INTRODUCTION

The Election Commission established under Article 324 of the Constitution, it

is intended to oversee the entire election process to ensure free and fair regular
elections are taking place. Since India follows a democratically elected form of
government, the important to have free, fair and regular elections

The Commission can exist as a single or even as a multi-member body. The

framers of the Constitution provided for but did not make mandatory a multi-
member body, to ensure uncontrolled powers are not in the hands of the CEC
alone. But it was only in 1989, that ECs were appointed for the first time. The
existing constitutional provisions, as will be noted, do provide for the
appointment of the ECs, but do not specify the manner of functioning of the
Commission if it has more members than the CEC alone. Therefore, it became
necessary lay down procedural rules concerning the functioning of the
Commission and define the roles of the CEC and the ECs. The first important
judicial decision in this connection was SS Dhanoa v. Union of India, followed
by TN Seshan v. Union of India. Both the decisions differed substantially on a
number of points of law. While the Dhanoa placed the CEC at a higher position
as compared to the ECs, the latter established that they are all equally placed.
The present legal position fully supports the Supreme Court decision in the
latter case.

THE ROLE OF THE ELECTION COMMISSION IN INDIA

A. IMPORTANCE OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN A

DEMOCRACY

In a democracy, sovereign power is in the hands of the collective body of the

people, who alone decide who their representatives shall be, and how they shall
govern over them. Free and fair elections are a must in any democracy, as this is
the only means by which the people can chose their representatives. All modern
democracies therefore have a system of elections, through which their head of
state is decided.

Inherent in the notion of free and fair elections is that everyone should enjoy
equal political rights. Inequalities may exist in society and in the economy, but
politically everyone should be equally placed in so far as choosing their
representatives is concerned. This has led to the emergence of universal adult
franchise, meaning all those who are adults will be entitled to vote. Thereby, a
number of undemocratic requirements intended to limit the electorate strength
stand done away with, such as holding property, educational qualifications, etc.
The principle of one man, one vote, and one value is what can best sum up the
concept of universal adult franchise.

The process of elections, so as to be truly meaningful has to be free and fair.

For this purpose, it is necessary to ensure there is an independent and impartial
body to oversee the process of elections. Ideally, it should consist of
representatives completely insulated from all kinds of extraneous pulls and
pressures, like those likely to be exerted by the ruling party. Its actions must be
judicially reviewable if found to be patently mala fide, but should not otherwise
be subject to any executive or legislative control.

In India, the Constituent Assembly chose to enact specific constitutional

provisions with respect to elections, in contrast to the usual practice of
other constitutions that simply confer authority to the national legislature to
enact laws in this respect. The Drafting Committee on Fundamental Rights
prepared a report to the effect that the independence of elections and avoidance
of any executive interference should be a fundamental right. As Dr. Ambedkar
said, “Many people felt that if the elections were conducted under the auspices
of an executive authority … which did not have sufficient power that will
certainly vitiate the process of free elections.” The House did not incorporate
this as a fundamental right, but without any kind of dissent decided that there
has to be an independent body called the “Election Commission” that has to be
free from all kinds of executive interference. All this indicates the high degree
of importance placed upon free and fair elections by the Constituent Assembly.

B. PERMANENT ELECTION COMMISSION WITH CEC AS

PERMANENT INCUMBENT

There were two broad approaches before the Constituent Assembly. On the one
hand, it could have appointed a permanent body consisting of 4 – 5
representatives who would continue in office continuously. Since elections are
not a daily affair, that would have proved to be unnecessary, and was therefore
not adopted. But rejecting this approach would have meant the absence of an
election machinery. On the other hand, the President could have been permitted
to appoint an ad hoc body as and when elections were approaching. Finally, it
was decided to adopt a middle path, by having a permanent body called the
Election Commission consisting of the CEC as its permanent incumbent. The
basic, skeletal machinery would thus be available at all times. At the same time,
the President could add to that machinery by appointing other members of the
Commission, thereby ensuring that the additional work burden at the time of
elections could be successfully handled.

In the Constituent Assembly, Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena desired that the CEC

and the ECs should be removed by the same process – on the same grounds and
in the same manner as a judge of the Supreme Court. Also, he contended that
there should be an express provision to the effect that the service conditions of
the ECs shall not be altered to their disadvantage after their appointment, as had
been provided to the CEC. For some reason, this amendment was not accepted.
On a plain reading of the relevant constitutional provisions, it would have
appeared that there is a clear distinction between the CEC and the ECs.

In so far as the terms and conditions of service of the ECs are concerned, the
President was given full authority to decide upon the same by framing rules.
The relevant constitutional provisions simply laid down the manner of removal
of the CEC. Clearly, the aim of having an independent and impartial election
machinery would have been defeated had the executive been in a position to
simply remove the CEC. However, it is surprising no similar provision was
expressly guaranteed to the ECs, since it cannot be said a multi-member
Commission could not have been envisaged at that point of time. The President
can remove the ECs upon the recommendations of the ECs, but those
recommendations are required to be founded upon relevant considerations.
Should that not baseless, judicial review shall extend, even to the extent of
quashing such a removal. Therefore, it may be inferred that there is as such no
lack of constitutional protection to the ECs. The constitutional protection
enjoyed by the CEC may not be expressly provided to the ECs, but the manner
of removal of both the CEC and the ECs does not appear to give scope for any
mala fide action that may affect the independence of the Commission.
The requirements to be fulfilled by an election machinery include, as held by
the Supreme Court in NP Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal
Constituency :

C. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMISSION

Under Article 324 (1), the supervision, direction and control of elections is in

the hands of the Election Commission, which is to conduct all elections to the
offices of the President, Vice-President, and the Parliament and state
legislatures.

Since it enjoys the status of an independent constitutional body, there were

even proposals to authorize it to conduct elections to the Panchayats and Nagar
Palikas as well, but these did not take the shape of law. The entire process of
conducting elections (including preparation of electoral rolls) is done by the
Commission. This provision being fairly widely worded enables the
Commission to exercise its authority in relation to all those issues in connection
with elections.

Under Article 324 (2) the President may appoint ECs in consultation with the
CEC. With respect to their appointment, it should be noted their appointment is
not mandatory. It shall be done keeping in mind the requirements of the
Commission from time to time. For this reason, their number is not fixed. They
are thus intended to assist the CEC in discharging his functions. An increased
work burden in itself will not justify their appointment. The duties to be
performed have to be of such nature so as to warran t their appointment. Their
appointment has to be on justifiable grounds, that the judiciary may call into
question. They shall be appointed upon the recommendations of the CEC, but
this does not place him at a higher position. Drawing an analogy, in the
Supreme Court, and even in the High Courts, the judges are appointed by the
President in consultation with the Chief Justice. But this does not mean the
Chief Justice is at a higher position as compared to the judges. His decisions are
not binding upon the other judges, they being free to decide a case as they
please in accordance with the relevant legal principles.

Under Article 324 (3) in a multi-member Commission, the CEC shall act as the
Chairman of the body. By virtue of being the Chairman, to what extent may he
control the ECs in discharge their functions? In the first place, should he be
allowed to control the ECs in performing their functions, the independence of
the Commission shall stand directly affected. The very purpose for which the
ECs are appointed shall thereby be defeated. The appointment of ECs ensures
there is a system of checks and balances in force to check the CEC, to ensure
that he does not exceed his jurisdiction. Their independence is therefore a must.

The relevant constitutional provisions have taken adequate care to ensure the

independence of this body from all kinds of executive influences. Under Article
324 (5), the CEC can be dismissed only in the same manner as a judge of the
Supreme Court. Further, his conditions of service cannot be changed to his
disadvantage after his appointment. The same constitutional protections have
not been expressly extended to the ECs, as they can be removed only on the
recommendations of the CEC. The Commission may require staff to help it in
discharging its function of conducting elections. Under Article 324 (6), the
President or the Governor of a state shall ensure all necessary staff is provided
to it for this purpose. However, there is a distinction between ordinary staff and
ECs, the latter may be appointed only when the work burden of the Commission
is such that it cannot be discharged by using ordinary staff.

Considering the nature of functions to be performed by it, the Commission has

been armed with widest possible powers. The Commission can go to the extent
of ordering a repoll in those constituencies wherein elections have not been
conducted fairly. The final word as to which symbol shall be allotted to which
party shall be decided by the Commission itself. In all contingencies that have
not been provided for by the law, the Commission may pass necessary orders.

The conduct of free and fair elections is what is intended to be achieved.

Therefore, if the conditions in a state are conducive due to breakdown of law
and order, or due to other factors that in the opinion of the appropriate
authorities shall prevent the people from choosing their candidates in a fair
manner, the Commission may postpone elections, but only for a reasonable
period of time. In Yadav Reddy v. Election Commission of India, a Division
Bench of the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the Election
Commission's order for postponing elections for the Bihar Assembly for a
definite period of time, due to the conditions prevailing in Bihar at that point of
time.

In recent years, there has been a lot of concern about the manner in which
elections are to be funded. In this respect, the Commission has the authority to
issue directions, in the process of conducting elections, requiring all political
parties to provide details of their expenditure in the elections, and the sources of
their funds. (Held in Common Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India).

THE CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER – NOT A “FIRST AMONG

EQUALS”

A. FACTS OF THE SS DHANOA CASE

I. On 7th October 1989, the President, in exercise of his powers under Article 324
(2), issued a notification fixing the number of Election Commissioners at two.

II. On 16th October 1989, by a subsequent notification issued in exercise of the

same power, he appointed SS Dhanoa (the petitioner) and VS Seigell as the
Election Commissioners. By another notification issued on the same day, he
made rules to regulate regulated their conditions of service.

III. According to these rules, an EC shall hold office for a term of 5 years or till
he attains the age of 65 years, whichever happens earlier.

IV. On 1st January 1990, the President issued another notification in exercise of
the same power cancelling the previous notifications with immediate effect.

V. The petitioner challenged the notification of 1st January 1990 in his writ
petition.

B. MANNER OF ABOLITION OF POSTS OF ECs

The petition challenged the manner of abolition of the posts of the ECs. The
court upheld the validity of the final Presidential notification. The scope of
judicial review extends to the abolition of their posts was open to judicial
review, as was the creation of their posts. Due to the absence of any procedural
rules in relation to the manner of functioning of a multi-member Commission,
their appointment was found to have rendered the functioning of the
Commission unworkable. Thus, the abolition of their posts was held to be
wholly justifiable. The contention that this affected the overall independence of
the Commission was rejected, since the government did not act at the instance
of the CEC in abolishing their posts. The CEC had not recommended their
removal, a fact not only supported by the available evidence on record, but also
admitted to by the ECs. The decisions were taken unanimously, notwithstanding
minor differences of opinion. However, considering the difficulties in the
functioning of the Commission due the creation of their posts, the government
could have either allowed the ECs to continue or would have had to frame rules
governing their conduct. Simply because the government chose to abolish their
posts was not held to be a sufficient ground to successfully allege mala fide
actions on part of the CEC or even the government.

The ECs were appointed to assist the Commission in handling the increased
burden due to the 61st Constitution Amendment Act, and the 64th and
65th Constitution Amendment Bills relating to elections to Panchayats and
Nagar Palikas. However, at the time of issuing the said notification, both
grounds appeared to be non-existent. While revision of electoral rolls had
already been completed by July 1989, both the Amendment Bills failed in
Parliament. So, there were no justifiable grounds to warrant the appointment of
the ECs. Moreover, it was held that the body has to decide whether it wants
greater secretarial or other staff at its disposal, or whether it would like to have
Commissioners. The nature and not quantum of work has to be decided upon
first, before putting forth a demand for the appointment of Commissioners.
Their appointment shall not be necessary if ordinary staff can deal with the
work. The inference that may be drawn is that ECs are to be appointed only
when the work burden is of such nature so as to be handled only by ECs.
Moreover, the President appointed the ECs without consulting the CEC. In fact,
he came to know about their appointment only after it was done. Though not
questioned by the Supreme Court, this clearly suggested extraneous
considerations guiding the President in appointing them. In the light of the
aforesaid, the very appointment of the ECs was not warranted, thus the abolition
of their posts was found to be completely consistent with the
overall constitutional scheme in this respect.

Under Article 324 (2) the President shall have the authority to decide whether or
not to appoint ECs. Since he enjoys the authority to create these posts, he can
also abolish their posts when he finds that there is not enough requirements to
warrant their appointment. It cannot be contended that they have suffered a
material loss since the abolition of their posts was in the nature of an exigency
attached to their office.
C. POSITION OF THE CEC IN RESPECT OF THE ECs

The existing constitutional provisions are silent on the position of the CEC

with respect to the ECs. The framers of the Constitution perhaps chose to
remain silent about the manner in which the Commission has to transact its
business. The functions of the Commission are public functions, essentially
administrative but at times also quasi-judicial and legislative in nature. The
Commission was to be manned by the CEC, a senior public official, due to
which it was felt that his and his colleagues’ sagacity and wisdom would not
require any procedural rules to be laid down in this respect. However, the
functioning of the first multi-member Commission proved otherwise.

The composition of the Commission is such that it shall always consist of the
CEC, a permanent incumbent. The appointment of the ECs is not necessary, but
can be done by the President from time to time depending upon the
requirements. He is free to increase or reduce their number too. Further in the
exercise of this power he may be regulated by any law passed by the
Parliament. In comparison, that is not the case with the CEC who has to be
present at all times. In a multi–member Commission, the CEC acts as the
Chairman. If the Commission is a single-member body, he alone takes all the
decision on behalf of the Commission. In both situations, it is the CEC who has
an upper hand, as by way of his being the Chairman he enjoys a superior
position.

The constitutional provisions expressly provide for not altering the conditions

of service of the CEC to his disadvantage after his appointment, although the
same has not been guaranteed to the ECs. Moreover, the CEC cannot be
removed except for the manner and on the grounds of a judge of the Supreme
Court. However, no such protection has been provided to the ECs. Thus, it was
held that as far conditions of service and manner of removal are concerned, the
ECs, far from being at par with the CEC, are actually at par with the Regional
Commissioners, the only distinguishing feature being that Regional
Commissioners do not form part of the Commission. Since their conditions of
service and manner of removal are the same, it was held that the position of the
CEC is higher than that of both the ECs and the Regional Commissioners, both
of whom are placed at the same status and level of authority.
In deciding on this issue, the Supreme Court held that the CEC is not intended
to be a “primus inter parties (first among equals) but is intended to be placed
at a higher position.”

In the present case, while recognizing these broad guiding principles, it was
held that the procedural rules relating to the functioning of the Commission
should be clearly spelt out either by a statue or in the form of rules framed
before or at the time of appointment of the ECs. It was further held that to
ensure the smooth functioning of the Commission, till such rules are not framed,
the ECs should not be appointed at all. A multi-member Commission may be
desirable, but it is necessary to define the roles of all those who man this
Commission, otherwise that shall affect the very functioning of the
Commission, preventing it from discharging the vital function of conducting
elections in a free and fair manner.

E. DESIRABILITY OF A MULTI-MEMBER COMMISSION

The Commission is entrusted with the all-important function of conducting

elections. Being armed with exclusive and uncontrolled powers to perform such
functions, it is prudent that such powers are not in the hands of a single
individual. Not only human prudence, but also settled democratic principles
require the same. A single individual may sometimes successfully withstand
pulls and pressures, but sometimes may not. Since the institution is not
accountable to anyone, the best means to prevent arbitrary action would have
been to provide for the appointment of ECs. The following words of the
Constituent Assembly are noteworthy in this connection:

“We cannot have an Election Commission sitting all the time during those five
years doing nothing. The Chief Election Commissioner will continue to be a
whole-time officer performing duties of his office and looking after the work
from day to day but when major elections take place, the Commission must be
enlarged to cope with the work.”

In the SS Dhanoa case, the Supreme Court did not oppose a multi-member
Commission, by abolishing the posts of the ECs, but instead intended to ensure
the smooth functioning of this body because of which it decided to abolish their
posts.
THE CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER IS NO MORE THAN A
“FIRST AMONG EQUALS”

A. FACTS OF THE TN SESHAN CASE

I. In exercise of his powers under Article 123 of the Constitution, the President

promulgated an Ordinance (No. 32 of 1993) called “The Chief Election
Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Conditions of Service)
Amendment Ordinance, 1993” in order to amend “The Chief Election
Commissioner and Other Commissioners (Conditions of Service) Act, 1991”.

II. On 1st October 1993, the day on which this Ordinance had been issued, he
issued another notification under Article 324 (2) by which he fixed the number
of ECs at two, and under another notification appointed Mr. MS Gill and Mr.
GVG Krishnamurthy as the ECs w.e.f. the said date.

III. The first writ petition was filed by a journalist, Mr. S Ramaswamy who
prayed for a declaration that the Ordinance was arbitrary, unconstitutional and
void. He also prayed for the writ of certiorari to quash the said notifications.

IV. The second writ petition was filed by the CEC himself (Mr. TN Seshan)
claiming similar relief. The other two writ petitions were filed challenging
the constitutionality of the Ordinance and the said notifications.

V. In the course of the pendency of these petitions, the Ordinance became an

Act without any change. Since the petitions involved an interpretation of Article
324 of the Constitution, they were placed before a Constitution Bench that
decided upon the petitions.

B. AMENDING ACT OF THE CEC AND ECs (CONDITIONS OF

SERVICE) ACT, 1991 NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL

The CEC alleged mala fide action on part of the President in issuing the said
notifications, since the actual purpose was to enable the ruling party to extract
favors from the ECs by sidelining the CEC and eroding his authority. Sections 9
and 10 of the Ordinance were challenged as unconstitutional. Further, it was
contended Article 324 did not provide for the Parliament to frame rules for
transaction of the business of the Commission. The Ordinance was however
upheld in entirety. Section 9 of the Ordinance required that the business of the
Commission be transacted in accordance with the provisions of the Act,
while Section 10 specified that the business of the Commission may be carried
out by unanimous decision as far as possible, but in cases of there being no
unanimity the rule of majority shall prevail.

C. NO SUPERIOR STATUS ON THE CEC

The relevant constitutional provisions require that there has to be a permanent

body known as the Election Commission, to be headed by the CEC, a permanent
incumbent. It may be a single or a multi-member body. Since the Constituent
Assembly provided for a multi-member Commission, it cannot be said that there
should not be a multi-member Commission, since the same would be
unworkable. In the SS Dhanoa case, there were no grounds to justify the
creation of the posts of the ECs in the first place, due to which the government
was found unjustified in creating these posts. At the same time, the court
observed that there can be a multi-member Commission since the same has been
provided for under the Constitution, and even upheld its desirability.

In contending that the CEC enjoys a higher status as compared to the ECs, the
petitioners largely relied upon the SS Dhanoa case, citing the following grounds
in aid of their contention:

i. The CEC enjoys the same conditions of service as those of a Supreme Court
judge, but the ECs did not enjoy the same conditions of service before the
Ordinance got passed.

ii. The CEC can be removed only in the same manner as a judge of the Supreme
Court, whereas the ECs can be dismissed upon the recommendations of the
CEC.

iii. The conditions of service of the CEC cannot be altered to his disadvantage
after his appointment, though the ECs enjoy no similar protection.

iv. In a multi-member Commission the CEC acts as its Chairman.

v. The CEC is a permanent incumbent but the posts of the ECs can be
abolished, as happened in the SS Dhanoa case.

The President has to determine the conditions of service and tenure of office of
all the functionaries of the Commission subject to the laws passed by the
Parliament in this respect. The constitutional protection against conditions of
service being altered to his disadvantage has been extended only to the CEC.
But the Ordinance has placed both the CEC and the ECs at the same level as far
as their salary is concerned. Thus, in the opinion of the court there was
absolutely no distinction between the CEC and the ECs in so far as their
conditions of service are concerned.

According to the SS Dhanoa case in a multi-member body there has to be a

Chairman, but he shall stand above the other members of such a body in so far
as rights, and authority are concerned. However, this line of reasoning is
completely inapplicable to the Commission. No member of an institution can
ever claim to be higher than the institution that he represents. He may take the
decisions individually, but those shall be decisions of the body, not his
individual decisions. Thus, even if there is a single-member Commission, the
CEC alone will have to take all the decisions, but he shall have to do so within
the scope of authority that he enjoys because of the Commission. The decisions
shall be the decisions of the Commission. As aptly held in this case, “He is a
creature of the institution, he can exist only if the institution exists.” It may be
said that the CEC is no more than a functionary of the Commission. Whether
the Commission is a single or multi-member one shall have no bearing on his
position, since he is no more than a functionary, meant to represent the
institution.

In conclusion, it was held that the CEC is at par with the ECs. Citing the
instance of other multi-member bodies such as the Union and State Public
Service Commissions, wherein there is a Chairman, Vice-Chairman and other
members, it was held that there has to be close co-operation between all the
members to ensure the smooth functioning of the body.

D. SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS ON THE ROLE OF CEC IN A MULTI-

MEMBER COMMISSION

In Election Commission of India v. Dr. Subramaniam Swamy, a procedure for

functioning of the Election Commission was laid down under which the
involvement of the CEC in all the decisions of this body was not held to be
necessary. The writ petition challenged the election of Ms. J Jayalalitha

(then the CM of Tamil Nadu), alleging she was not entitled to be a member of
the Legislative Assembly since she was a partner in a partnership firm that had
entered into a contract with the state government. The Governor has to act on
the opinion of the Election Commission in deciding whether a member of the
Legislative Assembly should be disqualified or not. In interpreting the meaning
of “the opinion of the Election Commission”, it was held that the Commission
can sit in Benches as the judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts.
However, the exclusion of the CEC from the process of decision - making is not
what is intended. Instead, the underlying logic is that since all the members of
the Commission stand equally placed, therefore may sit in Benches. In such a
capacity, the judges are not supposed to consult the Chief Justice, but are
required to apply legal principles and decide the case. The analogy between the
ECs and judges of the higher judiciary is well supported by this case. Again, all
the functionaries may participate in the process of decision – making but that is
not necessary. This clearly establishes that there is intended to be equality
between the CEC and the ECs.

This decision has significantly changed the position of the CEC. Proceeding
along the same lines as the TN Seshan case did, this decision laid down that the
CEC is no different from an ordinary member of the Commission. His absence
in a particular decision does not mean that the decision suffers from any flaw.
Thus, by way of being the Chairman in a multi-member Commission, he does
no more than preside over the functioning of the Commission. Had he been
placed at a higher position, no decisions would have been possible without his
participation.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the aforesaid, the researcher has come to the following
conclusions:

1. The importance of free and fair elections in India is beyond doubt. The
Election Commission established as an independent body under the mandate of
the Constitution has to conduct elections in a free and fair manner. The
fundamental consideration that shall therefore guide the courts in deciding cases
in relation to the Commission is to under all circumstances ensure that it is able
to function independently of all kinds of extraneous influences.

2. The approach adopted by the Constituent Assembly is definitely the best

possible course that could have been taken in the light of the circumstances and
choices available to it. The present Election Commission is a basic skeletal
machinery for conducting elections, present at all points of time. In addition,
more members may be appointed whenever there is an increased requirement.

3. The appointment of ECs has to be warranted by requirements. There has to be

an increased work burden that can be handled only by the ECs so as to warrant
their appointment. If the work is such that employing ordinary staff can serve
the purpose then that shall be preferred.

4. The desirability of a multi-member Commission is supported by judicial

decision, settled democratic principles and human prudence. At the same time,
there have to be procedural rules that specify the kind of relationship that shall
bind the members of such a body (in the present case the CEC and the ECs).
Presently, the relevant statutes and judicial decisions lay down that the business
should be transacted in a unanimous manner as far as possible. If there is no
unanimity on issues, the rule of majority shall apply. But the latter is equally
important since when the functions involve taking decisions, there may not be a
unanimous opinion at all times.

5. The CEC is in no way superior as compared to the ECs. They are all
equally placed in so far as their powers and functions are concerned. This
legal position appears to be perfectly sound, since it ensures that the ECs
who are appointed are not just advisors, but can exercise authority. Thus,
their independence is guaranteed, enabling them to act as a watchdog in
the exercise of the Commission’s powers. The fundamental consideration of
the independence of the Commission is thus ensured. The CEC is no more
than a first among equals.

6. The relationship between the CEC and ECs is largely similar to that of the
Chief Justice and judges. The former is not in a position to influence the latter in
the course of discharging their functions. The judges of the Supreme Court and
High Courts can sit in benches, thus showing that the presence of the Chief
Justice is not necessary in all the decisions of the court. Similarly, the
Commission may also sit in benches, with the participation of the CEC not a
must in all the decisions of the Commission.

7. The Chairman in a multi-member body is not more than a functionary

representing the body. Even if he alone takes all the decisions, the decisions
shall be those of the Commission and not his own. He can never be higher than
the institution he is meant to serve since he shall exist only so long as that
institution does. His role is to preside over the proceedings of the body,
ensuring that its business is conducted in a smooth manner. In any such body,
the other members shall be able to act independently only if they are placed at
par and not subordinate to him.