Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public HELD: The Department of Public Works and Highways insists
insists that
Works and Highways (DPWH) Vs. Sps. Francisco R. Llamas and
Carmelita C. Llamas
G.R. No. 194190 January 25, 2017
FACTS: On April 23, 1990, the Department of Public Works and
Highways initiated an action for expropriation for the widening of Dr.
A. Santos Ave, which also known as Sucat Road. This action was
brought against 26 defendants, none of whom are respondents in
this case.
On November 2, 1993, the Commissioners appointed by the
Regional Trial Court in the expropriation case submitted a resolution
recommending that just compensation for the expropriated areas be
set to P12, 000.00 per square meter.
Llamas spouses filed "Most Urgent and Respectful Motion for Leave
to be Allowed Intervention as Defendants-Intervenors-Oppositors" on
January 27, 1994. They also filed their Answer-in-Intervention on
March 21, 1994. After which, on August 2, 1994, they filed a "Most
Urgent Motion for the Issuance of an Order Directing the Immediate
Payment of 40% of Zonal Value of Expropriated Land and
Improvements."
After years of not obtaining a favorable ruling, the Llamas Spouses
filed a "Motion for Issuance of an Order to Pay and/or Writ of
Execution dated May 14, 2002. In this Motion, the Llamas Spouses
faulted the Department of Public Works and Highways for what was
supposedly its deliberate failure to comply with the Regional Trial
Court's previous Orders and even with its own undertaking to
facilitate the payment of just compensation to the Llamas Spouses.
Department of Public Works and Highways and the Llamas Spouses
had an understanding that the resolution of the latter's claims
required the submission of: (1) certified true copies of the TCTs
covering the lots; and (2) certified true copies of the tax declarations,
tax clearances, and tax receipts over the lots.  But, due to their
continued failure to comply with their undertaking, the Department of
Public Works and Highways did not pay them.
On October 8, 2007, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order
directing the payment to the Llamas Spouses of just compensation at
P12,000.00 per square meter for 41 square meters for the lot
covered by TCT No. 217267. It denied payment for areas covered by
TCT No. 179165 and noted that these were subdivision road lots,
which the Llamas Spouses "no longer owned" and which "belonged
to the community for whom they were made." In the Order dated May
19, 2008, the Regional Trial Court denied the Llamas Spouses'
Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether just compensation must be paid to respondents Francisco
and Carmelita Llamas for the subdivision road lots covered by TCT
No. 179165.    
the road lots are not compensable since they have "already been
withdrawn from the commerce of man." It relies chiefly on this Court's
1991 Decision in White Plains Association, Inc. v. Legaspi, which
pertained to "the widening of the Katipunan Road in the White Plains
Subdivision in Quezon City.”More specifically, in the 1991 White
Plains Decision that shows a compulsion for subdivision owners to
set aside open spaces for public use, such as roads, and for which
they need not be compensated by Subdivision owners are mandated
to set aside such open spaces before their proposed subdivision
plans may be approved by the government authorities, and that such
open spaces shall be devoted exclusively for the use of the general
public and the subdivision owner need not be compensated for the
same. A subdivision owner must comply with such requirement
before the subdivision plan is approved and the authority to sell is
issued.
On the other hand, in its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals set
aside the Regional Trial Court's Orders and required the Department
of Public Works and Highways to similarly compensate the Llamas
Spouses for the two (2) road lots at P12, 000.00 per square meter.
The Court of Appeals correctly stated that a "positive act" must first
be made by the "owner-developer before the city or municipality can
acquire dominion over the subdivision roads." As there is no such
thing as an automatic cession to government of subdivision road lots,
an actual transfer must first be effected by the subdivision owner:
"subdivision streets belonged to the owner until donated to the
government or until expropriated upon payment of just
compensation." Stated otherwise, "the local government should first
acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to
be utilized as a public road."
Delineated roads and streets, whether part of a subdivision or
segregated for public use, remain private and will remain as such
until conveyed to the government by donation or through
expropriation proceedings. An owner may not be forced to donate his
or her property even if it has been delineated as road lots because
that would partake of an illegal taking. He or she may even choose to
retain said properties.
Respondents have not made any positive act enabling the City
Government of Parañaque to acquire dominion over the disputed
road lots. Therefore, they retain their private character. Accordingly,
just compensation must be paid to respondents as the government
takes the road lots in the course of a road widening project.
DANILO BARTOLATA, REBECCA R. PILOT and/or DIONISIO P.
PILOT, Petitioner VERSUS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS,
and TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, Respondents
G.R. No. 223334 June 7, 2017
FACTS: Petitioner Danilo Bartolata acquired ownership over a 400
square meter parcel of land identified as Lot 5, Blk. 1, Phase 1, AFP
Officer's Village, Taguig, Metro Manila by virtue of an Order of Award
from the Bureau of Lands dated December 14, 1987. Sometime in
1997, respondents acquired 223 square meters of petitioner's
property for the development of the Metro Manila Skyway Project.
The parties agreed that in exchange for the acquisition, petitioner
would be paid just compensation for the appraised value of the
property to be fixed for the entire affected area by the Municipal
Appraisal Committee of Taguig, Metro Manila.
Respondents then argued that pursuant to Section 112 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141) the government is entitled to
an easement of right of way not exceeding 60 meters in width,
without need of payment for just compensation, save for the value of
improvements existing.
Further upholding the government's right to enforce against
petitioner's property the easement for public highways without cost,
the CA granted respondents' counterclaim on appeal. The CA noted
that the portion of petitioner's property that was used by respondents
corresponds to the widths of 13.92 meters and 13.99 meters, well
within the 60-meter limit under CA 141. Given that respondents never
exceeded the threshold width, and that petitioner never established
that there were improvements in his property that were affected, the
CA held that petitioner is not entitled to any form of compensation.
Consequently, the CA ordered him to return the partial payment
made, lest he be unjustly enriched by respondents' use of the legal
easement that under the law should have been free of charge.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property owned by petitioner is
subject easement of right of way in favor of the government
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to just compensation.
HELD: The easement of right of way in favor of the government
subsists despite the enactment of PD 2004 Resolving the first issue,
the Court rejects petitioner's claim that the subject property is no
longer subject to the 60 meter width easement of right of way in favor
of the government.
First, no less than the Order of Award granting petitioner title over the
subject property reads that the parcel of land conferred to him is
subject to the restrictions contained under Sec. 109-114 of CA 141,
which necessarily includes the easement provided in Sec. 112.
Notably, petitioner was awarded the subject property in 1987, while
PD 2004, which allegedly removed all encumbrances and restrictions
from awarded properties, was signed into law much earlier in 1985.
This alone raises suspicion on the applicability of PD 2004 to the
subject property.
Second, the Court finds no reversible error in the R TC and CA's
interpretation of the coverage of PD 2004 and RA 730. The title of
RA 730 itself supports the rulings of the courts a quo that the laws
petitioner relied upon only cover the sale of public lands for
residential purposes and to qualified applicants without public
auction.
To quote: REPUBLIC ACT NO. 730 - AN ACT TO PERMIT THE
SALE WITHOUT PUBLIC AUCTION OF PUBLIC LANDS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES
TO QUALIFIED APPLICANTS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS
It can readily be inferred from the title of RA 730 that the definite
ambit of the law could not be extended to sales of public lands via
public auction, through which mode of disposition petitioner acquired
the subject property. Consequently, when RA 730 was amended by
PD 2004 to the effect of removing encumbrances and restrictions on
purchased properties without public auction, petitioner could not have
benefitted from the same.
Lastly, even the contents of RA 730 belie petitioners claim. The
foremost section of the law reads: Section 1. Notwithstanding the
provisions of sections sixty-one and sixty-seven of Commonwealth
Act Numbered One hundred forty-one, as amended by Republic Act
Numbered Two hundred ninety-three, any Filipino citizen of legal age
who is not the owner of a home lot in the municipality or city in which
he resides and who has in good faith established his residence on a
parcel of the public land of the Republic of the Philippines which is
not needed for the public service, shall be given preference to
purchase at a private sale of which reasonable notice shall be given
to him not more than one thousand square meters at a price to be
fixed by the Director of Lands with the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. It shall be an essential condition
of this sale that the occupants has constructed his house on the land
and actually resided therein. Ten per cent of the purchase price shall
be paid upon the approval of the sale and the balance may be paid in
full, or in ten equal annual instalments.
# 2 NO. The seminal case of Andaya  likewise involved property
subject to the statutory lien under Sec. 112 of CA 141. xxx
The Court affirmed the CA’s interpretation of Sec. 112 of CA 141 and
ruled that the Republic was under no obligation to pay therein
respondent Andaya just compensation in enforcing its right of way.
Be that as it may, the Court did not foreclose the possibility of the
property owner being entitled to just compensation if the enforcement
of the right of way resulted in the “taking”  of the portions not subject
to the legal easement.
Jurisprudence teaches us that “taking,”  in the exercise of the power
of eminent domain, “occurs not only when the government actually
deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its
ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction or
material impairment of the value of his property.” xxx
To recapitulate, two elements must concur before the property owner
will be entitled to just compensation for the remaining property under
Sec. 112 of CA 141: (1) that the remainder is not subject to the
statutory lien of right of way; and (2) that the enforcement of the right
of way results in the practical destruction or material impairment of
the value of the remaining property, or in the property owner being
dispossessed or otherwise deprived of the normal use of the said
remainder.
National Power Corporation vs Gutierrez GR 60077
18 January 1991
Facts: National Power Corporation a gocc vested with ED power
initiated negotiations for ight of easement to construct transmission
lines to several lots. The commissioners appointed recommended
1.xx easement fee for Guiterrez lot. This was countered by Gutierrez
with 10.xx as disturbance compensation. Court countered with 5.xx.
Lower court granted 10.xx this was appealed and was reduced to
5.xx. Still not satisfied NPC appealed to CA.
NPC contend that full ownership is retained by the private
respondents and they are not totally deprived of the use of the land.
They can continue planting the same agricultural crops, except those
that would result in contact with the wires. On this premise, petitioner
submits that if full market value is required, then full transfer of
ownership is only the logical equivalent.

Issue: Whether or not full compensation should be paid on the

ground of deprivation of use of Gutierrez property?
Decision: While it is true that plaintiff are (sic) only after a right-of-way
easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their
proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff
upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher
than three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-
tension current conveyed through said transmission lines, danger to
life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot
altogether be discounted, and to cap it all plaintiff only pays the fee to
defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due
on said affected portion of their property.
The nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay
transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of
the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its
ordinary use.

For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled

to a just compensation.