HUMAN AFFAIRS 21, 157–162, 2011

DOI: 10.2478/s13374-011-0017-5

PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE AS A SPACE FOR SEEKING

A GOOD LIFE, IDENTITY AND CRITICAL THINKING

BLANKA ŠULAVÍKOVÁ

Abstract: In recent years (since the 1980s) we have witnessed growth in the practical application of
philosophy. Some authors talk about a so-called “shift in philosophical counselling” or “philosophical
practice” taking place chiefly in western countries. Some Slovak authors also discuss the application of
philosophy in practice but this issue is only in its infancy here. The author of this paper seeks to establish
the boundaries of understanding the possibilities philosophy has to offer in practical life and to formulate
an opinion on the competency of philosophy in this area. The author believes that it is the “good life” that
is central to the agenda of philosophical practice. The aim of philosophical counselling is to advise people
through their personal life philosophy. It is a conversational process that controls dialectic thinking and
reflects the fears and questions that arise in everyday life as well as questions about the meaning of life as a
whole. The author understands philosophical dialogue as a space for seeking a good life, identity and critical
thinking.
Keywords: philosophical practice, philosophical counseling, personal life philosophy, good life, critical
thinking.

Issues concerning “philosophical practice” are rarely discussed in Slovakia, despite the
need to adopt a position on this, given that the area of applied philosophy usually called
“philosophical counselling” has been taking shape in western countries since the mid-1980s.
Some Slovak authors also discuss the application of philosophy in practice but the issue is
only in its infancy (J. Šulavík, E. Farkašová, E. Višňovský).
In my opinion, the modern movement of philosophical practice (counselling) did not
come into being at the end of the last century because psychotherapists were unable to move
beyond the general questions they have to face in solving their clients’ problems, rather the
value system became rather blurred with the boom in the variety of lifestyle models and the
weakening of the attractiveness of grand narratives. In that situation, there was an increasing
feeling that philosophy should start engaging with everyday human issues and play an active
role in solving them, in helping shape people’s life philosophy and clarify their personal
identity.
The aim of philosophical counselling is to advise people on their personal life philosophy. A
“practicing philosopher” philosophises together with the client on the questions that life brings.
The philosopher seeks to convey philosophical knowledge and experience to a layman—non-

157
© Institute for Research in Social Communication, Slovak Academy of Sciences

hum2_11_text.indd Odd1:157 7.6.2011 23:02:01

 philosopher—in order to help him or her to use it in constructing their own philosophy and
lifestyle. Philosophical counselling presents philosophy as life wisdom, a conception of
life: it is based on philosophical tradition like a thread weaving through from ancient times.
Philosophical counselling is based on critical thinking and uses the Socratic method of posing
questions. It is a conversational process that controls dialectic thinking and reflects the fears
and questions that arise in daily life as well as questions about the meaning of life as a whole.
We believe that it is the good life that is central to the agenda of philosophical practice.
This does not mean that we place this issue above all other philosophical themes; it means
that it can deepen our knowledge of the issues concerning our individual being in relation
with others and, within the context of the world as a whole, it can improve the quality of
human life. The author understands the agenda of the good life as being something to which
our philosophizing is in the end related (although this issue need not be explicitly expressed),
whether we are solving questions of our being or of existence at the different levels that life
and the world itself provide. It also points to the fact that the issue of the good life hides a
strong ethical aspect in itself. Philosophical dialogue should thus be understood as a space
for exploring the good life, identity, and critical thinking.
Let us go back to Socrates at this point. It can be said that Socrates was a “practical
philosopher”: he is known to have related his thinking to his own actions, forcing others to do
so as well. From a Socratic perspective, a philosopher is a private person who concentrates
on individual (microgroup) discussions and through persuasion, he or she provides a kind of
counselling and therapeutic activity. Socrates’ philosophy sought to influence the thinking,
feeling, behaviour and way of life of people who were the subject of philosophy (Šulavík
2002, 176). The current movement of philosophical practice can be seen as a continuation of
this model, and not only in the direction given. By posing a series of questions, Socrates—as
is also well known—forced people to think and respond to the question of why they live the
way they live, or, he showed them that they do not know why they live one way or another.
He asked “what is the good life”?
V. Suvák suggests that if Socrates had asked “what is the good life?”, he might have had
two different things in mind (the Greek version allows for this ambiguity):
1. What does the good life mean?
2. What is it that makes life good?
The first question leads us to a “definition” of the good life. It forces us to distinguish
between “the good life” and a “bad life” and/or “bad lives”. The second question is directed
towards an action that has made our lives better. It would seem that Socrates asked himself
the question more in practical terms although his question was formulated thus: “what is it?”
(Suvák 2004, 117).1 We believe that not only is this the core of Socrates’ method of posing
questions but also the core of current philosophical practice.
Socratic philosophy—albeit full of tension and social struggle—attempts to be a doctor for
the soul through the use of mental therapy, “psychotherapy”. Just as the aim of medicine is a

1
V. Suvák states that Plato’s understanding of this question is much more theoretical although
inseparable from practical action. Aristotle used this difference in the way that the questions are posed
to separate theoretical explorations from practical ones (ibid.)

158

hum2_11_text.indd Odd1:158 7.6.2011 23:02:02

 healthy human body, the aim of philosophy should be a healthy soul that leads to blessedness,
to a happy life that is a permanent and active state (ibid.)

Considering the question of the good life (bios eudaimón) to be the central aim of
philosophical practice in the Socratic spirit also means taking account of the ethical side
of life. Since philosophy’s aim is to teach people how to orient themselves better within
the community to which they belong, to teach them to understand the world around them,
within which they continually have to make decisions and understand that people themselves
choose their lives. In this sense it is moral in character: it leads people to understand how to
get along with other people, how to live the good life, and all for the good of the community
(ibid., 111).
I have to stress that this paper focuses on philosophical counselling based on the
development of critical thinking and not on the various meditative eastern practices
undertaken by some philosophical counsellors. Here, I fully agree with the view of H.S.
Chamberlain, who sees philosophical counselling as a dialogue in critical thinking.2
S. C. Schuster also insists on the fact that the goal of philosophical counselling is to
philosophise together with a client (2004, 4) in terms of critical philosophy and not some
kind of “contemplation” or “meditation” (Marinoff 2002) refers to this, his interpretation
being based on eastern practices3). The majority of philosophers who cultivate philosophy
at a strictly academic level reject counselling practice at the level of critical thinking as well.
Schuster points out that “in our post-Freudian and postmodern world the idea of autonomy of
thought seems scandalous” (1999, 6). This claim can be supported by referring to criticism
by Christian Perring who teaches philosophy and states that he has no convincing proof that
the philosophical experience of students has any positive impact in helping them solve their

2
“Critical thinking is a way of thinking and evaluating the quality of one’s own thinking, and the
thinking of others in light of particular criteria. Critical thinking can be called a kind of “metathinking”.
It requires learning and perseverance. It is the opposite of day-dreaming or free association… By means
of the structures, tools and methods inherent in these processes of critical inquiry, a dialogue takes
place between philosophical counsellor and counsellee (where it is an individual session; if it is a group
session then it involves all the members). There is also, however, an internal dialogue between “self”
and “self”, reaching unto the deepest levels of conscious and pre-conscious activity to uncover the
motivations for feelings, thoughts, and actions” (Chamberlain 1999, 38).
3
Here is how Schuster comments on this fact: “Marinoff prefers meditation that has its roots in the
ancient Far East, as he quotes abundantly Chinese and Zen sages” (Schuster 2004, 6). Marinoff is the
author of two popular books Plato, Not Prozac: Applying Philosophy to Everyday Problems (1999)
and Philosophical Practice (2002). He outlines a five-factor process of philosophical counselling and
uses the acronym “PEACE”. It is based on the idea that clients pass through five phases during the
process: “Problem identification,” “Expressing emotion,” “Analyzing options,” “Contemplation,”
“Equilibrium.” 1. Problem identification—the first and fundamental problem is defined. 2. Emotions
and feelings which evoke or impair the problem are expressed. 3. Analysis of the various ways of
solving the problem; here the counsellor can reveal hidden options which the client could not see
or shed new light onto the problem. 4. While contemplating the problem and all its consequences
from the philosophical perspective, the client chooses the option that is most compatible with his/
her innate philosophical dispositions. 5. Equilibrium is the re-establishment of the state of inner
equilibrium and harmony, which can only come from a true and honest philosophical solution
(Marinoff 2002).

159

hum2_11_text.indd Odd1:159 7.6.2011 23:02:03

 personal problems4. He suggests that philosophical counselling need not have any positive
effect on people in terms of improving rational thinking; it may make people unhappy since
it may show them how poor the state of their knowledge is. When people’s comfortable
frames of thought are disturbed and replaced with uncertainty, it can be exhausting for
them.5 There is often a gap between emotions and reason and regardless of the breadth of a
person’s cognitive information and perspective, their emotions reject them. Perring also asks:
If clear thinking is a mystery of happiness, are philosophers happier than other people? And
his answer is: “I’m sorry to say, they seem just as unhappy as everyone else” (Perring 1997,
2). Moreover, although they are very skilful in some areas, they might lack other forms of
intelligence; maybe they are lacking in emotional intelligence. Their “interpersonal skills are
rather underdeveloped, and … [they] can be socially awkward” (ibid.). Perring adds: “And of
course, we have an unfortunately fondness for tweed jackets. If you ever go to a meeting of
the American Philosophical Association, you will encounter a sea of tweed” (ibid., 2-3).
By way of response, we could say that this applies equally to psychologists as to
psychiatrists; nevertheless, there is no reason to regard them as incapable of helping people
to solve their problems. More seriously, Perring argues that rational thinking can have
a rather negative effect upon a person’s state of mind or that it may not have a positive
impact on problem solving since the emotional part may remain completely untouched by
the rational components. J. Šulavík (1998, 243) suggests that therapy and counselling are
not the same thing. Activities which cannot be regarded as therapy in the primary sense
can also have a therapeutic effect. In this respect, S.C. Schuster states that non-therapeutic
activities, such as a visit to an ancient city or a holiday may have better therapeutic effects on
people than previous therapeutic procedures. However, Schuster points out that counselling
consists of activities, which, though not therapies6, can bring health and wellbeing. Most
seriously, Perring argues directly against the fundamental conviction of philosophical
practice that critical thinking and philosophy as a whole can have a favourable effect on
people and help them solve their problems.7 In contrast to Perring, J. Šulavík thinks that
the general knowledge philosophy provides can become a general layer of our self-image
that develops gradually. The acquired conceptual level will then spontaneously change
axiological structures, emotional processes, influence our attention, memory, motivation
and the whole psyche and, as the case may be, will also have a therapeutic impact (1998,
245). Moreover, when philosophical counselling is reproached for neglecting emotions and
feelings or, as psychologists say, the affective domains, we should bear in mind that John

4
Practical philosophers might argue that this is a consequence of the current state of academic
philosophy, which has nothing of benefit to offer anyone or it may be proof of the fact that the author
was not able to master his own “craft”.
5
He says: “I find that in teaching students I am often taking away their comfortable frames of thought
and replacing them with uncertainty, which can be unnerving for them” (ibid., 2).
6
Schuster refers to philosophical practice as an alternative to psychological counselling and therapy,
citing Achenbach: “It is not a new therapy, even more definitely, it is no therapy at all” (Achenbach
1987, 14 in Schuster 1999).
7
Since counselling is not necessarily merely individual, Šulavík believes it is appropriate to distinguish
between “individual” and “social” philosophical counselling (1998, 239-40).

160

hum2_11_text.indd Odd1:160 7.6.2011 23:02:04

 Locke, for instance, characterized the emotions, which he called passions, as ideas in our
minds based on both our “sensations and reflections”. Many renowned philosophers, such
as Plato, Aristotle, Seneca, Hobbes, Aquinas, or Sartre, have said that emotions are not
simply something that explodes from the dark unconscious but that emotions can be evoked
through one’s perception of the world. Feelings and emotions can thus be changed by critical
investigation into one’s perception of the self, one’s fears of the world and one’s place in the
world (Raabe 2001).
Some authors criticize—and often justifiably—the overenthusiastic promotion of
philosophical counselling as a medicine to cure all human ills and its use for commercial
purposes. Our attitude to philosophical counselling and its practice is closer to Schuster’s
position, which is more sober than, let’s say, Marinoff’s concept; Marinoff even goes as far
as to intervene in territory belonging to psychology. Schuster underscores that “Philosophical
practice as counselling is not a hybrid of philosophy and psychology, but philosophy
‘proper’”(1999, 6). Schuster highlights the work of G. Achenbach—the founder of modern
philosophical counselling—which became the starting point for a number of philosophers
beginning their counselling practice, in particular, Achenbach’s books Philosophische Praxis
(1997) and Das Prinzip Heilung (1985). Schuster (2004, 3-4) has built his interpretation of
counselling upon the following items:
The basic points that Achenbach presented for philosophical counselling are: 1. Sincere
communication between the philosophical practitioner (an academically trained philosopher)
and the visitor or client, based on a “beyond-method” method. 2. The importance of dialogue,
as that which enlivens and flows from being. 3. “Auslegen”—a looking for explanations—in
which the practitioner becomes united with the problem, not by imparting his own
understanding of it, but by giving the visitor a fresh impulse to explain him or herself. This
instead of “ünterlegen”—explanations given by psychotherapists (or others!) to their patients’
problems. 4. The innovative component of dialogue, the element of wonder in philosophical
practice, which does not allow for fixed viewpoints, standard attitudes or permanent solutions.
Consequently, philosophical counselling is not about applying philosophy, as if placing a
poultice of Kant on the soul, but it is philosophizing itself.

Schuster also mentions “astonishment” in her characterization of philosophical

counselling: “Philosophical practice as an alternative to psychological counselling and
therapy can provide a place for examining the self, life, and the world, and aims at restoring
a childlike wonder to our existence”(1999, 5). Robert D. Walsh says that philosophy is
“guided by perpetual astonishment and wonder and a desire to live with others in harmony
with what is happening” (Walsh 2005, 503).8
The development of critical thinking through philosophical dialogue has had an impact
on the client in two main regions. On the one hand, it is the building of habits and skills

8
I agree with this author’s criticism of the growth in various commercial practices that are developing
in connection with the provision of philosophical counselling. According to Walsh, charging a fee is
at variance with the essence of philosophy. “Philosophy is primarily an ethical way of living guided
by perpetual astonishment and wonder and a desire to live with others in harmony with what is
happening”, it is not a commodity and thus, philosophical practice should be available to others free of
charge (ibid.).

161

hum2_11_text.indd Odd1:161 7.6.2011 23:02:04

 that forms the basis for creative thinking, it enriches the client’s own philosophy of life
and improves his or her capability to resolve and cope with personal life problems on the
grounds of open thinking. This, however, is only the first part of the agenda of the good life.
Its second part is more tightly knit with the community so that the creative dialogue at the
philosophical level and the deepening of the critical thinking skills build up preconditions for
creating or improving clients’ skills allied with their role within particular groups—from the
narrowest one up to the role it plays in the position of a citizen living in democratic society.
Openness, listening to others, the ability to understand and share the reaching of consensus
with others (in groups) or with a counsellor (in individual dialogues) is a precondition for a
critical dialogue; cultivating these abilities is beneficial to both an active civic attitude and
respect for democratic practices. Critical thinking helps to protect people from demagogy,
remove the danger of passive acceptance of various futile or dangerous doctrines.9

References
Achenbach, G. (1987). Philosophische Praxis. Köln: Jurgen Dinter.
Farkašová, E. (2002). Filozofia v praktickom živote. Literárny týždenník 1-2, 10-11.
Farkašová, E. (2004). Filozofie pre nové storočie. In Filozofia ako problém? Bratislava: Kalligram 219-
236.
Marinoff, L. (1999). Plato, Not Prozac: Applying Philosophy to Everyday Problems. New York:
HarperCollins.
Marinoff, L. (2002). Philosophical Practice. San Diego, New York, Boston, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto:
Academic Press.
Perring, C. (1997). Essays on Philosophical Counseling. Metapsychology Online Reviews 14, N. 16.
Raabe, P. B. (2001). Philosophical Counseling. Theory and Practice. London: Praeger.
Schuster, S. C. (1996). Philosophical Counseling and Humanistic Psychotherapy. Journal of Psychology
and Judaism 20, No. 3, 247-259.
Schuster, S. C. (1999). Philosophy Practice: An Alternative to Counseling and Psychoterapy. Westport,
CT and London: Praeger.
Schuster, S. C. (2004). Marinoff’s Therapy: A Critique of His Books on Philosophical Practice. http://
www.aspcp.org/ijpp/SchusterMarinoff.pdf.
Šulavík, J. (1998).Vzťah medzi filozofickou terapiou a poradenstvom. Filozofia 53, 238-246.
Šulavík, J. Metafilozofické implikácie psychoterapie. Bratislava: Album 2001.
Višňovský, E. (2004). Filozofické poradenstvo ako forma filozofickej praxe. In Filozofia ako problém?
Bratislava: Kalligram, 251-270.
Walsh, R. D. (2005). Philosophical Counseling Practice. Janus Head, 8 (2), 497-508. Retrieved from
http://www.janushead.org/8-2/Walsh.pdf.

Institute for Research in Social Communication,

Slovak Academy of Sciences,
813 64 Bratislava,
Slovakia
E-mail: ksbkblan@savba.sk

9
The paper has been written with the support of VEGA research grant No. 2/0116/09 “Philosophical
Thought and Aesthetic Perception in the Context of Everyday Life”.

162

hum2_11_text.indd Odd1:162 7.6.2011 23:02:05