvassing before the National Canvassing Board when she ran for President against then
GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS. The other counsel was former Justice of the Supreme Court SERAFIN CUEVAS;
Ninth, I handled the 1987 and 1989 as well as the 2003 COUP CASES for leading generals like
ABENINA and COMMENDAOR and COLONELS like GREGORIO HONASAN as well as the SIX OAKWOOD
CAPTAINS, including now SENATOR ANTONIO TRILL ANES;
Tenth, I filed a case with the Supreme Court contesting the constitutionality and validity of the 2010
national elections, still undecided up to this day;
Eleventh, I filed together with another lawyer, a case in the Supreme Court on the constitutionality
and legality of the Corona impeachment which the SC only decided after the Senate decided his case
and former SC Chief Justice Corona conceding to the decision, thus the SC declaring the case moot
and academic;
Twelfth, I have been implementing and interpreting the Constitution and other laws as GOVERNOR OF
MISAMIS ORIENTAL, COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION and the senior member of the Opposition in the
regular Parliament in the Committee on Revision of Laws and Constitutional Amendments;
Thirteenth, I was the leading Opposition member of Parliament that drafted the Omnibus Election Law;
Fourteenth, I was the leading member of the Opposition in Parliament that prepared and orchestrated
the debate in the complaint for impeachment against PRESIDENT FERDINAND MARCOS;
Fifteenth, I have been practicing law for about fifty years now with appearances before the Supreme
Court when Justices were like Concepcion, Barrera and JBL REYES; in the Court of Appeals; and
numerous courts all over the country;
Sixteenth, I have been engaged as lawyer for a number of lawyers who have exemptions from the
MCLE;
x x x x6
Respondent further claimed that he had written five books: (1) Leaders From Marcos to Arroyo; (2)
Presidentiables and Emerging Upheavals; (3) Beginning, Hope and Change; (4) Ideas, Principles and
Lost Opportunities; and (5) Corona Impeachment. Thus, he asked for a reconsideration of the notice
for him to undergo MCLE. He asked for an exemption from MCLE compliance, or in the alternative, for
him to be allowed to practice law while complying with the MCLE requirements.
In its 2 June 2014 Resolution, the Court referred respondent's Compliance and Comment to the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the OBC
In its Report and Recommendation dated 25 November 2014, the OBC reported that respondent
applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods on the ground of expertise in law.
The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on 14 January 2009. Prof. Feliciano informed
respondent of the denial of his application in a letter dated 1 October 2012. The OBC reported that
according to the MCLE Governing Board, "in order to be exempted (from compliance) pursuant to
expertise in lp.w under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850, the applicant must submit sufficient,
satisfactory and convincing proof to establish his expertise in a certain area of law." The OBC reported
that respondent failed to meet the requirements necessary for the exemption.
The OBC reported that this Court requires practicing members of the Bar to indicate in all their
pleadings filed with the courts the counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption pursuant to 6ar Matter No. 1922. The OBC further reported that the MCLE Office has no
record that respondent filed a motion for reconsideration; and thus, his representation in a pleading
that his "MCLE Application for Exemption [is] for Reconsideration" in 2012 is baseless.
The OBC further reported that under Rule 12 of Bar Matter No. 850 and Section 12 of the MCLE
Implementing Regulations, non-compliance with the MCLE requirements shall result to the dismissal of
the case and the striking out of the pleadings from the records.7 The OBC also reported that under
Section 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, a member of the Bar who failed to comply with
the MCLE requirements is given 60 days from receipt of notification to explain his deficiency or to
show his compliance with the requirements. Section 12(e) also provides that a member who fails to
comply within the given period shall pay a non-compliance fee of PI,000 and shall be listed as a
delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the recommendation of the
MCLE Governing Board. The OBC reported that the Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent
on 13 August 2013. The OBC also reported that on 14 August 2013, the MCLE Governing Board
recommended that cases be filed against respondent in connection with the pleadings he filed without
the MCLE compliance/exemption number for the immediately preceding compliance period and that
the pleadings he filed be expunged from the records.
The OBC found that respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities as a lawyer. The OBC stated
that respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements jeopardized the causes of his clients
because the pleadings he filed could be stricken off from the records and considered invalid.
The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a delinquent member of the Bar and guilty of
non-compliance with the MCLE requirements. The OBC further recommended respondent's suspension
from the practice of law for six months with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
in the future will be dealt with more severely. The OBC also recommended that respondent be
directed to comply with the requirements set forth by the MCLE Governing Board.
The Issue
The only issue here is whether respondent is administratively liable for his failure to comply with the
MCLE requirements.
The Ruling of this Court
Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education "to ensure that
throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the
profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law." 8 The First Compliance Period was from
15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004; the Second Compliance Period was from 15 April 2004 to 14 April
2007; and the Third Compliance Period was from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010. Complainant's letter
covered respondent's pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 which means respondent also
failed to comply with the MCLE requirements for the Fourth Compliance Period from 15 April 2010 to
14 April 2013.
The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed to comply with the four compliance
periods. The records also showed that respondent filed an application for exemption only on 5 January
2009. According to the MCLE Governing Board, respondent's application for exemption covered the
First and Second Compliance Periods. Respondent did not apply for exemption for the Third
Compliance Period. The MCLE Governing Board denied respondent's application for exemption on 14
January 2009 on the ground that the application did not meet the requirements of expertise in law
under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. However, the MCLE Office failed to convey the denial of
the application for exemption to respondent. The MCLE Office only informed respondent, through its
letter dated 1 October 2012 signed by Prof. Feliciano, when it received inquiries from complainant,
Judge Sinfroso Tabamo, and Camiguin Deputy Provincial Prosecutor Renato A. Abbu on the status of
respondent's MCLE compliance. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration after one year, or on 23
October 2013, which the MCLE Governing Board denied with finality on 28 November 2013. The denial
of the motion for reconsideration was sent to respondent in a letter 9 dated 29 November 2013, signed
by Justice Pardo.
Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar Matter No.
850. His application for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods was filed after the
compliance periods had ended. He did not follow-up the status of his application for exemption. He
furnished the Court with his letter dated 7 February 201210 to the MCLE Office asking the office to act
on his application for exemption but alleged that his secretary failed to send it to the MCLE Office. 11 He
did not comply with the Fourth Compliance Period.
In its 1 October 2012 letter to respondent, the MCLE Office enjoined him to comply with the
requirements for the First to Third Compliance periods. It was reiterated in the 29 November 2013
letter denying respondent's motion for reconsideration of his application for exemption. The OBC also
reported that a Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent on 13 August 2013. Under Section
12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, respondent has 60 days from receipt of the notification
to comply. However, in his Compliance and Comment before this Court, respondent stated that
because of his involvement in public interest issues in the country, the earliest that he could comply
with Bar Matter No. 850 would be on 10-14 February 2014 and that he already registered with the
MCLE Program of the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman on those dates.
Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 12. Compliance Procedures
xxxx
(5) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade
compliance with the MCLE requirements.
A member failing to comply with the continuing legal education requirement will receive a Non-
Compliance Notice stating his specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the receipt of
the notification to explain the deficiency or otherwise show compliance with the requirements. Such
notice shall be written in capital letters as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF
COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE SHALL
BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING YOU AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO
PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE
COMMITTEE.
The Member may use the 60-day period to complete his compliance with the MCLE requirement.
Credit units earned during this period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior period
requirement unless units in excess of the requirement are earned in which case the excess may be
counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.
A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance
fee of PI,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP by the IBP Board of Governors
upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which case Rule 13 9-A of the Rules of Court
shall apply.
Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP Diliman, it would only
cover his deficiencies for the First Compliance Period. He is still delinquent for the Second, Third, and
Fourth Compliance Periods. The Court has not been furnished proof of compliance for the First
Compliance Period.
The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of respondent towards Complying with the requirements of
Bar Matter No. 850. He assumed that his application for exemption, filed after the compliance periods,
would be granted. He purportedly wrote the MCLE Office to follow-up the status of his application but
claimed that his secretary forgot to send the letter. He now wants the Court to again reconsider the
MCLE Office's denial of his application for exemption when his motion for reconsideration was already
denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013. He had the temerity to
inform the Court that the earliest that he could comply was on 10-14 February 2014, which was
beyond the 60-day period required under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, and
without even indicating when he intended to comply with his deficiencies br the Second, Third, and
Fourth Compliance Periods. Instead, he asked the Court to allow him to continue practicing law while
complying with the MCLE requirements.
The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it acted on respondent's application for
exemption on 14 January 2009, it took the office three years to inform respondent of the denial of his
application. The MCLE Office only informed respondent on 1 October 2012 and after it received
inquiries regarding the status of respondent's compliance. Hence, during the period when respondent
indicated "MCLE application for exemption under process" in his pleadings, he was not aware of the
action of the MCLE Governing Board on his application for exemption. However, after he had been
informed of the denial of his application for exemption, it still took respondent one year to file a
motion for reconsideration. After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, respondent still took,
and is still aking, his time to satisfy the requirements of the MCLE. In addition, when respondent
indicated "MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading, he had not filed any
motion for reconsideration before the MCLE Office.
Respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the directives of the
MCLE Office warrant his declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP. While the MCLE Implementing
Regulations state that the MCLE Committee should recommend to the IBP Board of Governors the
listing of a lawyer as a delinquent member, there is nothing that prevents the Court from using its
administrative power and supervision to discipline erring lawyers and from directing the IBP Board of
Governors o declare such lawyers as delinquent members of the IBP.
The OBC recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of aw for six months. We agree. In
addition, his listing as a delinquent member pf the IBP is also akin to suspension because he shall not
be permitted to practice law until such time as he submits proof of full compliance to the IBP Board of
Governors, and the IBP Board of Governors has notified the MCLE Committee of his reinstatement,
under Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing Regulations. Hence, we deem it proper to declare
respondent as a delinquent member of the IBP and to suspend him from the practice of law for six
months or until he has fully complied with the requirements of the MCLE for the First, Second, Third,
and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance
and reinstatement fees.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office to promptly act on matters that require
its immediate attention, such as but not limited to applications for exemptions, and to communicate
its action to the interested parties within a reasonable period;
(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be exempted from MCLE compliance as the
matter had already been denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013;
(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and SUSPEND him from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS, or until he has fully
complied with the MCLE requirements for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods,
whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance and reinstatement fees.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Homobono A. Adaza's personal record in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
to all courts in the land. Let copies be also furnished the MCLE Office and the IBP Governing Board for
their appropriate actions.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

A.C. No. 3056               August 16, 1991
FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant,  under Attys. Modesto Garcia and Pablo Amascual Jr., it is only during the incumbency of Atty.
vs.
ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON respondent.
PER CURIAM:p
This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant Attorney
Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for short), filed
against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter's irregular
actuations with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute
Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision. The present complaint charges the respondent with the
following offenses:
1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without sufficient justification, to
act within reasonable time (sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with
Assignment and the eventual issuance and transfer of the corresponding 163 transfer
certificates of titles to the GSIS, for the purpose of obtaining some pecuniary or material
benefit from the person or persons interested therein.
2. Conduct unbecoming of public official.
3. Dishonesty.
4. Extortion.
5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending
official transaction before him.
6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p. 10, Rollo.)
As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent Register of Deeds to register some
163 deeds of sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the
lot buyers. There was no action from the respondent.
Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve or deny registration of the
uniform deeds of absolute sale with assignment. Still no action except to require V & G to submit proof
of real estate tax payment and to clarify certain details about the transactions.
Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent Renomeron suspended the
registration of the documents pending compliance by V & G with a certain "special arrangement"
between them, which was that V & G should provide him with a weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban
to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon
City house and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives.
On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he would act favorably on the 163
registrable documents of V & G if the latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and send money for a
round trip plane ticket for him.
The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000) was sent to respondent
through his niece.
Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare, respondent imposed
additional registration requirements. Fed up with the respondent's extortionate tactics, the
complainant wrote him a letter on May 20, 1987 challenging him to act on all pending applications for
registration of V & G within twenty-four (24) hours.
On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163 certificates of title to
the GSIS on the uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale with assignment were ambiguous as to
parties and subject matter. On May 26, 1987, Attorney Collantes moved for a reconsideration of said
denial, stressing that:
... since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of nearly fifteen (15)
years or for a sum total of more than 2,000 same set of documents which have been
repeatedly and uniformly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City
Vicente C. Renomeron, that the very same documents of the same tenor have been refused
or denied registration ... (p. 15, Rollo.)
On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator, National Land
Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration Authority [LRA]). In
a Resolution dated July 27,1987 (Consulta No. 1579), the NLTDRA ruled that the questioned
documents were registrable. Heedless of the NLTDRA's opinion, respondent continued to sit on V & Gs
163 deeds of sale with assignment.
Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on June 4, 1987
administrative charges (docketed as Adm. Case No. 87-15), against respondent Register of Deeds.
Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio directed respondent to
explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken against him. Respondent
was further asked whether he would submit his case on the basis of his answer, or be heard in a
formal investigation.
In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges of extortion and of directly receiving
pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with the official transactions awaiting his
action.
Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to hear Attorney Collantes'
charges against him, Attorney Renomeron waived his right to a formal investigation. Both parties
submitted the case for resolution based on the pleadings.
The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended dropping the charges of: (1) dishonesty;
(2) causing undue injury to a party through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and (3) gross ignorance of the law and procedure. He opined that the charge of neglecting
or refusing, in spite repeated requests and without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable
time on the registration of the documents involved, in order to extort some pecuniary or material
benefit from the interested party, absorbed the charges of conduct unbecoming of a public official,
extortion, and directly receiving some pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with
pending official transactions before him.
Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio on
February 22, 1988, recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez that the respondent: (1)
be found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents
presented to him for registration; and (3) be warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt
with more severely.
After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoñez found respondent guilty of grave
misconduct.
Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample evidence supports
the Investigating Officer's findings that the respondent committed grave misconduct.
The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to him for
registration and, notwithstanding representations by the parties interested for expeditious
action on the said documents, he continued with his inaction.
The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the registration of the
documents involved; that he himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said
documents to Administrator Bonifacio after he formally denied the registration thereof, that
the Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the said documents in
question; and that, such resolution of the Administrator notwithstanding, the respondent still
refused the registration thereof but demanded from the parties interested the submission of
additional requirements not adverted to in his previous denial.
x x x           x x x          x x x
In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the respondent claims that he
neither touched nor received the money sent to him, on record remains uncontroverted the
 circumstance that his niece, Ms. de la Cruz, retrieved from him the amount of P800.00 earlier
sent to him as plane fare, not in the original denomination of P100.00 bills but in P50.00 bills.
The respondent had ample opportunity to clarify or to countervail this related incident in his
letter dated 5 September 1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but he never did so.
... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being new in office cannot serve to mitigate
his liability. His being so should have motivated him to be more aware of applicable laws,
rules and regulations and should have prompted him to do his best in the discharge of his
duties. (pp. 17-18, Rollo.)
Secretary Ordoñez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino that Renomeron be dismissed from
the service, with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and with prejudice to re-
employment in the government service, effective immediately.
As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the Philippines, by Adm. Order No. 165
dated May 3, 1990, dismissed the respondent from the government service (pp. 1419, Rollo).
Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA, Attorney Collantes
also filed in this Court on June 16, 1987, a disbarment complaint against said respondent.
The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may
also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official. The answer is yes, for his
misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes
upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his
obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary
action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).
As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon
him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders
rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. fair, speedy, and efficient
administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that
demands that in his every exertion the only criterion he that truth and justice triumph. This
discipline is what as given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From
a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-
speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility— all of which, throughout the centuries, have been
compendiously described as moral character.
Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest
order.1âwphi1 A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly
circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the
advancement of the quest of truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless
crusader. (Apostacy in the Legal Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790; emphasis supplied.)
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
requires public officials and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5,
subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material
interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting
gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by the
functions of their office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a
lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103).
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession. (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice the
profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest
standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).
The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public official have
demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law (Bautista vs. Judge
Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He should
therefore be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be disbarred from the practice
of law in the Philippines, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys
SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 4680             August 29, 2000
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant, 
vs.
ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and LIGAYA P. SALAYON, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon for
gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyer's oath in connection with the
discharge of their duties as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995
elections. Salayon, then election officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), was designated
chairman of said Board, while Llorente, who was then City Prosecutor of Pasig City, served as its ex
oficio vice-chairman as provided by law.1 Complainant, now a senator, was also a candidate for the
Senate in that election.
Complainant alleges that, in violation of R.A. No. 6646, §27(b), 2 respondents tampered with the votes
received by him, with the result that, as shown in the Statements of Votes (SoVs) and Certificate of
Canvass (CoC) pertaining to 1,263 precincts of Pasig City, (1) senatorial candidates Juan Ponce Enrile,
Anna Dominique Coseteng, Gregorio Honasan, Marcelo Fernan, Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo Biazon were
credited with votes which were above the number of votes they actually received while, on the other
hand, petitioner's votes were reduced; (2) in 101 precincts, Enrile's votes were in excess of the total
number of voters who actually voted therein; and (3) the votes from 22 precincts were twice recorded
in 18 SoVs. Complainant maintains that, by signing the SoVs and CoC despite respondents' knowledge
that some of the entries therein were false, the latter committed a serious breach of public trust and
of their lawyers' oath.
Respondents denied the allegations against them. They alleged that the preparation of the SoVs was
made by the 12 canvassing committees which the Board had constituted to assist in the canvassing.
They claimed that the errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to honest mistake,
oversight, and/or fatigue.
In his Consolidated Reply, complainant counters that respondents should be held responsible for the
illegal padding of the votes considering the nature and extent of the irregularities and the fact that the
canvassing of the election returns was done under their control and supervision.
On December 4, 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which this matter had been referred
pursuant to Rule 139-B, §13, in relation to §20 of the Rules of Court, recommended the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of merit.3Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 11, 1999, but his
motion was denied in a resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated April 22, 1999. On June 4, 1999,
he filed this petition pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(c).
It appears that complainant likewise filed criminal charges against respondents before the COMELEC
(E.O. Case No. 96-1132) for violation of R.A. No. 6646, §27(b). In its resolution dated January 8, 1998,
the COMELEC dismissed complainant's charges for insufficiency of evidence. However, on a petition
for certiorari filed by complainant,4 this Court set aside the resolution and directed the COMELEC to file
appropriate criminal charges against respondents. Reconsideration was denied on August 15, 2000.
Considering the foregoing facts, we hold that respondents are guilty of misconduct.
First. Respondent Llorente seeks the dismissal of the present petition on the ground that it was filed
late. He contends that a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Rule 139-B,
§12(c)5 and, therefore, the filing of such motion before the IBP Board of Governors did not toll the
running of the period of appeal. Respondent further contends that, assuming such motion can be filed,
petitioner nevertheless failed to indicate the date of his receipt of the April 22, 1999 resolution of the
IBP denying his motion for reconsideration so that it cannot be ascertained whether his petition was
filed within the 15-day period under Rule 139-B, §12(c).
The contention has no merit. The question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading or not under Rule 139-B, §12(c) has been settled in Halimao v. Villanueva,6 in which this Court
held:
Although Rule 139-B, §12(C) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its
text or in its history suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed within
15 days from notice to a party. Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged before
resort is made to this Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford
the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have
committed through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidenced. 7
On the question whether petitioner's present petition was filed within the 15-day period provided
under Rule 139-B, §12(c), although the records show that it was filed on June 4, 1999, respondent has
not shown when petitioner received a copy of the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors denying his
motion for reconsideration. It would appear, however, that the petition was filed on time because a
copy of the resolution personally served on the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court was received
by it on May 18, 1999. Since copies of IBP resolutions are sent to the parties by mail, it is possible that
the copy sent to petitioner was received by him later than May 18, 1999. Hence, it may be assumed
that his present petition was filed within 15 days from his receipt of the IBP resolution. In any event,
the burden was on respondent, as the moving party, to show that the petition in this case was filed
beyond the 15-day period for filing it.
Even assuming that petitioner received the IBP resolution in question on May 18, 1999, i.e., on the
same date a copy of the same was received by the Office of the Bar Confidant, the delay would only
be two days.8 The delay may be overlooked, considering the merit of this case. Disbarment
proceedings are undertaken solely for public welfare. The sole question for determination is whether a
member of the bar is fit to be allowed the privileges as such or not. The complainant or the person
who called the attention of the Court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and
generally has no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.9 For this reason, laws dealing with double jeopardy10 or prescription11 or with
procedure like verification of pleadings12 and prejudicial questions13 have no application to disbarment
proceedings.
Even in ordinary civil actions, the period for perfecting appeals is relaxed in the interest of justice and
equity where the appealed case is clearly meritorious. Thus, we have given due course to appeals
even though filed six,14 four,15and three16 days late. In this case, the petition is clearly meritorious.
Second. The IBP recommends the dismissal of petitioner's complaint on the basis of the following: (1)
respondents had no involvement in the tabulation of the election returns, because when the
Statements of Votes (SoVs) were given to them, such had already been accomplished and only
needed their respective signatures; (2) the canvassing was done in the presence of watchers,
representatives of the political parties, the media, and the general public so that respondents would
not have risked the commission of any irregularity; and (3) the acts dealt with in R.A. No. 6646, §27(b)
are mala in se and not mala prohibita, and petitioner failed to establish criminal intent on the part of
respondents.17
The recommendation is unacceptable. In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only
clear preponderance of evidence is required to establish liability. 18 As long as the evidence presented
by complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the Court1 9 is more convincing and worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto, 20 the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified..
In this case, respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the canvassing of
the Pasig City election returns. The only explanation they could offer for such irregularities is that the
same could be due to honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the part of the members of the
canvassing committees who prepared the SoVs.
This is the same allegation made in Pimentel v. Commission on Elections.21 In rejecting this allegation
and ordering respondents prosecuted for violation of R.A. No. 6646, §27(b), this Court said:
There is a limit, we believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight due
to fatigue, in the performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of she error, not only in
the total number of votes garnered by the aforementioned candidates as reflected in the CoC
and the SoVs, which did not tally with that reflected in the election returns, but also in the
total number of votes credited for senatorial candidate Enrile which exceeded the total
number of voters who actually voted in those precincts during the May 8, 1995 elections,
renders the defense of honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply
unacceptable.22
Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per
precinct as reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of the erroneous figures in one
or two SoVs23 but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the
expense of petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns. A cursory look at
the evidence submitted by petitioner reveals that, in at least 24 SoVs involving 101 precincts, the
votes for candidate Enrile exceeded the number of voters who actually voted in the said precincts and,
in 18 SoVs, returns from 22 precincts were-tabulated twice. In addition, as the Court noted in
Pimentel, the total number of votes credited to each of the seven senatorial candidates in question, as
reflected in the CoC, markedly differ from those indicated in the SoVs. 24
Despite the fact that these discrepancies, especially the double recording of the returns from 22
precincts and the variation in the tabulation of votes as reflected in the SoVs and CoC, were apparent
on the face of these documents and that the variation involves substantial number of votes,
respondents nevertheless certified the SoVs as true and correct. Their acts constitute misconduct.
Respondent Llorente's contention that he merely certified the genuineness and due execution of the
SoVs but not their correctness is belied by the certification which reads:
WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Statement of Votes by . . . [p]recinct is true and
correct. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we sign these presents at the City/Municipality of ___________
Province of ________ this _______ day of May, 1995. (Emphasis added)
Nor does the fact that the canvassing was open to the public and observed by numerous individuals
preclude the commission of acts for which respondents are liable. The fact is that only they had access
to the SoVs and CoC and thus had the opportunity to compare them and detect the discrepancies
therein.
Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. 25 However, if the misconduct also
constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath or is of such
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such
individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct. 26
Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule
1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the
government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to "do no
falsehood."
Nowhere is the-need for lawyers to observe honesty both in their private and in their public dealings
better expressed in Sabayle v. Tandayag27 in which this Court said:
There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers to behave at all times in a
manner consistent with truth and honor it is important that the common caricature that
lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly, should not
become a common reality . . .28
It may be added that, as lawyers in the government service, respondents were under greater
obligation to observe this basic tenet of the profession because a public office is a public trust.
Third. Respondents' participation in the irregularities herein reflects on the legal profession, in
general, and on lawyers in government in particular. Such conduct in the performance of their official
duties, involving no less than the ascertainment of the popular will as expressed through the ballot,
would have merited for them suspension were it not for the fact that this is their first administrative
transgression and, in the case of Salayon, after a long public service. 29 Under the circumstances, a
penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 for each of the respondents should be sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon GUILTY of
misconduct and imposes on each of them a FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 with a WARNING that
commission of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Footnotes:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, §221(b). The third member of the Board, Ceferino Adamos, now
1 
deceased, was the Clerk of Court of the Pasig City Metropolitan Trial Court.
SEC. 27. Election Offenses. — In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses
2  by Florin, as RARAD, in an Order8 dated March 15, 1999. Accordingly, Florin directed the issuance and
enumerated in Section 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following
shall be guilty of an election offense.
xxx             xxx             xxx
(b)Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who
tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any
election . . .
Rollo, p. 116.
3 
Pimentel, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133509, Feb. 9, 2000.
4 
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. —
5 
(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed
by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine)
it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case
shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other
interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.
A.C. No. 5119               April 17, 2013
ROSARIO BERENGUER-LANDERS and PABLO BERENGUER, Complainants,  CA.21
vs.
ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN, ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES and ATTY. PEDRO VEGA, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Rosario Berenguer-Landers and Pablo Berenguer
(complainants) against herein respondents Isabel E. Florin (Florin), Marcelino Jomales (Jomales) and
Pedro Vega (Vega).
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Remedios Berenguer-Lintag, Carlo Berenguer and Belinda Berenguer-Aguirre, Rosario Berenguer-
Landers and Pablo Berenguer (Berenguers) are the registered owners of a 58.0649-hectare land in
Bibingcahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Sometime in April 1998, a notice of coverage was issued by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) regarding the acquisition of their landholding pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The Berenguers
protested and applied for the exclusion of their land with the DAR and for a notice to lift coverage
based on the ground that their landholdings have been used exclusively for livestock pursuant to DAR
Administrative Order No. 09.2
On October and November 1998, the DAR Secretary, without acting on the application for exclusion,
cancelled the Berenguers’ certificates of title on the land and issued Certificates of Land Ownership
Award3 (CLOAs) in favor of the members of the Baribag Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development
Cooperative (BARIBAG).
Eventually, DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug (Dalugdug) denied their application for exclusion
from the CARP’s coverage in the Order4 dated February 15, 1999 based on the Investigation Report
dated February 9, 1999 submitted by the DAR Region V Investigation that said area sought to be
excluded is principally devoted to coconuts and not the raising of livestock. 5
Aggrieved, the Berenguers filed a notice of appeal6 with the Secretary of DAR.
While the case was pending appeal, BARIBAG filed a petition 7 for the implementation of the Order
dated February 15, 1999 before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). This was granted
implementation of the Writ of Possession.9
On March 19, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion for reconsideration, 10 claiming that they were
denied due process as they were not furnished with a copy of BARIBAG’s petition for implementation.
Florin denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in an Order 11 dated March 22, 1999.
On March 25, 1999, the Berenguers appealed 12 to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). BARIBAG, on
other hand, filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession.13 The Berenguers opposed14 the
motion saying that the execution would be premature in view of their pending appeal before the
DARAB. Nevertheless, BARIBAG still filed a Motion for the Appointment of a Special Sheriff. 15
In his Order16 dated April 6, 1999, DAR Acting Secretary Conrado S. Navarro denied the Berenguers’
appeal.
On April 8, 1999, Florin issued a Resolution,17 which granted BARIBAG’s Motion for the Appointment of
a Special Sheriff and ordered the issuance of the writ of possession prayed for.
On April 13, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion to set aside18 the Resolution dated April 8, 1999,
arguing that: the DARAB already acquired jurisdiction over case when they seasonably filed an appeal
before it; and that Florin should have waited until the DARAB has decided the appeal. In an
Order19 dated April 21, 1999, Florin denied the said motion prompting the Berenguers to move for her
inhibition20 on ground of partiality.
The Berenguers elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 51858, which was denied outright on procedural grounds, to wit: (1) copy of the
assailed order bears the words "certified true copy" but the name and authority of the person
certifying is not indicated as required in SC Circular No. 3-96, and the signature therein is illegible; (2)
only one of the petitioners signed the certification on non-forum shopping which is an insufficient
compliance of Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court; and (3) there is non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the assailed order of the Regional Director is not directly reviewable by the
Undaunted, the Berenguers filed a second petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 53174, which questioned the Orders dated March 15, 1999 and March 22, 1999 issued by Florin.
The petition was also denied on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and wrong mode of appeal. 22
Thus, Florin issued on April 21, 1999 a Writ of Possession 23 in favor of BARIBAG.
Florin subsequently directed the full implementation of the writ of possession pursuant to Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court in spite of the Berenguers’ protestations. 24
On June 3, 1999, the Berenguers moved to quash 25 the Writ of Possession, to no avail.
On August 4, 1999, the complainants filed the instant Complaint26 for the disbarment of respondents
Florin, Jornales, in his capacity as Assistant Regional Director for DAR, and Vega, in his capacity as
DAR Legal Officer V, for allegedly conspiring and confederating in the commission of the following
acts:
A. ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN AS REGIONAL ADJUDICATOR KNOWINGLY RENDERING AN UNJUST
JUDGEMENT, ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS ADVERSE AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE INTEREST OF
PETITIONERS;
 B. ISSUING AN ORDER AND GRANTING A WRIT OF EXECUTION EX-PARTE AND SUBSEQUENTLY
ISSUING AND SIGNING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION WITHOUT CERTIFICATION OF FINALITY
ISSUED BY THE PROPER OFFICER FULLY KNOWING THAT SHE HAS NO AUTHORITY AND
TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE APPLICABLE RULES AND IN CONTRAVENTION WITH THE NEW
RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD;
FURTHER, HIDING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION FROM PETITIONERS INSPITE OF REQUEST FOR A
COPY;
C. REFUSING TO TAKE ACTION ON PLEADINGS FILED BY PETITIONERS THRU COUNSEL AND
FAILING AND REFUSING TO CONDUCT A HEARING AS PRAYED FOR BY COUNSEL; FAILING AND
REFUSING TO FORWARD THE APPEAL TO THE PROPER APPELLATE BOARD;
D. UNWARRANTED INTERFERENCE IN LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS TO THE PREJUDICE OF
PETITIONERS AND LAWYER; ABUSE OF AUTHORITY TO CITE COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER IN
CONTEMPT AND ISSUING AN ORDER OF ARREST WITHOUT HEARING CONTRARY TO THE
RULES OF COURT;
E. ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES AND ATTY. PEDRO VEGA, INSPITE OF THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF
THE ILLEGALITY OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION, PERSISTED AND ASSISTED IN THE ILLEGAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION TO THE PREJUDICE OF LEGITIMATE FARMERS
AND PETITIONERS.27
Florin filed her Comment28 stating, among others, that: (1) the writ of possession is anchored on the
CLOAs issued by the Register of Deeds, and not on a final and executory decision that would require a
certification of finality as prescribed by the DARAB rules; (2) Atty. Federico De Jesus (De Jesus), as
Berenguers’ counsel, was not furnished with a copy of the writ because it was not yet issued at the
time when it was requested; (3) there was no intent to hide the writ; (4) when the writ of possession
was finally signed, it was delivered to the sheriff for service and enforcement; (4) it was unfair to
impute illegal acts against Vega and Jornales as DAR lawyers in view of the DAR’s denial of the motion
for a cease and desist order and because of the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of
their duty; (5) the petitions for certiorari filed with the CA were both dismissed; and (6) the findings of
DAR and the issuance of the CLOAs remain undisturbed. Florin also claimed that it is Atty. De Jesus
who wants her disbarred and not the Berenguers.
In a separate Comment,29 Vega denied the allegations against him arguing that: (1) the writ of
possession is not illegal in the absence of a court order stating its invalidity; (2) he did not participate
in the issuance of the writ of possession because he did not appear as the farmers’ counsel; (3) the
Legal Division he heads has no control or influence over the DARAB; and (4) his presence in the
execution of the writ of possession was to ascertain that no violations against any law are committed
by the person/s executing the writ. 30
Jornales’ Comment,31 for his part, stated that: (1) the writ has no prima facie infirmity; (2) he is not
privy to the issuance thereof; (3) he has no supervision and control over the DAR which issued the
writ; and (4) he has no authority to determine the writ’s validity or invalidity. Jornales admitted,
however, that he was in the meeting presided by the PNP Provincial Director of Sorsogon prior to the
writ’s implementation in his capacity as Regional Assistant Director for Operations of DAR Region V
and not as a lawyer. He added that the disbarment complaint against him is not only malicious for lack
of legal basis but is also meant to harass and intimidate DAR employees in implementing the CARP. 32
After the complainants filed their Consolidated Reply, 33 the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
IBP Commissioner Milagros San Juan (Commissioner San Juan) Recommended 34 that Florin be
"suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,
Orders and Resolutions adverse and prejudicial to the interests of the Complainants."
Commissioner San Juan, meanwhile, recommended that the charges against Jornales and Vega be
dismissed for failure of the complainants to substantiate the charges against them. 35
Commissioner San Juan’s recommendation against Florin is based on the findings  of the CA in its
36
Decision dated December 26, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 53174,37 which reads:
The Petition for Certiorari filed by the complainants before the Court of Appeals was treated as a
petition for review and the court found the following errors:
"1) Respondent DAR Secretary has no jurisdiction over the subject properties being devoted to pasture
and livestock and already classified as residential and industrial land, hence, outside the coverage of
Republic Act 6657. (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) The generation and issuance of Certificate
of Landownership Award (CLOA) was therefore void;"
2) Being outside the coverage of CARL (Republic Act 6657), respondent Hon. Isabel E. Florin who is
exercising delegated jurisdiction from the DARAB has no jurisdiction over Petitioners’ Properties as
held in Krus na Ligas Farmer’s Coop vs. University of the Philippines; G.R. No. 107022, 8 December
1992, which is squarely in point with the case at bar."
Anent the issue regarding the qualified beneficiaries of the subject land, the Court ruled thus –
"Assuming that the lands are indeed agricultural, we cannot understand why the DAR awarded them
to members of respondent Baribag and not to the farmers in the area, in violation of Sec. 22 of the
CARL x x x."
The court further stated – "We cannot xxx close this discussion without mentioning our observation on
the actuations of Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Isabel Florin. Just why she issued a writ of
execution and eventually a Writ of Possession in favor of respondent Baribag puzzles us no end. She
knew that Baribag is not a party in petitioners’ application for exclusion filed with the Office of DAR
Regional Director Percival Dalugdug. Obviously, she never acquired jurisdiction over Baribag. She also
knew that petitioners appealed to the DAR Secretary from the Order of Regional Director Dalugdug
dismissing petitioners’ application for exclusion. Clearly, such order was not yet final and executory
when she issued the assailed writs of execution and possession. Thus, the writ are [sic] void and would
be set aside."38
On May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XVII-2006-282 modifying the
recommended penalty, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for knowingly rendering an unjust
Judgment, Orders and Resolutions, adverse and prejudicial to the interest of the complainants, Atty.
Isabel F. Florin is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. The charges against
Atty. Marcelino Jornales and Atty. Peter Vega are DISMISSED for failure of the complainants to
substantiate the charges against Respondents.39
In her opposition,40 Florin averred that: (1) jurisdiction was acquired over BARIBAG at the time it filed a
petition for the implementation of the Order dated February 15, 1999; (2) the DARAB has jurisdiction
to issue the CLOAs; (3) as RARAD, she has concurrent jurisdiction with DARAB; (4) the Berenguers
were not denied due process; and (5) the Berenguers never questioned the regularity of the DAR’s
acquisition of their landholding nor did they file a petition for the cancellation of the CLOAs issued to
BARIBAG.
This Court agrees with the findings of the IBP Board of Governors but modifies the penalty to be
imposed.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.—A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a
party without authority so to do. x x x.
In Lahm III v. Mayor, Jr.,41 the Court ruled that:
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Gross misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful
or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e.,
conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive
behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. 42 (Citations omitted)
In the instant case, the Berenguers want this Court to impose disciplinary sanction against the three
(3) respondents as members of the bar. The grounds asserted by the complainants in support of the
charges against the respondents, however, are intrinsically connected with the discharge of their
quasi-judicial functions. Nevertheless, in Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig, 43 the Court already ruled that if a
misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then a lawyer
may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar, viz:
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of
the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said
misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may
be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.
xxxx
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the
Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the
conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is
clear from Canon 644 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost
fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their
professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
x x x For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might
tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the
dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing.1âwphi1 Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is
burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private
practice.45 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Thus, in Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr.,46 the Court ruled that an administrative case against a lawyer for
acts committed in his capacity as provincial adjudicator of the DARAB may be likened to
administrative cases against judges considering that he is part of the quasi-judicial system of our
government.47
Similarly in this case, Florin, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs
official functions of a RARAD that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present controversy
may be likened that of a judge whose decision, including the manner of rendition, is made subject of
an administrative complaint.
Going now to the acts complained of, Section 29 of DAR Administrative Order No. 06-00 provides:
SEC. 29. Effect of Appeal.—Appeal to the Secretary, the Office of the President, or the Court of Appeals
shall have the following effects:
(a) Appeal from the Regional Director or Undersecretary to the Secretary.—The appeal shall stay the
order appealed from unless the Secretary directs execution pending appeal, as he may deem just,
considering the nature and circumstances of the case (Executive Order No. 292 [1987], Book VII,
Chapter 4, Sec. 21).
xxxx
Based on the foregoing provision, the appeal of the Berenguers to the DAR Secretary clearly stayed
the implementation of Regional Director Dalugdug’s Order dated February 15, 1999. Moreover, it is
the DAR Secretary who has jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal. Records reveal that there
was no order by the DAR Secretary directing execution of the Order dated February 15, 1999 during
the pendency of the Berenguers’ appeal.
Corollarily, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides for the instances when execution may be had,
namely: (1) after a decision or order has become final and executory; 48 (2) pending appeal, only upon
good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing; 49 and (3) execution of several, separate
or partial judgments.50
Moreover, Rule XX of the 2009 Rules of the DARAB reads:
Sec. 1. Execution Upon Final Order or Decision.—Execution shall issue upon an order, resolution or
decision that finally disposes of the action or proceeding. Such execution shall issue as a matter of
course and upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly
perfected.
The Adjudicator concerned may, upon certification by the proper officer that a resolution, order or
decision has been served to the counsel or representative on record and to the party himself, and has
become final and executory, and, upon motion or motu proprio, issue a writ of execution ordering the
DAR Sheriff or any DAR officer to enforce the same. In appropriate cases, the Board or any of its
Members or its Adjudicator shall deputize and direct the Philippine National Police, Armed Forces of
the Philippines or any of their component units or other law enforcement agencies in the enforcement
of any final order, resolution or decision.
Sec. 2. Execution Pending Appeal. — Any motion for execution of the decision of the Adjudicator
pending appeal shall be filed before the Board which may grant the same upon meritorious grounds,
upon the posting of a sufficient bond in the amount conditioned for the payment of damages which
the aggrieved party may suffer, in the event that the final order or decision is reversed on appeal,
provided that the bond requirement shall not apply if the movant is a farmer-beneficiary/pauper
litigant. (Emphasis ours)
In this case, the Order dated February 15, 1999 of DAR Regional Director Dalugdug denying the
Berenguers’ application for exclusion from CARP is yet to become final and executory as it was
seasonably appealed to the DAR Secretary. There is also nothing in the records that will show whether
BARIBAG posted a bond pursuant to the Rules.
While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error was made with
a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice, 51 the facts on hand prove otherwise. Florin’s
issuance of the writ of execution and writ of possession in order to fully implement Regional Director
Dalugdug’s Order dated February 15, 1999 clearly constitutes ignorance of the law for as a rule, a writ
of execution is issued only after the subject judgment or order has already become final and
executory.52 As aptly stated by IBP Commissioner San Juan, Florin ordered the issuance of such writs
despite the pendency of the appeal with the DARAB.53 Consequently, the Court finds merit in the
recommendation of suspension.
As to the penalty –
Judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do
injustice will be administratively sanctioned.54 In this case, it appears, however, that this is the first
time that Florin has been made administratively liable. Although there is no showing that malice or
bad faith attended the commission of the acts complained of, the same does not negate the fact that
Florin executed an act that would cause an injustice to the Berenguers. To our mind, the act of issuing
the writ of execution and writ of possession is not simply an honest error in judgment but an obstinate
disregard of the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
With all these, the Court deems it reasonable to reconsider the penalty recommended and instead
impose the penalty of suspension for three (3) months 55 without pay. As also held in Rallos v. Judge
Gako, Jr.,56 three (3) months suspension without pay was imposed against a judge after finding out
that the ignorance of the law he committed was not tainted with bad faith.
With respect to the complaint against Jornales and Vega, the Court agrees and adopts the finding of
the IBP that no sufficient evidence was adduced to substantiate the charges against them. Hence, the
complaint against them should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN is found guilty of violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she is penalized with SUSPENSION from the
practice of law for three (3) months effective upon notice hereof. The complaint against Atty.
Marcelino Jornales and Atty. Pedro Vega is DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 1302, 1391 and 1543. April 26, 1991.]
PAULINO VALENCIA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ARSENIO FER. CABANTING, Respondent.
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, Complainant, v. ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, ATTY. EDUARDO U.
JOVELLANOS and ATTY. ARSENIO FER. CABANTING, Respondents.
LYDIA BERNAL, Complainant, v. ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, Respondent.

SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS. — Public policy
prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It is intended to curtail any
undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get the better of the sentiments of loyalty
and disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition would constitute malpractice (In re Attorney
Melchor Ruste, 40 O.G. p. 78) and is a ground for suspension. (Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLIES WHILE LITIGATION IS PENDING. — Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel
concerned, applies only while the litigation is pending. (Director of Lands v. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513;
Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A THING IS IN LITIGATION WHILE A CERTIORARI IS STILL IN PROGRESS; CASE AT
BAR. — In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting purchased the lot after
finality of judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be in litigation
not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it
becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. (Gan Tingco v. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic
dictates, in certiorariproceedings, that the appellate court may either grant or dismiss the petition.
Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has terminated when
the judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari connected therewith is still in progress.
Thus, purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes malpractice in violation of
Art. 1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a ground for suspension.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; AFFIRMATIVE TESTIMONY IS GIVEN
GREATER WEIGHT THAN NEGATIVE TESTIMONY. — It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for
and received the sum of P200.00 in consideration of his executing the document "Compraventa
Definitiva" which would show that Paulino bought the property. This charge, Atty. Antiniw simply
denied. It is settled jurisprudence that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative
testimony (Bayasen v. CA, L-25785, Feb. 26, 1981; Vda. de Ramos v. CA, Et Al., L-40804, Jan. 31,
1978). When an individual’s integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he deny the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show
proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all time is expected
of him. (De los Reyes v. Aznar, Adm. Case No. 1334, Nov. 28, 1989).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF A FARMER WHO FINISHED ONLY GRADE IV ON DELICATE SUBJECT GIVEN
CREDENCE. — Although Paulino was a common farmer who finished only Grade IV, his testimony, even
if not corroborated by another witness, deserves credence and can be relied upon. His declaration
dwelt on a subject which was so delicate and confidential that it would be difficult to believe the he
fabricated his evidence.
6. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; FIRST DUTY OF A LAWYER IS NOT TO CLIENT
BUT TO ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. — A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client
(Santos v. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622), but not at the expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shop workers
Union v. La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client but to the administration of
justice. (Lubiano v. Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. While a lawyer must
advocate his client’s cause in utmost earnestness and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is
not at liberty to resort to illegal means for his client’s interest. It is the duty of an attorney to employ,
for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth
and honor. (Pangan v. Ramos, 93 SCRA 87).
7. ID.; DISBARMENT; NOT MEANT AS PUNISHMENT BUT INTENDED TO PROTECT THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE. — Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most
important of them is mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In re: Ivan T. Publico, 102
SCRA 722). This Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts show his unfitness to continue as a
member of the Bar. (Halili v. CIR, 136 SCRA 112). Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment
depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by
requiring that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order
that courts and the public may rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega v. Sison, 125 SCRA 293).
Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the high standards of the law profession.
8. ID.; ID.; RESPONDENT LAWYER SHOULD BE GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES.
— Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses against him. He enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges against him until the contrary is proved. (Santos v. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622). The case must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. (Camus v. Diaz, Adm. Case No. 1616, February
9, 1989). Since Atty. Antiniw was not accorded this procedural due process, it is but proper that the
direct testimony of Lydia Bernal be stricken out.
9. ID.; ID.; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE DOES NOT RESULT IN DISMISSAL OF CASE; EXCEPTION. — In
view also of the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant, Administrative Case No. 1543
should be dismissed. Although the filing of an affidavit of desistance by complainant for lack of
interest does not ipso facto result in the termination of a case for suspension or disbarment of an
erring lawyer. (Munar v. Flores, 122 SCRA 448), We are constrained in the case at bar, to dismiss the
same because there was no evidence to substantiate the charges.
10. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; HEARSAY. — The additional charge against Atty. Antiniw in
Administrative Case No. 1391 is predicated on the information furnished by Lydia Bernal. It was not
based on the personal knowledge of Constancia L. Valencia: hence, hearsay. "Any evidence, whether
oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the
witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand." (Regalado, Remedial
Law Compendium, 6th ed., vol. 2, 1989, p. 486). Being hearsay, the evidence presented is
inadmissible.
11. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEY; CAMARADERIE AMONG LAWYERS IS NOT PROOF OF
CONSPIRACY. — Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof of conspiracy, but a sign of
brotherhood among them. One of the fourfold duties of a lawyer in his duty to the Bar. A lawyer should
treat the opposing counsel, and his brethren in the law profession, with courtesy, dignity and civility.
They may "do as adversaries do in the law: strive mightily but (they) eat and drink as friends." This
friendship does not connote conspiracy.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
These consolidated administrative cases seek to disbar respondents Dionisio Antiniw, Arsenio Fer
Cabanting and Eduardo Jovellanos (the last named, now an MCTC Judge) for grave malpractice and
misconduct in the exercise of their legal profession committed in the following manner:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
1. Administrative Cases No. 1302 and 1391
In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia (Paulino in short) and his wife Romana allegedly bought a
parcel of land, where they built their residential house, from a certain Serapia Raymundo, an heir of
Pedro Raymundo the original owner. However, they failed to register the sale or secure a transfer
certificate of title in their names.
Sometime in December, 1968, a conference was held in the house of Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos to settle
the land dispute between Serapia Raymundo (Serapia in short) another heir of Pedro Raymundo, and
the Valencia spouses since both were relatives and distant kin of Atty. Jovellanos. Serapia was willing
to relinquish ownership If the Valencias could now documents evidencing ownership. Paulino exhibited
a deed of sale written in the Ilocano dialect. However, Serapia claimed that the deed covered a
different property. Paulino and Serapia were not able to settle their differences. (Report of
Investigating Judge Catalino Castañeda, Jr., pp. 21-22).
On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting, filed a complaint against
Paulino for the recovery of possession with damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. V-2170,
entitled "Serapia Raymundo, Plaintiff, versus Paulino Valencia, Defendant." (Report, p. 11)
Summoned to plead in Civil Case No. V-2170, the Valencias engaged the services of Atty. Dionisio
Antiniw. Atty. Antiniw advised them to present a notarized deed of sale in lieu of the private document
written in Ilocano. For this purpose, Paulino gave Atty. Antiniw an amount of P200.00 to pay the
person who would falsify the signature of the alleged vendor (Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 7). A
"Compraventa Definitiva" (Exh. B) was executed purporting to be a sale of the questioned
lot.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, rendered a decision in favor
of plaintiff, Serapia Raymundo. The lower court expressed the belief that the said document is not
authentic. (Report, p. 14).
Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with Preliminary Injunction before the
Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court failed to provide a workable solution concerning his
house. While the petition was pending, the trial court, on March 9, 1973, issued an order of execution
stating that "the decision in this case has already become final and executory" (Exhibits 3 and 3-A).
On March 14, 1973, a writ of execution was issued.
On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty. Jovellanos and the
remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting, on April 25, 1973. (Annex "A"
of Administrative Case No. 1302).
On March 4, 1974, Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No. 1302)
against Atty. Cabanting on the ground that said counsel allegedly violated Article 1491 of the New
Civil Code as well as Article II of the Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibiting the purchase of property
under litigation by a counsel.
On March 21, 1974 the appellate court dismissed the petition of Paulino.
On October 14, 1974, Constancia Valencia, daughter of Paulino, filed a disbarment proceeding
(docketed as Administrative Case No. 1391) against Atty. Dionisio Antiniw for his participation in the
forgery of "Compraventa Definitiva" and its subsequent introduction as evidence for his client; and
also, against Attys. Eduardo Jovellanos and Arsenio Cabanting for purchasing a litigated property
allegedly in violation of Article 1491 of the New Civil Code; and against the three lawyers, for allegedly
rigging Civil Case No. V-2170 against her parents.
On August 17, 1975, Constancia Valencia filed additional charges against Atty. Antiniw and Atty.
Jovellanos as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. AGAINST ATTY. DIONISIO ANTINIW:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In the year 1973 Atty. Dionisio Antiniw fraudulently and in confabulation with one Lydia Bernal had a
deed of sale, fabricated, executed and ratified before him as Notary Public by one Santiago Bernal in
favor of Lydia Bernal when as a matter of fact said Santiago Bernal had died already about eight years
before in the year 1965.
"2. AGAINST ATTY. EDUARDO JOVELLANOS:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In the year 1954 Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos, fraudulently and in bad faith, in confabulation with Rosa de
los Santos as vendee had, as Notary Public, executed and ratified before him, two (2) deeds of sale in
favor of said Rosa de los Santos when as a matter of fact the said deeds were not in fact executed by
the supposed vendor Rufino Rincoraya and so said Rufino Rincoraya had filed a Civil Case in Court to
annul and declare void the said sales." (p. 7, Report)
2. Administrative Case No. 1543.
A deed of donation propter nuptias, involving the transfer of a piece of land by the grandparents of
Lydia Bernal (complainant) in favor of her parents, was lost during the last world war. For this reason,
her grandmother (the living donor) executed a deed of confirmation of the donation propter nuptias
with renunciation of her rights over the property. (Complaint, p. 1). Notwithstanding the deed, her
grandmother still offered to sell the same property in favor of the complainant, ostensibly to
strengthen the deed of donation (to prevent others from claiming the property).chanrobles.com.ph :
virtual law library
On consultation, Atty. Antiniw advised them to execute a deed of sale. Atty. Antiniw allegedly
prepared and notarized the deed of sale in the name of her grandfather (deceased at the time of
signing) with her grandmother’s approval.
Felicidad Bernal-Duzon, her aunt who had a claim over the property, filed a complaint against her
(Lydia Bernal) and her counsel, Atty. Antiniw for falsification of a public document. (Complaint, pp. 1-2)
The fiscal exonerated the counsel for lack of evidence, while a case was filed in court against Lydia
Bernal.
On October 3, 1975, Lydia Bernal filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No.
1543) against Atty. Antiniw for illegal acts and bad advice.
Pursuant to the resolution of the First Division of this Court dated December 9, 1974, the resolution of
the Second Division dated March 3, 1975 and the two resolutions of the Second Division both dated
December 3, 1975, Administrative Cases Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 were referred to the Office of the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
Upon formal request of Constancia L. Valencia and Lydia Bernal dated March 3, 1976, all of these
cases were ordered consolidated by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza per his handwritten directive
of March 9, 1976.
On April 12, 1988, We referred the investigation of these cases to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. When Atty. Jovellanos was appointed as Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge of Alcala-
Bautista, Pangasinan, We referred the investigation of these cases to Acting Presiding Judge Cesar
Mindaro, Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, Villasis, Pangasinan, for further investigation.
In view of the seriousness of the charge against the respondents and the alleged threats against the
person of complainant Constancia L. Valencia, We directed the transfer of investigation to the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The three administrative cases were raffled to Branch XVII of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, under
the sala of Judge Catalino Castañeda, Jr.
After investigation, Judge Catalino Castañeda, Jr., recommended the dismissal of cases against Atty.
Jovellanos and Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting; dismissal of Administrative Case No. 1543 and the
additional charges in Administrative Case No. 1391 against Antiniw and Judge Jovellanos; however, he
recommended the suspension of Atty. Antiniw from the practice of law for six months finding him
guilty of malpractice in falsifying the "Compraventa Definitiva."cralaw virtua1aw library

The simplified issues of these consolidated cases are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I. Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of Art. 1491 of the New
Civil Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
II. Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos are guilty of malpractice in falsifying notarial
documents.
III. Whether or not the three lawyers connived in rigging Civil Case No. V-2170.
I its subsequent introduction in court prejudices his prime duty in the administration of justice as an
Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public of judicial auction, either in person
or through the mediation of another:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x       x       x
(5) . . .this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they make take
part by virtue of their profession.
Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It is intended to
curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get the better of the sentiments
of loyalty and disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition would constitute malpractice (In re
Attorney Melchor Ruste, 40 O.G. p. 78) and is a ground for suspension. (Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil.
248).
Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the litigation is pending.
(Director of Lands v. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513; Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775).
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of
judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if
there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject
to the judicial action of the judge. (Gan Tingco v. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic dictates,
in certiorariproceedings, that the appellate court may either grant or dismiss the petition. Hence, it is
not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has terminated when the
judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari connected therewith is still in progress.
Thus, purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes malpractice in violation of
Art. 1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a ground for suspension.
The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There was no attorney-client
relationship between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos, considering that the latter did not take part as
counsel in Civil Case No. V-2170. The transaction is not covered by Art. 1491 nor by the Canons
adverted to.
II
It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and received the sum of P200.00 in consideration
of his executing the document "Compraventa Definitiva" which would show that Paulino bought the
property. This charge, Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is settled jurisprudence that affirmative
testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony (Bayasen v. CA, L-25785, Feb. 26, 1981;
Vda. de Ramos v. CA, Et Al., L-40804, Jan. 31, 1978). When an individual’s integrity is challenged by
evidence, it is not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of
morality and integrity which at all time is expected of him. (De los Reyes v. Aznar, Adm. Case No.
1334, Nov. 28, 1989).
Although Paulino was a common farmer who finished only Grade IV, his testimony, even if not
corroborated by another witness, deserves credence and can be relied upon. His declaration dwelt on
a subject which was so delicate and confidential that it would be difficult to believe the he fabricated
his evidence.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of a deed of sale, and
officer of the court.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client (Santos v. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622), but not at
the expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shop workers Union v. La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty of a
lawyer is not to his client but to the administration of justice. (Lubiano v. Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To
that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his client’s cause in utmost
earnestness and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to illegal means
for his client’s interest. It is the duty of an attorney to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor. (Pangan v. Ramos, 93
SCRA 87).
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most important of them is
mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In re: Ivan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court
may suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts show his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar.
(Halili v. CIR, 136 SCRA 112). Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a
source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that courts and
the public may rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega v. Sison, 125 SCRA 293). Atty. Antiniw
failed to live up to the high standards of the law profession.
The other charges of malpractice against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos should be dismissed for
lack of evidence.
During the proceedings in Administrative Case No. 1543, Lydia Bernal testified in full on direct
examination, but she never submitted herself for cross-examination. Several subpoenas for cross-
examination were unheeded. She eventually requested the withdrawal of her complaint.
Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses against him. He enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges against him until the contrary is proved. (Santos v. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622). The case must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. (Camus v. Diaz, Adm. Case No. 1616, February
9, 1989). Since Atty. Antiniw was not accorded this procedural due process, it is but proper that the
direct testimony of Lydia Bernal be stricken out.
In view also of the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant, Administrative Case No. 1543
should be dismissed. Although the filing of an affidavit of desistance by complainant for lack of
interest does not ipso facto result in the termination of a case for suspension or disbarment of an
erring lawyer. (Munar v. Flores, 122 SCRA 448), We are constrained in the case at bar, to dismiss the
same because there was no evidence to substantiate the charges.
The additional charge against Atty. Antiniw in Administrative Case No. 1391 is predicated on the
information furnished by Lydia Bernal. It was not based on the personal knowledge of Constancia L.
Valencia: hence, hearsay. "Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative
value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other
person not on the witness stand." (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 6th ed., vol. 2, 1989, p.
486). Being hearsay, the evidence presented is inadmissible.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
The additional charge filed by Constancia L. Valencia against Atty. Jovellanos in Administrative Case
No. 1391 was not proved at all. Complainant failed to prove her additional charges.
III
There is no evidence on record that the three lawyers involved in these administrative cases conspired
in executing the falsified "Compraventa Definitiva" and rigged the Civil Case No. V-2170.
Atty. Jovellanos is a distant kin of the Raymundos and Valencias. In fact, he and the Valencias are
neighbors and only two meters separate their houses. It would not be believable that Atty. Jovellanos,
a practicing lawyer, would hold a meeting with the heirs of Pedro Raymundo in his house with the
intention of inducing them to sue the Valencias. Atty. Jovellanos even tried to settle the differences
between the parties in a meeting held in his house. He appeared in Civil Case No. V-2170 as an
involuntary witness to attest to the holding of the conference.
Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof of conspiracy, but a sign of brotherhood among
them. One of the fourfold duties of a lawyer in his duty to the Bar. A lawyer should treat the opposing
counsel, and his brethren in the law profession, with courtesy, dignity and civility. They may "do as
adversaries do in the law: strive mightily but (they) eat and drink as friends." This friendship does not
connote conspiracy.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1. Dionisio Antiniw DISBARRED from the practice
of law, and his name is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer Cabanting
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months from finality of this judgment; and 3.
Administrative Case No. 1391 against Attorney Eduardo Jovellanos and additional charges therein, and
Administrative Case No. 1543 DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 70332-43 November 13, 1986
GENEROSO TRIESTE, SR., petitioner,  - P7,730.50
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), respondent.
Arturo M. de Castro for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
ALAMPAY, J.:
The present case relates to an appeal by way of a Petition for Review of the decision promulgated on
November 6, 1984, by the Sandiganbayan convicting the herein petitioner, Generoso Trieste, Sr., of
twelve (12) separate violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices - Act, which petitioner were accused of in Criminal Cases Nos.
6856-6867 of said Court. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was denied by the
respondent Sandiganbayan under its Resolution of March 11, 1985.
The twelve (12) separate Informations filed by the Tanodbayan against the herein petitioner for
violation of Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft Law are all similarly worded as the information presented in
Criminal Case No. 6856 which is hereunder quoted:
That on or about the month of July, 1980 and some time subsequent thereto, in the
municipality of Numancia, Aklan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being then the Municipal Mayor and
member of the Committee on Award of the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan and as
such, had administrative control of the funds of the municipality and whose approval
is required in the disbursements of municipal funds, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully have financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction
in connection with which said accused intervened or took part in his official capacity
and in which he is prohibited by law from having any interest, to wit the purchases
of construction materials by the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan from Trigen Agro-
Industrial Development Corporation, of which the accused is the president,
incorporator, director and major stockholder paid under Municipal Voucher No. 211-
90-10-174 in the amount of P558.80 by then and there awarding the supply and
delivery of said materials to Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation and
approving payment thereof to said corporation in violation of the Anti-Graft and
corrupt Practices Act.
except only as to the dates of the commission of the offense, voucher numbers, and amounts
involved.
Criminal Cases Nos. 6856, 6857, 6858, 6859, 6860. 6861, and 6862 were allegedly committed in July,
1980; Criminal Cases Nos. 6863 and 6864, in August, 1980; and Criminal Cases Nos. C-865, 6866 and
6867 in October, 1980. The separate vouchers involved in the twelve (12) cases are said to be the
following:
Crim. Case #6856, Vchr #211-90-10-174 at P558.80
Crim. Case #6857, Vchr #211-80-10-187 at 943.60
Crim. Case #6858, Vchr #211-80-10-189 at 144.00
Crim. Case #6859, Vchr #211-80-10-190 at 071.30
Crim. Case #6860, Vchr #211-80-10-191 at 270.00
Crim. Case #6861, Vchr #211-80-10-232 at 1,820.00
Crim. Case #6862, Vchr #211-80-10-239 at 1,085.80
Crim. Case #6863, Vchr #211-80-10-407 at 150.00
Crim. Case #6864, Vchr #211-80-12-494 at 500.00
Crim. Case #6865, Vchr #211-81-04-61 at 840.00
Crim. Case #6866, Vchr #211-81-04-62 at 787.00
Crim. Case #6867, Vchr #211-81-04-63 at 560.00
Total---
(Consolidated Comment, pg. 4; Rollo, 325)
After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered the challenged decision dated November 6, 1984, convicting
the petitioner in all the twelve (12) criminal cases, (Rollo, pp. 324-325) and in each case he was
sentenced,"...to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY as the minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the maximum, to further suffer
perpetual disqualification from the public office, and to pay the cost of the action." (pp. 37-40,
Decision; Rollo, 322).
After the petition for review was filed in this case and pending the submission by respondent of its
comment to the petition, herein petitioner presented to this Court on June 7, 1985, an urgent petition
to lift the order of the Sandiganbayan dated September 12, 1983, suspending him from Office as the
elected Municipal Mayor of Numancia, Aklan. His term was to expire in 1986. No objection to the
petition for the lifting of the suspension order was interposed by the Solicitor General. Accordingly,
and pursuant to the resolution of this Court dated October 1, 1985, petitioner's preventive suspension
was lifted and his reinstatement as Municipal Mayor of Numancia, Aklan was ordered to take effect
immediately.
A supplemental petition, dated October 10, 1985, was later filed by petitioner's new counsel in
collaboration with the original counsel on record of petitioner. In this supplemental pleading, it was
vigorously stressed that the petitioner did not, in any way, intervene in making the awards and
payment of the purchases in question as he signed the voucher only after all the purchases had
already been made, delivered and paid for by the Municipal Treasurer. It was further pointed out that
there was no bidding at all as erroneously adverted to in the twelve informations filed against herein
petitioner because the transactions involved were emergency direct purchases by personal canvass.
Upon leave of the Court given, the former Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment dated
November 4, 1984, to the original petition filed in this case dated April 30, 1985 as well as on the
supplemental petition dated October 10, 1985. He argued the dismissal of the petition on the ground
that the same raise factual issues which are, therefore, non-reviewable (Consolidated Comment, pg.
20; Rollo, 341). The submission made by the Office of the Solicitor General in the Consolidated
Comment dated November 4, 1986, are hereunder quoted:
xxx xxx xxx
The impugned decision convicted petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h), paragraph
(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from
having any interest.
The elements essential in the commission of the crime are:
a) The public officer has financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or
transaction;
b) In connection with which he intervenes in his official capacity.
Concurrence of both elements is necessary as the absence of one will not warrant
conviction. (Rollo, pp. 338-339).
The earlier view taken by the Solicitor General's Office was that petitioner's evidence of divestment of
interest in Trigen 'Corporation, which is said to have been effected on February 25, 1980, before the
petitioner assumed the Mayorship, should have been presented at the earliest opportunity before the
Tanodbayan and because this was not done by him the resolution of the Tanodbayan finding a prima
facie case against petitioner should be sustained. Furthermore, petitioner was faulted because the
transfer of his interest in the corporate stock of Trigen Corporation should have been recorded in the
Securities and Exchange Commission but no evidence of this sort, was presented. The consolidated
comment also played up the advertisement of Trigen Corporation in the program of the Rotary Club of
Kalibo, Aklan, showing the printed name of petitioner as the President-Manager of the said
corporation. (Consolidated Comment; Rollo, pp. 340-341)
Petitioner filed a Reply controverting the allegations and arguments recited in the aforestated
Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor General.
After considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised in the petition and
supplemental petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Sandiganbayan, as well as the
consolidated comment and the reply thereto filed by petitioner's counsel, the Court in its resolution of
January 16, 1986, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective
briefs.
Petitioner's exhaustive and well-reasoned out Brief which was filed with the Court on April 14, 1986,
raised the following legal questions.
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing recital of facts, the following legal questions arise:
1. Does the mere signing by a Municipal Mayor of municipal vouchers and other
supporting papers covering purchases of materials previously ordered by the
Municipal Treasurer without the knowledge and consent of the former, subsequently
delivered by the supplier, and, thereafter paid by the same Municipal Treasurer also
without the knowledge and consent of the Municipal Mayor, constitute a violation of
the provisions of Section 3 (h) of Rep. Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
2. Does the mere signing of the mere documents above constitute the kind of
intervention of taking part in (his) official capacity within the context of the above-
mentioned law?
3. Was damage or prejudice, as an element of the offense under Section 3 (h) of the
said law, caused to the Government or the Municipality of Numancia as a result of
the contracts in question and as a corollary thereto, was undue advantage and
gained by the transacting corporation?
4. Was there divestment on the part of the herein petitioner of his shares in Trigen
Agro-Industrial Development Corporation long before the questioned transactions?
(Appellant's Brief, page 15)
It was then discus and argued by the petitioner that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of
all the elements of the offense, and more particularly to adduce proof that petitioner has, directly or
indirectly, a financial or pecuniary interest in the imputed business contracts or transactions.
Discussion of petitioner's arguments in this regard will not however, be recited anymore as this was
obviated when a new Solicitor General, after seeking and obtaining several extensions of time to file
its Brief in this case at bar, filed on October 7, 1986, a "Manifestation For Acquittal" (in lieu of the
People's Brief). Rollo, 293).
The new Solicitor General's Office after adopting the statement of facts recited in the consolidated
comment of the former Solicitor General's Office moved for the acquittal of the petitioner, upon
acknowledging and concluding that:
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner has divested his interest with Trigen
Petitioner sought to establish that before he assumed office as mayor on March 3,
1980, he had already sold his shares with Trigen to his sister Mrs. Rosene Trieste-
Tuason. The sale was made by corresponding indorsements to her stock certificate
which was duly recorded in the stock and transfer book of the corporation.
Respondent Sandiganbayan however doubts the sale because the same was not
reported to the SEC. SEC records, as the prosecution evidence show, do not reflect
the sale and petitioner still appears as the firm's President.
The prosecution's evidence to establish non-divestment of petitioner's interest with
Trigen is weak. Anyway, Trigen has not updated its reports to the SEC since 1976. It
have not even submitted its financial annual report ever since. Absence of the sales
report in the SEC does not mean that the sale did not take place. Reporting the sale
is not a mandatory requirement.
Sales of stocks need not be reported to SEC
In any event, the law only requires submission of annual financial reports, not sales
or disposal of stocks (Section 141, Corporation Code of the Philippines).
Upholding the evidence of petitioner's divestment of his interest with Trigen would
necessarily allow him to act freely in his official capacity in the municipality's
dealings or transactions with Trigen. That in itself is sufficient to acquit him of the
crimes charged. (Rollo, pp. 299-300).
In the matter of the alleged intervention of petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General itself
subscribes to and on its own volition place on record the following observations:
Prosecution failed to prove charges; evidence discloses absence of bidding and award
The prosecution's lone witness, Treasurer Aniceto Vega, testified that there never
was a public bidding conducted because all the transactions were made by direct
purchases from Trigen.
Q. In other words, in all these transactions there never really was
any public bidding?
 A. Yes, Sir. There was no public bidding.
Q. And these purchases were made by direct purchases from the
establishment of Trigen?
A. Yes, Sir. (pp. 36-37, Tsn., Oct. 26, 1983)
In the absence of a public bidding and as emphatically declared by the prosecution's
sole witness Vega that all the transactions were on direct purchases from Trigen,
how can one ever imagine that petitioner has awarded the supply and delivery of
construction materials to Trigen as specifically charged in the twelve (12)
informations? The charges are of course baseless and even contradict the evidence
of the prosecution itself.
Even the respondent Court finally found that petitioner did not intervene during the
bidding and award, which of course is a false assumption because of Vega's
testimony that there was no public bidding at all. Respondent Court said:
. . . . In short, accused's intervention may not be present during the bidding and
award, but his liability may also come in when he took part in said transactions such
as signing the vouchers under certifications 1, 2 and 3 thereof, to make it appear
that the transactions were regular and proper. (Resolution dated March 11, 1985
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration/new trial, page 7).
No evidence to prove petitioner approved payment
Now, did petitioner intervene by approving payments to Trigen as also charged in
the information? Can there be intervention after payment.
Vega testified that petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers (Exhibits A
to L) for the purchase and payment of construction materials. It was sometime after
delivery of the construction materials that he (Vega) signed and paid the twelve (12)
-municipal vouchers (pages 5 to 7), decision of respondent Sandiganbayan dated
November 2, 1984). The prosecution has not presented evidence to show as to when
petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers. But it can safely be assumed
as a matter of procedure that petitioner had signed the voucher after Treasurer
Vega signed and paid them., (Rello, pp. 301-303)
xxx xxx xxx
Testimonial and documentary evidence confirms that petitioner signed vouchers
after payment
Additional facts which respondent Court failed to consider and which could have
altered the outcome of the case in the following uncontroverted testimony of Josue
Maravilla:
Q. When these municipal vouchers were prepared by the
municipal treasurer, as you said, and then presented to Mayor
Trieste for his signature, were the purchases in question already
paid?
A. They had already been paid for, sir.
Q. Previously, prior to the signature of Mayor Trieste?
A. Yes, sir.
A.J. ESCAREAL:
Q. Under what authority were they paid?
A. Under official receipt issued by Trigen.
Q. Who authorized the payment?
A. The municipal treasurer who paid the materials.
ATTY. CONSULTA:
Q. You said they had already been paid for. Do you know of any
receipts issued by Trigen to indicate that at the time these
municipal vouchers were signed by Mayor Trieste, the materials
had already been delivered and paid by the municipality to Trigen?
xxx xxx xxx
A. Yes, sir
Q. Now, what exhibits particularly do you know were issued
by Trigen to indicate that payments were made prior to the
signing of the municipal vouchers by Mayor Trieste?
A. Exhibits A, G, B, F, C, D, Exhibit I and Exhibit H.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now, Mr. Maravilla, aside from these prosecution's exhibits
which are Trigen receipts showing payments long before the
municipal vouchers were prepared, what can you say about the
other municipal vouchers in this case in reference to payments
made by Trigen to the municipality?
ESCAREAL:
Payment made by Trigen?
ATTY. CONSULTA:
I am sorry, Your Honor, made to Trigen by the municipality?
A. Official receipts issued by Trigen also indicate that when
municipal vouchers marked Exhibits E, B, C, D, F, G, H, I were
prepared, they had already been delivered and the amounts
indicated therein were already prepared by the municipal
treasurer.
Q. Did you say already made by the municipal treasurer-the
amounts were already paid by the municipal treasurer?
A. Already paid.
Q. Who disbursed the funds evidenced by the Trigen official
receipts?
A. The municipal treasurer, then Mr. Vega.
Q. Now, do you know why Mr. Vega asked that those municipal
vouchers be nevertheless signed in spite of the fact that he knew
that the amounts had already been disbursed and paid by him to
Trigen?
A. He said that the municipal vouchers for record purposes is
necessary to be signed by the mayor. (Tsn., Mar. 5, 1984, pp. 19-
49).
Inasmuch as Treasurer Vega signed and paid the vouchers after the materials were
delivered, petitioner's signature on the vouchers after payment is not, we submit the
kind of intervention contemplated under Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.
xxx xxx xxx
What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual
intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in
order that liability may attach. (Opinion No. 306, Series 1961 and Opinion No. 94,
Series 1972 of the Secretary of Justice). The official need not dispose his shares in
the corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with
the office. For the law aims to prevent the don-tenant use of influence, authority and
power (Deliberation on Senate Bill 293, May 6, 1959, Congressional Record, Vol. 11,
page 603).
There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his capacity as Mayor, used
his influence, power, and authority in having the transactions given to Trigen. He
 didn't ask anyone-neither Treasurer Vega nor Secretary Maravilla for that matter, to
get the construction materials from Trigen.
Trigen did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction
Petitioner should not be faulted for Trigen's transaction with the municipality, which
by the way, has been dealing with it even before petitioner had assumed the
mayorship on March 3, 1980. Personal canvasses conducted found that Trigen's
offer was the lowest, most reasonable, and advantageous to the municipality. . . .
(Rollo, pp. 307-308; Emphasis supplied).
It is also an acknowledged fact that there was no complaint for non-delivery, underdelivery or
overpricing regarding any of the transactions.
Considering the correct facts now brought to the attention of this Court by the Solicitor General and in
view of the reassessment made by that Office of the issues and the evidence and the law involved, the
Court takes a similar view that the affirmance of the decision appealed from cannot be rightfully
sustained. The conscientious study and thorough analysis made by the Office of the Solicitor General
in this case truly reflects its consciousness of its role as the People's Advocate in the administration of
justice to the end that the innocent be equally defended and set free just as it has the task of having
the guilty punished. This Court will do no less and, therefore, accepts the submitted recommendation
that the decision and resolution in question of the respondent Sandiganbayan be reversed and that as
a matter of justice, the herein petitioner be entitled to a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan, dated November 2, 1984, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 6856 to 6867, finding the herein petitioner, Generoso Trieste, Sr. guilty of the violations of
Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, is hereby set aside and reversing the
appealed judgment, a new judgment is now rendered ACQUITTING Generoso Trieste, Sr., of said
offenses charged against him with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 91391             January 24, 1991
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Solicitor General, petitioner  The lone issue in this petition is the propriety of impleading the petitioner as additional party
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano Reyes & Manalastas for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The petitioner challenges the resolutions dated June 8, 1989 and November 2, 1989 of the
Sandiganbayan issued in Civil Case No. 0033 which granted the motion of private respondent Juan
Ponce Enrile, one of the defendants in the civil case, to implead the petitioner as additional party
defendant in Enrile's counterclaim in the same civil case and denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
On July 31, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) with the assistance of Solicitor General Francisco Chavez filed with the
respondent Sandiganbayan a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 0033 against Eduardo Cojuangco,
Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile, among others, for reconveyance, reversion and accounting, restitution and
damages.
After the denial of his motion to dismiss, respondent Enrile filed his answer with compulsory
counterclaim and cross-claim with damages.
The Republic filed its reply to the answer and motion to dismiss the counterclaim. The motion was
opposed by respondent Enrile.
On January 30, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, to wit:
The resolution of the Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim against the Plaintiff government is
deferred until after trial, the grounds relied upon not appearing to be indubitable.
On the matter of the additional parties (Solicitor General Chavez, Ex-PCGG Chairman Diaz,
former Commissioners Doromal, Rodrigo, Romero and Bautista), the propriety of impleading
them either under Sec. 14, Rule 6 or even under Sec. 12 as third-party defendant requires
leave of Court to determine the propriety thereof. No such leave has been sought.
Consideration thereof cannot be entertained at this time nor may therefore, the Motion to
Dismiss the same be considered. (Rollo, p. 329; Annex "H", Petition)
Respondent Enrile then requested leave from the Sandiganbayan to implead the petitioner and the
PCGG officials as party defendants for lodging this alleged "harassment suit" against him.
The motion was granted in a resolution dated June 8, 1989, to wit:
In respect to defendant Juan Ponce Enrile's Manifestation and Motion dated February 23,
1989, praying for leave to implead additional parties to his counterclaim, the Court, finding
reason in the aforesaid Manifestation and Motion, grants leave to implead the defendants
named in the counterclaim and admits defendant Juan Ponce Enrile's answer with
counterclaim.
This is without prejudice to the defenses which said defendants may put forth individually or
in common, in their personal capacities or otherwise. (Rollo, p. 27)
In a later resolution dated November 2, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan denied a motion to
reconsider the June 8, 1989 resolution. The dispositive portion of the resolution states:
WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration of the Solicitor General and former PCGG
officials Ramon Diaz, Quintin Doromal, Orlando Romero, Ramon Rodrigo and Mary
Concepcion Bautista are denied, but, considering these motions as in the nature of motions
to dismiss counterclaim/answers, resolution of these motions is held in abeyance pending
trial on the merits. (Rollo, p. 31)
Thereafter, all the PCGG officials filed their answer to the counterclaims invoking their immunity from
suits as provided in Section 4 of Executive Order No. 1. Instead of filing an answer, the petitioner
comes to this Court assailing the resolutions as rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
defendant in the counterclaim filed by respondent Enrile in Civil Case No. 0033.
It may be noted that the private respondent did not limit himself to general averments of malice,
recklessness, and bad faith but filed specific charges that then PCGG Chairman Jovito Salonga had
already cleared the respondent and yet, knowing the allegations to be false, the petitioner still filed
the complaint. This can be gleaned from excerpts found in respondent Enrile's Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim and Cross-Claim:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Defendant-in-counterclaim Francisco Chavez was the Solicitor General who assisted the PCGG
in filing and maintaining the instant Complaint against Defendant. As the incumbent Solicitor
General, he continues to assist the PCGG in prosecuting this case.
He is sued in his personal and official capacities.
On or about October 1986, the PCGG, speaking through the then Chairman, now Senate
President, Hon. Jovito R. Salonga, found and declared that "not one of the documents left by
then President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos including the 2,300-page evidence turned over
to the PCGG by the US State Department implicates Enrile." Chairman Salonga stressed that
in view of the PCGG's findings, he refused to yield to the "pressure" exerted on him to
prosecute Defendant.
x x x           x x x          x x x
 Notwithstanding the findings of the PCGG that there was absolutely no evidence linking
Defendant to the illegal activities of former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, the
PCGG, this time composed of Chairman Ramon Diaz, the Commissioners Quintin Doromal,
Ramon Rodrigo, Orlando Romero and Mary Concepcion Bautista, filed the Complaint against
Defendant, among others, on or about 22 July 1987.
Defendant has reasons to believe, and so alleges that Chairman Diaz, and Commissioners
Doromal, Rodrigo, Romero and Bautista ordered, authorized, allowed or tolerated the filing of
the utterly baseless complaint against Defendant.
Solicitor General Francisco Chavez assisted or cooperated in, or induced or instigated, the
filing of this harassment suit against Defendant.
In so ordering, authorizing, allowing and tolerating the institution of the action against
Defendant, all the aforenamed officers, with malice and in evident bad faith, and with grave
abuse of power and in excess of their duty and authority, unjustly and unlawfully obstructed,
defeated, violated, impeded or impaired the constitutional rights and liberties of Defendant . .
. . (Rollo, pp. 260-262)
On the other hand, the petitioner submits that no counter-claim can be filed against him in his
capacity as Solicitor General since he is only acting as counsel for the Republic. He cites the case
of Borja v. Borja, 101 Phil. 911 [1957] wherein we ruled:
. . . The appearance of a lawyer as counsel for a party and his participation in a case as such
counsel does not make him a party to the action. The fact that he represents the interests of
his client or that he acts in their behalf will not hold him liable for or make him entitled to any
award that the Court may adjudicate to the parties, other than his professional fees. The
principle that a counterclaim cannot be filed against persons who are acting in representation
of another — such as trustees — in their individual capacities (Chambers v. Cameron, 2 Fed.
Rules Service, p. 155; 29 F. Supp. 742) could be applied with more force and effect in the
case of a counsel whose participation in the action is merely confined to the preparation of
the defense of his client. Appellant, however, asserted that he filed the counterclaim against
said lawyer not in his individual capacity but as counsel for the heirs of Quintin de Borja. But
as we have already stated that the existence of a lawyer-client relationship does not make
the former a party to the action, even this allegation of appellant will not alter the result We
have arrived at (at pp. 924-925)
Thus, the petitioner argues that since he is simply the lawyer in the case, exercising his duty under
the law to assist the Government in the filing and prosecution of all cases pursuant to Section 1,
Executive Order No. 14, he cannot be sued in a counterclaim in the same case.
Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena correctly observed that there is no general immunity arising
solely from occupying a public office.
The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have
been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is a
showing of bad faith. We ruled in one case:
A number of cases decided by the Court where the municipal mayor alone was held liable for
back salaries of, or damages to dismissed municipal employees, to the exclusion of the
municipality, are not applicable in this instance. In Salcedo v. Court of Appeals (81 SCRA 408
[1978]) for instance, the municipal mayor was held liable for the back salaries of the Chief of
Police he had dismissed, not only because the dismissal was arbitrary but also because the
mayor refused to reinstate him in defiance of an order of the Commissioner of Civil Service to
reinstate.
In Nemenzo v. Sabillano (25 SCRA 1 [1968]), the municipal mayor was held personally liable
for dismissing a police corporal who possessed the necessary civil service eligibility, the
dismissal being done without justifiable cause and without any administrative investigation.
In Rama v. Court of Appeals (G.R. Nos. L-44484, L-44842, L-44591, L-44894, March 16 1987),
the governor, vice-governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, provincial auditor,
provincial treasurer and provincial engineer were ordered to pay jointly and severally in their
individual and personal capacity damages to some 200 employees of the province of Cebu
who were eased out from their positions because of their party affiliations. (Laganapan v.
Asedillo, 154 SCRA 377 [1987])
Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the immunity proviso under Section 4(a) of Executive Order
No. 1 also extends to him is not well-taken. A mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso
facto result in the charges being automatically dropped.
In the case of Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña (159 SCRA 556 [1988]) then
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, added a clarification of the immunity accorded PCGG officials under
Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 as follows:
With respect to the qualifications expressed by Mr. Justice Feliciano in his separate opinion, I
just wish to point out two things: First, the main opinion does not claim absolute immunity for
the members of the Commission. The cited section of Executive Order No. 1 provides the
Commission's members immunity from suit thus: "No civil action shall lie against the
Commission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task
contemplated by this order." No absolute immunity like that sought by Mr. Marcos in his
Constitution for himself and his subordinates is herein involved. It is understood that the
immunity granted the members of the Commission by virtue of the unimaginable magnitude
of its task to recover the plundered wealth and the State's exercise of police power was
immunity from liability for damages in the official discharge of the task granted the members
of the Commission much in the same manner that judges are immune from suit in the official
discharge of the functions of their office . . . " (at pp. 581-582)
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano stated in the same case:
It may be further submitted, with equal respect, that Section 4 (a) of Executive Order No. 1
was intended merely to restate the general principle of the law of public officers that the
PCGG or any member thereof may not be held civilly liable for acts done in the performance
of official duty, provided that such member had acted in good faith and within the scene of
his lawful authority. It may also be assumed that the Sandiganbayanwould have jurisdiction
to determine whether the PCGG or any particular official thereof may be held liable in
damages to a private person injured by acts of such manner. It would seem constitutionally
offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the PCGG could not be required to
testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying with
orders of this Court. (at pp. 586- 587)
Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged
status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. (id., at page 586)
Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General acts in bad faith, or, as contended by
the private respondent, "maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG commissioners in persecuting
respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latter's
constitutional rights and liberties" (Rollo, p. 417), there can be no question that a complaint for
damages may be filed against him. High position in government does not confer a license to persecute
or recklessly injure another. The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on
Human Relations may be taken against public officers or private citizens alike. The issue is not the
right of respondent Enrile to file an action for damages. He has the right. The issue is whether or not
that action must be filed as a compulsory counterclaim in the case filed against him.
Under the circumstances of this case, we rule that the charges pressed by respondent Enrile for
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code arising from the filing of an alleged harassment suit with
malice and evident bad faith do not constitute a compulsory counterclaim. To vindicate his rights,
Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct civil action for damages against the Solicitor General.
In the case of Tiu Po v. Bautista, (103 SCRA 388 [1981]), we ruled that damages claimed to have been
suffered as a consequence of an action filed against the petitioner must be pleaded in the same action
as a compulsory counterclaim. We were referring, however, to a case filed by the private respondent
against the petitioners or parties in the litigation. In the present case, the counterclaim was filed
against the lawyer, not against the party plaintiff itself.
To allow a counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint for his clients, who is merely their
representative in court and not a plaintiff or complainant in the case would lead to mischievous
consequences.
A lawyer owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability. (See Agpalo, Legal Ethics
[1980] p. 147 citing Javier v. Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293 [1936]; In re Tionko, 43 Phil. 191 [1922]; In re: Atty.
C. T. Oliva, 103 Phil. 312 [1958]; Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 [1932]; Toguib v. Tomol, Jr., G.R. Adm.
Case No. 554, Jan. 3, 1969; People v. Macellones, 49 SCRA 529 [1973]; Tan Kui v. Court of Appeals, 54
SCRA 199 [1973]). A lawyer cannot properly attend to his duties towards his client if, in the same
case, he is kept busy defending himself.
The problem is particularly perplexing for the Solicitor General.1âwphi1 As counsel of the Republic, the
Solicitor General has to appear in controversial and politically charged cases. It is not unusual for high
officials of the Government to unwittingly use shortcuts in the zealous desire to expedite executive
programs or reforms. The Solicitor General cannot look at these cases with indifferent neutrality. His
perception of national interest and obedience to instructions from above may compel him to take a
stance which to a respondent may appear too personal and biased. It is likewise unreasonable to
require Government Prosecutors to defend themselves against counterclaims in the very same cases
they are prosecuting.
As earlier stated, we do not suggest that a lawyer enjoys a special immunity from damage suits.
However, when he acts in the name of a client, he should not be sued on a counterclaim in the very
same case he has filed only as counsel and not as a party. Any claim for alleged damages or other
causes of action should be filed in an entirely separate and distinct civil action.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are
SET ASIDE insofar as they allow the counterclaim filed against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12817             April 29, 1960
JULIO D. ENRIQUEZ, SR., representing the law firm of ENRIQUEZ and ENRIQUEZ, petitioner,  channels for pre-audit. On 24 June 1957 the Auditor General disallowed in audit the petitioner's claim
vs.
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ in his capacity as AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Julio D. Enriquez, Sr. for petitioner.
Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition filed under the provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 2 (c) of
Commonwealth Act No. 327 for a review of a decision of the Auditor General dated 24 June 1957.
On 18 June 1955 Republic Act No. 1383 creating the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority as a
public corporation and vesting in it the ownership, jurisdiction, supervision and control over all
territory embraced by the Metropolitan Water District as well as all areas served by existing
government-owned waterworks and sewerage and drainage systems within the boundaries of cities,
municipalities, and municipal districts in the Philippines, and those served by the Waterworks and
Wells and Drills Section of the Bureau of Public Works, was passed. On 19 September 1955 the
President of the Philippines promulgated Executive Order No. 127 providing, among others, for the
transfer to the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority of all the records, properties, machinery,
equipment, appropriations, assets, choses in actions, liabilities, obligations, notes, bonds and all
indebtedness of all government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems in the provinces, cities,
municipalities and municipal districts (51 Off. Gaz. 4415-4417). On 31 March 1956 the municipal
council of Bauan, Batangas, adopted and passed Resolution No. 152 stating "that it is the desire of this
municipality in this present administration not to submit our local Waterworks to the provisions of the
said Republic Act No. 1383." (Annex A.) On 20 April 1956 the municipal mayor transmitted a copy of
Resolution No. 152 to the Provincial Fiscal through the Provincial Board requesting him to render an
opinion on the matter treated therein and to inform the municipal council whether he would handle
and prosecute its case in court should the council decide to question and test judicially the legality of
Republic Act No. 1383 and to prevent the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority from
exercising its authority over the waterworks system of the municipality, (Annex B). On 2 May 1956 the
provincial fiscal rendered an opinion holding that Republic Act No. 1383 is valid and constitutional and
declined to represent the municipality of Bauan in an action to be brought against the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority to test the validity and constitutionality of the Act creating it
(Annex C). On 26 May 1956 the municipal council adopted and passed Resolution No. 201 authorizing
the municipal mayor to take steps to commence an action or proceedings in court to challenge the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 and to engage the services of a special counsel, and
appropriating the sum of P2,000 to defray the expenses of litigation and attorney's fees (Annex D). On
2 June 1956 the municipal mayor wrote a letter to the petitioner engaging his services as counsel for
the municipality in its contemplated action against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority
(Annex F.) On 27 June 1956 the Provincial Board of Batangas adopted and passed Resolution No. 1829
approving Resolution No. 201 of the municipal council of Bauan (Annex E). On 28 June 1956 the
petitioner wrote to the municipal mayor accepting his offer in behalf of the municipality under the
following terms and conditions: that his professional services shall commence from the filing of the
complaint up to and including the appeal, if any, to the appellate courts; that his professional fee shall
be P1,500 and payable as follows: P500 upon the filing of the complaint, P500 upon the termination of
the hearing of the case in the Court of First Instance, and P500 after judgment shall have become final
or, should the judgment be appealed, after the appeal shall have been submitted for judgment to the
appellate court; and that the municipality shall defray all reasonable and necessary expenses for the
prosecution of the case in the trial and appellate courts including court and sheriff fees, transportation
and subsistence of counsel and witnesses and cost of transcripts of stenographic notes and other
documents (Annex G). On the same date, 28 June 1956, the petitioner filed the necessary complaint in
the Court of First Instance of Batangas (civil No. 542, Annex I). On 9 July 1956 the municipal mayor
wrote to the petitioner agreeing to the terms and conditions set forth in his (the petitioner's) letter of
28 June 1956 (Annex H). On 16 July 1956 the defendant filed its answer to the complaint (Annex J). On
24 July 1956 the petitioner wrote a letter to the municipal treasurer requesting reimbursement of the
sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee and payment of the sum of P500 as initial
attorney's fee. Attached to the letter were the pertinent supporting papers (Annex K). The municipal
treasurer forwarded the petitioner's claim letter and enclosures to the Auditor General through
for initial attorney's fees in the sum of P500, based upon an opinion rendered on 10 May 1957 by the
Secretary of Justice who held that the Provincial Fiscal was not disqualified to handle and prosecute in
court the case of the municipality of Bauan and that its municipal council had no authority to engage
the services of a special counsel (Annex L), but offered no objection to the refund to the petitioner of
the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee (Annex M). On 15 August 1957 the petitioner
received notice of the decision of the Auditor General and on 11 September 1957 he filed with the
Auditor General a notice of appeal from his decision under section 4, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court
Annex N). On 13 September 1957 the petitioner filed this petition for review in this Court.
The Revised Administrative Code provides:
SEC. 2241. Submission of questions to provincial fiscal. — When the council is desirous of
securing a legal opinion upon any question relative to its own powers or the constitution or
attributes of the municipal government, it shall frame such question in writing and submit the
same to the provincial fiscal for decision.
SEC. 1682. Duty of fiscal as legal adviser of province and provincial subdivisions. — The
provincial fiscal shall be the legal adviser of the provincial government and its officers,
including district health officers, and of the mayor and council of the various municipalities
and municipal districts of the province. As such he shall, when so requested, submit his
opinion in writing upon any legal question submitted to him by any such officer or body
pertinent to the duties thereof.
SEC. 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation. —
The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district
 thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme
Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to
the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the same
province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof
are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political
subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council.
Under the foregoing provisions of law, the Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and
counsel of the various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to represent the municipality in
any court except when he is disqualified by law. When he is disqualified to represent the municipality,
the municipal council may engage the services of a special attorney. The Provincial Fiscal is
disqualified to represent in court the municipality if and when original jurisdiction of the case involving
the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court; when the municipality is a party adverse to the
provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province; 1 and when in the case
involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise.2 The fact that the Provincial Fiscal in the case at bar was of the opinion that Republic Act
No. 1383 was valid and constitutional, and, therefore, would not be in a position to prosecute the case
of the municipality with earnestness and vigor, could not justify the act of the municipal council in
engaging the services of a special counsel. Bias or prejudice and animosity or hostility on the part of a
fiscal not based on any of the conditions enumerated in the law and the Rules of Court do not
constitute a legal and valid excuse for inhibition or disqualification. 3 And unlike a practising lawyer
who has the right to decline employment,4 a fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his functions on
grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office, where he swore, among others,
"that he will well and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the office or position
upon which he is about to enter. . . ." 5 Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the
municipal council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal
in place of the provincial fiscal who had declined to handle and prosecute its case in court, pursuant to
section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. The petitioner claims that the municipal council
could not do this because the Secretary of Justice, who has executive supervision over the
Government Corporate Counsel, who represented the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority in
the case filed against it by the municipality of Bauan (civil No. 542, Annex J) and direct supervision
and control over the Provincial Fiscal, would be placed in an awkward and absurd position of having
control of both sides of the controversy. The petitioner's contention is untenable. Section 83 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 94, series of 1947 and further
amended by Executive Order No. 392, series of 1950, 46 Off. Gaz., 5913, 5917, provides that the
Secretary of Justice shall have executive supervision over the Government Corporate Counsel and
supervision and control over Provincial Fiscals. In Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil., 143; 51 Off. Gaz.,
2884, 2888, this Court distinguished supervision from control as follows:
. . . In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer
to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them
the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. . . .
The fact that the Secretary of Justice had, on several occasions, upheld the validity and
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 does not exempt the municipal council of Bauan from
requesting the Secretary of Justice to detail a provincial fiscal to prosecute its case.
The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and mayor without
authority of law, the Auditor General was correct in disallowing in audit the petitioner's claim for
payment of attorney's fees. The decision under review is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
[A.C. No. 1418. August 31, 1976.]
JOSE MISAMIN, Complainant, v. ATTORNEY MIGUEL A. SAN JUAN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila Police force and a member of the bar,
respondent Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with being the legal representative of certain
establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese descent and, what is worse, with coercing an
employee, complainant Jose Misamin, to agree to drop the charges filed by him against his employer
Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar’s Bakery, for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law. There was a
denial on the part of Respondent. The matter was referred to the Office of the Solicitor-General for
investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, it would seem there was a change of heart on
the part of complainant. That could very well be the explanation for the non-appearance of the lawyer
employed by him at the scheduled hearings. The efforts of the Solicitor-General to get at the bottom
of things were thus set at naught. Under the circumstances, the outcome of such referral was to be
expected. For the law is rather exacting in its requirement that there be competent and adequate
proof to make out a case for malpractice. Necessarily, the recommendation was one of the complaints
being dismissed. This is one of those instances then where this Court is left with hardly any choice.
Respondent cannot be found guilty of malpractice.
Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having appeared as counsel for
the New Cesar’s Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the
Manila Metropolitan Police. However, he contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated
exercise of his profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel, while holding a government
position, is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of
attorneys. The respondent also denies having conspired with the complainant Misamin’s attorney in
the NLRC proceeding in order to trick the complainant into signing an admission that he had been paid
his separation pay. Likewise, the respondent denies giving illegal protection to members of the
Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila." 1 
Then came a detailed account in such Report of the proceedings: "Pursuant to the resolution of this
Honorable Court of March 21, 1975, the Solicitor General’s Office set the case for investigation on July
2 and 3, 1975. The counsel for the complainant failed to appear, and the investigation was reset to
August 15, 1975. At the latter date, the same counsel for complainant was absent. In both instances,
the said counsel did not file written motion for postponement but merely sent the complainant to
explain the reason for his absence. When the case was again called for hearing on October 16, 1975,
counsel for complainant failed once more to appear. The complainant who was present explained that
his lawyer was busy ‘preparing an affidavit in the Court of First Instance of Manila.’ When asked if he
was willing to proceed with the hearing in the absence of his counsel, the complainant declared,
apparently without any prodding, that he wished his complaint withdrawn. He explained that he
brought the present action in an outburst of anger believing that the respondent San Juan took active
part in the unjust dismissal of his complaint with the NLRC. The complainant added that after
reexamining his case, he believed the respondent to be without fault and a truly good person." 2 
The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent’s practice of his profession
notwithstanding his being a police official, as "this is not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for the suspension or removal of an attorney. The
respondent’s appearance at the labor proceeding notwithstanding that he was an incumbent police
officer of the City of Manila may appropriately he referred to the National Police Commission and the
Civil Service Commission. As a matter of fact, separate complaints on this ground have been filed and
are under investigation by the Office of the Mayor of Manila and the National Police Commission." 3 As
for the charges that respondent conspired with complainant’s counsel to mislead complainant to
admitting having received his separation pay and for giving illegal protection to aliens, it is
understandable why the Report of the Solicitor General recommended that they be dismissed for lack
of evidence.
The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot prosper is in accordance
with the settled law. As far back as in re Tionko, 4 decided in 1922, the authoritative doctrine was set
forth by Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should
follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the Respondent. The
presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as
an officer of the court in accordance with his oath." 5 The Tionko doctrine has been subsequently
adhered to. 6  respondents are the complainants in the instant case.
This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations there might have been
of the Civil Service Law in view of respondent practicing his profession while holding his position of
Captain in the Metro Manila police force. That is a matter to be decided in the administrative
proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Nonetheless, while the charges
have to be dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to avoid all
appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from
living true to the concept of a public office being a public trust, he did make use, not so much of
whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in
the office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated
but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter that
should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of the bar, should refrain
from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position
occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable
profession who does not even take care that his honor remains unsullied.
WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. San Juan is dismissed for not
having been duly proved. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on his record.
MARTIN LAHM III and JAMES P. CONCEPCION, A.C. No. 7430
Complainants,  
 
- versus -
LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR.,
Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before us is a verified complaint[1] filed by Martin Lahm III and James P. Concepcion
(complainants) praying for the disbarment of Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. (respondent) for
alleged gross misconduct and violation of lawyers oath.
On June 27, 2007, the respondent filed his Comment[2] to the complaint.
In a Resolution[3] dated July 18, 2007, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The antecedent facts, as summarized in the Report and Recommendation [4] dated September
19, 2008 of Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr. of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, are as follows:
On September 5, 2006 a certain David Edward Toze filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission against the members of the Board of Trustees of
the International School, Manila. The same was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-
07381-06 and raffled to the sala of the respondent. Impleaded as among the party-
On September 7, 2006, David Edward Toze filed a Verified Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the
Respondents. The said Motion was set for hearing on September 12, 2006 at 10:00
in the morning. A day after, on September 8, 2006, the counsel for the complainants
herein entered its appearance and asked for additional time to oppose and make a
comment to the Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents of David Edward Toze.
 
Thereafter, the respondent issued an Order dated September 14, 2006 that
directs the parties in the said case to maintain the status quo ante. The
complainants herein sought the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14,
200[6] x x x.
xxxx
 
On account of the Order dated September 14, 2006, David Edward Toze
was immediately reinstated and assumed his former position as superintendent of
the International School Manila.
The pending incidents with the above-mentioned illegal dismissal case were
not resolved, however, the scheduled hearing for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction on September 20, 2006 and September 27, 2006 was postponed.
On January 19, 2007, the co-respondents of the complainants herein in the
said illegal dismissal case filed a motion for an early resolution of their motion to
dismiss the said case, but the respondent instead issued an Order dated February 6,
2007 requiring the parties to appear in his Office on February 27, 2007 at 10:00 in
the morning in order to thresh out David Edward Toze claim of moral and exemplary
damages.
xxxx
 
The respondent on the other maintains that the Order dated September 14,
2006 was issued by him on account of [the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents
that was filed by David Edward Toze, and of the Entry of Appearance with Motion for
Additional Time to File Comment that was thereafter filed by the counsel for the
herein complainants in the illegal dismissal case pending before the respondent.
 
The respondent maintains that in order to prevent irreparable damage on
the person of David Edward Toze, and on account of the urgency of [the] Verified
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction Against the Respondents of David Edward Toze, and that the counsel for
respondents in the illegal dismissal case have asked for a relatively long period of
fifteen days for a resetting, he (respondent) found merit in issuing the Order dated
September 14, 2006 that requires the parties to maintain the status quo ante.
 
 xxx
The respondent argues that [the] instant case should be dismissed for
being premature since the aforementioned illegal dismissal case is still pending
before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, that
the instant case is a subterfuge in order to compel the respondent to inhibit himself
in resolving the said illegal dismissal case because the complainants did not assail
the Order dated September 14, 2006 before the Court of Appeals under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.[5]
 
 
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that: (1) the grounds cited
by the respondent to justify his issuance of the status quo ante order lacks factual basis and is
speculative; (2) the respondent does not have the authority to issue a temporary restraining order
and/or a preliminary injunction; and (3) the inordinate delay in the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration directed against the September 14, 2006 Order showed an orchestrated effort to keep
the status quo ante until the expiration of David Edward Tozes employment contract.
 
Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar incident will be dealt with more severe penalty. [6]
 
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
644[7] which adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The said
resolution further pointed out that the Board of Governors had previously recommended the
respondents suspension from the practice of law for three years in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 7314
entitled Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr..
The respondent sought to reconsider the foregoing disposition, [8] but it was denied by the IBP
Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIX-2011-476 dated June 26, 2011.
 
The case is now before us for confirmation. We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that
the respondent should be sanctioned.
 
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or
suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for gross misconduct and violation of the lawyers oath.
Thus:
 
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what
grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilful appearing as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (emphasis supplied)
 
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency
in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. [9] Gross misconduct is any inexcusable,
shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of
justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause.
The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. [10]
 
Intrinsically, the instant petition wants this Court to impose disciplinary sanction against the
respondent as a member of the bar. However, the grounds asserted by the complainants in support of
the administrative charges against the respondent are intrinsically connected with the discharge of
the respondents quasi-judicial functions.
 
Nonetheless, it cannot be discounted that the respondent, as a labor arbiter, is a public
officer entrusted to resolve labor controversies. It is well settled that the Court may suspend or disbar
a lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his unfitness for the confidence and trust which
characterize the attorney and client relations, and the practice of law before the courts, or showing
such a lack of personal honesty or of good moral character as to render him unworthy of public
confidence.[11]
Thus, the fact that the charges against the respondent were based on his acts committed in
the discharge of his functions as a labor arbiter would not hinder this Court from imposing disciplinary
sanctions against him.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because
he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules
governing the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyers misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to
affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a
member of the bar on such grounds.[12]
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,[13] we stressed that:
 
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a
government official. However, if said misconduct as a government official
also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be
disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.
 
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions,
during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C.
Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of
money as consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or
requests before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondents
failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondents misconduct
as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a
member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently
unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the
approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
 
xxx
  
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his
professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility,
promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of
private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in
government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code. Lawyers in
government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service.
Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional
obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission
which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government,
she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a
high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in
government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with
high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in
private practice.[14] (emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
 
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr.,[15] we ruled that an administrative case against a lawyer for acts
committed in his capacity as provincial adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional
Arbitration Board may be likened to administrative cases against judges considering that he is part of
the quasi-judicial system of our government.
 
This Court made a similar pronouncement in Buehs v. Bacatan[16] where the respondent-
lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for acts he committed in his capacity as an accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board.
 
Here, the respondent, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs
official functions that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may be
approximated to administrative cases of judges whose decisions, including the manner of rendering
the same, were made subject of administrative cases.
 
As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his
official duties renders him liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge
in his official capacity do not always constitute misconduct although the same acts may be erroneous.
True, a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error was made with
a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice. [17]
 
While a judge may not always be held liable for ignorance of the law for every erroneous
order that he renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is sufficiently basic,
lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Indeed, even though a judge may
not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, that
relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his
adjudicatory prerogatives. [18]
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it.
Anything less would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. [19]
 
In the case at bench, we find the respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
 
Acting on the motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, the respondent issued the September 14, 2006 Order requiring the parties to
maintain the status quo ante until the said motion had been resolved. It should be stressed, however,
that at the time the said motion was filed, the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) is already in effect.
 
Admittedly, under the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiter has, in proper
cases, the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or restraining orders. Section 1, Rule XI
of the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that:
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. A preliminary injunction or
restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its Divisions pursuant
to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended,
when it is established on the basis of the sworn allegations in the petition that the
acts complained of involving or arising from any labor dispute before the
Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such
party.
If necessary, the Commission may require the petitioner to post a bond and
writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order shall become effective only upon
the approval of the bond which shall answer for any damage that may be suffered
by the party enjoined, if it is finally determined that the petitioner is not entitled
thereto.
 
The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the Labor
Arbiters only as an incident to the cases pending before them in order to
preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of the case, but
excluding labor disputes involving strike or lockout. (emphasis supplied)
 
 
Nevertheless, under the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiters no longer
has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining orders. Under
Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, only the NLRC, through its Divisions,
may issue writs of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining orders. Thus:
 
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. - A preliminary
injunction or restraining order may be granted by the Commission through
its Divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor
Code, as amended, when it is established on the basis of the sworn allegations in the
petition that the acts complained of involving or arising from any labor dispute
before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause
grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor
of such party. (emphasis supplied)
 
The role of the labor arbiters, with regard to the issuance of writs of preliminary injunctions and/or writ
of preliminary injunction, at present, is limited to reception of evidence as may be delegated by the
NLRC. Thus, Section 4, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that:
 
Section 4. Reception of Evidence; Delegation. - The reception of
evidence for the application of a writ of injunction may be delegated by
 the Commission to any of its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in
such places as he may determine to be accessible to the parties and their witnesses,
and shall thereafter submit his report and recommendation to the Commission
within fifteen (15) days from such delegation. (emphasis supplied)
 
 
The foregoing rule is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. However, the respondent, in violation
of the said rule, vehemently insist that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order. On this point, the Investigating Commissioner aptly ruled that:
The respondent should, in the first place, not entertained Edward Tozes
Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction Against the Respondents. He should have denied it outright on the basis
of Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the National Labor
Relations Commission.
 
xxxx
 
The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter of the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission, should have been familiar with Sections 1 and 4 of the 2005
Revised Rules of procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission. The first,
states that it is the Commission of the [NLRC] that may grant a preliminary
injunction or restraining order. While the second, states [that] Labor Arbiters [may]
conduct hearings on the application of preliminary injunction or restraining order
only in a delegated capacity. [20]
 
 
What made matters worse is the unnecessary delay on the part of the respondent in resolving the
motion for reconsideration of the September 14, 2006 Order. The unfounded insistence of the
respondent on his supposed authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, taken together with the delay in the resolution of the said motion for
reconsideration, would clearly show that the respondent deliberately intended to cause prejudice to
the complainants.
 
On this score, the Investigating Commissioner keenly observed that:
The Commission is very much disturbed with the effect of the Order dated
September 14, 2006 and the delay in the resolution of the pending incidents in the
illegal dismissal case before the respondent.
 
Conspicuously, Section 3 (Term of Contract) of the Employment Contract between
David Edward Toze and International School Manila provides that David Edward Toze
will render work as a superintendent for the school years August 2005-July 2006 and
August 2006-July 2007.
 
The Order dated September 14, 2006 in effect reinstates David Edward Toze as
superintendent of International School of Manila until the resolution of the formers
Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction Against the Respondents.
Since the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International
School Manila is about to expire or end on August 2007, prudence dictates that the
respondent expediently resolved [sic] the merits of David Edward Tozes Verified
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction Against the Respondents because any delay in the resolution thereof
would result to undue benefit in favor of David Edward Toze and unwarranted
prejudice to International School Manila.
 
xxxx
At the time the respondent inhibited himself from resolving the illegal dismissal case
before him, there are barely four (4) months left with the Employment Contract
between David Edward Toze and International School Manila.
 
From the foregoing, there is an inordinate delay in the resolution of the
reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 2006 that does not escape the
attention of this Commission. There appears an orchestrated effort to delay the
resolution of the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 2006 and keep
status quo ante until expiration of David Edward Tozes Employment Contract with
International School Manila come August 2007, thereby rendering the illegal
dismissal case moot and academic.
 
xxxx
 
Furthermore, the procrastination exhibited by the respondent in the
resolution of [the] assailed Order x x x should not be countenanced, specially, under
the circumstance that is attendant with the term of the Employment Contract
between David Edward Toze and International School Manila. The respondents
lackadaisical attitude in sitting over the pending incident before him for more than
five (5) months only to thereafter inhibit himself therefrom, shows the respondents
disregard to settled rules and jurisprudence. Failure to decide a case or resolve a
motion within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants
the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate x x x. The
respondent, being a Labor Arbiter, is akin to judges, and enjoined to decide a case
with dispatch. Any delay, no matter how short, in the disposition of cases undermine
the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary x x x. [21]
 
Indubitably, the respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the
strictures of the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby occasioning
sanction from this Court.
 
In stubbornly insisting that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order contrary to the clear import of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,
the respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
 
All told, we find the respondent to have committed gross ignorance of the law, his acts as a
labor arbiter in the case below being inexcusable thus unquestionably resulting into prejudice to the
rights of the parties therein.
 Having established the foregoing, we now proceed to determine the appropriate penalty to  
be imposed. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant
  and the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance and
Under Rule 140[22] of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance likewise be entered in the record of the respondent as attorney.
of the law is a serious charge, [23] punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00, but not  
exceeding P40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three SO ORDERED.
but not exceeding six months, or dismissal from the service. [24]
 
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., the respondent-lawyer and provincial adjudicator, found guilty of
gross ignorance of the law, was suspended from the practice of law for six months. Additionally, in
parallel cases,[25] a judge found guilty of gross ignorance of the law was meted the penalty of
suspension for six months.
 
Here, the IBP Board of Governors recommended that the respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for six months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar incident would be
dealt with more severe penalty. We adopt the foregoing recommendation.
 
This Court notes that the IBP Board of Governors had previously recommended the
respondents suspension from the practice of law for three years in A.C. No. 7314, entitled Mary Ann T.
Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.. This case, however, is still pending.
 
It cannot be gainsaid that since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded
upon lawyers in the government service is more exacting than the standards for those in private
practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of
public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in
favor of the interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere with the discharge of
their official functions.[26]
 
At this point, the respondent should be reminded of our exhortation in Republic of the
Philippines v. Judge Caguioa,[27] thus:
 
Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges are called upon
to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules.
Basic rules should be at the palm of their hands. Their inexcusable failure to observe
basic laws and rules will render them administratively liable. Where the law involved
is simple and elementary, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of
the law. Verily, for transgressing the elementary jurisdictional limits of his court,
respondent should be administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.
 
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and
elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge is
either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too
vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in
grave abuse of judicial authority.[28](citations omitted)
 
 
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. guilty of gross ignorance of the
law in violation of his lawyers oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court resolved
to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a WARNING that
commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe
penalty.
A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, complainant,  for a writ of injunction in the same case, respondent impliedly admitted being the partner of Atty.
vs.
ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
BIDIN, J.:
In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant Philippine National Bank charged
respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset Management Group of
complainant bank with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.
by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with complainant bank in which
respondent during his employment with aforesaid bank, had intervened.
Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in arranging the
sale of steel sheets (denominated as Lots 54-M and 55-M) in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for P200,000.
He even "noted" the gate passes issued by his subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of Mrs. Ong
Siy authorizing the pull-out of the steel sheets from the DMC Man Division Compound. When a civil
action arose out of this transaction between Mrs. Ong Siy and complainant bank before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146, respondent who had since left the employ of complainant bank,
appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.
Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative case filed by
complainant bank against his former subordinate Emmanuel Elefan, for grave misconduct and
dishonesty, respondent appeared as counsel for Elefan only to be later disqualified by the Civil Service
Commission.
Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainant’s Asset Management
Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan account of the spouses Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda
with complainant bank by writing demand letters to the couple. When a civil action ensued between
complainant bank and the Almeda spouses as a result of this loan account, the latter were
represented by the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" of which respondent is one of the
Senior Partners.
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared as counsel for Mrs. Ong Siy
but only with respect to the execution pending appeal of the RTC decision. He alleged that he did not
participate in the litigation of the case before the trial court. With respect to the case of the Almeda
spouses, respondent alleged that he never appeared as counsel for them. He contended that while the
law firm "Cedo Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" is designated as counsel of record, the case is actually
handled only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer. Respondent averred that he did not enter into a general
partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer nor with the other lawyers named therein. They are only using the
aforesaid name to designate a law firm maintained by lawyers, who although not partners, maintain
one office as well as one clerical and supporting staff. Each one of them handles their own cases
independently and individually receives the revenues therefrom which are not shared among them.
In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.
During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that respondent was previously fined
by this Court in the amount of P1,000.00 in connection with G.R. No. 94456 entitled "Milagros Ong Siy
vs. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, et al." for forum shopping, where respondent appeared as counsel for
petitioner Milagros Ong Siy "through the law firm of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and Associates."
The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent were fully substantiated.
Respondent's averment that the law firm handling the case of the Almeda spouses is not a partnership
deserves scant consideration in the light of the attestation of complainant's counsel, Atty. Pedro
Singson, that in one of the hearings of the Almeda spouses' case, respondent attended the same with
his partner Atty. Ferrer, and although he did not enter his appearance, he was practically dictating to
Atty. Ferrer what to say and argue before the court. Furthermore, during the hearing of the application
Ferrer, when it was made of record that respondent was working in the same office as Atty. Ferrer.
Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm is true, it is in itself a violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the client’s secrets and confidential records
and information are exposed to the other lawyers and staff members at all times.
From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of respondent to devise ways and
means to attract as clients former borrowers of complainant bank since he was in the best position to
see the legal weaknesses of his former employer, a convincing factor for the said clients to seek his
professional service. In sum, the IBP saw a deliberate sacrifice by respondent of his ethics in
consideration of the money he expected to earn.
The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for 3 years.
The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP had, on October 4, 1994, submitted to
this Court its Report and recommendation in this case, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated October 25, 1994 of the recommendation contained in the said Report with the IBP Board of
Governors. On December 12, 1994, respondent also filed another "Motion to Set Hearing" before this
Court, the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration. In resolving this case, the Court took into
consideration the aforesaid pleadings.
In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion appropriate to emphasize the
paramount importance of avoiding the representation of conflicting interests. In the similar case
of Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95 SCRA 24 [1980]) where a former Legal Officer
and Legal Prosecutor of PARGO who participated in the investigation of the Anti-Graft case against
Mayor Pablo Cuneta later on acted as counsel for the said Mayor in the same anti-graft case, this
Court, citing Nombrado vs. Hernandez (26 SCRA 13 119681) ruled:
The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no reason to disagree with him,
that even if respondent did not use against his client any information or evidence
acquired by him as counsel it cannot be denied that he did become privy to
information regarding the ownership of the parcel of land which was later litigated in
the forcible entry case, for it was the dispute over the land that triggered the
mauling incident which gave rise to the criminal action for physical injuries. This
Court's remarks inHilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 571, are apropos:
"Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a
complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well-
known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an
attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in
advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the
complainant's cause."
Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former
client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their
previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the
other side in the forcible entry case. In the case of Hilado vs. David, supra, this
Tribunal further said:
Hence the necessity of setting the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and
client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is
designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct,
but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
practice. . . . It is founded on principles of public policy, of good taste. As has been
said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties,
but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With
these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorney, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double dealing. Only thus can litigants. be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and effect to respondent in
the case at bar. Having been an executive of complainant bank, respondent now seeks to litigate as
counsel for the opposite side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction which he
formerly handled while still an employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting interests, to wit:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express conflicting
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning
of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interest when, in behalf on one client,
it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO from the
practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in Metro
Manila.
SO ORDERED.
WILFREDO M. CATU, A.C. No. 5738
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
 
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA,
Respondent. Promulgated:
February 19, 2008
 
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
 
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot [1] and the building erected thereon located at 959
San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested
the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu [2] and Antonio Pastor[3] of one of the units in the building. The
latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them
in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5 th District of Manila[4] where the
parties reside.
 
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation
meetings.[5] When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a
certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the
defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint,
[6]
 claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when
he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation
proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.
 
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints
referred to the barangays Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and
Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost
objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to
amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that
Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free
because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice
against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions
of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. [7]
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over
the conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and
Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed
against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings
including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so
doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened
while in said service.
 
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section
7(b)(2) of RA 6713:[8]
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions
of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing
laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
 
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
 
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized
by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict
or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)
 According to the IBP-CBD, respondents violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
 
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF
THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis
supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondents suspension from the
practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will
be dealt with more severely. [9] This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.[10]
We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty.
 
 
RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
APPLIES ONLY TO FORMER GOVERNMENT
LAWYERS
 
 
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in
connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service. In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,
[11]
 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service.
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act
complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)
(2) OF RA 6713, GOVERNS THE PRACTICE
OF PROFESSION OF ELECTIVE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency,
from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions. This is the
general law which applies to all public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160 [12] governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal
mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any
occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided,
That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a
local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the
government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an official;
and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when
the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the
Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official
hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials
concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective
local officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local
officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the
private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.
[13]
 
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are
the following: the governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for
provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for
cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the  sangguniang bayan for
municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the
members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.
 
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited
from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their
functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time service. They
should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach
in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions, engage in
any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and
municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayanare required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week.
[14]
 Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any
occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure
prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.
 
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial
board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice
their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong
barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
[15]
 Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice
their profession.And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact,
the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.[16]
 
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession.
However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department,
as required by civil service regulations.
 
A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO
IS NOT PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE LAW
MUST SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY FROM
THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the
disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission
of the head of the department concerned.[17] Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the
head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the
case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that
their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an
employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted
outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not
impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally,
that no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or
employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his
duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become
an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written
permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as
counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law,  vires
legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To
underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not
only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach
of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the
legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics
and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
 
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar. [18] Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[19]
 
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for
violation of the lawyers oath[20] and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
 
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct
for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months
effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely.
 
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
 
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records
of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all
the courts of the land for their information and guidance.
 
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005]
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), petitioner,
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN,
FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE,
MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by
TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN,
CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO,
ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN
T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE
CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS,
INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL
INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC.,
MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT
CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC.,
SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand,
the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its
effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing
it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central Bank. [1] It was later found by the
Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related
interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as
uncollectible.[2] As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which
reached a total of P310 million.[3] Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its
financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring
GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the
general public, and ordering its liquidation.[4] A public bidding of GENBANKs assets was held
from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.
[5]
 Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then
Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANKs
liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of
President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and
his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the  Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against
respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua,
Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C.
Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth
Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking
Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings
Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel
Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and
Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms,
Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively
referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.[6] In connection therewith, the
PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named
persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. [7] After the filing of
the parties comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition.
These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al.
were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then
resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel
for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos.
0005[8] and 0096-0099.[9] The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor
General[10] and counsel to Central Bank, actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which
was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation.
Respondent Mendoza allegedly intervened in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al.
when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Banks officials on
the procedure to bring about GENBANKs liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in
connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No.
107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of setting some standards
resolution denying PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005. [11] It found
that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendozas former
function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted
that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank
during his term as Solicitor General.[12] It further ruled that respondent Mendozas appearance as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of
Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section
prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any
matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or
separation from public office.[13] The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling. [14]
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayans Second
Division to the Fifth Division. [15] In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of
the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza.
[16]
 It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the
arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The
PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated December
5, 2001.[17]
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and
December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. [18] The PCGG alleged that the Fifth
Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a
former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection with any matter in which he
intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the
objection to respondent Mendozas appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil
Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.[19]
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the
import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and
the government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.
I
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in the said service.
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive
in England and other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble modern
codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly were
comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed towards the litigation
conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to any
obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times intricate, including
specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore
settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty,
confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but
ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not
differ markedly from those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial
oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from England was in the
pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in England varied over time, but
the variation in early America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a single
of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of
the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the
colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable
fees.[20]
The nineteenth century has been termed the dark ages of legal ethics in the United States.
By mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field,
the drafter of the highly influential New York Field Code, introduced a new set of uniform standards of
conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in
the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman
and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline of a
lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a
new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and
statutes, other than the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations e.g.,
the do no falsehood oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law
continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of
agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence
law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory
of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had
some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards
were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by
contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered
a new era in American legal ethics.[21]
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide
lawyers in their practice the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical
standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of ethical
guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes gave
detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures,
however, the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes and oaths.
Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them as binding
rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar associations
themselves. Local bar associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded
by the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again,
picking up where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations, most
notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of
drafting substantive standards of conduct for their members. [22]
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics.
The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states codes, and it was the foundation
for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.[23]
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to
attain the full measure of public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the
Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional
Ethics.[24]
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons.
Among their concerns was the revolving door or the process by which lawyers and others
temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private
practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service.
[25]
 These concerns were classified as adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest
conflicts. Adverse-interest conflicts exist where the matter in which the former government
lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt
with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse. [26] On
the other hand, congruent-interest representation conflicts are unique to government lawyers
and apply primarily to former government lawyers. [27] For several years, the ABA attempted to correct
and update the canons through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In
1928, the ABA amended one canon and added thirteen new canons. [28] To deal with problems peculiar
to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for adverse-
interest conflicts and congruent-interest representation conflicts. [29] The rationale for disqualification is
rooted in a concern that the government lawyers largely discretionary actions would be influenced by
the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the advantage
of parties who might later become private practice clients. [30] Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has
previously acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not,
after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons
46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.[31]
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics.[32]
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons
needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the
creation of a committee to study the adequacy and effectiveness of the ABA Canons. The committee
recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to
distinguish between the inspirational and the proscriptive and were thus unsuccessful in enforcement.
The legal profession in the United States likewise observed that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in
matters during their employment with the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility.[33] The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional
Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to
which the lawyer must adhere. [34] In the case of Canon 9,  DR 9-101(b)[35] became the applicable
supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved the Model
Code.[36]
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and
indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a
whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility. The Model Rules used the restatement format, where the conduct standards were
set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give better
guidance and clarity for enforcement because the only enforceable standards were the black letter
Rules. The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on
narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the
content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of substantive improvements
particularly with regard to conflicts of interests. [37] In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9,
citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of
anxious clients as well as the norms indefinite nature. [38]
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a
proposed Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for
approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and
to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[39] Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals
particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph
2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase investigated
and passed upon with the word intervened. It is, therefore, properly applicable to both adverse-
interest conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts.
The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent
Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp.
Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case
Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether
there exists a congruent-interest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from
representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of matter referred to in
the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the intervention made by the former government
lawyer on the matter. The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined matter as any
discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation
and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the matter which was the subject of intervention by
respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of
respondent Mendoza as constituting the matter where he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:[40]
The PCGGs Case for Atty. Mendozas Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in
issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza,
as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank
on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with
the CFI of Manila.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key
officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy
Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special
Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano
and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they
averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza),
who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the
said memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that
the following procedure should be taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies
and evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31,
1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so
that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors
and the general public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the
bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing
decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the
liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was
shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order
to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the banks liquidation. The pertinent
portion of the said minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:
...
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject
memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank
dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to
the Monetary Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report on the
current situation of Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated
March 23, 1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank,
to the Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to
Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the
state of insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor
General for his use in then CFI-praying the assistance of the Court in the
liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General
involved in the case at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. In fine, the Court should
resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is
included within the concept of matter under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in
black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever, upon examination by the head of
the appropriate supervising or examining department or his examiners or agents into the
condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be
the duty of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary
Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements of the department head
to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and shall designate an
official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as
receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible
collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors,
exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to,
bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.
...
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the
bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or
cannot resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, it
shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its
liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General,
file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken
and praying the assistance of the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall
have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or
non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual
liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such
institution and to implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The
Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central Bank, or a person of recognized
competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the
receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator
shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to money or sell, assign or
otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of paying the
debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be
necessary in the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such
institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the
Monetary Board under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall
be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof
that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction
shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under
this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing
proof that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and
the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is
pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the
court. The restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved
upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank
cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff
conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the
refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of
Court insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section
shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction
contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or
non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as
they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That this shall
not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands
 induced by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment
of a receiver under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the
provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by
PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK
is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal
Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of
law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term matter and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent
Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the
said act of respondent Mendoza which is the matter involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely
different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for
themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central
Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied
Bank. The matter where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary
petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject matter of Sp. Proc.
No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject
matter in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the
stocksowned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten.
The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to
Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far
removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by
the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In
other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases.
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes
without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to
respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc.
No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case
No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the intervention contemplated by Rule 6.03.
Intervene means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or
come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or
modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city lay on
both sides of an intervening river . . .) [41]
On the other hand, intervention is defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect
the interests of others.[42]
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word intervene. Under the first
interpretation, intervene includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant
or has no effect or little influence. [43] Under the second interpretation, intervene only includes an
act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. [44] We hold that this second
meaning is more appropriate to give to the word intervention under Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not
exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as x x x
drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing
abstract principles of law.
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36
provided that a former government lawyer should not, after his retirement, accept employment in
connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or
employ. As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase which he has investigated or passed upon
resulted in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude,
hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the
government service, had substantial responsibility. The 1983 Model Rules further constricted the
reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection
with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or
employee.
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is
significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is
an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting
Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actualparticipation of respondent
Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long number of
years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed
merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the
court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of
creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an
agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the
participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the
interest of government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort
on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it
is a take-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To
date, the legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Court took account of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and
application to the case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other values of equal
importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government
recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to match
compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse
that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to
recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can
later be exchanged for higher income in private practice. [45] Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the
sacrifice of entering government service would be too great for most men to endure should ethical
rules prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in
acquiring and cause the firm with which they become associated to be disqualified. [46] Indeed, to make
government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter. [47]
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to
harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The
danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel
in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass and
embarrass the opponent, and observed that the tactic was so prevalent in large civil cases in recent
years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary. [48] Even the United States Supreme
Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals description of disqualification motions as a
dangerous game.[49] In the case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult
to divine. The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated
after the lapse of many years and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of
respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was
filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed as
Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. [50] At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to
disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioners motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice
to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a
disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an government lawyers the ones who were hardest to beat not the least qualified or least vigorous
individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. [51] The client with a disqualified lawyer must start advocates.[65] But again, this particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no
again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter. [52] The effects of this prejudice to the charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with
right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due process. an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.
the rule on the official independence of lawyers in the government service . According to Prof. Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the excessive
Morgan: An individual who has the security of knowing he or she can find private employment upon influence of former officials or their clout. [66] Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this
leaving the government is free to work vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she believes concern too far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: Much of what appears to be an
them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of employees influence may actually be the power or authority of his or her position, power that
private employment does not enjoy such freedom. [53] He adds: Any system that affects the right to evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x. [67] More, he contends that the concern can
take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him further: x x x The idea that, present
independence.[54] The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more about the
occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in
General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this independence that federal officials that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials
allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives will tend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism. [68]
him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of III
the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
The question of fairness
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer
of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest
of a former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law firm. [55] Former government prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive
lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession. period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza.
Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid
Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any
in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if
speculative exercise at best[56] which can lead to untoward results. [57] No less than Judge Kaufman applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and
doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have any detrimental deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.
effect on that free flow of information between the government-client and its attorneys which the
canons seek to protect. [58] Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5,
the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct [59] and some courts have 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, No cost.
and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, SO ORDERED.
and the public.[60]
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly
disfavors lawyers who switch sides. It is claimed that switching sides carries the danger that former
government employee may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this
concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza
in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from
the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of
respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential official information
might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent sides to be bothered
about in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al.,
respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is
indirectly defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it
later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central
Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of
respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of
loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in
government service.[61] The example given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who
plans to work for the company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted
to prosecute less vigorously.[62] In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in
1960: The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well occur during the
period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of government policies.
[63]
 Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as probably excessive. [64] He opines x x x it is hard to
imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or her
last client the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the best