G.R. No.
L-18727             August 31, 1964 As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective
JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant,
ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.
Jose W. Diokno for plaintiff-appellee.
Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L. Hofileña for defendant-appellant.
Romulo Cui in his own behalf as intervenor-appellants.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu. The office in contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de
San Jose de Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the
plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma.
Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.
The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro
Cui and Doña Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of
charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons." It
acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine
Legislature passed 27 November 1925) and endowed with extensive
properties by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the
deed of donation executed on 2 January 1926.
Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly
and, in case of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may
nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them." Section 2 of the
deed of donation provides as follows:
Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para
administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro legitime sobrino Mariano Cui,
si al tiempo de nuestra muerte o incapacidad se hallare residiendo
en la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio
Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese
residiendo entonces en la caudad de Cebu, designamos en su
lugar a nuestro otro sobrino legitime Mauricio Cui. Ambos
sobrinos administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE
DE BARILI. A la muerte o incapacidad de estos dos
administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE
BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de
edad, que descienda legitimainente de cualquiera de nuestros
sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor
Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o
farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado
mayor impuesto o contribution. En igualdad de circumstancias,
sera preferida el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia
ultimamente la administracion. Cuando absolutamente faltare
persona de estas cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO
DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al senor Obispo de Cebu o quien
sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica, apostolica, Romana,
que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta Provincia de Cebu, y en
su defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu.
Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer
the Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to
Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May 1931 and the
second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio
Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series of
controversies and court litigations ensued concerning the position of
administrator, to which, in so far as they are pertinent to the present case,
reference will be made later in this decision.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the
sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and
Doña Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator,
Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a
"convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a notarial
document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of
office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio"
or of his brother's assumption of the position.
Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff
wrote a letter to the defendant demanding that the office be turned over to
him; and on 13 September 1960, the demand not having been complied with
the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened,
claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another
one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed
of donation.
qualifications to the position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two
and therefore under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to
section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be,
applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate
descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o
medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que
pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion."
The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado."
Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of
Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed
the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand,
is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court on 29 March
1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution
promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the
position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.
The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the
phrase "titulo de abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer,
but that has used in the deed of donation and considering the function or
purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a strict interpretation
but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor
of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the
intervenor.
We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term
"titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of
Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto,
qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined
as "testimonies o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o
profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Real Academia Espanola, 1947
ed., p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as follows: "Perito en el derecho
positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, los
derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las
cuestiones o puntos legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's degree
alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic
requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The
English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a
fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who
are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and
defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are
devolved by law as a consequence.
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the
authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission
requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving
a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license to
practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has
little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with
the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully
completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially
approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however,
possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the
prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are
instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where
persons who had not gone through any formal legal education in college
were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section
14 of that code required possession of "the necessary qualifications of
learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such persons
do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic
degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university.
The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the
foregoing test advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a
lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a
pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays the
highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because
under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make
regulations for the government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe
the conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute
persons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the
rules and conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the
provisions of the Act; and shall administer properties of considerable value —
for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the law
and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.
Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as
against the defendant, to the office of administrator. But it is argued that
although the latter is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by
virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the
administrator may be removed on the ground, among others, of ineptitude in
the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moral character.
Reference is made to the fact that the defendant was disbarred by this Court
on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact,
1
however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed
the office of administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral
rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the
Bar in the first place.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of
facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by
this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great
extent in the sound discretion of the court. The court action will
depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the
public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of
justice will be conserved by the applicant's participation therein in
the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant
must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court
that he is a person of good moral character — a fit and proper
person to practice law. The court will take into consideration the
applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the
nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his
conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has
elapsed between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)
Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to
reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has received a
pardon following his conviction, and the requirements for
reinstatement have been held to be the same as for original
admission to the bar, except that the court may require a greater
degree of proof than in an original admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney &
Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)
The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are
whether applicant is "of good moral character" in the sense in
which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and is
a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the
office of an attorney, and whether his mental qualifications are
such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his duty to the
public, and the moral attributes are to be regarded as a separate
and distinct from his mental qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney &
Client, Sec. 41, p. 816).
As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking
reinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that
implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office
which is disputed in this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll of
lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous
disbarment were wiped out.
This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of
time amounting the prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66
(formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from section 216 of Act 190), this kind of
action must be filed within one (1) year after the right of plaintiff to hold the
office arose.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as
long ago as 1932. On January 26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo
warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed the administration of
the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's father and Antonio
Ma. Cui came in as intervenors. The case was dismissed by the Court of First
Instance upon a demurrer by the defendant there to the complaint and
complaint in intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from the order
of dismissal, the case was remanded for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60
Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as indicated in
the decision of this Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby Teodoro
Cui continued as administrator, Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser" and
plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui accepted a position as assistant administrator.
Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial
maneuvers. First he informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter
dated 1 February 1950, that as of the previous 1 January he had "made clear"
his intention of occupying the office of administrator of the Hospicio." He
followed that up with another letter dated 4 February, announcing that he
had taken over the administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually, however,
he took his oath of office before a notary public only on 4 March 1950, after
receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from the Social Welfare
Commissioner, who thought that he had already assumed the position as
stated in his communication of 4 February 1950. The rather muddled
situation was referred by the Commissioner to the Secretary of Justice, who,
in an opinion dated 3 April 1950 (op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting another
opinion previously given, in effect ruled that the plaintiff, not beings lawyer,
was not entitled to the administration of the Hospicio.
Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy.
On 4 March 1950, the Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine
National Bank in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because
the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's deposits therein. The Bank then filed a
third-party complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who
had, as stated above, taken oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950,
having been deprived of recognition by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
he moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that he was
relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the administration of the Hospicio.
The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. On 6 February
1954 he was able to take another oath of office as administrator before
President Magsaysay, and soon afterward filed a second motion to dismiss in
Civil case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a
case was pending in Court, stated in a telegram to his Executive Secretary
that "as far as (he) was concerned the court may disregard the oath" thus
taken. The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and the other parties
in the case filed their notice of appeal from the order of dismissal. The
plaintiff then filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as party in the appeal
and the trial Court again granted the motion. This was on 24 November 1954.
Appellants thereupon instituted a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme
Court (G.R. No. L-8540), which was decided on 28 May 1956, to the effect
that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the appeal. That appeal, however,
after it reached this Court was dismiss upon motion of the parties, who
agreed that "the office of administrator and trustee of the Hospicio ... should
be ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the
incumbent by whomsoever is not occupying the office but believes he has a
right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of dismissal was issued 31 July
1956. At that time the incumbent administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no
action in quo warranto was filed against him by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as
indicated in the aforesaid motion for dismissal.
On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this
Court as member of the Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro
Cui resigned as administrator in his favor, pursuant to the "convenio"
between them executed on the same date. The next day Antonio Ma. Cui
took his oath of office.
The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court
decided the first case of Cui v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the
trial court for further proceedings; his acceptance instead of the position of
assistant administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to continue as
administrator and his failure to file an action in quo warranto against said Dr.
Cui after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu
Court was dismissed upon motion of the parties precisely so that the
conflicting claims of the parties could be ventilated in such an action — all
these circumstances militate against the plaintiff's present claim in view of
the rule that an action in quo warranto must be filed within one year after
the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose. The excuse that the plaintiff
did not file an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956 because of
the latter's illness did not interrupt the running of the statutory period. And
the fact that this action was filed within one year of the defendant's
assumption of office in September 1960 does not make the plaintiff's position
any better, for the basis of the action is his own right to the office and it is
from the time such right arose that the one-year limitation must be counted,
not from the date the incumbent began to discharge the duties of said
office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.
Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a
lawyer, grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of
the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of donation. He is further, in the
line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano
Cui, another one of the said nephews. The deed of donation provides: "a la
muerte o incapacidad de estos administradores (those appointed in the deed
itself) pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que
descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos
Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de
abogado ... En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas
edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administration." Besides
being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he
and therefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The
intervenor contends that the intention of the founders was to confer the
administration by line and successively to the descendants of the nephews
named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since the
last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui
line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom
the intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the
terms of the deed of donation.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from
is reversed and set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in
intervention are dismissed, with costs equally against plaintiff-appellee and
intervenor-appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Regala,
JJ., concur.
2
 A.C. No. 8235, January 27, 2015
JOSELITO F. TEJANO, Complainant, v. ATTY. BENJAMIN F.
BATERINA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a verified administrative complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina.
The Facts
On 26 March 2009, Joselito F. Tejano filed an Affidavit-Complaint1 before the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of the Supreme Court against Judge
Dominador LL. Arquelada, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, Branch 21, and Tejano’s own counsel, Atty. Baterina.
Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of acting in conspiracy with Atty. Baterina
for the former to take possession of his (Tejano) property, which was the
subject matter of litigation in the judge’s court.
The case stems from Civil Case No. 4046-V, a suit for recovery of possession
and damages filed by Tejano, his mother and sisters against the Province of
Ilocos Sur. The property involved in the suit is a strip of land located at the
northern portion of Lot No. 5663 in Tamag, Vigan City. The lot was wholly
owned by Tejano’s family, but the Province of Ilocos Sur constructed an
access road stretching from the provincial highway in the east to the
provincial government’s motor pool in the west without instituting the
proper expropriation proceedings.2
The case was raffled off to Branch 21 of the Vigan City RTC in October 1988.
Four judges would hear the case before Judge Arquelada became the
branch’s presiding judge in 2001.3 Prior to his appointment to the bench,
however, Judge Arquelada was one of the trial prosecutors assigned to
Branch 21, and in that capacity represented the Province of Ilocos Sur in Civil
Case No. 4046-V.4
In his Affidavit-Complaint, Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of colluding with
Atty. Baterina in the former’s bid to “take possession” of their property and
was “collecting rentals from squatters who had set up their businesses inside
the whole of Lot [No.] 5663.” In support of his accusations, Tejano attached a
copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-430045 covering Lot No. 5663 in the
name of Karen Laderas, purportedly the daughter of Judge Arquelada;
receipts of rents paid to Terencio Florendo,6 sheriff at Judge Arquelada’s sala
at the Vigan City RTC; receipts of rents paid to Aida Calibuso,7 who was
expressly designated by Laderas as her attorney-in-fact8 in collecting said
rents; and receipts of rents paid to Edgar Arquelada, Judge Arquelada’s
brother.9
As to his counsel, Tejano claims that Atty. Baterina “miserably failed to
advance [his] cause.” Specifically, Tejano alleged that Atty. Baterina (1) failed
to object when the trial court pronounced that he and his co-plaintiffs had
waived their right to present evidence after several postponements in the  RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-237
trial because his mother was ill and confined at the hospital;10 (2) manifested
in open court that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the order
declaring their presentation of evidence terminated but failed to actually do
so;11 (3) not only failed to file said motion for reconsideration, but also
declared in open court that they would not be presenting any witnesses
without consulting his clients;12 and (4) failed to comply with the trial court’s
order to submit their formal offer of exhibits.13
In a letter dated 27 March 2009, then Court Administrator (now Supreme
Court Associate Justice) Jose P. Perez informed Tejano that the OCA has no
jurisdiction over Atty. Baterina since it only has administrative supervision
over officials and employees of the judiciary. However, Tejano was informed
to file the complaint against his counsel at the Office of the Bar Confidant,
and that the complaint against Judge Arquelada was already “being acted
upon” by the OCA.14
In a Resolution dated 6 July 2009, the Court required Atty. Baterina  to file a
Comment on the complaint within 10 days from notice.15 Failing to comply
with the Court’s order, Atty. Baterina was ordered to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with and once again ordered to comply with
the Court’s 6 July 2009 Order.16
In his Compliance dated 28 March 2010, Atty. Baterina explained that he had
been recuperating from a kidney transplant when he received a copy of the
complaint. He begged the Court’s indulgence and said that his failure to
comply was “not at all intended to show disrespect to the orders of the
Honorable Tribunal.”17
Atty. Baterina also denied the allegation of bad faith and negligence in
handling the Tejano case. He explained that the reason he could not attend
to the case was that in 2002, after the initial presentation of the plaintiffs’
case, he was suspended by the Court from the practice of law for two
years.18 He alleged that this fact was made known to Tejano’s mother and
sister. However, the trial court did not order plaintiffs to secure the services
of another lawyer. On the contrary, it proceeded to hear the case, and
plaintiffs were not represented by a lawyer until the termination of the
case.19 Atty. Baterina instead points to the “displayed bias” and “undue and
conflict of interest”20 of Judge Arquelada as the culprit in Tejano’s
predicament.
The Court, in its 19 July 2010 Resolution, found Atty. Baterina’s explanation
“not satisfactory” and admonished him “to be more heedful of the Court’s
directives in order to avoid delay in the disposition of [the] case.” The Court
also referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
IBP Investigation, Report and Recommendation
After the proceedings, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline promulgated
its Report and Recommendation,21 part of which
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
First, it appears that respondent’s failure to appear in representation of his
clients in the said civil case before the RTC was due to his two-year
suspension from the practice of law in 2001. While this is a justified reason
for his non-appearance, respondent, however, manifestly failed to properly
inform the RTC of this fact. That way, the RTC would have, in the meantime,
ordered plaintiffs to seek the services of another lawyer. Respondent’s
contention that the fact of his suspension was nonetheless circularized to all
courts of the Philippines including the RTC is unavailing. Still, respondent
should have exerted prudence in properly informing the RTC of his
suspension in order to protect the interests of his clients.
Moreover, while he relayed such fact of suspension to his clients, there is no
showing that he explained the consequences to them, or that he advised
them to seek another counsel’s assistance in the meantime. Clearly
therefore, respondent’s inaction falls short of the diligence required of him
as a lawyer.
Second, it must be recalled that the RTC in the said case required the
plaintiffs therein to submit their formal offer of evidence. However,
respondent did not bother to do so, in total disregard of the RTC’s Order
dated 8 November 2004. Respondent’s bare excuse that he remembers
making an oral offer thereof deserves no merit because the records of this
case clearly reveal the contrary. Because of the said inaction of respondent,
his clients’ case was dismissed by the RTC.
xxxx
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent’s acts constitute sufficient
ground for disciplinary action against him. His gross negligence under the
circumstances cannot be countenanced. It is, therefore, respectfully
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
two (2) years, and be fined in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), considering that this is his second disciplinary action. x x x.22
On 20 March 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the following
resolution:       
Adm. Case No. 8235
Joselito F. Tejano vs.
Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED
and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex “A”, and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and
considering that Respondent is guilty of gross negligence, Atty. Benjamin F.
Baterina is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years.
However, the Fine of Fifty Thousand Pesos imposed on respondent is
hereby deleted.23
The Court’s Ruling
The Court adopts the IBP’s report and recommendation, with modification as
to the penalty.
The Code of Professional Responsibility governing the conduct of lawyers
states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
xxxx
RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
3
RULE 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for
information.
Lawyers have a “fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and
their clients,” and must act “in accordance with the values and norms of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.”24
When a lawyer agrees to take up a client’s cause, he makes a commitment to
exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Once a lawyer’s
services are engaged, “he is duty bound to serve his client with competence,
and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion
regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to
such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
on him.”25 A lawyer’s acceptance to take up a case “impliedly stipulates [that
he will] carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and
executory.”26
Atty. Baterina’s duty to his clients did not automatically cease with his
suspension. At the very least, such suspension gave him a concomitant
responsibility to inform his clients that he would be unable to attend to their
case and advise them to retain another counsel.
A lawyer – even one suspended from practicing the profession – owes it to
his client to not “sit idly by and leave the rights of his client in a state of
uncertainty.”27 The client “should never be left groping in the dark” and
instead must be “adequately and fully informed about the developments in
his case.”28
Atty. Baterina practically abandoned this duty when he allowed the
proceedings to run its course without any effort to safeguard his clients’
welfare in the meantime. His failure to file the required pleadings on his
clients’ behalf constitutes gross negligence in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility29 and renders him subject to disciplinary
action.30 The penalties for a lawyer’s failure to file the required brief or
pleading range from warning, reprimand, fine, suspension, or in grave cases,
disbarment.31
Further, Atty. Baterina’s reckless disregard for orders and directives of the
courts is unbecoming of a member of the Bar. His conduct has shown that he
has little respect for rules, court processes, and even for the Court’s
disciplinary authority. Not only did he fail to follow the trial court’s orders in
his clients’ case, he even disregarded court orders in his own disciplinary
proceedings.
Considering Atty. Baterina’s medical condition at that time, a simple
explanation to the Court would have sufficed. Instead, however, he simply let
the orders go unheeded, neglecting his duty to the Court.
Lawyers, as this Court has previously emphasized, “are particularly called
upon to obey court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost
in complying with court directives being themselves officers of the
court.”32 As such, Atty. Baterina should “know that a resolution of this Court
is not a mere request but an order which should be complied with promptly
and completely.”33
Proper Penalty
In Spouses Soriano v. Reyes, the Court held that “the appropriate penalty on
an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based
on the surrounding facts.”34
The Court notes that in 2001, Atty. Baterina was also suspended for two
years after being found guilty of gross misconduct.35 In that case, Araceli
Sipin-Nabor filed a complaint against Atty. Baterina for failing to file her
Answer with Counterclaim in a case for quieting of title and recovery of
possession where she and her siblings were defendants. Because of such
failure, Sipin-Nabor was declared by the trial court to be in default and
unable to present her evidence, and which, in turn, resulted in a decision
adverse to her.
Atty. Baterina was also found to have “convert[ed] the money of his client to
his own personal use without her consent” and “deceiv[ed] the complainant
into giving him the amount of P2,000.00 purportedly to be used for filing an
answer with counterclaim,” which he never did.
The Court likewise noted in that case Atty. Baterina’s “repeated failure to
comply with the resolutions of the Court requiring him to comment on the
complaint [which] indicates a high degree of irresponsibility tantamount to
willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the Supreme Court.”36
These two disciplinary cases against Atty. Baterina show a pattern of
neglecting his duty to his clients, as well as a propensity for disrespecting the
authority of the courts. Such incorrigible behavior is unacceptable and will
not be tolerated among the members of the Bar.
For this reason, the Court deems it proper to impose on Atty. Baterina a
longer suspension period of five (5) years.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina is found GUILTY of gross negligence.
He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years. He is
also STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.
This decision shall take effect immediately and copies thereof furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal record,
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to circulate copies of this
decision to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, (Chief Justice), on leave.
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama,
Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ.,
concur.
Carpio, J., Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 1914 dated 27 January
2015.
Brion, J., on official leave.
A.C. No. 10662
[Formerly CBD Case No. 10-2654]
JUN B. LUNA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DWIGHT M. GALARRITA, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Before us is a disbarment Complaint against Atty. Dwight M. Galarrita for his
failure to deliver to his client, complainant Jun B. Luna, the P100,000.00
settlement proceeds he received after entering into a Compromise
Agreement in the foreclosure case without his client’s consent.
On April 7, 2010, Jun B. Luna (Luna) filed an Affidavit-Complaint1 against his
lawyer, Atty. Dwight M. Galarrita (Atty. Galarrita), before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.
Luna alleged that he retained Atty. Galarrita’s legal services in filing a
foreclosure Complaint2 on October 14, 2002 before the Regional Trial Court
of Gumaca, Quezon.3 The Complaint against one Jose Calvario (Calvario)
alleged that Calvario borrowed P100,000.00 from Luna. This loan was
secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage4 over a parcel of land in Quezon
Province.5 Due to non-payment of the loan, Luna filed the Complaint praying
for payment of the obligation with interest, and issuance of a foreclosure
decree upon Calvario’s failure to fully pay within the period.6
The parties tried to amicably settle the case during pre-trial, followed by
Luna’s presentation and offer of evidence.7
Atty. Galarrita opted to enter into a settlement with the other party after his
formal offer of evidence.8 They submitted the Kasunduan9 (Compromise
Agreement) before the trial court on February 14, 2006.10 It provided that
Calvario would pay Luna P105,000.00 as payment for his mortgaged land
and, in turn, Luna would cause the removal of the encumbrance annotation
on the land title.11 The trial court approved12 the Compromise Agreement in
its February 20, 2006 Decision.13 Luna alleged that Atty. Galarrita never
informed him of this Compromise Agreement, and did not deliver to him the
P100,000.00 settlement proceeds Atty. Galarrita had received.14
Luna’s Complaint attached a copy of the Counsel’s Report15 dated August 12,
2003 where Atty. Galarrita proposed and provided justifications for
settlement, and waived any compensation for his services in the case:16
Please take note that Mr. Jose Calvario is willing, able and ready to pay
you IN CASH the full amount of One Hundred Ten Thousand
Pesos (Php110,000.00), no more no less. While we are aware that it’s your
desire to fight this case to its ultimate legal conclusion, allow us nonetheless,
to present the pros and cons of having this case be amicably settled.
Point One: He has in his possession the original copy of the checks you issued
showing that upon signing of the Contract Of Real Estate Mortgage, he
received from you Eighty Eight Thousand Pesos (Php88,000.00) only.
Meaning, he has already paid in advance his interest of 12% or the equivalent
of Twelve Thousand Pesos (Php12,000.00) when the contract was signed.
Consequently, it is useless for us to argue before the court that his principal
4
indebtedness amounted to One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00).
Hence, if you accept the compromise settlement of One Hundred Ten
Thousand Pesos (Php110,000.00), you stand to gain Twenty Two Thousand
Pesos (Php22,000.00).
....
Rest assured, your undersigned counsel leaves it to your better judgment as
to whether he deserves to be paid for his legal services regarding this case
against Mr. Jose Calvario.
Repeat, I will no longer ask from you any compensation for my services
regarding this case.17 (Emphasis in the original)
Atty. Galarrita wrote Luna the following: Counsel’s Reports, Requests for
Funding, and Statements of Accounts in relation to case developments,
retainer’s fees, and reimbursement for expenses incurred.18
After learning of the settlement, Luna wrote Atty. Galarrita: "I was so
surprised when you went into plea agreement for Compromise Agreement
without my knowledge [a]nd beyond to [sic] what we had discussed."19 Atty.
Galarrita replied through the Letter20 dated January 27, 2006, stating in part:
I entered into an amicable settlement with Mr. Jose Calvario because I am
certain that in this kind of case, a compromise is better than WINNING it.
Everything is transparent. You even told me that you are not interested to
acquire the land that’s why you signaled your approval of a compromise.
I was hoping that you already understood my situation. As I have told you, I
can’t waste my time going to Gumaca every now and then. Traveling time is
too precious for my cases here in Metro Manila.
The point is: I did not receive any appearance fee for the numerous hearings
conducted there despite sending several statements of accounts (SOA) to
your office.
If that’s the case, why prolong the agony?
Why bother after all to pursue this case when indeed, you are not interested
to acquire the land and you are not bent in spending the right remuneration
for your undersigned counsel?
I have nothing to hide. The money will be deposited in my savings account
because I just could not handle that amount of cash in my pocket.21
In his Letter22 dated February 27, 2006, Luna wrote:
Yes I’m not interested with that lot in Quezon, [and this is] the reason why
I’m the one who propose to them [that] [w]e settle this case on our own
without any lawyer, they are the one[s] who insist to go to Court. . . . This is
what we come out to [p]ropose to them, with the right amount to cover all
those only been spent including Acceptance fee. You even waive[d] your fee
on this, for every hearing which I couldn’t understand, [y]et we end up that
we still going [sic] to pursue this case, it was discussed during my trip there.
[This is] [t]he reason I’m too surprised with your plea Agreement without my
knowledge.23
Luna mentioned that the delay in retainer’s fee payments was due to Atty.
Galarrita’s negligence in handling the case.24
In his Letter25 of the same date, Atty. Galarrita explained: "The reason this
case was archived [was] because I could not attend several hearings for lack
of meal and transport allowance going to Gumaca, Quezon. . . . that’s moot
and academic because this case was not dismissed by the court, at all."26 Atty.
Galarrita then stated that "[f]or all my shortcomings as a lawyer, I now ask
forgiveness. . . . But let it not be said that I betrayed you and your cases."27
In August 2009, Luna received a letter from one of the heirs of Jose Calvario,
Emma C. Tayag, seeking delivery of the land title since they paid the
P100,000.00 settlement amount.28 Another heir, Lutchiare Calvario, wrote
Luna in September 2009 again demanding delivery of title.29
Luna alleged in his Affidavit-Complaint that Atty. Galarrita has not remitted
the P100,000.00 to date.30 He prays for Atty. Galarrita’s disbarment.31
32
In his Verified Answer,  Atty. Galarrita prays for the dismissal of the
disbarment Complaint.33 He argues that he entered the Compromise
Agreement by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney34 that includes this
purpose.35 He regularly submitted reports to Luna on developments and
possible settlement before he entered the Compromise Agreement.36 He
submits that Luna "‘slept’ on his rights."37
Atty. Galarrita adds that under their General Retainership
Agreement,38 Luna shall pay him _4,000.00 monthly.39 Luna should have paid
P48,000.00 as of November 17, 2006, and after four years with no
revocation, termination, or nullification, Luna’s unpaid obligation amounted
to P208,000.00.40 He listed other unpaid amounts for his legal services.41 Atty.
Galarrita, thus, argues for an application of the rule on retaining lien.42 Atty.
Galarrita also raises the two-year prescription under Rule VIII, Section 1 of
the Rules of Procedure of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission
on Bar Discipline.43 More than four years elapsed since their last
communication in 2006 when the Compromise Agreement became final.44
In his December 4, 2010 Report and Recommendation,45 the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Investigating Commissioner46 found that Atty. Galarrita
violated Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended "his suspension from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year[.]"47
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, in its April 15, 2013
Resolution No. XX-2013-441,48 adopted and approved with modification the
Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation in that Atty.
Galarrita is recommended to be "suspended from the practice of law for six
(6) months and [o]rdered to [r]eturn the amount of One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) Pesos to complainant without prejudice to the filing of a
collection case for retainer’s fee against complainant."49 The Board of
Governors denied reconsideration in its May 3, 2014 Resolution No. XXI-
2014-270.50
The Office of the Bar Confidant reported that "no motion for reconsideration
or petition for review was filed as of November 17, 2014."51 In any case, it is
this court that has the authority to discipline members of the bar.52
The issue for resolution is whether respondent Atty. Galarrita should be held
administratively liable for entering into a Compromise Agreement without his
client complainant Luna’s consent, then refusing to turn over the settlement
proceeds received.
This court acknowledges the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors, with modification increasing the period of
suspension from the practice of law to two (2) years.
I
Those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty
and integrity in all their dealings.53
Lawyers should maintain, at all times, "a high standard of legal proficiency,
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold
duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in
accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code [of Professional
Responsibility]."54
Members of the bar took their oath to conduct themselves "according to the
best of [their] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to [their] clients[,]"55 and to "delay no man for money or malice[.]"56
These mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients
considering the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship.57 Clients entrust
their causes—life, liberty, and property—to their lawyers, certain that this
confidence would not be abused.
Complainant Luna entrusted respondent Atty. Galarrita with handling the
civil case involving a mortgaged land in Quezon Province. However, without
complainant Luna’s consent, respondent Atty. Galarrita settled this case with
the other party.
Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides that "[s]pecial powers of attorney are
necessary in the following cases: . . . (3) To compromise, to submit questions
to arbitration, to renounce the right to appeal from a judgment, to waive
objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a prescription already
acquired[.]"
The Rules of Court thus requires lawyers to secure special authority from
their clients when entering into a compromise agreement that dispenses
with litigation:
5
SEC. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. – Attorneys have authority to ....
bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in
writing and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when
procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their
due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may
client’s litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client’s claim but the
apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
full amount in cash.58 (Emphasis supplied)
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also
have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
Atty. Galarrita contends that he holds a Special Power of Attorney to enter secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
into compromise agreements, but as found by the Investigating
Commissioner:
In several cases, we have disciplined lawyers who failed or refused to remit
amounts received for and on behalf of their clients. "The penalty for violation
There seems to be a compelling reason to believe that Complainant had not of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility usually ranges from
given any authority for the Complainant [sic] to enter into Compromise suspension for six months, to suspension for one year, or two years, and
Agreement at that precise stage of the trial. Firstly, the Complainant was even disbarment[,]"63 depending on the circumstances of each case.
not made a party to the Compromise Agreement despite the fact that he was
not abroad when the agreement was executed. Secondly, there was no
In Villanueva v. Atty. Ishiwata,64 respondent received four checks totalling
indication that he had agreed to the amount of P100,000.00 in exchange for
P225,000.00 from his client’s employer after signing a Quitclaim and Release
his withdrawal of the complaint. Thirdly, he was not seasonably informed of
pursuant to their compromise agreement.65 Despite full payment of
the execution of the Compromise Agreement/payment of the P100,000.00
settlement award, respondent only remitted P45,000.00 to his client and
and came to know of the same only much later.
refused to deliver the balance.66 Respondent explained that he delivered
P90,000.00 to his client’s wife, but his secretary misplaced the signed
Respondent argued that Complainant had previously executed a Special receipts, and he deducted his 25% attorney’s fees of P56,250.00 from the
Power of Attorney wherein he authorized the former to "enter into possible award.67 The balance left was only P750.00.68 This court found Atty.
amicable settlement or submit any matter to arbitration and alternative Ishiwata guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
modes of dispute resolution, simplification of the issues, the necessity of Responsibility, suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year, and
amendment to the pleadings, the possibility of obtaining stipulations or ordered him to restitute to complainant the amount of P154,500.00
admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof, the representing the balance after P45,000.00 and the 10% attorney’s fees had
limitation of the number of witnesses, the advisability of preliminary been deducted from the settlement award.69
reference of issues to a commissioner, the propriety of rendering judgment
on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a
In Aldovino v. Atty. Pujalte, Jr.,70 respondent received P1,001,332.26 from the
valid ground therefor be found to exist, the advisability of suspending the
Branch Clerk of Court corresponding to the six shares of his clients in the
proceedings, offer matters that may properly be considered under Rule 18 of
estate of their deceased mother, but respondent only delivered P751,332.26
the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure." It would seem, however, that despite the
to his clients.71 Respondent explained that he deducted P250,000.00 as his
authority given to Respondent, the same SPA cannot justify Respondent’s
attorney’s fees, while complainants countered that respondent could only
representation in the Compromise Agreement on February 14, 2006. To
retain P14,000.00 as they already paid him P86,000.00 for his services.72 This
dissect, the SPA was executed on September 16, 2002 or a month before
court found Atty. Pujalte, Jr. guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of
the filing of the Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage. Thus, the
Professional Responsibility, suspended him from the practice of law for one
conclusion seems to be that the authority given therein to Respondent to
(1) year, and ordered him to return to complainants the amount of
enter into a possible settlement referred only to a possible settlement that
P236,000.00.73
could be secured or firmed up during the preliminary conference or pre-trial
of the case. In fact, the tenor of the SPA indicates that the SPA was precisely
executed in order to constitute Respondent as Complainant’s representative In Almendarez, Jr. v. Atty. Langit,74 respondent received P255,000.00 from
during the preliminary conference or pre-trial. the Officer-in-Charge Clerk of Court representing the monthly rentals
deposited by the other party in the ejectment case respondent handled for
his client.75 Respondent did not inform his client of this transaction and failed
Assuming it can be inferred that the SPA and the authority given to
to reply to the final demand letter for accounting.76 Respondent did not file
Respondent can be liberally interpreted and allowed to extend up to the time
an Answer to the administrative Complaint despite notice, and failed to
the Compromise had been executed, still the Respondent may not have
appear at the mandatory conference.77 This court found Atty. Langit guilty of
faithfully performed his sworn duty to his client. During the mandatory
violating Canons 1, 11, 16, and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
conference, it was established that at the time the compromise was executed
suspended him from the practice of law for two (2) years, and ordered him to
the Complainant was not abroad and, therefore, given the current
restitute to complainant the amount of _255,000.00 with 12% interest per
information technology it would have been easy or convenient for
annum.78
Respondent to have informed his client about it. Admittedly, his failure in this
regard had only given Complainant the reason to cast doubt on his real
intention in agreeing to the compromise agreement for and in his behalf. In Bayonla v. Reyes,79 respondent should have delivered to her clients the
amount of P123,582.67—the net amount of Bayonla’s share in the
expropriation compensation after deducting respondent’s 40% share as
It would seem, however, that by Complainant’s act of demanding the amount
attorney’s fees—but respondent only delivered P79,000.00 and refused to
from Respondent, the former may have already ignored the issue on the lack
remit the P44,582.67 shortage.80 This court found Atty. Reyes guilty of
of authority on his part thus curing the defect on the latter’s authority to
violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
enter into the same.59 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
suspended her from the practice of law for two (2) years, ordered her to pay
complainants the amount of P44,582.67 with 12% interest per annum, and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "[a] lawyer render accounting and inventory.81
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."60 Members of the bar must always conduct themselves in a way
In Jinon v. Jiz,82 respondent received P45,000.00 from his client for transfer of
that promotes "public confidence in the integrity of the legal
title expenses.83 His client later learned that respondent had been collecting
profession."61 Even though complainant Luna effectively abandoned the issue
the rentals from the property amounting to P12,000.00, yet respondent only
on respondent Atty. Galarrita’s lack of authority to compromise the civil case
turned over P7,000.00.84 Complainant terminated respondent’s legal services
when he demanded the payment of the settlement proceeds, this does not
and demanded the return of the amounts.85 Respondent countered that his
erase his acts of abusing the trust and confidence reposed in him by
legal services covered negotiation and sale of the property for a fee of
complainant Luna.
P75,000.00.86 This court found Atty. Jiz guilty of violating Rules 16.01, 16.03,
and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, suspended him from
II the practice of law for two (2) years, and ordered him to pay complainant the
amount of P45,000.00 with 6% legal interest per annum from date of
demand until finality of Decision, then 12% until fully paid.87
Worse, respondent Atty. Galarrita not only failed to promptly inform
complainant Luna of the former’s receipt of the P100,000.00 settlement
proceeds but also refused to turn over the amount to complainant Luna. This In this case, respondent Atty. Galarrita entered into the Compromise
court has held that "any money collected for the client or other trust Agreement involving complainant Luna’s property without informing him.
property coming into the lawyer’s possession should promptly be reported Even though complainant Luna forewent the lack of authority issue,
by him [or her]."62 Rule 16.03 under Canon 6 of the Code of Professional respondent Atty. Galarrita still continued to act in bad faith by refusing to
Responsibility provides that: turn over the P100,000.00 settlement amount received. The Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Investigating Commissioner found that:
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession. On another point, there seems no cogent proof, too, that Respondent had
been advised of Complainant’s supposed agreement to Mr. Calvario’s

6
payment of P100,000.00. Despite R[es]pondent’s allegations that he had
informed Complainant about his so-called counsel’s report, it remains
undisputed that the Complainant did not give him any express approval of
the same.
There is to the undersigned enough indicia to conclude that Respondent had
committed bad faith in entering into the Compromise Agreement. From
February 2006 to November 2010, or a period of four (4) years, Respondent
failed to turn-over the P100,000.00 he had collected from Mr. Calvario to
Complainant. Worse, he failed to seasonably inform Complainant about the
same. He kept the money and claimed he had the right to retain the same
invoking the counsel’s right to a retaining line [sic]. He pointed out that
Complainant had incurred accrued attorney’s fees which he is bound to pay
under the general retainer agreement. Thus, it is not amiss to state that he
entered into the said agreement with the odious motivation to hold on to it
and pave the way for the payment of his attorney’s fees. In so doing, he
violated the trust reposed in him by his client and violated Rule 16.03 of the
Code of [P]rofessional Responsibility.
As to Respondent’s invocation of the lawyer’s retaining lien and his retention
of the money, the undersigned deems the same unlawful. True, the Code of
Professional Responsibility allows the lawyer to apply so much thereof as
may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to his client." But this provision assumes that the client
agrees with the lawyer as to the amount of attorney’s fees and as to the
application of the client’s fund to pay his lawful fees and disbursements, in
which case he may deduct what is due him and remit the balance to his
client, with full disclosure on every detail. Without the client’s consent, the
lawyer has no authority to apply the client’s money for his fees, but he
should instead return the money to his client, without prejudice to his filing
a case to recover his unsatisfied fees.
....
On Respondent’s argument that prescription has already set in against
Complainant, suffice it to state that the rules have already been supplanted
by a new set of rules which do not anymore carry the same.88 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
Administrative proceedings require only substantial evidence.89 This court
accepts and adopts the findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board
of Governors, but with modification increasing the period of suspension from
the practice of law to two (2) years considering that respondent Atty.
Galarrita not only compromised litigation without complainant Luna’s
consent, but also refused to turn over the settlement proceeds to date.
III
This court sustains the order for respondent Atty. Galarrita to return the
amount of P100,000.00 to complainant Luna.
In Ronquillo v. Atty. Cezar,90 the parties entered a Deed of Assignment after
which respondent received P937,500.00 from complainant as partial
payment for the townhouse and lot.91 However, respondent did not turn over
this amount to developer Crown Asia, and no copy of the Contract to Sell was
given to complainant.92 This court suspended Atty. Cezar from the practice of
law for three (3) years, but did not grant complainant’s prayer for the return
of the P937,500.00.93
Ronquillo held that "[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve
a trial of an action, but rather investigations by the court into the conduct of
one of its officers."94 Thus, disciplinary proceedings are limited to a
determination of "whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to
continue as a member of the Bar."95
Later jurisprudence clarified that this rule excluding civil liability
determination from disciplinary proceedings "remains applicable only to
claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature — for instance, when the
claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction
separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement."96
This court has thus ordered in administrative proceedings the return of
amounts representing legal fees. This court has also ordered restitution as
concomitant relief in administrative proceedings when respondent’s civil
liability was already established:
Although the Court renders this decision in an administrative proceeding
primarily to exact the ethical responsibility on a member of the Philippine
Bar, the Court’s silence about the respondent lawyer’s legal obligation to
restitute the complainant will be both unfair and inequitable. No victim of
gross ethical misconduct concerning the client’s funds or property should be
required to still litigate in another proceeding what the administrative
proceeding has already established as the respondent’s liability. That has
been the reason why the Court has required restitution of the amount
involved as a concomitant relief in the cited cases of Mortera v. Pagatpatan,
supra, Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, supra, Small v. Banares, supra.97 (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondent Atty. Galarrita does not deny his receipt of the P100,000.00 but
justifies his refusal to turn over the amount by invoking jurisprudence on
retaining lien.98 The Rules of Court provides for attorney’s retaining lien as
follows:
SEC. 37. Attorney’s liens. – An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds,
documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his
possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements
have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He
shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment
of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he
has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall
have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the
records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and
shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to
the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such
judgments and executions as his client would have enforce his lien and
secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.99
First, "lawyer[s] [are] not entitled to unilaterally appropriate [their] clients[’]
money for [themselves] by the mere fact that the client[s] [owe] [them]
attorney’s fees."100 They must give prompt notice to their clients of any
receipt of funds for or on behalf of their clients.101
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for a lawyer’s
duty to "account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client."
Respondent Atty. Galarrita refused to comply with these duties, warranting
his suspension from the practice of law.
Second, the elements required for full recognition of attorney’s lien are: "(1)
lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client’s funds,
documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees."102
Respondent Atty. Galarrita must prove the existence of all these elements.
However, this is not the main issue in this disbarment case against him, and
the validity of his retaining lien defense was not established. Counter
evidence even exists such as respondent Atty. Galarrita's Letter dated August
12, 2003 waiving any compensation for his services in the foreclosure
case.103 Complainant Luna also raises respondent Atty. Galarrita's negligence
in handling the case, and lack of supporting receipts for the incurred
expenses respondent Atty. Galarrita seeks to reimburse.104
Nevertheless, we maintain that the disposition of this case is without
prejudice to the filing of a collection case for retainer's fee against
complainant Luna.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Dwight M. Galarrita is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for two (2) years, with a stem warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is ORDERED to
return to complainant Jun B. Luna the amount of Pl00,000.00, with legal
interest of 6% per annum from February 2006105 until fully paid, without
prejudice to the filing of a collection case for retainer's fee against
complainant Luna.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to
be entered into respondent Atty. Galarrita's records as attorney. Copies shall
likewise be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. L-12817             April 29, 1960
JULIO D. ENRIQUEZ, SR., representing the law firm of ENRIQUEZ and
ENRIQUEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ in his capacity as AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
7
Julio D. Enriquez, Sr. for petitioner.
Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for
respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition filed under the provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
and section 2 (c) of Commonwealth Act No. 327 for a review of a decision of
the Auditor General dated 24 June 1957.
On 18 June 1955 Republic Act No. 1383 creating the National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority as a public corporation and vesting in it the
ownership, jurisdiction, supervision and control over all territory embraced
by the Metropolitan Water District as well as all areas served by existing
government-owned waterworks and sewerage and drainage systems within
the boundaries of cities, municipalities, and municipal districts in the
Philippines, and those served by the Waterworks and Wells and Drills Section
of the Bureau of Public Works, was passed. On 19 September 1955 the
President of the Philippines promulgated Executive Order No. 127 providing,
among others, for the transfer to the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority of all the records, properties, machinery, equipment,
appropriations, assets, choses in actions, liabilities, obligations, notes, bonds
and all indebtedness of all government-owned waterworks and sewerage
systems in the provinces, cities, municipalities and municipal districts (51 Off.
Gaz. 4415-4417). On 31 March 1956 the municipal council of Bauan,
Batangas, adopted and passed Resolution No. 152 stating "that it is the
desire of this municipality in this present administration not to submit our
local Waterworks to the provisions of the said Republic Act No. 1383."
(Annex A.) On 20 April 1956 the municipal mayor transmitted a copy of
Resolution No. 152 to the Provincial Fiscal through the Provincial Board
requesting him to render an opinion on the matter treated therein and to
inform the municipal council whether he would handle and prosecute its
case in court should the council decide to question and test judicially the
legality of Republic Act No. 1383 and to prevent the National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority from exercising its authority over the waterworks
system of the municipality, (Annex B). On 2 May 1956 the provincial fiscal
rendered an opinion holding that Republic Act No. 1383 is valid and
constitutional and declined to represent the municipality of Bauan in an
action to be brought against the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority to test the validity and constitutionality of the Act creating it
(Annex C). On 26 May 1956 the municipal council adopted and passed
Resolution No. 201 authorizing the municipal mayor to take steps to
commence an action or proceedings in court to challenge the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 and to engage the services of a
special counsel, and appropriating the sum of P2,000 to defray the expenses
of litigation and attorney's fees (Annex D). On 2 June 1956 the municipal
mayor wrote a letter to the petitioner engaging his services as counsel for the
municipality in its contemplated action against the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority (Annex F.) On 27 June 1956 the Provincial Board of
Batangas adopted and passed Resolution No. 1829 approving Resolution No.
201 of the municipal council of Bauan (Annex E). On 28 June 1956 the
petitioner wrote to the municipal mayor accepting his offer in behalf of the
municipality under the following terms and conditions: that his professional
services shall commence from the filing of the complaint up to and including
the appeal, if any, to the appellate courts; that his professional fee shall be
P1,500 and payable as follows: P500 upon the filing of the complaint, P500
upon the termination of the hearing of the case in the Court of First Instance,
and P500 after judgment shall have become final or, should the judgment be
appealed, after the appeal shall have been submitted for judgment to the
appellate court; and that the municipality shall defray all reasonable and
necessary expenses for the prosecution of the case in the trial and appellate
courts including court and sheriff fees, transportation and subsistence of
counsel and witnesses and cost of transcripts of stenographic notes and
other documents (Annex G). On the same date, 28 June 1956, the petitioner
filed the necessary complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas (civil
No. 542, Annex I). On 9 July 1956 the municipal mayor wrote to the
petitioner agreeing to the terms and conditions set forth in his (the
petitioner's) letter of 28 June 1956 (Annex H). On 16 July 1956 the defendant
filed its answer to the complaint (Annex J). On 24 July 1956 the petitioner
wrote a letter to the municipal treasurer requesting reimbursement of the
sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee and payment of the sum of
P500 as initial attorney's fee. Attached to the letter were the pertinent
supporting papers (Annex K). The municipal treasurer forwarded the
petitioner's claim letter and enclosures to the Auditor General through
channels for pre-audit. On 24 June 1957 the Auditor General disallowed in
audit the petitioner's claim for initial attorney's fees in the sum of P500,
based upon an opinion rendered on 10 May 1957 by the Secretary of Justice
who held that the Provincial Fiscal was not disqualified to handle and
prosecute in court the case of the municipality of Bauan and that its
municipal council had no authority to engage the services of a special counsel
(Annex L), but offered no objection to the refund to the petitioner of the sum
of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee (Annex M). On 15 August 1957
the petitioner received notice of the decision of the Auditor General and on
11 September 1957 he filed with the Auditor General a notice of appeal from
his decision under section 4, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court Annex N). On 13
September 1957 the petitioner filed this petition for review in this Court.
The Revised Administrative Code provides:
SEC. 2241. Submission of questions to provincial fiscal. — When
the council is desirous of securing a legal opinion upon any
question relative to its own powers or the constitution or
attributes of the municipal government, it shall frame such
question in writing and submit the same to the provincial fiscal for
decision.
SEC. 1682. Duty of fiscal as legal adviser of province and provincial
subdivisions. — The provincial fiscal shall be the legal adviser of
the provincial government and its officers, including district health
officers, and of the mayor and council of the various municipalities
and municipal districts of the province. As such he shall, when so
requested, submit his opinion in writing upon any legal question
submitted to him by any such officer or body pertinent to the
duties thereof.
SEC. 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial
subdivisions in litigation. — The provincial fiscal shall represent
the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in
any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in
the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or
municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial
government or to some other municipality or municipal district in
the same province. When the interests of a provincial government
and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial
fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality
or other political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may
be employed by its council.
Under the foregoing provisions of law, the Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser
of the mayor and counsel of the various municipalities of a province and it is
his duty to represent the municipality in any court except when he is
disqualified by law. When he is disqualified to represent the municipality, the
municipal council may engage the services of a special attorney. The
Provincial Fiscal is disqualified to represent in court the municipality if and
when original jurisdiction of the case involving the municipality is vested in
the Supreme Court; when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial
government or to some other municipality in the same province;1 and when
in the case involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily
involved as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise.2 The fact that the Provincial
Fiscal in the case at bar was of the opinion that Republic Act No. 1383 was
valid and constitutional, and, therefore, would not be in a position to
prosecute the case of the municipality with earnestness and vigor, could not
justify the act of the municipal council in engaging the services of a special
counsel. Bias or prejudice and animosity or hostility on the part of a fiscal not
based on any of the conditions enumerated in the law and the Rules of Court
do not constitute a legal and valid excuse for inhibition or
disqualification.3 And unlike a practising lawyer who has the right to decline
employment,4 a fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his functions on
grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office, where he
swore, among others, "that he will well and faithfully discharge to the best of
his ability the duties of the office or position upon which he is about to enter.
. . ."5 Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal
council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting
provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who had declined to handle
and prosecute its case in court, pursuant to section 1679 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The petitioner claims that the municipal council could
not do this because the Secretary of Justice, who has executive
supervision over the Government Corporate Counsel, who represented the
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority in the case filed against it by
the municipality of Bauan (civil No. 542, Annex J) and direct supervision and
control over the Provincial Fiscal, would be placed in an awkward and absurd
position of having control of both sides of the controversy. The petitioner's
contention is untenable. Section 83 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by Executive Order No. 94, series of 1947 and further amended by
Executive Order No. 392, series of 1950, 46 Off. Gaz., 5913, 5917, provides
that the Secretary of Justice shall have executive supervision over the
Government Corporate Counsel and supervision and control over Provincial
Fiscals. In Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil., 143; 51 Off. Gaz., 2884, 2888, this
Court distinguished supervision from control as follows:
. . . In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make
them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. . . .
8
The fact that the Secretary of Justice had, on several occasions, upheld the
validity and constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 does not exempt the
municipal council of Bauan from requesting the Secretary of Justice to detail
a provincial fiscal to prosecute its case.
The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council
and mayor without authority of law, the Auditor General was correct in
disallowing in audit the petitioner's claim for payment of attorney's fees. The
decision under review is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera and Gutierrez
David, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-42992             August 8, 1935
FELIPE SALCEDO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ, respondent-appellee.
In re contempt proceedings against Attorney VICENTE J. FRANCISCO.
Vicente J. Francisco in his own behalf.
DIAZ, J.:
In a motion filed in this case, which is pending resolution because the second
motion for reconsideration of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, who represents
the herein petitioner, has not been acted upon to date, for the reason that
the question whether or not the decision which has already been
promulgated should be reconsidered by virtue of the first assignment of
error relied upon in said petitioner's brief, has not yet been determined, for
which purpose the case was set for hearing on August 5, 1935, said attorney
inserted a paragraph the translation of which reads as follows:
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that
the resolution of this court, denying our motion for
reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an
outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the
municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means
within out power in order that this error may be corrected by the
very court which has committed it, because we should not want
that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he
has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein
petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire
to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and
every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same
time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like
these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will
necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of "sakdalism"
and make the public lose confidence in the administration of
justice.
When the court's attention was called to said paragraph, it required Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco to show cause, if any, why he should not be found guilty
of contempt, giving him a period of ten days for that purpose. In this answer
attorney Vicente J. Francisco, far from regretting having employed the
phrases contained in said paragraph in his motion, reiterated them several
times contending that they did not constitute contempt because, according
to him it is not contempt to tell the truth.
The phrases:
. . . and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner
Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the
polls . . . .
. . . because we should not want that some citizen, particularly
some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the
press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial
outrage . . . .
and ... we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like
these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will
necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of "sakdalism"
and make the public lose confidence in the administration of
justice", disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable
disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional
contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with
no less than having proceed in utter disregard of the laws, the
rights of the parties, and of the untoward consequences, or with
having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client, because the acts of
outraging and mocking from which the words "outrage" and
"mockery" used therein are derived, mean exactly the same as all
these, according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Language
published by the Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish
Language, 15th ed., pages 132 and 513).
The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, for many years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither
justified nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the attention of
the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument
and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said
motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In
order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make
trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done,
because both means are annoying and good practice can never sanction
them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free
exercise of a serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters,
in the consideration of questions submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's
motion contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is
insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which the voters of
Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to
the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial
outrage of which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a
threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the
reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it
in order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of
that referred to in his motion promote distrust in the administration of
justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious
and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public
knowledge, occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean
otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the
authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he
presumes that the court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not
resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact
that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and
authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred upon
him the high privilege, not á right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of
being what he now is : a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep.,
492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes
distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody from
harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of
disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark
called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection
and relief.
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of
his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable,
but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to
intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the
dignity of the courts require. The reason for this is that respect of the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said
institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
At this juncture, it is not amiss to invite attention to the provisions of rule 1
of Chapter 2 of Legal Ethics, which reads as follows:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent
of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its importance.
Judges, not being wholly free to defend themselves, are peculiarly
entitled to receive the support of the bar against unjust criticism
and clamor. Whenever there is proper ground for serious
complaint of a judicial officer, it is the right and duty of the lawyer
to submit his grievances to the proper authorities. In such cases
but not otherwise, such charges should be encouraged and the
person making them should be protected.
In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his
intention to offend the court or to be recreant to the respect thereto but,
unfortunately, there are his phrases which need no further comment.
Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places where the same conditions
and practice as those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no
excuse from liability (13 C.J., 45). Neither is the fact that the phrases
employed are justified by the facts a valid defense:
"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used
was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the
judicial office should always be observed and enforced." (In re Stewart, 118
9
La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of intention constitutes at most an
extenuation of liability in this case, taking into consideration Attorney Vicente
J. Francisco's state of mind, according to him when he prepared said motion.
This court is disposed to make such concession. However, in order to avoid a
recurrence thereof and to prevent others by following the bad example, from
taking the same course, this court considers it imperative to treat the case of
said attorney with the justice it deserves.
Briefly, this court is of the opinion and so holds that the act committed by
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco constitutes a contempt in the face of the court
(in facie curiae) and, reiterating what this court said on another occasion that
the power to punish for contempt is inherent in the courts in order that there
be due administration of justice (In re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944), and so that the
institution of the courts of justice may be stable and said courts may not fail
in their mission, said attorney is ordered to pay a fine of P200 within the
period of ten days, and to be reprimanded, and he is hereby reprimanded;
and it is ordered that the entire paragraph of his motion containing the
phrases which as has been stated, constitute contempt of court be stricken
from the record de oficio. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., dissenting:
From 1918 when in the case of the United States vs. Bustos (37 Phil., 731), it
was declared that "The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include
the right to criticize judicial conduct", until the present, I have consistently
and steadfastly stood for the fullest expression of freedom of speech. I stand
for the application of that basic principle now.
The language which the majority of the court finds contemptuous and
punishes as such is found in a second motion of reconsideration in an
election case, a class of cases out of which arise more bitter feelings than any
other. The motion is phrased in vigorous language, in fact vigorous and
convincing enough to induce the granting of a rehearing on the merits. It is
hardly necessary to add that that action was taken entirely uninfluenced by
the peroration of the motion here judicially penalized.
Following microscopic examination in the majority opinion of the paragraph,
attention is directed to words which prophesy the loss of public confidence in
the courts and the growth of Sakdalism. If, however, the passage flowing
from the pen of Mr. Francisco be set side by side with passages written by
the late Mr. Justice Johnson in the case of Garchitorena vs. Crescini and
Imperial ( [1918, 39 Phil., 258), little difference in phraseology will be noted.
One came from a lawyer and is condemned; the other came from a judge and
is accepted.
The main burden of the charge is that threats against this court were made
by the respondent. Admittedly a lawyer should maintain a respectful attitude
towards the courts. Any attempt on the part of a lawyer to influence the
action of the court by intimidation will justify not alone punishment for
contempt but also disbarment. But does anyone believe that the action taken
in this case has been obtained by coercion or could be obtained by such
methods? Judges are of sterner stuff than weak plants which bend with every
wind.1avvphil.ñet
The lawyer possesses the privilege of standing up for his rights even in the
face of a hostile court. He owes entire devotion to the interests of his client.
His zeal when a case is lost, which he thinks should have been won, may
induce intemperate outbursts. Courts will do well charitably to overlook
professional improprieties of the moment induced by chagrin at losing a
case.
So that it may not be assumed that the position taken by me is isolated or
peculiar, permit me to offer a few corroborative authorities.
Mr. Chief Justice Sharswood of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was the
pioneer authority in the subject of professional ethics. Speaking for the court
in one case, he said: "No class of the community ought to be allowed freer
scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity,
impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. ... To say that an
attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to
account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge
or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a
position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present
system." (Ex parte Steinman [1880], 40 Am. Rep., 637.)
Mr. Justice Brewer was first a member of the Supreme Court of Kansas and
subsequently was elevated to the Supreme Court of the United States. In the
former capacity, in sustaining a contempt of court, he nevertheless observed:
"We remark again, that a judge will generally and wisely pass unnoticed any
mere hasty and unguarded expression of passion, or at least pass it with
simply a reproof. It is so that, in every case where a judge decides for
one party, he decides against another; and ofttimes both parties are
beforehand equally confident and sanguine. The disappointment, therefore,
is great, and it is not in human nature that there should be other than bitter
feeling, which often reaches to the judge as the cause of the supposed
wrong. A judge, therefore, ought to be patient, and tolerate everything which
appears but the momentary outbreak of disappointment. A second thought
will generally make a party ashamed of such outbreak, and the dignity of the
court will suffer none by passing it in silence." (In re Pryor [1877], 26 Am.
Rep., 747.)
The late Mr. Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court of the United States was
until recently the leader of progressive thought in American jurisprudence. In
a dissenting opinion in a famous case, he said: "When it considered how
contrary if is to our practice and ways of thinking for the same person to be
accuser and sole judge in a matter which, if he be sensitive, may involve
strong personal feeling, I should expect the power to be limited by the
necessities of the case 'to insure order and decorum in their presence'. ... I
confess that I cannot find in all this or in the evidence in the case anything
that would have affected a mind of reasonable fortitude, and still less can I
find there anything that obstructed the administration of justice in any sense
that I possibly can give to those words." (Toledo Newspaper Co. vs. United
States [1917], 247 U.S., 402.)
In 1922 Attorney Feliciano Gomez was charged with having said in effect that
the Supreme Court had decided the election protest in favor of Cailles
because Governor-General Wood, out of friendship for Cailles, had invited
members of the court to Malacañang previous to formulating the decision,
and there, following a secret conference, had offered them a banquet. The
proceedings for contempt initiated against the respondent by the Attorney-
General were halted by the court. In he opinion it was said: "We doubt very
much if any one would think for a moment that memory of the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands would sell their birthright of judicial integrity
for a social courtesy and the favor of the Chief Executive. ... We feel also, that
litigants and lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words
said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that
the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language." (In
re Gomez [1922], 43 Phil., 376.)
To punish for direct contempt of the Supreme Court is a jurisdiction to be
exercised with scrupulous care. The members of the court sit as prosecutors
and as judges. Human sensitiveness to an attorney's unjust aspersions on
judicial character may induce too drastic action. It may result in the long run
in making of lawyers weak exponents of their clients' causes. Respect for the
courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial course from
the bench than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by
chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious exposition of his side of a
case. The Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought and courageous
bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and unafraid of any court,
high or low, and the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook occasional
intemperate language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which affects in no
way the outcome of a case.
Mr. Francisco assures us that it has not been his intention to be recreant to
the respect and consideration which he has always shown the highest
tribunal in the Philippines, and that the language of the last paragraph of his
motion of June 19 was not meant to offend the dignity of the court. I do not
think that the language found in Mr. Francisco's motion constitutes contempt
of court, but conceding that it did require explanation, I would accept his
disavowal of wrong intent at its face value. I would not mark the record of a
member of the bar of long and honorable standing with this blemish. With
due deference to the opinion of the majority, I must strongly dissent
therefrom.
Vickers, J., concurs.
A.M. No. 598               March 28, 1969
AURORA SORIANO DELES, complainant,
vs.
VICENTE E. ARAGONA, JR., respondent.
Vicente E. Aragona, Jr. in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General for the Government.
CASTRO, J.:
10
  This is a disbarment proceeding against Vicente E. Aragona, Jr. 1 upon a
verified letter-complaint of Aurora Soriano Deles filed with this Court on
November 6, 19637 charging the former with having made, under oath, false
and unfounded allegations against her in a motion filed in Court of Agrarian
Relations cases 1254 and 1255 Iloilo, which allegedly caused her great
mental, torture and moral suffering.
  On November 13, 1963 this Court required the respondent to answer the
complaint. On December 10, 1963 the respondent filed his answer, affirming
the truth of the allegations in the questioned motion, but claiming in his
defense that in preparing it, he relied not only upon information received but
also upon other matters of public record. He also averred that the
complainant had made a similar charge against him in a counter-motion to
declare him in contempt of court filed in the same C.A.R. case which was
however dismissed together with the complainant's counterclaims when the
main cases were dismissed; that the complainant failed to move for the
reconsideration of the said dismissal or to appeal therefrom; and that during
the few years that he has been a member of the bar, he has always
comforted himself correctly, and has adhered steadfastly to his conviction
that the practice of law is a sacred trust in the interest of truth.
  This Court, on December 14, 1963, referred the case to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report, and recommendation. Because both parties reside
in Iloilo City, the Solicitor General in turn referred the case to the City Fiscal
of Iloilo for investigation and reception of evidence. Both the petitioner and
the respondent adduced evidence in the investigation which was conducted.
Thereafter, the City Fiscal forwarded to the Solicitor General the record of
the investigation, including the recommendation of the assistant city fiscal
who personally conducted the investigation that the petition for disbarment
be dismissed. The Solicitor General thereafter filed with this Court his report,
concurring in the recommendation of the assistant city fiscal.
  Aurora Soriano Deles (hereinafter referred to as the complainant) is the
administratrix of the intestate estate of the late Joaquina Ganzon (the
deceased mother of Aurora and Enrique Soriano, Sr. who are heirs of the
estate concurrently with other forced heirs) in special proceeding 128 of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
  On July 26, 1961, upon motion of Enrique Soriano, Sr. and over and above
the opposition of the complainant, the intestate court issued an order
denying a proposed lease of ten hectares of the estate by the complainant to
one Carlos Fuentes and sustaining the possession of Enrique as lessee of the
said land. In effect, the order likewise sustained the possession by the
brothers Federico and Carlos Aglinao of a portion of the said land being
tenanted by them upon authority of the lessee, Enrique Soriano, Sr.
  In disregard of the abovementioned order, the complainant attempted to
take possession of the landholdings by placing thereon her own tenants.
Predictably, the Aglinao brothers, to protect their rights, countered by filing
against a the complainant two petitions with the Court of Agrarian relations
in Iloilo (hereinafter referred to as the agrarian court), docketed therein as
C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255 (hereinafter referred to as the C.A.R. cases). They
alleged in their respective petitions that they have been tenants of Enrique
Soriano, Sr. since 1960 on a parcel of riceland located in barrio Malapoc,
Balasan Iloilo, held by the complainant as administratrix of the intestate
estate of the deceased Joaquina Ganzon; and that they had started to plow
their leaseholds consisting of two hectares each at the start of the
agricultural year 1962-63 when "on March 7, 1962, the respondent
[complainant herein] ordered one Bonifacio Margarejo to harrow the plowed
land without the knowledge and consent" of the petitioners. Consequently,
they prayed for the issuance of an interlocutory order enjoining the
complainant and her representatives from interfering with their peaceful
cultivation of the lands in question pending determination of the merits of
their petitions. However, consideration of the petitioners' prayer for the
issuance of an interlocutory order of injunction pendente lite was
considerably delayed not only by reason of several postponements granted
at the behest of the complainant but also because of the assurance made by
her through counsel in open court at the hearing of June 16, 1962, that
neither she nor any of her men would disturb or interfere with the
petitioner's possession of their leaseholds until their petitions shall have
been finally resolved.
  But on June 18, 1962, barely two days after the abovementioned hearing,
the complainant's men again entered the land in question and planted rice
thereon. This unauthorized entry prompted the Aglinao brothers, through
their counsel, the herein respondent Atty. Vicente Aragona, Jr. (hereinafter
referred to as the respondent), to file on June 20, 1962 an "Urgent Motion
for Issuance of Interlocutory Order." There being no objection by the
complainant against the said motion, and finding the same meritorious, the
agrarian court issued on June 21, 1962 the interlocutory order prayed for,
directing "the respondent, her agent, or any person acting for and in her
behalf to refrain from molesting or in any way interfering with the work of
the petitioners in their respective landholdings."
  On June 24, 1962, upon the agrarian court's direction, the PC detachment
stationed in Sara, Iloilo, served copies of the order on the complainant's men,
Bonifacio Margarejo and Carlos Fuentes, and restored the Aglinao brothers
to the possession of their landholdings. On the same day, Margarejo and
Fuentes informed their landlord, the complainant, about the said
order.lawphi1.ñet
  For several months thereafter nothing of significance happened in the C.A.R.
cases until the palay planted on the land in question became ripe and ready
for harvest.
  Then on October 2, 1962 Enrique Soriano, Sr. showed to the respondent in
Iloilo City a telegram 2 which reads as follows:
BALASAN OCT 2 62
GILDA ACOLADO
ILOILO AMERICAN SCHOOL MARIA CLARA AVENUE
ILOILO CITY
TELL DADDY COMMUNICATE ARAGONA IMMEDIATELY
ALBERT HARVEST TODAY....
MAMANG
  The sender of the telegram was Mrs. Isabel Soriano, wife of Enrique, the
addressee Gilda Acolado, their daughter.
  After reading the telegram, the respondent asked Soriano whether his wife
(Mrs. Soriano) was coming to Iloilo City; when informed that she was arriving,
he decided to wait for her. Mrs. Soriano arrived from Balasan in the
afternoon of that same day, October 2, 1962. She went to see the
respondent, and informed the latter that it was she who had sent the
telegram upon request of the Aglinao brothers; that she was personally
present when one Albert, a tenant of the complainant, accompanied by
many armed men, went to the land in question and harvested the palay
thereon over the protests of the Aglinao brothers; that upon inquiring why
the said Albert and his armed companions harvested the palay, she was told
that they were acting upon orders of the complainant; and that instead of
filing a complaint with the chief of police as she originally planned, she
decided instead to see the respondent without delay.
  Possessed of the above information, the respondent promptly prepared and
filed with the agrarian court, on October 3, 1962, a verified "Urgent Motion
to Declare Respondent in Contempt of Court" (hereinafter referred to as
motion for contempt), praying that the complainant and "her armed goons"
be declared in, and punished for, contempt of court for violating the
interlocutory order of June 21, 1962. This motion for contempt elicited, on
the very same day it was filed, an instant reply from the complainant who
moved to strike it out from the, records claiming that the allegations therein
libeled her, and that it was the respondent who should be punished for
contempt for deliberately misleading the agrarian court. Moreover, not
content with this reply and countermotion for contempt the complainant
also lodged on October 4, 1962 a criminal complaint for libel against the
respondent with the City Fiscal of Iloilo, based on the same allegedly libelous
allegations made against her by the respondent in the latter's motion for
contempt filed in the C.A.R. cases. However, after preliminarily investigating
the said complaint, the assistant city fiscal to whom it was assigned dismissed
the same on the ground that the allegations of the motion for contempt
were privileged communications. The complainant did not appeal from the,
said dismissal to the city fiscal; neither did she elevate the same for review to
the Department of Justice.
  Meanwhile, no action was taken by the agrarian court in the C.A.R. cases on
the motion for contempt filed by the respondent against the complainant, as
well as on the latter's countermotion, also for contempt, against the formal
instead, by order dated October 24, 1963, the agrarian court dismissed C.A.R.
cases 1254 and 1255, including the complainant's counterclaims therein, for
lack of interest to prosecute on the part of the petitioners, the Aglinao
brothers. As a matter of course, the dismissal of the main cases carried with
it the dismissed of all incidents therein, including the motion for contempt
and counter-motion for contempt. Again, the complainant did not ask for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, nor did she appeal therefrom. She
filed instead the present administrative complaint against the respondent.
  The only issue raised in the present disbarment proceeding is whether the
respondent, Atty. Vicente E. Aragona, Jr., should be disciplined or disbarred
for having prepared and filed under oath the "Urgent Motion to Declare
Respondent in Contempt of Court" in C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255-Iloilo,
which allegedly contains false and libelous imputations injurious to the honor
of the complainant.
11
  For easy reference, the motion for contempt is hereunder reproduced in
toto.
  COMES NOW the undersigned, in behalf of the petitioners in
each of the above-entitled cases, and to this Honorable Court
respectfully states that:
1. Upon urgent and verified motion of the undersigned dated June
20, 1962, this Honorable Court issued an interlocutory order
dated June 21, 1962, the dispositive part of which is as follows:
  WHEREFORE, finding the motion meritorious, an
interlocutory order is hereby issued ordering the
respondent, her agent, or any person acting for and in
her behalf, to refrain from molesting or in any way
interfering with the work of the petitioners in their
respective landholdings, situated at Barrio Malapoc
Balasan Iloilo, with an area of 2 hectares for each of
them, in these two cases, pending the bearing of these
cases on the merits.
  The Commanding Officer of the Constabulary
Detachment of the 56th PC Company stationed at Sara,
Iloilo, or his duly authorized representative, is hereby
ordered to implement this order and to report to this
Court his proceedings in this particular within a week
from the date of his implementation of this order.
SO ORDERED.              In People vs. Aquino 3 this Court laid down the decisional authority that
Iloilo City, June 21, 1962.
(SGD.) JUAN C. TERUEL
Commissioner
2. Pursuant to the above-quoted order, the Commanding Officer
of the 56th PC Company stationed at Sara, Iloilo, ordered the
respondent and her men not to enter the landholdings in question
and to refrain from molesting or in any way interfering with the
work of petitioners in their respective landholdings; the report of
said Commanding Officer is now on file with the records of the
above-entitled cases;
3. On this date, the undersigned was just surprised when he
received a telegram from the petitioners, through Mrs. Isabel
Soriano, copy of which is thereto attached as Annex "A" and made
part hereof, informing the undersigned that respondent, thru a
certain Albert, with the aid of armed goons, harvested the palay
of the petitioners yesterday despite the vehement opposition of
the petitioners not to enter their landholdings;
4. The said acts of respondents and her men in harvesting the
palay of the petitioners, knowing fully well the existence and
implementation of the interlocutory order of this Court dated
June 21, 1962, is a gross and open defiance and disobedience of
said order and a challenge to the legal processes and authority of
this Court in the peaceful administration of justice;
5. This rebellious and seditious conduct of the respondent and her
men against the authority of this Court constitutes wanton
resistance and contumacious contempt of court;
6. Unless the respondent and her armed goons are declared in
contempt of Court and duly punished, the lawful orders,
processes and authority of this Court would be a mockery and
rendered useless by the stubborn resistance and defiance of the
respondent.
  IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Court that respondent and her armed goons be
declared and punished for contempt of Court until such time that
she turns over the produce of the landholdings in question which
she harvested illegally and until such time that she fully complies
with the interlocutory order of this Court.
  Petitioners pray for such other relief and remedies just and
equitable under the premises.
  Iloilo City, October 3, 1962.
E. I. Soriano Jr. and V. E. Aragona
Counsel for the Petitioners
Lopez Bros. Bldg., Iznart Street
Iloilo City
By:
(sgd.) VICENTE E. ARAGONA JR.
  The complainant's testimony is to the effect that (1) on October 2, 1962 she
was not in Balasan but in Iloilo City where she testified at the trial of C.A.R.
cases 1254 and 1255 after which she left for her home which is situated also
in Iloilo City; (2) the distance between Balasan and Iloilo City is 135
kilometers, and to reach Balasan from Iloilo City one has to travel four hours
by car or six hours by bus; (3) although she knows that the person Albert,
mentioned in the motion, is Alberto Boneta, a helper of Carlos Fuentes, one
of the tenants she had placed on the lands involved in the C.A.R. cases she
never met or saw Boneta or Fuentes from the time she was informed of the
interlocutory order dated June 21, 1962 in the aforesaid cases, until October
2, 1962 when the said Alberto Boneta and several armed men allegedly
harvested the crops on the lands in question; (4) she did not order Boneta to
harvest the said crops; and (5) she never visited the aforesaid lands in 1962.
Her uncontradicted testimony lends credence to her claim that she did not
order Alberto Boneta to harvest, with the aid of armed men, the crops on the
Aglinao brothers' landholdings.
  Nonetheless, this Court is loath to uphold the view that the preparation and
the filing of the questioned motion for contempt, furnish sufficient basis for
disciplinary action against the respondent.
[S]tatement made in the course of judicial proceedings are
absolutely privileged — that is, privileged regardless of
defamatory tenor and of the presence of malice — if the same are
relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in hand or subject of
the inquiry. And that, in view of this, the person who makes
them — such as a judge, lawyer, or witness — does not thereby
incur the risk of being found liable thereon in a criminal
prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages. (emphasis
supplied)
  Since there is no doubt that the allegations made by the respondent in the
questioned motion for contempt are statements made in the course of a
judicial proceeding — i.e., in C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255 — besides being
relevant, pertinent or material to the subject-matter of the said cases, they
are absolutely privileged, thereby precluding any liability on the part of the
respondent.
  To be sure, the charges levelled by the respondent against the complainant
in the questioned pleading lack sufficient factual basis. But even this
circumstance will not strengthen the complainant's position. "The privilege is
not affected by factual or legal inaccuracies in the utterances made in the
course of judicial proceedings." 4 In fact, "Even when the statements are
found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness
and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover
the mistake of the individual .... The privilege is not defeated by the mere
fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms .... A privileged
communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to
discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat
the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. The
ultimate test is that of bona fides." 5
  Indeed, the actuations of the respondent were motivated by the legitimate
desire to serve the interests of his clients. For, contrary to the complainant's
claim, the respondent did not rely merely on Mrs. Soriano's telegram (exh. 5)
when he prepared the motion for contempt. According to his unrebutted
testimony, when Mr. Soriano brought to him the said telegram on October 2,
1962, he asked the former whether his wife, the sender of the telegram, was
coming to Iloilo City, and, when informed that she was arriving, he waited for
her. True enough Mrs. Soriano saw the respondent in the afternoon of that
same day and informed him that she was personally present when one
Albert, a tenant of the complainant, accompanied by several armed men,
went to the landholdings of the Aglinao brothers and, against the objections
of the latter, harvested the palay crop thereon, and that upon her inquiry,
she was informed that they were acting upon orders of the complainant.
  Considering that the foregoing information which impelled the respondent
to file the questioned motion for contempt, was obtained by him first-hand
from someone who claimed to have actually witnessed the incident in
question, coupled with the complainants own admission that the Albert
referred to by Mrs. Soriano was indeed a helper of Carlos Fuentes, one of the
tenants whom she had illegally placed once on the landholdings of the
Aglinao brothers, it was not unseemly for the respondent to assume that
Albert did act at the behest of the complainant. After all, the complainant
12
had, in the past, committed the same forcible act of entering the said
landholdings on June 18, 1963, only two days after she had assured the
agrarian court that she would not disturb or interfere with the Aglinao
brothers' possession, pending final resolution of the petitions filed by them
against her. In truth it is precisely such forcible entry into the said lands that
precipitated the issuance of the very interlocutory order dated June 21, 1962
which the respondent accused her of disobeying in his motion for contempt.
Unquestionably, the aforenarrated circumstances provided the respondent a
probable cause for belief in the truthfulness of the allegations which he
couched in rather intemperate language in his motion for contempt. He had
merely acted in righteous indignation over the wrong supposedly done to his
aggrieved clients — believing as he did in the truth of his charges — without
deliberate intention whatsoever to malign and villify the complainant.
  The doctrine of privileged communication is not an idle and empty principle.
It has been distilled from wisdom and experience. "The privilege is not
intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public service
and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of the
public welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of
courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely and
exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal
prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages." 6 Lawyers, most
especially, should be allowed a great latitude of pertinent comment in the
furtherance of the causes they uphold, and for felicity of their clients they
may be pardoned some infelicities of language. 7
  The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the
individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the
court, and to remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for
their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust
reposed in them as members of the bar. 8 Thus, the power to disbar attorneys
ought always to be exercised with great caution, and only in clear cases of
misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and member of the bar. 9
  In this case, there is no evidence whatsoever tending to prove unfitness of
the respondent to continue in the practice of law and remain an officer of the
court.
  ACCORDINGLY, the administrative complaint against the respondent is
hereby dismissed.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 492             September 5, 1967
OLEGARIA BLANZA and MARIA PASION, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. AGUSTIN ARCANGEL, respondent.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Complainants Olegaria Blanza and Maria Pasion ask this Court to take
disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Agustin Arcangel for professional
non-feasance. They complain that way back in April, 1955,
respondent volunteered to help them in their respective pension claims in
connection with the deaths of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers, and for this
purpose, they handed over to him the pertinent documents and also affixed
their signatures on blank papers. But subsequently, they noticed that since
then, respondent had lost interest in the progress of their claims and when
they finally asked for the return of their papers six years later, respondent
refused to surrender them.
Respondent answered these accusations before Fiscal Raña to whom this
case was referred by the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. He admitted having received the documents from
complainants but explainer that it was for photostating purposes only. His
failure to immediately return them, he said, was due to complainants' refusal
to hand him the money to pay for the photostating costs which prevented
him from withdrawing said documents from the photostat service. Anyway,
he had already advanced the expenses himself and turned over, on
December 13, 1961, the documents, their respective photostats and the
photostat service receipt to the fiscal.
Finding respondent's explanation satisfactory and considering that he
charged complainants nothing for his services, Fiscal Raña recommended the
former's exoneration, or at most, that he be reprimanded only. The Solicitor
General, however, feels that respondent deserves at least a severe
reprimand considering (1) his failure to attend to complainants' pension
claims for six years; (2) his failure to immediately return the documents
despite repeated demands upon him, and (3) his failure to return to
complainant Pasion, allegedly, all of her documents.
At the hearing of the case before this Court on October 21, 1963, only
respondent, thru counsel, appeared. In lieu of oral arguments, therefore,
respondent submitted his memorandum, annexing therewith an affidavit
executed by Olegaria Blanza asking for the dismissal of the administrative
case.1
Respondent first submits that he was not obliged to follow up complainants'
pension claims since there was no agreement for his compensation as their
counsel. Respondent, however, overlooks the fact that he volunteered his
professional services and thus was not legally entitled to recover fees.2 But
having established the attorney-client relationship voluntarily, he was bound
to attend to complainants' claims with all due diligence.
Nevertheless, We find the evidence adduced insufficient to warrant the
taking of disciplinary action against respondent attorney. There is no clear
preponderance of evidence substantiating the accusations against him.3
Respondent's explanation for the delay in filing the claims and in returning
the documents has not been controverted by complainants. On the contrary,
they admitted4 that respondent asked them to shoulder the photostating
expenses but they did not give him any money therefor. Moreover, the
documents and their photostats were actually returned by respondent during
the fiscal's investigation with him paying for the photostating costs himself.
And the condition of the photostats themselves — they appear to have been
in existence for quite some time5 — supports respondent's allegation that
they remained in possession of the photostat service for the failure of the
owners (respondents and/or complainants), to withdraw the same upon
payment of the corresponding costs. Hence, complainants themselves are
partly to blame for the delay in filing their respective claims.1awphîl.nèt
As for the alleged failure of respondent to return all her documents to
complainant Pasion, the former denies this. Fiscal Raña made no findings on
the matter. The affidavit of Mrs. Blanza pardoning respondent cannot
prejudice complainant Pasion because res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet. Still, there is equiponderance of evidence which must necessarily
redound to respondent's benefit. Complainant Pasion had another
opportunity to substantiate her charges in the hearing set for October 21,
1963 but she let it go. Neither she nor her counsel of record appeared.
But while We are constrained to dismiss the charges against respondent for
being legally insufficient, yet We cannot but counsel against his actuations as
a member of the bar. A lawyer has a more dynamic and positive role in the
community than merely complying with the minimal technicalities of the
statute. As a man of law, he is necessarily a leader of the community, looked
up to as a model citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par excellence,
especially so when, as in this case, he volunteers his professional services.
Respondent here has not lived up to that ideal standard. It was unnecessary
to have complainants wait, and hope, for six long years on their pension
claims. Upon their refusal to co-operate, respondent should have forthwith
terminated their professional relationship instead of keeping them hanging
indefinitely. And altho We voted that he not be reprimanded, in a legal
sense, let this be a reminder to Atty. Arcangel of what the high standards of
his chosen profession require of him.
Accordingly, the case against respondent is dismissed. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
B.M. No. 1222               April 24, 2009
RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN, Petitioner,
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This treats the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated
November 10, 2008 filed by petitioner Danilo de Guzman. He prays that this
Honorable Court "in the exercise of equity and compassion, grant petitioner’s
13
plea for judicial clemency, and thereupon, order his reinstatement as a
member in good standing of the Philippine Bar."1
To recall, on February 4, 2004, the Court promulgated a Resolution, in B.M.
No. 1222, the dispositive portion of which reads in part:
WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating
Committee, hereby resolves to —
(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon
his receipt of this RESOLUTION;
xxxx
The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law
during the 2003 Bar Examinations. Petitioner at that time was employed as
an assistant lawyer in the law firm of Balgos & Perez, one of whose partners,
Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for Mercantile Law during the said bar
examinations. The Court had adopted the findings of the Investigating
Committee, which identified petitioner as the person who had downloaded
the test questions from the computer of Balgos and faxed them to other
persons.
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended the
reinstatement of petitioner in the Philippine Bar. In a Report dated January 6,
2009, the OBC rendered its assessment of the petition, the relevant portions
of which we quote hereunder:
Petitioner narrated that he had labored to become a lawyer to fulfill his
father’s childhood dream to become one. This task was not particularly easy
for him and his family but he willed to endure the same in order to pay
tribute to his parents.
Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he already imposed upon
himself the duty of rendering service to his fellowmen. At 19 years, he
started his exposure to public service when he was elected Chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig City. During this
time, he initiated several projects benefiting the youth in their barangay.
Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up Bachelor of Arts in
Political Science and eventually pursuing Bachelor of Laws. In his second year
in law school, he was elected as the President of the Student Council of the
Institute of Law of the Far Eastern University (FEU). Here, he spearheaded
various activities including the conduct of seminars for law students as well
as the holding of bar operations for bar examinees.
Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and student leader,
petitioner still managed to excel in his studies. Thus, he was conferred an
Academic Excellence Award upon his graduation in Bachelor of Laws.
Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner immediately entered
government service as a Legal Officer assigned at the Sangguniang Bayan of
Taguig. Simultaneously, he also rendered free legal services to less fortunate
residents of Taguig City who were then in need of legal assistance.
In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the Associate Lawyers at the
Balgos and Perez Law Offices. It was during his stay with this firm when his
craft as a lawyer was polished and developed. Despite having entered private
practice, he continued to render free legal services to his fellow Taguigeños.
Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate, petitioner’s flourishing
career was cut short as he was stripped of his license to practice law for his
alleged involvement in the leakage in the 2003 Bar Examinations.
Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself inside his house to
avoid the rather unavoidable consequences of his disbarment.
On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new lease in life when he
was taken as a consultant by the City Government of Taguig. Later, he was
designated as a member of the Secretariat of the People’s Law Enforcement
Board (PLEB). For the next five (5) years, petitioner concentrated mainly on
rendering public service.
Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of his act which
unfortunately, compromised the integrity of the bar examinations. As could
be borne from the records of the investigation, he cooperated fully in the
investigation conducted and took personal responsibility for his actions. Also,
he has offered his sincerest apologies to Atty. Balgos, to the Court as well as
to all the 2003 bar examinees for the unforeseen and unintended effects of
his actions.
Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his mistakes and has taken
the said humbling experience to make him a better person.
Meanwhile, as part of his Petition, petitioner submitted the following
testimonials and endorsements of various individuals and entities all
attesting to his good moral character:
1) Resolution No. 101, Series of 2007, "Resolution Expressing Full
Support to Danilo G. De Guzman in his Application for Judicial
Clemency, Endorsing his Competence and Fitness to be Reinstated
as a Member of the Philippine Bar and for Other Purposes" dated
4 June 2007 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, City of Taguig;
2) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-
Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga
Kasapi ng Southeast People’s Village Homeowners Association,
Inc. (SEPHVOA) kay Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong
Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa
Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo
ng Isang Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the Southeast People’s
Village Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA), Ibayo-Tipas,
City of Taguig;
3) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-
Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga
Kasapi ng Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC)
kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng
Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang
Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang
Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahang Residente ng
Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC), Lower Bicutan, City of Taguig;
4) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-
Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga
Kasapi ng Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI)
Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA) kay G. Danilo G. De
Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang
Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang
Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 1
June 2007 of the Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI)
Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA), Sta. Ana, City of
Taguig;
5) "An Open Letter Attesting Personally to the Competence and
Fitness of Danilo G. De Guzman as to Warrant the Grant of Judicial
Clemency and his Reinstatement as Member of the Philippine
Bar" dated 8 June 2007 of Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino, Laogan,
Trespeses and Llantino Law Offices;
6) "Testimonial to the Moral and Spiritual Competence of Danilo
G. De Guzman to be Truly Deserving of Judicial Clemency and
Compassion" dated 5 July 2007 of Rev. Fr. Paul G. Balagtas, Parish
Priest, Archdiocesan Shrine of St. Anne;
7) "Testimonial Letter" dated 18 February 2008 of Atty. Loreto C.
Ata, President, Far Eastern University Law Alumni Association
(FEULAA), Far Eastern University (FEU);
8) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-
Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga
Kasapi ng Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA) kay
G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng
Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang
Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang
Abogado" dated 8 July 2008 of the Samahang Bisig Kamay sa
Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA);
9) Board Resolution No. 02, Series of 2008, "A Resolution
Recognizing the Contributions of Danilo G. De Guzman to the
People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) – Taguig City, Attesting to
his Utmost Dedication and Commitment to the Call of Civic and
Social Duty and for Other Purposes" dated 11 July 2008 of the
People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB);
10) "A Personal Appeal for the Grant of Judicial Forgiveness and
Compassion in Favor of Danilo G. De Guzman" dated 14 July 2008
of Atty. Edwin R. Sandoval, Professor, College of Law, San
Sebastian College – Recoletos;
14
 11) "An Open Letter Personally Attesting to the Moral competence
and Fitness of Danilo G. De Guzman" dated 5 September 2008 of
Mr. Nixon F. Faderog, Deputy Grand [Kn]ight, Knights of Columbus
and President, General Parent-Teacher Association, Taguig
National High School, Lower Bicutan, Taguig City;
12) "Testimonial Letter" dated 5 September 2008 of Atty.
Primitivo C. Cruz, President, Taguig Lawyers League, Inc.,
Tuktukan, Taguig City;
13) "Testimonial Letter" dated 21 October 2008 of Judge Hilario L.
Laqui, Presiding Judge, Regional Trail Court (RTC), Branch 218,
Quezon City; and
14) "Testimonial Letter" dated 28 October 2008 of Justice Oscar
M. Herrera, former Justice, Court of Appeals and former Dean,
Institute of Law, Far Eastern University (FEU).
Citing the case of In Re: Carlos S. Basa, petitioner pleaded that he be afforded
the same kindness and compassion in order that, like Atty. Basa, his
promising future may not be perpetually foreclosed. In the said case, the
Court had the occasion to say:
Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of
California and the Philippine Islands. Recently, he was charged in the Court of
First Instance of the City of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent,
was found guilty in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. De Rosario,
Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of
two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal,
this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second division
of the Supreme Court.
xxxx
When come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be
taken by the court, we do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the
violation of the criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly
passed over. On the other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our
compassion to the uttermost in order that so promising a career may not be
utterly ruined.
Petitioner promised to commit himself to be more circumspect in his actions
and solemnly pledged to exert all efforts to atone for his misdeeds.
There may be a reasonable ground to consider the herein Petition.
In the case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyer’s Oath (Bar
Matter 712), which may be applied in the instant case, the Court said:
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al
Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and
practice the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath, the Court recognizes that
Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the
various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine
concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts, to atone for
the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the
doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating.
xxxx
Meanwhile, in the case of Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia
(Administrative Case No. 2984), the Court [in] deciding whether or not to
reinstate Atty. Mejia to the practice of law stated:
The Court will take into consideration the applicant’s character and standing
prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which
he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment and the time
that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement.
Petitioner was barely thirty (30) years old and had only been in the practice
of law for five (5) years when he was disbarred from the practice of law. It is
of no doubt that petitioner had a promising future ahead of him where it not
for the decision of the Court stripping off his license.
Petitioner is also of good moral repute, not only before but likewise, after his
disbarment, as attested to overwhelmingly by his constituents, colleagues as
well as people of known probity in the community and society.
Way before the petitioner was even admitted to the bar, he had already
manifested his intense desire to render public service as evidenced by his
active involvement and participation in several social and civic projects and
activities. Likewise, even during and after his disbarment, which could be
perceived by some as a debilitating circumstance, petitioner still managed to
continue extending his assistance to others in whatever means possible. This
only proves petitioner’s strength of character and positive moral fiber.
However, still, it is of no question that petitioner’s act in copying the
examination questions from Atty. Balgos’ computer without the latter’s
knowledge and consent, and which questions later turned out to be the bar
examinations questions in Mercantile Law in the 2003 Bar Examinations, is
not at all commendable. While we do believe that petitioner sincerely did not
intend to cause the damage that his action ensued, still, he must be
sanctioned for unduly compromising the integrity of the bar examinations as
well as of this Court.
We are convinced, however, that petitioner has since reformed and has
sincerely reflected on his transgressions. Thus, in view of the circumstances
and likewise for humanitarian considerations, the penalty of disbarment may
now be commuted to suspension. Considering the fact, however, that
petitioner had already been disbarred for more than five (5) years, the same
may be considered as proper service of said commuted penalty and thus,
may now be allowed to resume practice of law.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that
the instant Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated 10
November 2008 of petitioner DANILO G. DE GUZMAN be GRANTED.
Petitioner’s disbarment is now commuted to suspension, which suspension is
considered as served in view of the petitioner’s five (5) year disbarment.
Hence, petitioner may now be allowed to resume practice of law.
The recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is well-taken in
part.1avvphi1.zw+ We deem petitioner worthy of clemency to the extent of
commuting his penalty to seven (7) years suspension from the practice of
law, inclusive of the five (5) years he has already served his disbarment.
Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct
offenders.2 While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring
officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed
has already served its purpose.3
In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of
disbarment imposed on the lawyer, we have taken into account the remorse
of the disbarred lawyer4 and the conduct of his public life during his years
outside of the bar.5 For example, in Valencia v. Antiniw, we held:
However, the record shows that the long period of respondent's disbarment
gave him the chance to purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse
and repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up
once again to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of every member
of the bar and officer of the court. During respondent's disbarment for more
than fifteen (15) years to date for his professional infraction, he has been
persistent in reiterating his apologies and pleas for reinstatement to the
practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show that he has regained his
worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and
unblemished record as an elected public servant, as attested to by numerous
civic and professional organizations, government institutions, public officials
and members of the judiciary.6
And in Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia,7 we noted:
Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejia’s disbarment, it
also cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years.
While the age of the petitioner and the length of time during which he has
endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a
petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of
Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been
attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his
lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted long enough. x x x
15
Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him
considering the gravity of his transgressions. Even more to his favor,
petitioner has redirected focus since his disbarment towards public service,
particularly with the People’s Law Enforcement Board. The attestations
submitted by his peers in the community and other esteemed members of
the legal profession, such as retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Oscar
Herrera, Judge Hilario Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval and Atty. Lorenzo Ata,
and the ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas testify to his
positive impact on society at large since the unfortunate events of 2003.
Petitioner’s subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some
hope that if he were to reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his
achievements as a lawyer would redound to the general good and more than
mitigate the stain on his record. Compassion to the petitioner is warranted.
Nonetheless, we wish to impart to him the following stern warning:
"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold
the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore
the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets
a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the
body politic."8
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Judicial Clemency and
Compassion is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The disbarment of DANILO G. DE
GUZMAN from the practice of law is hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS
SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW, reckoned from February 4,
2004.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A.
EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the
Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short)
Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
"stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri,
submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,
pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP,
which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the
following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire
into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency
and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate,
including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for
the removal of the delinquent member's name from
the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall
be sent by registered mail to the member and to the
Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the
resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on
February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due
from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of
Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted
a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing,
the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral
arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would
show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to
particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the
Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was
integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP
By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme
Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys
is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas
the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10
of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to
the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground
for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated
in these words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized
an official national body to be known as the 'Integrated
Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose
names now appear or may hereafter be included in the
Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of
the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the
Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board
of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being
compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good
standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and
that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the
Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his
name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not
among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to
constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface
whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the
conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of
the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous
case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of
the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta,
et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in
that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the
unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious
study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No.
526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of
factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of
the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
16
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must
belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual
lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar
is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as
obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which
all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all
the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement
of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the
purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding
considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as
more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that
integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of
individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the
integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a
valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice
of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his
client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the
nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State —
the administration of justice — as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law
being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to
a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has
created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained,
the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject
to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the
Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the
exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to
"raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining
the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9,
1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of
the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated
May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public
welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public
necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and
regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property
may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as
the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is
the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of
individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because
then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an
undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom,
and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and
validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant
of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the
1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this
Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling
Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the
provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable
that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary
power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice
of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his
practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the
society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to
require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the
proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering
with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such
reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the
public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely
deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without
power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is
not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the
Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official
national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is
free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in
order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program — the lawyers.9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to
be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the
Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in
the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and
duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973
Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from
requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a
reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession
to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives
and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty
provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process
and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice
of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder
of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at
length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the
necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be
and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to
enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment,
is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right
but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory
power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
17
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to
state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and
are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities,
and the authorities holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the
Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and
disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of
Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its
officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a
power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is
an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from
the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations
no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in
judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the
facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a
determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession
and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of
the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or
prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when
it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the
fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is
indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and
of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are
neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court
that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred,
and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the
Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino,
Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
IN RE: PETITION OF ARTURO EFREN GARCIA for admission to the Philippine
Bar without taking the examination. ARTURO EFREN GARCIA, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
BARRERA, J.:
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his
verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino citizen born in
Bacolor City, Province of Negros Occidental, of Filipino parentage; that he
had taken and finished in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he
was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for
admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished
the law course graduating there as "Licenciado En Derecho"; that thereafter
he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the
provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions
between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state, he is entitled
to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the
required bar examinations.
After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny the petition on the
following grounds:
(1) the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of
Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State
can not be invoked by applicant. Under Article 11 thereof;
The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall have
obtained recognition of the validity of their academic degrees by
virtue of the stipulations of this Treaty, can practice their
professions within the territory of the Other, . . .. (Emphasis
supplied).
from which it could clearly be discerned that said Treaty was intended to
govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the
citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines.
Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the
Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not
entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in
the Philippines.
(2) Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides .
The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degree or
diplomas to practice the liberal professions in either of the
Contracting States, issued by competent national authorities, shall
be deemed competent to exercise said professions in the territory
of the Other, subject to the laws and regulations of the latter. . . ..
It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the
applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the
contracting State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal
profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2,9, and 16
thereof, which have the force of law, require that before anyone can practice
the legal profession in the Philippine he must first successfully pass the
required bar examinations; and
(3) The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Spanish State could not have been intended to modify
the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach
upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the lower to
repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of
the Philippines. (See Sec. 13, Art VIII, Phil. Constitution).
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, De Leon and
Natividad, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., on leave, took no part.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-2662             March 26, 1949
SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner,
vs.
Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE,
Colonel MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel
PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and
ROBERT PORT, respondents.
Pedro Serran, Jose G. Lukban, and Liberato B. Cinco for petitioner.
Fred Ruiz Castro Federico Arenas Mariano Yengco, Jr., Ricardo A. Arcilla and
S. Melville Hussey for respondents.
MORAN, C.J.:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial
Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The
Philippines during a period covering 19433 and 19444 who is now charged
before a military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed
forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to
discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal
atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners
of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war"
— comes before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive
Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit
respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the
prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission and to
permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of
petitioners.
In support of his case petitioner tenders the following principal arguments.
First. — "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates
not only the provision of our constitutional law but also our local laws to say
nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to
the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and
therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and
international." Hence petitioner argues — "That in view off the fact that this
commission has been empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional law an
illegal order this commission is without jurisdiction to try herein petitioner."
Second. — That the participation in the prosecution of the case against
petitioner before the Commission in behalf of the United State of America of
attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port who are not attorneys authorized
by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is a diminution of our
personality as an independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are
a violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to
practice law in the Philippines.
18
Third. — That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution
the United State not being a party in interest in the case.
Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing
rule and regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued
by the President of the Philippines on the 29th days of July, 1947 This Court
holds that this order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution
provides in its section 3, that —
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy
and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of
the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and
significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the
United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of
planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of
crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the
laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable
therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution
Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with
the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the
our Constitution.
The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of
his power as Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this
Court in the case of Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 664) 1 when we
said —
By the same token war crimes committed against our people and our
government while we were a Commonwealth are triable and punishable by
our present Republic.
Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys namely
Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port in the prosecution of his case on the
ground that said attorney's are not qualified to practice law in Philippines in
accordance with our Rules of court and the appointment of said attorneys as
prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty.
In the first place respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal
governed by a special law and not by the Rules of court which govern
ordinary civil court. It has already been shown that Executive Order No. 68
which provides for the organization of such military commission is a valid and
constitutional law. There is nothing in said executive order which requires
that counsel appearing before said commission must be attorneys qualified
to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In
facts it is common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually
military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal
training.
Secondly the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of
our nation sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United States, which has
submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her people
to a tribunal of our nation should be allowed representation in the trial of
those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of sovereignty it has
not been by our government but by the United State Government which has
yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies. The least that we
could do in the spirit of comity is to allow them representation in said trials.

Alleging that the United State is not a party in interest in the case petitioner
War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After
challenges the personality of attorneys Hussey and Port as prosecutors. It is
cessation of armed hostilities incident of war may remain pending
of common knowledge that the United State and its people have been
which should be disposed of as in time of war. An importance
equally if not more greatly aggrieved by the crimes with which petitioner
incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measure by the
stands charged before the Military Commission. It can be considered a
military command not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to
privilege for our Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication
seize and subject to disciplinary measure those enemies who in
of the honor of its citizens and its government to a military tribunal of our
their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have
country.
violated the law of war. (Ex parte Quirin 317 U.S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct.,
2.) Indeed the power to create a military commission for the trial
and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law with
in the language of a writer a military commission has jurisdiction jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of
so long as a technical state of war continues. This includes the Executive Order No. 68, and having said petitioner in its custody, this Court
period of an armistice or military occupation up to the effective of will not interfere with the due process of such Military commission.
a treaty of peace and may extend beyond by treaty agreement.
(Cowles Trial of War Criminals by Military Tribunals, America Bar
For all the foregoing the petition is denied with costs de oficio.
Association Journal June, 1944.)

Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to
consummate this unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment
of war criminal through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. December 3, 1948
68.
In re Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage of questions in
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to some subjects in the 1948 Bar Examinations.
try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and
the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first Felixberto M. Serrano for respondent.
and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and Enrique M. Fernando and Francisco A. Rodrigo, Abelardo Subido, and Arturo
regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly A. Alafriz (for the Philippine Lawyers' Association) as amici curiae.
based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these
rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nation the United
State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention, Such rule and
principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines
was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution
has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as continued inn
treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
The present case had its origin in a story or news item prepared and written
by the defendant, Angel J. Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly
Reporter, a local daily of general circulation, that appeared on the front page
committed the Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and
of the issue of September 14, 1948. The story was preceded by the headline
thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan
in large letters — "CLAIM 'LEAK' IN LAST BAR TESTS," followed by another in
to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent
slightly smaller letters — "Applicants In Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed; One
countries. These rights and obligation were not erased by our assumption of
School Favored," under the name — "By Angel J. Parazo of the Star
full sovereignty. If at all our emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce
Reporter Staff." For purposes of reference we quote the news item in full:
the right on our own of trying and punishing those who committed crimes
against crimes against our people. In this connection it is well to remember
what we have said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372): Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were
denounced by some of the law graduates who took part in the
tests, to the Star Reporter this morning.
. . . The change of our form government from Commonwealth to
Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with
the crime of treason committed during then Commonwealth These examinees claim to have seen mimeograph copies of the
because it is an offense against the same sovereign people. . . . questions in one subject, days before the tests were given, in the
Philippine Normal School.

19
 Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had those
mimeographed questions on said subject fully one week before
the tests.
The students who made the denunciation to the Star
Reporter claim that the tests actually given were similar in every
respect to those they had seen students of this private university
holding proudly around the city.
The students who claim to have seen the tests which leaked are
demanding that the Supreme Court institute an immediate probe
into the matter, to find out the source of the leakage, and annul
the test papers of the students of the particular university
possessed of those tests before the examinations.
The discovery of the alleged leakage in the tests of the bar
examinations came close on the heels of the revelations in
the Philippine Collegian, official organ of the student body of the
University of the Philippines, on recent government tests wherein
the questions had come into the possession of nearly all the
graduates of some private technical schools.
To the publication, evidently, the attention of the Supreme Court must have
been called, and Mr. Justice Padilla, who had previously been designated
Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners for this year, by authority of
the Court, instructed Mr. Jose de la Cruz as Commissioner with the assistance
of Mr. E. Soriano, Clerk of Court to cite Mr. Parazo for questioning and
investigation. In this connection, and for purposes of showing the interest of
the Supreme Court in the news item and its implications, it may here be
stated that this Court is and for many years has been, in charge of the Bar
Examinations held every year, including that of this year, held in August,
1948. Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines authorizes
this Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law,
and pursuant to that authority, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was
promulgated, under which rule, this Court conducts the Bar Examinations
yearly, appoints a Committee of Bar Examiners to be presided by one of the
Justices, to serve for one year, acts on the report of the committee and
finally, admits to the Bar and to the practice of law, the candidates and
examinees who have passed the examinations.
The investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted on September 18, 1948, on
which occasion he testified under oath and, answering questions directed to
him by Messrs. Cruz and Soriano admitted that he was the author of the
news item; that he wrote up the story and had it published, in good faith and
in a spirit of public service; and that he knew the persons who gave him the
information which formed the basis of his publication but that he declined to
reveal their names because the information was given to him in confidence
and his informants did not wish to have their identities revealed. The
investigators informed Parazo that this was a serious matter involving the
confidence of the public in the regularity and cleanliness of the Bar
Examinations and also in the Supreme Court which conducted said
examinations, and repeatedly appealed to his civic spirit and sense of public
service, pleading with and urging him to reveal the names of his informants
so that the Supreme Court may be in a position to start and conduct the
necessary investigation in order to verify their charge and complaint and take
action against the party or parties responsible for the alleged irregularity and
anomaly, if found true, but Parazo consistently refused to make the
revelation.
In the meantime, the writer of this opinion who was appointed to the
Supreme Court as associate Justice in the latter part of August, 1948, was
designated to succeed Mr. Justice Padilla as Chairman of the Committee of
Bar Examiners when the said Justice was appointed Secretary of Justice. The
writer of this opinion was furnished a copy of the transcript of the
investigation conducted on September 18, 1948, and he made a report
thereof to the Court in banc, resulting in the issuance of the resolution of this
Court dated October 7, 1948, which reads as follows:
In relation with the news item that appeared in the front page of
the Star Reporter, issue of September 14, 1948, regarding alleged
leakage in some bar examination questions, which examinations
were held in August 1948, Mr. Jose de la Cruz, as Commissioner,
and Mr. E. Soriano, as Clerk of Court, were authorized by Mr.
Justice Sabino Padilla then chairman of the committee of bar
examiners to conduct an investigation thereof, particularly to
receive the testimony of Mr. Angel J. Parazo, the reporter
responsible for and author of said news item. An investigation was
conducted on September 18, 1948; stenographic notes were
taken of the testimony of Mr. Parazo, and Mr. Justice Marcelino R.
Montemayor, the new chairman of the committee of bar
examiners, has submitted the transcript of said notes for the
consideration of this Court.
From the record of said investigation, it is clear that Mr. Parazo
has deliberately and consistently declined and refused to reveal
the identity of the persons supposed to have given him the data
and information on which his news item was based, despite the
repeated appeals made to his civic spirit, and for his cooperations,
in order to enable this Court to conduct a thorough investigation
of the alleged bar examination anomaly, Resolved, to authorize
Mr. Justice Montemayor to cite Mr. Parazo before him, explain to
him that the interests of the State demand and so this Court
requires that he reveal the source or sources of his information
and of his news item, and to warn him that his refusal to make the
revelation demanded will be regarded as contempt of court and
penalized accordingly. Mr. Justice Montemayor will advise the
Court of the result.
Acting upon this resolution, the writer of this opinion cited Mr. Parazo to
appear before him on October 13, 1948. He appeared on the date set and it
was clearly explained to him that the interest of the State demands and this
court requires that he reveal the source of sources of his information and of
his news item; that this was a very serious matter involving the confidence of
the people in general and the law practitioners and bar examinees in
particular, in the regularity and cleanliness of the bar examinations; that it
also involves the good name and reputation of the bar examiners who are
appointed by this Court to prepare the bar examinations questions and later
pass upon and correct the examinations questions and last but not least, it
also involves and is bound to affect the confidence of the whole country in
the very Supreme Court which is conducting the bar examinations. It was
further explained to him that the Supreme Court is keenly interested in
investigating the alleged anomaly and leakage of the examination questions
and is determined to punish the party or parties responsible therefor but that
without his help, specially the identities of the persons who furnished him
the information and who could give the court the necessary data and
evidence, the Court could not even begin the investigation because there
would be no basis from which to start, not even a clue from which to
formulate a theory. Lastly, Parazo was told that under the law he could be
punished if he refused to make the revelation, punishment which may even
involve imprisonment.
Because of the seriousness of the matter, Parazo was advised to think it over
and consider the consequences, and if he need time within which to do this
and so that he might even consult the editor and publisher of his paper,
the Star Reporter, he could be given an extension of time, and at his request,
the investigation was postponed to October 15, 1948. On that date he
appeared, accompanied by his counsel, Atty. Felixberto M. Serrano. The
writer of this opinion in the presence of his counsel, several newspapermen,
Clerk of Court Soriano, Deputy Clerk of Court Cruz, and Mr. Chanliongco
made a formal demand on Mr. Parazo to reveal the identities of his
informants, under oath, but he declined and refused to make the revelation.
At the request of his counsel, that before this Court take action upon his
refusal to reveal, he be accorded a hearing, with the consent of the Court
first obtained, a public hearing was held on the same day, October 15, 1948
in the course of which, Attorney Serrano extensively and ably argued the
case of his client, invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 53, the first
section of which reads as follows:
SECTION 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of
any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation
cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or
information appearing in said publication which was related in
confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court
or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is
demanded by the interest of the state.
This Court has given this case prolonged, careful and mature consideration,
involving as it does interesting and important points of law as well as
questions of national importance. Counsel contends that the phrase "interest
of the state" found at the end of section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 means and
refers only to the security of the state, that is to say — that only
when National Security or public safety is involved, may this Court compel
the defendant to reveal the source or sources of his news report or
information. We confess that it was not easy to decide this legal question on
which the conviction or acquittal of Parazo hinges. As a matter of facts, the
vote of the Justice is not unanimous.
In an effort to determine the intent of the Legislature that passed Republic
Act No. 53, particularly the Senate were it originated, we examined the
record of the proceedings in said legislative body when this Act, then Senate
Bill No. 6 was being discussed. We gathered from the said record that the
original bill prepared by Senator Sotto provided that the immunity to be
accorded a publisher, editor, or reporter of any newspaper was absolute and
that under no circumstance could he be compelled to reveal the source of his
information or news report. The committee, however, under the
chairmanship of Senator Cuenco inserted an amendment or change, by
adding to the end of section 1 of the clause "unless the court finds that such
revelation is demanded by the public interest."
20
When the bill as amended was recommended for approval on second
reading, Senator Sotto, the author of the original bill proposed an
amendment by eliminating the clause added by the committee — "unless the
court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," claiming
that said clause would kill the purposed of the bill. This amendment of
Senator Sotto was discussed. Various Senators objected to the elimination of
the clause already referred to on the ground that without such exception and
by giving complete immunity to editors, reporters, etc., many abuses may be
committed. Senator Cuenco, Committee chairman, in advocating the
disapproval of the Sotto amendment, and in defending the exception
embodied in the amendment introduced by the Committee, consisting in the
clause: "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public
interest," said that the Committee could not accept the Sotto amendment
because there may be cases, perhaps few, in which the interest of the public
or the interest of the state required that the names of the informants be
published or known. He gave as one example a case of a newspaperman
publishing information referring to a theft of the plans of forts or
fortifications. He argued that if the immunity accorded a newspaperman
should be absolute, as sought by the Sotto amendment, the author of the
theft might go scott-free. When the Sotto amendment was put to a vote, it
was disapproved. Finally, Senator Sotto proposed another amendment by
changing the phrase "public interest" at the end of section 1 as amended by
the Committee be changed to and substituted by the phrase "interest of the
state," claiming that the phrase public interest was too elastic. Without much
discussion this last amendment was approved, and this phrase is now found
in the Act as finally approved.
In view of the contention now advanced, that the phrase "interest of the
state" is confined to cases involving the "security of the state" or "public
safety," one might wonder or speculate on why the last amendment
proposed by Senator Sotto, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest
of the state," was approved without much discussion. But we notice from the
records of the deliberations on and discussion of the bill in the Senate that
the phrase "public interest" was used interchangeably by some Senators with
the phrase "interest of the state." For instance, although the bill, as amended
by the Committee presided by Senator Cuenco, used the words "public
interest, "when Senator Cuenco sponsored the bill before the Senate he used
in his speech or remarks the phrase "interest of the State" (interes del
Estado). Again, although the bill, as sponsored by the Cuenco Committee and
discussed by the Senate, used the words "public interest, "Senator Sebastian
referred to the exception by using the phrase "interest of the state." This
understanding of at least two of the Senators, who took part in the
discussion, about the similarity or interchangeability of the two phrases
"public interest" and "interest of the estate," may account for the readiness
or lack of objection on the part of the Senate, after it had rejected the first
Sotto amendment, to accept the second Sotto amendment, changing the
phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state."
In referring to a case wherein the security of the state or public safety was
involved, such as the theft of the plans of fortifications, Senator Cuenco was
obviously giving it only as an example of what he meant by "interest of the
state;" it was not meant to be the only case or example. We do not propose
to define or fix the limits or scope of the phrase "interest of the state;" but
we can say that the phrase "interest of the state" can not be confined and
limited to the "security of the state" or to "public safety" alone. These
synonymous phrases, — "security of the state" and "public safety," — are
not uncommon terms and we can well presume that the legislators were
familiar with them. The phrase "public safety," is used in Article III, section
1(5) of the Constitution of the Philippines, where it says that "the privacy of
communications and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court or when public safety and order require otherwise;" and
Article VII, section 10(2) of the same Constitution provided that the President
may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, in case of invasion,
insurrection, etc., when the public safety requires it.
The phrase "National Security" is used at the beginning of Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, thus: Title I, — Crimes against National Security and the
law of Nations, Chapter I, — Crimes against National Security. Then, more
recently, the phrase "National Security" was used in section 2, and the
phrase "public security" was equally used in section 19, of Commonwealth
Act No. 682 creating the People's Court, promulgated on September 25,
1945. If, as contended, the Philippine Congress, particularly the Philippine
Senate, had meant to limit the exception to the immunity of newspapermen
only to cases where the "security of the state," i.e., "National Security" is
involved, it could easily and readily have used such phrase or any one of
similar phrases like "public safety," "National Security," or "public security" of
which it must have been familiar. Since it did not do so, there is valid reason
to believe that that was not in the mind and intent of the legislators, and
that, in using the phrase "interest of the state," it extended the scope and
the limits of the exception when a newspaperman or reporter may be
compelled to reveal the sources of his information.
The phrase "interest of the state" is quite broad and extensive. It is of course
more general and broader than "security of the state." Although not as broad
and comprehensive as "public interest" which may include most anything
though of minor importance, but affecting the public, such as for instance,
the establishment and maintenance of barrio roads, electric light and ice
plants, parks, markets, etc., the phrase "interest of the estate" even under a
conservative interpretation, may and does include cases and matters of
national importance in which the whole state and nations, not only a branch
or instrumentality thereof such as a province, city or town, or a part of the
public, is interested or would be affected, such as the principal functions of
Government like administration of justice, public school system, and such
matters like social justice, scientific research, practice of law or of medicine,
impeachment of high Government officials, treaties with other nations,
integrity of the three coordinate branches of the Government, their relations
to each other, and the discharge of their functions, etc.
We are satisfied that the present case easily comes under the phrase
"interest of the state." Under constitutional provision, article VIII, section 13,
Constitution of the Philippines, the Supreme Court takes charge of the
admission of members to the Philippine Bar. By its Rules of Court, it has
prescribed the qualifications of the candidates to the Bar Examinations, and
it has equally prescribed the subject of the said Bar Examinations. Every year,
the Supreme Court appoints the Bar examiners who prepare the questions,
then correct the examination papers submitted by the examinees, and later
make their report to the Supreme Court. Only those Bar Examination
candidates who are found to have obtained to passing grade are admitted to
the Bar and licensed to practice law. There are now thousands of members of
the Philippine Bar, scattered all over the Philippines, practicing law or
occupying important Government posts requiring membership in the Bar as a
prerequisite, and every year, quite a number, sometimes several hundreds,
are added to the legal fold. The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have
always tried to maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in
academic preparation and legal training, as well as in honesty and fair
dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested
in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to
admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are
known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show proficiency in
and knowledge of the law by the standard set by this Court by passing the
Bar Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner. It is of public
knowledge that perhaps by general inclination or the conditions obtaining in
this country, or the great demand for the services of licensed lawyers, law as
compared to other professions, is the most popular in these islands. The
predominantly greater number of members of the Bar, schools and colleges
of law as compared to those of other learned professions, attest to this fact.
And one important thing to bear in mind is that the Judiciary, from the
Supreme Court down to the Justice of the Peace Courts, provincial fiscalships
and other prosecuting attorneys, and the legal departments of the
Government, draw exclusively from the Bar to fill their positions.
Consequently, any charge or insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of Bar
Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and general interest and
national importance.
If it is true that Bar Examination questions, for some reason or another, find
their way out and get into the hands of Bar examinees before the
examinations are actually given, and as a result thereof some examinees
succeed in illegally and improperly obtaining passing grades and are later
admitted to the Bar and to the practice of law, when otherwise they should
not be, then the present members of the legal profession would have reason
to resent and be alarmed; and if this is continued it would not be long before
the legal profession will have fallen into disrepute. The public would naturally
lose confidence in the lawyers, specially in the new ones, because a person
contemplating to go to court to seek redress or to defend himself before it
would not know whether a particular lawyer to whom he is entrusting his
case has legally passed the Bar Examinations because of sufficient and
adequate preparation and training, and that he is honest, or whether he was
one of those who had succeeded in getting hold of Bar Examination
questions in advance, passed the Bar Examinations illegally, and then started
his legal career with this act of dishonesty. Particularly, the Bar examinees
who, by intense study and conscientious preparations, have honestly passed
the Bar Examinations and are admitted to practice law, would be affected by
this anomaly, because they would ever be under a cloud of suspicion, since
from the point of view of the public, they might be among those who had
made use of Bar Examination questions obtained before hand. And,
incidentally, the morale of the hundreds of students and graduates of the
different law schools, studying law and later preparing for the Bar
Examinations, would be affected, even disastrously, for in them may be born
the idea that there is no need of much law study and preparation inasmuch
as it is possible and not difficult to obtain copies of questions before the
examinations and pass them and be admitted to the Bar.
The cloud of suspicion would, equally, hang over the Bar examiners
themselves, eight eminent lawyers who in a spirit of public service and civic
spirit, have consented to serve on the Committee of Examiners at the request
and designation of this Court. They would be suspected, — one or two or
more of them — that through negligence, or connivance, or downright
corruption, they have made possible the release if they have not themselves
actually released, before examination day, the questions they had prepared.
The employees of the Supreme Court in charge of the Bar Examinations,
specially those who copy or mimeograph the original copies furnished by the
Bar examiners, would all be under suspicion. And, lastly, and more important
21
still, the Supreme Court itself which has to overall supervision and control
over the examinations, would share the suspicion, as a result of which the
confidence of the people in this High Tribunal, which public confidence, the
members of this Court like to think and believe, it still enjoys, might be
affected and shaken. All these considerations of vital importance, in our
opinion, can and will sufficiently cause the present case to fall and be
included within the meaning of the phrase "interest of the state," involving
as it does, not only the interests of students and graduates of the law schools
and colleges, and of the entire legal profession of this country as well as the
good name and reputation of the members of the Committee of Bar
Examiners, including the employees of the Supreme Court having charge of
and connections with said examinations, but also the highest Tribunal of the
land itself which represents one of the three coordinate and independent
branches or departments of the Philippine Government.
In support of if not in addition to the power granted by section 1 of Republic
Act. No. 53 to this Court, we have the inherent power of courts in general,
specially of the Supreme Court as representative of the Judicial Department,
to adopt proper and adequate measures to preserve their integrity, and
render possible and facilitate the exercise of their functions, including, as in
the present case, the investigation of charges of error, abuse or misconduct
of their officials and subordinates, including lawyers, who are officers of the
Court. (Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil., 350; 21 C.J.S. 41, 138.) As we
have previously stated, the revelation demanded of the respondent, of the
identity of his informants, is essential and necessary to the investigation of
the charge contained in the publication already mentioned.
It will be noticed from Parazo's news item as quoted in the first part of this
decision, that, informants, law graduates and bar examinees, were
denouncing the supposed anomaly — consisting of the alleged leakage of the
Bar Examination questions — to the Supreme Court for due investigation. If
those persons really meant and intended to make a bona fide and effective
denunciation, with expectation of results, the right place to air their
grievance was the Supreme Court itself, not a newspaper; and if they truly
wanted an investigation, they should have come forward and furnished or
stood ready to furnish the facts on which to base and from which to start an
investigation, instead of concealing themselves behind the curtain of press
immunity.
Examining the news item in question, it is therein claimed and assured that
Bar Examination questions in at least one subject had been obtained and
used by bar examinees coming from a certain university, one week before
the examinations were actually held. Parazo in his statements and answers
during the investigation said that examination questions in several subjects
were involved in the anomaly. But no copy or copies of said examination
questions were furnished us. No one is willing to testify that he actually saw
said alleged copies of examination questions; that they were actually and
carefully compared with the legitimate examination questions given out on
the day of the examination and found to be identical; no one is ready and
willing to reveal the identity of the persons or bar examinees said to have
been seen with the said Bar Examination questions, although they as well as
the university where they came from, was known; and even the law subjects
to which the questions pertained are not disclosed; and, lastly, we are not
allowed to know even the identity of respondent Parazo's informants who
claim to have seen all these things.
In this connection it may be stated that in the las Bar Examinations held in
August, 1948, approximately nine hundred candidates took them, each
candidate writing his answers in a book for each subject. There were eight
subjects, each belonging to and corresponding to each one of the eight bar
examiners. There were therefore eight sets of bar examination questions,
and multiplying these eight sets of questions by nine hundred candidates,
gives a total of seven thousand two hundred (7,200) examination papers
involved, in the hand of eight different examiners. The examination books or
papers bear no names or identifications of their writers or owners and said
ownership and identification will not be known until the books or papers are
all corrected and graded. Without definite assurance based on reliable
witnesses under oath that the alleged anomaly had actually been committed,
— evidence on the identity of the persons in possession of the alleged copies
of questions prematurely released or illegally obtained and made use of, the
law subjects or subjects involved, the university from which said persons
come, this Court does not feel capable of or warranted in taking any step,
such as blindly and desperately revising each and every one of the 7,200
examination books with the fond but forlorn hope of finding any similarity or
identity in the answers of any group of examinees and basing thereon any
definite finding or conclusion. Apart from the enormity of the task and its
hopelessness, this Court may not and cannot base its findings and
conclusions, especially in any serious and delicate matter as is the present, on
that kind of evidence. Under these circumstances, this Court, for lack of
basis, data and information, is unable to conduct, nay, even start, an
investigation; and, unless and until the respondent herein reveals the
identities of his informants, and those informants and or others with facts
and reliable evidence, aid and cooperate with the Court in its endeavor to
further examine and probe into the charges contained in the news items,
said charges are considered and held to be without basis, proof or
foundation.
When the Supreme Court decided to demand of the respondent herein that
he reveal the names of his informants, it was not impelled or motivated by
mere idle curiosity. It truly wanted information on which to start an
investigation because it is vitally interested in keeping the Bar Examinations
clean and above board and specially, not only to protect the members of the
Bar and those aspiring for membership therein and the public dealing with
the members thereof and the Bar Examiners who cooperate with and act as
agents of this Court in preparing the examination questions and correcting
the examination papers, but also, as already stated, to keep the confidence
of the people in this High Tribunal as regards the discharge of its function
relative to the admission to the practice of law. These, it can only do by
investigating any Bar Examination anomaly, fixing responsibility and
punishing those found guilty, even annulling examinations already held, or
else declaring the charges as not proven, if, as a result of the investigation, it
is found that there is insufficiency or lack of evidence. In demanding from the
respondent that he reveal the sources of his information, this Court did not
intend to punish those informants or hold them liable. It merely wanted their
help and cooperation. In this Court's endeavor to probe thoroughly the
anomaly, or irregularity allegedly committed, it was its intention not only to
adopt the necessary measures to punish the guilty parties, if the charges are
found to be true, but also even to annul the examinations themselves, in
justice to the innocent parties who had taken but did not pass the
examinations. We say this because in every examination, whether conducted
by the Government or by a private institution, certain standards are
unconsciously adopted on which to base the passing grade. For instance, if,
as a result of the correction of many or all of the examination papers, it is
found that only very few have passed it, the examiner might reasonably think
that the questions he gave were unduly difficult or hard to understand, or
too long, as a result of which he may be more liberal and be more lenient and
make allowances. On the hand, if too many obtain passing grade, the
examiner may think that the examination questions were too easy and
constitute an inadequate measure of the legal knowledge and training
required to be a lawyer, and so he may raise his standard and become more
strict in his correction of the papers and his appreciation of the answers. So,
in a case where examinees, especially if many, succeed in getting hold of
questions long before examinations day, and study and prepare the answers
to those questions, it may result that when the examiner finds that many of
the examinees have easily and correctly answered the questions, he may
think that said questions were too easy, raise the standard by being strict in
his correction of the papers, thereby giving a grade below passing to a
number of examinees who otherwise would have validly passed the
examinations.
In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in the present case
demands that the respondent Angel J. Parazo reveal the source or sources of
his information which formed the basis of his news items or story in the
September 14, 1948 issue of the Star Reporter, quoted at the beginning of his
decision, and that, in refusing to make the revelation which this Court
required of him, he committed contempt of Court. The respondent
repeatedly stated during the investigation that he knew the names and
identities of the persons who furnished him the information. In other words,
he omitted and still refuses to do an act commanded by this Court which is
yet in his power to perform. (Rule 64, section 7, Rules of Court.)Ordinarily, in
such cases, he can and should be imprisoned indefinitely until he complied
with the demand. However, considering that case like the present are not
common or frequent, in this jurisdiction, and that there is no reason and
immediate necessity for imposing a heavy penalty, as may be done in other
cases where it is advisable or necessary to mete out severe penalties to meet
a situation of an alarming number of cases of a certain offense or a crime
wave, and, considering further the youthful age of the respondent, the
majority of the members of this Court have decided to order, as it hereby
orders, his immediate arrest and confinement in jail for a period of one (1)
month, unless, before the expiration of that period he makes to this Court
the revelation demanded of him. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
22
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While
ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case
would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our
national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the
1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what
constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest
of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court,
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for
them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in
the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out
to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an
attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with
opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and
collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is
also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising
person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under
the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there,
in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under
the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in
court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil.
173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by
the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5
Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part
of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate
relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and
great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear
an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts.
No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting
at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation
briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of
law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge
of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the
active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or
more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney
at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW
312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has
adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make
a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of
the Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications
provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of
the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we
would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications
regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as
long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal
knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners,
even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions
and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the
practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
23
 MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a
lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is
set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA,
although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in
COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance
with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is
equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others,
that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA)
should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of
auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways
synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not
engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are
private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as
commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the
business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are
often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The
firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some
firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced
attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law
practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as
that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West
Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as
the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to
be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145
Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128
Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every
function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition
would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the
most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the
average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large
percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating
lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of
the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects
history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander
SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as
a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases
before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed
laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-
litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending
more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in
trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the
diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed]
that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal
medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in
a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills,
legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even
the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform
at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role
such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a
client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one
of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the
exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have
mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers
find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for
many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that
is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove
from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special
roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in
which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The
most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government
legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted
are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the
traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a
revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers
and other professional groups, in particular those members
participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding
that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law
is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today
requires an accurate understanding of the nature and implications
of the corporate law research function accompanied by an
accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of
the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation,
particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has
impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be
processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional
factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating
the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast
decision and response in situations of acute danger have
prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and
electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved
decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected
alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged
in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of
corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate
legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to
legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by
those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an
early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the
various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business
administration or management, functioning at the legal policy
level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the
concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are
currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance
problems would require the services of an astute attorney
because of the complex legal implications that arise from each
and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business
issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).
24
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making
referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate
lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases
tycoons and magnates of business and industry. participating in the organization and operations of governance
through participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one,
complicated as corporations organize for global operations.
the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will
( Emphasis supplied)
vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and
some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to
private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with
certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to governmental policies toward the promotion and management of
handle most legal problems in-house. technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require
approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from
jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax
other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples
laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board
of collaborative efforts between governmental and business
meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory
Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and
in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the
Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other
managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of
than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is
both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has
representing. These include such matters as determining policy
been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-
and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders,
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being promoting team achievements within the organization. In general,
isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's work such external activities are better predictors of team performance
actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be than internal group processes.
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work
first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the
fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.
corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations
are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand
engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations.
provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate (Emphasis supplied)
lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international
law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three
firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many
factors are apropos:
as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In
most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced
attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been
practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding
May 25,1990, p. 4). both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and
rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the
problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer
psychological. New programming techniques now make the
Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot
system dynamics principles more accessible to managers —
problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and
including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better
decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in
law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of
the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional
litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and
law teaching method of confining the subject study to the
risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well
into the intertwining modern management issues.
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based
models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three
of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent
(3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current
and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on
advances which are of particular significance to the corporate
instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an
counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable
international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a
devotion to the organization and management of the legal
function itself. [Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal
function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting
circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills
"intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme that comprise a major part of the general counsel's
for the corporate counsel's total learning. responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble
and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the
when transactional or similar facts are being considered and
counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the
made.
globalization process, including the resulting strategic
repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required
to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at
multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced
as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms
increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each
other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

25
 Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are
undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal
consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this
nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms
change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent
environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate
today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of
the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments
to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp.
128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod
used to be a member.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a
The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the
team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various
most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate
contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials
counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic
of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the
issues, including structuring its global operations, managing
legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations
improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of
officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts)
employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new
who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven,
and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping
"Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers,"
internally with more complex make or by decisions.
Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p.
11). (Emphasis supplied)
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing
corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate
concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4)
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp
covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem
corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10,
1991, p. 4). In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt
restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries'
have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting
sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted:
each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of
Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L.
vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a
Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency
dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance
for International Development, during the Session on Law for the
and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory
exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989,
Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on
p. 4).
August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.

Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by
the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he
took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of
the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the
bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-
73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more
than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the
bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the
World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for
about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning
to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as
a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.
Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared
for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of
advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of
the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked
with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups,
in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian
reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of
his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial
body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than
purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of
contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in
renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an
international business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language
that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the
advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of
adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law
Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321).
( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract
construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines
the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define
the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the
recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a
devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine
qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of
law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They
carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men
learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and
serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in
Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal,
Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law".
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA
327, the Court said:
26
 Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be We now proceed:
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public
the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
political question involving considerations of wisdom which only
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of
the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the
Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated: instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this
the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no Additionally, consider the following:
authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another
person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice.
President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and
To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon
thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in
the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the
the negative.
discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. ( Emphasis supplied) (2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar,
consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the (3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the
Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; U.S. Senate.
and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v.
Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
200)

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the that giveth life.
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which
provides: Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of
Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing
Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first No blade shall touch his skin;
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two
Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, No blood shall flow from his veins.
without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator
capacity. placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front
of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened
to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The
that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow
stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the
modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation spirit of the agreement.
is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require
generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a
year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the SO ORDERED.
constitutional intent.
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really
means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of
law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
 
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all
situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but
we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member
of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming vs.
lawyers. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected R E SO L U T I O N
President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more
qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action
or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is
indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President? REGALADO, J.:

27
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from
issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A"
and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from
making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other
than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN
Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam
Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration
Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to
Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call
Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita,
Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-7232;
521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced
are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and
destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought
in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice
of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals
with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services,
the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of
Arizona,2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7,
1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues
raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2)
Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4)
U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of
the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA)
to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter,
their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and
extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes
note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the
services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can
properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we
deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the
respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations
and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar
matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which
respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal
services", common sense would readily dictate that the
same are essentially without substantial distinction.
For who could deny that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic
institutional services from government or non-
government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or
business registration, obtaining documents like
clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes
practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not
wish to make issue with respondent's foreign citations.
Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view
espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is
alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its
opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal
clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same
through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative
supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually
restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical
activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed.4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the
impression that respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers
legal services to the public, the advertisements in
question give the impression that respondent is
offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply
assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently
because this (is) the effect that the advertisements
have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in
question can be traced, first of all, to the very name
being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc."
Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the
rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a
medical clinic connotes medical services for medical
problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic"
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes
doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in
the advertisements subject of the present case,
appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the
more reinforces the impression that it is being
operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal
services. In addition, the advertisements in question
appear with a picture and name of a person being
represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this
practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as
to the nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is
merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by
it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer
actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes
unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal
services" and "legal support services," as the
respondent would have it. The advertisements in
question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the
reading public that legal services are being offered by
lawyers, whether true or not.
28
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce
the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public
order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the
advertisements in question are only meant to inform
the general public of the services being offered by it.
Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam
divorce, and any law student ought to know that under
the Family Code, there is only one instance when a
foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under
Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code
(defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special
contract of permanent
union between a man and
woman entered into accordance
with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an
inviolable social
institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the
property relation during the
marriage within the limits
provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is
obvious that the message being conveyed is that
Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a
marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by
simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce,
violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be
considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where
certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the
sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed
at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal
system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that
advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the
Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle
with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and
seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if
not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the
"special contract of permanent union," the inviolable
social institution," which is how the Family Code
describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity
and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement
appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy,
which is suggestive of immoral publication of
applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed,
it can readily be concluded that the above impressions
one may gather from the advertisements in question
are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
example alone confirms what the advertisements
suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are
being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with
impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine
courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal
support services" respondent offers do not constitute
legal services as commonly understood, the
advertisements in question give the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers
and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed.
Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes
of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar
themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals,
good customs and the public good, thereby destroying
and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be
enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted
that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it presently
offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services
to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing
computerized legal research, electronic data gathering,
storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms,
investigators for gathering of evidence, and like
services will greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead encouraged.
However, when the conduct of such business by non-
members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of
law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such
business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case
at bar can be better performed by specialists in other
fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of
their having devoted time and effort exclusively to
such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for
admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from
"encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the
profession of the great benefits and advantages of
modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer
will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter,
even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be
careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of
law in any form, not only for the protection of
members of the Bar but also, and more importantly,
for the protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be encouraged
without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of
illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is
allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such
services are made available exclusively to members of
the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering
technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively,
the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing
between which service may be offered to the public in
general and which should be made available
exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken.
This, however, may require further proceedings
because of the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of
respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright,
such as acts which tend to suggest or induce
celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or
otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While
respondent may not be prohibited from simply
disseminating information regarding such matters, it
must be required to include, in the information given, a
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that
certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine
law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a
legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before
29
deciding on which course of action to take, and that it
cannot recommend any particular lawyer without
subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice
of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising
should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar,
with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be
ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent
himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term
being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without
any adequate and effective means of regulating his
activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may
prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but
before allowance of such practice may be considered,
the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws
must conform to each and every provision of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court.5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the
practice of law but engaged in giving legal support
services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced
paralegals, with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is
absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding
out itself to the public under the trade name "The
Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its
enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice
which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the
Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely
engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent's own commercial advertisement which
announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling
the fields of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is
offering and rendering legal services through its
reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of
law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but
includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering
opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and
then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to
look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and
Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage
in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be
evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers
to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or
device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc."
holds out itself to the public and solicits employment
of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for
deception, especially so when the public cannot
ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the
business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of
law to persons who have been duly admitted as
members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of
Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of
the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses
its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act
for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law
is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it
nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270).
It is a personal right limited to persons who have
qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not
only respondent but also all the persons who are acting
for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical
law practice.6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in
answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only
unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral;
and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to
supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate
officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice
of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support
services" to answers, litigants and the general public as
enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its
Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of
Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as
enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that
it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of
court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory
services on Persons and Family Relations Law,
particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption;
Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related
problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law
of the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the
application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles
and procedures related thereto, the legal advices
based thereon and which activities call for legal
training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the
aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall
squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and
laymen equally term as "the practice of law."7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court,
paramount consideration should be given to the
protection of the general public from the danger of
being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who
may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a
rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year
bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take
and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer
qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many
jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice,
there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal
with the general public as such. While it may now be
the opportune time to establish these courses of study
and/or standards, the fact remains that at present,
these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime,
this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to
protect the general public from being exploited by
those who may be dealing with the general public in
the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified
to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be
protected from the dangers which may be brought
about by advertising of legal services. While it appears
that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of
Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears
in the instant case that legal services are being
advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to
protect the general public from falling prey to those
who advertise legal services without being qualified to
offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of
Respondent, however, seems to give the impression
30
that information regarding validity of marriages, not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein,
divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa however, the fact that the business of respondent
extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the
foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not
, will be given to them if they avail of its services. The necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful
Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not practice of law.
help matters. It gives the impression again that
Respondent will or can cure the legal problems
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . .
brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as
acting as a consultant can render
claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the
effective service unless he is
misleading impression that there are lawyers involved
familiar with such statutes and
in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any
regulations. He must be careful
medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in
not to suggest a course of
The Legal Clinic, Inc.
conduct which the law forbids. It
seems . . . .clear that (the
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very consultant's) knowledge of the
admissions of its President and majority stockholder, law, and his use of that
Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and knowledge as a factor in
main purpose of Respondent corporation in the determining what measures he
aforementioned "Starweek" article."9 shall recommend, do not
constitute the practice of law . . .
. It is not only presumed that all
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
men know the law, but it is a fact
that most men have
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly considerable acquaintance with
advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain broad features of the law . . . .
which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) Our knowledge of the law —
illegal and against the Code of Professional accurate or inaccurate — moulds
Responsibility of lawyers in this country. our conduct not only when we
are acting for ourselves, but
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is when we are serving others.
an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that Bankers, liquor dealers and
in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., laymen generally possess rather
could work out/cause the celebration of a secret precise knowledge of the laws
marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this touching their particular
country. While it is advertised that one has to go to business or profession. A good
said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is example is the architect, who
certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the must be familiar with zoning,
Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized building and fire prevention
to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for codes, factory and tenement
said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary. house statutes, and who draws
plans and specification in
harmony with the law. This is not
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and practicing law.
other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers
to advertise their special skills to enable people to
obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for But suppose the architect, asked
their particular needs can justify the use of by his client to omit a fire tower,
advertisements such as are the subject matter of the replies that it is required by the
petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by statute. Or the industrial
whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has relations expert cites, in support
yet to be amended so that such act could become of some measure that he
justifiable. recommends, a decision of the
National Labor Relations Board.
Are they practicing law? In my
We submit further that these advertisements that opinion, they are not, provided
seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are no separate fee is charged for
possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not the legal advice or information,
so, are highly reprehensible. and the legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about major non-legal problem.
how they could go about having a secret marriage
here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, It is largely a matter of degree
and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there and of custom.
is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals
and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the If it were usual for one intending
public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot to erect a building on his land to
be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be engage a lawyer to advise him
done. and the architect in respect to
the building code and the like,
then an architect who performed
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme this function would probably be
Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by considered to be trespassing on
circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and territory reserved for licensed
offenses of this character justify permanent attorneys. Likewise, if the
elimination from the Bar. 10 industrial relations field had
been pre-empted by lawyers, or
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados: custom placed a lawyer always
at the elbow of the lay personnel
man. But this is not the case. The
xxx xxx xxx most important body of the
industrial relations experts are
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice the officers and business agents
of law, such as management consultancy firms or of the labor unions and few of
travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, them are lawyers. Among the
perform the services rendered by Respondent does not larger corporate employers, it
necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is has been the practice for some
31
years to delegate special
responsibility in employee
matters to a management group
chosen for their practical
knowledge and skill in such
matter, and without regard to
legal thinking or lack of it. More
recently, consultants like the
defendants have the same
service that the larger employers
get from their own specialized
staff.
The handling of industrial
relations is growing into a
recognized profession for which
appropriate courses are offered
by our leading universities. The
court should be very cautious
about declaring [that] a
widespread, well-established
method of conducting business
is unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men who
customarily perform a certain
function have no right to do so,
or that the technical education
given by our schools cannot be
used by the graduates in their
business.
In determining whether a man is
practicing law, we should
consider his work for any
particular client or customer, as
a whole. I can imagine defendant
being engaged primarily to
advise as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client's
obligations to his employees, to
guide his client along the path
charted by law. This, of course,
would be the practice of the law.
But such is not the fact in the
case before me. Defendant's
primarily efforts are along
economic and psychological
lines. The law only provides the
frame within which he must
work, just as the zoning code
limits the kind of building the
limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The
incidental legal advice or
information defendant may give,
does not transform his activities
into the practice of law. Let me
add that if, even as a minor
feature of his work, he
performed services which are
customarily reserved to
members of the bar, he would be
practicing law. For instance, if as
part of a welfare program, he
drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's
work is the representations of
the employer in the adjustment
of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a
mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use
an agent for negotiations and
may select an agent particularly
skilled in the subject under
discussion, and the person
appointed is free to accept the
employment whether or not he
is a member of the bar. Here,
however, there may be an
exception where the business
turns on a question of law. Most
real estate sales are negotiated
by brokers who are not lawyers.
But if the value of the land
depends on a disputed right-of-
way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the
probable outcome of the dispute
and persuade the opposite party
to the same opinion, then it may
be that only a lawyer can accept
the assignment. Or if a
controversy between an
employer and his men grows
from differing interpretations of
a contract, or of a statute, it is
quite likely that defendant
should not handle it. But I need
not reach a definite conclusion
here, since the situation is not
presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to
represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the
federal government, especially
before trial examiners of the
National Labor Relations Board.
An agency of the federal
government, acting by virtue of
an authority granted by the
Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before
such agency. The State of New
Jersey is without power to
interfere with such
determination or to forbid
representation before the
agency by one whom the agency
admits. The rules of the National
Labor Relations Board give to a
party the right to appear in
person, or by counsel, or by
other representative. Rules and
Regulations, September 11th,
1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here
means a licensed attorney, and
ther representative' one not a
lawyer. In this phase of his work,
defendant may lawfully do
whatever the Labor Board
allows, even arguing questions
purely legal. (Auerbacher v.
Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in
Statsky, Introduction to
Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-
156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person
engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve
knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of
law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily
reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for
any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-
lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility
succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another
profession or occupation concurrently with the
practice of law shall make clear to his client whether
he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to
render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition).
32
Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like
securing a marriage license, and making arrangements
with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of
law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then
what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If
a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such
services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information
on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas
(See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving
informational materials may not constitute of law. The
business is similar to that of a bookstore where the
customer buys materials on the subject and
determines on the subject and determines by himself
what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from
purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals
may apply the law to the particular problem of the
client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the
publication of a legal text which
publication of a legal text which
purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And
the mere fact that the principles
or rules stated in the text may be
accepted by a particular reader
as a solution to his problem does
not affect this. . . . . Apparently it
is urged that the conjoining of
these two, that is, the text and
the forms, with advice as to how
the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice
of law. But that is the situation
with many approved and
accepted texts. Dacey's book is
sold to the public at large. There
is no personal contact or
relationship with a particular
individual. Nor does there exist
that relation of confidence and
trust so necessary to the status
of attorney and client. THIS IS
THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL
PRACTICE — THE
REPRESENTATION AND
ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR
PERSON IN A PARTICULAR
SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice
on common problems, and does
not purport to give personal
advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or
readily identified person.
Similarly the defendant's
publication does not purport to
give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated
or readily identified person in a
particular situation — in their
publication and sale of the kits,
such publication and sale did not
constitutes the unlawful practice
of law . . . . There being no legal
impediment under the statute to
the sale of the kit, there was no
proper basis for the injunction
against defendant maintaining
an office for the purpose of
selling to persons seeking a
divorce, separation, annulment
or separation agreement any
printed material or writings
relating to matrimonial law or
the prohibition in the
memorandum of modification of
the judgment against defendant
having an interest in any
publishing house publishing his
manuscript on divorce and
against his having any personal
contact with any prospective
purchaser. The record does fully
support, however, the finding
that for the change of $75 or
$100 for the kit, the defendant
gave legal advice in the course of
personal contacts concerning
particular problems which might
arise in the preparation and
presentation of the purchaser's
asserted matrimonial cause of
action or pursuit of other legal
remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary
documents (The injunction
therefore sought to) enjoin
conduct constituting the practice
of law, particularly with
reference to the giving of advice
and counsel by the defendant
relating to specific problems of
particular individuals in
connection with a divorce,
separation, annulment of
separation agreement sought
and should be affirmed. (State v.
Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are
"strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not
controverted, however, that if the services "involve
giving legal advice or counselling," such would
constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in
this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may
be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that
it can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong
notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the
solemnities, formalities and other requisites of
marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically
objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is
not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to
state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or
"legal support services", and not legal services, are
available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law"
becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues raised by the
petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has
long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts
have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and
scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic
of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any
kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes
legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and
contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may
not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages
in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions
to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for
clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed
by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which
possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property
according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement
of law. 14
33
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer,
he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as
to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the
latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the
conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who
renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives
pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in
several cases, we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts
constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and
the application of legal principles and technique to
serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting
in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all
advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person
is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business
of advising person, firms, associations or corporations
as to their right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings,
pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative
capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of
obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or
while so engaged performs any act or acts either in
court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged
in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil.
173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation
of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice
to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure
of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters
or estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of
the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p.
262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no
small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court.
It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
a large variety of subjects and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments covering an extensive
field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always
subject to become involved in litigation. They require
in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of
justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer
which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public
that these manifold customary functions be performed
by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under
the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon
all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court,
Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of
the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is.
Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A.
139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of
court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with
the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations
that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can
neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by
respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready
information by trained paralegals to laymen and
lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory, through the extensive use of computers and
modern information technology in the gathering,
processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of
information and communication, such as computerized
legal research; encoding and reproduction of
documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or
lawyers; document search; evidence gathering;
locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of
basic institutional services from government or non-
government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or
business registrations; educational or employment
records or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving
information about laws of other countries that they
may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or
adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to
emigration to the foreign country, and other matters
that do not involve representation of clients in court;
designing and installing computer systems, programs,
or software for the efficient management of law
offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other
entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal
services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely
involve mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of
computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices,
or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice
to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal
information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-
advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the
client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and
so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the
intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to
be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements
represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid.
That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of
law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent
corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the
weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract
drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in
the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the
Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the
structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given
by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
34
 This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday
at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of
the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No
matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as
complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic
situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who,
like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take
care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in
taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems,
labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are
backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and
attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired
by the trend in the medical field toward specialization,
it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of
the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when
they come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's
what doctors do also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you, they take your
temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and
so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the
problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one
of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require
surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic
disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss
can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a
hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care
of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung
baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-
confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea,"
explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive
"treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a
rich relative who died and named you her sole heir,
and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property,
we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There
would be real estate taxes and arrears which would
need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed
by the state for the right to transfer her property, and
only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained
to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other
heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would
need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the
problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence
to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is
not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law
by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it
within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements
which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said
reported facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to
serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client
may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation
and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond
the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by
private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by
paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals
found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the
bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law
and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom
respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there
also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the
requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes
or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business
except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions
required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to
practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through
education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing
profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with,
protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect
to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The
justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the
bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the
protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters
by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department
can exercise little control.27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the
concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from
the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its
merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for
judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has
done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by
respondent, there are schools and universities there which offer studies and
degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28 As
the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United
States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public.
One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar
Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant
Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify
legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States
with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association
of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance
of what may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA,
some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed
limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but
such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the
absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been
admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of
justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized
and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue
to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and
remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law
in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall
he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in
anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to
the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in
connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest
involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-
laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of
his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession.
advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising
his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or
solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that
the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of
Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those
of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to
constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was
a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of
his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business
from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
35
 provides among other things that "the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises
his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The
lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops
to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the public.
As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of
justice with mercenary activities as the money-
changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The
most worthy and effective advertisement possible,
even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code
of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising
possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community
has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a
normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his
success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The
canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against
advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be
undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those
which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from
the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a
manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of
brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading
and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships;
legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the
fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of
references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose;
it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal
or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that
reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program.
Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure
the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card
may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he
is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law
practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law
firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may
likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a
designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the
advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which even
includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for
services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and
conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is
repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by
respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the
fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer,
as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to
publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability
upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be
charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly
or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the
present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary
rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein
are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general
rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if
and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the
prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association
after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after
viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped
significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and
judicial systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used
by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating
public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in
time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair,
criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct
which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem
formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to
disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or
to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty.
Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and
proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is
hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of
the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed
upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an
obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters
of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of
course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a
different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law
and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the
practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against
unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called
paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the
concern and province of the Solicitor General who can institute the
corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual
background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light
of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is
referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under
the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or
dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or
similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction
proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let
copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur
 
36