This volume is a collection Art / Knowledge / Theory

of essays that presents both

Elo & Luoto (eds.) Senses of Embodiment: Art, Technics, Media

theory- and practice-based
approaches to questions
concerning the embodiment
of sense.
Exploring the opening of meaning
in sensible configurations, the texts
also address the medial structures

ISBN 978-3-0343-1233-2
www.peterlang.com
– at once aesthetic, bodily and technical –
that condition our access to what-
ever makes sense to us.
The texts show in various ways how these
phenomena call for trans-disciplinary
research, and how theoretical or philosophical Senses of Embodiment:
questioning gains from the experimental Art, Technics, Media
possibilities of artistic research.
Mika Elo is the head of the Media Aesthetics Research Group at Aalto Uni-
versity, Helsinki and Associate Professor in Media Aesthetics at University of
Lapland, Rovaniemi. He also works as curator and visual artist. His work
focuses on artistic research, photography and media theory.

Miika Luoto is Lecturer of Philosophy and Performance Theory at Theatre Mika Elo
Academy, University of Arts, Helsinki and associate researcher in the
Media Aesthetics Research Group at Aalto University, Helsinki. His research
Miika Luoto
work focuses on phenomenological and post-phenomenological thought. (eds.) Peter Lang
This volume is a collection Art / Knowledge / Theory

of essays that presents both

Elo & Luoto (eds.) Senses of Embodiment: Art, Technics, Media

theory- and practice-based
approaches to questions
concerning the embodiment
of sense.
Exploring the opening of meaning
in sensible configurations, the texts
also address the medial structures
– at once aesthetic, bodily and technical –
that condition our access to what-
ever makes sense to us.
The texts show in various ways how these
phenomena call for trans-disciplinary
research, and how theoretical or philosophical Senses of Embodiment:
questioning gains from the experimental Art, Technics, Media
possibilities of artistic research.
Mika Elo is the head of the Media Aesthetics Research Group at Aalto Uni-
versity, Helsinki and Associate Professor in Media Aesthetics at University of
Lapland, Rovaniemi. He also works as curator and visual artist. His work
focuses on artistic research, photography and media theory.

Miika Luoto is Lecturer of Philosophy and Performance Theory at Theatre Mika Elo
Academy, University of Arts, Helsinki and associate researcher in the
Media Aesthetics Research Group at Aalto University, Helsinki. His research
Miika Luoto
work focuses on phenomenological and post-phenomenological thought. (eds.) Peter Lang
Senses of Embodiment:
Art, Technics, Media
Art / Knowledge / Theory
Volume 3

Edited by
Suzanne Anker and Sabine Flach

PETER LANG
Bern • Berlin • Bruxelles • Frankfurt am Main • New York • Oxford • Wien
Senses of Embodiment:
Art, Technics, Media

Mika Elo
Miika Luoto
(eds.)

PETER LANG
Bern · Berlin · Bruxelles · Frankfurt am Main · New York · Oxford · Wien
Bibliographic information published by die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche National-
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Table of Contents

Introduction: In M ed ias R es 7

A ck n o w led g em en ts 21

ESA KIRKKOPELTO
T h e T o u ch o f M im esis 23

LAURA BELOFF
F ro m E lep h an s P h o to g rap h icu s to th e H ybronaut:
A n A rtistic A p p ro a c h to H u m a n E n h an cem en t 51

KORAY TAHIROGLU & JAMES NESFIELD

A n E m b o d ie d A p p ro a c h to C o lla b o ra tiv e M u sic P ractice 69

ALEX ARTEAGA
S e n su o u s K now ledge: M ak in g S en se T h ro u g h the S k in 85

CECILIA ROOS
R eflections o n W ords an d T h o u g h ts in M o tio n 97

A n n a p e t r o n e l l a f o u l t ie r
T h e D a n c in g B o d y an d C re a tiv e E xpression:
R eflections B a se d o n M e rle a u -P o n ty ’s P h e n o m en o lo g y 103

TUOMO RAINIO
P re se n te d Im ages: O n P h o to g ra p h s an d T h e ir V arious B odies 113

MIKA ELO
T h e se s, N o te s, an d Im ages:
O n th e P h o to g ra p h ic C o n d itio n s o f E m b o d im en t 131

MlIKA LUOTO
B ein g , V isio n , Im age: O n M e rle a u -P o n ty ’s E ye a n d M in d 151

C o n trib u to rs 169

B ib lio g rap h y 173

Introduction: In Medias Res

N ew tech n o lo g ies affe c t sen se p ercep tio n , our m o st im m ed iate access to the
w orld, in w ays th a t co n c e rn n o t o n ly w h a t an d how w e perceiv e, b u t the very
co n d itio n s o f p e rc e p tio n itse lf. T ran sfo rm in g th e sense o f tim e a n d space as w ell
as th e m e an in g o f th e b o d y in h ab itin g a place, new tech n o lo g ies in fac t m ake us
aw are o f th o se c o n d itio n s in n ew w ays. F o r a lo n g tim e, th e co n d itio n s o f p erc ep ­
tio n w ere h e ld to be u n ch an g in g a n d u n iv ersal, b elo n g in g to a natu ral or tra n ­
scen d en tal order, b u t h av e n ow p ro v e d to be fun ctio n s o f c o m p lex histo rical and
tech n ical processes. H ow ever, sin ce o u r aw aren ess o f th e w ays in w h ich te c h ­
no lo g ies tra n sfo rm o u r sen su o u s access to th e w o rld is m ain ly n o n-reflective and
practical, b a se d o n th e ev ery d ay use o f te c h n o lo g ica l d ev ices, o u r ex p erien ce o f
the c h an g in g co n d itio n s o f p e rc e p tio n is essen tially a m ix tu re o f fam iliarity and
strangeness. In th e o re tic a l d iscu ssio n s co n cern in g new m e d ia th is am big u o u sn ess
is m a n ife ste d in th e p o larity b e tw e e n tech n o p h ilic an d tech n o p h o b ic a c c o u n ts.1
A t th e sam e tim e, it has also becom e ev id en t th at w e do n o t co nfront tech ­
nologies m erely as w ell-designed in strum ents serving us in our efforts to achieve
p articular ends. E specially m ass m ed ia an d inform ation technology m ake us aw are
o f the fact th at new technologies organize an d structure our experience in w ays that
are difficult to analyze and h a rd to evaluate. W ith reference to our perceptual life,
technologies are there n o t sim ply as instrum ents at our disposal but, rather, as m e­
dia o f experience. In stead o f offering us a neutral space o f perception, these m edia
situate the act o f p erceiv in g into a field determ ined in com plex w ays by technical as
w ell as habitual, b odily an d m aterial factors.2 H ence, the technological possibilities
o f p erceiving an d com m u n icatin g are defined less b y clearly identifiable functions
than b y effects o f ongo in g differentiations in m edial fields characterized b y c o n ­
flicting forces. O u r im m ed iate experience o f w h at is called reality is, in its seem ing
im m ediacy, con stitu ted by m ed ia th a t clearly exceed our mastery.
It is n o w onder, th en , th a t w e h av e b eco m e quite u n c ertain as to th e ap p ro ­
p riate w ay s o f d ealin g w ith th e effects o f te ch n o lo g y on o u r b o d ily existence.
F u n d am en tal q u estio n s arise th a t are irred u cib le to the tech n o lo g ical m ean s-en d s-
sch em a an d th a t also seem to e x c e e d th e lim its o f trad itio n al a cad em ic d iscip lin es

1 For a concise overview of the most significant media theoretical positions and key terms see
for example Medientheorien. Eine Einfuhrung, eds. Daniela Kloock & Angela Spahr, Munich:
UTB/Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1997 and Critical Terms for Media Studies, eds. W.J.T. Mitchell
and MarkB.N. Hansen, Chicago: Chicago U.P., 2010.
2 Cf. for example Modernisierung des Sehens. Sehweisen zwischen Kunsten und Medien, eds.
Matthias Bruhn and Kai-Uwe Hemken, Bielefeld: Transcript, 2008.
8 Mika Elo & Miika Luoto

an d ev en scientific o b jectiv ity as such.3 It is esp ecially th e arts an d philo so p h ical

th o u g h t th a t h av e b een alert to th e se ch allen g es. T h e ir re ce n t dev elo p m en ts m ake
ev id e n t th a t o n e o f th e m a jo r task s b ro u g h t to us b y new tech n o lo g ies is the urg e n t
n e e d to re c o n sid e r th e v ery c o n d itio n s o f e x p e rin e ce, startin g fro m the n o tions of
tim e , sp ace, p la c e , an d th e body.

Mediality of sense

A n y d isco u rse o n th ese issu es co m es across e ssen tial term in o lo g ic al difficulties,

startin g w ith th e w o rd s tech n o lo g y an d m ed ium . In E nglish, th e w o rd ‘te c h n o l­
o g y ’ easily sugg ests th e p ra c tic a l ap p licatio n o f scientific k n o w led g e . In co m p ari­
son, fo r in stan ce, to th e G e rm a n Technik, w h ic h covers th e m ean in g s o f tech n iq u e
an d sk ill, the w o rd tech n o lo g y is o ften to o th e o retica l an d scien ce-o rien ted to
serv e as a n ap p ro p riate d e sig n a tio n o f th e p ro b lem atic a t issu e here. T h erefo re w e
w ill u se h e re the less th e o re tic a l w o rd ‘te c h n ic s’, w h ich refers to tech n ical ru les
o r m eth o d s, as w ell as to th e th e o ry a n d stu dy o f a n art o r process. B ein g also a
less h a b itu a l w o rd , it m ay p erh ap s serve b e tte r as the d esig n atio n o f a field th at is
a t o n ce fa m ilia r a n d strange.
M o re ch allen g in g d ifficu lties p e rta in to the w o rd ‘m e d iu m ’ as w ell as its
p lu ra l fo rm ‘m e d ia ’ . T he d iv e rsity o f p h e n o m e n a su b su m e d u n d er the w o rd m e ­
d ia (b o th in e v ery d ay co n tex ts a n d in th eo retical d iscu ssio n s) m akes any attem p t
at a u n iv o c a l d efin itio n o f m ed ia in to a v irtu ally im p o ssib le task. D e p en d in g on
co n tex t, w e can leg itim ately call m ed ia su c h div erse en tities an d p h en o m en a as
m aterials, v eh icles, m ach in es, to o ls, b o d ies, senses, lan g u ag es an d c o m p lex te c h ­
n o lo g ical settings. In o n e w ay o r another, how ever, all m ed ia in v o lv e at once
sen se p ercep tio n , th a t is, o u r e m b o d ie d ex p erience, a n d an a rtic u latio n o f m ean ­
in g . T h e re fo re, w h a t is at p la y in m e d ia are all the senses o f ‘se n se ’: sense p er­
cep tio n , m ean in g , an d th e ab ility to estim ate, ap p reciate o r feel som ething. A t the
sam e tim e, at p la y in m ed ia are also all the senses o f ‘e m b o d im e n t’: the te c h n i­
cal, m aterial, bodily, an d h ab itu al d ifferen ces th a t in ea ch case articu late sense
b y in c a rn a tin g it, rep re se n tin g it o r m ak in g it p art o f a system . In so fa r as m ed ia
articu late sen se b y g ath erin g to g e th e r the d iffe re n t senses o f ‘s e n se ’ , the qu estio n
co n cern s, generally, w h a t w e call m ed ia lity o f sense.

3 Over the past few decades, theoretical challenges related to new media have led to multifac­
eted reconsiderations of the status of verbal language in the humanities. Cf. Mika Elo, “Notes
On Media Sensitivity in Artistic Research”, in The Exposition of Artistic Research: Publish­
ing Art in Academia, eds. Michael Schwab and Henk Borgdorff, Leiden: Leiden U.P., 2014,
25-38 and Stefan Munker, Philosophie nach dem “Medial Turn”. Beitrage zur Theorie der
Mediengesellschaft, Bielefeld: Transcript, 2009.
Introduction: In Medias Res 9

W h a t is re q u ire d o f any a ttem p t to q u e stio n the senses o f e m b o d im e n t and

the m ed iality o f sen se is th a t th e q u estio n in g itse lf be sen sitive to its o w n m edial-
ity. B o th th e arts an d p h ilo so p h y h av e m ad e su ch a re q u irem e n t th e ir ow n: any
veritab le p h ilo so p h ical o r artistic in te rro g a tio n is esse n tia lly an in te rro g a tio n o f
the v ery m ed iu m o f th a t in te rro g a tio n . If th e arts a n d p h ilo so p h y have in d eed been
alert to th e a fo re m e n tio n ed cu ltu ral ch an g es, this is due perh ap s less to th e a rt­
is ts ’ an d p h ilo so p h e rs’ p e rso n a l sen sitiv ity th an to the h isto rica l pro cess in w hich
the re la tio n o f artistic an d p h ilo so p h ical p ractices to th e ir trad itio n a l m e d ia has
beco m e p ro b le m a tic . In fact, th e ir alertn ess to th e tran sfo rm atio n s going o n w ith
resp e c t to tech n ics is in v ario u s w ay s co u p le d w ith an aw aren ess o f a req u ired
tra n sfo rm a tio n o f th e ir o w n p ra c tic e s. T h is m eans at o n ce that, if th e questions
co n cern in g th e m e d ia lity o f sen se call fo r artistic an d p h ilo so p h ical approaches,
the ro le o f th ese ap p ro ach es m u st n o t b e d efin ed in advance. M o reo v er, the signs
th a t p o in t to th e n ecessity o f rec o n sid e rin g th e v ery n ature o f b o th art an d p h ilo so ­
phy in th e face o f th e se issu es also p o in t to th e p o ssib ility o f reco n sid erin g th eir
relatio n s to ea c h other.4

Technics and the question of presentation

A t th e h isto rical m o m e n t w h e n new tech n ical m odes o f re p ro d u ctio n gave rise to

w h o lly n ew art fo rm s, first p h o to g ra p h y a n d th en film , the tra d itio n al no tio n o f art
w as p u t in q u estio n . A s W alter B e n ja m in in p a rtic u la r sh o w ed in the 1930s, the
aesth etic c a teg o ries th a t u p until th e 19th cen tu ry h ad p o w erfu lly d e lim ited the
field o f art n o w b e g a n to lo o se th e ir im m ed iate credibility.5 In th e case o f p h o to g ­
rap h y an d film , n o tio n s lik e “ a u th e n tic ity ” , “ o rig in ality ” and the “p ro p e r p la c e ”
o f th e w o rk o f art p ro v e d to be q u estio n ab le, b ecau se th e id ea o f a n o rig in al w o rk
situ ated in its o w n p la c e b e c a m e u n ten ab le: a p h o to g rap h or a film is there fro m
th e b eg in n in g as a co p y to be re p ro d u c e d an d rew o rk e d as w ell as to be d istrib u ted
an d sh o w n in m an y p laces at th e sam e tim e. W h at w as at once m ade questio n ab le,
w as th e in te g rity o f th e w o rk o f art and, consequently, th e go v ern in g aesthetic

4 As the present anthology shows, this involvement can take many forms. For Cecilia Roos,
her own bodily practice becomes the key issue, whereas for Alex Arteaga, Anna Petronella
Foultier, Esa Kirkkopelto and Miika Luoto it is the philosophical argument that makes up the
testing ground of the senses of embodiment. Laura Beloff and Koray Tahiroglu & James Nes-
filed make use of philosophical discussions in framing their artistic inquiries. Mika Elo and
Tuomo Rainio, again, develop more strategic and performative modes of thought combining
text and images.
5 Cf. Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility”,
Selected Writings, vol.3, ed. Michael W. Jennings et al., various tranlators, Cambridge Mas­
sachusetts and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard U. P., 2002.
10 Mika Elo & Miika Luoto

id ea o f th e w o rk as a u n ified , m ean in g fu l w h o le. T he q u estio n no w is, w h at b e ­

co m es o f art w h en its “ w o rk ” is d efin ed b y the v ery relatio n s th a t form erly w ere
co n sid e re d to b elo n g to its “c o n te x t” , th a t is, to be ex tern al o r accessory, lik e the
m o d es o f its p resen tatio n , tra n sm issio n an d storage. A s w e now know , su ch q u e s­
tio n s h av e b eco m e e v e n m o re u rg en t in th e w ak e o f digital tech n o lo g ies. A n d as
B en jam in alread y c learly saw , the stakes o f the p ro b lem a tic co n cern the w hole o f
cu ltu re : th e aesth etic q u estio n s are im m ed iately also political.
A cco rd in g to M a rtin H e id e g g e r (w h o se reflections on technics started ap ­
p ro x im a te ly at th e sam e tim e as B e n ja m in ’s), the p ro b le m o f technics ex ceeds all
reg io n al p ro b lem s as it co n cern s th e v ery b ein g o f b e in g s.6 In o rd er to ap p ro ach
“th e essen ce o f te c h n ic s” , H e id eg g er argued, w e m u st free o u rselv es fro m the
in stru m e n ta l-a n th ro p o lo g ic al definition o f tech n ics. T he rea so n fo r this is n o t the
in co rrectn ess o f the defin itio n , acco rd in g to w h ich tech n ics are m an -m ad e m eans
to en d s. T h e d efin itio n is in fa c t co rre c t to such an ex ten t th at it is able to hide
th e fa c t th a t th ere is so m eth in g else a t play in tech n ics, so m eth in g else th a t by far
su rp asses in stru m e n ta lity an d h u m a n m astery.7 A cco rd in g to H eidegger, the e s­
sen ce o f tech n ics is n o th in g tech n ical. W h a t is at issu e in it, is a p a rticu la r m ode in
w h ic h th in g s co m e in to p resen ce, a p articu lar m o d e o f th e u n co v erin g o f w h a t is.
H e ch aracterizes it as a p ro cess o f “ se ttin g ” o r “p la c in g ” (stellen), in w h ic h ev e­
ry th in g is w ith referen ce to a to tal av a ila b ility o f bein g p lac ed a t w ill.8 To borrow
S am u el W e b e r’s a p t form ula: in tech n ics, “things are allo w ed to take p lac e only
in so fa r as th e y c a n be p u t in p la c e ” .9 M o st im portantly, th is o n to lo g ical d em an d
affects n o t o n ly te c h n o lo g ic a l o r scientific m o d es o f p ro d u ctio n and inquiry, b u t
all m o d es o f re p re se n ta tio n an d p re se n ta tio n (vo rstellen an d d a rstellen ), in clu d ­
in g th o se o f th e arts a n d philosophy.
W h a t b o th B en jam in an d H e id e g g e r started to brin g to the fore is the fact th at
no in terro g atio n o f th e a rtic u la tio n o f sense in co n tem p o rary cultu re can av o id the
u n se ttlin g effects o f tech n ics an d m ed ia. W h a t th eir w o rk s also p o in t to , alb eit in
v ery d ifferen t w ays, is a lim it o f th e th eo retical as su ch w ith re sp e c t to th e p ro b ­
lem atic a t issue. T h e fu n d am en tal q u estio n s b ro u g h t to us by tech n ics co n cerning
th e re la tio n b etw een space a n d place, d istan ce a n d proxim ity, presen ce a n d a b ­
sen ce b eco m e m a n ife st as p ro b lem s th a t e x ceed th e lim its o f ex istin g theo retical

6 Martin Heidegger’s reflections on technics can be found in several writings; in this context,
the two perhaps most important are “The Age of the World-Picture”, trans. Julian Young
and Kenneth Haynes, in Martin Heidegger, Off the Beaten Track, Cambridge: Cambridge
U.P., 2002, and “The Question Concerning Technology”, trans. William Lovitt, in Martin
Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell, New York: Harper, 1993.
7 “The Question Concerning Technology”, p. 312f.
8 Ibid. p. 324f.
9 Samuel Weber, Mass mediauras. Form, Technics, Media, ed. Alan Cholodenko, California:
Stanford U.P, 1996, p. 79.
Introduction: In Medias Res 11

app ro ach es and, p e rh a p s, all attem p ts at p u re th eo retical m astery. W h a t is c o m ­

m o n to th e ap p ro ach es o f b o th B e n ja m in an d H e id eg g er is th e ir aw aren ess o f the
p ec u lia r d em an d s th a t th e se p ro b lem s p u t o n th o u g h t as a th e o re tic al practice. In
th e ir w ork, th e essen tial p o ssib ilities o f th o u g h t are n o t red u cib le to m ere c o n ­
cep tu al d ete rm in a tio n an d lo g ical arg u m en tatio n , b u t re m a in co n n ec te d to the
p erfo rm ativ e an d tra n sfo rm a tiv e c h aracter o f discourse. T h e q u e stio n o f technics
a n d tech n ical m e d ia req u ire th a t th in k in g a tten d in new w ay s to its o w n m ed ia
a n d tech n iq u es, th a t is, lan g u ag e a n d its m eans o f p resentation. F rom o u r ow n
histo rical d istan ce w e c a n p erh ap s see th at, h ere, th e q u estio n o f th e po ssib le role
o f artistic p ractices in a d d ressin g co n te m p o ra ry q u estio n s starts to em erge.

Bodily capacities

W ith th e rise o f n ew m o d e s o f re p re s e n ta tio n b a se d o n te c h n ic a l p ro d u c tio n , at

first p h o to g ra p h y a n d film , an d m o re re c e n tly a w h o le a rra y o f e le c tro n ic and
d ig ita l m ed ia, w e h av e b e c o m e a w a re o f th e c o m p le x ity o f o u r see m in g ly n a tu ­
ral sen se p e rc e p tio n . “ It is a n o th e r n a tu re w h ic h sp e ak s to th e c a m e ra as c o m ­
p a re d to th e e y e ” , B e n ja m in p o in te d o u t w ith re g a rd to p h o to g ra p h y .10 T oday
th e q u e s tio n is, w h e th e r a n d h o w th e a lg o rith m ic p ro c e sse s ta k in g p la c e o n th e
su b fa c e 11 o f c o m p le x m e d ia -te c h n o lo g ic a l se ttin g s still “ sp e a k ” to o u r sen ses?
H ow to re la te o u r sen se e x p e rie n c e to te c h n o lo g ic a l p ro cesses th a t do n o t face
the b o d y in an y p h e n o m e n a l sen se b u t n e v e rth e le ss sig n ifica n tly c o n trib u te to
o u r sen se o f re a lity ?
In d istin ctio n to tra d itio n a l arts, in w h ic h the represen tatio n s o ffe re d by
w o rk s are d istin g u ish a b le fro m e v ery d ay reality, new m ed ia sim ulate o u r sense
p erception. T h erefo re, th e y are n o t m erely m eans fo r the tran sm issio n o f in fo rm a ­
tion. M u c h m o re fu n d am en tally , th e y e x te n d o u r b o d ily cap acities in su ch a w ay
th a t th e y d etach th e cap acity to see an d h ear fro m its bo d ily place. O fferin g us
new m o d es o f access to th e w orld, th e y also o rganize o u r e x p erien ce o f th e w orld
in w ay s th a t u n settle som e o f o u r m o st b asic n otions, su ch as th e u n ity o f body
and its p la c e , o r th e o n e-w ay re la tio n b e tw e e n the rep re se n tatio n an d the re p re ­
sen ted . W h ile n ew m ed ia o ffer u s n ew m o d es o f p e rc ep tio n , th ey also allow us to
ex p erien ce th e c o m p lex ity an d stran g en ess o f percep tio n , n o tab ly its depen d en ce
u p o n a v a st ap p aratu s th a t rem ain s b e y o n d o u r c o n tro l.12

10 Benjamin, Selected Writings vol. 3, p. 117.

11 Frieder Nake, “Surface, Interface, Subface: Three Cases of Interaction and One Concept”,
in Paradoxes of Interactivity. Perspectives for Media Theory, Human-Computer Interaction,
and Artistic Investigations, eds. Uwe Seifert et al., Bielefeld: Transcript, 2008, p. 92-109.
12 Samuel Weber has addressed these questions in a challenging way in his Mass mediauras.
12 Mika Elo & Miika Luoto

Today, as div erse sen satio n s an d facu lties are c o m b in ed in new w ays w ith the
a id o f co m p u ters, th e ro le o f o u r sen so riu m an d its in n er hierarch ies are, to g e th er
w ith th e w h o le n o tio n o f th e body, o n ce ag ain u n d erg o in g fu n d am en tal changes.
In the w ak e o f re c e n t m e d ia -te c h n o lo g ica l d ev elo p m en ts, such as w eb 2 .0 , touch
screen tech n o lo g ies as w ell as v ario u s m o b ile an d ub iq u ito u s m edia, th e pro m ise
o f infinite co m m u n ic a b ility an d seam less fu n ctio n ality c o m b in ed w ith relativ e
in d ep en d en ce fro m th e p h y sical en v iro n m en t, h av e beco m e p art o f o u r every d ay
ex p erien ce. F o r a lo n g tim e , W estern co n cep tio n s o f the b o d y w ere g o v e rn e d (and
in m an y w ay s still a re) b y th e p rin cip le o f con tain m en t, acco rd in g to w h ich the
b o d y is a self-co n tain ed u n it th a t tak es its p lace by ex clu d in g o th e r b o d ies fro m
th a t p la c e .13 T h is p rin cip le has b eco m e an in creasin g ly u n ten ab le startin g point
fo r an y d isco u rse o n th e liv e d body.
If sen se p e rc e p tio n an d o th e r b o d ily cap acities have beco m e questio n ab le
w ith th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f tech n ics, to th e e x ten t th a t th e b o d y itse lf seem s to be
m o re p ro b lem atic th a n ever, th is situ atio n has a t once g iv en rise to nu m ero u s a t­
te m p ts to in terro g ate th e b o d y in new w ays. T his side o f th e d istin c tio n b etw een
m in d an d body, th e liv e d b o d y is rev e a le d as an o rig in al referen ce p o in t o f the
articu latio n o f sen se - an o rig in al m ed iu m , as it w ere. W h at is o f in terest in the
body, fro m th is p o in t o f view , are fo r in stan ce its ex p ressiv e an d m im etic ca ­
p acities, its m o d es o f co m m u n ic a tio n th a t re m ain “b e lo w ” th e lev el o f co n ceptual
sig n ificatio n , its rh y th m ic an d p o stu ra l w ay s o f en g ag in g w ith situ atio n s, and its
ab ility to “th in k ” in w ay s th a t re m a in w ith in the bo d ily m edium , like dancing.
To sp eak o f th e b o d y as a n o rig in al m e d iu m m ak es it im p o ssib le to conceive
o f it as an o rig in al source. T h erefo re, a retu rn to th e o rig in al cap acities o f the
b o d y c a n n o t be a re tu rn to an au th en tic e lem en t, to so m eth in g natural o r im m ed i­
ate. In stead , th e b o d y m u st itse lf be c o n c e iv e d o f in term s o f m edia, th a t is, w ith
referen ce to all th o se tech n ical, m aterial an d h ab itu al stru ctu res th a t in each case
articu late its cap acities. B o th new ch allen g es an d new possib ilities o f inquiry
start to em erg e h ere. W e m ig h t fo llo w M au rice M e rle a u -P o n ty ’s reflections on
th e “p arad o x o f ex p re ssio n ” , o n w h a t h ap p en s w h en th e “ still m u te e x p e rie n ce ” is
b ro u g h t to th e “ ex p re ssio n o f its o w n sen se” . B eing n eith er a statem en t a b o u t e x ­
p erien ce, n o r th e rev e la tio n o f th e ex p erien ce in itse lf, an ex p ressio n is a pa ssa g e
w ith o u t a b eg in n in g o r an en d , a n d p recisely as such, th e m o m en t o f th e birth o f
se n se .14 D e v e lo p e d w ith re sp e c t to th e q u e stio n o f the m ed ia lity o f sense, this

13 For a first systematic articulation of this principle, cf. Aristotle, Physics, 208b-210b.
14 Merleau-Ponty developed the notion of expression in several writings, especially in those from the
beginning of the 1950’s. A profound summary of the various aspects of expression in Merleau-
Ponty is Bernhard Waldenfels, “The paradox of Expression”, in Chiasms. Merleau-Ponty’s Notion
of Flesh, ed. FredEvans and Leonard Lawlor, Albany: Stateuniversity ofNew York Press, 2000.
Introduction: In Medias Res 13

m ig h t m e a n th at, in c e rta in cases a t least, th e id ea o f k n o w led g e a b o u t a sensible

ph en o m en o n a rtic u la te d in sig n ify in g lan g u ag e gives w ay to the id ea o f a passage
b etw een d iffe re n t m ed ia o f ex p erien ce, o r th a t th e id ea o f th e o re tic al kn o w led g e
ab o u t p ra c tic a l k n o w -h o w g iv es w ay to th e id ea o f a tran sitio n b etw e en tw o p ra c ­
tices m u tu ally d e p e n d e n t o n e a c h o th er.15 H ence, w e en co u n ter the q u estio n o f
tra n sla tio n in a b ro a d sense, o f a tran slatio n , m oreover, w h ich is irred u cib le to the
id ea o f th e tra n sfe r o f significations.

The sense of aesthetics

T h e tra n sfo rm a tio n o f o u r p ercep tu al access to th e w o rld th ro u g h new te c h n o lo ­

gies also co n cern s the field o f aesth etics, alth o u g h in am biguous w ays. W h ile a
rig o ro u s d elim itatio n o f the field o f aesth etic p h en o m en a h a s b eco m e m ore and
m ore susp ect, th e v ery q u estio n s to w h ic h aesth etics has trie d to answ er, em erge
in new , ch allen g in g form s.
S o m e o f the m o st im p o rta n t top ics o f m o d ern aesthetics as first d ev elo p e d
by K a n t h av e b e e n th e fo llo w in g : th e d istin c tio n b e tw ee n aesth etic a n d co gnitive
ju d g e m e n t, th e d efin itio n o f a p ro p e rly aesth etic n o tio n o f fo rm , the d e lim itation
o f th e w o rk o f art th ro u g h a d iffe re n tia tio n b e tw e en its in tern al a n d ex tern al p ro p ­
erties, a n d th e irred u cib ility o f th e aesth etic ex p erien ce to co n cep tu al analysis.
F o r a lo n g tim e, th e se task s h av e p ro v e d to be intern ally p ro b lem atic, an d yet,
th ey h av e c o n tin u e d to ch allen g e th eo retical th in k in g in ev er new w ays. N ow , in
a cu ltu re d e te rm in e d th ro u g h an d th ro u g h by tech n ics an d m edia, th e ir challenge
has b e co m e e v en m o re am b ig u o u s. W h en k n o w led g e in tervenes m assiv ely in the
p ro d u ctio n o f “ a e sth e tic ” o b jects, w h en aesthetic form s com e to b elo n g to the
sphere o f p ro g ram m in g , w h e n th e “w o rk ” is m ore a n d m ore p rese n t as p a rt o f a
“n e tw o rk ”, a n d w h e n co n cep tu al an aly sis has beco m e a n alm o st n ecessary fra m e ­
w o rk fo r the p ro d u c tio n an d re c e p tio n o f aesthetic o b jec ts, w e are co n fro n te d
w ith th e q uestion: w h a t is th e v ery sen se o f aesthetics?
F ro m th e p o in t o f view o f th e arts, th e role o f aesth etics is no less a m b ig u ­
ous. S ince th e d efen ce o f th e au to n o m y o f a rt in the nam e o f tra d itio n al aesthetics
has b eco m e su sp ect, an d since the in stitu tio n al fram e w o rk o f art is all-p erv asiv e
today, a rt is easily u n d ersto o d as a fo rm o f cu ltu ral activity. T h is m ean s th a t ar­
tistic p ractice is ex p lic a te d w ith referen ce to structures o f m e an in g th a t hav e th e ir
basis in social, p o litical o r eco n o m ic d em an d s, an d th a t th e w o rk o f a rt is red u ced
to b ein g a v eh icle o f m eaning. In th is situ atio n, a retu rn to th e basic questio n s o f
aesth etics in th e K a n tia n sen se w o u ld seem to be in ev itab le, if only in o rd er to

15 In this volume, Alex Arteaga addresses these questions from an enactivistic point of view
relating his approach to Husserlian phenomenology.
14 Mika Elo & Miika Luoto

fo restall th e re d u c tio n ist u n d e rsta n d in g o f a rt as a cu ltural activity, o f w h ic h it is

leg itim ate to d em a n d th a t it be cu ltu rally u n d erstan d ab le, pu b licly im p o sin g and
eco n o m ically successful. H ow ever, th e ex p e c tatio n th a t aesth etics w o u ld be able
to o ffer a leg itim a tio n fo r a rt h as p ro v e d to be, esp ecia lly th ro u g h the in te rv e n tio n
o f tech n ics a n d m e d ia in to the aesth etic field, a fallacio u s id ea, b o th illu so ry and
ideological.
A cco rd in g to K a n t’s classical a n a ly sis,16 m y ex p erien ce is aesth etic if, in
th e p re se n c e o f an o b ject, I feel a p le a su re th at is u n iv e rsally c o m m u n icab le,
alth o u g h w ith o u t a concept. T h e aesth etic p leasu re is n o t an im m ed iate pleasu re
o f th e sen ses, b u t th e p le a su re o f reflectio n ch a ra cterizin g m y state in fro n t o f the
o b ject. Issu in g fro m th e free acco rd b e tw e e n u n d erstan d in g (the facu lty o f c o n ­
cep ts) an d im a g in a tio n (the facu lty o f sen sib le presen tatio n ), aesth etic p leasu re is
th e fe e lin g o f so m eth in g m e a n in g fu l, b u t p recisely in the ab sence o f any definable
m eaning. A esth etics, th en , refers n o t to m y cap acity o f perceiv in g but, rather, to
m y cap acity o f feeling. M o re p recisely, th e aesth etic feelin g is the sign o f m y
re c e p tiv ity to so m eth in g n o t y e t co n stitu te d as an o b je c t o f k n o w le d g e, in o ther
w o rd s, o f m y recep tiv ity to th e v ery d o n a tio n o f som ething.
F o llo w in g th e reflectio n s o f Jean -F ran g o is L yotard on the fate o f aesthetics in
th e co n te x t o f tech n o -scien tific c a p ita lism ,17 w e m ay b rin g up th ree to p ics w o rth
no tin g here: 1. th e n o n -c o n c e p tu a l co m m u n icatio n defining aesthetic recep tio n ,
2. th e p a ssib ility c h aracterizin g aesth etic sensibility, a n d 3. the p arad o x ical p re s­
en ce o f m a tte r in th e ab sen ce o f form . In w ay s th a t are m o st relev an t today, th ey
em p h asize th e irre d u c ib ility o f aesth etic sen sib ility to k n o w led g e an d w ill, and
th e resistan ce o f artistic p ractices to cu ltu ral p ro d u ctio n o f m eaning.
1. A s K a n t arg u ed , b e fo re in d u c in g u n d erstan d in g , the aesthetic o b je ct in ­
du ces a feelin g th a t is - co n stitu tiv e ly a n d im m ed iately - u n iv e rsally co m m u ­
nicable. T h is u n iv ersal co m m u n icab ility , w h ic h is n o t a fa ct b u t a d em and, is
o rig in al as it c o n stitu tes th e recep tiv ity o f th e h u m an m ind. T h erefo re, aesth etics
in th e K a n tia n sense is c o n n e c te d to a rad ical th in k in g o f no n -co n c ep tu a l c o m ­
m u n ica tio n : as th e recep tiv ity o f th e m ind, aesth etic co m m u n ica tio n p recedes any
ac t o f co m m u n ic a tio n a n d co n seq u en tly all prag m atics o f co m m u n icatio n . S u c h
co m m u n ic a tio n in aesth etic feelin g bears o n th e im m ed iate com m unity, in the
nam e o f w h ich th e w o rk is receiv ed ; w h a t m atters here is n o t the w o rk ’s co n ten t
o r form , b u t its m o d ality o f p re se n c e .18

16 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and
Eric Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2000.
17 Jean-Franfois Lyotard, The Inhuman. Reflections on Time, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and
Rachel Bowlby, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.
18 Lyotard, “Something like ‘communication...without communication”, in The Inhuman, p.
108-118.
Introduction: In Medias Res 15

2 . T h e p re se n c e o f so m e th in g is n o t an issu e o f o b je c tiv e k n o w le d g e , b u t
o f “ p a s s ib ility ” (th e c a p a c ity to su ffe r o r fe e l) w h ic h is th e v ery c o n d itio n o f
e x p e rie n c e. M o st im p o rta n tly , p a ssib ility is n o t passiv ity , w h ic h is d e te rm in e d
b y its o p p o site , activ ity . W h a t m a tte rs h e re is th a t so m e th in g is h a p p e n in g to
m e d u e to th e fa c t th a t so m e th in g is g iv e n to m e w ith o u t b e in g c o n tro lle d , p ro ­
g ra m m e d o r g ra sp e d b y a co n cep t. T h e a e sth e tic fe e lin g a n a ly z e d b y K a n t can
be u n d e rsto o d as th e im m e d ia te w e lc o m in g o f th e d o n atio n , o f w h a t c a n n o t be
c a lc u la te d b u t o n ly re c e iv e d , an d w h a t g iv e s m a tte r fo r a e sth etic re fle c tio n .19
H o w ev er, th e re are stro n g c o n te m p o ra ry te n d e n c ie s th a t ru n c o u n te r to th e n o ­
tio n o f p a ssib ility an d , co n se q u e n tly , a e sth e tic s. T oday, it is co m m o n th a t th e
e n c o u n te r w ith th e w o rk o f a rt is c o n c e iv e d o f in term s o f th e se lf-c o n stitu tio n
o f th e a c tiv e s u b je c t in re la tio n to w h a t is a d d re sse d to h im o r h er. In ste a d o f
ju d g in g th e e n c o u n te r w ith th e w o rk o n th e b a sis o f b e in g e x p o se d , d is c o n ­
c e rte d , it is ju d g e d o n th e b a sis o f th e w ill to a ctio n . E v en the p re su m e d in te r­
ru p tio n o f m a ste ry b y in te ra c tio n - a lso a w id e sp re a d te n d e n c y to d a y - le ad s to
n e g le c tin g th e v e ry p ro b le m o f p a ssib ility , sin ce th e q u e stio n still rem ain s one
o f actio n . In o rd e r to g iv e a e sth e tic s its d u e, w h a t m u st be in te rru p te d is n o t a
su b je c tiv e a ttitu d e , b u t th e m e a n s b y w h ic h w e th in k p re se n c e acc o rd in g to the
m o d a lity o f m a ste ry .20
3. Finally, w ith th e to p ic o f th e sub lim e, K an tian aesth etics break s w ith the
aesth etics o f form . A m o n g m an y oth ers, L yo tard has d ev elo p e d the n o tio n o f the
sub lim e as o n e ap p ro p riate to th e co n te m p o rary aesth etic sensitivity. H ow ever,
in c o n tra st to K an t, fo r w h o m th e su b lim e fe e lin g p o in te d to w ard s the sp here o f
m orality, fo r L y o tard it p o in ts to w a rd n u an ces, tim b res, in co m p arab le q u alities -
th a t is, m atter. T h is m atter is n o t d e stin e d fo r form , o r in o th e r w ords, fo r the sy n ­
thetic cap acity o f th e h u m a n m in d , an d th erefo re it rem ain s “ im m a terial” . W h at
is at issu e, th en , in th e c o n te x t o f th e p ro b lem atic o f p rese n tatio n w ith o u t form , is
p resen ce itself, th e “th a t th e re be so m e th in g ” , in so far as it is en c o u n tered o n ly in
the ab sen ce o f th e activ e m ind, in a state o f m in d w h ich is “ a prey to p re sen c e” .
W h a t is, after th e su b lim e, v eritab ly aesth etic, is the p re sen ta tio n o f the fac t th at
th ere is th e unpresen tab le: th e “to u c h ” o f a sin g u lar quality, the ev e n t o f passibil-
ity, fo r w h ich th e m in d ca n n o t be p re p a re d an d w h ich w ill have h ap p e n ed o n ly by
u n settlin g th e m in d .21

19 Ibid.
20 As Laura Beloff’s and Koray Tahiroglu’s & James Nesfiled’s contributions in this volume
clearly show, artists working with interactive media settings and devices often look for pos­
sibilities of widening the frames of interaction in order to include playfulness and enjoyment.
21 Lyotard, “After the Sublime, the State of Aesthetics”, in The Inhuman, p. 135-143.
16 Mika Elo & Miika Luoto

The pathic

D u rin g th e la st tw o o r th re e d e c a d e s, o n e p a rtic u la rly c h a lle n g in g a p p ro a c h to

th e p ro b le m a tic o f th e e m b o d im e n t o f se n se has ta k e n its o rie n ta tio n fro m the
q u e stio n s o f to u c h a n d th e “p a th ic ” . T o sp ea k o f th e p a th ic (fro m th e G re e k
p a th o s : to e x p e rie n c e , to su ffer, to b e u n d e r th e in flu en ce o f so m eth in g ) m e an s,
w ith re fe re n c e to th e tra d itio n a l fields o f study, to a tte n d to the clo se c o n n e c ­
tio n s b e tw e e n a e sth e sio lo g y a n d a e sth e tic s. M o reo v e r, sin ce th e q u e stio n o f th e
p a th ic p e rta in s to a b a sic e le m e n t o f o u r se n sib le e x iste n c e th a t is irre d u c ib le
to b o th c o g n itio n a n d w ill, su c h a n a p p ro a c h is situ a te d th is sid e o f th e d is­
tin c tio n b e tw e e n th e th e o re tic a l a n d th e p rac tic al. H ere, q u e stio n s c o n c e rn in g
th e arts, te c h n ic s a n d m e d ia c o m e to th e fo re, re la te d in c h a lle n g in g w a y s to
th e w h o le p ro b le m a tic o f th e b o d y . W ith re sp e c t to o u r se n so riu m , the sense
o f to u c h p ro v e s to b e p ro to ty p ic a l o f th e se n sib le o rd e r in its entirety, so th a t
its sig n ific a n c e e x te n d s fa r b e y o n d th e lim its o f one p a rtic u la r sen se m o dality.
F u rth e rm o re , in its w ay o f ex c e e d in g th e ta c tile w o rld , to u c h p ro v e s to b e m o re
th a n th e p h y sic a l se n se o f to u c h : as a d e sig n a tio n fo r th e p a ra d o x ic a l stru ctu re
o f ex p o su re , to u c h m a rk s e x p e rie n c e as su c h .22
To c o n c e iv e o f th e e x p e rie n c e in te rm s o f p a th ic e x p o su re e p ito m iz e d by
to u c h in g m e a n s to c o n s id e r it as an e v e n t, w ith o u t p o sin g any su b je c t o r o b ­
je c t p re c e d in g it o r su sta in in g it. T h ro u g h su ch an e v e n t, so m e th in g h a p p e n s
to m e b e c a u se so m e th in g to u c h e s m e\ th e e v e n t sin g les m e o u t. W h a t is m o st
im p o rta n t, h o w ev er, is th a t th e e v e n t o f to u ch p re c e d e s b o th th a t w h ic h to u ch es
a n d th e o n e w h o is to u c h e d . O n th e o n e h an d , to u c h in g has alre a d y ta k e n place
w h e n I re a c t to it o r a c t a c c o rd in g to it. A n d y et, I e n c o u n te r th a t w h ic h to u ch es
m e first th ro u g h m y resp o n se to its p a rtic u la r w ay o f to u c h in g , w ith o u t e v e r b e ­
in g ab le to re d u c e th e le a d o f th e e v e n t.23
O n th e risk y stag e o f life, i.e. in o u r b o d ily b ein g , to to u c h alw a y s also
m e a n s to be to u c h e d , h e n c e , e x p o su re. T h e re fo re, th e re c ip ro c a l stru c tu re o f
to u c h is n o t sy m m e tric b u t tw iste d o u t o f jo in t b y the p a th ic m o m en t. T h e s e lf is
alw a y s p re c e d e d b y so m e th in g th a t to u c h e s o r e x p o se s th e self. T h e se enco u n -
te rin g s c o n stitu te th e p re c o n d itio n o f an y resp o n se, sin ce it is o n ly th e p a th ic
ex p o su re th a t m a k e s th e s e lf tu rn to its e lf as sen tien t. T h e stru c tu re a t issu e is
n o t a re fle x iv e o n e , sin c e e x p o su re a lw ay s in v o lv e s th e tra n sitiv e fo rm a tio n o f
th e se lf.24

22 Cf. Mika Elo, “Digital finger: beyond phenomenologial figures of touch”, Journal of Aesthet­
ics and Culture, vol. 4., 2012, DOI: 10.3402/jac.v4i0.14982.
23 Waldenfels, Bruchlinien der Erfahrung. Phanomenologie - Psychoanalyse - Phanomeno-
technik, Frankurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002.
24 Touching involves a “testing” of the limits with multifaceted modalities: contesting, detest-
Introduction: In Medias Res 17

A s p a th ic , th e e x p e rie n c e is n e ith e r a s u b je c tiv e a c t o r s ta te , n o r an o b je c ­

tiv e p ro c e s s ; in s te a d , it s u rp a s s e s a ll m y a c tiv itie s as it b e fa lls m e , a lth o u g h
it re q u ire s m y c o n trib u tio n to ta k e p la c e . G e n e ra lly , th e p a th ic e x p e rie n c e is
c h a ra c te riz e d b y a te m p o ra l d e fe rra l in w h ic h th e fo re ig n e ffe c t a n d o n e ’s o w n
in itia tiv e a re b o th se t a p a rt a n d tie d to g e th e r. M a k in g u p th e su rp rise c h a ra c ­
te r o f th e e x p e rie n c e , th e p a th ic m o m e n t a lw a y s c o m es to o e a rly fo r us to be
re a d y fo r it, so th a t o u r re s p o n s e a lw a y s c o m e s to o la te to re a c h th e e x p e ri­
en c e a t its p eak . M o s t im p o rta n tly , h o w e v e r, th e re is n o t s o m e th in g p re c e d in g
m y e x p e rie n c e ; ra th e r, th e o n e w h o u n d e rg o e s th e e x p e rie n c e p r e c e d e s h im -
o r h e rse lf. To c o n c e iv e o f th e e x p e rie n c e as p a th ic m e a n s to c o n s id e r it as an
e v e n t th a t d o e s n o t b e g in at o n e s e lf, a t w h a t is o n e ’s o w n , b u t e ls e w h e re , at
th e fo re ig n .25
T h e self, in o th e r w o rd s, d o e s n o t e s ta b lish its e lf b u t is fo rm e d tra n sitiv e ly
in c o n ta c t w ith o th e rs. A s p a th ic se lf-se n se , to u ch is th e re fo re an a lie n se n se in
tw o w a y s: as a p re d isp o sitio n to sen se w h a t is a lie n in o n e s e lf a n d as a n ab ility
th a t, b e c a u se it re lie s o n th e o th er, is o n e ’s o w n o n ly se co n d a rily .26 A lth o u g h
to u c h in g in v o lv e s a p p ro p ria tio n , th e e v e n t o f to u ch is n o t a n y o n e ’s o w n o r
pre d ic ta b le . O n e m ig h t say th a t to u c h a lw a y s a rise s b e tw e e n som e a n d in th e
m id d le o f ev ery th in g .
In so fa r as th e c o n sid e ra tio n o f th e p a th ic im p lie s a re a sse ssm e n t o f th e b a ­
sic re la tio n s b e tw e e n su b je c t a n d o b je c t, s e lf an d o th er, a c tiv ity an d p a ssiv ity ,
p ro x im ity a n d d ista n c e etc., it c h a lle n g e s o u r a c c u sto m e d n o tio n s o f re se a rc h
a n d o p e n s u p n ew p o ssib ilitie s, in c lu d in g th e p o ssib ility to re c o n sid e r th e c u l­
tu ra lly o p e ra tiv e o p p o sitio n b e tw e e n th e o ry a n d p ractice. T h e o re tic a l m astery
as w ell as p ra c tic a l e ffe c tiv e n e ss co m e to be see n in a new lig h t, startin g fro m
th e fa c t th a t th e p a th ic e x p o su re p re c e e d es b o th m en ta l a n d p h y sic a l grasp. T h e
b o d y m u st n o w b e re c o n s id e re d in te rm s o f the p a th ic ; it is n o t th e p h y sic a l or
p h y sio lo g ic a l body, b u t so m e th in g lik e a b o d ily self. H o w ev er, it is a se lf n o t
by re la tin g to itse lf, b u t b y se n sin g its e lf se n sin g , th a t is, by o p e n in g to its e lf
th ro u g h b e in g e x p o se d to w h a t is n o t itse lf, w h a t is fo re ig n to it. To sense
m y s e lf sen sin g , th e n , m e a n s to sen se a fo re ig n n e ss in m y se lf th a t I c a n n ev e r
ap p ro p ria te . W ith o u t su ch an e x p ro p ria tio n c o n stitu tiv e o f m y self, th ere w o u ld
be n o sen ses, n o se lf a n d n o s e n se : I c a n be a ffe cted , to u c h e d o r a d d re sse d o n ly
in so fa r as I am n o t w h o lly in p o sse ssio n o f “m y se lf” .

ing, attesting, etc. What is at stake is the experience of a limit which is at the same time the
limit of experience. Cf. Elo, “Digital finger”.
25 Waldenfels, Sinne und Kunste im Wechselspiel. Modi asthetischer Erfahrung. Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 2010, p. 232f.
26 Cf. Waldenfels, Bruchlinien der Erfahrung, p. 64.
18 Mika Elo & Miika Luoto

T h e a rts , to o , h a v e b e e n th e o b je c t o f in q u irie s in te rm s o f to u c h .27 T h is is

to a tte n d to th e fa c t th a t th e re is in th e a rts a lw a y s so m e th in g th a t e s s e n tia lly
e sc a p e s b o th c o g n itiv e m a s te ry a n d w ill o f a c tio n . S in c e th e e v e n t o f to u c h
c a n n o t b e c a lc u la te d o r p re s e rv e d , m a s te ry a n d w ill a lw a y s c o m e to o e a rly
o r to o la te . W h a t I se n se in b e in g to u c h e d is m y o w n c a p a c ity to fe e l, su ffer,
a n d e n jo y , a n d p e rh a p s a lso to c re a te . To sp e a k o f a rt in te rm s o f to u c h c a n n o t
m e a n th e a ffirm a tio n o f an im m e d ia te c o n ta c t w ith th e w o rk o r a p re s e n ta tio n ;
th e s e e m in g ly im m e d ia te is a lw a y s m e d ia te d , a n d th e c o n ta c t a lw a y s in v o lv e s
an in te rru p tio n . T h e in te rru p tio n in h e re n t to to u c h c a n n o t b u t b re a k th e s e lf­
su ffic ie n t s u b je c t a n d g iv e w a y to a fra g ile m o d e o f b e in g at th e m e rc y o f
p ro b in g a n d g ro p in g . I f “a r t” is c o n c e iv e d as a te c h n iq u e o f to u c h , a s a s in ­
g u la r in te rru p tio n o f th e sig n ific a n t o rd e r o f th e w o rld , su c h a te c h n iq u e d o e s
n o t se rv e th e p ro d u c tio n o f m e a n in g . R a th e r, it e x p o se s us to th e e m b o d im e n t
o f s e n se a n d th e se n se s o f e m b o d im e n t, w h ic h m e a n s, a t th e sa m e tim e , to th e
m e d ia lity o f sen se.

Art and research

In th is v o lu m e , th e re a d e r w ill find th e o re tic a l stu d ies on the q u e stio n s o f art,

te c h n ic s an d m e d ia to g e th e r w ith p ra c tic e -b a se d a p p ro a c h e s re flec tin g on the
p o ssib ilitie s o f a rtistic re se a rc h a n d e v e n te c h n ic a l in n o v atio n . A s th e e d ito rs
o f th e b o o k , it is o u r c o n v ic tio n th a t q u e stio n s c o n c e rn in g th e e m b o d im e n t o f
sen se in th e c o n te x t o f art, m e d ia a n d te c h n ic s re q u ire a n o v el a n d e x p e rim e n ­
ta l re se a rc h attitu d e . W h a t is n e e d e d is a m u ltip lic ity o f a p p ro a c h e s th a t c ro ss
n o t o n ly th e b o u n d a rie s b e tw e e n a c a d e m ic d isc ip lin e s u su a lly c o n sid e re d to be
d istin c t, b u t th e v ery b o u n d a ry b e tw e e n th e o ry a n d p ractice. In so fa r as artistic
re se a rc h ta k e s th e fo rm o f a n a c tiv ity u n d e rta k e n in th e b o rd e rla n d b e tw e e n
th e a rt w o rld a n d th e a c a d e m ic w o rld , it c a n b e c a lle d “ b o u n d a ry w o rk ” , w h ich
n o t o n ly c ro sse s b o u n d a rie s b u t a lso h as th e p o te n tia l to d e sta b iliz e a n d e v en
d isp la c e th e m .28
T h e aim o f this an th o lo g y is n o t a h o listic u n d e rstan d in g o f a p a rtic u lar field
o f research , a n d its p o ssib le stren g th is n o t a strictly m eth o d o lo g ical one, issuing
fro m th e ap p licatio n o f c o n cep ts, m e th o d s, o r results o f one p articu lar field o f
stu d y in th e sp h ere o f another. R ather, th e m u ltip licity o f appro ach es p rese n t­
ed h ere m u st be c o n sid e re d b o th e x p erim en tal an d ex p lo rin g , d ev elo p in g novel

27 A most challenging contribution is Jean-Luc Nancy, Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf, California:
Stanford U.P, 1996.
28 Cf. Henk Borgdorff, “Artistic Research as Boundary Work”, in The Conflict of Faculties.
Perspectives on Artistic Research and Academia, Leiden: Leiden U.P.,2012,p. 130-138.
Introduction: In Medias Res 19

m odes o f ap p ro ach fo r as y et u n k n o w n o b jects o f research . Its startin g p o in t is

an alo g o u s to K an tian aesth etic ju d g m e n t: w ith o u t the confines o f an esta b lish ed
d iscip lin e, b o th an a rtist-research er an d a th in k er are in the p o sitio n o f one w ho
n eeds to ju d g e w ith o u t, h o w ev er, k n o w in g the ru le on the b asis o f w h ich to ju d g e .
H e o r she h a s to reflect, w ith o u t any o th er g u id e th an the p leasu re and ex ig en cy o f
reflex io n , so th a t the ru le o f ju d g m e n t can o n ly b e g ra sp ed after the fact. In short,
it is sim p ly a q u e stio n o f h ow to en co u n ter a stranger.29

M IKA ELO & M lIKA LUOTO

29 Sarat Maharaj has aptly characterized artistic research in terms of xenography, the key chal­
lenge of which is to write the foreign, not about the foreign. Maharaj, ’’Unfinishable sketch
of ’an unknown object in 4D’: scenes of artistic research”, in Artistic Research, eds. Annette
Balkema and Henk Slager, Amsterdam/New York: Lier en Boog, 2004, p. 46.
Acknowledgements

T h e startin g p o in t o f th e p re se n t v o lu m e w as the in tern atio n al c o llo q u iu m S en se s

o f E m b o d im e n t in M a y 2 0 1 2 th a t w as o rg an ized b y the M e d ia A esth etics R e ­
search G ro u p a t A alto U n iv ersity in H elsinki. M an y o f the p apers, w o rk sh o p s and
perfo rm an ces p resen ted at th is o cc a sio n w ere d e v e lo p ed in to w ritte n c o n trib u ­
tio n s fo r th is volum e.
P ro jects lik e this te n d to h av e u n fo re se e n tem p o ral d y n am ics. T his m eans
th at it is the flex ib ility an d p ro fe ssio n a l in p u t o f the p erso n s in v o lv ed th a t m akes
the c o o p eratio n sm o o th an d fru itfu l. W e are th ankful fo r S u zanne A n k e r and
S abine F lach, th e ed ito rs o f th e b o o k series A rt / K n o w leg d e / T heory, fo r o ffer­
ing us th e p o ssib ility to p u b lish th is an th o lo g y in th e ir b o o k series. O u r a c k n o w l­
ed g em en ts go also to R au l G o m ez V aldeverde an d to A n g elica S cholze w h o has
acco m p an ied the p ro je c t fro m the p u b lis h e r’s side. F urther, this p u b lic atio n co u ld
no t h av e b e e n re a liz e d w ith o u t th e g en ero u s su p p o rt o f prof. H arri L aak so an d the
F ig u res o f Touch re se a rc h p ro je c t fu n d e d b y th e A cad em y o f F in lan d . W e are also
th a n k ful fo r the in stitu tio n a l su p p o rt th is p ro je c t has g o t fro m A alto U n iv e rsity ’s
S chool o f A rts, D e sig n an d A rch itectu re. K o n e F o u n d atio n w e th a n k fo r the grant
th a t m ad e p o ssib le th e o rg an izin g o f th e S e n se s o f E m b o d im en t colloquium . A
special th a n k goes to K aisa S iv en iu s w h o se lin g u istic feed b ack w as o f in valuable
h e lp in th e final p h ase o f th e e d ito ria l p ro cess. Finally, w e w a n t to exp ress our
gratitu d e to th e co n trib u to rs a n d all th o se co lleag u es in F in la n d an d a b ro ad w ho,
in one w ay o r another, w ere in v o lv e d in c o m m en tin g a n d discu ssin g th e c o n trib u ­
tions.

H elsin k i an d B rem en , Jan u ary 2014

M ik a E lo & M iik a L uoto
The Touch of Mimesis

ESA KIRKKOPELTO

In th is essay, I w ill c o n sid e r to u c h as it b e c o m e s th e m a tic in th e p e rfo rm in g

arts. T h e re , th e m e a n s o f im ita tio n (m im e sis) - an d o fte n a lso its o b je c t - is the
ac tin g a n d sp e a k in g h u m a n b o d y .1 In th e fo llo w in g , I w ill ad d ress m im e sis as
th e p ro c e ss o f im a g in g o r re se m b lin g th a t ta k e s p lac e b e tw e e n en titie s, a n d in
w h ic h th e b o d y o r p a rt o f th e b o d y (n o t n e c e ssa rily h u m an ) a p p ea rs fo r a n o th e r
b o d y as a n im a g e , so th a t th e b o d y c re a te s a p re se n ta tio n fo r th e o th e r body.
W h a t I c a ll h e re p re se n ta tio n (D a rste llu n g ) is th e a p p e a rin g o f th e e v e n t o f
re p re se n ta tio n (V o rstellu n g ). H en ce, I w ill n o t lim it th e sp h e re o f m im e sis to
im a g in g o r re p re se n ta tio n . R ath er, I th in k th a t b o th a sp e c ts a re th e re in m im e tic
p h e n o m e n a , in m im e tism . T h e o b je c t o f m y refle ctio n s w ill b e th e e v e n t o f im ­
a g in g o r p e rfo rm in g , n o t a rtistic p re se n ta tio n in g eneral. I h o p e th a t an an a ly sis
o f th e fo rm e r w ill be ab le to c h a n g e o u r c o n c e p tio n o f th e latter. B y co n n ec tin g
th e c o n c e p t a n d th e p h e n o m e n o n o f to u c h b o th in te lle c tu a lly a n d e x p e rie n tia lly
to in te ra c tio n b e tw e e n b o d ie s, w e b rin g th e w h o le p ro b le m a tic to g e th e r: how
do m im e sis, to u c h a n d th e b o d y a rtic u la te e a c h o ther, a n d ho w do th e p e rfo rm ­
in g arts fu n c tio n as th e m e a n s o f th is a rtic u la tio n ? M y e ssa y also ta k es the fo rm
o f a c o m m e n t o n th e o n g o in g d is c u ssio n a b o u t th e p a ra d ig m a tic c h a n g e o f th e
statu s o f to u c h , e sp e c ia lly th e d ia lo g u e b e tw e e n Ja c q u e s D e rrid a an d Jea n -L u c
N a n c y a ro u n d th e m ille n n iu m .2 M y q u e s tio n w ill be, h o w is a c o n sid e ra tio n o f
m im e sis b o u n d to c h a n g e o u r a c c u sto m e d c o n c e p tio n s o f to u c h ?

Mimesis, touch, body

A cco rd in g to m y h y p o th esis, all m im etic relatio n s an d p h e n o m en a - m im icry -

are ch a ra c teriz e d b y touch. In fact, w e a t le a st sp eak o f th e m as fig u re s o f touch,
th a t is, w ith the h e lp o f the m e ta p h o r o r tro p e o f to u ch . W h at w e m u st no w p u t on
trial is th e u n iv e rsa lity o f th a t trope; w e m u st co n sid e r the reaso n o f its u n iv e rsa l­
ity. Irresp ectiv e o f w h eth er w e fo cu s o n m im etic p h e n o m en a en c o u n tered in n a ­

1 Must the body, in the performing arts, always be alive? Not necessarily, but even if the body
at issue is presumably dead and absent, the criterion of its consideration is constituted by
language and action.
2 Jacques Derrida, Le Toucher, Jean-Luc Nancy, Paris: Galilee, 2000.
24 Esa Kirkkopelto

tu re or lim it o u rselv es to m im etism w ith in h u m a n cu lture, m im esis is so m ething

th a t touch es. In h u m a n cu ltu re, to u c h as w ell as th e p ro h ib itio n o f to u c h (and
co n seq u en tly b o th th e p o ssib ility a n d th e d esire o f to u ch ) is a co m m on tra it of, for
in stan ce, th e m ag ical, relig io u s, artistic, p ath o lo g ical an d social m an ifestatio n s o f
m im esis. M im e tism is n o t lim ite d to th e sen se o f touch. H ow ever, the sense o f
to u ch seem s to h av e a sig n ifican t in fluence on w h e th er a sen sib le p h en o m en o n is
en c o u n te re d as m im etic, o r w h eth er th is a sp ec t is neglected. A visual, acoustic,
o lfacto ry o r g u stato ry ap p re h e n sio n is rec o g n iz ed as m im etic to th e ex ten t th a t it
has cap acity to “to u c h ” , th a t is, in so fa r as an en tity is bo d ily affe cted by th e m ode
o f th e ap p earin g o f an o th er entity, be it attractiv e o r repellent. A t th e sam e tim e,
m im e tism leads u s to reflect o n to u ch sep arately fro m the sense o f to u c h , o r in
a m o re g en eral w ay, as so m eth in g fo r w h ic h th e sense o f to u c h offers th e bodily
startin g p o in t, b u t w h ic h can n o t be lim ite d to its sphere.3 M im etism , to u c h and
th e b o d y are c o n n e c te d to g e th e r b y a stru ctu ral unity, th e lo g ic o f w h ich I w ill
n ow try to ex plicate.
M im esis is alw ay s c o n n ected to so m e k in d o f im ag in g o r rep resen tatio n by
an en tity fo r an o th er entity. S in ce m im esis is im itatio n , th e rep ro d u ctio n o f a tra it
o f a b o d y b y an o th e r b o d y - w h ich in p e rfo rm in g arts is u su ally the p e rfo rm e r’s
o w n b o d y - it m ay b e , d e p en d in g o n the situ atio n , a m a tte r o f id entification,
m ask in g , actin g , m ak in g up, etc. In all its m an ifestatio n s, both in n ature an d in
cu ltu re, m im esis has reco u rse to v ario u s m eans an d resources. It is an art, a te c h ­
n iq u e - a n d th e su rv iv al o f a n in d iv id u al en tity o r a species m ay w ell d e p en d on
th e m astery o f such a tech n iq u e. H ow ever, m im esis is n o t o n ly a m ech an ism o f
rep resen tatio n , a co n scio u s te c h n iq u e o r an u n co n scio u s habit, b u t also a force4
w h ich , in d e p e n d e n tly fro m h u m an s an d th e ir co n scio u s w ill, is effective b etw een
en tities. W h e th e r w e th in k ab o u t m im esis as a fo rce o r a tech n iq u e o f re p re se n ta ­
tio n , th e fo rm s o f m im esis co n sid ered cu ltu ral c an in fa ct n ev e r be en tirely c u t o ff
fro m m im e tism as it show s u p in nature. In b o th cases it is v ery hard, e v e n im p o s­
sible, to u n d e rsta n d th e m im etic fo rce w ith o u t the bo d ily d im e n sio n o f touch. In
m im esis, a b o d y affects an o th e r b o d y a n d so to u c h es it fro m near or afar. A ll the
am b iv alen ce b e tw e e n re p re se n ta tio n an d to u ch is, I th in k , ex p ressed b y S ir Jo h n

3 This undermines the view proposed by Lakoff and Johnson that all linguistic concepts can
be understood as metaphors of the living body and bodily relations. Cf. George Lakoff and
Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By. Illinois: Chicago U.P., 1980. If touch is common to all
senses, then the sense of touch becomes, in a certain sense, necessarily ideal and, hence, de­
tached from immediate corporeality. This tells of how language takes part in the constitution
of the sensible.
4 Distinguished from its techniques, mimesis is an effective force (Kraft), rather that a potential
capacity, a power (Macht, puissance).
The Touch o f Mimesis 25

F razer in his sem in al w o rk o n an thropology, The G o ld en B o u g h . H e defines the

tw o b asic law s o f m ag ic b y say in g th a t a p ictu re alw ay s rem ains in co n tact w ith
w h a t it p ictu res (“ h o m eo p ath ic m a g ic ”) a n d th a t th e th in g s th a t w ere in co n tact
on ce w ill re m a in in c o n ta c t fo rev er (“co n tag io u s m ag ic ”).5
M im etic in te ra c tio n is im m ed iate re p re sen ta tio n w h ic h e scap es co nscious
control: w h e n o n e n o tices it, it has alread y happened. A s a seem in g ly sp o n tan e ­
ous fo rce o f attra c tio n o r re p u lsio n b e tw e e n b odies, m im etic in terac tio n occurs
as th e a sp ira tio n eith er to b eco m e sim ilar to the o th er o r d ifferen t fro m th e other,
nam ely, b y b eco m in g sim ilar to a th ird one. M im esis is sp read o u t th ro u g h to u c h ­
ing , an d it m ay to u ch fro m afar. M im e tic in teractio n m ay b e a p lay -lik e in terp lay
an d v a ria tio n o f effects (ex p lo rin g , p alp atin g , listen in g , sm elling, tastin g , lo o k ­
ing, sho w in g ), or, w ith th e in crease o f its pow er, it m ay b eco m e contagious. T his
m ean s th e en d o f p lay and, in a sense, th e en d o f to u ch , since one now becom es
d ep e n d e n t o n th e o th e r o r a p p ro p ria te d by th e other, u n d er th e spell o f th e o th er
or p o sse sse d b y th e other, so th a t th e re la tio n b etw een o n e se lf a n d the o th er is
blurred. A s in th e case o f a disease, m im etic co n tag io n m ay start the d e stru c ­
tio n o f an in d iv id u al, a co m m u n ity o r a species. In co llectiv e im ag in atio n , poetry
or fo lk lo re, etio lo g y an d m im e to lo g y o fte n go h an d in h an d (co m p are e.g. w ith
“p la g u e ” o r “p o iso n ”); e v en m o d ern m ed icin e is n ev e r w h o lly p ro te c te d ag ain st
m agic.
B o th th e fu ndam ental am bivalence o f m im etic forces w ith respect to their
quality and p o w er - the q uestion w hether they are beneficial o r disastrous - and the
seem ingly uncritical nature o f m im etic practices, w hich savagely p u t o n trial the
lim its b etw een nature an d culture, have b een ontological, pedagogical and political
problem s for W estern thou g h t since P lato. T he question has been how to secure the
established o r conventional sym bolic relations, the linguistic correspondences and
representational relations b etw een w ords an d things, fro m an excessive m im etic
influence, its disturbance and contagion? Inso far as m im esis can never b e w holly
expelled, it b ecom es som ething to be contro lled a n d directed into socially proper
form s tim e an d again. M im etism is, then, alw ays enclosed into a social and id eo ­
logical econom y, w hich determ ines w hich o f its form s are appreciated o r rejected,
how it is p u t into practice, a n d how it is th o u g h t about.
In m o d ern ity , m im e tism h as b eco m e an o b jec t o f scientific re se arch in b o th
bio lo g y a n d th e h u m an sciences: an th ro p o lo g y, socio lo g y a n d psychology. In the
lig h t o f th is research , o u r u n d erstan d in g o f m im etic p h e n o m en a - th e scale o f its
m an ifestatio n s an d its d y n am ics - h as b eco m e m ore p recise and nuanced; h o w e v ­

5 Sir James George Frazer, The Golden Bough, A Study in Magic and Religion, Part 1, The
Magic Art and the Evolution of Kings, Vol. 1, p. 52-54. On the question at issue here, cf. Mi­
chael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity, a Particular History of the Senses, London: Routledge,
1993, p. 47.
26 Esa Kirkkopelto

er, the b e tte r v erifiable th e p h e n o m e n a o f m im e tism b e co m e , the m o re en igm atic

th e ir a m b iv a le n t ch aracteristics appear. P erh ap s th e m o st tellin g ex am ple in this
re sp e c t is th e theory, p ro p o se d in th e la st d ecades, o f “m irro r n e u ro n e s” , th a t is, o f
cereb ral cells cap ab le o f reco g n izin g ac tio n s.6 T h e fac t th a t w e ca n reveal a new
b io lo g ical sphere o f m im e tism stren g th en s th e view o rig in atin g in A ristotle, th a t
m im e tism trav erses th e w h o le sph ere o f liv in g entities. H ow ever, th e th eo ry does
n o t o ffer th e lo n g - aw aited ex p lan atio n to m im etic p h en o m en a. E ven if the th eo ry
pro v es to be tru e (to m y k n o w led g e, u p to now it has b ee n p o ssib le to te st it only
w ith apes, n o t w ith h u m an s - m u c h less p lants), o n its basis w e ca n only say th a t
cells, to o , are cap ab le o f im itatin g . B u t w h a t is im itatio n ? A n d ho w are w e able to
reco g n ize th a t so m eth in g im itates so m eth in g else, e.g. a cell a p erc eiv e d m otion
o r an o rg a n ism an o th er org an ism ?
T h e q u e stio n co n c e rn in g th e re la tio n o f m im esis a n d to u c h is im m ediately
also a social q uestion. P re su m in g th a t b o th m im esis an d to u c h are relatio n s o f
co m m u n ic a tio n b etw een bodies, relatio n s in w h ic h th e y beco m e sim ilar to o r d if­
fe re n t fro m ea c h other, th e h u m a n so ciety m ay be c o n sid ered a p la y g ro u n d o f d if­
fe re n t m im etic fo rces (m o d ern social p h ilo so p h y starts, in R o u sse a u an d H obbes,
w ith co n sid eratio n s o f th is kind). T h e b asic dy n am ics o f th e society th e n appears
first o f all as a p ro cess o f sp atial re g u la tio n , the criterio n o f w h ich is the m ain te­
n an ce o f th e p o ssib ility o f so cial to u c h : th e en tities m u st n o t g e t to o far fro m each
o th e r o r to o clo se to e a c h other. T h e ex trem e lim it o f beco m in g sim ilar is fusion,
as in th e case o f fu n d a m e n ta list relig io u s co m m u n ities, w h ic h isolate th em selv es
fro m society. T h e ex trem e lim it o f b eco m in g d ifferen t is in tu rn th e d isp e rsio n
o f in d iv id u als, as in th e case o f m o d e rn alien atio n , lo n elin ess or m arg in alizatio n
w h ic h c h aracterize th e in d u strial, u rb a n society.7 W h at is th re aten ed in b o th cases
is th e v ery p o ssib ility o f society, the stay in g -to g eth er o f h u m an b e in g s. Jacq u es
D e rrid a speaks o f th e “law o f ta c t” w h ic h seem s to be at th e basis o f all law s re g u ­
latin g h u m a n in te ra c tio n .8 T h e b asic co n d itio n o f social ex isten ce is th a t h um an
b ein g s d o n o t a ttack each o th e r o r d o n o t h av e to flee each other, alth o u g h b o th
attitu d es are p o ssib le in th e p u b lic space at ev ery m om ent. A sy m b o lically in sti­
tu te d p u b lic space w h ic h is re g u la te d by v arious p ro h ib itio n s a n d p erm issions,
differs in th is re sp e c t essen tially fro m a space o f “n a tu re ” (the sphere o f w h ich is
also d efin ed each tim e b y v ario u s in stitu tio n al stru ctures).

6 Theviewwaspresentedforthefirsttim ein V. ,p.593-609.

7 Without being able to prove it here, I would like to make the claim that these two extreme
social movements appear, as reactions to the same modern situation of political chaos, simul­
taneously in history. Hence, they are not truly opposed to each other.
8 Derrida, Le Toucher, p. 81-82.
The Touch of Mimesis 27

L aw s, as sy m b o lic p ro h ib itio n s a n d p erm issio n s, reg u late w h a t m ay and

w h a t m ay n o t be rep resen ted , since th e y also reg u late w h en a b o d y m ay o r even
sh o u ld b e to u c h e d (p u n ish m en t, sh ak in g h a n d s, m assag e, tak in g o f fingerprints,
airp o rt secu rity co n tro l), a n d w h en a b o d y sh o u ld n o t be to u c h e d (the p ro p erty o f
another, b o d ily integrity, relig io u s situ atio n s, a rt exhibition). M im esis, to u ch and
sy m b o lizatio n are artic u la te d to g e th e r o n the sam e circle, so th at, w h en reflecting
o n o n e o f th em , w e d o n o t g e t v ery far w ith o u t co n sid erin g th e o th er tw o. T ouch
o n ly b eco m es p o ssib le in th e o rd er o f sy m b o lizatio n a n d acco rd in g to its c o n d i­
tio n s. W h en th e sy m b o lic in stan ce, logos, in terv en es w ith the m im etic pro cess so
as to p ro d u ce a d ifferen ce w ith in it, o n ly th e n m ay the m im etic pro cess be a rtic u ­
late d as to u c h (w h ic h is allo w e d fo r a c e rta in lim ited tim e an d o n certain c o n d i­
tio n s, o r w h ich is prohibited). T h is does n o t e x tin g u ish the m im etic attraction,
w h ic h w e c o u ld consider, in term s o f p sy ch o an aly sis, as “ d riv e s” b etw een bodies.
A p a rtic u la r bod y , th en , articu lates a p a rtic u la r feelin g o f co rp o reality an d in ter­
co rp o reality w h ich is n o t lim ite d to th e m o m en t o f to u ch . W h a t is e ssen tial w ith
re sp e c t to th e p o ssib ility o f social ex isten ce is, hence, n o t th e co n te n t o f law s, b u t
the fa c t th a t b o d ies are d ifferen tiated fro m each o th er an d th a t th e ir relatio n s are
d efin ed an d reg u lated . A t the stake in this re g u latio n is alw ays a p artic u la r so cia l
b o d y , a citizen , a rticu lated in re la tio n to a set o f giv en ru les he o r she eith er obeys
or resists.
F ro m th e social p o in t o f view , w e alw ay s en co u n ter m im esis, w h e th er k n o w ­
in g ly o r unkn o w in g ly , w ith in p re v a le n t sy m b o lic institu tio n s an d th e ir p e rm is­
sions an d p ro h ib itio n s co n c e rn in g touch. A t th e sam e tim e, the ec o n o m y o f social
to u ch in g , tact, is re g u la te d th ro u g h v ario u s m im etic m eans. T h e one w h o fails
to to u ch the o th er in an ap p ro p riate w ay is at le a st su b jected to rid ic u le, p u t to
sham e, so as to feel te m p o ra rily a n d co n d itio n ally e x p elle d fro m th e p rev ailin g
com m unity. T h e re tu rn b ack to th e co m m u n ity is u su ally d e p en d en t o n how the
p e rso n reacts to th e situation. T h o se, m oreo v er, w h o c o m m it, a severe tra n sg re s­
sio n o f a law co n cern in g to u c h are iso la te d fro m the free social realm by co ercive
m eans. In sp ecial situ atio n s, new k inds o f rules fo r to u c h in g co m e in to force.
A lth o u g h th e a fo re m e n tio n ed p h en o m e n a are in p rin cip le v ery w ell k now n
to us, th e y are seld o m c o n sid e re d in th is way. It seem s th at, in social discourse,
the re g u la tio n o f re p re se n ta tio n an d th a t o f to u ch are k e p t separate: to talk a b o u t
one m ean s to k eep silen t a b o u t th e other. O n th e one h and, to u c h is ap p reciated
at th e ex p en se o f m im esis. C lassically , “liv in g ” and “ au th en tic ” is ju x ta p o se d
w ith “ d e a d ” an d “c o p y ” , as p re se n c e is ju x ta p o se d w ith absence. In this sense, a
p ictu re m ay be v alu ab le o r au th en tic o n ly if it to u ch es its o w n origin: its m a k er or
o w n er o r th e o n e w h o ex p erien ces it. T h e m agical rule is valid: th in g s th a t w ere
to g e th e r on ce, stay to g e th e r alw ays. O n th e o th e r hand, th e in stitu tio n s o f re p re ­
sen tatio n are g o v e rn e d b y v ario u s self-ev id en t, u n q u e stio n e d sy m b o lical rules
28 Esa Kirkkopelto

co n c e rn in g to u c h (co n sid er th e a tre an d th e d istin c tio n b etw ee n the stage an d a u ­

dience). A g a in st th e b a c k g ro u n d o f th e h isto ry o f m im etism , th ere is n o th in g sur­
p risin g h ere. W h a t is a sto n ish in g , h o w ev er, is the very co n sisten cy and co n tin u ity
o f th a t h isto ry e v en today.
In so far as m im esis a n d to u c h are k e p t separate, o u r societies m a in tain a P la­
to n ic su sp icio n a g a in st m im esis, reco g n izin g in it a th re at to th e p o ssib ility o f
m etap h y sical o rd e r and, hence, th e sy m b o lic in stitu tio n o f h u m an com m unity. It
is n o t m e re ly a m a tte r o f e x tern al so cial d iscipline; o u r ex p erien ce o f ourselv es as
m etap h y sical su b jects is su ch th a t th e sep aratio n b e tw ee n m im esis and to u ch is
so m eh o w in d isp en sab le to o u r ex isten ce, e v en co n stitu tiv e o f it. T h e coin cid en ce
o f m im esis an d to u c h w ith in o n e p articu lar p h en o m e n o n th reaten s the g ro u n d o f
o u r c o m m on ex isten ce o r m ak es u s at le a st p erp lex ed . W h a t is b ro u g h t u p here
is th e q u e stio n o f a m o d e o f ex isten ce in w h ic h m im esis a n d to u c h w o u ld n o t
ex clu d e e a c h o th e r th e w ay th e y d o now.

The touch of reality

I h av e alread y p o in te d o u t th a t a lth o u g h the p o w er o f m im esis is articu lated

th ro u g h to u ch , m im esis a n d to u c h are k e p t separate. A g ain st th e b a c k g ro u n d o f
th e trad itio n o f W estern th o u g h t, th e re a so n fo r the sep aratio n seem s ev id en t,
sin ce to u ch p lay s such a sig n ifican t ro le h ere. T ouch signifies the sense o f reality.
M o re p recisely , the n o tio n o f re a lity is d ep en d en t on the co -o p eratio n o f touch
an d vision: to u ch verifies re p re se n ta tio n , it g ives the o b je ct its p re se n ce , ac co rd ­
in g to H e id e g g e r’s fam o u s th em atizatio n , as b o th p rese n t-at-h an d an d read y -to -
h a n d (vo rh a n d en /zu h a n d en ).9 T h e ex p erien ce w h ic h th e co g n itiv e, speak in g and
activ e su b ject h as b o th o f its e lf an d th e w o rld is articu late d literally th ro u g h v a ri­
o us figures o f to u c h .10 W h a t w e co n sid e r “re a lity ” , all co m m u n icab le and verifi­
ab le facts as a w h o le, d ep en d s o n h ow w e u n d ersta n d th e re latio n o f o u r rep re se n ­
ta tio n s to w h a t is rep resen ted , how rep resen tatio n s to u c h us an d how th ey bring
us in to c o n ta c t w ith things. T h e reality is a m atter o f to u c h to th e ex te n t th a t it is
so m eth in g th a t has effects o n us (efficiens). T h e crite rio n o f h av in g effects a n d b e ­
in g affe c ted is p ercep tib le change. A m o n g all th e th in g s th a t ca n be represented,

9 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1967, §9, §15.

10 The story of doubting Thomas, in John 20: 16-29, is emblematic in this respect. The moral
of the story is that even the combination of visible perception and bodily touch, the “haptic-
intuitionist” evidence, cannot guarantee belief, but only makes the object of belief withdraw
farther away, beyond the senses, opening thus a new and more insecure domain of belief
resisting all intuition. The subject of modem philosophy is the heir of Thomas: one to whom
belief is per se doubt about one’s own belief. The interiority constituted by doubt is without
exit.
The Touch of Mimesis 29

real th in g s are o n ly th o se w e b eliev e to be able to affect o u r ex isten ce, in o th er

w o rd s, th o se th in g s th a t ch an g e, o r are cap able o f ch an g in g , so m eth in g in the
sphere o f o u r ex isten ce. H en ce, re a lity alw ays p ro d u ces verifiable ch an g es. T he
state o f so m eth in g b e in g em p irically verifiab le is b a se d on h o w w e u n d e rstan d
an d show th e e x isten ce o f in d e p e n d e n t cau sal relatio n s b etw een o u r perceptions.
W h en w e reach an u n d erstan d in g o f the re a l state o f things on the b asis o f causal
relatio n s, w e d raw th e c o n c lu sio n th a t a to u c h has really ta k e n place, o r is at least
p o ssib le. T h e em p irical o b je c t o f k n o w le d g e m u st be tan g ib le in p rinciple; it m u st
be p o ssib le fo r th e em p irical su b ject to en co u n ter it b e y o n d or on this side o f its
co n cep tu al d eterm in atio n . A t the sam e tim e as the su b ject k n o w s the o b ject, it is
in o n e w ay o r an o th er co n scio u s o f th e fa c t th a t it belo n g s itse lf to th e sam e bodily
sphere as th e en c o u n te re d o b ject. T h e em p irical p ro cess o f re aso n in g is fo llo w ed ,
acco m p a n ied o r su stain ed by a m o re im m ed iate sense o f reality, th e ex p erien ce o f
b ein g in to u ch w ith so m eth in g else th an m erely o n e ’s ow n rep resen tatio n s.
T h e elem en tary re p re se n ta b ility o f th in g s as percep tib le a n d nam eab le p h e­
no m en a, as w ell as o u r cap acity to c o n n e c t th e m w ith eac h o th e r a n d co n sid er
th e m in d ifferen t w ay s, is, o n th e o th e r h a n d , also a m im etic p ro cess. W e are
acc u sto m e d to th in k in g th a t o u r m im etic capacity, the p o w e r o f im a g in a tio n (Ein-
bild u n g skra ft) - m im esis (o r its part) as ta m e d fo r th e use o f o u r co n scio u s reaso n
- b rin g s us in to a v ital relatio n sh ip , n am ely c o n ta ct w ith th in g s su rro u n d in g us,
th in g s o f w h ic h w e are m ade. O u r co n cep tu al reason, logos, grasps in a lo g i­
cal w ay, in co n cep tu al relatio n s, w h a t o u r m im etic p o w er rep resen ts a n d brings
w ith in th e re a c h o f concepts. T h e u n d erstan d in g o f w h a t is real a n d w h a t is only
im ag in ary - phantasy, dream , d e liriu m - is b ro u g h t a b o u t th ro u g h a critical re ­
flection o n the g en esis o f re p re se n ta tio n s. S u ch an u n d e rstan d in g o f rea lity as a
fu n ctio n o f ex p erien ce w as b o rn w ith th e E n lig h te n m en t a n d fo rm u late d by K ant,
an d it is still very m u c h in ac c o rd w ith th e w ay in w h ic h w e discuss reality and
experience.
If w e tra n sp o se th e q u e stio n o f m im esis an d to u c h in this w ay to th e sphere
in w h ich ex p erien ce is co n stitu te d , reflectio n beco m es tra n scen d en ta l, a self-re­
flection o f h u m a n e x p erien ce. C o n sid eratio n n o w pertain s to the activities p ro p e r
to ex p erien ce as w ell as th e ir cond itio n s. F o r us, th e actual ph ilo so p h ical qu estio n
w ith re sp e c t to to u c h is n ow esp ecially c o n n e c ted to th e a ttem p t to b rea k o u t fro m
the o p p o sitio n an d d ialectic b e tw e e n tra n sc e n d e n tal th in k in g (an ch o red in the
ex p erien ce o f th e sub ject) an d o n to lo g ical th in k in g (an c h o red in the m o d e o f b e ­
ing o f b e in g s). To u n rav el this d iv isio n c h aracteristic o f the m o d ern su b ject is the
challen g e o f to d a y 's th in k in g .11 I f th e p ro b le m o f m im esis is tak en in to c o n sid ­
eratio n , it p ro d u ces a critical sh ift w ith re sp e ct to th e w ays in w h ich the m o d ern
su b ject ex p erien ces to u ch an d th in k s ab o u t it.

11 At this point, “transcendental” refers first of all to the constitution of the subject in the tension
30 Esa Kirkkopelto

The subject of touch

In th e fo llo w in g , th e su b ject is u n d e rsto o d as an en tity co n scio u s o f its e x p eri­

ence, o n e w h ich n o t o n ly p erceiv es th in g s in side an d o u tsid e o f itself, b u t is also
co n scio u s o f th o se p erc e p tio n s an d , h e n c e , cap ab le o f reflecting its exp erien ces as
su ch , in d e p e n d e n tly o f the o b jects. T h e p re c o n d itio n o f the b irth o f su b jectiv ity
is, th en , a certain sep aratio n o f the ex p erien ce fro m its o b ject, so th a t c o n se q u en t­
ly th e en tity b eco m es free to re p re se n t o r n o t to rep resen t th in g s it encounters.
T h e su b ject o ffers a re la tiv e ly stab le g ro u n d , a su b stan ce, fo r the en c o u n te re d
th in g s, p h e n o m e n a . A s an in d iv id u a te d , self-co n scio u s substan ce w alk in g on tw o
fe e t, th e su b ject g ro u n d s e v ery th in g it en co u n ters u p o n itself, u p o n its o w n m ode
o f b ein g . In so far as th e su b ject g ro u n d s in such a w ay, w e say th a t it is ratio n a l or
lo g ic a l, since rea so n is the c ap acity to g ive rea so n and to g round. B u t the su bject
n o t o n ly th in k s, it also lives. A s it liv es, it co n ceiv es o f itse lf in d ifferen t social
situ atio n s as d ifferen t so cial su b jects, like the su b ject o f ap p earin g , desire, id e ­
o logy, re v o lu tio n , su rv iv al o r gender. In each m odality, the su b ject reaso n s in a
d ifferen t w ay. W h a t m atters h e re is m o re th an a so cial role: the qu estio n con cern s
a v a ria tio n in trin sic to th e co n stitu tio n o f th e su b ject, as w e ll as the possib ilities
an d lim its o f such a variation.
M y h y p o th esis is th a t to u c h is a c o m m o n d e n o m in ato r in all m o d alities of
th e subject. T h ro u g h th e figure o f to u ch , th ese m od alities can b e u n d ersto o d as
v ariatio n s o f the su b ject itse lf, n o t o n ly as d ifferen t co n cep tio n s o f su b jectiv ity
by d iffe re n t th in k ers, in co m m e n su ra b le fro m the start. F ro m this p o in t o f view ,
it is m ean in g fu l to sp e a k o f th e m o d ern su b ject generally. T he m o d ern su bject
un d erstan d s th a t it is in to u c h w ith w h a t is n o t itse lf only in a p articu lar w ay or
o n th e b asis o f a p articu lar selectio n , an d th ere b y co unts itse lf am o n g the b o d ­
ies su rro u n d in g it. To co n sid e r to u c h as co n stitu tiv e o f co rp o rea lity m eans to
co n sid e r it as irred u cib le to w h a t is m erely em p irical in it, th a t is, irred u c ib le to
th o se m o d es o f to u ch w h ich are p e rc e p tib le and verifiable. To co n sid e r to u ch in
th is w ay m ean s to a c c o u n t fo r th e id e n tity an d differen ce b etw een each m o d e o f
to u c h , th e cap acity o f to u ch to fu n ctio n as a figure, and the m e tam o rp h o ses o f
th a t figure. A t the sam e tim e , w e h av e to assum e th at to u ch itse lf strives to w ard
id e a liz a tio n a n d su b lim atio n , a n d th erefo re to a sep aratio n fro m th e im m ed iate
sen se p ercep tio n , as w e alread y noted.

between mimesis and touch. This definition will be specified later. According to Derrida, a
transcendental position is as such always “haptic-intuitionist”, that is, a discursive construc­
tion leaning on the co-operation of the hand and the eye and other similar figures (Derrida;
Le Toucher, p. 139, 161, 185-186). Even the idea of “synthesis” is conditioned by touch. Let
us simply note that according to Gallese et al, the mirror neurones react in the first place on
the movements of the hand and the mouth (Gallese et al., “Action recognition”, p. 593 and
“Summary”).
The Touch o f Mimesis 31

F o r th e sak e o f consistency, I call tra n sc e n d e n tal th e n o tio n o f to u c h as c o n ­

stitu tiv e o f th e se lf-u n d erstan d in g o f th e su b ject. T ran scen d en tal to u ch is, fo r the
m o d ern su b ject, a m atter o f life an d d e a th .12 In all its m an ifestatio n s, the su b ­
je c t liv es fro m to u ch an d in to u ch , fro m rec o g n izin g and b ein g reco g n ize d . T his
also m ean s th a t th e su b ject dies fro m th e lack o f touch. T he to u ch is lacking
w h en th ere is to o little o f it (iso latio n ) o r to o m u c h o f it (co n tam in atio n , v io ­
lence, c o m p u lsio n ).13 T o u ch a n d its p o ssib ility are th u s determ in ed by a certain
econom y. T h is is an issu e o f th e s u b je c t’s tra n scen d en tal rese rv e o f k n o w le d g e ,
or ex isten tial u n d e rsta n d in g , w h ich m ean s th a t the su b jec t k n o w s this in one w ay
or an o th e r all th e tim e, w ith o u t h av in g to a sk itse lf o r others. It k now s this, on
the b asis o f its o w n ex isten ce an d e x p e rie n c e, b y w ay o f reflection. F o llo w in g
such tra n sc e n d e n tal k n o w le d g e , b ein g itse lf g ro u n d e d b y it, the su b ject clin g s to
to u ch , reso rts to it, as its o w n co n d itio n o f p o ssibility. W h a t is the re aso n fo r such
a claim ? F o r th e id ea o f h a p tic su b ject thus o u tlin ed w e can find b o th em p irical
an d tra n sc e n d e n tal reasons.
I f w e suppose that there is no onto-theological (i.e. philosophical) G od to guar­
antee the correspondence betw een our representations and the w orld, it m eans that,
practically, the subject becom es responsible for it. T he transcendental question con­
cerning the conditions o f possibility o f experience opens historically from this point.
As Jean-L uc N ancy has noted, w ith K ant, truth - the correspondence betw een things
and representations - is no longer a relation betw een an inner w orld, governed by an
I, and a w orld outside the I but becom es instead an inner function o f the experience
itself.14 T his presupposes that experience has alw ays already, in one w ay or another,
enclosed in its ow n sphere that w hich surpasses it and rem ains foreign to it. T he other
is alw ays already here; the stranger has already stepped over the threshold. T here are
at least tw o basic interpretations o f this m odern situation.
O n th e o n e h a n d , it can m ean th a t th e co n scio u s su b ject ap propriates v o ra ­
cio u sly w h a t it has alread y receiv ed , w ith o u t q u estio n in g its o rig in o r its o w n in ­
n ate rig h ts. T h e su b je c t m ak es o f e v ery th in g it m eets im m ed iately its serv an t and
c o u n terp art, the “o b je c t” , w ith o u t sto p p in g to reflect on w h y and h o w ev ery th in g
so w illin g ly su b jects to its pow er. T h e ap p ro p riativ e p ro cess, the objectification
o f th e w o rld , p ro ceed s w ith o u t k n o w led g e o f its o w n co n d ition, su stain ed by th at

12 The modem subject is, in this respect, the heir of the Aristotelian psyche (cf. Derrida, Le
Toucher, p. 61-62), with the difference that the modern subject is finally responsible for its
own life and death.
13 Killing, abandoning, hitting - the violation of the other’s bodily integrity or the restriction of
the other’s capacities with violent means - are strictly speaking not modalities of touch but
modalities of the end of touch.
14 Truth becomes verification, the correspondence of the intuition and the concept, the free ele­
ments of experience. Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, L ’Imperatif categorique, Paris: Flammarion, 1983,
p. 96-97.
32 Esa Kirkkopelto

igno ran ce. O n th e o th e r hand, if it is tru e th a t th e o th e r is alw ays already here,

th e n all th e eth ical th in k in g o f th e la st cen tu ry w h ich has e m p h asize d the prim acy
o f “o th e rn e ss” m u st in fa c t alw ay s p ractically b an ish th e other, tak e distan ce to
th e u n in v ite d g u est w h o alread y in h ab its its o w n space, in ord er to m ake p o ssible
th e tru e e n c o u n te r w ith th e stranger.
T h e q u e stio n o f tra n sc e n d e n ta l to u c h c o n n e c ts th e se tw o n o tio n s o f the
m o d e rn s u b je c t in an in te re stin g w ay. N o w , th e n e e d an d th e sig n ifican ce o f
to u c h are a rtic u la te d w ith re s p e c t to th e fe a r o f la c k o f to u ch , th e re a so n o f
w h ic h is th e e x c e ssiv e te c h n ic iz a tio n o f e x p e rie n c e . A s W alter B e n ja m in has
sh o w n , th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f th e m o d e s o f re p re se n ta tio n is m a n ife st in th e g ro w ­
in g a u to m a tiz a tio n a n d m e c h a n ic a l re p ro d u c tio n , th e c o n se q u e n c e o f w h ic h is
th e lo ss o f re p re se n ta b ility , th e lo ss o f p re se n ta tio n . A t th e sam e tim e, w h ile th e
d e v e lo p e d te c h n iq u e s o f re p re s e n ta tio n b rin g to us w h o lly u n fo re se e n im ag es,
th e ir c o n n e c tio n to th e o b je c t is lo st b e c a u se o f the h ig h d e g re e o f te c h n ic a l m e ­
d iatio n . 15 T h e sam e in c re a se o f m e d ia tio n is tru e b o th o f th e o rg an ic a n d n e rv ­
o u s p ro c e sse s o f h u m a n p e rc e p tio n (h u m a n s to le ra te e v e r stro n g e r a n d m ore
m u ltifa c e te d stim u la tio n ), a n d o f th e te c h n ic s o f re p re se n ta tio n , m e d ia, w h ic h
m ak e p o ssib le an e v e r fa rth e r re a c h in g c o n c a te n a tio n o f th e o rg a n ism w ith m e ­
d ia te ch n o lo g y . T h e e x p e rie n c e th a t n o th in g re ally m a tte rs c o rre sp o n d s to th e
e x p e rie n c e th a t re a lity h as b e c o m e m e re im ages. A t th e sam e tim e, th e ev er
m o re c o m p le x m e d ia l re la tio n s are su ite d fo r p ro d u c in g new k in d o f m y stic ism
a n d m a g ic a l re la tio n s. T h e im p o rta n c e p la c e d o n “p re se n c e ” b o th in p h ilo so p h y
an d th e p e rfo rm in g a rts, fo r in sta n c e , re q u ire th e d ista n c e o f re fle ctio n an d the
u n ra v e llin g o f e x c e ssiv e p ro x im ity , th a t is, th e c o n stru c tio n o f d iffe re n t k inds
o f p re se n ta tio n a l d im e n sio n s, o p tic s o r stages. A t th e sam e tim e, th e se stages
h a v e to be c u sto m iz e d a c c o rd in g to th e e v e r m o re c o m p le x p ro ce sse s o f re p re ­
sen tatio n . H ere, a c e rta in k in d o f “m im o te c h n iq u e ” is o p p o se d to a n o th e r k in d
o f te c h n iq u e a n d m im esis. T h e ir c ritiq u e h a s n e v e r b e e n p o ssib le o n a p u rely
th e o re tic a l le v e l (n o t e v e n in P la to o r A risto tle ), sin c e th e q u e stio n co n cern s the
tra n s fo rm a tio n o f p ra c tic e s as w ell.

The loss and return of touch

E v e n th o u g h th e o th e r is alread y here, w e d o n o t e n c o u n te r - o r do n o t rise to e n ­

co u n ter - th e o th e r as other, b ecau se w e are n o t in to u c h w ith it. To to u c h m eans
to ex p erien ce, k n o w an d reco g n ize th e fa c t th a t th ere is so m eth in g o r som eone,
an d th e re w ith th e fa c t th a t I am so m eb o d y and, m oreover, th a t th ere is a relatio n

15 Walter Benjamin, “Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit”, Ge-

sammelte Schriften, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989, Bd l,p . 471-508.
The Touch of Mimesis 33

b etw een us, a d o u b ly asy m m etrical, d ialectical relation, w h ich m ean s one th ing
to m e an d so m eth in g else to th e other. In his read in g o f K ant, M a rtin H eid eg g er
em p h a siz e d - w ith g o o d reaso n , a n d faith fu l to th e p h en o m en o lo g ical tra d itio n
- th a t th e ap p ercep tio n o f the tra n sc e n d e n tal su b ject, the “I th in k ” , alw ays re ­
qu ires as its su p p le m e n t a “ so m eth in g ” (e tw a s).16 T h e “u n ity o f a p p e rc ep tio n ” ,
the K an tian se lf-co n scio u sn ess, m ean s a co m m unity, a co m m u n io , m ade up o f
rep resen tatio n s, th e co n ten ts o f th e co g n itiv e experience. T h is co m m u n ity is
op en ed an d g a th e re d b y the self-co n scio u s su b ject, so th at the em p irical law s
co n cern in g th e co m m erce (co m m erciu m ) o f rep resen tatio n s ca n be d eterm in ed
m ore exactly, th a t is, co n cep tu ally , w ith in its sphere. T h e p h en o m en a are n ev er
m ere co n ten ts o f th e m ind, th e y issu e fro m elsew h ere, an d th e m in d is c o n stitu ted
as a p h e n o m en o lo g ical in stan ce recep tiv e to w h at surp asses it.17 T he o b jects o f
th o u g h t alw ays o rig in ate fro m so m ew h ere, a p la ce to w h ich the su b ject can refer
w ith co n cep ts o f re a so n such as “n a tu re ” o r “w o rld ” , b u t the existen ce o f w h ich it
can n e v e r em p irically verify, b ecau se th e se d esig n atio n s o f the ab so lu te o n ly have
m ean in g to th e su b je c t itself.
N e v e rth e le s s , K a n t’s a n a ly sis o f th e c o n d itio n s o f p o ssib ility o f em p iric a l
e x p e rie n c e in th e C ritiq u e o f P u re R e a s o n h as b e e n u n d e rsto o d , sin ce th e early
years o f G e rm a n id e a lism , as a d o c trin e w h ic h d e ta c h e s th e h u m a n e x p erien c e
fro m its liv in g re la tio n s to reality. K a n t h as b e e n c ritic iz e d fo r th e fa c t th a t
alth o u g h h e g iv es a n a c c o u n t o f th e p o s s ib ility o f to u c h , he a t o n ce re fu se s th e
p o ssib ility fo r to u c h to e n te r th e sp h ere o f c o n sc io u s e x p e rie n c e a n d research .
T h e to u c h in w h ic h a n d fro m w h ic h th e s u b je c t liv es can b e e x p e rie n c e d , a c ­
co rd in g to K a n t, o n ly a e sth e tic a lly , th ro u g h a fe e lin g p u rified o f all e m p iric a l
d e te rm in a tio n s. T h e K a n tia n su b je c t e n jo y s its fre e d o m in d iffe re n t w a y s w ith
th e arts, e n te rta in m e n t, e ro tic ism , sp o rts, fa sh io n , gastro n o m y , to u rism , an d
m a n y o th e r c u ltu ra l a c tiv itie s th a t a ffe c t o u r senses. In th e K a n tia n b o u rg eo is
sp ace, w o rk a n d a m u se m e n t d o n o t e n c o u n te r each o th e r e x c e p t a t th e m o m e n t
o f su b lim e e x p e rie n c e , w h e n th e a e sth e tic ex p e rie n c e , th e a sp ira tio n to pure
p le a su re , re c o g n iz e s its o w n lim its w ith re s p e c t to so m eth in g h ig h e r th a n itself,
th a t is, th e p o w e r o f R easo n . T h e su b lim e is, th e re fo re , th e p ro p e r fe e lin g o f th e
life o f th e tra n sc e n d e n ta l su b je c t. H o w e v e r, th is e x p e rie n c e is e x trao rd in ary ,
an d m o st o f th e tim e th e s u b je c t liv e s, w ith o u t k n o w in g it, the life o f another.
To liv e is , fo r th e su b je c t, to k n o w th e re a lity an d d e te rm in e it th ro u g h g iv e n
co n c e p ts a n d ru les, to b u ild a w o rld (p re su m e d co m m o n ) a n d to d w ell in it in
c o n fo rm ity w ith d iffe re n t k in d s o f m o d e ls o f id e n tific atio n . N e v e rth e le ss, fro m

16 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, § 64.

17 The “Refutation of idealism” in the Critique of Pure Reason confirms this note by showing
how the mere experience of time projects the mind originally outside itself. Insofar as the
phenomena are possible only within time, everything is something “given”, literally data.
34 Esa Kirkkopelto

a tra n sc e n d e n ta l p o in t o f v iew , th e su b je c t e x ists all the tim e in a su b lim e w ay,

th a t is, at its o w n lim its. S o m e th in g in th e s u b je c t liv es all the tim e in to u c h and
fro m to u c h , b u t th is so m e th in g - le t us ca ll it th e su b lim e b o d y - is n o t m an ife st,
b u t re m a in s b e lo w th e m o re re c o g n iz a b le la y ers o f ex p erie n ce. T h is im p lic it re ­
la tio n to to u c h ta k e s , in th e su b je c t, th e fo rm o f a firm co n fid en c e ak in to b e lie f.
S in ce th is re la tio n is u n q u e s tio n a b le , it re m a in s u n n o tic e d b y th e su b je c t and
o fte n o n ly m a n ife sts in a m o m e n t o f distress.
E m p irically , th e e x iste n c e o f th e su b lim e body, to g e th e r w ith its c o v e rt e f­
fe c t, th e tra n sc e n d e n ta l to u c h , sh o w s its e lf m o st e v id e n tly in a p an ic attac k , in
w h ic h o n e m o m e n ta rily e x p e rie n c e s a lo ss o f b e lie f, a to ta l d e ta c h m e n t fro m
o n e ’s e n v iro n m en t. In th is situ a tio n , o n e e sca p es b y re m a in in g w h e re o n e is,
b y an in w a rd tu rn , w h ile a t th e sam e tim e fe a rin g o n e ’s o w n d istin c tn e ss, in ­
w a rd n e ss - o n e ’s o w n u n re a lity . T h is state w h ic h , c o n sid e re d fro m th e o u tsid e ,
is n o t w ith o u t c e rta in c o m ic a lity d e sp ite its se rio u sn e ss, o sc illa te s irre so lu te ly
b e tw e e n fe a r o f d e a th a n d th e in a b ility to die, a n d so k eep s stre n g th e n in g itself.
T h e n u m b n e ss o f lim b s, a fe e lin g o fte n c o n n e c te d to a p a n ic a tta ck , m a n ife sts
in a c o n c re te w ay th e fu n d a m e n ta l lo ss o f th e sen se o f so m eth in g . T h is e x p e ri­
en c e sh o w s th e im p o ssib ility o f a to ta l in w a rd n e ss o f the m in d ; c o n se q u en tly ,
it im p lic a te s th a t o u r e x p e rie n c e is c o n sta n tly su sta in e d a n d c o n d itio n e d by a
d o u b le c o n sc io u sn e ss, d e te rm in e d b y to u ch . T o u c h is th e sen se o f re a lity w h ic h
is lim ite d n e ith e r to o b je c ts an d c o n sc io u s p e rc e p tio n s n o r to th e m ere sen se o f
to u c h . T ra n sc e n d e n tally , th e s u b je c t is th e b ea rer o f to u ch , b u t n o t its guarantor.
T h e fa c t th a t to u c h is n o t g u a ra n te e d m e a n s th a t the m o d e rn su b je c t is re s p o n s i­
b le fo r tra n sc e n d e n c e , th e o u tsid e. T h e c o n tin u a tio n , re p e titio n a n d p e rsiste n c e
o f to u c h a re d e p e n d e n t o n o u rse lv e s, o n o u r d e c isio n s a n d acts. T h e tra n sc e n d ­
e n ce, th e ra d ic a l o u tsid e , w h e re e n titie s are in to u c h w ith e a c h other, m u st be
o p e n e d tim e a n d again.
In p o st-K a n tia n h isto ry th ere are m an y attem p ts, b o th th e o re tic al an d p ra c ti­
cal, to d ig up th e liv in g a n d ex istin g , y e t la te n t body, to free an d stren g th en it and
m ak e it co n scio u s o f itself. T h e attem p ts to tea r aw ay fro m the tran sce n d en tal p o ­
sitio n an d free o n e se lf fro m the b o u rg eo is su b ject h av e also p ro d u ce d n u m erous
failu res, d isap p o in tm en ts a n d fru stratio n s, ev en d o w n rig h t catastrophes. E arly
p o st-K a n tia n id e a lism an d ro m a n tic ism already re c o g n iz ed m an y issues th a t w ere
v erified in an in v e rte d m a n n e r b y later, n eg ativ e ex p erien ces. T he m o st essen tial
teach in g in this re sp e c t can alread y b e re a d fro m K a n t’s tran sce n d en tal gesture.
I f to u ch b ec o m e s in th e m o d ern p o st-re v o lu tio n a ry situ atio n an in tern al issue o f
th e ex p erien ce, an o ccu rren ce th a t essen tially c h aracterizes its d y n am ic, so th at
all ex p erien ce o f th e su b ject tak es p la c e o n the b asis o f to u ch , th en it follow s th at
th e re la tio n o f th e su b ject (o f each o f u s) to e x terio rity is in an elem en tary w ay
m ix ed , im p u re, a d isp ro p o rtio n . T h e m o d e rn n ee d o f to u c h as w ell as th e m o d ern
The Touch of Mimesis 35

cultu re o f to u c h d o n o t issu e fro m th e lack o f to u c h but, rather, fro m th e excess

o f to u c h , an e x trem e p ro x im ity o f so m eth in g . W h at m atters is an excess o f the
giv en , a m ix in g u p o f im m an en ce an d tra n sc e n d en ce , an d an o v er-d ev elo p m en t
o f th e m o d es o f rep resen tatio n . A s a co n seq u en ce o f this, ev ery th in g seem s to
close itse lf in to th e sph ere o f h u m an ex p erience. T h is d isp ro p o rtio n ate e x p e ri­
ence, th is ex p erien ce o f d isp ro p o rtio n , is re a liz ed in e x o rb itan t action, the m o d ern
tech n o lo g ical an d p o litical hubris. O u r ch allen g e, then, is n o t to reach so m ething
ou tsid e o u rselv es, b u t to c o n stru c t a relatio n sh ip w ith th a t in to w h ic h w e are bo rn
an d w ith in w h ic h w e live.
W h e n H eg el states, in the P h e n o m e n o lo g y o f Spirit, th a t th e co n d itio n o f the
F ren ch R ev o lu tio n is th e fa c t th a t h e av en has d e sc en d ed u p o n earth, th e issue is
basically th e sa m e .18 T h e re su lt o f th e rev o lu tio n w as n o t h e av e n o n earth, a th o u ­
san d -y ear em p ire o r an en tran ce to p arad ise; in stead , the re su lt w as co n fu sio n ,
terror, an d th e w a r o f all a g a in st all, as w ell as v arious ecstatic relig io u s m o v e­
m e n ts, c ritic iz e d b y b o th P ie tism an d K a n tia n ism , w here the la tter w as influ en c ed
by th e form er. T erro r an d relig io u s m o v em en ts w ere signs o f the loss o f to u c h and
o f tra n sc e n d e n tal co n fu sio n o n th e le v e l o f society. W h en in d iv id u als to d ay attack
th e ir n eig h b o u rs, o th e r citizen s o r a ssu m e d in tru d ers in a n in ex p licab le a n d yet
p u rp o sefu l a n d p reten tio u s m anner, th is c a n be seen as a sy m p to m o f th e c o n tin u ­
atio n o f th e sam e crisis o f h istoricity: th e loss o f touch.
T h e fa c t th a t to u c h b eco m es a n issu e o f in w ard n ess also m eans th a t h um an
ex p erien ce is at o n ce irrev o cab ly e x te rio riz ed an d m aterialized , an d cap ab le o f
b ein g staged. T o u ch reig n s ev ery w h ere a n d n ow here. T h is is so n o tw ith stan d in g
th e fa c t th a t th e b o u rg eo is so ciety strives, tim e an d ag ain a n d w ith ev e r m ore so­
p h istic a te d m eth o d s, to en v elo p e ex p erien ce an d p u t it b ack into the in terio rity o f
th e in d iv id u al, to tra n sfo rm it in to a reso u rce to be u sed a n d c o n tro lle d - to p sy ­
ch o lo g ize, m ed icalize an d p ro d u ctize it. T ouch, too, beco m es depo liticized , as it
is m ad e a p riv a te p h e n o m e n o n an d an o b je c t o f c a p italist ex p lo itatio n . H ow ever,
th e cap italizin g o f to u c h a n d its tra n sfo rm a tio n into a com m odity, a “se rv ic e” ,
is d e p e n d e n t o n th e p a rtic u la r co n stitu tio n o f the su b ject, the institu tio n s w hich
h av e th e ir c o u n te rp a rt in o u r ex p erien ce, an d w h ic h th e th in k in g o f to u c h tries to
dism antle.
F ro m th e p o in t o f view o f su ch d ism an tlin g , th e q u estio n o f to u c h concerns,
in a w ay w h ic h is at o n ce e th ic a l a n d te c h n ic a l, the resto ra tio n (o f the p o ssibility)
o f to u ch . F o r th e su b ject, to u ch is at o n ce so m eth in g g iv en and so m eth in g lost.
F o r th e sam e reaso n , to u c h c a n show itse lf as a fun d am en tal lack. E v e n th o u g h
the lack o f to u ch is so m eth in g fu n d a m e n ta l fo r the su b ject, as an irred u cib ly co r­
p o real ex p erien ce it alw ay s also m ark s th e p ro m ise o f the retu rn o f touch. F ro m
now on, th e b o d y starts to show its e lf as b o th th e possib ility a n d b earer o f touch,

18 Hegel, Phanomenologie des Geistes, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986, p. 431.

36 Esa Kirkkopelto

o r as its m edium . In so fa r as th e b o d y is th e b earer o f to u ch , it is also d iv id ed

by it, b ein g th e n a so rt o f “sh ifte r” .19 T h e b o d y literally ex-sists: it is o u tsid e o f
itself, at o n ce sam e an d different. O n ly w h e n o u r b o dies are situ ated in such an
in -b e tw e e n , d e te rm in e d b y su ch m ed iatio n in the tem p o ral ten sio n b e tw ee n loss
an d return, o n ly w h en th e y are sy m b o lized , is to u c h po ssib le fo r them . T h e n w e
are in th e sph ere o f tou ch ; w e are in to u ch .20 T he ex p erien ce o f the b o d ily su bject
c a n now be u n d e rsto o d m o re g en erally as the sphere o f the te m p o rally an d sp a­
tially d e te rm in e d to u c h , th e field in w h ich the v ario u s q u an tities and qualities o f
to u c h - h ap tic v a ria tio n - b eco m e possible. If th ere is no v ariatio n o f touch, th ere
is n o to u c h a t all. In o rd er to be ab le to to u c h som ething, I m u st be able to do it
in d ifferen t w ay s an d at d iffe re n t p o in ts. V ariation is the arch i-eth ical freed o m
in h ab itin g th e spaceless space o f to u ch , its sp atia liz atio n (esp a c em en t), o f w h ich
all free a c tio n is d e p e n d e n t.21 V ariation signals th e p o tential su b sisten ce o f to u ch
ev e n w h e n w e are n o t co n scio u s o f it, w h ich m eans m o st o f th e tim e.
If w e u n d e rsta n d to u c h in th is w ay, fro m th e p o in t o f view o f re sto ra tio n and
retu rn , w e c a n also re a d th e C ritiq u e o f P ure R e a so n in a new way. T h e ethics
o f th e m o d e rn h u m a n b ein g is now c o n n e c ted w ith his o r her ability to o p en a
re la tio n to so m eth in g . E v en th e em p irical o b ject, the m o st b elo v e d ch ild o f the
m o d ern h u m a n b e in g , is in this sen se a p ro d u c t o f to u ch . A m o re refin ed analysis
co u ld also find traces o f the w o rk in g h an d s o f tra n sc en d e n tal im ag in atio n in it.22
H en ce, th e em p iric a l d ete rm in a tio n w h ich fo rm s the o b jects is o n ly one m o d al­
ity o f th e rela tio n sh ip o n th e b asis o f w h ich the su b jec t is in to u ch w ith w h at is
n o t itself. T h e p red o m in an ce o f em p irical k n o w led g e is, th en , co n n ec ted w ith its
in stitu tio n al prim acy: in o rd er th a t a d isco u rse on so m eth in g , som ew h ere be p o s­
sible a n d in o rd er th a t a g ro u n d be possible. If w e u n d e rsta n d this, w e u n d erstan d
b o th the artificiality o f ev ery g ro u n d a n d th eir h u m an orig in . R ea so n , the sy n o ­
n y m o f g ro u n d an d th e cap acity to give a g round, is in a p ainful w ay co nscious
o f its grou n d lessn ess. T h e F irst C ritiq u e as a w h o le is an e x p ressio n o f this pain:
it is p erh ap s th e m o st p ro saic eleg y ev er w ritten o n the topic. T h an k s to it, w e
ca n to d a y u n d e rsta n d th a t th ere are v ario u s g rounds w h ich differ fro m ea ch other.

19 I have discussed the issue in “Towards the Structure of the Scenic Encounter”, in The Event of
Encounter in Art and Philosophy: Continental Perspectives. Korhonen, Kuisma & Rasanen,
Pajari (eds.). Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2010.
20 One particular paradox proper to touch which Aristotle already paid attention to is the fol­
lowing: when touch is possible, it is already to an extent actualized (Aristotle, On the Soul,
417a; Derrida, Le Toucher, p. 16. This hints to the fact that also our modal understanding is
constituted through or around touch.
21 Cf. Derrida, Le Toucher, p. 42 and 48, esp. note 3.
22 I refer to the chapter on “schematism”, in the Critique of Pure Reason, where the working of
the transcendental power of imagination is characterized by the word “Handgriffe”, that is,
literally, “handles”.
The Touch o f Mimesis 37

N o n e o f th e m is th e g ro u n d in g g ro u n d , th e ro o t, the so u rce, o r the u m b ilic al cord;

instead, ea c h g ro u n d is m erely o n e m ean s am o n g others to g et in to u c h w ith
th in g s. T h e m o d ern su b ject is th e one w h ich , b y g iv in g reaso n s again and again,
tries to resto re th e to u c h fro m w h ic h an d in w h ic h it lives.
In m y th in k in g , th e p ersp ectiv e o f re sto ra tio n is co m m o n to all m odes o f
su b jectiv ity an d all n o tio n s o f th e su b ject. B o th the bo u rg eo is su b ject an d its
critical attem p t to resto re to u ch - th ey are in d e ed b o th m o d ern h u m an subjects.
F ro m now on, th e real p ro b lem is th e e c o n o m y o f th a t restoration: th e place and
fu n ctio n o f to u ch in the ex p erien ce o f th e su b ject and its w ay o f co n stitu tin g th at
ex p erien ce. T h e q u estio n o f to u ch o p en s as a h isto rical-p o litic al d ebate.

The touch of the past

N e x t, I w ill b riefly co n sid e r h o w h isto ry an d po litics ov erlap in the q u estio n c o n ­

cern in g th e re la tio n o f to u c h an d im itation: how w as the tran sce n d en tal q u e s­
tio n o f th e re tu rn o f to u c h a rtic u la te d in th e d ebate, d u rin g c la ssic ism an d early
ro m an ticism , a b o u t th e d ifferen ce b e tw e e n a n cie n t a n d m o d ern ex p re ssio n and
ex p erien ce? In the p o st-K a n tia n p h ilo so p h y and art critiq u e, an c ien t G reece d id
no t show its e lf - as w as still the case in c la ssic ism - as the etern al id eal an d ob ject
o f ex tern al im itatio n , b u t as th e te stim o n y o f an o th er p o ssib ility o f in d iv id u al and
com m u n al existence. T h e n o stalg ia o f G reece k ep t its d ag g e r o f rev o lu tio n ary
criticism v e ile d an d sim u ltan eo u sly p o in te d a t the co n seq u en ces o f th e F ren ch
R evolution. C o m p a re d w ith th e b o u rg eo is m o d e o f life a n d exp erien ce, w here
eith er n o th in g can b e g rasp ed o r e v ery th in g th at is g ra sp ed beco m es o n e ’s ow n,
the G reek s h ad a m o re liv in g relatio n sh ip w ith eac h o th er an d th e su rrounding
co sm o s. T h e G re e k m an w as n o t a su b ject su ffering its d iv id ed n ess, b u t a w hole
h u m an bein g , one body, w h ic h re a c h e d its in teg rity a n d sp len d o u r in a struggle
w ith th e p o w ers o f p h u s is , th e a g o n , an d th e m utual contest. T h e ex tern ality o f
the G reek s w as n o t su perficiality, b u t a d ifferen t k in d o f spiritu ality w h ich d id
n o t ex clu d e the b o d y b u t, in ste a d , to o k p la c e b e tw e en the b o d ie s. W h a t w as at
issu e in th e a d m ira tio n o f th e G reek s since th e e n d o f th e 18th cen tu ry w as n o t
o n ly h u m an ism o r th e c o n stru c tio n o f a n atio n al identity, b u t also a pro g ram m e
o f th e p o litical e m a n c ip a tio n o f th e body. A cco rd in g to th e sam e pro g ram m e, the
W estern ad m iratio n c o u ld also b e p ro je c te d to o th er n o n -E u ro p e an cu ltures and
eth n ic groups.
T h e re fo re , th e c o m p a riso n b e tw e e n G re e k a n d m o d e rn a rt n o lo n g e r e n ­
co u ra g e d d ire c t im ita tio n ; in s te a d , it c a lle d fo r a tra n sfo rm a tio n o f the m o d ern
e x p e rie n c e a n d fo r a n a rt w h ic h w o u ld b e th e m e d iu m o f th a t tran sfo rm a tio n .
A c c o rd in g to th e fa m o u s a n a ly sis p re s e n te d b y S c h ille r in 1796, G re e k p o etry
38 Esa Kirkkopelto

is “ n a iv e ” , th a t is, p la stic , e x te rn a l, fin ite an d se n su a l, w h ere as m o d e rn p o e try is

“ s e n tim e n ta l” , th a t is, sp iritu a l, in w a rd , in fin ite an d a b stra c t.23 T h e fo rm e r h a d
ev id e n t a d v a n ta g e s o v e r th e latter: o n ly v e rita b ly n aiv e p o e try has th e p o w e r to
sp e a k to a n a tio n an d u n ify it; se n tim e n ta l p o etry , b y c o n tra st, m ean s p ra c tic a lly
a n e sc a p e fro m re a lity a n d a m y stic ism re s e rv e d fo r th e c h o se n few. N aiv e p o ­
etry h as a h a n d ic ra ft n a tu re , its p ro d u c tio n is tra n sm itta b le , a te c h n iq u e th a t can
b e ta u g h t. S e n tim e n ta l p o e try , o n th e o th e r h a n d , is n o n -te c h n ic a l an d d e p e n d ­
e n t o n in d iv id u a l g en iu s, a n d th e re fo re a lso u n p red icta b le. H isto ric ally , th e se
e x p e rie n c e s are n o t a lte rn a tiv e s, b e c a u se th e v a lu e o f th e n a iv e c an only ap p ear
in th e p e rsp e c tiv e o f th e sen tim en tal. T h e n aiv e is a re m n a n t, w h ic h re m in d s th e
se n tim e n ta l m in d o f its in te rn a l co n tra d ic tio n . T h e se n tim e n ta l h a rb o u rs its o w n
d e s tru c tio n in itself. It d e sig n a te s a p ro b le m , th e c risis o f m o d e rn ex p erien ce.
T h e so lu tio n to th e c risis o ffe re d b y S ch iller, o n e th a t is c o n n e c te d to his o w n
p e rsp e c tiv e as a n a rtist, is in c lu d e d in th e ra th e r sim p le in sig h t th a t th e n aiv e
is n o t o n ly th e p ro p e rty o f G re e k art, b u t a tra n sh isto ric a l p ro p e rty o f all art.
T h e re fo re , it is n e v e r w h o lly lost. T h e m o d e rn sen tim e n ta l h u m a n b e in g has a
n a iv e h e a rt, w ith w h ic h h e o r sh e c a n b e in c o n ta c t b o th in re lig io n a n d art. F o r
th e p h ilo s o p h e r-p o e t S c h ille r, th e liv in g e x a m p le o f th is is th e p o e try o f G o eth e;
a c c o rd in g to h im , G o e th e m a n a g e d to c o m b in e m o d ern , se n tim e n ta l c o n te n t
w ith a n a iv e , e x te rn a l fo rm , a n d so to c re a te u n p re c e d e n te d , v erita b ly m o d e rn
poetry.
S c h ille r’s p ro g ra m m e h as o ften b e e n in terp reted , in a d ialec tical w ay, as a
m o d ern p ro je c t aim ed at ap p ro p riatin g classical A n tiq u ity ,24 an d as one c o n n ected
to the b irth o f n atio n -states. H o w ev er, it can b e u n d e rsto o d differently, in a w ay
th a t ch allen g es b o th th a t p ro je c t an d th e n atio n -states. I f the sen tim en tal m eans a
d e v e lo p e d cap acity to be affe c ted b y ex tern al im p ressio n s, if it m ean s in tern a liza­
tio n an d su b lim atio n , th en th e n aiv e m ean s a certain re p re ssio n , b e in g non-affect-
ed, k e e p in g to th e surface, th e ex tern al, th e body. A s a co n seq u en ce, the challen g e
o f m o d e rn p o etry an d o f a rt in gen eral is to lea rn to be a ffected in a new way.
W h ile the sen tim en tal b o d y is affected in such a w ay th at it en clo ses a n d k eeps
ev ery th in g w ith in itself, w ith o u t h av in g tim e to tru ly ex p erien ce th in g s before
th ey tu rn in to m e m o rie s, the n aiv e b o d y liv es in the h ere -a n d -n o w and is affected
w ith o u t in tern alizatio n ; it lets its acts a n d reactio n s shine b rightly, allo w in g th em
to ra d ia te fro m itse lf sp o n tan eo u sly , as fro m a ch ild o r a soldier. W h a t arose in
S ch iller a n d o th e r th in k ers o f th e tim e w as th e n e ed to articu late the m o d ern body
in a new way. T h e p o ssib ility o f m o d e rn p o etry d ep en d ed o n th e p o ssib ility o f a
tru ly m o d e rn b o d y a n d v ice versa!

23 Friedrich Schiller, Uber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, Stuttgart: Reclam, 2006.
24 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, “Holderlin and the Greeks”, in Typography. Mimesis, Philosophy,
Politics, Harvard U.P: Cambridge, 1989.
The Touch of Mimesis 39

T h e n o tes to G re e k trag ed ies th a t F rie d ric h H o ld erlin , the o th er p o et-p h ilo so -

p h er o f th e tim e, p re se n te d at th e b eg in n in g o f the 19th cen tu ry follow in th e w ake
o f S ch iller in th is respect. C o n sid erin g th e d ifferen ces b etw ee n an cien t an d m o d ­
ern m o d es o f re p re se n ta tio n (V o rstellungsart), H o ld erlin co m es to the follow ing
conclusion: w h ile th e tech n ical p ro b lem o f G re e k a rt w as how to “ g rasp itse lf”
(sich fa s s e n ), th a t is, h o w to b rin g ab o u t a self-co n scio u s sep aratio n o f the b o d y
w ith re sp e c t to its su rro u n d in g s, th e life o f th e m o d ern body is d e p e n d en t o n its
cap acity to “reach so m e th in g ” (etw a s treffen) an d to “h it so m e th in g ” (G esch ick
ha b en ) in th e K a n tia n sense e x p la in e d a b o v e .25
T h e m o d e rn body, th en , cam e in to b ein g as one lo st fro m th e start, b u t also
as o n e to b e d isco v ered ; to u ch is th e criterio n o f th a t discovery. A t the sam e tim e,
the tra n sc e n d e n tal stru ctu re o f ex p erien ce a n a ly se d ab o v e w as both tem p o raliz ed
an d tech n icized : it w as e x te rn a liz ed in a p resen tatio n al w ay, th a t is, it b ecam e
staged. T h e re sto ra tio n o f th e liv in g relatio n ssh ip s an d to u ch now sh o w ed itse lf
as a p o litic a l an d p e d a g o g ic a l p ro je c t to b e re aliz ed in h isto ry , as a new p aid eia,
in w h ich art h a d a sp ecial fu n ctio n . W h a t fro m n o w on w ere to b e offered to the
p eo p le w as c o m m o n ly sh ared p ercep tio n s an d em o tio n s, exp erien ces o f m o v e ­
m en t th a t co n c e rn e d th e ir o w n ex isten ce a n d its co n d itio n s.26 It is deb atab le, how
the d y n am ics o f th a t p ro je c t w as fin ally u n d ersto o d and w h o w as to rea liz e it.
O n e co m m o n tra it o f all so lu tio n s is th e id ea th a t the body is a rticu la te d by touch
- a p articu lar k in d o f to u c h articu lates a p articu lar k in d o f body, an o th er k in d o f
to u ch an o th er k in d o f body. T h e m o d e rn b o u rgeois b o d y w h ich cam e to im itate
the m an n ers an d g estu res o f th e fo rm e r aristo c ra cy in a new k in d o f u rban, public
space, w as c h a lle n g e d b y o th e r m o d es o f life callin g fo r an o th er k in d o f society
and b ein g -to g eth er.
T h e p o litics o f rad ical id e a lism c a n be su m m arized in the fo llo w in g re a so n ­
ing: w h ere b o d ies are in to u ch w ith ea c h other, there is S pirit. S p irit is the staying-
to g eth er o f th in g s, w h ich su rp asses th eir o w n po w er; it m eans the in -b etw een o f
th in g s, rad ical exteriority. H en ce, S p irit is n ev er so m eth in g giv en in ad v an ce or
supposed, b u t alw ay s c o m m o n ly p ro d u c e d an d shared. C orrelatively, the aim o f
critica l p o litical ac tio n is fro m th e start to o v erco m e co n fu sio n , to d ifferen tiate
b etw een th in g s to the p o in t w h ere th eir free c o m in g -to g e th er an d bein g -to g eth er,
th a t is, th e e n d u rin g o f co n trad ictio n s, b eco m es possible. U n d e rsto o d bodily, c ri­
tiq u e is stru g g le aim in g a t S p irit, b o d ily b ein g -to g eth er. T he p ro je c t o f co n serv a ­

25 Friedrich Holderlin, “Anmerkungen zur Antigona”, Samtliche Werke und Briefe, Munchen:
Hanser, 1992, p. 374.
26 Jacques Ranciere has emphasized the social change and the redistribution of the senses at is­
sue in many of his writings.
40 Esa Kirkkopelto

tiv e id e a lism n ev er sh ared th is program m e: fo r it, S p irit is re alize d in th e c o n stitu ­

tio n a l state, in its ab so lu te, o rg an ic d y n am ics w h ich in co rp o rates everything. T he
q u e stio n o f th e c o n stitu tio n o f th e m o d e rn b o d y is, then, a political question: like
citizen , lik e society.
T h e m o d e rn b o u rg e o is b o d y is th o ro u g h ly fa m ilia r to us, b e c a u se it is our
o w n to d ay . B u t w h a t a b o u t its c h a lle n g e r? D o e s it p la y an y ro le in o u r c o n ­
s c io u s n e s s , o r is it m e re ly a p h ilo s o p h ic a l c o n s tru c tio n ? T h e re are in p rin c ip le
n u m e ro u s a lte rn a tiv e s fo r th e m o d e rn body. H o w e v e r, th e b o u rg e o is w o rld
o rd e r is b y n a tu re su c h th a t is h a s in c o rp o ra te d th e m in a d v a n c e a n d so ta k e n
th e m in its se rv ic e . H e re , it c a n b e a q u e s tio n o f p a rty in g b o d ie s re e lin g d ru n k
a t th e w e e k e n d , e x o tic b o d ie s s u n b a th in g o n th e b e a c h , b o d ie s d a n c in g in th e
d isc o , o r th e b o d ie s o f fo o tb a ll p la y e rs, m o d e ls o r p o p sta rs a ro u sin g g lo b al
a d m ira tio n a n d im ita tio n . T h e b o u rg e o is w o rld o rd e r k n o w s m a n y a lte rn a tiv e
m o d e s o f b o d ily e x is te n c e in w h ic h th e sta tu s o f th e ra tio n a l, a u to n o m ic s u b ­
je c t is s h a k e n , tra n s fo rm e d o r te m p o ra rily s u s p e n d e d , a n d g iv e s m a n y o p p o r­
tu n itie s to re a liz e th e m . H o w e v e r, a ll th o s e m o d a litie s o f e x c e p tio n a l b o d ie s,
o r b o d ie s o f e x c e p tio n , c o m e to d a y u n d e r th e d e m a n d o f c a p ita liz a tio n : p e o ­
p le a re d e p riv e d o f th e ir b o d ie s , w h ic h a re th e n so ld b a c k to th e m re g a rd le ss
o f th e ir a g e , g e n d e r o r so c ia l sta tu s. F o r th e sa m e re a so n , th e b o d ie s a re d e ­
p o litic iz e d a n d a e s th e tic iz e d : th e y a c q u ire th e ir m e a n in g fro m th e in d iv id u a l
e x p e rie n c e a lo n e . T h e re is tra n s fo rm a tio n , b u t it is h a p p e n in g a c c o rd in g to
an e c o n o m y in w h ic h its s o c ia lly c h a lle n g in g p o te n tia l is ta k e n in th e se rv ic e
o f o th e r p u rp o s e s fro m th e start. N e v e rth e le s s , I w o u ld lik e to c la im th a t th e
m o re v a rio u s m a ss h a p p e n in g s b e c o m e p ro d u c ts to b e so ld , th e m o re th e m i­
m e tic a n d th e h a p tic d im e n s io n s o f th e p a r tic ip a n ts ’ b o d ie s a re se p a ra te d fro m
e a c h o th er. T o th e e x te n t th a t th e s e tw o d im e n sio n s c o n s titu tiv e o f th e b o d y
are n o t a rtic u la te d in th e ir m u tu a l re la tio n , th e b o d ie s a p p e a r to th e m s e lv e s as
w e ll as to th e o th e rs a s m a g ic a l e n titie s , fe tis h e s , b o th e x tre m e ly v a lu a b le a n d
w o rth le s s , b o th as tre a s u re s a n d w a s te , o b je c ts o f b o t h a d o ra tio n a n d d e sp ite ,
a n d so as o b je c ts o f c o n s u m p tio n . F ro m th e tra n s c e n d e n ta l p e rs p e c tiv e , it is
a g a in a q u e s tio n o f th e re g u la tio n o f th e v a ria tio n w h ic h th e su b je c t a llo w s
its e lf a n d w h ic h is r e a liz e d a c c o rd in g to c e rta in u n e x p re s s e d p a ra m e te rs . T he
re c o g n itio n o f th o s e p a ra m e te rs , as w e ll as th e ir tra n s fo rm a tio n , re q u ire s th a t
w e b rin g th e b o d y -s u b je c t, in a ll its m o d a litie s , b a c k to th e d o u b le p e rsp e c tiv e
o f th e h a p tic a n d th e m im e tic .
The Touch of Mimesis 41

The touch of critique

T h e critical q u e stio n o f to u c h w h ich , today, attem pts to differen tiate b etw een
to u c h in g a n d to u ch in g , co m es u p only w h en it is co n n e cte d to the q u estio n o f
rep resen tatio n (V orstellung), c o n c e iv e d o f as m im etic pow er. T h e effect an d force
o f re p resen tatio n s is a rtic u la te d th ro u g h to u ch , w h ereas to u c h is re g u late d and
d irected th ro u g h rep resen tatio n s. If th e re p re sen ta tio n has th e fu n c tio n o f a lure,
as in ad v ertisin g , its c o n n e c tio n to to u c h is evident: it is th e p ro m ise o f touch. If
to u c h is p ro h ib ited , th e n th e re p re se n ta tio n is also o ften pro h ib ited , as if it w ere
fro m now o n a q u e stio n o f a p u re ly sy m b o lic relation, a police issu e (cf. th e p ro ­
hib itio n s o n p h o to g ra p h in g o r film ing in co n c e rts, m useu m s an d theatres). H ere,
the fu n d am en tally b o d ily n atu re o f th e d y n am ics at q u estio n is ig n o red a n d lo st
fro m sight, an d th e b o d y is now re tu rn e d to its su blim e place, iso late d in th e in ­
feriority o f the su b ject. H o w ev er, if w e tak e in to ac co u n t the p rev io u sly an alysed
fact th a t to u c h req u ires a sim u ltan eo u s sep a ratio n a n d stay in g to g eth er - dia-
p h e ro n h ea u to - w e e n te r a d im en sio n in w h ich the self-critical n ature o f touch
(its k rin e in ) is co n n e c te d to th e o rig in al criticality o f ph ilo so p h ical thinking. A t
the sam e tim e, th in k in g reg ain s its m ateriality. T ouch m eans n o t only contact,
co m m u n ic a tio n a n d reco g n itio n , th e re p re se n ta tio n o f one by an other, b u t also
neg atio n , rep ellin g , p ro tectio n , p o ten tial su ffering (pathein). B etw ee n b rushing
and v io le n c e , th ere is b u t a g rad u al d ifferen ce. T h erefo re, to u ch is an o b jec t o f
critiq u e, a n d is o fte n re g u la te d b y contracts. If ex p erien ce is alw ays, in a tra n ­
scen d en tal sense, at its lim its, th e e x p erien ce o f ex p erien ce is alw ay s am bivalent.
T ouch is n o t o n ly c o n ta c t, b u t also su fferin g , even w hen it is en jo y ab le. K antian
beauty, p u re p leasu re issu in g fro m th e free h arm o n y b e tw ee n th e sensible an d the
u n d e rsta n d in g , h as a su b lim e co re. H ere th e q u estio n o f h o w to reach the haptic-
m im etic p ersp ectiv e m ay be refo rm u lated as follow s: how to b rin g th e beautiful
and th e sub lim e w ith in the sp h ere o f th e sam e ex p e rie n ce? 27
E v en th o u g h to u ch articulates th e body in relation to another body, it at once
strives to offer th e body certain integrity, a feeling o f itself, and hence certain un-
touchability - in accordance w ith th e G reek exam ple discussed above. In H older-
lin ’s view , the m o st elem entary difference b etw een the ancient and the m odern
com es o u t in relatio n to th e untouchable. F o r the G reeks, there w as som ething cat­
egorically u n touchable a n d holy, nam ely, th e divine sphere, the transcendence in all
its m anifestations. A ccording to th e G reek n o tion o f hubris, any approach to the d i­
vine sphere cau sed an im m ediate, fateful punishm ent, w hich brought hu m an beings
back to th eir p ro p er place in th e order o f cosm os. F or the m o dern experience, there
is n o such categorical prohibition: noth in g is holy per se. Instead, the m odern expe­

27 The question is central in many reflections of Schiller, especially Anmut und Wurde (1793), in
which the beautiful and the sublime are united in the phenomenon of the human being.
42 Esa Kirkkopelto

rience is characterized b y th e m ixing o f th e holy an d the profane, o f transcendence

an d im m anence, from w hich there is n o return. In distinction to A n cient m an, the
m o d ern h u m an being is tru ly capable o f m ixing the touchable and the untouchable,
an d thus tou ch in g th e untouchable. A s w e already noted, this co nfusion structures
ou r m ode o f existence. H ow ever, th e fact th at the confusion is elem entary does not
change its nature as confusion, th a t is, as an unbearable situation, w hich is bound
to destroy itself sooner o r later. M o d ern hubris is som ething anybody is capable o f
(so there is noth in g hero ic in it: there w as nothing heroic in H itler). W h at m odern
hubris does is m erely to articulate th e destruction inhabiting all o f us, so th a t the
very nature o f th e issue, th e n eed o f to u ch an d difference, com es up in a terrible
m anner. A s a consequence o f violation, h u m an beings do n o t return to th eir natural
state (organic or non-organic); instead , the resu lt is som ething m onstrous. W hat
is characteristic o f the m o n ster is th a t it destroys the relation betw een nature and
culture - by d estroying bo th .28
In distinction to th e G reeks, th e m od ern body is also separated fro m itself by
th e sym bolic law, the p ro h ib itio n a n d th e perm ission, w hich separates the bodies
from each other. N ow , the m o d ern bo d y is d iv ided ag ain an d again betw een w h at is
exp o sed to touch an d w h at rem ains b eyo n d touch, betw een touchable and untouch­
able, the sensible an d th e spiritual body. A s a consequence o f this separation, the
b o d y becom es, as I alread y noted, the bearer o f touch. T ouch m ay be experienced
an d rem ain in force, o n ly w h en th e difference betw een the to uched and the u n ­
touchable com es up. In order th a t th e u ntouchable rem ain untouchable, th at is, the
transcendental lim it o f the su b ject’s experience, touch m u st now be m aintained,
rep eated an d tak en care of. T h e aspiratio n to the untouchable therefore m eans the
resto ratio n o r sanctification o f the h o ly through the articulation o f transcendence as
o ne w ith o u t an opposite, as an inter-corporeality, tow ard w hich bodily existence di­
rects itself.29 B eing neither an ob ject, a do m ain, som ething given, nor a p er se holy
b o d y (there is n o b o d y in itself), the h o ly refers, rather, to the no m a n ’s lan d w hich
rem ains betw een the untouchables', it is an inter-corporeality w ithout m utual d ia­

28 This is the stumbling block of modern metaphysics. An argument for the prohibition of the
touch of something untouchable, one that founds the symbolic hierarchy of such a prohibi­
tion, recognizes in spite of itself that the untouchable is not wholly untouchable, so that the
preserved hierarchy is at once made questionable. As I have showed, this structure is still
operative at least up until Kant’s “Analytic of the Sublime”, a fact that turns it into a theory of
bourgeois aesthetics. Cf. Le theatre de l'experience., Contributions a la theorie de la scene, p.
141-147, 383-428.
29 Why do I not speak here of “immanence”? In contrast to Derrida and Nancy, I do not believe
in the “continuist postulate” which is the presupposition of immanentism (cf. Derrida, Le
Toucher, p. 143-145. Through it, philosophical thought is subjected to a religious and, finally,
anti-modem attitude. Whatever we do, immanence reigns. Transcendence does not reign with­
out us explicitly taking care of it. The question of transcendence is constituted from the start
as a political issue; immanence offers itself as a possible ontology for political thought.
The Touch of Mimesis 43

lectic an d hostility. In contrast to all its precursors, m odern transcendence is w ithin

the reach o f hum ans. T h e real p ro b lem is th a t it is only reachable together. R espect
for the u ntouchable is, then, n o t only an an cien t virtue, but also an essential part o f
m od ern th o u g h t an d m o d ern artistic, pedagogical an d political action.
E v e n in m odernity, h ow ever, th e relatio n sh ip w ith the unto u ch ab le m ay take
m an y form s; o th erw ise, w e w o u ld n o t h a v e to argue ab o u t it. A lth o u g h m odern
ex p erien ce is ch a ra c teriz e d b y th e a b sen ce o f a tra n sc en d en t d im e n sio n o f the
holy, a b e y o n d , it does n o t fo llo w th a t n o th in g is h o ly fo r the bo u rg eo is subject.
T h e sen tim en tal ex p erien ce is u su a lly co n sid ered to be “to u c h in g ” , a n d yet, it has
a h a rd a n d u n to u ch ab le, e v e n in n o cen t, core. E v en a t th e m o m e n t o f g reatest p a s­
sion, th e sen tim en tal ex p erien ce tries to fo ste r w h at is u n to u ch ab le in it.
T h e issu e b eco m es m o re co n crete if w e a tte n d to th e fac t th a t the rational
su b ject b ro u g h t fo rth b y th e E n lig h te n m e n t, as w ell as the sen tim en tal su b ject
c riticized b y Schiller, d o n o t in fa c t fo llo w e a c h o th er in an assu m e d h isto ri­
cal n arrativ e b u t are, in stead , tw o m an ifestatio n s o f th e sam e m o dern, bourgeois
subjectivity. T h e m an o f E n lig h te n m e n t, the in sen sitiv e m an o f re aso n , is at the
sam e tim e also an e x cessiv ely em o tio n a l d ream er. P sy ch o lo g ically , the affinity
to sen tim en tality c a n be u n d e rsto o d as th e re a ctio n o f the sen tim en tal m in d to its
o w n insensitivity, o r e v e n as an a tte m p t to c o v e r it up. H ow ever, in th e lig h t o f the
g en ealo g y o f the m o d ern su b ject sk e tc h e d ab o v e, th ere seem s to be a tra n sce n ­
d en tal b asis fo r th e p h e n o m e n o n . T h e “h e a rt” o f the bo u rg eo is su b ject is e sse n ­
tia lly “c o ld ” .30 T h e su b ject suffers fro m its o w n in ab ility to b eco m e in te re sted in
an y th in g a n d be a ffected b y an y th in g , its o w n in ab ility to to u c h a n d be to u ch ed .31
T his in te rn a l d istan ce o f the su b ject fro m its e lf h a s, again, tw o sides: “d eep dow n
in sid e ” , the su b ject m ay feel in n o c e n t, u n to u ch a b le, o r a v ictim , b u t also have
the feelin g o f n ev er b ein g born, n e v e r h a vin g liv ed . T h ere is no im m ed iate w ay
o u t o f th is d ile m m a. In term s o f p sy ch o an aly sis, one c o u ld call the situ atio n n a r­
c issistic. C o rrelativ ely , th e s u b je c t’s la m e n t o v er its lo st b o d y b eg in s to so u n d

30 Das kalte Herz is a story by the romantic writer Wilhelm Hauff from 1827, in which a cold
heart of stone is revealed to be the secret ofbourgeois wealth and success. Its film adaptation
by Paul Verhoeven in 1950 was the first full-length colour film in the GDR. Also in Thomas
Mann’s Doctor Faustus (1947), coldness is the counterpart of the composer-hero’s creative
genius.
31 Let me give an example of the functioning of this economy: the repeated arguments according
to which entertainment based on violence, as well as other products of the cultural industry
based on the excitation of the individual, are not harmful because the individual understands
them to be fictions and therefore does not take them as “real violence”, are self-confirming vi­
cious circles based on the differentiation between touch and mimesis. Exciting him- or herself
mimetically in an excessive manner, the individual develops an insensitive and indifferent, in
every situation safe attitude, which the modern global and urban society demands of its ideal
citizen. The time of aesthetic education is not yet over; the question now is, who has the right
to educate and by what means.
44 Esa Kirkkopelto

m o re a n d m o re feig n ed a n d n eurotic. A s I n o ted above, in th e ex p erien ce o f the

tra n sc e n d e n tal su b ject, the su b lim e b o d y is all the tim e w aitin g fo r its finder. B u t
is it ev en m e a n t to b e finally fo u n d an d to b e re v e ale d in the fo rm it has taken
w ith in th e su b ject? D o es th e b o u rg eo is su b ject rea lly w a n t to em b o d y itse lf m ore
p e rm a n e n tly th an it alread y d o es? Is n ’t it, rath er, b o rn to p ro te c t its o w n m ystery?
H ow c o u ld th e a tte m p t at rev ealin g it le a d to an y th in g b u t a m o m en tary fam ily
scan d al? I f th is is th e c ase, th en it w o u ld b e m uch m ore significant to d ism an tle
th e w h o le e co n o m y w o v e n aro u n d th e ex p erien tial body. B u t how can su ch a
d ism a n tlin g b e re a liz e d ? N e x t, I w ill ad d ress this p ro b lem atic b y retu rn in g once
m o re to th e H o ld e rlin ia n id ea o f th e tra n sfo rm ativ e body.

The touch of the body

T h e m o d e rn a n d th e an cien t b o d y are different, a n d y et sim ilar: body an d to u c h

are p a ra m e te rs co m m o n to b o th b o d ies; th eir quality and dy n am ics v aries h isto ri­
cally. T h e re la tio n b etw een th e se b o d ies is n o t w h o lly dialectical o r dialecticiz-
able; in ste a d , th ere alw ay s rem ain s a b o d ily -m im e tic re st, w h ich is n o n m ed iated ,
u n to u c h a b le an d in ap p ro p riab le, a b lin d sp o t fu n ctio n in g as an in v isib le jo in t, a
m ed iu m , an im m em o rial c o m m e m o ra tio n b etw een tim es an d habits. H ence, the
b o d y h as its h istory. W h ile th e an c ie n t b o d y tries to be. fir m on its ow n surface,
th e m o d e rn body has to stru g g le in o rd e r to resurface fro m o u t o f its sentim ental
ab y sses, in o rd er to take d ista n ce fr o m its e lf a n d b eco m e touchable. B ein g the
b e a re r o f to u ch , the m o d ern su b ject sh o u ld b e qualified fo r this: it harb o u rs the
p o ssib ility o f its o w n m etam o rp h o sis in itself.
H old erlin b eliev ed th a t w e m ay reach to u ch again in a poetical way, as the
resu lt o f a new k in d o f regular com position. H is poem s w ere b u ilt up like a w orld
w hich h a d fo u n d its tact again and w as n ow filled w ith Spirit. B ut ho w can som e­
thin g that is realized in p o etry be realized in society? W e m ay read the follow ing
answ er fro m H o ld erlin ’s notes: the structure o f the p o e m and that o f the society are
g o v ern ed b y the sam e archi-ethical rules. F o r these rules to b e bro u g h t o ut, so as
to be referred to a n d applied, th e relationship betw een the m em bers o f the society
m u st b ecom e sim ilar to th e one b etw een poetical elem ents, an d the m em bers o f the
society m u st also show them selves in these relationships w ith each other. T he e x ­
cessive integrity, self-sufficiency, autonom y and sentim entality o f the m o d em sub­
je c t - th at w hich forces things into d ialectical oppositions - m u st be dism antled. In
his pro g ram o f aesthetic education, Schiller had already em phasized the im portance
o f p la y as a pedagogical m eans to m ove to w ard the “ State o f R easo n ” . In H olderlin,
w e can read som ething m o re radical: in all m odes o f social being, w e m u st preserve
th e dim en sio n o f play an d presentation. T h e “A esthetic S tate” exists as the cease­
The Touch of Mimesis 45

less d econstruction o f the “ State o fR e a s o n ” . T he bourgeois subject, the one w hich

understands its existence th ro u g h th e dialectic o f w o rk and am usem ent, earnest and
entertainm ent, suffering an d enjo y m en t, beautiful and sublim e, w ill never be able
to realize this. F orm erly, the m ajority o f p eople w ere b o m to be o th e rs’ slaves; to ­
day, the m ajority o f p eo p le enslave them selves and, contrary to the prevalent belief,
they can n o t free them selves b y their ow n w ork. I f the radically m o d em subject w ill
ever be b o rn , it w ill b e b o m as a sovereign subject abolishing the class distinctions,
as b o th w orker an d aristocrat. F ro m the history o f the m odern body, w e know m any
solutions to his paradox.
R eferrin g to th e elem en ts o f co m p o sitio n , H o ld erlin speaks o f “m o re in d e ­
p e n d e n t p a rts” (selb ststa n d ig ere T heile), in d istin ctio n to th e co n cep ts o f p h ilo ­
so p h ical lo g ic su b jected to the sy stem .32 T h e b asic tra it o f the artistic e le m e n t is
its relativ e in d e p en d en ce w h ic h o n ly ap p ears in its “ co n n ectio n ” (Z usam m en-
h a n g ) w ith other, sim ilar elem ents. T h e elem en ts o f artistic co m p o sitio n are not
fo rc e d to g e th e r but, in stead , c o m m u n icate w ith each o th er relativ ely freely. T hey
are n o t c h a in e d to each o th e r but, as h u m an s in a free com m unity, th ey are in
to u ch w ith each other. T h e y are free, sin ce b ein g in to u c h w ith each o ther th ey
h av e th e p o ssib ility o f b ein g otherw ise. T h e b o d y w h ich is cap able o f to u ch and
lives fro m to u c h m ust, h ow ever, reco g n ize a c ertain d ep en d en cy o n the others,
its lim ited n ess o r fin itu d e, w h ich is n o t em p irical o r p ra ctica l, b u t o n to lo g ic al and
ab so lu te.33
T h e b o d ily s u b je c t d o e s n o t re a c h its g o a ls, an y g o a ls, w ith o u t the o th ers;
th e re fo re , it is as w o rrie d a b o u t th e o th e rs a n d th e so c ie ty as m u c h as it is a b o u t
itself. It is, th en , p lu ra l a n d re la tiv e , b u t n o t d e p e n d e n t o n an y o th e r in d iv id u al.
It is d e ta c h e d in a stra n g e a n d frig h te n in g w ay. T h a t th e b o d y is d e ta c h e d does
n o t m e a n th a t it w o u ld be s e p a ra te d fro m a la rg e r w h o le, o n e w h ic h w o u ld b o th
m iss th e b o d y an d b e th e o b je c t o f its lo n g in g . T h e b o d y is n o t fa sh io n e d by
a n y b o d y ’s h a n d , w h ic h im p lie s th a t it c a n n o t b e “ th ro w n ” e ith e r.34 N e ith e r is it
th e re su lt o f th e b re a k in g o f a w h o le , a p ie c e , a fra g m e n t.35 A s M e rle a u -P o n ty
h a s su g g e ste d , th e b o d y is, rath er, c o n s titu te d as a so rt o f “to ta l p a rt” :36 it is
w h o le in itse lf, b u t d e p e n d e n t o n th e c o m m u n ity o f o th e r sim ilar en tities. S uch

32 Cf. Holderlin, Anmerkungen.

33 The finitude is again infinite, but beyond metaphysical hierarchies. I refer here to the recent
debates on the topic of finitude in Continental thought.
34 Its haptic quality is, then, not subject to the philosophical metaphor of the hand and the “hap-
tocentric hierarchies” made questionable by Derrida and Nancy.
35 With this note I want to show my criticality towards a conservative post-modernism, which
collects the splinters of the world it has itself destroyed in its pockets like chips.
36 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Le Visible et l'invisible, p. 266-267. I thank Sami Santanen for
bringing this to my attention.
46 Esa Kirkkopelto

an entity, d isp ro p o rtio n a te w ith re sp e c t to itself, is p er se d a n g e ro u s b o th to

its e lf a n d to others: it d o es n o t k n o w its lim its, it fee ls it is u n lim ite d . T h e aim
o f m o d e rn s o c ia liz a tio n is, in fact, n o t so m u c h to d e fe n d h u m a n s a g a in st th e
d a n g e r o f n a tu re th a n to d im in ish th e d a n g e r o f h u m a n s to th e m se lv e s.37
H o w e v e r, th e su b je c t m u st h a v e tra n sc e n d e n ta l k n o w le d g e o f to u c h an d
o f its o w n b o d ily lim ite d n e ss, its o w n o u tlin e a n d su rface. T h e b o d y b e ars this
k n o w le d g e , th is in te rru p tio n , in its h e a rt as th e d iffe re n c e b e tw e e n th e to u c h e d
a n d th e u n to u c h a b le . Its “h e a rt” is th e p la c e le ss p lac e, th e site, o f th a t in te r­
ru p tio n a n d d iffe re n tia tio n . A t th e sam e tim e , it is th e sy m b o lic in te rru p tio n ,
a c c o rd in g to w h ic h th e b o d y u n d e rsta n d s its re la tio n to a n o th e r body, as w ell
as to its o w n body, as a sig n ify in g re la tio n b e tw e e n th e im a g e a n d th e im ­
ag ed . A t th is site, th e im a g e is d e ta c h e d fro m th e b o d y in o rd e r to be e m b o d ie d
an ew in th e sa m e b o d y o r a n o th e r b o d y (o r in its o w n b o d y as a n o ther). T h e
im a g e is th e “tra c e ” o f to u c h .38 T o u c h is in e a c h case o f a c e rta in k in d , as is
its tra c e . T h e tra c e sig n ifies th e fa c t th a t to u c h h as h a p p e n e d an d can h a p p e n
ag ain . T race is th e q u a lity o f a sy m b o lic , lin g u istic relatio n . T h e sy m b o lic in te r­
ru p tio n (sy m -b a lle in ) a t th e c o re o f th e re la tio n is a t o n ce a p ro h ib itio n a n d a
p ro m ise. It is a re la tio n b e tw e e n b o d ie s, a t the sa m e tim e m im e tic a n d h a p tic ,
b y w h ic h th e b o d ie s a re in s titu te d as lin g u istic , a n d by w h ic h lan g u a g e a cq u ires
a bo d y . W ith o u t a sy m b o lic in te rru p tio n , a b a rrie r, m im e tic fo rces w o u ld a ffect
us lim itle ssly a n d u n c ritic a lly , th e y w o u ld ta k e o v e r th e b o d y a n d b e c o m e u n re ­
stric te d ly sp re a d o u t a n d m ix e d o n its su rfa ce , so th a t th e b o d y w o u ld lo se the
fe e lin g o f itself. A s a rtic u la te d b y th e sy m b o lic in te rru p tio n , m im e tic re latio n s
are a lw a y s to a c e rta in e x te n t p a rtia l a n d re g io n a l.39 B u t b e ca u se o f th is in c o m ­
p le te n e ss th e y c a n a lso be o p tio n al: free, im ag in g , a n d p re se n ta tio n a l relatio n s.
In th e sam e w ay th a t p ro h ib itio n s are b o rn to be ev ad e d , p e rm issio n s fo rc e us
to d e lib e ra tio n . T h is is a lso tru e o f to u c h w h ic h ca n a p p e a r as to u c h o n ly in th e
sp h e re o f la n g u a g e , as a sin g u la r site o r tra c e . W h a t su stain s the sy m b o lic in te r­
ru p tio n ? O r d o e s it su sta in itse lf? W h a t is a sy m b o l in th e first p la c e ? H o w d o es
it co m e a b o u t a n d h ow is it c a p a b le o f sa y in g at o n ce b o th “ y e s ” a n d “n o ” to th e
su b ject?

37 I refer here to Jacques Derrida’s concept “auto-immunity”, presented in Foi et Savoir, p. 67.
What is at issue is a condition, in which the system starts to suffer from the antidote it pro­
duces to defend itself against an external threat.
38 I am thinking here of Derrida’s notion of the trace, which is one name for differance\ cf. “Dif­
ference”, Marges de laphilosophie, Paris: Minuit, 1972. Touch leaves and erases its trace and
thus produces the virtual presence of representation that removes farther, or delays, the pres­
ence of the other to the perceiver.
39 I am reminding here of Jean-Luc Nancy’s reflection on the zonal character of touch and the
birth of “sense”; cf. Les Muses, p. 34 and 38. I would like to emphasize the relationship be­
tween partiality and the fact of freedom.
The Touch of Mimesis 47

O n ly a h u m a n b ein g b o rn in to th e d o m ain o f sy m b o lizatio n is cap ab le o f

u n d erstan d in g its e lf tru ly as a body, as an en tity m ean in g less in itself, y e t full o f
m eaning. O n th e o th e r h and, in m im etic relatio n s a body o r a body p a rt b ecom es
sim ilar to an o th er b o d y o r b o d y part. M im etic im aging, then, alw ay s has a m a te ­
rial su p p o rt o r ground. F o r th e sam e reaso n , m im etic p h en o m e n a are co n stitu ­
tiv ely superficial. T h e su rface o f th e b o d y is alw ays (at le ast p o ten tially ) a screen
and, correlativ ely , ea c h screen articu lates th e co rresp o n d in g body. A painting,
p h o to g ra p h , p ic tu re , d raw in g , figure, o r fiction to u ch es the b o d y in m e, o r touches
m e as a bo d y ; each to u ch p ro d u ces a re p re se n tatio n , e v en if a sin g u lar touch does
no t b rin g a b o u t any co n scio u s im age. C o rrelatively, th e illu stratio n o f any surface
brings a b o u t a c h an g e in th e m ateriality su stain in g th a t surface a n d em b o d ies it in
a p a rtic u la r w ay.40
T h e feeling o f to u ch should from now o n be understood as the fe e lin g o f im ­
aging, o f disclosure. T h e touching, m im etic body is constituted in the difference
b etw een th e to u ch in g an d th e untouchable, so th a t to u ch is understood and ex p e­
rienced as th e quality o f th e surface, the u n touchable in tu rn as the interiority o f
the body. H ow ever, th a t relationship is n ev er stable. Instead, as partial an d divided
(betw een various b o d y p arts, traits, nu an ces, g estures, details etc.), it is first o f all
subject to continuous variation. Its partiality can b e understood as its spatial and
tem poral variation. V ariation is th e m o v em en t o f differentiation, for w hich there is
no other external reaso n ex cep t th e elem entary disclosure o f the body to other bo d ­
ies, an d its openness to th e m im etic forces th o se bodies focus to it. In the dom ain
o f those innum erable forces, the b o d y com es forth as such and such, defined b y a
plurality o f qualities: o f such a w eight, o f such a colour, as such to the touch, etc. Its
qualities can b e m astered and d ecid ed b y the subject only partially. A ll disclosure,
w hich is n o t d ecid ed b y the subject an d o f w hich the subject is n o t conscious, sus­
tains an d accom panies (as the feeling, w ith o u t any particular content, o f the body
and the “reality ”) all rep resentations o f the subject.
A s en dlessly vary in g an d variable, th e h u m an body (w hich A ristotle called the
m o st m im etic, m im etikotaton) is in itse lf en dlessly differentiated and self-differen­
tiating, div id ed an d y et cohesive; it is the sym bolic, linguistic body. T he sym bolical­
ness o f th e body, its delim itatio n from its surroundings as a seem ingly m eaningless,
y et m eaningful entity, a signifier, is the resu lt o f the extrem e m im etic capacity o f
h u m an beings, their capacity to d ep ict anything, to pretend to be anything, an d so to
p resent them selves as lim itedly indefinite b eings. T he hu m an b e in g ’s indefiniteness
is lim ited and relative becau se it is b ased o n the b o d y ’s sim ultaneous disclosure
and, independently o f it, m im etic variation. W h eth er he o r she w ants it, the hum an
being is alw ays o f a p articular kind, never being able to w holly m aster or decide

40 In this respect, cave paintings, for instance, do not essentially differ from marks produced on
the human skin.
48 Esa Kirkkopelto

his o r her m ode o f disclosure. H ence, sym bolization is an activity determ ined by
m im etism an d contam in ated b y it, alw ays partial, alw ays delim iting itself anew.
T h e sym bolic interruption - th e strict p rohibition and the sublim e strictness o f the
prohibition - is th e result o f m im etic activity accelerated to the extrem e, as the con­
sequence o f w h ich th e process o f im aging is able to tu rn against itself an d create
an im age o f itself, to beco m e in d ep en d en t.41 T he hu m an being is bo rn am ong such
relatively independent things, th at is, in lan g uage. H ence, the body determ ined by
sym bolic interruption is n o t pure an d im ag eless, b u t over-im aged, over-determ ined,
an d th erefore m eaningless, “m ere” surface, “m ere” body, w hich how ever m akes
itself know n, felt, b y enjoying itse lf as touch. A s touch, it harbours the d im ensions
o f b o th death an d birth: it leads a tran scen d en t life.

***

W h e re to u c h an d m im e sis are c o n n e c te d , th e m im e tic b o d y is su b stitu te d fo r

th e su b lim e bo d y . H e re , th e b o u rg e o is s u b je c t o r th e m e ta p h y sic a l su b je c t as
d e s c rib e d ab o v e c e a se s to reign. T oday, w e c a n im a g in e how su c h a m e ta m o r­
p h o sis is p o ssib le , in th e p e rfo rm in g arts, as a state o f e x c e p tio n a t th e m o m e n t
o f th e p e rfo rm a n c e. I h a v e a lre a d y in d ic a te d ab o v e how su ch a b o d y m ay also
co m e u p , s u b je c t to c e rta in c o n d itio n s , in th e sp h e re o f p re v a le n t so c ia l p ra c ­
tic e s. T h e q u e stio n n o w is , h o w can th is sta te o f e x c e p tio n b e c o m e a ru le ? A n ­
o th e r k in d o f so c ie ty is p o p u la te d b y a n o th e r k in d o f citizen s. A s F ran z K a fk a
n o te d in o n e o f h is ap h o rism s: “ T h e re is an in fin ite a m o u n t o f h o p e , b u t n o t
fo r u s ” .42 T h e re fo re , ra d ic a l c h a n g e in so c ie ty alw ay s a p p e ars to us as a rad ica l
p e d a g o g ic a l p ro je c t.
I n o te d a t th e b eg in n in g o f th e e ssa y th a t m y startin g p o in t is m im esis in the
p erfo rm in g arts. E v e n th o u g h I h av e u p to n ow c o n sid ered th e arts ex p licitly only
in p a ssin g , I h av e also ad d ressed th e q u e stio n o f art all the tim e. W h a t I have
b e e n search in g fo r is a lan g u ag e an d lo g ic m o re ap p ro p riate to th e ex p erien ce
an d p ractice o f p erfo rm in g , a n d o n e cap ab le o f d ism an tlin g th o se d isco u rses by
w h ich th e y are g o v ern ed today. H en ce, I claim th a t ev ery th in g I have d escrib ed

41 This is how Kant considers the issue in the “Analytic of the Sublime”, without however think­
ing it to the end in all its consequentiality. Adorno has, in particular, emphasized this “reify­
ing” moment proper to mimetic processes.
42 “Es gibt unendlich viel Hoffnung. Nur nicht fur uns”. The passage was written down by Max
Brod; cf. Max Brod, Uber Franz Kafka, p. 71.
The Touch o f Mimesis 49

an d said so fa r can be tra n sp o se d to th e sp h ere o f perfo rm in g , its exp erien ces and
tech n iq u es, an d can also b e v erified in th a t sp here. S uch v erificatio n , the brin g in g
ab o u t o f o th e r k in d s o f b o d ies, is b o th a p ed ag o g ical an d a n artistic ch allen g e, and
m o st ap p ro p riate fo r artistic research.
T he follow ing five additional notes concern ethics and the arts m ore generally.

1. I f w e a re b o rn to b e b e a re rs o f to u c h , as I h a v e trie d to sh o w in th e ab o v e ,
a n d if, th e n , th e sy m b o lic in te rru p tio n d iv id e s us fro m o u r b irth o n , th is also
m e a n s th a t so m e th in g b e c o m e s im a g e d in us, th a t so m e th in g p la y s a n d a lso
e n jo y s in u s at e a c h m o m e n t, e v e n w h e n w e are n o t c o n s c io u s o f it. I n o w
v e n tu re to c a ll th is so m e th in g th e m im e tic b o d y. T h e m im e tic b o d y is a b o d y
w h ic h is se t a p a rt fro m its e lf, a d is tin c t, d iv id e d , m u ltip lie d b o d y w h ic h m ak e s
o f e v e ry th in g it e n c o u n te rs a se m b la n c e o f itse lf, as stra n g e a n d e x te rn a l as
its e lf, a lin g u is tic b e in g . F in a lly , it d o e s n o t n e e d lim its se t o n its e lf fro m th e
o u tsid e , th e w o rld , b e c a u s e it b e a rs its o w n lim its in itse lf, n o t, h o w e v e r, as
an in te rn a l in te rru p tio n , b u t as th e su rfa c e a n d d e p th o f its o w n body. T o th in k
th e m im e tic bo d y , a n d to stu d y a n d e x e rc ise it in v a rio u s w a y s, is a m ea n s
to c h a n g e th e s y m b o lic in s titu tio n o f th e b o u rg e o is body, th e g iv e n im a g e o f
o u rs e lv e s a n d th e e c o n o m y o f e x p e rie n c e w h ic h stre n g th e n s it. T h e d e c o n ­
stru c tio n o f th e b o u rg e o is su b je c t d e s c rib e d ab o v e p ro c e e d s fro m th e su b lim e
b o d y to th e m im e tic bo d y , fro m th e tra n s c e n d e n ta l (th e e n d le ss a p p ro a c h in g
o f o n e ’s o w n lim its ) to th e tra n s c e n d e n t (b e in g a t th e lim it o r as th e lim it,
s e re n e ly in h a b itin g th e b o rd e rla n d ), fro m e x is tin g b e y o n d o r o n th is sid e o f
la n g u a g e to sta y in g o n th e le v e l o f la n g u a g e . W h e n w e b e c o m e c o n sc io u s o f
o u rs e lv e s as m im e tic b o d ie s, th e to u c h w e b e a r w ith in o u rse lv e s a lso a p p e a rs
as th e lim it o f life a n d d eath . A t th e sa m e tim e , th e fe a r o f d e a th c o n s titu tiv e
o f th e b o u rg e o is s u b je c t is e a se d . T h u s e x p e rie n c e is n e v e r o n c e a n d fo r a ll,
b u t a n is su e o f re p e titio n , e x e rc ise . H o w to p re v e n t th is r e p e titio n fro m r e ­
tu rn in g to th e e c o n o m y o f th e su b je c t?

2. In so fa r as ex p e rie n c e is e x te rn a liz ed an d w e liv e in tran scen d en ce, a t once

alive an d dead, o u r o p eratio n s are real a n d realizing, ev en if th e y be fro m now
on re a liz e d in th e m e d iu m o f p erfo rm in g , th a t is, in th e arts: th ey m an ifest the
lin g u istic ex isten ce o f th e bodies. A rt m ay signify, at best, th e critical sh arin g o f
tran scen d en ce, a co m m o n e n jo y m en t, an e n c o u n ter w ith in o r in the re a lm o f the
holy. H o w ev er, th e tran sp o sitio n o f th e p ro b le m into the field o f arts does n o t
y e t solve anything. A s m u c h as a rt has striv ed to w ard em an cip atio n , it has also
b een sy m p to m atic o f th e n eu ro tic ec o n o m y d esc rib e d above. T he identification
o f th e se tw o has a ssisted confu sio n . To free o n e se lf fro m th is dy n am ics requires
a c h an g e in th e p ractices o f th e creatio n an d recep tio n o f art.
50 Esa Kirkkopelto

3. T h e m ix in g o f th e sp heres an d th e fa c t th a t tra n sce n d en ce has beco m e a h u ­

m a n issu e are th e re su lt o f th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f th e m odes o f rep resen tatio n , a
p ro cess th a t h as tak en p lace u n d e r th e influ ence o f v arious h isto rical factors. T he
ex tre m e ly m im etic n atu re o f th e m o d ern h u m an b ein g also signifies ex trem e te c h ­
nicality , an ex cess o f tech n iq u e, w h ich finally con ceals its o w n tech n ical nature
an d o ffers u s a self-su fficien t w o rld , a h u m a n iz ed co sm o s o r globus. To reach the
m im etic body a n d to b eco m e su ch a b o d y tim e an d tim e again, to re p e a t it, m eans
to rev eal a n d dism an tle th e w o rld su rro u n d in g us as w ell as th e te ch n iq u e su sta in ­
in g it. It m ean s th e ir sim p lifica tio n , to be re a lize d in ord e r to b rin g up th e relations
b e tw e e n bodies. T h e p ro b lem is fam iliar to ev ery b o d y w o rk in g to d a y w ith q u e s­
tions co n cern in g p erfo rm in g . B u t h o w to th in k ab o u t it eth ically ?

4. T h e ch an g e in th e d y n am ics o f to u ch , o n e th a t follow s if to u c h a n d m im esis

are e x p e rie n c ed an d u n d e rsto o d to g eth er, m eans a ch an g e in the su b je c t’s w ay o f
ju d g in g an d e v alu atin g its o w n ex p erien ce. O ne p a rticu lar c o n seq u en ce o f this is
th e follow ing: th e b eau tifu l an d th e sub lim e, pleasu re a n d suffering, freed o m and
co e rc io n , a m u sem en t a n d w o rk can no lo n g er ap p ear to the su b ject as op p o sites,
as states m u tu ally ex clu d in g each o th e r tem p o ra lly and spatially. W h ere the sen ­
tim e n ta l su b ject is a sto n ish ed , w e m u st refu se w o n d e r in fro n t o f the sp ectacles in
w h ic h it is alw ay s th e sam e th in g th a t m atters: the setting up o f sceneries b eh in d
w h ich the su b lim e b o d y can b e c o n c e a led o v er and o v er ag ain as an o b je c t o f a
co llectiv e cu lt. W e m u st d are to re fu te the p ro h ib itio n o f e n jo y m en t. W e should
dare to co m e u p b e fo re o u rselv es as w ell as the others as en jo y in g b o d ies, and
also to e n co u rag e o th ers to en jo y m en t. T h ere is e n jo y m e n t o n ly as con tin u o u s.
T h e ch allen g e is n o t so m u ch h o w to reach en jo y m en t, b u t h o w to stay in it, live
in it. It is a q u e stio n o f a n eth ics w h ic h ab o lish es th e b o urgeois m ode o f life (the
ec o n o m y o f e n jo y m e n t an d , h e n c e , th e d o m in ance o f eco n o m y in gen eral).

5. T h e m im etic b o d y is to itse lf a n en ig m a, an untouchable. It has n o t pro d u ced

its e lf an d does n o t k n o w itself; it can o n ly m a n ife st its e lf an d study its o w n m a n i­
festatio n s. It c a n o n ly k n o w th e oth ers, it k n o w s itse lf th ro u g h c o n tact w ith others.
If th e o th ers h av e alread y e n te re d the sp h ere o f ex p e rie n ce, the m im etic su bject
m u st re tu rn - acco rd in g to an eth ics p ro p er to it - to ev ery th in g th a t alread y sur­
ro u n d s an d sustain s it, w aits fo r it. It m u st re tu rn to all th o se w h o it has up to now
fo rg o tten a n d to w h o m it has b een v io le n t by n eg lectin g them . It m u st en co u n ter
ev ery th in g in e n jo y m en t, co rp o re a lity an d la n g u ag e, as its o w n sem blance.
From Elephans Photographicus to the Hybronaut:
A n Artistic Approach to Human Enhancement

LAURA BELOFF

Introduction

In 1969 G reg o ry B ateso n p ro p o se d th a t in ste a d o f m id -n in etee n th -c en tu ry th in k ­

ing o n su rv iv al in D a rw in ia n term s, in w h ich u n it o f survival is e ith er fam ily line
or th e sp ecies, w e k n o w b y now (1969) th a t th e u n it o f survival in th e real b io ­
lo g ical w o rld is th e o rg an ism plus its en v iro n m ent. In o th er w ords, th e org an ism
th a t d estro y s its en v iro n m e n t d estro y s itse lf.1T his su g gests a co h esiv e im age o f a
sy n erg istic o rg an ism th a t is firm ly jo in e d w ith its env iro n m en t.
T o w ard a sim ilar d ire c tio n in p erceiv in g th e c o n n ection b etw e en an o rg a n ­
ism an d its en v iro n m e n t, Jak o b v o n U ex k u ll (1864-1944) w as arguing already in
1934 w ith his d e v e lo p m e n t o f th e c o n c e p t o f U m w elt, w h ic h pro p o ses th a t o rg a n ­
is m ’s su b jectiv e p e rc e p tio n o f the w o rld is d ire cte d b y its p h y sio lo g ic al d esign
a n d its needs. In th is v iew p o in t, th e su rro u n d in g e n v iro n m en t pro v id es th e n e c e s­
sary sup p lies fo r o rg a n ism ’s su rv iv al an d the o rg a n ism ’s p h y sio lo g ica l d esig n has
ad ap ted to this e n v iro n m ent.. T h a t is to say th a t the o rg an ism fo rm s a su bjective
p erc e p tio n th a t can be im ag in ed as a soap b u b b le th a t su rrounds each in dividual
an d co n tain s sig n ify in g m ark ers re le v a n t o n ly to the w o rld o f th a t specific in d i­
vid u al. U e x k u ll’s re se a rc h re v e a le d th a t ev ery species has its ow n c o n stru cted
U m w elt b ecau se e a c h sp ecies reacts in a d istin ctiv e w ay to th e sam e signals it
receiv es fro m th e p h y sical w o rld .2 W h a t is thus n ecessary fo r o n e ’s b io lo g ical
su rv iv al, is in c lu d e d w ith in o n e ’s p e rc e p tio n o f the w orld; the U m welt.
N otably, U ex k u ll w as m ak in g em p irical ex p erim en ts, fo r exam ple, w ith a
fighting fish. H e d rew c o n clu sio n s fro m an ex p erim en t w h ic h p ro v e d th at fighting
fish d o n o t reco g n ise th e ir o w n reflectio n if it is show n eig h te en tim es p e r second,
b u t th ey d o reco g n ize th e ir reflectio n if it is show n at a speed o f th irty tim es p er

1 Gregory Bateson, “Pathologies of Epistemology”, in Gregory Bateson (ed.), Steps to an Ecol­

ogy of Mind, London, Toronto: Granada Publishing Limited, 1978 [1969], p. 454-63.
2 Jakob von Uexkull, “A Stroll Through the Worlds of Animals and Men; A Picture book of Invis­
ible Worlds”, in Claire H. Schiller (ed.), Instinctive Behavior; The Development of a Modern
Concept, New York: International U. P., 1934, p. 5-76.
52 Laura Beloff

seco n d . T his ex p e rim e n t d em o n strates th a t in the w o rld o f fighting fish, “ w ho

fe e d o n fast-m o v in g prey , all m o to r p ro cesses - as in the case o f slo w -m o tio n
p h o to g rap h y - ap p e a r a t re d u c e d sp eed ” .3 T h e U m w elt o f a fighting fish is b ase d
o n its n e e d to cap tu re fo o d fo r its v ery survival.
O v er th ree d ecad es after U e x k u ll’s ex p e rim e n ts, L ettv in , M a tu ran a , M c C u ll­
och an d P itts p ro v e d in b io lo g ic a l term s th a t a fro g ’s p h y sio lo g ic al structure and
in n e r o rg a n iz a tio n d eterm in e w h a t it is ab le to reco g n ize w ith in th e su rro u n d in g
w orld. T h e ir classic p ap er W h a t The F r o g ’s E ye Tells T he F r o g ’s B ra in proves
th a t a fro g is ab le to reco g n ize o n ly m o v in g p rey su c h as insects, w h ic h are its
ch o ice o f food. T h e fro g w o u ld starv e to d e ath if its surro u n d in g s w ere im m o ­
b ile.4 In o th e r w o rd s, o rg an ism s re sp o n d to th eir en v iro n m ent, w ith in the lim its
o f th e ir p h y sio lo g ical ab ilities to reco g n ize elem en ts o f th e ir un iq u e en v iro n m en t
an d fo rm in g sp ecies-sp ecific self-o rg an isation.
A pparently, re c o g n izab le asp ects o f th e w o rld by ea ch species are tightly
co n n e c te d to th e su rv iv al o f th e in d iv id u al species. E.g. the p rev io u sly m en tio n ed
th e fig h tin g fish ’s an d th e fro g ’s p h y sio lo g ic a l abilities allow th em to reco g n ize
prey, w h ic h is su itab le fo r th e ir nutrition. B io lo g ical survival th a t is c o n n ected
w ith o rg a n ism ’s n u tritio n p ro v id e d b y its e n v iro n m en t is one o f the factors affect­
in g th e o rg a n ism ’s p h y sio lo g ic a l d e sig n , w h ich fu rth er on w ill im p ac t the fo rm a­
tio n o f its U m w elt, i.e. th e su b jectiv ely co n stru c ted p e rce p tio n o f the w orld.
A ll o f th ese arg u m en ts em p h asize o rg a n ism ’s tig h t c o n n ectio n to its en v iro n ­
m en t. A cco rd in g to th e m , o rg a n ism ’s d esig n and its e n v iro n m e n t im p a ct each
o th e r an d fo rm a c o m p lex sy stem o f co n tin u o u s interplay.
F ro m th e se arg u m en ts, w e can d raw th e c o n clu sio n th a t a n org an ism th at
m o difies its e n v iro n m e n t m odifies its e lf and, vice v e rsa , the m o d ification o f o n e ’s
abilities an d p h y sio lo g y lead s to th e m o d ification o f an env iro n m en t.
T h is in sig h t has in te re stin g im p licatio n s co n sid erin g the h u m an perspective.
In th e co n te m p o ra ry w o rld h u m an s activ ely m o d ify an d m an ip u late the en v iro n ­
m en t, an d in c re a sin g ly also th e ir b io lo g ical body.
T h e id ea th a t o u r (hu m an ) p h y sio lo g ical d esig n is g u id ed by o u r survival
w ith in o u r e n v iro n m e n t is shifting. T h is h o ld s tru e o n ly in situations w h ere the
b io lo g ical su rv iv al is at stake. H ow ever, th is is no lo n g e r n ecessarily th e case
w h en co n cern in g h u m a n w ith re g a rd to th e ex am p les p rese n ted abo v e th a t focus

3 Uexkull, “A Stroll Through the Worlds of Animals and Men”, p. 28.

4 Jerome Lettvin et al., ‘What The Frog’s Eye Tells The Frog’s Brain’, in William C. Corning
and Martin Balaban (eds.), The Mind: biological approaches to its junctions, New York: John
Wiley & Sons Inc., 1968, p. 233-58.
From Elephans Photographicus to the Hybronaut 53

on an im als in n atu re - catch in g p rey fo r th e ir food. In co n tem p o rary w estern

societies stay in g aliv e - th e b asic b io lo g ical survival - is m ainly so lv ed th ro u g h
m an -m ad e so cial in frastru ctu res th a t o ffer th e p re re q u isites fo r life. W estern c iti­
zens n o lo n g e r n e e d to c a tc h th e ir fo o d in d iv id u ally fo r b io lo g ical survival.
To co n sid e r th e d e v e lo p m e n t an d ev o lu tio n o f h u m a n b ein g fro m a tra d itio n ­
al p ersp ectiv e o f survival is n o lo n g er th e o n ly approach. P h y sio lo g ical ad a p ta ­
tio n as th e m o d el fo r bio lo g ical su rv iv al is cu rren tly b ein g m ix e d o r e v en rep laced
w ith th e self-d efin ed d esig n o f the h u m a n body. H u m an s are in in c re asin g degrees
m an ip u latin g th e ir body, th e ir senses a n d also th e ir e n v iro n m en t v ia m eans d e ­
ve lo p e d in science an d technology. T h ese m eans in clu d e v ario u s tech n o lo g ies
ran g in g fro m th e re c e n t d e v e lo p m e n t in sy n thetic b iology an d bio tech n o lo g y to
cog n itiv e science, g en etic en g in eerin g , co sm etic surgery, p ro sth etics, in fo rm atio n
tech n o lo g y a n d nanotech n o lo g y , as w ell as d ev elo p m en ts in u b iq u ito u s c o m p u t­
ing, w earab le tech n o lo g y an d au g m e n te d reality.5
T h is p a p e r fo cu ses o n th e ab o v e-p resen ted aspects specifically w ith in the
field o f the arts, an d p re se n ts ex am p les th a t c o n cern the e n h an c em en t o f h u m an
body an d sen ses in th e re la tio n to su rro u n d in g environm ent.

Enhancement of the senses

A caricatu re illu stra tio n b y a m id -n in e te e n th cen tu ry c a rto o n ist w as claim in g to

hav e d isc o v e re d a new sp ecies w ith a sin g le eye, tw o w o o d en fro n t legs a n d tw o
h u m an legs. T h is “v ery cu rio u s a n im a l” w as n am ed as E lep h a n s P h o to g ra p h ic u s
acco rd in g to th e im ag e-tex t. T h is illu stra tio n p o in te d to w ard s th e th e n recen tly
e m erg ed figure o f a p h o to g ra p h e r in p u b lic .6 In this caricatu re, one ca n see a su g ­
gestio n th a t th e h u m a n an d th e m ach in e seem ed to have fu se d together. In the
im ag e, o n e c a n see a p h o to g ra p h e r w h o se h id d en u p p er body seem s to have been
re p la c e d b y the c a m era an d th e h o o d u n d e r w h ich a sin g le-ey e (a cam era lens) is

5 Human enhancement has been theoretically and critically investigated by many scholars,
among them. Cf. Katherine N. Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cy­
bernetics, Literature, and Informatics, Chicago & London: Chicago U.P., 1999; Natasha Vita
More, “Life Expansion: Toward an Artistic, Design-Based Theory of the Transhuman / Post­
human”, Plymouth University, 2012; Andy Miah, Genetically Modified Athletes; biomedical
ethics, gene doping and sport, London and New York: Routledge, 2004; Helga Nowotny and
Giuseppe Testa, Naked Genes; Reinventing the Human in the Molecular Age, Cambridge and
London: MIT Press, 2010; Andy Clark, Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World To­
gether Again, Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1998 and Gregory R. Hansell and William
Grassie (eds.), H+ Transhumanism and Its Critics, Philadelphia: Metanexus Institute, 2011.
6 Thomas L. Hankins, and Robert J. Silverman, Instruments and the Imagination, Princeton:
Princeton U.P, 1995.
Appendix by Beloff 2011,photo Laura Beloff 2012.
From Elephans Photographicus to the Hybronaut 55

lo o k in g fo r new prey. T h e im ag e p o in ts to th e sim u ltan eo u s fears a n d desires o f

the p u b lic to w ard s n ew tech n o lo g y , in w h ic h tech n o lo g y is rep lacin g parts o f the
h u m an b o d y w ith a specified fu n ctio n ality . In this im ag e the h u m an is learning
to p erceiv e th e w o rld th ro u g h technology. T h e im age form s a statem en t ab o u t
tech n o lo g y im p ro v in g th e h u m a n an d ex ten d in g his abilities, b u t also a b o u t te c h ­
no lo g y p o ssib ly rep lacin g th e h u m a n or, perh aps, his hum anity.
T h e figure o f a p h o to g ra p h e r can be co n sid ered as an early ex am p le o f a situ ­
ation, w h ere th e h u m a n senses h av e b e e n en h a n c ed w ith tech n o lo g y still allow ing
the m o b ility o f th e h u m a n body. T h is k in d o f situ atio n hig h lig h ts how te c h n o lo g i­
cal ap p u rten an ce affects the in d iv id u a l’s ex p erien ce o f the w o rld . In o th er w o rd s,
tech n o lo g y rides alo n g as a p art o f th e h u m a n in his ev ery d ay life, b u t also im ­
pacts his p e rc e p tio n o f th e su rro u n d in g w o rld by offering new poten tialities for
observations.
T h ere h as b e e n a lo n g -te rm in te re st in the arts and the sciences in the
h u m a n ’s re la tio n to tech n o lo g y an d its p o ten tial to im p ro v e o r e x te n d the
hum an. A lfo n s S ch illin g is an ex am p le o f a n artist, w hose practice d u r­
ing th e 1 9 7 0 ’s w as fo cu sed o n ex p erim en tin g w ith h u m an p e rc ep tio n . H is
artistic p ro d u c tio n in clu d es a larg e b o d y o f self-c o n stru cte d instru m en ts th at are
en titled Vision M a c h in e s (S eh em a sch in e). T h ese p ercep tu al devices w ere c o n ­
stru cted as h e a d -w o rn o b jects in a v ariety o f shapes and sizes, w h ich tran sfo rm ed
the v ie w e rs ’ p e rc e p tio n th ro u g h first-h an d ex p erien ce. A t the sam e tim e, th ey also
p h y sically h in d e re d th e u ser th ro u g h th e ir d im en sio n an d h eav y construction.
B a se d o n his research , S ch illin g cla im e d th a t h u m a n eyes are n o t spatial reference
po in ts, b u t tem p o ra l.7 T h e p rim ary aim w ith his e x p erim en ts w as to see som ething
n o b o d y has ev er seen before: he b e lie v e d th a t new realities co u ld be re v eale d by
an e x te n d e d p e rc e p tio n .8 S c h illin g ’s artistic in v estig atio n s can b e seen in p arallel
to scientific re se a rc h . R o m an a S ch u ler w rites: “ S im ilar to ex p e rim e n tal enquiries
in scientific lab o rato ries S c h illin g ’s v isio n m ach in es create artificial p ercep tu al
d istu rb an ces in th e v ie w e r’s v isu al-m o to ric re a lm ” .9

7 Romana Schuler, “Experimentelle Wahrnehmung in Psychologie und Kunst. Von Umkehr-

brillen und Sehmaschinen”, in Elisabeth von Samsonov (ed.), Unzipping Philosophy, Wien:
Passagen Verlag, 2009,46-75.
8 Alfons Schilling, Binocularis, New York, Vienna, Cologne: Galerie Ariadne, 1975. Christian
Reder, “Uber Sehen sprechen; Im Dialog mit Alfons Schilling”, in Peter Noever and Oswald
Oberhuber (eds.), Alfons Schilling Sehmaschinen, Wien: Hochschule fur angewandte Kunst
und Osterreichischen Museum fur angewandte Kunst, 1987.
9 Schuler, “Experimentelle Wahrnehmung”, p. 75.
56 Laura Beloff

W ith this research an d w o rk S ch illin g p resen ts us an ex am p le o f artistic p ra c ­

tic e th a t fo c u se d o n e n h a n c e m en t o f an ex istin g sense w ith in a situ atio n th a t could
o n ly b e e x p e rie n c ed at the first-h an d b y the user. In o th er w o rd s, the u se r h a d to
ad a p t to th e p h y sical an d co n cep tu al fra m e w o rk o f the d evice in o rd er to e x p eri­
en ce th e artw ork.

Prosthetic abilities and normativity

T h e fu n c tio n o f th e in testin al a p p en d ix is n o t fu lly co m p reh en d e d in science,

sim ilarly, th e fu n ctio n al p u rp o se o f m y o w n a rtw o rk e n titled A p p e n d ix (2011) is
p u rp o sely left open. R a th e r th a n aim in g a t b ein g an en h an c ed fu n ctio n o r p re d e­
fin ed ab ility o f a h u m a n , A p p en d ix creates a situ atio n th at m erges the u ser and
th e e n v iro n m en t.
T h e A p p e n d ix is a n e tw o rk e d ta il c o n stru c te d fo r a h um an. T h is te c h n o ­
lo g ic a l d e v ic e is d e s ig n e d to b e c o m e p a rt o f the u s e r ’s p h y sio lo g ic a l b o d y , b u t
its m o v e m e n ts a re c o n tro lle d a n d trig g e re d by a n a tu ral p h e n o m e n o n a n d b y a
h u m a n -c o n s tru c te d artific ia l sy ste m . T h e w o rk is e x p e rim e n tin g w ith tech n o -
o rg a n ic c o n n e c tio n s th a t m e rg e th e u s e r ’s b o d y an d th e e n v iro n m e n t in to a
sin g le entity.
In a c o n s tru c te d s itu a tio n lik e th is it is p o s s ib le to in v e s tig a te th e m e a n ­
in g o f te c h n o lo g ic a l e x p e rim e n ta tio n b y u s in g te c h n o lo g y th a t is d e s ig n e d
w ith a n o n -p u rp o s e fu l a n d n o n -in s tru m e n ta l a p p ro a c h . T h e A p p e n d ix is c o n ­
c e iv e d to b e a ta il, w h ic h h a s v a rio u s h u m a n a n d n o n -h u m a n c o n n e c tio n s .
T h e s e c o n n e c tio n s a re d e v e lo p e d to h a v e n o p u rp o s e fu l in te n tio n o r self-
e v id e n t m e a n in g fo r th e user. T h e h o riz o n ta l d ire c tio n o f th e ta il m o v e m e n t
is d e te rm in e d b y th e d ire c tio n o f th e H e ls in k i c ity tr a n s p o rt tra m w a y , a n d th e
v e rtic a l m o v e m e n ts a re tr ig g e r e d b y th e w a v e h e ig h t o f th e B a ltic S ea , b o th
in re a l tim e . T h is s p e c ific n o n -in te n tio n a lity o f th e c o n n e c tio n s re je c ts th e
ra tio n a l a p p ro a c h to te c h n o lo g y as a p u rp o s e fu l to o l a n d tre a ts te c h n o lo g y as
a n e n v iro n m e n t a n d m a te ria l fo r th e c re a tio n o f new , n e tw o rk e d o rg a n s fo r
h u m a n . T h e w o rk p re s e n ts a n a e s th e tic e x p e rim e n t in w h ic h it is n o t k n o w n
b e fo re h a n d w h a t m ig h t b e th e b e n e fit o f it o r w h a t k in d o f e x p e rie n c e it w ill
c re a te . E v e n th o u g h th e s tru c tu re o f th e w o rk is b a s e d o n te c h n o lo g y , it p u r­
p o s e ly la c k s a n in s tru m e n ta l te c h n o lo g ic a l u se as a m e a n s fo r a c h ie v in g a
p r e d e fin e d g oal.
C en tral to th e A p p e n d ix are th e relatio n sh ip s b etw e en th e b o d y a n d te c h n o l­
ogy, an d th e h u m an an d h er su rro u n d in g environm ent. T h ese are the elem ents
th a t are in creasin g ly b a se d o n tech n o lo g ical o r artificially create d features and
co nnections.
Appendix by Beloff 2011,photo Laura Beloff 2012.
Appendix by Beloff 2011, photo Laura Beloff 2012.
From Elephans Photographicus to the Hybronaut 59

M y h y p o th esis is th a t in th e fu tu re h u m an s w ill be increasin g ly co n n e cted to th eir

en v iro n m en t th ro u g h v ario u s te c h n o lo g ical m ean s th a t differ fro m the cu rren t
situation. T h e h u m an s are cu rren tly b ein g d ev elo p e d w ith en h a n ce d ab ilities and
n ew ly co n fig u red sen ses, b u t also o u r e n v iro n m ent, is gettin g en h an ced , m o d i­
fied an d d ata -in fu se d in v ario u s d eg rees. T h ese dev elo p m en ts re c ip ro c ally im p act
ea c h other.
B ateso n w ro te th a t th e u n it o f su rv iv al is the o rg an ism + en v iro n m en t.1 0
H o w ev er, the e v o lu tio n o f h u m a n h a n d -in -h an d w ith e n v iro n m e n t is no lo n g er
b o u n d b y th e b io lo g ic a l su rv iv al o f a h u m a n , b u t this d ev e l-o p m e n t has already
ta k e n a p a th o f its o w n .11T h is is v isib le cu rren tly in g en eral in terests in h u m a n d e ­
sig n th ro u g h v ario u s h u m an e n h a n c e m en t te c h n iq u es a n d science d ev elopm ents
aim in g e.g. fo r in c re a se d lo n g ev ity .12
H ow ever, u n derlying th e m o st b o d y en h ancem ent practices there is a cultural
assum ption o n w h at is co n sid ered a n o rm a l body. D ifferent cultural values create a
different u n d erstan d in g o f norm ality, an d they also influence the degree o f accept­
ance o f b o d y enhancem ent. Prostheses, fo r exam ple, are typically seen as im p ro v e­
m ents o f an incom plete or injured body. T h ey are n o t designed to upgrade a norm al
body.13 T he scientific v iew p o in t to b o d y en h ancem ent practices typically do not
allow p layfulness o r rad ical ex p erim entation w ithout a ju stified objective, such as
repair o f th e body.
In w earab le tech n o lo g y , in co n trast, th e extern a lity o f tech n o lo g y fro m the
org an ic b o d y ap p ears to fu n c tio n as th e d iv id in g fac to r fo r acc ep ted b o d y e n ­
h an c e m e n t p ra c tic e s. W earable tech n o lo g y p ro v id es an op en area fo r e x p e rim e n ­
tal a n d p lay fu l p ractices th a t are c o n c e rn e d w ith h u m a n e n h an cem en t w ith o u t
n ecessarily re q u irin g eth ical an d m o ra l ju stific atio n . N ev erth ele ss, this o p p o r­
tu n ity is cu rren tly m ain ly u se d by th e p ractices em erg in g w ith in th e arts, w h ich
o fte n d rastically d iffer fro m th e w o rk s m o tiv ate d by technology, en g in eerin g or
science.

10 Gregory Bateson, “Pathologies of Epistemology”, p. 454-63.

11 A. Sandberg, The Transhuman Vision, website: <http://www.aleph.se/Trans/Intro/vision.
html>. [accessed 20.12.2012]
12 Aubrey de Grey, “Defeat of aging - utopia or foreseeable scientific reality?”, in Vladimir
Burdyuzha (ed.), The Future of Life and the Future of our Civilization, Dordrecht: Springer,
2006, p .277-90.
13 Looking at the recent Olympics in London (2012), it seems that currently the Paralympics is
the real-life showcase for physical body enhancements. During the last decade there is an in­
crease of debates within the world of professional sports concerning the right of para-athletes,
who are equipped with their hi-tech prostheses, to compete with normal bodied athletes. Cf.
Nowotny and Testa, Naked Genes.
60 Laura Beloff

The Hybronaut

W h a t k in d o f n ew sen ses an d ab ilities seem sensible o r n e cessary fo r a future

h u m a n ? W h a t k in d s o f co n n ectio n s w ill b e co n stru c ted b etw een the h u m an and
h e r en v iro n m en t? H o w d o es th is d e v e lo p m e n t ch an g e the w ay w e u n d e rstan d a
u n it c a lle d th e h u m a n ? In ste a d o f try in g to satisfy in g ly answ er th ese in feasib le
q u estio n s, I w ill p re se n t so m e o f m y in v estig atio n s th a t specu late o n th ese q u e s­
tions th ro u g h p ra c tic e -b a se d ex p erim e n ta tio n w ith in w earab le tech n o lo g y a rt.14
I see th e te c h n o lo g ic a l n e tw o rk in frastru ctu re as p o ten t fo r ex p erim en tin g
w ith new k in d s o f co n n ectio n s an d b o n d s b e tw ee n h u m an a n d the environm ent.
F o r in v estig atin g this I h av e d e v e lo p e d a p ra ctic e-b a se d resea rch c o n cep t th at I
alread y m en tio n e d at th e o u tset o f th is paper: th e H ybronaut. T h e H y b ro n au t is an
artistic ex p erim en t, re a lise d th ro u g h n etw o rk ed w earab le tec h n o lo g y eq u ip m en t
b a se d o n th e m erg er o f th e p h y sic a l an d th e v irtu al, the organic and the artificial.
It in v estig ates a tech n o -o rg an ic en tity th a t co m b in es h u m a n and tech n o lo g y lo ­
ca te d w ith in h y b rid en v iro n m en t. It is a m erg er o f tech n o lo g ical an d physical
realities.
T h e H y b ro n a u t en ab les first-h an d ex p erien ce w ith in the h y b rid e n v iro n m ent.
v ia th e u se o f p h y sic a lly co n stru c te d w earab le e q u ip m e n t th a t is m ad e av ailable
fo r p u b lic use. T h is eq u ip m en t en ab les th e u se r to beco m e th e H y b ro n a u t and
ex p lo re the p o te n tia lity o f th e h y b rid en v iro n m ent, fro m the H y b ro n a u t’s p e rsp e c ­
tive.
T h e H y b ro n a u t is a figure w h o se ex isten ce is p ro fo u n d ly b a se d on a h y b rid
en v iro n m e n t an d v ario u s k in d s o f relatio n sh ip s, ph y sical an d n etw orked, w h ich
are co n stru c te d w ith in th is en v iro n m en t. In th e crea te d situation, n etw o rk te c h ­
n o lo g y is tre a te d as an ele m e n t o f a h u m a n body, as w ell as a featu re an d a d im en ­
sio n o f o u r e v ery d ay enviro n m en t. T h e H y b ro n a u t co n cen trates o n ex am in in g
th e p o ssib ilities o f p erc e iv in g n e tw o rk an d co n n ected n ess as a new facu lty o f a
h u m a n body. T h e co n cep t o f c o n n ected n ess is tre a te d in a v ery d ifferen t w ay in
th e se w o rk s in c o m p a riso n to o u r ty p ical use o f m o b ile n etw o rk te ch n o lo g y as a
co m m u n ic a tio n ch an n el o r in fo rm a tio n retriev al device.
T h e H y b ro n a u t in v estig ates th e w ay in w h ic h (netw ork) tech n o lo g y en h a n c­
es o u r p erc e p tio n o f th e w o rld an d o u r p resen ce in it by b eco m in g an in teg ral part
o f o u r id en tity an d ph y sio lo g y . T h is does n o t o n ly co n cern the m o d ification o f
th e h u m a n b o d y an d its ap p earan ce th ro u g h w e arab le o r b o d y -e m b ed d ed tech-

14 Wearable technology art is a term coined by Susan E. Ryan to discuss the art & design approaches
in the field of wearable technology. Cf. Susan E. Ryan, “What is Wearable Technology Art?”,
in S. Ryan and P Lichty (eds.), Intelligent Agent, 2008, <www.intelligentagent.com>, [accessed
29.3.2014],p.7-12.
Fruit Fly Farm by Beloff 2006, photo Laura Beloff, Anu Akkanen 2007.
62 Laura Beloff

nology, b u t also th e esta b lish m e n t o f re latio n sh ip s w ith h etero g en eo u s n etw o rk s

o f h u m an s a n d n o n -h u m an s. W h ile b e in g th e H y b ro n au t, the u se r does n o t only
ap p e a r in th e p h y sical en v iro n m en t, she sim u ltan eo u sly ap p ears in th e virtual
sphere. T h e p o ssib ilities fo r c o n cretely lin k ed relatio n s are e x p an d e d by m eans
o f technology. T h ese relatio n sh ip s fo rm a c o m p lex n etw o rk o f p h y sical a n d v ir­
tu al in teractio n s, m aterials, hu m an s, an d o rganic a n d te ch n o lo g ica l com p o n en ts
sim u ltan eo u sly . T h e H y b ro n a u t can b e seen in re latio n to the acto r-n etw o rk th e o ­
ris t Jo h n L a w ’s argum ent: “ w h a t co u n ts as a p e rso n is an e ffect g en erated b y a
n e tw o rk o f h etero g en eo u s, in teractin g , m a te ria ls”.15 T his k in d o f persp ectiv e is
at th e core o f th e H y b ro n au t, w h o is co n stitu ted o f relations, actio n s an d diverse
m aterials in a h etero g en eo u s structure. T h e b o d y is en h a n ce d by w earab le device
in o rd e r to c o m p re h e n d its co n n ectio n , spatial p la ce m e n t a n d p o ssib ilities w ith in
a n e tw o rk in clu d in g b o th p h y sical a n d v irtu al characteristics.
O n e can arg u e th a t in th e w earab le te ch n o lo g y artw o rk s, the h u m an and
tech n o lo g y create a tech n o -o rg an ic entity, w h ich is n o t b a se d on rep resen ta tio n al
qu alities b u t o n a co n crete co n stru c tio n o f an e x p erien ce fo r th e user. M y earlier
w ork, F ru it F ly F a rm (2 0 0 6 ), in clu d es a w earab le , tech n o lo g ica lly n etw o rk ed
fru it fly fa rm an d a h u m a n as a single entity. In this w o rk , the h u m a n exp erien ces
a c o -p resen ce w ith b io lo g ic a l o rg an ism s an d w ith o th er p eo p le w ith in a h y b rid
en v iro n m en t, w h o c a n co n n ect to th e F ru it F ly F a rm v ia a m o b ile netw ork. T he
w o rk creates a co n n e c tio n b e tw e e n the au d ien ce, the u se r o f the w o rk a n d n o n ­
h u m a n o rg an ism s, th e fru it fly com m unity. A ll o f th ese p arts affect each o ther
an d fo rm a sy stem w ith in th e c o n te x t o f h y b rid environm ent. T h is an d o th e r th ese
k in d s o f w earab le w o rk s o ffer an im m ed iate re al-life ex p erien ce as an artw ork, in
w h ich the u se r b eco m es a co m p o n en t in a tech n o -o rg an ic system .
T h e H y b ro n a u t is specifically re fe re n ce d in co n n ectio n w ith m y series o f
n e tw o rk e d w earab le te c h n o lo g y artw o rk s p ro d u ced d u rin g la st d e c a d e .16 T h e H y ­
b ro n a u t is n o t fo u n d e d on a g o a l-o rie n te d trajecto ry w ith one clearly defined ai m .
R ather, th e v ario u s w earab le e q u ip m e n t th a t I have c reate d fo r the H y b ro n au t
h av e th eir o w n specific co n cep ts. T h ese series o f dev ices en able the H y b ro n a u t
to ex p erim en t, o b serv e a n d speculate: w h a t w ill hap p en , w h a t k inds o f e x p e ri­
en ces are b ein g fo rm e d a n d w h a t u n p red ictab le poten tial th ese situations offer.
T h e H y b ro n a u t is co n stru c te d c o n cretely to ex p e rim e n t w ith situations in w hich
te c h n o lo g y h as b eco m e in sep arab le fro m o u r env iro n m en t, and, consequently,
fo rm us. T h ro u g h th e em p h asis o n b ein g ra th er th a n d oing, the H y b ro n au t points
to a w ay in w h ic h te c h n o lo g y is c o m m o n ly u n d e rsto o d fro m a v ery in stru m e n ­

15 John Law, “Notes on the Theory of the Actor Network: Ordering, Startegy and Heterogene­
ity”, 2003 [1992], <http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/papers/Law.Notes-on-ANT.
pdf>,[accessed29.3.2014], p.4.
16 <http://www.realitydisfunction.org>, [accessed29.3.2014].
From Elephans Photographicus to the Hybronaut 63

tal p ersp ectiv e; it ch allen g es the ap p ro ach es th a t focus p rim arily on p u rp o sefu l
functionality. T h e H y b ro n a u t p u sh es fo rw a rd q u estio n s o n th e d ev e lo p m en t o f
the h u m a n bo d y , senses an d h u m a n ’s re la tio n to h er en v iro n m en t. T he aim is
to fo rm v ario u s m od els, co n cep tu al an d tan g ib le, w h ich p ro v id e op p o rtu n ities
to in v estig ate th e se situ atio n s an d th e ir possibilities. A s co n crete a n d m aterially
co n stru c te d situ atio n s th e y also p ro v id e m en tal space fo r u sers, in w h ic h it is p o s­
sible to g rad u ally ad ap t to new p o ssib ilities, req u irem en ts an d fu tu re changes. In
a sense, th e H y b ro n a u t an d th e cre a te d situ ations ca n be seen as p ro to ty p es and
reh earsals fo r p o ssib le fu tu re circu m stan ces.

Exploring the hybrid environment

E m p ty S p a ce (2009) is a w o rk th a t ad d resses the id ea o f loss and p re sen c e in the

h y b rid enviro n m en t. It is a co n stru c te d m aterial m o n u m e n t th a t c an be ded icated
on lin e to th e lo ss o f som ething. In o th e r w o rd s, it is a w earab le, m aterial artifact
th a t is d e sig n e d to co m m e m o rate a m aterial o b je ct o r a cause th at has b eco m e im ­
m aterial. T h e c o n stru c te d w earab le o b je c t is a tra n sp aren t p o ly carb o n ate cap su le,
w h ic h is m ad e as a v a c u u m - p resen tin g an actu al ph y sical em p ty space. T his
actual p h y sic a l o b je c t is o ffe re d to th e g e n e ra l p u b lic to b e w o rn w ith in p e o p le ’s
e v ery d ay lives: at ho m e, o u t o n th e streets an d an y w h ere else th ey h ap p en to be.
T h e p iece is eq u ip p e d w ith a n e tw o rk e d sm all screen, w h ich co n sta n tly displays
the cu rren tly sch ed u led d e d ic a tio n o f th e piece. In o th er w ords, th e general public
is o ffe re d a n o p p o rtu n ity to d ed icate th e p iece te m p o rarily to th e ir n eeds - be it
a p riv ate an d p erso n al o r u n iv ersal cau se w ith an im p act o n the en tire globe. T he
sho rt d e d ic a tio n te x t w ill be sh o w n o n th e sm all sc re en attac h ed to the cap su le at
the d efin ed tim e an d date.
E m p ty S p a ce is c o n stru c te d specifically fo r the h y b rid env iro n m en t; it lo ­
cates th e u ser c o n cretely in a h y b rid en v iro n m en t a n d m akes ap p a re n t th e socially
an d te c h n o lo g ic a lly n e tw o rk e d w o rld in w h ich o u r lives are entangled. In this
w ork, te c h n o lo g y is n o lo n g e r seen as a utility, b u t p art o f o u r ev ery d ay existence.
In a w ay, it can be co n sid e re d as a tra d itio n a l, m ateria l-b ased scu lp tu re, w hich
m an ifests ex isten ce in a h y b rid en v iro n m en t. T h e in h e re n t featu re o f h y b rid e n ­
viro n m en t, m obility, is d e m o n stra te d b y its d ep en d en cy o n hu m an s, the sculpture
trav els on s o m e o n e ’s b ack . In o th e r w o rd s, the w o rk is d esig n e d as a w earab le
parasite, w h ic h u ses th e h u m a n as a v eh icle to m o v e fro m p lace to place. T his
featu re creates sk ep ticism to w ard s th e m o tiv atio n s b e h in d the w ork; the users
h av e to find th e ir o w n satisfacto ry in terp retatio n fo r the situ atio n and decid e w ho
is in th e serv ice o f w hom .
64 Laura Beloff

T h e u se o f th is o b je c t is b a se d o n h u m a n relatio n sh ip s; a h u m an is c o n sid ­
ere d as a n o d e an d th e n ec e ssa ry co m p o n e n t, w h ich en ab les this n etw o rk ed o b jec t
to p e rfo rm . T h e re la tio n sh ip s esta b lish e d g lo b ally th ro u g h the o b je c t are m ore or
less arbitrary, b u t at th e sam e tim e, v ery concrete. T h e perso n al ded icatio n s m ade,
n o t o n ly ap p e a r in p u b lic o n th is scu lp tu re, b u t th ey also e n te r the U m w elt o f the
H y b ro n a u t, w h o is carry in g the object.

Conclusions

O n e o f th e cen tral aspects o f U e x k u ll’s co n cep t o f U m w elt is the o rg a n ism ’s ab il­

ity to in te rp re t v isu al signs v ia a p ro cess g u id ed by an o rg a n ism ’s p h y sio lo g ical
facu lties an d n eed s. A cco rd in g to U e x k u ll, the o rg a n ism ’s su b jectiv e U m w elt,
th e p ercep tio n o f th e w o rld , is c re a te d o n th e basis o f reco g n isab le signs. In o ther
w o rd s, w h a t it is ab le to see o r sen se is su b seq u en tly g u id ed by its phy sio lo g ical
ab ilitie s.17 A lso F ran cisco J. V arela’s in v estig atio n s h av e re v e aled th at o u r c o g n i­
tio n is d ep e n d e n t o n ex p erien ces th a t are p ro d u ced by h av in g a certain k in d o f
bo d y w ith certain k in d s o f sen so r an d m o to r capacities, w h ich are em b ed d e d in
a b io lo g ical a n d in a cu ltu ral context. V arela w rites th a t “ [ ...] sensory an d m o to r
pro cesses, p e rc e p tio n an d actio n , are fu n d am en tally in sep arab le in liv ed c o g n i­
tion. In d eed , th e tw o are n o t m erely co n tin g en tly lin k ed in in d iv id u als th ey have
also ev o lv e d to g e th e r.”18 In o th e r w o rd s, th e structure o f the p erceiv er is in se p a ­
rab le fro m th e e x p e rie n c ed w orld.
T h e co n te m p o ra ry p e rc e p tio n o n h u m a n d e v elo p m e n t has d ep a rte d from
th e scen ario w h ere b io lo g ical ev o lu tio n is deeply co n n ec ted to survival w ith in
a specific en v iro n m e n t, in a sim ilar w ay as m an y o f the n o n -h u m an organism s
are d ep e n d e n t o n th e ir en v iro n m en ts. Increasingly, hum ans an d th e ir abilities
an d senses are m a n ip u lated , m o d ified , en h a n ce d and ex ten d ed th ro u g h v arious
m ethods. T h is d e v e lo p m e n t also su g g ests th a t hum ans w ill d ev elo p very d ifferen t
kin d s o f relatio n sh ip s a n d co n n ectio n s to th e ir su rro u n d in g en v iro n m en ts th a t are
in d e p e n d e n t o f th e h u m a n d e v e lo p m e n t trajectory.
E v en i f b io lo g ic a l su rv iv al is n o lo n g e r the defining c o m p o n en t o f the h u m an
ev o lu tio n , o r h u m an d esig n , th e a c t o f su rv ival is still a key c o m p o n en t in the
H y b ro n a u t’s tech n o -o rg an ic en v iro n m en t. H ow ever, the su rv iv al at stake is n o t a
b io lo g ic a l o n e, b u t one re la te d to c o n n ected n ess. W e m ig h t ca ll this the u n in te n d ­
ed c o n n ecto m e. A n d ev en i f the H y b ro n a u t is m o dified fo r su rv iv al in a h y b rid
tech n o -o rg an ic en v iro n m e n t, th e H y b ro n a u t’s sub jectiv e p erc ep tio n o f the w o rld

17 Uexkull, “A Stroll Through the Worlds of Animals and Men”, p. 5-76.

18 Francisco J. Varela, Eleanor Rosch and Evan Thompson, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Sci­
ence and Human Experience, Cambridge, London: MIT Press, 1991, p. 173.
Empty Space by Beloff 2009, photo Laura Beloff 2009.
66 Laura Beloff

(its U m w elt) is c o n stru c te d w ith in th e m erg in g o f ph y sical reality an d tech n o lo g i­

cal space. N otably, lik e b io lo g ical d eath, a lo st n etw o rk co n n ec tio n c o u ld cause a
lo ss o f h y b rid en v iro n m en t, a loss o f th e U m w elt, as w ell as a loss o f id en tity as
th e H y b ro n au t. T h e H y b ro n a u t p erceiv es and con stru cts h e r sub jectiv e U m w elt
w ith in th e fram e o f h er p h y sical an d co g n itiv e abilities, w h ich are extended, and
so m etim es also h in d ered , by w earab le equipm ent.
Empty Space by Beloff 2009, photo Laura Beloff 2009.
An Embodied Approach to Collaborative Music Practice

KORAY TAHIROGLU AND JAMES NESFIELD

N ew m e d ia te d fo rm s o f a rt e x p erien ce m ak e dem an d s in term s o f in tu itiv e, e x ­

p lo rato ry an d re sp o n siv e in teractio n s. T h ese form s o f in te rac tio n can be stu d ­
ied in a m u lti-sen so ry an d m u ltim o d al in teractio n co n tex t, co m b in in g m u ltip le
m o d es o f sen so ry in p u t an d ou tp u t, su ch as audio, visual, ta ctile a n d hap tic m o ­
d alities. In th e p h y sic a l w o rld , m u lti-sen so ry fo rm s o f in teractio n are v ery natural
to h u m a n actio n , as w e to u ch a n d fe e l, listen a n d h ea r a n d look a n d see a t the
sam e tim e .1 Today, new d ig ital tech n o lo g ies p rovide an attractiv e set o f tools
fo r stu d y in g m u lti-sen so ry in te ra c tio n s, a n d giv e us y et an o th er w ay to lo o k at
in teractio n p arad ig m s; w o rk in g o n th e m allow s us to b ette r u n d erstan d o u r re la ­
tio n sh ip to e sta b lish e d cu ltu ral p ractices a n d th eir m ed ia te d ch aracter.2 In a new
era o f in teractio n d esig n , m an y o f the specific affordances o f tech n o lo g ies and
d esig n ch allen g es create a n ew g ro u n d fo r research ers, artists a n d desig n ers to
u n d e rsta n d th e ev o lv in g in te ra c tio n sty les an d beh av io rs.3
O u r research , “N o tio n o f th e P articip ativ e a n d E n actin g S onic In te rac tio n ”
(P E S I), aim s to in v estig ate p o ten tial affo rd an ces o f dig ital tech n o lo g ies to c re ­
ate in teractio n s th a t ch allen g e th e n o tio n o f ex p ressio n in co llab o rativ e m usic
practices. T h is article ex p lo res th e creativ e activ ities w ith reg ard to bo d ily and
situ ated in teractio n an d in tro d u ces th e P E S I resea rch p ro je ct as a fac ilita to r o f a
p ractice lead in g to a b etter u n d erstan d in g o f th e bo d ily in terac tio n o f particip an ts
in term s o f th e ir lo catio n , d istan ce an d c o o rd in a tio n as a group.
W h ile th e ad v a n c e s o f n ew re v o lu tio n a ry te c h n o lo g ie s m ay c o n trib u te to
so m e fre e d o m in a rtistic c re a tio n , it is o u r re se a rc h in te n tio n to p a y m o re a t­
te n tio n to th e a c t o f e x p re ssio n in a c re a tiv e p ro ce ss, the e x p re ssio n o f the s e l f
in a n d th ro u g h a m e d iu m .4 A rtistic p ra c tic e s c a n ra re ly be lim ite d to tec h n ic a l
a sp e c ts only, a n d it is p ro b le m a tic to o u tlin e a c re a tiv e in sig h t if one d isre ­
g a rd s th e c o m p le x n a tu re o f creativ ity . A c c o rd in g to Jo h n D ew ey , cre a tiv ity

1 John Dewey, Art As Experience, New York: Perigee Trade, 2005,p.51.

2 Steven Heim, The Resonant Interface, HCI Foundations For Interaction Design, Boston: Ad­
dison Wesley, 2008.
3 Ibid., p. 3-4. See also Dan Saffer, Designing for Interaction: Creating Innovative Applica­
tions and Devices (2nd Edition), Berkeley: New Riders Press, 2010.
4 The term medium refers here to a material, which can be further formulated and contextual-
ized as technology. Cf. Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 67.
70 Koray Tahiroglu and James Nesfield

is so m e th in g c o m p le x , a n o n g o in g p ro c e ss b e tw e e n m ak in g , d o in g a n d u sin g .5
T h e c o n tin u o u s p ro c e ss c a n h e lp c re a tiv e e x p re ssio n to c o m e u p w ith id ea s th a t
are new , su rp risin g a n d v a lu a b le .6 W e are le d to define o u r re la tio n sh ip w ith
te c h n o lo g y so th a t th e te c h n o lo g y b e c o m e s a facilita to r, a m e d iu m o f cre ativ e
e x p re ssio n an d , th ro u g h th a t, th e c re a tiv e act. E v e n th o u g h it is e a sy to u n d e r­
sta n d th e v a rie ty o f te c h n iq u e s a n d te c h n o lo g ie s p la y in g an eq u a lly im p o rta n t
ro le in th is re la tio n sh ip , it is n o t alw a y s th e case th a t te c h n o lo g y sh o u ld p rec ed e
th e c re a tiv e act: a rtists a n d re se a rc h e rs h av e b e e n p u sh in g th e lim its o f w h at
te c h n o lo g y c a n o ffe r b y u sin g te c h n o lo g y to ch a lle n g e th e m an y asp e c ts o f o u r
c re a tiv e ex p erien ce.
T ec h n o lo g y h as a lw ay s b e e n p a rt o f a rt p rax is, b u t today, th a n k s to the
in c re a se d a c c e ssib ility o f d ig ita l te c h n o lo g ie s a n d g en e ra l c o m p u te riz a tio n o f
c u ltu ra l p ra c tic e s, a h ig h le v e l o f d ia lo g b e tw e e n th e a rtist a n d th e v ie w e r has
b e e n ach ie v e d . It is in o u r n a tu re to e x p lo re new to o ls a n d te c h n iq u e s in a
p la y fu l way. H o w ev er, th e e m e rg e n c e o f th e c re a tiv e a c t is n o t o n ly a sso c ia te d
w ith tech n o lo g y . It is, fu rth e rm o re , th e c o m p le x stru c tu re o f cre a tiv ity its e lf
th a t g ath ers a ro u n d it p le a su ra b le a c tiv itie s, su c h as p la y fu l e n g a g e m e n t w ith
te c h n o lo g y . In th is a rtic le , w e w ill n o t o ffe r o r su g g e st an u ltim a te d efin itio n o f
cre a tiv ity . W h a t w e w ill d o in ste a d is sh ift th e fo cu s to the n o tio n o f ‘cre ativ e
a c tiv ity ’ a n d th e e x p e rie n c e o f p le a su re th a t it in v o lv es in a sp ecific c o n te x t o f
c o lla b o ra tiv e a rtistic p ractice.
A s D ew ey show s, in any ty p e o f creativ e activ ity th ere is a co n tin u o u s phase
o f d o in g o r m ak in g , w h ic h in v o lv es o u r b o d ily m o v em en t an d th e m an ip u latio n
o f o b jects an d is thus an activ e ex p erien ce.7 K n o w led g e an d p ercep tio n are ro o ted
in o u r in ten tio n al, m ean in g fu l a n d a ctiv e ex p erien cin g o f art. A n a ly sin g the c o n ­
cep tu al fra m e w o rk o f th e pro cess, D ew ey p o in ts o u t th a t ac tio n an d p ercep tio n
ca n n o t be sep arated fro m ea c h o th er.8 S u ch a sep a ra tio n w o u ld im p ly th a t art
does n o t reflect th e c o m p lex n atu re o f the creativ e act. W h a t occu rs in the cre a ­
tiv e p ro cess is a n u ltim ate co u p lin g o f a c tio n a n d perception. F o r D ew ey, th ere is
so m eth in g lik e a w o rk o f art first in aesth etic ex p e rie n ce, w h ich in tu rn req u ires
th e activ ity o f perception.

5 Ibid., p. 48.
6 Margaret Boden, The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms, London and New York: Rout-
ledge, 2004, p. 1-10.
7 Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 46-56.
8 Ibid., p. 48.
An Embodied Approach to Collaborative Music Practice 71

W ith in this fram ew o rk , w e b elie v e th at th ere is a strong co n n ectio n b etw een

the act o f creativ e e x p ressio n an d in tersu b jectiv e b o d ily a ctiv ities. In the P E S I re ­
search p ro je c t, w e h a v e lin k e d this co n n e c tio n fu rth e r to attem pts at b rin g in g the
bo d y o n th e a rea o f aesth e tic e x p lo ra tio n ,9 as w ell as to our ph y sical ex p erien ce o f
th e w o rld th ro u g h o u r in te ra c tio n w ith o u r en v iro n m en t, w h ic h h ap p en s a t every
m o m e n t o f o u r liv es a n d co n stitu tes h u m a n e x p e rie n c e.10

Physicality of the body

T h e v ery n o tio n o f e m b o d ie d in te ra c tio n aim s a t articu latin g our c o n tin u o u s in ­

te ra c tio n w ith th e w orld. E m b o d ie d in te ra c tio n is ch a ra cteriz ed as an everyday
h u m an activ ity in w h ic h w e u n d erg o b o d ily exp erien ces an d in w h ic h m eanings
em erge. M an y p h ilo so p h ers an d sch o lars h av e long d iscu ssed th e w ay in w hich
ou r e v ery d ay in teractio n is e m b o d ie d in in tersu b jectiv e and b o d ily activ ities, and
how h u m a n ex p erien ce resid es in th is in te ra c tio n .11
M a rk J o h n so n 's d e sc rip tio n o f th e e x p e rie n c e o f b a la n c e sh o w s h o w w e
le a rn it e sse n tia lly fro m o u r b o d ily a c tiv ity a n d h o w th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f b a l­
an c e tru ly em e rg e s fro m th e a c t o f b a la n c in g w ith in o u r m o v e m e n ts.12 J o h n ­
s o n ’s p o in t h e re is to e m p h a siz e th a t th e m e a n in g o f b a la n c e b e g in s to em erg e
th ro u g h o u r a c t o f b a la n c in g w ith o u r m o v e m en ts. O u r e x p e rie n c e o f bo d ily
a c tiv itie s a n d b o d ily in te ra c tio n s c re a te s itu a te d a n d in te rp re te d m ean in g . A s
A lv a N o e p o in ts out, o u r p e rc e p tu a l e x p e rie n c e re p re se n ts th e w o rld in d e ta il in
th e fo rm o f se n so rim o to r k n o w le d g e , w h ic h is to say th a t p e rc e iv in g b eco m e s
a sk ilfu l b o d ily a c tiv ity in w h ic h o u r e x p e rie n c e d e p e n d s o n o u r sen so rim o to r
sk ills .13 F u rth e r, th is c o n c e p tu a l v ie w p o in t c an b e re la te d to D e w e y ’s n o tio n o f
aesth etics: a e sth e tic e x p e rie n c e a n d m e a n in g o f the a rt o b je c t are d e riv e d fro m
th e a c t o f p ercep tio n .

9 Deniz Peters, Gerhard Eckel and Andreas Dorschel, Bodily Expression in Electronic Music:
Perspectives on Reclaiming Performativity, London and New York: Routledge, 2012.
10 Paul Dourish, Where the Action Is: The foundations of Embodied Interaction, Cambridge
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2004.
11 Thomas Fuchs and Hanne De Jaegher, “Enactive intersubjectivity: Participatory sense-mak­
ing and mutual incorporation”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences vol: 8, 4, 2009,
p. 465-486. Cf. Dourish, Where the Action Is and Alva Noe, Varieties of Presence, Harvard:
Harvard U. P., 2012.
12 Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Rea­
son, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990, p. 74.
13 Noe, Varieties of Presence, p. 2-4.
72 Koray Tahiroglu and James Nesfield

To en fo rce o u r aw aren ess o f b o d ily ex p erien ce, w e c an also ex p lo re this point

o f view in th e c o n te x t o f p rev io u s re se a rc h o n e m b o d ie d interaction. E m b o d ied
actio n s p o sitio n th e h u m a n b o d y as an au to n o m o u s en tity th at is in tern ally self-
co n stru ctiv e an d ac tiv e ly reg u lates h u m a n interactio n s w ith the e n v iro n m e n t.14
In th is p ersp ectiv e, m ean in g in clu d es p attern s o f em b o d ied exp erien ce, and, vice
v e rsa , e m b o d im ent, influences th e d e v e lo p m en t and articu latio n o f m ean in g s. In
sh o rt, em b o d ied actio n influences th e w ay s in w h ich things can b e m ean in g fu l
to u s .15 U n d erstan d in g th e ro le o f th e h u m a n b o d y in its ev ery d ay em b o d im en t
presu p p o ses th a t o n e ta k e s in to a c c o u n t th e m u ltifac ete d ch a ra cter o f em b o d ied
in te ra c tio n th a t in v o lv es creatin g , d istrib u tin g an d sh aring m ean in g th ro u g h m u ­
tu a lly e n g a g e d in te ra c tio n fo rm s.16
R e la te d d iscu ssio n s w ith in co g n itiv e science o ffer us new w ays o f th in k ­
in g ab o u t artistic p ra c tic e s. In o u r specific re se arc h co n te x t, th ese new d irections
p ro v id e us w ith d iv erse o p p o rtu n ities to co n sid er o u r in terp re tatio n an d u n d er­
stan d in g o f b o d ily activ ities in g ro u p m u sic p ra ctice s. W e aim to fo rm u late our
v iew o n p ra c ticin g art, specifically in a c o llab o rativ e m usic ex p erien ce th ro u g h
an e m b o d ie d in te ra c tio n p erspective.
T h e a p p lic a tio n d o m a in o f o u r re se a rch , re g a rd in g so u n d a n d m u sic in ­
te ra c tio n , in c lu d e s th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f m u sic as a co m p le x d y n a m ic system .
In ste a d o f fo c u sin g o n h isto ric a l fa c to rs it a im s a t p u sh in g th e b o u n d a rie s o f
so u n d a n d m u sic p e rfo rm a n c e s. W e are th u s p a y in g m o re a tte n tio n to p e rfo r­
m a n c e p ra c tic e s th a t are situ a te d , e m b o d ie d an d so c ia lly c o n te x tu a liz e d . W e
g iv e a n a c c o u n t o f b o d ily a c tiv itie s th a t b u ild o n sp atial a n d te m p o ra l re la tio n s
b e tw e e n th e p e rfo rm e rs. T h is p ro c e ss h e lp s us to d e v e lo p an in te ra c tio n m o d el
fo r u n d e rsta n d in g c o m p le x c re a tiv e a c tiv itie s b e tw e e n th e p e rfo rm e rs, p h y sic al
a rte fa c ts a n d th e e n v iro n m e n t. In th is m u sic p ra c tic e , th e p h y sic a l e x iste n c e o f
th e p e rfo rm e r is n o t re d u c e d to a n y sy m b o lic ab stra c tio n s in th e c o n tro l p a ra m ­
ete rs o f th e m u sic a l in stru m e n ts. F u rth e rm o re , th e p h y sic a lity o f th e p erfo rm ers
p ro v id e s p h y sic a l ric h n e ss in th e m o m e n t o f m a k in g m u sic by c re a tin g g ro u p
d y n a m ic s a n d d is trib u tin g th e m u sic a l e x p e rie n c e b e tw e e n th e in d iv id u als. T h is
ap p ro a c h p ro v id e s a n a c c o u n t o f sh a re d in te ra c tio n in th e m u sic a l c o n te n t an d
th e re fo re in th e m u sic e x p e rie n c e. S im ilarly , in a g ro u p c re a tiv e a c tiv ity the

14 Evan Thompson and Mog Stapleton, “Making sense of sense-making: Reflections on enactive
and extended mind theories”, Topoi, vol 28(1), 2009, p. 23-30. Cf. Francisco J. Varela, Evan
Thompson and Elelanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experi­
ence, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1993 and John Steward, Olivier Gapenne and Ezequiel Di
Paolo (eds.), Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science, Cambridge MA:
MIT Press, 2010.
15 Cf. Johnson, The Body in the Mind.
16 Raymond W. Gibbs, Embodiment and Cognitive Science, Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2005.
Cf. Dourish, Where the Action Is.
An Embodied Approach to Collaborative Music Practice 73

m e a n in g is e m b e d d e d in th e in te ra c tio n a n d a rtic u la te d o n th e le v e l o f p h y sic a l

en g a g e m e n t in th e in te ra c tio n . In th e P E S I re se a rc h p ro je c t, w e b e lie v e th a t the
in te ra c tio n a n d c o o rd in a tio n o f th e p e rfo rm e rs in th e m o m e n t o f m u sica l p ra c ­
tic e c a n o ffe r w id e -ra n g in g sc e n a rio s o f in v e stig a tin g the p h y sic a l e n h a n c e m en t
o f c re a tiv e activ ity , su b je c tiv e e x p re ssio n , an d the a c tu a l ro le o f th e u se r in in ­
te ra c tiv e m u sic p e rfo rm a n c es. In th is c o n te x t, o u r a p p ro a c h re so n a te s w ell w ith
the c u rre n t v ie w in c o g n itiv e stu d ie s o n in te rsu b je c tiv ity in e m b o d ie d in te ra c ­
tio n a n d h o w m e a n in g is g e n e ra te d th ro u g h it.17
W e sh a re th e sa m e a s s u m p tio n s as F u c h s a n d J a e g e r in th e ir th e o ry o n th e
n o tio n o f in te rs u b je c tiv ity , as th e se h e lp u s to d e v e lo p o u r u n d e rs ta n d in g o f
s e n s e -m a k in g a c tiv itie s sta rtin g fro m th e in te ra c tio n a n d c o o rd in a tio n o f h u ­
m a n b o d ie s in a so c ia l c o n te x t.18 W h e n tw o p e o p le g e t in v o lv e d in an activ ity ,
th e p ro c e s s its e lf c a n le a d to in te ra c tio n s in w h ic h th e y a c tiv e ly p a rtic ip a te in
th e g e n e ra tio n o f m e a n in g in d ia lo g u e w ith th e ir e n v iro n m e n t. T h is d ia lo g u e
b e tw e e n th e s e n s e -m a k in g a c tiv ity o f th e p a rtic ip a n ts a n d th e re s p o n s e s fro m
th e ir e n v iro n m e n t is in te ra c tio n a l ra th e r th a n in d iv id u a l. T h e d ia lo g is e m ­
b o d ie d in th e s e n se th a t it is c o m p o s e d o f fu ll b o d y a c tio n s; it is d y n a m ic an d
lo c a te d ; in s h o rt, it is in th e w o rld . T h e d ia lo g is in te n tio n a l; a n d th e se in te n ­
tio n a l a c ts a re a v a ila b le to o th e rs. T h e in te n tio n s a re e m e rg e n t, th a t is, th e y
a re n o t b a s e d o n in d iv id u a l d e c is io n s b u t c o m e fro m th e o n g o in g in te rp la y
b e tw e e n p e rs o n a n d e n v iro n m e n t. F u c h s a n d J a e g h e r ’s v ie w o n in te rs u b je c ­
tiv ity a n d s e n s e -m a k in g a c tiv itie s p ro v id e s u s w ith a fra m e w o rk fo r fo r m u la t­
in g th e d e s ig n o f a s y ste m fo r a c o lle c tiv e m u sic e x p e rie n c e th a t e m p h a siz e s
th e a p p ro a c h e s to e m b o d ie d in te ra c tio n . T h is o v e rv ie w o n in te rs u b je c tiv ity is
c ritic a l in th e se n se th a t it h e lp s u s to fo rm u la te o u r v iew o n s itu a te d in te r a c ­
tio n w ith sp a tia l a n d te m p o ra l c o o rd in a tio n a c tiv itie s o f th e p e rfo rm e rs in a
c o lla b o ra tiv e m u s ic e x p e rie n c e .
W ith in o u r c u rre n t re se a rc h in te re s ts , i.e ., in th e c o n te x t o f m u ltise n so ry
in te ra c tio n s a n d c re a tiv e a c tiv itie s in v o lv in g th e p h y sic a lity o f th e body, w e
fo c u s o n b o d ily m o v e m e n ts a n d in te ra c tio n s in p a rtic ip a tiv e m u sic p e rfo rm a n c e
p ra c tic e s . W e d e a l w ith th e n o tio n s o f p a rtic ip a tio n , e m b o d im e n t, a n d h u m an -
h u m a n in te ra c tio n . T h e m a in d ire c tio n o f o u r c u rre n t re se a rc h is to u n d e rsta n d
m o re a b o u t b o d ily in te ra c tio n a m o n g p a rtic ip a n ts, sp e cific ally in term s o f th e ir
lo c a tio n , d ista n c e a n d c o o rd in a tio n as a g ro u p . W e u se th e se p a ra m e te rs as
so u n d -p ro d u c in g ev e n ts (F ig u re 1).

17 J. Steward et al, Enaction.

18 Fuchs and Jaegher, “Enactive intersubjectivity”, p. 469-470.
74 Koray Tahiroglu and James Nesfield

The Notion of Embodiment in a Group Music Practice

T h e P E S I p ro je c t p ay s atten tio n to the e n g a g em e n t o f the b o d y in e m b o d ie d in ­

te ra c tio n in m u sic p ractices. P E S I re se a rc h aim s a t brin g in g to view the relational
sp ace th a t w e create w ith o u r en v iro n m en t, the space in w h ich any ty p e o f ac ­
tio n w ill b e tak en as situ ated actio n . T h e n o tio n ‘situ ated a c tio n ’ is im p o rta n t as
it fram es th e c h aracteristics o f th e p e rfo rm e r’s actions an d g estures d u rin g the
m o m e n t o f m u sical interactio n . T h u s m ean in g s asso ciate d w ith th e actions ta k e n
in th is in teractio n are situ ated an d co n tex tu alized ; the g estu res and actions p er­
fo rm e d w ith in th e m u sic p ractice w ill be m ean in g fu l to such ex p erim en tal m usic
an d m ean in g less to o th e r ty p es o f m u sic practices.
In this p ro je c t, w e h av e b e e n d ev elo p in g a certain type o f sy stem d esign
m o d el fo r d ev ice in teractio n , w h ere th e c o m m u n ication b e tw e en th e u ser (per­
fo rm er) an d th e in te rfa c e (m o b ile p h o n e in stru m en ts) w o u ld p resen t co m p ac t in ­
fo rm a tio n a n d a v o id a co g n itiv e lo a d in th e v isu al dom ain. T h e co re in teractio n
m o d el in o u r in stru m e n t d e sig n strateg y allo w s th e particip an ts to focus m ore on
th e ir in te ra c tio n w ith o th e r p articip an ts an d w ith th e environm ent. O n the o ther
hand, in th e m o m e n t o f play in g , th e in te ra c tio n b etw e en pe rfo rm er an d in stru m en t
break s d o w n a n d th e p a rtic ip a n t pays m o re atten tio n to th e in stru m e n t th a n to the
in teractio n w ith th e o th e r p articip an ts in o rd er to re-en g ag e w ith the p ro cess.
T h e b re a k d o w n an d re -e n g a g em e n t tu rn s in to a co n tin u o u s p ro c ess, w h ic h can
b e lin k ed to H e id e g g e r’s c o n c e p t ‘re a d y -to -h a n d ’ (zu handen) th a t P aul D o u rish
u tilizes in H C I re se a rc h .19 H e ex p lain s H e id e g g e r’s ‘p re se n t-a t-h an d ’ (vorhanden)
in term s o f an in teractiv e sy stem rev ealin g itse lf an d b eco m in g th e fo cu s o f a tte n ­
tio n . In o u r p ro je c t, p e rfo rm e rs are actin g th ro u g h m o b ile instru m en ts a n d their
b o d ies to articu late m usic. T h e in stru m en ts, th e m o b ile phones, as ex ten sio n s o f
th e bod ies (an d th e b o d ies as full en tities), b eco m e veh icles o r facilitato rs o f the
e x p ressiv en ess in m u sical interactio n . T h e d esig n o f the e x te n d e d system allow s
th e in stru m e n t to d isap p ear in its u se , it is ‘re a d y -a t-h a n d ’; ho w ev er, w hen the
in teractio n b reak s d o w n it b eco m es ‘p re se n t-a t-h a n d ’.
O u r ap p ro ach h as b een w ell d efin ed b y D o u rish , and w e are in te re sted in
m ak in g c o m p u tatio n fit in m o re n atu rally w ith the ev ery d ay w o rld (our in terac­
tio n w ith m o b ile p h o n e s, th ro u g h g estu res d efined as in teractiv e) an d thus e n rich ­
in g o u r ex p erien ce w ith th e p h y sical (u sin g an ev ery d ay d evice to capture g es­
tu res an d ex p lo it th e m in m u sical actions). H ere o u r instru m en ts an d the ex ten d ed
sy ste m can b e d efin ed as ‘sen se sy ste m s’ th at cap tu re the p erfo rm an ce g estures
an d sonify th e e n v iro n m e n t aro u n d u s.20 In o rd er to ex ten d the structure o f the

19 Dourish, Where the Action Is, p. 109.

20 Atau Tanaka, “Musical Performance Practice on Sensor-Based Instruments”, in M. Wanderley
and M. Battier, eds. Trends in Gestural Control of Music. Paris: IRCAM, 2000, p. 389-406.
Figure 1. Three performers in the PESI environment.
76 Koray Tahiroglu and James Nesfield

bo d ily ex p erien ce in o u r re se a rc h co n tex t, w e in clude m o b ile d ev ices/phones

as p art o f th e in terface, b esid es th e h u m a n body. A t the sam e tim e as w e have
b e e n fo cu sin g o n th e stru ctu res o f th e b o d ily ex p erien ce an d body as in terface
in p a rtic ip a to ry m u sic, w e h av e b e e n d ev elo p in g d esig n strateg ies to in terface
new m o b ile -p h o n e fu n ctio n s in to ex p ressiv e m u sical in stru m en t featu res. M o ­
bile in terfaces h av e alread y b e g u n to p ro v id e altern ativ e feed b ack m echanism s.
T apping o n a to u ch screen , tiltin g the m o b ile d ev ic e, an d m u lti-to u ch in terfaces
ch an g e the w ay p eo p le in teract w ith a m o b ile p h o n e. W e d ev e lo p ed o u r research
in m o b iles further, n o t o n ly b ecau se o f th e new feed b ac k m ech an ism s, b u t also
b ecau se o f th e ad v an tag e o f e n ric h e d c o m p u tatio n al possib ilities th a t co m e w ith
th e new series o f m o b ile phones.
C o n cretely , th e P E S I e x te n d e d sy ste m is in te n d e d to b e a m o d u la r fra m e ­
w o rk fo r g ro u p p a rtic ip a tiv e m u sic m a k in g w ith th re e p e rfo rm ers. It in c o rp o ­
ra te s n e w -g e n e ra tio n m o b ile p h o n e s a n d g ro u p -m o tio n -tra c k in g te c h n o lo g y to
cre a te a n e n v iro n m e n t in w h ic h p la y e rs a re n o t o n ly free to m o v e b u t w h ere
th e ir m o v e m e n ts also d ire c tly a ffe c t th e g ro u p ’s c o m b in e d so n ic re su lts.
T h e first v ersio n o f th e sy stem , w h ich h as b e en d e v e lo p ed in the first h a lf o f
2 0 1 2 , co n sists o f th ree co n c e p tu a lly d istin c t m ain co m p onents: 1) in d iv id u al iP ­
h o n e 4s sm artp h o n es ru n n in g R JD J21 fo r so und syn th esis an d au d io play b ack , 2)
m o tio n tra c k in g v ia th e M ic ro so ft K in e c t fo r group p o sitio n an d m o v em en t, and
3) a n e tw o rk e d lap to p ru n n in g P u re D a ta (P d )22 to co o rd in ate th e en tire system .
P u re D ata is a g rap h ical p ro g ram m in g en v iro n m en t, w h ich affords th e rap id d e ­
v e lo p m e n t o f so n ic ideas as w ell as th e b u ild in g o f c o m p lex system s. T h ese co m ­
b in e sen so r d ata a n d re a l tim e au d io . P u re D ata can b e u se d in sid e R JD J, w h ich is
a n ativ e ap p licatio n d e sig n e d fo r A p p le ’s iP h o n e O S . R JD J allow s P u re D a ta files
to ru n o n m o b ile d ev ices w ith m in im al m o d ification. K in e c t uses several cam eras
in th e in fra re d sp ectru m to m o n ito r a n d m ap the 3D space w ith in its field o f view .
W ith o n b o a rd m o d els o f th e h u m a n fo rm , K in ec t sy stem is able to id en tify and
tra c k peo p le as th e y m o v e th ro u g h its m o n ito rin g space. T h e ph o n es are h a n d h eld
b u t co n n e c te d to sp eak ers p la c e d o n each p e rfo rm e r’s ch e st to en h an ce the feelin g
o f in tim acy b e tw e e n th e p e rso n a n d th e in stru m en t, an d to fo ster th e feelin g o f
perso n al o w n ersh ip o f th e so u n d prod u ced . B o th th e co o rd in atin g c o m p u ter and
th e K in e c t h ard w are p lay a cru cial b u t u n o b tru siv e role in facilitatin g the p e rfo r­
m an ce so as n o t to d istra c t th e g ro u p m em b ers fro m th e co re focus o f th e ir task:
th e ir in stru m en ts, th e ir collaborators.

21 <http://rjdj.me/> [accessed 29.3.2014],

22 <http://puredata.info/> [accessed 29.3.2014],
An Embodied Approach to Collaborative Music Practice 77

T h e th ree c o m p o n en ts w o rk to g e th e r to create a system , w h ic h en c o u ra g ­

es c o llab o rativ e m u sic m aking. It has th e c ap acity to ch an g e its o w n b eh av io u r
b ased o n th e actio n s o f th e p erfo rm ers b o th fro m a n ind iv id u al persp ectiv e an d as
a single co llectiv e entity. In o rd er to d o so, th e e x ten d ed sy stem uses d ata c o llec t­
ed fro m all its sensors (co m b in in g the p h o n e ’s sen so r cap abilities w ith the m otion
an d spatial sen sin g h ard w are) to d y n am ically alter th e sonic ou tco m es o f the
p e rfo rm e r’s in p u t actio n s as th e d ata is p a sse d th ro u g h a c o m p lex set o f analysis
an d m ap p in g m atrices. T h is is in te n d e d to create a v ery d y n am ic e n v iro n m en t in
w h ich th e sy ste m ad ap tatio n s p e rp etu ate a ‘cau se and e ffe c t’ lo o p , w h ich in turn
enh an ces the m u sical ex p erien ce fo r th e g ro u p . In this w ay, the g ro u p ’s actions
are sim u ltan eo u sly a ffectin g an d b ein g a ffected by th e sy m p ath etic resp o n ses o f
th eir d ig ital in stru m en ts such th a t the final so nic re su lt can n o t b e attrib u ted to a
single d ig ital source o r p lay er action.
T h is fisrt v ersio n o f the e x te n d e d sy stem deals w ith the p aram eters relev an t
to th e in d iv id u al b o d ily e n g a g e m e n t in th e m o m en t o f m usic m ak in g an d in p ar­
tic u la r fo cu ses o n relatio n al p aram eters th a t p ro v id e facto rs an d dim en sio n s o f
the g ro u p d y n am ics an d social interactio n . T h e level o f T ogetherness fu n c tio n is
co n tro lled as a g ro u p as it is c a lc u la ted th ro u g h th e overall distan ce am o n g the
perfo rm ers in w h ic h th e in d iv id u al d ifferen ces in distan ce p aram eters at average
level a ffect th is function. T h e m a x im u m level o f T ogetherness is a ch ie v ed w h en
all th e p erfo rm ers co m e c lo ser to ea c h o th e r (F igure 2). S y n c h ro n iza tio n is a n ­
oth er fu n c tio n th a t ta k e s in to a c c o u n t th e tem p o ral status o f the p erfo rm ers id e n ­
tify in g th e co n d itio n fo r resp o n se p attern s o f in d iv id u als to eac h o th er th ro u g h the
gestu res a n d actio n s ta k e n in th e perform ance.
In th e p ro cess o f th e d esig n in g th e ex ten d ed system , befo re the actual im p le­
m en tatio n , w e co n d u c te d u se r-te st stu d ies in o rd er to u n d e rsta n d h o w w ell our
initial d esig n id eas w o u ld m e e t w ith th e u se r/p a rtic ip a n ts’ exp ectatio n s (F igure
3). T h e findings o f th ese in itial u ser-tests h e lp e d us to illu m in ate w h a t kin d s o f
social in teractio n s are m o st lik ely to o c c u r in such a p articip ativ e activity. T he
qu alitativ e d ata an aly sis sh o w s th e su itab ility o f o u r a p p ro ach fo r au g m en tin g
the social d im e n sio n o f m u sic m ak in g an d e n rich in g the p layful in te rac tio n in a
gro u p .23
T h e fo llo w in g sectio n w ill d escrib e in d etail how th e hard w are an d physical
sen so r cap ab ilities c o m b in e w ith th e d y n am ic d ata p ro cessin g arch itectu re o f the
ex ten d ed sy ste m to p ro d u c e th e final sy stem output.

23 Roberto Pugliese, Koray Tahiroglu, Callum Goddard, James Nesfield, “A Qualitative Evalu­
ation of Augmented Human-Human Interaction in Mobile Group Improvisation”, in Proc. of
New Interfaces for Music Expression (NIME), Michigan: Ann Arbor, 2012.
78 Koray Tahiroglu and James Nesfield

PESI Extended System_initial version

D a ta co llectio n a n d co n d itio n in g in m o b ile in stru m en t

M o d e rn sm artp h o n es affo rd a w ide v a rie ty o f sensing op tio n s in a sm all, w ire ­

less an d b a tte ry -p o w e red p a c k a g e . In o rd e r to translate actions into so u n d the
acceleratio n s w ere m e a su re d co n tin u o u sly alo n g all axes p ro v id in g a pictu re o f
th e p e rfo rm e r’s h a n d as it g estu res an d m o v es. T he th ree values fo r X , Y and Z
w ere sam p led at ap p ro x im ately 5 0 H z an d w ere lim ited b y the p h o n e ’s hard w are
accelero m eters to a ran g e o f ro u g h ly ±3G . T h e se values arrive as a continuous
stre a m o f floats in P u re D ata after p a ssin g th ro u g h the R JD J h o st fro m the iP ­
h o n e ’s o p e ra tin g sy stem . T h ese v alu es are g en tly hig h -p ass filtered at the sy stem
in p u t to rem o v e shak e an d n o ise , ad d itio n al lo w -p ass filtering th en help s m itigate
g ra v ity ’s c o n sta n t co n trib u tio n . T h ese co n d itio n e d in p u ts are th en read y to be
u se d b y a n u m b e r o f m o d u les w ith in th e m o b ile synthesis c o m p o n en t an d are also
tra n sm itte d d irectly to th e co o rd in atin g lap to p m o d u le via O p en S o u n d C ontrol
O S C p ro to c o l.24
In ad d itio n to acceleratio n s, u s e r ’s to u ch w as u se d to p ro v id e b in ary values
(screen -to u ch ed , screen -n o t-to u ch ed ) to the re st o f the system .

D a ta co llectio n a n d co n d itio n in g in p o sitio n

In fo rm atio n ab o u t th e p la y e r’s p o sitio n s an d th eir m o v em en ts w as c a p tu re d u sin g

M ic ro s o ft’s K in ect, w h ich allow s m u ch o f the co m p u ter visio n and acco m p an y ­
in g c o m p u ta tio n to be p e rfo rm e d a t th e h ard w are level. C o n n ec te d via U S B to
a c o n tro llin g co m p u ter, d ata o f each p la y e r’s lo catio n in the th ree-d im ensional
p erfo rm an ce sp ace w as p a c k a g e d in to a sim p le co llected syntax a n d sen t via O SC
to th e m a ste r co o rd in atin g laptop. T h e co o rd in ates o f in d iv id u al p o sitions are sent
alo n g w ith a n u m b e r rep resen tin g th e to tal n u m b er o f players th a t the sy stem is
tra c k in g at e a c h m o m en t. T h is la st v alu e is u sed by th e ex ten d ed sy stem to c o n ­
tro l erro rs c re a te d b y o cclu sio n an d o u t-o f-ran g e p ro b lem s in the K in e c t’s visio n
system .
E a c h p lay er is assig n e d an ID b y th e K in e c t so th a t ind iv id u al p aram eters
can b e id en tified an d a ltered in o th e r p arts o f the sy stem . T his p o ses a p ro b le m
w h en o cc a sio n o r o th e r erro rs o ccu r as th e K in e c t’s ID can b eco m e w ro n g ly as­
sig n ed to the p e rfo rm e rs. T h e p ersiste n c e o f the play ers an d th eir K in ect ID ’s is
cru cial an d is p ro te c te d b y re a ssig n in g th e la st lo st ID if a p la y e r ‘re a p p e a rs’ after

24 <http://opensoundcontrol.org/> [accessed29.3.2014].
Figure 2. Social actions provided dynamic control features for the system implementation.
80 Koray Tahiroglu and James Nesfield

a p e rio d o f tim e. C arefu l m an a g e m e n t a n d c a lib ra tio n o f th e p erfo rm an ce space

also h elp to red u ce th e n u m b e r o f w ro n g ly a ssig n e d ID s, th o u g h w ith the cu rren t
setu p w ro n g assig n m en ts can n e v e r b e co m p letely av o id ed due to K in e c t’s in ­
ab ility to reco g n ise d istin g u ish in g featu res b etw een in d iv id u al p erfo rm e rs. W ith
th e se lim itatio n s, erro rs in m ism a tc h e d ID s c an o ccu r w h en m ore th a n one perso n
is o cclu d ed o r o u t o f ra n g e . W h en tw o o r m ore play ers are ‘lo s t’, the re -e n terin g
p la y e rs w ill be a ssig n ed ID s in ascen d in g n u m erical o rd er fro m the first available
n u m b er, w h ich m ay o r m ay n o t b e th e ID th at th ey ‘le ft’ w ith.

S y ste m co o rd in a tio n a n d a d a p ta tio n

T h e en tire sy stem is co o rd in a te d b y o n e lap to p ru n n in g PD , w h ich m an ag es the

n e tw o rk an d d ata c o m m u n ic a tio n b e tw e e n all o f the in d iv id u al m o b ile devices
an d in form atio n it receiv es fro m th e K inect. T h is m ach in e is also resp o n sib le for
erro r d e te c tio n an d reco v ery d u rin g a p erfo rm an ce an d pro v id es useful d eb u g g in g
in fo rm a tio n to o ff-stag e sy stem o p erato rs. T he co o rd in atin g sy stem is able to
sen d a n d receiv e m essag es to each ph o n e, allo w in g its o p erators to ch an g e presets
an d ev en co n tro l in d iv id u al p aram eters v ia its g raphical interface.
T h is c o m p o n e n t o f th e sy stem is resp o n sib le n o t only fo r m o n ito rin g an d fa ­
cilitatin g co m m u n ic a tio n b etw een th e dev ices, b u t also fo r activ ely ch an g in g the
in stru m e n t’s c h a ra c ter b a se d on th e m o m en tary changes in the g ro u p d y nam ics
o f th e p erfo rm an ce. S calin g o f in stru m e n t vo lu m e p ro p o rtio n ally to group to g e th ­
ern e ss, o r m e asu rin g the g ro u p ’s sy n ch ro n izatio n and m ap p in g it o n to several
co m p lim e n ta ry sy n th esis p aram eters m ig h t serve as exam p les o f activ e changes
o f this k in d . T h e sy stem w as d e sig n e d to b e as flexible an d m o d u lar as p o ssib le, in
o rd e r to p ro v id e v ery w id e o p p o rtu n ities fo r ex p e rim e n tin g w ith the w ay in w hich
it resp o n d s to b o th in d iv id u al an d g ro u p actions.

A u d io sy n th e sis a n d co n tro l

T h e au d io o u tp u t is cre a te d en tirely in P D an d it uses a n u m b er o f d iffe re n t sy n ­

th esis tech n iq u es in d y n am ic c o m b in atio n to p ro v id e a co m p lex an d flexible array
o f sonic po ssib ilities. A d d itiv e a n d su b tractiv e synthesis, v arious noise sources
an d effects in clu d in g rev erb a n d d elay are availab le to th e co n tro llin g system
d e p en d in g o n u ser inputs. A lth o u g h it is cru cial to place a rich palette o f sounds
Figure 3. Three volunteers participating in PESI user-test session.
82 Koray Tahiroglu and James Nesfield

at th e in stru m e n t’s d isp o sal, it is e q u ally im p o rta n t to h av e fin e-g rain ed co ntrol
o v er th e se p aram eters, as it is th e co n tro l a n d the co rresp o n d in g b eh av io u r o f the
in stru m e n t th a t u ltim ately d ecid e th e o v erall c h a ra cter o f th e au d io o u tp u t in the
h an d s o f a n activ e perform er.
S ev eral m o d u les w ere d ev e lo p e d to a id tem p o ral (rath er th a n tim b ral) control
o f th e instru m en t. A ll sta n d a rd p aram eters, w h ich a ffect th e A D S R 25 en v elo p e are
first scaled u sin g a v ariab le ex p o n en tial fu n ctio n th at allow s the resp o n se (m ost
p ro m in e n tly in th e in stru m e n t’s attack) to b e altered v ia one m a ster v ariab le. In
th is w ay, th e c h a ra c ter o f th e in stru m e n t c o u ld be c h a n g e d d y n a m ica lly by the
sy ste m its e lf d e p en d in g o n th e g ro u p co n d itio n s. T he in stru m e n t’s attitude co u ld
b e c h a n g e d easily b e tw e e n sharp an d p ercu ssiv e, an d slow an d lethargic. Equally,
th ese p aram eters can ch an g e th e in stru m e n t’s resp o n se to a u s e r ’s gestu re such
th a t v ary in g am o u n ts o f e ffo rt are n e e d e d fo r co n sisten t o u tp u t so u n d levels.

Music is a part of life

M u sic is p erh ap s th e m o st co n su m e d a rt form . In o u r tim es, scarcely a single day

can p ass w ith o u t o n e h earin g at le a st o n e p iece o f m usic. W h ile this reflects the
in crease o f in teractiv e m u sic co n su m p tio n , th ere h av e b ee n significant concerns
ab o u t th e w ay in w h ic h c u rre n t d ev elo p m en ts in m ed ia ted m usic m ak in g an d
listen in g are sh iftin g m u sic activ ity in to a p a ssiv e, n o n -in teractiv e and no n -so cial
ex p erien ce. D esp ite th e fa c t th a t new m e d ia te d form s o f m u sic ex p erien ce in a so­
cial c o n te x t w ith lo cal o r rem o te users are em e rg in g ,26 d esig n m o d els fo r co m b in ­
in g c o llab o rativ e so cial in teractio n w ith ev e n t-b a se d interactio n s in the d ev elo p ­
m e n t o f in te ra c tiv e /m ed ia te d sy stem s h a v e n o t b ee n w ell-defined. P E S I research
p ro je c t applies e m b o d ie d ap p ro ach es in e x te n d ed sy stem d esign to co n stru ctiv ely
en co d e su c h issu es in m u sic experience.
In a sim ilar co n tex t, M arc L e m a n m ak es a d istin c tio n b etw een the w ay in
w h ic h d ig ital m e d ia o n th e o n e h and, an d w e, the users, o n th e o th e r hand, deal
w ith th e m u sic. H e claim s th a t th ere is a sig n ifican t gap b etw e en th ese tw o d o ­
m ain s; d ig ital m e d ia h an d le m u sic as e n c o d ed p h y sic al energy, w h ereas w e deal
w ith m u sic b a se d o n o u r in ten tio n s an d e x p erien c es.27 L e m a n su g gests th a t w e
can fill the g a p w ith a ctio n -b ased ap p ro ach b y rein tro d u cin g em b o d ied e x p eri­

25 Attack- Decay-Sustain-Release is used for amplitude envelope term.

26 SBM, International Workshop on Social Behaviori n Music (Online), <http://www.infomus.
org/Events/SBM2012/> [accessed 29.3.2014],
27 Marc Leman, Embodied Music: Cognition and Mediation Technology, Cambridge MA: MIT
Press, 2008,p. 73-76.
An Embodied Approach to Collaborative Music Practice 83

ence in to m e d ia te d m u sic m ak in g a n d listening. T h e im p o rta n t p o in t here is th a t

L e m a n ’s actio n -b ased ap p ro ach its e lf arises a co m p lex p h e n o m en o n and ex p lo r­
ing altern ativ e form s o f e m b o d ie d ap p ro ach es in m usic e x p erien ce c an help us to
deal w ith th is co m p lex ity .28
T h e em b o d ied ap p ro ach o f o u r research takes account o f experiences am ong
individuals th at arise from bodily activities and bodily interactions w ith artifacts
and w ith o u r social environm ent. T h ese interactions are incorporating the continu­
ous action-perception loops in em b o d ied action m odel to create and m aintain our
ow n understanding. T h e em b o d ied ap p ro ach to m usic m aking experience, position­
ing th e body a t the cen ter o f interactio n as th e active com p o n en t for creating m ean­
ing an d aesthetics o f th e experience, m ay resu lt in developing alternative strategies
for new interactio n p aradigm s in m usic experience. N ovel paradigm s o f interaction
and o f d esign strategies for em b o d ied en g ag em ent o f the m ulti-user participants are
needed.29

28 Ibid. p. 232-238.
29 The final research outcomes including the latest design strategies and system implementation
of the PESI research project are presented in: Koray Tahiroglu, Nuno Correia and Miguel
Espada, “PESI Extended System: In Space, On Body, with 3 Musicians”, in Proc. of New
Interfaces for Music Expression (NIME), Daejeon + Seoul, Korea Republic, 2013; Callum
Goddard and Koray Tahiroglu, “Situating the Performer and the Instrument in a Rich Social
Context with PESI Extended System”, in Proc. of the Sound and Music Computing Con­
ference, Stockholm, Sweden, 2013 and Adam Parkinson and Koray Tahiroglu, “Composing
Social Interactions for an Interactive-Spatial Performance System”, in Proc. of the Sound and
Music Computing Conference, Stockholm, Sweden, 2013.
Sensuous Knowledge:
Making Sense Through the Skin

A lex Arteaga

In th is essay I w ill ad d ress so m e b asic asp ects o f th e aesth etic p ro d u ctio n o f

k n o w led g e, o r as I p refer to call it, th e em erg en ce o f kn o w led g e in the a esth et­
ic e x p e rie n c e . F irst I w ill b riefly d e lim it th e term “ sensuous k n o w le d g e ” in the
fra m e w o rk o f a gen eral c h a ra c teriz a tio n o f “aesth etic e x p e rie n c e ”. I w ill th e n
relate this fo rm o f k n o w le d g e to tw o e sta b lish e d categ o ries - “k n o w in g -h o w ” and
“k n o w in g -th a t” - arg u in g th a t sen su o u s k n o w led g e ca n n o t be re d u ce d to eith er
one o f th ese, alth o u g h th e y c a n be u n d e rsto o d as aspects o f aesth etic know ledge.
F urther, I w ill restate th e b asic q u e stio n o f aesth etic e x p erien ce to ex am in e how
this specific fo rm o f ex p e rie n c in g , th a t is, this p a rtic u lar m o d ality o f en g a g em e n t
o f an o rg an ism w ith its en v iro n m en t, affects th e b o u n d aries b e tw ee n th em and
co n seq u en tly co n trib u tes to tran sfo rm in g b o th o f th em . F inally, I w ill briefly p o s­
tulate th e n ecessity o f a specific co g n itiv e ap p ro ach to sen suous k n o w led g e - an
a esth etic approach. I w ill en d u p claim in g th a t aesth etic p ractice constitu tes one
fun d am en tal research m e d iu m fo r th is fo rm o f know ledge.

* * *

S en su o u s k n o w led g e is a fo rm o f co g n itio n th a t em erges in th e aesth etic e x p e ri­

ence, th a t is, b y ex p erien cin g aesthetically. T his v ariety o f ex p erien ce correlates
w ith an o rganic d isp o sitio n , w h ich co n d itio n s the w ay in w h ich th e in teractio n
b etw een o rg an ism a n d e n v iro n m e n t o c c u rs.1 T h e aesth etically d isp o se d organism
in teracts w ith its e n v iro n m e n t p rim arily in an im m ediate w ay, th a t is, w ith o u t a
sig n ifica n t m ed ia tio n o f signs. T h e o rg an ism is activ ely m oved, a ffec ted ,2 by the

1 The term “organic disposition” designates here a specific actualization of the organization
of the organism. I could as well use the term “bodily disposition” according to the enactivist
sense of “body“. However, I prefer in this point not to make reference to the body in order to
avoid possible misunderstandings based on different conceptions of the relationship between
body and mind.
2 The term affection is here used according to its Husserlian definition in Edmund Husserl,
Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic. Hus­
serl Collected Works, vol. IX. Dordrecht 2001.
86 Alex Arteaga

o n g o in g flow o f e x ch an g e w ith its e n v iro n m en t, w h ich in tu rn is tran sfo rm ed

b y v irtu e o f th is fo rm o f in teractio n in to a co m p lex field o f ve cto ria l p o te n ti­
a lities, in w h ic h a ttra c tio n a n d rep u lse em erge an d in terw eav e w ith one another,
creatin g in tricate sen so ry -m o to r p attern s. A n aly sis, lo g ical o p e ra tio n s, ju d g m e n t,
co m p o sitio n , a n d v o litio n re tre a t to th e b ack g ro u n d o f org an ic dy n am ics a n d are
m in im iz e d a n d su sp en d ed in a te m p o ra ry latency. T h is p articu lar m o d ality of
in teractio n - eith e r self-in d u c e d an d fo ste re d th ro u g h a co n scio u s decisio n and
th e p erfo rm an ce o f c e rta in p ractices, o r sp o n tan eo u sly trig g e re d by chan g es in
th e activ ity o f th e e n v iro n m e n t - g en erates a situ atio n o f va g u en e ss an d unseiz-
a b ility, w h ich , in tu rn , creates th e su b strate fo r a po ssib le re alig n m e n t o f th e cu r­
re n t co h eren ce o f th e e x p e rie n c ed w o rld , th a t is, o f th e ap p earan ce o f a w o rld as
a c o h e re n t w hole.
T h e ae sth e tic a lly in teractin g o rg an ism nav ig ates in its e n v iro n m e n t by re ­
d u cin g its ta rg e t-o rie n ted fo rm s o f a ctiv ity an d letting its m ore b asic c o n n ectin g
d yn a m ics, i.e. th o se kin d s o f actio n s th a t facilitate the ad ap tatio n to the ongoing
ch an g es o f th e en v iro n m en t, act o n th e ir ow n. T h e sam e w ay that, acco rd in g to
K ant, p u rp o siv e n e ss w ith o u t p u rp o se is a co n d itio n fo r the m a n ife statio n o f b e au ­
ty, d isin terested n ess is re q u ire d to e sta b lish a n aesth etic re latio n w ith the en v iro n ­
m en t.3 T h e d y n am ic re la tio n b e tw e e n o rg an ism an d its e n v iro n m en t is m ed iated
n e ith e r by p re fo rm e d im ag es o r co n cep ts o f th e situ atio n in w h ic h the in teractio n
ta k e s place, i.e. by m en tal artifacts c o n so lid ate d p rio r to th e c u rren t interaction,
n o r b y in ten tio n s o r v o lu n tary acts, i.e. acts b ased o n w ill. D isin terested n ess - the
la c k (dis-) o f so m eth in g ex istin g (-esse) in b etw e en (-inter-) - su b stitutes d e lib ­
era tio n - th e v o lu n tary act o f en tirely (de-) b a lan c in g o r p o n d erin g (-librare).
V ague, im p lic it p u rp o siv en ess - to m a in ta in th e contact, to su stain th e structural
co u p lin g 4 w ith th e e n v iro n m e n t - d riv es th e actio n s o f th e organism . T his p u r­

3 In his Critique of Judgment Kant delivers a first definition of his concept of “purposiveness
without purpose” in relation to “will” (§ 10). Later on he presents a definition of beauty based
on this paradoxical expression: “Beauty is the form of the purposiveness of an object, so far
as this is perceived in it without any representation of a purpose.” (§ 17). Nevertheless, the
relation between beauty and “purposiveness without purpose” in relation to the “judgment of
taste” is introduced already in §11. My interpretation of this concept is guided on the one hand
by my reflection upon my own aesthetic experience and on the other hand by the interpretation
of John Michael Krois: “[According to Kant] aesthetic judgments required disinterestedness
if they were to be objectively valid, meaning that they could not be based either upon sensuous
pleasure or practical, utilitarian concerns. Things appear beautiful (or not) to a disinterested
spectator because they possess the appearance of “purposiveness without purpose”. John Mi­
chael Krois, “Experiencing Emotion in Depictions. Being Moved without Motion?”, in S.
Flach, D. Margulies and J. Soffner: Habitus in Habitat I. Emotion and Motion, Bern / Berlin:
Peter Lang, 2010, p. 159-179.
4 The term “structural coupling” was defined in the context of the theory of autopoiesis as the
fundamental relation between a living system and its environment, in virtue of which the or­
Sensuous Knowledge 87

po siv en ess is n o th in g else b u t th e in elu ctab le p erfo rm an ce o f in ten tio n a lity . T he

org an ism is th u s d riv e n b y its rela tio n w ith th e environm ent. T h e source o f the
pu rp o siv en ess, w h ic h is h ere at stak e can n o t be lo caliz ed in th e org an ism itse lf
bu t in th e re la tio n w ith th e en v iro n m en t. T h a t is the reaso n w h y this p u rp o siv e ­
ness m u st be w ith o u t p u r p o s e : th e ab sen ce o f an y p u rp o se g e n erated ex clu siv ely
by th e o rg an ism is a co n d itio n fo r th e re a liz a tio n o f sh a red p u rp o siv e n e ss . 5 T he
p u rp o selessn ess o f th e o rg an ism p ro v id es th e co n d itio n s fo r its a d a p ta tio n to the
actio n s o f th e e n v iro n m e n t a n d th u s th e p rereq u isite fo r b o th o f th e m to becom e
ap t to ea c h other. P u rp o selessn ess th u s en ab les the p erfo rm an ce o f the m o st basic
an d in h e re n t p u rp o siv en ess o f th e living.
In th is fo rm o f in teractio n , th e p u rp o seless an d th erefo re vu ln erab le o rg an ­
ism en ters in a m o re in tim ate re la tio n w ith its counterpart. T h e b o u n d aries b e ­
tw e e n th e m - as I w ill ad d ress later o n - in crease th eir perm eab ility and, as a
con seq u en ce, ex p erien ce changes: it b eco m es a e sth e tic . T he e x p erie n ced adopts
the fo rm o f a d y n am ic n e tw o rk o f se n su o u s-em o tio n al q u alities th at q u estio n s,
an d (p o ssib ly ) alters a n d rearran g es th e p re e x istin g co h eren ce o f th e w orld. T his
“new w o rld ” - a w o rld liv ed aesth etically - acq u ires th e v ag u en ess o f contours
and th e flu id ity th a t ch aracterizes th e in c re a sed ad ap tab ility b etw e en org an ism
an d enviro n m en t.
T h e te rm “ aesth etic e x p e rie n c e ” th a t I p re se n t here as d e sig n atin g the field o f
em erg en ce o f sen su o u s k n o w led g e has a d o u b le m eaning. Firstly, it d en o tes a v a ­
riety o f in te ra c tio n b e tw e e n o rg an ism an d en v iro n m en t, o n the one h an d en ab led
by a m o d ality o f a c tio n - b y a d y n am ic d isp o sitio n - o f th e org an ism ch aracter­
ized b y d isin terested n ess - b y p u rp o siv en ess w ith o u t p u rpose - and, o n the o th er
h a n d , p ro p itia te d b y im m e d ia te , sen so ry -m o to r and em o tio n a l activity.6 S econdly
it d e sig n ates th e k in d o f w o rld th a t app ears to a su b ject - as w e ll as the k in d o f
su b ject ap p earin g to itse lf as b e in g in th e w o rld - arising b o th o u t o f this variety
o f interaction.

ganization of the living system is actualized. For the first formulation of this term: Humberto
Maturana, “Biology of Cognition”, in: H. Maturana and F. J. Varela: Autopoiesis and Cogni­
tion: The Realization of the Living, Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company,
1970, p. 2-58. For its reformulation in the context of the enactive approach see the bibliogra­
phy listed in the footnote 8.
5 Senso stricto, the organism cannot generate any purpose exclusively on its own, because it is
coupled constantly with its environment. The organism has no exclusive existence. The for­
mulation “purpose generated exclusively by the organism” expresses therefore the possibility
to generate purposivenes in a mode of interaction with the environment that, contrary to the
aesthetic mode, reinforces the boundary between the acting organism and its environment,
allowing it to act as if it would not be coupled with the environment.
6 The semantic link between the terms “disinterest” and “immediacy” reveals an original rela­
tionship between these two characteristics of the aesthetic interaction.
88 Alex Arteaga

* * *

In th e o n g o in g d eb ates o n artistic research an d k n o w led g e in th e arts, sensuous

k n o w le d g e is o ften id en tified as a fo rm o f k n o w ing-how . B efo re I refu te this
th esis, I w o u ld like to in tro d u ce a v ery b asic c o m m o n a sp ec t o f th e tw o form s o f
k n o w le d g e d efin ed b y G ilb e rt R yle - “k n o w in g -h o w ” an d “k n o w in g -th a t”7 - as a
basis fo r th e fo rm u la tio n o f an altern ativ e re latio n be tw e en th em a n d th e sensuous
fo rm o f know ledge.
B oth know ing-how (to know how to do som ething) as w ell as know ing-that (to
k n ow w hat som ething is) refer to an object, w hich is conceived as distinguishable
from know ledge itself. K now ledge refers to this object. Thus both form s o f know l­
edge are m odalities o f w hat w e can call “k n ow ing-about”. T he im plicit assum ptions
here are, first, that there is an enquiring entity w hich relates to an object and, second,
that know ledge - as the ability to deal w ith this object or as an explanation or a
definition o f it - is both a result o f this relation and the form o f the relation itself, its
m ediating instance. K now ledge m ediates betw een the one w ho w ants to know - the
subject o f know ledge - and the object to be kn ow n - the object o f know ledge. In this
conceptual fram ew ork it is possible to m ake a clear difference betw een the subject,
the object and the know ledge. B efore I w ill address the first side o f this triangle - the
relation betw een the subject and object o f know ledge - I w ill focus on the relation
betw een the object o fk n o w le d g e and the know ledge itself.
T he differentiation betw een the object o f know ledge and the know ledge about
it is categorical as w ell as tem poral. T he know ledge about an object is not the object
itself but som ething related to it. T his categorical difference im plies a tem poral one:
the object m ust be there, it m ust be som ehow available for the subject w ho seeks to
k n ow it, and then it w ill treat the already accessible object in a w ay that im proves or
extends its accessibility in an action-oriented or conceptual way, through the apparent
production o f know ledge a bout it.
S en su o u s k n o w le d g e is n e ith e r a fo rm o f k n o w in g -a b o u t n o r a k n o w led g e
co n stitu te d after th e e n c o u n te r w ith th e o b ject. T he k n o w le d g e em erg in g in the
aesth etic ex p erien ce is n o t a fo rm o f k n o w led g e th a t c an be d ifferen tia ted from
an o sten sib le o b je c t o f k n o w le d g e , th a t is, fro m an entity, w h ich a lin g u istic d e ­
sc rip tio n o f th e situ atio n p re se n ts a s so m eth in g d iffe re n t fro m w h at em erges as
k now led g e. S im p le an d ap p aren tly n eu tral exp ressio n s like “ I k n ow w h a t th a t is”

7 Gilbert Ryle, “Knowing How and Knowing That: The Presidential Address”, in Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 46. 1945-1946, p. 1-16; Gilbert Ryle, The Con­
cept of Mind, Chicago: Chicago U.P, 1949.
Sensuous Knowledge 89

or “I know how to deal w ith it” m ig h t g en e ra te a differen ce th a t does n o t n e c e s­

sarily ex ist in th e situ atio n d e sc rib e d b y th e se sentences. T h e ir sim p licity - “ I
know th a t” , “I k n o w h ow to d o th a t” , “I know how to han d le it” - rein fo rce d by
the sp o n tan eo u s an d n o n -reflected w ay in w h ich th ey m ay b e p ro n o u n c ed and
heard, co n ceals th e ir g en erativ e c h aracter a n d hides th e ir fu n d am en tally p e rfo rm ­
ative n atu re as sp e e c h a c ts. T h e ap p aren tly n eutral d e sc rip tio n c rea te s, w ith the
en o rm o u s p o w er o f th e im p licit, a trip le d ifference. T h e d ifferen ces b e tw ee n the
su b ject o f k n o w le d g e an d th e k n o w le d g e itse lf, b e tw e en kn o w led g e and its ob ject
and b e tw e e n th e su b ject an d th e o b je c t o f kn o w led g e are defined in the m ed iu m
o f lan g u ag e in su ch a seem in g ly in n o c e n t w ay th a t th ere does n o t ap p e ar to be any
reaso n to d o u b t th e facticity o f th ese dem arcations. B ut, w h a t h appens d u rin g the
realizatio n o f the aesth etic ex p erien ce? H o w do th ese lin g u istica lly d istin g u ish ­
able e n tities ap p ear in the fram e o f an o n g o in g sensuous in teractio n ? D o w e really
d ifferen tiate b e tw e e n k n o w le d g e an d the o b je c t o f k n o w led g e w hile ex p erien cin g
aesth etically o r is th is d iffe re n tia tio n th e p ro d u c t o f a posterio ri treatm en t o f this
sensu o u s e x p erien ce in the m e d iu m o f lan g u ag e o r o th er sig n -b ased m edia?
W h a t I call “ sen su o u s k n o w le d g e ” is th e very o b ject w ith w h ic h w e are in te r­
actin g w h en ex p erien cin g aesthetically. It is the w ay in w h ich an o b je ct appears
to us: its im m ed ia te p re se n c e in th e aesth etic ex p erien ce. W h a t is a rtic u la ted as
k n o w led g e a fter its em erg en ce in th e aesth etic e x p erien ce is o rig in a lly the d is­
clo su re o f th e o b je c t its e lf in th e fo r m m ad e po ssib le by th e in te ra ctio n b etw een
the o b je c t an d th e o rg an ism . It is th e em erg en t in -fo rm a tio n o f the o b ject c o n d i­
tio n ed b y th e w ay in w h ich th e o b je c t an d o rg an ism en g ag e aesth etically w ith one
another. F u rth er, it is at th e sam e tim e w h a t w e are ex p erien cin g and the field o f
p o ssib ilities o f ex p erien cin g it. O r b etter yet, it is w h a t w e are ex p erien cin g as an
o n g o in g tran sfo rm ativ e actu alizatio n o f an o p en field o f p o ssib ilitie s o f e x p e ri­
en cin g th a t em erg es o u t o f the v ery w ay in w h ich o b jec t and o rg a n ism en gage in
aesth etic experience.

* * *

In his la st b o o k “ V arieties o f P re se n c e ” A lv a N oe b rings th ree term s into a close

relatio n sh ip w ith one another: p re se n c e , u n d ersta n d in g a n d a c c e ssib ility .8 H e a r­
g ues th a t th e m o m e n t w e p erceiv e so m eth in g, th e m o m en t in w h ic h so m ething
ap p ears to u s w ith its specific p re se n c e , is th e v ery m o m e n t in w h ich w e u n d e r­
stan d th is object; it is the m o m e n t in w h ich the o b ject disclo ses its e lf to us and
w e ach iev e access to it. T h erefo re, u n d e rsta n d in g m eans the arisin g o f a specific

8 Alva Noe, Varieties of Presence, Harvard: Harvard U.P., 2012.

90 Alex Arteaga

p re se n c e o u t o f o u r in teractio n w ith so m eth in g th a t rem a in e d n o n -accessib le un til

th e m o m e n t o f its d isclo su re, u n til th e m o m en t w e are finally able to p erce iv e it,
th a t is, to u n d e rsta n d it, th a t is, to in teract w ith it in a viable w a y . T h is m o m en t
im p lies a p o in t o f in flex io n in th e re la tio n b etw een the tw o entities: the o b jec t
an d th e o rg an ism in teractin g w ith it converge. T h e y “tu rn ” a n d “te n d to w a rd ”
(-v erg e), to g e th e r (co n -). T h e y b eco m e a ble to m ak e a co m m o n w ay (via-). T his
tu rn in g p o in t im p licates a tra n sfo rm a tio n o f b o th entities in v o lv e d in th e rela ­
tion. T h e y tra n sfo rm (each o th er) an d o p e n (to eac h other) to w a rd th e c o n stitu ­
tio n o f th e com m on. To u n d erstan d , thus, m eans to e stab lish a co m m u n ic a tio n , a
m ak in g -to g eth er. It m ean s a sh ift fro m actin g in p ara llel, w ith o u t to u ch in g each
o th er, to in teractin g . It m ean s a sh ift fro m n o n -sen se to co m m o n se n se-m a kin g .9
A ccordingly, sen su o u s k n o w led g e, i.e., to u n d ersta n d aesthetically, is to be
seen as th e em erg en ce o f a p re se n c e th ro u g h im m ed ia te bodily, th at is, the n o n ­
m e d ia te d - d is-in te r-e ste d - sen so rim o to r an d em o tio n al co n tact w ith the entity
w h ic h d isclo ses itse lf in th e m o m e n t it b eco m es accessib le to th e one to w h o m it
appears. To know sen su o u sly is o n e o f th e fun d am en tal dy n am ics in the process
o f se n se-m ak in g th a t facilitates th e sh ift fro m the iso latio n o f no n -accessib ility ,
fro m th e ex p e rie n tia l b lin d n e ss,10 fro m p araly zin g la ck o r su sp en sio n o f co h e r­
en ce to th e em erg en ce o f th e co m m o n v ia b le , the sh ared gu id an ce o f an in clusive
sense.
T h e stru ctu re o f this fo rm o f k n o w le d g e can b e d escrib ed as a tw o fo ld c o ­
em erg en ce. O n e side o f th is p ro cess co n sists o f the co -em erg en ce o f the o b jec t
o f k n o w led g e an d th e k n o w led g e itself. K n o w led g e - u n d ersto o d as accessib ility
- arises at the v ery sam e m o m e n t in w h ich the o b je ct appears in its o w n actual
p resen ce. T h e accessib le o b je c t is n o th in g else th an its accessib ility as presen ce.
In o th e r w o rd s, accessib ility is n o th in g o th er th a n th e fo rm o f p resen ce o f the
o b ject, w h ich , in tu rn , is n o th in g o th e r th an the o b je ct itse lf in its o w n p ro cess o f
b e c o m in g p re se n t, e m b o d y in g a n o n -reflected , n o n -articu la ted , ta cit and o p e ra ­
tiv e sen se o f c o h e re n c e , ex p ressed a fter its c o n stitu tio n as kn o w led g e a b o u t the
o b ject. C o n seq u en tly , w h ile ex p erien cin g aesthetically, the o b je ct o f k n o w led g e
an d th e k n o w led g e are n o t tw o d ifferen t th in g s b u t tw o ex p ressio n s o f th e very
sam e ex p erien ce. D u rin g th e rea liz a tio n o f aesth etic ex p erien ce th ese tw o e n ti­
tie s, d e sc rib e d so far as b e in g in re la tio n o f co -em e rg en ce , are indistin g u ish ab le.

9 For the concept of “sense-making“ see: Francisco J. Varela, Eleanor Rosch and Evan Thomp­
son, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive science and human experience, Cambridge Massachu­
setts and London: MIT Press, 1991; Francisco J. Varela, “Organism: A meshwork of selfless
selves”, in A. I. Tauber (ed.), Organism and the Origin of Self, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1991, p. 79-107 and Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and
the Science of Mind, Cambridge Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, 2007.
10 For the concept of “experiential blindness“ see Alva Noe, Action in Perception, Cambridge
Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, 2004.
Sensuous Knowledge 91

T h e d istin ctio n b e tw e e n th e m is g en e ra te d a p o ste rio ri, actin g in th e m ed iu m in

w h ic h w e - I as a w riter an d y o u as a read er - are o p eratin g now : th e p re p o si­
tio n al lan g u ag e. To d escrib e the sin g u lar o b je c t o f ex p erien ce as tw o co -em erg en t
en tities, th u s, is th e rh eto rical strateg y th a t allo w s m e to com e closer, w ith in the
confines o f p re p o sitio n a l la n g u ag e, to a k in d o f ex p erien ce m ade in an o th er m e ­
dium .
F ollo w in g th e sam e strategy, I w ill now address the other side o f this process:
the co-em ergence o f the subject o fk n o w le d g e and the know ledge. K now ledge -
interp reted as u n derstanding - arises w h en the organism successfully reestablishes
its stru ctu ra l coupling w ith the o b ject w ith w hich it interacts. D escribed fro m the
perspective o f th e organism , this w o u ld be the m o m ent in w hich it adopts a viable
con d u ct11, i.e. w h en it guides itse lf in function o f the changes o f the object or, better,
w hen it lets itse lf to b e g u id ed by the activity o f the object creating conditions for a
shared (con-) g uidance (-ducere) in a possib le and com m on path. W ithout m o d ify ­
ing its internal fo rm o f organization, i.e. w ith out losing the autonom y th at arises
from its op era tio n a l closure12, the org an ism m odifies its actual form : it tra n sfo rm s,
in o rd er to deal in a suitable w ay w ith the affordances13 o f the object. T his process,
w hich is the process o f em b o d im en t o f th e organism , th at is, the em ergence o f its
actual fo rm due to the confluence o f its ow n organization and its coupling w ith the
environm ent, is as w ell th e process o f th e em ergence o f know ledge. K now ledge
is the very p ro cess o f co-em ergence o f b o th interacting entities, w hich, w hen ar­
ticulated in the sign-based m ed iu m o f p rep o sitional language, m anifests itse lf as
organism and o bject. Sensuous kno w led g e is not a m ediating u n it betw een tw o
entities existing indepen d en tly from o n another but, rather, the form th at both take
as co m p a tib le14 interacting entities. T h e aesthetic m odality o f know ledge, thus, is
the m anifestation o f b o th the k n ow n o b ject and the know ing subject in their co ­
em ergence th ro u g h aesthetic interaction. C onsequently, sensuous know ledge is not
a fo rm o f k now ing-about. It is a m anifestation em erging o u t o f the experience o f
w h at w e call the o b ject o f know led g e. T h erefore sensuous know ledge cannot be
identified as a fo rm o fk n o w in g -h o w .

11 Thompson introduces the term “viable conduct” in the explanation of Varela’s proposition
“live is sense-making”. Evan Thompson, Mind in Life, p. 158.
12 For the first formulation of the term “operational closure” see Francesco J. Varela, Principles
of Biological Autonomy, New York: Elsevier North-Holland, Inc., 1979.
13 I use the term “affordances“ here according to the formulation of Gibson: James J. Gibson,
The Ecological Approach To Visual Perception, Boston: Houhgton Mifflin, 1979.
14 I use the term “compatible” in its original meaning as able to suffer (pati, pathos) together
(com-). In turn the word “suffer” should be understood in the sense of experiencing. Object
and organism become compatible because they become able to share their mutual process of
co-emergent transformation through constant adaptation.
92 Alex Arteaga

It is, n e v e rth e le ss, p o ssib le to id en tify b o th the sk ill-b ased , actio n -o rien ted
sen se o f k n o w in g -h o w as w ell as the co n cep tu al, lan g u a g e-b a sed ch a ra cter o f
k n o w in g -th a t as asp ects o f th e sensu o u s k n o w le d g e. K n o w in g -h o w can be relate d
to th e c o n c e p t o f th e aesth etic k n o w led g e as a c c e ssib ility . In th e virtue o f this
k n o w le d g e , w e are able to act in o r w ith the o b je ct in a viab le w ay. W e are able to
d ev elo p a v iab le c o n d u c t to w ard s an d w ith the o b je ct o f ex p erien ce. T his fo rm o f
k n o w led g e co m p rises and, at th e sam e tim e, actu alizes th e possib ilities o f in te ra c­
tio n w ith th e o b je c t o f ex p erien ce th a t em erg es fro m the in teractio n itse lf an d the
fo rm o f o rg an izatio n o f b o th o b je c t an d su b ject o f exp erien ce. In the ex p erience
o fk n o w in g aesth etically , w e d ev elo p th e ab ility to in teract w ith the o b jec t o f our
ex perience: w e co m e to k n o w h o w to in teract w ith it.
K now ing-that, in turn, can be identified in the concept o f sensuous know ledge
as understanding. In and through the process o f perception, the object w e are ex­
periencing achieves its specific constitution as a phenom enal object. It appears to
us as som ething specific and as a specific “(som e-)thing” . T hen, w hen w e perceive
“that”, w e understand w hat w e are facing as a concrete and contoured “that”. As
the constitution o f the object o f experience, sensuous know ledge m akes this object
understandable as the very w ay it presents itself to us. W e understand it in the m ost
fundam ental way, i.e. as and through its presence. T herefore, this form o f know ledge
em beds and, at the sam e tim e, actualizes the possibilities o f understanding the object
o f experience that em erges in the experience itself. In the sensuous interaction w ith a
part o f our environm ent, w e com e to know w hat it is because it show s up, it achieves
a presence as a senseful object and thus creates the possibilities o f its transform ation
as a m eaningful one through its treatm ent in a different, sign-based m edium such as
propositional language.15 Sensuous know ledge, thus, constitutes sim ultaneously the
object o f experience as understandable presence and as an accessible entity, open for
the interaction w ith a subject, w hich concurrently becom es accessible for its object o f
know ledge.

* * *

T h e in itia l m o m e n t o f th e a e s th e tic e x p e rie n c e , th e m o m e n t in w h ic h th e o r­

g a n ism b e g in s to in te ra c t w ith its e n v iro n m e n t in a se n su o u s w ay, is in d u c e d
b y o n e b a sic a lte ra tio n : th e s o fte n in g o f th e b o u n d a rie s b e tw e e n o rg a n ism
a n d e n v iro n m e n t. T h e c le a r d iffe re n c e b e tw e e n th e m th a t m a k e s p o ssib le , fo r

15 The distinction between “senseful” and “meaningful” correlates to the differentiation between
aesthetic and sign-based knowledge. Accordingly, a “senseful object” would constitute a pres­
ence, which is not (yet) articulated in a sign-based medium, in which it will be (or become)
meaningful.
Sensuous Knowledge 93

e x a m p le , th e ir fu n c tio n a l in te ra c tio n o n th e b a sis o f u n e q u iv o c a l d is c rim in a ­

tio n s lik e “I a m u s in g th is to m a k e th a t” , b e g in s to m e lt, p re v e n tin g c e rta in
k in d s o f a c tio n s w h ile , in tu rn , o p e n in g a n e w field o f p o s s ib ilitie s . T h e p e r ­
m e a b ility o f th e lim its b e tw e e n th e c le a rly c o n to u re d e n titie s is in c re a s e d , so
th a t th e m o d a litie s o f e x c h a n g e b e tw e e n th e m a re a lte re d . R e g a rd e d fro m the
p e rs p e c tiv e o f th e s u b je c t, th is n e w situ a tio n is e x p e rie n c e d as a re d u c tio n
o f its o w n a g e n c y in fa v o r o f a c c e p tin g th e a g e n c y o f th e e n v iro n m e n t. In
c o n tra s t, w h e n in te ra c tin g in a fu n c tio n a l w ay , th e su b je c t h a s a c le a r se n se o f
agen cy . A c tu a lly , a c le a r se n se o f a g e n c y is n e c e ssa ry fo r fu n c tio n a l b e h av io r.
It m u s t b e c le a r, in o rd e r to m a k e th e s itu a tio n w o rk , th a t “I a m u sin g th is ” ,
i.e. th a t it is m e w h o is u s in g it. T h is c la rity in th e se n se o f a g e n c y im p lies
u n a m b ig u ity o f te le o lo g ic a l c a u sa lity : it is c le a r th a t “ I a m u sin g th is to do
th a t” . In th is fu n c tio n a l fra m e w o rk th e re is n o r e c o g n itio n o f a n y a g e n c y o f
th e o b je c t w ith w h ic h I a m in te ra c tin g . It a p p e a rs as a su b sid ia ry , p a ssiv e in ­
sta n c e , b e in g th e re in fu n c tio n o f m y a c ts a n d in te n tio n s.
O n th e contrary, th e so ften in g o f bo u n d aries w h ich pro p itiates an d n o urishes
the aesth etic ex p erien ce creates a sh a re d sp a ce o f a g en cy. In this specific space
o f actio n , th e agen cy o f th e actin g su b ject is rea sse sse d as a co n d itio n fo r the
ex p erien ce o f the e n v iro n m e n t’s ag en cy an d m ain ly o f the sh ared ag ency w ith
the en v iro n m en t. In th e sen su o u s ex p erien ce, actions an d th e cau sal structure,
in w h ic h th ey o c c u r are n o lo n g e r unid irectio nal. T h e aesth etically exp erien cin g
su b ject en ters in to a n o n -h iera rch ica l d ia lo g w ith the en tities it is in teractin g w ith
an d its ex p erien ce c o a lesces w ith in th is in ter-actio n .
In th is co n tex t, b o u n d aries are n o lo n g e r e x p erie n ced as elem en ts o f c o n ta in ­
m e n t b u t as c o n d itio n s o f co n tin g en cy. T h e lim its o f the p e rce iv e d o b je ct as w ell
as the lim its o f the ex p erien cin g su b ject - b o th b e in g p a rt o f h e r o w n ex p erien ce
- cease to be elem en ts o f iso latio n , release th eir fu n c tio n o f k eep in g to g e th er
a co n te n t - co n -ten ere - , a n d tu rn to be elem en ts o f con n ectio n , o f reciprocal
to u c h - con-tingere. T h e sep aratin g m em b ran es beco m e c o n n ectin g o n e s.16 C o n ­
sequently, th e co n ta in e d e n tities th a t th ey o n ce d e lim ited cease to be in a state
o f iso latio n in w h ich ju s t p u n c tu a l ex ch an g es are p o ssib le, in o rd er to co-create
a c o n tin u o u s p ro c e ss o f touch, o f in tim ate in teractio n , w h ic h constitu tes a space
fo r th e ir m u tu al sp ecificatio n , i.e. the space o f th e ir co-em ergence. T h e aesthetic
m o d e o f ex p erien cin g is in d u c e d an d m a in ta in e d by this so ftening o f b o u n d a ­

16 For two different formulations of my concept of a dialectic between containment and contin­
gency see: Alex Arteaga, “Das Primat des Prozesses. XX Fragmente uber radikale Verkor-
perung und ihre Erschliefiung durch eine bildschaffende Strategie”, in U. Feist and M. Rath
(eds.), Et in imagine ego. Facetten von Bildakt und Verkorperung, Berlin: Akademie Verlag,
2012, p. 255-274 and Alex Arteaga, “Fantasie in a non-given World?”, in S. Flach and S.
Anker (eds.), Embodied Fantasies, Bern and New York: Peter Lang, 2013.
94 Alex Arteaga

ries. O n ce th is m o d e is trig g ered , it co n trib u tes to in creasin g the p e rm e a b ility o f

th e d iscrim in atin g elem en ts, g en eratin g a situ atio n o f reciprocal accessib ility b e ­
tw e e n org an ism a n d en v iro n m en t. I co n sid e r this c o n c ep t o f recip ro cal a c ce ssib il­
ity m o re ap p ro p riate fo r d e scrib in g th e aesth etic ex p erien ce th a n th e trad itio n ally
u se d c o n c e p t o f “b ein g a ffe c ted ” .17
T w o m ain reasons support this consideration. First, by regarding the aesthetic
experien ce from th e p erspective o f reciprocal accessibility w e are facing the w hole
sy stem at once - the w hole field o f shared agency - and our p o int o f view is n o t lim ­
ited to o n ly one p art o f it, w hich is the case w hen the description concerns m erely
th e state o f the o rganism b ein g affected. S peaking o f being affected, w e focus on
th e organism and conceive o f the env iro n m ent as a subsidiary entity: the organism
is affected b y th e environm ent. T hus, facing the situation from the perspective o f
th e reciprocal accessibility helps to o vercom e the duality betw een a contained in ­
side space - th e o rganism - being affected by som ething com ing from the outside
- th e env iro n m en t - in fav o r o f an in teg ra ted p ro cess o f contingency.
S econd, th e c o n c e p t o f recip ro cal accessib ility overrid es an o th er duality,
w h ic h is im p licit, e v e n gram m atically , in th e fo rm u la tio n “ bein g a ffe cted ” : the
d u a lity b etw een activity an d p a s s iv ity . A d esc rip tio n o f th e aesth etic ex p erien ce
b a se d o n th e id ea o f “b ein g a ffe c ted ” im p lies th a t a u su ally activ e en tity turns
p assiv e an d is affe c ted by an o th er one, w h ic h n o rm ally is p assiv e an d now b e ­
co m es th e acto r o f th e affection. O n ce affected, the org an ism b ecom es active
ag a in an d reacts. T h is d e sc rip tio n is lo g ic a lly co rrec t b u t it does n o t grasp the
su b tle n u an ces o f th e sensuous. In th e fra m ew o rk o f th e recip ro cal accessibility,
th e sh ared activ ities o f b o th o rg an ism s an d en v iro n m en ts ach iev e th e quality o f
a listen in g p a s s iv ity .18 T h e sub tle to u ch b e tw ee n the co -arisin g u n its can n o t be
co m p re h e n d e d w ith in th e d u ality o f activ e a n d passive.

** *

T h e c h a ra c teriz a tio n o f sen su o u s k n o w led g e as a fo rm o f co g n itio n em erg in g out

o f th e aesth etic ex p erien ce I h av e o u tlin e d is m ark ed by th e d isso lu tio n o f four
d u alities: the d u ality b etw een kn o w le d g e an d the o b je ct o f kn o w led g e; the duality
b e tw e e n k n o w le d g e an d the su b ject o f k n o w led g e; the duality b etw een the o rg an ­
ism as an co n ta in e d in sid e an d th e e n v iro n m en t as an o u tside; and the d u ality
b e tw e e n a ctiv ity a n d passivity.

17 See footnote 2.
18 Jean-Luc Nancy developed a concept of “listening”, which converges not only with the sense,
in which I introduce this term here but also with some of the main ideas expressed in this
paper. Jean-Luc Nancy, A l’ecoute, Paris: Galilee, 2002.
Sensuous Knowledge 95

T h is co n c e p tu a liza tio n is n o t th e re su lt o f the ap p licatio n o f g eneral c o g n i­

tive th eo ries to th e field o f aesth etics b u t an attem p t to gen erate a d e scrip tio n , th at
is, a n a rtifa c t in th e m e d iu m o f p ro p o sitio n al lan g u ag e, in the fra m ew o rk o f the
en a ctive a p p ro a ch to c o g n itio n 19 th a t relates p ro p e rly to th e aesth e tic experience
as such. It is an a tte m p t to “d w ell in th e p h e n o m e n o n ” , as G o e th e e x p re s s e d it,
w h ile b e in g o u ts id e o f it, a c tin g in a n o th e r m e d iu m .20
A cc e p tin g th e p o ssib ility o f ac c o m p lish in g this ta sk successfu lly as w ell as
reco g n izin g th e en ric h m e n t th a t su c h a tre a tm e n t o f th e aesth etic e x p erien ce in
the d o m a in o f pro p o sitio n al lan g u ag e c a n en tail, I m ig h t a d d th a t th is activ ity can
n ev er rep lace a reflected ap p ro ach to this k in d o f ex p erien ce in the experien ce
itself, th a t is, in th e p re se n t first-p erso n p e rsp e ctiv e o f a silen t listen in g . A esth etic
practices - stru ctu red fo rm s o f a c tio n d e v e lo p ed in teractin g a esth etically - can
co n stitu te th e ap p ro p riate m ed iu m fo r th is k in d o f re sea rc h .21 N eith er becau se they

19 The enactive approach to cognition was defined for the first time 1991 in a “preliminary formula­
tion”, succinctly, in following terms: “(1) perception consists in perceptually guided actions and
(2) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be
perceptually guided.” (Varela et al., The Embodied Mind, p. 173). Alva Noe deliverd an interpreta­
tion of the initial definition of these autors: “They call ‘enactive’ a way of thinking about the mind
according to which 1) the subject of mental states is taken to be the embodied, environmentally
situated animal; 2) the animal and the environment are thought as a pair, standing in a relation of
being essentially coupled and reciprocally determining; 3) perceptual and other cognitive states
are thought of in terms of activity on the part of the animal and as a nonrepresentational; 4) the
mental life of a creature is taken to be an autonomous domain for the sort of investigations pursued
within the philosophical movement known as Phenomenology.” (Noe, Action in Perception, p.
233). Evan Thompson provided a more detailed summary: “The first idea is that living beings are
autonomous agents that actively generate and maintain themselves, and thereby also enact or bring
forth their own cognitive domains. The second idea is that the nervous system is an autonomous
dynamic system: It actively generates and maintains its own coherent and meaningful pattern of
activity, according to its operation as a circular and reentrant network of interacting neurons. [...]
The third idea is that cognition is the exercise of skillful know-how in situated and embodied ac­
tion. Cognitive structures and processes emerge form recurrent sensorimotor patterns of perception
and action. Sensorimotor coupling between organism and environment modulates, but does not
determine, the formation of endogenous, dynamic patterns of neural activity, which in turn inform
sensorimotor coupling. The forth idea is that a cognitive being’s world is not a prespecified, exter­
nal realm, represented externally by its brain, but a relational domain enacted or brought forth by
that being’s autonomous agency and mode of coupling with the environment. The fifth idea is that
experience is not an epiphenomenal side issue, but central to any understanding of the mind, and
needs to be investigated in a careful phenomenological manner.” (Thompson, Mind in Life, p. 13).
20 “Verweilen im Phanomen”. Johann Wolfgang Goethe, “Uber Naturwissenschaft im Allgemein,
einzelne Betrachtungen und Aphorismen. IV. Alteres, beinahe Veraltetes”, in Goethes Werke,
Weimarer Ausgabe, WAII, Abteilung, Bd. 11, p. 146.
21 Instead of referring to “aesthetic practices” I could use here the most common term “artistic practice”.
I prefer to use the first in order to not exclude practices that not been considered art - e.g. some so­
matic practices - constitute an appropriated medium for the research of sensuous knowledge.
96 Alex Arteaga

g en erate aesth etic ex p erien ce n o r b ecau se th is k in d o f ex p erien ce is ex clu siv e to

th em , b u t d u e to th e ir p o w e r to in ten sify th e so ftening o f b o u n d aries, to increase
th e p erm eab ility o f th e sk in w h ic h co n stitu tes one fu n d am en tal co n d itio n o f sen­
suo u s ex p erien ce. A esth etic p ractices c a n p ro v id e us w ith a suitable m ed iu m for
re se a rc h o n th e aesth etic b ecau se th e y create the n ecessary sp a ce o f o b se rv a tio n .
It is n o t a m a tte r o f reg ard in g th e p ractices th em selv es, b u t b eco m in g aw are o f the
o n g o in g p ro cess o f sen su o u s in te ra c tio n b e tw ee n organism s an d th e ir en v iro n ­
m ents. A esth etic p ractices u ltim ately create the space o f o b se rv a tio n th a t m akes
im m ed iately a c cessib le th e em erg en ce o f sensuous kn o w led g e, th a t is, th e m a n i­
festatio n as k n o w le d g e o f th e m o st fu n d am en tal lev e l o f co -em erg en ce o f the o b ­
je c t an d th e su b ject o f k n o w led g e: th e ir co -em erg en ce in the aesthetic ex p erience.
Reflections on Words and Thoughts in Motion

C e c il ia r o o s

W h e n se v e ra l d a n c e rs p e rfo rm a m o v e m e n t, it m ay lo o k q u ite th e sa m e , alm ost,

id e n tic a l; an d y e t, ea c h d a n c e r ’s e x p e rie n c e o f the m o v e m e n t as w e ll as the
d e sc rip tio n h e o r sh e w ill g iv e o f it, m a y b e c o m p le te ly d iffe re n t. W h a t I h a v e
b ee n o c c u p ie d w ith in m y re se a rc h is th e d iffe ren ce in e x p e rie n c e b e tw e e n first
see in g a m o v e m e n t a n d th e n stu d y in g it in o rd e r to do it. In th is paper, I w ill
p re se n t a d e s c rip tio n o f th a t p ro c e ss fro m th e p e rsp e c tiv e o f m y o w n e x p erien c e
as a dancer.
T h e re se a rc h p ro je c t From, m o v e m e n t o u t o f reflection in b eco m in g : The
d a n cer a n d the crea tive p ro c e ss sta rte d in Ja n u ary 2 0 1 0 .lt has b e en clo sely c o n ­
n ected to In a C riste l J o h a n n e se n ’s 1 d an ce p iece N O W S H E K N O W S 2, in w h ich I
p a rtic ip a te d as a d an c e r an d w h ich m y c o -research ers p e rio d ic ally o b serv ed . M y
research is b a se d o n th e d a n c e r’s v iew o n th e m o v em en t an d the ch o re o g ra p h er’s
idea, seen fro m in sid e th e p ro cess, as w ell as m y o w n ex p erien ce o f th a t p ro ­
cess. In a d d itio n , I h av e a c q u ire d an ex tern al p ersp ectiv e on the w o rk in g process
th ro u g h d iscu ssio n s w ith m y c o -research ers. In the research w o rk , the in ternal
and th e e x tern al p ersp ectiv es h av e b een sh ifting co n sta n tly b etw ee n a pre-reflec-
tive an d a reflectiv e k in d o f actio n . W ritin g fro m in side the p ro cess o f the p iece
N O W S H E K N O W S has re q u ire d fro m m e so m eth in g else c o m p ared to w riting
fro m an ex tern al p o in t o f v iew ab o u t a pro cess in gen eral. W h a t w as req u ire d w as
th a t I w as first really p a rt o f the artistic p ro c e ss, b u t th a t I w as th en also able to
step o u t o f the p ro cess so as to en g ag e in a d ialo g u e w ith m y co -research ers about
w h a t th ey o b se rv e d in re la tio n to w h a t I ex p erien c ed . W h at w e h a v e w a n te d to
d ev elo p in th e research g ro u p is a d isco u rse w here th e d an cer sets h er o w n lim its
an d lim itatio n s an d th u s c o n cep tu alizes h er process.
O u r re s e a rc h m e th o d s h a v e g ro w n o u t o f th e p ro c e ss; th e y are b o th in ­
sp ire d b y a n d b a s e d o n th e w o rk w ith th is p a rtic u la r d a n c e p ie ce . O u r b e lie f
h as b e e n th a t th e m e th o d o lo g ic a l to o ls m u s t b e ta k e n fro m p ra c tic e in o rd e r to
b e fru itfu l; m y w o rk w ith th e p ie c e N O W S H E K N O W S h as g iv e n th e o p p o r­
tu n ity fo r th a t. F ro m th e b e g in n in g o f th e p ro c e ss (w h e n m y re h e a rs a ls c o u ld

1 Johannesen is a Norwegian choreographer, based in Oslo. She runs her own company, zero
visibility, but she has also produced dance pieces for institutions such as Royal Swedish Bal­
let, Scottish Dance Theatre and Cullbergbaletten.
2 The dance piece NO W SHE KNO WS had its premier in 2010 at Norrlandsoperan in Umea and
has since then toured in Norway, Denmark, Germany and Mexico.
98 Cecilia Roos

n o t b e o b s e rv e d ), w e s ta rte d e a c h s e m in a r w ith d is c u s s io n s a b o u t a te x t one

o f u s h a d c h o se n . P re tty so o n w e - o r I, e s p e c ia lly - d is c o v e re d th a t th e re w as
a d im e n s io n m is sin g in o u r se m in a rs: th a t o f p h y s ic a l p ra c tic e . W e d e c id e d to
sta rt e a c h w o rk s h o p w ith a w a rm u p , w h e re I a lso ta u g h t m y c o -re s e a rc h e rs
s h o rt m o v e m e n t s e q u e n c e s fro m N O W S H E K N O W S . W e d a n c e d a n d d is ­
c u s s e d th e m o v e m e n ts in d e ta il a n d p o n d e re d d iffe re n t w a y s o f in te rp re tin g
th em : fo r e x a m p le th e d y n a m ic s , d ire c tio n s a n d th e te m p o o n th e b a sis o f
e v e ry o n e ’s o w n e x p e rie n c e . M y c o -re s e a rc h e rs th e n b e g a n to fo rm u la te th e ir
o w n p e rs p e c tiv e s o n th e p ro c e s s , w h ic h in tu rn le d m e to sp o t th in g s I h a d
fo rg o tte n o r h a d n o t y e t d is c o v e re d in m y o w n p ra c tic e . O f c o u rse , th e re w as
a d iffe re n c e b e tw e e n th e w a y s in w h ic h w e d e s c rib e d th e p ro c e ss; th ro u g h
m y e x p e rie n c e as a d a n c e r I h a d m o re p o s s ib ilitie s to d e v e lo p th e m o v e m e n t
m a te ria l, w h ic h g a v e m e a n o th e r sp a c e to a c t in. N e v e rth e le s s , it w a s in te r­
e stin g fo r m e th a t th e o th e rs c a m e c lo se to a p ro c e s s -b a s e d m o v e m e n t a n a ly ­
sis. S o m e th in g h a p p e n e d to th e m th a t th e y c o u ld e x p e rie n c e in th e ir b o d ies,
e x p lo re a n d v e rb a liz e , a n d th is in tu rn h e lp e d m e to d e sc rib e m y e x p e rie n c e
m o re clearly .
A fte r a w h ile w e e n c o u n te re d so m e th in g else th a n k s to o u r sh a re d p h y sic al
tra in in g , a p o sitiv e sid e e ffe c t as it w ere: o u r b o d ily sta rtin g p o in t, th e w arm up,
h e lp e d u s to a c q u ire a p e c u lia r c o n sc io u sn e ss, w h ic h b e c a m e sig n ific an t fo r o u r
co n v e rsa tio n s in th e fo llo w in g te x t sem in ars. T h ro u g h th e c o rp o re a l e x p e rie n c e
th a t w as c o m m u n ic a te d a n d e x c h a n g e d b e tw e e n us, th e re w e re su d d e n ly n o t
o n ly w o rd s b u t a lso so m e th in g lik e a c o n ta c t surface. F o r m e p erso n ally , th e
new s itu a tio n a llo w e d m e to be m o re o p e n a n d to see p o ssib ilitie s o f o th e r re a d ­
in g s o f th e te x ts d isc u sse d . G e n e ra lly sp e a k in g , m y re la tio n sh ip to th e w ritte n
w o rd b e c a m e m o re fle x ib le , c o m p a ra b le to th e se n sa tio n o f a m o v e m e n t. T his
in tu rn le d m e to find n ew w ay s to a p p ro a c h an d p ro c e ss m o v e m e n t m a te ria l in
th e studio.
M y p e rso n a l re se a rc h m e th o d h as b e e n a p ractic e-b a sed pro cess an alysis,
w h ere m o v e m e n t co n stitu tes th e m aterial an d the d a n c e r’s pro cess co n stitu tes the
to p ic. I h av e a cq u ired an a d v an ced an d d ee p en e d u n d ersta n d in g o f the d a n c e r’s
p ro cess th ro u g h reflectio n o n th e m o v e m e n t m aterial b y m ean s o f a b o d ily d ia ­
lo g u e w ith it; th is h as cre a te d a state o f c o n stan t sh ift in m y u n d erstan d in g and
m y aw aren ess o f the m aterial. In re h e a rsa l, ju s t w h en I th o u g h t I g o t h o ld o f one
m o v em en t, it slip p e d aw ay, lik e th e w h o le p ro cess itself. T h e m aterial, th e dance
is there, b u t it alw ay s ch an g es d e p en d in g o n th e ch o sen m ethod. In th e research
group, o u r research m eth o d s h av e b een d e v e lo p e d o u t fro m a n e ed to u n d erstan d
an d ex am in e th e to p ic, i.e., the d a n c e r’s p ro cess and the m aterial, w h ic h is op en
fo r n ew w ay s o f u n d e rsta n d in g th a t p ro cess. T he d a n c e r’s pro cess em erges as a
to p ic th ro u g h a p ro c e ss-b a se d m e th o d th a t ev olves along w ith the questio n s w ith
Reflections on 'Words and Thoughts in Motion 99

w h ic h I a p p ro a c h th e m o v e m e n t m aterial a n d the questio n s w h ic h th e sam e m a ­

terial sug g ests to m e. T h e d a n c e r’s p ro cess em erges in the w o rk w ith the m o v e ­
m en t m aterial; th e m a te ria l can b e in te re stin g only in so far as the d a n c e r’s pro cess
rem ain s essential.
D u rin g th e w h o le p ro c e ss o f th e p ie c e N O W S H E K N O W S , I co n tin u o u sly
w ro te d o w n re fle c tio n s o n m y e x p e rie n c e w ith th e m o v e m e n t m a te ria l (this
to o k p la c e d u rin g b o th re h e a rsa l a n d p e rfo rm a n c e p erio d ). A s I re a d m y n o te ­
b o o k now , m y p ro c e ss a c tu a lly co n tin u e s. I am no w ab le to c a tc h sig h t o f th e
a m b iv a le n c e, th e u n c e rta in ty a n d th e d e sire a t w o rk in th e d e e p e n in g re la tio n ­
ship to th e m o v e m e n t th a t I d e v e lo p e d b y d a n c in g N O W S H E K N O W S . B u t the
d ifficu lties I e n c o u n te re d w h e n try in g to w rite fro m in sid e th e c re a tiv e p ro ce ss
are a lso v e ry o b v io u s to m e now . I w ro te th e fo llo w in g re flec tio n s in M a rc h
2011 :

C an I d iscu ss the d a n c e r ’s p ro c e ss se p a ra te d fr o m the m ovem ent? I f I claim to

w rite fr o m insid e the p ro c e ss, m u st I let m y th o u g h t be se p a ra te d fr o m the m o v e ­
m ent? C a n I even th in k a b o u t the p ro cess? M a yb e a p ro c e ss is so m eth in g I can
only do? I ’m m u ch m ore in terested in se e in g m o v em e n t as p a r t o f th o u g h t a n d
vice versa. T h e se p a ra tio n b etw een them b rin g s n o th in g , b u t the co m b in a tio n
p ro v id e s a co m p lexity th a t is interestin g to develop. W riting fr o m inside the p r o ­
cess c o u ld be like letting the text be the m o v e m en t a n d vice versa. T h in k in g is also
“a d o in g ”, b u t the se p a ra tio n b etw een b ody a n d th o u g h t m ay as w ell be a “to o l”
to e va lu a te/a n a lyze the process.

T here are several perspectives an d approaches, b o th internal and external, th a t the

dancer can choose to ad o p t w ith resp ect to the m o vem ent m aterial. T here is, for
exam ple, th e general difference b etw een w h at she feels w h en she looks at it and
w h at she feels w h en she does it. She oscillates betw een these perspectives, w hich
are b o th intuitive an d conscious. T h e shift b etw een these perspectives creates a
gap, a space or a crease in tim e w here th e perspectives m erge or run parallel. It is a
m o m en t consisting o f possible articulations. A s a kind o f interm ediate position, an
in-betw een, it is a place o f co n stan t deviation w here the possibilities o f each m o v e­
m en t are constantly explored. H ere, an ap proach to the m o vem ent is suggested,
tested, form ulated, an d articulated only to be reconsidered. It is in this process th at
the d an cer is m aking th e choices th at underlie the continuous developm ent, the
deepening o f th e ta sk or th e m ovem ent, its interpretation and reinterpretation. She
creates a distance to h erself an d to th e m o v em ent by, for exam ple, w atching herself
in th e m irro r doing it. O r she com es clo ser to th e m o vem ent by consciously explor­
ing the feeling o f doin g it. W h at m atters h ere is the duality, the conscious and d e­
liberate o scillation b etw een d istance an d p roxim ity w ith respect to the m ovem ent.
100 Cecilia Roos

T h ese inn er an d outer perspectives o n the m ov em en t m aterial are n o t opposed to

each oth er b u t interrelated in dialogue. W h at she w ants and w h at she intends w ith
th e m aterial is b ased o n th e experience o f ask ing the questions she needs to ask in
ord er to be able to dance it. H er full atten tio n is directed tow ards that.
It is in th is p ro cess th a t th e d a n c e r d eep en s h e r relatio n to th e m o v em en t m a­
te ria l an d th e d etails em erge; th ere is n o final in terp retatio n h ere , the p o ssib ilities
are endless. S he is co n sta n tly try in g to m o re clearly articu late w h a t she e x p eri­
en ces p h y sic a lly w h en she w o rk s w ith th e m aterial. It c an be so m eth in g th a t she
d id n o t at first d etect in th e m o v em en t, b u t felt w h en she d id it. It is th ro u g h im ­
m e rsio n in th e a rtic u la tio n o f th e m o v e m e n t th a t fu rth er d etails c a n em erge.
F o r m e p erso n ally , th e k ey w o rd s th a t m ake u p the b asis o f the d a n c e r’s w ork
are reflection, rela tio n sh ip , an d dialogue.
R eflectio n is a p rereq u isite fo r p ro cessin g the m aterial, in so fa r as th e o p ­
p o rtu n ities o f th e d a n c e r’s w o rk arise fro m th in k in g , seeing and listen in g to each
detail o f th e m o v em en t. A s th e rela tio n sh ip to th e m o v e m e n t grow s an d re p e a t­
ed ly co m es to th e fore, th e e n c o u n te r w ith th e m o v em en t o r ta sk changes. T here
is a co rp o real tra n sfo rm a tio n goin g o n th ro u g h the d o ing o f th e m o v em en t, as
an activ ity o r an ev en t in w h ich th e ex p erien ce o f the m o v e m e n t chan g es all the
tim e. It is a d ia lo g u e w ith th e m o v e m e n t in to w h ich I go in m y p ractice, in such a
w ay th a t m y ex p erien ce o f it is tran sfo rm ed , a n d th a t show s th ro u g h in m y d an c­
in g . T h e m o v e m e n t is alw ay s m o re th an w h a t it w as p rev io u sly ; the p o te n tia l
in creases w ith each rehearsal.
In th e c o n tin u o u a l d isc u ssio n s w e h a d in th e re se a rc h gro u p , p a ra l­
lel w ith m e p e rfo rm in g a n d to u rin g th e p ie ce N O W S H E K N O W S , so m e ­
th in g n ew w as re v e a le d to m e. It all sta rte d w h e n I b e g a n to a tte n d m ore
ca re fu lly to th e w ay in w h ic h m y c o -re se a rc h e rs stu d ie d the tex ts th a t w e
h a d s e le c te d a n d th e w ay th e y d is c u s s e d th em . I c o u ld see th a t th e y c re ­
ate d stru c tu re s a n d p a tte rn s o f reaso n in g . F o r m e, it w as lik e a n ew k in d o f
ch o re o g ra p h y th a t I h a d n e v e r d a n c e d , a c lu ste r o f w o rd s p u lle d a p a rt an d
p u sh e d to g eth er. It b e c a m e lik e a to p o g ra p h y , a la n d sc a p e o f w o rd s w h ic h
g av e m e n ew id e a s o f h o w to a p p ro a c h a m o v e m e n t m aterial. I w ro te th is
re fle c tio n a fte r a p e rfo rm a n c e in G u a n a ju a to , M e x ic o in N o v e m b e r 2011:

W h en I d a n ce, I th in k in a n e w way. I ca n d isa sse m b le m o ve m en ts, o r p u t them

o n top o f e a c h other, in a w a y I d id n ’t e x p e rie n c e th em before. I t a ffe c ts m y
p h r a s in g o f the m o v e m e n ts b u t a lso m y fo c u s , w h ic h c a n be b o th clo se a n d f a r
a w a y a t th e sa m e m o m en t. M y re la tio n sh ip to the ro o m a n d to the o th e r d a n ce rs
o c c u rs a g a in a n d a g a in in d iffe re n t w a ys. I use d iffe re n t a p p ro a c h e s to tim e a n d
sp a c e like c irc u la tin g re fe re n c e s o r clu ste rs. To th in k a c co rd in g to th is g iv e s
m e a w a y o f e x p e rie n c in g m y b o d y a s a p la c e th a t cre a tes room w ith in a room .
Reflections on 'Words and Thoughts in Motion 101

D iffe re n t re a litie s a n d levels in sp a c e sim u lta n e o u sly. W h a t h a p p e n s is h a rd to

d escrib e, th e b o d y b e c o m e s like a ro a rin g in sid e. I t so u n d s, I so u n d , b u t no one
ca n h e a r th a t e x c e p t m e. I f I h a ve so f a r p u s h e d fo r w a r d the m a teria l, I ’m now
in sid e o f it. I t ’s p o s s ib le to p la y w ith a ll th e d e ta ils o f it; I ’m like a kite in the
w in d . I f e e l like ste p p in g into a fa m ilia r skin, o r th a t su d d e n ly a n a tm o sp h e re
is c re a te d a ro u n d w h a t I do. T he m o v e m e n t in sid e g e ts a resp o n se fr o m the
o u tsid e , its flo a tin g a ro u n d i s n ’t u n c e rta in a t a ll. 'There is so m e th in g there th a t
I ca n rela te to. In teg rity, it sw ings.

T h ro u g h m y re se a rc h in th e group, m y ex p erien ce o f th e artistic pro cess has

changed. T h is c h an g e has o cc u rre d by w ay o f in teractio n an d dialo g u e w ith m y
c o -research ers, an d also b y w ay o f reflectin g on m y ex p erien ce o f the pro cess
fro m th e inside. M y re se a rc h has b een le d by th e fo llo w in g questions: how does
the d an c e r p erceiv e th e m o v em en t, an d h ow do es th e p ercep tio n o f m o v em en t
ch an g e b e tw e e n w atch in g it a n d p erfo rm in g it, b e tw ee n th e w h o le o f a piece and
a p a rtic u la r p a rt o f it? I h av e a p p ro ach ed th ese q u estio n s b y d isc u ssin g the d iffer­
ences an d sim ilarities b e tw e e n v isio n an d p erfo rm an ce w ith m y co-research ers
an d by ask in g th e m to d escrib e th e d ifferen ce th ey ex p erien ce b etw ee n seeing
an d d o in g m o v e m e n t m aterials. O n e c o u ld say th a t w h a t w e h a d w as b o th an in ­
n er a n d an o u te r p ersp ectiv e, w h ere I w as in sid e th e pro cess creatin g N O W S H E
K N O W S , w h ile th ey re m a in e d outside.
B u t m y p e rs o n a l w a y o f v e rb a liz in g th e p ro c e ss is n o t re le v a n t, I is s lip ­
p in g th ro u g h m y fin g e rs. M y e x p e rie n c e is o f c o u rse a lw a y s o n a m o re p h y s i­
cal le v e l th a n w o rd s c a n show . T h e b o d y o f th e la n g u a g e a n d th e la n g u a g e o f
th e b o d y , h o w c a n I tra n s c rib e m y e x p e rie n c e o f d a n c in g in to w o rd s? W h a t
w ill m o v e m e n t a n d m y fe e lin g o f e m b o d im e n t lo o k lik e in th e fo rm a te x t? I
can w rite re fle x iv e ly a n d d e s c rib e th e p ro c e s s , b u t th e o u tc o m e w ill a lw a y s
lo o k d iffe re n t, d e p e n d in g o n w h a t p ro c e s s I d e s c rib e a n d w h e n I w rite it. I f
I w a it te n m in u te s o r h a lf a day, m y d e s c rip tio n w ill b e d iffe re n t. T h e s p a ­
tia l a n d te m p o ra l d is ta n c e b e tw e e n th e a c tu a l e v e n t a n d th e w ritte n re fle c tio n
o p e n s u p th e p o s s ib ility o f n ew in te rp re ta tio n s. In o th e r w o rd s, n o th in g is
sta b le . T h e tra n s itio n fro m m y re fle x iv e w ritin g s to a th e o re tic a l o r p h ilo ­
so p h ic a l p e rs p e c tiv e , if I m ay c a ll it th a t, is lim p in g . T h e re a re b o th in te rn a l
a n d e x te rn a l p e rs p e c tiv e s h e re , to o , b u t th e g a p s th a t I w ish e d to be a b le to
b rid g e b y d e s c rib in g th e m p e rs is t. P e rh a p s it is in th e se g a p s th a t fle x ib ility
a n d lin g u is tic d isp la c e m e n t o f m e a n in g c a n e x is t a n d d iffe re n t in te rp re ta tio n s
o f th e m o v e m e n ts a re p o ssib le . T h e d is ta n c e b e c o m e s a p re re q u is ite fo r a r ­
tic u la tio n a n d v a ria b ility o f th e m o v e m e n ts. B e tw e e n th e tw o m o v e m e n ts, o n e
p e rfo rm e d b y th e d a n c e r a n d th e o th e r p e rc e iv e d a n d v e rb a lly a rtic u la te d , is
th e sp a c e c re a te d fo r th e p ro c e ss, w h e re it c a n b e c o m e m u ltila y e re d , a m b ig u ­
102 Cecilia Roos

o u s a n d s u b je c tiv e . W h e n I d is c u s s e d th e q u e s tio n w ith m y c o -re se a rc h e r,

p ro fe s s o r C h ry s a P a rk in s o n 3 in o n e o f o u r se m in a rs, she said: “L a n g u a g e is
v e ry u s e fu l in p h y s ic a l p ro c e s s e s fo r its a b ility to m a k e d istin c tio n s b e tw e e n
m o v e m e n ts . A m o v e m e n t is u s e fu l fo r i t ’s a b ility to h u m b le a n d q u e stio n
th o s e d is tin c tio n s ” .
In m y o p in io n , a w o rk in g lan g u ag e o r term in o lo g y has g ro w n o u t o f m y e x ­
p erie n c e an d p ractice in the research gro u p ; the v alue o f such a lan g u ag e lies in
its u sa b ility an d c o n sta n t ch an g eab ility . W h a t m atters is a lan g u ag e th at springs
fro m ex p erien ce a n d an ex p erien ce th a t g ro w s o u t o f language. A t issue is a c o n ­
ce p tu a liz atio n th a t o p en s u p to an o th er w ay o f looking, w h ic h in tu rn opens up a
new w ay o f u n d e rsta n d in g m o v em en t. W ith chains and clu sters o f w ords it can be
visib le, b u t it can n e v e r rep lace th e c o m p lex p atterns a n d structures o f the m o v e ­
m en t, th o u g h it c a n be a w ay to v isu alize em o tio n a n d em b o d im en t in w ords.
D an ce creates a sp ecial p resen ce fo r th e dancer. It is th e ex p erien ce o f being
co n sta n tly in a state o f flux, a “ m o v in g b e in g ” . In the m o m en t o f m y d an cin g ,
th e re ’s m em o ry , reflectio n , th o u g h t an d action to g eth er in h a rm o n y o r d ia ­
logue. I c a n eith er w o rk in tu itiv ely w ith th e m o v em en ts an d follow im pulses
o r co n sc io u sly ch o o se am o n g th e p o ssib ility th a t show s up in th e m om ent. In
m y d an cin g , m y in te n tio n a n d im p u lse co m e to g eth er an d th e b o u n d ary b etw een
th o u g h t a n d a c tio n is elim in ated . In a clu ster o f m o v em en ts, th o u g h ts, w ords,
an d th e ir te m p o ra lity I m e e t th e p resen t, th e past, a n d th e fu ture in m y dancing.

3 Chrysa Parkinson is a dancer based in Brussels. She holds a professorship in dance at DOCH
(University of Dance and Circus) in Stockholm, Sweden.
The Dancing Body and Creative Expression:
Reflections Based on Merleau-Ponty’s
Phenomenology 1

A n n a p e t r o n e l l a f o u l t ie r

W h e n a d a n c e r p e rfo rm s a c h o re o g ra p h y , h e r b o d y ap p ea rs as a p a rtic u la r, liv ­

in g h u m a n body, b u t it a lso c a rrie s a m e a n in g th a t d istin g u ish e s h er p e rfo r­
m a n c e as d a n c e , as a w o rk o f art. T h e m e a n in g o r sig n ific atio n b ro u g h t a b o u t
by th e d a n c in g b o d y h as ra re ly b e e n a d d re sse d in th e h isto ry o f p h ilo so p h y ,
an d o n ly re c e n tly h a v e re se a rc h e rs b e g u n to c o n sid e r it to be a th e m e w o rth y o f
p h ilo so p h ic a l in te re st.2
In P h e n o m e n o lo g y o f P ercep tio n , M a u ric e M e rlea u -P o n ty gives a p h e n o m ­
e n o lo g ical ch ara c teriz a tio n o f the liv in g b o d y as a w o rk o f art;3 here, m ean in g
in general - n o t o n ly th e m ean in g o f th e b o d y b u t also th a t o f a rt an d signs - is
u n d e rsto o d as an in c a rn a te d p h e n o m e n o n . In his later w ritin g s, M erleau -P o n ty
furth erm o re attem p ts a t u n d erstan d in g lin g u istic m ean in g by co m p arin g it w ith
m ean in g in art - in p ain tin g , poetry, an d m u sic.4 In m y view , his id eas o p en to ­
w ards an u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e sig n ificatio n o f the d a n cin g body, alth o u g h the
F ren ch p h e n o m e n o lo g ist h im se lf m en tio n s th e art o f d an cin g o n ly in passing. F or
M erleau -P o n ty , le co rp s p ro p re - the liv in g b o d y o r b o d y -p ro p er - is a m oving
and p erc e iv in g b o d ily su b ject, w h ich as such constitu tes the v ery site o f e x p re s­

1 I am indebted to Miika Luoto for valuable comments on this paper.

2 Although other art forms have been of concern to philosophers at least since the Antiq­
uity, dance theory is arguably a contemporary phenomenon. For a discussion of this issue,
see David Michael Levin, “Philosophers and the Dance”, Ballet Review 6:2, 1977-1978,
reprinted in What is Dance?, eds. Roger Copeland and Marshall Cohen, New York: Ox­
ford U.P., 1983 and Francis Sparshott, “Why Philosophy Neglects the Dance”, in the
same volume.
3 Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald A. Landes, London: Routledge, 2012 / Pheno-
menologie de la perception, Paris: Gallimard, 1945. English translations have occasionally
been altered.
4 See Merleau-Ponty’s essay from 1952, “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence”, re­
vised trans. Michael B. Smith, The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader, ed. Galen A. Johnson,
Evanston, 111: Northwestern U.P., 1993 / “Le langage indirect et les voix de silence”, Signes,
Paris: Gallimard, I960, and the manuscript written at about the same time, published post­
humously as The Prose of the World, trans. John O’Neill, Evanston, 111.: Northwestern U.P.
1973 / La prose du monde, ed. Claude Lefort, Paris: Gallimard, 1969.
104 Anna Petronella Foultier

sion: “th e b o d y is em in en tly a n ex p ressiv e sp a c e ”.5 T h erew ith , the b o d y -p ro p er

is th e b asis fo r th e c reatio n o f new m ean in g , b u t also fo r k n o w led g e an d rational
p ractices in g en eral. H en ce, I b eliev e w e can find in M e rle a u -P o n ty ’s p h ilo so p h y
th e o re tic a l to o ls th a t le a d us to w ard s a n u n d erstan d in g o f th e d an cin g b o d y and
o f d an ce as such.
A cco rd in g to M erleau -P o n ty , the liv in g b o d y has a fo rm o f u n ity th at m u st
n o t be u n d e rsto o d in a su m m ativ e w ay, as in e m p iricist a n d intellectu alistic th e o ­
ries. H e th e re fo re d istin g u ish es b e tw e e n tw o levels, o r layers, in the liv in g body:
th ere is o n th e o n e h a n d w h a t he calls th e h a b itu a l b o d y , an d o n the o th er the a c ­
tu a l b o d y .6 T h e b o d y -p ro p e r is at its m o st fu n d am e n tal lev el a h a b itu al body: its
ex p erien ces an d p ractices - p h y sio lo g ical a n d p sy ch o lo g ical - are in co rp o rated
as habits, w h ic h b e co m e p a rt o f th e person. E v e n the to o ls u se d in th ese activities
are in te g ra te d in to th e stru ctu re o f th e body.7
T h anks to the h ab itu al bo d y , w e d o n o t n eed to reflect up o n each step w e take
on ce w e h av e le a rn e d to w a lk , an d in fa c t it is fo r the m o st p a rt ra th e r d ifficu lt to
g ive a n a c c o u n t o f ex actly w h a t w e d o w h e n w e p erfo rm h ab itu al m ovem ents.
W h e n a p ractice is in te g ra te d in to th e bo d y , a seg m en t o f the w o rld also beco m es
p a rt o f its structure: th e m o v em en ts o f cy clin g, fo r exam ple, ca n n o t be p erfo rm ed
w ith o u t a b icy cle, a n d th e b icy cle I u se ev ery day w ill beco m e an ex te n sio n o f
m y h ab itu al b o d y in a m o re d ecisiv e w ay th a n any o th er bicycle. E v e n th e route
I u su ally tak e w ill b eco m e so w ell k n o w n to m e th a t I do n o t n e ed to th in k about
th e m o v em en ts I n eed to p erfo rm to fo llo w it, e x cep t perh ap s if th e co nditions
change: if it rains, th e ro a d is iced over, o r th e re is a ro a d rep a ir going on. For
M erleau -P o n ty , th e h a b itu a l b o d y is situ ated b etw een the se lf and the w o rld , it is
th e “m e d ia to r o f a w o rld ”.8
T h e a c tu a l body, o n th e o th e r h an d , is th e b o d y h e re a n d now : it is n o t
a n o th e r body, b u t ra th e r th e h a b itu a l b o d y in a p a rtic u la r situ atio n , fa c in g a
p a rtic u la r task , w h ic h it m a y b e m o re o r less a c q u a in te d w ith. I f I am in a situ ­
a tio n I k n o w v e ry w ell, th e h a b itu a l a n d th e a c tu a l b o d y w ill to a la rg e e x te n t
c o in c id e , b u t if, fo r e x a m p le , I g o to m o u n t a c lim b in g w a ll fo r the first tim e , o r
try to le a rn a w h o lly n ew d a n c e te c h n iq u e , th e d isc re p a n c y b e tw e e n th e h ab itu al
a n d th e a c tu a l b o d y w ill b e c o m e m o re p ro n o u n ce d . I f I fall ill, v ery sim p le
m o v e m e n ts - le t us say g e ttin g o u t o f b e d - m ay b e c o m e la b o rio u s, a n d a n y o n e
w h o h a s b e e n p re g n a n t k n o w s th a t o n e n e e d s to find n ew w ay s o f p e rfo rm in g
fa m ilia r m o v e m e n ts in th a t situ atio n .

5 Phenomenology, p. 147 / Phenomenologie, p. 171: “le corps est eminemment un espace expressif”.
6 For example, ibid., p. 84 / 97 f.
7 See ibid., p. 93 / 107.
8 Ibid., p. 146 / 169: “le corps comme mediateur d’un monde”.
The Dancing Body and Creative Expression 105

O n e ex am p le M e rle a u -P o n ty g iv es to clarify the d ifference b etw ee n the h a ­

bitual an d th e actu al b o d y is th a t o f ph a n to m pain. H e argues th a t a p e rso n w hose
leg o r arm has b e e n am p u tated , b u t w h o still feels p a in o r o th e r sen satio n s in it, is
h av in g a n ex p erien ce p recisely o f th e h ab itu al body. T h is m eans th a t th e perso n
co n tin u es to relate to a w o rld w h ere a certain n u m b er o f m o v em en ts a n d gestures
w ere p o ssib le - an d still are fo r m o st p eo p le aro u n d him - b u t are no lo n g er
ach iev ab le fo r his actu al body.9 T h is is an ex am p le o f how the h ab itu al an d the
actual b o d y co m e in to co n flict w ith o n e another.
C learly , the n o tio n s at issu e are d y n am ic; w e are tem p o ral b ein g s and the
h ab itu al b o d y is n e v e r g iv en o n ce an d fo r all: this is w h y M e rle au -P o n ty in tro ­
du ces th e id ea o f th e actu al body. E v e n so m eo n e w h o fo llo w s very strict routines
an d n ev er falls ill is su rro u n d e d by a c h an g in g w o rld th a t he m u st cope w ith. T he
actual body, th e b o d y h ere an d now , can th erefo re n ev e r com p letely co in cid e w ith
the h ab itu al body. O n e m ig h t ra th e r say th a t th e se asp ects or “la y ers” o f the body
are d ia lectica lly re la te d .10
A n o th e r d y n am ic n o tio n th a t M e rle a u -P o n ty u ses, one th at is re la te d to th at
o f th e h ab itu al body, is th e b o d y s c h e m a . T h e term s body sch em a a n d body im age
h av e b een in u sag e sin ce th e e n d o f th e 19th cen tu ry a n d w ere d ev elo p e d by the
n e u ro lo g ist H en ry H e a d an d the P sy c h ia trist P au l S ch ild er in the first d ecades o f
the 2 0 th cen tu ry .11
A c c o rd in g to M e rle a u -P o n ty , it is th e b o d y sc h e m a th a t g iv e s th e liv in g
b o d y its u n ity : th e b o d y -p ro p e r is n o t a c o lle c tio n o f lim b s a n d o rg a n s a tta c h e d
to o n e a n o th e r a n d to b e a c tiv a te d in d e p e n d e n tly o f o n e an o th e r. T h e b o d y -
p ro p e r c o n s titu te s a s p a tio te m p o ra l, b u t a ls o in te rs e n s o ry a n d se n so rim o to r,
unity. A t a b a sic le v e l, d iffe re n t se n so ry e x p e rie n c e s re fe r to o n e an o th er:
w ith re g a rd to th e d iffe re n t s e n s o ry fie ld s, “ th e b o d y sc h e m a fu rn is h e s m e
[ ...] a s y ste m o f e q u iv a le n c e s ” . 12 T h is is w h y M e rle a u -P o n ty ca n c la im th a t

9 Ibid, p. 84 / 97.
10 For Merleau-Ponty, a “dialectical relation” is one where “the effect of each particular action
is determined by its signification for the whole”, rather than “the external and blind relations
of juxtaposed realities”, The Structure of Behavior, trans. Alden L. Fisher, Pittsburgh, Pa.:
Dusquesne U.P., 1963 p. 202 / La Structure du comportement, Paris: P.U.F., 1990 (1942),
p. 218: “non pas les relations exterieures et aveugles de realties juxtaposees, mais des rap­
ports dialectiques ou l’effet de chaque action partielle est determine par sa signification pour
l’ensemble”.
11 Head, Studies in Neurology, vol. II, Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1920 and Schilder, The Image and
Appearance of the Human Body: Studies in the Constructive Energies of the Psyche, London:
Routledge, 1999 (1935) / Das Korperschema: Ein Beitrag zur Lehre vom Bewusstsein des
eigenen Korpers, Berlin: J. Springer, 1923.
12 Child Psychology and Pedagogy: The Sorbonne Lectures 1949-1952, trans. Talia Welsh, Evan­
ston, 111.: Northwestern U.P., 2010, p. 247 / Merleau-Ponty a la Sorbonne. Resumes de cours
(1949-1952), ed. Jacques Prunair, Grenoble: Cynara, 1988, p. 311: “Les differents domaines sen-
106 Anna Petronella Foultier

“ [s ]y n e s th e tic p e rc e p tio n is th e r u le ”.13 S im ila rly , m o tility a n d p e rc e p tio n are

fu n d a m e n ta lly c o n n e c te d : I c a n n o t e x p e rie n c e a n y th in g w h a ts o e v e r w ith o u t
m o v in g th e b o d y in so m e w ay. It is a ls o th ro u g h th e b o d y sc h e m a th a t I k n o w
th e p o s itio n o f m y lim b s, n o t as a sta tic p o sitio n , h o w e v e r, b u t in re la tio n to
a ta sk , e ith e r re a l o r p o s s ib le .14 B e c a u s e o f th e b o d y sc h e m a , th e b o d y -p ro p e r
h a s “ a s itu a tio n a l s p a tia lity ”, to b e d is tin g u is h e d fro m “ a p o s itio n a l s p a tia l-
ity ” c h a ra c te riz in g e x te rn a l o b je c ts .15
M o re recen tly , th e A m e ric a n p h ilo so p h e r S h au n G a lla g h e r has d iffe re n ti­
ate d b e tw e e n th e n o tio n s b o d y sc h e m a a n d b o d y im a g e ,16 w ith M e rle a u -P o n ty ’s
an a ly se s as a p o in t o f d e p a rtu re , in a w a y th a t I b e lie v e is fru itfu l to th e p h e ­
n o m e n o lo g ic a l stu d y o f d a n c e a n d b o d ily e x p re ssio n . W h e re a s th e b o d y im ag e
is an in te n tio n a l o b je c t, in o th e r w o rd s so m e th in g th a t w e are c o n scio u s o f o r
ca n m ak e c o n sc io u s, th e b o d y sc h e m a is n o t d ire c tly a cc essib le to re fle ctio n ,
b u t ra th e r so m e th in g th a t p re c e d e s a n d stru ctu re s o u r ex p erien ce: in G a lla g h ­
e r ’s w o rd s, it is “p re n o e tic ” .17
T h e b o d y s c h e m a im p lie s a n a p p ro p ria tio n o f m o to r h a b its - p o sitio n s
a n d m o v e m e n ts - w h ic h a re in te g ra te d in to th e b o d y a t a p re c o n s c io u s lev el,
a n d c o n s titu te a p re c o n d itio n fo r n e w m o v e m e n ts a n d e x p e rie n c e s, fo r b o d ily
e x p re s s io n , b u t a ls o fo r c o g n itiv e p ro c e s s e s in g en e ral: th o u g h t a n d lan g u a g e .
G a lla g h e r c a lls th e b o d y sc h e m a “ a s y s te m o f se n s o ry -m o to r p ro c e s s e s th a t
c o n tin u o u s ly re g u la te p o s tu re a n d m o v e m e n t” .18 M o re o v e r, it im p lie s a h o lis ­
tic a w a re n e s s o f th e bo d y , in c o n tra s t w ith th e b o d y im a g e th a t a lw a y s p re ­
se n ts th e b o d y fro m a c e rta in p e rsp e c tiv e . T h e b o d y im a g e re p re se n ts n o t o n ly
o u r p e rc e p tio n o f th e bo d y , b u t a ls o o u r c o n c e p tu a l u n d e rs ta n d in g as w e ll as
o u r e m o tio n a l re la tio n to i t .19

soriels interesses dans la perception de mon corps entretiennent certaines relations: le schema cor-
porel me foumit a cet egard un systeme d’equivalences.”
13 Phenomenology, p. 238 / Phenomenologie,p. 265: “Laperception synesthesique estlaregle”.
14 Ibid.,p.l02/116.
15 Ibid.\ “sa spatialite n’est pas comme celle des objets exterieurs [...] une spatialite de position,
mais une spatialite de situation” (emphasis in original).
16 See Gallagher, “Body Image and Body Schema: A Conceptual Clarification” , The Journal
of Mind and Behavior, 7(4), 1986: 541-554; “Body Schema and Intentionality”, in The
Body and the Self, ed. Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony Marcel and Naomi Eilan, Cam­
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995; and How the Body Shapes the Mind, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2005, p. 19 f.
17 Gallagher, How the Body, p. 2 and 133 f.
18 Ibid., p. 37.
19 Gallagher, “Body Image and Body Schema”, p. 546; “Body Schema and Intentionality”, p. 226.
The Dancing Body and Creative Expression 107

In m a n y w ay s, th e h a b itu a l b o d y a n d th e b o d y sch e m a see m to b e sy n ­

o n y m o u s n o tio n s, a lth o u g h d e sc rib e d fro m d iffe re n t an g les. T h e fo rm e r w as
se t in c o n tra st w ith th e a c tu a l body, w h e re as th e n o tio n o f th e b o d y sch em a
w as in tro d u c e d in o rd e r to e x p lic a te th e p a rtic u la r sp a tia lity a n d u n ity o f the
b o d y -p ro p e r. T h a t n o tio n is, in M e rle a u -P o n ty ’s w o rd s, “ a m b ig u o u s” , “ as are
all n o tio n s th a t a p p e a r a t tu rn in g p o in ts in sc ie n c e ” .20 D u e to its p re n o e tic statu s,
th e b o d y sc h e m a is n o t w h o lly a c c e ssib le to p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l study, b u t m ust,
w rite s G alla g h e r, “be w o rk e d o u t c o n c e p tu a lly w ith th e h e lp o f th e e m p irical
sc ie n c e s ” .21
M e rle a u -P o n ty c o n te n d s th a t it is o w in g to th e b o d y sc h em a th a t an in fant,
can im m e d ia te ly “ tra n s la te ” th e e x p re ssio n it sees in a n o th e r’s face to its ow n
m o to r m o v e m e n ts, a n d th e re w ith b e c a p a b le o f im ita tin g it. H e n ce , a tra n s p o ­
sitio n o f so rts ta k e s p la c e th ro u g h th is sc h e m a b e tw e e n m y e x p e rie n c e o f th e
o th e r p e rs o n ’s m o v e m e n ts, p e rc e iv e d v isu a lly fro m th e o u tsid e , an d m y o w n ki-
n a e sth e tic e x p e rie n c e .22 In th is w ay, th e m o v e m e n ts o f a n o th e r p erso n , in c lu d ­
in g th o se I h a v e n o t se e n e a rlie r a n d th o se I c a n n o t p e rfo rm m y self, c a n h av e
m e a n in g fo r m e. S o m e c o n te m p o ra ry re se a rc h e rs e v e n try to e x p lain , w ith the
h e lp o f th e n o tio n o f th e b o d y sc h e m a , h ow p eo p le w ith a p la sia (the co n g en ita l
ab se n c e o f a lim b ) c a n e x p e rie n c e p h a n to m sen satio n s; a c c o rd in g to th e se r e ­
se a rc h e rs, th e p e rc e p tio n o f o th e r p e o p le m o v in g a ro u n d w ith th e ir lim b s in ta c t
is tra n s fe rre d to th e ir o w n b o d y sc h e m a .23
F o r th is re a so n , th e b o d y sc h e m a is th e b a sis o f a c e rta in g e n e r a lity o f
th e bod y : w h e n I h a v e a c q u ire d a h a b it it a lso h a s th e m e a n in g o f so m e th in g
on e c a n d o . To d e v e lo p a h a b it is , in fa c t, to c a p tu re a sig n ific a tio n , “ th e m o ­
to r g ra s p in g o f a m o to r s ig n ific a tio n ” .24 N ow , if w e w a n t to u n d e rs ta n d ho w
a n e w m o v e m e n t, a n e w b o d ily s ig n ific a n c e , is in c o rp o ra te d as a h a b it in th e
liv in g b o d y , w e c a n o fte n d e s c rib e th is as a p a ssa g e fro m th e b o d y im a g e to
th e b o d y sc h e m a . W h e n I le a rn a n e w m o v e m e n t, I h a v e re c o u rs e to re fle c ­
tio n ; I m u st to so m e e x te n t b e c o m e c o n s c io u s o f m y b o d y a n d its m o v e m e n ts.
T h e re fo re , w h a t c o m e s in to p la y h e re is th e b o d y im ag e: m y b o d y as a n in te n ­
tio n a l o b je c t.

20 Phenomenology, p. 101 / Phenomenologie, p. 114: “la notion du schema corporel est ambigue
comme toutes celles qui apparaissent aux tournants de la science”.
21 Gallagher, “Body Schema and Intentionality”, p. 233.
22 Phenomenology, p. 172 / Phenomenologie, p. 196.
23 See Gallagher, How the Body, p. 86 f.
24 Phenomenology, p. 144 / Phenomenologie, p. 167: “L’acquisition de l’habitude est bien la
saisie d’une signification, mais c’est la saisie motrice d’une signification motrice.”
108 Anna Petronella Foultier

S o m e tim e s th e re fle c tio n w e m a k e u se o f is a m a tte r o f fo c u sin g o n a

p a rtic u la r b o d y p a rt; h e n c e w h a t m a tte rs is th e b o d y im a g e as an o b je c t o f
k in a e s th e tic p e rc e p tio n . S o m e tim e s w e re fle c t in a lite ra l sen se: w e u se a m ir­
ro r in o rd e r to se e h o w th e m o v e m e n t is p e rc e iv e d fro m th e o u tsid e , p e rh a p s
in o rd e r to c o rre c t it. A t o th e r tim e s , w e lo o k a t so m e o n e e lse p e rfo rm in g
th e m o v e m e n t a n d try to im ita te it, m a k in g u se o f th e c a p a c ity to tra n sp o se
b e tw e e n th e se n se s p ro v id e d b y th e b o d y sc h e m a . W h e n a p a rtic u la r m o v e ­
m e n t h as b e e n a c q u ire d , it is to so m e e x te n t in te g ra te d in to th e b o d y sc h em a,
so th a t th e le a rn in g o f a n ew c h o re o g ra p h y m ay b e d e s c rib e d as th e in te rp la y
b e tw e e n th e b o d y im a g e a n d th e b o d y sch em a.
S o m etim es w e also m ak e u se o f lan g u ag e a n d th o u g h t, b u t p rim arily it is the
b o d y its e lf th a t ex p lo res the m o v e m e n t an d tries to find its w ay, an d I th in k w e
n e e d to sp eak o f a b o d ily reflectio n o f sorts th at is m ore fu n d am en tal th an c o g n i­
tiv e reflectio n . T h u s, n o t o n ly does “ a reflective c ap acity [exist] at the v ery core
o f p e rc e p tio n ” , as Jacq u es T am iniaux w rite s,25 b u t the m o v in g b o d y -p ro p er has
a reflectiv e p o w e r o f its o w n , w h ich sh o w s its e lf in p artic u la r w h en new dance
m o v em en ts are elaborated. T h is is p o ssib le b ecause th e liv in g body has its ow n
fo rm o f in ten tio n ality , w h ic h is situ ated a t a lev el below th e co n scio u s intention-
ality o f acts, an d w h ich M e rle a u -P o n ty calls, fo llo w in g E d m u n d H u sserl, “o p ­
e ra tiv e ” o r “fu n c tio n in g ” in te n tio n a lity (fu n gierende In ten tio n a lita t),26 o r sim ply
“ m o to r in ten tio n a lity ” .27
W e saw th a t th e m o v e m e n t “ d is a p p e a rs” fro m v iew to so m e e x te n t w hen
it h a s b e e n in te g ra te d as a h a b it. A c c o rd in g to G a lla g h e r’s in te rp re ta tio n , the
b o d y sc h e m a is to a larg e e x te n t in a c c e ssib le to p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l reflec tio n .
T h e in te rp re ta tio n is c o n firm e d b y M e rle a u -P o n ty as h e w rite s th a t the situ ­
atio n a l sp atiality , c o n s titu te d by th e b o d y sch em a, is th e “ d a rk n e ss in th e th e a tre
n e e d e d fo r th e c la rity o f th e p e rfo rm a n c e ” .28 S in ce th e b o d y sc h e m a fu n c tio n s
as a sy ste m o f tra n sp o sitio n s, it e x p la in s h o w m o v e m e n ts ca n b e le a rn e d in a
sy ste m a tic w ay , an d n o t as c irc u m sc rib e d u n its. A n o rg a n ist, to tak e M erlea u -
P o n ty ’s e x a m p le , w h o is g o in g to p la y o n an o rg an u n k n o w n to h e r, o n ly n eeds

25 Taminiaux, “The Thinker and the Painter”, trans. Michael Gendre, in M. C. Dillon (ed.),
Merleau-Ponty Vivant, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991, p. 200.
26 Phenomenology, p. lxxxii / Phenomenologie, p. xiii: “l’intentionnalite operante”.
27 Ibid., p. 523 / 161: “l’intentionnalite motrice”. This notion was introduced by Husserl in
The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to
Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carr, Evanston, 111.: Northwestern U.P., 1970/
Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phanomenologie: Eine
Einleitung in die phanomenologische Philosophie, ed. Walter Biemel, Husserliana, vol. VI,
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969, § 59.
28 Phenomenology, p. 103 / Phenomenologie, p. 117: “L’espace corporel [...] est l’obscurite de
la salle necessaire a la clarte du spectacle”.
The Dancing Body and Creative Expression 109

an h o u r to g e t u se d to th e in stru m e n t, in sp ite o f th e fa c t th a t th e m o v e m e n ts to
b e p e rfo rm e d are h e re o b je c tiv e ly sp e a k in g c o m p le te ly d iffe re n t th an th o se she
h a b itu a lly p e rfo rm s, as th e re are, a m o n g o th e r th in g s, “ m o re o r few er m an u a ls,
an d sto p s d iffe re n tly a rra n g e d ” .29
E a c h tim e w e a c q u ire a h a b it, w e in c o rp o ra te a n ew sig n ific atio n o r a new
“sig n ify in g c o re ” (n o y a u s ig n ific a tif) 30 T h e n o tio n o f the b o d y sc h e m a clarifies
h o w sig n ific a tio n s are in sc rib e d in th e b o d y to c o n stitu te a p re su p p o sitio n fo r
th e e x p re ssio n o f n ew sig n ific a tio n s, b u t a lso fo r th e ap p re h e n sio n o f sig n ific a­
tio n s e x p re s s e d b y o th e r b o d ie s - fo r e x a m p le w h en lo o k in g at dance. T h is is
w h y M e rle a u -P o n ty c a n c a ll th e b o d y “ a k n o t o f liv in g sig n ific a tio n s” ,31 an d
c o m p a re it to a w o rk o f art. T h e b o d y -p ro p e r is “ the v e ry m o v e m e n t o f e x p re s­
s io n ” , w h ic h m e a n s th a t it p ro je c ts sig n ific a tio n s “ on th e o u tsid e ” a n d m ak es
th e m a c c e ssib le to o th e rs.32 Y et, th e se sig n ific atio n s do n o t a lre a d y e x ist in a
p re fo rm e d sta te in sid e th e c o n sc io u sn e ss, as it w ere, b u t are c o n stitu te d in th is
v ery p ro je c tio n . T h is c re a tio n o f m e a n in g o c c u rs on th e b a sis o f alre a d y e x is t­
in g sig n ificatio n s: e ith e r th e m e a n in g o f g e stu re s tie d to b io lo g ic a l life , w h ich
is tra n sfo rm e d in to a fig u ra tiv e m e a n in g , o r the m e a n in g g iv e n in th e alread y
c o n stitu te d cu ltu ra l w orld.
T h ro u g h o u t his p h ilo so p h ic a l w o rk , M e rle a u -P o n ty m a k e s a d istin c tio n b e ­
tw e e n tw o fu n d a m e n ta l a sp e c ts o f ex p ressio n : th e re is w h a t h e c alls “ sp e ak in g
sp e e c h ” (p a ro le p a r la n te ), in d istin c tio n to “sp o k e n sp e e c h ” (p a ro le p a r l e e ) 33
or, as he so m e tim e s say s, “p rim a ry ” o r “ c re a tiv e ” e x p re ssio n in d istin c tio n to
“se c o n d a ry ” o r “e m p iric a l” e x p re ssio n , or, ag ain , “in d ire c t” la n g u a g e in d is ­
tin c tio n to “d ire c t” la n g u a g e .34 T h e b a sic c o n tra st seem s to b e d e riv e d fro m
th e o n e F e rd in a n d de S a u ssu re m a k e s b e tw e e n lan g u a g e sy ste m (la n g u e ) and
sp e e c h (p a ro le), a lth o u g h th e m e a n in g o f th e d istin c tio n is tra n sfo rm e d in M er-
le a u -P o n ty ’s u sa g e .35 S p o k e n sp e e c h re fe rs to th e a c q u ire d fo rm s o f ex p ressio n ,
w h e re c o n stitu te d , d ire c t, “ in te lle c tu a l” m e a n in g is a t issu e, w h ere as sp ea k in g
sp e e c h is th e a c t w h e re m e a n in g is c re a te d , a lb e it o n th e b asis o f th e g iv en
fo rm s o f m e a n in g o r sig n ific a tio n . A t th is le v e l, M e rle a u -P o n ty ta lk s a b o u t

29 Ibid, p. 146 / 169.

30 Ibid, p. 148 / 171.
31 Ibid, p. 153 / 177: “un nreud de significations vivantes”.
32 Ibid, p. 147 / 171.
33 Note that “parole” in French is not completely equivalent with the English “speech”, but often
means word, wording, or, as in Saussure, a particular usage of language.
34 I examine these different distinctions in some more detail in my “Cezanne and ‘The First
Man Speaking’: Expression as the Task of Phenomenology in Merleau-Ponty” (still in
manuscript).
35 For a discussion of this issue, see my “Merleau-Ponty’s Encounter with Saussure’s Linguistics:
Misreading, Reinterpretation or Prolongation?”, Chiasmi international, no. 15,2013.
110 Anna Petronella Foultier

co n stitu tin g , g e stu ra l o r in d ire c t m e a n in g o r sig n ifica tio n . W ith th is d istin c ­

tio n , M e rle a u -P o n ty is n o t try in g to re fo rm u la te a n a tu re -c u ltu re o r b o d y -m in d
d u a lism .36 H is a im is ra th e r to sh o w how m e a n in g can be b o th in c a rn a te d an d
a c c e ssib le to o th ers, b o th h isto ric a lly a c q u ire d a n d c o n stitu tiv e o f a new tra d i­
tio n . T h e se tw o fo rm s o f e x p re ssio n an d m e a n in g are d e p e n d e n t o n eac h other;
th e y are re la te d to o n e a n o th e r in a d ia le c tic a l w ay.37
I b e lie v e th a t th e sy ste m a tic ity fo u n d in th e liv in g b o d y th ro u g h th e body
sch em a, a n d th e c o n n e c tio n s c o n stitu te d b y it b e tw e e n th e b o d y a n d th e w o rld ,
a n d b e tw e e n m y liv in g b o d y a n d th e b o d ie s o f o th e r p eo p le a n d th e ir e x p e ri­
en c e s, are a clu e fo r u n d e rsta n d in g w h a t sig n ifica tio n is at th e le v e l o f the body.
T h e y h e lp us to u n d e rsta n d h o w th e liv in g b o d y c a n be e x p re ssiv e o f m ea n in g
in d a n c e . T h e h a b itu a l b o d y is a b e a re r o f c u ltu ra l m e a n in g s, an d ju s t as w ith
o th e r fo rm s o f m e a n in g , th e se m e a n in g s h a v e to be ta k e n u p in a new c o n te x t in
o rd e r to ex p ress. T h e v e ry c o n tra st b e tw e e n d iffe re n t ty p e s o f b o d y sch em ata,
b e tw e e n a p a rtic u la r sty le o f m o v e m e n t - b e it a q u e stio n o f a c e rta in c u ltu re,
a c e rta in d a n c e te c h n iq u e o r c h o re o g ra p h ic v o c a b u la ry - a n d a n a ctu al p a tte rn
o f m o v e m e n t, is w h a t m a tte rs h e re . In th is w ay, th e d ifficu lty in id e n tify in g
th e “ in d e p e n d e n tly m e a n in g fu l e le m e n t o f a d a n c e ”, p o in te d o u t by G ra h am
M c F e e ,38 m ig h t be reso lv ed .
N e v e rth e le s s , th e re is a d iffic u lty in M e rle a u -P o n ty ’s d e s c rip tio n s th a t
m u s t b e d e a lt w ith in th is c o n te x t. I f th e b o d y -p ro p e r is as su ch c o m p a re d to
a w o rk o f a rt, w h a t h a p p e n s to th e d iffe re n c e b e tw e e n th e o rd in a ry e x p re s s io n
o f a re g u la r m o v in g h u m a n b o d y a n d th e a rtistic , c re a tiv e e x p re s s io n th a t o c ­
c u rs in d a n c e ?
In sev eral p laces in th e P h e n o m e n o lo g y o f P erc ep tio n , M erlea u -P o n ty links
creativ e ex p re ssio n in gen eral to th e liv in g body, callin g it a “ g e stu ra l” o r “ em o ­
tio n a l” m ean in g , w h ereas th e co n stitu ted , seco n d ary fo rm o f m eaning, w h ich he
d istin g u ish es fro m th e form er, is o fte n tie d to sp o k en lan g u ag e an d called, am ong
o th e r th in g s, “in te lle c tu a l” o r “c o n c e p tu a l” m ean in g o r signification. N e v e rth e ­
less, v erb al lan g u ag e has its o w n level o f em o tio n al m ean in g , as is cle ar fro m the
ex am p le o f poetry.

36 As Thomas Baldwin believes, “Speaking and Spoken Speech”, in Baldwin (ed.), Reading
Merleau-Ponty: On Phenomenology of Perception, London/New York: Routledge, 2007, p.
88, 93.
37 The distinction between them is not ontological, but analytical, as Jenny Slatman points out in
L ’Expression au-dela de la representation: Sur l ’aisthesis et l’esthetique chez Merleau-Ponty,
Leuven: Peeters / Paris: Vrin, 2003,p. 132.
38 Understanding Dance, London and New York: Routledge, 1992, p. 117.
The Dancing Body and Creative Expression 111

F o r th is re a so n , th e re m u s t b e, to g e th e r w ith th e c re a tiv e , o rig in a ry p o s ­

sib ilitie s o f e x p re ss io n , a fo rm o f “ s p o k e n s p e e c h ” a t th e le v e l o f th e b o dy: if
n o t “ in te lle c tu a l” , a t le a s t c o n s titu te d , ste re o ty p ic a l m e a n in g e m b o d ie d h ere.
M e rle a u -P o n ty is n o t v e ry e x p lic it o n th is is s u e , b u t I b e lie v e th a t w e ca n find
th is le v e l o f sig n ific a tio n in so m e o f th e p a th o lo g ic a l c a se s h e re fe rs to - fo r
e x a m p le , in th e c a se o f th e a p h o n ic g irl in th e c h a p te r o n “T h e B o d y as a S e x ­
u a l B e in g ” .39 In o rd e r to p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a lly u n d e rs ta n d th e a rtistic m e a n in g
e x p re s s e d b y th e d a n c in g b o d y , w e w o u ld h a v e to fu rth e r e lu c id a te its o th e r
side: a n e ffo rt to w a rd s b o d ily e x p re s s io n th a t fa ile d to go b e y o n d th e c lic h e.

39 Phenomenology, p. 156 / Phenomenologie, p. 187 f.

Image 1: Tuomo Rainio’s media performance Valotuksia / Exposures at the museum of
contemporary art, Kiasma, Helsinki. Photo: Petri Summanen.
Presented Images:
On Photographs and Their Various Bodies

TUOMO RAINIO

R eflectio n o n p h o to g rap h y b eg in s w ith th e c ro ssin g o f tw o p a th s — on one side,

th ere is th e p a th o f th e p ictu re itse lf an d o n th e other, th e p a th o f th e m aterial su b ­
stance. In th is essay I w ill ad d ress th is in te rse c tio n in th e fo rm o f th eo retical notes
(I), a p re se n ta tio n o f m y p ro je c t Valotuksia / E xp o su res (II), and som e reflections
on a set o f o th e r w o rk s o f m in e th a t I co n sid e r ‘im a g e -b o d ie s’ (III).

I. Theoretical notes

M a te ria l su b stan ce such as p a p e r o r in k is e v id en t in its con creten ess; at the sam e

tim e, it seem s, in m an y cases, to be a lm o st im perceptible. T h e m atte r becom es
ev en stran g er w h e n w e realize th a t an im ag e ca n n o t e x ist w ith o u t m aterial su p ­
port. In short, m aterial su b stan ce is th e a p r io ri o f an im ag e. A non-figurative
p h o to g rap h p o in ts this o u t becau se o f its lack o f rec o g n iza b le subject. A n ab stract
or d iffu se p ictu re em p h asizes th e tw o -d im en sio n al quality o f the im age p lan e. Its
im p ercep tib le m a tte r m atters.
W h e n lo o k in g at so m eth in g (a p h o to g ra p h , fo r ex am ple) w e g rasp the v isual
field w ith sight. I f w e u se d h an d s w e w o u ld q u ick ly en d u p w ith a m aterial in te r­
actio n , v ery d ifferen t fro m th e o n e w e are in v o lv e d in w h en w e to u c h th in g s w ith
ou r eyes. T h is o p en s u p a gap b e tw e e n th e tw o paths (those o f p icto riality and
m ateriality ), a n d new q u estio n s arise.
G rasp in g th e field o f v isu al in fo rm atio n b y lo o k in g at a p h o to g ra p h m oves us
fro m h e re to th ere - fro m th e b o d y to th e b o d iless ex p erien ce (in a sim ilar w ay, a
3D m o d el th a t d isp lay s im ag es to g e th e r w ith p o ssib le in teractiv e features creates
an illu sio n o f b o d ily m o v e m e n t th ro u g h sp ace). T he ‘p h o to g ra p h ic ’ , or the B ar-
th e sia n n o em e “ th a t-h a s-b e e n ” , is tra n sfo rm e d into “it-is-th e re” , and ev en fu rth er
into “I-a m -th e re-w ith -it” .1 In o rd er to u n d e rstan d this, an d to p u t th in g s in order,
bare lo o k in g is n o t en o u g h ; w e also n e e d to th in k (or im ag in e). V isual co n te m ­
platio n is in te rru p te d a n d su p p le m e n te d b y th in k in g an d know ledge. T h e v iew er
is o n th e th re sh o ld o f im m ersio n . “T h is is n o t real, it is o n ly a m o v ie ” , a m o v ­

1 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida - Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard,

1981, p. 76-77.
114 Tuomo Rainio

ieg o er m ig h t say. Today, w e c a n reco g n ize a sim ilar situ atio n w ith reg a rd to p h o ­
to graphs: “th is is n o t real, it is p h o to sh o p p e d ”. T h ere is, nev erth eless, so m eth in g
w e see, so m eth in g th a t is rig h t in fro n t o f o u r eyes, h o w ev er d istan t a n d u n rea ch ­
able it m ig h t rem ain ; it is so m eth in g th a t is n o t en tirely g rasp ab le, and still, w e
are c o n tem p latin g it. (T h e p ro b le m arises fro m this: w e are lo o k in g a t im ages th a t
sh o ck us an d e v e n tra u m a tiz e us, an d yet, a t th e sam e tim e, w e are p ro tecte d by
th e thought: th is is n o t real.)
T h e p icto rial q u ality o f a p h o to g rap h c a n so m etim es seduce us to believ in g
in w h a t w e see. O n ly th e m aterial su rface o f a p h o to g rap h prev en ts th is illu ­
sio n fro m b eco m in g real. T h e re is so m eth in g a b o u t th e surface th a t m akes us
in te rp re t th e p h o to g rap h ic view as an im age. T h e surface allo w s us to say: I am
lo o k in g at a n im age. T h is b o rd er seem s to situate the q u e stio n o f th e real. It is the
su rface th a t c o n stitu tes th e ed g e o f th e real. In o rd er to en ter b ey o n d it, w e n eed
to im agine.
In o th e r w o rd s, th ere are im ag es th a t su g g est th a t w h a t w e are lo o k in g at is
n o t so m ew h ere b e y o n d o u r reach, b u t rig h t a t hand. T h ey elim in ate th e surface
an d su g g est th a t w h a te v e r lies b e y o n d c o u ld be possessed. (T h is m ay ev en help
us u n d e rsta n d w h y so m eo n e w an ts to o w n an artw ork). A rtw o rk s o fte n su g g est
th a t in ste a d o f a d iv isio n b etw een h ere a n d th ere, o r b etw e en now an d then, th ere
is o n ly o n e h ere a n d now , a full presence.
W h en w e lo o k at a w o rk o f art, th e im m ed iacy and tran sp aren cy o f our g rasp ­
in g sig h t is in terru p ted . T h e re is so m eth in g th a t blo ck s th e look. T his in terru p tio n
m ig h t m ak e us feel an x io u s, an d w e m ig h t feel lik e tearin g o ff the veils th a t co v er
th e field o f v isio n . T he tearin g , h o w ev er, releases a n ew q u ality o f lo o k in g , w hich
is m o re p o w erfu l a n d m o re p h y sical th a n th a t o f a tra n sp aren t look. H ere, w e tru ly
co n fro n t th e im ag e itself, to u c h in g th e eye. T h is e n co u n ter m arks th e m o m en t
o f rea liz in g th a t th e im ag e o n ly ex ists in its m aterial support. T h e p o ssib ility o f
b re a k in g it m ak es it vu ln erab le. T h e p o ssib ility o f a w o u n d in it m akes it banal
(a n d profane). T h is is w h en w e m ig h t start fe elin g protective. (M ay b e the artw o rk
reflects o u r o w n sense o f v u ln erab ility an d the frag ility o f o u r body.) B y b ein g
u n iq u e, an a rtw o rk rep resen ts th e irrep laceab ility o f the body. T h e m o m e n t o f
co n fro n tin g th e p resen ce o f a m aterial b ein g is the m o m en t o f sh aring tru e e x ist­
ence; an d im ag e la id b are is a m aterial being.
A fter this tentative description o f the artw ork in its final state, it is tim e to brief­
ly elaborate th e process o f artistic creation. T his step m ight seem aw kw ard, a step
backw ards as it w ere, b u t there is a good reason for it. Just as, for a painter, there has
already b een a m o m en t o f seeing before the m aking o f an im age, creativity actually
follow s experience; it is not the starting point.
Presented Images 115

C re a tiv e p ro c e ss h a s its sta rtin g p o in t in th e sen se o r th e feel o f presen ce.

A n y e v e n t m ig h t ev o k e th is se n sib ility ; an y o b je c t o r ev e n any id e a (in a v ery
sp e c ia l m a n n e r) m ig h t a c tiv a te o u r sen se o f b e in g in th e w orld. T h o se m o m e n ts
o f c la rity m a k e an a rtist c o n fro n t th e re a lity n o t as a fixed set o f (o b jectiv e) c ir­
c u m sta n c e s th a t are m a ste re d b y th e su b je c t, b u t as a liv in g c o h e re n c e o f the
fre e self.
T he process o f m aking an artw ork is m im etic only in a very broad sense. A n art­
w o rk is an im itation o f the true presence o f reality. T he m im etic quality is lim ited to
adapting a m ode o fb e in g from the creative subject to the artw ork (w hich, in the end,
is nothing b u t a new subject). T he process through w hich an artw ork becom es inde­
pendent o f its creator is based o n this m im etic m ode o f being that is an adaptation o f
the already real. B u t h ow does an artw ork becom e different from its origin? H ow does
it cut the m im etic ties?
P h o to g ra p h y p o in ts o u t th e p ro b lem atic c h aracter o f th is question. A p h o to ­
g rap h is a g estu re o f g rasp in g th e field o f v isio n . T his gestu re clearly w ithdraw s
itse lf fro m its m aterial startin g p o in t a n d ex p resses (in th e fo rm o f pure show ing)
the n o n -m aterial sense o f the w o rld (an d fo rg ettin g o f the o th er senses). T his is to
say th a t p h o to g ra p h y is a m e d iu m o f illu sio n (this is the true n am e o f the so-called
‘d o c u m e n t’). C o n seq u en tly , it is n o su rp rise th a t p h o to g ra p h y has c h an g e d the
co u rse o f th e h isto ry o f v isu al arts. W h e n p h o to g rap h y fre e d p a in tin g fro m the
ta sk o f d ep ictin g reality, th e la tte r g ain ed th e p o sitio n o f th in k in g b e y o n d the
visib le su rface o f reality. N ow , o v er 150 y ears later, w e are in the m id d le o f the
‘dig ital re v o lu tio n ’ th a t w ill p e rm a n e n tly ch an g e the v isu al arts - p e rh ap s even
m o re fu n d am en tally th a n th e in v e n tio n o f photography. It is already b eco m in g
cle a r th a t ph o to g rap h y , after all, w as ju s t a sh o rt c h ap te r in the b o o k o f v isu al re p ­
re se n ta tio n .2 P h o to g rap h y as lig h t-w ritin g falls u n d er the m u ch w id er ca teg o ry o f
in d ex ical im aging. A s an in d ex ical im ag in g technology, pho to g rap h y has a long
prehistory, a n d now , an em erg in g afterlife.
A s a m ed iu m o f illu sio n , p h o to g rap h y has estab lish ed its place in m odern
society. T h e reaso n s fo r th is are clear. P h o to g rap h s play the gam e fra m ed by the
ru le s o f m o d e rn life: p h o to g ra p h y is fast, m ech an ical, ob jectiv e an d fragm entary.
Q u ite ch aracteristically , th e ro u n d im ag e o f c am era o b scu ra w as c ro p p e d in to a
re c ta n g u la r shap e to fit it in c a m era m o d ern . W e are still w aitin g fo r the in v en tio n
o f p h o to g ra p h ie n o u velle an d th e retu rn o f th e organic im age. P erhaps it is partly
due to th is illu sio n ism th a t it to o k su ch a lo ng tim e befo re p h o to g rap h y co u ld
co m m o n ly be c o n sid e re d a fo rm o f art. O n e m ig h t u n d e rstan d th is as a h istorical
p ro c e ss, d u rin g w h ich an im ag e b ec o m e s a relic - and only in so far as it b ecom es

2 According to Peter Lunenfeld, for example, photography has turned out to be just one output
mode of computer graphics. See Lunenfeld, Snap to Grid: A User’s Guide to Digital Arts,
Media & Cultures, Cambridge Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, 2000, p. 164-165.
116 Tuomo Rainio

a relic g ain s its p o sitio n as a cu ltu rally v alu ab le o b ject. T his is the m o m en t w hen
th e m ark et d isco v ers a rtw o rk as y e t a n o th e r fo rm o f in v estm en t, an d the a rt m ar­
k e t em erg es. It is o b v io u s th a t art also finds its p la ce o u tsid e the m ark et, b u t the
q u e stio n h ere co n cern s artw o rk s as b o d ies (e v e n if th e y so m etim es m ig h t beco m e
em p ty b o d ies - fetish es).
W h at about forgotten artw orks, those w ithout a b o d y o r form , have they all van­
ished? W h a t about the experiences they p ro d uced, the im pressions they m ade? A ll
o f this rem ains unreco rd ed . M ay b e ev erything is repeated. It is difficult to believe
th a t th e am o u n t o f k now ledge is lim ited an d the quality o f art does n o t increase. It
is difficult to approve th at the idea o f d ev elo p m ent is rev ealed as an illusion and that
art does n o t follow th e great story o f th e new b u t is caught in eternal return instead.
O n ly a forgotten w o rk o f art co u ld be repeated as the sam e. P erhaps the play is the
sam e every nig h t and only the audiences vary? Isn ’t this exactly w h at m akes every
experience uniq u e so th at no language can articulate all o f its nuances?

II. Valotuksia / Exposures

D u rin g th e sem in ar “ S enses o f E m b o d im e n t” th a t to o k place a t A alto A R TS in

H e lsin k i M a y 2 0 1 2 ,1 p re se n te d a m e d ia p erfo rm an ce p ro je c t V alotuksia / E x p o ­
su res, w h ich I h a d b een w o rk in g o n sin ce the year 2 0 1 0 . V alotuksia / E xp o su res is
b a se d o n th e id ea o f p h o to g rap h y as a m e d iu m o f presence. D u rin g the p e rfo r­
m a n c e , th e im ag es ap p ear an d disap p ear. T h e o rig in al startin g p o in t o f the p ro jec t
w as photo g rap h y , b u t in o rd e r to re p re se n t m o v em en t a n d change, I p ro ce ed e d
to w ard s the m o v in g im ag e an d finally to p erfo rm in g arts. W ith this tran sitio n
fro m th e c a p tu re d re c o rd to an ev er-ch an g in g ev e n t I h o p e d to achieve a u n ique
m o m e n t o f presence.
In th e m ed ia p erfo rm an ce V alotuksia / E x p o su res the p e rfo rm er (I m yself)
in teracts w ith liv e v id eo im ag e a n d co m p u te r b ased im age p rocessing. T h e p er­
fo rm e r a n d th e screen are b o th in th e fo cu s o f th e ev en t (Im ages 1 a n d 2). T he
screen show s th e live v id eo im ag e, w h ich is co n stan tly ch an g in g acco rd in g to the
g estu res a n d m o v em en ts o f th e perform er. T h e co n stan tly tran sfo rm in g im age
is c re a te d o n a b la c k b a c k g ro u n d b y ex p o sin g it in a d iffe re n tia ted w ay w ith the
h elp o f lig h tin g e q u ip m en t, sev eral to rch es, an d p h o to co p y prints. T h e p re sen ta­
tio n in stru m e n t is a self-m ad e d ev ice in the shape o f an in v erted p y ra m id th at
in clu d es a v id eo c a m era an d a U S B -k e y b o a rd (Im age 3). T he liv e im age fro m
th e c a m era is tran sferred to th e c o m p u te r an d p ro c essed in re al tim e u sin g M A X /
M S P an d Jitte r p ro g ra m m in g in terfaces.
Image 2: Valotuksia / Exposures media performance.
118 Tuomo Rainio

T h e basic principle o f th e pro g ram is based o n the m ethod o f difference im ag ­

ing, w here the v id eo is an aly zed so as to m ake the changes in tim e (betw een the
cap tu red m om ents) v isible (Im ages 4 - 7 ) . F or exam ple, a com parison betw een a
black reference fram e an d the b lack live stream generates a b lack im age, b u t w hen
a flashlight is b ro u g h t in front o f the cam era, only the lig h t itself becom es visible.
Further, w h en the light is tu rn ed aw ay from the cam era and it is pointing in the
sam e direction as th e lens, only th e areas w ith additional light w ill be visible o n the
screen. T h e p erfo rm er can change the param eters fed into the softw are not only to
capture changes b u t also to layer m ultiple im ages and draw lines w ith light by m o v ­
ing the flashlight in fro n t o f the cam era. T he perform er can also expose prints by
p lacing th em in fro n t o f th e cam era an d b acklighting them . (The w ays m entioned
here are the m o st essential ones for the p erform ance, although m ore exist.)
T h e m e d ia p e rfo rm a n c e a lso in c lu d e s sound. T h e so u n d s are g e n e ra te d in
real tim e a n d c o n tro lle d b y th e im a g e d a ta fe d in to th e so ftw are. T h e so ftw are
tra c k s th e v id e o im a g e , a n d th e m o v e m e n ts a re tra n sla te d so as to c o n tro l th e
sound. T h e c h a n g in g so u n d s a n d im a g e s to g e th e r w ith th e p re se n c e o f th e p er­
fo rm e r m a k e u p th e c o rn e rsto n e s o f th e p e rfo rm a n ce. T h e b o d y a n d its gestu res
a re a n in se p a ra b le p a rt o f th e liv e p e rfo rm a n ce. D u rin g th e show , th e p e rfo rm e r
is fo c u sin g his a tte n tio n e n tire ly o n th e im a g e o n th e screen. S o m e o f th e g e s­
tu re s m ig h t a p p e a r u n n a tu ra l o r e v e n stra n g e to th e v iew er, e v e n if they, in fact,
are o n ly fu n c tio n a l. T h e re is n o p re d e te rm in e d a e sth e tic c h o re o g ra p h y fo r th e
body. T h e p e rfo rm e r is sittin g all th e tim e o n a chair, u n a b le to m o v e around.
T h is lim ite d sp ace is sc a rc e w ith re g a rd to all th e p ro p s a n d d e v ic e s n e c e ssa ry
fo r th e p e rfo rm a n c e. E v e ry n o w a n d th en , th e p rin ts a n d to rc h e s fa ll d o w n as
if th e sh o w w e re c o n sta n tly a b o u t to g o in to p ie c e s. T h is in c o m p le te n e ss finds
its c o u n te rp a rt o n th e screen . E v e ry th in g is in a state o f c o n sta n t change. T h e re
is a n aim , b u t n o a p p a re n t resu lts. T h e re is fo rw a rd m o v e m e n t, b u t no e n d o f
th e ro a d . O n e im a g e fo llo w s an o th e r; th e y c o m e fo rth an d v a n ish w ith o u t le a v ­
in g a trace. T h is in te rp la y o f c re a tio n a n d d e stru c tio n m a k e s th e im ag es ap p ear
fra g ile . T h e y la c k th e s e c u re d m a te ria l g ro u n d u su a lly so se lf-e v id e n tly a sso c i­
ate d w ith th em . T h e y gro w e lse w h e re , a n d th e n , fro m th e re , th e y m ak e a v isit,
as Je a n -L u c N a n c y h a s su g g e ste d . T h e im a g e s are a lw a y s-a lre a d y -th e re a n d
fro m there th e y v is it u s.3 In th e c o n te x t o f d ig ita l im a g in g , th e pix el arra y (or
g rid ) c o u ld b e th o u g h t o f n o t o n ly as an ac c ess to the (alm o st) in fin ite n u m b e r
o f im a g e s b u t a lso as a p la c e w h e re th e d a ta p re se n ts itself. Im a g es a p p e a r like
su d d e n flash es o f lig h t, n o t as a stre a m b u t as a p ro c e ss o f tra n sfo rm a tio n s. Im ­
ag es a p p ear, c h a n g e , b u rn , c o rro d e , a n d , finally, m a k e sp ac e fo r n ew im ag es.

3 Jean-Luc Nancy, “Visitation”, in The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Ford-
ham U.P.,2005,p. 118.
Image 3: The self-made device used in Valotuksia / Exposures -performance.
Image 4: Still-image from the Valotuksia / Exposures -performance.
Image 5: Still-image from the Valotuksia / Exposures -performance.
Image 6: Still-image from the Valotuksia / Exposures -performance.
Image 7: Still-image from the Valotuksia / Exposures -performance.
Image 8: Still-image from the Valotuksia / Exposures -performance.
Presented Images 125

A t th e co re o f th e p erfo rm an ce is th e q u e stio n o f photography. T h e relatio n sh ip

b etw een p erfo rm an ce a n d p h o to g rap h y is p resen t in m an y leads. T h e w h o le se t­
tin g w ith th e d ark space, th e p rin ts an d th e lights is re m in iscen t o f a p h o to g ra­
p h e r ’s d ark ro o m . T h e p rin ts are fo u n d an d c o llected m ostly fro m the In tern et and
fu n ctio n as m aterial fo r th e ev en t. T he im ag es do n o t re p re se n t a specific them e;
nev erth eless, th ey are n o t ra n d o m visuals. T h ey are selected acco rd in g to th eir
ap p licab ility to th e p erfo rm an ce. T h e y d o n o t have a p red eterm in ed order, and
th ey d o n o t b u ild u p a story. T h e im ag es are th ere ju s t to be at h an d , to b e selected
an d u se d up. T h e y are o n ly c o n n e c te d to e a c h o th er o n th e screen. T h e difference
b etw een th e p rin t an d its im ag e o n th e screen is rem ark ab le, an d y et th e ir rela tio n ­
ship rem ain s p o ssib le to detect.
O n th e c o n c e p tu a l le v e l, th e m e d ia p e rfo rm a n c e V alotuksia / E x p o ­
su re s se a rc h e s fo r th e b o u n d a rie s a n d p o in ts o f co n v e rg e n c e b e tw e e n d o c u m e n ­
ta tio n a n d p e rfo rm a n c e. T h e h in g e, as I h a v e a lre a d y in d ic a te d , is photo g rap h y .
P h o to g ra p h y is h e re u n d e rsto o d as a m e d iu m o f th e p a st te n se , a n d th e key
q u e stio n c o u ld b e fo rm u la te d as fo llo w s: w h a t is p h o to g ra p h y , w h en it is n o t
a b o u t reco rd in g b u t a b o u t p e r fo r m in g ? T h e im ag e s p re se n te d on th e sc re en do
n o t re fe r to a n y w h e re b e y o n d th e m o m e n t o f th e ir ap p e aran ce. T h e p rin ts are
sca n n e d , tra n s la te d a n d p ro je c te d , an d th is m ak es th e im a g es ap p e ar in th ree
d iffe re n t m a te ria l fo rm s. T h e im a g e s o n th e sc re e n o n ly re fe r to th e p rin te d im ­
ages th a t c o -a p p e a r w ith th e m as im a g e s. T h e im ag e s are c re a te d an d p re se n te d
at th e sam e m o m e n t in d iffe re n t b o d ie s - an e v e n t n o t u n lik e w h a t in a re lig io u s
c o n te x t is c a lle d tra n su b sta n tia tio n . H o w e v e r, a c e rta in d ista n c e rem ain s b e ­
tw e e n th e screen , th e p rin ts a n d th e p erfo rm er. P e rc e p tio n p lay s a n im p o rta n t
ro le here. T h e p e rfo rm e r o b se rv e s th e im a g e o n th e sc ree n a n d in te ra c ts w ith it.
H e k e e p s a n ey e o n th e d ista n c e to th e im a g e a t th e sam e tim e as he p e n e tra te s
the tissu e o f p ic to ria l re a lity , as o n e m ig h t say, c o m p lic a tin g B e n ja m in ’s fam o u s
c o m p a riso n b e tw e e n th e p a in te r a n d th e c a m e ra m an .4 H e is a d d in g a n d re m o v ­
in g m atter, b a se d o n th e c o m b in a tio n o f h is o b se rv a tio n s a n d in n e r visio n s. T h e
a u d ie n c e , a g a in , stay s p a ssiv e a n d o n ly ta k e s p a rt b y lo o k in g (a n d liste n in g ),
u n le ss, as so m e tim e s h a p p e n s, th e c a m e ra is p o in te d to w a rd s th e a u d ie n c e an d
th e ir fig u res a p p e a r o n th e screen .
T h e m e d ia p e rfo rm a n c e V a lo tu ksia / E x p o su re s a lso e x p a n d s to a n o th e r
d im e n sio n , b e c a u se it is p a rtly re co rd ed . S ev eral still im ag e s are se le c te d a n d
c a p tu re d fro m th e stre a m o f im ag es. T h e se stills are th e n p rin te d a n d u se d late r
as a series o f w o rk s. T h is a sp e c t m a k e s it p o ssib le to th in k o f th e p e rfo rm a n c e
as a m e ta p h o r o f th e (a rtistic ) c re a tiv e p ro c e ss, w h e re th e e v e n t o f th e p e rfo rm a ­

4 Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings, vol. 3: 1935-1938, ed. Michael W. Jennings et al., vari­
ous tranlators, Cambridge Massachusetts and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard U.P,
2002, p. 115-116.
126 Tuomo Rainio

tiv e a c t re p re se n ts th e m o m e n t o f a c re a tiv e in sta n t, a c o n sta n t flow o f u n c o n ­

scio u s o r su rre a l v isio n s th a t are b ro u g h t forth. T h e e v e n t o f p e rfo rm in g is a
le a p to an u n k n o w n g ro u n d . T h e re is n o scrip t; no in stru c tio n s o r c h o re o g rap h y ,
o n ly s itu a tio n /sy ste m a n d a c tio n /re a ctio n . T h e re is a b eg in n in g a n d an en d , and
b e tw e e n th o se te m p o ra l lim its , an u n k n o w n field o f im a g e s. (It is re m in isc e n t
o f e x p o sin g a fra m e o f lig h t-se n sitiv e m a te ria l, w h ere th e sh u tte r o f a c a m e ra or
a sta g e c u rta in is o p e n e d , a n d th e lig h t starts its play.) It is th e sta te o f p o te n tia l
im a g e s, a tru e e v e n t o f im a g in a ry space. T h e scre en o p en s u p a p a ssa g e fo r the
im ag es.

III. Image-Bodies

T h e q u e stio n o f im a g e a n d b o d y h as b e e n p re se n te d slig h tly d iffe re n tly in a

se t o f m y o th e r w o rk s e x h ib ite d , fo r e x a m p le, in a sm all e x h ib itio n d u rin g the
sem in ar, S e n se s o f E m b o d im e n t . H ere, I w o u ld lik e to fo rm u la te th e q u e stio n in
th e fo llo w in g term s: O n th e o n e h an d , it is a b o u t th e c o n n e c tio n b e tw e e n im ag e
a n d p la c e , a n d o n th e o th e r h an d , it is a q u e stio n o f m a te rial quality.
F irstly, im ag es c o n n e c te d to a specific p lace m u st b e u n d e rsto o d as events
ra th e r th a n rep resen tatio n s. T h is is e v id e n t w h en a ch ange o f p lace w o u ld affect
th e m ean in g o r in te rp re ta tio n o f th e im age. T his is the case w h en a n im ag e is part
o f v isu al reality , an d in th a t w ay also m o re th an an im ag e. It is an o b je c t or a body
w ith sp atio tem p o ral qualities. In th e w o rk s d isp lay ed d u rin g the sem in ar I u se d a
m irro r as th e m aterial su p p o rt o f th e im ages. T h e im ag es w ere p rin te d o n o ffset
film an d m o u n te d o n m irro r g lass. T h e p la c e and im ag e c o u ld also b e e x am ined
fro m the o p p o site v ie w p o in t b y o b serv in g n atu re as a re a lm o f im ag e-lik e q u a li­
ties. It c o u ld b e a reflectio n (fro m a coffee cup) o r a field o f visio n b o rd ere d b y a
w indow pane.
S econdly, th e q u e stio n c o u ld b e d efin ed b y th in k in g o f the im ag e as a body.
In th a t case, th e im ag e c o u ld n o t be reg a rd e d as a tran sp are n t m ed iu m th a t only
co n v ey s the o rig in al v iew to a n ew p la c e a n d tim e. Q uite the o p p o site, the im age
w o u ld h av e its u n iq u e p resen ce as a m aterial being. T his m ateriality o f th e im age
w ill in ev itab ly be a cru cial q u e stio n w h e n w e th in k o f im ages as a m eans o f ar­
tistic p ractice. F ro m th e artistic v iew p o in t, th e m aterial g ro u n d c o u ld a n sw er the
v ery fu n d am en tal question: w h a t is an im ag e?
M a n y o f m y w o rk s p re s e n te d in th e e x h ib itio n d u rin g th e se m in a r c o n ­
fro n te d th e q u e stio n o f g ro u n d as p a rt o f th e im ag e . W h e n tra n sp a re n t film is
u s e d as th e m a te ria l su p p o rt o f an im ag e, th e im a g e its e lf seem s to b e u n lim ite d
(Im a g e 9). A n d th e p o s s ib ility to m o v e th ro u g h th e im ag e (by lo o k in g ) seem s
to su g g e st th a t th e im a g e is b u t o n e la y e r o f reality. In som e o f th e w o rk s I also
Presented Images 127

worked with multiple transparent films on top of each other. The layers increase
the spatial volume of the image, which could also be understood as a new qual­
ity of image. This dimension could also be characterized by specific meaning­
fulness, for example temporality. The method used was an attempt to underline
the fact that the image is not a representation but an independent (body) and
that image is not something over there (like a landscape seen through the win­
dow) but here, among us. Space-image (as one might call it) is limited not only
as a plane but also as a space, which means that immersing oneself in the image
is interrupted because there is no way out. The traditional image on the wall
places the viewer in a position where the looking is directed towards the infi­
nite. In the case of sculpture or “space-image”, the looking is directed towards
the infinite, a certain point in the image space, which is immersed into the cor­
poreal space. This looking is about defining a place and a body.

***

T he u se o f d ig ital m e d ia h as b ro u g h t b ig chan g es to the field o f v isual arts.

A s d ig ital m ed ia seem to escap e th e ir m aterial ground, th e q u e stio n o f m ateriality
beco m es m o re relevant. T h e a b stra c t a n d co n cep tu al fo rm u latio n s o f artw orks
m ig h t seem ad eq u ate to th e p resen t cu ltu ral h o rizo n o f in fo rm a tio n society, b u t to
foresee th e need s o f fu tu re society, w e sh o u ld retu rn to th e elem en tal experien ce
o f bein g , w h ere o u r sen sin g ab ilities o p e n u p a new v ista to th e ete rn ally sam e.
A rtw o rk s call fo r o u r carefu l sen sin g a n d it is th ro u g h th em th a t w e le arn such
sen sitiveness.
Image 9: Passage (sketch), from the series Spatiotemporal objects.
Pigment prints on transparent film, acrylic plates 2012.
Mika Elo: volume A.
Theses, Notes, and Images:
On the Photographic Conditions of Embodiment

MIKA ELO

P h o to g rap h s tell us a b o u t b o d ie s... b y b ein g m ute. T his “te llin g ” ta k es th e form

o f sh o w in g , in d ic a tin g a n d m ark in g ; it y ield s to th in k in g b e y o n d rep resen tatio n s.

P h o to g rap h s tell us a b o u t b o d i e s . b y b ein g d ista n t in proxim ity. T h e p h o to ­

g rap h ic su rface sp eak s an o th er lan g u ag e to the eye th an to the finger; and yet,
b o th o f th e se are m o v e d b y th e sam e asym m etry.

P h o to g rap h s tell us a b o u t b o d i e s . b y m ak in g th em scalable, n o t o n ly in space

b u t also in tim e. P h o to g rap h s show th e co n tin g en cy o f the p ro p er scale as regards
b o d ily stance. In lig h t o f p h otography, b o d ies are n o t only o rganized, th e y are
also calibrated.

P h o to g rap h s tell us a b o u t b o d i e s . b y sh o w in g th e strange co n cu rren ce o f differ­

e n t tim es. T h e y n e v e r rep ro d u ce th e sim u ltan eity o f seeing a n d the seen, o r the
style o f th e ir enco u n ter, b u t th e y c a n stage it.
132 Mika Elo

P h o to g rap h s tell us a b o u t b o d i e s . b y ex p o sin g th em in a lim ited tim e fram e.

W ith re g a rd to this fram e, p h o to g rap h ic im m o b ility is n o th in g b u t a special case
o f d ifferen ce in velocity. It is a fo rm o f su sp en sio n re m in iscen t o f flying: the
p h o to g rap h ic su rface o p erates like a w in g creatin g a differen ce in p ressu re across
itself. B o th o n th e w in g an d o n th e p h o to g rap h ic surface, it is th e differen ce in v e ­
lo city th a t tu rn s in to d ifferen ce in p re ssu re . P h o to g rap h ic im m o b ility is m oving;
it e x ercises p ressu re u p o n th e look. A p h o to g ra p h w ith o u t any tem p o ral ten sio n
is lik e a w in g in a vacuum .

P h o to g rap h s tell us a b o u t b o d i e s . b y tu rn in g th e visib le w o rld into th e burial

g ro u n d s o f full p resence. P h o to g rap h s o p e n up a space h in tin g at th e sam e tim e
a t th e stru ctu ral p o ssib ility o f its u ltim ate collapse. In th is p h o to g rap h ic space,
th in g s are b u rie d rig h t in to th e ir o w n surface. A p h o to g rap h ic to m b is a crad le o f
evidence.

P h o to g rap h s tell us a b o u t b o d i e s . b y lettin g th em surface o n a surface. P h o to ­

g rap h ic tem plum , its sp atio tem p o ral fram e, show s d elim itatio n as its o w n o p e ra­
tio n , as p h o to -g rap h y . In acco rd an ce w ith this o p eratio n , b o d ies, at th e ir lim its,
ap p e a r as surfaces. S urfaces, at th e ir lim its, are lines. L ines are points at every
point. P o in ts are n o th in g in space. P h o to g rap h s show this nothing.
Theses, Notes, and Images 133

Epistemocritical note

W h a t d o th ese th eses tell u s? W h a t is th eir m ode o f tellin g ? T he selectio n o f

sev en sep arate p o in ts fra m e d b y th e n o tio n o f “th e sis” seem s to in d icate a p o in t
o f c o n v erg en ce th a t w o u ld situ ate th e q u e stio n o f th e p h o to g rap h ic co nditions
o f em b o d im e n t a n n o u n c e d in th e title. A t th e sam e tim e, eac h th esis m ak es a
separate claim . In ste a d o f a sin g le p o in t th e re is a c o n ste llatio n o f points an d the
in teg rativ e a rg u m en t is m issing. A s a co n seq u en ce, th ese frag m en tary points are
c lo ser to p h o to g rap h ic sh o w in g th a n to arg u m en tativ e discourse. T h ey hig h lig h t
specific aspects (as if th ey w ere en actin g the fu n ctio n o f a view finder) and only
h in t a t a set o f relatio n s em erg in g th ro u g h th e ir lim ite d view points.
If th e th e se s are in te rc o n n e c ted a n d co n stitu te so m eth in g lik e an im age, it is
an im ag e to b e re a d - b u t h o w to re a d such a co n stellatio n ? H o w to add the m iss­
ing lines to it?
A n a m o rp h o sis hints a t how o n e m ig h t proceed. A s a v isual m a n ife statio n o f
w h a t B en jam in fam o u sly id en tified as th e k e y o p eratio n o f B aro q u e allegory, th at
is, “ex p re ssio n o f c o n v e n tio n ” ,1 a n a n am o rp h ic im ag e show s o p en ly th a t th e re p ­
rese n ta tio n o ffe re d to th e sp ectato r is co n stru c ted w ith reg a rd to a certain v ie w ­
p o in t. T h e v a st m a jo rity o f im ag es are c o n stru cted in such a w ay as to in v ite the
v iew er to tak e a fro n tal v iew in g p o sitio n fro m w h ere th e im ag e offers itse lf for
visual m astery. A n am o rp h ic im ag es, by co n trast, p u t this acc u sto m ed p o sitio n in
q u e stio n by sh o w in g th a t it is, in fact, a c o n tin g en t construction.
S im ilar lo g ic ap p lies to a cad em ic texts. O bviously, w e - you, the reader, and
I, th e w riter - are b o th facin g h ere a te x t th a t o b structs any fro n tal ap p ro a ch and
appears aw ry. It is d ifficu lt to d ecid e w h eth er to focus on w h a t is said o r on ho w
the say in g its e lf u n fo ld s. Ju st lik e an an am o rp h ic im age this tex t o p enly asks fo r
active p o sitio n in g , n o t in o rd er to fill th e gaps b u t to th in k along w ith them . It
inv ites us to e n te r th e scene w h ere th e q u e stio n o f th e p h o to g rap h ic co n d itio n s o f
em b o d im e n t is staged.
In his sem in al w o rk T he O rigin o f G erm a n M o u rn in g P la y , W alter B en jam in
em p h asizes th e im p o rtan ce o f p re se n ta tio n in p h ilo so p h ical w o rk .2 “T h e a rt o f
settin g a p a rt as o p p o sed to th e ch ain o f d ed u ctio n ; p e rsiste n c e o f the treatm ent
as o p p o se d to th e g estu re o f th e frag m en t; the rep etitio n o f m o tives as o p p o sed
to sh allo w univ ersalism : th e fu lln e s s o f c o n c e n tra te d p o sitiv ity as o p p o sed to po-

1 Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, eds. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhau-
ser in co-operation with Theodor W. Adorno and Gershom Scholem, Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, vol. I/1, 1991, p. 351.
2 As is well known, this intended Habilitationsschrift was turned down by the academic board
at the University of Freiburg because of its unorthodox form and approach - due to its “an­
amorphic” structure, as I am inclined to think.
Mika Elo: volume M.
Theses, Notes, and Images 135

lem ical n e g a tio n ” are th e o b jectiv es o f h is treatise.3 W h a t is at stake in h is e m p h a ­

sis o n p resen tatio n , is th e q u e stio n o f th e in tertw in in g o f th e “w h a t” a n d “h o w ” .
B e n ja m in ’s im p erativ e is to w o rk w ith th e ten sio n b etw e en “ w h a t” and “h o w ” .
T h is, in fa c t, is m o re th an a style: it is a m e th o d , alb eit in a specific sense. F o r a
researcher, th e m e th o d is th e ro a d to know led ge. F o r a philosopher, w h o ta k es up
the “h e ig h te n e d p o sitio n b e tw e e n re se a rc h er a n d a rtist” , this ro ad o r deto u r is, in
turn , B e n ja m in u n d e rlin e s, the v ery p re se n ta tio n o f tru th .4
B e n ja m in ’s m e th o d co n sists o f a c a lc u lated w ay o f settin g ap art and p u t­
tin g to g eth er, in a w ord: w e ig h te d reco n fig u ratio n . In stea d o f the cla ssic al aim o f
co n cep tu alizatio n , th a t is, “m ak in g a p o in t” , brin g in g so m eth in g to th e p o in t by
su b su m in g p h e n o m e n a u n d e r u n iv e rsa ls, B en jam in ch o o ses the m eth o d o f stag ­
ing. F o r him , co n cep ts h av e a m ed ia tin g ro le b etw een the p h en o m e n a an d the
ideas. T h ey set th e p h e n o m e n a ap art an d b rin g fo rth th eir “th in g -lik e e le m e n ts” .
F o r B en jam in , co n cep ts are n o t so m eth in g th at gath ers sim ilar p h en o m en a to ­
g eth er an d fo rm u late th e ir essence. To co n cep tu alize p h e n o m en a is n o t to fo rm u ­
late w h a t is ty p ical o f th em . Q u ite the co n trary, b y h ig h lig h tin g the “ th in g -lik e
ele m e n ts” in p h en o m en a, co n cep ts m a rk th e ex trem es in stead, an d th ro u g h this
o p eratio n th ey p rep are the g ro u n d fo r id eas, th a t is, fo r the “o b jectiv e v irtu al ar­
ran g em en t o f th e p h e n o m e n a ” . Id eas are, in o th er w ords, c o n stellatio n s w h ic h are
m ade v isib le th ro u g h p re se n ta tio n , th e re c o m b in a tio n o f th in g -lik e e lem en ts and
the h ig h lig h tin g w o rk c a rrie d o u t b y th e c o n cep ts.5
In B e n ja m in ’s view , this h ig h lig h tin g re c o m b in atio n w o rk is the aim o f a
tru e p h ilo so p h ical treatise. H e rem in d s us th a t its trad itio n a l nam e tra cta te lite r­
ally refers to tracin g an d d raw in g . In th e sam e p a g e s, B en ja m in also ch a ra cter­
izes a p h ilo so p h ical tre a tise as a m o sa ic .6 In b o th cases (the tractate as a tracing
co n ste lla tio n an d as a m o saic) th e w h o le is d e p e n d e n t o n th e d elicacy o f the
sm all details. T h e d etails in q u e stio n are, h ow ever, n o t to be fo u n d at th e level o f
in d iv id u al claim s (“th e g estu re o f th e fra g m e n t”). F u rth erm o re, ch aracteristic o f
the a rra n g e m en t o f the all-o v er p re se n ta tio n is, acco rd in g to B en ja m in , rep etitiv e
“re tra c in g ” .
M y p re se n tatio n h ere shares th is “e p iste m o critica l” starting p o in t w ith B e n ­
ja m in ’s treatise, ev en i f the stakes are d ifferen t. T he seven theses - to g eth e r w ith
the n o tes a n d th e im ag es a c c o m p an y in g th e m - aim a t p resen tin g an id ea o f the
p h o to g rap h ic co n d itio n s o f em b o d im en t. A s in B e n ja m in ’s case, this “id e a ” is n o t

3 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften vol. I/1, p. 212.

4 Ibid., p. 208-212.
5 Ibid., p. 214.
6 Ibid, p. 208.
136 Mika Elo

a stable essence. It is so m eth in g th a t has to be co n stru c ted by a d o u b le m o v em en t

o f settin g a p a rt an d restoring. T h is d o u b le m o v em en t is th e key issue o f m y p re s­
en tatio n . In p h o to g rap h ic term s o n e m ig h t sp eak o f read ju stm en ts o f ex posure
an d d ep th o f field.
If th e th eses ab o v e aim at o p en in g u p a space fo r p o n d erin g o v er th e p h o to ­
g rap h ic co n d itio n s o f em b o d im e n t in th e ir o v erw h elm in g richness, it is the aim o f
th e fo llo w in g “fo o tn o te s” , in tu rn , to resto re so m eth in g o f th e m u ltip le im p lica ­
tio n s o f th e theses.

Footnotes

In P la to ’s c av e, the p riso n ers w ere n o t able to see h o w b o d ies an d th eir shadow s

w ere connected . T h e p h o to g rap h ic o p e ra tio n th ro u g h w h ic h bodies are in scrib ed
in to th e re a lm o f im ag es w as c o n c e a led fro m them . T uom o R a in io ’s m e d ia p er­
fo rm an ce V alotuksia / E x p o su res tu rn s th is scen ario in sid e out, or, m o re exactly,
it levels the im a g in a l g ro u n d o f the v isib le w o rld . H ere the v ie w e rs’ lo t is to see
th e w h o le setting, th e w h o le shad o w p lay th a t bo d ily bein g s b rin g w ith them .
L ig h t so u rces, th e spatial arra n g e m en t o f p h o to g rap h ically lin k ed surfaces, sh ad ­
o w s, tracin g s an d b o d ies - in c lu d in g th a t o f the a rtist-p u p p eteer h im se lf - m ake
up th e p erfo rm an ce en sem b le.7 In ste a d o f a cave a n d th e safe d elim itatio n s and
h ierarch ies it im p lie s, th ere is th e a ll-en co m p assin g surface o f the visib le w o rld
la id b are in fro n t o f o u r eyes. T h e cav ities o f it are d issec ted by tu rn in g th e w hole
settin g in to a screen, th a t is, a w eav e w h ere m aterial an d im m aterial aspects o f
em b o d im e n t are m a p p e d to g eth er, w ith an d ag ain st ea ch other. R a in io ’s p e rfo r­
m an ce stages th e q u e stio n o f th e p h o to g rap h ic con d itio n s o f em b o d im en t in term s
o f th e te n sio n b e tw e e n im m o b ility an d flow , th eir m a terial re co rd and im m aterial
beco m in g , o n a set o f in te rlin k e d surfaces.
T h is te n sio n m ak es th e stran g en ess o f an im ag e appear: A n im ag e can be
m ean in g fu l an d to u c h in g a t th e sam e tim e as it w ith d raw s fro m th e realm o f
m ean in g s an d tangibility. A n im ag e gives rise to sp eech by being m ute, its visual
im m o b ility m o b ilizes flow s o f sig n ificatio n . A n im ag e opens u p a space fo r th in k ­
in g by a g estu re o f clo sin g its e lf off, by b ein g in d iv id u ally sep arate an d distinct,
an d yet, in th e m id st o f its sin g u lar g esture, it ev o k es a n u n c o u n tab le n u m b er
o f o th e r im ages. B y b ein g p recise, scalab le, tran sferrab le a n d seem in g ly b o d i­
less im ages, p h o to g rap h s show th is stran g en ess in a p o ig n a n t way. A p h o to g rap h
au to m atically m ark s its o w n se p a ra tio n o u t as b o th necessary an d contingent. It
em b o d ies so m eth in g o f th e stran g e fre e d o m w h ich M au rice M e rlea u -P o n ty sees
in the figure o f an artist: d ete rm in a tio n w h ich im poses itse lf on a self, o r “creative

7 Cf. Tuomo Rainio’s contribution in this book.

Tuomo Rainio’s media performance Valotuksia / Exposures at the museum of contemporary art,
Kiasma, Helsinki. Photo: Petri Summanen.
138 Mika Elo

retriev al o f o u rse lv e s” (reprise crea trice de n o u s m em es), as M e re leau -P o n ty puts

it.8 V alotuksia / E x p o su res stages th is d eterm ination as a p h o to g rap h ic operation.
It sh o w s how th e selfsam en ess o f an im ag e em erges in th e v ery ex ec u tio n o f
p h o to -g rap h y , lig h t-d raw in g .
W h en a s e lf app ears as a u n it, it is already e m p lac ed in a spatio tem p o ral
fram e w ith ex p erien tial param eters. P h o to g rap h y helps us reco g n ize th a t som e
o f th e se p aram eters are h isto rical variab les. In so far as p h o to g rap h y to u ch es u p o n
o u r b o d ily hab itu s, it hints at th e fa c t th a t liv e d b o dies are n o t sim p ly natural
u n its. B o d ie s, in th eir self-relatio n , ad d th em selv es to n ature.
M e rle a u -P o n ty th in k s o f th is in term s o f sty le.9 F o r him , n ature is so m ething
th a t em erg es as n atu re in an d th ro u g h th e p ecu liarities o f bo d ily b e in g .10 T h ere is
a fu n d am en tal d iscrep an cy b e tw e e n im m an en ce an d tra n sce n d en ce at th e core o f
o u r sen se ex p e rie n c e: w h a t w e p erceiv e ca n n o t be to ta lly fo re ig n to us, an d yet
so m eth in g o f it alw ay s rem ain s b e y o n d o u r grasp. E ac h app earan ce is th u s a k n o t
o f p resen ce an d absence.
T h is k n o t is as m u c h ab o u t tech n ics an d calib ratio n as it is a b o u t style. T h is is
so m eth in g th a t M e rle a u -P o n ty ’s w ay o f d ev elo p in g his arg u m en t in dialo g u e w ith
p a in tin g ten d s to c o n ceal, since a p a in te r’s tech n iq u e finds its cu lm in atio n p o in t
in w h a t w e are a ccu sto m ed to ca ll “ sty le” . W h en w ritin g ab o u t C e z a n n e ’s art
M e rle a u -P o n ty p o in ts o u t th a t th e p a in te r u se d a palette c o n sistin g o f 18 c o lo u rs.11
In ste a d o f th e tech n ical im p licatio n s o f this settin g , M erlea u -P o n ty focu ses on
th e ch ro m atic n u an ces an d v ariatio n s th a t co n stitu te the fram ew o rk o f C e z a n n e ’s
sty le, th e p a in te r’s sin g u lar w ay o f n eg o tiatin g b e tw ee n the intellig ib le an d the
sen sib le asp ects o f p e rc e p tio n o n a canvas. T h e v ery fram e o f th ese n eg o tiations,
how ever, in v o lv es a series o f tech n ical decisions. P ho to g rap h s an d o th er te c h n i­
cal im ag es re m in d us o f th e fa c t th a t m an y o f th e se fram in g co n d itio n s are b e ­
y o n d o u r p e rc e p tu a l p o ssib ilities an d in d iv id u al choice; there is a w h o le in dustry

8 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Cezanne’s doubt” in The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader, ed. Galen
A. Johnson, trans. ed. Michael B. Smith, Northwestern U.P., Evanston 1993,p. 75.
9 See for example Merleau-Ponty, “Indirect Language and Voices of Silence”, in The Merleau-
Ponty Aesthetics Reader, p. 76-120.
10 Especially in Merleau-Ponty’s late writings and lectures nature constitutes an ontological
problem that involves the question of bodily being. Nature is not simply the given; it is the
“non-instituted foundation” of bodily existence. Cf. Renaud Barbaras: “Merleau-Ponty and
Nature”, Research in Phenomenology, vol. 31, p. 22-38.
11 Merleau-Ponty,“Cezanne’s doubt”, p. 62.
Theses, Notes, and Images 139

b eh in d th e m .12 W ith p h o to g rap h y , the q u e stio n o f in terface, th at is, the q u estion

co n cern in g th e w ay in w h ic h an im ag e faces th e b o d y (an d vice versa), beco m es a
v iru len t them e. P h o to g rap h s m ak e u p an “aesth etic h o rizo n ” 13 very d ifferen t from
pain tin g b y e n g ag in g c y b ern etic p ro cesses a t th e level o f th e senses.
In lig h t o f tech n ical im a g e s, M e rle a u -P o n ty ’s distin ctio n b etw e en “liv ed p e r­
sp e c tiv e ” an d th a t o f p h o to g ra p h y app ears ra th er o n e -sid e d .14 H e n eglects th e fact
th a t te c h n o lo g ic a l p h o to re a lism h as d eep ro o ts in o u r co rp o real ex isten ce. W e
co u ld also ask , w h e th e r M e rle a u -P o n ty ’s d iscu ssio n on the “fictio n al” co n n e c ­
tio n s b e tw e e n d ifferen t b o d y p arts th a t in his view m ak e up th e tem p o ral d y n a m ­
ics o f a R o d in o r a G ericau lt, actu ally p resu p p o ses a cin em atic und erstan d in g
o f tem p o ral re la tio n s.15 O n e c o u ld arg u e fu rth er th a t rath er th a n testify in g to the
im p o ssib ility o f e x p ressin g m o v e m e n t th ro u g h ph o to g rap h y , as M erleau -P o n ty
su g g ests, th e p h o to g rap h ic o p eratio n s o f M a re y ’s and M u y b rid g e ’s chro n o p h o to -
graphs b rin g fo rth th e fa c t th a t ev ery d e p ic tio n o f m o v e m e n t n ecessarily im plies
a v irtu al p o in t o f referen ce. B o th th e a rtis t’s seeing and the c a m e ra ’s lo o k em b o d y
this v irtu al p o in t; b o th o f th e m p ro d u ce an d in stitu te spatio tem p o ral relatio n s
th a t are effectiv e in o u r b o d ily ex isten ce. It seem s to m e th a t M e rle a u -P o n ty ’s
in tricate d ialo g u e w ith p ain tin g p rev en ts h im fro m fully tak in g into a c co u n t the
tech n ical m ed iatio n s a n d cy b ern etic p ro cesses th a t effectiv ely shape o u r aesthetic
horizon.
I f all tech n ics is b o d ily tech n ics, as M e rle au -P o n ty co n te n d s,16 then, w ith
p hotography, w e en ter in to a realm o f co rp o reality th a t in v o lv es hetero g en eo u s
b odies, e v en m onstrosity. S eem in g ly b o d iless, th e p h o to g ra p h is actu a lly a m o n ­
strous bo d y , d e c a p ita ted , its o n e -e y e d cam e ra h e a d cu t off. T he act o f taking a
p h o to g rap h m ark s th e n o n -co in cid en ce o f its tw o sides: the tak er and the taken.
A p h o to g ra p h ties th e se tw o o th ers to g e th e r in a strange superim p o sitio n , w hich
- th is is to be n o te d - is n o t a fu sio n , p erh ap s n o t e v en a chiasm a. P h o to g rap h ic
cap tu re brin g s th e o n e an d th e o th e r to g e th e r by in tro d u cin g a clear an d distin ct

12 Gerhard Richter’s works, such as 1025 Farben, would offer productive starting point for con­
sidering the technical aspects of a painter’s palette.
13 I borrow this term from Miriam Hansen. According to her analysis of the early 20th century
mainstream film culture, the so-called “classic cinema” “not only traded in the mass produc­
tion of the senses but also provided an aesthetic horizon for the experience of industrial mass
society”. It “engaged the contradictions of modernity at the level of the senses” and contrib­
uted by ‘mainstreaming’ to the emergence of mass culture. Miriam Bratu Hansen, “The Mass
Production of Senses: Classical Cinema as Vernacular Modernism”, Modernism/Modernity
6.2 (1999): 59-77.
14 Cf. Merleau-Ponty, “Cezanne’s doubt”, p. 64.
15 Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind”, in The Merleau-Ponty Aesthet­
ics Reader, ed. Galen A. Johnson, trans. ed. michael B. Smith, Northwestern U.P., Evanston
1993, p. 144-145.
16 Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind”, p. 129.


Mika Elo: volume S.

Theses, Notes, and Images 141

cu t b e tw e e n them . A s an ex p o su re, a p h o to g ra p h is a re m in d er o f th is partitioning.

I find it illu m in atin g to co n sid e r this re m a in d e r in re latio n to m a th em atical te rm s :
ju s t lik e th e re m a in d e r o f an a rith m etic d iv isio n m arks the shift fo rm the d o m ain
o f natu ral n u m b ers to th e d o m a in o f real n u m b ers, th e p h o to g rap h as a rem ain d er
m ark s th e sh ift fro m th e w o rld o f natu ral b o d ies to the w o rld o f real b o dies w h ich
in th e ir co n stitu tio n are ex p o se d to co n ta m in a tio n , to the re a lm o f p a rt objects
an d p rostheses.
T h e c learn ess o f th e p h o to g ra p h ic c u t is strange; one m ig h t call it literally
a n a-tom ic. T h e w o rd “a n a to m y ” d eriv es fro m th e G re ek tem nein (“to c u t”). T he
prefix a na- a ttach ed to it h as the cu rio u s d o u b le m ean in g o f “w ith ” and “ a g ain st” .
“A n a to m y ” , accord in g ly , m ean s “cu ttin g w ith an d a g ain st” . T his literal m ean in g
sugg ests th a t an a-to m y is ab o u t th e articu latio n o f d etails. T he q u estio n is, ho w
to co n ceiv e o f th e flesh articu lated b y p h o tography. H o w does it relate to the
“flesh o f the v isib le ” , a n o tio n th a t M e rle a u -P o n ty dev elo p s in The Visible a n d the
In v isib le ? 17 B ecau se p h o to g rap h y c a n cap tu re an d u ltim ately ca p tiva te us as b o d ­
ily b ein g s, it w o u ld also seem cap ab le o f p ro d u cin g new “p ro to ty p es o f B e in g ” .18
T h is, at least, is w h a t p h o to g rap h s tell us.
Je a n -L u c N a n c y h as p o in te d o u t th e stru ctu ral an alo g y b e tw ee n the p h o ­
to g rap h ic im ag e an d C a rte sia n co g ito .19 C ogito, th e I th a t th in k s, is th e p o in t o f
referen ce th a t g u aran tees th e unity o f co n scio u s thinking. It is, quite literally, a
p o in t o f view . In lin g u istic term s, th is stru ctu re is m an ifested in th e fu n ctio n o f the
p ro n o u n “I” . In o rd e r to b eco m e a n “I” o n e has to tak e up th is p o sitio n , perfo rm
it by say in g “I ” . T h e w o rd “I” o p en s u p a p o in t o f view : “ I versus the o th e rs” .
T his is also w h y “ I” can say “ y o u ” . In R o m a n Ja k o b so n ’s term s, “ I” fu nctions as
a sh ifter. In short, th e n am in g th a t tak es p lace in the p ro n o u n “ I” is a b o u t decid in g
the sid e.20
A c c o rd in g to N an cy , a s im ila r d e c is io n ta k e s p la c e in th e p h o to g ra p h ic
g e s tu re th a t fin d s its c u lm in a tio n in th e sn a p o f a c a m e ra sh u tte r: “b y p r e s s ­
in g d o w n , th e fin g e r sa y s I ” , as N a n c y p u ts it.21 In o th e r w o rd s, a p h o to g ra p h
m a rk s th e d e c is iv e d iv is io n b e tw e e n th e im a g e a n d th e sp e c ta to rs.

17 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. Alphonso
Lingis, Evanston: Northwestern U.P, p. 136, passim.
18 “When we speak of the flesh of the visible [...] we mean that carnal being [...] is a prototype of
Being, of which our body, the sensible sentient, is a very remarkable variant” (Merleau-Ponty,
The Visible and the Invisible, p. 136).
19 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the Image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York: Fordham U. P., 2005,
p. 102.
20 Ibid., p. 100.
21 Ibid., p. 101.
142 Mika Elo

N ow , if th e p h o to g ra p h ascrib es a p lace fo r the sin g u lar “I” in the im age, how

ab o u t th e p lu ra l “w e ” , th e sp ectato rs? N a n c y po in ts o u t th at there is a stru ctu ral
d ifferen ce b e tw e e n th e “I” a n d th e “w e ” . “I” fun ctio n s as a shifter an d decides
th e p o in t o f view , seem in g ly w ith o u t a rest. T h e “w e ” in tu rn rem ain s o b v io u sly
disp u tab le, a n d b eco m es a q u e stio n o f w h o is speak in g fo r us, fo r th e “w e ” . T he
“w e ” can n o t b e p e rfo rm e d lik e th e “I” ; it can only b e p ro jec ted , it is co n stan tly
b ein g form ed.
In re g a rd to im ag es, h o w ev er, the “ w e ” is, in a sense, clear-cu t. W h e n an im ­
age says “I” , w e sp ectato rs are th e o th ers w ith o u t dispute. T h is ico n ic cut, h o w ­
ever, does n o t m ean th a t th e “ w e ” sh o u ld b e u n ified socially. N an cy ex p licates
th e h etero g en eity o f th e “w e ” w ith h elp o f th e S p an ish p ro n o u n nosotros, “w e
o th e rs” , w h ic h m ark s the d ifferen tial d em a rc atio n o f the “w e ” an d the identifica-
to ry p ro je c tio n s w h ich are at w o rk th e re .22
O n a c lo se r lo o k , th e sh ifte r fu n c tio n o f th e “I ” also h in ts a t th e w a y in
w h ic h th e lin g u istic su b je c t p a rts w ith itself: “ I ” can o n ly b e said e ffe c tiv ely by
a n tic ip a tin g its e ffe c tiv e n e ss. S im ila rly , th e fin g er trig g e rin g th e c a m e ra c a n n ot.
b u t a n tic ip a te th e im a g e o ffe re d to th e eye. A p h o to g ra p h , in tu rn , c o in s th is
stru c tu re in v isu a l term s. It ex p o se s th e “I ” by p u ttin g it in to ex te rio rity , b y e m ­
b e d d in g it a lo n g sid e “u s o th e rs ” in th e stra n g e n e ss o f a n illu m in a te d c a p tu re .23
In th is sen se, p h o to g ra p h y c a n b e se e n as a n e x p o sin g d is c o u r s e .24 P h o to g ra ­
p h y e x p o se s u s to o u r fin ite e x iste n c e th a t is alw a y s a c o -e x iste n c e o f th e “ w e
o th e rs ” . P h o to g rap h ic space as “th e b u rial grounds o f full p re se n c e ” is also the
crad le o f ev id e n c e .25

22 Ibid,p. 102.
23 Ibid,p. 101-105.
24 This exposing discourse finds its culmination in the figure of the death mask. Cf. Louis Ka­
plan, “Photograph/Death Mask: Jean-Luc Nancy’s Recasting of the Photographic Image”,
Journal of Visual Culture 2010; 9; 45, DOI: 10.1177/1470412909354255, p. 49.
25 This would be the place to develop some reflections on my sixth thesis that refers to Dag Pe-
tersson’s notion of “photographic space”: the a priori space that delimits the photographable.
Petersson emphasizes that it cannot be reduced to temporal categories of singular experience;
it needs to be considered also in spatially productive terms, such as “relational distribution
of image elements” and “translation of the photographed”. Cf. Dag Petersson in collabora­
tion with Walter Niedermayr, “Photographic Space” in Representational Machines, ed. Anna
Dahlgren et al., Aarhus U.P., 2013, p. 107-147. My thesis hints at the necessity of taking both
(finite) time and (excessive) space into account. With Nancy this could be done in terms of
a singular-plural Being articulated in photographs. I hope that I can come back to this in an
another context.
Mika Elo: volume D.
144 Mika Elo

T h e m u te ex p o su re th a t p h o to g ra p h y first and fo rem o st is also ex p oses v erbal

lan g u ag e to its o w n lim its, in clu d in g m y lan g u ag e here. It carves o u t the body
o f an y d isco u rse th a t ad d resses it. T h is e n c o u n ter im p lies a d e m an d fo r ta c t and
self-ex p o sin g o f th e th o u g h t; in sh o rt, sen sitivity to situations w h ere w o rd s and
im ag es are n o t set in h ierarch ic relatio n s to e ach other, b u t only have d ifferen t
p o in ts o f d ep artu re an d are th erefo re in th e p o sitio n o f to u ch in g ea ch other, o v er
a distance.
T h is is th e w ay in w h ic h th e p h o to g rap h ic c u t in stan tiates thinking. L eaning
o n th e stru ctu ral an alo g y b etw een th e p h o to g rap h ic im age an d C a rte sia n c o g ito ,
N an cy e v e n m ak es th e fo llo w in g claim : “E v ery p h o to g ra p h is an irrefu tab le and
lu m in o u s I a m [...] L ik e th e o th e r ego sum , this one is m ade e x p lic it as a n ego
cogito. P h o to g rap h y th in k s [...]” .26 O n th e o th er h and, N ancy is also so m ebody to
in sist o n th e in se p a ra b ility o f b o d y an d th in k in g in D escartes: “ [ ...] fo r D escartes,
th e res co g ita n s is a b o d y ” .27
T h is e m b o d im e n t o f sense im p lies th a t th e clearn ess o f the p h o tographic
cu t c a n n o t be th o u g h t o f in term s o f transparency. R ather, it is a b o u t evidence.
T h e L a tin ro o t evid en tia (w h ich literally m eans “seen fro m afa r”) su g gests th at
ev id en ce is n o t sim p ly tra n sp a re n t o b v io u sn ess o r th e im m ed iacy o f an em b o d ied
grasp. E v id en ce in v o lv es a distance. T h e co re issue in p h o to g rap h ic evidence
is th e sp atio tem p o ral d istan ce a n d te n sio n b etw e en th e tw o sides o f the p h o to ­
g rap h ic body: th e v ie w e r a n d th e view. Its key featu re is the im m o b ility o f the
p h o to g rap h ic im age.
R a in io ’s V alotuksia / E x p o su res lets th e p h o to g rap h ic ev id en ce u n fo ld in
fro n t o f o u r eyes. T h e co n stan tly tra n sfo rm in g im ag e presses u p o n th e lo o k and
g en tly fo rces the eyes o f th e v iew er to m o v e along w ith its d istin c t figurations in
o rd e r to c a tc h p h o to g rap h ic instants. T h e m o v e m e n t o f th e im ag e feeds th e desire
to freeze it, a g a in a n d again. H ere th e p h o to g rap h ic im m o b ility has a m o to r fu n c ­
tio n th a t does n o t lim it itse lf to th e m ech an ical a sp ect o f th e m ob ility o f th e im ­
age. R ather, it m ak es u p an in v arian t, an en g in e o f v ariatio n a n d a referen ce point
fo r tran sfo rm atio n s th a t can be th o u g h t o f as m etam o rp h o sis, or, m ore exactly, as
an am o rp h o sis, sin ce th e spatial relatio n s th a t are at stake here in v o lv e d isco n ti­
n u itie s.28 In o th er w o rd s, th e v iew ers are in v o lv ed in the ev en t o f beco m in g -o f-
th e-im ag e in itia te d b y th e p h o to g rap h ic cu t. W e, the v iew ers, are (each one o f us
in a sin g u lar w ay) in v o lv e d in th e in terp lay o f m o v em e n t a n d its arrest th a t brings
fo rth th e im ag e as a fo rm in g force. A s su ch a force, p h o to g rap h y m akes an an a­
to m ical c u t in to th e elem en tal flesh o f o u r b o d ily ex isten ce.

26 Nancy, The Ground of the Image, p. 105.

27 Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard A. Rand, Fordham U.P., 2008,p. 131.
28 Cf. Nancy, The Evidence of Film, Bruxelles: Yves Gevaert Editeur, 2001,p. 52.
Still image from Tuomo Rainio’s media performance Valotuksia / Exposures.
146 Mika Elo

In one o f his last sem in ars M a rtin H e id e g g e r co m p ares th e fra m e w o rk o f m o d ­

ern tech n o lo g y , G e s te //— “e m p la c e m en t”29— w ith the p h o to g ra p h ic n egative.
A cc o rd in g to H eid eg g er, e m p la c e m en t gives a n egative im age o f w h a t he calls
E reig n is.30 Ju s t lik e th e p h o to g ra p h ic n eg ativ e, em p lac em en t show s in an in v erted
fo rm so m eth in g “ a n te rio r” , b o th in term s o f p re ced en ce an d arriving. F urther, the
in v e rsio n o f fa m ilia r relatio n s (in th e case o f a p h o to g rap h ic n egative, lights and
sh ad o w s) show s th a t th e p o sitiv e sh ap es, figures an d pattern s th at can co n stitu te
o b jects o f k n o w le d g e are in fa c t effects o f a g en era tiv e o p eration, w h ich itse lf
rem ain s co n cealed .31
I in te rp re t th e te rm ‘n e g a tiv e ’ in this c o n te x t as a nam e fo r the h id d e n n ess
o f th e g en erativ e o p e ra tio n c h aracteristic o f photography. T h e w ay w e are “ fac­
in g ” E reig n is ex ceed s th e fram e o f phenom enality. “F ace v alu e” , in o th er w ords,
is o n ly p a rt o f it; an d the p h o to g ra p h ic n eg ativ e h in ts a t the n o n -p h en o m en al
d im en sio n s o f em p lacem en t. T h e n eg ativ e in v e rsio n o f th e p h o to g rap h c o u ld be
d e sc rib e d as “in tro v e rsio n ” : In an d as the gen erativ e o p eratio n o f “lig h t-d ra w ­
in g ” , th e p h o to g ra p h tu rn s to w a rd s itse lf a n d b ecom es “o n e ” , a discrete u n it th a t
k eep s itse lf a t a d istan ce fro m e v ery th in g else. In fact, all im ag es are m ark ed
b y th is k in d o f n e g a tiv ity in re g a rd to th e w o rld o f bodies. A s im ages, th ey are
intangible. T h e p h o to g ra p h o n ly show s th is o p eratio n in an ex cep tio n ally clear
an d d istin c t w ay. Its “in tro v e rsio n ” is at the sam e tim e self-distancing: a p h o to ­
g rap h o n ly im p arts its im ag in ality b y p artin g w ith itself, by in scrib in g itse lf into
an o th er b o d y a t an o th er tim e. Its g en erativ e o p e ratio n is (in acc o rd an ce w ith the
d o u b le m o v em en t im p lie d b y th e prefix ana-) b o th a n a m o rp h ic an d anachronic.
A nd, since sp ace an d tim e are alw ay s in v o lv e d in in stitu tin g rational thinking,
th e p h o to g rap h ic o p e ra tio n is, fu rth erm o re, a n a ra tio n a l. In short, p h o to g rap h y
w o rk s w ith a n d a g a in st o u r aesth etic h o riz o n a n d in tellig ib le categ o ries, h ereby
co n trib u tin g to th e p ecu liarities o f o u r b o d ily existence.

29 This apt translation is introduced by Samuel Weber in Massmediauras. Form, Technics, Media, ed.
Alan Cholodenko, California: Stanford U.P, 1996, p. 71.
30 Martin Heidegger, Seminare. Gesamtausgabe, I. Abteilung: Veroffentlichte Schriften 1910­
1976, Band 15, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1986, p. 366.
31 Cf. “Theory on TV: After-Thoughts - Laurence A. Rickels talks with Samuel Weber”, Reli­
gion and Media, eds. Hent de Vries and Samuel Weber, California: Stanford U.P., 2001, p.
97-99.
Theses, Notes, and Images 147

Retouch

B o th th e th eses an d the n o tes th a t ech o th e m like th u n d er echoes flashes,32 aim

at in d icatin g , a lb e it in a ra th e r sch em atic w ay, th a t in stead o f co n ceiv in g p h o ­
to g rap h y as a n in terv en in g in stan ce th a t lead s to the d isin teg ra tio n o f an original
ex p erien ce w e sh o u ld see its tech n icity as a histo rical c o n stitu en t o f our bodily
exp erien ce. A s B ern h ard W aldenfels ap tly p o in ts o ut, the “ logos o f p h e n o m e n a ”
is n e v e r free fro m a sim u ltan eo u s “log o s o f tec h n e” .33 D ue to th e in tertw in in g o f
th ese tw o , th e m e d ia tisa tio n o f ex p erien ce is a pro cess o f estab lish in g “in te rm ed i­
ary in sta n c e s” (Z w isch en in sta n zen ) th a t c o n trib u te to th e c o n so lid atio n o f e x p e ­
rien ce.34 In ste a d o f tech n ical in stru m en ts th a t w o u ld enab le som e specific acts or
p ro cesses, m e d ia as su ch in term ed iary in stan ces co n stitu te disp o sitio n s th a t un d er
suitab le c ircu m stan ces b eco m e a c tiv a te d a n d c o n so lid ate d into “resp o n se re g is­
te rs ” (A n tw o rtreg ister).35 T h e d ecisiv e p o in t h ere is to n o te th a t m ed ia u n d e rsto o d
as in term ed iary in stan ces c o n trib u te to sh ap in g the so -called “a ls-stru c tu re ” th at
form ats p h en o m en a, lets so m eth in g ap p e a r a s so m eth in g . In so fa r as ph o to -g ra-
phy36 c o n stitu tes su ch an in term ed iary in stan ce it con trib u tes to the fram e fo r this
“ as” . In this sen se p h o to -g ra p h y tru ly p ro d u ces ex p erien tial form ats and shapes
the co n d itio n s o f em b o d im en t. S till, th is sh ap in g is n o t creatio ex nihilo. In ter­
m e d ia ry in stan ces o p erate in the ten sio n al field b etw ee n the tw o ex trem es o f pu re
crea tio n an d p u re rep ro d u ctio n , as W aldenfels rem in d s u s.37 I f pho to -g rap h y , as I
cla im e d in o n e o f m y th eses, is cap ab le o f sh o w ing d e lim itatio n as its o w n o p e ra ­
tio n an d if it u ltim ately ten d s to red u ce th is spatio tem p o rin ess in to a point, th a t
is, a “n o th in g in sp a c e ” , c a n w e th e n th in k o f this n o th in g in the plural w ith the
help o f photo g rap h y , th a t is, w ith th e h elp o f im ag es p ro d u ced by p h o to g rap h ic
tech n iq u es? D o p h o to g ra p h s sh o w this n o th in g in the plu ral?
W h en a p h o to g rap h appears as a partitioning contact surface it relates to itself
as a photograph, w h ich fo r N ancy m eans th a t it thinks. T he connection betw een
bein g and thinking, in oth er w o rd s, finds an articulation in it. A s I have already
indicated, this articulation is strange: everything in the photograph is o u t o f place
and nevertheless th e im age itself constitutes som ething like a place, a gaping place,

32 It is in these insightful terms that Benjamin evokes the different temporalities of image (flash)
and text (thunder) in his notes to Passagenwerk. Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. V/1,
p. 570and 577.
33 Bernhard Waldenfels, Phanomenologie der Aufmerksamkeit, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
2004, p . 120.
34 Ibid., p. 113.
35 Ibid, p. 118.
36 I refer with this hyphenated form to the ensemble of light-writing as an operation and to the
technological apparatus of photography.
37 Waldenfels, Aufmerksamkeit, p. 165.
148 Mika Elo

a silent m o u th facin g th e eye.38 N ancy has w o rk ed o u t an apt form ulation regarding

this strange place: “T h e pho to captures th e fam iliar, and im m ediately, instantane­
ously, it strays into stran g en ess” .39 P hotographs capture this straying, an d “lead
astray ” . T hey estrange us as th in k in g beings by constituting a place o f thinking,
an inferiority that is expo sed , p u t into exteriority, ju s t like our body. In this sense,
photographs show th at it is the exteriority o f thinking th at constitutes the innerm ost
strangeness o f corporeality.
In th e seem in g ly v icio u s circle in w h ic h th in k in g , b o d y an d im age are b o und
to g e th e r b y p h o to -g rap h y , th e k e y o p eratio n is a k in d o f “p h o to sy n th e sis” . P h o to ­
sy n th esis is c o m m o n ly k n o w n as a b io ch em ical process in w h ich plants co n v ert
carb o n d io x id e an d w a te r in to o x y g en an d g lu co se, n ee d ed to fu el the o rg a n ism s’
activ ities. S o m eth in g sim ilar tak es p lace in photography, a lb e it w ith d ifferen t in ­
gredients. L ik e b io ch em ical p h o to sy n th esis, p h o to g rap h y is a sy n thetic m eans o f
p ro cessin g th e effects o f light. It stru ctu res th e re la tio n sh ip b e tw ee n the inside
an d th e o u tsid e o f o u r b o d ies b y p resen tin g the surface as a surface, at once and
w ith o u t reco u rse to rep etitiv e strokes o r m o ves fro m p o in t to point. B ecau se o f
th is in stan tan eity , it h o ld s th e p o w er to strip th e b o d y o f its w eig h t an d size. It
breed s a n d m ain tain s life fo rm s th a t call fo r th e relativ ity o f sp atio tem p o ral d is­
tances. T h e p h o to sy n th esis o f p h o to g rap h y snaps up th e visib le fro m o u r reach
an d reb u ild s it w ith in a w o rld in to w h ich w e are in v ite d to re -e n te r fro m the
outside. T h is m u te in v itatio n is th e so u rce o f the sw eet nectar o f photography,
cap tiv a tin g in its carn al figurations.

38 Here I am only able to mark the starting point for relating photography to Nancy’s motive of
bucality. Cf. Jacques Derrida, On Touching - Jean-Luc Nancy, trans. Christine Irizarry, Cali­
fornia: Stanford U.P., 2005, p. 28-29.
39 Nancy, The Ground of the Image, p. 106.
Mika Elo: volume B.
Being, Vision, Image:
On Merleau-Ponty’s Eye and Mind

MlIKA LUOTO

E ye a n d M in d , th e v ery la st te x t M a u ric e M e rle au -P o n ty p u b lish e d h im self, at­

tem p ts to d ev elo p an o n to lo g y o f v isio n th ro u g h reflections on v isu al arts, e sp e ­
cially painting. In its o n to lo g ical asp iratio n , it is clo sely co n n e cte d to th e p h ilo ­
so p h ical p ro je c t w h ich o c c u p ie d M e rle a u -P o n ty du rin g the la st years o f his life:
the o n to lo g ic a l re a sse ssm e n t o f the resu lts o f h is first m ajo r w o rk , P h en o m e n o l­
ogy o f P ercep tio n . T h is p ro je c t re m a in e d u n fin ish ed at the tim e o f h is d eath in
1961, b u t th e m o st im p o rta n t m aterial le ft b e h in d w as p u b lish e d po sth u m o u sly
by C lau d e L efo rt in 1964 as T he Visible a n d the Invisible. F ro m th is fra g m en t w e
learn th a t th e g en eral aim o f the p ro je c t, o f w h ic h E y e a n d M in d is a part, w as to
inv estig ate B ein g o n th e b asis o f th e w ay w e are o p en ed to the visib le w o rld and
th ereb y also in v estig ate th e n atu re o f ideality.
W h ile it dev elo p s an o n to lo g y o f v isio n , E ye a n d M in d is also a philo so p h ical
reflectio n o n p ain tin g . W e sh o u ld n o te, h o w ev er, th at p a in tin g co n stitu tes less an
ob je c t o f th e o re tic a l stu d y th an an ap p ro p riate c o n tex t w h ich allow s the p h ilo so ­
p h er to ad d ress b asic q u estio n s o f v isio n a n d B eing. In this respect, E ye a n d M in d
belo n g s to a series o f w ritin g s in w h ic h M e rle au -P o n ty dev elo p s h is th o u g h ts in
a k in d o f d ialo g u e w ith v isu al arts: le t us sim p ly m en tio n “C e z a n n e ’s D o u b t” and
“In d ire c t L an g u ag e a n d th e V oices o f S ile n c e ” .
H ow does th e e x p lo ra tio n o f v isu al arts m ake th e d ev e lo p in g o f an o n to l­
ogy o f v isio n p o ssib le? H o w is th e p h ilo s o p h e r’s attem p t to th in k v isio n and
B ein g re la te d to th e a rtis t’s attem p t to p a in t w ith visib le co lours? In its c a p a c ­
ity to articu late o u r b o d ily access to B ein g , p ain tin g h a s, acco rd in g to M erleau -
Ponty, a “m etap h y sical sig n ifican ce” : it is the “n o n co n c ep tu a l p re se n tatio n o f
un iv ersal B e in g ” .1 W h a t p a in tin g b rin g s ab o u t is so m eth in g like a p h e n o m e n o ­
lo g ical re d u c tio n w h ich m ak es it p o ssib le fo r th o u g h t to “re tu rn to the things
th e m se lv e s” , th a t is, re tu rn to th e ap p earin g o f w h a t appears, th e ev en t o f p re s­
en ce. F o r th o u g h t, p a in tin g m an ifests th e p re -p red icativ e an d pre-o b jectiv e: the
pre se n c e o f th e w o rld p re c e d in g all o u rju d g e m e n ts and o bjectifications.

1 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, L ’&il et l’esprit, Paris: Gallimard, 1964, p. 61 and 71 / “Eye and
Mind”, in The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader, ed. Galen A. Johnson and trans. ed. Michael
B. Smith, Evanston: Northwestern U.P, 1993, p. 139 and 142.
152 Miika Luoto

H o w is such a v isib le p re se n c e articu lated ? In E ye a n d M in d , as I w ill argue

in th e fo llo w in g , th e a rtic u la tio n o f v isib le presen ce, a n d co n seq u en tly th e rela­
tio n b e tw e e n o n to lo g y an d p ain tin g , is co n ce iv ed in term s o f im age. In stead o f
p re se n tin g so m eth in g v isib le, an im ag e p re sen ts, acco rd in g to M erleau -P o n ty ,
v isib ility itself. Im ag es m ak e u p th e n e c e ssa ry m ed iu m in w h ich th e B eing o f
th e v isib le w o rld is articu lated . W h a t is a t issue in E ye a n d M in d is, as B ern h ard
W ald en fels say s, “Im a g e -B e in g ” (B ild -S e in ), w h ich m u st be u n d ersto o d in b o th
directions: b o th B ein g ta k in g p lace in im ag e an d the im ag in ality o f B ein g itself.2
In d istin c tio n to The Visible a n d the In v isib le, w h ich elab o rates th e ontology
o f v isio n in critical d ialo g u e w ith th e tra d itio n o f m o d ern p h ilo so p h y (in p artic u ­
lar H u sserl, B erg so n , H e id e g g e r an d S artre), E ye a n d M in d d ev elo p s its ideas
m u c h m o re freely. A lth o u g h it tak es th e fo rm o f a p h ilo so p h ical essay esp ecially
co n c e rn e d w ith p ain tin g a n d is w ritte n in a style th a t is m u c h to o easily lab elled
“m e ta p h o ric ” o r e v en “lite ra ry ” , its m o d e o f p resen ta tio n has in fac t a p ro fo u n d
ph ilo so p h ical aim : in ste a d o f m asterin g p h e n o m e n a th ro u g h concep tu al d e te rm i­
n atio n s, it attem p ts to d isclo se th e m in th e ir irred u cib le rich n ess an d am biguity.
A s M e rle a u -P o n ty h im s e lf say s, w h a t m atters here is n o t to sp eak ab o u t space and
light, b u t to allo w space an d lig h t a s they are there to sp eak th em se lv es.3

Body and vision

W h a t is th e ch allen g e o f th o u g h t to w h ic h E ye a n d M in d re sp o n d s? A cco rd in g to
M erleau -P o n ty , it is n ecessary to step b a c k fro m the scientific p ro je c t aim in g at
th e ra tio n a l m a ste ry o f o b jectiv e re a lity an d to re tu rn to w h at su ch a p ro je c t b o th
p resu p p o ses an d co v ers u p . W h a t is n e e d e d is the retu rn to the “there is ” (il y a),
“to the site, the soil o f th e sen sib le an d h u m an ly m o dified w o rld such as it is in
o u r liv es a n d fo r o u r b o d ies” .4 T h e F re n c h p h rase il y a here refers to th e sim ­
ple fa c t o f presence: th a t th e re is som ething. B u t how to ta lk a b o u t th e fac t that
th ere is so m eth in g w h ic h p reced es all k n o w led g e a b o u t w h a t there is? A n d how
to th in k B ein g w h ich is n o t an o b je c t o f co n sc io u sn ess, b u t essen tially a locality
w h ic h is th ere o n ly fo r a b o d y an d o n ly as so m eth in g liv e d ?

2 Bernhard Waldenfels, Sinne und Kunste im Wechselspiel. Modi asthetischer Erfahrung,

Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2010, p. 149.
3 L ’&il et l’esprit, p. 59 / Eye and Mind p. 138. As Merleau-Ponty makes explicit here, the
questions of depth, space and light are, for him, at the same level as Aristotle’s question of the
Being of beings: ti to on.
Ibid., p. 12 / 122.
Being, Vision, Image 153

In E y e a n d M in d , p ain tin g o ffers a p riv ileg ed c o n te x t fo r th e develo p in g

o f su ch a th o u g h t, sin ce it is cap ab le o f u n settlin g th e m o st b asic conceptual
o p p o sitio n s o f p hilosophy: “E ssen ce a n d ex istence, im ag in ary an d real, visible
an d in v isib le - p ain tin g scram b les all o u r categ o ries, spread in g o u t befo re us its
o n eiric u n iv e rse o f carn al esse n c e s, efficien t resem b lan ces an d m u te m e a n in g s.”5
A t th e sam e tim e as p a in tin g u n settles th e co n cep ts w h ic h classical rationality
has u se d to secu re its g rasp o f B ein g , it calls fo r th e ir rad ical reassessm ent. A s
the p h rase “carn al e sse n c e ” sugg ests, p ain tin g offers us the p o ssib ility to reth in k
th ese co n cep ts in th e co m m o n ele m e n t o f th e body an d th e visib le w o rld called
“flesh” (chair).
In M e rle a u -P o n ty ’s earlier w ritin g s, “ flesh” is h is co n tro v e rsia l tran slatio n o f
E d m u n d H u sse rl’s te rm L eib , d esig n atin g th e living, active body. In his last texts,
h o w ev er, “flesh” refers b e y o n d the b o d y to an o rig in al structure o f the w o rld to
w h ic h o u r b o d ies testify. T h e b o d y (corps) w h ich is p ara d o x ica lly b o th p art o f the
v isib le w o rld a n d w h a t allo w s th e w o rld to show itself, m akes m an ifest the m ode
o f b e in g o f th e w o rld c a lle d flesh. I en co u n ter this o n to lo g ic al structure in the fact
th a t th e w o rld is p re se n t to m e th ro u g h an in tern al dou b lin g , as a differen tiatio n
in m y b o d y b e tw e e n th e seer an d th e seen, b e tw e en co n scio u sn ess an d th e w orld.
In o rd e r to re a c h the d im e n sio n o f flesh - and to p ass fro m the o rd er o f
k n o w led g e to th a t o f B ein g - M e rle a u -P o n ty co n sid ers the h u m an b o d y as the site
in w h ich th e w o rld co m es to p resen ce. W h a t is the b o d y lik e in so far as it is o p e n ­
n ess to th e w o rld ? It is an “ in tertw in in g [entrelacs] o f v isio n a n d m o v e m e n t”.6
It is in fa c t e v id e n t th a t m o v e m e n t is a tta c h e d to vision: I know sp ontaneously
how to re a c h fo r w h a t I see an d how to steer m y body in th e m id st o f visible
things. C onversely, v isio n is ev id en tly a tta c h ed to m ovem ent: I see w h a t I look
at, a n d I w o u ld n o t see an y th in g w ith o u t m o v in g m y body, w ithout, say, m oving
m y ey es. T he sphere o f m y m o to r p ro jectio n s and the sphere o f visib le things
are d istin c t a n d in co m m u n icab le, a n d y e t th e re is a n essen tial “e n c ro a ch m en t”
(em p ietem en t)1 b e tw e e n th em , so th a t m y m o v em en ts are d irecte d to w ard s the
visib le w o rld as m o v em en ts, w h ile a t th e sam e tim e th e visib le w o rld is a rtic u ­
la te d as v isib le in re la tio n to m y m ovem en ts. T h ese tw o spheres m ak e up “total
p a rts ” , self-su fficien t an d w h o le, w h ich h o w ev e r b e lo n g to the “ sam e B e in g ”
b ecau se o f th e v ery e n c ro a c h m en t.8

5 Ibid, p. 35 / 130, translation slightly modified.

6 Ibid, p. 16 / 124.
7 Ibid., p. 17 / 124. The English translation of Eye and Mind by Johnson and Smith uses “over­
lapping” for empietement, but I prefer “encroachment”, since what matters here is a move­
ment of advancing beyond one’s proper limits and intruding upon the rights of another.
8 Ibid.
154 Miika Luoto

T his e n c ro a c h m en t efficien tly u n settles trad itio n al n o tions o f visio n . W e can

no lo n g e r co n ceiv e o f seein g as p u re c o n te m p latio n a n d so d istin g u ish it from
m o v e m e n t co n c e iv e d as actio n , n o r c a n w e d istin g u ish th e p assiv e recep tio n o f
“sen sib le d a ta ” fro m th e activ e a n d sy n th etic fu n ctio n o f “p e rc e p tio n ” . B ecause
v isio n is essen tially in te rtw in e d w ith m o v em ent, it ca n n o t be u n d e rsto o d as a
fu n c tio n o f th o u g h t, w h ich w o u ld sp read o u t a pictu re o r rep re se n tatio n o f the
w o rld b efo re th e m ind. M o st im portantly, it is now e v id en t th a t th e sensible w o rld
is o n ly p re se n t fo r th e b o d y w h ich , in its a c t o f seeing, is itse lf one o f the visible
th in g s and, in its m o v em en t, o n e o f th e m o v ab le th in g s o f th e w orld. A visible
th in g is, th en , n o t an o b je c t th a t c o n scio u sn ess has tak en in p o ssessio n th ro u g h
th e b o d ily cap acity o f seeing, b u t v isib le p resen ce fo r th e body, w h ich in tu rn
op en s itse lf to th e w orld.
T h e b o d ily o p en in g to th e w o rld is at o nce cen tralizin g a n d decentralizing.
B ecau se th e b o d y is o n e o f th e v isib le a n d m o v ab le th in g s, it is alw ay s a ttac h ed to
th e “tissu e o f th e w o rld ” , b u t b ecau se it sees an d m oves itself, it h o lds the th in g s
aro u n d itself. O n th e o n e h and, th e v isib le w o rld is g ath ered aro u n d th e body,
b u t on th e o th e r h a n d , th e b o d y is scattered into the things; th ese th in g s are its
“ an n ex or p ro lo n g a tio n ” , th ey are “ in c ru ste d in its flesh, th ey are p a rt o f its full
d efin itio n ” .9 F o r this re a so n M e rle a u -P o n ty can say th at “the w o rld is m ade o f the
v ery stu ff o f th e b o d y ” , nam ely , the flesh o f the visible.
A s w e can see, th e n o tio n o f b o d y n o lo n g e r signifies b o d ily co n scio u sn ess,
as w as still th e case in P h e n o m e n o lo g y o f P e rc ep tio n . T h e b o d y at issue in E ye
a n d M in d is n o t th e “m e d ia to r o f a w o rld ” fo r co n scio u sn ess, b u t th e site in w hich
th e w o rld tak es p lace in th e c h ia sm o f th e seer a n d the seen:

The enigma derives from the fact that my body simultaneously sees and is seen. That
which looks at all things can also look at itself and recognize, in what it sees, the
“other side” of its power of looking. It sees itself seeing; it touches itself touching; it
is visible and sensitive for itself.10

In his last w ritings, M erleau -P o n ty attem pted to account for the occurrence o f v i­
sion in o u r bodies by considering th e body as the site o f the crossing betw een the
seer an d th e seen or, m ore generally, b etw een the sensing and the sensed. T he w ord
“ch iasm ” (le ch ia sm e) w h ich in The Visible a n d the Invisible nam es the crossing,
does not o ccu r in E ye a n d M in d , b u t “in tertw ining” (entrelacs) and “reversibility”
(reversibilite) refer to the sam e issue.

9 Ibid., p. 19 / 125.
10 Ibid., p. 18 / 124.
Being, Vision, Image 155

In th e fam o u s c h a p te r “In te rtw in in g - C h iasm ” o f The Visible a n d the In v is­

ible, M e rle a u -P o n ty tak es the p h e n o m e n o n o f to u ch as his starting p o in t.11 It had
fo rm e rly b een an a ly se d b y H u sserl in his Id e a s I I in th e co n te x t o f his in v e stig a ­
tio n s co n cern in g th e co n stitu tio n o f o n e ’s o w n b o d y .12 M erlea u -P o n ty rad icalises
the resu lts o f H u sse rl’s in v estig atio n s an d ex tends th e m to the w h o le field o f the
sen sib le. W h en m y rig h t h a n d to u ch es m y le ft h a n d , I p erceiv e m y le ft h a n d as
an o b je c t w ith p a rtic u la r sen sib le p ro p erties and, at the sam e tim e, I also sense
m y le ft h a n d b ein g to u c h e d by m y rig h t hand. A t its o w n surface, then, m y body
senses th a t it is sen sin g (“ su b je c t”) p re c ise ly as sen sed (“ o b je c t”). T his does n o t
m ean th a t a c e rta in p art o f m y body is e n d o w ed w ith co n scio u sn ess, b u t th e fact
th a t m y b o d y is essen tia lly b o th to u c h in g a n d tangible. A s R e n au d B arb aras e x ­
p licates, sen sin g is th e in c a rn a tio n o f th e sense, th e fa ct th a t the sense becom es
w o rld .13 To p u t it co ncretely, I c a n to u c h so m eth in g o n ly in so far as I am m y self
tan g ib le, o r in o th e r w o rd s, p art o f th e sen sib le w o rld to w h ich I am o p en ed by the
sense.
A cc o rd in g to M erleau -P o n ty , th is is also true o f visio n . To say th at v isio n is
in c a rn a te d m ean s to say th a t th e re is v isio n only fo r a body w h ic h is b o th seeing
an d visible. V isio n in fa c t o ccu rs fro m th e m id st o f the visib le w o rld w h ic h stops
up m y v iew an d w h ich is n o t b e fo re m e as an o b je ct b u t, rath er, su rrounds m e and
surp asses m e .14 A s in th e case o f to u ch , m y b o d y is th e site o f visio n as th e site o f
th e in tertw in in g b etw een seein g a n d th e seen. H ow ever, b ecau se m y gaze im m e ­
d iately re ach es its d ista n t o b ject, I in e v ita b ly ten d to fo rg et the in carn ate n atu re o f
m y vision. B ecau se o f th is seem in g tra n sp aren cy o f v isio n to itse lf it has served,
in th e tra d itio n o f W estern th o u g h t, as the p rim a ry m e tap h o r o f k n o w led g e . T he
an aly sis o f to u ch , h ow ever, w h ic h h ere p lay s th e role o f the p h en o m en o lo g ical
red u ctio n , in terru p ts su ch n o tio n s o f v isio n th a t con ceiv e o f it as a m ode o f in tu i­
tio n a n d as in tellectu al possessio n . L ik e to u ch , v isio n is essen tially d eterm in ed by
th e cro ssin g o f th e sen sin g a n d th e sensed.

11 Merleau-Ponty, Le Visible et l’invisible, Paris: Gallimard (Coll. tel). 2007, p. 170-201 IThe
Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Evanston: Northwestern U.P., 1968, p. ISO-
155.
12 Edmund Husserl, Ideen zur einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen
Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phanomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution. Ed.
Marly Biemel. Husserliana 4, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952, § 36-37.
13 “Sensibility, in this case touch, is achieved as body, as tangible hand, and the dimension of
incarnation is simply the other name for this exteriority from oneself proper to sensing. But
accordingly, the body is never grasped as pure exteriority, because the self-absence of sensing
constitutes its own mode of immanence”. Renauld Barbaras, The Being of the Phenomenon.
Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, trans. Ted Toadvine and Leonard Lawlor, Bloomington: Indiana
U.P.,2004,p. 155.
14 Ibid., p. 156f.
156 Miika Luoto

S eein g a n d th e seen are in sep arab le a n d yet, since I do n o t m erge w ith w h a t I

see, th e y are n e v e r identical. T h e d ifferen ce b e tw ee n th em is a n in ternal d istance
in m y b o d y (like th e d ifferen ce b e tw e e n th e to u c h in g rig h t h a n d an d the to u ch e d
le ft h an d ); it o p en s a sp ace o f b o d ily reflection in w h ich the b o d y tru ly senses
itself. M e rle a u -P o n ty says in E ye a n d M ind: “It is a self, n o t by transparency, like
th o u g h t, [...] b u t a s e lf b y c o n fu sio n , n arcissism , in h eren ce o f the see-er in the
seen, th e to u c h e r in th e to u ch ed , th e feeler in the fe lt - a self, th en , th a t is cau g h t
up in th in g s.” 15
W h a t d oes it m ean th a t th e b o d ily s e lf is d e term in ed by co n fu sio n and n arc is­
sism ? W h ile I see so m eth in g I am p a rt o f th e spectacle m yself, so th a t m y b o d y is
ex p o se d to a gaze fro m th e outside. B ecau se I do n o t see m y se lf in th e w ay others
ca n see m e but, in stead , su ffer m y o w n visibility, the activ ity o f seeing is m ark ed
by passivity. M y seein g b o d y is m y o w n b u t in su ch a w ay th a t I rem ain a stranger
to m y se lf in th is body. A cco rd in g to The V isible a n d the In v isib le , to see m eans
“to be sed u ced , cap tiv ated , a lie n a te d by th e p hantom , so th a t the seer a n d the
visib le recip ro cate o n e an o th e r an d w e n o lo n g e r know w h ich sees a n d w h ich is
seen .” 16 T h e b asic p h e n o m e n o n o f se e in g m y s e lf se ein g th a t stru ctu res all v isio n is
n o t co n scio u sn ess o f m y s e lf as an object; in stead , it is an e ssen tial m ode o f “b ein g
to ...” (etre a), in w h ic h I o p e n to m y se lf as th e one I am to be. H ow ever, th e fact
th a t I o p e n to m y se lf does n o t m e a n th a t I re ac h m y se lf but, q u ite th e contrary,
th a t I escap e m yself. T h e se lf a t issu e is n o t a n identity, b u t a se lf by d ivergence
(b etw een th e seer an d th e seen in m y body). T h erefo re, the se lf to w h ic h I am
o p e n e d in m y v isio n , in seein g m y se lf seeing, alw ays rem ains laten t a n d is only
d isc lo se d as c o n c e a lin g .17
H en ce, I am m y s e lf o n ly in so fa r as th is se lf is g o v e rn e d b y th e p o w e r o f
g e n e ra l v isib ility , so th a t I a m d e te rm in e d b y c e rta in anonym ity. B e in g a body,
I a m m y s e lf o n ly as p a rt o f th e “ flesh o f th e w o rld ” . T h e re fo re , m y b o d y is the
site in w h ic h I a m o p e n e d to th e w o rld w ith o u t m y se lf b e in g th e o rig in o f th a t
op en in g .

Painting and image

V isio n , fo r M erleau -P o n ty , is n o t a cap acity o f the su b ject, b u t the open in g o f the

b o d y to th e w o rld th a t is g o v ern ed b y th e p o w er o f visibility. H ow to th in k ab o u t
th is p o w er? It is at th is p o in t th a t the p h ilo so p h e r turns to w a rd painting:

15 L ’E il et l’esprit, p. 18-19 / Eye and Mind, p. 124.

16 Le Visible et l’invisible, p. 181 / The Visible and the Invisible, p. 139.
17 Ibid., p. 297 / 249.
Being, Vision, Image 157

Once this strange system of exchanges [between sensing and the sensed; M.L.] is
given, we find before us all the problems of painting. These problems illustrate the
enigma of the body, which enigma in turn legitimates them. Since things and my
body are made of the same stuff, vision must somehow come about in them; or yet
again, their manifest visibility must be repeated in the body by a secret visibility.
[...] Quality, light, color, depth, which are there before us, are there only because
they awaken an echo in our bodies and because the body welcomes them.18

W e m u st n o t co n fu se the o n to lo g ical relatio n s at issue here w ith any c au sal re la ­

tions o r in teractio n . W h a t m atters is B ein g , th o u g h t on the b asis o f the v isib ility
o f th e w o rld fo r th e seein g body.
B ecause the capacity to see is n o t b ased o n the act o f the subject, the fact that
I see som ething does n o t prim arily m ean th at I reach an object w ith m y eyes but,
rather, th at som ething com es to be seen w h en m y gaze takes p art in the becom ing-
visible o f th e thing. T h e visual presence o f the th in g issues from the ontological
m o v em en t in w hich the intrinsic visibility o f things is crystallized for the body,
w hich in tu rn articulates the po w er o f visibility through its ow n em placem ent and
directedness in the m id st o f the visible. T h e articulation o f visibility is the w elco m ­
ing, b y the body, o f a p o w er th at encloses an d surpasses the body; it is the “rep eti­
tio n ” an d “ech o ” o f th e “m an ifest” visibility o f things in the “secret” visibility o f
the b o d y th at concerns n o t a visible o b ject b u t its very visibility.
In th e v isib le p resen ce o f th e w o rld , th e carnal d y n am ism o f v isio n is h id ­
den . A cc o rd in g to M erleau -P o n ty , h o w ev er, p a in tin g b reak s the self-ev id en ce o f
visual p resen ce an d w o rk s o n th e e v e n t o f v isib ility itself: “it is th e p a in ter to
w h o m the th in g s o f the w o rld g ive b irth b y a so rt o f co n c en tratio n o r co m in g -to -
itse lf o f th e v isib le ” .19 T h e p a in te r’s w ay o f stu d y in g a v isu al ev en t - fo r instance
the ev e n t o f c o lo u r o r depth, as in C ezan n e - is b ased o n th e fac t th a t visib ility is
double: it tak es p lace in th e m in im al d ifferen ce b e tw ee n “e v id e n t” an d “sec re t”
visibility, in o th er w o rd s, b etw een th e v isib le presen ce o f th e th in g an d its “in ter­
nal co rre sp o n d e n c e ” in th e body.
It is w o rth no tin g th a t, fo r M erleau -P o n ty , the q u estio n o f im ag e is situ ated
here:

Things have an internal equivalent in me; they arouse in me a carnal formula [sche­
ma] of their presence. Why shouldn’t these correspondences in turn give rise to some
tracing rendered visible again, in which the eyes of the others could find an underly­
ing motif to sustain their inspection of the world? Thus there appears a “visible” to
the second power, a carnal essence or icon of the first.20

18 L ’E il et l ’esprit, p. 21-22 / Eye and Mind, p. 125.

19 Ibid, p. 69 / 141.
20 Ibid, p. 22 / 126.
158 Miika Luoto

A n im ag e is alw ay s “an o th e r v isib le ” , b u t th e d o u b lin g p ro p er to it m u st n o t be

re d u c e d to th e stru ctu re o f rep resen tatio n : o rig in al a n d copy. In stead , it is to be
th o u g h t o n th e b asis o f th e re p e titio n o f th e m a n ife st v isib ility by th e secret v isi­
bility. T h e id ea o f c o rresp o n d en ce m u st be ta k en literally here: w h at m atters is not
th e sim ilarity b e tw e e n the th in g an d its re p resen ta tio n , b u t a c o -resp o n d in g b e ­
tw een the th in g ’s v isib le p re se n c e an d m y b o d ily articu latio n o f th at visibility. A n
im ag e, as it is b a se d o n this co -re sp o n d in g , is n o t a d o u b lin g o f the visib le w o rld ,
b u t a v isib le d o u b lin g o f th e in v isib le d o u b lin g intrin sic to vision. T herefo re, an
im ag e is an e x p o sitio n o f v isib ility itse lf, “ a ‘v isib le ’ to the seco n d p o w e r” .
R eferrin g to the ag e-o ld cav e p ain tin g s o f L ascau x th a t still shine on the sur­
face o f ch alice w a lls, M e rle a u -P o n ty d escrib es the p e cu lia r m ode o f the v isib ility
o f im ag es as follow s:

I would be hard pressed to say where the painting is I am looking at. For I do not look
at it as one looks at a thing, fixing it in its place. My gaze wanders within it as in the
halos of Being. Rather than seeing it, I see according to, or with it.21

H en ce, w e m u st d istin g u ish b e tw e e n “seein g so m eth in g ” , nam ely, a th in g , and

“seein g acco rd in g to o r w ith so m e th in g ” , nam ely, th e im age. S eein g “acco rd in g
to ” is co n stitu tiv e o f th e im ag e as im age.
W ith re sp e c t to the to p ic , E lian e E sco u b as speaks o f the “im ag e sp ac e” in
o rd e r to em p h asize th a t a n im ag e esse n tia lly opens a space o f seein g .22 T h e im age
sp ace is n o t a sp ace o f re p re se n ta tio n o r rep ro d u ctio n , fo r an im ag e does n o t offer
us a d o u b le o f reality. In stead , a n im ag e o ffers us a space o f visible ap p earin g as
it defines a p a rtic u la r p la c e o f seein g . In this w ay it calls u s, in its p a rticu la r w ay,
to ex ercise o u r c ap acity to see. T h is ex ercise, how ever, p ertains n o t to a visible
th in g but, rather, to th e v isib ility itse lf o f a n y th in g - to th e v isib ility that, a cc o rd ­
in g to M erleau -P o n ty , o p en s o u r access to the B ein g o f w h at is. W h at beco m es
visib le in th e im ag e is in fa c t so m eth in g invisible: th e visib ility o f th in g s, others
an d m yself. In p h e n o m en o lo g ical term s th is ca n be c a lle d “w o rld ” . In one his
p o sth u m o u s n o te s, M e rle a u -P o n ty in fa c t w rites: “the p a in tin g is a ‘w o rld ’ b y o p ­
p o sitio n to the u n iq u e an d ‘re a l’ w o rld ” , an d alth o u g h the w o rld o f the p a in tin g is
“c lo se d ” , it is “ stran g ely [ ...] rep resen tativ e fo r all th e re st” .23

21 Ibid., p. 23 / 126.
22 Eliane Escoubas, “Beitrage zur Phanomenologie der Kunst”, in Phenomenologie frangaise et
phenomenologie allemande / Deutsche und franzosische Phanomenologie, ed. Eliane Escou­
bas and Bernhard Waldenfels, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2000, p. 490.
23 Le Visible et l’invisible, p. 272-273 / The Visible and the Invisible, p. 223.
Being, Vision, Image 159

In o rd er to sp ecify M e rle a u -P o n ty ’s n o tio n o f im ag e, I w an t to co m p are it

briefly w ith H u sse rl’s. M e rle a u -P o n ty ’s reflections take u p and rad ica liz e som e
im p o rta n t in sig h ts o f H u sse rl’s p h en o m e n o lo g ical th eo ry o f im age co n sc io u s­
ness. F o r H u sserl, th e im ag in ality o f th e im ag e lies in th e fac t th a t I ap p reh e n d a
th in g a s an im ag e, th a t is, as an o b je c t th a t d ep icts p ic to ria lly so m eth in g , so th a t I
see so m eth in g , n am ely w h a t is d ep icted , as re p re sen te d in the picture. C o n ceiv ed
in su ch a w ay, th e im ag in ality o f th e im ag e d oes n o t issue fro m th e d o u b lin g o f
extern al reality but, rather, fro m th e in tern al d o u b lin g o f th e im age itse lf into
w h a t is d ep ictin g an d w h a t is d ep icted . H en ce, as W aldenfels em p h asizes, an
im ag e rem ain s in a strict sen se invisible: I d o n o t see an im ag e but, instead, I see
so m eth in g th a t is d ep ic te d in so m eth in g th a t depicts. T h e in v isib le im age itse lf
is n o th in g b u t th e space o f ap p earin g , co n stitu te d by the differen ce b e tw e en the
w h a t o f ap p earin g an d th e in w h ich o f ap p e a rin g .24
F o r H usserl, th e im age itself does n o t b elong to the order o f visible things, but
to a m ode o f visible appearing according to w hich som ething is seen. T his is also
em ph asized b y M erleau-P onty, w ho on the other h a n d can n o t b u t find H u sse rl’s
theory o f im age co n sciousness lim ited in oth er respects. A ccording to W aldenfels,
H u sserl’s theory is lim ited , fro m M erleau -P o n ty ’s p o in t o f view , by three decisive
presuppositions:25 F irst, an im age is for H usserl essentially an object o f a specific
im age consciousness, and the im age consciousness is in turn a m odification o f the
original percep tu al co nsciousness. H u sse rl’s theory therefore presupposes our ac­
cess to a reality th a t precedes im ages or is n o t dependent o n them . C onsequently,
w hat com es to show itself in an im age is as such nothing im aginal. T herefore, an
im age is self-evidently a m eans o f representation, an A bbild. Second, for H usserl
the im ag in ality o f the im age is n o t g iv en as such, since it is n o t an intrinsic pro p ­
erty o f the o bject, a “real p red icate” , like its fo rm or colour. Instead, im aginality is
dep endent o n the specific im age co nsciousness. H ence, im ages are im age-objects
for an im age-constituting subject. A n d third, the invisibility o f the im age is not
constitutive o f it but, rather, only a prelim inary appearance: a phenom enological
reflection on the elem ents o f im age consciousness is in fact able to turn those ele­
m ents into them atic objects o f theoretical vision.
B y saying th at m y gaze does n o t fix the im age in its place b u t “w anders w ithin
it as in the halos o f B ein g ” , M erleau -P o n ty m akes it clear that w h at m atters to him
is n o t th e im age consciousness th at allow s m e to reach, th ro u g h the im age, w h at is
rep resented in it, b u t an u n m asterable m o v em ent w h ich opens, w ithin the intrinsic

24 Waldenfels, Sinne undKunste im Wechselspiel, p. 134.

25 Ibid, p. 135-136.
160 Miika Luoto

forces o f th e im age space, to th e B ein g o f th e visible w orld. Instead o f being fo u n d ­

ed in p erceptual consciousness and, consequently, itself unable to found perception,
th e im age is th e p lace in w h ich th e p o w er o f visibility is articulated so as to found a
new m ode o f vision.
A lthough he develops im p o rtan t insights o f H u sse rl’s theory, M erleau-P onty
in fact m oves th e p roblem atic o f im ages from the sphere o f consciousness to the
ev en t o f visibility. H is reflections address the p ow er o f im ages as one issuing from
th eir w ay o f anim ating th e ch iasm o f vision: seer/seen. T he ontological structure
o f th e im age is analogous to th a t o f th e body, as it opens the space o f visibility by
being p art o f th e visible itself. T h e im age is situated inside the w o rld o f things only
to allow th e gaze a passage outside th a t w o rld or, w h at am ounts to the sam e, the im ­
age borrow s its visibility fro m th e outside surface o f things, from th eir “m an ifest”
visibility, only to allow access to th e “secret” , internal life o f visibility. A n im age is
“th e inside o f th e outside an d th e outside o f th e inside, w hich the duplicity o f sens­
ing [du sentir] m akes p ossible” .26 In stead o f being a representation, an im age is the
lim it b etw een th e inside an d outside o f the visible, o r the site o f differentiation, in
w h ich a p articular visible opens into its o w n visibility, w hile this visibility in tu rn
leaves its traces in the form er.
It is o n the basis o f such an u n d erstan d ing o f im age th at M erleau-P onty can
speak o f the autofigurative nature o f a p ainting. B eing a “ spectacle o f n o thing”
b efo re b ein g a spectacle o f so m ething, a pain ting - w hether figurative or non-figu-
rativ e - is alw ays “ autofigurative”27 first. T his is to say that a painting is, for M er-
leau-Ponty, the exam ple o f its ow n figuration, a visible “em b lem ” o f its becom ing-
visible, an d o n ly o n th e basis o f this does it have the capacity to reach som ething in
th e w orld.
To fin ish o u r re fle c tio n s o n M e r le a u - P o n ty ’s n o tio n o f im a g e , le t u s n o te
th a t h e n e v e r o ffe rs a g e n e ra l th e o ry o f im a g e s; in s te a d , h e sp e a k s in e a c h ca se
o f a p a rtic u la r k in d o f im a g e s. In E y e a n d M in d , h e c o n s id e rs p a in tin g s in p a r­
tic u la r a n d , to g e th e r w ith th e m , d ra w in g s , s c u lp tu re s a n d e tc h in g s , b u t a lso
b rie fly p h o to g ra p h s a n d film s. In a d d itio n , h e a lso c o n sid e rs im a g e s th a t are
n o t c o u n te d a m o n g th e m e a n s o f e x p re s s io n o r re p re s e n ta tio n , su c h as m irro rs
a n d th e im a g in a ry . W h a t w e h a v e is a b a fflin g m a n ifo ld o f im a g e s w ith o u t a
c le a r-c u t d e lim ita tio n o f th e p ro p e r sp h e re o f th e im a g e as su ch . H o w e v e r,
th is is e s s e n tia l fo r th a t w h ic h M e rle a u -P o n ty a tte m p ts to th in k h e re . A t one
e x tre m e , th e re is th e te c h n ic a l m e a n s, th e m irro r, a n d a t th e o th er, th e c a p a c ity
o f th e m in d , im a g in a tio n . W h a t k e e p s th e e x tre m e s to g e th e r is th e b o d y as th e
v e ry site o f v is ib le p re s e n c e : a ll te c h n iq u e s , M e rle a u -P o n ty sa y s, are te c h ­

26 L ’E il et l’esprit, p. 23 / Eye and Mind, p. 126, translation slightly modified.

27 Ibid., p. 69 / 141.
Being, Vision, Image 161

n iq u e s o f th e b o d y 28, a n d a ll a c tiv itie s o f th e m in d a re in c a rn a te d a c tiv itie s.

In s te a d o f b e in g a s ig n o f re c k le s s m e th o d o lo g y , th e se e m in g lim itle s s n e s s o f
th e sp h e re o f im a g e s p o in ts to th e fa c t th a t th e re is no im a g e as su c h ; in s te a d ,
th e re a re n u m e ro u s k in d s o f im a g e s w h ic h to g e th e r m a k e up th e h e te ro g e n e ­
ou s m e d iu m o f v isio n . A s th is m e d iu m a llo w s us to e x is t in im a g e s a n d so tak e
p a rt in th e c a rn a l a rtic u la tio n o f th e v is ib le w o rld , it o ffe rs us a ll th o se w ay s
o f se e in g th a t a re irre d u c ib le e ith e r to th e se e r o r th e seen. T h e re b y im a g e s
o p e n a fie ld fo r a ll th e in v e n tio n s (b o d ily , te c h n ic a l, h a b itu a l e tc .) th a t m ak e
u p a c u ltu re .29
F ro m th is p o in t o f v iew , th e e x p e rim e n ts o f v isu a l a rts a re e x e rc is e s th a t
p e rta in n o t to th e c o n d itio n s o f re p re s e n ta tio n , b u t to th e c o n d itio n s o f v is ib il­
ity, a lw a y s w ith r e s p e c t to e a c h c u ltu ra l m o d e o f e x is te n c e .30 T h e re fo re , v isu a l
a rts a re fo r M e rle a u -P o n ty m o re b a s ic a lly an issu e o f p h ilo s o p h ic a l th o u g h t
th a n , say , a rt h is to ry . H o w e v e r, p a in tin g h a s a p h ilo s o p h ic a l sig n ific a n c e n o t
b e c a u s e p h ilo s o p h ic a l th o u g h t c o u ld s o m e h o w m a s te r its m e a n in g b u t, q u ite
th e c o n tra ry , b e c a u s e p a in tin g in te rru p ts its c o n s titu tiv e d re a m o f m a ste rin g
th e v is ib le w o rld .

The challenge of painting

In E y e a n d M in d , th e p h ilo so p h ic a l sig n ifican ce o f p a in tin g lies in the fa c t th at it

has th e p o w er to u n settle so m e o f th e m o st basic co n cep tu al op p o sitio n s o f c lassi­
cal ra tio n a lity a n d to m ak e th e re -in te rp reta tio n o f th ese co n cep ts p o ssib le in the
ele m e n t o f th e sen sib le w orld. In w h a t w ay a n d th ro u g h w h ich co ncepts d o es B e ­
ing co m e to b e th o u g h t th ro u g h p ain tin g ? In o rd er to prep are a ten tativ e an sw er to
the q u e stio n , I w a n t to stu d y h o w “ carn al e sse n c e s” , “efficien t re se m b la n c es” and
“m u te m e a n in g s” o ffered to u s b y p a in tin g su stain a re -in te rp retatio n o f the three
co n cep tu al o p p o sitio n s M e rle a u -P o n ty b rin g s out: esse n ce /e x isten ce, im ag in ary /
real, a n d v isib le/in v isib le.

1. W h a t is c alled “ carn al e sse n c e ” u n settles the trad itio n a l o p p o sitio n b etw een
essen ce a n d ex isten ce (or b etw een m e an in g an d fact, o r p o ssib ility a n d actuality).
A t th e sam e tim e, it b rin g s u p th e q u e stio n o f carnal ideality, th a t is, o f ideality
th a t w o u ld n o t be th e o p p o site o f th e sen sib le o r sep arab le fro m it.

28 Ibid, p. 33 / 129.
29 Waldenfels, Sinne und Kunste im Wechselspiel, p. 158.
30 Escoubas, “Beitrage zur Phanomenologie der Kunst”, p. 490f.
162 Miika Luoto

In T h e V isib le a n d th e I n v is ib le , M e r le a u -P o n ty e la b o ra te s in a g e n e ra l
w a y th e n o tio n o f c a rn a l e s s e n c e (o r “a c tiv e ” o r “w ild e s s e n c e ”) as a n ew
w a y to th in k th e g e n e ra lity o f th e s e n s ib le th in g . T h is re q u ire s th e c o n c e p t
o f e s s e n c e to b e d e ta c h e d fro m its o p p o s itio n to th e c o n c e p t o f e x is te n c e ; it
is th e o p p o s itio n , h e a rg u e s , th a t le a d s u s to c o n c e iv e o f th e m as tw o p o s i­
tiv e th in g s : o n e o f th e m th e u n iv e r s a l m e a n in g in th o u g h t, a n d th e o th e r th e
in d iv id u a l fa c t in tim e a n d s p a c e . W ith r e s p e c t to o u r e x p e rie n c e , th is is b u t
a n a b s tr a c tio n , as w e n e v e r e n c o u n te r a p u re in d iv id u a l fa c t o r a p u re tim e ­
le s s a n d s p a c e le s s e s s e n c e .31 T o s p e a k o f c a rn a l e s s e n c e , o n th e o th e r h a n d ,
m e a n s to th in k a b o u t th e s e n s ib le “ f a c t” as a lre a d y o rg a n iz e d b y a n “ e s ­
s e n tia l” s tru c tu re , b u t in s u c h a w a y th a t th is s tru c tu re is in tu rn o n ly m e a n ­
in g f u l i f it r e m a in s a tta c h e d to th e s e n s ib le e le m e n t. W h a t is to b e th o u g h t,
th e n , is th e w a y in w h ic h “ th e a lle g e d f a c ts , th e s p a tio -te m p o ra l in d iv id u ­
a ls , a re fro m th e f ir s t m o u n te d o n th e a x e s, th e p iv o ts , th e d im e n s io n s , th e
g e n e ra lity o f m y b o d y , a n d th e id e a s a re th e re fo re a lre a d y e n c ru s te d in its
j o i n t s .”32
M e r le a u - P o n ty a lso s ta te s th a t th e lite ra ry w o rk o f M a rc e l P ro u s t g o e s
v e ry fa r in in v e s tig a tin g “id e a s ” th a t a re n o t re a c h a b le w ith o u t s e n s ib ility
a n d th e b o d y . In th e w o rk o f P ro u s t, th e id e a lity o f a m e lo d y (th e fa m o u s
“little p h r a s e ” ), o f lig h t, o f p h y s ic a l v o lu p tu o u s n e s s o r o f r e lie f a re su c h
th a t “th e y c o u ld n o t b e g iv e n to u s as id e a s e x c e p t in a c a rn a l e x p e rie n c e .
It is n o t o n ly th a t w e w o u ld f in d in th a t c a rn a l e x p e r ie n c e th e o c c a s io n to
th in k th e m ; it is th a t th e y o w e th e ir a u th o rity , th e ir f a s c in a tin g , in d e s tr u c t­
ib le p o w e r, p r e c is e ly to th e fa c t th a t th e y a re in tr a n s p a re n c y b e h in d th e s e n ­
sib le , o r in its h e a r t.” 33 L ik e th e s e id e a s in h a b itin g s e n s ib le c o n f ig u ra tio n s ,
c a rn a l e s s e n c e s a re n o t s im p ly s e n s ib le ; r a th e r , th e y m a k e u p th e “ d e p th ” o f
th e s e n s ib le , its p o s s ib ility a n d a rtic u la tio n .
In E y e a n d M in d , M e r le a u - P o n ty a p p ro a c h e s th e n a tu re o f c a rn a l e s ­
se n c e b y d e s c r ib in g th e v is u a l p re s e n c e o f w a te r in a p o o l. I t is th e a q u e o u s
e le m e n t its e lf, h e a rg u e s , w h ic h a llo w s us to se e , th ro u g h d is to rtio n s a n d
rip p le s o f s u n lig h t, th e g e o m e try o f th e tile d b o tto m o f th e p o o l; m o re o v e r,
th e v is u a l p re s e n c e o f w a te r e x te n d s o u ts id e th e p o o l, fo r in s ta n c e to th e
n e a r c y p re s s e s , in to w h ic h th is e le m e n t s e n d s its “a c tiv e a n d liv in g e s s e n c e ”
in th e fo rm o f a w e b o f r e f le c tio n s .34 I n s te a d o f b e in g s itu a te d in sp a c e , th e
v is u a l th in g is th e re as a s y s te m o f o p p o s itio n a l re la tio n s h ip s , as a n o r g a n i­

31 Le Visible et l’invisible, p. 154 / The Visible and the Invisible, p. 115.

32 Ibid., p. 151-152 / 114.
33 Ib id .,p .l9 4 / 150.
34 L ’E il et l’esprit, p. 71 / Eye and Mind, p. 142.
Being, Vision, Image 163

z a tio n o f a s p a c e o f p la n e s a n d fie ld s a b o u t its e lf. B e c a u s e it is n o t tr a n s p a r ­

e n t b u t e s s e n tia lly “t h ic k ” (e v e n c le a r w a te r is n o t w h o lly tr a n s p a r e n t b e ­
c a u s e o f th e d is to r tio n s , rip p le s a n d re f le c tio n s ), th e v is ib le th in g o c c u p ie s
o u r v is io n a n d c a lls u s to a n “a u s c u lta tio n o r p a lp a tio n in d e p th ” .35
T h e c a rn a l o r a c tiv e e ss e n c e o f a th in g is n o t w h a t w e see; lik e th e im ­
ag e , it is th a t a c c o rd in g to w h ic h w e se e . “ P e rc e p tio n is n o t first p e rc e p tio n
o f th in g s, b u t p e rc e p tio n o f e le m e n ts [...] o f ra y s o f th e w o rld , th in g s w h ic h
are d im e n s io n s , w h ic h a re w o r ld s .”36 T h e v isu a l p re se n c e o f e v e ry re a lity is
d e te rm in e d b y so m e th in g lik e an e s s e n c e a n d , th e re fo re , b y se n se ; h o w e v e r,
to p e rc e iv e m e a n s n e ith e r to a p p re h e n d a m e a n in g , n o r to re c e iv e a c o n te n t,
b u t to o p e n u p a d im e n s io n a c c o rd in g to w h ic h th in g s m a y sh o w th e m se lv e s.
A s a d im e n s io n a l b e in g , as a b e in g o f d e p th , th e v isib le th in g is n o t p re se n t
in a sim p le h e re -a n d -n o w ; fa r fro m b e in g a p o s itiv ity , th e v isu a l th in g is th e re
a c c o rd in g to laten cy .
C a rn a l essen ce is, finally, sy n o n y m o u s w ith “d im e n sio n ” . A d im en sio n is,
fo r M erleau -P o n ty , th a t acco rd in g to w h ich a re ality is giv en to m y body, th at
w h ic h allo w s a series o f co n ten ts to be g ath ered together. T herefo re, it d esignates
a m o d e o f u n ity w ith o u t sy n th esis an d a p rin cip le o f co h esio n w ith o u t concept.
W h a t a p a in tin g , u n d e rsto o d as carn al e ssen ce, m ak es visib le is the fac t th at in the
o rd e r o f visibility, ev ery sen sib le th in g is a lread y p re sen t as a dim ension: a p o in t
as a pivot, a lin e as a vector, a c o lo u r as a level, a plan e as a ho rizo n .37 In th e m idst
o f th e visib le, p ain tin g s ex p o se o u r gaze to its depth.

2. W h a t M e rle a u -P o n ty calls “efficien t re se m b la n c e ” o r “ efficient sim ila rity ” d is­

m an tles th e o p p o sitio n b e tw e e n th e im ag in ary an d th e real, an d calls us to po n d er
on the im ag in ality or fig u rality at w o rk in th e h e a rt o f B eing.

[...] the same thing is both out there in the world and here at the heart of vision - the
same or, if you will, a similar [semblable] thing, but according to an efficient simi­
larity [similitude efficace ], which is the kinship, the genesis, the metamorphosis of
being in his [the painter’s; M.L.] vision. It is the mountain itself which from out there
makes itself seen by the painter; it is the mountain he interrogates with his gaze.38

35 Le Visible et l ’invisible, p. 168 / The Visible and the Invisible, p. 128.

36 Ibid, p. 267 / 218.
37 Alphonso Lingis, “Translator’s Preface”, in The Visible and the Invisible, p. l.
38 L’E il et l’esprit, p. 28 / Eye and Mind, p. 128, translation modified. In order to make sense of the
apposition “parente, genese et metamorphose de l’etre”, I readparente as parente (“kinship”). This
interpretation is supported by the use of parente in Le Visible et l’invisible\ see p. 164 (where kinships
are identified with “lateral relations” constitutive of meaning) and 174 (where a kinship is said
to exist between touching and the touched); The Visible and the Invisible, p. 124 and 133. In both
cases, parente refers to the basic structure of the flesh of the visible world which defines Being.
164 Miika Luoto

P a in tin g s o ffe r u s n e ith e r th in g s n o r im ita tio n s , b u t re se m b la n c e s . H ere , re ­

se m b la n c e is n o t an e x te rn a l re la tio n b e tw e e n tw o th in g s , b u t an e ffic ie n t
re la tio n th a t first a llo w s th e c o m in g in to p re s e n c e o f so m e th in g . W h a t w e see
in th e c o m in g in to p re s e n c e o f th e th in g is, in fa c t, n o t th e th in g “its e lf ” , b u t
its sa m e n e s s in its d iffe re n c e . It is a n o th e r sa m e n e ss th a n th a t o f la n g u a g e o r
th e c o n c e p t: as a n im a g in a l s a m e n e ss in h a b ite d by d issim ila rity , re se m b la n c e
ca lls u s n o t to id e n tific a tio n o r sig n ific a tio n , b u t to v isu a l in te rro g a tio n . In
p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l te rm s , e ffic ie n t re s e m b la n c e m e a n s th a t th e th in g ’s a p p e a r­
in g “a s s o m e th in g ” ta k e s p la c e o rig in a lly a c c o rd in g to th e m o d a lity o f “like
so m e th in g ” o r e v e n “a s i f s o m e th in g ” . F a r fro m b e in g a s e c o n d a ry tr a it o f
th e a p p e a ra n c e o f a th in g , e ffic ie n t re s e m b la n c e is an e le m e n ta ry m o d e o f its
s e lf-s h o w in g .
A s th e p reced in g d iscu ssio n o f carn al essen ce m ad e clear, the self-sh o w in g
o f a th in g p resen ts a sense. T h is sense is n o t a po sitiv e m ean in g but, rather, a call
o r so licitatio n . R esem b lan ce m u st n o w b e u n d ersto o d as the im ag in al o r figural
ele m e n t o f such a ca ll th a t su stain s o u r v isu al in terro g atio n o f B ein g . W e m u st
note, h ow ever, th a t B ein g is n o t o n ly w h a t I in terro g ate (or, as in th e q u o ted
passag e, w h a t th e p a in te r in terro g ates), b u t w h a t at once in terro g ates m e. In the
m o v e m e n t o f v isu al in terro g atio n , B ein g m ain tain s itse lf as a so rt o f asto n ish ­
m e n t in th e v ery g estu re w h ic h ap p ro p riates it.39
To co n sid e r v isu al in te rro g a tio n in term s o f resem b lan ce m ean s to co nsider
it acco rd in g to the stru ctu re o f flesh. T h e p h en o m e n o n o f resem b lan ce derives
fro m th e re la tio n b e tw e e n th e w o rld an d m y body: b ecau se m y body is both seer
an d seen, it n o t o n ly sees th in g s w ith o u t h av in g to leav e itself, it also sees th em
b y b earin g an essen tial re sem b lan ce to them . In T he Visible a n d the In v isib le ,
M e rle a u -P o n ty sp eak s o f a “p a c t” b e tw e e n the sen sib le th in g s and m y sen tien t
b o d y “acco rd in g to w h ich I le n d th e m m y b o d y in o rd e r th a t th e y in scrib e u p o n it
an d give m e th eir re se m b la n c e.”40 In th e p a in te r’s b o d ily in terro g atio n o f the a llu ­
sive co m in g -to -p re se n ce o f the v isu al th in g , B ein g itse lf p ro v es to issue fro m the
m o d alities o f resem blance: fro m th e co n tin u o u s “m e tam o rp h o sis” tak in g place
b e tw e e n th e seer a n d seen, fro m th e secret “g e n e sis” o f th e v isib le th in g s a cc o rd ­
in g to the axes o f th e p a in te r’s bo d y , an d fro m the “k in sh ip ” to w h ich the m o ­
m en ts o f th e em erg in g sp ectacle b e a r w itness.
A cco rd in g to M erleau -P o n ty , th is is w h a t the scu lp to r G iaco m etti po in ts to
w h en he says: “W h a t in terests m e in all p a in tin g is re sem b la n ce [ressem blance]
- th a t is, w h a t re sem b lan ce is fo r me: so m eth in g th a t m akes m e u n co v e r the e x ­
te rn a l w o rld a little .”41 O u r access to th e ex tern al w o rld m u st no t be c o n fu se d w ith

39 Barbaras, The Being of the Phenomenon, p. 141.

40 Le Visible et l’invisible, p. 189 / The Visible and the Invisible, p. 146.
41 L ’E il et l’esprit, p. 24 / Eye and Mind, p. 126.
Being, Vision, Image 165

ou r access to th e re a l as o p p o sed to the im ag inary. Q uite the contrary, M erleau -

P o n ty calls u s to th in k th e im ag in ary as the w o rk o f efficien t re sem b lan c e, o f an
orig in al p o w e r o f fig u ratio n in the h e a rt o f B eing. In stea d o f b e in g the p ro d u c t
o f a cap acity o f th e m ind, th e im ag in ary is a carnal p rin cip le stru cturing reality:
in m y body, it is “th e sch em a o f th e life o f re a lity ” , in th e visib le w o rld it is the
“im ag in ary tex tu re o f th e r e a l”.42

3. W h a t is c a lle d “m u te m e a n in g ” d ism an tles the o p p o sitio n b etw ee n the visible

an d th e in v isib le (th at is, trad itio n ally , b e tw e e n th e sen sib le a n d th e ideal). T he
m u te m ean in g s en c o u n te re d in p a in tin g call us to reflect on the p re sen c e o f m e a n ­
ing in the ab sen ce o f signification.
A c c o rd in g to M e rle a u -P o n ty , p a in tin g m a k es the in v isib le v isib le: “ It gives
v isib le e x iste n c e to w h a t p ro fa n e v isio n b e lie v e s to be in v is ib le .”43 O ne w ay to
p u t th is is to say th a t p a in tin g u n v e ils th e v isib le m ea n s by w h ic h so m eth in g
co m e s to p re se n c e b e fo re o u r e y e s. A s M e rle a u -P o n ty e x p la in s, a m o n g th ese
m e a n s are lig h t, lig h tin g , sh a d o w s, re fle c tio n s, c o lo u r e tc ., th a t is, th e v isib le
m e a n s w e m u st n o t see in o rd e r to see th e p re se n t th in g . W e m a y w o n d e r if this
m o d e o f sp e a k in g is still to o fu n c tio n a l; in any case it re m a in s o rie n te d b y a
c e rta in e p o c h in th e h isto ry o f p a in tin g (say, fro m th e R e n a issa n c e to C e z a n n e
an d C u b ism ). W h a t m a tte rs, h o w e v e r, is th a t a p a in tin g h a s the p o w e r to op en
us to a n in v isib le o f th e v isib le. It is n e ith e r a fa ctu a l in v isib le , n o r a n in v isib le
b e y o n d th e v isib le , b u t “th e in v isib le o f th is w o rld , th a t w h ic h in h a b its th is
w o rld , su sta in s it, a n d re n d e rs it v isib le , its o w n a n d in te rio r p o ssib ility , th e B e ­
in g o f th is b e in g .”44
A s an e x p lo ra tio n o f th e in v isib le d e p th o f the v isib le, pain tin g offers us
“m u te m e a n in g s” . I f w e sp eak o f “m e a n in g ” w ith referen ce to the p ain tin g itse lf
(an d n o t w ith re fe re n ce to w h a t it “re p re se n ts”), th en w e m u st say, fro m M erleau -
P o n ty ’s p o in t o f view , th a t th ere is so m eth in g like m ean in g in a p ain tin g o n ly in
the w ay it articu lates th e p o w er o f v isib ility an d allow s us to ex ercise o u r capacity
to see. F u rth erm o re, su c h m e an in g o r sen se p resen ts itse lf only in its w ithdraw al
fro m th e sph ere o f lin g u istic sig n ificatio n s to the visib ility o f the p ain tin g ; so it is
“m u te ” . H en ce, th e “m u te m e a n in g ” o f p a in tin g refers to a sense th a t is n e v er an
av ailab le significance b u t, rath er, th e v ery d ep th o f m ean in g or, as M erleau -P o n ty
o fte n says, th e “p re g n a n c y ” o f th e v isib le.45

42 Ibid.
43 Ibid, p. 27 / 127.
44 Le Visible et l ’invisible, p. 196 / The Visible and the Invisible, p. 151.
45 On “pregnancy” as productivity, see the working note from September, 1959, ibid. p. 256 /
208-209.
166 Miika Luoto

The thing is there

A t th e cen tre o f E y e a n d M in d w e find the q u e stio n o f the sp atiality o f B eing.

M e rle a u -P o n ty d ev elo p s th e to p ic b y co n tra stin g the C artesian n o tio n o f space
(sp ace as m a ste re d by th o u g h t) w ith th e space th a t beco m es m an ifest in p ainting
(sp ace as th e B ein g o f th e visu al w orld). H is startin g p o in t is th e ex p erien ce o f
depth.
F o r M erleau -P o n ty , d ep th is a p rim a ry p h en o m en o n o f space. In distin ctio n
to h e ig h t a n d w id th th a t seem to be p ro p erties o f th in g s, dep th is d istan ce b etw een
m y b o d y an d th e thing. D e p th rev eals n o t o n ly th a t th e visual o rg an izatio n o f
th e w o rld is relativ e to m y b o d ily p ersp ectiv e, it also m akes m an ifest th e w ay in
w h ic h th e e x terio rity o f th e w o rld is u n fo ld ed in vision. F o r th o u g h t, th e e x p eri­
en ce o f d ep th is so m eth in g p arad o x ical: “I see o b jects th at h id e each o th e r and
th a t co n seq u en tly I d o n o t see; each one stands b e h in d the other. I see d ep th and
y e t it is n o t visib le, since it is re c k o n e d fro m o u r bo d ies to th in g s an d w e are c o n ­
fin ed to o u r b o d ie s.”46 H ow to co n ceiv e o f th e se parad o x ical relatio n s b etw een
co v e rin g an d u n c o v e rin g , b e tw e e n v isib le and in v isib le?
F o r C artesian th o u g h t th a t M e rle a u -P o n ty ad d resses in his critical discu ssio n
o f D e sc a rte s’ D io p tric s, th e p arad o x o f d e p th is o n ly a seem in g one. F rom an
ap p ro p riate p o sitio n , lo o k in g fro m aside, o n e can see th a t d ep th is o n ly a given
w id th , th a t is, so m eth in g p u rely visible. In th e sam e w ay, th in g s o n ly seem to be
co v e re d b y each other, fo r in tru th th e y are alw ay s o u tsid e each o th e r in th e pure
ex ten sio n o f space; to b e co v e re d b y each o th er does n o t rea lly b elo n g to the
m o d e o f b ein g o f ex ten d ed things. H en ce, th e seem ing p arad o x o f dep th o n ly tells
us o f th e lim ited n ess o f h u m a n visio n , its in ab ility to m aste r th e distan ce b etw een
th e seein g b o d y a n d th e seen thing. H ere, it is re aso n th a t saves us: I am able to e s­
tim ate th e o b je c t’s d istan ce fro m m y b o d y w ith the h elp o f m y e y e ’s co nvergence
o r b y c o m p arin g th e o b je c t’s seem in g size w ith its re al size. F o r a C artesia n , the
ex p erien ce o f d ep th is, in th e la st in stan ce, so m eth in g thought: it issues fro m the
w ay I in te rp re t v isu al d ata b y situ atin g th e m in a to tality o f o b jectiv e relatio n s
th a t acco u n ts fo r them . To m ak e space th in k ab le req u ires, then, a tu rn in g aw ay
fro m th e ex p erien ce o f d ep th to a th o u g h t ad o p tin g th e v iew p o in t o f a universal
sp ectator, a th o u g h t o f “so arin g a b o v e ” (pen see de survol).
T h e p h e n o m e n o n o f d e p th in te rru p ts th is m o d e o f th in k in g a n d its a t­
te m p t a t m astery . T h e e x p e rie n c e o f d e p th re m a in s irre d u c ib le to th e th re e
d im e n s io n s o f th e h o m o g e n e o u s sp a c e , fo r d e p th o n ly a p p e a rs to o n e w h o is
s itu a te d in sp a c e , th a t is, to a body. “I t is, ra th e r, a sp a c e re c k o n e d sta rtin g
fro m m e as th e n u ll p o in t o r d e g re e z e ro o f sp atiality . I d o n o t see it a c c o rd in g
to its e x te rio r e n v e lo p e ; I liv e it fro m th e in sid e ; I a m im m e rs e d in it. A fte r

46 L ’E il et l’esprit, p. 45 / Eye and Mind, p. 133.

Being, Vision, Image 167

all, th e w o rld is a ro u n d m e, n o t in fro n t o f m e .”47 T o say th a t th e b o d y is in

sp a c e is n o t to sa y th a t it is s itu a te d in a p a rtic u la r p o in t o f it b u t, ra th e r, th a t
it ta k e s p a rt in th e o p e n in g o f sp ace. T h e sp a c e e x c e e d s m e, fo r sp a c e m ea n s
p re c is e ly th e fa c t th a t th in g s e s c a p e m e a n d k e e p u p a d ista n c e to m e. S u ch
e sc a p e , h o w e v e r, is n o t th e in fin ite s p re a d in g o u t o f th e C a rte s ia n e x te n sio n
b u t, ra th e r, th e w a y th in g s a re n e a r m e in th e d ista n c e , th a t is, th e w ay th e y
are as sp a tia l.
H en ce, d ep th is th e o p en in g o f spatiality, and as such it can b e c a lled the first
dim en sio n . H ow ever, it is n o t a d im e n sio n in the trad itio n a l sense, fo r it does
n o t m ak e an y m e asu rin g o f spatial relatio n s possible. D e p th in fac t refers to a
w h o lly o th e r k in d o f sp atiality w h ich M e rle a u -P o n ty calls “d im en sio n ality ” (d i­
m e n sio n a lity ): “sp ace does n o t h av e p recisely th ree dim en sio n s [ ...] d im en sio n s
are ta k e n b y d ifferen t system s o f m e a su re m en t fro m a single d im ensionality, a
p o ly m o rp h o u s B e in g , w h ich ju stifies all o f th e m w ith o u t bein g fully ex p ressed
by an y .”48 C h a ra c te rize d b y dep th , B ein g is “p o ly m o rp h o u s” in the sense th a t our
p resen tatio n s n ev er e x h a u st it, alth o u g h th ey are all ex p ressio n s o f it; h e n c e, there
is B ein g o n ly in w ithdraw al.
F o r M e rle a u -P o n ty , th e tru th o f th e C a rte s ia n sp a c e is in th e id e a l c o n ­
s tru c tio n w h ic h le a v e s b e h in d e m p ir ic is m b y s e ttin g sp a c e fre e a n d ra is in g
it as a n e x te n s io n to a b a s ic c h a r a c te r is tic o f B e in g . Its u n tru th , h o w e v e r, is
in th e w a y it e re c ts th e e x te n s io n “in to a p o s itiv e b e in g , b e y o n d a ll p o in ts
o f v ie w , a ll la te n c y a n d d e p th , d e v o id o f a n y re a l th ic k n e s s .”49 T h e re is
s o m e th in g a b o u t s p a c e th a t e v a d e s a ll a tte m p ts to s u rv e y it fro m a b o v e a n d ,
as M e r le a u - P o n ty ’s d is c u s s io n o f D e s c a r te s ’ D io p tr ic s trie s to sh o w , e v e ry
su c h a tte m p t m is s e s th e e s s e n tia l, n a m e ly , th e v e ry d o n a tio n o f th e v is ­
ib le . E v e n th e p e r s p e c tiv e te c h n iq u e s o f th e R e n a is s a n c e , p re s e n te d w ith th e
fa ls e c la im o f c lo s in g th e p a i n t e r ’s in v e s tig a tio n s b y fo u n d in g an in fa llib le
a rt, w e re f ir s t o f a ll a n e n c o u r a g e m e n t to f re e ly e x p e rim e n t w ith d e p th a n d
th e p r e s e n ta tio n o f B e in g . F a r fro m b e in g a b le to o ffe r a n u ltim a te s o lu tio n
to th e p ro b le m o f th e e x p o s itio n o f s p a c e , p e rs p e c tiv e te c h n iq u e s in fa c t
o p e n e d se v e ra l n e w p a th w a y s , so th a t in s te a d o f b e c o m in g a fu n d a m e n ta l
law o f p a in tin g , th e R e n a is s a n c e p e r s p e c tiv e p ro v e d to b e b u t a m o m e n t in
th e h is to ry o f th e v a rio u s m o d e s o f p r e s e n tin g th e v is ib le w o rld . B e y o n d a ll
ra tio n a liz a tio n s o f s p a c e , p a in tin g in p a r tic u la r o ffe rs us th e ta s k to th in k
th e s p a tia lity o f B e in g in o th e r w a y s , s ta rtin g fro m th e d e p th ly in g b e tw e e n
th in g s:

47 Ibid, p. 59 / 138.
48 Ibid, p. 48 / 134.
49 Ibid., p. 48 / 135.
168 Miika Luoto

The enigma, though, lies in their bond, in what is between them. The enigma consists
in the fact that I see things, each one in its place, precisely because they eclipse one
another, and that they are rivals before my sight precisely because each one is in its
own place - in their exteriority, known through their envelopment, and their mutual
dependence in their autonomy.50

S pace is an o rd e r o f b e in g -to g e th e r in the sim ple sense th at all the things I see are
g iv en to g eth er, so th a t th eir v isib ility is th e ir b ein g -together. T ogetherness and
sim u ltan eity o f v isib le th in g s is a p h e n o m e n o n o f depth: in th e o rd er o f visible
ap p earin g , th in g s rev eal th em selv es th ro u g h being h id d en by eac h o th er an d gain
in d ep en d en ce by sh o w in g th em selv es as d ep en d en t o n eac h other.
A s B a rb a ra s e x p lic a te s, d e p th m u st be u n d e rsto o d as th e p ro c ess o f d if­
fe re n tia tio n b e tw e e n th in g s, w h ic h is n o t so m e th in g else th a n th o se th ings: th e
p ro c e ss o f v isib le d iffe re n tia tio n o p e n s th e d ista n c e b e tw e e n th in g s, b u t th e d is­
ta n c e is n o t d istin g u is h e d fro m th o se th in g s as a re ality o f its o w n - as th o u g h t
e x te n s io n in C a rte s ia n p h ilo so p h y - a n d th e re fo re d e p th re m a in s in su rp a ssa -
b le .51 T h in g s a p p e a rin g in d e p th d o n o t, th e n , o c cu p y a p a rtic u la r p o in t in space;
in ste a d , th e y are th e ir o w n sp ace, w h ic h m ean s th a t th e ir b e in g o cc u rs th ro u g h
th e ir sp a tia liz a tio n . D e p th g iv es sp ace in w h ic h th in g s sp a tia liz e th e m se lv es,
ta k e th e ir place.

Depth thus understood is, rather, the experience of the reversibility of dimensions,
of a global “locality” in which everything is at the same time, a locality from which
height, width, and depth are abstracted, a voluminosity we express in a word when
we say that a thing is there .52

A fte r a lo n g d e to u r th ro u g h th e carn al n atu re o f b o th v isio n a n d p ainting, w e

h av e co m e b ack to th e in itial q u e stio n co n cern in g th e “th ere is ” , il y a. N ow w e
can say th a t, fo r M erleau -P o n ty , the sp acin g th at is m ade m a n ife st by d ep th is the
h a p p e n in g o f B ein g as locality. H en ce, space is so m eth in g concrete; as pain ters
know , “space an d c o n te n t m u st be so u g h t to g e th e r” . P ain tin g show s us spaces o f
th in g s w h ic h o p e n in colour, line, o r tex tu re an d w hich, consequently, preced e
o b jectified sp ace. To learn to th in k th a t is, fo r M erleau -P o n ty , the rea l ch allenge
o f philosophy.

50 Ibid.,p.64-65/ 140.
51 The Being of the Phenomenon, p. 211-213.
52 L ’E il et l’esprit, p. 65; Eye and Mind, p. 140,translation slightly modified.
Contributors

Alex Arteaga’s re se a rc h in teg rates aesth etic and p h ilo so p h ic al p ractices th ro u g h

the to p ics o f aesth etic p ro d u c tio n o f k n o w led g e, aesth etic em erg en ce o f sense,
ph en o m en o lo g y , e n a c tiv ism an d au d ito ry arch itectu re. F ro m 2008 to 2 0 1 2 , he
w as a n a cad em ic re se a rc h er at th e C o lleg iu m fo r the A d v an c ed S tudy o f P icture
A c t an d E m b o d im e n t a t H u m b o ld t U niversity. M o st recently, he has w o rk e d on
the re se a rc h p ro je c t V isual an d A u d ito ry P ercep tu al A p p aratu s fo r the E v alu atio n
o f C ity D e v e lo p m e n t in A g g lo m eratio n s in c o o p eratio n w ith th e Z u ric h U n iv er­
sity o f th e A rts an d as th e h e a d o f th e A u d ito ry A rch itectu re R e search U n it and
V isiting P ro fe sso r in th e m asters p ro g ram o f S o u n d S tudies a t the B erlin U n iv e r­
sity o f th e A rts. C u rren tly , h e is lead in g th e th ree-y e ar re sea rch p ro je ct A rc h ite c ­
ture o f E m b o d im e n t as E in ste in Ju n io r F ello w at the B erlin U n iv ersity o f the A rts.

Laura Beloff is an in tern atio n ally a c c la im ed a rtist an d cu rren tly a n A ssociate

P ro fesso r an d th e H e a d o f S ectio n fo r In te ra c tio n D esig n & C o m p u te r G am es at
IT U n iv ersity C o p en h ag en . R esearch in terests in clu d e p ra ctic e-b a se d in v e stig a ­
tio n s in to a co m b in a tio n o f v ario u s tra d itio n a l m aterials an d m ethods w ith te c h ­
nology, in fo rm atio n , a n d o rg an ic m atter, lo catin g th e co re o f the re search in to the
cross sectio n o f art/d esig n , tech n o lo g y an d science. H e r research has specifically
fo cu sed o n a tech n o lo g ic a lly en h a n c e d h u m an figure ad ap tin g to an increasin g ly
co m p lex w o rld th a t in clu d es tec h n o lo g ic a l, m o dified en v iro n m en ts. T he research
is m an ife ste d , ad d itio n ally to acad em ic p u b lica tio n s, in a fo rm o f pro ce ss-b ase d
an d p articip ato ry in stallatio n s, p ro g ra m m e d concep tu al stru ctu res an d n etw o rk ed
w earab le o b jects. M o re in fo rm a tio n o n h e r w orks and activities: http://w w w .re-
ality d isfu n ctio n .o rg

Mika Elo is th e h e a d o f M e d ia A esth etics R e sea rc h G ro u p a t A alto U niversity,

H elsin k i an d A sso ciate P ro fe sso r in M e d ia A esth etics a t U n iv ersity o f L apland,
R ov an iem i. H is research in terests in clu d e th e o ry o f p h o to g rap h ic m edia, p h ilo ­
sop h ical m ed ia theory, an d artistic research. H e is p articip atin g in discu ssio n s in
these areas in th e cap acity o f cu rato r, v isu al artist an d researcher. In 2009-2011 he
w o rk ed in th e F ig u res o f Touch re se a rc h p ro ject. M o st rec en tly h e c o -cu ra ted the
F in n ish e x h ib itio n F a llin g Trees a t th e B ie n n a le A rte 2013 in Venice.
170 Contributors

Anna Petronella Foultier teach es p h ilo so p h y a t S tock h olm U niversity, S w eden,

an d is a P h D can d id ate w o rk in g o n M e rle a u -P o n ty ’s p h en o m en o lo g y o f e x p res­
sio n . S he is also affiliated w ith the U n iv e rsity o f D an ce and C ircu s in S to ck h o lm ,
w h ere she h as p a rtic ip a te d in an in terd iscip lin ary re search p ro je c t ab o u t the d an c­
er an d th e creativ e pro cess, a n d is to g e th e r w ith C e cilia R oos editin g a n a n th o l­
o g y b a se d on this p ro ject. F o u ltie r (fo rm erly F redlund) also w orks as a tran slato r
o f p h ilo so p h y an d fictio n , an d h a s, am o n g o th e r th in g s, ed ite d and tran sla ted an ­
th o lo g ies w ith essay s b y M e rle a u -P o n ty an d B eauvoir. She has p u b lish e d articles
o n p hilosophy, literatu re, fe m in ist theory, a n d dance theory, in an th o lo g ies and
jo u rn a ls such as H y p a tia an d C h ia sm i intern ational.

Esa Kirkkopelto is p h ilo so p h er, artist-research er, fo rm er th eatre d irecto r and

p la y w rig h t, c o n v e n o r o f O th er S p aces live art collectiv e. S ince 20 0 7 , h e h a s b een
w o rk in g a t th e T h e a tre A cad em y (U n iv ersity o f A rts H elsin k i) as p ro fesso r o f ar­
tistic research. H is re se a rc h fo cu ses o n th e d e co n stru ctio n o f the p e rfo rm in g body
b o th in th eo ry an d in p ractice. S ince 2 0 0 8 , h e h as co n d u c te d a co llectiv e research
p ro je c t “A c to r’s A rt in M o d e rn T im e s” o n the p sy c h o p h y sical actor training. H e
h as m ade h is P hD o n p h ilo so p h y in 2 0 0 2 at the U n iv e rsity o f S trasbourg. A uthor
o f L e theatre de l ’experience. C o n trib u tio n s a la theorie de la scen e (P resses de
l ’U n iv ersite P a ris-S o rb o n n e , 2 0 0 8 ). H e is a co re-co n v en o r o f P erfo rm an ce P h i­
lo so p h y A sso c ia tio n a n d a m e m b e r o f th e ed ito rial b o ard o f T h eatre, D an ce and
P e rfo rm an ce T raining.

M iika Luoto is a p h ilo so p h e r an d tra n sla to r w hose w o rk has fo cu sed o n p h e ­

n o m e n o lo g ic a l an d p o st-p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l th o u g h t. H e is cu rren tly L e ctu rer o f
p h ilo so p h y an d p erfo rm an ce th e o ry a t th e T h e atre A cadem y, U n iv ersity o f A rts,
H elsinki. In a d d itio n to n u m ero u s articles o n C o n tin en tal p h ilo so p h y an d ae sth et­
ics, L u o to has p u b lish e d th e b o o k s H e id e g g e r j a ta iteen arvo itu s (“H e id eg g e r an d
th e E n ig m a o f A rt” , 2002) an d H eid eg g er: A ja tte lu n aih eita (“ H eidegger: Issues
o f T h o u g h t” , co -ed ited w ith J. B ac k m a n , 2 0 0 6 ). A m o n g his m an y tran slatio n s
is M a u ric e M erle a u -P o n ty : F ilo so fisia kirjo itu ksia (“P h ilo so p h ical W ritin g s” ,
2 0 1 2 , co -ed ited an d c o -tra n sla te d w ith T. R o in ila). A t the p re se n t, he is w o rk in g
o n an E n g lish -la n g u a g e study on th e q u e stio n o f finitude and h isto ricity in H e i­
degger. In a d d itio n , h is F in n ish tra n sla tio n o f H e id e g g e r’s D e r S a tz vo m G rund
is so o n to appear.
Contributors 171

James Nesfield is a d o cto ral stu d en t in th e D e p artm en t o f M edia, A alto U n iv er­

sity. H is re se a rc h fo cu ses o n e m b o d ie d m ean s o f in teractio n w ith th e n o tio n o f
en activ e ap p ro ach es in new m ed ia p ractices. H e has w o rk e d in SO PI research
g ro u p in th e sam e d e p a rtm e n t b e tw e e n 2011 an d 2012.

Cecilia Roos is a d ancer, a P ro fe sso r in In terp re tatio n a n d H e ad o f the D ance

D ep a rtm e n t at U n iv ersity o f D an ce an d C irk u s (D O C H ) in S tock h olm . She also
w o rk s as a reh earsal d irecto r in dan ce, cirk u s a n d o p e ra productions. H er research
focu ses o n the d a n c e r’s p ra c tic e an d the ro le th at play s in p erfo rm ativ e pro cesses
and s h e ’s e n g a g e d in te rn a tio n a lly in th ese areas as an e x p ert a d v icer and le c ­
turer. H er c u rre n t research is a p ro je c t w h ere co m m u n ica tio n lin k ed to learning
in d an ce is explored.

TUomo Rainio is a v isu al a rtist a n d a P h D stu d en t in M ed ia A esth etics R esearch

G ro u p at A alto U niversity. R a in io w o rk s w ith a w id e ran g e o f len s-b a sed m ed ia
an d live m e d ia perfo rm an ce. H is a rt w o rk s o fte n focus on tran sfo rm atio n s and
tran sitio n s in the m e d iu m as w ell as in the su b ject m atter. In h is latest p rojects
R ain io is esp ecially in te re ste d in th e in term ed ia b etw e en digital p h o to g rap h y and
philosophy, w h ere his m ain focus is o n th e o n to lo g y o f im ages an d translation.

Koray Tahiroglu is th e fo u n d e r an d h e a d o f S o u n d an d P h ysical In teractio n

(S O P I) re se a rc h g ro u p a t th e D e p a rtm e n t o f M e d ia A alto U n iv ersity H elsinki, c o ­
o rd in atin g sev eral p ro jects w ith re se a rc h in terests in clu d in g em b o d ie d ap p ro ac h ­
es to sonic in teractio n , p articip ativ e m u sic ex p erien ce, m u ltim o d al p h y sicality in
so u n d an d interactio n . H e p ractices a rt as a re se arch er as w ell as a p erfo rm e r o f
interactiv e m u sic. S in ce 2 0 0 4 , h e h a s b een also tea ch in g w o rk sh o p s and courses
in tro d u cin g artistic strateg ies an d m eth o d o lo g ies fo r in teractiv e m u sic. T ahiroglu
has p e rfo rm e d ex p erim en tal m u sic in c o lla b o ratio n as w ell as in solo p e rfo rm an c ­
es in E u ro p e an d N o rth A m erica.
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Art / Knowledge / Theory
Edited by Suzanne Anker and Sabine Flach

Art / Knowledge / Theory is a book series that explores artistic modes of expression as forms of knowl­
edge production. It focuses on transdisciplinary, epistemological and methodological approaches to
contemporary art. Linking artistic and scienti0 c practices, tools, techniques and theories, the volumes
investigate the cultures of aesthetics and science studies as they relate to works of art.

Art / Knowledge / Theory analyzes the role of art in contemporary culture by probing the philosophical,
historical and social parameters by which images are accessed and assessed.

As an amplification - as well as intervention or even a correction - to historical research, this series

questions the state of the art and knowledge within a culture, characterized by technology and science.

Volume 1 Suzanne Anker, Sabine Flach (eds)

Em bodied Fantasies: F rom Awe to Artifice
2013, ISB N 978-3-0343-1102-1

Volume 2 Suzanne Anker, Sabine Flach

The G lass Veil: Seven A dventures in W onderland
Forthcom ing, ISB N 978-3-0343-1101-4

Volume 3 M ika Elo, M iika L uoto (eds.)

Senses o f Em bodim ent: Art, Technics, M edia
2014, ISB N 978-3-0343-1233-2