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Nike 150222024122 Conversion Gate02 PDF
Nike 150222024122 Conversion Gate02 PDF
Nike, Inc.
Maryanne M. Rouse
Can Nike (NKE) find enough shelf space to make up for lower sales to its top customer? In February 2002,
Foot Locker told Nike that it wanted to reduce the number of Nike’s marquee shoes—the Air Jordans,
Shox, and others that sell for well over $100—because the retailer believed that consumers were turning
more to midpriced shoes. Because Nike refused to change its product mix to support Foot Locker’s product
line reshuffling, Foot Locker, the dominant global footwear retailer, with over 3,600 stores, cancelled
approximately $150 million in Nike orders. (Nike’s premium segment accounts for approximately 15%–
20% of total global revenues and although neither company discloses details of total orders, Nike noted in
its 2002 10-K form that sales to Foot Locker represented approximately $1 billion of Nike’s $9.9 billion
worldwide sales.)
According to Foot Locker, Nike retaliated by cutting the retailer’s allotment of key products, including the
highly popular Air Force One. The feud escalated in December, when Nike announced that Foot Locker
would no longer be its launch customer for marquee products and, in fact, gave rival FootAction access to
high-end basketball shoes that had been exclusive to Foot Locker. In mid-February 2003, Nike’s “Hall of
Hoops” displays in Foot Locker stores came down and were replaced by Reebok’s “Above the Rim”
campaign. In 2004, Nike was aggressively lining up new outlets, while Foot Locker faced a significant
challenge in maintaining a broad, attractive, and profitable product line (for 2002, Nike comprised 47% of
Foot Locker’s sales).
______________________________________________________________________________
This case was prepared by Professor Maryanne M. Rouse, MBA, CPA, University of South Florida.
Copyright © 2005 by Professor Maryanne M. Rouse. This case cannot be reproduced in any form without
the written permission of the copyright holder, Maryanne M. Rouse. Reprint permission is solely granted to
the publisher, Prentice Hall, for the books, Strategic Management and Business Policy–10th and 11th
Editions (and the International version of this book) and Cases in Strategic Management and Business
Policy–10th and 11th Editions by the copyright holder, Maryanne M. Rouse. This case was edited for
SMBP and Cases in SMBP–11th Edition. The copyright holder is solely responsible for case content. Any
other publication of the case (translation, any form of electronics or other media) or sold (any form of
partnership) to another publisher will be in violation of copyright law, unless Maryanne M. Rouse has
granted an additional written reprint permission.
THE COMPANY
Nike designed, developed, and marketed athletic and casual footwear, active sports and leisure apparel,
sports equipment, and accessories under the Nike, Bauer, Cole-Haan, and Hurley brands. Nike was the
largest seller of athletic footwear and apparel in the world, with a U.S. market share exceeding 40%. The
company’s products were sold through approximately 18,000 retail accounts in the United States, including
footwear stores, department stores, and sporting goods stores. Nike, with the broadest product line of all
competitors, also distributed to specialty, skate, tennis, and golf shops. The company operated several retail
formats in the United States: 78 Nike Factory Stores (primarily close-out merchandise), 4 Nike stores, 13
Niketown “showcase” stores, 4 employee-only stores, and 61 Cole-Haan stores. Sales in the United States
accounted for 53% of total revenues in 2002. Nike sold its products outside the United States through
independent distributors, licensees, and subsidiaries in 140 countries.
In addition to performance equipment (sports balls, timepieces, eyewear, skates, and other equipment
designed for sports activities), Nike sold hockey equipment and related accessories under the Bauer and
Nike brand names. In April 2002, Nike acquired Hurley International LLC, a California-based designer
and distributor of sports apparel for surfing, skateboarding, and snowboarding as well as youth lifestyle
apparel. Footwear accounted for 58% of fiscal 2002 revenues; apparel, 29%; equipment, 8%; and other,
5%.
Almost all Nike brand apparel was manufactured by approximately 700 independent contractors, 99% of
which were located in Southeast Asia. The reasons for locating shoe production in Southeast Asia were
COMPETITION
The athletic footwear, apparel, and equipment segments were intensely competitive both in the United
States and globally. Key competitors included Reebok, New Balance, and Adidas in athletic footwear and
sports apparel.
New Balance
Privately held New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts, was a leading
manufacturer of technically innovative, width-sized footwear and athletic apparel for women, men, and
children. The range of product categories included running, walking, cross-training, basketball, tennis,
adventure sports, and kids. In 1998, New Balance acquired Dunham Bootmakers to expand into work and
hiking boots, sandals, boat shoes, and rugged casuals without diluting the New Balance brand. In 2001, the
company acquired PF Flyers to pursue the comfort/casual market.
The company, which has remained committed to a domestic manufacturing strategy, employed more than
2,400 people around the globe. New Balance, long a staple in such outlets as Sports Authority, Foot
Locker, and Champs, expanded its distribution channels in 2000 to include independently owned retail
stores that would provide the opportunity to showcase the full brand and were to carry New Balance
apparel, accessories, and the Dunham line of casual shoes. At the end of 2001, 55 of these independently
owned stores, which generated about $46.4 million in sales—4% of New Balance’s $1.16 billion in revenue
—had opened. By the end of 2002, the company was distributing to over 90 independent retailers. New
Balance surprised analysts and industry watchers alike with its vault to the number three spot both
worldwide and in the United States, with a 25% year-over-year sales increase from 2001 to 2002, estimated
athletic shoe market share of more than 11%, and full line sporting goods market share of 19%.
Adidas
German-based Adidas-Salomon AG held the number four spot in the United States in 2002, with an
estimated 11% market share. With global sales of almost $7 billion, a 7.7% increase from 2001 and a
record for the company, Adidas was the number two footwear and apparel company worldwide, behind
Nike. Industry analysts noted that double-digit sales increase in both North American and Asian markets
helped fuel the company’s growth. Although analysts expected a sales boost in Asia (the World Soccer Cup
matches were played in Japan and South Korea), the company’s gains in the North American market were
interpreted as a strong indicator of Adidas’ success.
Adidas suffered a setback in 2002, when its most important endorser, Kobe Bryant of the L.A. Lakers,
bought out his contract (he was expected to sign with either Nike or Reebok). Although the company’s new
“marquee endorser,” Tracy McGrady, was a popular NBA player, he played for the Orlando Magic, a
losing team in what was considered a small market. The Adidas group comprised three distinct divisions:
Adidas Sports Performance, Adidas Sports Heritage, and Adidas Sports Style. The Sports Performance
group housed the current footwear and apparel lines and accounted for 80% of the business; Sports
Heritage was the retro division that put out the classic, old-style sneakers targeted to the urban audience;
Sports Style, introduced in February 2003, was an upscale sportswear collection to be sold in 150 retailers,
including Barney’s New York, where the launch was held. Although it accounted for just 20% of the
company’s revenue, Adidas Sports Style was expected to make significant contributions to both the top and
bottom lines.
Reebok
Reebok International, with a 12.2% market share, was the number two U.S. maker of athletic shoes, behind
Nike, and ranked fourth globally. In addition to athletic shoes, sportswear, and accessories, Reebok’s
product lines included the Greg Norman line of men’s casual wear, Rockport walking and casual shoes,
and Ralph Lauren and Polo dress and athletic shoes. An athletic shoe powerhouse in the mid-1980s and
early 1990s, Reebok couldn’t compete with Nike when the emphasis shifted from fitness to team sports.
Reebok reached its low point in 1999, when its share price fell to about $7; however, industry observers